Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure (Cuneiform Monographs)

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure Brill’s Cuneiform Series inMonographs Jewish Studies General Editors Editor t. abusch ...

Author: Shalom E. Holtz

75 downloads 1440 Views 1MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure

Brill’s Cuneiform Series inMonographs Jewish Studies General Editors Editor t. abusch – m. j.(Tel geller David S. Katz Aviv) s. m. maul – f. a. m. wiggermann

VOLUME 40 VOLUME 38

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure by

Shalom E. Holtz

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neo-Babylonian court procedure / edited by Shalom Holtz. p. cm. — (Cuneiform monographs, ISSN 0929-0052 ; v. 38) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17496-2 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Civil procedure (Assyro-Babylonian law) I. Holtz, Shalom. KL2447.N46 2009 347.35’05—dc22 2009007851

ISSN 0929-0052 ISBN 978 9004 174962 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

‫לאהובתי‪,‬‬ ‫בלב שלם ובנפש חפצה‬ ‫‪To Leebie‬‬

CONTENTS Acknowledgments ....................................................................... List of Tables .............................................................................. Abbreviation and Transliteration Conventions ..........................

xi xv xvii

Introduction ................................................................................ A. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Texts: Their Contents and Provenance ................................................. B. Litigation Records: The Study of the “Tablet Trail” ...... C. Studies of Litigation Records from Earlier Periods ......... D. Need for the Present Study .............................................. E. Methods .............................................................................

1 1 3 5 10 17

PART I: FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS Chapter One Decision Records .............................................. 1.A The Legal Function of the Decision Record ............... 1.B The “Royal Judges” Styles of Decision Records ......... 1.C The “Eanna” Styles of Decision Records ................... 1.D Comparison of the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna” Styles .............................................................................. 1.E Non-Stylized Decision Records ....................................

23 23 27 47 55 63

Chapter Two Other Text-Types Including the Resolution of Disputes ................................................................................... 2.A Conclusions of Disputes ............................................... 2.B Memoranda Including Decisions .................................. 2.C Settlements ....................................................................

69 69 74 78

Chapter Three Preliminary Protocols and Records of Statements in Court ................................................................ 3.A Preliminary Protocols .................................................... 3.B Memoranda of Proceedings ......................................... 3.C Records of Statements in Court ................................... 3.C.1 Accusatory Depositions ....................................

85 85 99 100 103

viii

contents 3.C.2 Depositions of Testimony ................................ 3.C.3 Memoranda of Depositions ............................. 3.C.4 Sworn Depositions ...........................................

107 110 113

Chapter Four The dabābu- and quttû-Type Summonses .......... 4.A Summonses to Argue (dabābu) a Case ........................... 4.B Summonses to End (quttû) a Case .................................

117 117 128

Chapter Five Text-Types Calling for Evidence ...................... 5.A Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu) ........................ 5.B Guarantees for Testimony ............................................. 5.C Penalties Pending Evidence .......................................... 5.D Summary Discussion of Texts-Types Calling for Evidence ........................................................................

133 133 143 151

Chapter Six Text-Types Ensuring an Individual’s Presence .. 6.A Summonses to Present (abāku) an Individual ................ 6.B Guarantees for an Individual’s Presence ......................

167 169 177

Chapter Seven Other Text-Types ........................................... 7.A Other Summonses ......................................................... 7.B Promissory Oaths .......................................................... 7.C Injunctions .....................................................................

197 197 199 209

162

PART II: NEO BABYLONIAN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE Chapter Eight The Adjudication of Private Disputes: The “Royal Judges” Decision Records and Other Texts ...... 8.A The Scene ..................................................................... 8.B The Initiation of the Case: dīna gerû and Similar Terms ............................................................................. 8.C Summoning the Defendant .......................................... 8.D Oral Arguments: dīna dabābu ......................................... 8.E The Presentation of Evidence: “Establishing the Case” (kunnu) and the Means of Evidence .............................. 8.F The “Hearing” of Oral Statements: šemû .................... 8.G Obtaining Evidence ......................................................

223 223 224 232 235 239 243 245

contents 8.H 8.I 8.J 8.K

Chapter 9.A 9.B 9.C 9.D 9.E 9.F 9.G 9.H 9.I 9.J

ix

Questioning the Litigants: ša ālu ................................. Oaths ........................................................................... The Conclusion of the Trial: Deliberation (mitluku) and Decision ( purussû) ................................................. Adjudicating Authorities: Royal Judges ...................... 8.K.1 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in Babylon ......................................................... 8.K.2 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus outside Babylon ............................................. 8.K.3 Royal Judges during the Reign of Cyrus and Cambyses ............................................... 8.K.4 Royal Judges after the Reign of Cambyses ....................................................... 8.K.5 Royal Judges under Nebuchadnezzar II ......

247 250

Nine The Adjudicatory Process in the Eanna ......... The Scene ................................................................... The Initiation of the Case: Accusations .................... Investigative Procedures in the Eanna ....................... Summoning in the Eanna ........................................... The Answer of the Accused Individual: Confession and Counter-Accusation ............................................. “Establishing the Case”: kunnu .................................... Questioning and Interrogation: ša ālu and maš altu ......................................................................... Oaths ........................................................................... The Decision ............................................................... The Adjudicating Authorities in the Eanna ...............

267 268 269 270 275

Chapter Ten The Neo-Babylonian Tablet Trail in Comparative Perspective ........................................................ 10.A The Decision Record .................................................. 10.A.1 The Legal Function of the Decision Record ........................................................... 10.A.2 The Form of the Decision Record ............... 10.B Settlements .................................................................. 10.C Preliminary Protocols and Records of Statements in Court ........................................................................... 10.D Memoranda .................................................................

252 254 254 255 257 258 261

278 282 284 290 295 296 301 302 302 306 309 310 312

x

contents 10.E 10.F

dabābu-Type Summonses ............................................. Text-Types Calling for Evidence ................................

313 317

Bibliography ................................................................................ Index of Cuneiform Texts Cited ............................................... Index and Glossary of Akkadian Terms Discussed ...................

321 329 334

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book began as a 2006 University of Pennsylvania doctoral dissertation in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, entitled NeoBabylonian Decision Records and Related Documents: Structural, Procedural and Comparative Aspects. The dissertation was written under the supervision of Professor Barry Eichler, now an esteemed colleague and cherished guide at Yeshiva University. His sensitive readings and careful eye contributed much to the coherence of the original work, and I hope the present monograph meets the high standards he has always set. Professors Erle Leichty and Jeffrey Tigay, as readers of the original dissertation, also gave freely of their time as the work took shape. I thank them, as well as my other teachers in the departments of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at both Penn and Harvard, for all I have learned from them. The original research for this work was supported by the University of Pennsylvania’s William Penn, Ellis and University Dissertation Fellowships. Most of my research was conducted in the Weigle Judaica and Ancient Near East Seminar Room in Van Pelt Library, home to books marked with notes by Professor E.A. Speiser, their previous owner. Reading copies of cuneiform texts in the seminar room was, therefore, an experience that spanned not only millennia of history, but several academic generations, as well. I am grateful to Dr. Arthur Kiron, who kept the room up to current research standards, and to the dedicated staff at Van Pelt, who made the research possible. Books that were not available at Van Pelt were usually available from the University of Pennsylvania Museum library, the Center for Advanced Judaic Studies, or from Professor Erle Leichty’s own research collection at the University Museum’s tablet room. Towards the end of my work on the original dissertation, I had the fortunate opportunity to meet Bruce Wells of St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. At the suggestion of Cornelia Wunsch, he and F. Rachel Magdalene have included me in the NEH-funded Neo-Babylonian Trial Proceedings Project. In addition to sharing their time and materials, it was they who first suggested that this book should have a corollary anthology of actual texts. With their encouragement and support,

xii

acknowledgments

I have begun work on this anthology, provisionally entitled Neo-Babylonian Adjudicatory Records, which will be published by the Society of Biblical Literature’s Writings from the Ancient World series. While revising the dissertation for publication, I have served as an assistant professor of Bible at Yeshiva University. I am extremely grateful to Yeshiva for the time and space in which I do my work, and especially for my colleagues, junior and senior, who have taken interest in my research and have provided invigorating intellectual stimulation. The librarians at the Mendel Gottesman Library of Hebraica/Judaica and its interlibrary loan service have been most attentive to my requests. I thank Mr. Avi Kelin, a former student, for his proofreading assistance. Our work together has, I hope, eliminated most errors, and I accept full responsibility for any that remain. My many friends have contributed to this work, by reading parts of chapters, furnishing helpful references, or simply providing much-needed diversion. Special thanks go to Spencer Allen and Karen Sonik, two fellow students at Penn, for their on-the-spot consultations and for our conversations over lunch. I wish them much success as they complete their doctorates. I have known two fellow Penn alumni, Shawn Zelig Aster and Moshe Simon-Shoshan, since before I was an undergraduate student. I hope that they treasure our long-lasting friendship as much as I do and that they have benefited from it as much as I have. Since Zelig is also at Yeshiva, I am confident that I shall continue to reap the rewards of being his colleague. In the category of longtimefriends-turned-colleagues, I must also acknowledge two other former Penn students, Debra Kaplan, whom I have known since high school (and who knows my wife since before that), and Aaron Koller. Both are now my neighbors on the fifth floor of Belfer Hall. May we continue to share the joys of each others’ successes! It was in the home of my parents, Drs. Avraham and Toby Berger Holtz, that I was first introduced to the world of scholars and scholarship, in general, and to the specific area of the study of the ancient Near East. I thank them for contributing to my academic progress longer than anyone else and pray that they may continue to do so for many years to come. I especially thank my father for patiently reading the dissertation and suggesting improvements in anticipation of its publication as a book. Like the original dissertation, this book is dedicated to my wife, Leebie Mallin. Since my graduation, we have been blessed by the births of a son, Zev Barukh Boaz (“Billy”), and a daughter, Avigayil Sara.

acknowledgments

xiii

Their arrivals have made me all the more grateful for all Leebie has given me. 544 Belfer Hall New York, NY January 13, 2009

"‫ג' לפרשת "ואנכי אהיה ﬠם פיך‬ ‫יז בטבת תשס"ט‬

LIST OF TABLES Summary Table 1.1 “Royal Judges Style A” Decision Records .................................................................................... Summary Table 1.2 “Royal Judges Style B” Decision Records .................................................................................... Summary Table 1.3 “Eanna Style A” Decision Records ........ Summary Table 1.4 “Eanna Style B” Decision Records ....... Summary Table 1.5 Non-Stylized Decision Records ............. Summary Table 2.1 Conclusions ............................................ Summary Table 2.2 Memoranda Including Decisions ........... Summary Table 2.3 Settlements ............................................. Summary Table 3.1 Preliminary Protocols ............................. Summary Table 3.2 Memoranda of Proceedings .................. Summary Table 3.3 Accusatory Depositions .......................... Summary Table 3.4 Depositions of Testimony ...................... Summary Table 3.5 Memoranda of Depositions ................... Summary Table 3.6 Sworn Depositions ................................. Summary Table 4.1 dabābu-Type Summonses ........................ Summary Table 4.2 quttû-Type Summonses ........................... Summary Table 5.1 Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu) ...................................................................................... Summary Table 5.2 Guarantees for Testimony ...................... Summary Table 5.3 Penalties Pending Evidence .................... Summary Table 6.1 abāku-Summonses ................................... Summary Table 6.2 Guarantees for Individuals’ Presence .... Summary Table 7.1 Other Summonses .................................. Summary Table 7.2 Promissory Oaths ................................... Summary Table 7.3 Injunctions .............................................. Table 8.1 Directory of Individuals Designated lu2DI.KU5 ......

41 45 60 62 66 72 79 83 91 101 108 111 113 116 126 132 144 150 160 178 194 200 210 216 263

ABBREVIATION AND TRANSLITERATION CONVENTIONS The abbreviation of references follows Erica Reiner and Martha Roth, eds., The Assyrian Dictionary of the University of Chicago, vol. P. (Chicago, 2005), pp. vii–xxvii. In addition, the following abbreviations are used: Abraham, Business

AuOr Bongenaar, Ebabbar Moore, Documents Sack, CuDoc Stolper, Entrepreneurs Wunsch, BA 2 Wunsch, CM 3

Wunsch, CM 20

Kathleen Abraham, Business and Politics under the Persian Empire: The Financial Dealings of Marduknā ir-apli of the House of Egibi (521–487 B.C.E.) (Bethesda, 2004). Aula Orientalis A.C.V.M. Bongenaar, The Neo Babylonian Ebabbar Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and Its Prosopography (Istanbul, 1997). Ellen Whitley Moore, Neo-Babylonian Business and Administrative Documents (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1935). Ronald H. Sack, Cuneiform Documents from the Chaldean and Persian Periods (London, 1993). Matthew W. Stolper, Entrepreneurs and Empires: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm and Persian Rule in Babylonia (Leiden, 1985). Cornelia Wunsch, Urkunden zum Ehe-, Vermögens-, und Erbrecht aus verschiedenen neubabylonischen Archiven (Babylonische Archive 2) (Dresden, 2003). Cornelia Wunsch, Die Urkunden des babylonischen Gesschäftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit Naturalien im 6. Jarhundert v. Chr. (Cuneiform Monographs 3) (Groningen, 1993). [3a = volume a, 3b = volume b] Cornelia Wunsch, Das Egibi Archiv: Die Felder und Gärten (Cuneiform Monographs 20) (Groningen, 2000). [20a = volume a, 20b = volume b]

In the footnotes, articles and books are cited fully in the first reference to them. Subsequent citations of articles are by author’s last name and journal title. Subsequent citations of books are by author’s last name

xviii

abbreviation and transliteration conventions

and abbreviated title. Akkadian texts first published in journals are cited by the author’s last name, followed by the journal title. Because of the erratic nature of Neo-Babylonian orthography, Akkadian and Sumerian forms are normalized following the grammatical conventions of Old Babylonian. The transliteration of personal names follows the indices at the ends of Kümmel, Familie, Wunsch, CM 3 and Wunsch, CM 20.

INTRODUCTION A. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Texts: Their Contents and Provenance The textual legacy of southern Mesopotamia during the seventh, sixth and fifth centuries BCE stands out for its abundance. The vast majority of these texts pertain to legal and administrative, rather than literary, matters. Loans, contracts, sales, marriages, adoptions and other day-to-day affairs were recorded on clay tablets by scribes writing in cuneiform script. Thousands of these tablets are known to today’s scholars, while many more are believed to exist and await discovery or publication.1 Modern Assyriological scholarship refers to these texts as Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts. They offer pictures of many aspects of Mesopotamian socio-economic and legal institutions in the centuries immediately preceding the Common Era. From the point-of-view of political history, the term ‘Neo-Babylonian’ refers to a specific historical period, which begins with the rise of the Babylonian king Nabopolassar in 626 BCE,2 and lasts until the end of the reign of Nabonidus, when Cyrus and the Achaemenid Persians conquered Babylonia in 539 BCE. However, because the cuneiform textual record continues unchanged for a considerable time after the Achaemenid conquest, for the purposes of studying cuneiform law there is no reason to distinguish between texts written before and after Babylonia came under Persian control. Thus, when the term ‘Neo-Babylonian’ is used to describe cuneiform texts, rather than a specific historical period, it can refer to texts written during the Achaemenid period and even to texts written later, during the Hellenistic period (after 330 BCE).3

1 For estimates of the actual numbers, see Michael Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents: Typology, Contents and Archives (Guides to the Mesopotamian Textual Record, 1) (Münster, 2005), p. 1. 2 All dates follow R.A. Parker and W.H. Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.– 75 A.D. (Providence, 1956). 3 See Olof Pedersén, Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East 1500–300 B.C. (Bethesda, 1998), pp. 181–182 and Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 1–2. Note that both Pedersén and Jursa include texts from Babylonia before the rise of Nabopolassar in the discussion of ‘Neo-Babylonian’ texts.

2

introduction

This book adopts the broader use of the term ‘Neo-Babylonian.’ It considers texts that date to the reigns of the Babylonian kings from Nebuchadnezzar II (son of Nabopolassar) through Nabonidus, as well as texts dating to the Achaemenid emperors as late as Darius II. Despite their abundance, most Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts come from just five cities in southern Mesopotamia: Babylon, Borsippa (modern Birs Nimrud and Tell Ibrahim al-Khalil), Nippur (Nuffar), Sippar (Abu Habba) and Uruk (Warka).4 For the most part, they stem either from private archives or temple archives.5 The private archives contain texts pertaining to the property and business dealings of individuals or families. Among the more famous examples of NeoBabylonian private archives are the Egibi archive from Babylon, the Ea-Ilūta-bāni archive from Borsippa, and the Murašû archive from Nippur.6 These are only three of the more extensive private archives among numerous others.7 There are far fewer temple archives; less than ten are known.8 Nevertheless, temple archives were much larger than private archives. Thus, texts from temple archives, particularly the Ebabbar temple at Sippar and the Eanna temple at Uruk, dominate the Neo-Babylonian text corpus.9 These texts pertain to administrative aspects of these institutions, such as the delivery of goods to the temple, the organization of temple workers and the redistribution of resources by the temple. The classification of Neo-Babylonian texts into archives poses numerous challenges. First, because most of the Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts do not come from well-documented excavations, exact details about find-spots are often missing. Thus, the assignment of a

4 Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 2. Other sites, also discussed by Jursa, have not yielded nearly as many texts as these five. 5 For discussion of the published Neo-Babylonian texts from the palace archives at Babylon (the so-called “Kasr” texts) see Pedersén, Archives, pp. 183–184 and Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 60–61. On the somewhat anachronistic use of the term “archives,” see G. van Driel, “The ‘Eanna Archive,’” BiOr 55 (1998), pp. 61–62. 6 For a survey of these and other private archives, including the numbers of tablets included in each, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 60–152. 7 Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents enumerates some 90 known private archives. 8 Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 59 n. 359. 9 For an estimate of the size of the Ebabbar archives, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 117–118. For the Eanna archive, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 138.

introduction

3

particular text to a particular archive usually cannot be based on where the text was discovered. Instead, archives must be reconstructed by considering internal factors of each text, such as the prosopography of the protagonists.10 This painstaking process of reconstruction is further impeded by the fact that although the ancient archives originate from a relatively limited geographical area, modern discovery has scattered their contents throughout the world. To cite just one typical example, the texts from the Eanna temple archive, which were probably kept in a single location in antiquity, are now in at least five different collections in Europe and the United States.11 The general disarray is reflected in many of the first modern editions of Neo-Babylonian texts, which do not present them as part of ancient archives but rather as part of the collections of a particular museum or university. This approach to publication makes texts available quickly, but allows the randomness of modern collection to limit the study of antiquity. Students today must sift through all the material in order to relate texts in different museums to each other.12 B. Litigation Records: The Study of the “Tablet Trail” The documents that survive from the Neo-Babylonian period attest to a wide variety of legal transactions pertaining to the property of the individuals or institutions that kept them.13 This book focuses on litigation records: texts that attest to the adjudication of legal cases for the most part by Neo-Babylonian authorities. Litigation records, like other Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts, come from both private and temple archives. In private archives, litigation records pertain to cases surrounding the property of the archive owner. For example, a slaveholder whose ownership of a slave was disputed and then reconfirmed by a court might retain a record of

10 Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 57. For discussion of the archaeological data pertaining to the archives from particular cities, see Pedersén, Archives, pp. 181–212. 11 Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 138. 12 For a convenient schematic summary of the problems surrounding the reconstruction of ancient archives, see Heather D. Baker, The Archive of the Nappā u Family (AfO Beiheft 30) (Vienna, 2004), pp. 5–6. 13 For a survey of the different categories of texts included in Neo-Babylonian archives see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 9–54.

4

introduction

the decision as proof of ownership.14 Temple archives provide records of hearings conducted by temple authorities, such as the šatammu of the Eanna, as part of the prosecution of the mishandling of temple property.15 All of these litigation records, from both private and temple archives, offer insights into the main question this book hopes to answer: How was a case adjudicated in the Neo-Babylonian period? The discussion in the following chapters will demonstrate that the adjudication of cases in the Neo-Babylonian period generated a considerable quantity of written records. Some records provide complete descriptions of proceedings in court, from the initiation of a case through its decision. Others record only one stage in the proceedings that eventually led to a decision. Therefore, addressing the question of how a case was adjudicated requires the study of what might best be called the ‘tablet trail’ left behind when cases were brought to justice in the Neo-Babylonian period. The ideal situation for the study of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure would be the discovery of all the texts pertaining to one particular case (the case’s ‘tablet trail’) in a single location. Having all the relevant litigation records together would allow one to follow the progress of the case in the texts it generated. Unfortunately, only in rare instances has more than one record from any Neo-Babylonian legal case survived.16 Instead, the numerous litigation records that have survived pertain to different cases. Thus, for the most part, these records cannot be studied within the context of a particular case. Rather, in order to make the best use of the available evidence, one must group litigation records together into text-types based on similarity of legal function. When this is done, the litigation records offer insight into the different See the discussion of decision records in the following chapter. For a general overview of litigation records, see the discussion of “records of court proceedings” in Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 15–17. For a description of the administrative structure of Neo-Babylonian temples, see Jursa, NeoBabylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 49–51 and Ronald H. Sack, “Royal and Temple Officials in Eanna and Uruk in the Chaldean Period,” in Manfried Dietrich and Oswald Loretz, eds., Vom Alten Orient Zum Alten Testament (AOAT 240) (Neukirchen, 1995), pp. 425–432. For discussions of the relationship of the royal establishment and the temples, see Grant Frame, “Nabonidus, Nabû-šarra-u ur, and the Eanna Temple,” ZA 81 (1991), pp. 37–86 and John MacGinnis, “The Royal Establishment at Sippar in the 6th Century BC,” ZA 84 (1994), pp. 198–219. 16 Examples are collected in Cornelia Wunsch, “Und die Richter ins. berieten: Streitfälle in Babylon aus der Zeit Neriglissars und Nabonids,” AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), pp. 59–100. See also M. San Nicolò, “Parerga Babylonica VII: Der §8 des Gesetzbuches ammurapis in den neubabylonischen Urkunden,” ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 341–342. 14 15

introduction

5

text-types that might have been included in any particular case’s ‘tablet trail.’ By identifying these different text-types, one can reconstruct a hypothetical ‘tablet trail,’ even if one cannot find all the litigation records pertaining to any one particular case.17 C. Studies of Litigation Records from Earlier Periods Litigation records written in cuneiform are attested beginning in the Ur III period and continue to be attested throughout the over 1,000 years of Mesopotamian history that preceded the Neo-Babylonian period. Modern scholars have applied typological methods to these earlier texts as a means of reconstructing court procedure. This book draws on the methods pursued in the following studies of court procedure in four earlier periods of Mesopotamian history: • Adam Falkenstein’s Die Neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden (1956); • Two studies of the Old Babylonian litigation records: Eva Dombradi’s Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßurkunden (1996) and John D. Fortner’s Adjudicating Entities and Levels of Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian Era (1997);18 • Roy Hayden’s Court Procedure at Nuzu (1962); • Remko Jas’s Neo-Assyrian Judicial Procedures (1996). All of these studies attempt to describe the adjudicatory process, or at least some aspect of it. To achieve this goal, all address the need for typological classification of the litigation records. In all of these works, classification of the texts and attention to legal terminology are the basis for a description of the adjudicatory process. In order to illustrate this connection between text-typology, the study of legal terminology and the reconstruction of the adjudicatory process, the relevant aspects of each of these works should be considered.

17 For a similar characterization of this aspect of the textual records, see F. Rachel Magdalene, On the Scales of Righteousness: Neo-Babylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job (Brown Judaic Studies 348) (Providence, 2007), p. 43. 18 For discussion and bibliography of earlier works on the Old Babylonian texts, see Eva Dombradi, Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßurkunden (FAOS 20) (Stuttgart, 1996), Vol. 1, pp. 1–2.

6

introduction

Falkenstein’s work is based on Sumerian court records from the Ur III period (2112–2004 BCE), mainly those texts that carry the Sumerian designation d i. t i l. l a (“completed legal matter”). Falkenstein begins with a discussion of the different text-types (“Textgattungen”) that carry this designation, in which he distinguishes between texts that record “judicial certification” ( gerichtliche Beurkundung) of transactions, and those that record aspects of proceedings in court, which he labels “protocols” (“Prozeßprotokollen”). Falkenstein also discusses “combineddocuments” (“Sammelurkunden”), which record more than one case, and the “pisandubba (tablet-basket) labels (“pisandubba-Etiketten”), which are labels for the baskets that held the court records.19 Falkenstein then uses the information in the Sumerian court documents to describe various aspects of law during the Ur III period. Most importantly, his discussion opens with descriptions of court organization and legal procedure.20 The discussion of legal procedure is divided into four main sections which correspond to the main phases of a trial: the initiation of proceedings, evidentiary actions, the decision, and the renunciation of future claims (Verzichterklärung).21 This discussion includes a study of the legal terminology associated with each of the phases, such as the terms i n i m- g a r (literally “to set forth a matter”) for the assertion of a claim22 and t u g2- u r3 (literally “to drag the cloak”) for the renunciation of a claim.23 Both Dombradi and Fortner, who treat the Old Babylonian (2000– 1595 BCE) material, make extensive use of typological methods.24 Both distinguish between texts that describe entire trials and texts that describe only part of the proceedings. The main differences between the typologies that Dombradi and Fortner present appear in their further classification of the documents. Dombradi, after making the distinction between “documents regarding trial proceedings” (“Urkunden über

Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 7–17. In his presentation of the texts themselves, Falkenstein further classifies the texts based on subject matter. See the table of contents in Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 2, p. V. 20 Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 18–80. 21 Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 59–80. 22 Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 59–60. 23 Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 79. 24 For Dombradi’s text-typology, see Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 161–204, especially the outline on p. 168. Fortner’s typology appears in John D. Fortner, Adjudicating Entities and Levels of Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian Era (Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1997), pp. 29–81. See Table 4, pp. 73–81 for Fortner’s classification of all the texts his dissertation considers. 19

introduction

7

Prozeßverfahren”) and “documents regarding trial actions” (“Urkunden über Prozeßhandlungen”), subdivides each of these sets based on categories of law (civil or criminal), legal formulations employed in the texts and procedures described. Fortner, on the other hand, specifically rejects the use of legal terminology as the basis for classification.25 Instead, his typology is based primarily on the legal function of the texts. Thus, because all of the “lawsuit records” have the same legal function, Fortner does not classify them any further. He does, however, divide the “associated documents” into six types, each with a different legal function. In addition to proposing typologies of the Old Babylonian litigation records, both Dombradi and Fortner pay considerable attention to the legal terminology used in the documents. Fortner’s terminological discussion is devoted to three terms that describe the judges’ activities: dīnam šū uzum, dīnam dânum, and awātam amārum.26 Dombradi considers these terms, as well,27 but also studies other terms that pertain to other aspects of the proceedings. She places special emphasis on terms for the initiation of the lawsuit, such as ragāmum, baqārum,28 and abātum,29 as well as the various terms that describe the different decisions that would bring the case to a conclusion.30 Apart from studying and defining the terms themselves, Dombradi’s work also considers legal terms within the context of the phraseological structure (Klauselnbestand) of the litigation records.31 She then identifies the legal terms associated with each part of the adjudicatory process. In this manner, Dombradi’s description and classification of the Old Babylonian material goes beyond Fortner’s. Whereas Fortner limits his discussion to functional aspects of the texts, Dombradi demonstrates

25 Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 35. Fortner’s system cannot, of course, ignore the terminology used in the different texts. Thus, the register of lawsuit records and associated documents (Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 73–81) also indicates certain terminological aspects of the texts. 26 Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 82–168. 27 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 312–318 (dīnam šū uzum, dīnam dânum); pp. 327–329 (awātam amārum). 28 Both ragāmum and baqārum are discussed in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 262–294. The two verbs are discussed together because Dombradi concludes that they are geographic variants with the same meaning. For a critique of this conclusion, see Raymond Westbrook’s review of Dombradi, Darstellung in Or. 68 (1999), pp. 125–127. 29 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 295–302. 30 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 342–346. 31 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 33–160.

8

introduction

that these texts also had formal compositional aspects that must be taken into account. For both Fortner and Dombradi, the study of typology and legal terminology is the basis for an inquiry into other aspects of the Old Babylonian legal system. This part of Fortner’s study concerns itself with the Old Babylonian “adjudicating entities and institutions.”32 In particular, it is devoted to identifying these different adjudicating entities and institutions and to understanding the relationship between the “levels of legal authority” and the “interplay which existed between the crown administrative organization and the local judicial and administrative infrastructure.”33 Dombradi’s typological and terminological studies have a much broader goal. They form the basis for a comprehensive description of Old Babylonian civil procedure.34 Like Fortner, Dombradi also gives attention to understanding the adjudicating agencies (die Organe der Rechtsprechung).35 In addition, however, Dombradi’s work also traces the course of legal proceedings (Rechtsgang) from the assertion of the claim (die Geltendmachung von Rechten) to the conclusion of the case.36 Hayden’s study of court procedure at Nuzi (c. 1500–c. 1350 BCE) begins with the identification of adjudicating authorities and a description of court organization.37 It then continues with a thorough survey of court procedure, which begins with the “initiation of the suit,” and continues with descriptions of “the trial,” “the evidence,” “investigations,” “the ordeal,” “decisions,” “appeals,” “penalties,” and “enforcement.”38 Although the main purpose of Hayden’s work is “to attempt a reconstruction of the court procedure at Nuzu,”39 Hayden recognizes that this reconstruction is dependent on understanding the different types of documents in which court procedures are recorded. In his own words: Several types of documents furnish evidence for the reconstruction of the court procedure at Nuzu. While the lawsuits are the main source, there are also letters, memorandum tablets, and declarations in court. Often

Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 170–570. Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 171–172. 34 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 207–378. 35 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 211–257. 36 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 262–365. 37 Roy Edmund Hayden, Court Procedure at Nuzu (Ph.D. Thesis, Brandeis University, 1962), pp. 6–21. 38 Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 22–72. 39 Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 7. 32 33

introduction

9

a contract, with or without a penalty clause, helps us to understand the reasoning behind a decision.40

As a result of this observation, Hayden devotes the latter part of his work to presenting a selection of these different types of documents. Hayden’s presentation begins with the most abundant text-type, which he calls the “lawsuit.” These documents record the proceedings in court up to and including the authorities’ decision. Typically, they begin with the statement that “PN1 appeared with PN2 in court before the judges” (“PN1 itti PN2 ina dīni ana pāni dayyānē ītelûma”),41 and end with the statement that one of the parties “prevailed in the case” (ina dīni iltēma).42 Hayden further classifies these texts based on subject matter, by devoting separate sections to “civil lawsuits,” that pertain either to real estate or to “personal” matters, and to “criminal lawsuits.”43 Besides the “lawsuits,” Hayden’s typology of texts includes three other types that specifically do not record the entire course of legal proceedings leading to a decision. Hayden calls these three types “declaration tablets,” “memorandum tablets” and “letters.”44 Remko Jas studies the Neo-Assyrian (8th–7th centuries BCE) litigation records. Jas states the goals and methods of his study as follows: The main object of this study . . . is to gain some insight into the course of the proceedings. This will be done by dividing the court documents into groups based on strictly formal criteria in the belief that these formally distinct groups of texts represent different stages in a trial. Every text will then be analysed in detail which will . . . lead to a better understanding not just of their background but also of their function.45

Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 72. Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 25. The translation quoted is Hayden’s. Given the adversarial meaning of the conjunction itti, especially in the context of lawsuits, a better translation might be “PN1 came to court against PN2 before the judges.” See AHw. dabābu 3b (p. 147) and AHw. itti 5 (p. 405). This translation also accords with Hayden’s observation that the person mentioned first is generally the plaintiff (Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 25). 42 Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 50. 43 Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 73–171. 44 The main description of these types occurs in the sections devoted to each type in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–181. Note, however, that the sections devoted to the “lawsuits” also include some texts of other types. For discussion, see below. 45 Remko Jas, Neo-Assyrian Judicial Procedures (SAAS 5) (Helsinki, 1996), pp. 2–3. For a similar use of individual documents to reconstruct the stages of the Neo-Assyrian procedure for homicide, see Martha Roth, “Homicide in the Neo-Assyrian Period,” in Francesca Rochberg-Halton, ed., Language, Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (AOS 67) (New Haven, 1987), pp. 351–365, especially 40

41

10

introduction

Jas’s first classification of the Neo-Assyrian texts is based on formal criteria. Using these criteria, Jas divides the texts into the following groups: 1) texts that begin with the word dēnu (“lawsuit” or “judgment”); 2) texts in which the word sartu (“crime” or “fine”) occurs; 3) “murder texts,” in which a murderer must pay blood money to the family of the victim; 4) “theft texts,” in which a thief must make a payment for stolen goods; 5) debt texts, which reflect the payment of a debt as the result of a dispute; 6) texts that mention the uršān ordeal; 7) texts that begin with the word šumma; 8) texts headed by a date; and 9) abātusummons. Recognizing that formally-similar texts may in fact have different functions, Jas attempts to identify the purpose for which each text was issued. Jas’s analysis demonstrates that different texts, even within the same group, may have been composed at different stages in the adjudication of disputes. For example, some sartu texts record the imposition of a penalty that remains to be paid, while others record the actual payment.46 Similarly, with regard to the “texts headed by a date,” Jas writes that “some of the texts belong to the preparatory stages of a lawsuit, while others represent attempts at solving a conflict outside the courtroom.”47 D. Need for the Present Study In contrast with the abundance of studies of legal procedure in earlier periods of Mesopotamian history, no comprehensive study of the Neo-Babylonian material has ever been undertaken. Writing in the late 1990s, Cornelia Wunsch expressed the need for such a study in a footnote to an article on records of legal cases from the time of Neriglissar and Nabonidus. In her note, Wunsch writes: “Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung zum Gerichtswesen und Prozeßrecht in neubabylonischer und achämenidischer Zeit fehlt bislang” (“a comprehensive description of court practices and procedural law in the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid period has been lacking to date”).48 A survey of scholarship on Neo-

p. 362, and Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 56–70. 46 Jas, SAAS 5, p. 51. 47 Jas, SAAS 5, p. 81. 48 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 59 n. 1. For a similar sentiment, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39.

introduction

11

Babylonian legal proceedings before Wunsch’s comment and of some of the research subsequent to it demonstrates that the lack observed by Wunsch still remains. Before turning to the survey itself, however, it is important to note that existing discussions of Neo-Babylonian litigation records occur only in broader discussions of related topics. In other words, there has not yet been any separate discussion that addresses the specific subject of litigation records on their own. Therefore, the present survey cannot limit itself to previous studies of Neo-Babylonian litigation records. Instead, it must consider the broader range of studies that include Neo-Babylonian litigation records. In general, the studies that include Neo-Babylonian litigation records may be divided into three main categories: 1) text editions, whose main purpose is the publication of cuneiform texts themselves, in hand copy or transliteration, sometimes accompanied by translation and commentary; 2) archival studies, whose main purpose is the reconstruction of Neo-Babylonian archives or the study of one aspect of these archives; and 3) legal studies, whose main purpose is the description of NeoBabylonian law. These categories are not, of course, exclusive. For instance, an archival or legal study may include editions of relevant texts. Nevertheless, these categories provide a useful framework for the discussion of earlier studies. Text editions are the earliest publications concerning Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts. These early publications present the texts as part of the collections of specific museums. Joachim N. Strassmaier published hand copies of texts in the British Museum, beginning in 1889 with texts from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar (Nbk) and Nabonidus (Nbn), with a separate volume of copies for texts from each king. These were followed by texts from the reign of Cambyses (Camb) and Cyrus (Cyr) in 1890, and Darius (Dar) in 1892. Similarly extensive early museum publications of hand copies include editions of texts from the University Museum published by H. V. Hilprecht in BE 9 (1898) and by Albert Clay in BE 10 (1904) and PBS 2/1 (1912), Arthur Ungnad’s copies of texts from the Vorderasiatisches Museum in Berlin in VAS 3–6 (1907–8), copies of texts from Yale by Raymond P. Dougherty and Arch Tremayne in YOS 6 and 7 (1920 and 1925), and Georges Contenau’s copies of texts from the Louvre in TCL 12 and TCL 13 (1927 and 1929). Transliterations and English translations of the texts from the Louvre are published in Moore, Documents (1935). Some more recent museum publications, such as McEwan, LB Tablets,

12

introduction

G. J. P. McEwan’s edition of the texts in the Royal Ontario Museum (1982) and OIP 122, David B. Weisberg’s edition of texts at the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute (2003), present more than hand copies. They include transliterations and translations, as well as some commentary to the texts. The main purpose of text-editions is, as has been stated, to make the Neo-Babylonian texts available. Thus, text-editions do not usually include broader discussions of legal matters. However, text-editions rarely consist solely of copies of the texts. Usually, text-editions include indices of personal and geographic names, as well as a catalogue of the texts contained in the edition. These catalogues list all the texts in the edition and sometimes include a very brief description of the contents of each text. Similar brief descriptions of Neo-Babylonian texts are found in Erle Leichty’s Catalogue of the Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum (1986–1988). They are also strewn throughout scholarly discussions of the texts. These descriptions, however brief, often reflect the editors’ attempts to classify the texts. In other words, they are the result of a concern for text-typology. Given the existence of brief descriptions in catalogues and elsewhere, one might imagine that the need for a text-typology has largely been addressed. However, this is not so for several reasons. First, because these descriptions are so brief, they do not state the criteria by which a particular text is given a particular description. This poses problems for the classification of newly discovered texts. Furthermore, these descriptions are often quite general, and do not reflect a precise picture of a text’s legal function. Terms like “court record,” “protocol” or “Prozeßurkunde” might be used without attention to the different functions court records might have. Finally, perhaps the most vexing problem is that different authors use different brief descriptions to describe similar texts. For example, one might be left to wonder whether a text formulated in a particular way is a summons or a contract.49 Thus, although brief descriptions of texts, in catalogues and elsewhere, clearly reflect attempts at text-typology, no rigorous text-typology has yet been presented. The problems of brief catalogue descriptions are, however, ancillary to the main problem of text-editions based on museum holdings. As has already been noted, these editions are limited by modern collection

49 For example, see the discussion in section 4.A below of the different descriptions of dabābu-summonses (summonses to argue a case).

introduction

13

practices. It is true that the text-edition of a museum’s collection might sometimes coincide with an ancient archive. This is the case with many of the University Museum’s Murašû texts, which appeared under the title Business Documents of the Murashû sons of Nippur already when they were first published by H. V. Hilprecht in BE 9 (1898) and by Albert Clay in BE 10 (1904) and PBS 2/1 (1912). Yet even the University Museum’s early publications of the Murašû texts do not include all the texts in the archive, and so do not provide a complete picture. Proper understanding of the Murašû archive, as well as others, requires archival studies that “break the museum barrier” to assemble all the texts that were held together in antiquity. Thus, for the Murašû archive, there are two main archival studies: Guillaume Cardascia’s Les Archives des Murašû (1951) and, more recently, Matthew Stolper’s Entrepreneurs and Empires (1985).50 Other ancient private archives have also been the subjects of archival studies, as well. Numerous archival studies have examined the Egibi archive, which is the largest Neo-Babylonian private archive from Babylon. Among the more recent monographs are Cornelia Wunsch’s on the documents of Iddin-Marduk in CM 3 (1993) and on the fields and gardens in CM 20 (2000), as well as Kathleen Abraham’s Business and Politics under the Persian Empire (2004).51 The Nappā u family archive, the second largest Neo-Babylonian private archive from Babylon, is the subject of Heather Baker’s The Archive of the Nappā u Family (2004). Examples of archival studies of private archives from outside Babylon include Francis Joannès’s Archives de Borsippa (1989), devoted to the Ea-ilūta-bāni archive, and Michael Jursa’s Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni (1999), about the archive of one family from Sippar. The two major temple archives, the Ebabbar archives from Sippar and the Eanna archives from Uruk, have benefited from archival studies, as well. Examples of book-length works include Cocquerillat, Palmeraies (1968) a study of date farming as organized by the Eanna, and Michael Jursa’s Die Landwirtschaft in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit (1995), a study on the organization of agriculture on lands administered by the Ebabbar at Sippar. The study of the temple archives has also

50 For the history of the discovery of the Murašû archives, see Matthew Stolper, Entrepreneurs and Empires: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm and Persian Rule in Babylonia (Leiden, 1985), p. 1; 157–161. 51 For a summary of earlier studies of the Egibi archive, see Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 1–19.

14

introduction

benefited from prosopographical monographs, which are indispensable to gaining a hold on the material. For the Eanna at Uruk, Kümmel, Familie has updated and replaced Mariano San Nicolò’s earlier Beiträge zu einer Prosopographie neubabylonischer Beamten der Zivil- und Tempelverwaltung (1941). Bongenaar, Ebabbar (1997) has made serious study of the Ebabbar archive possible. The archival approach is of inestimable value for the proper understanding of the Neo-Babylonian texts, and, more generally, for the understanding of numerous aspects of ancient society and culture. Nevertheless, when it comes to the elucidation of questions of law, the archival approach is of only limited use. In order to describe the adjudication of legal cases, one cannot simply look at one archive, since any one archive may or may not contain litigation records.52 Furthermore, not every litigation record can be securely assigned to a specific ancient archive. To be sure, the results of the archival approach are necessary; situating a litigation record within an archive, when possible, often illuminates the legal question at hand.53 A comprehensive understanding of legal procedure, however, requires cross-archival and extra-archival research in order to select the relevant litigation records. Legal studies approach the Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts in just this manner. They bring together numerous texts from different archival and extra-archival sources, among them litigation records, in order to address one particular legal subject or to arrive at a general description of Neo-Babylonian law. Studies of particular legal subjects, such as Herbert Petschow’s Neubabylonische Pfandrecht (1956) or Wunsch, BA 2 (2003), a collection of texts on marriage, property and inheritance law, include litigation records that bear on these subjects.54 However, because they focus on other, distinct legal questions, these works do not describe the adjudicatory process, per se. Similarly, San Nicolò addresses some questions of legal procedure in his editions and

52 For example, litigation records in the Murašû archive are relatively rare. See San Nicolò’s review of Cardascia, Murašû in Or. 23 (1954), p. 278 and Matthew W. Stolper, “The Genealogy of the Murašû Family,” JCS 28 (1976), p. 195. For a general comparison between the contents of the Murašû archives and other archives, see Veysel Donbaz and Matthew W. Stolper, Istanbul Murašû Texts (Istanbul, 1997), pp. 12–15. 53 For example, see the discussion of Wunsch, CM 20, No. 84 in Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 110–113 and of Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 in Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 124–125. 54 See, for example, Petschow, Pfandrecht, p. 127 and Wunsch, BA 2, Nos. 42, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48.

introduction

15

studies of texts from the Eanna archives.55 However, his work on this subject never reaches beyond the level of comments on particular texts in the course of discussing other issues. Two early works that attempt a more comprehensive description of Neo-Babylonian law are Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben by Josef Köhler and Felix Ernst Peiser (1890–1898) and Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden by Mariano San Nicolò and Arthur Ungnad (1935). Both discuss litigation records in sections on procedural law.56 The work by San Nicolò and Ungnad, however, is limited because it considers only texts in the Vorderasiatisches Museum in Berlin.57 The work by Köhler and Peiser considers texts from numerous collections, but not many of the texts actually come from outside the British Museum. 58 Furthermore, neither Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben nor San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV considers the wealth of adjudicatory material available from the Eanna archives. And, of course, neither work takes into account the numerous texts that have seen light in the nearly 100 years since these two works were published. Despite these shortcomings, however, Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben and San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV remain important because of their use of text typology. In both works, the description of procedural law is based on the authors’ classification of different litigation records. In fact, one might argue that in both works, the heavy reliance on text typology results in a somewhat atomized picture of procedural law. Because the typological method requires close scrutiny of the texts, it prevents, to some extent, a more general, descriptive synthesis of the material. Throughout the twentieth century, Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben and San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV remained the most comprehensive descriptions of the Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory process. The early twenty-first

55 San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–348; “Parerga Babylonica IX: Der Monstreprozeß des Gimillu, eines širku von Eanna,” ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 61–77; “Parerga Babylonica XI: Die maš altu-Urkunden im neubabylonischen Strafverfahren,” ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 287–302; Symbolae Koschaker, pp. 219–234; “Eine Kleine Gefängnismeuterei zur Zeit des Kambyses,” in Wenger AV, pp. 1–10. See also Sibylle von Bolla, “Drei Diebstahlsfälle von Tempeleigentum in Uruk,” ArOr 12 (1944), pp. 113–120. 56 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, pp. 30–33; 2, pp. 63–79; 3, pp. 50–62; 4, pp. 80–89. San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV, pp. 600–618. 57 Note that even at the time of its publication, San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV did not include all the Neo-Babylonian texts known to have been in the Vorderasiatisches Museum; texts from Uruk are not included. See San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV, p. III (Vorwort). 58 See the indices at the end of each volume of Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben.

16

introduction

century has already seen an apparently renewed interest in the subject. As of the current writing, there are four contemporary examinations of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure. These may be divided into two categories: two studies that focus primarily on describing NeoBabylonian law and two studies that use Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory law to inform discussions of the Hebrew Bible. The two studies that focus primarily on Neo-Babylonian law are found in broader works that take the first steps towards a history of ancient Near Eastern law: Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie, edited by Francis Joannès (2000) and A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, edited by Raymond Westbrook (2003). In the first work, the Neo-Babylonian period is represented by Francis Joannès’s own selection and translation of litigation records.59 This is the first such collection to combine texts from both temple and private archives. However, because the Neo-Babylonian section is just one part among several, the number of texts it surveys is limited. Apart from the French translations, Joannès’s discussion of the texts consists only of a brief general overview and a separate introductory summary of each text. Joannès does not attempt to classify the texts into text-types, nor does he attempt a general description of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure. In the work edited by Westbrook, Neo-Babylonian law is described in a chapter by Joachim Oelsner, Bruce Wells and Cornelia Wunsch.60 “Litigation” is one of the numerous subjects that this chapter addresses.61 However, the general synthesis that this chapter provides is quite brief and does not engage in a more detailed description of litigation records or legal terminology. In addition to the two discussions focused primarily on Neo-Babylonian law, two studies have been undertaken that examine Neo-Babylonian procedural law in the context of comparison with law in the Hebrew Bible. These two works are: The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes by Bruce Wells (2004) and On the Scales of Righteousness NeoBabylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job by F. Rachel Magdalene (2007). In Wells’s book, the discussion of Neo-Babylonian litigation records is limited to those texts that inform an understanding of Biblical laws

59 Francis Joannès, “Les textes judiciaires néo-babyloniens,” in Francis Joannès, ed. Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie (Saint-Denis, 2000), pp. 201–239. 60 Joachim Oelsner, et. al., “Neo-Babylonian Period,” in Raymond Westbrook, ed. A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2003), pp. 911–973. 61 Oelsner et. al., in Westbrook, ed. History, pp. 921–923.

introduction

17

pertaining to the testimony of witnesses. Wells uses the litigation records to “show witnesses in action and the court’s treatment of those witnesses and their testimony” in a “working legal system in the ancient Near East.”62 The primary goal of Wells’s work is, however, an understanding of the laws of testimony, not a comprehensive understanding of court procedure. Magdalene seeks to understand the Book of Job in light of NeoBabylonian court procedure. One of her explicit goals is to uncover “the machinery of justice in the Neo-Babylonian period—that is, those formal steps that gave shape to a legal action.”63 To achieve this goal, Magdalene devotes an entire chapter to “trial procedure in the NeoBabylonian courts,” in which she identifies and describes the “basic phases of litigation.”64 Magdalene characterizes her own methodology as “legal-historical.”65 This method is intended as a corrective to earlier “philological” studies of the material, which, in Magdalene’s own estimation, can lead one to “lose sight of the legal-historical forest for [one’s] study of the philological trees.”66 In keeping with her stated methodology, Magdalene does not engage in typological discussion of the texts themselves, nor does she devote intensive study to the legal terminology associated with the adjudicatory process. Thus, the need remains for a thorough understanding of the legal texts themselves and the terms they use. E. Methods The proposed reconstruction of the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases faces a number of obstacles. Foremost among these challenges is one common to any study of Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts: assembling the texts. Just as modern collection and publication practices have often not kept ancient archives together, they have not kept all the texts in a particular text-type together, either. Thus, one must begin by sorting through the numerous published texts in order to select those

Bruce Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes (Wiesbaden, 2004), p. 9. Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39. 64 Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 55–94. The “phases” are outlined on p. 66. 65 Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39. 66 Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39 n. 42. 62 63

18

introduction

that are relevant to the adjudicatory process. Some texts, like those that explicitly describe the adjudication of a dispute by judges or those that record a particular procedure in court, are obviously relevant. Other texts, however, do not give explicit descriptions of court activities but do suggest that they were written as part of the adjudicatory process because they contain references to procedures like summoning witnesses. Before one can place any such text within the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases, one must ask whether such a text belongs in the ‘tablet trail’ at all. Only once one has addressed this fundamental problem can one consider the question of any text’s legal function and determine the stage in the adjudicatory process that the text represents. Part I addresses these challenges in order to arrive at a typological classification of the different Neo-Babylonian litigation records that make up the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases. It is the result of a survey of the numerous publications67 containing Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts in order to select those texts that inform the discussion of the adjudicatory process. By studying the contents of the various text-types pertaining to court litigation, the typological discussion attempts to characterize the different legal functions that these texts served. Based on this, the discussion classifies the texts into text-types. When the adjudicatory setting of these texts is not obvious, those features of the different text-types that indicate that they were composed as litigation records are identified. The typology presented in Part I classifies the texts into text-types based on legal function. This criterion for classification requires the identification of the reason for which particular texts might have been composed. As the typological discussion will show, the texts themselves often furnish the information necessary to identify why they were composed. Texts that show that they were composed for the same reason will be said to have the same legal function and will, therefore, be classified together into a text-type. Thus, the resulting text typology will illustrate the different functions for which the adjudicating authorities might have composed the different texts that make up the ‘tablet trail.’ In addition to the main criterion of legal function, Part I will also consider the formal aspects of some of the texts. Thus, within textThis book focuses only on published texts. This includes texts that have been published in editions complete with transliteration and translation as well as those that are known only in cuneiform copy. Numerous unpublished texts are known to exist in museum collections, but these are not considered here. 67

introduction

19

types, the discussion will also distinguish between different compositional styles. Each style exhibits consistent composition. One style differs from another in terms of its formal characteristics, such as specific phrasing or the order of compositional elements. However, despite the compositional differences, different styles of the same text-type share the same legal function. Although the typology will consider formal aspects of the Neo-Babylonian texts, it should be emphasized that the main basis of classification is function, not form. The choice of function over form stems from a concern that similarly-worded texts may actually have served different legal functions.68 Thus, a functional typology is better suited to achieving the goal of describing the process of adjudication. Only by identifying legal function can one attempt to situate the different text-types within the framework of the adjudicatory process. One important consequence of the functional method of typology pertains to the archival context to which the different texts belong. As has already been noted, the texts considered in this book come from two main sources: temple archives and private archives. Despite their different origins, however, the needs of the adjudicatory process are the same, regardless of the subjects to which it pertains. Thus, the ‘tablet trail’ for both temple and private cases consists of the same text-types. Because all of the texts pertain to the adjudicatory process in some way, it is not surprising to find that texts from both temple and private archives serve similar legal functions. In fact, to a large extent, texts of the same text-types are found among the texts from both temple archives and private archives. In some cases, the documentation is predominantly from one context, but the existence of one or two texts of the same text-type from the other context suggests that both the temple and private contexts used the same text-type. In keeping with the functional emphasis of the typology, texts of the same text-type are all discussed at the same time. When the archival context is significant, it will be mentioned, but the main distinctions between private and temple archives will only be addressed in the discussion of adjudicatory procedure (Part II).

68 Jas, SAAS 5 is an example of a typology that is based primarily on form, and only secondarily on function. This is based on Jas’s belief, stated in Jas, SAAS 5, pp. 2–3, that “formally distinct groups of texts represent different stages in a trial.” However, the discussion of the sartu-texts in Jas, SAAS 5, p. 51 shows that even Jas recognizes that these formally-similar texts may actually reflect more than one stage in the trial.

20

introduction

Apart from achieving a comprehensive text typology, the typological discussion has two additional results, one pertaining to legal procedure and the other to legal terminology. In terms of legal procedure, the typological discussion sets the different text-types within the framework of the adjudication of cases and hence results in a textual record of the different procedures involved. In addition, the close scrutiny of the contents of the litigation records leads to the identification of important legal terminology associated with adjudication. Both the procedural and terminological results of the typological discussion are the basis of Part II, which traces the progress of a case in the Neo-Babylonian period from its initiation to its final adjudication. In doing so, Part II uses the different text-types to outline the progress of the case. Furthermore, it attempts to understand the adjudicatory process by defining the legal terminology associated with each of its stages.

PART I

FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS

CHAPTER ONE

DECISION RECORDS 1.A

The Legal Function of the Decision Record

On 26 Šebā u, year 2 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, Rēmanni-Bēl came to court in an attempt to free his sister, Bābunu, and her children from their enslavement to mNabû-mukīn-apli. The case was heard by the judges of Nabonidus in Tapšu u. Two copies of the decision record survive and are published as Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58 and Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 59. The proceedings and the judges’ decision are recorded as follows:1 2 1. di-i-ni ša2 mre-man-ni-dEN A-šu2 ša2 mte-rik-LUGAL-ut-su 2. a-na mu - i fba-bu-nu u3 DUMU. MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 3. ša2 mdNA3-<mu>-ki-in-IBILA DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdKUR.GALMU-id-di-nam 4. it-ti mdNA3-DU-IBILA a-na maar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ 5. ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN. TIRki id-bu-bu um-ma f ba-bu-nu

(1–5) The case which mRēmanniBēl son of mTērik-šarrūssu argued against mNabû-mukīnapli, regarding fBābunu and her children, members of the household of mNabû-mukīn-apli son of mAmurru-šuma-iddinam, before the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, thus:

6. ša2 i-na E2-ku-nu2 a- a-ta-a ši-i lu2 DI.KU5.MEŠ

(5–6) “fBābunu, who is in your household, is my sister!”

7.

re-man-ni-dEN iš-ta- -a-lu um-ma ba-bu-nu

m f

8. NIN-ka ul-tu im-ma-ti ki-i E2mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU

(6–7) The judges questioned Rēmanni-Bēl thus:

m

(7–9) “Since when has fBābunu, your sister, been part of the household of mAmurru-šumaiddinam, father of mNabû-mukīnapli?”

Text follows Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 59. According to the opening lines, only one person, mAmurru-šuma-iddinam, is being addressed. Therefore, the use of the plural possessive -kunu is difficult to explain. 1 2

24

chapter one 9. AD ša2 mdNA3–DU-IBILA ši-i m re-man-ni-dEN iq-bi

(9–10) mRēmanni-Bēl said thus:

10. um-ma 40 MU.AN.NA.MEŠ an-na-a-ti fba-bu-nu 11. NIN-a mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU ta-pal-la di-i-ni a-na mu - i-šu2 12. it-ti mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA ad-di-bu-ub 13. u3 a-di i-na-an-na iš-tu E2-šu2 la u2-še- i-iš

(10–13) “For these past 40 years, Bābunu, my sister has served m Amurru-šuma-iddinam. I argued a case regarding her against m Amurru-šuma-iddinam, father of m Nabû-mukīn-apli, but he has not let her go from his household until now!”

14. mre-ma-an-ni-dEN mim-ma i-da-tu ša2 di-i-ni a-na UGU 15. fba-bu-nu it-ti mdKUR.GALMU-MU AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-A 16. id-bu-bu a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ la u2-kal-li-im

(14–16) mRēmanni-Bēl did not show the judges any evidence of the case regarding fBābunu which he argued against m Amurru-šuma-iddinam, father of mNabû-mukīn-apli.

17.

lu2 DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu-ti iš-mu-ma mim-ma i-da-tu4 18. ša2 di-i-ni la i-mu-ru-u iš-ta-lumu 40 MU.AN.NA.MEŠ

(17–18) The judges heard their arguments. They did not see any evidence of the case. They conferred.

19. an-na-a-ti fba-bu-nu mdKUR. GAL-MU-MU AD ša2 mdNA3DU-IBILA 20. tu3-pal-la man-ma di-i-ni u3 paqa-ri 21. ina mu - i-šu2 la ir-ši

(18–21) For these 40 years, f Bābunu served mAmurru-šumaiddinam, father of mBēl-mukīnapli. He did not have any case or claimant against him.

22. fba-bu-nu u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mdKUR.GALMU-MU 23. a-na mdNA3-DU-IBILA id-di-nu

(22–23) They assigned fBābunu and her children, the members of the household of mAmurru-šumaiddinam to mNabû-mukīn-apli.

f

Rēmanni-Bēl claims that the family of mNabû-mukīn-apli is in wrongful possession of fBābunu. Upon questioning, mRēmanni-Bēl reveals that f Bābunu has been in the service of the family of mAmurru-šuma-iddinam, father of mNabû-mukīn-apli, for forty years. mRēmanni-Bēl claims to have tried to obtain her release by bringing suit against mAmurrušuma-iddinam. mRēmanni-Bēl is unable to produce any record of the lawsuit which he claims to have brought. Seeing no evidence of any legitimate claim against mAmurru-šuma-iddinam or his son, mNabûmukīn-apli, the judges decide that fBābunu and her children should stay in the possession of mNabû-mukīn-apli. m

decision records

25

The need to prove that a lawsuit had actually been brought lies at the heart of this case. mRēmanni-Bēl is unable to produce “evidence of the case” (i-da-tu ša2 di-i-ni ) that he claims to have argued (and presumably won), so he loses his present claim. His opponent, mNabû-mukīn-apli, on the other hand, will never have to face that problem. mNabû-mukīnapli will have a copy of the decision record to prove his ownership of f Bābunu and her children. The text itself continues with the following lines, which state that this is its purpose: 23. . . . u3 a-na la e-ne-e 24. up-pi iš- u-ru-mu ina na4KIŠIB. MEŠ-šu2-nu 25. ib-ru-mu-ma a-na mdNA3-DUIBILA id-di-nu

(23–25) And so that (the decision) would not be changed they wrote a tablet and sealed it with their seals and gave it to mNabû-mukīn-apli.

The judges’ actual seal marks, which appear at the end of the text, prove that these lines refer to the very text on which they appear. The decision record was written “so that (the decision) would not be changed,” that is, to prevent any claim against mNabû-mukīn-apli’s ownership. Notices like the one just quoted appear at the end of a number of other decision records.3 They illustrate explicitly that the legal function of this type of text is to serve as proof that a case has been settled and thereby to prevent any future claims. Those in possession of the decision tablet would have a clear record of the case and of the ruling in their favor. An additional illustration of this purpose of the decision records comes from two texts pertaining to the disputed property of fTašmētudamqat and her daughters. These women sold a field to mNabû-a ēiddin, a well-known descendant of the Egibi family from Babylon. Another woman, f ibu u, and her son, mMušēzib-Marduk, question the validity of the sale and bring their case before the judges of Nabonidus in Babylon. The beginning of the case is recorded in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112, a fragmentary decision record. Both Roth and Wunsch reconstruct the lost decision as follows.4 The judges allow fTašmētu-damqat

3 Other, similar expressions are found in: Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34–36; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:32–35; Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:44; Nbn 1128:26–28, all “royal judges decision records” (see the discussion in section 1.B below). Other non-stylized decision records including similar notices are: Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9:9–12; Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:10–12. 4 Martha Roth, “Tašmētu-damqat and Daughters,” in J. Marzahn and H. Neumann, eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster, 2000), p. 397 and Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 124–125.

26

chapter one

and her daughters to sell the land to mNabû-a ē-iddin. mNabû-a ēiddin, however, must make some compensation to f ibu u and her son. This requirement is recorded in Nbn 355, a debt note composed in the presence of judges of Nabonidus. This later text includes the following notice, found in lines 11–13: 11.

f i-bu- u u mKAR-dAMAR. UTU DUMU-šu2 12. up-pi di-i-ni ina maar lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ 13. a-na mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU id-dan-na

(11–13) f ibu u and mMušēzibMarduk, her son, will give the tablet of legal proceedings to m Nabû-a ē-iddin before the judges.

Once they are paid, f ibu u and her son must give “the tablet of legal proceedings” ( up-pi di-i-ni) to mNabû-a ē-iddin. Originally, this tablet would have been in the possession of f ibu u and her son, as a record of their claim to the compensation. Once mNabû-a ē-iddin has completed his payments to them, they demonstrate that their claim has been satisfied by transferring the tablet of legal proceedings to him. As Roth suggests, the decision record Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 is the very uppi dīni to which these lines refer.5 From Roth’s correlation, it seems that the Babylonians themselves recognized a specific text-type whose purpose was to record the decision. This purpose is reflected in the Akkadian designation uppi dīni. Thus, by identifying the decision records, the present discussion arrives at the definition of a nativelyrecognized text-type, the uppi dīni. Because decision records must reflect the details of the particular case which they describe, differences between one text and another are to be expected. Nevertheless, the decision records may be classified into several different styles. Each style is characterized by a consistent use of compositional elements, such as the terminology describing the legal proceedings and the ordering of elements within the text. The different styles of decision records can be associated with the particular venues in which the decisions were made and recorded. The following discussion presents and describes four different styles of decision records: two styles associated with the royal judges, which will be known as the “Royal Judges” styles, and two styles of decision records from the Eanna at Uruk, which will be known as the “Eanna” styles. A number

5 Roth, AOAT 252, p. 397. The term uppi dīni occurs in a similar context in TCL 12, 122:14, although the actual uppi dīni to which the text refers has not survived.

decision records

27

of decision records will be presented after the discussion of the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna” styles. These are texts whose formulation does not easily fit into a particular style of decision record, but whose legal function is nevertheless to record the decision in a legal case. 1.B

The “Royal Judges” Styles of Decision Records

Twenty-eight decision records fall into two distinct styles based on their compositional elements. Because most of these decision records involve the royal judges,6 the two styles in which they are written will be designated “Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style B.” Although some of these texts do not actually involve the royal judges, they are included in the present discussion because they share the characteristic elements of these two styles.7 Of the twenty-eight “Royal Judges” style decision records, twenty are written in “Royal Judges style A.” They come from Babylon, Sippar, Tapšu u and Uruk and date from as early as the regnal year of Neriglissar to as late as year 9 of Cyrus. They all have the following general outline: I. Plaintiff ’s Statement A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating authority) B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s statement C. Imperative to authority

6 In the decision records written in the “Royal Judges” styles, the name of the king is included in the term designating these judges, lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 RN (“the judges of RN”). The more general term dayyānū ša šarri (lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 LUGAL; “judges of the king”) is attested in addition to the term dayyānū ša RN in Nbn 13:5 and in Wunsch, AuOr 17 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:15’, 20’, 26’. The designation lu2DI.KU5 ša LUGAL also follows the names of both judges recorded in Cyr 301:12–13. For more on the office of judges of the king, see the discussion at the end of chapter 8 and Cornelia Wunsch, “Die Richter des Nabonid,” in J. Marzahn and H. Neumann, eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster, 2000), pp. 557–597. 7 The texts written in both styles are listed in summary tables 1.1 and 1.2 at the end of this section. These tables also list the different adjudicating authorities mentioned in these texts.

28

chapter one

II. Judicial Actions A. šemû-clause B. Judicial review of evidence C. mitluku-clause D. Decision III. Conclusion A. Introduction of authorities B. Names of authorities C. Scribe(s) D. Place of composition E. Date Seals of authorities All the “Royal Judges style A” decision records follow this general outline. In order to illustrate this style, YOS 19, 101, a decision record from a case that apparently pertains to a misappropriated shipment of dates, will be quoted in full, divided according to the outline just presented: I. Plaintiff ’s Statement (lines 1–25) A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating authority)8 1.

U.GUR-re- u-u2-a lu2qal-la ša2 MU-dAMAR.UTU 2. a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki 3. iq-bi um-ma md m

(1–3) mNergal-rē ūa the slave of Iddin-Marduk said thus to the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon: m

B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s statement 3. mMU-dAMAR.UTU EN-a 4. 4 ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA e-pi-ru-tu 5. ul-tu EDIN a-na gišMA2.MEŠ ša2 md KUR.GAL-na-tan 6. lu2MA2.LA 5 A-šu2 ša2 mam-ma-a u2-še-li-ma

8

(3–6) “mIddin-Marduk, my master, loaded a shipment of 480 kur of dates for transport (?)8 from the hinterland on the boats belonging to mAmurru-natan, the boatman, son of mAmmaya.”

The Akkadian word epirūtu is not known as a qualification of dates. Both AHw.

decision records

29

7. pu-ut EN.NUN-tim ša2 ZU2. LUM.MA u2-ša2-aš2-ši-iš

(7) “He had him bear the responsibility for keeping the dates.”

8.

MA2.MEŠ a-na TIN.TIRki u2-še-la-am-ma 9. ši-pir-tu4 ša2 mMU-dAMAR. UTU id-di-nam-ma 10. 4 ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM. MA ina lib3-[bi-šu2] ša2- i-ir

(8–10) “He brought the boats to Babylon and he gave me m Iddin-Marduk’s message. 480 Gur of dates was written i[n it].”

11. re-eš ZU2.LUM.MA aš2-ši-ma 47 GUR 1 PI 12. ina lib3-bi ma- u-¢u2Ü a-na UGU

(11–12) “I took account of the dates, and 47gur 1pi were missing.”

13. mi- i-tu4 ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA it-ti md KUR.GAL-na-tan

(12–14) I raised a claim against m Amurru-natan concerning the missing amount of the dates and . . . thus:

giš

14. ar-gum2-ma u2-ŠAR-X-RI um-ma ZU2.¢LUM.MAÜ-ka 15. ul aš2-ši ar2?-ki ba-ti-qu XXX ...

(14–15) “ ‘I did not take your dates.’” (15) “Afterwards, an informer . . .

16. 4! GUR 1 PI ¢ZU2.Ü[LUM. MA]

(16) “ ‘4 Gur 1 Pi of dates . . .

17. u3 ku-tal-la ša2 ¢gišMA2-niÜ X-X u2

(17) “ ‘and be hind m y boa t . . .

18. ZU2.LUM.MA šu2-nu-tu2 i-na X-šu2-[

(18) “ ‘those da tes in . . .

19. rik-su it-ti-šu2 ni-iš-ku-us 20. um-ma 7 GUR 1 PI ZU2.LUM. MA 21. mdKUR.GAL-na-tan ina sar-tu iš-šu-u2

(19–20) “We contracted a contract stating thus: ‘mAmurrunatan illegally took 7 gur 1 pi of dates.’ ”

epēru II (p. 223) and CAD epēru (E, p 191) list the verb epēru as a variant of the verb ebēru, “to cross” (AHw., p. 182; CAD E, p. 10). Note especially the /p/ variant in the NB letter TCL 9, 102:91 listed by CAD). This verb is used in connection with rivers and other bodies of water, which fits the present context. Therefore it seems that the word in question is an adjective meaning “for transport.” Note, however, that it is the Š-stem form of the verb which usually has this meaning.

30

chapter one 22. ar2-ki ri-ik-su šu-a-tu2 mdKUR. GAL-[na-tan] 23. šu -ur-ma a-di u4-mu an-ni-i X

(22–23) “After mAmurru-[natan] wrote this contract until today . . .

24. i-na-an-na i-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub-la-aš2

(24) Now, I have brought him before you.”

C. Imperative to authority 25. EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na

(25) “Establish our decision!”

II. Judicial Actions (lines 25–35) A. šemû-clause 25. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu 26. iš-mu-u2

(25–26) The judges heard their arguments.

B. Judicial review of evidence 26. rik-su šu-a-tu2 u ši-pir-tu4 27. ša2 mMU-dAMAR.UTU ša2 4 ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA 28. ina lib3-bi ša -ru ša2 mdU.GURre- u-u2-a ub-la 29. maar-šu-nu iš-tas-su-u2 md KUR.GAL-na-tan 30. i-ša2-lu-ma na-šu-u2 ša2 ZU2. LUM.MA ša2 ina sar-tu4 31. na-šu-u2 e-li ra-ma-ni-šu2 u2-kin-ma

(26–29) They read before them that contract and mIddin-Marduk’s message in which 480 Gur of dates was written which mNergalrē ūa brought.

(29–30) They questioned Amurru-natan.

m

(30–31) (Regarding) the taking of the dates, he established about himself that they were taken illegally.

C. mitluku-clause This clause is absent in YOS 19, 101, but is present in several other “Royal Judges style A” texts. It is, therefore, considered a formulaic component of “Royal Judges style A.” See the subsequent discussion for more details.

decision records

31

D. Decision 32. 40 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA mi- i-tu4 ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA šu2-nu-šu2 33. e-li [m]dKUR.GAL-na-tan ip-rusu-ma 34. a-na mdU.GUR-re- u-u2-a lu2[qal-la ša2] mMU-dAMAR.UTU 35. id-di-nu

(32–35) They decided that Amurru-natan must pay 40 gur of dates, the missing amount of those dates, and assigned them to mIddin-Marduk, [slave] of m Nergal-rē ua. m

III. Conclusion (lines 35–43) A. Introduction of authorities 35. ina EŠ.BAR ¢di-i-niÜ šu-a-tim

At the decision of this case:

B. Names of authorities 36.

md

U.GUR-[GI lu2DI.KU5] DUMU ši-gu-u2-a

(36) mNergal-[ušallim, the judge,] descendant of Šigûa;

37.

md

NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU lu2DI. KU5 [DUMU]¢e-gi-biÜ

(37) mNabû-a ē-iddin, the judge, [descendant of] Egibi;

38.

md

NA3-[MU-GI].NA lu2DI.KU5 DUMU ir-a-[ni ]

(38) mNabû-[šuma-ukī]n, the judge, descendant of Ir an[ni];

39.

md

EN-[ŠEŠ.MEŠ]-¢MUÜ DI.KU5 DUMU mdZALAGd 30

(39) mBēl-[a ē]-iddin, the judge, descendant of Nūr-Sîn;

40.

md

EN-[KAR]-¢irÜ lu2DI.KU5 DUMU md30-tab-ni

(40) mBēl-ē ir, the judge, descendant of Sîn-tabni;

lu2

C. Scribe(s) 41.

NA3-MU-GAR-un DUB. SAR DUMU lu2GAL-DU3

md

(41) mNabû-šuma-iškun, the scribe, descendant of Rāb-bānê.

D. Place of composition E. Date 42. TIN.TIRki ITI ŠE U4 4-kam2 43. MU 10-kam2 mdNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(42–43) Babylon. 4 Addaru, year 10 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

32

chapter one

Seals of authorities Left edge: na4 KIŠIB mdU.GUR-GI lu2DI.KU5 na4 KIŠIB mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU [lu2DI].KU5 na4 KIŠIB mdNA3-MU-GI.NA lu2DI. KU5 Right edge: KIŠIB mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU lu2 DI.KU5 na4 [KIŠIB] mdEN-KAR-[ir] lu2 DI.KU5 na4

Seal of mNergal-ušallim, the judge; Seal of mNabû-a ē-iddin [the jud]ge; Seal of mNabû-šuma-ukīn, the judge; Seal of mBēl-a

ē-iddin, the judge;

[Seal] of mBēl-ē [ir], the judge.

In terms of its formulaic elements, that is those elements that do not pertain to the specifics of the case, YOS 19, 101 closely resembles three other texts: Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 6; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21; and Nbn 356. All four texts were written by the same court scribes, Nabû-šuma-iškun descendant of Rāb-banê (who wrote YOS 19, 101) or Nādinu descendant of Pa āru, either together or alone. These two men were, apparently, scribes of the court of the royal judges of Nabonidus in Babylon, where all four cases were heard. These texts exhibit the same formulaic components in their entirety or with only minor variations. They will, therefore, serve as the basis for a more general discussion of the formulaic components of “Royal Judges Style A,” which are attested in sixteen other documents. The following outline presents the formulaic components of the four paradigmatic texts in terms of the general outline of “Royal Judges style A” decision records: I. Plaintiff ’s Statement A. Opening PN ana lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša mdNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN. TIRki iqbi umma “PN said thus to the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon:”9 B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s statement C. Imperative to authority EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na “Establish our decision!”

9

Because the plaintiff in Nbn 356 is female, the verb is taqbi rather than iqbi.

decision records

33

II. Judicial Actions A. šemû-clause lu2 DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u210 “The judges heard their arguments.” B. Judicial review of evidence C. mitluku-clause im-tal-ku-u2 “They deliberated.”11 D. Decision III. Conclusion A. Introduction of authorities ina EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-a-tim “At the decision of this case” B. Names of authorities (Names of judges of Nabonidus) C. Scribe(s) m Nādinu descendant of Pa āru (and/or) m Nabû-šuma-iškun descendant of Rāb-banê D. Place of Composition Babylon E. Date Seals of authorities The discussion will now turn to a more detailed presentation of the variations that are attested within the formulaic components of the “Royal Judges style A” decision records. The formulaic components of the four paradigmatic texts will serve as the basis for this presentation. Each component of the outline above will be described separately, including the discussion of its variant forms. For ease of reference, these variants are also presented in summary table 1.1 at the end of the discussion of the “Royal Judges” styles.

10 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21:3’, as restored by Wunsch, AfO 44–45 (1997–1998), pp. 90–91, reads lu2DI.¢KU5Ü.[MEŠ] [1–en]-TA-AM3 dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu[u2-ma]. 11 This clause is present only in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21. Based on its presence in other “Royal Judges style A” texts, it is considered to be a formulaic component of the style.

34

chapter one

As the outlines show, decision records written in “Royal Judges style A” begin with the plaintiff ’s direct address to the adjudicating authorities (section I). In the four paradigmatic texts, as well as in most others, this address is introduced with an opening sentence (element IA), including the phrase iqbi umma (“said thus”). Two texts replace the verb qabû with the verb ma āru12 (“to approach”). In these cases, only the particle umma serves to introduce the plaintiff ’s direct address. Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 and Cyr 312 retain the verb qabû, but include the verb abālu (“to bring”) before it. This additional verb indicates that the plaintiff “brought” the defendant before (ana ma ri ) the judges. Following the opening (IA), decision records in the “Royal Judges style A” quote the plaintiff ’s particular statement to the judges (IB). The formulation of this element varies to reflect the particulars of the case at hand. The conclusion of the quotation, however, is a formulaic imperative to the judges (IC). In the four paradigmatic texts, the plaintiff ’s statement ends with the sentence EŠ.BAR-a-ni ( purussâni ) šuk-na (“Establish our decision!”). This imperative also exhibits variations. The plaintiffs’ opening statement in BIN 2, 134, addressed to the šākin māti alone, mentions the defendants in the concluding imperative.13 Another version of the imperative employs the verbal construction dīna epēšu (“to judge a case”) instead of purussâ šakānu (“to establish a decision”). The imperative phrase is it-ti DEFENDANT ep2-šu2 di-i-ni (“Judge my case against the defendant!”).14 Other decision records whose composition otherwise closely resembles the four paradigmatic “Royal Judges style A” texts omit this imperative.15 Before turning to other elements of the “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the plaintiff ’s statement (section I) in Durand, Textes babyloniens Nos. 58/59 should be considered. This text has a headinglike opening (IA) that reads: di-i-ni ša2 mPN1 a-na mu - i fPN2 u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mPN3 it-ti mPN4 ana maar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN.TIRki id-bu-bu um-ma

Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:1–3; YOS 6, 92:1–3. it-ti lu2qi-pa-a-nu ša2 E2.AN.NA EŠ.BAR-a-ni šu-kun (BIN 2, 134:11–12). 14 OIP 122, 38:27–28. See also Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:8–9 (it-ti fPN ip-ša2in-ni di-i-ni ). This imperative may be reconstructed in Cyr 332:17. 15 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5; Nbn 13; TCL 12, 86; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60; Cyr 301; Cyr 312. 12 13

decision records

35

The case regarding PN2 and her children, members of the household of PN3, which PN1 argued against PN4 before the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, thus . . .

This opening is followed by a statement addressed by the plaintiff directly to the defendant, instead of by a statement addressed to the judges. Because of this change, the address does not conclude with an imperative to the judges (IC). This text is considered to be written in “Royal Judges Style A” because it opens with a direct quotation of the plaintiff ’s statement in the presence of the judges of Nabonidus.16 Nbn 1128, on the other hand, whose opening is very similar to Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59, is classified as a “Royal Judges style B” document because it does not include any quotation of the plaintiff ’s statement. Following the plaintiff ’s statement, texts written in “Royal Judges style A” record the actions of the judges (section II). In the four paradigmatic texts, this section begins with the sentence lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2nu iš-mu-u2 (“The judges heard their arguments”). Instead of the noun dibbu (“case”), some texts use the noun amātu (“words, statements”) in the formulation of this element (IIA).17 In Nbn 13:6, there is no noun preceding the verb šemû. Other texts omit the clause altogether.18 In the paradigmatic form of the šemû clause (IIA), the noun dibbu ends with the plural possessive suffix (-šunu). The plural form is used despite the fact that in all four of the paradigmatic texts only one person is presented as the plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that the word dibbīšunu (“their arguments”) also refers to the defendant named in the preceding statement of the plaintiff (section I).19 There are, however, also variant texts in which a singular possessive suffix is used in grammatical agreement with the single plaintiff who makes a claim in the text.20

The structure of Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5 is similar. The plaintiff ’s statement is addressed directly to the defendant and does not end with an imperative to the judges. 17 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:20; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:23; OIP 122, 38:29. 18 YOS 6, 92; Cyr 312; Cyr 332. 19 Apart from the actual mention of the defendant in the plaintiff ’s statement, the involvement of the defendant is similarly implied in the first-person common plural possessive (-ni ) in the word purussâni in the imperative to the judges (IC). 20 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; OIP 122, 38:28–29. Note that in both these texts, the noun in the imperative to the judges (IC) is dinī, which has a singular possessive suffix, as well. 16

36

chapter one

This formulation must refer only to the plaintiff and does not refer to the defendant, against whom the claim has been made. In its position in the four paradigmatic texts, the šemû-clause (IIA) marks the transition between the plaintiff ’s presentation of the claim and the judges’ examination of the evidence. In a number of texts, however, the šemû-clause appears only in the middle of the second section, following the description of some judicial actions involving the defendant.21 The defendant, therefore, has already been mentioned outside the context of the plaintiff ’s statement. In these texts, the plural suffix on the word dibbīšunu (“their arguments”) clearly refers not only to the plaintiff, but to the defendants as well. The appearance of the plural possessive pronoun following the involvement of the defendant makes it clear that the plural refers not only to the plaintiffs, but to all those involved in the dispute.22 In most “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the judicial review of the evidence (IIB) is followed immediately by the decision (IID). In six decision records, including one of the four paradigmatic texts, a phrase with the verb mitluku (“to deliberate”) indicates that the judges deliberated after hearing all the evidence (IIC).23 This phrase marks the transition from the judicial review of the evidence (IIB) to the recording of the decision (IID). It is omitted in most of the “Royal Judges style A” decision records. The fact that in those texts in which it does occur, the mitluku-clause occurs in the same position at the conclusion of the review of evidence suggests that it should be considered as one of the formulaic components of the style. The “Royal Judges style A” decision records conclude with the names of the adjudicating authorities (IIIB) and the scribes who wrote the decision record (IIIC), followed by the place of composition (IIID) and the date (IIIE). In the four paradigmatic texts, the concluding section

Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; BIN 2, 134. 22 This is the case even though these texts also happen to be those in which there is more than one plaintiff. Based on the typical position of the šemû-clause, the coincidence of more than one plaintiff and the appearance of the šemû-clause at a point not immediately after the imperative to the judges is probably nothing more than circumstance. 23 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:28; Nbn 13:10; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21:20’; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:38; Cyr 332:24; OIP 122, 38:42. A seventh text, Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59:18 has the verbal form iš-ta-lu-mu (“they conferred”) instead of imtalkū. 21

decision records

37

(section III) begins with the introductory phrase ina EŠ.BAR (= purussê) di-i-ni šu-a-tim (“At the decision of this case”). There are two variant introductory phrases: ina ša āri uppi šuāti (“at the writing of this tablet”)24 and ina šemê dīni šuātu (“at the hearing of this case”).25 Apart from these introductions, two texts present the names of the judges as part of a complete sentence. This sentence begins with the prepositional phrase ina ma ar (“before”), followed by the names of the judges, and ends with the words ša āri (or uppi ) ša ir (“the tablet was written”).26 Most of the decision records written in the “Royal Judges style” are written in “Royal Judges style A.” There are, however, eight decision records involving the royal judges that have a different outline, called the “Royal Judges style B.” The general outline of “Royal Judges style B” is presented below, alongside the general outline of “Royal Judges Style A,” for purposes of comparison between the two styles. “Royal Judges Style B” I. Presentation of t he C ase A. Confrontation between parties (sometimes including subject of case) B. Appearance before authorities C. Statements before authorities II. Judicial A ctions A. šemû-clause B. Judicial review of evidence C. mitluku-clause D. Decision III. Conclusion A Introduction of authorities B. Names of authorities C. Scribe(s) D Place of composition E. Date Seals of authorities

“Royal Judges Style A” I. Plaintiff ’s S tatement A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating authority) B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s statement C. Imperative to authority II. Judicial A ctions A. šemû-clause B. Judicial review of evidence C. mitluku-clause D. Decision III. Conclusion A. Introduction of authorities B. Names of authorities C. Scribe(s) D. Place of composition E. Date Seals of authorities

Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:33 and Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:42. 25 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:37. 26 Cyr 312:29–34 (ša āri) and OIP 122, 38:46–50 ( uppi). 24

38

chapter one

The comparison between the general outlines of the two “Royal Judges” styles reveals several points of contact. The structure of the section in which the judicial actions are presented (II) is the same in both styles, as is the structure of the conclusion (III). These structural similarities are reinforced by the use of similar terminology: the šemû27 and mitluku28 clauses are attested in both styles of decision records in the same position in the outlines (elements IIA and IIC). The phrases introducing the authorities (element IIIA) in style B—ina purussê dīni šuāti or ina ša āri uppi šuāti—are both known from style A. These specific terminological similarities, along with the fact that texts in both styles are sealed by the adjudicating authorities, reinforce the general situational similarities between the two styles of decision records.29 The main difference between the two styles occurs in the initial presentation of the case (section I). Whereas “Royal Judges style A” decision records begin with the plaintiff ’s statement, “Royal Judges style B” decision records begin by mentioning a confrontation between both parties (element IA). The following example, from Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, will illustrate the typical beginning of a “Royal Judges style B” text: 1. ¢fbuÜ-na-ni-tu4 DUMU.SALsu ša2 mGAR-MU DUMU m DU3-eš-DINGIR 2. a-na mdEN-IBILA-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MU-SI. SA2 DUMU mKAL-dIM 3. di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma a-na maar mmu-še-zib-dEN lu2 GAR-UMUŠ TIN.TIRki

(1–3) fBunanītu daughter of m Šākin-šumi descendant of Eppeš-ilī brought suit against mBēl-apla-iddin son of mNabû-šumu-līšir descendant of Mudammiq-Adad.

4. DUMU mUGU-DINGIRGAL-dAMAR.UTU lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ u ši-bu-tu4 URU ik-šu-du-ma

(3–4) They arrived before m Mušēzib-Bēl, the šākin- ēmi of Babylon son of mEli-ili-rabiMarduk, the judges and the elders of the city.

27 Wunsch BA 2, No. 42:5–6; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:26’–27’; Nbn 1113:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’. See the accompanying summary table. 28 Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:31; Nbn 1128:12. 29 Also note the following similarity between the phrasing of two texts recording cases heard by the judges of Neriglissar. Near the conclusion of the case, Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34 (style A) reads di-in-šu2-nu di-i-ni a-mat-su-nu gam-rat. Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:43 (style B) reads di-in-šu2-nu di-i-nu EŠ.BAR-ši-na pa-ri-is.

decision records 5. dib-bi-šu-nu u2-ša2-an-nu-ma f bu-na-ni-tu4 taq-bi 6. um-ma

39

(5–6) They related their arguments. Bunanītu said thus:

f

In this text, the verbal phrase di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma (“brought suit”) denotes the initial confrontation between the parties. Another text uses the verb ragāmu30 (“to raise a claim”). One “Royal Judges style B” decision record indicates that two brothers and their uncle “fought each other” (a a a a imta ū) over division of property before “they had a legal case” (iršû dīni).31 The description of the confrontation (IA) in “Royal Judges style B” decision records describing cases heard by the judges of Nabonidus is somewhat more complex. The opening lines of Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1 will serve as an example: 1’ . . . mdNA3-tul-tab-ši-[li-šir] 2’. [DUMU-šu2 ša2] mdENNUMUN-DU3 DUMU LU2. SIMUG a-na 3’. 2 1/3 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR ŠAM2 gam-ru-tu i-ša2-mu-ma 4’. a-mi-lut-tum ta-pal-la- u-šu i-naan-na 5’. fina-E2.SAG.IL2-ra-mat al-ti md NA3-tul-tab-ši-SI.SA2 6’. ¢u3 f Üdtaš-me-tu4-dam-ŠU.2 AMAšu2 7’. [a-na] UGU LU2-tu2 šu-a-tu2 ir-gu-mu

(1’–4’) (. . . the slavegirl) w hich Nabû-tultabši-[līšir, son of ] m Bēl-zēra-ibni descendant of Nappā u purchased at full price for 2 1/3 mina of silver, so that the slavegirl would work for him— m

(4’–7’) Now, fIna-Esagil-ramât, wife of mNabû-tultabši-līšir, and f Tašmētu-damqat, her mother, raised a claim [con]cerning that slave.

As these opening lines illustrate, this element begins with a description of the subject of the case, a slavegirl purchased by mNabû-tultabši-līšir. The actual description of the confrontation comes in the following sentence, which usually begins with the conjunction inanna (“now”). It indicates that the plaintiff has raised a claim (ragāmu).32 After the description of the confrontation (IA), the next element in the outline of “Royal Judges style B” describes the parties’ appearance before the adjudicating authority (IB). This deliberate mention of the

Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:5’. Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42:1–3. 32 Nbn 1113:1–4 is a similar example. Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:1’–4’ follows this pattern without including the word inanna. In Nbn 495:10–12 the verbal phrase is paqāri šubšû instead of ragāmu. 30 31

40

chapter one

appearance before the authority is another characteristic unique to “Royal Judges style B” decision records. While “Royal Judges style A” decision records simply imply that the parties have appeared before the judges, “Royal Judges style B” decision records include a specific mention of their appearance. Most of the texts use the prepositional phrase ina ma ar or ana ma ar to indicate that the parties arrived “before” the authorities named following the preposition, although two texts use the synonymous prepositional phrase ina pāni. The verb used is usually kašādu (“to arrive”), although some “Royal Judges style B” decision records use the verbal construction dīna dabābu (“to argue a case”).33 The discussion thus far has defined the two “Royal Judges” styles of decision records. The discussion will conclude by attempting to explain when each of the two different styles was used. The two styles cannot be attributed to the writing styles of different scribes, because the same scribes are known to have written decision records in both styles. The court scribes mNādinu descendant of Pa āru and mNabû-šuma-iškun descendant of Rāb-banê, who wrote the four paradigmatic “Royal Judges style A” decision records, also wrote Nbn 495, a “Royal Judges style B” decision record. Similarly, the scribe mNergal-bānûnu descendant of Rāb-bānê wrote both Nbn 13, a “Royal Judges style A” decision record, and Nbn 1128, a “Royal Judges style B” decision record. Instead, the key to understanding when each style was used lies in the formulaic distinctions between the two styles. To recall, there are two elements in the outline of “Royal Judges style B” which distinguish it from “Royal Judges style A”: the notice of the confrontation between the parties (element IA above) and the mention of the parties’ appearance before the judges (IB). From these elements, it seems that the cases described using “Royal Judges style B” appeared before the judges only after an initial confrontation somewhere else, either in an informal setting or in a lower court.34 In contrast, decision records written in “Royal Judges style A” begin with a statement to the authorities. This suggests that the initial attempt to resolve the case took place in the court, rather than outside of it.

33 For occurrences of the different constructions, see summary table 1.2 at the end of this section. 34 BIN 2, 134 is a “Royal Judges style A” decision record in a case that begins before the šākin māti, who transfers the case to the šākin ēmi and the judges of the šākin māti. From this text, it seems then, that if a case was initially heard in an official setting (rather than informally), the entire case might have been recorded in “Royal Judges style A.”

EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi— ni šuk-na šu2-nu iš-mu-u2

—

—

PN ana AUTH. iqbi umma

PN ana AUTH. taqbi umma

Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6

Nbn 13

Durand, Textes di-i-ni ša2 m babyloniens, PN1 a-na Nos. 58/59 mu - i fPN2 u3 DUMU. MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mPN3 it-ti m PN4 ana maar AUTH. id-bu-bu umma

i-na EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-[atim]

i-na še-me di-ini šu-a-tu2

ina EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-a-ta

i-na EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-a-tim

DI. i-na EŠ.BAR KU5. di-i-ni šu-a-ta ME imtal-ku-ma lu2

*dib-bi- iš-ta-lušu2-nu-ti mu iš-muma

iš-muma

[im-tal]ku-ma

it-ti PN2 PN1 AUTH im- u-ru umma ip-ša2-in-ni di-i-ni

Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13

a-ma-tu PN1 išmu-ma

*dib-[bi- — šu-nu išmû]

—

PN1 [u PN2 ana] AUTH. [il-l]i-ku-nimma it-ti PN3 di-i-ni id-bubu-ma

Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5

Intro. of authorities

Judges of Nbn

Judges of Nbn

Judges of Nbn

Uruk

Tapšu u

Šamaššarra-u ur/ m Bēl-šumaiškun// Pa āru m

Babylon

Nergalbānûnu// Rāb-bānê m

m Nādinu// Babylon Pa āru m Nabû-šumaiškun// Rābbānê

Judges of Ngl mZababa(qīpu of the šuma-ukīn/ m Eanna) Mardukšuma-ibni// Šubarmana

26.XI.2 Nbn

12.XI.0 Nbn

? Nbn

11.IX.2 Ngl

10.VII.0 Ngl

Place of DATE Composition

m sukkallu, Nabû-mutīr- Babylon judges of Ngl gimilli// Ga alMarduk

Authorities** Scribe

“Royal Judges Style A” Decision Records

mitluku

šemû

Address to Judges

Opening line

TEXT

Summary Table 1.1

decision records 41

—

?



PN AUTH. im- ur um-ma

PN ana AUTH. taqbi umma

TCL 12, 86

Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 20

YOS 6, 92

Nbn 356

šemû

?

—

EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi— ni šuk-na šu2-nu iš-mu-u2

it-ti PN ¢ip?Ü-šu2 di-i-ni

?

?

ina EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-a-tim

ina EŠ.BAR di-i-[ni MU]. MEŠ

Judges of Nbn

Babylon

m Nādinu // Babylon Pa āru m Nabû-šumaiškun// Rābbānê

Uruk


26.VI.9 Nbn

17.IX.7 Nbn

2–6 Nbn

6 Nbn

3 Nbn



administrator mNādin/ m of Eanna; Nergal-inašākin ēmi tēšê-ē ir// of Uruk; Sîn-lēqiqīpi-official unninnī of Eanna; (assembly, judges (?))

[ina] EŠ.BAR sartennu; di-[ni šu-a-tim] Judges of Nbn

[i-n]a EŠ.BAR Judges of di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn

Judges of Nbn


im-talku-u2

m Nādinu // Pa āru



mitluku

— dib-bišu2-nu iš-mu-u2

EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bini šuk-na šu2-nu iš-muu2-ma


Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21

Address to Judges

Opening line

TEXT

Summary Table 1.1 (cont.)

42 chapter one


?


TCL 12, 122

Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19

Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/ TCL 13, 219

?

šemû ?

mitluku

?

?

*a-maa-tišu2-nu iš-timmu-ma

EŠ.BAR-a- *a-mani šuk-na a-tišu2-nu iš-timmu-ma

[ Judges of Nbn]

Judges of Nbn

Judges of Nbn

Judges of Nbn

ina ša- a-ri up- Judges of pi šu-a-ti Nbn

?

i-na EŠ.BAR di-i-ni [MU. MEŠ]


m Bēl-kā ir// Atkuppu m Bēl-iddina // Atû

Babylon

m Nabû-šuma- Babylon iškun// Rābbānê

?

24.V.17 Nbn

11.VII.13 Nbn

? (After 12 Nbn. See Wunsch, AfO 44/45 [1997/ 1998], p. 88).

21.X.12 Nbn


?

4.XII.10 Nbn

m Nabû-šuma- Babylon iškun// Rābbānê

29.VII.9 Nbn


Nādinu // Babylon Pa āru m Nabû-šumaiškun// Rābbānê m


[ina] EŠ.BAR Judges of di-i-ni [šu-aNbn tim]


lu2 DI. i-na ša- a-ra KU5. up-pi šu-a-tim MEŠ im-tal-kuma

—

— EŠ.BAR-a- [lu2DI. KU5. ni šuk-na MEŠ dib-bišu2-nu iš]-mu-u2

?

— EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bišu2-nu ni šuk-na iš-mu-u2

— Durand, Textes PN1 u PN2 babyloniens, PN3 u PN4 itti No. 60 PN5 a-na ma ri AUTH. u2-bil-lu-nimma iq-bu-u2 um-ma


YOS 19, 101

PN1 u PN2 ana ? AUTH. iqbû umma

Wunsch, CM 20, No. 84

Address to Judges

Opening line

TEXT


decision records 43


OIP 122, 38

it-ti DEF. ep2-šu2 dii-ni

it-ti DEF. [ep-šu2 dii-ni]

?

Uruk (?)

Judges of Cyr

šangû of Sippar; (“temple enterers”; elders)

Arad-Bēl/ Bēl-ušallim //Adadšammê m Ile iMarduk// Eppeš-ili m Bau-ēreš scribe of Gobryas

m

m

Uruk

Sippar (?)

Babylon

9 Cyr

8 Cyr

11.V.8 Cyr

21.II.8 Cyr

2 Cyr–5 Cyr


m Rīmūt/ Sippar (?) šangû of m BēlSippar; Judges of Cyr ušallim// Adad-šammê

šākin māti (šākin ēmi of Uruk, Judges of šākin māti)


m ina Marduk“Great ma ri . . . ša2- a- Ones” Judges nā ir/mBāneri ša- i-ir of Cyr ša-iliya

im-tal-ku- i-na EŠ.BAR ma di-nu MU.MEŠ (+IGI)

?

a-ma-tu- lu2DI. i-na maKU5. šu2 išar . . . up-pi mu-u2 MEŠ ša2- i-ir im-tal-kuma

—

—

i-na EŠ.BAR [di-i-ni] MU.MEŠ

?


* The šemu clause does not immediately follow the plaintiff ’s statement. ** Authorities not mentioned in the beginnings of the texts are listed in parentheses.

The following fragments appear to come from decisions written in the “royal judges” style, as well: Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3, No. 874; Nbn 64; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 25; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 13; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 23; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 22; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 37.

[PN ana] AUTH. [iqbi umma]

Cyr 332

— PN1 PN2 ana ma -ri AUTH. u-billam-ma iq-bi um-ma

—

Cyr 312

?


Cyr 301

—

it-ti DEF. *dib-bi- ? EŠ.BAR-a- šu2-nu ni šu-kun iš-mu-u2

PN1, PN2, PN3 ana AUTH. iqbû umma

mitluku

BIN 2, 134

šemû

Address to Judges

Opening line

TEXT


44 chapter one

Confrontation Appearance šemû

m PN . . . e-nin- i-na maar ni ir-gu-mu um- AUTH. ma di-i-ni idbu-bu-ma

i-na maar AUTH. idbu-bu

Nbn 1113

Nbn 1128

[dib-bu] ša2 PN1 a-na UGU SUBJ. it-ti PN2

—

dib-bišu2-nu iš-mu-u2

a-na maar — AUTH. ik-šudu-ma dib-bišu-nu u2-ša2an-nu-ma

PN1 a-na PN2 di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma

m

f

Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69

*a-mat PN iq-bu-šunu-ti išmu-u2-ma m

i-na pa-ni AUTH. di-i-ni id-bubu-u2-ma

PN1 a-na PN2 ir-gu-mu um-ma

Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254

Wunsch, BA 2, PN1 u3 PN2 . . . [ana] AUTH. a-ma-tiir-šu-u2 di-i-ni ik-šu-du-ni- šu-nu No. 42 im-ma [iš-mu]-u2

TEXT

a-na ša- a-ri [ up-pi ] šu-a-tim

im-tal-ku-ma i-na ša- a-ra up-pi šu-a-tim

mu-kin-nu[ut]-su iš[mu-ma]

im-tal-ku-ma i-na ša- a-ri up-pi šu-a-tim

?

?

sartennu Judges of Nbn

sukkallu, “great ones,” judges of Nbn

šākin ēmi of Babylon Judges elders

sukkallu Judges of Ngl

šākin ēmi of Babylon (elders)

Babylon

?

?

22.VII.1 Ngl

? Ngl

? Nbk

Place of Date composition

m NergalBabylon bānûnu // Rāb-banê m Nabû-a ēiddin//Egibi

11.II.1 Nbn

[mIle iBīt-šar-Bābili 17.VIII.? Nbn Marduk, the scribe, descendant of ] mEppeš-ili

m Mardukšāpik-zēri/ m MušēzibMarduk// Šu aya

?

?


“Royal Judges Style B” Decision Records

Other Intro. of terminology Authorities

Summary Table 1.2

decision records 45

dib-biši-na išmu-u2

[a-na] maar AUTH. ik-šu-dunim-ma

SUBJ. + ina-an-na PN1 u PN2 [a-na] UGU SUBJ. šu-a-tu2 irgu-mu

SUBJ. + i-na-[an-na] PN pa-qa-ri e-li SUBJ. u2šab-šu-u2

Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1

Nbn 495 ?

Judges of Nbn

i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn

?

?

17.I.12 Nbn

? Nbn

? Nbn

Place of Date composition

m Nādinu// [Babylon] Pa āru m Nabû-šumaiškun// Rābbānê

?

?


[ina EŠ.BAR] Judges of di-i-nu šu-a-[ti ] Nbn

Other Intro. of terminology Authorities

* The šemu clause does not immediately follow the plaintiff ’s statement. ** Authorities not mentioned in the beginnings of the texts are listed in parentheses.

?

1-en-ta3am dibbi-ši-na [išmû]

SUBJ. + PN1 [a-na] mau PN2 ana ar AUTH. UGU SUBJ. [ik-šu-d ] su-a-tu2 ir-gu- u-nim-ma [mu-ma]


a-na maar AUTH. ik-šu-du-ma

Confrontation Appearance šemû

TEXT


46 chapter one

decision records 1.C

47

The “Eanna” Styles of Decision Records

In addition to the two “Royal Judges” styles there are two styles of decision records from cases heard at the Eanna temple at Uruk, which will be called “Eanna style A” and “Eanna style B.” “Eanna style A” has the following general outline: I. Subject of case II. Judicial Actions A. Evaluation of evidence B. Decision III. Conclusion A. Names of authorities B. Names of witnesses C. Scribe D. Place of composition E. Date In order to illustrate the features of the “Eanna style A” decision record, the present discussion will take Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 as an example. This text records the decision in the case of two ducks belonging to the Lady of Uruk that were stolen, killed and buried in mud. The decision record will be divided according to the sections presented in the outline above. A discussion of the particular features of each section precedes the presentation of each separate section. For ease of comparison, the different features are presented in graphic format in summary table 1.3 at the end of this section. I. Subject of Case (lines 1–4) In the example below, as in several other examples, the subject of the case is described in a third-person summary.35 In other “Eanna style

35 TCL 12, 119:1–5; TCL 13, 147:1–8; YOS 7, 161:1–6. YOS 7, 7 is a composite decision record of the decisions in numerous charges against mGimillu. The entire text reads as a series of “Eanna style A” decision records. The subject of each case is presented in a summary form. The entire decision record begins with a summary statement in lines 1–5.

48

chapter one

A” decision records, the subject of the case includes quotations of the statements of parties to the case, such as an accusation.36 1. 2 UZ.TURmušen ša2 ¢dGAŠANÜ UNUGki u3 dna-na-[a ša2 qa-puut-tu4] 2. ša2 mni-din-tu4 u3 mgu-za-nu DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdna-na-a[MU . . . U4 11-kam2 ša2 ITI AB] 3. MU 2-kam2 mkam-bu-zi-ia LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL [KUR.KUR. . . 4. ša2 KA2.GAL d15 di-i-ku-ma i-na i- u3 [qit-bu-ru . . . ]

(1–4) 2 ducks, property of the Lady-of-Uruk and Nanaya [from the pen of ] mNidintu and mGuzānu, sons of mNanaya-iddin [ . . . on 11 Tebētu] year 2 of Cambyses king of Babylon king [of the lands] at the Ištar Gate, killed and [buried] in mud.

II. Judicial Actions (lines 5–27) A. Evaluation of Evidence (lines 5–18) In the sample decision record, the evidence consists of the testimony of the criminals themselves, as well as the corpses of the two dead ducks. The testimony is presented to the šatammu and the ša rēš šarri administrator “in the assembly.” The corpses are inspected “in the assembly of the qīpi officials and the mār banî.” These and other adjudicating authorities, such as the scribes of the Eanna, play similar roles in the evaluation of evidence in “Eanna style A” decision records.37

YOS 6, 123:1–6; YOS 6, 225:1–7; YOS 6, 231:1–9; YOS 7, 66:1–8; TCL 13, 170:1–7. 37 See the column labeled “Authorities in Body of Text” in summary table 1.3 at the end of this section. 36

decision records

49

5. mŠEŠ-SUM.NA u3 mda-nu-ŠEŠ. MEŠ-TIN-¢i Ü [DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-KAD2 mdna-na-aŠEŠ-MU] 6. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-aKAM2 u3 mŠEŠ-SUM.NA [DUMU-šu2 ša2 mki-na-a. . . ] ID2 7. ša2 MUŠEN.MEŠ i-na meš- išu2-nu di-i-ku-ma i-[na i- u3 iqte-bi-ru] 8. a-na maar mdNA3-DUIBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. NA DUMU-šu2 ša2 m[na-di-nu DUMU da-bi-bi] 9. u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN. NA [ . . .] 10. ina UKKIN iq-bu-u2 um-ma U4 11-kam2 ša2 ITI AB MU 2-kam2 ni-i-ni u3 mdna-na-a-MU

(5–10) mA a-iddin and mAnua ē-bulli , [sons of mNabû-kā ir, m Nanaya-a a-iddin] son of m Nanaya-ēreš and mA a-iddin [son of Kīnaya . . .] in whose working-area the birds were killed [and buried in mud], said thus before mNabû-mukīn-apli, šatammu of the Eanna, son of m[Nādinu descendant of Dābibī], and m Nabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri, the administrator of the Eanna [. . .], in the assembly:

11. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdin-ninNUMUN-DU3 it-ti a- a-meš ina ku-tal BAD3 ID2 ni- i-¢irÜ-ru

(10–11) “On 11 ebētu, year 2, we were digging below the canal wall, together with mNanaya-iddin son of mInnin-zēra-ibni.”

12. 2 UZ.TURmušen.ME NIG2.GA d GAŠAN UNUGki ša2 qa-pu-uttu4 ša2 mni-din-tu4 u3 mgu-za-nu 13. DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdna-na-aMU ki-i ni-du-ku i-na i- u3 ni-iqte-bir

(12–13) “When we killed 2 ducks, property of the Lady-of-Uruk, from the pen of mNidintu and m Guzānu, sons of mNanaya-iddin, we buried them in mud.”

14. ¢pagÜ-ra-nu ša2 UZ.TURmušen-a 2 ša2 mŠEŠ-MU u3 mdDIŠ-ŠEŠ. MEŠ-TIN-i DUMU.MEŠ 15. ša2 mdNA3-KEŠDA-ir mdna-naa-ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 md na-na-a-APIN-eš 16. mŠEŠ-SUM.NA DUMU-šu2 ša2 mki-na-a u mdna-na-a-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdin-ninNUMUN-DU3 17. i-du-ku-ma ina i- u3 iq-bi-ri i-na UKKIN lu2qi-pa-a-nu u lu2 DUMU DU3-i.[MEŠ] 18. in-nam-ru-ma

(14–18) The corpses of these 2 birds that mA a-iddin and m Anu-a ē-bulli sons of mNabûkā ir, mNanaya-a a-iddin son of m Nanaya-ēreš, mA a-iddina son of mKīnaya, and mNanaya-iddin son of mInnin-zēra-ibni killed and buried in mud were inspected in the assembly of the qīpu officials and the mār banî.

50

chapter one

B. Decision (lines 18–27) The judicial actions end with the actual decision. In the sample decision record, the decision is clearly marked with a sentence with the verb parāsu (“to decide”). This is true of most “Eanna style A” decision records. In other “Eanna style A” decision records, the conclusion of the case with a decision is implicit in the end of the text. Thus, for example, the judicial actions section in YOS 7, 66 ends with the notice that the Eanna authorities returned the slave in question to its owners.38 18. ki-i pi-i lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 m ŠEŠ-SUM.NA 19. mda-nu-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i md na-na-a-ŠEŠ-MU u3 mŠEŠMU i-na UKKIN qi2-pa-a-nu 20. u3 lu2DUMU DU3-i.ME e-li ram-ni-šu2-nu ¢u3Ü [maar] md NA3-DU-IBILA 21. lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA UKKIN 22. lu2TIN.TIRki.ME u3 lu2UNUGkia-a ki UZ.TURmušen 1-en a-di 30 ku-um UZ.TURmušen.ME-a 23. 2 e-li mŠEŠ-MU u3 mdDIŠ-PAP. ME-TIN-i DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-KAD2 mdna-na-aŠEŠ-MU 24. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-KAM m ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 m ki-na-a u mdna-na-a-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdINNIN.NANUMUN-DU3 25. lu2EN ar!- šu2-nu ša2 la in-nam-ru a-na e- e-ru a-na NIG2. GA E2.AN.NA šul-lu-un-du 26. e-li-šu2-nu ip-ru-su UZ.TUR. MEŠ-a 60-šu ib-ba-ku-nim-ma a-na NIG2.GA E2.AN.NA

(18–26) In accordance with the testimony of mA a-iddin, m Anu-a ē-bulli , mNanayaa a-iddin and mA a-iddin against themselves in the assembly of the qīpu officials and the mār banî, and [before] mNabû-mukīn-apli, the šatammu of the Eanna, mNabûa a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri, administrator of the Eanna, the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians—they decided that m A a-iddin and mAnu-a ē-bulli sons of mNabû-kā ir, mNanayaa a-iddin son of mNanaya-ēreš, m A a-iddin son of mKīnaya, and m Nanaya-iddin son of mInninzēra-ibni, their accomplice in crime who was not seen, must pay a thirty-fold restitution for the 2 ducks to the property of the Eanna.

27. i-nam-di-nu

(26–27) They shall bring and pay these 60 ducks to the property of the Eanna.

38 For other examples in which the verb parāsu is not used in the decision, see summary table 1.3 at the end of this section.

decision records

51

III. Conclusion A. Personal Names of Authorities (lines 27–28) In addition to mentioning the authorities in the judicial actions section, the “Eanna style A” decision records also record the names of overseeing authorities at the end of the text. Their role as authorities is indicated by the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (= ušuzzu) ša (“in the presence of ”). As Eva von Dassow notes, this phrase is used “to introduce officials in . . . records of procedures overseen or authorized by them.”39 In the sample decision record, only the names of the šatammu and the administrator follow this phrase. In other texts, a number of other names appear in addition to the names of authorities mentioned in the body of the text. These are probably the names of the members of the “assembly.”40 27. ina u2-šu-uz-zu ša2 mdNA3DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA DUMU mda-bi-bi

(27) In the presence of mNabûmukīn-apli, the šatammu of the Eanna, descendant of Dābibī.

28.

(28) mNabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri, administrator of the Eanna.

md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN SIG5 E2.AN.NA

B. Names of Witnesses In addition to the designation ina DU.ZU (= ušuzzu) ša, the sample text also records names of individuals designated as lu2mu-kin-nu (“witnesses”). Whereas the individuals whose names follow the designation ina DU.ZU ša are the authorities, the individuals designated as lu2mukin-nu serve as witnesses to the proceedings. Their precise role will be considered in the procedural discussion (section 9.J). Unlike the sample decision record, most “Eanna style A” decision records do not include separate groups of names with both designations. Usually, there is only one group of names following either the designation ina DU.ZU ša or lu2 mu-kin-nu, but not both.

Eva von Dassow, “Introducing the Witnesses in Neo-Babylonian Documents,” in R. Chazan, et al., eds., Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Judaic Studies in Honor of Baruch A. Levine (Winona Lake, Indiana, 1999), p. 13. 40 Kümmel, Familie, p. 162. 39

52

chapter one 28.

lu2 mu-kin-nu md30-KAM2 DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MUSI.SA

(28) Witnesses: mSîn-ēreš son of m Nabû-šumu-līšir descendant of Ibni-ilī;

29. DUMU mib-ni-DINGIR md UTU-DU-IBILA DUMUšu2 ša2 mdDI.KU5-PAP.ME-MU DUMU mši-gu-u2-a

(29) mŠamaš-mukīn-apli son of m Madānu-a ē-iddin descendant of Šigûa;

30. mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN DUMU me-gi-bi mdAMAR. UTU-MU-ŠEŠ DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdEN-TIN-i 31. DUMU mbu-u2- u mENKAR-dNA3 lu2SAG mda-nu-MUDU3 DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3SUR DUMU md[PN]

(30–31) mLâbāši-Marduk son of Arad-Bēl descendant of Egibi; m Marduk-šuma-u ur son of mBēluballi descendant of mBū u; (31) mBēl-e ēri-Nabû, ša rēši; mAnušuma-ibni son of mNabû-ušēzib descendant of [PN];

32.

(32–33) mInnin-a a-iddin son of Nabû-bāni-a i descendant of Kurī; mLū a-ana-nūr-Šamaš son of mŠulaya descendant of ŠangûNinurta; (33) mAnu-a a-iddin son of m Gimillu descendant of Kurī;

INNIN-ŠEŠ-MU DUMUšu2 ša2 mdNA3-DU3-ŠEŠ DUMU mKUR-i mlu- a-anaZALAG2-dUTU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mšu-la-a 33. DUMU lu2E2.MAŠ-dMAŠ md DIŠ-ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mŠU DUMU mKUR-i md

m

m

C. Scribe The sample decision record includes the names of two scribes, as does YOS 7, 161. Other texts were written by only one scribe. 33–34.

na-di-nu DUB.SAR DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdEN-ŠEŠ. MEŠ-BA-ša2 DUMU m e-gi-bi mIR3-dAMAR. UTU DUB.SAR DUMU-šu2 ša2 m[dAMAR. UTU-MU-MU DUMU md EN-A-URI3] m

(33–34) mNādinu, the scribe, son of mBēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of Egibi; mArad-Marduk, the scribe, son of [mMarduk-šuma-iddin descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur]

D. Place of composition E. Date 35. UNUGki ITI AB U4 12-kam2 MU 2-kam2 mkam-bu-zi-[ia LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR]

(35) Uruk. 12 ebētu, year 2 of Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

decision records

53

The sample text includes the seals of the šatammu, the administrator and the first three people listed as witnesses. As far as can be seen from published drawings, most decision records from the Eanna at Uruk are not sealed. Explaining why some Eanna decision records are sealed and others are not requires a more complete exploration of the sealing practices in the Eanna archives. Such an exploration goes beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Three decision records from the Eanna follow a different general outline. This outline is designated “Eanna style B.” It is presented below alongside the outline of “Eanna style A” decision records, for comparison purposes: Style B I. Opening A. Personal names B. Transition II. Subject of Case III. Judicial Actions A. Evaluation of Evidence B. Decision

Style A I. Subject of case II. Judicial Actions A. Evaluation of evidence B. Decision III. Conclusion A. Personal names of authorities B. Personal names of witnesses C. Scribe D. Place of composition E. Date

IV. Conclusion A. Scribe B. Place of composition C. Date Comparison between the outlines of the two “Eanna” styles of decision records reveals that both styles record the same information. There does not seem to be a difference between the cases that led to decisions recorded in “Eanna style A” and those that are recorded in “Eanna style B.” The difference between the two styles occurs only in the placement of the personal names. “Eanna style A” decision records place these names after the narration of the subject of the case and the judicial actions. “Eanna style B” decision records, on the other hand, place the personal names at the beginning, before the subject of the case and

54

chapter one

the judicial actions. In both styles, however, the name of the scribe, the place of composition, and the date appear at the end of the text. The “Eanna style B” decision records do not use the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU to designate the names of individuals in whose presence the decision was made. Instead, two of these decision records use the transitional phrase lu2mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses before whom . . .”) or an equivalent phrase lu2DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pānišunu (“the mār banî before whom . . .”).41 This phrase appears in section I, after the names that begin the decision record, while in style A, the names appear in section III. The names at the beginning of the text, therefore, are “witnesses.” The decision that is recorded in the remainder of the text is made “before” them. The precise role of the witnesses in these texts will be discussed in section 9.J below. It now remains to explain the different situations in which the two “Eanna” styles were used. As has been seen, both “Eanna” styles of decision records involve the same adjudicating bodies, so that a difference in venue does not seem to explain the existence of the two styles. However, a possible explanation for the two styles emerges from examination of the names of the scribes who wrote the two different styles of decision records. Most of the “Eanna style A” decision records were written by the scribe mNādin son of mBēl-a ē-iqīša, descendant of Egibi, either alone or together with other scribes.42 mŠamaš-mukīn-apli, his son, wrote one “Eanna style A” decision record (YOS 7, 66) during m Nādin’s lifetime, and the scribe mNabû-mukīn-apli son of mMardukšuma-iddin descendant of Balā u wrote another. On the other hand, m Nādin did not write any of the “Eanna style B” decision records. One explanation, then, for the “Eanna style A” decision records might be that this style is particular to the scribe mNādin and those scribes who imitated him. Another possible explanation is based on the status of these scribes. The scribes who composed the “Eanna style A” decision records seem to have been of especially high rank. In a number of texts, mNādin is designated upšar Eanna (“scribe of Eanna”).43 The three other scribes named in YOS 7, 7 together with mNādin are all designated upšarrū

41 On the equivalence of these two phrases and for a discussion of the term mār banî (usually translated “citizens” or “freemen”), see von Dassow, “Witnesses,” p. 11 n. 24 and Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 919. 42 See summary table 1.3 at the end of this section. 43 Kümmel, Familie, p. 144.

decision records

55

Eanna (“scribes of Eanna”) in the text itself.44 The scribe mArad-Marduk son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin, descendant of Balā u, who wrote Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 and YOS 7, 161 together with mNādin is also known to have been a “scribe of the Eanna,” although only after the composition of these texts.45 mNādin’s son, mŠamaš-mukīn-apli, who wrote YOS 7, 66 is not known with this title, although he is known to have served as the šatammu of the Eanna after serving as a scribe.46 It might be suggested, then, that the “Eanna style A” was used for cases that required high-ranking scribes, perhaps because of the severity of the crimes commmitted. This suggestion remains speculative, however, because both the “Eanna style A” and the “Eanna style B” decision records involve the same adjudicating authorities deciding cases of crimes against the Eanna. Thus, it is difficult to determine what kinds of cases would have required the presence of the higher-ranking scribes. 1.D Comparison of the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna” Styles The discussion of the “Eanna” styles has been limited until now to the comparison between one Eanna style and the other. Similarly, the discussion of the “Royal Judges” styles above focused only on the different situations in which the “Royal Judges style A” and the “Royal Judges style B” documents were composed. One final question which should be addressed is which cases were recorded in the Eanna styles and which were recorded in the “Royal Judges” style. One possibility that should be ruled out is the correlation between authorities and style of decision record. It has already been noted above (section 1.B) that the authorities deciding the cases in “Royal Judges” decision records are not always the royal judges. In fact, the Eanna authorities, who regularly appear in the “Eanna” style decision records, are attested in “Royal Judges” decision records, as well. YOS 6, 92 is a “Royal Judges” style decision record in which the plaintiff addresses his statement to the šākin ēmi of Uruk, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna and the qīpi official of the Eanna. These three officials seal the document, as well. Whereas the “Royal Judges” documents may

44 45 46

YOS 7, 7:28. Kümmel, Familie, p. 144. Kümmel, Familie, p. 143.

56

chapter one

not always include royal judges, the “Eanna” style decision records do always include the Eanna authorities. This does not mean, however, that only these authorities are present. YOS 7, 161 is an “Eanna” style decision record written in the presence of the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. The judges who make the decision in this case, mRīmūt and mBau-ēreš, are known to have been “judges of the king” from other texts.47 The use of an “Eanna” style decision record or a “Royal Judges” decision record does not, therefore, depend on the adjudicating authority. Cases recorded in the “Royal Judges” style may be adjudicated by Eanna authorities and cases recorded in the “Eanna” style may be adjudicated by royal judges. The question of which authorities decided which cases will not be addressed here. The question at hand pertains only to the style of record. Is there a factor that determines whether a case is written in the Eanna or the “Royal Judges” style? Examination of the internal evidence of the different decision records indicates that the style of decision record corresponds to the party who would retain the record. Decision records written in the “Royal Judges” styles were kept by private individuals, while those written in the “Eanna” style were kept in the Eanna’s internal records. The earlier discussion of the decision records indicated that they were retained by the prevailing party. Therefore, one might expect all decision records in which the Eanna prevails to be written in the “Eanna” style. Thus, for example, in YOS 7, 161, the royal judges rule in favor of the Eanna that one mBēl-iqīša must pay thirty-fold for branded sheep belonging to Ištar of Uruk. The Eanna is the prevailing party, and so it would retain the text as proof of mBēl-iqīša’s obligation. The text is written in the “Eanna” style, even though royal judges make the decision. Similarly, in YOS 6, 92, members of the Eanna administration rule in favor of one of two litigants in a dispute pertaining to a plot of land. Because the prevailing party is a private individual, and not the Eanna, the

47 See the discussion of mRīmūt and mBau-ēreš in Kümmel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198. The present transliteration of the name mBau-ēreš follows Kümmel’s. Erle Leichty, in personal communication, has suggested that the theophoric element Bau should be read Baba, based on the regularly attested spelling of this divine name with the KA2 (= bābu) sign. The reading of this divine name poses difficulties in earlier periods, as well. For a recent discussion and survey of the evidence, see Gianni Marchesi, “On the Divine Name dBA.U2,” Or. 71 (2002), pp. 161–172. I am grateful to Philip Jones for this reference.

decision records

57

private individual would retain the decision record, which is written in the “Royal Judges” style. One “Royal Judges” decision record, Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60, however, undermines this direct correlation between the prevailing party and the style. This text comes from a dispute over the possession of a slave branded as property of Ištar-of-Uruk and of Nanaya and her son. The chief brewer of Ištar-of-Uruk and a scribe of the Eanna present the case before the judges of Nabonidus in Babylon against m Nūrea, who is found to be in unlawful possession of the slave. The proceedings, which end with the decision, are described as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

md DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu A m ši-gu-u2-a lu2 UGULA SIRAŠ.MEŠ ša2 d INANNA UNUGki u3 mba-la- u DUMU-šu2 ša2 md30-ib-ni DUB.SAR E2.AN. NA fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni GEME2 ša2 kak-kab-ti rit-ta-šu2 še-en-di-ti u3 a-na dna-na-a ša -ra-tu4 u mta-addan-nu DUMU ša2 fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni it-ti m ZALAG2-e-a DUMU-šu2 ša2 DUGUD-ia a-na ma -ri lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki u2-bil-lu-nim-ma

9. iq-bu-u2 um-ma GEME2 an-ni-tu4 za-ki-tu4

(1–8) mMadānu-a ē-iddin, son of mGimillu descendant of Šigûa, chief of the brewers of Ištar-ofUruk and mBalā u, son of mSînibni, scribe of Eanna, brought f Nanaya- ussinni, a slavegirl whose hand was marked with a star and inscribed ‘of Nanaya’, and mTaddannu, son of fNanayaussinni, with mNūrea, son of m Kabtiya, before the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

(9–10) They said thus: “This slavegirl, oblate of Nanaya, serves m Nūrea.”

10. ša2 dna-na-a mZALAG2-e-a tapal-la 3 mZALAG2-e-a i-pul

(10–11) mNūrea answered thus:

11. um-ma fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni a-na KU3.BABBAR

(11–12) “I purchased fNanayaussinni for silver.”

12. a-ta-bak u3 ina BAL-e mLU2d AMAR.UTU LUGAL TIN.TIRki 13. ul-tu E2-ia ki-i ta -li-qu kak-kab-ti 14. rit-ta-šu2 tal-te-mi-it u3 ša2- a-ri ina UGU 15. rit-ti-šu2 a-na dna-na-a-a tal-ta- ar2 lu2 DI.KU5.MEŠ

(12–15) “During the reign of Amēl-Marduk, king of Babylon, when she escaped from my house, she marked her hand with a star and wrote the inscription ‘of Nanaya’ on her hand.”

58

chapter one 16. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni i-ša2-lu-ma

(15–16) The judges questioned f Nanaya-hussinni.

17. taq-bi um-ma a-di la mZALAG2-e-a (17–19) She said thus: “Before a-na KU3.BABBAR ib-ba-kan-ni mNūrea purchased me for silver, md 18. DUMU-SAG.IL2-lu-mur EN-a mMār-Esagil-lūmur, my previous ma -ra-a a-na master, dedicated me to Nanaya.” 19. dna-na-a uz-sak-ka-an-ni lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ 20. a-ma-a-ti-šu2-nu iš-tim-mu-ma se-pi-ri u2-bil-lu-nim-ma 21. rit-ti ša2 fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni 22. u2-ad-di-ma iq-bi um-ma ša2- a-ri la-bi-ri

(19–22) The judges heard their statements. They brought a sēpiru48 before them and he informed them of fNanaya- ussinni’s hand. He said thus:

23. ša2 u4-mu ru-qu-tu4 a-na dna-na-a-a (22–24) “Her hand is inscribed with an old inscription, from a long time ago: ‘of Nanaya.’ 24. rit-ta-šu2 ša -ra-at 25. u3 ša2- a-ru ša2-na-a ina ša2-pal ša2- a-ri 26. ma -ra-a a-na dINANNA UNUGki ša2- i-ir 27.

(25–26) “And another inscription is written under the earlier inscription: ‘for Ištar of Uruk.’”

DI.KU5.MEŠ a-na mdZALAG2- (27) The judges said thus to m e-a iq-bu-u2 um-ma mi-nam-ma Nūrea: lu2

28. GEME2 ša2 a-na dINANNA UNUGki za-ka-a-ti kak-kab-tu4 29. še-en-di-it-tu4 u3 rit-ta-šu2 a-na d INANNA UNUGki 30. u dna-na-a ša -ra-tu4 a-na KU3. BABBAR tab-ba-ak

(27–30) “Why did you purchase for silver a slavegirl dedicated to Ištar of Uruk, marked with a star, and inscribed for Ištar of Uruk and Nanaya?”

31. u3 at-ta taq-bi um-ma i-na BAL-e m LU2-dAMAR.UTU 32. LUGAL TIN.TIRki GEME2 ul-tu E2-ia ta -liq-ma 33. kak-kab-tu4 rit-ta-šu2 taš-mi-it mi-nam-ma

(31–33) “And you say thus: ‘During the reign of AmēlMarduk, king of Babylon, the slavegirl escaped from my house and marked her hand with a star.’ ”

48 The sēpiru was the alphabetic scribe, who wrote on parchment (CAD S, pp. 225– 226). According to Daniel Arnaud, “Un document juridique concernant les oblats,” RA 67 (1973), p. 156, this scribe was called because the mark on the slavegirl’s arm was in alphabetic characters, used for ease of branding.

decision records 34. ina U4-me-šu2 a-na ma -ri lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ ul tu-bil-šu-ma 35. ar2-kat-su ul ip-ru-us-ma it-ti LU2 ša2 rit-ta-šu2 36. iš- u2-ru ul i-di-in-ka e-li 37. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni u m ta-ad-dan-nu DUMU-šu2

59

(33–36) “Why did you not bring her before the judges on that day? Why did they not investigate her circumstances? Why didn’t anybody judge your case against the man who inscribed her wrist?” (36–38) “You have no claim over Nanaya- ussinni and mTaddannu her son!”

f

38. ul ra-ša2-a-ti lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ im-tal-ku-ma

(38) The judges deliberated.

39. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni u m ta-ad-dan-nu DUMU-šu2 40. it-ti um-man-ni za-bil tup-sik-ku ša2 E2.AN.NA 41. im-nu-u2 mZALAG2-e-a it-ti ar2-ki-šu2 ša2 LU2-ta id-di-nu-šu2 id-dab-bu-ub

(39–41) They considered f Nanaya- ussinni and mTaddannu her son among the gangs of corvée laborers of Eanna. m Nūrea may argue a case with the guarantor of (the one) who sold him the slave.

The decision in this case is in favor of the Eanna authorities; the slavegirl and her son belong to the Eanna, and not to mNūrea. Given the evidence of YOS 7, 161, one would expect this decision to be recorded in the Eanna style, as well, even though the royal judges hear the case. Nevertheless, the decision is clearly written in the “Royal Judges” style. The notice in line 41 seems to hold the key to an explanation. This line allows mNūrea to reclaim his losses by bringing a case against the person who had guaranteed clear title to the slaves. Based on this line, it seems that this decision record was retained by mNūrea in order to justify his eventual claim against the guarantor, rather than by the Eanna authorities. Thus, even though the Eanna authorities prevailed in this case, because the decision record was written for someone outside the Eanna administration, it is written in the “Royal Judges” style.48 Based on the discussion above, one may conclude that the difference between the “Eanna” and “Royal Judges” styles reflects the difference between internal and public records. The “Royal Judges” decision records, even in cases in which the Eanna prevails, were given to someone outside the Eanna administration. Thus, one may say that the “Royal Judges” styles are “public” styles, for use in texts which would be held in personal archives. The “Eanna” styles, on the other hand, are “internal,” for use in the Eanna’s own recordkeeping. 48

šatammu; scribes of Eanna; assembly

assembly

šatammu; administrator of Eanna; scribes of Eanna

qīpu-official of Eanna; šatammu of Eanna; administrator of Eanna; scribes of Eanna; assembly

qīpu-official of (deposit of slaves [lu2MU].DU Eanna; šatammu of with owner) Eanna; administrator of Eanna; scribes of Eanna

YOS 6, 231

TCL 12, 119

YOS 7, 7

YOS 7, 66

ē-iqīša

ina DU.ZU

3 PNs; 1 scribe

Šamaš-mukīn-apli/ Nādin// Egibi m

m

ē-iqīša

m šākin ēmi of Uruk; Nādinu, mKīnaya, m qīpu-official of Eanna; Mūrānu, mBalā u (scribes šatammu of Eanna; of the Eanna) administrator of Eanna; ša mu i quppi; 16 PNs; 4 scribes

m

Nādin and mKīnaya

m Nādin/ mBēl-a // Egibi

ē-iqīša

parāsu

šatammu; administrator; 2 ša rēš šarri officials; 2 PNs; 2 scribes

šatammu; 7 PNs; 1 scribe

m Nādin/ mBēl-a // Egibi

Scribe

m šatammu of Ezida; Nādin/ mBēl-a šatammu of Eanna; ša rēš // Egibi šarri administrator; 3 PNs;1 scribe

ina DU.ZU

ina DU.ZU

šanû of Uruk; 7 PNs; 1 scribe

Names at end of text

(indication that ina DU.ZU evidence is false)

parāsu

(confirmation of accusation?)

ina DU.ZU

YOS 6, 225

parāsu

assembly; adminstrators of Eanna

Introduction of names at end of text

YOS 6, 123

Decision Terminology

Authorities in Body of Text

“Eanna Style A” Decision Records

Text

Summary Table 1.3

23.III.7 Cyr

3.VI.1 Cyr

4.V.17 Nbn

14.IV.17 Nbn

6.XI.12 Nbn

5.VIII.9 Nbn

Date

60 chapter one

TCL 13, 170 šatammu; scribe; ša rēš šarri, assembly of mār banî

2 judges

YOS 7, 161

?

parāsu

ina u2-šu-uz-zu + mu-kin-nu šatammu; administrator; 9 PNs; 2 scribes

šušānu of the king; 3 PNs; 1 scribe


lu2

mu-kin-nu

5 PNs; 1 scribe

i-na u2-šu-uz-zu + šatammu; administrator mu-kin-nu of Eanna; 3 PNs; 2 scribes

lu2

lu2

parāsu

šatammu of Eanna; administrator of Eanna; assembly of qīpu-officials and mār banî; assembly of Babylonians and Urukians

Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101

mu-kin-nu

Introduction of names at end of text lu2


parāsu


TCL 13, 147 šākin ēmi of Uruk; šatammu of Eanna; assembly of Babylonians and Urukians

Text


Nādin // Egibi; Arad-Marduk Bēl-apla-u ur Nabû-mukīn-apli / Marduk-šuma-iddin // Balā u m

m

m

m

Nādin/ mBēl-a ē-iqīša // Egibi; m Arad-Marduk/ [mMarduk-šuma-iddin // Bēl-apla-u ur] m

Nādin// Egibi

m

Scribe

5 Camb

12.XII.3 Camb

12.X.2 Camb

30.III.1 Camb

Date

decision records 61

YOS 7, 128 assembly of [ parāsu] Babylonians and Urukians; collegium of the Eanna; assembly of mār banî

return of slave (see Beaulieu, YOS 19, p. 4)

YOS 19, 91 administrator of Eanna; assembly


parāsu


YOS 19, 90 assembly (?)

Text Šamaš-zērašubši/ Silim-Bēl m

Scribe

2 Nbn

26.X.1 Nbn

Date

m Šamaš-zēra-iddin 13.VII.2 Camb / mA ulap-Ištar // Ekur-zākir

m Ibni-Ištar / šākin ēmi of Uruk; scribe of Eanna; ša rēš mŠula[ya] // šarri in charge of the Gimil-Nanaya chest; šušanu; 12 PNs (1 scribe at end)

DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina 10+ PNs pa-ni-šu2-nu (1 scribe at end)

lu2

lu2

MU.DU.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu

an-nu-tu lu2mu-kin-ne-e ša2 ina 5 PNs pa-ni-šu2-nu (1 scribe at end)

Names listed

“Eanna Style B” Decision Records

Transitional phrase

Summary Table 1.4

62 chapter one

decision records 1.E

63

Non-Stylized Decision Records

The decision records discussed until this point show signs of having been composed according to an identifiable style. The discussion turns now to those decision records that are not composed in one of the four styles outlined above. Although these decision records do not present a clearly defined style, their legal function is the same as other decision records: to record the decision in a case. Therefore, these texts are considered to be of the same text-type as other decision records. In order to be considered a non-stylized decision record, a text must not follow the stylistic criteria of one of the styles presented above. It must, however, indicate the following information: 1) the dispute being decided; 2) the adjudicating authorities; and 3) the authorities’ decision.49 The specifics of the different texts are presented in the summary table at the end of this section. The discussion of these texts will focus on two main issues: the interpretation of the names at the end of the different texts and when the texts were used. The non-stylized decision records all end with personal names. In some, these names are presented in a manner that resembles the end of the “Royal Judges” style texts in that the names are clearly those of the adjudicating authorities. For example, Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251 ends with the phrase ina ma ar (“before”) followed by the names of the judges. Each name is followed by the designation lu2 DI.KU5 (“judge”). Similarly, the designation lu2DI.KU5 follows four of the names at the end of VAS 6, 171. The names at the end of Camb 412, apart from that of the scribe, do not carry any designation. The text itself, however, does mention that the case appeared “before” (ina ma ar) mBēl-uballi who is the šangû of Sippar, the “temple enterers of Šamaš,” and the elders of the city.50 mBēl-uballi ’s name can be restored

49 In Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 the elders of the city, who review the evidence, do not actually reach a decision. Instead, the case ends when the plaintiff “turns back” (i-tur-[ru?]) in the face of the evidence against him. This text is considered a decision record (rather than a settlement) because it is the presentation of the evidence before the elders that leads to the conclusion of the case. AnOr 8, 79, as edited by San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, Vol. 6, pp. 45–47, seems to be the record of a penalty imposed for not fulfilling a sworn obligation. It does not include any details about the procedures that led to the imposition of the penalty, but it is likely that the penalty was imposed at a hearing before the Eanna officials. 50 Camb 412:6–7, 9–10, 11.

64

chapter one

at the end of the text, along with the names of two other individuals, m Iqīša-Marduk son of mEtel-[pî-Šamaš descendant of Šangû-Sippar] and mNabû-a ē-šullim son of mMušēzib-Marduk [descendant of Šangû-Ištar]-Bābili. mIqīša-Marduk is known, from other texts, as a “temple enterer of Šamaš,” while mNabû-a ē-šullim is also known to have been active in the Sippar temple administration.51 Thus, it is clear that Camb 412 ends with the names of authorities, even though the manner in which the names are presented gives no clear indication that they belong to the adjudicating authorities. The names at the end of most of the non-stylized decision records, however, are designated lu2mu-kin-nu (“witnesses”). In some texts, this designation may, nevertheless, refer to the adjudicating authorities, as it might in the “Eanna style B” decision records (see section 9.J). Thus, both Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 and Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129 describe cases in which evidence is presented “before the elders of the city”.52 It is tempting to identify the names at the end of these texts with those of the elders, although there is no solid evidence for this. Caution is similarly in order in the interpretation of Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110. This text mentions an “assembly” (lu2UKKIN), whose members may be identical to those individuals named at the end of the text. In other non-stylized decision records, the designation lu2mu-kin-nu apparently refers to actual witnesses. Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9:12–13 indicates that the decision record was “[wr]itten before m[Marduk]šuma-iddin the šangû of Sippar” (ina maar m[dAMAR.UTU]-MUMU[lu2]SANGA sip-parki ša- a-ru [ša]-ti-ir-ru). After this notice follow four names designated as lu2mu-kin-nu. The text does not mention any other adjudicating entities with which these four names might be identified. This leads to the conclusion that these four people were witnesses to the proceedings. Similarly, in Dar 410, the judge mItti-Nabû-balā u “and his colleagues, the judges” (u3 lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2 lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ) are mentioned in the body of the text.53 mItti-Nabû-balā u’s name does not

51 For m Iqīša-Marduk as a “temple enterer” see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, p. 162. For Nabû-a ē-šullim’s activities see the different references listed in Bongenaar, Ebabbar, p. 527. 52 Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103:15 (a-na ma -ri ši-bu-ut URU); Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:28 (i-na maar lu2ši-bu-tu URU). 53 Dar 410:5. m

decision records

65

appear at the end of the text, and none of the names at the end of the text has the title lu2DI.KU5. In this case, too, the individuals designated as lu2mu-kin-nu witnessed the proceedings but were not judges. Finally, some attention must be given to explaining why the nonstylized decision records exist alongside the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna” styles. As can be seen from summary table 1.5 below, a number of non-stylized decision records were written in Nippur, Dilbat and Borsippa, where no “Royal Judges” decision records are attested. These texts may, therefore, reflect variant regional scribal practices of recording decisions. Similarly, the non-stylized decision records from Babylon are not written by the same scribes as the “Royal Judges” style decision records. Thus, they too may reflect the practices of the different scribes. The non-stylized decision records from Sippar present a unique problem, which is best illustrated by comparing Camb 412, a non-stylized decision record, with Cyr 332, a “Royal Judges style A” decision record. The same scribe, mArad-Bēl son of mBēl-ušallim descendant of Adad-šammê, composed both of these texts. Thus, the difference in style cannot be attributed to the practices of different scribes. The difference in style is not due to different authorities, either, since the same authorities appear in both texts. Furthermore, it is impossible to distinguish between the subjects of the two texts, since both texts pertain to private property. Therefore, it would be incorrect to suggest that in the Ebabbar at Sippar, like in the Eanna at Uruk, the “Royal Judges” styles were used for cases pertaining to private property while another style was used for cases pertaining to temple affairs. Nevertheless, the existence of decision records written in different styles by the same scribe suggests that the different styles were used in different situations. Unfortunately, the evidence of the texts themselves does not offer any clear indication of what these different situations might be.

f PN1 . . . itti [mPN2] šangû of Sippar Termination id-[bu-bu um-ma] of marriage (l. 1–4)

(defendants’ statement)

(unfulfilled oath)

Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9

Cyr 184

AnOr 8, 79 (?)

(oath was sworn Payment to ša rēš šarri)

šangû of Sippar; Payment (?) scribes of Ebabbar

?

judges

?

(claimant turns back)

Decision

VAS 6, 171 (?)

Authority

elders of the city

Dispute Terminology

[Arad-Bēl /] Bēl-ušallim// descendant of Adad-šammê

Nabû-bēlšunu/ Nūrea

MU.DU + 3 PNs; 1 scribe lu2

[Arad-Bēl/ Bēl]-ušallim// Adad-šammê m

m

m

m

m

[lu2MU.DU] + 3 PNs; 1 scribe

ina maar [lu2]SANGA sip-parki ša- aru [ša]- i-ir-ru; [lu2]mu-kin-nu + 4 PNs; 1 scribe

Uruk

[Sippar]

[Sippar]

Dilbat

30.III.8 Cyr (as read by San Nicolò, SBAW 1937 Vol. 6, p. 46)

26.?.4 Cyr

26.?.4 Cyr

2.II.? (Persian royal epithet)

11.VI.1 Nbn

Place of Date Composition

m Ea-iddin/mBalā u Babylon // Maštuk

Scribe

4 judges; qīpu of mMarduk-balāssuE-imbi-Anim; iqbi šatammu of Eimbi-Anim; 9 PNs; 1 scribe

lu2 mu-kin-nu + 5 PNs; 1 scribe


Non-Stylized Decision Records

Rutten, RA 41 PN pa-qa-ri a-na (1947), pp. 99–103 UGU u2-¢šeb-šiÜ (l. 13–14)

Text

Summary Table 1.5

66 chapter one

Payment

lu2 m MU.DU + Tāqiš-Gula / Payment ? (related to PBS 5(+) PNs (3 with mIddin-Bēl titles); 1 scribe 2/1, 140)

a-na maar judges AUTH. di-i-ni tu-te-lu- -ma (l. 5–7)

pa-qa-ru . . . iš-kunu-ma (l. 5–8)

PN1 ša2 . . . it-ti assembly PN2 . . . i-rag-gu-mu

PN1 ša2 KI PN2 [ir-gu-mu iq-bu-u2 um-ma] (l. 1–2)

Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251

PBS 2/1, 140

Stolper, Entrepreneurs No. 110

assembly [of the citizens of Nippur]

judges

Payments

Ownership of house

Ownership of prebends

—

—

m Mušēzibi-Bēl// Egibi

[Nippur]

[Nippur]

Borsippa

Babylon

lu2 m mu-kin-nu + Arad-Ba u// 12 PNs; 1 scribe Ašlāku

ina maar + 2 judges; 1 scribe; 1 PN

[Sippar]

lu2 mu-kin-nu + [mBēl]-uballi / 10 PNs; 1 scribe mLīšir // [ŠangûIštar-Bābili]

[6 Dar II] (see PBS 2/1, 140)

6 Dar II

9.I.32 Dar

10.VIII.15 Dar

11.VII.? Dar

27.XI.8 Camb

Sippar

Arad-Bēl/ Bēl-ušallim// Adad-šammê m

m

Dar 410

elders of the city

3 PNs + 1 scribe

PN . . . ir-gu-um um-ma (l. 20–23)

šangû of Sippar, Payment “temple enterers,” elders


Scribe

Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129


?

Decision

Camb 412

Authority

Dispute Terminology

Text


decision records 67

CHAPTER TWO

OTHER TEXT-TYPES INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES The previous chapter focused on one text-type—the decision record— and on analyzing the different styles in which decision records were composed. This text-type, however, is not the only one that provides evidence for the final resolution of disputes. There are three other texttypes that provide similar evidence: conclusions, memoranda including decisions, and settlements. Like the decision records, these three text-types include some mention of a dispute and how it was resolved. Unlike the decision records, however, they were not composed only for the purpose of recording the decision. Although these text-types mention that a dispute has ended by means of a decision, this decision is secondary to their actual purpose. 2.A

Conclusions of Disputes

Like the decision records, these texts also mention a legal dispute and the decision reached by the adjudicators. Unlike the decision records, however, conclusions do not end with the authorities’ decision. Instead, they continue with some record pertaining to the subject of the case after the ruling. In most cases, the texts conclude with the transfer of the property in question to its rightful owner in compliance with the outcome of the recorded dispute. The different conclusions, which depend directly on the particulars of each case, are listed in summary table 2.1 at the end of this section. The formulation of conclusions does not follow an identifiable outline. To be classified as a conclusion, a text must include evidence of the following: a dispute adjudicated by a legal authority and actions pertaining to the subject of the dispute subsequent to the decision. The evidence of these different elements from the texts classified as conclusions is presented in summary table 2.1 at the end of this section, as well.

70

chapter two

In order to describe the specific legal function of the conclusion, Nbn 668 will serve as an example. This text is especially illustrative because it can be situated within a “dossier” of texts pertaining to the same case. The case surrounds mBēl-rēmanni’s legal efforts to take possession of four slaves as compensation for having repaid a debt on behalf of m Arad-Gula. As Wunsch has noted, Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 13 and TCL 12, 122 are the two “Royal Judges” decision records that indicate that mBēl-rēmanni was entitled to receive the slaves as payment.1 Nbn 668 was composed one month after TCL 12, 122, the second of the two decisions, by mNādin and mNabû-šuma-iškun, the same court scribes who wrote TCL 12, 122. The conclusion begins by presenting the basic history of the case. It then reads as follows: 9. ar2-ki mdEN-re-man-ni 10. fa-na-dtaš-me-tum-at-kal f GEME-ia 11. fdna-na-a-a-na-E2-šu2 u mdzaba4-ba4-SUM.NA 12. UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mIR3-dgu-la E2 maš-ka-ni-šu2 13. a-na maar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ LUGAL ub-lam-ma

(9–13) Afterwards, mBēl-rēmanni brought fAna-Tašmētu-atkal, f Amtiya, fNanaya-ana-bītīšu and m Zababa-iddin, the household slaves of mArad-Gula, which were pledged to him, before the judges of the king.

14. LU2-tu2 ša a-na ku-mu 3 MA.NA 50 GIN2 [KU3. BABBAR] 15. ŠAM2 gam!-ru-tu pa-ni mdEN-reman-nu 16. ki-i pi-i up-pi-šu2 u2-šad-gi-l[u]

(14–16) They gave the slaves instead of the full price—3 mina 50 šeqel [of silver]—to mBēlrēmannu, in accordance with his tablet.

17. na-din ma- ir a-pil2 ru-gum-ma-a ul i-ši

(17) He is given, received, and quit. He has no claim.

The mention that the judges transferred the slaves to mBēl-rēmanni is the aspect of Nbn 668 that characterizes the text as a conclusion, rather than a decision record.2 The decision in this case was reached one month earlier, as is clear from the decision record TCL 12, 122. Even with this decision record in hand, however, it took one month for m Bēl-rēmanni to gain possession of the slaves. Thus, although a ruling had been reached, the matter was not closed until mBēl-rēmanni has

Wunsch, AfO 44–45 (1997–1998), pp. 68–70. For similar notices in conclusions see McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:8; Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106: 21–23; BE 9, 69: 8–9 and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109:15. 1 2

other text-types including the resolution of disputes

71

received the slaves. The notice in line 17 that “he is given, received, and quit,” and that “he has no claim”, points directly to the purpose for which the conclusion was written. The purpose of the conclusion is to serve as record that the parties have actually complied with the judges’ decision. It is at this point that the case is actually closed. In addition to the notice that mBel-rēmanni has received payment, Nbn 668 also includes the following statement: 18. u3 aš2-šu2 ma-ti-ma la sa- a-riim-ma 19. a-na UGU LU2-tu2 šu-a-tu2 la ra-ga-mu lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ 20. up-pi iš- u-ru-ma ina na4 .MEŠ-šu2-nu ib-rumu-ma 21. a-na mdEN-re-man-ni id-di-nu

(18–21) And so that there will be no turning back and raising a claim regarding these slaves, the judges wrote a tablet and sealed it with their <seals> and gave it to mBēl-rēmanni.

This notice, and ones like it from other conclusions,3 is similar to those mentioned at the beginning of the typological discussion of the decision records (section 1.A above). These notices state that the decision records were written as proof of the decision in order to prevent future claims. The appearance of such notices in the conclusions indicates that the conclusions are written to prevent future claims, as well. The conclusions, then, have a dual legal purpose. Like the decision records, they serve as a record of the decision itself, and thus prevent reopening the case. But they also go beyond the decision records by recording that the parties actually complied with the decision. One feature common to all the text-types discussed thus far is the presence of a clearly identifiable adjudicating authority, such as the royal judges or the assembly of the Eanna at Uruk. The role that these authorities play as adjudicators is obvious from the texts themselves. In the “Royal Judges” style decision records, for example, the judges appear not only when their names are recorded at the end of the texts; their actions as judges are recorded within the text, as well. The same may be said for the other styles of decision records and for the conclusions of disputes. The presence of adjudicators is not entirely apparent in the other two text-types that mention the decision of legal disputes: the memoranda

3 McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:7; Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106:23–26; BE 9, 69:9–14; Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109:15–17.

judges

DI.KU5.MEŠ giving control transfer of of property slaves as ina up-pi iš- upayment ru-ma (l. 1–2) [cf. Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 13 and TCL 12, 122]

Nbn 668

Wunsch, BA 2, See Wunsch’s No. 48 restorations

lu2

Nebuchadnezzar; “assembly”

ina pu ur ummāni la ba-la -su iq- sale of eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma bi-ma napišti-šu confiscated (l. 17–18) ik-ki-su field (l. 19–29)

giving control transfer of of property house to heir

m Mardukibni/mA i[X]

Scribe

m AradBēl/ mBēlušallim// [AdadŠammê]

m i-na maar 5 Nādin and PNs up-pi ša2- mNabûir; 2 scribes šuma-iškun (see “Royal Judges” summary tables)

m Nabûina ka-nak IM.DUB šuāti; mukīn-apli/ m ina ušuzzu ša2 Nabû+ 10 PNs bēlšunu// (including Iddin-d[X] šangû of Borsippa); 1 scribe

ina [DU.ZU] + 9 PNs; 1 scribe

Names

šangû of Sippar; ina E³.BAR “temple enterers;” DI.KU5 city elders MU.MEŠ; šangû of Sippar; 1 PN; 1 scribe

assembly

Weidner, AfO 17 (1954– 1956), pp. 1–5

payment

Authority

[di-ni] ig-re-e-ma di-in-šu2-nu (l. 2); di-i-ni id- un-de-e-si-ma bu-bu-ma (l. 3) (l. 3–4); ip-rusu (l. 5)

Conclusion

McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38

Decision

Dispute

Conclusions

Text

Summary Table 2.1

[Sippar]

Babylon

Borsippa

—

4.I.7 [Cyr]

26.XI.12 Nbn

22.XI.11 Nbk

6.VI.5 ?


72 chapter two

PN1 ša2 ina (ownership of UKKIN property) EN.LIL2¢kiÜ a-na PN2 iq-bu-u2 umma (l. 1–2)

di-i-ni ir-gu-mušu2 . . . it-ti [PN] (l. 12–13)

BE 9, 69

Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109

?

payment

ownership PN1 ra-gaof property [mu] . . . u2established šab4-šu-u (l. 8–9); PN1 PN2 u PN3 di-i-ni ina UKKIN [it-ti a- a-meš ] . . . idbu-bu-u2-ma (l. 12–14)

Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106

payment

payment

payment

order to pay

ina qi2-bi lu2 sar-ten-nu u DI.KU5.MEŠ (l. 10–11)

VAS 4, 87

Conclusion

Decision

Dispute

Text


?

assembly of Nippur

assembly of [mār banî ] of Nippur

sartennu and judges

Authority

[scribe]

lu2 MU.DU + 22 PNs; 1 scribe

lu2 MU.DU + 17 PNs (including šaknu and paqudu of Nippur)


Names

m Ninurtanā ir/ m ManuEnlil-dāri

m

Bēlšunu/ Ninurtanā ir

Nippur

Nippur

Nippur

?

m

Babylon

9.XII.0 Dar II

4.XII.39 Artaxerxes

6.IV.20 Artaxerxes

4.II.1 Dar


m Mardukšuma-ibni/ m Bēl-aplaiddin// Egibi

Scribe

other text-types including the resolution of disputes 73

74

chapter two

including decisions and the settlements. Properly understanding these two text-types requires attention to this additional ambiguity. More specifically, in order to properly situate these text-types within the ‘tablet trail’, one must determine not only what stage of adjudication they reflect, but also how the cases they describe were adjudicated. Were judges or other adjudicators present, or were the cases that these texts describe settled without formal judicial intervention? 2.B

Memoranda Including Decisions

The memoranda derive their name from the words ta sistu lā mašê (“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) that occur at the end of most of them.4 One additional defining feature of this text-type is the absence of the scribe’s name.5 The phrase ta sistu lā mašê commonly occurs in Neo-Babylonian texts that do not include the name of the scribe.6 The absence of the scribe’s name and the designation of some of the texts as ta sistu point to the function of this text-type. The memoranda were meant for the scribe’s own use, rather than as an official legal record of how a case was decided. The scribe might have composed such a document to remind himself of the actual proceedings. All the important information would have been recorded, but the scribe’s own name would not have been necessary. The memoranda might have served the scribe in composing the more formal documents. The memoranda may be divided into two styles, one from Babylon and the other from outside Babylon. The memoranda written in Babylon have the following basic outline: I. Descriptive sentence(s) A. Designation of names B. Dispute C. Decision II. Names III. Place of composition and date IV. ta sistu lā mašê TCL 13, 212:15; BE 8/1, 29:32; VAS 6, 38:21; VAS 6, 89:17. This absence is first noted by San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 608. 6 This conclusion is based on examination of the Neo-Babylonian examples cited in CAD mašû A 1d (M1, p. 400) and AHw. ta sistu 4 (p. 1302). 4 5


75

The relevant parts of VAS 6, 89, a memorandum written in Babylon, will serve to illustrate the different elements of this text-type. The text will first be presented in its entirety. Then, the different components will be presented in terms of the outline above. The specific details of other memoranda are presented in summary table 2.2 at the end of this section. VAS 6, 89 pertains to a dispute between two descendants of the Nappā u clan, mŠākin-šumi and mBalā u, over income from a certain prebend (isqu). mŠākin-šumi’s claim to the income is granted and m Balā u forfeits his claim to the income. mBalā u places the income at the disposal of mŠākin-šumi, apart from 10 šeqels which mBalā u gave on behalf of mŠākin-šumi in a payment of some kind.7 The text itself reads as follows:8 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

DUMU-DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu mGAR-MU A-šu2 ša2 mnad-na-a A lu2 SIMUG u mTIN A-šu2 ša2 md AMAR.UTU-SU A lu2SIMUG it-ti a- a-meš a-na UGU is-qu pa-ni dEN-URU-ia ša2 urusar-raba-nu id-bu-bu--ma mTIN a-na UGU is-qu lu2

6. la u2-šar-šu-u2 mTIN a-na m GAR-MU

(1–5) The mār banî before whom m Šākin-šumi son of mNadnaya descendant of Nappā u and m Balā u son of mMarduk-erība descendant of Nappā u argued against each other regarding the prebend-income from Bēl-āliya of Šarrabanu.

(5–6) They did not allow mBalā u possession of the prebend-income.

7. iq-bu-u2 um-ma a-mur is-si-qi2 ina pa-ni-ka 8. al-la 10 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR ša2 a-na msu-za-a 9. a-na mu - i-ka ad-di-nu 10. i bi-in-nu

(6–7) mBalā u said thus to mŠākinšumi: (7–10) “Look here! My prebendincome is at your disposal, except for the 10 šeqel which I gave to m Suzaya on your behalf. Give (that) to me!”

11. mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2 mDI.KU5d AMAR.UTU A mdEN- -u2

(11) mMūranu son of mDayyānMarduk descendant of Bēliyau;

12. mna-din A-šu2 ša2 ma-ta-mard A.NUN.SU

(12) mNādin son of Atamard Nusku;

7 For the later history of this income, see San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 615 and Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), p. 37 and pp. 129–130. 8 Readings follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), No. 50 (pp. 129–130).

76

chapter two 13.

md EN-u2-sep-pe A-šu2 ša2 mENšu2-nu A mba-bu-tu

(13) mBēl-useppe son of mBēlšunu descendant of Bābūtu;

14. mIR3-dgu-la A-šu2 ša2 mki-rib-tu A lu2dul-lu-pu

(14) mArad-Gula son of mKiribtu descedant of Dullupu;

15.

(15) mBēl-iddin son of mMardukerība descendant of Nappā u.

EN-MU A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR. UTU-SU A lu2SIMUG TIN. TIRki

md

16. ITI ŠU U4 25-kam2 MU 17-kam2 mdNA3-I 17. LUGAL Eki ta -sis-tu4 la mašše-e

(16–17) Babylon. 25 Du ūzu, year 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon. (17) Memorandum not to be forgotten.

In terms of the outline above, the components of VAS 6, 89 may be presented as follows: I. Descriptive sentence(s) (Lines 1–6) A. Designation of personal names (1) lu2 DUMU-DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu B. Dispute (1–5) m PN1 u mPN2 it-ti a- a-meš a-na UGU is-qu . . . id-bu-bu-ma C. Decision (5–6) m PN2 a-na UGU is-qu la u2-šar-šu-u2 “The mār banî before whom mPN1 and mPN2 argued against each other regarding the prebend-income . . . They did not allow mPN2 possession of the prebend-income.” II. Names 5 PNs III. Place of composition and Date Babylon. 25 Du ūzu, year 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon. IV. ta -sis-tu4 la maš-še-e “Memorandum, not to be forgotten.” The two extant memoranda not written in Babylon include all of the same elements in a slightly different order. The names appear at the very beginning. The following sentence identifies all the named individuals as mār banî and mentions the dispute. For comparison purposes, the outlines of the two different styles are presented here side-by-side.


77

Decision Memoranda from Babylon

Decision Memoranda from outside Babylon

I. Descriptive Sentence(s) A. Designation of Names B. Dispute C. Decision II. Names

I. Names

III. Place of composition and date IV. ta sistu lā mašê

II. Descriptive Sentence(s) A. Designation of Names B. Dispute C. Decision III. Place of composition and date IV. ta sistu lā mašê

VAS 6, 89, the memorandum quoted above, demonstrates that the situation described in this text-type is very similar to the situations described in the decision records. A case is “argued” (dabābu) “before” (ina pāni ) a group of people; in VAS 6, 89 they are designated as mār banî. The use of the prepositional phrase ina pāni together with the verb dabābu suggests that the group of mār banî are the adjudicators.9 The same idiom—dabābu ina pāni—or the semantically equivalent dabābu ina ma ar occurs in a number of “Royal Judges style B” decision records, where it describes the arguing of the case “before” the judges. In VAS 6, 89, it is the mār banî who do not allow mBalā u possession of the prebend income. Thus, the memorandum itself shows that the mār banî play a role in adjudicating the case argued before them. In VAS 6, 89, the evidence for the adjudicatory role played by the named individuals comes from the use of the idiom dabābu ina pāni together with the actions described. Several other memoranda offer evidence in addition to the use of dabābu ina pāni which underscores the fact that the named individuals play an adjudicatory role. This additional evidence includes the designation of the individuals named in Nbk 109 as lu2da-a-ne-e (“judges”) or, in BE 8/1, 29 as lu2ši-bu-tu ša2 EN.LIL2ki (“the elders of Nippur”). The opening sentence of VAS 6, 38 reads: lu2[mu-kin-nu ša2 ina] pa-ni-šu2-nu mP[ N1 itti ] mPN2 di-i-[ni-šu2 ša2] ša -le-e a-na UGU pi-i-šu2-nu iš-ku-un (“[The witnesses] before whom

9 See the “Appearance” column in the summary table of the “Royal Judges style B” decision records (summary table 1.2).

78

chapter two

P[N1] presented [his c]ase regarding the cress [against] mPN2 for their adjudication”).10 The verb dabābu does not occur, but the case (dīnu) is presented (šakānu) before (ina pāni ) the individuals for their judgment. Furthermore, in the lines that follow this introduction, the litigants swear that “we shall not change their judgment that they judge for us” (mim-ma ma-la i-di-nu-na-šu2 di-i-ni-šu2-nu nu-ul-ta-nu-u2).11 In the memoranda discussed thus far, there is clear evidence that the people “before whom” the case is argued are those who decide the case. There are, however, memoranda that use the idiom dabābu ina pāni without any additional evidence that the people “before whom” the case is argued play an adjudicatory role. The question arises in YOS 17, 320, in which the individuals are designated as lu2mu-kin-nu (“witnesses”) and in TCL 13, 212, where the text containing the designation is broken. On the one hand, the use of the term dabābu ina pāni may indeed indicate that, like the “witnesses” in the Eanna decision records, the individuals named in these memoranda served in an adjudicatory capacity. On the other hand, the individuals “before whom” the case was argued may have served not as judges, but as witnesses. It may be that the case was argued and settled between the two parties without any need for adjudication. m

2.C

Settlements

The presentation of the document typology began by positing that each text-type has its own legal function. The identification of the settlements, the text-type to be discussed here, deviates from this methodological axiom. Instead of a common legal function, the settlements share a common setting. All of them record disputes resolved without mentioning a ruling by an authority. Because they share a common setting, rather than a common legal function, texts of this text-type may share a purpose with one of the other text-types described above. Thus, for example, at least one settlement resembles a conclusion. It records

10 Restored based on the translation of VAS 6, 38:1 as “(Diese sind) d[ie Zeugen v]or welchen” in San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 609. Their translation reflects the restoration of the line as lu2[mu-kin-nu ša2 ina] pa-ni-su2-nu. Whatever the missing noun, it is clear from the remainder of the text that the people play an adjudicatory role. 11 For this interpretation of the oath, see CAD dânu b3’ (D, p. 103).

other text-types including the resolution of disputes Summary Table 2.2 Text

Designation of Names

TCL ? 13, 212

lu2 ši-bu-tu ša2 BE 8/1, 29 EN.LIL2ki + 5 PNs; ina DU.ZU + 7 PNs lu2 YOS mu-kin-nu 17, 320

Nbk 109

lu2

da-a-ne-e

VAS 6, ? 38

VAS 6, lu2DUMU 89 DU3.MEŠ

79

Memoranda Including Decisions

Dispute Terminology

Decision


PN1 di-i-nu . . . it- ? ti [PN2] id-dabbu-ub-ma (l. 12–14) ? ?

—

—

[Nippur]

15.VII.? Nbk

PN1 it-ti PN2 dii-ni i-dab-bu-ubma (l. 11–13) [di]-i-ni . . . id-bubu (l. 5–6)

Nippur

21.IX.10 Nbk

return of slave

return of Babylon property to plaintiff PN1 [it-ti] PN2 a-na PN2 Babylon di-i-[ni-šu2] . . . a- iq-bu-u2 na UGU pi-ium-ma + šu2-nu iš-ku-un (l. ruling 1–7) (l. 10–15) PN1 u PN2 it-ti la u2-šar-šu- Babylon a- a-meš . . . idu2 (l. 6) bu-bu-ma (l. 1–5)

6.I.17 Nbk 24.III.34 Nbk

25.IV.17 Nbn

not only the ruling, but the compliance, as well.12 It is considered a settlement rather than a conclusion because it does not mention the activities of authorities. The fact that these settlements result from a dispute is apparent from the verbs used, or from the situations described by the texts. This evidence is presented in summary table 2.3 below. The use of terms such as dīna dabābu or dīna gerû may offer some insight into the setting in which these texts were composed. In order to illustrate this point, it is best to present one of the settlements, Dar 260. In this text, m Karêa and his wife, fNuptaya, initiate litigation against mNergal-a aiddin, fNuptaya’s son from a previous marriage. mNergal-a a-iddin is

12

BIN 1, 141.

80

chapter two

in possession of several slaves to whom mKarêa and fNuptaya have a claim, presumably through fNuptaya. Fearing the pending litigation, m Nergal-a a-iddin returns the living slaves and swears that he will compensate his mother and her new husband for the death of one of the slaves. The litigants settle out of court. The text itself, before the names of witnesses, reads as follows: 1. di-i-ni ša2 mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 md EN-DA A mŠEŠ-u2-tu 2. u3 fnu-up-ta-a DUMU.SALsu ša2 mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi ¢DAMÜ-šu2 3. a-na mu - i fku-uz-ba-a u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 u mdNA3- uršu2 UN.MEŠ E2-šu2-nu 4. it-ti mdU.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 mŠEŠ.MEŠ-e-a ir-gu-mu-

(1–4) The suit of mKarêa son of Bēl-lē i descendant of A ūtu and f Nuptaya daughter of mNabûbalāssu-iqbi, his wife, regarding f Kuzbaya and her sons and mNabûu uršu, the members of their household, which they brought against mNergal-a a-iddin son of m A êa.

5.

md U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU di-i-ni i-dur6 -ma it-ti mka-re-e-a 6. u fnu-up-ta-a AMA-šu2 a-na daba-ba di-i-ni 7. la il-lik fku-uz-ba-a u3 DUMU. MEŠ-šu2 i!-ter-ri-ba

(5–7) mNergal-a a-iddin feared the suit and he did not come to argue the case against mKarêa and f Nuptaya, his mother. (7) He returned fKuzbaya and her sons.

8. a-na mka-re-e-a u3 fnu-up-ta-a AMA-šu2 it-te-me 9. ki!-i! 4 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR ku-um mdNA3- ur-šu2 ša2 ina E2 md U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU 10. mi-ti a-na mka-re-e-a fnu-up-ta-a AMA-šu2 [i-nam-din]

(8–10) He swore to mKarêa and f Nuptaya his mother that [he will pay] 4 mina of silver in exchange for mNabû-u uršu, who died in the house of mNergal-a a-iddin to m Karêa (and) fNuptaya, his mother.

11.

U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 ŠEŠ.MEŠ-e-a a-ŠIR-tu4 it-ti m ka-[re-e-a] 12. u3 fnu-up-ta-a DUMU.SAL-su ša2 mdNA3-TIN-su-E AMA-šu2 i-nam-[din]

(11–12) mNergal-a a-iddin, son of mA êa s hall p[ ay] . . . with m Ka[rêa] and fNuptaya, daughter of mNabû-balāssu-iqbi, his mother.

13. dib-bi ša2 mka-re-e-a u3 fnu-up-taa [a-na mu - i] 14. a-me-lut-tu4 u3 man-da-at-tu4. MEŠ it-ti m[dNA3-ŠEŠ-MU] 15. qa-tu-u2

(13–15) The case of mKarêa and f Nuptaya [regarding] the slaves and the payments against mNabû-a aiddin is settled.

md m

m

other text-types including the resolution of disputes 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 ŠEŠ.MEŠ-a-a m[ka-re-e-a] A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DA A mŠEŠu2-tu u3 fnu-up-ta-a AMA-šu2 [. . .] a-na mu - i aa-meš ina dEN dNA3 u a-de-e ša2 mdari- u-šu2 LUGAL [Eki u KUR. KUR] a-na a- a-meš it-te-mu-u2 ki-i a-na UGU md m

21. ša2 ni-pu-uš ni-te-e -si man-daat-tu4.MEŠ 22. mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DA A mŠEŠ-u2-tu4 [u3 fnu-up-ta-a] 23. AMA-šu2 ina ŠU.2 mdU.GURŠEŠ-MU

81

(16–20) mNergal-a a-iddin son of A ēa, m[Karêa] son of mBēl-lē i descendant of A ûtu and f Nuptaya his m other . . . swore by B ēl, Nabû and the oaths of Darius king [of Babylon and the lands] to each other: (20–21) “Whatever we have agreed we have received.”

m

(21–23) mKarêa son of mBēl-lē i descendant of A ūtu, and f Nuptaya, his mother, have received the payments (for the slaves) from m Nergal-a a-iddin.

As with all the texts of this text-type, judges or other officials are not mentioned as part of the proceedings. In fact, the text specifically mentions that the case never reaches a court because “mNergal-a a-iddin feared the suit and he did not come to argue the case.” Thus, it is possible that the entire text records a settlement reached between the parties once mNergal-a a-iddin concedes. The text does not mention the names of authorities because no authorities were involved. On the other hand, the opening of the text describes the situation as dīni ša m Karêa u fNuptaya . . . itti mNergal-a a-iddin irgumū (“The suit which mKarêa and f Nuptaya raised against mNergal-a a-iddin”). Similar phrases occur in “Royal Judges style B” decision records, in which judges clearly have a role. It is possible, therefore, that the opening phrase of Dar 260 indicates that judges were involved in an early stage of the process, but that the settlement was reached before they had to decide the case. Another settlement that raises similar ambiguities is VAS 6, 127. In terms of form, this text closely resembles the memoranda from Babylon described earlier (section 2.B). Before the names, the text reads as follows:13

13

Transliteration and translation follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), No. 9.

82

chapter two 1.

DUMU DU3-i.MEŠ ša2 ina IGI-šu2-nu mni-din-tu A-šu2 ša2 md NA3-MU-MU 2. a-na mMU-dNA3 A-šu2 ša2 md NA3-DU3-NUMUN A lu2 SIMUG 3. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ra-šu-ta-a ina mu - i 4. mše-el-le-bi DUMU-ka ia-a-nu

(1–3) The mār banî before whom m Nidintu son of mNabû-šuma-iddin said thus to mIddin-Nabû son of m Nabû-bāni-zēri descendant of Nappā u:

5. u a-na mu - i-šu2 ul a-kaš2-ša2-du

(5) “And I will not proceed against him.”

lu2

(3–4) “There is no debt owed by m Šellebi, your son.”

The situation may be reconstructed as follows. mŠellebi, son of mIddin-Nabû, has taken a loan from mNidintu. Apparently faced with the threat of impending legal proceedings against his son, mIddin-Nabû has repaid the debt. “Before” (ina pāni ) six mār banî, mNidintu declares that mŠellebi is no longer in his debt. mNidintu also declares that he will not undertake legal proceedings against mŠellebi.14 The role of the mār banî in this text may simply have been as witnesses to mNidintu’s declarations. It is also possible, however, that by their very presence the mār banî constitute an adjudicating body. mNidintu may have begun proceedings by turning to these mār banî, perhaps with a demand for repayment of the debt. The debt was paid before any further action was required; the case was thus settled. The defining feature of the settlements is the absence of adjudicating authorities. The discussion above has offered several ways to understand this absence. It is possible that no authorities were ever involved in the case. It stands to reason that not all cases had to appear before judges or any other officially sanctioned adjudicating body. Alternatively, because all the settlements include the names of witnesses or mār banî, it is possible that these individuals served as arbiters in these cases. Finally, the inclusion of dispute terminology such as dīna gerû or dabābu raises the possibility of some official initiation of proceedings. These phrases may indeed reflect a formal procedure, and not simply an informal confrontation between the parties. If so, then it is possible that even though judges or other adjudicators are not mentioned in the settlements, they are nonetheless involved, at least in the initial stages of the case. 14 For the translation of the expression kašādu ana mu i as “to proceed against” see CAD kašādu 1d (K, p. 276) and AHw. kašādu 9 (p. 460).

other text-types including the resolution of disputes Summary Table 2.3

83

Settlements

Text

Dispute Terminology

Decision

Names

Scribe

Place of Composition

Date

BIN 1, 141

di-i-ni ig-re-u2ma um-ma (l. 3–4)

? (ul i-ta-tarma . . . ul i -dabbu-ub)

—

—

—

—

Evetts, Ner. 36

PN1 it-ti PN2 i-dab-bu-ub umma (l. 9–11)

?

lu2

mu-kin-nu + 6 PNs; 1 scribe

Šamašzēra-iqīša/ m Balā u// Šigûa

Babylon

28.IV.2 Ngl

YOS 6, 18/ YOS 19, 100

PN1 a-na PN2 u2-paq-qi-ru (l. 8–9)

claim rejected


m Nabû-šuma- Uruk imbi/mTaqīšGula// anbu

8.XI.1 Nbn


claim made in lines 3’–4’

release of property

lu2

mu-kin-nu + 5 PNs + 1 scribe

[mItti-Nabû- ? balā u]/ m Mardukšuma-[u ur// Nappā u]

[22.VI.5 Camb?]

Dar 260

di-i-ni ša2 PN1 u3 PN2 . . . it-ti PN4 ir-gu-mu(l. 1–4)

dib-bi ša2 PN1 u3 PN2 . . . qatu-u2

[lu2mu-kinnu] + 12 PNs; 1 scribe

Ša rini Nabûapla-iddin/ m Nabû-šumaiškun// Šangû-NinEanna

25.VIII.9 Dar

VAS 6, 127

—

a-na mu - i-šu2 6 mār banî ul a-kaš2-ša2-du

—

Babylon

18.VI.11 Dar

BE 10, 9

charge made in l. 1–4

DI.KU5 u raga-mu . . . a-na u4-mu a-a-tu2 ia-a-nu

Šulaya/ Ninurtanā ir

Nippur

16.I.1 Dar II

MU.DU + 9 PNs; 1 scribe lu2

m

m

m m

CHAPTER THREE

PRELIMINARY PROTOCOLS AND RECORDS OF STATEMENTS IN COURT The text-types discussed until this point all include a record of the outcome of a case. The discussion now turns to texts that end without recording the case’s outcome. Instead, these texts reflect different stages of the legal proceedings. The discussion will begin with preliminary protocols (section 3.A) and memoranda of proceedings (section 3.B). Like the decision records, both of these text-types include descriptions of proceedings involving authorities. These descriptions provide the necessary information to situate the texts within the context of a trial. The discussion will then turn to the different text-types that record only statements: accusatory depositions (section 3.C.1), depositions of testimony (section 3.C.2), memoranda of depositions (sections 3.C.3) and depositions under oath (section 3.C.4). These text-types do not explicitly mention the activities of a court. Thus, identifying their place within a trial and their legal function must depend on other factors, such as the authorities involved or the content of the statements made. The description of these two text-types will note these different factors. 3.A

Preliminary Protocols

Texts of this text-type describe proceedings without recording the outcome of the case. The absence of a record of the cases’ outcome distinguishes the preliminary protocols from the decision records. Because these texts include descriptions of procedures, and not only records of statements, they are also to be distinguished from depositions (discussed below in section 3.C). The legal function of this text-type is to record the preliminary stages of the trial.1 The most direct evidence for this use of the preliminary 1 For remarks about the preliminary nature of the proceedings, in general, see San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 76 and, about YOS 6, 223, in particular, San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 295. See also Cornelia Wunsch, “Neu- und spätbabylonische Urkunden aus dem Museum von Montserrat,” AuOr 15 (1997), p. 163.

86

chapter three

protocols comes from the comparison between YOS 7, 140, a preliminary protocol, and YOS 7, 161, a decision record, both of which pertain to the same trial.2 YOS 7, 140 reads as follows: 1. 1-en UDU pu- al u3 4-ta UDU U8.¢MEÜ [NIGIN 5-ta] ¢ e-eÜnu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 2. še-en-du NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki [u dna-na-a ] ša2 mdanu-LUGAL-URI3 3. A-šu2 ša2 mLUGAL-DU lu2 NA.GAD ša2 d¢INNINÜ [UNUGki . . .] ša2 qa-pu-ut-tu4 4. ša2 mdEN-LUGAL-URI3 Ašu2 ša2 m¢ŠEŠÜ-ia-a-[li-du ša2 md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG]. LUGAL 5. lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA u3 [. . .] iq-bu-u2 6. um-ma man-na e-e-nu-a ša2! [kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du . . .]

(1–6) 1 ram, 4 ewes, [total 5] sheep, branded with a star, property of Ištar of Uruk [and Nanaya] belonging to mAnušarra-u ur son of mŠarru-kīn, a herdsman of Ištar [of Uruk . . .], from the pen of mBēl-šarra-u ur son of mA iya-a[lidu, (regarding) which mNabû-a ā-iddin, the ša rēš ] šarri administrator of the Eanna and [. . .] said thus:

7.

(7–9) In the assembly, mBēl-šarrau ur said thus: “In year 2 of [Camby]ses king of Babylon, king of the lands, mBēl-iqīša son of m illaya [deposited] 1 ram and 4 [ewe]s, [total] 5 [sheep branded with a star] with me.”

EN-LUGAL-URI3 ina UKKIN iq-bi ¢um-ma ina MU 2Ü-[kam2 mkam-bu-zi ]-¢ia LUGAL TIN.TIRÜki LUGAL KUR.KUR 8. 1-en UDU pu- al u3 4-ta UDU [U8].ME [NIGIN] 5-[ta e-enu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 ] ¢še-en-duÜ 9. mdEN-BA-ša2 A-šu2 ša2 m il-la-a ina ŠU.2!-ia [ip-qid mdEN-BAša2] md

10. i-bu-ku-nim-ma iš-ša2-al-[lušu . . . iq-bi ] 11. um-ma 1-en UDU pu- al 4-ta [UDU U8.ME ša2 kak-kab-tu še-en-du] u3

(6) “Who . . . these sheep [branded with a star . . .] ?”

(9–11) They brought [mBēl-iqīša] and question[ed him . . . he said] thus:

2 The connection between the two texts is first identified by San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 341.

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court

87

12. 5-ta UDU la -rat.ME ta-mi¢im-ma-ta NIGIN 10 eÜ-[e-nu ul-tu] ¢ e-e-nuÜ 13. NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki ¢ša2 qa-pu-ut-tuÜ ša2 mda-nuLUGAL-URI3 A-šu2 ša2 m [LUGAL]-ki!-i-ni lu2 14. NA.GAD ša2 dINNIN UNUGki da-nu-LUGAL-URI3 [ 15. ina ITI ŠU MU 2-kam2 iddan-ni [

(11–15) “In Du ūzu, year 2, m Anu-šarra-u ur gave me . . . 1 ram, 4 [ewes branded with a star] and 5 unbranded ewes, total 10 sh[eep from the] sheep, property of Ištar of Uruk, from the pen of mAnu-šarra-u ur son of mŠarru-kīni, herdsman of Ištar of Uruk.”

16. u [. . .] ina UKKIN it-te-¢meÜ

(16) and . . . swore in the assembly:

17. ki-i e-lat 1-en UDU pu- al 4-ta UDU la -rat.ME ša2 kak-kabtu4 še-en-du 18. u3 5-ta UDU la -rat.ME tami-im-ma-a-ta NIGIN 10-ta e-e-nu 19. ku-um ra-šu-ti-ia mda-nuLUGAL-URI3 id-di-ni ša2 ina lib3-bi 1-en UDU pu- al u3 20. 4-ta UDU la -rat.ME NIGIN 5-ta e-e-nu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 šeen-du ina pa-ni mdEN-LUGALURI3 21. A-šu2 ša2 mŠES-ia-a-li-du lu2NA. GAD ša2 dINNIN UNUGki ap-te-qid mdEN-LUGAL-URI3

(17–21) “Indeed, I did deposit with mBēl-šarra-u ur son of m A iya-alidu, the shepherd of Ištar of Uruk, in addition to 1 ram, 4 ewes branded with a star, 5 unbranded ewes, total 10 sheep, which mAnu-šarra-u ur gave (me) as (payment for) my claim, which included 1 ram and 4 ewes, total 5 sheep, branded with a star.”

22. ina UKKIN niš DINGIR. MEŠ u LUGAL iz-kur u a-na md EN-BA-ša2 u-ki-in um-ma 1-en UDU pu- al

(21–22) In the assembly, mBēlšarra-u ur took an oath by the gods and the king and established (a case) against mBēl-iqīša thus:

23. u3 4! UDU U8.ME ša2 kak-kabtu4 ina ITI APIN MU 2-kam2 ina pa-ni-ia ta-ap-te-qid 24. ina ITI ZIZ2 MU 2-kam2 UDU U8.ME-a 5-ta ina pa-niia it-tal-da-

(22–24) “In Ara šamna, year 2, you did deposit with me 1 ram and 4 ewes branded with a star. These 5 ewes (however) were born in my flock (later) in Šabā u, year 2.”

25.

mu-kin-nu msi-lim-DINGIR SAG.LUGAL lu2ša2 mu - i qu-up-pu ša2 E2.AN.NA

lu2

lu2

(25) Witnesses: mSilim-ili the ša rēš šarri in charge of the chest of the Eanna;

88

chapter three 26.

md

NA3-DU-IBILA A-šu2 ša2 AMAR.UTU-MU-MU A m ba-la- u mdNA3-na-din-ŠEŠ A-šu2 27. ša2 mIR3-dEN A mMU-dPAP. SUKKAL mdUTU-DU-A Ašu2 ša2 mdDI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠMU A mši-gu-u2-a 28.

md

md

EN-KAR-dNA3 lu2SAG. LUGAL mlu-u -a-na-ZALAG2d AMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 md NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i 29. A mda-bi-bi mki-na-a A-šu2 ša2 md in-nin-li-pi-u2- ur 30. mna-di-nu mIR3-dAMAR.UTU u mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN lu2 DUB.SAR.ME ša2 E2.AN. NA

31. UNUGki ITI ZIZ2 U4 3-kam2 MU 3-kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-ia 32. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR

(26–27) mNabû-mukīn-apli son of Marduk-šuma-iddin descendant of Balā u; mNabû-nādin-a i son of mArad-Bēl descendant of Iddin-Papsukkal; (27) mŠamaš-mukīn-apli son of m Madānu-a ē-iddin descendant of Šigûa; m

(28–29) mBēl-ē ir-Nabû, the ša rēš šarri; mLū i-ana-nūri-Marduk son of mNabû-a ē-bulli descendant of Dābibī; (29) mKīnaya son of mInnin-līpiu ur; (30) mNādinu, mArad-Marduk and Itti-Marduk-balā i, scribes of the Eanna.

m

(31–32) Uruk. 3 Šabā u, year 3 of Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

This text, written on 3.XI.3 Camb, records that five sheep belonging to mAnu-šarra-u ur, branded for Ištar of Uruk, have been found in the possession of mBēl-šarra-u ur. Upon questioning in the Eanna, m Bēl-šarra-u ur blames mBēl-iqcša for giving him the sheep. mBēl-iqīša is brought to the assembly for interrogation, where he claims that he received the five branded sheep directly from mAnu-šarra-u ur, the original owner, along with five other unbranded sheep, as payment for a debt owed by mAnu-šarra-u ur. He then swears that he deposited these ten sheep (including the five branded sheep in question) with mBēlšarra-u ur. mBēl-šarra-u ur then swears that mBēl-iqīša did deposit the five branded sheep in question with him, but that the five additional, unbranded sheep, were born later to mBēl-šarra-u ur, with no connection to mBēl-iqīša’s claim. Thus, mBēl-šarra-u ur’s oath undermines m Bēl-iqīša’s claim that all ten sheep were given together, and originally represented the payment of a debt from mAnu-šarra-u ur. YOS 7, 140 ends with mBēl-šarra-u ur’s oath. The decision in this case is reached more than one month later. It is recorded in YOS 7, 161, a decision record dated 12.XII.3 Camb, in which two royal judges, mRīmūt and m Bau-ēreš, rule that mBēl-iqīša must pay thirty-fold for the branded sheep as well as replace the five unbranded ewes. The purpose of YOS 7, 140, then, is simply to record the different claims made during a


89

preliminary hearing about the case. The royal judges probably used this information in rendering the decision recorded in YOS 7, 161. The preliminary protocols may also be divided into two styles analogous to the two “Eanna” styles of decision records described above (section 1.C). The two styles of preliminary protocols follow the following outlines: Style A I. Proceedings II. Conclusion A. Names of authorities (ina DU.ZU) B. Names of witnesses (lu2mu-kin-nu) C. Scribe D. Place of composition E. Date

Style B I. Opening A. Personal names B. Transition II. Proceedings

III. Conclusion A. Scribe B. Place of composition C. Date

These two styles of preliminary protocols closely resemble the two “Eanna” styles of decision records. Except for the fact that a decision is not recorded, the outlines are identical. As is the case with the two “Eanna” styles of decision records, both styles of preliminary protocol record the same information. The difference between the two styles occurs in the placement of the personal names. In style A preliminary protocols, these names come after the narration of the specifics of the case, while in style B preliminary protocols, they occur at the beginning, before the details of the case. As in the “Eanna” style decision records, the name of the scribe and the date appear at the end of both styles of preliminary protocols. It is difficult to determine when each of the two styles was used. Geography does not seem to be a factor, since both styles are attested in several locations. Furthermore, the same scribes are known to have composed preliminary protocols in both style A and style B, so it is difficult to associate one style with a particular scribe. Most of the preliminary protocols come from cases pertaining to the Eanna’s property. Officials of the Eanna, along with the “assembly,” are mentioned as playing a part in the proceedings, especially in gathering

90

chapter three

evidence. Often, they are the ones who conduct the proceedings described in the text. In addition, their names may be recorded together with the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”). The participation of these officials indicates that obtaining evidence involved an official process, which was separate from the ultimate decision of the case.3 A number of preliminary protocols even use the Akkadian term maš altu (“interrogation”) to refer to one such evidence-gathering process. Preliminary protocols from the Ebabbar at Sippar indicate that the temple authorities were involved there, as well.4 There are two Eanna texts, YOS 7, 78 and TCL 13, 132, that do not mention the involvement of officials. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that both texts describe processes conducted by temple officials. The cases in both texts involve temple property. The scribes who wrote them, mPir u son of mEanna-cuma-ibni (YOS 7, 78) and mGimillu son of mInnin-zēra-iddin (TCL 13, 132) are otherwise known from the Eanna archives.5 In YOS 7, 78, the first individual to testify has been “caught” (kal-du-ma),6 and is probably being held in official custody. In TCL 13, 132, the statement of each party is preceded by the notice, PN i-bu-ku-nim-ma iq-bi um-ma (“they brought PN and he said thus”).7 Presumably, the parties are brought before some official body. Thus, although no officials are named in the texts, YOS 7, 78 and TCL 13, 132 belong to the category of preliminary protocols since they also describe proceedings conducted by officials. Although most of the preliminary protocols pertain to temple property, two texts, Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 and Camb 329, demonstrate that this text-type was used in cases pertaining to private property, as well. Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 is a style A preliminary protocol that describes a procedure overseen by the judges of Nabonidus.8 Camb 329 is a style B9 preliminary protocol that does 3 See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 292. For the different officials mentioned in these texts, see summary table 3.1 at the end of this section. 4 MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 9 and Cyr 329 mention officials known to have been involved in the management of the Ebabbar. See the references to the names in Bongenaar, Ebabbar. 5 Kümmel, Familie, p. 123 (mPir u) and p. 113 (mGimillu). 6 YOS 7, 78:3. 7 TCL 13, 132:4, 7. 8 For the interpretation of the text as a preliminary protocol rather than a decision record, see Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), p. 163. 9 The names in Camb 329 come after an introductory sentence instead of preceding a transitional sentence as in most style B preliminary proceedings. Thus, in terms of composition, it closely resembles a memorandum. However, because it includes the name of the scribe, it is included in the present discussion.

A

A

A

AnOr 8, 27

YOS 6, 222

šatammu + scribes of Eanna

—

administrator of Eanna

record of crime; imprisonment; gathering of evidence

testimony; gathering of evidence

“interrogation” + preservation of evidence

mu-kin-nu

lu2

ina DU.ZU + mu-kin-nu

lu2

lu2

mu-kin-nu

—

YOS 6, 137

šatammu of Eanna; šešgallu of Eanna; the “temple enterers,” the collegium and the mār banî (28 PNs)

“interrogation”

A

YOS 6, 77

i-na maar lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ MU.MEŠ!

judges (of Nbn); šākin ēmi of Babylon

A

Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12

—

Term(s) Introducing Names

Šumaya / Ibni-Ištar// Ašlaku m

m

MušēzibMarduk/ Bēl-uballi // Amēl-Ea m

?

?

Scribe

Uruk

Uruk

—

[Sippar]

8 Witnesses + 1 scribe

Nādin/ Uruk Bēl-a ēiqīša // Egibi m

m

4.VII.12 Nbn

10.IV.12 Nbn

30.IV.7 Nbn

15.III.4 Nbn

(3–11 Nbn)

[18 Nabopolassar –4 Nbk]


m Nādinu/ ina DU.ZU: Uruk administrator, mBēl-a ēqīpu-official, iqīša // Egibi šatammu; + 5 witnesses 1 scribe

7 witnesses + 1 scribe

—

Seals of 5 judges

5 + PNs (mār banî ?)

Names

Preliminary Protocols

oath; testimony

interrogation

mār banî ša2 a-di GAL X illa-ku

MacGinnis, A Iraq 60 (1998), No. 9

Procedures Described

Style

Authorities in body of text

Text

Summary Table 3.1

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 91

—

šatammu of Eanna; ša mu i suti

A

B

B

B

B

YOS 6, 235

Oberhuber, Florenz, No. 155

YOS 19, 92

YOS 6, 224

YOS 6, 116

šanû of the rāb rēši; assembly

šatammu and administrator of Eanna

mār banî; šākin ēmi of Uruk; šatammu of Eanna

šatammu; scribes of Eanna

A

YOS 6, 223


Style

Text

Summary Table 3.1 (cont.) Term(s) Introducing Names

reading of records

statements; bringing of witness; oath

reading of tablet

?

statement; questioning; response 6 mār banî

[DUMU.DU3. ME]Š ša2 ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu

lu2 DUMU.MEŠDU3-i [ša2 i-na] u2-šu-uz-zi-šu2-nu

5 mār banî; 1 scribe

DUMU ba-ni-i ša2 9 mār banî i-na DU.ZU-šu2-nu (including šākin ēmi of Uruk and ša rēš šarri in charge of king’s chest) + 1 scribe

lu2

DUMU ba-ni-i ša2 8 mār banî ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu

lu2

lu2

šatammu + 7 PNs + 1 scribe

—

Names

ina DU.ZU

“interrogation;” — response

Procedures Described —

Kīnaya/ Zēriya

Uruk

Uruk

[Uruk]


m

m

m

—

?

m

m

23.IV.16 Nbn

3.12b.15 Nbn

22.X.13 Nbn

13 Nbn

27.12b.12 Nbn

4.XIIb.12 Nbn


Nādin/ Uruk Bēl-a ēiqīša // Egibi

—

Scribe

92 chapter three

B

B

A

Spar, AOAT 203, No. 1

YOS 7, 88

VAS, Neue Folge 4, No. 126

?

šatammu and administrator of Eanna; assembly



A

YOS 6, 156


administrator of Eanna;

Style

TCL 12, 117 ?

Text


“interrogation”

statement; examination and gathering of evidence

order to swear; statement

statement; questioning; oath and testimony

preservation of evidence


ina DU.ZU

DUMU-DU3. MEŠ ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu lu2

lu2 DUMU-DU3. MEŠ ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu

mu-kin-nu

lu2

Uruk

Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin Mūrānu/ Nabû-bānia i// Ekurzākir m

m

m

m

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

2.VIb.2 Cyr

21.?.2 Cyr

?.8.? Cyr

11.V.17 Nbn

21.IX.16 Nbn



m

šatammu and ? administrator of Eanna, šanû of Uruk; 8 (+) PNs (?)

8 mār banî + 1 scribe



m Gimillu/ ina DU.ZU: ša rēš šarri [in mInnin-zēracharge of the iddin chest] in the Eanna; lu2 mu-kin-nu + 7 PNs + 1 scribe

lu2

DUMU.DU3i.MEŠ ša2 i-na pa-ni-šu2-nu; ina DU.ZU; lu2mu-kin-nu

Scribe

Names



assembly

A

B

A

YOS 7, 42

AnOr 8, 47// TCL 13, 138

YOS 7, 91

assembly

—

assembly

TCL 13, 133 B

šākin ēmi of Uruk; šatammu of Eanna; administrator of Eanna; assembly of Babylonians and Urukians

—

A

AnOr 8, 38


TCL 13, 132 A

Style

Text


examination of tablet

statement; questioning; testimony

“interrogation;” confession; gathering and examination of evidence

statement (including accusation); confession to accusation

bringing of defendant; oath

presentation of cow in question; claims of litigants


mu-kin-nu

lu2

DUMU-DU3i.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2

lu2 DUMU-DU3. MEŠ ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu

mu-kin-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2



8 PNs; 1 scribe

4 PNs + 1 scribe


8 PNs + 1 scribe

10 PNs +1 scribe

Names Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin

Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin

Uruk

Uruk


Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin m

m

m

m

m

m

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

13.IV.6 Cyr

8?.V.5 Cyr

20.IV.5 Cyr

22.V.4 Cyr

18.V.4 Cyr

28.VIII.2 Cyr


m NabûUruk mukīn-apli / mMardukšuma-iddin// Balā u

m

m

m

m

Scribe

94 chapter three

Style

A

A

A

A

A

Text

AnOr 8, 56


YOS 7, 78

Cyr 329

YOS 7, 97

adminstrator of Eanna and asesembly of mār banî

“elders of the city”

—





statement; bringing of defendants; testimony; examination of evidence; further testimony

inspection; assembling elders; statements

Scribe

Pir u/ Eannašuma-ibni

m Gimillu / ina DU.ZU: administrator; mInnin-zēra6 Witnesses iddin + 1 scribe

ina DU.ZU; mu-kin-nu

lu2

?

m

m

m AradMarduk/ m Mardukšuma-iddin // mBēl -apla-[u ur]

—


1 scribe

4 witnesses + mArad1 scribe Marduk/ m Mardukšuma-iddin // mBēl-apla[u ur]

Names

—

mu-kin-nu

lu2

—

address to assembly; assembly’s report

testimony of suspects

lu2

mu-kin-nu


claims; temporary (?) award of slave to claimant


Uruk

[Sippar]

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

19.IX.0 Camb

30.XII.8 [Cyr]

17.I.8 Cyr

16.XI.7 Cyr

12.X.7 Cyr



A

YOS 7, 158


royal judge; scribe; šatammu and administrator of Eanna

assembly

A

A


šatammu of Eanna

YOS 7, 159

B

YOS 7, 106



A

YOS 7, 102


TCL 13, 179 A

Style

Text


accusation; order to present stolen goods and criminals

accusation; summons; testimony

statement; demand of evidence; oath

accusation; response

imprisonment

statements; submission, citation and review of evidence


mu-kin-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2

ina DU.ZU

DUMU.DU3. MEŠ ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu

lu2

—


Uruk

m Iddinaya / mInninašuma-u ur

4 witnesses + mArad1 scribe Marduk/ m Mardukšuma-iddin // Bēl-aplau ur

5 witnesses + mMarduk1 scribe nā ir / m Madānua ē-iddin // Šigûa

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

?.VI.3 Camb

24.IV.3 Camb

3 Camb

10.IV.2 Camb

13.XI.1 Camb

27.IX.0 Camb


IddinMarduk / m LâbāšiMarduk// Egibi m

—

Scribe

5 (+?) [mGimillu]/ witnesses + 1 mInnin-[zērascribe iddin]

šatammu + 4 PNs + 1 scribe


—

Names

96 chapter three

Style

A

B

A

A

Text

YOS 7, 149

Camb 329

YOS 7, 146

YOS 7, 152


assembly

—

official in charge of outstanding debts; šatammu of the Eanna; assembly of Babylonians and Urukians



oath; counteraccusation

questioning; testimony

arresting of debtor; accusation; debtor’s response

accusation; presentation of evidence; questioning; statement


mu-kin-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2

lu2 DUMU-DU3. MEŠ ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu; lu2mu-kin-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu


Scribe

m Bullu u / mIddinMarduk // Bu u

m 5 witnesses Gimillu/ (including one mInnin-zēraša rēš šarri ) + iddin 1 scribe

m 5 witnesses Gimillu/ (including one mInnin-zēraša rēš šarri )+ iddin 1 scribe

4 witnesses/ mār banî

Uruk

Uruk

Ša rīnu

22.X.3 Camb

22.X.3 Camb

1.IX.3 Camb

19.VI.3 Camb


7 witnesses + mŠamašUruk 1 scribe zēra-iddin / m A ulap-Ištar // Ekur-zākir

Names



šatammu of Eanna; administrator of Eanna; assembly of mār banî

B

YOS 7, 198

TCL 13, 181 A

administrator of Eanna; assembly

A

YOS 7, 140


Style

Text


questioning; oath; further questioning; response

order; note of escape (failure to appear)

accusation; summons; questioning; oath


qi-pa-nu u3 DUMU-DU3i.ME ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu

lu2

mu-kin-nu

lu2

lu2

lu2

mu-kin-nu


Scribe

Marduknā ir / m Madānua ē-iddin // Šigûa m

6 witnesses + mMarduk1 scribe nā ir // Šigûa

8 PNs (including šākin ēmi of Uruk; ša rēš šarri in charge of the chest in the Eanna; ša rēš šarri stationed in the Eanna); + 2 scribes

Uruk

Uruk

6.VI.2 Dar

18.X.6 Camb

3.XI.3 Camb


m Uruk 7 witnesses Nādinu, m (including Aradša rēš šarri in Marduk and charge of the mItti-Mardukchest of the balā i, scribes Eanna and of the Eanna one other ša rēš šarri ) + 3 scribes of Eanna

Names

98 chapter three


99

not mention any adjudicating authority. In this text, mMadānu-bēlau ur detains (kullû) mKalbi-Ba u because of an unpaid debt of produce. m Kalbi-Ba u responds that he has paid the debt to another individual.10 m Madānu-bēla-u ur detains mKalbi-Ba u “before” (ina pāni ) the individuals who are designated both as lu2DUMU-DU3.MEŠ (mār banî ) and lu2 mu-kin-nu.11 Because no adjudicating authorities are mentioned, it is possible that Camb 329 describes proceedings that took place without the involvement of a court or any other formal body. On the other hand, as was suggested with regard to the settlements discussed earlier, it is also possible that the group of mār banî or witnesses, on their own, may have constituted an official body of sorts. Preliminary protocols describe a number of different procedures. Most involve the collection of evidence, by obtaining oral statements, by reading tablets, or by gathering actual physical evidence. Other texts record the claims of two opposing parties or the holding of a suspect. The specific procedures described in these texts are listed in summary table 3.1. They will be analyzed in more detail in the discussion of legal procedure in Part II. 3.B

Memoranda of Proceedings

In addition to the preliminary protocols just described, there are three memoranda that record proceedings without mention of a decision. As discussed above (section 2.B), the defining feature of a memorandum is the absence of the scribe’s name. This absence, together with the fact that some of the memoranda include the label ta sistu lā mašê (“memorandum, not to be forgotten”), suggest that the memoranda were meant for the scribe’s own use. The memoranda of proceedings apparently served as the scribe’s own record of the proceedings that took place. In terms of style, the memoranda of proceedings follow the conventions identified in section 2.B above. Nbn 68 and CT 2, 2 are composed in the “Babylon” style, even though CT 2, 2 probably comes from Sippar, not from Babylon. BIN 1, 142 is written in the “Non-Babylon” style. Because the details of BIN 1, 142 are lost in the breaks in the text, the main discussion will focus on CT 2, 2 and Nbn 68. CT 2, 2 records

10 11

See Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 434. Camb 329:1, 12. See von Dassow, “Witnesses,” pp. 10–11.

100

chapter three

an investigation into the whereabouts of a linen garment missing from the Ebabbar temple. The procedures described in this text closely resemble those mentioned in the preliminary protocols from the Eanna at Uruk. The šangû of Sippar and “temple enterers” of Šamaš question a number of different workers of the temple “before”(ina pāni ) a group of mār banî. Nbn 68 comes from the Nūr-Sîn archive and records the reading of a debt-note before witnesses in order to demonstrate that the debtor’s name has been incorrectly written.12 As for the formality of the proceedings, it does not mention the involvement of any authorities. Nbn 68 does state, however, that the debt-note was “brought” (našû) before (ina pāni ) the witnesses.13 This formulation recalls the language of more obviously formal proceedings, such as those described in YOS 6, 116, a preliminary protocol “in the presence” (ina ušuzzu) of mār banî in which an official “brings” (našû) the writing boards to be read in the assembly.14 This similarity may suggest that the text was composed as part of a formal resolution of a dispute about the debt. The reading of the debt-note may have served as evidence presented in a formal process of resolving the question. 3.C

Records of Statements in Court

From the preliminary protocols and the decision records, it is clear that part of the decision process involved the hearing of testimony and other statements. When such statements are recorded in the context of a decision record or a preliminary protocol, then the context explains the purpose of the statement. The next four text-types, however, record only a statement or several different statements made by an individual or individuals. Therefore, one must rely on additional factors to determine the context in which the statements were made. Only once this determination is made can the texts be classified into text-types based on their legal function.

12 See Laurence Brian Shiff, The Nūr-Sîn Archive: Private Entrepreneurship in Babylon (603–507 B.C.) (University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. Thesis, 1987), p. 343 and Wunsch, CM 3a, p. 74. 13 Nbn 68:1–5. Note that the 3ms subject of the verb našû is not clearly indicated. Shiff, Nūr-Sîn, p. 342 translates “he (the scribe) has brought.” 14 YOS 6, 116:6–10. See also YOS 19, 92:9–16; YOS 7, 91:1–7.

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 101 Summary Table 3.2

Memoranda of Proceedings

Text

Style

Procedures described

Authorities Designation Place of Date of names Composition

BIN 1, 142

“NonBabylon”

presentation of evidence (?)

—

an-nu-tu lu2 mu-kin-nee ša2 . . .

—

—

Nbn 68

“Babylon” presentation and reading of tablet

—

lu2 mu-kinne2-e ša2 ina IGI-šu2-nu

—

10.IV.2 Nbn

šangû of Sippar; “temple enterers” of Šamaš

lu2 DUMUDU3.MEŠ ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu

(Sippar)

?.II. 18 Dar

CT 2, 2 “Babylon” statement; searching; questioning; response; further questioning; testimony

Taken together, these texts may be characterized as “depositions” or “declarations.” This characterization, however, does not reflect the different purposes that these declarations served. For this reason, texts that record statements are classified into four text-types: accusatory depositions, depositions of testimony, memoranda recording depositions, and sworn depositions. This classification emerges from a closer examination of the actual contents of the statements. Before proceeding with the specifics of the typology, however, a general remark on the styles of these text-types is in order. The accusatory depositions and depositions of testimony may be divided into three styles. Two of these styles are analogous to the two styles of preliminary protocols, and will be labeled style A and style B. The third style, style C, closely resembles the “Babylon” memoranda, which begin with an introductory sentence identifying the names that follow. The three outlines are presented below: Style A I. Statement A. PN iqbi umma B. Statement II. Conclusion A. Names of authorities (ina DU.ZU)

Style B I. Opening A. Names B. Designation of names II. Statement A. PN iqbi umma

Style C I. Opening A. Designation of names II. Statement A. PN iqbi umma

102 B. Names of witnesses (lu2mu-kin-nu) C. Scribe D. Place of composition E. Date

chapter three B. Statement

B. Statement III. Names

III. Conclusion A. Scribe B. Place of composition C. Date

IV. Conclusion A. Scribe B. Place of composition C. Date

Comparison between the three different styles shows that they present the same information but in different orders. Common to them all is the phrase PN iqbi umma (“PN said thus”) which precedes the speaker’s statement. The variation between the styles cannot be readily explained based on subject, scribe or place of composition. Although these texts do not describe the entire dispute and decision, many of the statements seem to have been made as part of a larger legal process that required the presence of official authorities. In most of the texts, officials of a temple are among the people hearing the statements, which indicates that the statements were made before a formal adjudicating body. Several texts use the preposition ana to indicate that the statements are addressed directly “to” these officials.15 The different authorities to whom these statements are addressed are listed in the summary tables below in the columns labeled “ ‘To’ whom.” A number of texts, from the Eanna and elsewhere, use the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of”) to describe the presence of individuals hearing the statement. In the Eanna decision records, this prepositional phrase indicates that the named individuals oversee the proceedings. The use of ina DU.ZU in the texts presently under discussion suggests that the individuals in whose presence the statement was made served in a similar capacity. In addition to the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”) or the indication that the statements were made directly “to” (ana) an authority, many of the texts indicate that the statements were made ina pāni (“before”) a group of people. In some texts, the names of officials follow this preposition, which suggests that the statements

15 AnOr 8, 21; YOS 6, 88; YOS 6, 57; YOS 6, 131; YOS 7, 10; YOS 7, 23; TCL 13, 125; Cyr 328 and Dar 128.

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 103 are official declarations of some sort. In several texts, however, there is no indication that the individuals named are anything but witnesses. Such texts raise the possibility that the statements were made in settings other than official proceedings. 3.C.1

Accusatory Depositions

Texts of this text-type record the speaker’s accusation that another individual has committed some wrongdoing. In order to be considered an accusatory deposition, the statement recorded in the text must indicate the wrong that another individual has committed. In most accusatory depositions, the wrong committed is stated clearly as part of the declaration. For example, YOS 7, 10, an accusatory deposition from Uruk, reads as follows: 1. [m]dNA3-re- u-u2-a lu2qal-la ša2 m la-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU 2. A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN A me-gi-bi ša2 la ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 a-na 3. mdNA3-DU-NUMUN lu2ŠA3. TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 m na-di-nu A mda-bi-bi 4. u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA iq-bi 5. um-ma U4 28-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN na4 AR a-ši-mur ša2 md 15-ŠEŠ-MU 6. A-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-MU-URI3 A mdNA3-šar- i-DINGIR ul-tu mu - i ba-ab ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 7. ina sa-ar-tu4 ina mu-ši mSUMna-a A-šu2 ša2 mla-a-ba-šid AMAR.UTU 8. A me-gi-bi it-ta-sa-a la il-ta-kan 9. u3 mdNA3-lu-u-da-a-ri lu2qal-la ša2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 10. ša2 mta-ri-bi-ia-ti-im u3 m aš-da-a ŠEŠ ša2 mSUM-na-a 11. ina UKKIN iq-bi um-ma na4 AR a-ši-mur ša2 m[PN]

(1–5) mNabû-rē ua, slave of m Lâbāši-Marduk son of mAradBēl descendant of Egibi, without interrogation said thus to mNabûmukīn-zēri, šatammu of the Eanna, son of mNādinu descendant of Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri, administrator of the Eanna: (5–8) “On 28 Kislīmu, mIddinaya son of mLâbāši-Marduk descendant of Egibi unlawfully removed the cumin mill of mIštara a-iddin son of mInnin-šumau ur descendant of Nabû-šar i-ilī from the gate of the Lady-ofUruk at night and did not replace (it).”

(9–11) And mNabû-lū-dāri, slave of m Bāniya son of mTaribiatim and m ašdaya brother of mIddinaya said thus in the assembly:

104

chapter three 12. A md15-ŠEŠ-MU ina sa-ar-tu4 na-ša2-a-ta 13. ina E2 mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR. UTU AD-ia a-ta-mar

(11–13) “I found the cumin mill of m[PN] son of mIštar-a a-iddin, which was taken away unlawfully, in the house of mLâbāši-Marduk, my father.”16

14.

(14–15) Witnesses: mRīmūt-Bēl, the šešgallu of Eanna, son of mBēl-uballi , descendant of Gimil-Nanaya;

mu-kin-nu mri-mut-dEN lu2ŠEŠ. GAL E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 md EN-TIN-i

lu2

15. A mŠU- dna-na-a mGAR-MU A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-d15 A md30-tab-ni

(15) mŠākin-šumi son of mIbniIštar descendant of Sîn-tabni;

16.

md

17.

md m

m

18.

ze-ri-ia A-šu 2 ša 2 mdna-na-aKAM2 A mki-din-dAMAR.UTU

(18) mZēriya son of mNanaya-ēreš descendant of Kidin-Marduk;

in-nin-MU-URI3 A-šu2 ša2 MU-dNA3 A mki-din-dAMAR. UTU m

NA3-TIN-su-iq-bi A-šu2 ša2 ib-na-a A mE2.KUR-za-kir

m

19. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a A md NA3-šar- i-DINGIR 20. mKAR-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 mkab-ti-ia A mši-gu-u2-a 21.

lu 2 UMBISAG m gi-mil-lu Ašu2 ša2 mdin-nin-NUMUN-MU

22. UNUGki ITI GU4 U4 1kam2 MU 1-kam2 mku-ra-aš2 LUGAL KUR.KUR

(16) mInnin-šuma-u ur son of Iddin-Nabû descendant of Kidin-Marduk;

m

(17) mNabû-balāssu-iqbi son of Ibnaya descendant of Ekur-zākir;

(19) mArdiya son of mAplaya descendant of Nabû-šar i-ilī; (20) mMušēzib-Marduk son of Kabtiya descendant of Šigûa;

m

(21) Scribe: mGimillu son of Innin-zēra-iddin

m

(22) Uruk. 1 Ayaru, year 1 of Cyrus, king of the lands.

This text records two statements. In the first statement, mNabû-rē ua, a slave, states that his master’s son, mIddinaya, stole a cumin mill. In the second statement, m ašdaya, brother of mIddinaya, confirms that the mill was found in their father’s property. The two statements are clearly accusations of theft against mIddinaya. Both specifically mention that the cumin mill was taken “unlawfully” (ina sarti ).16 16 From lines 9–10 it seems that there are two speakers, the slave mNabû-lū-dāri and m ašdaya, brother of the suspected thief. The statement in lines 11–12, however, seems to have been made by m ašdaya alone. The speaker refers to mLâbāši-Marduk as “my father” (AD-ia), which can only be true of m ašdaya. Furthermore, the verbs (including the verb iqbi following the names of both individuals) are all in the singular. Thus, the role of the slave mNabû-lū-dāri is unclear.

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 105 There are other texts, however, in which understanding the statement as an accusation depends on contextual factors. One such example is TCL 13, 125, which records the following statement of mBalā u to the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna: 5. 2 AB2.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kabtu4 še-en-du 6. ša2 qa-pu-ut-tu4 ša2 AB2. GU4. I.A ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 7. ša2 ina pa-ni-ia mgi-mil-lu A-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-MU-DU3 8. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-ba-ku

(5–8) “mGimillu son of mInninšuma-ibni led away from my hands 2 cows branded with a star from the cattle-pen of the Lady-of-Uruk at my disposal.”

Taken alone, this statement appears to be simply a declaration that two cows were taken by mGimillu. However, this mGimillu was a notoriously corrupt official, known for misappropriating Eanna property.17 It stands to reason, then, that this statement is actually an accusation made against mGimillu directly to the šatammu and the administrator. The scribe mGimillu son of mInnin-zēra-iddin, who is known to have written a number of preliminary protocols, also wrote TCL 13, 125. His presence, therefore, may further support the understanding of this text as an accusation against mGimillu made during the course of proceedings similar to those that might have been recorded in a preliminary protocol. One way of placing the accusatory depositions within the different stages of a trial is to understand the accusations as the initiation of the dispute. This seems to be Peiser’s interpretation when he describes one accusatory deposition (Cyr 328) as “Klageschrift des Civilklägers in einem strafrechtlichen Processe” (“a plaintiff’s charge in a criminal case”).18 Similarly, Cocquerillat refers to another accusatory deposition (YOS 7, 23) as “la plainte . . . adressée aux autorités de l’Eanna” (“the complaint . . . addressed to the Eanna authorities).19 According to this interpretation, the accusatory depositions were composed as a record of the very beginning stages of the cases to which they pertain. They reflect the point when the charge is first brought against the person to be tried.

For more on mGimillu, see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 337–339; ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 61–77; and von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 113–117. 18 KB 4, p. xvi. 19 Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 85. 17

106

chapter three

A second understanding of the place of the accusatory depositions emerges from examination of YOS 6, 131. Following the names of five mār banî (including one designated as ša rēš šarri ), the text reads as follows: 5.

DUMU.MEŠ DU3-i- ša2 ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu 6. mda-nim-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-URI3 lu2AKIN ša2 DUMU-LUGAL 7. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2 SAG-LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 8. E2.AN.NA iq-bu-u2 um-ma 2 AB2.GAL

(5–8) The mār banî in whose presence mAnim-a ē-u ur the messenger of the crown prince said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna:

9. 1 AB2.TUR PAP 3 GU4. I.A ša2 ina qa-pu-ut-tu4 10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina IGI mba-ni-ia 11. A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-SU m ba-u2-SUR 12. A-šu2 ša2 mba-ni-ia ki-i u2-kal-liman-nu 13. ina a-mat DUMU LUGAL ki-i a-bu-ku a-na 14. mdba-u2-SUR ap-te-qi2-id

(8–14) “When mBau-ētir son of m Bāniya showed me 2 cows and 1 small cow, total: 3 bovines from the pen of the Lady-of-Uruk at the disposal of mBāniya son of m Marduk-erība, by the order of the prince, when I led them away I entrusted them to mBau-ē ir.”

15. u mba-u2-SUR a-na mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 iq-bu-u2

(15–16) And mBau-ētir said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur:

16. um-ma AB.GAL-a 3-ta ša2 mdanim-ŠEŠ.ME-URI3 17. lu2A KIN ša2 DUMU LUGAL ip-qi-du map-la-a 18. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-tab-ni-URI3 a-na ši-gi-il-tu2 19. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-bak

(16–19) “mAplaya son of mNabûtabni-u ur unlawfully took away from me the 3 cows which m Anim-a ē-u ur, the messenger of the king, entrusted to me.”

20.

lu2

UMBISAG mna-din A-šu2 ša2 EN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-BA-ša2 21. A me-gi-bi UNUGki ITI APIN

m

22. U4 16-kam2 MU 10-kam2 d NA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(21–22) Uruk. 16 Ara šamna, year 10 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

lu2

md

(20–21) Scribe: mNādin son of Bēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of Egibi.

This text records two separate statements. In the first, the messenger of the crown prince declares that mBau-ē ir was given three cows. m Bau-ē ir then accuses mAplaya of stealing those three cows. From these two declarations, the following case may be reconstructed. Three cows have gone missing from mBau-ē ir’s herd. The messenger of the crown prince confirms that the cows in question were actually given to m Bau-ē ir, which makes mBau-ē ir responsible for them. mBau-ē ir’s

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 107 accusation is actually an attempt to clear himself of guilt by placing the blame on mAplaya. Thus, the accusation in this text does not come from the initial stages of the case. Instead, the accusation comes as part of the original suspect’s own defense. The accusatory depositions, then, come from two distinct stages in the adjudicatory process. They serve as records of the initiation of the dispute, in which a plaintiff states his charge against the defendant. The accusatory depositions may also come from a stage after the trial itself has begun. They record accusations made by an individual who is originally suspected of some wrongdoing and who, in the course of the trial, accuses another individual. 3.C.2 Depositions of Testimony Like the accusatory depositions, this text-type also records an individual’s statement without any other explicit indication of the surrounding proceedings. Unlike the accusatory depositions, the depositions of testimony are records of testimony rather than of a specific accusation. Texts of this text-type serve as part of the evidence considered in the adjudication of the case. Not every statement made in the presence of witnesses is considered a deposition of testimony. In order to be included in the present discussion, a text must indicate in some way that it emerges from an adjudicatory context. The most direct evidence comes from Cyr 199, which opens with the heading lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 mPN (“testimony of m PN”), and includes names of officials of the Sippar temple among those hearing the testimony itself. The use of this opening heading confirms that this particular text was written as a record of testimony that the speaker has provided. Unfortunately, the content of the testimony is lost, but the heading preserves the purpose for which it was written. Other texts do not provide the evidence of a label like that on Cyr 199. There are, however, other indications that a text belongs in an adjudicatory context. This evidence may come from the content of the statement itself, as in AnOr 8, 21, in which an individual provides the names of the “criminals” (lu2sa-ar-ri-u2-tu) who committed a crime with him. Similarly, the speaker in YOS 6, 183 declares that one individual “has not committed a crime” (sa-aš2-ta ul i-pu-uš ).20 The speaker then names the criminal, and reminds the authorities that he had caught

20

YOS 6, 183:11–17.

Nonpayment (see Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 85)

Nonpayment

YOS 7, 23 A BIN 2, 115

Theft of sheep

YOS 7, 14 C

B

YOS 6, 131

Wrongful sale of slave (?)

Theft of cumin mill

B

YOS 6, 79 (?)

Accusation

YOS 7, 10 A

Style

Text

šākin ēmi of Uruk; šatammu and administrator of Eanna

—



—

“To” whom

8 witnesses

ša rēš šarri in charge of royal chest; 5 mār banî/ witnesses —

ina pāni ina DU.ZU

—

ina DU.ZU

ina pāni

Other Prepositions

Rīmūt / Iddinunu

Nādin / mBēla ē-iqīša // Egibi m

m

m

Uruk

City of Bītkuzba-ili

Gimillu / Uruk Innin-zēra-iddin

m

m

m Nādin / mBēla ē-iqīša // Egibi

Uruk

Uruk

Ištar-mukīnapli/ mZēriya m


Scribe

Accusatory Depositions

7 witnesses (including šešgallu)

5 mār banî (including ša rēš šarri )

7 mār banî (including administrator of Eanna and qīpuofficial)

Other Hearers

Summary Table 3.3

26.IX.2 Cyr

5.III.2 Cyr

1.II.1 Cyr

16.VIII.10 Nbn

8.XII.5 Nbn

Date

108 chapter three

Style

A

A

A

A

Text

TCL 13, 125 (?)

TCL 13, 134

Cyr 328

Dar 128

Nonpayment

Theft

Non-delivery of sheep to Eanna

“Leading away” of sheep by corrupt official

Accusation


šangû of Sippar

šangû of Sippar

—


“To” whom

4 PNs

5 witnesses

4 witnesses

6 witnesses

Other Hearers

ina DU.ZU

—

—

—

Other Prepositions


Arad-Bēl/ Bēl-[ušallim]// Adad-šammê —

m

m

(Sippar)

Sippar

Gimillu / Uruk Innin-zēra-iddin

m

m

m

m

Gimillu / [Uruk] Innin-zēra-iddin

Scribe

27.VI.4 Dar I

28.XII.8 Cyr

25.VII.4 Cyr

18.VIII.1 Cyr

Date


110

chapter three

him red-handed and had brought him before them. Other texts are included because they name officials among those who hear the declarations. In these cases, the contents of the declarations themselves do not allude to any clear reason, such as a crime, for legal proceedings. Nevertheless, the fact that officials hear the declarations suggests that these texts were composed as part of the formal proceedings in which the declarations were made. 3.C.3 Memoranda of Depositions In addition to the two text-types described above, there are also memoranda that record an individual’s statement. Like other memoranda, texts of this text-type are also characterized by the absence of the scribe’s name. There are also two styles of this type of memoranda, corresponding to the “Babylon” and “Non-Babylon” styles of other memoranda. In memoranda written in the “Babylon” style, the designation of the names precedes the names themselves, while in memoranda from outside Babylon, the designation follows the names (see outlines in section 2.B above). Most of the memoranda of this type record testimony. As with the depositions of testimony, determining the adjudicatory context depends on the content of the statement itself, or on the mention of adjudicating authorities. VAS 6, 45 is a unique memorandum that corresponds, in terms of statement recorded, to the accusatory depositions. The statement itself is broken, but the opening sentence reads lu2mu-kin-ne2-e ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu mPN1 a-na mPN2 u2-paq-qi-ru [um-ma] (“The witnesses before whom mPN1 claimed thus against mPN2”).21 The use of the locution puqquru ana mPN2 indicates that the statement that follows is a claim against mPN2, rather than simply testimony. Most of the memoranda including statements do not mention adjudicating authorities. Only Nbn 958 explicitly mentions that the statement was made by an oblate of Šamaš ina pu- ur-ru (“in the assembly”).22 Otherwise, the memoranda record statements that were apparently made without the presence of adjudicating authorities. As with other

VAS 6, 45:1–5. Nbn 958:3. Three of the individuals who hear the statement, [mBēl-apla-iddin son of mBēl]-Balī u descendant of Šangû-Sippar, mNabû-šuma-iddin son of [mŠamaš-aplau ur descendant of ] mIle i-Marduk, and mMarduk-šuma-ibni son] of mMušēzib-Marduk [descendant of Šangû-Ištar-Bābili] can also be placed within the administration of the Ebabbar at Sippar. See Bongenaar, Ebabbar, pp. 160–164. 21 22

B

B

YOS 6, 57

YOS 6, 183

sa-aš2-ta-a ša2 GU4 ki-i i-pu-uš ŠU.2 i-bit-ti ina ŠU.2-šu2 ki-i a -ba-ta (l. 14–16)

presence of administrator


sa-ar-ri-u2-tu (l. 34)

lu2

C

B

AnOr 8, 21

m Nādin known among Eanna officials (l. 3; Kümmel, Familie, p. 122); “temple enterers” mentioned

YOS 6, 88

B

YOS 19, 95

officials among hearers; see Wunsch, CM 3, p. 16

relation to AnOr 8, 21

C

Nbk 344

Evidence of adjudicatory context

Stigers, JCS 28 — (1976), No. 39

Style

Text

—


administrator

—


—

—

“To” whom

8 mār banî (including administrator of Eanna)

5 witnesses

2+ witnesses

—

10 mār banî

10 mār banî

3 witnesses (including 2 ša rēš šarri )

ina pāni

ina pāni

ina pāni

—

ina pāni

ina pāni

ina pāni

Gimillu / Innin-zēraiddin

—

Uruk

Uruk

Babylon

Uruk

m Anu-a a-iddin Uruk / mSîn-ibni // Rē i-alpi

m Nabûmušētiq-uddê/ m Balāssu // Dā iqa

m

m

23.X.10 Nbn

13.XII.4 Nbn

14.VI.4 Nbn

—

17.V.4 Nbn

27.I.? Nbn

16.II.39 Nbk


Balā u/ Territory of Mušēzib-bēl// the Lady-ofBēl-ušēzib Uruk

—

m

m

—

m

m

Bul aya/ Rīmūt // Pa āru

Other Scribe Preposition

Depositions of Testimony

Hearers

Summary Table 3.4


B

C

A

Sack, CuDoc, No. 78

YOS 7, 107

YOS 7, 22

See Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 85.

presence of officials


—

—

—

—

A

Cyr 243

presence of temple officials

—

text labeled lu2mukin-nu-tu

A

Cyr 199

—

—

determination of status

“To” whom

assembly

B

Sack, CuDoc, No. 77

Evidence of adjudicatory context

Stigers, JCS 28 C (1976), No. 6

Style

Text


—

9 qīpi officials and mār banî (including šatammu and administrator of Eanna)

8 mār banî; administrator of Eanna

šangû of Sippar; “temple enterers;” elders

“temple enterer” of Šamaš; vellum-scribe of crown prince’s house

qīpu of the Eulmaš + 1 PN

12+ mār banî

Hearers

Mūrānu/ Nabû-bānia i // Ekur-zākir

—


ina DU.ZU

—

m

m

m

Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin m

?

—

m Nabû-ē irnapšāti/ m Bāniya// Šangû Akkad

m

m

ina pāni

ina ma ar

ina pāni

ina pāni

ina pāni

Other Scribe Preposition

Uruk

Uruk

(Uruk)

(Sippar)

Sippar

—

Uruk

26.IX.2 Camb

23.II.1 Camb

13.12b.6 Cyr

6.?.6 Cyr

7.V.5 Cyr

16.XII.4 Cyr

1.?.14 Nbn


112 chapter three

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 113 such situations, the witnesses or mār banî who hear these statements may have served as an informally-constituted court. Summary Table 3.5 Text

Style

Contents

Memoranda of Depositions

Evidence of Designation adjudicatory of names context


VAS 6, “Babylon” Testimony escaped 253 slave

— an-nu-tu [mu-kin]¢ne2Ü-e ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu

—

GCCI “NonTestimony declaration 2, 195 Babylon” regarding oblate

[an-nu-tu2] lu2 DUMU. DU3.ME [ša2 ina IGI-šu2]-nu

15.?.30 Nbk

VAS 6, “Babylon” Accusation u2-paq-qi-ru 45

lu2 mu-kin-ne2-e — ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu

25.III.38 Nbk

Nbn 69

“Babylon” Claims (?)

mu-kin-ne2-e Babylon ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu

10.IV.2 Nbn

Nbn 958

“Babylon” Testimony assembly

[lu2DUMU DU3].MEŠ ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu

?.II.16 Nbn

oath mentioned

lu2

Uruk

lu2

Sippar

3.C.4 Sworn Depositions Like the accusatory depositions (see section 3.C.1), the depositions of testimony (see section 3.C.2) and the memoranda of depositions (see section 3.C.3), sworn depositions also record statements made during the course of legal proceedings. The difference between the sworn depositions and the other types of depositions is that the sworn depositions record statements made under oath. Thus, texts of this text-type use the verbal construction temû kî (“to swear that”) instead of qabû umma (“to say thus”) to introduce the recorded statement under oath.23 In terms of style, all of the sworn depositions follow “style A,” in which the names of the witnesses follow the recording of the sworn statement. 23 Note that Cyr 293:7 uses the phrase MU dUTU iz-ku-ru-ma (“they spoke the name of Šamaš”) instead of the usual itmû (“they swore”) to indicate that the speakers made their deposition under oath. For more on these formulations, see the discussion in sections 8.I and 9.H below.

114

chapter three

Sworn depositions, like the other text-types that only record statements, do not include descriptions of the proceedings during which the oaths were taken. Between this fact and the breaks in the texts, it is often difficult to reconstruct the situations that led to the oaths. The best-preserved examples record oaths taken in the context of the administration of the Eanna. One example, reconstructed by Cocquerillat, is YOS 7, 165, in which mNabû-a ē-bulli‘ swears the following oath:24 1.

NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i A-šu2 ša2 [ 2. ¢i-na dENÜ dNA3 u3 a-¢de-e ša2 m kam2Ü-[bu]-zi-ia2 3. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR it-te-me ¢ki-iÜ [a-di ŠE.BAR]

(1–3) mNabû-a ē-bulli son of m PN swore by Bēl, Nabû and the oaths of Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the lands:

4. ša2 i-na ši-pir-tu4 ša2 mKI-dNA3TIN lu2si-[pi-ri ša2] m 5. i- u-um-mu lu2ša2 UGU giš BAN2 mPN 6. im-šu- u-mu a-na ZID2.DA ana [nap-ta-nu] 7. ša2 LUGAL a-na mdNA3-ŠEŠMU lu2[SAG.LUGAL at-ta-din]

(3–7) “I [gave] the [barley] that m PN measured at the order of m Itti-Nabû-balā u, the parchmentscribe of m : ummu, the one in charge of the measure, for the flour for the king’s table to mNabû-a a-iddin [the ša rēš šarri ]!”

md

8. [ki ]-ma a-na UGU al-tap-par ŠE.BAR [. . .] 9. [it]-ta- u-u2 ni-ik-lu a-na mu - i 10. [ul at-ta]-ki-$il

(8–10) “Since I sent word about it, barley . . . that came out (?). I have [not com]itted any misdeed.”

The last words of the oath ni-ik-lu a-na mu - i [ul at-ta]-ki-il (“I have [not com]itted any misdeed”) are the key to understanding the context of this oath. It seems that mNabû-a ē-bulli‘ has been accused of misappropriating barley that he was supposed to give to the Eanna for flour. In order to clear himself, he takes an exculpatory oath affirming that he did indeed give this flour, which had been measured, to an official in the Eanna and that he has not done any misdeed. Thus, Cocquerillat is correct to consider this text among examples of “procès-verbaux de défense” (“oral defense proceedings”).25

Transliteration follows Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 133. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 83–85. See also p. 60, where Cocquerillat offers a similar interpretation of BIN 2, 108, another sworn deposition, and includes it among “documents concernant les injustices dans l’estimation” (“documents relating to inconsistencies in assessment”). 24 25

preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 115 A somewhat different purpose for the oath may be inferred from Cyr 293. The text begins with the heading lu2mu-kin-nu-tu (“testimony”) and continues with the names of three witnesses who present their testimony under oath in the assembly. In this case, it seems that the oath was testimony presented as part of a hearing regarding the possession of a certain contract. The precise details of the sworn testimony are not entirely clear,26 but the three people swearing are different from those about whom they swear. In other words, the three people do not swear about themselves, as is to be expected if the oath were exculpatory. It seems, therefore, that the oath in this text is not exculpatory, but is, instead, a means of ensuring the veracity of the testimony. A more detailed account of the administration of oaths will be presented as part of the description of adjudicatory procedures in Part II. For now, the discussion will focus on what can be said about the formality of the proceedings in which the sworn depositions were made. Officials of both the Eanna and the Ebabbar are included among those who hear the oaths. In BIN 2, 108 and YOS 7, 153, the individuals swear “to” (ana) officials of the Eanna.27 BIN 2, 108 also concludes with a list of individuals in whose presence (ina DU.ZU) the oath was sworn, including the qīpu-official of the Ebabbar.28 The oath in Cyr 318 is pronounced “before” (ina ma ar) the šangû of Sippar, who is also present in Camb 426. Even AnOr 8, 55 and YOS 7, 165, which do not specifically mention temple authorities, are written by the scribes mGimillu son of mInnin-zēra-ibni and mNādinu son of mBēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of Egibi, respectively. The presence of these scribes, who are known for their involvement in recording other proceedings, suggests that these texts were composed in similar contexts. All of the above indicates that the sworn depositions were made in formal adjudicatory contexts.29

26 The text records the oath as follows: mPN1 ri-kis-su ša2 KU3.BABBAR a-na mPN2 la ip-qi2-du-ma mPN2 ri-kis u2- er-ri-ma a-na mPN1 id-din-nu (“mPN1 has not deposited his contract regarding the silver with mPN2; mPN2 has given the contract which he repaid to mPN1”). 27 BIN 2, 108:6; YOS 7, 153:5. 28 BIN 2, 108: 11. 29 Note, however, that there are texts, such as Dar 187 and BRM 1, 70, that describe (promissory) oaths without any apparent official setting. See the discussion in section 7.B below.

—

šatammu of Eanna


ina dEN dNA3 u3 m ku-ra-aš2 LUGAL ¢TIN.TIRkiÜ LUGAL ¢KUR. KURÜ it-te-me

ina dEN dNA3 u LUGAL it-te-mu ki-i

MU dUTU iz-kuru-ma

[it-te-me] ki-i

i-te-[mu . . .] ki-i

i-na dEN dNA3 u3 a-de-e ša2 mka-ambu-zi-ia . . . it-te-muu2 ki-i

i-na dEN u dNA3 u3 a-de-e ša2 mkam2-buzi-ia . . . it-te-mu-u2 ki-i

¢i-na dENÜ dNA3 u3 — a-¢de-e ša2 mkam2Ü[bu]-zi-ia2 . . . it-te-me ¢ki-iÜ

YOS 7, 18

AnOr 8, 55

Cyr 293

Cyr 318

Camb 426

BIN 2, 108

YOS 7, 153

YOS 7, 165

—

—

—

—

“To” whom

Oath term

Text

ina ma ar

—

ina DU.ZU

Other Preposition



qīpu of Ebabbar; 2 PNs (witnesses?) + 1 scribe

šangû of Sippar + 2 witnesses + 1 scribe

—

—

ina DU.ZU

?

Babylon (?)

(Sippar)

Uruk

Uruk


Marduk-nā ir / Madānu-a ēiddin// [Šigûa]

m Nādinu/ mBēl-a iqīša // Egibi

Gimillu/ mInninzēra-ibni m

m

m

ē-

Uruk

Uruk

Ša eru

[mMušallim-Marduk]/ ? Lâbāši // Ša-nāšīšu

m

Arad-Bēl / [mBēlušallim] // Adadšammê

m

—

Gimillu/ mInninzēra-ibni

m

Gimillu/ mInninzēra-ibni

m

Scribe

Sworn Depostions

ina ma ar šangû of Sippar + 5 witnesses (including ša rēš šarri ) + 1 scribe

assembly, mMarduknā ir


šatammu and administrator of Eanna; 15 PNs

Other Hearers

Summary Table 3.6

24.V.4 Camb

9.V.3 Camb

4.XI.? Camb

25.IX.[1] Cyr and Camb

28.VI.8 Cyr

10.I.8 Cyr

12.XI.6 Cyr

15.V.3 Cyr

Date

116 chapter three

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DABĀBU- AND QUTTÛ-TYPE SUMMONSES The typological discussion until this point has focused on text-types that narrate activities in court during the course of a trial. The decision records and the preliminary protocols describe the activities of the various people in the court, including the adjudicating authorities, witnesses and parties to the proceedings. Similarly, the depositions record statements that are made during the course of such proceedings. This chapter and the two that follow discuss text-types that do not necessarily narrate courtroom activities or record litigants’ statements. This lack of narrative context means that in order to situate these text-types within the ‘tablet trail’ one must reconstruct the situations that led to their promulgation. One must, therefore, use the available evidence to determine whether or not these text-types were composed as part of the adjudicatory process and, if they were, how they might have functioned. This chapter considers two of these text-types whose place in the adjudication of disputes is easiest to determine. Both the dabābu- and quttû-type summonses employ phrases that allude to a dispute. Thus, it is clear that they belong in the ‘tablet trail’ of texts composed during the adjudication of disputes. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter will focus primarily on determining the legal function of these two text-types. 4.A

Summonses to Argue (dabābu) a Case

Summonses of this text-type have the following general outline: I. Summons clause: U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI MN MU X-kam2 RN, PN1 illakamma dīna1 itti PN2 idabbub

1

For discussion of this transliteration, see the footnotes to section 8.D below.

118

chapter four

On day X of MN, year X of RN, PN1 shall come and argue the case against (the claim of ) PN2 II. Penalty clause: kî lā ittalka— If he does not come > penalty against PN1 III. Witnesses + Scribe IV. Place of composition and date In order to illustrate these different components, YOS 7, 31, a dabābutype summons from Uruk, will serve as an example. The summons clause of this text reads as follows: 1. U4 20-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN MU 4-kam2 mku-ra-aš2 2. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR md ASAR.LU. I-DI.KU5DU3-uš 3. A-šu2 ša2 m i-ra-a - a a-na TIN.TIRki il-la-ka-ma 4. di-i-ni ša2 2 UDU.NITA. MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 šeen-du 5. ša2 mgi-mil-lu A-šu2 ša2 mdinnin-MU-ib-ni 6. ul-tu e-e-ni ša2 mdASAR. LU2. I-DI.KU5-DU3-uš 7. i-bu-ku it-ti mni-din-tu4-dEN lu2 ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA 8. mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA 9. u3 lu2UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2 E2.AN.NA ina E2 di-i-ni 10. ša2 LUGAL i-dab-ub-bu

(1–3) On 20 Kislīmu, year 4 of Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of the lands, mMarduk-dīna-īpuš son of m ira a shall come to Babylon.

(4–10) He shall argue the case regarding 2 male sheep branded with a star that mGimillu son of mInninšuma-ibni led away from the flock of mMarduk-dīna-īpuš, against (the claim of ) mNidintu-Bēl the šatammu of the Eanna, mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna and the scribes of the Eanna, in the king’s court of law.

The requirement in this type of summons is formulated using a combination of two verbs: alāku and dabābu. The first verb indicates that the summoned individual (PN1) must “come.”2 As can be seen from the sample text, the verb alāku is usually preceded by the prepositional 2 This nuance is implied by the use of the ventive -am on the verb alāku. Note that the ventive is absent in VAS 6, 99:3.

the DABĀBU- and QUTTÛ-type summonses

119

phrase “ana GN” (“to GN”) to specify the place to which the summoned individual must come. In addition to specifying the location, the summons clause above specifies that the case is to be argued ina bīt dīni ša šarri (“in the king’s court of law”). Other summonses of this type usually designate the authorities “before” (ina pāni ) whom the case is to be argued. The different places and authorities specified in the different texts are listed in summary table 4.1 at the end of this section. In most of the dabābu-type summonses, as in the example above, the requirement to argue the case is expressed using the verbal phrase dīni . . . idabbub. Other texts use the synonymous phrase dibbu (followed by a possessive suffix) idabbub.3 In the example above, the subject of the case is stated in the relative clause following the word dīna. The case is to be argued itti another party. In legal contexts, the word itti has an adversarial connotation and should be translated “against.”4 Thus, a simple translation of the verbal construction dīna itti PN2 dabābu is “to argue a case against PN2.” The dabābu-type summonses, however, are not simply a means of beginning a case by bringing two parties to court to argue their claims against each other. Instead, the dabābu-type summonses were written after one party has already made a claim against the summoned individual. This understanding of the dabābu-type summonses emerges from consideration of the penalty clauses, which indicate that the dabābu-type summonses were not written as a means of initiating a legal case. The penalties mentioned in dabābu-type summonses are not uniform, a fact that indicates that they are not a standardized fine for failure to appear. These penalties are imposed only upon the summoned individual (PN1) even though another party (PN2) is involved in the dispute. Furthermore, the penalties are obligations of the summoned individual to the opposing party or the institution the opposing party represents. Thus, the

See summary table 4.1 at the end of this section for the texts which use dīni and those which use dibbu. The use of the different nouns may be related to the provenance of the texts. The phrase using the word dibbu appears in the documents written in Babylon during the reign of Nabonidus, while the phrase using the word dīnu appears in documents written outside Babylon after the reign of Nabonidus. For documents using only the verb dabābu, see the discussion of Abraham, Business, Nos. 17 and 45 below. For documents using the phrase dibba quttû see the discussion in section 4.B below. The phrase dīna quttû is a hypothetically possible combination and is attested in other Akkadian contexts. It is not, however, attested in the documents considered in this section (see CAD qatû 4d [Q , p. 181]). 4 See AHw. dabābu 3b (p. 147). For a similar meaning, see the use of itti with verbs denoting war listed in AHw. itti 5 (p. 405). 3

120

chapter four

varying penalties reflect different disputed obligations to the opposing party. The opposing party is a plaintiff who has already made a claim against the summoned individual. The dabābu-type summonses are a means of obligating the summoned individual to answer the plaintiff’s claim. By not coming to argue the case, the summoned individual implicitly accepts the obligation in question. Given this information, the following general scenario emerges as the background behind the texts in this text-type. The opposing party (PN2) is a plaintiff who has already made a claim against PN1. The texts in this text-type are a means of obligating PN1 to answer the plaintiff’s claim. By not coming to argue the case, PN1 implicitly accepts the obligation in question. To properly reflect this scenario, the translation of the phrase dīna itti PN2 idabbub should not be simply “he shall argue against PN2” but rather, “he shall argue against (the claim of ) PN2.” This general scenario may be illustrated by returning to the sample text, YOS 7, 31. The penalty clause in this text reads: 10. ki-i 11. la it-tal-ku UDU.NITA-a 2 12. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-din

(10–12) If he does not go, he shall pay 30-fold for these 2 sheep to the Lady-of-Uruk.

When this penalty is taken together with the summons clause, the following situation may be reconstructed. mMarduk-dīna-īpuš is responsible for two sheep that mGimillu, known to have been a corrupt official, led away from his flock.5 The šatammu and scribes of the Eanna have already accused mMarduk-dīna-īpuš of misappropriation, for which he would have to pay the standard thirty-fold penalty.6 Following the accusation of the Eanna authorities, mMarduk-dīna-īpuš is summoned to Babylon to make his defense (“argue the case”) against their claim. If he does not appear, he incurs the penalty. The earliest discussion of the legal function of this text-type occurs in Köhler and Peiser’s description of Nbn 102. They describe this text as “Fristenvertrag” (“a time-period contract”) and “eine vertragsmässige Klagfrist” (“a contractual appointment-time for a trial”).7 Their use of the German word “Vertrag,” meaning “contract,” indicates that they take Nbn

Following the example of TCL 13, 134, one may speculate that these two sheep were for the Lady-of-Uruk, but mGimillu did not deliver them there. 6 For more on this subject, see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–348. 7 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 80. 5


121

102 as a “contract” in which PN1 agrees to appear in court to respond to PN2’s charge on a particular date. If PN1 does not appear, then he agrees to submit to PN2’s claim. Although Köhler and Peiser do not explicitly discuss who composed this document, their description of it as a contract suggests that it was drawn up between the two parties without any prior involvement of the court. From this perspective, it would be incorrect to see any intervention by a legal authority to compel the parties to bring the case to a conclusion. On the other hand, Arch Tremayne, in his catalogue of YOS 7, uses the word “summons” to describe the relevant texts in that volume.8 According to Tremayne, then, this text-type is not a contractual agreement reached between parties. Rather it is a court order of sorts, a summons, which requires PN1 to appear in court to respond to PN2’s claim. The difference between these two interpretations of the text-type apparently reflects the ambiguity of the durative tense of the verbs illakamma and idabbub in the summons clause. The Akkadian duratives can bear the simple future sense of “he will go” and “he will argue.” Thus, the texts could simply be contracts, as Köhler and Peiser would have them. On the other hand, the duratives could also bear the sense of “he must go” and “he must argue.” This understanding would support Tremayne’s interpretation of the texts as “summonses.” The strongest evidence against the interpretation of the dabābu-type summonses as a contract comes from YOS 7, 189. This text completely describes the legal proceedings that led to its promulgation. The text begins with the statement of mBau-ēreš, a shepherd of Ištar of Uruk, who, in the assembly, accuses two slaves belonging to mKīnaya of having stolen sheep. The text concludes with a summons requiring mKīnaya to present the two slaves and argue his case against mBau-ēreš’s claim before the royal judges. Failure to appear results in mKīnaya’s having to compensate mBau-ēreš. It is clear, then, that YOS 7, 189 was issued not as a contract between the two parties, but as a summons by the court in direct response to the plaintiff’s initial complaint. Apart from the very explicit evidence of YOS 7, 189, additional support for the involvement of an official body in the composition of the documents comes from the mention of different legal authorities before

8

YOS 7, pp. 43–48.

122

chapter four

whom the defendant must appear.9 In the case of Nbn 102, the text that Köhler and Peiser describe as a contract, the individual must argue his case before officials of the Esagil temple. The requirement to appear on a specific date indicates that these officials will hear the case on the date specified. It would seem, then, that the officials were notified before the document was issued.10 Similarly, VAS 6, 99:14–16 states clearly that “the document was written in the (presence?) of mŠarru-lū-dār the qīpu of the Ebabbar and mMarduk-šuma-iddin the scribe of Sippar.”11 The decision records and preliminary protocols provide further evidence for understanding the texts at hand as summonses issued by a court. Several of these texts describe the judges bringing a defendant before them after the plaintiff has detailed his complaint.12 The dabābu-type summons, therefore, is a written record of the procedure by which the judges bring the person before them for trial. One complication in the interpretation of these documents as summonses arises from the notices about where the documents were written. Given that the summonses were written once the plaintiff had approached the court, and that they express the authority of the court to summon the defendant, one might expect the documents to have been written in the court itself, or, at the very least, in the same city as the court. This is the case in AnOr 8, 50, that summons mArdiya to argue a case in Uruk and that was written in Uruk.13 In many cases, See summary table 4.1 below. Note that AnOr 8, 37 and YOS 7, 189 require the summoned individual to appear before the judges of the king by (adi ), rather than on, a particular date. Based on these two texts one might argue that a court might not have been involved initially in these and in any other such texts. The evidence of the texts suggests otherwise. The penalty clause in AnOr 8, 37:11–14 does not begin with the word adi, which suggests that a specific date was intended, despite the word adi at the beginning of the text. Even if the word adi is intended, the unspecified date does not necessarily mean that these documents were written as agreements between the two parties rather than by an official body. One might imagine that the court hearing the complaint could compel the litigants to arrange a hearing by a particular time. This must have been the case in YOS 7, 189, which describes the formal lodging of the complaint in the assembly before recording the summons to appear by a particular date. 11 ina ¢ma?- ar?Ü mLUGAL-[lu]-¢u2Ü-[da-ar lu2]qi-i-pi E2.BABBAR.RA u mdAMAR.UTUMU-MU lu2UMBISAG UD.KIB.NUNki ša- a-ru ša2- i-ir-ru. 12 Examples include: Nbn 13:5–6; OIP 122, 38:28–30; and Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48: 10–12. In YOS 7, 159:7–8, the judges send a messenger to a particular defendant. See the discussion in sections 8.C and 9.D below. 13 In Nbn 102, there is no specific mention of the city to which the individual is summoned. However, the presence of the officials of the Esagil (Nbn 102:4) suggests that the case was to be heard in Babylon. If so, then Nbn 102, which is also writ9

10


123

however, the dabābu-type summonses were written in a different location from the summoning court. It is also noteworthy that while these other summonses were written in Uruk or Sippar,14 all of them contain summonses to Babylon. When these facts are taken together with the understanding that the documents were composed only after the plaintiff had lodged a formal complaint, one necessarily reaches the conclusion that these summonses were written by local authorities acting on behalf of the authorities in Babylon. Some support for this description comes from VAS 6, 99, a summons to Babylon, which makes explicit reference to the authorities in Sippar present at its composition. Thus, it seems that the plaintiff first approached the local officials, who had the authority to summon the defendant to Babylon on a later date, or that the plaintiff had approached the authorities in Babylon who then ordered the local authorities to issue the summons.15 Recently, Abraham has published two documents that appear to be a variant of the dabābu-type summons.16 Both texts require an individual to appear in Babylon and impose a penalty upon this individual if he does not appear. The summons clauses in these two texts read: 1) Abraham, Business, No. 17:1–6 1. U4 20-kam2 ša2 ITI DU6 mgu-zanu A-šu2 ša2 2. mdNA3-NUMUN-GIŠ A mga- al il-la-kam2--ma 3. ina TIN.TIRki it-ti mdAMAR. UTU-nair-IBILA 4. A-šu2 ša2 mSUM.NA-a A me-gibi a-na mu - i 5. KU3.BABBAR ni-din-tu4 ša2 lu2 BAN ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-nair-A 6. a-na mgu-za-nu id-din-nu i-dab-bu-ub

(1–6) On 20 Tašrītu, mGuzānu son of mNabû-zēru-līšir descendant of Ga al shall come, and, in Babylon, argue against (the claim of ) mMarduk-nā irapli son of mIddinaya descendant of Egibi regarding the silver, the “contribution of the archer” that mMarduk-nā ir-apli gave to m Guzānu.

ten in Babylon, is another example of a document composed in the same city as the summoning court. 14 AnOr 8, 37 and YOS 7, 31 were written in Uruk. VAS 6, 99 was written in Sippar. 15 For more on this possibility, see Matthew Stolper, “ ‘No-one Has Exact Information Except for You:’ Communication Between Babylon and Uruk in the First Achaemenid Reigns,” Achaemenid History 13 (2003), pp. 265–287. 16 Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45.

124

chapter four

2) Abraham, Business, No. 45:1–13 1. [U4 10-kam2 ša2 ITI AB MU 2]6-kam2 2. [mda-ri-ia-muš ] ¢LUGALÜ [Eki u KUR.KUR] mdEN-NIGIN-ir 3. [A-šu2 ša2 m]¢dU.GUR-MU anaÜ [TIN.T]IRki a-na pa-ni md 4. AMAR.UTU-nair-IBILA A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTUTIN A me-gi-bi 5. il-la-kam2-ma a-na mu - i u2il3-tim ša2 1 MA.NA [KU3. BABBAR]

(1–5) [On 10 ebētu, year 2]6 of [Darius king of Babylon and the lands] mBēl-upa ir [son of ] mNergal-iddin shall come to [Baby]lon before mMarduk-nā irapli son of mItti-Marduk-balā u descendant of Egibi.

6. BABBAR-u2 nu-u - u-tu ša2 ina ¢1Ü GIN2 bit-qa 3 GUR ZU2. LUM.[MA] ¢u3Ü GU4? 7. ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- irIBILA ša2 ina mu - i-šu2 u3 ša2- [a-ru.(MEŠ)] 8. ša2 a-na mu - i u2-il3-tim.MEŠ ša2 KU3.BABBAR ŠE.BAR ZU2.LUM.MA ¢u3 GU4Ü 9. ša2 mdDI.KU5-EN-URI3 lu2qalla ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- irIBILA 10. ša2 ina mu - i mdEN-NIGIN-ir ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- irIBILA 11. ul-tu MU 20-kam2 mda-ri-ia-muš it-ti 12. mdEN-NIGIN-ir iš- u-ru it-ti 13. mdAMAR.UTU-nair-IBILA i-dab-bu-ub

(5–13) He shall argue against (the claim) of mMarduk-nā irapli regarding the debt-note of 1 mina of medium-quality [silver] in which 1/8 is alloy, 3 kur of date[s and an ox] belonging to m Marduk-nā ir-apli that he owes, and the [documents] regarding the debt-notes of silver, barley, dates and cattle belonging to m Madānu-bēla-u ur, slave of m Marduk-nā ir-apli, owed by m Bēl-upa ir, that mMarduk-nā irapli drew up against mBēl-upa ir from year 20 of Darius.

Both texts require the individual to go to Babylon and both use the verb dabābu to indicate the action that he must perform there. Neither text, however, includes the noun dibbu or dīnu as an object in the dabābu expression. Apparently because of this absence, Abraham translates the verb in both texts as “to reach an agreement,” based on the meaning of the verb dabābu in Neo-Babylonian letters.17 Furthermore, Abraham 17 Abraham gives her reasons in the discussion of No. 45 (Abraham, Business, p. 286). Although she does not mention No. 17 in her discussion of No. 45, her translation of No. 17 (Abraham, Business, p. 234) seems to reflect the same line of reasoning.


125

points to the fact that neither text mentions judges or another authority before whom the summoned individual must appear. Therefore, she specifically rejects the possibility that the summoned individual, the debtor, is to appear in court to plead against his creditor.18 Thus, according to Abraham, these documents are not summonses to argue a case, but “summons to settle payment”19 or “summons to settle debts.”20 Abraham’s interpretation is not convincing; there are still reasons to understand these texts in the same way as the other dabābu-type summonses. The absence of the noun dīna or dibba in the summons clauses does not, of itself, indicate that the verb dabābu means anything but “argue.” There are examples in which the verbal phrase itti PN dabābu means “to argue against,” even without a preceding noun.21 Both summons clauses mention disputed debts, so this translation is not out of context. In both texts, the summons clauses imply that the individual who is the object of the preposition itti has already raised a claim. This is also indicated in the penalty clauses (in the continuation of both texts), which state that the summoned individual must make a payment if he does not appear. Thus, the verbal phrase itti PN dabābu should retain its meaning “to argue against (the claim of ) PN,” even though the noun dīna or dibba is absent. In light of this interpretation of the verb dabābu, one must reconsider the fact that these texts do not mention legal authorities. Contrary to Abraham’s interpretation, these texts require an “argument” rather than an “agreement,” but do not mention the authorities before whom the argument is to be made. Abraham’s suggestion that these texts do not require a court appearance may, in fact, be correct. It is possible that these summonses respond to the plaintiff’s claim by ordering the defendant to make his arguments outside a court.22 This possibility, however, seems somewhat remote, given that the very issuance of a summons might have already involved adjudicating authorities. There is, however, room to challenge Abraham’s rejection of the possibility that the summoned individual must appear in court. Abraham, Business, p. 286. Abraham, Business, p. 194 and p. 234. 20 Abraham, Business, p. 194 and p. 284. 21 See CAD dabābu 4b (D, p. 9). CAD translates “to litigate.” 22 Compare this possibility with the discussion of the quttû-summons below. This possibility should be considered especially in the cases of Abraham, Business, No. 45 and Dar 189 in which the summoned individual is required to appear “before” (ana pāni ) the plaintiff. 18 19

Noun

dīnu

dibbu

dibbu

dīnī

dīnī

—

dīnī

TEXT

Wunsch, BA 1, pp. 356–357

Nbn 102

BE 8/1, 48

AnOr 8, 37

VAS 6, 99

MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4 (?)

YOS 7, 31

(ina bīt dīni ša šarri )

rāb ummānu/ šangû of Sippar

sartennu + royal judges

royal judges

—

qīpuofficials (?) of Esagil

mār banî (?)

Authority

30-fold payment

30-fold payment

payment of losses due to stopped work

enslavement of slaves in question

?

slave service

?

Penalty ?

1.VIII.4 Cyr (11/12)

24.V.4 Cyr (9/7)

3.VI.3 Cyr (8/28)

18.XI.1 Cyr (1/30)

20.IX (12/30)

25.V (9/8)

15.[VII]

(adi ?) 15.I (3/26)

22.VI.5 ? Nbn (10/1)

48 days

1 day

42 days

(< ?) 55 days

?

19 days

?

Appearance Length Date of Time

25.II.3 15.III Nbn (5/31) (6/19)

?

Date Written

Babylon

Opis

Babylon

Babylon

Babylon

—

—

Uruk

Sippar

Sippar

Uruk

Babylon

Babylon

?

Place of Place of Appearance Composition

Summary Table 4.1 dabābu-Type Summonses

Bēl-iddin/ Šāpik-zēri// Mandidi

Arad-Bēl/ Bēl-ušallim //Adadšammê


m

m IqīšaMarduk/ m Etel-pîŠamaš // Šangû-Sippar

m

m

m

m

Balā u / Sîn-ibni // Rē i-alpi

—

m

m

?

Scribe

126 chapter four

—

—

dīnī

—

—

—

YOS 7, 189

Dar 189

Abraham, Business, No. 17

Abraham, Business, No. 45

repayment of debts

1 mina

payment

repayment of loss

payment for use of slave

Penalty

2.IX.26 Dar (11/30)

12.VII.6 Dar (10/24)

8.XII.5 Dar (2/26)

7.II.6 Camb (5/22)

18.XI.5 Cyr (2/14)

Date Written

10.X. (1/7)

20.VII (11/1)

adi 10.IV (6/25)

adi 1.III (6/14)

7.XII (3/5)

38 days

8 days

< 120 days

< 23 days

19 days

Appearance Length Date of Time

Babylon

Babylon

—

—

Uruk

?

ursagkalamma

Babylon

Uruk

Uruk

Place of Place of Appearance Composition

Dates are calculated according to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology. Lengths of time do not include date of composition.

—

royal judges

royal judges

dīnī

AnOr 8, 50

Authority

Noun

TEXT


Nabû-iddin/ Nabû-gāmil // Su aya

?

m Šamašiddina // Sagdidi

m

m

Marduknā ir / m Madānua ē-iddin // Šigûa m

Šamašmukīn-apli/ m Nādin// Egibi m

Scribe

the DABĀBU- and QUTTÛ-type summonses 127

128

chapter four

The use of the verb dabābu alone, without the noun dīnu or dibbu does not, of itself, preclude the possibility that the summoned individual is to actually appear before adjudicating authorities.23 The fact that these texts specifically require the individual to come to Babylon on a particular date suggests that, as is the case with other dabābu-type summonses, a formal appearance is required. Furthermore, these texts were composed in response to a plaintiff’s claim, which implies (as does Abraham’s own classification of the texts as summonses) that some official body has already been involved in their issuance. Thus, even though Abraham, Business, No. 17 and Abraham, Business, No. 45 do not mention an adjudicating authority, it is still possible that they require the summoned individuals to actually appear in court. Like the other dabābu- type summonses, these texts may require the defendant’s appearance in court to argue a case against the plaintiff’s claim. In summary, the dabābu-type of summonses are composed by authorities in response to a plaintiff’s claim. Their legal function is to require a defendant to go and argue his case against the claim of a plaintiff. The requirement to argue the case may be expressed by the verb dabābu alone or in combination with the noun dīnu or dibbu. Most dabābu-type summonses specify the authorities before whom the defendant must argue his case. Those which do not may, nevertheless, require an appearance in court. 4.B

Summonses to End (quttû) a Case

The formulation of this type of summons resembles that of the dabābutype summons. Like the dabābu-summonses, the quttû-summonses include varying penalties for failure to appear that are always the obligations of the summoned individual to the opposing party.24 If the summoned 23 This much is clear from another text which uses the verb dabābu without a noun: MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4:3–4. In this text, even though no noun is used, the individual must appear “before the chief of the workers” (ina IGI lu2GAL um-ma-nu) and “in the presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) the šangû of Sippar. Because the rest of the text is unclear, the use of the verb dabābu here remains in question. MacGinnis actually translates the verbal phrase itti PN idabbub in the summons clause as “will speak with PN.” 24 This is true even in Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276/Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 243: 8–15, which includes obligations upon both the summoned individual and the opposing party. Only the obligation upon the summoned individual is contingent upon his failure to appear.


129

individual does not come to end the case, then he implicitly accepts the obligation in question. Thus, it seems that both the dabābu- and quttû-type of summonses were composed as a response to a claim. However, instead of the verb dabābu (“to argue”), documents of this text-type use the verbal construction dibbišu quttû (“to end his case”) to express the summoned individual’s obligation. The use of the verb quttû rather than dabābu implies that the two types of summonses have different functions. An example of this type of summons is Nbk 379. According to Wunsch’s collations,25 the text reads as follows:26,27 1. a-di U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI KIN 2-kam2 mkal-ba-a 2. A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-u2-še-zib il-la-kam2-ma 3. dib-bi-šu ša2 KU3.BABBAR u ŠE.BAR it-ti 4. flu-bal- a-at u2-qa-at-ta

(1–4) By X Ulūlu II, mKalbaya son of mNergal-ušēzib shall come and end his case against (the claim of ) f Lū-bal at concerning the silver and the barley.

5. ki-i la it-tal-ka 6 G[IN2?] K[U3.BABBAR?]26 (erasure)- a-at 6. ša2 la ta-x -tu4 a-na flu-bala-at 7. i-nam-din

(5–7) If he does not come, he shall pay fLū-bal āt 6 š[eqel (?)] of s[ilver (?)] of not . . .

8. mim-ma ma-la ina ŠU.2 flubal-[ a-at x x]-su 9. i-tur fga-ga-a pu-ut

(8–9) Whatever, in total, he . . . from f Lū-bal āt he shall return.27

10. e- er ša2 KU3.BABBAR u ŠE.BAR na-ša2-ti

(9–10) fGagaya bears responsibility for the repayment of the silver and the barley.

Wunsch, CM 3, No. 39. Wunsch’s tentative restoration raises the following problem: the initial presentation of the case (line 3) and the guarantee clause (line 10) include barley, but the penalty for not appearing does not seem to include payment of the barley. Note, however, that the words mim-ma ma-la in the penalty clause (line 8) represent the totality of the disputed debt, and so, may reflect both barley and silver. 27 San Nicolò-Ungnad translate the G form of the verb târu as a transitive, “to pay in return,” while noting this uncharacteristic usage (San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV No. 34, n. 10 [p. 48]). Wunsch and the present translation follow San Nicolò-Ungnad. For a similar usage, see Nbk 52: 9 and the translation in Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben, p. 31. 25 26

130

chapter four 11.

mu-kin-nu mSUM.NAŠU2 A-šu2 12. ša2 mBA-ša2-a A mZALAGd 30 mkal-ba-a 13. A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mEN. NUN-KA2.GAL

(11–12) Witnesses: Iddin-Marduk, son of mIqīšaya descendant of NūrSîn; (12–13) mKalbaya, son of mNādin descendant of Ma ār-abulli;

14. u lu2UMBISAG mdAMAR. UTU-GI A-šu2 ša2 mSUd ŠU2 15. A mman-di-di TIN.TIRki ITI KIN u4 25-kam2 16. MU 41-kam2 dNA3-NIG2. DU-PAP 17. LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(14–15) And the scribe: mMardukušallim son of mErība-Marduk descendant of Mandidi. (15–17) Babylon. 25 Ulūlu year 41 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon.

lu2 d

This text is the result of a dispute about a debt of barley and silver that m Kalbaya owes fLū-bal āt. Apparently, fLū-bal āt has claimed that mKalbaya has not paid his debt. mKalbaya is summoned to “end his case” (dibbišu quttû) against fLū-bal āt’s claim by (adi ) a particular date. If he does not come, then mKalbaya must pay fLū-bal āt. A guarantor named fGagaya assumes responsibility for the repayment of the silver and barley. As stated, the difference between the dabābu- and quttû-type summonses is apparent from the use of the different verbs. Unlike the verb dabābu, the verb quttû (derived from the verb qatû, “to end”) does not imply arguing a case, even in conjunction with the noun dibbu. Furthermore, a number of other differences between the dabābu- and quttû-summonses underscore the distinction between the two text-types. Unlike the dabābu-type summonses, the quttû-type does not mention any adjudicating authority before whom the summoned individual must appear. Another difference between the two text-types relates to the date of appearance. Because the dabābu-type summonses require an appearance in court, they usually give a precise date on which the summoned individual must come to argue the case. The quttû-type summonses, on the other hand, begin with the word adi, indicating that the summoned individual may come to “end his case” at any time before the specific date. Furthermore, from the scant data available, it also appears that the quttû-type documents usually allow for less time than the dabābu-type summonses between the date of the writing of the summons and the settlement.28

28

See summary tables 4.1 and 4.2 for calculations of length of time. Note the excep-


131

These differences between the dabābu- and quttû-type summonses suggest that the quttû-type summonses require an informal settling of the case rather than a formal argument in the presence of adjudicating authorities. The case will “end” by, but not on, a particular date, because there is no need to arrange a formal hearing. An informal settlement might also require less time than arguing a case. This interpretation raises the possibility that, unlike the dabābu-type summonses, these texts were not written by a court. It is possible that the plaintiffs made their claim directly to the summoned individuals, and that the document was written to arrange the settling of the case. Joannès describes Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276, a quttû-type text, as an “accord ” (“agreement”) between the two parties.29 This understanding implies that there was no formal complaint before the document was written. Instead, the two parties reached an agreement to settle by a certain date without any official body compelling either of them. According to Joannès, then, it would be incorrect to apply the label “summons” to this text-type, since no authority issued the summons. On the other hand, there are reasons to retain the label “summons” and to consider the texts as coming from a court. The setting of a deadline, even if not a specific date, and the requirement that the summoned individual “come” somewhere, even if the location is not specified, suggest that there is a need to compel the summoned individual to act. One might argue, then, that the plaintiffs have sought redress from a court that issued the summons ordering the summoned individuals to “end the case.” If this interpretation is correct, then both the dabābuand quttû-types of summons are issued by a court. The only difference between the two text-types is how the case is to be concluded. The dabābu-type summonses require the summoned individual to appear before a court of law. The quttû-type summonses, on the other hand, do not require an appearance in court, but nevertheless require that the case come to an end. If the summoned individuals do not act to end the case, then they face the penalty. If, as has just been suggested, the quttû-summonses also originate in a court, then they may be related to another text-type, the guarantees

tionally short span of time (1 day) in MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4, which may be a dabābu type of summons. Dar 229, in which an individual swears to “settle” within 2 days, provides additional support for the correlation between short time span and a summons to informal settlement (rather than to formal proceedings). 29 Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 56.

132

chapter four

for testimony (see section 5.B). In these texts, a guarantor assumes responsibility for “establishing the case” (kunnu) against another individual. Sometimes, as will be seen below, the guarantors are accused individuals who have attempted to clear themselves by accusing another individual. Therefore, the guarantors assume responsibilty for substantiating the accusations. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is important to note that this text-type does not specify a date on which or by which the guarantors must provide the evidence. Thus, based only on the guarantee for testimony, the case against the guarantors would remain unsettled for an unlimited time. The quttû-summonses, which do specify a terminus by which the case must be “ended,” might address this problem. By issuing a quttû-summons, a court might indicate that individuals who have assumed responsibility for substantiating an accusation in order to clear themselves must provide the evidence by a certain time or face a penalty. Summary Table 4.2 quttû-Type Summonses TEXT

Penalty

Date Written

Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe Date of Time Appearance Composition

TuM 2–3, 1 mina 213

?.VI.7 ? adi qīt ša ITI ? [ MN ]

—

Borsippa

m IttiNabûbalā u/ m Nabû-x

Nbk 379

6 šeqel

25.VIb. 41 Nbk (9/28)

a-di ?.VIb

Penalty against PN1

These clauses indicate that if the summoned individual (PN1) establishes the case, then the opposing party (PN2) will make a payment. If the summoned individual (PN1) does not establish the case, then the summoned individual (PN1) incurs the penalty in the case. In order to illustrate this subtype, BIN 1, 113 will be presented in its entirety. The text reads as follows:10 1. mri-mut-dEN A-šu2 ša2 md ENŠADA-MU ša2 lu2NU. giš KIRI6.MEŠ 2. ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA ZAG A.ŠA3. MEŠ NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki 3. u dna-na-a ša2 MU 1kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-ia LUGAL TIN.TIRki 4. LUGAL KUR.KUR ša2 gišBAN ša2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 ša2 mkal-ba-a 5. ik-ki-su ina UKKIN u2-kin-nu-uš um-ma ZU2.LUM.MA

(1–5) mRīmūt-Bēl son of mNuskuiddin, about whom the gardeners who cut the dates constituting the imittu-yield10 of the fields belonging to Ištar of Uruk and Nanaya, of year 1 of Cambyses king of Babylon king of the lands the sūtu-tax of mBaniya son of m Kalbaya, established thus:

9 Nbk 266 and Nbk 366 state only that PN1 is clear (zaki ), but do not impose a penalty on PN2. 10 For the meaning of this term, see CAD imittu B (I/J, pp. 123–125).

136

chapter five

11

6. ina ZAG A.ŠA3.MEŠ ša2 ina pani-ni mri-mut-dEN ina ŠU.2-i-ni 7. iz-zi-bi-il u3 mri-mut-dEN ina UKKIN

(5–7) “mRīmūt-Bēl took the dates from the estimated yield of the fields at our disposal from our hands.”

8.

DUMU.DU3.MEŠ iq-bu-u2 um-ma ZU2.LUM.MA ša2 ina ŠU.2-šu2-nu 9. aš2-šu-u2 ina E2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 ša2 mkal-ba-a 10. a-na KAŠ.SAG at-ta-di U4-mu ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA

(7–8) And mRīmūt-Bēl said thus in the assembly of the mār banî: (9–10) “The dates that I took from their hands I put in the house of mBaniya son of mKalbaya for beer.”

11. [lu2]ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mda-bi-bi u md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU 12. [lu2]SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-ti E2.AN.NA re-eš 13. [m]ri-mut-dEN i-na-aš2-šu-u2 illa-¢kam2Ü-ma 14. u2-ka-nu

(10–14) The day that mNabûmukīn-apli šatammu of the Eanna son of mNādin descendant of Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna summon mRīmūt-Bēl, he shall come and establish (his case).

15. ki-i mri-mut-dEN la qir-bi11 ZU2. LUM.MA ma-la 16. lu2NU.gišKIRI6.MEŠ a-na mrimut-dEN u2-kin-num 17. ri-mut-dEN a-na NIG2.GA d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-namdin

(15–17) If mRīmūt-Bēl does not arrive, mRīmūt-Bēl shall pay the property of the Lady-of-Uruk whatever amount of dates that the gardeners establish.

18.

lu2

mu-kin-nu mdEN-su-pe-e-mu- ur A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dUTU-TIN A mdEN-A-URI3 mdNA3NUMUN-DU A-šu2 ša2 md NA3-ka- ir A mar2-rab3-tu4 <m>dEN-A-MU A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-TIN-i A lu2ša2-MUN. I.A-šu2 mŠUd UTU A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SURZI.MEŠ A me-gi-bi

(18–19) Witnesses: mBēl-supêmu ur son of mItti-Šamaš-balā u descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur; (19–20) mNabû-zēra-ukīn son of mNabû-kā ir descendant of Arrabtu; (20–21) mBēl-apla-iddin son of m Bēl-uballi descendant of Šaābušu; (21–22) mGimil-Šamaš son of m Nabû-ē ir-napšāti descendant of Egibi;

UMBISAG mmu-še-ziib-dUTU A-šu2 ša2 md15NUMUN-DU3

(23) Scribe: mMušēzib-Šamaš son of mIštar-zēra-ibni.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

lu2

lu2

Note that the penalty clause governs only failure to establish the case. YOS 7, 35 is similar. The use of la qir-bi to describe the failure to appear (and establish the case) is unique to this text. 11

text-types calling for evidence 24. UNUGki ITI BAR2 U4 30kam2 MU 1-kam2 mkam2-bu-ziia2 25. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR

137

(24–25) Uruk. 30 Nisannu, year 1 of Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

The situation in this text may be reconstructed as follows. A discrepancy has arisen regarding the dates that mKalbaya owes as sūtu-tax. The gardeners who cut those dates testify that mRīmūt-Bēl received the dates of the imittu-yield of those fields from them. In the assembly, m Rīmūt-Bēl asserts that he delivered those dates to mKalbaya’s house for beer processing. When the šatammu and the administrator summon m Rīmūt-Bēl, he must establish his claim. If he does not appear, then he must pay whatever amount of dates the gardeners establish. The general scheme of the penalty clauses and the specifics of BIN 1, 113 indicate that the present subtype of kunnu-summonses were written because the summoned individual (PN1) wishes to avoid payment of a penalty. In an attempt to clear himself, he has raised a claim against another individual (PN2). If the summoned individual establishes his claim against the opposing party, then the opposing party must make the payment and the summoned individual is clear. The evidence he is to bring is, therefore, exculpatory. Within the corpus of exculpatory kunnu-summonses there are two exceptional texts that should be considered. Both texts, Nbn 679 and YOS 7, 192, impose a penalty against the opposing party if the summoned individual establishes the case. They do not, however, include a penalty clause against the summoned individual for failure to establish the case. Nevertheless, both texts apparently call for exculpatory evidence and are, therefore, included in the present subtype. In Nbn 679, the summoned individual is an escaped slave. If she establishes that the person to whom she escaped knew her situation, then that person must make payment to her former master. This text, therefore, seems to result from the slave herself wishing to avoid the payment.12 In order to do so, she has blamed the person to whom she has escaped, and must now “establish the case” or bear the penalty. In YOS 7, 192, the opposing party swears that he did not take any temple property from the house of the summoned individual. The summoned individual must establish that the opposing party actually did steal the items.

12

See Wunsch, AfO 44–45 (1997–1998), No. 17 (p. 87).

138

chapter five

This must be because the summoned individual is himself responsible for these items. By proving that the opposing party stole the items, the summoned individual can avoid payment. Thus, even though they do not explicitly state that the summoned individual bears a penalty, both Nbn 679 and YOS 7, 192 document cases in which exculpatory evidence is required in order to avoid payment. The second subtype of kunnu-summons is the general kunnu-summons. In contrast with the exculpatory subtype, the general kunnu-summonses do not impose a penalty against the summoned individuals if they fail to establish the case. Instead, the penalty clauses in this subtype read as follows:13 (a) kî uktinnušu . . . If he (PN1) establishes (the case) against him (PN2) > penalty against PN2 (b) kî lā uktinnušu zaki If he (PN1) does not establish (the case) against him (PN2), he (PN1) is clear.

Nbk 365 will serve to illustrate the features of this subtype: 1. U4 5-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN m LUGAL-GI.NA DUMU-šu2 ša2 mam-ma-nu 2. lu2mu-kin-ne-šu2 i-na URU pi-qudu ib-ba-kam2-ma

(1–2) On 5 Kislīmu, mŠarru-kīn son of mAmmanu shall bring his witnesses to the city of Piqūdu.

3. a-na mi-di- i-DINGIR DUMUšu2 ša2 mdi-na-a u2-ka-nu 4. ša2 mi-di- i-DINGIR a-na LUGAL-GI.NA-a iš-pu-ra 5. um-ma di-i-ni ša2 lu2qal-li-ka ša2 di-i-ki

(3–5) He shall establish (the case) against mĪdi i-ilu son of m Dīnaya, that mĪdi i-ilu sent thus to mŠarru-kīn:

6. it-ti-ia la ta-dab-bu-ub a-na-ku

(5–6) “Do not bring the case against me regarding your slave who was killed.”

7. nap-ša2-ti ša2 lu2qal-li-ka u2-šallam-ka

(6–7) “I shall pay you for your slave’s life.”

13 Among the texts in this subtype, the clause expressing the penalty (a) is written first in Nbk 52, Nbk 183 and Nbk 365. The zakû clause (b) is written first in OIP 122, 34 and Nbk 366. Nbk 419 does not include a zakû clause.

text-types calling for evidence

139

8. ki-i uk-tin-nu-uš 1 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR ŠAM2 9. ša2 lu2qal-li-šu2 mi-di- iDINGIR.MEŠ a-na 10. mLUGAL-GI.NA i-nam-din

(8–10) If he establishes (the case) against him, mĪdi i-ilu shall pay 1 mina of silver, the price of his slave to mŠarru-kīn.

11. ki-i la uk-tin-nu-uš ¢za-kiÜ

(11) If he does not establish (the case) against him, he is clear.

mu-kin-ni mna-zi-ia LUGAL

(12) Witnesses: mNaziya, the ša rēš šarri;

12.

lu2

lu2

SAG.

13. mKUR.GAL-MU A-šu2 ša2 m ri-mut-DINGIR

(13) mAmurru-iddin son of m Rīmūt-Ili;

14. mše-gu-zu DUMU-šu2 ša2 mtala- lu2GAL KAR ša2 U 2ki

(14) mŠeguzu son of mTala , the rāb kāri of Opis;

15. u3 lu2DUB.SAR mdNA3-ŠEŠ. MEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2

(15–16) and the scribe: mNabûa ē-iddin son of mŠulaya descendant of Egibi.

16. mšu-la-a A me-gi-bi U

ki

2

17. ITI APIN U4 7-kam2 MU 40kam2 18. dNA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(16–18) Opis. 7 Ara šamna, year 40 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon.

This summons pertains to the death of mŠarru-kīn’s slave. After his slave was killed, mŠarru-kīn sought to press charges against mĪdi i-ilu. m Īdi i-ilu wrote to mŠarru-kīn asking him not to bring the case to court, and agreeing to compensate him for the slave. mŠarru-kīn now wishes to collect the payment from mĪdi i-ilu, but apparently cannot present the actual document that mĪdi i-ilu sent him. mŠarru-kīn must bring witnesses to the city of Piqūdu to confirm that mĪdi i-ilu indeed wrote to him. If mŠarru-kīn brings the witnesses and establishes the case against mĪdi i-ilu, then mĪdi i-ilu must pay mŠarru-kīn 1 mina of silver (the price of the slave). If he does not establish the case against m Īdi i-ilu, then mĪdi i-ilu is clear. As has already been noted and can be seen from Nbk 365, there is no penalty against the summoned individual for failure to establish the case. Thus, general kunnu-summonses are not composed because the summoned individuals are defendants who face a penalty of some sort and have attempted to clear themselves by accusing other individuals. Instead, these kunnu-summonses were composed because of a disputed claim brought by the plaintiffs, who are the summoned individuals. The evidence that the summoned individuals must bring is not exculpatory.

140

chapter five

From the discussion thus far, the following description of the kunnusummonses emerges. Like the dabābu-type summonses (see section 4.A above), the kunnu-type summonses are a response to a claim. The summoned individuals in the kunnu-type summonses are the individuals who have made the claim, rather than those against whom the claim has been made. These individuals may have been defendants in a legal case who made the claim in the face of an impending penalty. To avoid paying the penalty, they must present exculpatory evidence to prove the claim. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses come from such situations. Alternatively, the summoned individuals may be the plaintiffs in a legal case who have made a claim that is contested by the defendant. If the summoned individuals can establish the claim, then the defendant will have to make whatever payment is due. If, however, the claim remains unestablished, then the opposing party faces no penalty. In this situation, a general kunnu-summons would be written. Although both the kunnu- and the dabābu-type summonses are written as responses to claims, only the dabābu-type summons specifically allude to an eventual confrontation in court. The basic formulation of the kunnu-type summonses, on the other hand, does not explicitly indicate that they were issued as part of the official adjudication of a dispute. Thus, in order to address the issues of the setting in which the kunnu-summonses were composed, two main questions must be answered. First, was the claim that must be established made in court or outside of court? That is, were the kunnu-type summonses, like the dabābu-type, issued by a court during formal proceedings, or were they composed outside of an official adjudicatory setting? Second, the nature of “establishing the case” must also be discussed. Do these texts require a formal evaluation of evidence, or might they envision a less formal procedure? Answering these questions allows a more precise definition of the legal function of these summonses. A number of exculpatory kunnu-summonses, like BIN 1, 113, describe the proceedings that took place before the summonses were issued. For example, YOS 7, 35 specifically describes the hearing “in the assembly” during which the accusation against the summoned individual is made. Four scribes bearing the title “scribes of the Eanna” wrote the text “in the presence” (ina DU.ZU) of the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna.14 Most of the kunnu-summonses, however, are not as explicit

14

See also YOS 7, 192, which opens with the defendant’s oath claiming innocence.


141

as YOS 7, 35 or BIN 1, 113, and, in fact, do not even name specific adjudicating authorities. Nevertheless, the consensus of scholarship is that these documents were also composed in a court of law.15 Despite the lack of specific references to judges or courts, there is reason to concur with the prevailing understanding. Many of these texts were written by the same scribe, mNabû-a ē-iddin son of mŠulaya of the Egibi family during the latter part of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar.16 In later texts, m Nabû-a ē-iddin is known as one of the judges of Nabonidus. Following van Driel, one might understand the writing of the summonses to present witnesses as reflections of the early stages of mNabû-a ē-iddin’s climb towards becoming a royal judge.17 It is plausible that mNabû-a ēiddin began his legal career as a court scribe. If this understanding is correct, then the presence of mNabû-a ē-iddin as scribe suggests that the texts of this text-type that he wrote, as well as others like it that he did not write, originated in a formal court setting. The question of the setting in which the evidence was to be evaluated has already been addressed by Köhler and Peiser’s discussion of where the testimony of the summoned witnesses is to be heard. On the one hand, they raise the possibility that these documents are orders to settle out of court, by means of a private hearing of testimony (“Privaternehmung”), outside of the official adjudicatory process. On the other hand, they strongly consider the possibility that these documents call for formal testimony in the presence of court officials.18 The evidence of the texts themselves is inconsistent and leaves both possibilities open. In BIN 1, 113, the case is to be established “the day that” (U4-mu) the šatammu and the administrator call for the summoned individual. Apparently,

Nbk 266 begins by quoting the defendant’s statement in a manner which suggests that it was made as a declaration in court. 15 G. van Driel, “The Rise of the House of Egibi: Nabû-a ē-iddina,” JEOL 29 (1985–1986), pp. 54–55. See also Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31. Peiser’s earlier label of Nbk 365 also implies the involvement of a court in the composition of the document (KB 4, p. XX). Similarly, see Weisberg’s label of OIP 122, 34 as an “order to produce witnesses,” which suggests that a court has issued the order. None of these interpretations includes any citations of evidence from the texts themselves. 16 See summary table 5.1 below. The year in Nbk 419:14, also written by the same scribe, is broken. Van Driel, JEOL 29 (1985–1986), p. 55 notes that all of the texts dated to year 40 were written in Opis, and suggests that they reflect a tour of duty. If so, then Nbk 419, also written in Opis, may date from the same stint. 17 Van Driel, JEOL 29 (1985–1986), p. 55. According to Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 572, the case of mNabû-a ē-iddin may be exceptional. See, however, the discussion of the career of the scribe mIle i-Marduk in section 8.K.2 below. 18 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31.

142

chapter five

in this specific case, the evidence will be evaluated in a hearing before these authorities. BIN 1, 113 is unique in this regard, since other texts do not name authorities who will summon the individual. Similarly, the summons clauses in both Nbk 227 and YOS 6, 153 specifically mention that the summoned individual must “bring” the opposing party in order to establish the case against him.19 This additional stipulation suggests that the case is to be established in a formal setting. In addition, as can be seen from summary table 5.1 below, a number of kunnu-summonses specify a date and location for the presentation of the evidence. These specifications suggest that the case is to be established in a formal hearing. On the other hand, those texts that leave the date open and do not otherwise mention authorities may require only an informal evaluation of the evidence outside. The question of whether or not the evidence is to be evaluated in a formal hearing has direct consequences for determining the place of these texts within legal proceedings, and, in turn, the legal function of these texts. On the one hand, the documents might call for the evidence to be heard in court. Therefore, one might argue that the judges remain involved, since they would decide if the evidence had indeed “established” the case. On the other hand, because many of the kunnu-summonses include the results both of presenting the evidence and failure to present it, they seem to reflect a concluding stage of the proceedings. There seems to be no further need for any adjudicating authority to render a decision. If so, then texts of this text-type mark the end of the judicial activities in these particular cases. Both of these possibilities are reflected in the existing interpretations of these texts. The first possibility, which suggests that the court remains involved even after the composition of the summonses, is implied in Peiser’s label for Nbk 365 and Nbk 266. In his catalogue, Peiser calls these texts a “Vorentscheidung” (“a preliminary decision”) written during the course of legal proceedings.20 Although Peiser does not expand his description, the term implies that this document records one stage in a more protracted process of adjudication. According to this understanding, the kunnu summonses are the written means by

19 Although the verb abāku appears in the summons clauses of both these texts, the inclusion of the verb kunnu indicates that their main purpose is as exculpatory summonses to establish a case. For a description of the abāku-summonses, see the discussion below. 20 KB 4, p. XX.


143

which judges obtained the testimony necessary for deciding a case. Thus, the case would remain before the court even after the issuance of the summonses.21 The possibility that the texts represent the end of the court’s involvement is reflected in Köhler and Peiser, Rechtsleben. In this work, the kunnu-summonses are called “Beweisverträge” (“contracts to present evidence”).22 This label suggests that the documents reflect an agreement or settlement reached between the parties, which, based on the evidence discussed earlier, was written for them in the presence of the court. This interpretation understands the documents not as an interim stage in proceedings, but as a conclusion to the case. In the presence of a court, the two parties agree to settle their case according to the testimony of the witnesses. Because these “contracts” were written in a court, it may be that the parties agree to return to court to have the testimony heard. However, the label “Beweisverträge” leaves open the possibility that the parties will not return to court, but will settle once the summoned individual presents his evidence. 5.B

Guarantees for Testimony

Texts of this text-type record an individual’s assumption of the obligation to provide testimony. They include the following characteristic formula: pūt mukinnūtu ša2 . . . PN naši PN assumes responsibility for the testimony concerning23 . . .

21 For a similar understanding of these texts, particularly Nbk 366, see Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, History, p. 923. 22 Kohler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, pp. 30–33. For Nbk 366 see Kohler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 13. See also Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp. 46–48, which is a discussion of Nbk 366. See also Petschow, Pfandrecht, p. 61 n. 172 (end of note, on Nbk 419). 23 In Nbn 343:1, YOS 6, 108:1, YOS 6, 208:17, Cyr 311:1, and YOS 7, 96:23 a personal name follows the word ša. In these texts, it is, therefore, possible that the guarantee is for the testimony “of,” that is testimony given by, that particular person. See, for example, the translation in CAD mukinnūtu c (M2, p. 187). Note, however, that this translation is impossible in Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:1 and TCL 12, 96:1 because in both cases the noun which follows the word ša is inanimate. Therefore, the present translation of all the texts of this text-type translates the relative particle ša as “regarding.” This translation is not meant to preclude the possibility that a particular person is required to testify.

it-tal-kuma . . . ik-te-nu

mu-kin-nišu2 . . . ip-qi2-di

Nbk 52 general

general

exculpatory PN ib-baksilver kam2-[ma] . . . u2ka-an-šu2

exculpatory uk-kin-nu

exculpatory

general (?)

general

Nbk 183

Nbk 227

Nbk 266

Nbk 361

Nbk 363

Nbk 365

lu2 mu-kin-nešu2 . . . ib-bakam2-ma

silver

7.VIII.40 Nbk (10/20)

19.VI.40 Nbk (9/4)

—

—

80 days

4 days

163–193 days

106–135 days

Length of Time

5.IX (11/17)

27 days

?.VIII 40–70 [10/14–11/12] days

silver

lu2

mu-kin-ni-šu2 ib-ba-kam2-ma

2.VI.36 — Nbk (8/31)

27.XI.30 20.II (5/17) Nbk (2/26)

28.IV.28 2.V Nbk (7/27) (7/31)

double payment 21.IV.40 — (for wrongful Nbk (7/11) seizure of property)

sheep

payment of clothing

Du’ūzu (no day specified) (6/15–7/14)

Appearance date

14.VI.6 Addaru (no Nbk (9/15) day specified) (2/25–3/26)

19.XII.4 Nbk (3/7)

Date written

Piqūdu

—

—

—

—

Gate

Larsa

Uruk

Opis

Opis

Opis

Tagretain

Sippar

Babylon

City of MušallimMarduk m

Uruk

Šamaš-nā ir/ Ša-pî-Bēl // Mušēzib

m Nabû-a ēiddin/ mŠulaya// Egibi

Nabû-a ēiddin/ mŠulaya// Egibi m

Nabû-a ēiddin//Egibi m

m Nabû-a ēiddin/ mŠulaya// Egibi

m

m

Nabû-a ēiddin/ mŠulaya// Egibi m

m Liblu /Nergaliddin

m Innin-zēraušabši/ mNergalšuma-ibni // Šamšiya

Place of Place of Scribe Appearance Composition

Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu)

mu-kin-ni-šu2 i-tab-kam2-ma

lu2

lu2

payment of barley

PN2 must pay amount PN1 establishes

il-la-kam2-ma mu-kin-nešu2 . . . ib-bakam2-ma

OIP general 122, 34

lu2

Penalty

Requirement

Subtype

Text

Summary Table 5.1

144 chapter five

implement

silver

—

—

— (upon summons by authorities)

15.XII (3/15)

—

—

—

28 days

—

19–23 days

31–59 days

< 8 days

Length of Time

—

(Uruk?)

(Uruk?)

(Uruk?)

—

Uruk

—

Opis

Nippur

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Babylon

Uruk

Opis

Opis

ē-iddin

Nādin, mKīnaya, Mūrānu and m Balā u, scribes of the Eanna Mušēzib-Šamaš / Ištar-zēra-ibni

?

Nabû-bēlšunu/ Nūrea m

m

m

m

m

m

m

Nabû-apla-iddin/ Nummuru // Mi iraya

Pir u/ mTabnêa // Bā iru m

m Nabû-a // Egibi

m Nabû-a ē-iddin / mŠulaya // Egibi


Dates are calculated according to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology. Lengths of time do not include the date of composition.

m PN uk-tal[lim . . .

6.XI.6 [Dar II] (8/21)

exculpatory

PBS 2/1, 126

30.I.1 Camb (5/11)

27.XI.3 Cyr (2/15)

20.XIIa.12 — Nbn (3/8)

30.III.7 Camb (7/3)

dates

BIN 1, exculpatory il-la-kam2-ma 113 u2-ka-nu

?.III [5/20–6/17]

a-di 1.IX (by 11/13)

Appearance date

22.IX.1 10–15.XII Nbn (2/10) (3/1–3/5)

29.I.[40] Nbk [4/19]

23.VIII.40 Nbk (11/5)

Date written

YOS 7, exculpatory lu2mu-kin-ne-e 30-fold 192 PN1 i-tab-kam2- penalty ma a-na PN2 uk-ti-in-ni

sheep

YOS 7, exculpatory u2-kan-na 35:14– 20

exculpatory tu-uk-tin-nu

slave’s compensation

mu-kin-ni-šu2 ib-ba-kam2-ma

lu2

Nbn 679

general

Nbk 419

barley

lu2 mu-kin-nee-šu2 . . . ib-bakam2-ma

silver

?

Nbk 366

Penalty

Requirement

YOS 6, exculpatory PN ib-bak153 kam2-ma a-na PN u2-kan-na

Subtype

Text


text-types calling for evidence 145

146

chapter five

In most guarantees for testimony, the guarantor (PN in the above formula) assumes this obligation because he has attempted to clear himself of a charge by accusing another person. Thus, as is the case with the exculpatory kunnu-summonses, the guarantor often faces a penalty for failure to provide witnessed testimony.24 YOS 6, 208 will serve as an example. This text also records the questioning that led up to the assumption of a guarantee. Therefore, it has the added advantage of setting the scene in which such texts might have been composed, although most of these texts do not include such a description. The text reads as follows:25 1. mtab-ne2-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dENtab-ni 2. mgi-mil-lu A-šu2 ša2 mZALAG2 -e2-a 3. mla-ba-ši A-šu2 ša2 mdUTU-ŠEŠMU m 4. i-di- i-DINGIR.MEŠ A-šu2 ša2 mMU-dNA3

(1) mTabnea son of mItti-bēl-tabni; (2) mGimillu son of mNūr-Ea; (3) mLâbāši son of mŠamaš-a aiddin; (4) mIdi i-ilī son of mIddin-Nabû;

5. mnar-gi-ia A-šu2 ša2 mEN-šu2-nu

(5) mNargiya son of mBēlšunu;

DUMU-DU3-i ša2 ina IGIšu2-nu mgi-mil-lu 7. A-šu2 ša2 mdINNIN-na-MUDU3 a-na mdNA3-MU-MU 8. A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a iq-bu-u2 um-ma

(6–8) The mār banî in whose presence mGimillu son of mInninšuma-ibni25 said thus to mNabûšuma-iddin son of mAplaya:

6.

lu2

9. mi-nam-ma GU4 bu-uš-tu4 ša2 d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 10. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-[de-e-ti . . .]

(9–10) “Why [. . .] a cow of the Lady-of-Uruk that is bran[ded] with a star?”

11. mNA3-MU-MU iq-[bu-u2] 12. um-ma mbal- i-ia [A-šu2 ša2]

(11–12) mNabû-šuma-iddin s[aid] thus:

13. ša2 mdINNIN-na- NUMUN-TIL ul-tu ITI SIG4 14. MU 17-kam2 dNA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki 15. a-na i-di-šu2 a-na MU.AN.NA 4 GUR ŠE.BAR 16. 1 (PI) 4 ŠE.GIŠ.I3 id-da-na-aš2 pu-ut

(12–16) “From Simānu, year 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, m Bal iya [son of ] mInnina-zērašubši gave it to me for its hire of 4 kur of barley, 1 pi 4 sūt sesame, per year.”

24 See summary table 5.2 below for the variety of penalties. Although YOS 7, 96 does not specify a penalty, it is clear that the guarantor has accused a number of people about whom he must provide testimony in order to clear himself. 25 This text dates to the beginning of the career of the notorious temple official, m Gimillu son of mInnin-šuma-ibni. At that time, he served as the collection official, ša mu i rē ānu. See Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 102.

text-types calling for evidence 17. 18.

147

mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 mbal- i-ia NA3-MU-MU na-ši U4-mu uk-tin-nu-uš 19. za-ki ia-a-nu 1-en 30 a-na d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 20. i-nam-din GU4 bu-uš-tu4 mgimil-lu

(16–18) mNabû-šuma-iddin assumes responsibility for testimony concerning mBal iya. (18–19) On the day he establishes (the case) against him, he is clear. (19–20) If not, he shall pay 30-fold to the Lady-of-Uruk.

21. ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-MU-MU i-tabak u2-il3-ti3

(20–21) mGimillu has led the cow away from mNabû-šuma-iddin.

22. ša2 mdNA3-MU-MU u mbal- i-ia it-ti a- a-meš 23. i-il-lu- mdNA3-MU-MU a-na 24. mgi-mil-lu i-nam-din lu2 UMBISAG

(21–24) mNabû-šuma-iddin shall give mGimillu the note that m Nabû-šuma-iddin and mBal iya drew up together.

25.

(24–25) Scribe: mNabû-bēlšunu son of mNūrea.

lu2

md

NA3-EN-šu2-nu A-šu2 ša2 ZALAG2-e-a

md m

26. URU ša2

NA3-MU-MU

md

27. ITI SIG4 U4 9-kam2 28. MU 17-kam2 dNA3-I 29. LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(26) City of mNabû-šuma-iddin. (27–29) 9 Simānu, year 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

This text is considered a guarantee because it records mNabû-šumaiddin’s guarantee to provide testimony about mBal iya (lines 16–18). m Nabû-šuma-iddin assumes this responsibility in the wake of questioning about a branded cow belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk that is apparently found in his possession. He professes his innocence by informing mGimillu, the questioner, that the cow is rented from mBal iya. In order for mNabû-šuma-iddin to establish his own innocence, he must provide testimony against mBal iya. If he successfully establishes the case against m Bal iya, the text specifically states that mNabû-šuma-iddin is clear of any obligation (lines 18–19).26 If he is unable to provide the testimony to establish the case, then he must pay the thirty-fold penalty himself. From YOS 6, 208 it is apparent that the guarantor’s original accusation was made in a formal court of law. Although not all guarantees for testimony provide the same contextual information, there is additional evidence that suggests that they were also composed in similar settings. The guarantor in Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 must establish the case with testimony “in the presence” (ina DU.ZU) of the šatammu and the

26 Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:7 contains a similar clause to indicate that the guarantor is clear if he provides the testimony.

148

chapter five

administrators of the Eanna.27 Other texts name the authorities involved in their composition.28 The scribe who wrote TCL 12, 96, mMušēzibMarduk son of mKabtiya descendant of Šigûa, is known as one of the scribes who worked in the Eanna at Uruk.29 This raises the possibility that the guarantee was composed in the Eanna, perhaps as a result of a formal complaint raised there, even though the text does not mention any Eanna authorities. There was probably official involvement in the composition of Cyr 311, as well, even though it does not name any authorities, either. In this text, mNargiya has accused a father and a son of falsifying a marriage document between mNargiya’s son and a slavegirl. The two accused men have apparently claimed that they are innocent. In order to clear themselves, they guarantee testimony regarding the role of m Mušēzib-Bēl, who ordered them to write the marriage document on behalf of his master, the owner of the slavegirl. If they do not produce this testimony then they must compensate mNargiya. This case came to trial three days later, as can be seen from Cyr 312, a decision record. 30 Unfortunately, the decision record does not include the actual testimony regarding mMušēzib-Bēl that was to have been provided according to Cyr 311. Nevertheless, Cyr 312 clearly indicates that the royal judges rendered the decision in the trial, which suggests that they were involved in composing Cyr 311, as well. Most of the guarantees for testimony can be shown to be the result of the guarantors’ accusations that must be substantiated. In these cases, the accusations were made during formal hearings after which the guarantor assumed responsibility for the testimony. One exception is Nbn 343, which consists only of the following guarantee clause, followed by the names of witnesses, scribe and date:

Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:5–7. See the summary table. 29 See Kümmel, Familie, p. 118. YOS 6, 153 may provide further support for this suggestion. This kunnu-summons pertains to the same case and illustrates that the guarantor failed to meet the obligations of TCL 12, 96. It, too, was written by a scribe known from the Eanna, mPir u son of mTabnêa descendant of Bā iru (see Kümmel, Familie, p. 123). 30 See the interpretation offered in Joannès, Justice, pp. 206–207. 27 28

text-types calling for evidence 1. mMU-MU ¢A-šu2 ša2 mÜdUTUMU-u2-kin 2. A lu2PA.ŠEki pu-ut lu2mu-kin-nu-tu 3. ša2 fra-mu-u2-a ša2 flu-u2-bal- a-at 4. fqal-lat ša2 fbu-ra-šu2 DUMU. SAL-su 5. ša2 mgi-mil-lu A mDU3-ešDINGIR 6. ma-ri ša2 tu-ul-li-du-ma 7. a-na fra-mu-u2-a ta-ad-di-nu-ma 8. mtat-at-ta-dan-nu MU-šu 2 ta[zku-ru] 9. na-ši

149

(1–9) mŠuma-iddin son of Šamaš-šuma-ukīn descendant of Isinaya assumes responsibility for testimony regarding fRamûa, that fLū-bal āt, slavegirl of f Burašu, daughter of mGimillu descendant of Eppeš-ilī, gave the son to whom she gave birth to f Ramûa and she na[med] him m Tattadannu.31 m

This text does not impose any penalty upon the guarantor for failure to provide testimony. Thus, it is not clear that the guarantor must provide the testimony in order to substantiate an accusation and clear himself. This text also does not offer any information about the setting in which this guarantee was composed.31 With the exception of Nbn 343, most of the guarantees seem to have a purpose similar to that of the exculpatory kunnu summonses. Both text-types require accusers to present evidence in order to substantiate their accusations and clear themselves of a charge. Both text-types seem to have the same function of obtaining evidence. These similarities may explain why some have referred to these documents as “summonses.”32 This interpretation implies that, like other summonses, these texts were composed as an order by the court. According to this understanding, the guarantors play the same role as the summoned individuals who must provide testimony to substantiate a claim. The inclusion of the guarantee clause in the texts in this text-type, however, suggests other possible interpretations. In the summonses, the verbs in the summons clause are in the iparras form, which bears a modal sense and allows the understanding of the summonses as orders.33 The verb in the guarantee clause, however, is in the paris form which does

31 Restored based on Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 2, p. 68 n. 2. It is not clear which of the two women in the text, fRamûa or fLū-bal āt, named the child mTattadannu. 32 Moore, Documents, p. 97 (regarding TCL 12, 96) and Sack, CuDoc, p. 49 (regarding Sack, CuDoc, No. 80). In both cases, the references are titles for the text and do not include further discussion. 33 For the function of the iparras as a modal in NB see Michael P. Streck, Zahl und Zeit: Grammatik der Numeralia und des Verbalsystems im Spätbabylonischen (Cuneiform Monographs 5), (Groningen 1995), II §8 (pp. 94–98). See also von Soden, GAG §78d–e (p. 102).

150

chapter five

not bear this modal sense.34 This suggests that these documents should be understood more as descriptions of obligations rather than as actual orders of the court. Thus, it seems that these documents indicate that the guarantors have accepted the obligation, either as it has been imposed by the court or on their own.35 Although the obligation created by the exculpatory kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for testimony is the same, the two text-types reflect two different perspectives: the summonses reflect the court’s demands of the summoned individuals, while the guarantees reflect the guarantors’ acceptance of these demands. Summary Table 5.2 Text

Authorities Mentioned

Penalty

Guarantees for Testimony Place of Scribe Composition

Date

Sack, šatammu + 30-fold CuDoc, No. administrator payment 80 of Eanna

Uruk

m Nabû-bānia i/mIbnaya // Ekur-zākir

Nbn 343

—

—

Babylon

m

?.III.9 Nbn

TCL 12, 96

—

—

Uruk

m

MušēzibMarduk/ m Kabtiya // Šigûa

20.VIII.10 Nbn

YOS 6, 175

šatammu of Eanna

30-fold payment

Uruk

Nādinu/ [mBēl-a ] ēiqīša// Egibi

7.XIIb.12 Nbn

YOS 6, 108

—

i- u ša2 LUGAL i-zab-bil

Uruk

m Lū i-ana22.IX.15 nūri-Marduk/ Nbn m Nabû-bānia i// Dābibī

YOS 6, 208

5 mār banî (+ ša mu i rē ānu)

30-fold payment

City of Nabû-šumaiddin

Nabûbēlšunu son of mNūrea

Bullu u

m

m

?.IV.14 Nbk

9.III.17 Nbn

34 See Streck, Zahl und Zeit, II §37e–g (pp. 169–173) for the different functions of this form. 35 For the understanding of these documents as records of accepted obligations, rather than as summonses, see Raymond P. Dougherty, “Cuneiform Parallels to Solomon’s Provisioning System,” AASOR 5 (1923–1924), p. 41; Dougherty, Shirkutu, pp. 60–61; Koschaker, Burgschaftsrecht, pp. 157–160; San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 336; San Nicolò, Or. 23 (1954), p. 354 and Johannes Renger, “Notes on the Goldsmiths, Jewelers and Carpenters of the Neo-Babylonian Eanna,” JAOS 91 (1971), p. 500. Most of these authors do not directly address the question of whether the obligation is self-imposed or imposed on the guarantor by the court. Note, however, that Dougherty, Shirkutu, p. 61 specifically states that the guarantor “was required by the temple to become surety that the facts would be properly presented in court.”


151

Summary Table 5.2 (cont.) Text

Authorities Mentioned

Penalty

Place of Scribe Composition

Cyr 311

—

payment

Babylon

Nabû-mukīn- 8.V.8 Cyr zēri/ mNabûšuma-ēreš // Ēreb-bīti

Uruk

m Arad28.IX.0 Marduk Camb /mMardukšuma-iddin // Bēl-apla-u ur

YOS 7, 96 šatammu + — administrator of Eanna

5.C

Date

m

Penalties Pending Evidence

Texts of this text-type have the following basic structure: I. Requirement of evidence ina ūmu36 lu2mukinnu u lū lu2bātiqu37 ittalkamma38 PN uktinnu ša . . . On the day that a witness or an informer comes and establishes39 (the case) against PN, that he . . . II. Penalty against PN

36 The word U4-mu without the preposition ina appears in YOS 17, 32:1 and TCL 12, 50:1. The word ki-i appears instead of ina ūmu in Nbk 104:6 and YOS 6, 204:7. YOS 6, 177 does not include any opening adverbial phrase. Instead, the requirement of evidence is embedded in the phrase mim-ma ma-la e-lat 1 ME 30 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA lu2 mu-kin-nu ana PN u2-kan-nu-u2-¢maÜ ina mu - i-šu2 il-lu-u2-nu (“whatever amount above 130 kur of dates which a witness establishes that he owes”) (YOS 6, 177:6–9). 37 BE 9, 24:6 reads lū bātiqu lū mukinnu. The following texts omit the word lu2bātiqu: Nbk 104:1; YOS 17, 32:1; TCL 12, 50:1; TCL 12, 70:1; YOS 19, 97:1; YOS 6, 134:1; YOS 6, 160:1; YOS 6, 179:1; YOS 6, 193:1; YOS 6, 180:1; YOS 6, 177:7; YOS 7, 24:1; YOS 7, 26:1; YOS 7, 141. 38 The following texts omit the verb alāku: Nbk 104:6; TCL 12, 60: 5; YOS 6, 160:4; GCCI 1, 380:2; YOS 6, 203:3; YOS 6, 191:3; YOS 6, 214:3; YOS 6, 179:3; YOS 6, 193:2; YOS 6, 180:3; AnOr 8, 39:3; YOS 7, 24:3; AnOr 8, 61:18; YOS 7, 141:1. 39 San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 329 n. 4 notes that the word lu2mu-kin-nu is a singular form which is to be understood as a collective, as at the beginning of the witness lists. Therefore, he translates all occurrences as plural, even though he translates the word lu2 ba-ti-qu as a singular. San Nicolò employs this translation even against the evidence of the apparently singular form it-tal-kam2-ma. Assuming parallelism in the phrase mukinnu u lū bātiqu, the present translation takes both nouns as singular. Additional support for the translation in the singular may be found in the verbal form uk-ti-i-in (referring to the

152

chapter five

III. Witnesses + Scribe IV. Date Texts of this text-type impose a penalty upon individuals should evidence against them, usually testimony,40 become available. YOS 6, 122 will serve as the first example of this text-type: 1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu lu-u2 lu2 ba-ti-qu 2. it-tal-kam2-ma mlu-u2-šu-um-mu 3. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUNDU3 lu2 uruia-a-šu-ba-a-a 4. uk-tin-nu ša2 KU6. I.A ina GARIN.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNU[Gki] 5. ša2 ina UGU ID2 LUGAL ana ši-gil-ti 6. i-ba-a-ri giš i-li-pu giš ar-ba-ti 7. GI.MEŠ u3 giš u- a-bi 8. a-na ši-gil-ti ul-tu 9. A.ŠA3.MEŠ gišTIR u3 gišAMBAR 10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki iš-šu-u2

(1–10) On the day that a witness or an informer comes and establishes (the case) against m Lušummu son of mNabû-zēraibni descendant of Yašubaya, that he unlawfully fished fishes from the pools of the Lady-of-Uruk above the king’s canal, (and that) he unlawfully carried off willow, poplar, reeds and straw from the fields, forests and marshes of the Lady-of-Uruk

11. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-din

(11) He shall pay 30-fold to the Lady-of-Uruk.

12. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG LUGAL 13. lu2EN pi-qit-ti E2.AN.NA

(12–13) In the presence of m Nabû-šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna.

witness) in Nbk 104:7, the relevant line in this text. The (erroneous) ommission of the u reveals that, at least in the scribe’s mind, the form agrees with a singular subject, and that the final u should be taken only as a marker of the subjunctive and not as a marker of the plural. Similarly, the apparently singular form lu2ba-ti-iq, without the ambiguous final vowel, occurs in AnOr 8, 61:17. Note that the form lu2mu-kin-nu-ne-e in YOS 6, 180:3 and the verbal form u2-kan-nu-¢nimÜ-ma in YOS 7, 141:9 may indicate that more than one witness was required in these texts. The verb alāku, which might have provided further evidence, does not appear in either of these texts. Translation with singular forms follows Raymond P. Dougherty, Nabonidus and Belshazzar: A Study of the Closing Events of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (YOR 15) (New Haven, 1929), p. 114 and “The Babylonian Principle of Suretyship as Administered by Temple Law,” AJSL 46 (1929–1930), pp. 73–103 (see also the note in GCCI 1, p. 67 regarding GCCI 1, 380); Moore’s translations of TCL 12, 50 and similar documents in Moore, Documents; Renger, JAOS 91 (1971), pp. 501–503; Cardascia, Archives, p. 184; Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 83–86 and Beaulieu’s note regarding YOS 19, 98 (YOS 19, p. 14). 40 In addition to testimony, TCL 12, 60:4 and BE 9, 24:5–6 mention the possibility that the suspect himself is found in possession of the missing objects. YOS 6, 204 does not specify the type of evidence which might become available.

text-types calling for evidence 14.

153

mu-kin-nu mdin-nin-naLUGAL-URI3 15. A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-GI A md 30-TI-ER2

(14–15) Witnesses: mIninna-šarrau ur son of mNergal-ušallim descendant of Sîn-lēqi-uninnī;

16. mna-din A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-ŠEŠ. MEŠ-BA-ša2 A me-gi-bi

(16) mNādin son of mBēl-a iqīša descendant of Egibi;

17. mKAR-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-TIN-i 18. A mLU2-dIDIM lu2UMBISAG md 15-DU-A 19. A-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-NUMUNGAL2-ši

(17–18) mMušēzib-Marduk son of Bēl-uballi descendant of AmēlEa; (18–19) Scribe: mIštar-mukīn-apli son of mInnin-zēra-šubši.

20. UNUGki ITI GAN U4 8-kam2 MU 9-kam2 21. dNA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(20–21) Uruk. 8 Kislīmu, year 9 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

lu2

ē-

m

The main purpose of this text is the imposition of the thirty-fold penalty upon mLušummu if a witness comes and establishes that he unlawfully fished or gathered wood from the property of the Lady-of-Uruk. Most other texts of this text-type also involve similar violations of temple property. Accordingly, the penalty imposed is thirty-fold payment to the temple.41 In other texts, which do not specifically pertain to violations of temple property, additional factors indicate that the payment imposed is actually a penalty for some wrongdoing. Thus, for example, BE 9, 24 uses the expression ina qāt ibitti (“in possession of stolen goods”) to describe the possibility that the accused might be found in wrongful possession of stolen sheep.42 From the basic outline and the text quoted above one might argue that texts of this text-type are issued in order to prevent any wrongdoing. This interpretation is implicit in Dougherty’s brief description of YOS 6, 122 as a “provision for supplying the temple with fish and wood.”43 According to this understanding, YOS 6, 122 was written when m Lušummu was employed to provide fish and wood to the Lady-of-Uruk. 41 YOS 19, 98 and AnOr 8, 61 both involve violations against the Eanna but impose other penalties. 42 For discussion of this idiom see CAD ibittu 4 ( , pp. 156–157). 43 YOS 6, p. 44. See Dougherty’s similar descriptions of other such texts in YOS 6, pp. 41–47 and Tremayne’s descriptions in YOS 7, pp. 43–48. Similarly, see Dougherty’s description of YOS 6, 134 in “A Babylonian City in Arabia,” AJA 34 (1930), p. 310. Note, however that Dougherty’s description of YOS 6, 134 in YOS 6, p. 44 and of GCCI 1, 380 in GCCI 1, p. 67 both mention “action upon the decision of a witness.” Dougherty’s wording implies that these two texts were not issued as preventative measures against future misdeeds, but were, instead, issued in light of an actual suspicion.

154

chapter five

Should a witness ever testify that mLušummu abused his position and took fish or wood for himself, then mLušummu would have to pay thirtyfold. If this interpretation is correct, then the texts of this text-type do not belong in a discussion of the adjudicatory process since they were not issued during the adjudication of disputes. There are, however, other existing interpretations of the penalties pending evidence that situate this text-type within the adjudicatory process. San Nicolò describes the adjudicatory context in which these texts were written, and specifically rules out the possibility that these texts are “Beweisverträge” (“evidence-contracts”) drawn up between two parties outside the context of legal proceedings.44 Cocquerillat offers a similar description of the “procès-verbaux” (“oral proceedings”) that resulted in the issuance of these texts.45 Weisberg emphasizes the role of an official adjudicating body by listing YOS 17, 32 among “court documents” and by labeling OIP 122, 35 as a “court order.”46 The texts themselves indicate that the penalties pending evidence were issued during the adjudication of legal disputes. For example, TCL 12, 70 reads as follows: 1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu it-talkam2-ma 2. a-na mina-gišMI-dINNIN lu2qal-la 3. ša2 mMU-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 me- e3-ru 4. uk-tin-nu ša2 qa-ra-a-tu4 ša2 ŠE.BAR 5. eš-ru-u2 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 mdNA3-GAL2-ši 6. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUNDU ina lib3-bi id-du-u 7. u mina-gišMI-dINNIN ip-tu-u2-ma 8. iš-šu-u2 ŠE.BAR ma-la iš-šu-u2

(1–8) On the day that a witness comes and establishes (the case) against mIna- illi-Ištar, slave of m Iddin-Marduk son of E ēru, that he opened the storehouses where m Nabû-ušabši son of mNabû-zēraukīn placed the tithe-barley of the Lady-of-Uruk, and took (it)—

9.

(8–12) mNabû-ušabši shall swear (to) whatever amount of barley he deposited therein, and whatever barley he (mIna- illi-Ištar) took, he shall repay thirty-fold to the Lady-of-Uruk.

NA3-GAL2-ši MU DINGIR.MEŠ u2-še-el-li-ma 10. ŠE.BAR ma-la ina lib3-bi iddu-u2 11. 1-en 30 mina-gišMI-dINNIN a-na 12. dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam ki-i

44 45 46

md

San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 333 n. 1. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 85–86. YOS 17, p. 2 and OIP 122, p. 60.


155

13. lu2mu-kin-nu la uk-tin-nu-uš 14. mina-gišMI-dINNIN za-ki ina DU.ZU

(12–14) If a witness does not establish (the case) against him, m Ina- illi-Ištar is clear.

15. ša2 mKAR-dAMAR.UTU lu2 qi2-i-pi ša2 E2.AN.NA

m

16. mDU3-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. NA A-šu2 ša2 17. mtab-ne-e-a A lu2ŠU. A mdENna-din-A 18. A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-TIN. TIRki A mDA-dAMAR.UTU

(16–17) mBāniya, šatammu of the Eanna, son of Tabnêa descendant of Bā iru; (17–18) mBēl-nādin-apli son of m Zēr-Bābili descendant of Ile iMarduk;

19. mtab-ne-e-a A-šu2 ša2 DU3-uš

(19) mTabnêa son mNabû-īpuš;

20.

lu2

NA3-

md

UMBISAG mna-din A-šu2 ša2 EN-ŠEŠ.ME-BA-ša2

md

21. A me-gi-bi UNUGki ITI DIRI.ŠE.KIN.KUD 22. U4 15-kam2 MU 3-kam2 d U.GUR-LUGAL-URI3 23. LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(14–15) In the presence of Mušēzib-Nabû, qīpu-official of the Eanna;

(20–21) Scribe: mNādin son of m Bēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of Egibi; (21–23) Uruk. 15 Addaru II, year 3 of Neriglissar, king of Babylon.

This text imposes a thirty-fold penalty upon mIna- illi-Ištar should a witness come and establish that he stole tithe-grain. In addition, however, the clause in lines 12–14 states that mIna- illi-Ištar is “clear” (zaki ) if a witness does not establish the case against him. This additional notice, which does not appear in other texts of this text-type, implies that m Ina- illi-Ištar has actually been accused of stealing the tithe barley and is now under suspicion. This suspicion must be confirmed before he can be penalized. Thus, TCL 12, 70 shows that the penalties pending evidence were not composed as a preventative measure, before any suspicion arose. Instead, texts like this were composed in the face of actual suspicions in need of confirmation. In addition, TCL 12, 70 provides some insight into the court setting in which it was composed. It indicates that it was composed “in the presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) authorities of the Eanna. The use of this phrase in this text, as well as in others of this text-type, suggests that these texts were composed during a formal hearing.47 This formal hearing The following texts use the phrase ina DU.ZU: TCL 12, 70:14; YOS 6, 122:12; YOS 6, 148:12; YOS 6, 134:9; GCCI 1, 380:11; TCL 12, 106:12; YOS 6, 203:18; 47

156

chapter five

would be the forum in which the initial accusation against the suspect was raised. In response to this accusation, the authorities present had the penalty pending evidence drawn up by the scribe. Besides the use of the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU in TCL 12, 70, support for the understanding that the penalties pending evidence were drawn up during formal proceedings comes from two features of other texts. These two features are: records of the accused individual’s statement and guarantees for the appearance of the accused individual. Both of these features are present in YOS 6, 191. In this text, mNabûē ir is suspected of having received silver and gold from two smiths who have pilfered precious metals of the Eanna.48 If a witness or an informer establishes the case against mNabû-ē ir, then he must repay thirty times the amount that the witness or informer establishes. The text, in its entirety, reads as follows: 1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu lu-u2 lu2ba-ti-qu 2. mdNA3-KAR-ir A-šu2 ša2 mdENŠEŠ-GAL2-ši A mDIL-SUR 3. uk-kin-nu lu-u2 KU3.BABBAR lu-u KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mKI-dUTU-TIN 4. tab-la-nu u3 mkal3-bi-dba-u2 lu2KU3. TIM tab-la-nu 5. A-šu2 ša2 mna-di-nu im- u-ru e-lat 8 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR 6. ša2 mdNA3-KAR-ir iq-bu-u2 um-ma 3 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR a-na 7. 1 TUG2.KUR.RA u3 5 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR a-na NINDA. I.A u3 KAŠ. I.A 8. id-dan-nu mim-ma ma-la lu2mu-kin-nu 9. u2-ka-an-nu-šu2 1-en 30 a-na d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 10. i-nam-din mri-mut A-šu2 ša2 mdENSEŠ-GAL2-ši

(1–8) On the day that a witness or informer establishes (that) m Nabû-ē ir son of mBēl-a ašubši descendant of Eda-ē ir had received silver or gold from mItti-Šamaš-balā u, the pilferer, or mKalbi-Bau, the goldsmith, the pilferer, son of m Nādinu, apart from the 8 šeqels of silver about which m Nabû-ē ir said thus: “He gave me 3 šeqels of silver for a ‘mountain cloak’ and 5 šeqels of silver for bread and beer”— (8–10) whatever the witness establishes against him he shall pay 30-fold to the Lady-ofUruk.

YOS 6, 214:14; YOS 6, 204:10; AnOr 8, 39:15–16; YOS 7, 141:12; YNER 1, 2:11. See the summary table for the different authorities mentioned. 48 For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding this case, see Renger, JAOS 91 (1971), pp. 494–503 and Wells, Testimony, p. 115.


157

11. A mDIL-SUR u3 mdNA3ŠEŠ-TIN-i A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3NUMUN-DU 12. A lu2ka-si-dak pu-ut mdNA3-KAR-ir 13. na-šu-u2 U4-mu lu2ŠA3.TAM u lu2 UMBISAG.ME ša2 E2.AN.[NA]

(10–13) mRīmūt son of mBēla a-šubši descendant of Eda-ē ir and mNabû-a abulli son of mNabû-zēra-ukīn descendant of Kasidak assume responsibility for mNabû-ē ir.

14. re-eš-šu i-na-aš2-šu-u ib-ba-ku-nim-ma 15. i-nam-di-su

(13–15) The day that the šatammu or the scribes of the Eanna summon him, they shall bring (him) and hand him over.

16.

mu-kin-nu md30-KAM2 A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MU-GIŠ A mDU3DINGIR

lu2

17. mIR3-dEN A-šu2 ša2 m il-la-a A m MU-dPAP.SUKKAL

(16) Witnesses: mSîn-ēreš son of Nabû-šumu-līšir descendant of Ibni-Ilī;

m

(17) mArad-Bēl son of m illaya descendant of Iddin-Papsukkal;

DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.ME-MU A-šu2 ša2 mŠU A mši-gu-u2-a

m

in-nin-MU-PAP A-šu2 ša2 MU-dNA3 A mki-din-dAMAR. UTU

m

NA3-IBILA-MU A-šu2 ša2 DU3-d15 A mE2.KUR-za-kir

m

18.

md

19.

md

20.

md

m

m

(18) mMadānu-a ē-iddin son of Gimillu descendant of Šigûa; (19) mInnin-šuma-u ur son of Iddin-Nabû descendant of Kidin-Marduk; (20) mNabû-apla-iddin son of Ibni-Ištar descendant of Ekurzākir;

21. mpir- u A-šu2 ša2 mtab-ne-e-a A lu2 ŠU.KU6

(21) mPir u son of mTabnêa descendant of Bā iru.

22.

mu-kin-nu49 mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2 NA3-DU3-ŠEŠ 23. A mE2.KUR-za-kir UNUGki ITI ŠE.KIN.KUD

(22–23) Scribe: mMūrānu son of mNabû-bāni-a i descendant of Ekur-zākir.

24. U4 12-kam2 MU 12-kam2 dNA3IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(23–24) Uruk. 12 Addaru II, year 12 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

lu2

md

Apart49from stipulating that a witness or an informer must establish the case against mNabû-ē ir, the requirement of evidence also quotes m Nabû-ē ir’s own statement. mNabû-ē ir has stated that he received eight šeqels for a “mountain cloak” and food. The thirty-fold penalty applies only to any additional silver or gold that a witness can prove

m

49 The repetition of lu2mu-kin-nu is a scribal error. The text should read lu2UMBISAG. Mūrānu is known to have been a scribe (Kümmel, Familie, p. 118).

158

chapter five

that he received. It seems that mNabû-ē ir made this statement in order to justify his possession of the eight šeqels of silver. The statement seems to be a formal declaration and suggests that it was made in response to an accusation that is not recorded. If this is indeed the correct understanding, then the quotation of mNabû-ē ir’s statement indicates that YOS 6, 191 was issued as part of the formal proceedings in which both the accusation and the declaration in response were made. Other texts that include similar quotations were probably written during similar proceedings.50 Following the penalty pending evidence, YOS 6, 191 also records that two men assume responsibility for mNabû-ē ir’s appearance. When the šatammu and the scribes of the Eanna summon mNabû-ē ir, these guarantors must bring mNabû-mukīn-zēri and hand him over to the authorities. This stipulation provides additional evidence that YOS 6, 191 was written as part of an official hearing. In this text, and in others with similar guarantees,51 it seems that the officials are involved in the case from the very beginning. They hear (or perhaps even bring) the charge against the accused, and they will decide if the evidence requires the accused to be presented. It is clear, then, that the penalties pending evidence were written during formal adjudicatory proceedings in the wake of a suspicion of wrongdoing. Thus, they definitely belong in a discussion of the adjudicatory process. Nevertheless, situating the penalties pending evidence within that process remains difficult. Köhler and Peiser’s use of the term “Vorentscheidung” (“preliminary decision”) to describe the penalties pending evidence best characterizes the ambiguity that these texts present.52 On the one hand, they are preliminary; they still require the presentation of evidence before the penalty can be imposed. On the other hand, they also seem to reflect a decision made in the face of a suspicion or an accusation. Some scholars see the penalties pending evidence as the reflection of an intermediate stage towards a trial. Moore interprets the different penalties pending evidence in TCL 12 as “accusations pending trial.”53

50 The relevant texts are: YOS 19, 98:7–8; GCCI 1, 380:6–8; TCL 12, 106:6–8; YOS 6, 191:6–8; YOS 6, 204:1–7; YOS 6, 179:6–9; YOS 6, 193:3–6; YOS 6, 177:1–5; AnOr 8, 39:10–12; AnOr 8, 61:7–17; YNER 1, 2:1–10. 51 YOS 6, 191:13–15; YOS 6, 214:12–13; YOS 6, 193:11–15. 52 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 85. 53 See the headings in Moore, Documents.


159

Similarly, Cardascia interprets BE 9, 24 using the Latin juridical term litis contestatio, which means “the final agreement of the parties to a suit on the issue to be decided.”54 The texts that mention a summons by the temple officials would support this line of interpretation: if ample evidence would turn up, then the accused individual would be summoned to face the officials. The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that these texts record the penalties to be imposed upon presentation of evidence. It seems, therefore, that there is no opportunity for the accused individual to make his case before the judges. These texts seem to reflect the presumption that the accused individual is guilty, and that there would not be any “trial” to clarify his status. Other interpretations recognize the apparent finality expressed in the penalties pending evidence. San Nicolò, like Köhler and Peiser before him, labels these texts “Beweisurteile” (“evidence-judgments”).55 Similarly, Cocquerillat calls these texts “condamnations de principe” (“judgments in principle”)56 and Beaulieu refers to them as “indictments.”57 All of these labels imply that the penalties pending evidence reflect the fact that, to a certain degree, the case against the accused has already been decided. As San Nicolò suggests, if the evidence was actually provided, it would lead directly to the punishment of the accused “ohne neurliche Urteilsfällung” (“without a new passing of sentence”).58 In the wake of the accusation, the authorities issue their ruling, which will take effect as soon as evidence can be provided. The penalties pending evidence, according to this understanding, are not “summonses” that require another appearance in court. Instead, they are the outcome of a trial that has not yet reached a definite conclusion. The available evidence is not sufficient to prove that the accused individual is guilty, and the accused does not readily admit guilt, either. Nevertheless, the accusation has created enough of a suspicion to warrant maintaining a record against the accused, should the evidence prove that the accused is actually guilty.

54 Cardascia, Archives, p. 184. For the definition of the Latin term, see Brian A. Garner, ed. Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1999), p. 945. Note that Cardascia’s label suggests that a court has not yet been involved in the dispute or in the issuance of the document. 55 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 85; San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 328–333. See also Renger, JAOS 91 (1971), p. 500. 56 Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83; pp. 85–86. 57 YOS 19, pp. 13–14. 58 San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 334.

160

chapter five Summary Table 5.3 Penalty

Penalties Pending Evidence

Text

Charge

Authority


Nbk 104

misappropriation 30-fold assembly of goods payment of elders of Šamaš

—

m

YOS 17, 32

misappropriation 30-fold — of sheep payment

Babylon

Ibni-Ištar/ Nabûzēra-ibni// Šatammu

TCL 12, 50

misappropriation 30-fold — of animals payment

Šarrabanu

m Nabû-bāni4.[IX].[35] a i/ mIbnaya// Nbk Ekur-zākir

TCL 12, 60

misappropriation lu2sa-arrāb širki of she-ass ri . . . iššu-u2 (“he is a thief ”)

Babylon

m Nabû-bēlšunu / mBēl-a ašubši // AmēlEa

9.I.1 AmēlMarduk

TCL 12, 70

misappropriation 30-fold qīpu-official of tithe barley payment and šatammu of the Eanna

Uruk

m

Nādin/ mBēla ē-iqīša// Egibi

15.XIIb.3 Ngl

YOS 19, 97

unlawful purchase

30-fold — payment

Uruk

m Nabû-bānia i/ mNabûbalāssu-iqbi // Sîn-lēqi-uninnī

25.II.8 Nbn

YOS 19, 98

misappropriation payment — of precious items

Uruk

m MušēzibMarduk/ m Bēl-uballi // Amēl-Ea

26.II.8 Nbn

YOS 6, 122

unlawful fishing

30-fold administrator payment of Eanna

Uruk

m

Ištar-mukīnapli / mInninzēra-šubši

8.IX.9 Nbn

YOS 6, 148

unlawful fishing


Uruk

m Ištar-mukīnapli/ mInninzēra-šubši

8.IX.9 Nbn

YOS 6, 134

unlawful sale of camel


Uruk

Šumaya/ Ibni-Ištar // Ašlakku

19.V.10 Nbn

YOS 6, 160

misappropriation 30-fold — of barley payment

Uruk

Ina-tēšê-ē ir / 21.XII.11 Nabû-mušētiq- Nbn uddê // Egibi

OIP 122, 35

misappropriation 30-fold — of barley payment

Uruk

m Balā u / mSîn- 20.V.12 ibni // Rē iNbn alpi

GCCI 1, 380

misappropriation payment adminisrator of barley and šatammu of Eanna

Uruk

m Balā u/ mSînibni // Rē ialpi

Mukīn-apli / Bāniya

Date 14 Nbk

m

m m

m m

15.II.19 Nbk

m m

20.V.12 Nbn


161


Charge

Penalty

Authority

TCL 12, 106

misappropriation 30-fold administrator of barley payment and šatammu of Eanna

Uruk

Balā u / mSîn- 23.V.12 ibni // Rē iNbn alpi

YOS 6, 203

misappropriation 30-fold šatammu of of gold payment Eanna

Uruk

m

YOS 6, 191

misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu and of gold payment scribes of Eanna)

Uruk

YOS 6, 214

misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu) of gold payment

Uruk

Mūrānu/ 12.XIIb.12 Nabû-bāni-a i Nbn // Ekur-zākir

YOS 6, 204

misappropriation 30-fold qīpu, šatammu of dates payment and ša mu i quppu ša šarri of Eanna

Uruk

m Nabû-mukīnapli / PN

YOS 6, 179

misappropriation 30-fold — of goods payment

Uruk

Nādinu/ mBēl- 12.X.13 a ē-iqīša// Nbn Egibi

YOS 6, 193

misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu of of goods payment Eanna)

Uruk

m Nādin/ mBēla ē-iqīša// Egibi

12.X.13 Nbn

YOS 6, 180

misappropriation 30-fold — of hides payment

Uruk

m LâbāšiMarduk/mBēlē ir // ābi u

12.XI.13 Nbn

YOS 6, 177

misappropriation 30-fold šatammu and of dates payment administrator of Eanna

Uruk


7.VII.16 Nbn

AnOr 8, 39

misappropriation 30-fold šatammu and of produce payment administrator of Eanna

Uruk


29.XI.2 Cyr

YOS 7, 24

unlawful sale or 30-fold — receipt of barley payment

Uruk


16.V.3 Cyr

YOS 7, 26

unlawful receipt of barley

Uruk

AnOr 8, 61

misappropriation i - u ša2 of cattle LUGAL i-šad-dadu

30-fold — payment


Date

m

Kīnaya / Zēriya

m

5.XIIb.12 Nbn

Mūrānu/ 12.XIIb.12 Nabû-bāni-a i Nbn // Ekur-zākir m m

m m

11.IV.13 Nbn

m

m m

šatammu, Uruk administrator, 2 messengers of Gobryas

m Nabû-mukīn- 23.VIII.3 apli/ mMarduk- Cyr šuma-iddin // Balā u

Marduk-nā ir/ 23.IV. 8 Madānu-a a- Cyr iddin// Šigûa m m

162

chapter five


Charge

Penalty

Authority

YOS 7, 141

misappropriation 30-fold administrator of sheep payment of Eanna


Date

Uruk

Arad-Marduk/ 10.V.3 Marduk-šuma- Camb iddin //Bēlapla-u ur

YNER misappropriation 30-fold qīpu-official + 1, 2 of dates payment administrator + iof Eanna u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-dad

[Uruk]

m Itti-Marduk12.IV.2 Dar balā u/ mNabûmukīn-apli // Dābibī

BE 9, 24

Nippur

m

theft of sheep

payment —

m m

Nusku-iddin/ Arad-Gula

m

5.D

8.I.31 Artaxerxes

Summary Discussion of Texts-Types Calling for Evidence

The discussion until this point has presented three different text-types, all of which serve as means of obtaining evidence: 1) The kunnu-summonses, which are apparently court orders that require the summoned individual to “establish the case” against other individuals. 2) The guarantees for testimony, in which the guarantors assume the responsibility for establishing the case in order to clear themselves. 3) The penalties pending evidence, which are a means of requiring evidence to substantiate a suspicion. Examples from all three text-types suggest that they were composed during formal proceedings. The requirement for evidence is the result of a charge made in court. Whether the case will return to court is a matter that remains open. Phrased in somewhat modern terms, all of these texts raise the question of whether they were written during the evidentiary phase of the trial or during the sentencing. As has been seen above, there are those who interpret all three types of texts as “summonses,” which implies that the case remains open and awaits a final ruling. It may be, however, that all three text-types represent the end of the court’s involvement. Accordingly, the kunnu-summonses may not serve as summonses at all, but are, instead, “contracts” written by


163

the court for the parties after a complaint. Similarly, the guarantees for testimony may also reflect the final result of proceedings. The court’s involvement ends with the guarantor’s assumption of the obligation to present the testimony. The penalties pending evidence may also reflect the end of proceedings, if they are understood as sentences which will take effect when evidence becomes available. One difference between the kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for testimony, on the one hand, and the penalties pending evidence, on the other, is that while the summonses and guarantees specifically name the person who must present the evidence, the penalties pending evidence do not impose any obligation on any specific individual. The formulation of the penalties pending evidence might be characterized as hypothetical; the penalty applies on any day that a witness might come. Unlike the kunnu summonses and the guarantees for testimony, they do not require anyone to “bring” (abāku) the witnesses or establish the case.59 The kunnu-summonses and guarantees for testimony, on the other hand, impose an obligation on particular individuals to present the evidence. In relating these three text-types to the two other types of summonses, the dabābu- and quttû-types, an additional factor that must be considered is the imposition of a deadline. Both the dabābu- and the quttû-types of summonses impose a deadline on which or by which the case is to be settled. Penalties pending evidence do not specify a date on which or by which the evidence must be brought, nor do most of the guarantees for testimony. Most of the kunnu summonses impose deadlines, although there are some that do not. Bruce Wells, whose analysis is summarized in the discussion of Neo-Babylonian legal procedure in Raymond Westbrook’s A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, uses the presence or absence of a deadline to distinguish between the five text-types. Based on this crucial factor, Wells characterizes all five text-types as follows: There are a number of records attesting to the use of a conditional verdict. The condition was almost always that another witness appear before the court and offer testimony in support of a particular party’s version of the facts. That party then had the responsibility for meeting the condition by producing the additional witness. The verdict states that if

59 Note that YOS 17, 32:1; YOS 6, 160:1 and YOS 6, 180:1 designate the witness as ša (“of ”) a named individual, who is apparently the accuser. In a way, then, these texts do specify who is responsible for providing the testimony. Nevertheless, even these texts do not require the named individual to bring the witnesses. Like other penalties pending evidence, they govern the case in which a witness “comes.”

164

chapter five the condition is fulfilled, that party wins the case; if not, victory would be for the opposing party. If the accuser had established a prima facie case, then the court would place the burden on the accused to produce an exculpatory witness, often with a deadline to appear (e.g., Nbk 366: one week). If a prima facie case had not been established in the court’s opinion, as in the case of a thief who identifies the accused as receiver of the stolen goods, the burden is on the accuser, with no deadline (cf. YOS 6, 191, 214, and 235).60

According to this interpretation, all five text-types—the dabābu-, quttûand kunnu-summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties pending evidence—turn out to be different ways of recording a “conditional verdict.” The main distinction to be made is between those texts that include a deadline and those that do not. Whenever a deadline is imposed, it is the accused who must bring “exculpatory witnesses.” When a deadline is not imposed, it is the accuser who must bring the witnesses. The dabābu- and quttû-summonses support the correlation between the imposition of a deadline and the placement of the burden to establish the case upon the accused individual. As has been demonstrated, both of these types of summonses require a defendant (“the accused”) to respond to the claim of a plaintiff (“the accuser”) on or by a certain date. Wells indicates, however, that this correlation is correct “often,” but not always. Several general kunnu-summonses provide examples of exceptions to Wells’s proposed correlation. These general kunnu-summonses do not impose penalties upon the summoned individuals and thus do not indicate that they have been accused of any wrongdoing.61 Nevertheless, these texts do impose a deadline on which the summoned individual must provide the evidence. These texts demonstrate, then, that the inclusion of a deadline, does not, of itself, imply that an “accuser has established a prima facie case” against the person who must bring the evidence.62

60 Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, pp. 922–923. For the attribution of this position to Wells, see p. 922 n. 46. 61 OIP 122, 34; Nbk 52; Nbk 183; Nbk 365; Nbk 419. 62 Wells clarifies his suggested correlation between the assignment of the burden of presenting evidence and whether or not a prima facie case has been established in Wells, Testimony, pp. 124–126. Wells’s interpretation of the textual evidence is not entirely convincing. For instance, on p. 126 Wells posits that in YOS 6, 169 the accuser is able to prove that he owns the sheep found in the accused’s possession and that as a result, the accused is required to present exculpatory evidence. It is clear that the accused is required to defend himself and that he is unable to show any “accounts for


165

The penalties pending evidence, which do not include a deadline, support the correlation between the lack of a deadline and the placement of the burden to establish the case upon the accuser. An accuser who wished to see the accused individual pay the penalty would have to present the necessary evidence. Wells’s interpretation, however, seems to imply that, unlike in texts with deadlines, the evidence required by all texts without deadlines would not be exculpatory. Yet there are guarantees for testimony without deadlines in which the guarantors must present the evidence because they themselves have been accused of some wrongdoing.63 The evidence that is to be brought is, therefore, also exculpatory. Thus, the absence of a deadline does not necessarily imply that the accuser is above suspicion nor does it necessarily imply that the evidence to be brought is not exculpatory. Based on this discussion, Wells’s correlation between the presence or absence of a deadline and the party who must bring the evidence does not seem to hold true in all cases. In addition, by distinguishing between functions based on the presence or absence of a deadline, Wells ignores the stylistic differences between summonses, guarantees and penalties pending evidence. Instead, his interpretation subsumes all five text-types under the label of “conditional verdicts.” However, the stylistic differences between summonses, guarantees and penalties pending evidence may point to a functional difference. It is possible that the summonses and guarantees impose an obligation on a particular individual, and require the summoned individual or the guarantor to actually take action. The penalties pending evidence, on the other hand, may not require any additional action to be taken. It is not clear, therefore, that the penalties pending evidence impose any obligation upon the accuser.

proof ” (KA2 u3 i-da-ti ) (lines 14–17). However, the text itself does not mention that the accuser has presented any “documents in his favor,” as Wells suggests. Taken on its own, the text indicates that the action against the accused occurs simply because of the accusation, not because the accuser has “established a prima facie case.” 63 Cyr 311, Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 and YOS 6, 208.

CHAPTER SIX

TEXT-TYPES ENSURING AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRESENCE The two text-types that will be considered next are those meant to ensure the presence of another individual: the abāku summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence. Before turning to a description of the two text-types themselves, however, some issues that arise from their wording must be addressed. The formulation of both text-types closely resembles the formulation of guarantees for regular debts. In the Neo-Babylonian period, guarantees for regular debts may be formulated in one of two ways.1 The first, known by the German term Gestellungsbürgschaft (“presentation-guarantee”), requires the guarantors to “bring” (abāku) the debtors and “give” (nadānu) them to the creditors. If the guarantors do not present the debtors at the appointed time, then the guarantors must repay the debt themselves.2 The second formulation of the guarantee for debts, known as Stillesitzbürgschaft (“guarantee of sitting still”), requires the guarantors to ensure that the debtors remain available to repay the debt and do not go anywhere. The guarantors must repay the debt if the debtors should escape. The abāku-summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence closely resemble the Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees. Because of this similarity, these two text-types raise the question of whether any particular text is simply a guarantee for a regular debt and is thus not pertinent to a discussion of adjudicatory procedure.3 In order to address this question, the discussion of each text-type will identify those particular features of the texts that move them out of the general

1 For the original distinction between the two types of guarantees see Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, p. 50. 2 See Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp. 42–45 and the the ensuing discussion of “Gestellungsbürgschaft,” pp. 50–54; San Nicolò, “Bürgschaft,” RLA 2, especially p. 78; Joachim Oelsner, “The Neo-Babylonian Period,” in Raymond Westbrook and Richard Jasnow, eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2001), p. 300 and Raymond Westbrook, “Conclusions,” in Westbrook and Jasnow, eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2001), p. 329. 3 Similar problems arise from the Neo-Assyrian texts. See the discussion of “the šumma texts” and “the texts headed by a date” in Jas, SAAS 5, p. 76 and p. 81.

168

chapter six

category of simple guarantees and into the category of texts pertaining to adjudicatory proceedings. Distinguishing between Gestellungsburgschaft guarantees for regular debts and texts pertaining to legal proceedings is based on the assumption that guarantees for debts were composed before the time that the debt came due, rather than as part of the adjudicatory process for default on a debt. It should be noted, however, that even the guarantees for debts may have been the result of legal proceedings. One might imagine that the guarantees were written only after the debt was due and that the guarantee was assumed when the creditor had come to court to demand payment from a defaulting debtor. All Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees, then, may actually be abāku-summonses issued by authorities to ensure payment of a late debt. Although this is a plausible interpretation, the written evidence of most guarantees does not seem to point to an adjudicatory context. Thus, only those texts that do provide some additional evidence for an adjudicatory setting will be considered in the present discussion. Another group of guarantees that should also be considered at this point is the guarantees for the release of a prisoner. In the NeoBabylonian period, imprisonment was usually a means of distraining a defaulting debtor.4 Distraint was the creditor’s first step toward obtaining payment. The purpose of the guarantee is to obtain release of the debtor. Unlike standard guarantees for payment of debt, the guarantees for the release of a prisoner were clearly written after the debtor had already defaulted on the obligation.5 Therefore, all such guarantees for the release of a prisoner apparently reflect a stage in the resolution of a legal dispute pertaining to an unpaid debt. However, imprisonment seems to have been a means of self-help for the creditor that did not require resorting to official channels of adjudication. Thus, the guarantee for the release of a prisoner would not require any official intervention, either. To be sure, in cases concerning debts to official entities, such as the Eanna, the line between official means of adjudication and selfhelp may not be clear. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to situate the guarantees for the release of a prisoner within an adjudicatory context, these texts will not be considered in the present discussion. For discussion of the purpose of imprisonment see Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp. 60–61; Petschow, Pfandrecht, pp. 35–39; and Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 953 and p. 967. 5 Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, p. 61. 4

text-types ensuring an individual’s presence

169

6.A Summonses to Present (abāku) an Individual This type of summons requires the summoned individual to “bring” (abāku) and “give” another individual to another party. Failure to do so results in the summoned individual having to face a penalty. The following is the basic outline of this type of summons: I. Summons Clause U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI MN PN1 PN2 ibbakamma ana PN3 inamdin On6 day X of month MN PN1 shall bring PN2 and give (him) to PN3 II. Penalty Clause kî lā ītabak . . . If he does not bring (him) > Penalty against PN1 III. Witnesses + Scribe IV. Place of composition and date In terms of composition, this outline closely resembles that of Gestellungsbürgschaft texts that record the guarantor’s obligation to present the debtor to the creditor for payment of the debt. Those texts require the guarantor to “bring” (abāku) the debtor and “give” (nadānu) him to the creditor. If the guarantor does not bring the debtor at the appointed time, then the guarantor himself must repay the debt. Guarantees for payment of debts may safely be excluded from the present study since they were typical debt transactions, and so do not reflect an adjudicatory setting. In order to be considered an abāku-summons, a document must indicate in some way that the reason for its composition involves more than a simple debt. In terms of the outline above, PN1 (the summoned individual) must bring PN2 and give him to PN3 because of some wrongdoing. YOS 7, 68 will serve as the first example of the abāku-summons. This text requires the summoned individual to bring the gardener who destroyed7 three date palms and present him to the administrator of the

6 See summary table 6.1 below for abāku-summonses which require the presentation “by” (adi) a certain date, or do not specify any date at all. 7 In interpreting this text, San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 347 n. 1 and AHw. dâku (p. 152) assign the verb dâku a meaning that seems to reflect their understanding of the crime as intentional. CAD dâku 4 (D, p. 41) translates “to let (a date palm) die”

170

chapter six

Eanna. If he does not present the gardener, then the summoned individual must pay for the three date palms. The text reads as follows: 1. A.ŠA3 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina [X] 2. ša2 ina pa-ni mdNA3-SIG15 A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SUR 3. ša2 3 gišGIŠIMMAR ina lib3bi de-ku-

(1–3) A field of the Lady-ofUruk that . . . at the disposal of m Nabû-damiq son of mNabû-ē ir, from which 3 date palms were destroyed.

4. a-di U4 15-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠE lu2 NU.GIŠ.ŠAR 5. ša2 gišGIŠIMMAR ina A.ŠA3 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 6. ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2 i-du-ku 7. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na 8. mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG LUGAL 9. i-nam-din ki-i la it-tab-kam2-ma

(4–9) By 15 Addaru, he shall bring the gardener who destroyed the date palms in the field of the Lady-of-Uruk that is at his disposal, and give him to mNabûšarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri.

10. la id-dan-nu 3 MA.NA KU3. BABBAR 11. ku-um da-a-ka ša2 giš GIŠIMMAR 12. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-din

(9–12) If he does not bring (him) and does not give (him), he shall pay the Lady-of-Uruk 3 mina of silver for the destruction of the three date palms.

13.

lu2

mu-kin-nu mdINNIN-DU-A A-šu2 14. ša2 mNUMUN-ia2 mdna-na-aKAM2 15. A-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu

(13–14) Witnesses: mIštar-mukīnapli son of mZēriya; (14–15) mNanaya-ēreš son of m Gimillu.

16.

lu2

(16) Scribe: mPN

[UMBISAG] mBA-[

17. UNUGki [ITI X U4 X-kam2 MU X] 18. mkur-aš2 LUGAL TIN.TIRki 19. LUGAL KUR.KUR

(17–19) Uruk. [Day X of MN year X of ] Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

The mention of the destruction of the date palm in this text indicates that the text should be included in the present discussion. It is clear that the penalty of 3 mina of silver is not just a debt to the Eanna, but

which suggests that the crime was one of negligence rather than intentional damage to the trees.


171

is, instead, the penalty for a crime.8 The imposition of the thirty-fold penalty in other abāku-summonses is another indication that such texts involve transgression of temple property rather than simple debts.9 The need to distinguish the abāku-summonses from standard Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees for debts comes to the fore with regard to three texts from the Eanna archive that Cocquerillat labels “mandats d’amener” (“orders to bring”): YOS 7, 109; YOS 7, 27; GCCI 2, 115.10 Cocquerillat presents all of these texts in a discussion of “les fraudes” (“frauds”), which implies that all of the texts pertain to criminal activities and are not simply guarantees for the payment of debts to the Eanna.11 Ostensibly, then, all three texts should be classified as abāku-type summonses. The evidence of both GCCI 2, 115 and YOS 7, 109 supports Cocquerillat’s classification. GCCI 2, 115 should be considered an abāku-summons because it specifically mentions that the individual who is to be brought owes five years of back-payments of estimated yields. In YOS 7, 109 the people are to be brought to the administrator of the Eanna on the very same day that the document was written. This immediacy, together with the fact that it is the elders of the city who must bring the people, suggests that the elders serve as more than simply guarantors for eventual payment of a debt.12 On the other hand, YOS 7, 27 does not indicate that it was written because of any legal action or wrongdoing. Although it is possible, as Cocquerillat implies, that this text is also the result of fraudulent activity, it is also possible that it is simply a guarantee for a payment due to the Eanna.13 Based on the discussion thus far, the abāku-summonses reflect the following general situation. An individual (PN2) has been accused of

8 TCL 12, 89 also mentions killing a date palm. Similar texts mention theft (YOS 6, 123; TCL 13, 131; PBS 2/1, 85). 9 The following texts impose a thirty-fold penalty: TCL 12, 77; YOS 6, 152; YOS 7, 58. In YOS 7, 25:7–9 the penalty imposed is “bearing the punishment of Cyrus” ( i- u ša2 mku-ra-aš . . . i-šad-da-ad). Although the terminology clearly implies a penalty, the precise nature of this penalty is not known. See San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 336 n. 1 and Petschow, Pfandrecht, pp. 29–30, especially note 64. 10 TCL 13, 157, a fourth text in this group, is considered among the “guarantees” because it includes the phrase pūtal našû. 11 Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 82–83. 12 Both facts are noted by Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83, but are not specifically presented as support for her interpretation of the text. See the summary table for calculations of time spans between the date of composition and the date of appearance in other texts. Note that longer time spans do not preclude the possibility that a particular text involves a crime. 13 See San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, p. 45 n. 6.

172

chapter six

a crime for which he faces a penalty. The summoned individual (PN1) must bring the accused individual (PN2) to another party (PN3). If the summoned individual does not bring the accused, then the summoned individual himself faces the same penalty as the accused individual was to pay. The imposition of the penalty upon the summoned individual implies that the summoned individual bears some responsibility for the crime in question. For example, in YOS 7, 68, the text quoted above, the date palms were destroyed in a field that is at the disposal of mNabûdamiq. He is, therefore, ultimately responsible for the loss the gardener caused and must face the penalty if he does not present the accused. The summoned individual can, however, avoid having to pay for the crime by presenting the accused. Thus, the situation surrounding the composition of the abāku-summonses is similar to the situation surrounding the composition of the exculpatory kunnu-summonses. In both text-types, the summoned individual is the “first address” in the pursuit of the penalty for the crime. In order to avoid payment of the penalty, the summoned individual has accused another person. As a result, an exculpatory kunnu-summons or an abāku-summons might be composed. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses require the summoned individual to “establish the case” against the person he has accused. The abāku-summonses require the summoned individual to actually present the person he has accused. Failure to comply with the requirements of either text-type results in a penalty. This situational similarity between the abāku-summonses and the exculpatory kunnu-summonses is borne out by TCL 12, 77. In this text, m Nabû-nā ir must bring his shepherd to officials of the Eanna or face the thirty-fold penalty for a dead branded ewe. The text reads as follows: 1. a-di ITI ŠE mdNA3-PAP A-šu2 ša2 m ša2-dNA3-šu2-u2 md 2. UTU-a-a lu2SIPA-šu2 ib-bakam2-ma 3. ina E2.AN.NA a-na mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG.LUGAL 4. u3 lu2EN.MEŠ pi-iq-ne-e-tu4 ša2 E2.AN.NA 5. i-nam-din ki-i la i-tab-ku 30 e-en

(1–5) By the month of Addaru, m Nabû-nā ir son of mŠa-Nabû-šū shall bring mŠamšaya, his shepherd and, in the Eanna, give him over to mNabû-šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri, and the qīpu-officials of the Eanna.

text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 6. ku-um 1-et U8 ša2 kak-kab-ti ša2 ina sa-ar2-ti 7. ni-ik-si-tu-ma ina ŠU.2 mdNA3PAP am-ra-ti 8. u3 mdNA3-PAP iq-bu-u2 um-ma md UTU-a-a 9. [it-ta-ak]-is mdNA3-PAP a-na 10. dGAŠAN ša2 Uruk i-nam-din

173

(5–10) If he does not bring (him), m Nabû-nā ir shall pay the Ladyof-Uruk 30 sheep for the ewe with a star that was killed in treachery and found in the hands of mNabûnā ir, and (about which) mNabûnā ir said thus: “mŠamšaya [kill]ed (it).”

The penalty clause in this text confirms that mNabû-nā ir has to bring his shepherd to the Eanna because mNabû-nā ir has accused him of killing the sheep. The dead sheep was found in mNabû-nā ir’s possession, so he is responsible for paying the penalty. He can avoid the payment by presenting the shepherd whom he has accused. The quotation of mNabû-nā ir’s statement in TCL 12, 77:8–9 suggests that he has made his accusation against the shepherd in a hearing in the Eanna. YOS 6, 123 describes just such a hearing: 1. 5 UDU.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 kak-kab-tu4 šeen-du 2. ša2 ina e-e-ni ša2 mki-na-a A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-ina-SU 3¢SURÜ 3. A mdan-ne-e-a am-ra-a-ma m NUMUN-ia A-šu2

(1–3) 5 sheep belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk, branded with a star, which were seen in the flock of mKīnaya son of mNergal-inatēšê-ē ir descendant of Dannea—

4. ša2 mTIN-su lu2NA.KAD ša2 d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 3 ina lib3-bi 5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina sa-ar2-ti ul-tu e-ni-ia 6. ab-ka-a ina UKKIN a-na m ki-na-a u2-kin-nu

(3–5) about 3 of which mZēriya, son of mBalāssu, the herdsman of the Lady-of-Uruk said thus: (5–6) “They were led away from my flock in treachery.” In the assembly, he established (the case) against mKīnaya.

7. 1-en 30.MEŠ e-e-ni ra-bi-ti ina UGU mki-na-a 8. par-su u3 2-ta e-e-ni re- i-it 5-ta e-e-[ni]

(7–8) They decided that mKīnaya must pay 30–fold for the fullgrown sheep.

9. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du ša2 m ki-na-a iq-bu-u2 10. um-ma ul-tu ITI ŠE MU 7-kam2 mTAR-a-a 11. lu2SIPA ina e-ni-ia ip-te-qid m TAR-a-a

(8–10) And (as for) the 2 sheep, the remainder of the 5 sheep branded with a star, about which m Kīnaya said thus: (10–11) “Since the month of Addaru, year 7, mTAR-a-a, the shepherd, deposited them in my flock”—

174

chapter six 12. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAGLUGAL 13. lu2EN pi-qit-tu2 E2.AN.NA 14. u3 lu2EN.MEŠ pi-iq-ne-e-tu2 ša2 E2.AN.NA 15. i-nam-din ki-i mTAR-a-a la i-tab-kam2-ma

(11–15) He shall bring mTAR-a-a and give (him) to mNabû-šarrau ur, the ša rēš šarri adminstrator of the Eanna and to the administrators of the Eanna.

16. la id-dan-nu DIŠ-šu e-e-ni it-ti e-e-ni-a 17. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-din

(15–17) If he does not bring m TAR-a-a and does not give (him), he shall pay 60 sheep together with those (other) sheep, 30-fold (for the two sheep) to the Lady-of-Uruk.

This text is actually composed of a decision record (lines 1–8) followed by the abāku-summons (lines 8–17). The entire hearing takes place “in the assembly.” The assembly first decides that mKīnaya must pay a thirty-fold penalty for stealing three sheep. mKīnaya then claims that the remaining two sheep were given to him by another shepherd. The abāku-summons is issued in the wake of this accusation. mKīnaya must present the shepherd to the administrators of the Eanna. If he does not present the shepherd, then mKīnaya must repay the Eanna thirty fold for those two sheep, as well. The abāku-summonses presented thus far indicate that they were issued following an accusation made during a formal hearing. Determining the legal function of these texts depends upon explaining the purpose for “bringing” the individual. According to Moore, TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89 are summonses “to present a man for trial.”14 The high rank of the officials to whom the person must be brought supports Moore’s understanding of these texts as summonses to present for trial.15 These high-ranking officials may have been the authorities before whom the suspect would be tried. Moore’s title implies that the fate of the person who must be “brought” is yet to be determined by trial. This suggestion finds some support from the formulation of the penalty clauses in both TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89. The penalty in TCL 12,77 is for 1-et U8 ša2 kakMoore, Documents, p. 83 and p. 91. Moore addresses only TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89. The application of her interpretation to other documents is an extension of her original interpretation. 15 See summary table 6.1 for the authorities included in these texts. 14


175

kab-ti ša2 ina sa-ar2-ti ni-ik-si-tu-ma (“one ewe with a star that was killed unlawfully”) and in TCL 12, 89 it is for da-a-ki ša2 gišGIŠIMMAR (“the killing of the date-palm”). Both leave the guilt or innocence of the person to be brought open to question; neither states that the person to be brought has actually committed the crime. Similarly, in YOS 6, 123:8–17, it is not clear that the shepherd whom mKīnaya has accused is actually guilty of the crime. In all of these examples, it is entirely possible that the person to be brought will not have to make the payment. All that is certain is that the summoned individual is ultimately responsible for payment. However, not all abāku-summonses leave the guilt of the person to be brought open to question. Several abāku-summonses make it clear that the person to be brought is the person who has committed the crime. Thus, in the first abāku-summons cited, YOS 7, 68, the person to be brought is the “gardener who killed the date palm.”16 Similarly, the penalty clause in PBS 2/1, 85 states that if the summoned individual does not bring the accused (PN2), the summoned individual must repay “the five oxen that mPN2 led away in theft” (5 GU4 ša2 ina sa-aš2-tu4 mPN2 i-bu-uk).17 In all these cases, a trial to determine guilt, as implied by Moore’s labels of TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89, would be unnecessary. Furthermore, in PBS 2/1, 85, the criminal is not to be brought before any authorities, but rather he is to be given directly to the person from whom he stole. These texts open room for further debating the interpretation of all the abāku-summonses. The outset of this discussion noted the similarities between the abākusummonses and the Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees for debts. Because of these similarities, one may understand those abāku-summonses that impose monetary penalties as a specific kind of Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantee, one in which the debt is incurred because of a crime committed. The “summoned individual,” according to this interpretation, is actually a guarantor. He guarantees that he will present the guilty individual, who must pay for his crime. If the guarantor fails to present the guilty individual, then he assumes responsibility for payment. Augapfel adopts this interpretation in the heading preceding his edition of PBS 2/1, 85, in which he refers to this text as a “Gestellungsbürgschaft mit gleichzeitiger eventueller Schuldübernahme” (“presentation-guarantee with

16 17

YOS 7, 68:4–9. PBS 2/1, 85:8–9. See also YOS 6, 152:1–6 and TCL 13, 131:4–6.

176

chapter six

concurrent assumption of penalty”).18 Augapfel’s interpretation may apply to all the abāku-type summonses.19 Accordingly, these documents are not summonses, but are guarantees for payment. The only unique aspect of these documents is that the debt they mention was incurred as the punishment for a crime. It should be noted that according to both Moore and Augapfel the abāku-summonses belong in the ‘tablet trail’ of texts that record adjudicatory proceedings. The difference between the interpretations lies in how these documents functioned as part of the ‘tablet trail.’ According to Moore, the abāku-summonses are a means of bringing a person to trial. If this is the case, then they were composed before a case was closed, as part of the ongoing proceedings. Augapfel’s understanding, on the other hand, indicates that all the abāku-summonses were written at the end of the proceedings and assume that the person to be brought was guilty. They are not “summonses,” but are, instead, guarantees that the penalty will be paid by the guilty party. Before concluding the discussion of this text-type, there is one additional text, Abraham, Business, No. 85, which must be considered among the abāku-summonses. This text is unique because it does not include a penalty for failure to hand over the criminals. The body of this text, as transliterated by Abraham, reads as follows:20 1. U4 1–kam2 ša2 ITI SIG4 ša2 MU X-[kam2 ša2 da-ri- -mu-uš ] 2. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR mIR3-¢dENÜ [A-šu2 ša2 mPN] 3. A me- e3-ru lu2sa-a-ri.MEŠ ša2 ni-i[k . . .] 4. i-na bi-rit ID2.MEŠ ina URU ša2 lu2qi2-pi 5. a-na E2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- irIBILA ik-si-[ma? ] 6. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na mdAMAR. UTU-nair-IBILA

(1–7) On 1 Simānu, year X [of Darius] king of Babylon king of the lands, mArad-Bēl [son of m PN] descendant of Ē iru, shall bring the thieves who . . . between the rivers and the city of the qīpuofficial,20 having bound (?) (them), to the house of mMarduk-nā irapli and give (them) to mMarduknā ir-apli.

18 Augapfel, p. 92. Note, however, that Moore, Documents, p. 129 refers to TCL 13, 131 as a “summons to present at Eanna a man accused of theft.” Unlike the titles she gives TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89, this title does not mention any trial. Moore seems to have recognized the difference between TCL 13, 131 and the other documents. Her use of the term “summons,” however, suggests that she does not see TCL 13, 131 in the light of other guarantees. 19 Augapfel does not mention any of these documents. 20 According to Abraham, Business, p. 364 the location “the city of the qīpu-official” indicates that the theft described was of temple property.

text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 7. i-nam-din e-lat ra-šu-tu ša2 md AMAR.UTU-nair-IBILA 8. ša2 ina mu - i mIR3-dEN

177

(7–8) Apart from the obligation due to mMarduk-nā ir-apli owed by mArad-Bēl.

Arad-Bēl must “bring” and “give” thieves to mMarduk-nā ir-apli. As in PBS 2/1, 85, the criminal is not handed over to any authority, but directly to the person from whom he stole. Thus, it does not seem likely that this text is a summons for a trial. According to the notice at the end of the text, this obligation is placed upon mArad-Bēl apart from his other obligation to mMarduknā ir-apli. This may explain the reason for the composition of this summons and for the apparent absence of a penalty. The concluding notice implies that the present document carries some obligation, like the other obligations that mArad-Bēl must pay to mMarduk-nā ir-apli. This may indicate mArad-Bēl does indeed incur the obligation for the theft if he does not present the thieves. As has already been noted above, the abāku-summonses may, in fact, be guarantees for payment of a penalty for theft. Thus, in Abraham, Business, No. 85, mArad-Bēl guarantees that he will present the thieves, or else, it seems, he will himself assume the obligation to pay the penalty. m

6.B

Guarantees for an Individual’s Presence

The second text-type ensuring an individual’s presence consists of texts that, like other guarantees, use the term pūta našû. This text-type records the fact that one individual (or a group of individuals) assumes responsibility ( pūta našû) for the presence of another individual (or group of individuals) at a particular time. Like the abāku-summonses (see section 6.A above), the guarantees for an individual’s presence resemble the Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for payment of a regular debt. Thus, as with the abāku-summonses, the discussion must begin by identifying those particular features of the guarantees for an individual’s presence that indicate that any particular text belongs in the ‘tablet trail.’ The distinction between abāku-summonses and standard Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees is based on details, such as the mention of a specific crime, that indicate that the individual who is to be ‘brought’ is suspected of some wrongdoing. Similar evidence may be mustered to distinguish between the guarantees for an individual’s presence that belong in the ‘tablet trail’ and standard Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees for debts. Apart from passing mentions of details, the penalties imposed upon the guarantors for failure to discharge their obligation provide

killing of branded ewe

cutting date administrator palm of Eanna

TCL 12, 77

TCL 12, 89

šatammu; scribes of Eanna

sale of gold

cutting date ša rēš šarri palms

? (penalty of šatammu + ī u ša šarri) administrator of Eanna

YOS 6, 152

YOS 7, 68

YOS 7, 25

adi XII (3/9)

—

?.?.? Cyr adi 15.XII

5.XIIb.12 Nisannu Nbn (3/29–4/ (3/23) 26)

5.VIII.9 Nbn (10/29)

≤8 days

?

6–35 days

—

≤ 10 days

≤ 76 days

(Uruk)

(Uruk)

(Uruk)

(Uruk)

Uruk

Eanna (Uruk)

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Uruk

Nādin/ Bēl-a ēiqīša // Egibi


m

?

m Arad-Inninni / mIbni-Ištar // GimilNanaya

m

m

m GimilNanaya / m Nabû-šumaiddin // Gimil-Nanaya

m Nabûmukīn-apli / m Zēriya


12.XII.8 adi 22.XII Nbn (3/25) (3/15)

13.IX.2 Nbn (12/23)

Date Written

i- u ša2 26.VII.3 adi 5.VIII ku-raCyr (10/28) aš . . . i(10/20) šad-da-ad m

3 mina silver

30-fold

administrators 30-fold of Eanna

1 mina silver

30-fold

Penalty

YOS 6, theft of 123:8–17 sheep

ša rēš šarri and qīpu-officials

Wrongdoing “To” Whom

Text

Summary Table 6.1 abāku-Summonses

178 chapter six

theft

TCL 13, 131

25.V (8/27) 5 days

≤ 113 or ≤ 116 days

0 days

Nippur

House of m Marduknā ir-apli

(Uruk)

Uruk

≤ 8 days (Uruk)

(Uruk)

Nādin, Kīnaya, [mMūrānu] and mBalā u Pir u / Eannašuma-ibni Gimillu/ Innin-zēraiddin m

m

m

m

m

m

Nippur

Babylon

Enlil-aplau ur/ m Šuma-iddin m

m Nabûbalāssuiqbi//?

m Ālu-šaMardukU.MUK.ME nā ir/ m Madānua ē-[iddin] // Šigûa

Āl-pî- illini

Uruk

Uruk


Owner of 5 oxen stolen property

20.V.4 Dar II (8/22)

payment 15.XII.1 15.XII of arrears Camb

PBS 2/1, theft 85

nonadministrator payment of Eanna of estimated yield

YOS 7, 109

12.XII.6 adi 20.XII Cyr (3/7) (2/27)

payment 29.VII.0 Ara šamna 1–30 of dates Camb (no date days (11/15) specified) (11/16– 12/15)

30-fold

?


3+.XIIa.? 1.III.? Dar Dar (6/13 or (2/21+ 6/16) or 2/18 +)

administrator

nonpayment of estimated yield

GCCI 2, 115

Date Written

payment 2.XIIb.3 [a-di] ? of what Cyr (3/21) thief owes

Penalty

m Abraham, bringing Marduk-nā ir- — Business, and handing apli (owner No. 85 over thieves of stolen property?)

šatammu + administrator of Eanna

YOS 7, 58 theft (extortion?)


Wrongdoing “To” Whom

Text


text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 179

180

chapter six

the clearest means of distinguishing between the guarantees for an individual’s presence and Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for loans. The operative factor is whether or not the guarantee imposes a monetary penalty. The presence of a monetary penalty indicates that the guarantee is written in the wake of a debt. The person who i s to be presented is a debtor who owes the amount stipulated as the penalty against the guarantors. The guarantors must present the debtor or pay the debt themselves. In contrast, the absence of a monetary penalty indicates that the guarantors’ obligations are not the result of a debt that must be paid. Thus, those guarantees that do not impose a penalty upon the guarantor,21 or that impose an apparently non-monetary penalty like “the punishment of the king” ( ī u ša šarri),22 are considered as records of the adjudicatory process. If a guarantee for an individual’s presence does impose a monetary penalty, it can only be considered as part of the ‘tablet trail’ if it contains other evidence that it was written as part of the adjudication of some wrongdoing. YOS 7, 137 will serve as an example of this text-type. In this text, two oblates assume responsibility for bringing five prisoners to Babylon. The text reads: 1.

du-um-mu-qu DUMU-šu2 ša2 bal- i-ia LU2 uruša2-ad-mu [. . .] 2. ša2 mde2-a-kur-ban-nu lu2pa-qudu ša2 UNUGki a-na UGU DUMU.SAL[-šu2] 3. ša2 a-na KU3.BABBAR id-di-nu i-na ši-pir-ti ša2 mkal-ba-a lu2paqu-du ša2 uruša2-ad-mu

(1–4) mDummuqu son of mBal iya of the city of Šadmu . . . whom m Ea-kurbannu, the paqūdu-official of Uruk, seized by order of mKalbaya the paqūdu-official of Šadmu, because of his (mDummuqu’s) daughter whom he (mDummuqu) sold for silver;

4. i -ba-tu mKI-dna-na-a-i-ni-ia u3 m su-qa-a lu2APIN.MEŠ 5. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 giš APIN.ME-šu2-nu u2-maš-ši-ru u3 i-i -li-qu

(4–5) mItti-Nanaya-īnīya and m Sūqaya the fieldworkers of the Lady-of-Uruk who abandoned their plows and fled;

m m

21 YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111 and YOS 7, 115. In this last text, there are two guarantors who must present one individual. The verb in the penalty clause (lines 8–11) is in the singular (i-nam-din), which indicates that the penalty is not upon the guarantors but upon the individual whom they must present. 22 YOS 7, 137 and YOS 7, 177.


181

6.

md

a-nu-NUMUN-DU3 lu2pu- aa-a lu2GAL 10–tu4 ša2 dul-la-šu2 u2-maš-ši-ru 7. u3 i-i -li-qu-ma 2 MU.AN. NA.MEŠ la in-nam-ru mu2ba-ru

(6–7) mAnu-zēra-ibni, the fuller, the chief of ten, who abandoned his work and fled and wasn’t seen for two years;

8.

lu2 RIG7 ša2 dIGI-DU ša2 uruu2dan-nu ša2 mdNA3-MU-GI.NA lu2 UGULA E2.KUR.ME

(7–8) mUbāru, an oblate of Nergal of Udannu;

9. ina E2 ki-li i -ba-tu PAP 5 lu2 ERIN2.MEŠ ša2 i-na E2 ki-li a-ab-tu-ma

10. mKI-dna-na-a-i-ni-ia u3 msuqa-a-a lu2APIN.ME mda-nuNUMUN-DU3 11. lu2pu- a-a-a lu2RIG7.ME ša2 d GAŠAN UNUGki u3 mu2-baru lu2RIG7 12. [ša2 dIGI-DU ša2 uruu2-dan-nu] a-na mdNA3-DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3. TAM E2.AN.NA mdNA3-ŠEŠMU 13. [ lu2SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit] E2.AN.NA u3 mri-mut u3 mba-u2KAM 14. [ lu2DI.KU5.ME] LUGAL iqbu-u2 um-<ma> mdu-um-mu-qu DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdbal- i-ia 15. [. . . a-na] ¢UGUÜ LUGAL la a-ba-tu4 i-na E2 ki-li [. . .] 16. [. . . iq]-ta-bi mdNA3-DU-IBILA lu2 ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.[NA]

(8–9) (all of ) whom mNabû-šumaukīn, the official in charge of the temples, imprisoned. (9) Total: 5 men who were imprisoned. (10–14) mItti-Nanaya-īnīya and Sūqaya the fieldworkers, m Anu-zēra-ibni, the fuller, the oblates of the Lady-of-Uruk and m Ubaru, the oblate [of Nergal of Udannu] said thus to mNabûmukīn-apli the šatammu of the Eanna, mNabû-a a-iddin [the ša rēš šarri administrator] of the Eanna and mRīmūt and mBauēreš, the [ judges]23 of the king: m

(14–16) “In prison, mDummuqu son of mBal iya [sp]oke treason24 [aga]inst the king . . .

23

24

For the restoration of lu2DI.KU5.ME, reflected in the translation in Joannès, Justice, No. 148 (p. 205) see Kümmel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198. 24 The restoration of this line and the translation of lā ābātu as “treason” follows Joannès, Justice, p. 205 (“des paroles de lèse majesté”). 23

182

chapter six 17. [A mda-bi-bi] ¢u3Ü mdNA3-ŠEŠMU lu2SAG-LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit E2.A[N.NA] 18. mdu-um-mu-qu mKI-dna-naa-i-ni-ia msu-qa-a-a mda-nuNUMUN-DU3 19. u3 mu2-ba-ru i-na i -qa-a-ta i ba-tu-ma a-na mgi-mil-lu 20. lu2GAL 10-tu4 u3 mdNA3-ik- ur DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdu-um-muqu lu2RIG2.ME ša2 dGAŠAN UNUGki

(16–21) mNabû-mukīn-apli, the šatammu of the Ean[na descendant of Dābibī] and mNabû-a aiddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna seized mDummuqu, m Itti-Nanaya-īnīya, mSūqaya, m Anu-zēra-ibni and mUbaru in fetters and gave them to mGimillu, the chief of ten, and m Nabû-ik ur son of mDummuqu, the oblates of the Lady-of-Uruk.

21. id-di-nu pu-ut ma-a - ar-tu4 ša2 lu2 ERIN2.ME-a 5 mŠU u3 md NA3-ik- ur 22. na-šu-u2 ib-ba-ku-ma i-na TIN. TIRki ina IGI mna-bu-u2-gu Ašu2 ša2 mgu-ba-ru 23. lu2NAM TIN.TIRki u3 lu2e-berID2ki u2-ša-az-za-az-zu-šu2-nu-tu ki-i man-ma ina lib3-bi-šu2-nu 24. a-na a-šar ša2-nam-ma it-tal-ku m ŠU u3 mdNA3-ik-[ ur i- u] ša2 LUGAL

(21–22) mGimillu and mNabûik ur assume responsibility for the keeping of these five men. (22–23) They shall bring them to Babylon and present them before mNabūgu son of Gobryas, the governor of Babylon and the Transeuphratene district. (23–25) If anyone among them goes to another place, mGimillu and mNabû-ik[ ur] shall bear [the punishment] of the king.

25. i-šad-da-du ¢iÜ-na u2-šu-uz-zu ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3. TAM E2.AN.NA 26. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mna-di-nu DUMU mda-bi-bi mdNA3ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG-LUGAL lu2 EN pi-qit E2.[AN.NA]

(25–26) In the presence of m Nabû-mukīn-apli šatammu of the Eanna, son of mNādinu descendant of Dābibī; (26) mNabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna.

27.

(27) Witnesses: mŠamaš-mukīnapli son of mMadānu-a ē-[iddin descendant of ] Šigûa;

mu-kin-nu mdUTU-DUIBILA DUMU-šu2 ša2 md DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-[MU DUMU] mši-gu-u2-a lu2

28. mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN DUMU me-gi-bi mmu-šezib-dEN 29. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mTIN-su DUMU me-gi-bi mdNA3-IBILAMU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdENTIN-i DUMU lu2ša2 MUN-šu2

(28–29) mLâbāši-Marduk son of m Arad-Bēl descendant of Egibi; m Mušēzib-Bēl son of mBalāssu descendant of Egibi; (29) mNabû-apla-iddin son of m Bēl-uballi descendant of Ša- ābtīšu.


183

30. mŠU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3MU-MU DUMU mŠU-dnana-a mdin-nin-MU-URI3 31. DUMU mgi-mil-lu DUMU m kur-i mdKUR.GAL-LUGALURI3 DUMU-šu2 ša2 mta-li-mu

(30–31) mGimillu son of mNabûšuma-iddin descendant of GimilNanaya; mInnin-šuma-u ur son of m Gimillu descendant of Kurī; (31) mAmurru-šarra-u ur son of m Talīmu;

32. mIR3-dAMAR.UTU DUB. SAR DUMU-šu2 ša2 md AMAR.UTU-MU-MU DUMU mdEN-IBILA-URI3

(32) mArad-Marduk, the scribe, son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur.

33. UNUGki ITI ŠE U4 30-kam2 MU 3-kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-[ia] 34. LUGAL TIN.[TIR]ki LUGAL KUR.KUR

(33–34) Uruk. 30 Addaru, year 3 of Cambys[es], king of Baby[lon], king of the lands.

The imposition of the apparently non-monetary “punishment of the king” is the clearest indication that this text is not a standard Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantee for a debt. The text also specifies the crime for which the guarantors must bring the prisoners to Babylon: one of them, mDummuqu, has spoken treason against the king. The mention of this crime is a clear circumstantial indication that it is not simply a guarantee for a debt. YOS 7, 111, another text of this text-type includes a similar indication of the wrongdoings to which it pertains. The individuals to be brought in YOS 7, 111 are all involved in the theft and killing of temple livestock. Apart from the specific mention of a crime, the wording of the guarantors’ obligation in YOS 7, 137 also points to circumstances other than simple debts surrounding this guarantee. The guarantors must present the individuals “before” (ina pāni ) Nabugu, the satrap’s son.25 The prepositional phrase, known from other adjudicatory contexts, suggests that Nabugu is to conduct a hearing or investigation once the parties arrive in Babylon.26 Similarly, some texts require the guarantors to present the individuals upon summons by temple authorities, who will, presumably, conduct a hearing of some sort.27 The wording of For a similar use of the locution a-na pa-ni see YOS 7, 177:7. For a similar understanding of why the guarantor must present the individual, see San Nicolò’s interpretation of YOS 7, 115 in ArOr 4 (1932), p. 339. A similar reason may also be implied in YOS 6, 64. Dougherty, who discusses both YOS 7, 137 and YOS 7, 177, does not identify the authority’s role in either text. See Dougherty, AJSL 46 (1929–1930), p. 101 (YOS 7, 177) and Dougherty, Shirkûtu, p. 60 (YOS 7, 137). 27 Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111. Von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), p. 117 hints at an adjudicatory context for YOS 7, 111 by describing the text as “eine Gestellungsbürgschaft, wahrscheinlich vor dem Tempelgericht” (“a presentation-guarantee, probably before the temple court”). 25 26

184

chapter six

the guarantors’ obligation in these texts makes it clear that they are to present the individual not for payment of debt, but as part of the adjudicatory process. In YOS 7, 137, the circumstantial information (the mention of treason and the indications that the prisoners are to be presented for trial) complement the fact that it does not impose a monetary penalty to clearly show that the text should not be considered a standard Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee. Texts that do impose a monetary penalty, however, can only be removed from the category of Gestellungsbürgschaftguarantees if they provide the necessary information about circumstances. This may be illustrated by examining YOS 6, 194 and TCL 13, 157, two texts that, according to Cocquerillat’s reading, pertain to fraud.28 Before the names of the witnesses and the scribes, YOS 6, 194 reads as follows:

28

1. pu-ut a-ba-ku ša2 mdNA3-ta-addan-na-URI3 2. ša2 ZAG ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA ša2 KA2 i-¢ilÜ-tu4 3. ša2 MU 9-kam2 dNA3IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki 4. a-na UNUGki a-na pa-ni mkalba-a 5. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3-mu-šetiq-UD.DA 6. u mKAR-dAMAR.UTU mbibe-e-a 7. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SIG15 ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA 8. A-šu2 ša2 mTIN-su a-di-i ITI DU6

(1–9) In the presence of m Nabû-mušētiq-uddê and m Mušēzib-Marduk, mBibēa son of mNabû-udammiq assumes responsibility to mNabû-mušētiquddê son of mBalāssu for bringing mNabû-tadanna-u ur to Uruk before mKalbaya by Tašrītu, regarding the estimated yield of dates of Bāb- iltu for year 9 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

9. na-ši ki-i mbi-be-e-a 10. mdNA3-ta-ad-dan-na-URI3 a-di ITI DU6 11. la i-tab-ku a-ki-i ZAG ša2 mkalba-a 12. i-qab-bu-u2 ZU2.LUM.MA mbibe-e-a 13. a-na mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA u m KAR-dAMAR.UTU 14. i-nam-din

(9–14) If mBibēa does not bring m Nabû-taddanna-u ur by Tašrītu, m Bibēa shall pay according to the estimated yield that mKalbaya reported to mNabû-mušētiq-uddê and mMušēzib-Marduk.

Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 82–84.


185

This text dates to year 10 of Nabonidus, and states that the guarantor must bring the individual regarding (ša) “the yield of year 9 of Nabonidus.” If the guarantor fails to present the individual, then the guarantor himself must pay the yield of the previous year. Cocquerillat deduces that the person who is to be brought is under suspicion of attempting to defraud the Eanna of the previous year’s yield.29 TCL 13, 157, the second guarantee for the presence of an individual that Cocquerillat presents in the context of fraud, reads as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

a-nu-MU-DU3 A-šu2 ša2 NA3-SUR A mdNA3-šar- iDINGIR u mdUTU-NUMUN-MU Ašu2 ša2 ma- u-lap-dINNIN A m E2.KUR-za-kir pu-ut mdna-na-a-KAM2 A-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu u mdUTU-SU A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3ŠEŠ-SUM.NA sa2 ZU2.LUM.MA NIG2.GA d INNIN UNUGki a-na E2.AN.NA u2-qar-rab-buu2-nu ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-DU-[A] lu2 ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mda-bi-bi u3 md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN pi-qit E2.AN.[NA] md md

(1–10) mAnu-šuma-ibni son of m Nabû-ē ir descendant of Nabûšar i-ilī and mŠamaš-zēra-iddin son of mA ulap-Ištar descendant of Ekur-zākir assume responsibility to mNabû-mukīn-[apli] šatammu of the Eanna, son of m Nādin descendant of Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of Ean[na] for m Nanaya-ēreš son of mGimillu and mŠamaš-erība son of mNabûa a-iddin, who must bring the dates, property of Ištar of Uruk to the Eanna.

10. na-šu2-u2 U4 7-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠU ib-ba-ku-[nim-ma] 11. i-nam-din-nu-uš-šu2-nu-tu ki-i a-na a-šar

(10–11) On 7 Du ūzu they shall br[ing] (them) and hand them over.

12. ša2-nam-ma it-tal-ku- ZU2. LUM.MA 13. re- i ša2 ina mu - i-šu2-nu ina e-peš NIG2.GA il-nu14. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-din-nu- 1-en pu-ut 2-i na-šu-u2

(11–14) If they depart to another place, they shall pay the Lady of Uruk whatever (amount of dates) turned up to their debit in the accounting. (14) Each assumes responsibility for the other.

29 Note Dougherty’s earlier interpretation of YOS 6, 194 in AJSL 46 (1929–1930), p. 86, which does not seem to imply fraud. Dougherty writes that a “question had arisen as to the division of dates,” and that the purpose of the guarantee is “to have the transaction concluded.”

186

chapter six

Cocquerillat points to a number of different factors that suggest that the text pertains to fraud.30 The two men whom the guarantors must present, mNanaya-ēreš and mŠamaš-erība, “are to deliver the dates, property of Ištar of Uruk, to the Eanna” (ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA NIG2. GA dINNIN UNUGki a-na E2.AN.NA u2-qar-rab-bu-u2-nu). Cocquerillat identifies both men as intermediaries between the Eanna and the collection center at Kār-Nanaya.31 Cocquerillat determines that the text is not simply a guarantee for a debt of dates because the text was composed eight months after the time designated for delivery of dates to the Eanna. The Eanna’s accounts apparently reveal some discrepancy, and the Eanna authorities (the šatammu and the administrator) suspect fraud. The guarantors, one of whom, mŠamaš-zēra-iddin, is known to have been a scribe in the Eanna,32 assume responsibility directly to these officials. If they fail to present the suspects, the two guarantors must themselves pay for whatever discrepancies have turned up. In sum, a guarantee to present an individual may be distinguished from a Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee for a regular debt in one of three ways. The first is the absence of a monetary penalty, which is the clearest indication that a debt is not in question. The other two ways pertain to the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the guarantee, and may be applied to texts that impose both non-monetary and monetary penalties. The explicit or implicit mention of a wrongdoing because of which the individual must be brought indicates that more than a debt is in question. Similarly, the text may be distinguished from a regular Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee if it contains any indication that the individual must be presented for a hearing of some sort. The criteria established thus far provide sufficient indication that a particular guarantee for an individual’s presence is an adjudicatory record, part of the ‘tablet trail.’ The simple wording of the guarantee, however, does not indicate whether or not the guarantee was issued in a formal setting. This problem is best addressed by looking beyond the wording of the guarantee to the additional information that the texts provide. The first sample text above, YOS 7, 137, is clearly the result Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83. According to Kümmel, Familie, p. 122, mNanaya-ēreš also held the title gugallû (“canal inspector”) and served as a scribe of texts from the Eanna archive. Cocquerillat does not consider his function in these positions in her analysis of the fraud. 32 Cocquerillat identifies both guarantors as scribes. Only mŠamaš-zēra-iddin son of mA ulap-Ištar descendant of Ekur-zākir is listed among the scribes in Kümmel, Familie (on p. 125). 30

31


187

of proceedings in the Eanna. It begins with a statement by four prisoners addressed to the šatammu, the administrator of the Eanna and the royal judges. In addition to mentioning the authorities as part of the proceedings, the text indicates that it was written ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”) the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. YOS 6, 194:5 uses the same preposition, which hints at a formal tribunal leading to the guarantee in this text, as well. Although other texts are not as descriptive, temple officials are present in all of them.33 This fact suggests that all of the guarantees for an individual’s presence were composed during formal hearings. The last question that must be addressed is how the guarantees for an individual’s presence function within the ‘tablet trail.’ Investigation of this subject can proceed along the same lines as the investigation of the legal function of the abāku-summonses because both text-types impose similar obligations. The requirement of the guarantor to present the individual is similar to the requirement of the summoned individual to “bring” another individual. There are two main interpretations of this requirement in the abāku-summonses, both of which also apply to the guarantees for an individual’s presence. According to Moore, the abāku-summonses are a means of bringing a person to trial at a particular time. Thus, the guarantees would be another means of assuring the individual’s presence at a hearing. According to Augapfel, on the other hand, the abāku-summonses are actually guarantees that the penalty will be paid by the guilty party. This would mean that the guarantees for an individual’s presence belong within the broader set of Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for payments of obligations resulting from crimes. In determining whether a particular guarantee for an individual’s presence functions as a means of assuring the individual’s presence at a hearing or as a guarantee for a payment there are two factors that 33 See summary table 6.2 for the officials involved. The presence of temple officials in all the texts does not preclude the possibility that guarantees for an individual’s presence were used in the course of private litigation, at least in theory. However, the nature of the texts, especially the need to distinguish between the guarantees for an individual’s presence and the Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees, makes it difficult to identify those that come from private litigation. It is, in fact, possible that some (if not all) Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees were actually written after the debt was due, as part of the adjudication of disputes over the unpaid debts, rather than at the time the debt was incurred, as guarantees for initial payment on time. Those texts for which this might be demonstrated would be examples of the use of the guarantees for an individual’s presence in the course of private litigation.

188

chapter six

must be examined: the penalty which a particular text imposes and the time frame it sets for the guarantor’s obligation. As has already been noted, the penalties imposed may be either monetary or non-monetary. Monetary penalties, like those imposed upon the guarantors in YOS 6, 194 and TCL 13, 157, suggest that the legal function of these texts resembles that of other Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for obligations. The penalty represents an obligation that was incurred through some wrongdoing; the guarantee is composed to ensure payment. In contrast, those guarantees that impose no penalty on the guarantor, or apparently non-monetary penalties, such as “the punishment of the king,” cannot be guarantees for a payment. Instead, they are probably guarantees to present the individual for a hearing. The second factor that impacts the determination of the legal function of the guarantees for an individual’s presence is the time frame the texts allow for the fulfillment of the obligation. When the guarantees for an individual’s presence are examined from this point of view, they fall into four categories: 1) Texts that specify a date on which or by which the individual is to be presented;34 2) Texts that require the individual to be presented upon summons, but do not specify any particular date;35 3) Texts without any designation of when the individual is to be presented;36 and 4) Texts that create a period of obligation by requiring presentation upon summons and specifying a date until which the guarantor’s obligation applies.37 The implications of the first three possible time frames will be discussed first. The discussion of the fourth possibility will follow. The first three possibilities reflect the requirement that the individual be presented at a specific time (possibility 1), upon summons (possibility 2) or whenever possible (possibility 3). Those texts that specify a date for the presentation (possibility 1) may, at least in theory, be interpreted either along the lines suggested by Moore or those suggested by Augapfel. That is, they may be understood either as guarantees for the individual’s appearance for a hearing on the particular date or as guarantees for the payment of an obligation at that time. Among the YOS 6, 194; TCL 13, 157; YOS 7, 170. YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111. YOS 7, 170:11–14 requires the individuals to be presented when the administrator of the Eanna enters Uruk. Although the text does not specifically state that the administrator will summon them, it does specify a time of appearance in terms of the authorities and without specifying a date. 36 YOS 7, 115 and YOS 7, 137. 37 Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 213. 34 35


189

texts in the present discussion, texts that impose a deadline happen to also be those that impose a monetary penalty upon the guarantors. Thus, they are likely to be guarantees for the payment of obligations by the deadline. One might, however, still imagine a text without a monetary penalty but with a specific deadline. Such a text would only require the guarantor to present the individual for a hearing by the deadline, but would not require any payment. Texts that only specify that the individual is to be presented upon summons or that do not specify any date for appearance (possibilities 2 and 3 above) are less likely to be guarantees for a payment. The person or authorities to whom the payment is to be made would probably wish to specify a deadline for the payment. Thus, those texts that require the individual to appear only when summoned, or that do not impose a deadline at all, seem to require the individual to appear for a hearing, as Moore suggests for the abāku-summonses. However, YOS 6, 206 demonstrates that Augapfel’s interpretation of the abāku-summonses as guarantees for payment is not entirely irrelevant. This text requires the presentation of the individual when the authorities summon him, and also requires the guarantors to pay the individual’s debt to the Eanna if they fail to present him. In this text, the individual will be summoned not only for a hearing, but also for paying a debt. In all three of the possibilities discussed thus far, the role of the guarantor is similar to that of the summoned individual in the abākusummonses. The guarantor, like the summoned individual in the abākusummonses, must present an individual on a specified date or upon summons by the authorities. The reason for presentation might be either for a hearing or for paying a monetary obligation. The imposition of a penalty upon the guarantor implies that, like the summoned individual in the abāku-summonses, the guarantor is not randomly chosen to ensure another person’s presence. Instead, one might imagine that, like the summoned individual in the abāku-summonses, the guarantor bears some initial responsibility. For example, as Cocquerillat notes, the penalty that the guarantors in YOS 6, 194 face suggests that they are also implicated in this crime.38 If this is so, then the guarantees, like the abāku-summonses, are a means of allowing the guarantors to avoid payment of the penalty.

38

Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83.

190

chapter six

There are, however, texts that indicate that the guarantors are not involved in any wrongdoing. Instead, they are responsible for bringing the people because of their positions. In YOS 7, 137, the first sample text above, the guarantors are the two officials to whom the šatammu and the administrator place in charge of the five prisoners. Similarly, in YOS 6, 64 the šatammu himself assumes responsibility for bringing an individual to Babylon before the ša rēš šarri. In YOS 7, 111, one of the guarantors is the notorious official mGimillu. He and another person must present those involved in the killing of temple sheep to the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. The text, however, does not clarify whether mGimillu is the guarantor because he was himself accused in these crimes, or whether it is simply because mGimillu served as an official in the Eanna. The discussion can now return to the fourth possible time frame, the one which creates a period of obligation during which the authorities might summon the individual. The guarantors must ensure that the individual is available during this time. In terms of the discussion thus far, the purpose of these guarantees might be either to ensure payment of a debt upon summons or presence at a hearing. The creation of a period of obligation means that the summons to repay the debt will take place during this period or that the hearing will take place then. At the end of the period of obligation, the individual and the guarantors are free of any obligation. There are two texts that create a period of obligation: Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 and YOS 6, 213. The body of YOS 6, 213, written on 10 Abu, reads as follows: 1. pu-ut mkal-bi A-šu2 ša2 mZALAG2-e-a 2. mZALAG2-e-a A-šu2 ša2 ma- ulap-d15 AD-šu2 3. mba-la- u A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-GI A md 30-TI-ER2 4. a-di U4 10-kam2 ša2 ITI KIN i-na ŠU.2 5. mDINGIR.MEŠ-re-man-ni lu2 SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-ti 6. E2.AN.NA na-šu-u2 U4-mu

(1–6) mNūrea son of A ulapIštar, his father, and mBalā u son of mNabû-ušallim descendant of Sîn-lēqi-uninnī assume responsibility for mKalbi son of mNūrea to mIlī-rēmanni, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna until 10 Ulūlu.

7. ša2 re-e-su in-na-šu-u2 8. i-ba-kan-nim-ma i-nam-din-nu

(6–8) The day that he summons him they shall bring him and deliver him.

text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 9. ki-i la i-tab-kan-nim-ma 10. la id-dan-ni 11. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-du

191

(9–11) If they do not bring (him) and he is not delivered, they shall bear the punishment of the king.

In this text, mKalbi’s father and another man assume responsibility to the administrator of the Eanna for one month. Whenever the administrator summons mKalbi within the month, the two men must present him. If they do not, they shall incur “the punishment of the king.” The absence of a monetary penalty in this text indicates that the text is not a Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantee for a monetary debt that mKalbi owes to the Eanna. Instead, it seems that mKalbi must be presented for a hearing which will take place within the month. The body of Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155, before the names of the witnesses and the scribes, reads as follows: 1. mre- e-e-ti A-šu2 ša2 mra- a 2. A lu2ŠU. A u m¢BA-ša2Ü A-šu2 ša2 mki-na-a 3. lu2mu-ša2-ki-il GU4 ša2 LUGAL a-di TIL 4. ša2 ITI ZIZ2 pu-ut [GIR3] ša2 md UTU-NUMUN-DU3 5. A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-a-na-KUR-šu2 na-šu-u2 6. ki-i ul-tu U4 1–kam2 ša2 ITI AB 7. a-di TIL ša2 ITI ZIZ2 mdENGI 8. lu2qi2-i-pi ša2 E2.BABBAR.RA re-eš 9. mdUTU-NUMUN-DU3 it-tašu-ma 10. la qer-bu 15 MA.NA KU3. BABBAR 11. mre- e-e-ti u mBA-ša2 12. a-na NIG2.GA dUTU i-mannu-u2

(1–5) mRe ēti son of mRa a descendant of Bā iru and mIqīša son of mKīnaya, the royal cattle fattener, assume responsibility for m Šamaš-zēra-ibni son of mBēl-anamātišu until the end of Šabā u.

(6–12) If mBēl-ušallim, qīpuofficial of the Ebabbar, summons m Šamaš-zēra-ibni from 1 Tebē u until the end of Šabā u (and) he does not appear, mRe ētu and m Iqīša shall count 15 mina of silver to the property of Šamaš.

The two guarantors in this text must guarantee mŠamaš-zēra-ibni’s presence between 1 Tebē u and the end of Šabā u. If the qīpu-official of the Ebabbar summons mŠamaš-zēra-ibni on any date within this time, the two guarantors must ensure that he is available. If he is not, then the guarantors face a very severe penalty of fifteen mina (nine hundred šeqel) of silver.

192

chapter six

At first glance, the imposition of the monetary penalty suggests that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni owes a debt of fifteen mina of silver. The two guarantors must pay this penalty if he is not present to pay the debt himself. However, the rather severe penalty suggests that the fifteen mina are not just a debt that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni owes, but may be, instead, misappropriated funds. The requirement that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni be presented upon summons by the qīpu-official suggests that a hearing regarding the misdeed will take place during the two-month period between 1 Tebē u and the end of Šabā u. Alternatively, the hearing might not pertain to the fifteen mina of silver at all. Instead, the silver might be, as Dougherty suggests,39 simply a fine upon the two guarantors for not presenting mŠamaš-zēra-ibni for a hearing pertaining to an unmentioned subject. Although both YOS 6, 213 and Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 create a period of obligation during which the guarantor must present the individual, the two texts differ from each other with regard to when this period of obligation begins. In YOS 6, 213, this period begins immediately with the composition of the text and ends one month later. Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155, on the other hand, does not take effect immediately. The text itself was composed on 21 Kislīmu, year 4 of Nebuchadnezzar. The guarantors’ obligations do not begin until 1 Tebē u, nine days later,40 and end at the end of Šabā u, the following month. The delayed onset of the period of obligation in Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 and the requirement that the individual be presented upon summons during a particular period of time raise certain difficulties with both interpretations of the texts that have been considered thus far. The creation of a period of obligation indicates that both YOS 6, 213 and Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 are written for the benefit of the guarantors, rather than for the benefit of the summoning authority. From the point-of-view of an issuing court, if all that is required is presence upon summons, then there is no reason to delay the onset of the guarantors’ obligation. Similarly, whether the purpose of the official summons is for payment of a debt or for a hearing, there is no

39 Dougherty, AJSL 46 (1929–1930), pp. 90–91 n. 1 notes that the text imposes a “heavy fine.” 40 See Parker and Dubberstein, Chronology, p. 27.


193

need to limit the power of the summoning authorities by specifying a period of obligation. If this understanding is correct, then the guarantors are actually not free of their obligation once the time set in the texts passes. Instead, the guarantors in both texts are actually obtaining a temporary release of the individuals. During this time, the guarantors must be able to account for the individuals upon the officials’ demand. If the guarantors cannot account for the individuals, then the guarantors face the penalty of fifteen mina of silver or the “punishment of the king.” After the time passes, the guarantors must still return the individuals to their original places, which is with the temple authorities. Accordingly, it might be that neither Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 nor YOS 6, 213 is a prelude to a hearing. Instead, both texts might be the written means of obtaining a temporary release. The individuals who are to be “presented” might actually be prisoners who are released temporarily and are to be returned at the end of the guarantors’ terms of obligation. In sum, there are two means of determining the legal function of any particular guarantee for an individual’s presence: the penalty that a particular text imposes and the time frame it sets for the guarantors’ obligation. In most texts, the guarantors’ obligation to present the individual ends when they present the individual, on a specific date or in response to an official summons. This indicates that the goal of these guarantees is the presentation of the individual. To determine why the individual must be presented, one must examine the penalty on the guarantors. A non-monetary penalty implies a hearing of some kind, while a monetary penalty raises the possibility that the individual is to be presented to repay a debt. There are, however, texts in which the guarantors’ obligation extends beyond the presentation upon summons. These texts may also be means of guaranteeing the individual’s presence at a hearing, with the only difference being that the texts indicate that the hearing will take place before a certain date. However, these texts may actually not envision any hearing at all, and are simply means of ensuring that the individual will be returned to the authorities at the end of a term of release.

?

failure to pay estimated yield

? (debt to the Eanna)

?

theft and killing presenting 4 of branded individuals upon sheep summons

YOS 6, 64

YOS 6, 194

YOS 6, 206

YOS 6, 213

YOS 7, 111

presenting individual upon summons

presenting individual upon summons

presenting individual by Tašrītu

presenting individual in Babylon upon summons

presence of individual upon summons

?

Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155

Guarantor’s Obligation

Wrongdoing

Text

—

i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-du

payment of debt

payment of individual’s debt

m Nabû-mušētiquddê/ mBalāssu

[Uruk]



Uruk

Uruk

m Gimillu /mInninzēra-iddin

m Gimillu /mInninzēra-iddin

13.V.1 Camb

10.V.14 Nbn

15.XIIb.12 Nbn

30.V.10 Nbn

10.XII.4 Nbn

Nādinu/ mBēlUruk a ē-iqīša// Egibi m

21.IX.4 Nbk


m ŠamašSippar munammir/ m Šamaš-mukīn-apli // Šangû-Sippar

Scribe

šatammu, scribes mMūrānu / mNabû- Uruk of Eanna; ša rēš bāni-a i // Ekurzākir šarri in charge of king’s chest

[officials of Eanna]

šatammu (guarantor) + administrator of Eanna (summoner)

qīpu-official of Ebabbar

15 mina of silver

—

Authority

Guarantees for Individuals’ Presence

Penalty

Summary Table 6.2

194 chapter six

failure to deliver presenting two dates individuals on 7 Du ūzu

treason

theft of silver cultic object

?

TCL 13, 157

YOS 7, 137

YOS 7, 170

YOS 7, 177



Authority

1 mina of silver for missing cultic object

ša rēš šarri

[ i- u] ša2 LUGAL šatammu + i-šad-da-du administrator of Eanna (+Nabugu)

payment of debt of dates

30-fold payment (by summoned individual)

Penalty

individual (and i- u ša2 mgu-bar-ru šatammu of i-šad-da-du Eanna guarantor) going (+Nabugu) to Babylon before Nabugu within the month

presenting two individuals to administrator

presenting five prisoners in Babylon before Nabugu

individual going to Babylon

misappropriation of temple produce

YOS 7, 115


Wrongdoing

Text


m Nabû-mušētiquddê/ mNūrea// Iddin-Papsukkal

Uruk

8.IV.5 Camb

21.IX.4 Camb

Šamaš-zēra-iddin/ Uruk A ulap-Ištar // Ekur-zākir m

m

m

30.XII.3 Camb

3.IV.3 Camb

Uruk

Arad-Marduk/ Marduk-šumaiddin // Bēl-aplau ur m

m Šamaš-mukīn-apli Uruk / mNādin// Egibi

27.XII.1 Camb

Uruk

Marduk-nā ir / Madānu-a ēiddin // Šigûa m

m


Scribe

text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 195

CHAPTER SEVEN

OTHER TEXT-TYPES 7.A

Other Summonses

The summonses presented until this point have been divided into four major types, based on the different obligations they place upon the summoned individual. These four obligations—“arguing a case” (dabābu), “ending a case” (quttû), “establishing a case” (kunnu) or “presenting” (abāku) another individual—are not the only actions that a summons may require. In addition to these four major groups of summonses, there are other summonses that stipulate requirements using different terms. These texts are described briefly in the present section. The other summonses may be broadly divided between those that impose a penalty on the summoned individual for failure to comply and those that do not impose a penalty for failure to comply. As with the four major types of summonses, the imposition of the penalty on the summoned individuals indicates that they are initially responsible for the penalty, but may avoid it by complying with the summons. In VAS 6, 97, for example, the two summoned individuals have guaranteed clear title to a sold slave. In the wake of a claim against the sale, these two guarantors must present the claimant and have him renounce his claim by a certain date or face a penalty. Similarly, in TCL 13, 161, the summoned individual is in possession of an escaped oblate which he must hand over by a certain time or face a penalty.1 The role of the summoned individuals as the first responsible party may also be seen in summonses that require the presentation of exculpatory evidence. Unlike kunnu-summonses, which, at most, require the presentation of witnesses to “establish the case,” these summonses specify that another kind of evidence is to be brought. For example, YOS 7, 113 requires mKiribtu, who owes 160 kur of dates to Ištar of Uruk, to present proper documentation about the disposal of these 1 YOS 7, 44 is a similar text, in which a third party must remove an escaped oblate from another person’s possession and bring him to the Eanna. See San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, p. 27 n. 3.

198

chapter seven

dates. If he does not, he must repay the 160 kur of dates to the Ladyof-Uruk.2 mKiribtu is summoned to bring the evidence because he is the party responsible for the dates. Other summonses require that a person appear before an authority or face a penalty. In AnOr 8, 45 and AnOr 8, 46, the summoned individual must appear before Gobryas the satrap. Although no reason for this appearance is mentioned, the use of the prepositional phrase ana pāni (“before”) in both texts suggests that the satrap is to play an adjudicatory role.3 The wording of TCL 13, 222 makes the adjudicatory context explicit by requiring the summoned individual to come to a royal court to “establish a decision” ( purussâ šakānu) with the qīpu-officials. These summonses raise the same questions of setting as the four main types of summonses. As can be seen from summary table 7.1 below, many of the texts were written with the involvement of authorities, probably during a formal hearing of some kind. Because the required actions differ from text to text, the setting in which the action is to be performed must be considered separately for each text. Some texts, such as those which require an appearance before the satrap, indicate that there is to be some degree of formal proceedings. In other texts, the absence of authorities can be interpreted to imply that the required action might take place outside of a court. Finally, there are three texts which, because they require an action to be performed, resemble the summonses, but do not impose any penalty for failure to comply: Evetts, Ner. 55; YOS 6, 144; and Dar 299. All of them require an individual to present another individual. In YOS 6, 144 and Dar 299, the summoned individual must present another individual to authorities for questioning. In Evetts, Ner. 55, the people are to be brought “t[o] the gate of the crown prince’s house” (a-[na] KA2 E2 DUMU.LUGAL) for the ša rēš šarri to settle accounts with them. As can be seen from these requirements, these three texts

2 Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 1:1–7 also requires the presentation of a tablet as evidence. Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; YOS 6, 202 and Dar 358 require an oath. VAS 6, 120 requires giving a tablet and imposes an oath as a penalty for failing to do so. 3 For the use of a similar phrase (ina pāni ) with a similar function see Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:6’.

other text-types

199

are preludes to formal procedures,4 and all are probably the result of formal proceedings, as well. YOS 6, 144 specifically describes how a thief was caught and turned over to the Eanna authorities, who turn him over to one mNabû-mukīn-apli, who bears the title lu2GAL SI.MEŠ.5 The text ends with the following summons (lines 12–15): 12. . . . mdNA3-DU-A mdUTU-ki-ini lu2sa-ar2-ru 13. u lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 ibba-kam2-ma 14. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2 SAG.LUGAL u lu2EN.MEŠ pi-qit-tan-ne-e-tu4 15. ša2 E2.AN.NA ib-ba-kam2-ma ma-ša2-al-ta-šu2-nu 16. i-šak-kan

(12–15) mNabû-mukīn-apli shall bring mŠamaš-kīni, the thief, and the thieves who were with him to m Nabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš šarri and the administrators of the Eanna. (15–16) He will carry out their interrogation.

Based on these lines, there are two possibilities to understand this text, as well as Dar 299 and Evetts, Ner. 55. The absence of a penalty may support interpreting them as agreements. On the other hand, these texts might be an order by the court requiring the summoned individual to present the person or they might be a contract stating that the summoned individual agrees to present the person. The possibility that these texts are court orders is supported by the involvement of officials. 7.B

Promissory Oaths

Overall, the different types of summonses and guarantees and the penalties pending evidence pertain to one of three goals: bringing a case to trial, presenting evidence, or presenting a party to a case. The discussion now turns to one additional text-type, the promissory oaths, in which an individual assumes an obligation by swearing an oath. In many respects, the four texts of this text-type achieve the same ends as

4 The specification of a date for appearance in Evetts, Ner. 55 and Dar 299 further supports this understanding. Note that YOS 6, 144 does not include a date of appearance, although it clearly states that there is to be a formal interrogation. 5 San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 288 n. 3 is uncertain about the reading of this title. Based on the reading of /SI/ as ešēru (Borger, Zeichenliste, p. 89), one might propose the reading rāb ešerti. Note that this reading is not listed by Labat, Manuel, p. 91. For the position of this official in the cattle culture of Uruk, see Kümmel, Familie, pp. 52–53.

oath

bringing people ša rēš šarri to settle accounts

Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268

Evetts, Ner. 55

—

Presenting claimant

presenting tablet

VAS 6, 97

Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 1

AnOr 8, 45 appearance before satrap

—

YOS 6, 202 oath

satrap; šatammu + administrator of Eanna

šatammu + administrator + scribes of Eanna

—

oath

Nbn 954

I (4/8–5/6)

m

i- i ša2 9.XII.4 Cyr gu-bar-ra (3/17)

adi VI.2 Cyr (10/5) adi 10.VIII (11/12)

28.IV.2 Cyr (7/6)

10.VIII.16 16.VIII Nbn (11/16) (11/22)

20.I (5/3)

transfer of 24.VI.2 Cyr property (8/30)

payment

payment

—

“the magic circle”

(Uruk)

gate of crown prince’s house

—

(Uruk)

—

22–50 Babylon days

< 73 days

< 90 days

Uruk

Uruk

Babylon

Uruk

Babylon

Uruk

Babylon

Borsippa

m

m

Pir u/ Eanna-šumaibni

m

m


m

m

Liburu/ Nabû-zēru-līšir // Nabûnaya

m

Nādin/ mBēla ē-iqīša // Egibi

m

m

Silim-Bēl/ Balāssu // Dannêa

m

m

Bazūzu/ Nādin

m Nabû-a ēiddin/ mŠulaya // Egibi

m

Nabû-šumaibni / mNabû[šu]mu-līšir // Iliya


6 days —

1 day

—

10.IV (6/29) 1 day

12.IV.9 Nbn — (7/10)

9.IV.3 Ngl (6/28)

15.X.30 Nbk — (1/16)

Time Span

Other Summonses

Date Written Appearance Date

dropping 19.I.16 Nbn claim (5/2)

administrators — of Eanna; qīpu officials

—

payment

Penalty

YOS 6, 144 bringing individual for questioning

—

Action required Authority

Text

Summary Table 7.1

200 chapter seven


handing over escaped slave

EŠ.BAR it-ti lu2 TIL.LA.GID2. DA.ME ša2 E2.AN.NA i-šakkan

presenting documentation

handing over escaped slave

YOS 7, 44

TCL 13, 222

YOS 7, 113

TCL 13, 161

scribes of Ešitlam

Bringing individual for questioning

oath

Dar 299

Dar 358

payment

—

oath

payment

payment

adi 20.?.2 Camb

22.X.13 Dar (1/13)

16.IV.11 Dar (7/7)

29.V.2 Dar (8/28)

28.X (1/19)

adi 21.IV (7/12)

adi 10.VI.2 Dar (10/6)

21.X.3 adi 11.XII Camb (1/31) (3/21)

?.?. 2 Camb

—

(Uruk)

(Uruk)

6 days —

< 5 days—

< 34 days

< 50 days

?

Uruk

Uruk

Babylon

Babylon

Babylon

Uruk

Uruk

royal — courthouse?

10 days (Uruk)

—(when — authorities enter Babylon)

15.VII.5 Cyr [2]5.VII (10/16) (10/26)

21–49 Babylon days

10.XII.4 Cyr I.5 Cyr (3/18) (4/8–5/6)

m Arad-Ba u //Ašlāku

?

m Iddinna-Bēl/ Aqar// Šippe

m Nabûmukīn-apli / m Marduk-šumaiddin // Balā u

m

m


—

m

m


m AradMarduk/ m Mardukšuma-iddin// Bēl-apla-u ur


Time Span

Date Written Appearance Date

surrender (Camb or of Dar) property

payment

i- u ša2 gu-ba-ru

m

Penalty


—

—

VAS 6, 120 handing over tablet


rāb limiti

qīpu-officials of Eanna; šatammu of Eanna

satrap; šatammu + administrator of Eanna

Action required Authority

AnOr 8, 46 appearance before satrap

Text


other text-types 201

202

chapter seven

the summonses and guarantees. As will be seen below, in all four texts the swearers obligate themselves to perform some of the same actions as those required of the summoned individual or the guarantor. The difference between the promissory oaths and summonses or guarantees lies in the means by which the obligation is assumed. In these texts, the obligation is assumed by means of an oath. The four texts included in the present discussion are those that can be shown to have emerged from an adjudicatory context. The evidence for this comes from the self-imposed obligations expressed in the oath. The four texts are: YOS 7, 50; VAS 6, 154; Dar 229 and YOS 7, 194, each of which will be considered separately. YOS 7, 50 reads as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

a-nu-um-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 NUMUN-tu2 A mkur-i ina dEN dPA u a-da-e LUGAL a-na mni-din-ti-dEN lu2ŠA3. TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DU-NUMUN A mda-bi-bi u mdEN-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit md m

(1–6) mAnum-a a-iddin son of m Zērūtu descendant of Kurî swore by Bēl, Nabû and the oaths of the king to mNidinti-Bēl šatammu of the Eanna son of m Bēl-mukīn-zēri descendant of Dābibī and mBēl-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna:

6. E2.AN.NA it-te-me ki-i a-di 7. U4 5-kam2 ša2 ITI APIN m ki-ne-na-a-a 8. lu2RIG7 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 9. ab-ba-kam2-ma a-nam-dak-kašu2-nu-tu

(6–9) “By 5 Ara šamna I shall bring mKīnenaya, an oblate of the Lady-of-Uruk, and give (him) to you.”

10. ki-i la i-ta-bak i- u 11. ša2 ¢LUGALÜ i-ša-ad-[da-ad ]

(10–11) If he does not bring (him) he shall be[ar] the punishment of the king.

12.

lu2 mu-kin-nu mIR3-dAMAR. UTU A-šu2 ša2 13. mNUMUN-ia A me-gi-bi m IR3-dEN 14. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUNGIŠ A mMU-dPAP.SUKKAL

(12–13) mArad-Marduk son of m Zēriya descendant of Egibi; (13–14) mArad-Bēl son of mNabûšumu-līšir descendant of IddinPapsukkal;

15. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 mGAR-MU A mŠU-dna-na-a

(15) mArdiya son of mŠākin-šumi descendant of Gimil-Nanaya;

other text-types 16.

UMBISAG mdEN-na-din-A A-šu2 ša2 mdŠU2-MU-MU 17. A mdEN-A-URI3 UNUGki ITI ZIZ2 18. U4 30-kam2 MU 5-kam2 m ku-ra-aš2 19. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL KUR.KUR.MEŠ lu2

203

(16–17) Scribe: mBēl-nādin-apli son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur. (17–19) 30 Šabā u, year 5 of Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

In this text, mAnum-a a-iddin swears that he will present an oblate of the Lady-of-Uruk to the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. If he fails to present the oblate, he will “bear the punishment of the king.” The obligation which mAnum-a a-iddin swears to fulfill closely resembles the obligation imposed by the abāku-summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence.6 The absence of a monetary penalty indicates that the oblate is not required to be presented to pay a debt.7 The fact that the oblate is to be presented to the Eanna authorities raises the possibility that these authorities will conduct a hearing of some sort. However, if such a hearing were intended, one would expect a certain degree of urgency to be reflected in a short gap between the date of the oath and the date by which the oblate is to be presented. The text allows for the rather lengthy span of up to 239 days, which does not seem to imply that a trial is to take place. It may be that mAnum-a a-iddin swears an oath in order to obtain a temporary release of the oblate. After 5 Ara šamna, he must return the oblate to the Eanna. Thus, this text most closely resembles the guarantees for an individual’s presence that create a period of obligation. Alternatively, one may imagine that mAnum-a a-iddin is obtaining rights to use the services of the oblate until 5 Ara šamna. After this date, he must return the oblate to the Eanna authorities. If this latter interpretation is correct, then the text bears only a surface resemblance to the abāku-summonses or guarantees for the presence of an individual. It is actually a contract that does not come from an adjudicatory context.

A similar oath is recorded in AnOr 8, 79:1–8. The text records the fact that the swearer did not meet his obligation and imposes a 1 mina penalty. See San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, pp. 45–47. 7 See also San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, p. 45. 6

204

chapter seven

The next text to be discussed, VAS 6, 154, pertains to the presentation of evidence. It reads:8 1. mMU-dNA3 DUMU ša2 mdzab[a4-ba4-mu (A mIR3-GIR4KU3)] 2. ina dEN dNA3 u mda-ri-ia-[muš LUGAL] 3. a-na mše-el-le- DUMU ša2 m MU-dNA3 4. A lu2SIMUG it-te-me ki-i a-di-i 5. U4 2-kam2 ša2 ITI DU6 al-laak-am-ma 6. gi-i - a-nu a-na-aš2-šam-ma 7. a-na mše-el-le-bi 8. u2-kal-la-mu ki-i

(4–8) “By 2 Tašrītu I shall come and bring the receipt-documents and show them to mŠellebi.”

9. la ¢ukÜ-te-¢li-muÜ > 10. a-ki-¢iÜ u2-il3-¢ti-šu2Ü KU3.¢BABBARÜ 11. ¢ša2Ü mše-el-le-bi id-¢dan-nuÜ

(8–11) If he does not show (the documents) he shall pay mŠellebi’s silver according to his promissory note.

12.

lu2

MU.DU mdAMAR.UTU¢NU?.ME? DUMU ša2Ü 13. mdNA3-ŠEŠ.¢MEŠ-MUÜ A mlu2 MU-¢lib2-ši Ü

(12–13) Witnesses: mMardukNU-ME? son of mNabû-a ēiddin descendant of Šumu-libši;

14.

NA3-GI DUMU ša2 AMAR.UTU-NUMUNDU3

(14) mNabû-ušallim son of m Marduk-zēra-ibni;

15.

¢šiš Ü-ki DUMU ša2 SUR

(15) mŠirku son of mBēl-ē ir;

16.

md

md md

m

EN-

md

EN-bul-li -su lu2UMBISAG A mlu2GAL-DU3

17. ¢TIN.TIRÜki ITI KIN U4 ¢28-kam2Ü 18. ¢MUÜ 28-kam2 ¢mda-ri-iaÜ[muš ] 19. LUGAL Eki u KUR.KUR

8

(1–4) mIddin-Nabû son of Z[ababa-iddin (descendant of Arad-Nergal)] swore by Bēl, Nabû and Dari[us the king] to mŠellebi son of mIddin-Nabû descendant of Nappā u: m

(16) mBēl-bullissu, the scribe, descendant of Rāb-banê. (17–19) Babylon. 28 Ulūlu, year 28 of Dari[us] king of Babylon and the lands.

Readings and translation follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30, No. 227.

other text-types

205

This text apparently emerges from a dispute over the repayment of a debt. mIddin-Nabû, the swearer in this text, has borrowed silver from m Šellebi. mŠellebi claims that he has not been repaid, while mIddin-Nabû claims that he has repaid the debt. To support his claim, mIddin-Nabû swears that he will bring the receipt-documents ( gi ānu) within four days. If he does not bring the documents, mIddin-Nabû must repay the debt. The obligation to present evidence of having repaid the debt is similar to the obligations imposed by the exculpatory kunnu-summonses (see section 5.A above). Like mIddin-Nabû in VAS 6, 154, the summoned individual in the exculpatory kunnu-summonses must also present exculpatory evidence to prove his claim. The main difference between the exculpatory kunnu-summonses and VAS 6, 154 lies in the way in which this obligation is assumed. The discussion of the kunnu-summonses demonstrated that this text-type is composed as a court order to present evidence. In VAS 6, 154, no authorities are named and mIddin-Nabû assumes the obligation himself. This difference between VAS 6, 154 and the kunnu-summonses may point to a difference between the settings in which they were composed. It is possible that, unlike the kunnu-summonses, VAS 6, 154 is not the result of a court order issued during the formal adjudication of a dispute. Instead, it may reflect an oath sworn in an informal adjudicatory context. On the other hand, the fact that no authorities are named does not necessarily mean that no authorities are present. Therefore, one cannot ignore the possibility that the oath is actually imposed in court by an unnamed authority. The discussion of the kunnu-summonses addressed not only the question of where they were written, but also the question of where the evidence is ultimately to be presented. It demonstrated that the kunnusummonses might result in either a formal or an informal determination of whether or not the case had been “established.” This question is relevant to VAS 6, 154, as well. mIddin-Nabû swears that he will “bring the receipt documents and show them to mŠellebi.” The fact that mIddin-Nabû must show the documents directly to mŠellebi seems to suggest that no other authorities will be involved in rendering a final evaluation. On the other hand, one might imagine that the “bringing” refers to a separate, formal procedure in court, and that the documents will be “shown” to mŠellebi there.

206

chapter seven

The third text to be considered is Dar 229, which reads as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

lu2 DUMU DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu m i-qu-bu lu2nu-gišKIRI6 a-na mdAMAR.UTU-PAP-A A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTUTIN A me-gi-bi ina dEN dNA3 u m da-ri-ia-a-muš LUGAL Eki it-te-me ki-i a-di-i U4 8-kam2

(1–6) (These are) the mār banî before whom mIqubu, the gardener, swore by Bēl, Nabû and Darius king of Babylon to m Marduk-nā ir-apli son of m Itti-Marduk-balā u:

7. ša2 ITI ZIZ2 al-kam-ma dib¢biÜ . . . 8. u2-qa-tu-u2 mdNA3-na-¢ irÜ

(6–8) “By 8 Šabā u I shall come and settle the case . . .”

9. A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-ia A lu2SU. A

(8–9) mNabû-nā ir son of mBāniya descendant of Bā iru;

10.

AMAR.UTU-MU-MU Ašu2 ša2 mgu-za-nu 11. A mDU3-eš-DINGIR mdENMU A-šu2 ša2 12. mdNA3-KAR-ZI.MEŠ A m dam-qa

(10–11) mMarduk-šuma-iddin son of mGūzānu descendant of Eppeš-ilī; (11–12) mBēl-iddin son of m Nabû-ē ir-napšāti descendant of Damqa;

13. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 mda-di-di-ia A 14. mna-ba-a-a mdEN-KAM A-šu2 ša2 15. mgi-in-na-a

(13–14) mArdiya son of mDadidiya descendant of Nabaya; (14–15) mBēl-ēreš son of mGinnaya;

16. mri-mut-dEN DUB.SAR A-šu2 ša2

(16–17) Rīmūt, the scribe, son of mArdiya.

17. mIR3-ia Eki ITI ZIZ2 U4 6-kam2 18. MU 7-kam2 mda-ri- -muš 19. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR. KUR

(17–19) 6 Šabā u, year 7 of Darius, king of Babylon, king of the lands.

md

Although the wording of mIqubu’s oath is not entirely preserved, the part that can be read indicates that mIqubu swears that he will “settle a case” (dibba quttû) by (adi ) 8 Šabā u. The formulation of this oath seems to recall the formulation of the quttû-type summonses (section 4.B above). This latter text-type imposes a penalty which is always an obligation of the summoned individual to an opposing party if the summoned individual fails to “settle” (quttû) his case. It was suggested that the quttû-summonses, like the dabābu-summonses, are composed in response to the opposing party’s claim against the summoned individual.

other text-types

207

The quttû-summonses call for an informal settlement of a case, rather than a resolution in court. This suggestion was based on four features of the quttû-summonses: the use of the verb quttû rather than dabābu, the absence of an official adjudicating authority, the requirement to appear “by” (adi) but not “on” a specific date, and the relatively short time span allowed for appearance. Dar 229, the promissory oath, exhibits all four of these features as well but, unlike the summonses, does not impose a penalty for failure to settle the case by the stipulated date. Nevertheless, the use of the term dibbu (“case”) suggests that a legal claim has in fact been made. mIqubu swears the oath “to” (ana) mMarduk-nā ir-apli, who is probably his opponent in the case. One might imagine that mMarduk-nā ir-apli has actually stated a claim and, as a result, mIqubu has had to swear the oath to ensure that the case will be settled in a timely manner.9 The discussion of the promissory oaths will conclude by analyzing one text, YOS 7, 194, in which the formulation of the oath includes the verb dabābu, which suggests that it should be compared with the dabābu-summonses (section 4.A above). However, as will be seen, the text seems to have an entirely different purpose. The text reads as follows: 1. mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mdan-nud U.GUR 2. ina dEN dNA3 u mka-am-bu-zi-ia 3. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR. KUR it-te-me ki-i 4. a-di-i U4 2-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN al-la-kam2-ma 5. it-ti mIR3-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.UTU MU-MU A mdEN-IBILA-URI3 6. u mdKUR.GAL-LUGALURI3 A-šu2 ša2 mta-li-mu 7. a-dib-bu-ub u3 ZU2.LUM. MA-a 8. 36 GUR re- i-it ZU2.LUM. MA i-mit-tu4 A.ŠA3.MEŠ 9. NIG2.GA dGAŠAN UNUGki ša2 DU6 a-gur-ru-tu4 10. ša2 MU 7-kam2 ša2 ina mu i-ia2 a-na 11. NIG2.GA E2.AN.NA e-et-ti-ru

(1–3) mKārēa son of mDannuNergal swore by Bēl, Nabû and Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the lands: (4–11) “By 2 Kislimu I shall come and speak to mArad-Marduk son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin descendant of mBēl-apla-u ur and mAmurru-šarra-u ur son of m Talīmu and repay those dates, 36 kur, the remainder of the dates of the imittu-yield of the field-ofcut-brick belonging to the Ladyof-Uruk.”

The purpose of the oath may be compared, therefore, with the different functions proposed for the quttû-summons discussed in section 4.B above. 9

208

chapter seven 12.

lu2

mu-kin-nu m¢XÜ-[X A-šu2 ša2 PN2] 13. A mba-si-ia2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ[MU10 A]-šu2 14. ša2 mdEN-u2-sat A mdEN-u2-sat

(12–13) Witnesses: mPN1 [son of m PN2] descendant of Basiya; (13–14) mNabû-a ē-[iddin son] of mBēl-ūsāt descendant of Bēlūsāt;

15.

md

(15) mŠamaš-a a-iddin son of m Kīnaya descendant of Mandidi;

m

UTU-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 ki-na-a A lu2man-di-di

m

16. mkal-ba-a A-šu2 ša2 man-ni 17.

18.

NA3-re-

md

UMBISAG mda-nuNUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 m la-ba-aš lu2

uru E2 U.WUK.MEŠ ITI APIN U4 25-kam2 19. MU 8-kam2 mka-am-bu-zi-ia 20. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR. KUR 10

(16) mKalbaya son of mNabûrēmanni; (17) Scribe: mAnu-zēra-šubši son of mLâbāš. (18–21) Bīt-Uwuk. 25 Ara šamna, year 8 of Cambyses, king of Babylon.

As Cocquerillat has noted, this is one of several “documents occasionnels relatifs aux perturbations survenant dans l’acheminement des récoltes vers l’Eanna” (“occasional documents relating to disruptions that arise in the delivery of the harvests to the Eanna”).11 mKārēa has apparently failed to deliver a quantity of dates, and, as a result, must swear that he will deliver them by a certain time. In addition, mKārēa swears that he will “speak” (dabābu) to two men, mArad-Marduk and mAmurru-šarra-u ur, who are known to have been officials of the Eanna.12 Because the verb dabābu is used, one might interpret the oath in this text as one which accomplishes the same purpose as the issuance of a dabābu-summons. Like the dabābu-summonses, the oath in this text might be a means of getting mKārēa to “argue his case” against the claim of the Eanna officials. However, the text itself does not indicate that there is any dispute about the missed delivery. mKārēa swears that he will, without any contest, deliver the dates. Furthermore, the text does not impose a penalty for failure to appear before the officials, which, in line with the dabābu-summonses, might have been understood as the disputed

Restoration follows Kümmel, Familie, p. 26 n. 30. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 79. 12 For this suggestion, see Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 81. For other references to these two men, see the index entries in Kümmel, Familie, pp. 170–171. 10 11

other text-types

209

obligation.13 Thus, it would be incorrect to translate the verb dabābu in this text as “to argue a case,” and to interpret the oath as a preliminary stage of the case. Instead, it seems that the oath comes from the end of an investigation of some kind, which has concluded that mKārēa has not met all his obligations. mKārēa must deliver the dates, and he swears that he will do so, apparently without any further claims. He will “speak” with the officials, perhaps to apprise them that he has met the obligation.14 7.C

Injunctions

This text-type imposes a penalty upon an individual if that individual performs a particular action. They are formulated according to the following basic outline: I. Hypothetical Violation kî/ina ūmu15 . . . “On the day that” + action performed by PN II. Penalty against PN III. Witnesses IV. Date The legal function of the injunctions, then, is to impose a penalty of some kind in order to prevent the performance of a particular action. Most of the texts impose a non-monetary penalty. 16 The discussion will begin with these texts, and then turn to those injunctions 13 See the discussion in section 4.A above. Note that in YOS 7, 194, the word dīnu is absent from the oath, as well. As has already been noted in the discussion of Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45, the absence of this noun does not preclude the possibility that “arguing a case” is intended. Unlike YOS 7, 194, however, Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45 do impose a penalty for failure to appear. It is this penalty, rather than the verb dabābu itself, that indicates that a disputed obligation is in question and which distinguishes Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45 from YOS 7, 194. 14 For the understanding of the idiom itti PN dabābu as “to speak with,” rather than “to argue against,” see CAD dabābu 3a2’ and 3b2’ (D, p. 8). 15 UCP 9/1, 53:1 does not include the preposition ina before the word ūmu. YOS 19, 110:6 and BIN 1, 169:21 use kî (“if ”) instead of the prepositional phrase. 16 See summary table 7.3 at the end of this section for the various penalties imposed.

come (alāku) and state (dabābu) claim

come (alāku) and settle (quttû) case

come (alāku) and show receipts

YOS 7, 194

Dar 229

VAS 6, 154

Date Written

—

Officials of Eanna

adi 5.VIII (10/24)

adi 2.VII (10/11)

adi 8.XI (2/5) ≤ 4 days

≤ 2 days

—

—

(Uruk)

(Uruk)

Place of Obligation

Babylon

—

Bīt Uwuk

Uruk



28.VI.28 Dar (10/7)

6.XI.7 Dar (2/3)

≤ 6 days

≤ 239 days

Date of Time Obligation Span

Promissory Oaths

25.VIII.8 adi 2.IX Camb (11/13) (11/19)

šatammu + 30.XI.5 Cyr administrator (2/26) of Eanna

Authority

repayment — of debts

—

—

i- u ša2 Bringing oblate to ¢LUGALÜ šatammu and i-ša-adadministrator [da-ad ] of Eanna

YOS 7, 50

Penalty


Text

Summary Table 7.2

Bēl-nādin-apli / Marduk-šumaiddin // Bēl-aplau ur

m Bēl-bulli su/ Rāb-banê

Rīmūt/ mArdiya m

m Anu-zēra-šubši/ Lâbāši

m

m

Scribe

210 chapter seven

other text-types

211

which impose a monetary penalty. YOS 19, 110 will serve as a first example:1718 1. mkur-ban-ni-dAMAR.UTU lu2 ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA 2. A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-ia A md 30-da-ma-qu 3. a-na mdEN-KAD3 A-šu2 ša2 m il-la-a 4. A mdEN-e- e-ru iq-bi um-ma

(1–4) mKurbanni-Marduk, šatammu of the Eanna, son of m Zēriya descendant of Sîndamāqu said thus to mBēl-kā ir son of m illaya descendant of Bēl-e ēru:

5. li-gi-in-ni a-na lu2RIG7.MEŠ 6. ul tu-ša-aq-bi ki-i lu2RIG7

(5–6) “You shall not cause someone to recite the excerpt tablet to the oblates!”18

7. a-na UGU dak-kan-ni-šu2 ittal-ku 8. u3 li-gi-in-ni ul-ta-qab-bu-u2 9. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-ad

(6–9) If an oblate goes to his bedroom and he has the excerpt tablets recited, he shall bear the punishment of the king.

10.

mu-kin-nu mIR3-dAMAR. UTU A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-ia2 A me-gi-[bi]

lu2

(10) Witnesses: mArad-Marduk son of mZēriya descendant of Egibi;

11. mla-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU-A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN A me-gi-bi

(11) mLâbāši-Marduk son of m Arad-Bēl descendant of Egibi;

12. mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3DU3-ŠEŠ A mE2-kur-za-kir

(12) mMūrānu son of mNabû-bānia i descendant of Ekur-zākir.

13.

(13) Scribe: mBalā u son of mSînibni descendant of Rē i-alpi.

lu2 UMBISAG mba-la- u A-šu2 ša2 md30-DU3 A lu2SIPA GU4

14. UNUGki ITI SIG4 U4 4-kam2 MU 15-kam2 15. dNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN. TIRki

(14–15) Uruk. 4 Simānu, year 15 of Nabonidus king of Babylon.

This text begins with the šatammu’s warning to mBēl-kā ir against having someone recite excerpt tablets to the oblates. The injunction itself occurs in lines 6–9 and consists of two parts: the hypothetical violation (“If an oblate goes to his bedroom and he has [him] recite the excerpt tablets”) and the penalty (“he shall bear the punishment of the king”). The legal function of this text is rather apparent. The injunction is issued in order to prevent mBēl-kā ir from having the excerpt tablets recited.

17 Readings follow Paul-Alain Beaulieu, “New Light on Secret Knowledge in Late Babylonian Culture,” ZA 82 (1992), pp. 99–101. 18 This prohibition apparently pertains to the dissemination of forbidden knowldge. See Beaulieu, ZA 82 (1992), pp. 106–107.

212

chapter seven

In YOS 19, 110, there are two factors that indicate that the action is prohibited: the formulation of the penalty (item II in the scheme above) and the quotation of the šatammu’s warning. The penalty is a non-monetary negative consequence (“the punishment of the king”) for committing the action. The non-monetary formulation distinguishes this injunction, and others with similarly-worded penalties, from those in which committing the hypothetical action results in a monetary payment. The non-monetary formulation indicates that the consequences are to be construed as a penalty rather than as a simple payment.19 From comparison with other injunctions, it is clear that the šatammu’s warning in YOS 19, 110 may be considered as background, rather than as an integral part of the formulation of the injunction itself. It does, however, provide additional internal evidence of the wrongful nature of the prohibited action. In other injunctions, the formulation of the hypothetical violation (item I in the outline above) may provide similar evidence. For example, TCL 13, 142:12 uses the phrase qāt sa-bit-ti to denote stolen items which may be found. Similarly, Cyr 307:4 prohibits the action performed ina pi-ir- a-tu4 (“falsely”).20 The injunctions that impose a non-monetary penalty come either from the Eanna at Uruk or the Ebabbar at Sippar, and were written by scribes known to have served in these temples.21 Some mention temple authorities in whose presence (“ina DU.ZU”) the injunction was written,22 or list authorities as witnesses.23 Mentions of the temple authorities suggest that the injunctions were issued during formal hearings. The quotation of the šatammu’s warning in YOS 19, 110 may be the written record of such a hearing. Similarly, YOS 7, 56 begins with a statement by the individual against whom the injunction is issued. This statement was probably made during a hearing, as well. A second matter which must be addressed is when an injunction would have been issued. In his discussion of YOS 19, 110, Beaulieu, who is the first to use the term “injunction” to describe these texts, suggests that the individual against whom it is written “was apparently caught

19 It is entirely possible that “bearing the sin of the king” entailed a monetary payment. Nevertheless, the formulation itself makes it clear that the consequences are a penalty, rather than a payment for performing an action. 20 See AHw. piri tu, p. 866. 21 See the summary table for a list of the different scribes. 22 YOS 7, 77:8. 23 Cyr 307:10–11.

other text-types

213

in flagrante delicto.”24 The very specific wording of YOS 19, 110 suggests that this particular injuction was issued because the individual was actually caught teaching forbidden knowledge. On the other hand, it is also possible that YOS 19, 110, and other texts like it, were issued in the wake of only a suspicion, rather than after the individual had actually committed a misdeed. In either case, the injunctions serve as a warning to the individual and provide the authorities with a grounds for future action against the individual. In the texts discussed so far, committing the hypothetical act has non-monetary consequences. By their very nature, these consequences clearly show that they are penalties. There are, however, two texts, one from Uruk (UCP 9/1, 53) and one from Babylon (Nbn 682) in which the performance of the hypothetical action results in a payment of some kind rather than in a non-monetary penalty. In these texts, it is difficult to determine whether this payment is actually a penalty or simply a fee for performing the action. The discussion will address each text separately in order to highlight the specific problems of each. The text from Uruk reads as follows:2526 1. U4!-mu m i-bi-il 25 DAM ša2 m EN-NUMUN 2. it-ti mšu-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-a 3. it-tan-ma-ru26 ITI 10-GIN2 KU3.BABBAR

(1–3) The day that ibil, wife of mBēl-zēri, is seen with mŠulaya son of mArdiya—

4. man-da-at-tu4-ša2 mšu-la-a 5. [i-nam-din] a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki

(3–5) mŠulaya shall [pay] her monthly wage of 10 šeqel of silver to the Lady-of-Uruk.

6.

lu2 mu-kin-nu mdU.GUR-nair Ašu2 ša2 7. ma-qar-A A mdEN-A-URI3

(6–7) Witnesses: mNergal-nā ir son of mAqar-apli descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur;

8.

(8) mNādin son of mPN descendant of Bēl-e ēru;

m

na-din A-šu2 ša2 EN-e- e3-ru

md

X-X-X A

md

Beaulieu, ZA 82 (1992), p. 106. According to Lutz’s drawing, a vertical (masculine) determinative preceeds the name of ibil, even though it is clear that she is a woman from the following DAM and from the feminine suffix ša in line 4. 26 The verb it-tan-ma-ru is a 3ms form (with a subjunctive) instead of the expected 3fs form beginning with ta. 24 25

214

chapter seven 9. mli-ši-ru A-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu A m mu-še-zi-bu

(9) mLīširu son of mGimillu descendant of Mušēzibu;

10. u lu2UMBISAG mdINNIN-naNUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2

(10–11) and the scribe: mInninazēra-šubši son of mNanaya-a aiddin.

11.

(11–13) Uruk. 17 Simānu, year 28 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon.

na-na-a-ŠEŠ-MU UNUGki ITI SIG4 12. U4 17-kam2 MU 28-kam2 d NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 13. LUGAL TIN.TIRki md

This text imposes a monetary payment upon mŠulaya “the day that ibil, wife of mBēl-zēri, is seen with mŠulaya son of mArdiya” (U4!-mu m i-bi-il DAM ša2 mEN-NUMUN it-ti mšu-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-a it-tanma-ru). The payment is described as ibil’s “wages” (mandattu) of 10 šeqel per month, and must be paid to the Eanna. The obligation to the Eanna indicates that ibil somehow belonged to the Eanna. Dandamaev views this text as a contract between mŠulaya and the Eanna. He uses the text to prove that “temple slave women (including married women) were also hired out as concubines.”27 The text may indeed be a contract, but that it is for the hire of the woman as a concubine cannot be proven based on the available evidence. There are, however, features of UCP 9/1, 53 which suggest that it is an injunction rather than a contract. The fact that ibil is mentioned as mBēl-zēri’s wife may suggest that her “being seen” together with m Šulaya involves some illicit action. It may be that adultery is suspected. However, the requirement to pay wages seems to indicate that it is the ownership of ibil that is in question, rather than an illicit liaison between her and mŠulaya. mŠulaya and the Eanna may disagree as to who has the rights to ibil. If this is the case, then the purpose of the text is to prevent Šulaya from claiming possession of ibil. Because the obligation is to the Eanna, one may suggest that the text was issued as an order from there, although the protagonists, the witnesses and the scribe are not otherwise attested in the Eanna’s archives.28 Thus, there is nothing precluding the possibility that the text is actually an agree-

Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 135. The scribe is listed in Kümmel, Familie, p. 115, but the present text is the only one in which he is attested. Other individuals in this text do not appear in Kümmel, Familie. 27 28

other text-types

215

ment between mŠulaya and the Eanna, in which mŠulaya indicates that he has ceded any claim to ibil. The second text which imposes a monetary obligation is Nbn 682, which belongs to the Egibi archives from Babylon. Like the previous text, the hypothetical action pertains to where a slavegirl, fAmtiya, “is seen.” Before the names of the scribe and the witnesses, the text reads as follows:29 1. ina U4-mu fGEME2-ia lu2qal-la-ta 2. ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU 3. A me-gi-bi it-ti mgu-za-nu 4. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-¢mu-še-ti Ü-iq.DA 5. A mKAL-dIM ta-at-na-mar-ri 6. u ši-mu-us-su it-ti-šu2

(1–5) On the day that fAmtiya, slavegirl of mItti-Mardukbalā u son of mNabû-a ē-iddin descendant of Egibi, is seen with m Guzānu son of mNabû-mušētiquddê descendant of MudammiqAdad or she is rumored to be with him—

7. it-te-še-mu-u2 U4-mu 3 (BAN2) ŠE.BAR 8. man-da-at-ta-šu2 mgu-za-nu 9. a-na mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN i-nam-din

(7–9) mGuzānu shall pay mIttiMarduk-balā u her daily wage of 3 sūtu of barley.

The text, taken on its own, states that if mItti-Marduk-balā u’s slavegirl f Amtiya is found or is rumored to be in mGuzānu’s possession, mGuzānu will have to compensate mItti-Marduk-balā u. The required compensation, of itself, does not necessarily indicate that it is a penalty. In fact, this text, like UCP 9/1, 53, has been interpreted as a contract for the slavegirl’s sexual services.30 However, by considering Nbn 682 together with other texts concerning that particular slavegirl, Wunsch demonstrates that it is not such a contract.31 Instead, one may surmise that the text was composed under the following circumstances. The slavegirl was found in mGuzānu’s possession, perhaps because mGuzānu has made some claim to her or because she herself attempted to escape from mIttiMarduk-balā u.32 The payment, therefore, is actually a penalty against

29 The present transliteration and translation follow Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), pp. 87–88. 30 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 29; Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 134. 31 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70. For refutation of the use of the slavegirl as a prostitute, see the comments to Nbn 679:5 in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 87. 32 The slavegirl fAmtiya is involved in an escape attempt mentioned in the kunnusummons Nbn 679. See Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70.

216

chapter seven

Guzānu to prevent the slavegirl from leaving mItti-Marduk-balā u’s possession. The text does not mention any authorities who might have imposed this penalty by issuing the injunction. Instead, as Wunsch has suggested, mGuzānu has probably accepted this obligation on his own, without the intervention of other authorities.33 m

Summary Table 7.3 Text

Penalty

UCP 9/1, 53

payment of — compensation (for slave?)

m

Nbn 682

payment of — compensation for slave

m

YOS 19, 110

i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-ad

m

YOS 7, 56

i- u ša2 mgu- — ba-ru . . . i-šadda-ad

m

YOS 7, 92

i- u ša2 mgu-ba- — ru . . . i-šad-daad

m

TCL 13, 142

i- i ša2 mgu— bar-ru . . . i-šadda-ad

m

Cyr 307 branding as slave

Authority

šatammu of Eanna

ša mu i sūti of Šamaš

Injunctions

Scribe


Inninazēra-šubši / m Nanayaa a-iddin

Uruk

17.III.28 Nbk

Nabû-nādin- Babylon a i / mKiribtuMarduk // Dābibī

25.XII.12 Nbn

Balā u / Sîn-ibni // Rē i-alpi

Uruk

4.III.15 Nbn


Uruk

28.II.6 Cyr


Uruk

11.III.6 Cyr

Pir u / Eannašuma-ibni

Uruk

12.IV.7 Cyr

Arad-Bēl/ Bēl-ušallim // Adadšammê

Sippar

3.IV.8 Cyr

m

m

m

m

m m

33 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70 writes that mGuzānu “obligates himself ” (“verpflichtet sich”) to pay the wages.

other text-types

217


Penalty

Authority

YOS 7, 77

mul-le-e a-na šatammu of mu - i-šu2 Eanna un-da-al-lu (“just desert”)

m

BIN 1, 169

i- u ša2 mgu- šatammu + ba-ru . . . i-šad- adminisda-du trator of Eanna; 8 mār banî

m

BIN 2, 116

i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-du-

m


Scribe


AradUruk Marduk/ m Mardukšuma-iddin // Bēl-apla-u ur

27.XII.8 Cyr

ŠiriktuKU3.SUD/ m Balā u

Uruk

17.IX.0 Camb


Na ibāta

23.V.3 Camb

d

m

PART II

NEO BABYLONIAN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE

In Part I, the primary focus was to analyze the legal function of the different text-types that were generated during the course of adjudication of disputes in the Neo-Babylonian period. Each text-type was situated within the framework of the adjudicatory process. Texts that set the courtroom scene, such as the decision records and the preliminary protocols, served as the background against which other text-types, such as the summonses and the guarantees, were interpreted. The typological discussion in Part I mentioned a number of procedures, such as summoning and interrogation. However, in the interest of maintaining a focus on the legal function of text-types, the discussion did not offer a complete picture of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure. In addition, the typological discussion did not consider the differences between the adjudicatory procedures pertaining to temple property and those pertaining to private litigation. Part II addresses these issues. Each of the following two chapters considers the process in a different context. Chapter 8 addresses the process as it is reflected in private records, especially the “Royal Judges style” decision records. Chapter 9 addresses the process that is reflected in texts from temple archives, particularly from the Eanna. Generally speaking, private records can best be described as the records of the adjudication of civil cases; they reflect the attempts of individuals to find redress for wrongdoings against them by other individuals. Temple records, on the other hand, reflect the temple’s own prosecution of mishandling of its property. This difference gives the proceedings in the temple a different character, which warrants a separate description. The discussion of legal procedure follows a hypothetical case from its initiation to its conclusion. It is structured around the decision records, which provide a complete and organized narrative of the adjudication of cases by authorities. The discussion of each stage of the trial begins with an analysis of the information derived from the decision records. It is therefore important to consider the nature of the information that the decision records provide. The decision records present the adjudication of a dispute as a series of consecutive actions in “real time.” Prima facie, it seems that these actions take place at one judicial session, which begins when the case is initiated and ends when the judges render their decision. The reality, however, must have been different. The numerous preliminary protocols,

222

chapter eight

mostly from the Eanna, but also from private archives, indicate that adjudicatory actions can occur separately. Each action—registering a complaint, hearing testimony, collecting physical evidence—might leave behind separate documentation, even before it is mentioned in a decision record. The decision records, therefore, should not be understood as a minute-by-minute account of the trial proceedings. Instead, they should be understood as a condensed narrative of the events leading, over time, to the decision. The decision records remain, however, a useful framework into which one can fit the preliminary protocols and documents from the other text-types. An action that the decision records might cite in a single word or phrase may be reflected in an entirely separate text-type. The discussion, therefore, will begin with the evidence available from the decision records, but will, when possible, move on to consider the evidence from other text-types. It will use these text-types to flesh out the condensed narrative that the decision records present. The correlation between the decision records and texts of other text-types results in a clearer picture of how cases were adjudicated in the Neo-Babylonian period. An additional goal of the discussion of adjudicatory procedure will be to identify the terminology associated with each particular action in the trial. Thus, the discussion of each action will specify the different phrases that describe it. In this manner, the following discussion will also serve as a legal glossary of sorts.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ADJUDICATION OF PRIVATE DISPUTES: THE “ROYAL JUDGES” DECISION RECORDS AND OTHER TEXTS 8.A

The Scene

The term for a “case” or “lawsuit” is dīnu. The clearest evidence for this definition comes from the endings of several “Royal Judges” style decision records, in which the names of the judges are introduced with the formula ina EŠ.BAR dīni šuāti (“at the decision of this case”). The use of the anaphoric pronoun šuāti (“this,” meaning “the aforementioned”) indicates that the term dīni refers to the matter whose adjudication is described in the particular decision record. The resolution of a case may occur in several different settings. In the broadest terms, one may distinguish between those cases resolved formally in the presence of adjudicating authorities and those resolved informally. The discussion of the settlement text-type (section 2.C above) considered some of the evidence for the informal resolution of disputes. One notable feature of this text-type is that individuals designated as “witnesses” ( lu2mukinnū) or mār banî, rather than as judges, observe the proceedings. The textual evidence, however, does not allow for a more detailed discussion of informal adjudication. Leaving aside the informal settlements, then, the discussion may turn to address formal adjudicatory settings.1 Some summonses indicate that cases are to be argued ina bīt dīni ša šarri “in the king’s court of law.”2 One literary text, CT 46, 45, which W. G. Lambert has entitled “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice,” states that the king “built anew the courts of law” (E2 di-i-nu eš-šiš ib-nu).3 The use of the verb banû (to build) with bīt dīni as its direct object indicates that the bīt dīni was a

1 The discussion in this paragraph is based, in part, on Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, pp. 918–919. 2 YOS 7, 31:9–10; TCL 13, 222:5–6. 3 CT 46, 45:ii, 26. See W.G. Lambert, “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice,” Iraq 27 (1965), p. 5.

224

chapter eight

structure of some kind that, in the case of this literary text, had fallen into disrepair and needed to be rebuilt. It is there, presumably, that the royal judges (dayyānū ša šarri ) hear cases.4 The decision records themselves, however, do not mention this location. The identification of these formal adjudicatory venues raises the question of the “staging” of the courtroom dramas described in the decision records. Many of the texts mention the appearance of litigants, witnesses and evidence “before” (ma ar, ina pāni ) the judges. Further spacial implications of these prepositions are difficult to reconstruct from the texts. Some texts indicate that the authorities have an individual stand before them. For example, after the plaintiff presents his case, Nbn 13 describes the summoning of the defendant as follows: 5. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 LUGAL 6. iš-mu-ma mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU ub-lu-nim-ma maar-šu2-nu ušziz-zu

(5–6) The king’s judges heard (the plaintiff’s statement) and brought m Nabû-a ē-iddin and had him stand before them.

Descriptions like this one5 indicate that individuals would stand when appearing “before” the judges. Unfortunately, not much more can be said about the courtroom setting based on the descriptions in the legal texts. Despite the fact that texts often describe cases in vivid detail, this depth of description does not detail the courtroom setting. 8.B

The Initiation of the Case: dīna gerû and Similar Terms

In order to learn more about the initial stages of the case in the NeoBabylonian period, one must turn to the opening lines of decision records. The typological discussion identified two “Royal Judges” styles. Comparison between “Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style B” demonstrated that the main difference between the two occurs in the opening lines, in which the case is initially presented. The beginnings of the two “Royal Judges” style decision records were outlined as follows:

Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 55 notes the existence of the bīt dīni but argues that “most commonly, the court met at the gate of the temple, an administrative building, or city.” The texts considered in this book do not regularly mention the gate as the locus of adjudication, but do not preclude this possibility, either. 5 For other examples see Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–11; Cyr 332:17–19. 4

the adjudication of private disputes “Royal Judges Style B” I. Presentation of the Case A. Confrontation between parties (sometimes including subject of case)

225

“Royal Judges Style A” I. Plaintiff’s Statement A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating authority)

B. Appearance before authorities

B. Quotation of Plaintiff’s Statement

C. Statements before authorities

C. Imperative to authority

Whereas “Royal Judges style A” begins with the plaintiff’s statement, “Royal Judges style B” begins by mentioning a confrontation between both parties (element IA) followed by a specific mention of the appearance before the judges (element IB). Although “Royal Judges style A” begins with the plaintiff’s statement to the judges, a closer examination reveals that the decision records written in this style actually describe the beginning of the case in two different ways. According to one description, the plaintiffs alone appear in court to speak to the judges, while in the second description both the plaintiffs and the defendants appear together. The opening section of Nbn 13 is typical of the first group. It reads as follows: 1. fbe-li-li-tu4 DUMU.SAL-su ša2 md EN-u2-še-zib A lu2šip-ri 2. a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3na- -id LUGAL TIN.TIRki taq-bi

(1–3) fBēlilitu, daughter of mBēlušēzib descendant of Šipri said thus to the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon:

3. um-ma ina ITI NE MU 1-kam2 md U.GUR-LUGAL-URI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki mba-zu-zu 4. qal-la-a a-na 1/2 MA.NA 5 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR ana mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 5. mšu-la-a DUMU me-gi-bi addin-ma u2-il3-ti3 i-il-ma KU3. BABBAR la id-di-nu lu2DI.KU5. MEŠ ša2 LUGAL

(3–5) “In the month of Abu, in the first year of Neriglissar, king of Babylon, I sold my slave, m Bazūzu, to mNabû-a ē-iddin, son of mŠulaya, descendant of Egibi for 1/2 mina 5 šeqel of silver. He wrote a promissory note and did not pay the silver.”

6. iš-mu-ma mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU ub-lu-nim-ma maar-šu2-nu ušziz-zu

(5–6) The king’s judges heard and brought mNabû-a ē-iddin and had him stand before them.

226

chapter eight

Like most “Royal Judges style A” decision records, this text begins with the simple statement PN ana AUTHORITY iqbi umma (“PN said thus to AUTHORITY”). The mention of the authorities in this introductory sentence suggests that the case is initiated when fBēlilītu, the plaintiff, addresses the authorities in court, rather than elsewhere. The fact that after fBēlilītu states her claim the judges “bring” (abālu) mNabû-a ēiddin before them indicates that both parties are not present in court when the case is initiated. Instead, the plaintiff states her claim in a separate appearance before the judges. A different picture emerges from a second group of “Royal Judges Style A” decision records. In contrast to the texts like Nbn 13, the texts in this second group clearly indicate that the plaintiffs bring the defendants to court when they speak to the judges. For example, in Nbn 356, the plaintiff, a widow named fBunanītu, states her claim against her late husband’s brother, mAqab-ili. At the end of her statement, fBunanītu declares a-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub-la-aš2 (“I have brought him before you).6 Similarly, in the beginning lines of two other “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the verb abālu (“to bring”), referring to the plaintiffs’ “bringing” of the opposing parties, precedes the verb qabû.7 The contrast between the two groups also manifests itself in the plaintiffs’ imperative to the judges. In some of the texts in which the plaintiffs appear alone, the plaintiffs name the defendant and demand “it-ti DEFENDANT ep2-šu2 di-i-ni” (“Judge my case against the DEFENDANT!”).8 In those texts in which both litigants appear together, the plaintiffs refer both to themselves and the defendants by stating, “purussâni šuknā” (“establish our decision!”).9 In the two scenarios just described, the action may take place in one of two ways. In some cases, the plaintiffs bring the defendants when stating the case to the judges. In others, the defendants are not present when the plaintiffs state their case, so the court must summon them 6 Nbn 356:28. Similar notices occur in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:18–19; YOS 19, 101:24; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:6. See also Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:2’. 7 Durand, Textes babyloniens No. 60:8; Cyr 312:5. 8 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:8–9 (Note the variant form of the verb epēšu in the imperative, which reads it-ti DEF. ip-ša2-in-ni di-i-ni ); YOS 6, 92:20; Cyr 332:17 (partially restored); OIP 122, 38:27–28. BIN 2, 134:11–12 has a variant formulation of the imperative which reads it-ti DEFENDANT EŠ.BAR-a-ni šu-kun (“establish our decision against the DEFENDANT!”). The imperative is absent in Nbn 13. 9 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Nbn 356:28; YOS 19, 101:25; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:6; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:2’.

the adjudication of private disputes

227

afterwards. These two scenarios point to a stage in the proceedings even before the case comes to court and the plaintiffs address the judges. At this earlier stage, the plaintiffs must have approached the defendants with the complaint and demanded that they appear in court. Sometimes, presumably because the defendants comply with the plaintiffs’ demands, the plaintiffs are able to bring the defendants before the authorities. In these situations, the defendants are already present when the plaintiffs speak to the judges, so there is no need for the court to summon them. However, the defendants may not always agree to appear in court. If this occurs, the plaintiffs state their case to the judges even though the defendants are not present. In these situations, the statement of the case is not just the formal initiation of the trial; it is also the plaintiffs’ demand that the authorities compel their opponents to appear.10 Thus, the descriptions of disputes in the “Royal Judges style A” decision records are not entirely complete. The disputes do not begin when the plaintiffs register a complaint in court. Rather, the complaint takes place outside the court, in a separate procedure between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiff’s address in the opening lines of the “Royal Judges style A” occurs only after the initial complaint has been lodged. Unlike the “Royal Judges style A” texts, decision records written in “Royal Judges style B” do not simply begin with the plaintiff’s statement. Instead, they include a notice of an initial confrontation between the parties before the plaintiff’s address to the judges. For example, Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, a “Royal Judges Style B” decision record, begins as follows: 1. ¢fbuÜ-na-ni-tu4 DUMU.SALsu ša2 mGAR-MU DUMU m DU3-eš-DINGIR 2. a-na mdEN-IBILA-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MUSI.SA2 DUMU mKAL-dIM 3. di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma a-na maar m mu-še-zib-dEN lu2GAR-UMUŠ TIN.TIRki

(1–3) fBunanītu daughter of m Šākin-šumi descendant of Eppešilī brought suit against mBēl-aplaiddin son of mNabû-šumu-līšir descendant of Mudammiq-Adad.

In YOS 6, 92:20, the plaintiff makes this demand explicit. It seems that only one of the two defendants has appeared in court. Thus the plaintiff states to the judges: i-na-an-na mPN1 maar-ku-nu bi-lu it-ti mPN1 u mPN2 “ip?”-šu2 di-i-ni (“Now, bring mPN1 before you, and judge my case against mPN1 and mPN2!”). 10

228

chapter eight 4. DUMU mUGU-DINGIRGAL-dAMAR.UTU lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ u ši-bu-tu4 URU ik-šu-du-ma

(3–4) They arrived before m Mušēzib-Bēl, the šākin- ēmi of Babylon son of mEli-ili-rabiMarduk, the judges and the elders of the city.

5. dib-bi-šu-nu u2-ša2-an-nu-ma f bu-na-ni-tu4 taq-bi 6. um-ma

(5–6) They related their arguments. f Bunanītu said thus:

In these lines, four verbs describe the beginning of the case, before any litigant’s speech is quoted. The description begins with the verbal phrase dīna gerû (“to bring suit”), conjugated in the feminine singular, with fBunanītu, the plaintiff, as its subject. The verbs kašādu and šunnû, both in the plural, follow, indicating that the two parties “arrived” in court and “related” their arguments to the authorities. It is only after all these actions have taken place that the verb qabû introduces fBunanītu’s address to the authorities. One way to understand these lines is to interpret the verbal phrase dīna gerû as a general, introductory phrase. The actions that follow, beginning with the arrival in court, all explain the verbal phrase dīna gerû; they detail how fBunanītu “brought suit.” The verb dīna gerû, however, has no specific procedural meaning. According to this interpretation, the description above is similar to the description in the “Royal Judges style A” decision records. The quotation of the plaintiff’s address to the judges, introduced by the verb qabû, is the first procedure recorded in the text. The complaint procedure, in which fBunanītu first confronted her opponent, must have taken place, but it is not described in the decision record itself. The beginning of Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, another “Royal Judges style B” decision record, seems to support this interpretation of the opening lines as an introduction, rather than as the notice of a separate procedure. The text, which pertains to a dispute between three brothers and their uncle, begins as follows: 1. [

AMAR.UTU-MU-ib-ni NA3-mu-š ]e-ti-iq-UD.DA u3 mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-SUM. NA DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3IBILA-S[UM.NA] 2. [. . . ] u3 mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi ŠEŠ AD-šu2-nu a-na UGU za-a-zu zi-it-ti 3. [. . . a]- a a- a im-ta - u-u2-ma ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni md

md

(1–3) [mMarduk-šuma-ibni, m Nabû-muš]ētiq-uddê and mBēla ē-iddin sons of mNabû-aplaiddin . . . and mNabû-balāssu-iqbi, their father’s brother, came to blows against each other concerning the division of shares; they had a legal case.


229

4. [. . . a-na] mdEN-re-ma-an-ni DUMU lu2man-di-di lu2GAR. UMUŠ TIN.TIRki ik-šu-du-niim-ma

(4) They arrived [before] mBēlrēmanni descendant of Mandidi, the šākin ēmi official of Babylon and

5. [. . .] lu2GAR.UMUŠ TIN. TIRki u3 lu2AB.BA.MEŠ URU DUMU.MEŠ TIN.TIRki a-mati-šu-nu 6. [iš-mu]-u2 mdAMAR.UTU-MUib-ni i-qab-bi um-ma

(5–6) . . . the šākin ēmi official of Babylon and the elders of the citizens of Babylon [hear]d their matters. (6) mMarduk-šuma-ibni said thus:

In these lines the verbal phrase dīna rašû (“to have a legal case”) precedes the verb kašādu, in much the same way that the verbal phrase dīna gerû precedes the verb kašādu in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69. In Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, just as the verbal form im-ta - u-u2-ma refers to both sides of the case (the brothers and their uncle), the phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni refers to both sides, as well. Accordingly, it seems that the phrase functions as an introductory heading to all the proceedings that follow. One might argue that the verbal phrase dīna gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 has a similar introductory, rather than procedural, function. Any complaint procedure that has taken place is not recorded in the text itself. There is, however, room to question this conclusion. First, rather than serving as an introduction, the verbal phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni in Wunsch BA 2, No. 42 could refer to a procedure involving both parties that takes place before they arrive in court. Furthermore, even if the phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni is introductory, it is conjugated in the plural, unlike the verb tagrêma in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, which is singular. Whereas it is possible that the phrase iršû dīnī introduces the narration of the entire case, because the phrase in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 is conjugated in the feminine singular, it might refer to a specific action that only fBunanītu has performed. The phrase dīna gerû, then, is not a general introduction but is, rather, the specific, technical term for a procedure that has taken place before the case comes to court. The formulation of other “Royal Judges style B” decision records supports the procedural, rather than general, interpretation of the verbal phrase dīna gerû. These other texts use other verbs before the verb kašādu, but, like the verb gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh No. 69, the subjects of these other verbs are the plaintiffs alone. In Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 the verb ragāmu (“to raise a claim”) precedes the verb kašādu, and in Nbn 495, the verbal phrase paqāri šubšû (“to bring a claim”) occurs before the “arrival” (kašādu) of the litigants in court and before the plaintiff addresses the royal judges. The fact that the plaintiffs are

230

chapter eight

the subjects of these verbs suggests that these verbs, unlike the verbal phrase iršû dīnī in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, are not introductions to the proceedings, but refer, instead, to a specific action taken by the plaintiffs before their arrival in court. The somewhat different formulation of two other “Royal Judges style B” decision records, Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254 and Nbn 1113, provides further supporting evidence for the procedural interpretation of the introductory verbs. The introductory lines of Nbn 1113 will illustrate: 1. [mba-ri-ki-DINGIR].MEŠ IR3 pu- u-ru KU3.BABBAR ša2 fgaga-a DUMU.SAL-su

(1–2) [mBariki-il]ī, the silverredeemed slave of fGagaya, daughter [of mPN]

2. [ša2 mPN] ša2 MU 35–kam2 md NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki 3. [m]ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ri A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3na-din-ŠEŠ a-na 1/3 MA.NA 8 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR

(2–4) who, in year 35 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, was pledged for 1/3 mina 8 šeqel of silver by mA u-nūri son of m Nabû-nādin-a i—

4. ¢paqÜ-du e-nin-ni ir-gu-mu umma DUMU ba-ni-i a3-bat ša2 md EN-re-man-ni 5. [taš ]-li-šu2 ša2 ŠU.2 mdUTUSIG5–iq A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-na-dinŠEŠ 6. u fqu-da-šu2 DUMU.SAL-su ša2 mŠEŠ-nu-u2-ru a-na-ku i-na maar

(4–6) now brought suit (saying) thus: “I am a free man held by m Bēl-rēmanni the third charioteer of mŠamaš-mudammiq son of m Nabû-nādin-a i and fQudāšu, daughter of mA u-nūri.”

7.

(6–8) Before the sukkallu, the “great ones” and the judges of Nabonidus king of Babylon they argued (their) case.

SUKKAL lu2GAL.MEŠ u3 DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki 8. di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma lu2 lu2

This decision record begins with a description of mBariki-ilī’s status, followed by the verb ragāmu, indicating that he “brought suit.” As has already been argued, the fact that mBariki-ilī is the subject of this verb indicates that the verb refers to a specific action. The formulation of this text and of Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254, however, uses more than just a verb to describe this action. In both texts, the verb ragāmu, followed by the word umma, introduces a direct quote of the plaintiffs’ statements. This direct quote illustrates the nature of this procedure, which occurs before the “arguing” (dabābu) before the judges: it is the process in which the plaintiff states the complaint.


231

The evidence just presented precludes the introductory, rather than procedural, interpretation of the verbs that precede the plaintiff’s statement in “Royal Judges style B.” Even the expression dīna rašû, which seems to be introductory in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, can refer to a specific legal procedure. Thus, the terms dīna gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh No. 69, ragāmu in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 and other texts, paqāri šubšû in Nbn 495, and dīna rašû in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42 are, apparently, legal terms for the complaint procedure with which every case begins. The procedural interpretation of the opening verbs in “Royal Judges style B” allows for a better understanding of the difference between “Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style B.” The difference does not mean that different procedures have taken place. According to both styles, the case is initiated in a procedure that takes place before the plaintiffs address the judges. The only difference between the two styles is whether or not the initial complaint procedure is actually recorded in the text. “Royal Judges style B” begins the narration of the case with a notice of the complaint procedure (dīna gerû and the like). “Royal Judges style A” begins the narration one stage later, with the plaintiff’s statement in court. Even in this style, however, it is clear that the case has already been initiated with a complaint procedure. The discussion above has identified four terms for the complaint procedure that initiates the case: dīna gerû, ragāmu, dīna rašû and paqāri šubšû. This identification has been based on an analysis of these verbs as they occur at the beginnings of “Royal Judges style B” decision records. Some of these verbal phrases also occur at the beginnings of other texts, such as the non-stylized decision records, conclusions and settlements. In all these texts, these phrases seem to refer to the same complaint procedure that takes place before the arrival in court.11

11 Examples of these phrases from texts that are not “Royal Judges style B” decision records are: dīna gerû—McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:1–2 (noun restored) and BIN 1, 141:1–4; ragāmu—Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:20–23; PBS 2/1, 140:1–13 and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110:2 (restored by Stolper); paqāri šubšû—Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103:13–14 (see restorations in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 85) and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106:8–14. In addition to these phrases, the terms paqāru šakānu ( Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, pp. 251:5–8) and puqquru (YOS 19, 100:8–9; see also YOS 6, 18) occur in similar positions. Note that all the verbs related to paqāru are used in cases that pertain to land. Nbn 495, which pertains to slaves, is an exception. The cognate verb baqāru occurs regularly in Old Babylonian texts, where it might have a specialized usage for claims pertaining to property, as opposed to personal claims. For discussion, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 262–294 and Raymond Westbrook’s review of Dombradi, Darstellung, in Or. 68 (1999), pp. 125–126.

232

chapter eight

Thus, based on the “Royal Judges” style decision records and other texts from private archives, it is clear that the case is initiated with a complaint procedure known by terms such as dīna gerû and ragāmu. This procedure, in which the plaintiffs inform the defendants of the claim, takes place before the parties arrive in court. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to determine the setting in which the complaint procedure takes place. One might imagine that it takes place in an informal setting in which only the plaintiffs and defendants are present. On the other hand, the procedure might actually take place in another court.12 8.C

Summoning the Defendant

The complaint procedure with which the case begins can result in a number of different actions. According to the descriptions in the “Royal Judges” style decision records, the case goes from the complaint stage directly to the court. If both litigants appear before the court, then the case goes to trial immediately. However, if the complaint procedure is unsuccessful, then the plaintiff alone appears in court to demand that the court summon the defendant. The case described in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13 is an example of a case in which the plaintiff states his case in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff is a cook named mIna- illi-abulli. He tells the judges of Neriglissar that he had originally been given to the priestess f A ata in order to pay off a debt of 42 šeqels of silver. Upon fA ata ’s death, fBanât-ina-Esagil inherited the debt-claim. Ten years after the original debt was contracted, mIna- illi-abulli claims that fBanât-inaEsagil has been repaid and that he should no longer be in her service. The presentation of the claim and the judges’ first action in response to it, read as follows: 1. [ m]ina-gišMI-KA2.GAL-i lu2 MU ALDIM A-šu2 ša2 m a- u-šu2-nu lu2RIG7 2. ša2 dINNIN UNUGki lu2DI.KU5. MEŠ ša2 mdU.GUR-LUGALURI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(1–3) mIna- illi-abulli, the cook, son of mA ušunu, the oblate of Ištar of Uruk, approached the judges of Neriglissar, king of Babylon, (saying) thus:

12 For additional discussion of this question, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 68.


233

3. im- u-ru um-ma 10 MU.AN. NA.MEŠ-a ma- u-šu2-nu AD-u2-a 4. ku-um 2/3 MA.NA 2 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR i-na pa-ni f a- a-ta-a 5. fsa-gi-it-tu4 maš-ka-nu ki-i iš-kuna-an-ni a-pal-la -šu2

(3–5) “Because, 10 years (ago), m A ušunu, my father, gave me as a pledge for 2/3 mina 2 šeqel of silver, to fA ata , the priestess, I had been serving her.”

6. fa- a-ta-a šim-ta u2-bil-šu-ma ar2-ki U4

(6) “fA ata died.”

7. fba-na-at-E2.SAG.IL2 ta-ap-paqid-ma a-di U4-mu an-na-a 8. man-da-at-tu a-na-ad-din-šu2 it-ti f ba-na-at-E2.SAG.IL2 9. ip-ša2-in-ni di-i-ni lu2DI.KU5. MEŠ a-ma-tu4 mina-gišMI-KA2. GAL-i

(6–8) “Afterwards, she left everything to fBanât(ina)-Esagil. Until today, I pay mandattu to her.” (8–9) “Judge my case against f Banât-(ina)-Esagil!”

10. iš-mu-ma fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG. IL2 i-bu-ku-nim-ma 11. i-na maar-šu2-nu uš-zi-iz-zu

(9–11) The judges heard mInailli-abulli’s words and brought f Banât-ina-Esagil and stood her before them.

As has already been noted, the plaintiff states his claim to the judges without the defendant’s presence. Based on the fact that the judges respond by having the defendant come before them, it seems that the plaintiff’s goal in approaching them is to compel his opponent to appear. The complaint procedure (see section 8.B) has been unsuccessful, and so the plaintiff turns to the court. The judges’ response to mIna- illi-abulli is described as follows: They “hear” (šemû) his claim, and respond to it by “bringing” (abāku) the defendant and having her stand (šuzuzzu) before (ina ma ar) them. In other “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the verb abālu, instead of abāku, is used to indicate that the judges “bring” the defendant before them.13 Both verbs refer to a process in which the judges apparently compel the defendant to appear. 13 Nbn 13:5–6; Cyr 332:17–19; OIP 122, 38:28–30. The verb occurs with the authorities as its subject and apparently after the plaintiff’s statement in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:9’–12’ and Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–20’. In YOS 6, 92:20, the verb abālu occurs in the plaintiff’s imperative to the authorities, which reads in part i-na-an-na m PN1 maar-ku-nu bi-lu (“Now, bring mPN1 before you!”). The verb that indicates the authorities’ response occurs at the end of line 22, which is broken. All that is legible in Dougherty’s drawing before the break is u2-še?-, which might be restored u2-še?-[bi-lu]

234

chapter eight

Taken alone, and even in the context of decision records, the verbs abālu and abāku, do not describe how the judges “bring” the defendants. For a better understanding of exactly how the abālu or abāku procedure takes place, the discussion must turn to another text-type: the dabābu-type summons (see section 4.A). If a document of this text-type achieves its goal, then an individual would appear in court. Thus, one might plausibly suggest that when the decision records state that the authorities “bring” the defendant before them, the implication is that the authorities issue a dabābu-type summons. The suggested correlation between the description of summoning the defendants in the decision records and the composition of a dabābusummons finds further support in a connection between the wording of the summonses and the descriptions in the decision records. The dabābu-summonses require the summoned individual to “argue” (dabābu) against an opposing party’s claim. In the decision records, the action that follows the “bringing” (abāku/abālu) of the defendant is “arguing” (dabābu) the case. For example, in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13, the “Royal Judges” style text quoted at the beginning of the present section, after the judges “bring” (abāku) the defendant, the text states “they argued (their) case” (dīna idbubūma).14 It seems, therefore, that the formulation of the dabābu-summonses and the “Royal Judges” decision records complement each other. The summonses clearly state that the reason the summoned individual must “go” (alāku) to court is to “argue” (dabābu) against a claim. In their narration of the actual proceedings, the decision records attest to the same sequence of events: once the defendant is “brought” (abālu/abāku) the two parties “argue the case” (dīna dabābu). The fact that the same verb describes the similar outcomes of both the summonses and the “bringing” of the defendant in the decision records indicates that there is more than a coincidental relationship between the two text-types. Rather, it seems that the dabābu-type summonses are written record of the summoning procedure.*

(“they brou[ght]”). The problem with this restoration is that the name mPN1 does not occur in the text leading up to this verb, so mPN1 is probably not the object of the verb. Because the defendant and the plaintiff are present in the action that follows the break, however, it seems that the defendant was “brought,” even if the text does not state as much. 14 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:11. * For the oral nature of this procedure, see the discussion in 10.E below.


235

8.D Oral Arguments: dīna15 dabābu The actions described until this point in the procedural discussion are undertaken by the plaintiffs or by the judges in response to them. Once both parties to the case are present in court, the trial continues with the presentation of oral arguments to the judges. This procedure is described by the term dīna dabābu (“to argue the case”), as may be seen in the following excerpt from Nbn 1113, a “Royal Judges style B” decision record: 1. [ mba-ri-ki-DINGIR].MEŠ IR3 pu- u-ru KU3.BABBAR ša2 f ga-ga-a DUMU.SAL-su

(1–2) [ mBariki-il]ī, the silverredeemed slave of fGagaya, daughter [of mPN]

2. [ša2 mPN] ša2 MU 35-kam2 md NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki 3. [ m]ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ri A-šu2 ša2 md NA3-na-din-ŠEŠ a-na 1/3 MA.NA 8 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR

(2–4) who, in year 35 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, was pledged for 1/3 mina 8 šeqel of silver (by) mA u-nūri son of m Nabû-nādin-a i—

4. ¢paqÜ-du e-nin-ni ir-gu-mu umma DUMU ba-ni-i a3-bat ša2 md EN-re-man-ni 5. [taš ]-li-šu2 ša2 ŠU.2 mdUTUSIG5-iq A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-nadin-ŠEŠ 6. u fqu-da-šu2 DUMU.SAL-su ša2 m ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ru a-na-ku i-na maar

(4–6) now raised a claim thus: “I am a free man . . . of mBēl-rēmanni the third charioteer of mŠamašmudammiq son of mNabû-nādina i and fQudāšu, daughter of m A u-nūri.”

15 When this noun occurs as the grammatical direct object of the verb dabābu, it is usually spelled di-i-ni. Gwyneth Hueter, Grammatical Studies in the Akkadian Dialects of Babylon and Uruk 556–500 B.C. (University of Oxford Ph.D. Thesis, 1996), p. 181 notes that “if the CV sign chosen by the scribe has the historically correct vowel it is probably the indication of a good scribal education.” The usual spelling di-i-ni for the noun functioning as the direct object of the verb dabābu could be interpreted as the historically correct oblique plural, perhaps referring to the oral arguments of both sides. Therefore, the correct transliteration of di-i-ni should be dīnī. However, because Neo-Babylonian scribes are usually not consistent in their writing of vowels at the ends of words, the present transliteration does not assign any significance to the [i] vowel in the usual written form in Neo-Babylonian. Instead, the transliteration uses the expected Old Babylonian singular accusative form dīna. This transliteration is supported by the fact that the noun dīnu is apparently grammatically singular, rather than plural, when it refers to “the case.” See Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12 (di-in-šu2-nu u2-par-su-ma, “they judged their case”) and Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34 (di-in-šu2nu di-ni, “their case is judged”).

236

chapter eight 7.

16

SUKKAL lu2GAL.MEŠ u3 DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki 8. di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u2 lu2 lu2

(6–8) Before the sukkallu, the “great ones” and the judges of Nabonidus king of Babylon they argued (their) case.16 They heard their arguments.

Like other “Royal Judges style B” texts, Nbn 1113 begins with a verb—in this case ragāmu—that describes the complaint procedure. mBariki-ilī is the only subject of the verb ragāmu since he is the only one making the complaint. The verbal form that follows the statement of the claim, di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma, is apparently plural.17 It refers not only to mBariki-ilī, but also to his opponents. Other “Royal Judges style B” decision records use the verbal phrase dīna dabābu in a similar manner. The phrase refers to an action performed by both sides of the dispute, even though the opening verbs (those that describe the complaint procedure) refer only to the plaintiffs.18 In the “Royal Judges style A” texts, a similar example of the use of the phrase occurs in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13. As has already been noted, the plaintiff in this case states his claim without the defendant’s presence, since it is the judges who summon the defendant before them. The text, following the plaintiff’s statement, reads as follows: 9.

DI.KU5.MEŠ a-ma-tu4 minaMI-KA2.GAL-i

lu2 giš

(9–11) The judges heard mInailli-abulli’s words and brought f Banât-ina-Esagil and stood her before them.

16 The plural translation understands the [u] before the enclitic -ma in the form id-bu-bu-ma as a marker of the 3mpl; the word should be normalized idbubūma. Note, however, that in line 4 of this very text, where the plaintiff is the only logical subject, the scribe writes ir-gu-mu (with an anomalous final [u]) for the expected 3ms form irgum. This anomalous spelling does not affect the plural interpretation of the form id-bu-buma. Neo-Babylonian scribes commonly use CV signs for expected VC signs, but this practice seems to be limited to the word’s final consonant. Thus, the form ir-gu-mu should be taken as a 3ms form, while the form id-bu-bu-ma can still be considered a plural. See Hueter, Grammatical Studies, p. 218. 17 See footnote to lines 6–8 in the translation. 18 Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:3’–8’ (Note the spelling id-bu-buu2-ma in line 8’). Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:1–5 begins with the 3fs form dīna tagrêma, followed by the 3mpl form dibbīšunu ušannû (“they related their arguments”). Although this text uses a different phrase, it provides a clear demonstration that the first verbal phrase refers only to the plaintiff, while the second verbal phrase refers to both parties. See also McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:1–3, where the initial verb, referring only to the plaintiff, is ig-re-e-ma, followed by the phrase di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma, in the plural.


237

10. iš-mu-ma fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG. IL2 i-bu-ku-nim-ma 11. i-na maar-šu2-nu uš-zi-iz-zu di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma

(11) They argued (their) case.

12. di-in-šu2-nu u2-par-su-ma

(12) They (the judges) decided their case.

As in Nbn 1113, the verbal form idbubūma is apparently plural.19 The verbal phrase occurs only after the defendant is summoned to court. It clearly denotes a procedure that involves both litigants.20 The use of the verbal construction dīna idbubūma is not the only way the decision records might indicate that the oral arguments have taken place. A number of texts use only the plural noun dibbū, cognate to the verb dabābu, in referring to the “arguments” that the judges “hear” (šemû). The use of the noun dibbū alludes to the oral arguments procedure without actually employing the verbal construction dīna dabābu. For example, YOS 19, 101 begins with the plaintiff’s statement, in which he details his complaint and declares that he has brought the defendant before the judges. The relevant section of the text reads as follows: 24. i-na-an-na i-na ma -ri-ku-nu ubla-aš2

(24–25) “Now, I have brought him before you. Establish our decision!”

25. EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na lu2DI.KU5. MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu 26. iš-mu-u2

(25–26) The judges heard their arguments.

Unlike the earlier examples, the verb dabābu does not occur in this text. Instead, the cognate noun dibbū seems to refer to the oral argument procedure. The use of the plural possessive suffix -šunu makes it clear that even though only the plaintiff has been quoted, both parties have made arguments that the judges have heard. The noun itself refers to the arguments that both sides have made. Consequently, it should be

19 The orthography of this text presents the same problems as Nbn 1113. In Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:3 the scribe writes im- u-ru for the expected 3ms im ur. See the footnote to the translation of Nbn 1113:6–8. 20 A similar use of the verbal phrase dīnī dabābu may plausibly be reconstructed in YOS 6, 92:23, which would read mPN1 u mPN2 di-i-ni ina pa-ni-šu2-nu [id-bu-bu]. If this reconstruction is correct, then the phrase clearly refers to an action performed by both parties to the dispute, since the names of both (mPN1 and mPN2) would be the subjects of the reconstructed verbal form id-bu-bu.

238

chapter eight

construed as a plural.21 Thus, there are two terms associated with the procedure of presenting oral arguments to the judges. The term dīna dabābu refers to the entire procedure, which involves both litigants. The term dibbū refers to the arguments presented by both litigants. In addition to its placement in the middle of the “Royal Judges” style decision record, the phrase dīna dabābu also occurs in the opening lines of a number of “Royal Judges” decision records. For example, Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 begins as follows: 1. di-i-ni ša2 mre-man-ni-dEN A-šu2 ša2 mte-rik-LUGAL-ut-su 2. a-na mu - i fba-bu-nu u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 3. ša2 mdNA3-<mu>-ki-in-IBILA DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdKUR.GALMU-id-di-nam 4. it-ti mdNA3-DU-IBILA a-na maar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ 5. ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN. TIRki id-bu-bu um-ma

(1–5) The case regarding fBābunu and her children, members of the household of mNabû-mukīn-apli son of mAmurru-šuma-iddinam, which mRēmanni-Bēl son of m Tērik-šarrūssu argued against m Nabû-mukīn-apli, before the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, thus:

Unlike other occurrences of dabābu in this section, the subject of the verb in the example above, and in two others like it,22 is the plaintiff alone.23 One might, therefore, assume that the verb refers only to the plaintiff’s statement that follows. The earlier discussion of the phrase dīna dabābu, however, indicates that the verb describes a procedure that includes more than just the plaintiff’s claim. According to this understanding, opening lines like those of Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 are different from the beginnings of most of the other “Royal Judges” style texts (see section 8.B above). Most texts begin the description of the case with the plaintiff’s initial actions. These actions may be the presentation of the case to the judges, denoted by the verb qabû (style A), or a complaint procedure, denoted by verbs like dīna gerû or ragāmu (style B). On the other hand, opening lines like 21 The noun dibbū is used similarly in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:8’–9’; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:3’; TCL 12, 86:11–12; Nbn 356:29; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:7; BIN 2, 134:19–20. In Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:19–20, the noun amâtu (“words”) occurs instead of dibbū, but refers to the arguments presented by both litigants. 22 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5; Nbn 1128. 23 The verb id-bu-bu is a 3ms + subjunctive governed by the relative particle ša in line 1. For the singular verb in a clause with subjects combined by itti, see von Soden, GAG §132e.


239

those of Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 begin the narration of the case at a later stage in the proceedings, when both parties have arrived in court and make their oral arguments. 8.E The Presentation of Evidence: “Establishing the Case” (kunnu) and the Means of Evidence In addition to oral arguments, the litigants may also present other evidence during the course of the trial. The verb kunnu (“to establish [the case]”) is the term used for that part of the proceedings in which the litigants present evidence to support their claims. The verb can occur on its own, without any additional information regarding the evidence that is presented. One example of this usage of the verb occurs in Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5, a case of treason against Nebuchadnezzar. The text states that the king himself proved the case against the treasonous man: qul-lul-ti i-pu-šu ina pu ur ummāni eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma (“in the assembly of the people, he [= the king] established against him [= the treasonous man] the crime that he committed”).24 The verb kunnu simply indicates that Nebuchadnezzar “established the case” but does not indicate how he did so. Similarly, the verb occurs without any additional information in a number of kunnu-type summonses. The summoned individual is required simply to “establish the case,” but the texts do not state any additional procedural requirements.25 The procedure of establishing the case by presenting written evidence is described in a number of different texts. Some texts describe a litigant “showing” (kullumu) a document to the authorities.26 Usually, however, the verb šasû (“to read”) is used in reference to documentary evidence. For example, Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:21 describes the reading of documentary evidence in the presence of the judges as follows: ¢rikÜ-su šu-a-tu2 ma-¢ arÜ-šu2-nu iš-tas-su-ma (“they read that contract

Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5:17–18. Nbk 52; Nbk 227; Nbk 266. For discussion of the kunnu-type summons, see section 5.A above. 26 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:7–12; Nbn 13:7–8; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:15’. The verb is used in the negative when the litigant is unable to show the necessary evidence. See Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59:14–16; Cyr 332:23–24. 24 25

240

chapter eight

in their presence”).27 The preposition ma ar and the anonymous plural form of the verb that is used in this text, and in others like it, apparently indicate that the judges do not read the documents themselves. Instead, one might imagine that the court scribes read the documents aloud to the judges. The absence of the preposition ma ar in other texts suggests that, in these particular cases, the judges themselves “read” (šasû) the documents.28 In addition to written evidence, oral testimony may be presented, as well. The verb kunnu itself can, at times, refer to this specific procedure.29 This specific usage of kunnu is demonstrated by the opening lines of Nbn 679, a kunnu-type summons, which read as follows: 1. ina ¢U4Ü-mu GEME2-ia qal-la¢tu4Ü 2. ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU 3. A me-gi-bi a-na mZALAG2-d30 A-šu2 ša2 4. mdUTU-ŠEŠ-MU A lu2GALDU3 tu-uk-tin-nu 5. um-ma e-le-[qi2]-ia še-ma-a-ta

(1–5) On the day that fAmtiya, slavegirl of mItti-Marduk-balā u son of mNabû-a ē-iddin, descendant of Egibi, establishes (the case) against mNūr-Sîn, son of m Šamaš-a a-iddin descendant of Rāb-banê, (saying) thus: (5) “You heard of my es[ca]pe!”

In this text, the verb kunnu is followed by the word umma, which introduces the precise statement that fAmtiya will make. From its use in Nbn 679, it is clear that the verb kunnu can refer not only to “establishing the case,” in general, but also to the specific procedure of presenting oral testimony. The use of the verb kunnu to indicate the presentation of specifically oral testimony is implied in the following passage from Nbn 13.30

27 Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:16’–17’; Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:23–24; Nbn 1128:7–10; Nbn 68 (in the presence of witnesses); Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:18’; Nbn 356:29–30; YOS 19, 101:25–29; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:7–8; YOS 19, 92 (ina DU.ZU); TCL 12, 119:10–14; BIN 2, 134:41 (restored); Cyr 332:20–23; Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:29–30. 28 Nbn 1113:8–14; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–12’; OIP 122, 38:28–30. 29 See CAD kânu A 4 (K, p. 159). 30 For a brief description of this text and complete bibliography of earlier discussions, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), p. 96.

the adjudication of private disputes 7.

241

NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU rik-si ša2 fbe-li-li-tu4 8. ir-ku-su-ma KU3.BABBAR ŠAM2 mba-zu-zu i- i-ru-uš iš-ša2-am-ma lu2DI.KU5.ME u2-kal-lim

(7–8) mNabû-a ē-iddin showed the judges the contract which he contracted with fBēlilitu indicating that he had repaid the remaining silver of the price of mBazūzu.

9. u mNUMUN-ia mNA3-MUSI.SA2 u me-tel-lu KU3.BABBAR ša2 fbe-li-li-tu4 AMA-šu2-nu e -re-tu4 10. ina IGI lu2DI.KU5.ME u2kin-nu

(9–10) And mZēriya, mNabûšumu-līšir and mEtellu established the amount of silver that their mother was repaid.

md

These lines describe how both mNabû-a ē-iddin and fBēlilitu’s sons establish that fBēlilitu has been paid. mNabû-a ē-iddin proves his case by “showing” (kullumu) the relevant documents. fBēlilitu’s sons, on the other hand, prove their case by an action denoted by the verb kunnu, without any mention of documents. The contrast between the verbs in this passage suggests that in Nbn 13, at least, the verb kunnu refers specifically to oral testimony, rather than the presentation of documentary evidence. The term for oral testimony is the noun mukinnūtu, related to the verb kunnu and the noun mukinnu (“witness”). The specifically oral character of mukinnūtu is illustrated by Nbn 1113:25, in which a speaker’s statement is introduced by the verb apālu (“to respond”). After the quotation, the text states [ lu2SUKKAL lu2GAL].MEŠ u3 lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ mu-kin-nu-[ut]su iš-[mu-ma] (“[The sukkallu, the great] ones and the judges he[ard] his testim[ony]”). The verb šemû, which apparently follows the noun, reinforces the fact that mukinnūtu is something that has been spoken and can therefore be heard.31 The verb kunnu occurs in a number of contexts that provide some additional procedural details about the presentation of oral testimony. Several kunnu-type summonses require the summoned individual to “bring his witnesses” (mukinnīšu ibbakamma) in order to “establish the case.”32 In some decision records, the verb kunnu follows the verb ša ālu (“to question”), which suggests that the procedure involved questioning

31 A similar restoration of the verb šemû is reflected in the translation of Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:35’ in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 159. 32 Nbk 183; Nbk 361; Nbk 363; Nbk 365; Nbk 366; Nbk 419.

242

chapter eight

by the judges, as well.33 However, not all instances of the verb kunnu follow the verb ša ālu, which indicates that kunnu can take place without questioning, as well. The verb often describes an action that takes place in the presence of the adjudicating authorities.34 But the presence of these official authorities may not have been required in all instances. As Köhler and Peiser have suggested, the kunnu-summonses may, in fact, call for a private hearing of testimony (Privaternehmung), outside of the official adjudicatory process.35 The result of the kunnu procedure is denoted by the G-stem verb kânu. In the D-Stem, the verb kunnu has a factitive sense (literally “to make firm,” thus “to establish”). Thus, the G-stem expresses the intended result of the kunnu procedure: when a person “establishes” (kunnu) a case, the facts of the case “are established” (kânu). This use of the verb kânu is illustrated by the following citation from Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69. 24. . . . 1 1/2 MA.[NA KU3.BABBAR] 25. nu-dun-nu-u2 ša2 fbu-na-ni-tu4 u3 5 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR nu-dun-[nu-u2] 26. ša2 fe-tel-li-tu4 maar-šu-nu i-kun

(24–26) 1 1/2 m[ina of silver], the nudunnû of fBunanītu, and 5 minas of silver, the nudun[nû ] of f Etellitu, were established in their presence.

This passage follows a description of the judges’ examination of two documents, one that shows that fBunanītu is owed a nudunnû of 1 1/2 mina of silver and one that shows that fEtellitu is owed a nudunnû of 5 mina of silver. The use of the G-stem verb kânu implies that the kunnu procedure has taken place, even though the verb kunnu itself does not actually appear. The procedure in this case involved the presentation of written evidence, rather than oral testimony, to the judges.36

33 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12–18; YOS 19, 101:29–31; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48:11–20. The presence of the verb ša ālu as a preliminary to the kunnu procedure indicates that questioning can take place either before or after evidence is actually presented. For more on ša ālu and the questioning procedure see section 8.H. 34 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12–18; Nbn 13:9–10; YOS 19, 101:30–31; Wunsch, Altorientalische Forschungen 24 (1997), pp. 231–241:7–8; BA 2, No. 48; BE 8/1, 107:13–14. 35 Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31. See the discussion of this possibility in section 5.A above. 36 For a similar usage of the verb kunnu to refer to the presentation of documentary evidence see YOS 6, 92.

the adjudication of private disputes 8.F

243

The “Hearing” of Oral Statements: šemû

In the “Royal Judges” style texts, the verb šemû (“to hear”), with the judges as its subject, refers to the “hearing” of oral statements. Objects of the verb include the nouns mukinnūtu (“testimony”),37 amâtu (“words”)38 and dibbū (“arguments”),39 followed by a reference to the speaker by means of a possessive pronominal suffix or a proper name.40 Because these objects all refer to utterances that might actually be heard, one might suggest that the verb šemû is used rhetorically and does not add any procedural information. It simply spells out the implication of the fact that the parties have spoken in court: the judges “hear” what has been spoken. Alternatively, it is possible that the verb šemû refers to an actual procedure. The typical formulation and position of the šemû-clause bring to the fore the question of whether the verb has a rhetorical or procedural meaning. In its usual formulation, the šemû-clause indicates that “the judges heard their arguments” ( lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u2). Most often, it occurs immediately after the plaintiff’s statement, and marks the transition between the presentation of the arguments and the judicial actions. For example, in Nbn 356:41 28. a-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub-la-aš2 EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na

(28) “I have brought him before you. Establish our decision!”

29.

(29) The judges heard their arguments. (29–30) They read before them the tablets and contracts which f Bunanītu brought.

DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u2 up-pa-nu u3 rik-sa-a-tu2 30. ša2 fbu-na-ni-tu4 tu-ub-la ma- aršu2-nu iš-tas-su-ma lu2

Nbn 1113:25. Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:26–27; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–19’; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:19–20; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:23; OIP 122, 38:29; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:9’–10’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47:10’–12’. 39 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:15; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:17–18; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:3’; TCL 12, 86:11–12; Nbn 356:29; YOS 19, 101:25–26; BIN 2, 134:19–20; Nbn 1113:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’. 40 In Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874:14–16, the name of the litigant is the object. In Nbn 13:5–6, the verb šemû occurs without an object; it refers to the plaintiff’s statement, which occurs in the immediately preceding lines. 41 For other examples, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:3’; TCL 12, 86:11–12; YOS 19, 101:25–26; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:7; BIN 2, 134:19–20 (once the case arrives before higher authorities); OIP 122, 38:28–29. 37

38

244

chapter eight

Although there is only one plaintiff, and only her statements are recorded in the preceding lines, the plural possessive on the noun dibbīšunu indicates that the judges “heard” arguments of both parties.42 In light of this, one might assume that additional, unrecorded arguments were made by the defendant. The verb šemû, on its own, might not refer to anything besides the fact that the judges heard these oral arguments as well as those that are recorded on the tablet.43 But the transitional position of the clause suggests that the verb šemû refers to the first judicial procedure after the presentation of arguments. The phrase dibbīšunu išmû might mean that the judges engaged in a deliberative procedure of “considering the arguments” before taking further action.44 Non-typical positions of the šemû-clause present further complications to interpreting the verb. There are “Royal Judges style B” texts in which the clause appears at the very beginning of the proceedings, just after the description of the confrontation between the parties and their arrival in court.45 Even though no statements have been quoted, the verb ragāmu does appear in these texts before the verb šemû.46 Thus, the verb šemû might refer to a procedure of evaluating statements made but not actually recorded. Alternatively, the statement that the judges “heard their arguments” might be a summary of the procedures that are narrated subsequently, without any reference to a specific procedure.47 Similarly, there are texts in which the šemû-clause occurs after 42 Note that this is not the case in texts in which the possessive suffix is singular, rather than plural. These texts make it clear that all the judges “hear” is the plaintiff’s statement. For examples, see Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:9’–10’; Wunsch BA 2, No. 47:10–12. 43 The connection between the presentation of arguments and the šemû-clause is most apparent in Nbn 1113, where the phrase dīni idbubūma immediately precedes the phrase dibbīšunu išmû. 44 In terms of its position in the decision records, the šemû-clause should be compared with the dīnam šū uzu clause of Old Babylonian decision records. The Old Babylonian clause may refer to a procedure of granting the trial a hearing, and it is possible that the Neo-Babylonian clause, at least in its typical position, refers to a similar procedure. For discussion of the meaning of the Old Babylonian clause, with references to earlier literature, see Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 312–320 and Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 92–130. 45 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’. In BIN 2, 134:19–20, a “Royal Judges style A” text, the clause opens the description of the proceedings once they have been moved to the court of the šākin ēmi. 46 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:7’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:7’. 47 A similar interpretation probably applies to Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:6’. According to Wunsch, the line reads [. . . id ]-bu-bu-u2-ma di-in-šu-nu i-¢mur ?-ru? Ü. Based on its position just after an initial confrontation between the plaintiff and defendant, this line seems to be a variant of the typical šemû clause. The formulation with dīnu (and apparently


245

a number of judicial actions are recorded, even near the end of the recorded proceedings.48 A procedural interpretation of the clauses in these texts makes sense; the procedure of “hearing” can take place at any point, even near the end of the trial. On the other hand, the proximity to quoted statements leaves the rhetorical interpretation open. This latter interpretation would be further supported by the fact that the texts include an additional notice of the judges “deliberating” just prior to the decision itself.49 It would be strange for these two deliberative procedures to take place so closely together. A distinction between the šemû procedure at the end of the case and this second deliberative procedure is not readily apparent from the available evidence. 8.G

Obtaining Evidence

As has already been seen, the litigants themselves often present their own evidence to the judges in court. At times, however, the judges may require additional evidence. The specific procedure by which the evidence is obtained begins with a demand for the evidence by the authorities. For example, in Nbn 1128, a decision record that pertains to an unpaid debt, the judicial actions are described as follows: 7. u2-il3-ti3 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠbul-li 8. AD ša2 mdNA3-ga-mil ša2 UGU m na-di-nu AD ša2 mmu-še-zibd EN 9. ša2 E2-su maš-ka-nu a-ab-tu maar-šu2-nu 10. il-tas-su-u2 lu2sar-te-nu u lu2DI. KU5.MEŠ

(7–10) They read before them the debt-note of mNabû-a ē-bulli , father of mNabû-gāmil, owed by m Nādinu, father of mMušēzib-Bēl, for which his house was pledged.

without the verb šemû, which would probably have begun with /iš/ rather than /i/) suggests that the line refers to the proceedings that follow. Note, however, that the phrase as restored could have a specific procedural reference, as well. The other restorations suggested in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 158 admit either possibility. 48 Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:17–18; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:23; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:19–20. 49 mitluku in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:28 and Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:38; šitlumu in Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:18. For discussion, see section 8.J below.

246

chapter eight 11. rik-su u i-da-tu ša2 e- i-ru mmuše-zib-dEN 12. i-ri-šu-ma la ub-la

(10–12) The sartennu and the judges demanded from mMušēzibBēl the contract and the “signs” indicating repayment, but he did not bring (them).

Nabû-gāmil, the plaintiff, presents the notes that indicate that mNādinu, father of the defendant, mMušēzib-Bēl, owed a debt to mNabû-gāmil’s father, mNabû-a ē-bulli . After the judges hear the note read, they “demand” (erēšu) evidence from the defendant that the debt has been repaid, but he is unable to “bring” (abālu) any. The verb erēšu refers to the specific procedure by which the authorities “demand” evidence. The verb bu û (“to search”) seems to refer to a similar procedure in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:20’–22’, in which the authorities of Kutha seek additional “signs” (idātu) to prove a certain individual’s status.50 In addition to demanding evidence from the litigants themselves, the authorities might seek testimony on their own. For instance, Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 describes how the judges of Nabonidus “bring” (abālu) a sēpiru-scribe to read the mark on the hand of a slavegirl whose ownership is disputed. Similarly, the judges in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21 “bring” (abālu) a person who apparently provides additional corroborative evidence.51 These examples from the decision records indicate that the judges might, at times, require additional evidence to be presented. They might “demand” (erēšu) it from one of the litigants or they might “bring” additional witnesses before them. These notices in the decision records may correspond to the composition of the kunnu-type summonses (see section 5.A above). This type of summons requires the summoned individual to “establish the case” (kunnu). One might, therefore, interpret this text-type as the written expression of a demand by an adjudicating authority that additional, corroborative evidence be presented.52 m

50 The judges may seek additional proof because the individual cannot bring an actual adoption tablet. See the discussion in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 154. 51 For discussion, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), p. 72. 52 Another possibility that should be considered is that the judges issue the kunnusummonses before the trial, in order to obtain preliminary evidence. According to this understanding, the kunnu-summonses are not written during the trial, but, instead, attest to an earlier investigative procedure to obtain preliminary evidence.

the adjudication of private disputes 8.H

247

Questioning the Litigants: ša ālu53

One of the actions performed by the judges to obtain information, either before or after the presentation of evidence, is designated by the verb ša ālu (“to question, to interrogate”). The authorities are the subject of the verb and the individual they interrogate is the object. This individual is usually the defendant,54 although the object of the verb may also be the plaintiff 55 or other individuals who might be able to provide information relevant to the matter at hand.56 Often the verb occurs without any additional information about what the action entails. For example, in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12, the text simply states fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG.IL2 iš-ta-lu-ma (“they questioned f Banât-ina-Esagil”).57 In some texts, however, the verb ša ālu introduces a quotation of the question that the authorities pose, as in the following example from Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59: 6. 7.

DI.KU5.MEŠ re-man-ni-dEN iš-ta- -a-lu um-ma fba-bu-nu lu2 m

8. NIN-ka ul-tu im-ma-ti ki-i E2mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU 9. AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA ši-i

(6–7) The judges interrogated m Rēmanni-Bēl thus: (7–9) “Since when has fBābunu, your sister, been part of the household of mAmurru-šumaiddinam, father of mNabû-mukīnapli?”

53 The verb occurs both with and without a -t- infix. Examples with the infix include: Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:13; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:7; TCL 12, 86:13. Examples without the infix include: Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:16; YOS 19, 101:30; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:13–14. 54 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48; YOS 19, 101; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19; Cyr 312; Cyr 332. 55 Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59. 56 Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 (slavegirl in question); Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45 (creditors); Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48 (parties to a settlement). 57 Other examples of the verb ša ālu alone are: Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:7’–9’; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:8; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–20’; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:15–16; YOS 19, 101:29–30; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:13–14; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 37:3’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48:11–13, 16–17; Cyr 312:10; Cyr 332:19.

248

chapter eight

This quotation demonstrates that ša ālu, as the verb itself implies, refers to a process in which the authorities address a question to an individual who appears in court.58 In addition to the verb ša ālu itself and the quotation of questions in texts, the surrounding descriptions offer some further insight into how the procedure is carried out. In several texts, the procedure occurs after the authorities summon (abālu) the individual who is questioned.59 After the actual questioning is mentioned, the individual’s response may be introduced by the verb qabû (“to speak”),60 which indicates an oral response. The verb kunnu (“to establish”) may also be used, followed by either an actual quotation of testimony61 or by a summary of what was “established.”62 Sometimes, but not always, the response is given under oath, which is designated by the term nīš DINGIR.MEŠ/DN zakāru.63 Texts also describe questioning without using the verb ša ālu to refer to the procedure. Instead, the text may quote the authorities’ question introduced by the verb qabû, rather than ša ālu. For example, in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44, two women are questioned. The description of their questioning reads as follows: 8’. 9’.

[U.GUR-NUMUN-DU3] GAR.UŠ4 GU2.DU8.Aki u3 UKKIN lu2GU2.DU8. Aki.[MEŠ] 10’. a-ma-a-ti mdNA3-ke-šir3 iš-timmu-u2-ma md lu2

(8’–10’) m[Nergal-zēra-ibni], the šākin ēmi of Kutha and the assembly of Kutha heard mNabûkēšir’s statement and

58 Wunsch reconstructs the verb ša ālu in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:9’, where it has two individuals, mRīmūt and m illaya, as objects. The continuation of the text records m Rīmūt’s oath in response, but indicates that m illaya is “sick” (ma-ru-u -ma) and that he apparently does not arrive to swear the oath (see Wunsch, BA 2, p. 160). If Wunsch’s reconstruction of the situation is correct, then the verb ša ālu refers to an action performed without the presence of one of the people being questioned. This text also raises the possibility that the action is separate from the oath in response. 59 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48; Cyr 332. 60 Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19. 61 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48. 62 Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; YOS 19, 101. 63 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:23’ (dŠamaš); Cyr 312:11 (DINGIR.MEŠ).

the adjudication of private disputes 11’. fdam-qa-a u3 fbu-ra-šu2 a-na ma -ri-šu2-nu 12’. u2-bil-lu-nim-ma iq-bu-ši-na-a-ti um-ma mi-nam-ma 13’.

(11’–12’) brought fDamqaya and Burāšu before them and said to them thus:

f

NA3-ke-šir3 a-na la DUMU ša2 mdNA3-SUR tu-tir-ra

(12’–13’) “Why did you turn m Nabû-kēšir into a non-son of m Nabû-ē ir?”

14’. iq-ba-a um-ma it-ti AMA-šu2 a-na E2 mdNA3-SUR 15’. i-ter-bi

(14’–15’) They said thus: “He entered Nabû-ē ir’s household with his mother.”

md

249

The procedure described in this excerpt begins immediately after the šākin ēmi and the assembly evaluate (šemû) the plaintiff’s statement. The two women are summoned (abālu) before the adjudicating authorities. The authorities’ speech to the two women begins with the word mīnamma (“why”), which clearly indicates that the authorities are posing a question to the women.64 The fact that the question is introduced by qabû (“to speak”), rather than by ša ālu, raises the possibility that ša ālu has a specific, procedural meaning that is applied only to certain kinds of questions, and that other questions are introduced by qabû. A glance at the usage in the Eanna material shows that questions introduced by qabû do not seem to be distinguished from questions introduced by ša ālu in terms of form,65 content66 or the response obtained. Furthermore, in one text from the Eanna, the question posed is introduced by the

See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47:13–15 which also contains a question posed by the authorities that begins with mīnamma and is also introduced by the verb qabû, rather than by ša ālu. 65 YOS 7, 128:21–23 includes a similarly worded question (beginning with mīnamma), but introduced by ša ālu, instead of qabû. See also YOS 6, 225:9–11. 66 TCL 13, 170 includes a question introduced by qabû (lines 8–11) followed by a question introduced by ša ālu (lines 14–17). The use of qabû may be explained by the fact that the first question ends with an order to the person addressed: mi-nam-ma a-na lu2 ŠA3.TAM u lu2SAG.LUGAL! ša2 ina pa-na-tu-u2-a paq-du ul taq-ba u3 ul-tu UGU ša2 a-na-ku paq-da-ak-ka ul taq-ba- en-na mim-ma ša2 ina ŠU.2-šu ta-mu-ur i-šam2-ma kul-lim-an-na-a-šu2 (“Why did you not report to the šatammu or the ša rēš šarri who was appointed before me and why did you not report it after I was appointed? Now, whatever you see in his possession bring and show us!”). The phrase introduced by ša ālu is apparently a question, although it does not contain any internal indication that it is. It reads: mimma ša2 mPN ša2 E2 ŠU.2 ina mu - i-ku-nu u2-še- u-u2, and should probably be translated, following Moore, Documents, No. 170, “(Is there) anything that mPN took out from the storehouse in your charge?” In both Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 and Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47, the questions introduced by qabû include only questions, without any order at their ends. 64

250

chapter eight

phrase fPN iš- -al-u2-ma iq-bu-u2-šu2 um-ma (“They interrogated fPN and said thus to her”).67 In this example, the verb qabû seems to explain the action described by ša ālu, since what the authorities “say” (qabû) is a question. Therefore, it seems that qabû and ša ālu do not refer to different kinds of questioning. 8.I

Oaths

The use of oaths, in general, during the Neo-Babylonian period has already been surveyed by Joannès.68 This subject is, understandably, quite broad, and thus merits a more complete study than may be accomplished in the present context. The present discussion will, therefore, primarily focus on the administration of oaths as an evidentiary procedure.69 There are two terms for swearing an oath: nīš ili [u šarri ] zakāru (literally, “to pronounce the oath of the god [and the king])”70 and ina DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by DN and the oaths of RN”).71 The words of the actual oath are usually quoted, and may be introduced by the term iqbi umma (“said thus”) or by the word kî. The oath itself may be formulated in one of two ways, which Joannès calls the “positive” and “negative” forms.72 The “positive” form is to be interpreted as one would any other statement. The oath implies that the statement is true as recorded. The “negative” form, on the other hand, implies a self-imposed curse upon the swearer if the assertion under oath is true. The oath, therefore, implies that the opposite of what is actually stated

YOS 19, 91:21–23 F. Joannès, “La pratique du serment à l’époque néo-babylonienne,” in Sophie Lafont, ed. Jurer et maudire: pratiques politiques et usages juridiques du serment dans le ProcheOrient ancien (Méditerranées 10–11, 1996), pp. 163–174. 69 The promissory oaths, discussed in section 7.B above, show another, non-evidentiary context in which oaths might occur during the adjudicatory process. 70 An example of this formula, including both god and king, occurs in Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12:1. Variations include: nīš DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL zakāru (Dar 260:19); nīš DN zakāru (Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:10’, 23’; Wunsch BA 2, No. 46:19’–20’). 71 Dar 260:19; BE 10, 9:26–27 (ina DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL temû ); Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109:17–18 (restored as ina DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL temû). The verb temû without any surrounding context also occurs in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45, 33’. 72 Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 171. 67

68


251

is true. One must rely on context to determine whether the “positive” or “negative” oath is intended. An oath may be taken in response to questioning by the judges (ša ālu).73 However, as the discussion of the questioning procedure has shown (section 8.H above), not every questioning by the judges results in an oath. Furthermore, an oath may be applied without “questioning,” as well. Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 provides a good description of the procedure for administering the oath. In this text, mNabû-kēšir presents his complaint against fDamqaya and fBurāšu to the šākin ēmi official and the assembly of Kutha. mNabû-kēšir claims that he has received land and a slave as inheritance from mNabû-kēšir, but that fDamqaya and f Burāšu have not given it to him. The šākin ēmi and the assembly question the two women, who argue that mNabû-kēšir is not an actual son of mNabû-ē ir. According to the two women, mNabû-kēšir was not born into the family, but rather he entered the household as a slave together with his mother. mNabû-kēšir counters this claim by citing a tablet in which fDamqaya instructed the scribe to include him as a witness and called him a son of mNabû-ē ir.74 After mNabû-kēšir’s response, the judges call for the scribe who wrote the tablet and another witness. The text reads: 22’. 23’. 24’. 25’. 26’.

73

20’.

U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 DU3-a DUMU lu2ŠIDIM lu2DUB. SAR u3 m il-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mdU. GUR-¢ŠEŠ.MUÜ DUMU md30–SISKUR2ŠE.GA lu2[mu]-kin-nu ¢ša2Ü [ imDUB] u2-bil-lu-nim-ma niš dUTU u3 qa-an up-[ p i. . .] i-na UKKIN u2-ša2-az-ki-ir-šunu-ti-ma i-da-[tu4 . . .] md m

(22’–25’) They brought mNergala a-iddin son of mIbnaya descendant of Itinnu, the scribe, and m illaya son of mNergal-a a-iddin descendant of Sîn-karābi-išme the [wit]ness on the [tablet] before them and (25’–26’) had them swear an oath of Šamaš and the tablet reed in the assembly and . . . proo[fs. . .]

Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:23’; Cyr 312:11. See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–

74 For more on this text and the complicated relationship between the protagonists, see Wunsch, BA 2, pp. 153–154.

252

chapter eight 27’. ki-i la ki-i pi-i ša2 fdam-qa-a AMA AD ša2 mdNA3-¢ke-šir3Ü 28’. mdNA3-ke-šir3 A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3KAR-ir DUMU mda-bi-bi a-na 29’. lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ina imDUB ni-iš- u-ru

(27’–29’) “(May we be cursed) if we inscribed (the name of ) m Nabû-kēšir, son of mNabûē ir, descendant of Dābibī, as a witness in the tablet, not in accordance with the word of f Damqaya, mother of Nabûkēšir’s father!”

Nergal-a a-iddin, the scribe, and m illaya, the witness, confirm mNabûkēšir’s argument by swearing that they did not write his name in the tablet without fDamqaya’s directive. In this text, the verb abālu (“to bring”) refers to a procedure in which the judges summon the people who are to swear.75 This procedure is also attested in a number of summonses in which the summoned individual must swear an oath or face a penalty.76 Besides summoning the individual who is to swear, the example above suggests that authorities might also play a role in the actual administration of the oath. The use of the Š-stem form of the verb zakāru (šuzkuru) indicates that the authorities caused the individual to take an oath.77 m

8.J

The Conclusion of the Trial: Deliberation (mitluku) and Decision (purussû)

Several “Royal Judges” style decision records indicate that after the examination of evidence, the judges “deliberate” (mitluku). Apart from the use of this verb in some, but not all, “Royal Judges” texts, this stage of the proceedings does not seem to have left any independent records which would offer a more complete picture. Nevertheless, based only on the well-established meaning of the verb mitluku (“to consult one another”), one can suggest that the judges confer before pronouncing the sentence. The implications of the absence of a mitluku-clause in some decision records are more difficult to determine. One might imagine

75 For another example of the same procedure, see Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’ (abāku). 76 Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; Dar 358. 77 See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:19’–20’.


253

that the judges’ deliberation takes place but goes unrecorded. One might, however, also argue that the judges do not always “deliberate,” and that the mitluku-clause occurs only when they do. The general term for “decision” is purussû (EŠ.BAR), which occurs in the phrase that introduces the names of the authorities in a number of “Royal Judges” style decision records. This phrase indicates that the authorities named were present “ina purussê dīna šuāti” (“at the decision of this case”). The formulation of the authorities’ actual decision, however, varies according to the circumstances of the case. The verb nadānu (“to give”), for example, is used to express the awarding of ownership to one of the parties.78 In some texts, the judges “confirm” (šuzuzzu) the litigants’ status according to documentary information.79 The verb parāsu (“to decide”), related to the noun purussû (“decision”), occurs in the phrase eli PN iprusū (“they decided that PN must pay,” or, more literally, “they decided to the debit of PN”).80 The phrase then goes on to specify what the judges determine that the named individual must pay. The purpose of the decision record, as was noted in section 1.A above, is to serve as a permanent record of how a particular case was decided. However, the decisions, as they are recorded in the decision records, create obligations that must still be met. For example, in Nbn 356 the judges decide the order in which different creditors are to be repaid. Similarly, in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, the judges’ ruling includes the long-term arrangement for the support of a husband. Thus, although the decision records show that a case has been decided, they do not indicate that the parties have complied with the decision. This final step, as has already been discussed in the previous chapter, is not recorded in the decision records themselves, but, instead, in documents of the text-type known as the conclusion (see section 2.A).

78 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:16–19; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:22–23; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21 (pp. 90–91):21’; TCL 12, 122:3’ (restored). 79 Nbn 356:34–35; OIP 122, 38:42–45. 80 See, for example, YOS 19, 101:33 and Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90:31.

254

chapter eight 8.K

8.K.1

Adjudicating Authorities: Royal Judges81

Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in Babylon

A number of texts attest to the activities of individuals who are designated lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 LUGAL (šarri ) (“judges of the king”).82 This term indicates that there was a specific judicial position of “royal judge,” that was somehow associated with the king. Alongside this general term, the royal judges are also designated by the more specific term lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 (“judges of ”) followed by the name of the king. The royal judges are most frequently attested in texts from Babylon during the reigns of Neriglissar and Nabonidus. These judges are the subject of an extensive study by Cornelia Wunsch, which will serve as the basis for the present discussion.83 In her work, Wunsch examines the names of the royal judges as they appear at the end of the so-called “Richterurkunden” (“judicial documents”), a group of texts which includes both dispute documents (mostly decision records) and land sales. In these texts, the royal judges, as a group, are designated “judges of Neriglissar” or “judges of Nabonidus.” The name of a particular judge may be identified by the title lu2DI.KU5 following his personal name.84 By studying these names, Wunsch assembles a “directory” of all the judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in Babylon, including the judges’ seals, and lists the dates of each judge’s service. By doing so, Wunsch arrives at a detailed description of the office of royal judge. Wunsch observes that individual royal judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus did not hear cases alone. Instead, cases were heard by “judicial councils” (Richterkollegien), which consisted of several royal judges and

81 Several adjudicating authorities, and not just the royal judges, may preside over decisions recorded in the “Royal Judges” style. For a preliminary overview of these different adjudicating authorities see Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, History, pp. 916–920. For discussion of the role of the king, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 58–59. 82 The term occurs in the body of the following texts: Nbn 668:13; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000):15’, 20’; AnOr 8, 37:8; AnOr 8, 50:9; YOS 7, 159:2; YOS 7, 189:14. The phrase should probably be restored in YOS 7, 137:14, as well. See Kümmel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198 and the translation in Joannès, Justice, No. 148 (p. 205). This term also occurs following the names of the judges in Cyr 301:12–13. 83 Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 557–597. 84 Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 558.


255

sometimes included other officials, as well.85 Wunsch determines that there was a strict hierarchy within these councils based on seniority; a judge could advance only with the departure of a more senior judge.86 The judges’ family names are well attested in business documents of the period, which indicates that they came from economically influential families.87 Usually, judicial councils included only one representative of any particular family. The number of judges on a council varies, which indicates that not all the royal judges had to be present to constitute a council. Judges may be absent from texts known to have been composed during their time of service. For example, the judge mNergal-ušallim descendant of Šigûa is listed as the first judge in a number of texts from years 9 through 14 of Nabonidus. Nevertheless, he is not listed among the judges in Nbn 356 (26.VI.9 Nbn). Similarly, Wunsch lists a number of cases in which a judge is absent because of a conflict of interest.88 The above description of the institution of the royal judges is a summary of Wunsch’s conclusions. Wunsch limits her study to the royal judges attested in certain documents from Babylon during the reigns of Neriglissar and Nabonidus. Judicial councils of royal judges, however, are known from other places and under other kings. Therefore, a survey of the attestations of royal judges outside of Babylon during the reign of Neriglissar and Nabonidus is in order. The survey will begin with judges of Nabonidus and Neriglissar known from outside Babylon. Then it will turn to consider the evidence for royal judges at other times, first under later kings and then under earlier kings. A list of all individuals named as “judges” occurs at the end of this section. 8.K.2

Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus outside Babylon

As Wunsch herself notes, the titles “judges of Neriglissar” and “judges of Nabonidus” are attested outside of Babylon, in Uruk, Tapšu u, Bītšar-Bābili and Bāb-nār-Šamaš.89 In the texts from these locations, the judges are clearly designated lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša RN (“judges of RN). In 85 Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 568 and the chart on pp. 570–571. See below for discussion of the other officials. 86 Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 572. 87 Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 568. 88 In the chart in Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 570–571, the conflict of interest is indicated by the sign . 89 Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 567 n. 33.

256

chapter eight

one text from Borsippa (Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874) the title lu2DI.KU5 follows the names of all the individuals at the end of the text, but there is no other indication that the judges are royal judges. Nevertheless, Wunsch considers these judges to have been royal judges, as well.90 The names of the judges who heard cases outside Babylon during the reign of Nabonidus and Neriglissar are different from those who heard cases in Babylon at the same time. This indicates that the institution of “royal judges” was localized to some degree, with different judges functioning in different places. One might imagine that each locality, like Babylon, had its own group of royal judges, who functioned in councils. Because of sparse attestation, however, not much can be said about the organization of the judges into councils. Three texts, two from Bīt-šar-Bābili (Nbn 1113 and TCL 12, 120) and one from Bāb-nār-Šamaš (Nbn 738), do provide some evidence for the organization of judicial councils outside Babylon. The royal judge m Šuma-ukīn plays a role in all three texts. In Bāb-nār-Šamaš, he and a sukkallu named mSîn-šēzib oversee the release of a slave together with other (unnamed) judges. In one text from Bīt-šar-Bābili (Nbn 1113, a “Royal Judges style B” decision record), the judge mŠuma-ukīn and the sukkallu mSîn-šēzib decide a case together with another judge named m Nergal-a a-u ur, a kizû named mKiribtu, and a group named the “Great Ones” (lu2GAL.MEŠ). These same authorities, without the sukkallu, oversee the return of a deposit in another text from Bīt-šar-Bābili (TCL 12, 120), along with the qīpu official of the Esagil and another kizû named mMušēzib-Bēl. The texts from both Bīt-šar-Bābili and Bābnār-Šamaš were written by the same scribe, mIle i-Marduk descendant of mEppeš-ili. This evidence suggests that the royal judge mŠuma-ukīn served as a “circuit judge” with his own scribe, mIle i-Marduk.91 The two would travel between places on the circuit, sometimes together with the sukkallu, and would join the local adjudicating authorities to constitute a judicial council.

90 This is apparent from the fact that Wunsch takes Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874 as evidence for the existence of a judicial council of royal judges in Borsippa during the reign of Nabonidus. See discussion of this argument below. 91 For discussion of this scribes career, see Sholom E. Holtz, “The Career of a Neo-Babylonian Court Scribe,” JCS (forthcoming).

the adjudication of private disputes 8.K.3

257

Royal Judges during the Reign of Cyrus and Cambyses

The institution of the royal judges does not end with Nabonidus, the last Neo-Babylonian king. Based on the title alone, one might expect that there would have been some change in the office with the termination of the Babylonian monarchy under the Persian conquest. Despite some apparent association with the king, however, the royal judges continue to function even during regime changes.92 The textual evidence indicates that there continued to be royal judges even once Mesopotamia fell under Persian control. Two dabābu-type summonses (AnOr 8, 37 and AnOr 8, 50) dating to the reign of the first Persian emperor, Cyrus, require an individual to go to Babylon and argue a case before the “judges of the king.” Another dabābu-type summons (YOS 7, 31) also dating to the reign of Cyrus requires the summoned individual to go to Babylon from Uruk and argue his case “in the king’s court of law” (ina E2 di-i-ni ša2 LUGAL). There are decision records from cases heard by the “judges of Cyrus” in Sippar (Cyr 301), Babylon (Cyr 312) and Uruk (OIP 122, 38). As Wunsch points out, there are at least three judges who are known to have been “judges of Nabonidus” and who continue their careers as “judges of Cyrus” in Babylon.93 During the reign of Cyrus’s successor, Cambyses, the evidence for the office of the royal judges comes from the Eanna archives at Uruk. A dabābu-type summons (YOS 7, 189) from the reign of Cambyses requires the summoned individual to bring his slaves to Uruk and argue his case before the “judges of the king.”94 Two judges of Cambyses are known by name. One judge, mBau-ēreš, is first attested as a “judge of Cyrus” in OIP 122, 38, a “royal judges” style decision record from Uruk. During the reign of Cambyses, he and another judge, mRīmūt, are apparently called “judges of the king” in YOS 7, 137:14.95 mRīmūt

See Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 572–574. The three judges are mNabû-balāssu-iqbi, mRīmūt-Bēl, mNabû-etel-ilāni. See Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 573. 94 VAS 6, 99, as read by San Nicolò-Ungnad NRV No. 700, is a dabābu-type summons written in Sippar during the reign of Cyrus which requires the summoned individual to go to Babylon “to the sartennu and the judges” (a-na sar-te-e u lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ) and argue a case. The evidence presented by Wunsch, as well as the evidence from Uruk during the time of Cambyses, discussed below, indicates that royal judges often carry the simple title “judge.” If this is the case, then VAS 6, 99 is further evidence for the institution of royal judges in Babylon during the reign of Cyrus. 95 For this reading, see Kümmel, Familie, p. 136. 92

93

258

chapter eight

is also called a “judge of the king” in YOS 7, 159, a preliminary protocol which records proceedings he oversees. m Rīmūt and mBau-ēreš, the two royal judges from Uruk during the time of Cambyses, also issue the decision in YOS 7, 161, an Eanna style decision record dated to 12.XII.3 Camb. Both men are already known to have been “judges of the king” before this text was written, yet in this text they bear only the title “judges” ( lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ), without the additional designation “of the king” (ša2 LUGAL). Wunsch has observed that, under earlier kings, the title lu2DI.KU5, even without the addition of the words ša LUGAL, can be used to identify the royal judges of Nabonidus.96 The evidence of YOS 7, 161 shows that Wunsch’s observation applies not only to texts from Babylon during the reign of Nabonidus. It seems that in Uruk during the reign of Cambyses, as well, royal judges may also simply be called “judges.” 8.K.4

Royal Judges after the Reign of Cambyses

In the legal texts considered in this book, the most explicit attestations of the royal judges end with the reign of Cambyses. In published texts from the reign of his successor, Darius I, the terms “judges of the king” and “judges of Darius” do not occur. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that even though the title itself is not known from this period, the office of royal judge nevertheless continued. One summons from Uruk (TCL 13, 222), which probably dates to the reign of Darius I,97 mentions E2 DI.KU5 ša2 [LUGAL] (“the [king]’s court of law”), assuming correct restoration. Presumably, then, there continued to be “judges of the king,” as well. There are also numerous individuals who appear in judicial settings in texts from the reign of Darius I who bear the title lu2DI.KU5 (“judge”). As has already been seen above, Wunsch’s observation that this shorter title designates royal judges holds true not only for the judges of Nabonidus in Babylon, which are the ones considered by Wunsch, but also for royal judges of Cambyses in Uruk. By extending this observation and applying it to texts from the reign of Darius, one

Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 558. For discussion of the dating of this text to the reign of Darius I, see Kümmel, Familie, p. 141 n. 245. 96 97


259

may argue that the individuals who bear the shorter title lu2DI.KU5 are also royal judges. This argument is supported by the similarities between the texts considered by Wunsch and the texts from the reign of Darius. Therefore, a brief review of some of Wunsch’s evidence is in order.98 One of the texts Wunsch includes in her discussion is Nbn 355. This text is a debt note that ends with the following notice: 14. i-na maar mdU.GUR-GI md NA3-MU-GI.NA 15. mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU mdENKAR-ir mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi 16. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ u2-il3-tim e-lat

(14–16) The debt-note was drawn up before mNergal-ušallim, m Nabû-šuma-ukīn, mBēl-a ēiddin, mBēl-ē ir and mNabûbalāssu-iqbi, the judges.

Based on this notice alone, one would know only that the five men named are judges, but not necessarily that they are “judges of the king.” However, the names of these five men occur in other contexts in which they are clearly called “judges of Nabonidus.” For example, in Nbn 356, a “Royal Judges” style decision record from a case presented “to the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon,” their names appear with the title “judge.” Therefore, Wunsch concludes that whenever the title lu2 DI.KU5 appears alone, even if there is no other indication of the presence of royal judges, the title lu2DI.KU5 designates royal judges. As a result, Wunsch considers the judges named in Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874 to be royal judges of Nabonidus, even though their names occur with only the title lu2DI.KU5 and without any other indication that they are royal judges.99 Notices similar to the one cited from Nbn 355 occur in a number of texts from the reign of Darius. For example, the end of BE 8/1, 107, a debt note written in Babylon and dated to 18.XI.6 Dar, reads as follows:

98 Wunsch herself does not explicitly make the case for the use of the title lu2DI. KU5 to refer to royal judges. The discussion is based on the different texts Wunsch includes as part of her discussion. 99 Wunsch AOAT 252, p. 568 n. 33.

260

chapter eight 19. ina maar mdNA3-na-din-ŠEŠ m EN-šu2-nu mba-ga- i-in m 20. na-din md30-SIG5-iq map-la-a u md NA3-ZI-tim-URI3 21. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ mMU-dNA3 lu2 si-pi-ri u2-il3-ti e-let

(19–21) The debt-note was drawn up before mNabû-nādin-a i, m Bēlšunu, mBaga in, mNādin, mSînmudammiq, mAplaya and mNabûnapištim-u ur, the judges and m Iddin-Nabû, the alphabet scribe.

As in the notice from Nbn 355, the title lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ follows the names of seven judges “before” (ina maar) whom the note was written. In the case of Nbn 355, other texts indicate that the judges named in it are actually royal judges of Nabonidus. In the case of BE 8/1, 107, however, there are apparently no texts that indicate that the judges are judges of Darius. Nevertheless, Wunsch’s observation about the use of the title lu2DI.KU5 to designate royal judges may apply to BE 8/1, 107. If so, then these seven men named in it, and in other notices like it,100 are royal judges of Darius. Some additional support for interpreting the title lu2DI.KU5 as an indicator of royal judges during the reign of Darius comes from Dar 410, a decision record written in Babylon. This text is the result of a dispute between fIna-Esagil-ramât and her grandson, mMarduk-nā irapli, about a particular house on ubur street in Babylon. The notice of the appearance before the judges reads as follows:101 4. . . . fina-E2.SAG.IL2-ra-mat DUMU.SAL ša2 mze-ri-ia A m na-ba-a-a 5. a-na maar mKI-dNA3-TIN u3 lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2 lu2DI.KU5. MEŠ 6. a-na mu - i E2 šu-a-tim a-na md AMAR.UTU-nair-IBILA DUMU ša2 7. [ mKI]-dAMAR.UTU-TIN A m e-gi-bi a-na di-i-ni tu-te-lu- -ma

(4–7) fIna-Esagil-ramât, daughter of mZēriya descendant of Nabaya, came to court before m Itti-Nabû-balā u and his colleagues, the judges, regarding that house, against mMarduk-nā irapli, son of [ mItti]-Marduk-balā u descendant of Egibi.

In these lines, the title lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (“judges”) refers to mItti-Nabûbalā u “and his colleagues” ( lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2), who are unnamed. As noted earlier, Wunsch has observed that the royal judges of Nabonidus 100 Similar notices occur in Dar 149:13–14 (Opis); Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:16–17 (Borsippa). 101 Readings follow those in Wunsch, CM 3, No. 353 (pp. 293–294). For more on this case, see Vitali A. Beljawski, “Die Sklavenelite des Hauses Egibi,” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1973/1, p. 142 and p. 144.


261

functioned in judicial councils. The term lu2kinattêšu (“his colleagues”) in Dar 410 may refer to such a council. Thus, mItti-Nabû-balā u and his colleagues may have been members of a judicial council of royal judges.102 8.K.5

Royal Judges under Nebuchadnezzar II

As is the case with the legal texts from the time of Darius, the legal texts from the time of Nebuchadnezzar II, at the very beginning of the Neo-Babylonian period, do not specifically mention “judges of the king” or “judges of Nebuchadnezzar.” Some legal texts refer to unnamed “judges,” who, based on the conclusions reached above about the use of the title, may have been royal judges.103 One memorandum including a decision (Nbk 109) from the time of Nebuchadnezzar begins with the following sentence:104 1. [an-nu-tu] lu2da-a-ne-e 2. [ša2 mDUB-NUMUN] A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-tu2 3. [u3 mba]-la- u DUMU fna-si-katu4 4. [. . .] ša2 lu2KIN KUR tam-tim 5. [di]-i-ni ša2 E2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu 6. id-bu-bu

(1–6) [These are] the judges before whom mŠāpik-zēri son of mZērūtu and mBalā u son of f Nasikātu . . . of the šāpiru of the Sealand argued the case of the house—

None of the names at the end of this text, however, has the title lu2DI. KU5. In fact, several of the names recorded at the end of the memorandum have other titles, such as the šākin ēmi of Uruk (line 19) and the šangû of Ur (line 20).105 Although legal texts with more explicit mention of “judges of Nebuchadnezzar” have not come to light as yet, this does not mean that the institution of “royal judge” did not exist. Other texts from Nebuchadnezzar’s reign indicate that he, like other Mesopotamian

102 Unnamed “judges” ( lu2DI.KU5) are also mentioned in Dar 53:11 and VAS 4, 87:11 (along with the sartennu). 103 Nbk 116:5 and VAS 6, 43:2. 104 For more on this text see Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 2, 24. 105 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:5’ mentions lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ, and gives the impression of being a fragment of a “Royal Judges” style decision record. Wunsch, BA 2, p. 161 dates the text to the reign of Neriglissar or Nebuchadnezzar. If the Nebuchadnezzar date is correct, then the text may include additional evidence for “judges of Nebuchadnezzar.”

262

chapter eight

kings before and after him, associates his kingship with the institution of justice. The literary text “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice” extols the king for his accomplishments in correcting the judicial system, which, under earlier kings, had become corrupted.106 As has already been noted, the text specifically mentions that the king “built anew the court of law.”107 One assumes, then, that this “court of law” is the bīt dīni ša šarri (“the king’s court of law”), known from later texts, and that the “judges of the king” heard cases here. A similar association between the king and justice, which supports the possibility that Nebuchadnezzar had royal judges, appears in Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5. This text describes how Nebuchadnezzar handles a case of treason against him. The relevant section of the text reads:108 (7–15) i-na ūmi šu-ma mdna-bi-umku-du-ur2-u2- u-ur šar babi-i-liki ru-bu-u muš-ta-a-lu re-e2-a-um nišê ra-ap-ša2-atim ša2 ki-ma dšamši i-baar-ru-u2 gi-mir ma-ti-ta-an mu-ki-in ki-it-tim u3 mi-ša2ru mu- a-al-li-iq ra-ag-gu u3 za-ma-nu ep-še-e-ti mdbaba4–a a-iddina le-em-ne-e-ti it-ta-a - a-al-ma

(7–15) At that time, Nebuchadnezzar—king of Babylon, judicious prince, shepherd of wide humanity, who, like Šamaš, examines all lands, establisher of truth and justice, who removes the evildoer and the enemy—saw the evil deeds of mBaba-a a-iddin,

(16)

(16) he intercepted his plot.

ri-kil-ta-šu ik-šu-ud

(17–18) qul-lul-ti i-pu-šu ina pu ur ummāni eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma

(17–18) In the assembly of the people, he established the crime he committed against him.

(19–20) ag-giš ik-kil-me-šu-ma la ba-la -su iq-bi-ma napišti-šu ik-ki-su

(19–20) He gazed at him angrily, he commanded that he not live, he slit his throat.

Nebuchadnezzar’s participation in judicial proceedings dramatically demonstrates that the king is mukīn kittim u mīšarī (“establisher of truth and justice”). The king, according to this text, does not simply execute 106 Lambert, Iraq 27 (1965), pp. 1–11. For recent discussion and confirmation of Lambert’s dating of this text to the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, see Paul-Alain Beaulieu, The Reign of Nabonidus (New Haven, 1989), pp. 4–5. 107 CT 46, 45:ii, 26. 108 The present transcription follows Weidner’s. The photograph in AfO 17 (1954– 1956) is not clear enough to read.


263

Baba-a a-iddin. Instead, Nebuchadnezzar is described as any other litigant might be; he “establishes” (kunnu) the crime in an assembly before ordering the traitor’s death. Put in somewhat modern terms, this text is the king’s affirmation of the importance of “due process,” in some form. The existence of “royal judges,” who, at least by title, would be associated with the king, is entirely consistent with the desire to be perceived as a “king of justice.”

m

Table 8.1

Directory of Individuals Designated lu2DI.KU5 (In Chronological Order)

Numbers in parentheses indicate the position of the judge’s name in texts in which more than one judge is named. Names marked with an asterisk* include an indication that they are the names of royal judges. Names in underlined type also occur as names of judges of Nabonidus listed in Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 575–586. Any judges of Neriglissar or Nabonidus listed in this directory are either not listed by Wunsch or are known as judges of Cyrus, as well. Name

Text

Place

Date

[PN] / mNabû-ē ir [PN] / mA ē-iddinMarduk// Šigûa [PN]/ mItti-Mardukbalā u// Dābibī (?) m Bēl-a ē-iddin/ m Zēriya m Nabû-ē ir-napšāti, qīpi of the Sealand m Nabû-šuzzizanni, šanû of the Sealand m Marduk-erība, šākin emi of Uruk m Imbi-ili the šangû of Ur m Bēl-uballi / mMarduk-šuma-ibni, qīpi of A ulla m Aplaya/ mŠūzubu// Bābūtu m Mušēzib-Bēl/ m Iddin-a i// Bābūtu m Mušēzib-Marduk/ m Iddin-a i// Ša-nāšīšu

VAS 6, 171:18 (1) VAS 6, 171:19 (2)

Dilbat Dilbat

2.II.? 2.II.?

VAS 6, 171:20 (3)

Dilbat

2.II.?

VAS 6, 171:20 (4)

Dilbat

2.II.?

Nbk 109:15–16 (1)

Babylon

6.I.17.Nbk

Nbk 109:17–17 (2)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:19 (3)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:20 (4)

Babylon

6.1.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:21–22 (5)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:23 (6)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:24–25 (7)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:26–27 (8)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

264

chapter eight

Table 8.1 (cont.) Name

Text

Place

Date

Bāniya/mAplaya, scribe of the temple of Amurru m Šamaš-ibni the šangû of Amurru [mNabû-balās]su-iqbi/ m Marduk-nā ir* m Nabû-ē ir-napšāti/ m Ša-Nabû-šû* m Nabû-rā im-šarri/ m A ušunu* m Marduk-ušallim/ m Zēriya* m Arad-Bēl/ mMardukirība* m Bēl-a ē-irība/ m Kudurri // Adadšammê* m Šuma-u ur

Nbk 109:28–29 (9)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Nbk 109:30 (10)

Babylon

6.I.17 Nbk

Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:38 (1) Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:39 (2) Durand, Textes babyloniens, 58 (1) Durand, Textes babyloniens 58:28 (2) Durand, Textes babyloniens 58:29 (3) Durand, Textes babyloniens 58:30 (4)

Uruk

11.IX.2 Ngl

Uruk

11.IX.2 Ngl

Tapšu u

26.XI.2 Nbn

Tapšu u

26.XI.2 Nbn

Tapšu u

26.XI.2 Nbn

Tapšu u

26.XI.2 Nbn

3 No. Borsippa

2.V.10 [Nbn]

3 No. Borsippa

2.V.10 [Nbn]

3 No. Borsippa

2.V.10 [Nbn]

3 No. Borsippa

2.V. 10 [Nbn]

Bīt-šarBābili TCL 12, 120:23 (1) Bīt-šarBābili Nbn 1113:29 [1] Bīt-šarBābili Nbn 738 (seal) TCL 12, Bāb-nār120:24 (2) Šamaš Bīt-šarBābili Cyr 301:12a (1) Sippar

17.VIII.? Nbn

m

m

Balāssu

m

Nabu-šuma-u ur

m

Nabû-šuma-ukīn

m

Nergal-a a-u ur*

m

Šuma-ukīn*

Bēl-nā ir/ mNabûapla-iddin// Sîn-ilī* m Nabû-nā ir/ m aza-X-ili* m Nabû-apla-iddin* m

Böhl, Leiden Coll. 874:18 (1) Böhl, Leiden Coll. 874:19 (2) Böhl, Leiden Coll. 874:20 (3) Böhl, Leiden Coll. 874:21 (4) Nbn 1113:29 (2)

5.VI.17.Nbn 17.VIII.? Nbn 15.XI.13 Nbn 5.VI.17 Nbn 21.II.8 Cyr

Cyr 301:13 (2)

Sippar

21.II.8 Cyr

Cyr 312:32 (1)

Babylon

11.V.8 Cyr


265

Table 8.1 (cont.) Name

Text

Place

Date

Nabû-balāssu-iqbi* Kabti-Marduk* m Nabû-ušallim* m Rīmūt-Bēl* m Nabû-etel-ilāni* m Bau-ēreš*

Cyr 312:32 (2) Cyr 312:32 (3) Cyr 312:33 (4) Cyr 312:33 (5) Cyr 312:33 (6) OIP 122, 38:46 (+seal) YOS 7, 161:7–8 (2) YOS 7, 137:13–14 (2) YOS 7, 159:2 YOS 7, 161:7–8 (1) YOS 7, 137:13–14 (1) Dar 149:13–14 (1) Dar 149:13–14 (2) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (1) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (2) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (3) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (4) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (5) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (6) BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (7) Dar 410:5 (1) Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:16 (1) Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:17 (2)

Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Uruk Uruk Uruk Uruk Uruk Uruk Opis ? Opis ? Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Babylon Borsippa

11.V.8 Cyr 11.V.8 Cyr 11.V.8 Cyr 11.V.8 Cyr 11.V.8 Cyr 16+.IV.9 Cyr 12.XII.3 Camb 30.XII.3 Camb 24.IV.3 Camb 12.XII.3 Camb 30.XII.3 Camb 22.XII.4 Dar 22.XII.4 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 18.XI.6 Dar 10.VIII.15 Dar 9.I.32 Dar

Borsippa

9.I.32 Dar

m m

m

Rīmūt*

Ša-Nabû-šū Nergal-iddin m Nabû-nādin-a i m Bēlšunu m Baga in m Nādin m Sîn-mudammiq m Aplaya m Nabû-napištim-u ur m Itti-Nabû-balā u m Mušallim-Marduk// Rīmūt-Ea m Bēl-ittanni//Bēle ēru m m

CHAPTER NINE

THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS IN THE EANNA The previous chapter described the adjudicatory process as it is presented in the “Royal Judges” decision records and other texts that pertain primarily to litigation between private individuals. The corpus of Neo-Babylonian legal texts, however, also includes records of the adjudicatory process in cases pertaining to temple property. Textual records of proceedings pertaining to the Eanna at Uruk are particularly abundant, although there are also texts from the Ebabbar at Sippar. The present discussion draws mainly on the Eanna material, with only occasional reference to other texts. The adjudicatory process in the temples has a different purpose from the adjudicatory process that pertains to private property. The main reason for adjudicatory proceedings in the temples is the protection of the temples’ interests. The people who are judged are usually suspected of mishandling temple property in some way. Temple functionaries identify these suspects, but the cases that follow are not between the functionaries themselves and the suspects. Rather, the functionaries act on behalf of the temples as institutions.1 Thus, the adjudicatory process is more similar to modern day criminal proceedings, in which an institution, rather than an individual, protects its interests by prosecuting crimes. Consequently, the trial in the Eanna is not just a means of obtaining payment for damages to property. It is, instead, a trial for wrongdoings that are prosecuted as crimes against the temple. This aspect of the adjudicatory process in the Eanna is manifest in the thirty-fold penalty that is regularly imposed against those found guilty of mishandling the Eanna’s property.2 The imposition of this penalty clearly indicates that the Eanna is not simply interested in restoring the goods in question. Rather, the penalty reflects the Eanna’s interest in punishing (and presumably thus preventing) any transgression against it. To be sure, the temple functionaries may also be concerned with avoiding prosecution themselves and protecting their own jobs within the bureaucracy. Fundamentally, however, the adjudicatory system in the temples serves the interests of the temples. 2 For discussion of the penalty see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–344. 1

268

chapter nine

Despite the fundamental difference between the two processes of adjudication, the process in both settings is carried out in a basically similar manner. This similarity stems from the common needs of adjudication, and is reflected in the similar text-types that make up the ‘tablet trail’ from both processes. Therefore, the description of certain procedures in the temple context will resemble the description of the same procedure in the private context. Nevertheless, at the risk of repetition, the discussion will consider the same procedures again, and will note, when relevant, that the procedure is essentially the same. 9.A

The Scene

Unlike the “Royal Judges” decision records, the “Eanna style” decision records do not typically refer to the “case” itself with the term dīnu. Nevertheless, this seems to have been the term for proceedings that take place in the temple context. YOS 19, 90, although broken, is an “Eanna style B” decision record in which the term dīnu apparently refers to a “case” involving shepherds of the Eanna.3 Adjudicatory procedures often take place “in the assembly” (ina UKKIN). Because the cases pertain to the temple’s property, it seems reasonable to assume that the assembly meets in the temple, although this is not stated in the texts themselves. The preposition ina (“in”) in the phrase ina UKKIN could refer to a specific location within the temple, but it could also refer simply to the gathering of the members of the assembly.4 Litigants, witnesses and evidence appear “before” (ma ar, ina pāni ) or “in the presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) the authorities. The paucity of details

3 The text states an-nu-tu lu2mu-kin-ne-e ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu mPN1 . . . di-i-ni i-dab-bu-u2-¢ubÜ (“these are the witnesses before whom mPN1 argued a case . . .”) (YOS 19, 90:4–9). For the identification of one of the protagonists in this text, mSîn-ibni son of mNanaya-ēreš, as a herdsman in Uruk, see Kümmel, Familie, p. 74. 4 As noted by Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 55 n. 26, TCL 12, 117 records the names of the mār banî “before” (ina pāni ) whom a man drew a dagger against the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna. The action takes place “in the great gate of the Eanna” (ina KA2.GAL-i ša2 E2.AN.NA). The text then states that “the assembly” ( lu2UKKIN) tied up the dagger as evidence. The text clearly indicates that some action takes place in the great gate. However, it does not explicitly state that the mār banî and the administrator were at the great gate of the Eanna for an adjudicatory process when the dagger was drawn. Furthermore, it does not explicitly state that the assembly that tied up the evidence did so in the great gate.

the adjudicatory process in the eanna

269

about the courtroom setting, already noted in the previous chapter, extends to the texts from the Eanna, as well. Other than the prepositional phrases already mentioned, it is difficult to derive any further information about the “staging” of the proceedings in the Eanna.5 9.B

The Initiation of the Case: Accusations

In the “Eanna” style decision records, as well as in many of the preliminary protocols from the Eanna, the description of the case begins with an accusation made before the authorities. For example, the beginning of YOS 7, 128, after the names of mār banî, reads as follows: 9.

DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pani-šu2-nu mdINNIN-a-lik-pa-ni lu2 RIG7 dINNIN UNUGki lu2 10. na-qi2-du ša2 dINNIN UNUGki iq-bu-u2-um-ma

(9–10) The mār banî before whom m Ištar-ālik-pāni, an oblate of Ištar of Uruk, a herdsman of Ištar of Uruk, said thus:

11. mEN-šu2-nu lu2RIG7 dINNIN UNUGki DUMU-šu2 ša2 m 12. ZALAG2-e-a a-na ši-gi-il-ti a-na ¢U8. I.AÜ 13. NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki ša2 ina IGI-i-a ki-i u2-ri-du 14. 1-et TA U8. I.A ša2 kak-kab-tu2 šen-de-e-ti 15. ul-tu U8. I.A NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki ša2 ina IGI-i-a ki-i i-buka?-mi

(11–16) “When mBēlšunu, an oblate of Ištar of Uruk, son of m Nūrea unlawfully went down into the (flock of ) ewes of Ištar of Uruk which is at my disposal, he led away and killed 1 ewe branded with a star, from the flock of Ištar of Uruk, which is at my disposal.”

16. it-te-kis a-na mu - i ki-i aq-ba-aš2šu2 um-ma U8. I.A 17. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 AN.BAR la ta-nakkis qaq-qa-da-a ki-i ip- u-ru 18. i-na ku-dur2-ra ša ti-ik-ki!-šu2 i -taqa-an-ni u3 19. i-qab-ba- um-ma lib3-bu-u2 a-ga-a m gu-ba-ru 20. u3 mpar-nak ku-dur2-ra ti-ik-ku ša2 lu2 ERIM2.MEŠ i-na-ad-du-u2

(16–20) “When I said to him thus regarding (this): ‘You must not kill the iron-starred sheep!’ he uncovered my head, choked me (with) the kudurru of his neck and said thus: ‘In this way, they will cast a neck-kudurru of the workmen upon mGobryas and m Parnak!’ ”

lu2

5 See Oberhuber, Florenz, No. 155:11 where the verb īzuzu apparently indicates that the speakers “stand” in the assembly.

270

chapter nine

This case opens with the herdsman’s accusation made to a group of mār banî. He accuses mBēlšunu of stealing and killing a ewe and of choking him. These lines and others like them in other Eanna style decision records6 and preliminary protocols7 indicate that the adjudicatory procedure in the Eanna begins with an accusation. In these text-types the accusation begins the description of the entire adjudication of a case. There do not seem to have been any procedures, either in court or outside of it, before this stage. Based on this, it is possible to suggest that the accusatory depositions belong to this initial stage in the proceedings, as well. Texts of this texttype record only the speakers’ accusations that other individuals have committed some wrongdoing (see section 3.C.1 above). Given their contents, it seems reasonable to assume that they were composed at the very beginning of the adjudicatory process. There are, of course, accusatory depositions that seem to have been composed in response to an accusation. These belong to a later stage in the trial, when the accused individual has already appeared in court and responds to the accusation. Nevertheless, those accusatory depositions that do not indicate that the speakers are actually accused individuals might be considered the product of this stage of adjudication. 9.C

Investigative Procedures in the Eanna

YOS 7, 7 is a multi-part decision record that pertains to various items misappropriated by mGimillu, a notoriously corrupt official of the Eanna.8 One section of this decision record, regarding two misappropriated cows, reads as follows:

6 For other examples, see: YOS 6, 225:1–7; YOS 7, 66:1–8; TCL 13, 170: 1–7. In YOS 7,7, the decision record pertaining to several different charges against the same corrupt official, the case described in lines 43–50 (regarding a cow) also begins with an accusation. See YOS 7, 7:43–48. 7 YOS 6, 235:1–12; YOS 6, 156:4–8; YOS 7, 88:15–21; AnOr 8, 47// TCL 13, 138:11–17; YOS 7, 97:3–7; YOS 7, 102:3–9; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:3–11; YOS 7, 159:4–6; YOS 7, 158:5–8; YOS 7, 149:4–9. 8 For more on this text, see San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 61–77. For a similar description, see YOS 7, 158, a poorly preserved preliminary protocol. The legible sections of the text seem to contain a report about misappropriated livestock and the order to confiscate them and to present the shepherds who sold them.


271

30. 2 AB2.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 [še-en-du] ša2 U4 1-kam2 ša2 ITI KIN 31. [MU 1-kam2 9 m]ku-ra-aš2 LUGAL KUR.KUR ša2 mdNA3DU3-ŠEŠ A-šu2 ša2 32. [ mX-X]-iq-bi A mku-ri-i a-na mdanu-LUGAL-URI3 33. [ lu2qi2-pi ša2] E2.AN.NA mdNA3DU-NUMUN lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA 34. [A-šu2 ša2 mna-di ]-nu A mda-bi-bi md NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. LUGAL 35. [ lu2EN pi-qit]-tu4 E2.AN.NA u3 lu2 UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2 E2.AN. NA

(30–36) 2 cows, [branded] with a star, which, on 1 Ulūlu, [year 1] of Cyrus, king of the lands, mNabû-bāni-a i son of [mX-X]-iq-bi descendant of Kurī reported to mAnu-šarrau ur [the qīpi official of ] the Eanna, mNabû-mukīn-zēri, the šatammu of the Eanna [son of m Nādinu] descendant of Dābibī, m Nabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri [administra]tor of the Eanna and the scribes of the Eanna—

36. iq-bu-u2 lu2qi-i-pi lu2ŠA3. TAM mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU u3 lu2 UMBISAG.ME 37. a-na mu - i AB2.GAL.MEŠ šua-tim iš-pu-ru-u2-ma 2 AB.GAL. ME

(36–37) The qīpi-official, the šatammu, mNabû-a a-iddin and the scribes sent word concerning those cows.

38. ša2 kak-¢kabÜ-tu4 še-en-du ul-tu E2 m gi-mil-lu 39. i-bu-ku-nim-ma maar mna-di-nu lu2 GAR.UMUŠ UNUGki 40. UKKIN lu2TIN.TIRki.MEŠ u3 lu2 UNUGki-a-a uš-šu-zi-zu-ma

(37–40) They brought two cows branded with a star out of m Gimillu’s house and presented them before mNādinu, the šākin ēmi of Uruk and the assembly of the Babylonians and the Urukians.

41. 60-šu AB.GAL.MEŠ ku-mu 2 AB.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 42. ¢šeÜ-[en-du e]-l[i mgi ]-mil-lu ipru-su

(41–42) They decided that [ mGi]millu must pay 60 cows for the 2 cows [branded] with a star.

According to these lines, this case begins when mNabû-bāni-a i makes his report to the qīpi-official, the administrator, the šatammu and the scribes. These officials send orders for the cows to be confiscated. The actual adjudication does not begin until the two cows are presented before a different group of authorities, namely the šākin ēmi of Uruk and the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians. It is this second group that renders the decision in the continuation of the text.

9

Date restored based on Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 102.

272

chapter nine

One might argue that the purpose of the pre-trial investigation is simply to get the misappropriated goods—the two branded cows—back to the Eanna. However, if this was the only purpose of the investigation, then it would probably be unnecessary for the text to specifically state that the cows were presented before the assembly. It seems, therefore, that there is a specific procedural need for the cows to be presented. If so, then the pre-trial investigation serves a double purpose: to recoup the Eanna’s property and to ensure that the misappropriated goods are present during the adjudicatory proceedings that follow. The Eanna officials issue orders for the confiscation of the items in question in order to achieve both ends. The role of the Eanna officials in the collection of evidence is reflected in a number of preliminary protocols that describe an investigative procedure, similar to the one in the excerpt above from YOS 7, 7, in which the officials of the Eanna impound evidence in advance of a trial.10 For example, YOS 7, 88 reads as follows: 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

DUMU -DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina IGI-šu2-nu ma-na-E2.AN.NAtur-ru lu2 NI.DU8 ša2 E2 šu-tum3-mu LUGAL mri-mut lu2 NI.DU8 ša2 KA2 i-mu u mlaqip lu2AD.GUB5 A-šu2 ša2 mri-mut a-na mni-din-tid EN lu2 ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-DU-NUMUN A m da-bi-bi u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAGLUGAL EN pi-qit-ti E2.AN. NA iq-bu-u2 um-ma mba-si-ia A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-ki-šir lu2

lu2 RIG7 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina E2 -tum3mu LUGAL 17. a-ab-tu si-mir-re-e-šu2 AN.BAR ip-ta- ar il-ta-su-um

(9–15) The mār banî before whom m Ana-Eanna-turru, the gatekeeper of the king’s storehouse, mRīmūt, the gatekeeper of the imu-gate and mLā-qīp, the reedworker, son of mRīmūt, said thus to mNidintiBēl, the šatammu of the Eanna, son of mNabû-mukīn-zēri descendant of Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna:

(15–17) “mBasiya son of mNabûkišir, the oblate of the Lady-ofUruk who was held in the king’s storehouse, opened his iron fetters and ran.”

10 A similar procedure of collecting and preserving evidence is attested in Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 6, a text from Dilbat. See Matthew Stolper, “Late Achaemenid Texts from Dilbat,” Iraq 54 (1992), pp. 123–125 and Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, trans. P. T. Daniels (Winona Lake, Indiana, 2002), pp. 601–602.


273

18. u3 ar2-ki-šu2 ki-i ni-li-su-mu 19. pa -ri AN.BAR a-na mu - i-i-ni it-ta-as-si 20. ina KA2 i-mu ki-i ni-i -ba-tu-šu2 a-na E2.AN.NA

(18–19) “And afterwards, while we were running (after him), he drew an iron sword against us.” (20–21) “When we seized him at the imu-gate, we brought him into the Eanna.”

21. nu-ul-te-rib-šu2 u3 pa -ri ša2 mu i-šu2-nu is-su- u

(21–22) The assembly inspected the sword which he drew against them.

22.

(22–23) They bound up the iron sword, sealed it and deposited it in the Eanna.

lu2 UKKIN i-mu-ru pa -ri AN.BAR iš-ku-su ik-nu-ku 23. u3 ina E2.AN.NA ip-qi-du

This text records the proceedings that accompany the recapture of an escaped oblate of the Lady-of-Uruk. Three men come before the Eanna officials and report that the oblate opened his fetters and attempted to escape. While the three men were chasing after him, the oblate drew a sword against them. The men have, apparently, brought the sword before the Eanna officials and the assembly. The officials inspect it (amāru), bind (rakāsu) and seal (kanāku) it, and deposit ( paqādu) it in the Eanna. The text itself does not state why this is done, but, as San Nicolò suggests, it seems that the officials are preserving the corpus delicti for use as evidence in the case against the oblate.11 A similar procedure, in the wake of a theft, is recorded in AnOr 8, 27. Before the names of five witnesses, the scribe and the date, the text reads as follows: 1. mlu-u-da-a-nu A-šu2 ša2 mib-ni[dINNIN A mPN ša2] 2. mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku! A-šu2 ša2 md ¢NA3Ü-¢NUMUNÜ-[ X ] 3. ina sa-aš2-tu4 i -ba-ta-aš2-šim-ma a-na mdU.GUR-PAP 4. A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-DU3 id-dinu-uš ša2 la ma-aš2-a-a-al-tu4

(1–4) mLū-dānu son of mIbni[ Ištar descendant of mPN whom] m Iltameš-baraku son of mNabûzēra-[ X] caught in (an act of ) theft and gave him to mNergal-nā ir son of mNanaya-ibni. (4–5) Without interrogation he said thus:

11 San Nicolò, Wenger AV, pp. 16–17. San Nicolò’s comment comes as part of his discussion of YOS 7, 97, which describes a similar procedure. In the course of this discussion, he lists several other examples of the preservation of evidence. YOS 6, 222 should be added to this list. For discussion of this text, see Denise Cocquerillat, “Recherches sur le verger du temple campagnard de l’Akītu (KIRI6 allat),”WO 7 (1973–1974), pp. 113–114.

274

chapter nine 5. iq-bi um-ma a-¢naÜ-[ku] mmura-šu-u2 A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUNDU3 6. mdINNIN-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 [ša2 . . .] mba-si-a u mdINNINna-ŠEŠ.ME-MU 7. A.MEŠ ša2 mib-ni-dINNIN ina mu-ši ni-ik-su a-na 8. E2 mdU.GUR-nair A-šu2 ša2 md na-na-a-ib-ni 9. ša2 ina UGU id2tak-ki-ru ki-i ni-ik-ki-su 10. ki-i ni-ru-bu 1 na-aš2- i-ip-tu4 ap-pa-tu4 AN.BAR 11. [ka-la]-ab-ba-tu4 AN.BAR 3 mar AN.BAR.MEŠ u3 tug2muip-e-tu4 12. 1 (GUR) ŠE.BAR 1 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA 13. ki-i ni-iš-šu-u2 a-na mNUMUNDU3 AD ša2 mmu-[ra-šu-u2] 14. lu2ŠU. A ša2 it-ti-ni ni-ip-ta!qi2-id

(5–14) “mMurašû son of mZēraibni, mIštar-a a-iddin son [of PN], m Basiya and mInnin-a ē-iddin sons of mIbni-Ištar and I—at night, when we cut a hole in the house of mNergal-nā ir son of mNanayaibni, which is near the Takkiru canal, when we entered and took 1 iron-tipped spade, an iron a[x], 3 iron shovels, a mu ipetu garment, 1 kur of barley and 1 kur of dates, we deposited it with mZēra-ibni, father of mMu[rašû], descendant of Bā iru, who was with us.”

15. 1 na-aš2- i-ip-tu4 ša2 kak!-kab-tu4 še-en-¢deÜ-[e-ti ] 16. ša2 ul-tu E2 mdU.GUR-nair iš-šu-[u2 . . .] 17. ša2 mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku ina ŠU.2-šu2 iš-ša2 18. SU.2 i-bit-ti-šu2 ina E2.AN.NA iš-ku-nu

(15–18) They placed 1 spade, brand[ed] with a star, which they to[ok] from the house of mNergalnā ir [ . . .], w hich mIltameš-baraku took from his (= mLū-dānu’s) hands,12 the property he (= mLūdānu) stole, in the Eanna.

19. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA

(19) In the presence of: mNabûšarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri, administrator of the Eanna;

20. mgab-bi-DINGIR.MEŠLUGAL-URI3 lu2qi2-i-pi ša2 E2.AN.NA

(20) mGabbi-ilī-šarra-u ur, the qīpu -official of Eanna;

21. mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mib-na-a 22. A me-gi-bi

(21–22) mZēriya, the šatammu of Eanna son of mIbnaya descendant of Egibi.

12 The present translation of the relative clause ša2 mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku ina ŠU.2-šu2 iš-ša2 understands the prepositional phrase ina ŠU.2 to mean “from the hands” and the possesive -šu as referring to nū-dānu. It is also possible to take the prepositional phrase


275

The proceedings in this text take place “in the presence” (ina DU.ZU) of the administrator, the qīpu-official and the šatammu of the Eanna. m Iltameš-baraku has caught a thief named mLū-dānu robbing the house of mNergal-nā ir.13 The thief, in his confession, names his accomplices and mentions all the items that they stole from mNergal-nā ir. One of the stolen items, a branded spade, is placed (šakānu) in the Eanna. The purpose of “placing” (šakānu) the spade in the Eanna is not stated in the text. Because the spade is branded, and because it seems to be the only object that is placed in the Eanna, one might assume that this text simply records the return of the Eanna’s property. If so, then AnOr 8, 27 does not belong in the present discussion of the collection of evidence before a trial. However, the earlier discussion of YOS 7, 7 suggested that the presentation of the items in question seems to have been a requirement of the adjudicatory process. One might, therefore, argue that the spade is “placed” (šakānu)14 in the Eanna in order to be brought out when the thief is tried. The fact that Eanna authorities play an active role in the collection of evidence at this stage of the proceedings reflects the prosecutory character of the adjudicatory process in the Eanna. Judges in cases pertaining to private property do not seem to have played a similar role in collecting evidence before the case arrives in court. Instead, the judges may call for additional evidence, but it is up to the parties themselves to present it. In contrast, the Eanna authorities, who represent the interests of the institution, make special efforts to ensure that their case against an accused criminal is as strong as possible. 9.D

Summoning in the Eanna

Like the “Royal Judges” style texts, the “Eanna” use the verbs abāku and abālu to refer to the procedure of summoning (literally, “bringing”) an ina ŠU.2 to mean “in, with the hands” and to take mIltameš-baraku as the antecedent of the possesive -šu. Accordingly, the translation would be “which mIltameš-baraku brought with his (own) hands.” 13 At the time of this document’s composition, mNergal-nā ir was serving in the administrative function of the ša mu i sūti (see Joannès, Justice, p. 213 and Kümmel, Familie, p. 105). 14 The verb šakānu, of itself, can bear either meaning. It is used in the context of preserving evidence in YOS 7, 102, which pertains to a letter written on parchment containing evidence against the notorious official, mGimillu. The letter, like the sword in YOS 7, 88, is bound, sealed and placed in the Eanna. The relevant section of the text reads (YOS 7, 102:24–27): ši-pir-tu4 . . . iš-ku-su ik-nu-ku u ina E2.AN.NA iš-ku-nu. See San Nicolò, Wenger, AV, p. 17.

276

chapter nine

individual before the authorities (see section 8.C above). For example, YOS 6, 225 reads as follows: 1.

AMAR.UTU-MU-URI3 u3 SU-ba-dAMAR.UTU A.MEŠ 2. ša2 mdEN-TIN-i A mbu-u2-šu ša2 a-na mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA 3. A-šu2 ša2 mib-na-a A me-gi-bi u3 lu2 UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2 E2.AN. NA

(1–3) mMarduk-šuma-u ur and m Erība-Marduk sons of mBēluballi descendant of Būšu said thus to mZēriya, the šatammu of the Eanna, son of mIbnaya descendant of Egibi, and to the scribes of the Eanna:

4. iq-bu-u2 um-ma 4 (BAN2) 3 QA ŠE.GIŠ.I3 mdIM-nu-u2-ru 5. A-šu2 ša2 mna-a-du a-na mdAMAR. UTU-MU-DU3 A-šu2 ša2 mdENSU 6. A mdan-ne-e-a ki-i id-di-nu um-ma a-na E2.AN.NA 7. i-din ŠE.GIŠ.I3 a-na E2.AN.NA ul id-din ŠE.GIŠ.I3 it-ta-ši

(4–7) “When mAdad-nūru son of Nâdu gave mMarduk-šuma-ibni son of mBēl-ērib descendant of Dannea 4 sūtu 3 qa of linseed, saying, ‘Give it to the Eanna,’ he did not give the linseed; he took the linseed (for himself ).”

md m

8. mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA mdAMAR.UTUMU-URI3 mSU-ba-dAMAR. UTU 9. u3 mdAMAR.UTU-MU-DU3 i-bu-kam-ma ina UKKIN mdŠU2MU-DU3 iš- a-a-al 10. um-ma

m

(8–9) mZēriya, the šatammu of the Eanna brought mMardukšuma-u ur, mErība-Marduk and m Marduk-šuma-ibni. (9–10) In the assembly, he interrogated mMarduk-šuma-ibni as follows:

In this text, two brothers, mMarduk-šuma-u ur and mErība-Marduk, accuse mMarduk-šuma-ibni of misappropriating linseed. The šatammu, to whom the accusation is made, responds by “bringing” all three men and interrogating mMarduk-šuma-ibni, the accused.15 The verb abāku denotes the summoning procedure in this text. It occurs in similar contexts in other Eanna style decision records;16 the verb abālu may also be used.17

15 Note that the šatammu also summons the two accusers. Thus, this text implies that the accusation is made in a separate appearance before the šatammu. 16 TCL 12, 119: 9–10 (following presentation of accusatory evidence); TCL 13, 132: 4, 7–8 (twice, in response to two accusations); YOS 7, 128:21–22. 17 YOS 19, 91:21 and YOS 7, 97:10–12. The first text is an “Eanna style B” decision record that begins with the “bringing” of an individual for interrogation, but not in response to any recorded claim. The second is a preliminary protocol.


277

In addition to the terms abālu and abāku, the idiomatic expression rēša našû (literally, “to lift the head”) should also be considered in a discussion of the summoning procedure in the Eanna. The translation of this idiom as “to summon” is commonly accepted, so that it is unnecessary to restate the philological evidence.18 The term itself does not occur in the decision records or preliminary protocols, but appears in a number of documents of another text-type, the guarantees for an individual’s presence. These guarantees are known only from the Eanna.19 They state that the guarantor must “bring” (abāku) an individual when the authorities “summon” the individual (rēssu inaššû).20 The typological discussion of the guarantees for an individual’s presence showed that one of the reasons that the individual might have to be brought is for a hearing before the officials. Thus, like the verbs abālu and abāku, the expression rēša našû belongs among the terms that describe the process by which the authorities have a defendant brought before them. The expression rēša našû, however, refers only to the beginning of the process, when the authorities “summon” the individual. As a result of rēša našû, the defendant must still be “brought” before the authorities. The verbs abālu and abāku, on the other hand, refer to the entire process of “bringing” the defendant. As a result of these actions, the defendant stands before the authorities. YOS 7, 159, a preliminary protocol, provides some further insight into how this stage of the proceedings took place. The text begins with m Bazūzu’s accusation that mLâbāši stole a cow branded with the mark of the Lady-of-Uruk.21 The text reads: 1. mba-zu-zu A-šu2 ša2 mdUTU-MUDU lu2NA.KAD ša2 AB2. GU4. I.A 2. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina maar mri-mut lu2DI.KU5 LUGAL 3. u3 mDA-dAMAR.UTU lu2 UMBISAG iq-bu-u2 um-ma

(1–3) mBazūzu son of mŠamaššuma-ukīn, the herdsman of the cattle of the Lady-of-Uruk who said thus before mRīmūt, the judge of the king22 and mIle i-Marduk, the scribe:

See CAD našû A 6c (N1, p. 107). See section 6.B above. 20 Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 64; YOS 6, 206; YOS 6, 213; YOS 7, 111. The term also occurs in BIN 1, 113, a kunnu-type summons. 21 For further discussion of this text see von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 117–120. 22 Note that a royal judge is involved in proceedings that clearly pertain to the Eanna’s property. 18 19

278

chapter nine 4. 1 AB2.GAL ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-ende-e-ti ul-tu AB2.GU4. I.A-ia 5. ina mu - i ID2 LUGAL ki-i taam-mi-ir-ku-u2 mla-a-ba-ši 6. A-šu2 ša2 mku-na-a A lu2E2.MAŠ d MAŠ ša2 la-nu-u2-a i-ta-bak-šu2 7.

(4–6) “When 1 cow, branded with a star, from my herd lagged behind at the king’s canal, mLâbāši son of m Kūnaya descendant of ŠangûNinurta, without my consent, led it away.”

DI.KU5.ME lu2DUMU! šip-ri (7–8) The judges sent a messenger a-na mu - i mla-a-ba-ši iš-pu-ru-ma to mLâbāši, but he was not found; 8. la in-na-mir i -liq he escaped. lu2

The text describes a procedure in which the judges respond to the accusation by sending a messenger to the accused. One might imagine that the messenger’s purpose is to summon the accused to a hearing, although the text does not explicitly say so.23 If this assumption is correct, then it is possible that the messenger is sent with a court-issued summons requiring mLâbāši to appear in court. Thus, the action described in this text best fits the term rēša našû, although the term itself does not actually appear. As has already been suggested, the term rēša našû refers to the first part of the summoning procedure, before the summoned individuals actually appear. Had mLâbāši not escaped, the procedure would have been successful. Accordingly, the text might never have mentioned the messenger. Instead it might have used the verbs abāku or abālu to denote that mLâbāši was “brought” to court. 9.E The Answer of the Accused Individual: Confession and Counter-Accusation Once the investigative procedures have taken place, the trial itself is underway. The accused individuals answer the accusation. They may confess. This is illustrated in the following example from YOS 7,7, the multi-part decision record pertaining to the misdeeds of the notorious m Gimillu:

23 This assumption is supported by the texts from Nuzi, which indicate that the summoning procedure involved sending an official of the court to “call” (šasû) the summoned individual. The procedure is discussed in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 13–14. For examples of texts that describe the procedure, see Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 195, n. 45.


279

96. 1 ka-lum ša2 mdNA3-DIB-UD.DA A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-MU 97. lu2NA.KAD ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina ITI KIN MU 17-kam2

(96–97) 1 lamb (about) which m Nabû-mušētiq-uddê son of m Nanaya-iddin, the herdsman of the Lady-of-Uruk said thus:

98. it-ti e-e-nu ina re-e- u ša2 ina mu i-ia 99. a-na E2.AN.NA aš2-pu-ru mgi-millu ina ŠU.2 mdINNIN-ŠEŠ.MEŠSU 100. ŠEŠ-ia i-ta-ba-ak u3 mgi-mil-lu e-li

(97–100) “In Ulūlu, year 17, together with the sheep from the remainder (of the debt) that I owed and sent to the Eanna, m Gimillu led (this sheep) away from mInnin-a ē-erība, my brother.”

101. ram-ni-šu2 u2-kin-ni um-ma ka-lum šu-a-tim a -ta-bak . . .

(100–101) mGimillu established (the case) against himself thus: (101) “I led away that lamb . . .”

The proceedings described in this selection begin when the herdsman reports (qabû) that mGimillu “led away” (abāku) a lamb that the herdsman had sent to the Eanna. mGimillu apparently received the lamb but never actually delivered it to the Eanna. The phrase e-li ram-ni-šu2 u2-kin-ni (“he established [the case] against himself ”) describes mGimillu’s confession. This term occurs in numerous Eanna texts that refer to similar confessions in response to accusations.24 Instead of confessing to a crime, the accused individuals may also answer the accusation with a counter-accusation. For example, after the names of five mār banî, YOS 6, 131 reads as follows: 5.

DUMU.MEŠ DU3-i- ša2 ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu 6. mda-nim-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-URI3 lu2A-KIN ša2 DUMU-LUGAL 7. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAGLUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 8. E2.AN.NA iq-bu-u2 um-ma 2 AB2. GAL lu2

(5–8) The mār banî in whose presence mAnim-a ē-u ur the messenger of the crown prince said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna:

24 YOS 7, 7:49; YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7, 7:113–114; YOS 7, 42:11–15; YOS 7, 78:11–13; YOS 7, 97:10–12; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:13. The verb qabû (“to say”), instead of eli ramnišu kunnu, describes the confession in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95– 101:10. However, the connection to the verb kunnu is maintained in lines 18–22, which refer to the confession as lu2mu-kin-nu-tu . . . e-li ram-ni-šu2-nu (“the testimony . . . against themselves”). For the suggestion that the term eli ramnišu kunnu refers to confessions obtained through maš altu-torture see San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 72 and the discussion of the maš altu procedure below (section 9.G).

280

chapter nine 9. 1 AB2.TUR PAP 3 GU4. I.A ša2 ina qa-pu-ut-tu4 10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina IGI mba-ni-ia 11. A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-SU mbau2-SUR 12. A-šu2 ša2 mba-ni-ia ki-i u2-kal-li-mannu 13. ina a-mat DUMU LUGAL ki-i a-bu-ku a-na 14. mdba-u2-SUR ap-te-qi2-id

(8–14) “When mBau-ē ir son of Bāniya showed me 2 cows and 1 small cow, total: 3 bovines from the pen of the Lady-ofUruk at the disposal of mBāniya son of mMarduk-erība, by the order of the prince, when I led them away I entrusted them to m Bau-ē ir.” m

15. u mba-u2-SUR a-na mdNA3LUGAL-URI3 iq-bu-u2

(15–16) And mBau-ē ir said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur:

16. um-ma AB.GAL-am3 3-ta ša2 mdanim-ŠEŠ.ME-URI3 17. lu2A KIN ša2 DUMU LUGAL ipqi-du map-la-a 18. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-tab-ni-URI3 a-na ši-gi-il-tu2 19. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-bak

(16–19) “mAplaya son of m Nabû-tabni-u ur unlawfully took away from me the 3 cows which mAnim-a ē-u ur, the messenger of the king, entrusted to me.”

This text is classified as an accusatory deposition because it does not record any proceedings beyond the accusations. However, it amply demonstrates the initiation of the case through accusation and the accused individual’s answer with a counter-accusation. The case begins when the messenger of the crown prince declares that mBau-ē ir was given three cows, which are now, apparently, missing.25 mBau-ē ir, who is now held responsible for the cows, then accuses mAplaya of stealing those three cows. mBau-ē ir’s accusation is actually an attempt to clear himself of guilt by placing the blame on mAplaya. By answering the accusation with a counter-accusation, the accused individuals seek to clear their own names. However, simply making a counter-accusation does not end their responsibility. Instead, they must prove their counter-accusation. This responsibility finds expression in the text-types that require individuals to support a claim, such as the kunnu-summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties pending evidence, as well as in the text-types that require individuals to present another individual, such as the abāku-summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence. The typological discussion of

25 The case may actually begin with an accusation against the messenger himself. If this is so, then the messenger’s declaration is itself a counter-accusation.


281

these text-types demonstrated that the individuals who must meet the requirements in these text-types are, in some cases, themselves accused individuals. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for testimony obligate these accused individuals to substantiate their counter-accusations by “establishing the case” (kunnu). Similarly, the abākusummonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence require the accused individuals to present the individuals against whom they have leveled the counter-accusation. The typological discussion has already presented much of the evidence supporting the correlation between the accused individual’s answer to the accusation and the issuance of the kunnu-summonses (section 5.A), the guarantees for testimony (section 5.B), the abāku-summonses (section 6.A) and the guarantees for an individual’s presence (section 6.B). Therefore, just one example will be cited. The example is an excerpt from YOS 7, 35, a multi-part text pertaining to branded livestock that has been found in the unlawful possession of mGimillu.26 m Gimillu justifies his possession of a lamb and a ewe by saying that he, in apparent innocence, received them as a deposit from a shepherd named mMušēzib-Bēl. mGimillu is then required to establish the case against mMušēzib-Bēl, whom he has accused of misappropriating the sheep. The relevant section of the text reads: 14. u3 1-en pu- al 1 U8 ša2 mgi-mil-lu (14–15) And (as for) the lamb and the 15. iq-bu-u2 um-ma mmu-še-zibewe about which mGimillu said thus: d EN ip-te-qid “ mMušēzib-Bēl deposited (them with me)”— 16. a-di U4 15-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠE m gi-mil-lu mKAR-dEN 17. u2-kan-na a-na E2.AN.NA i-nam-din

(16–17) By 15 Addaru, mGimillu shall establish (the case) against m Mušēzib-Bēl and give (the sheep) to the Eanna.

18. ki-i la uk-tin-nu 60-šu e-e-nu a-na E.AN.NA i-nam-din

(18) If he does not establish the case (against him), mGimillu shall pay 60 sheep to the Eanna.

This excerpt illustrates how a kunnu-summons might be the immediate result of a counter-accusation. Although mGimillu has claimed that he is innocent by accusing mMušēzib-Bēl, mGimillu will not be considered

26 This is not the notoriously corrupt official with the same name, who also plays a role in this text; it is he who brings the initial accusation. For more on this text, see von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 113–115.

282

chapter nine

innocent until he can establish the case against mMušēzib-Bēl. If mGimillu cannot establish the case, then he remains liable for the 30-fold payment for the misappropriated sheep. 9.F

“Establishing the Case”: kunnu

Mere accusations are not sufficient cause for the Eanna authorities to impose a penalty upon accused individuals; the accuser must “establish the case” (kunnu) against the accused. This requirement is illustrated in the following excerpt from YOS 6, 123: 1. 5 UDU.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du 2. ša2 ina e-e-ni ša2 mki-na-a A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-ina-SU 3-¢SURÜ 3. A mdan-ne-e-a am-ra-a-ma m NUMUN-ia A-šu2

(1–3) 5 sheep belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk, branded with a star, which were seen in the flock of m Kīnaya son of mNergal-ina-tēšê-ē ir descendant of Dannea—

4. ša2 mTIN-su lu2NA.KAD ša2 d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 3 ina lib3-bi 5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina sa-ar2-ti ul-tu e-ni-ia

(3–5) about 3 of which mZēriya, son of mBalāssu, the herdsman of the Lady-of-Uruk said thus: (5–6) “They were led away from my flock in theft.”

6. ab-ka-a ina UKKIN a-na mkina-a u2-kin-nu

(6) In the assembly, he established (the case) against mKīnaya.

7. 1-en 30. MEŠ e-e-ni ra-bi-ti ina UGU mki-na-a 8. par-su

(7–8) They decided that mKīnaya must pay 30-fold for the full-grown sheep.

This excerpt describes the initiation of the case with mZēriya’s accusation that the sheep found in mKīnaya’s flock were actually stolen. The verb qabû is used to describe the procedure of accusation. The verb kunnu denotes a separate action of “establishing the case” that occurs only after the initial accusation has been made. The narrative in YOS 6, 123 implies that the penalty is imposed upon mKīnaya as a result of this second action, and not simply on the basis of the accusation. The connection between the counter-accusation and the issuance of kunnu-summonses (see section 9.E above) demonstrates the need for a case to be “established” before a penalty can be imposed. This need is also reflected in another text-type, the penalties pending evidence (see section 5.C above). Texts of this text-type come mostly from the


283

Eanna archives. They impose a penalty upon accused individuals should a witness or informer establish the case against them. The typological discussion (s.c) suggested that these texts might be the result of accusations that are not accompanied by sufficient evidence. The accusers have stated their accusations, but, once the cases come to trial, they cannot establish their case. Thus, only accusations remain at the end of this trial. They will result in a penalty only once additional evidence can be presented. In the Eanna, the actual procedure denoted by the verb kunnu resembles the procedure of the same name described in the previous chapter (section 8.E above). It seems to have entailed the presentation of oral testimony (mukinnūtu). The verb kunnu often describes an action that takes place in the presence of the Eanna assembly.27 In some of these texts, the statement described by the verb kunnu is made under oath28 or as the result of questioning (ša ālu).29 However, not all instances of the verb kunnu indicate that the testimony was given under oath or following interrogation. In addition to oral testimony, written evidence may also be presented as part of this stage of the trial. One text states that the authorities “see” (amāru) a document.30 The authorities may also “read” (šasû) documents themselves,31 or the documents may be read “before” (ma ar) or “in the presence of ” the authorities.32 One interesting example that sheds some additional light on how the kunnu procedure takes place in the Eanna occurs in AnOr 8, 56. This text begins with a slavegirl’s declaration that she belongs to mLāqīpi. Her claim, however, is contested by mBēl-lē i. His claim and the ensuing action by the authorities are described as follows:

27 YOS 6, 123:6; YOS 6, 231:9–10; YOS 6, 156:8–20; AnOr 8, 47:18–19 (mār banî); YOS 7, 78:11–13; YOS 7, 97:10–12; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:1; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:13; YOS 7, 140:21–22. In YOS 7, 7:56–57; YOS 7, 7:69–70; YOS 7, 7:91–94 the presence of the assembly is mentioned. Note, however, that in the following sections of YOS 7, 7, the verb kunnu occurs without the mention of the assembly: YOS 7, 7:49; YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7, 7:137–138; YOS 7, 7:145; YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7, 7:113–114; YOS 7, 7:128–129. 28 YOS 6, 231:9–10; YOS 6, 156:13–14; YOS 7, 140:21–22. 29 YOS 6, 156:8–20; AnOr 8, 47:18–19. 30 YOS 7, 91. 31 YOS 6, 116:10. 32 YOS 19, 92 (ina DU.ZU); TCL 12, 119:10–14; BIN 2, 134:41 (restored).

284

chapter nine 7. u EN-le-e 2-u2 ša2 si-imma-gir 8. IGI-ut2-tu a-na mdNA3-DUIBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. NA 9. u mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2EN piqit-tu4 E2.AN.NA 10. iš-pu-ru um-ma fqal-lat-a iš-ši-i md

11.

lu2

lu2

NA3-DU-IBILA u3 mdNA3ŠEŠ-MU 12. fa-bi-ul-ti-di a-na mMU-dNA3 A-šu2 ša2 mri-mut lu2 13. A-KIN ša2 mdEN-DA ina IGI-ut-tu2 ša2 mdEN-DA 14. lu22-u2 ša2 lu2si-im-ma-gir id-dinu . . . md

(7–10) And mBēl-lē i, the deputy of the simmagir sent testimony to m Nabû-mukīn-apli the šatammu of the Eanna and mNabû-a a-iddin the administrator of the Eanna thus: (10) “She is my slavegirl.”

(11–14) mNabû-mukīn-apli and Nabû-a a-iddin gave fAbi-ūl-tīdi to mIddin-Nabû son of mRīmūt, the messenger of mBēl-lē i, based on the testimony of mBēl-lē i the deputy of the simmagir . . . m

Bēl-lē i claims that the slavegirl belongs to him. The text uses the word mukinnūtu (“testimony”) to describe his claim, but does not use the verb qabû or kunnu to introduce his statement. Instead, the text states that m Bēl-lē i has “sent” (šapāru) his testimony with a “messenger” ( lu2A-KIN= mār šipri ). Even though it is clear that mBēl-lē i himself does not appear in court, the text quotes his claim in the first person, as if he himself were speaking. This fact apparently indicates that mBēl-lē i’s own words have been written down in a document that the messenger brings before the authorities. Although this text seems to be exceptional, it nevertheless demonstrates that the individual giving “testimony” (mukinnūtu) did not have to actually appear in court. m

9.G

Questioning and Interrogation: ša ālu and maš altu

The texts from the Eanna describe two procedures by which the authorities may confront accused individuals in order to obtain information from them. These two procedures are designated by the verb ša ālu and the noun maš altu. The ša ālu procedure is similar to the procedure described by the same verb in the texts from private archives (see section 8.H above). The verb usually describes how the authorities question the accused,33 although the authorities may also question anyone

33 YOS 6, 225; TCL 12, 119; YOS 6, 156; YOS 7, 128; YOS 7, 149; YOS 7, 140; YOS 7, 146. CT 2, 2 describes the questioning of two suspects in the Ebabbar at Sippar.


285

who can provide relevant information.34 The verb may occur alone,35 or may include a quotation of the question posed.36 The individual who is questioned may be summoned before the questioning.37 The individual’s response may be quoted, introduced by the verb qabû38 or by the verb kunnu.39 Sometimes, but not always, the ša ālu procedure results in testimony under oath.40 In addition to the procedure denoted by the verb ša ālu, which seems to denote a questioning procedure similar to the one described in texts from private archives, the Eanna texts also attest to a procedure designated by the noun maš altu (“interrogation”). A good example comes from YOS 6, 144, a summons to present a number of thieves to the administrator of the Eanna, who will “conduct their interrogation” (maš alta šakānu).41 The text reads as follows: 1. mUTU-ki-i-ni lu2sa-ar-ru ša2 6-ta GU4 AB2.GAL.MEŠ 2. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ina saar2-ti ul-tu GU4 AB2.GAL.MEŠ md NA3-na-din-MU 3. A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a lu2SIPA-u2 ša2 d GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-bu-ku md 4. U.GUR-DU3-uš lu2EN.NUN i bat-ma a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3

(1–4) mNergal-īpuš, the guard, caught mŠamaš-kīni, the criminal, who, in theft, led away 6 cows belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk from the cows of mNabûnādin-šumi son of mAplaya, the shepherd of the Lady-of-Uruk.

5.

(4–7) He sent him to mNabû-šarrau ur, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna, to mGabbi-ilī-šarrau ur, the qīpu official of the Eanna and to the administrators of the Eanna.

SAG-LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 ša2 E2.AN.NA m gab-bi-DINGIR.MEŠ-LUGALURI3 6. lu2qi-i-pi ša2 E2.AN.NA u3 lu2EN. MEŠ pi-qit-tan-ni-tu4 7. ša2 E2.AN.NA iš-pur-aš2-šu u3 md NA3-LUGAL-URI3 a-na lu2

34 YOS 19, 91 (owner of slave in question); TCL 13, 170 (guards associated with suspected guard). 35 TCL 12, 119:9–10; AnOr 8, 47:18–19; YOS 7, 149:11–12; YOS 7, 146:15–16; YOS 7, 140:9–11. 36 YOS 19, 91:21–23; YOS 6, 225:9–11; YOS 7, 128:21–23; TCL 13, 170:14–16. 37 YOS 19, 91; YOS 6, 225; TCL 12, 119; YOS 7, 128; YOS 7, 140. 38 YOS 19, 91; YOS 6, 225; YOS 7, 149; YOS 7, 146; YOS 7, 140. 39 AnOr 8, 47 (qabû + kunnu); YOS 7, 128. 40 YOS 6, 156:8–14; TCL 13, 170:19. 41 For a similar example of an order from the Eulmaš at Akkad, see Michael Jursa, “Akkad, das Eulmaš und Gubāru,” WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211.

286

chapter nine 8.

NA3-DU-A lu2GAL-SI.MEŠ id-din-uš-šu2 um-ma

md

9. a-lik-ma lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 lu-kal-lim-ka-ma DU-ka 10.

(7–8) mNabû-šarra-u ur handed him over to mNabû-mukīn-apli, the rab ešerti saying thus: (9) “Go! Let him tell you (the names of ) the criminals who were with him and confirm (them) for you!”

UTU-ki-i-ni iq-bu-u2 um-ma EN-I u mdEN-ŠEŠ-ME-BA-ša2 11. A.MEŠ ša2 m a-am-ma-ru-ru u m ri- e-e-tu4 A-šu2 ša2 m a-gi-ra-

(10) mŠamaš-kīni said thus: (10–12) “mBēl-na id and mBēla ē-iqīša sons of m ammaruru and mRi ētu son of m agira were with me.”

12. it-ti-ia mdNA3-DU-A mdUTU-kii-ni lu2sa-ar2-ru 13. u lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 ib-bakan2-ma 14. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2 SAG.LUGAL u lu2EN.MEŠ pi-qit-tan-ne-e-tu4 15. ša2 E2.AN.NA ib-ba-kam-ma maša2-al-ta-šu2-nu 16. i-šak-kan

(12–15) mNabû-mukīn-apli shall bring mŠamaš-kīni, the criminal, and the criminals who were with him to mNabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš šarri official and the administrators of the Eanna. (15–16) He will carry out their interrogation.

md md

Šamaš-kīni, a thief, is caught and brought before the administrator of the Eanna. The administrator hands the thief to mNabû-mukīn-apli, and the thief names three other accomplices to the crime. The maš altu procedure, performed by the administrator, will take place when mNabûmukīn-apli brings all four thieves. In order to better understand this procedure, one may turn to a number of texts from the Eanna at Uruk that have the word maš altu in their headings.42 One such example is YOS 6, 223:

m

1. ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 ša2 mMU-dSU A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-dINNIN 2. ša2 iq-bu-u2 um-ma 8 ½ GIN2 gir2u2 KU3.GI ina ŠU2.2 lu2ERIN.ME 3. a-na KU3.BABBAR an-daar u3 a-na KU3.BABBAR a-na lu2ERIN. ME at-ta-din

(1–2) Interrogation of mIddinIštar son of mIbni-Ištar (during) which he said as follows: (2–3) “8 ½ šeqel and 1 gerû of gold I purchased from the people for silver, and I sold to the people for silver.”43

YOS 6, 77; YOS 6, 137; YOS 6, 223; VAS, Neue Folge 4, No. 126; YOS 7, 42. Note the discrepancy between the sum in line 2 (8 ¹³⁄²⁴ šeqel of gold) and the tally of the sums enumerated (9 5⁄16). See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 295 n. 2. 42 43

the adjudicatory process in the eanna 4.

287

lu2 ŠA3.TAM u lu2UMBISAG.ME ša2 E2.AN.NA a-na mMU-dSU 5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma KU3.GI ma-la ina ŠU.2 lu2ERIN.ME 6. ta-am- u-ru u3 a-na lu2ERIN.ME ta-ad-di-nu KA2.MEŠ qi2-ba-anna-šu2

(4–5) The šatammu and the scribes of the Eanna said thus to mIddinIštar: (5–6) “Tell us whatever gold you purchased from the people and the specific amounts you gave to people.”

7. mMU-dSU

(7–8) mIddin-Ištar said thus:

iq-bi

8. um-ma ½ GIN2 mi-šil bit-qa KU3. GI ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-PAP 9. A-šu2 ša2 mŠEŠ.ME-MU an-daar 3-ta 4-tu2.ME ina ŠU.2 10. mina-SU 3-SUR A-šu2 ša2 mIR3ia2 an-daar

(8–9) “I received ½ šeqel and half of one eighth of a šeqel of gold from mNabû-nā ir son of m A ē-iddin.” (9–10) “I received ¾ (šeqel) from mIna-tešê-ē ir son of m Ardiya.”

11. 2 GIN2 KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mdENŠEŠ-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3BA-ša2 12. ina TIN.TIRki an-daar

(11–12) “I received 2 šeqel of gold from mBēl-a a-šubši son of m Nabû-iqīša in Babylon.”

13. 1 GIN2 KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mdNA3DU-NUMUN lu2KU3.DIM 14. an-daar

(13–14) “I received 1 šeqel of gold from mNabû-mukīn-zēri, the goldsmith.”

15. KU3.GI ša2 mMU-dSU iq-bu-u2 um-ma a-na KU3.BABBAR 16. a-na lu2ERIN.ME at-ta-din

(15–16) This is the gold about which mIddin-Ištar said thus: “I sold it for silver to the people.”

17. 3 GIN2 KU3.GI a-na mda-nimŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 mmu-še-zib

(17) 3 šeqel of gold to mAnima a-iddin son of mMušēzib.

18. 2 GIN2 KU3.GI a-na mdNA3-muše-tiq-UD.DA A-šu2 19. ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-MU-DU3

(18–19) 2 šeqel of gold to m Nabû-mušētiq-uddê son of m Marduk-šuma-ibni.

20. ITI DIRI ŠE.KIN.KUD U4 4-kam2 MU 12-kam2 dNA3IM.TUK 21. LUGAL TIN.TIRki

(20–21) 4 Addaru II, year 12 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

After the heading, which indicates that mIddin-Ištar is being interrogated,44 the text records his statement. Following his initial statement,

44 This is the usual meaning of ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 ša2 PN. However, note that in YOS 6, 137:1 the phrase clearly means “interrogation by PN (of another individual).” This can be seen from lines 12–13, in which PN, a ša rēš šarri, interrogates the two thieves.

288

chapter nine

the text records the officials’ demand that he give a detailed account45 of the gold he handled. mIddin-Ištar names the people from whom he received gold and specifies the amounts he received and then names the people to whom he sold gold for silver and specifies the amounts he sold. As San Nicolò has noted in his initial study of the maš altu texts, it is always an accused individual who is subject to the procedure in texts that bear this heading.46 Thus, in YOS 6, 223, the example above, the procedure takes place because mIddin-Ištar has been accused of mishandling gold belonging to the Eanna.47 The record of the maš altu procedure may include a quotation of the accused individual’s confession, as in the case above. However, at least one text with the heading maš altu, YOS 6, 77, simply lists the items that are obtained as the result of the interrogation of a gatekeeper. Therefore, it seems that the purpose of the maš altu procedure is not only to obtain a confession, but also to obtain goods that have been misappropriated or stolen. The texts presented thus far do not describe how the maš altu procedure achieves its desired ends. In attempting to address this question, San Nicolò associates the maš altu texts with the fact that in almost all cases pertaining to theft or misappropriation from the Eanna, the accused individual confesses to the crime. Based on this, San Nicolò suggests that the Eanna authorities use physical torture to obtain confessions and that the noun maš altu refers to this procedure.48 More recently, Jursa has confirmed San Nicolò’s suggestion by pointing to Seleucid era texts that mention a device called simmiltu ša maš alti (“ladder of interrogation”) in the context of a procedure involving judges.49 Although the For this interpretation of the logogram KA2.MEŠ, see CAD bābu A6a (B, p. 26). San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 301. 47 See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 294–298. For other inquiries into the handling of gold in the Eanna that took place later in the same month of the same year see Renger, JAOS 90 (1971), pp. 501–503. 48 San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 72; pp. 301–302. San Nicolò suggests that the term eli ramnišu kunnu (“to establish about oneself ”), which frequently occurs in Eanna decision records, refers to confessions obtained in a maš altu procedure. One might expect, then, that the term would appear in the maš altu texts, as well. The term, however, occurs only once in a text labeled maš altu, (YOS 7, 42:11–12). Even in this text, there are two other statements that are introduced by qabû, rather than eli ramnišu kunnu. Furthermore, both AnOr 8, 27 and YOS 7, 78 describe confessions made ša lā maš alti (“without interrogation”). It is, therefore, difficult to say that all confessions described by the term eli ramnišu kunnu are obtained through torture. Rather, the frequency of confessions might be attributed to the accused individual’s desire to avoid torture. 49 Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), p. 199. See also Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 924. It should be noted that stronger evidence for the use of the “ladder of interrogation” in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian eras would be desirable. 45 46


289

references occur in much later texts, Jursa suggests that the “ladder” was used in the Eanna already in earlier times. It has already been noted that the texts with the term maš altu in their headings describe a procedure involving the Eanna authorities and an individual accused of a crime. Two other texts, YOS 7, 78 and AnOr 8, 27, record confessions by individuals who have been accused but who make their statements ša2 la maš alti (“without interrogation”).50 In these texts, it seems that the procedure might have been used against the accused individuals but, in actual fact, is not. The phrase ša2 la maša2-a-a-al-tu4 (“without interrogation”) also occurs in YOS 7, 10:2. In this text, it introduces a statement by a slave who accuses his master’s son of stealing a cumin mill. The text itself does not indicate that the slave has been accused of any crime, but the term ša2 la ma-ša2-a-a-altu4 (“without interrogation”) suggests that the maš altu procedure would have been carried out if it had been necessary. Given the possibility that the maš altu procedure involved torture, it is difficult (but not impossible) to imagine that it would have been used against innocent witnesses. Instead, the implication that maš altu would have been used suggests that the slave in YOS 7, 10 and the individuals in YOS 7, 78 and AnOr 8, 27 are not entirely beyond suspicion. Because the Eanna texts employ both the noun maš altu and the related verb ša ālu, one question that must be addressed is the relationship between the two terms. There are texts that include both the noun and the verb, in which the verb ša ālu describes the action of maš altu.51 One might conclude, therefore, that the verb ša ālu, even without the noun maš altu, refers to a maš altu procedure. There are, however, several factors that suggest that the noun maš altu refers to a specific procedure that is different from the procedure described by the verb ša ālu alone. First, as has already been noted, the maš altu procedure, unlike the verb ša ālu, has the specific goal of obtaining a confession and the misappropriated items, and thus probably involved torture of the accused. Furthermore, as San Nicolò has suggested, the existence of a separate term maš altu šakānu seems to indicate that it refers to a procedure that is different from the procedure denoted by ša ālu.52 Based on these factors it seems that maš altu refers to a specific interrogation

50 51 52

YOS 7, 78:3; AnOr 8, 27:4. YOS 6, 77:28; YOS 6, 137; Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211:4. San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 301.

290

chapter nine

procedure. This procedure is different from the procedure described by ša ālu alone, which refers to questioning that takes place during the regular course of a hearing.53 In sum, ša ālu and maš altu refer to two procedures by which the adjudicating authorities obtain information. The general term is the verb ša ālu, which describes the “interrogation” of different parties to a case during the course of a trial. The related noun maš altu refers to a specific procedure used to obtain confessions from accused individuals. This procedure is attested in a more limited set of texts and may have taken place as part of the gathering of physical evidence, even before the trial itself.54 9.H

Oaths

The terms for swearing an oath in the Eanna texts resemble those mentioned in the previous chapter’s discussion of oaths in the texts from private archives (see section 8.I above). The terms used in the Eanna texts include nīš ilī [u šarri ] zakāru (“to pronounce the oath of the gods [and the king])55 and ina DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by DN and the oaths of RN”).56 As is the case with the texts from private archives, the words of the actual oath are usually quoted, and may be introduced by the term iqbi umma (“said thus”) or by the word kî. The oath itself may be formulated in either the “positive” form, which implies that the statement made is true, or the “negative” form, which implies that the opposite of what is stated is true.57 Oaths administered during the course of proceedings serve one of two functions. In some cases, the oaths have an evidentiary function; they serve as a means of obtaining information to be used as evidence in deciding the case. In other cases, individuals may be summoned to swear an oath in response to an accusation. In these situations the oaths serve an exculpatory function; by swearing, the individuals attempt to clear themselves of the charge. 53 This conclusion is reached by San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 301 and echoed in Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 922. 54 For this suggestion, see Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 922. 55 YOS 6, 224:19–20; TCL 13, 170:18–19. The variant nīš DN zakāru occurs in TCL 13, 179:14–15. 56 An example of this basic formula occurs in YOS 7, 152:1–4. Variations include ina DN u RN temû (TCL 13, 181:9–10). 57 Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 171.


291

The evidentiary function of the oath is illustrated by YOS 6, 224, a preliminary protocol that describes the proceedings regarding mŠamaššuma-iddin’s status as an oblate as follows: 15. . . . mdUTU-MU-MU iq-bi

(15–16) mŠamaš-šuma-iddin said thus:

16. um-ma fba-bu-nu DUMU.SAL-su ša2 mSUM.NA-dAMAR.UTU 17. e-e-mu ša2 fsi-lim-dINNIN AMAia u3 f ar-ši-na-na AMA AMA-ia 18. ar- a-at ina ŠU.2 ur- a-a-ni lu2 GAR.UMUŠ UNUGki lu2ŠA3. TAM E2.AN.NA

(16–18) “ f Babūnu daughter of m Iddin-Marduk is aware of the matter of fSilim-Ištar, my mother, and f aršinana my mother’s mother. Find out from her!”

19. u3 lu2SAG.LUGAL fba-bu-nu i-buku-nim-ma niš DINGIR.MEŠ u3 LUGAL

(18–19) The šākin ēmi of Uruk, the šatammu of the Eanna and the ša rēš šarri brought fBabūnu to them.

20. i-na UKKIN ta-az-za-ku-ur ki-i a-na-ku kak-kab-ti u3 ar2-ra-a-tu4

(19–20) She swore by the gods and the king in the assembly:

21. ina mu - i rit-ti ša2 f ar-ši-na-na f qal-lat ša2 mSUM.NA-NUMUN 22. ŠEŠ AD-ia AMA AMA ša2 md UTU-MU-MU ša2 mSUM. NA-NUMUN ŠEŠ AD-ia 23. i-na pa-na-at ša2 tul-la-du a-na lu2 šir-ku-tu a-na 24. dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki u2-zak-kušu2 la a-mu-ru

(20–24) “(May I be cursed if ) I did not see the star and brand on the hand of f aršinana the slavegirl of mIddin-zēri, my father’s brother, mŠamaš-šumaiddin’s mother’s mother, whom m Iddin-zēri, my father’s brother, dedicated to the širku service of the Lady-of-Uruk, before she gave birth.”

Prompted by mŠamaš-šuma-iddin, the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna “bring” (abāku) fBabūnu in order to determine mŠamaš-šumaiddin’s status. She makes this determination by swearing that she has seen the brands on mŠamaš-šuma-iddin’s grandmother’s hand. In this particular example, mBabūnu’s oath is purely evidentiary. She is brought before the authorities simply in order to provide information. In contrast with the evidentiary function of the oath illustrated by YOS 6, 224, the oath in the following decision record has an exculpatory function. Two copies of the decision record exist and are edited as YOS 6, 169 and YOS 6, 231. The relevant section of the text reads as follows:58

58

Line numbering follows YOS 6, 231. The text is a composite transcription.

292

chapter nine 1. 2 UDU ka-lum ina lib3-bi 1 ša2 kak-kab-ti še-en-di 2. u3 1 MAŠ2-TUR PAP 3 UDU.NITA2 ša2 mzu-um-bu 3. A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-KAM lu2 NA.KAD ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 4. ul-tu e-e-nu ša2 mŠEŠ-li-ti5. A-šu2 ša2 mDINGIR.MEŠ-iaki-ni i-bu-ku um-ma

(1–5) 2 lambs, one branded with a star, and 1 goat. Total: 3 sheep, which m Zumbu son of mNanaya-ēreš, the herdsman of the Lady-of-Uruk led away from the flock of mA i-līti son of mIlūya-kīni, and (said) thus:

6. UDU.NITA2 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 qa-pu-ut-ti-ia2 šu2-nu

(6) “They are sheep of the Lady-ofUruk from my pen.”

7.

m

ŠEŠ-li-ti- ina UKKIN iq-bi um-ma

(7) mA i-līti said thus in the assembly:

8.

ba-zu-zu lu2SIPA ša2 mzu-umbu ina pa-[ni-ia]

(8–9) “mBazūzu, mZumbu’s shepherd deposited them with [me].”

9. ip-te-qid-su-nu-tu mba-zu-zu i-bu-ku-nim-ma 10. ina UKKIN niš DINGIR u3 LUGAL iz-ku-ur-[ma] 11. mŠEŠ-li-ti- u2-kin ki-i

(9–11) They brought mBazūzu and, in the assembly, he swore by the god and the king, and established against m A i-līti :

12. UDU.NITA2 a-na mŠEŠ-li-tiat-[ta-din] 13. u3 ina pa-ni-šu2 ap-qi-du

(11–13) “(May I be cursed if ) I gave m A i-līti any sheep or deposited anything with him.”

m

The authorities “bring” (abāku) mBazūzu to the assembly because mA ilīti has named him as the one who removed the sheep from mZumbu’s flock and deposited them with mA i-līti . mBazūzu swears that he has not given any sheep to mA i-līti , and thus clears himself of the charge. The examples above of both the evidentiary and exculpatory oaths show that the authorities might “bring” (abāku) the individual who is to swear an oath. Apart from the use of this verb in descriptions of proceedings, summoning to swear an oath is also attested in a group of summonses, mostly from outside the Eanna, in which the summoned individual must swear an oath or face a penalty.59 The imposition of the penalty in these summonses implies that the oath is exculpatory, like the one in the second example above.

59

Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; YOS 6, 202; Dar 358.


293

Besides “bringing” the individual who is to swear, the authorities might also play a role in the actual administration of the oath. Several texts use the Š-stem form of the verb zakāru (šuzkuru) to indicate that the authorities caused the individual to take an oath.60 For some insight into the implications of this causative form, one might turn to Spar, AOAT 203, No. 1, which describes how the authorities order an individual to swear. The relevant section of the text reads as follows: 8.

NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN. NA 9. a-na mšul-lu-mu A-šu2 ša2 10. mdNA3-DU-IBILA iq-bi um-ma

(8–10) mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna said thus to mŠullumu son of m Nabû-mukīn-apli:

11. i-na mku-ra-aš2 LUGAL TIN. TIRki 12. LUGAL KUR.KUR ti-me ki-i DUMU-u2-a 13. ša2 ta-bal i-ta-ba-lu a-mu-ru

(11–12) “Swear by Cyrus king of Babylon, king of the lands:” (12–13) ‘(May I be cursed if ) I have seen my son who has stolen!’ ”

md

The šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna order mŠullumu to swear that he has not seen his son. Their instructions include the formulation of the oath itself as mŠullumu is to swear it, with the verb (āmuru) in the first person singular. This text seems to describe the oath procedure as it is taking place, and indicates that the procedure begins with an order by the authorities.61 The causative form that occurs in other texts may refer to just such an order. Other details about how the oath was administered, such as the use of religious symbols in invoking the gods, have been discussed by Joannès.62 To conclude the present discussion of the oath, as well as the discussion of evidence, in general, it is useful to present Joannès’s observations about the place of oaths within the hierarchy of evidence. Joannès demonstrates that witnesses’ testimony and other evidence outweigh the evidence of an oath. Joannès proves that the testimony of witnesses is preferred over an oath from YNER 1, 2, a penalty pending

60 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:25’-26’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:19’–20’; YOS 6, 156:13–14. Note that in all of these cases the oath occurs in the context of “interrogation” (ša ālu). 61 Note, however, that mŠullumu’s own words do not match the oath as it is formulated by the authorities. See Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), pp. 170–171. 62 Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), pp. 172–174. See also, Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, pp. 924–925.

294

chapter nine

evidence text. This text begins with an oath sworn by mGimillu affirming that he has not sold or given away dates from the crop of year 1 of Darius. The text then states: 8. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu uk-te-nu-uš 1-en 30 9. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki inam-di-in 10. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-dad

(8–10) On the day that a witness establishes (the case) against him, he shall pay 30-fold to the Ladyof-Uruk. He shall bear the guilt of the king.

Even though mGimillu has sworn an oath, he has not, apparently, cleared himself of guilt entirely. If testimony of a witness becomes available, mGimillu will face the penalty. Thus, this text illustrates how the evidentiary power of an oath does not stand up to the evidence provided by witnesses.63 The proof that other evidence, and not just testimony, outweighs an oath comes from the continuation of YOS 6, 169 and YOS 6, 231, cited earlier in this section. After mBazūzu, the shepherd who has been accused of misappropriating the sheep, swears that he has done no wrongdoing, the authorities rule against his accuser, mA i-līti . This ruling is preceded by the following notice: 14. KA2 u3 i-da-ti 15. ša2 UDU.NITA2 ša2 mba-zu-zu a-na mŠEŠ-li-ti-[ ] 16. ip-qi-du mŠEŠ-li-ti- a-na UKKIN 17. la u2-kal-lim

(14–17) mA i-līti showed the assembly no accounts for proof (indicating) that mBazūzu deposited with mA i-līti .

The reason for the ruling against mA i-līti is the fact that he is unable to “show” (kullumu) any “accounts for proof ” (bābu u idāti ) to support his claim. This notice implies that if mAhi-līti had been able to present such evidence, he would have succeeded in his claim.64

63 Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 169. For similar examples of penalties pending evidence following an oath see AnOr 8, 61 and BIN 2, 116. 64 Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 169–170. Other examples of the use of oaths in the absence of documentary evidence are presented in Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, History, p. 924.

the adjudicatory process in the eanna 9.I

295

The Decision

Once the necessary evidence has been presented, the Eanna authorities are able to reach their decision. Unlike the decision records pertaining to private litigation, the “Eanna style” decision records do not use the verb mitluku to describe a procedure in which the authorities “deliberate.” However, logic alone would suggest that some deliberative procedure does take place before the decision is reached. This suggestion is supported by the notice in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:18–26 that the authorities reach their decision “in accordance with the testimony” (kî pî mukinnūti ). By recording the basis for the decision, the text indicates that the judges gave deliberate consideration to the evidence, in this case the testimony. The decision itself reflects the subject matter of the case.65 Because most of the Eanna decision records pertain to cases of misappropriation, the decision is usually the thirty-fold penalty. If, in the estimation of the Eanna authorities, the accused individuals are found guilty of misappropriating the Eanna’s property, the authorities impose the thirtyfold penalty upon them. This decision is reached throughout YOS 7, 7, the multi-part decision record pertaining to the misdeeds of mGimillu. One example from that text reads as follows: 86. UD5-a 1 1-en 30 30 e-e-nu 87. e-li mgi-mil-lu ip-ru-su

(86–87) (For) that 1 goat, they decided that mGimillu must pay 30fold: 30 of the flock.

The verbal phrase eli PN parāsu (“they decided that PN must pay,” or, more literally, “they decided to the debit of PN”) denotes the decision procedure, as it does in some decision records pertaining to private litigation. The thirty-fold penalty itself is expressed with the term 1-en 30 (“30-fold”),66 followed by the total owed by the criminal. The decision records end with the decision. They do not state whether or not the parties actually comply with the decision. Based on the discussion of the adjudication of disputes pertaining to private property, one might imagine that the parties’ compliance would have been recorded in a separate text-type, namely the conclusions. Unfortunately, the records from the Eanna have not, as yet, yielded texts of this textSee summary tables 1.3 and 1.4. The term occurs with the addition of the word adi, in the form 1-en a-di 30 in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:22 and YOS 7, 161:9. 65 66

296

chapter nine

type. Nevertheless, it seems likely that such texts did once exist, since the need for this text-type probably existed in the Eanna, as it did in other adjudicatory settings. 9.J

The Adjudicating Authorities in the Eanna

In the Eanna decision records, the main authorities bear the titles lu2 šatammu, lu2SAG.LUGAL lu2bēl piqitti and lu2qīpu. The names of these adjudicating officials, along with their titles, occur in two places in the decision records and preliminary protocols from the Eanna: within the description of the proceedings and among the personal names recorded at the beginning (“style B”) or the end (“style A”) of the texts. In “style A” texts, the names of officials are sometimes introduced by the term ina DU.ZU (= ušuzzu, “in the presence of ”).67 These specific officials often function together with “the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians” (UKKIN lu2TIN.TIRki.ME u lu2UNUGki-a-a),68 sometimes simply called “the assembly” (UKKIN=pu ru).69 In addition to the authorities and the assembly, the Eanna texts also record the names of individuals who are designated lu2mukinnū (“witnesses”). The “Eanna style A” decision records may include both the names of officials, which are introduced with the term ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”), as well as names designated lu2mukinnū (“witnesses”). In these texts, the names introduced by ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”) precede the names designated lu2mukinnū (“witnesses”). 70 The “Eanna style B” decision records begin with personal names followed by the transitional phrase lu2mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses before whom . . .”) or the equivalent lu2DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pānišunu (“the mār banî before whom . . .”). The “Eanna style B” decision records bear a close resemblance to other texts that open with a record of witnesses before whom an action takes place. As has long been noted, most recently by von Dassow, the purpose of documents written in this manner seems to be to record 67 See the discussion of the “Eanna style A” decision records (section 1.C above) and summary tables 1.3 and 1.4. For a discussion of the term ina DU.ZU, see von Dassow, “Witnesses,” p. 13. 68 See, for example, YOS 6, 92:21–22; YOS 7, 128:21–22; TCL 13, 147:8–13. 69 The equivalence between the two terms is implied in the use of the complete term in YOS 7, 7:37–38 and the shorter term in the remainder of the text. 70 See, for example, Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:27–34.


297

witnesses who could attest that a particular action or transaction was performed.71 In the “Eanna style B” decision records, the action to which the witnesses attest is the decision of a case. The witnesses, according to this interpretation, are observers of a decision made “before” them. There is, however, reason to believe that the witnesses play more than the role of simple observers. For example, after the names of twelve witnesses, YOS 19, 91 reads as follows: 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

MU.DU.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-nišu2-nu mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2 SAG.LUGAL lu2 EN pi-qit-ti ša2 E2.AN.NA f ina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let ¢DUMU.SALÜ-su ša2 mdNA3NUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 m a-bi-i-lu [a-na] mu - i fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat f qal-lat-i-šu2 [ša2] a-na lu2ka-lu-u2-tu2 a-na d GAŠAN ša2 [UNUGki] [taš]-ru-ku u3 ina DUMU.MEŠ [ša2] fd¢DU3-tuÜ-ra-mat tu-li-du fga-mil-tu DUMU.SALsu mDU3-i[a] A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-PAP-A ŠEŠ ša2 f ina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let a-na mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA A-šu2 ša2 mu4-ma-a-šu a-na KU3. BABBAR id-di-nu a-na UKKIN-i-šu2-nu u2-bil-lamma fina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let lu2

22. iš- -al-u2-ma iq-bu-u2-šu2 um-ma mi-nu-u2 i-da-ti 23. [ša2] fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat fqal-lat-ka ši-i fina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let

(12–21) The witnesses before whom mNabû-šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna brought fIna-Esagil-bēlet daughter of mNabû-zēra-šubši son of mAbi-ilu, before their assembly [rega]rding fBānītu-râmat, her slave, [whom] she [ded]icated to the kalûtu-service to the Lady-of[Uruk]. And, among the children [to whom] fBānītu-râmat gave birth, mBāniya, son of mNabûnā ir-apli, brother72 of fIna-Esagilbēlet, sold, fGāmiltu, her (fBānīturâmat’s) daughter, to mNabûmušētiq-uddê son of mUmāšu for silver.

(21–22) They questioned fInaEsagil-bēlet, and said thus to her: (22–23) “What are the signs [that] Bānītu-râmat is your slave?”

f

71 See von Dassow, “Witnesses,” pp. 10–11. Von Dassow’s position is based on the discussion of such lists in San Nicolò-Ungnad, pp. 607–609. See also Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 10. 72 f Ina-Esagil-bēlet’s father is mNabû-zēra-šubši (line 14). mBāniya’s father is mNabûnā ir-apli (line 19). Therefore, it seems that mBāniya is actually fIna-Esagil-bēlet’s step-brother.

298

chapter nine 24. ina UKKIN-i-šu2-nu taq-bu-u2 um-ma ina MU 13-kam2 dNA3NIG2.DU-URI3

(23–24) In their assembly, fInaEsagil-bēlet said thus:

25. LUGAL TIN.TIRki MU.AN. NA ša2 u-zi-ra-tu4 mdNA3NUMUN-GAL2-ši 26. AD-u2-a fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat lu2qallat-su a-na nu-dun-nu-u2 27. id-dan-na u ana-ku ina ud lib3-biia2 a-na ka-lu-tu4 28. ¢aÜ-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki al-ta-rak-šu2 [X-X]-šu2 ša2 a-na 29. [dGAŠAN] ša2 UNUGki u-ra?di?-u2- šu2 3 DUMU.MEŠ 2 NITA.MEŠ 30. [1 SA]L ta-at-ta-lad ina ŠA3 fgamil-tu2 31. [ša2 mDU3-i ]a A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3PAP-A ŠEŠ-ia 32. [. . .] ina šur-qu a-na mdNA3-mu-šetiq-[UD.DA] 33. [ a]-na KU3.BABBAR it-ta-din md NA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA

(24–33) “In year 13 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, the year of the uzirtu-insects, m Nabû-zēra-šubši, my father, gave me fBānītu-râmat, his slave as my nudunnû, and I, of my own volition, gave her to the kalûtu-service of the La dy-of-Uruk . . . they a dded (?) her (to the rosters) of the [Lady]-of-Uruk. She gave birth to 3 children—2 males and [one femal]e, among (them) fGāmiltu, [whom mBāniy]a son of mNabûnā ir-apli, my brother, sold fraudulently to mNabû-mušētiq[uddê f ]or s ilver.”

34. [. . .] tu4 ul ra-ši fga-mil-tu 35. [. . .]-ti it-ti dGAŠAN ša2 ¢UNUGkiÜ

(33) mNabû-mušētiq-uddê . . . (34) h as n o . . . fGāmiltu (35) . . . with t he La dy-of Ur uk

Following Beaulieu’s understanding, lines 33–35, although damaged, contain a decision,73 for which this text is considered among the “Eanna style B” decision records. The prepositional phrase ina pānišunu in line 12 suggests, as has already been mentioned, that the witnesses simply observe the proceedings overseen by the ša rēš šarri administrator. However, the fact that the administrator is the only authority named raises difficulties in interpreting the plural possessives at the end of the word UKKIN-i-šu2-nu (“in their assembly”) in lines 21 and 24. The witnesses themselves must be the members of this assembly. The defendant is brought before them and it is they who question her. A similar situation is described in YOS 7, 128, another “Eanna style B” decision record. Instead of the designation lu2mu-kin-nu following

For discussion, see Beaulieu, YOS 19, pp. 3–4. Note that Beaulieu designates this text as a “deposition.” This book reserves that term for texts containing only testimony. 73


299

the personal names, this text uses the equivalent transitional sentence lu2 DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša ina pānišunu (“the mār banî before whom . . .”). The interrogation of the defendant is described thus (lines 21–24): 21. UKKIN lu2DUMU TIN. TIR u UNUGki lu2ki-niš-tu4 E2.AN.NA mEN-šu2-nu 22. i-bu-ku-nim-ma ina UKKIN iš-ša2-al-lu-ma iq-bu-šu2 umma

(21–22) The assembly of Babylonians and Urukians, the collegium of the Eanna brought mBēlšunu, and questioned him in the assembly, saying thus:

23. mi-nam-ma UDU. I.A ša2 kak-kab-tu4 AN.BAR tab-¢uk ta-nakÜ-kis

(23) “What iron-starred sheep did you lead away and kill?”

In lines 21–22, the body that “brings” (abālu) the defendant is called “the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians, the collegium of the Eanna.” They question him “in the assembly” (ina UKKIN). From these lines alone, it would seem that the mār banî named at the beginning of the decision record are simply observers of the assembly’s questioning and the decision. However, it appears (despite breaks in lines 28–30) that the decision is made by a body known as UKKIN lu2DUMU.DU3 (“the assembly of the mār banî ”). It seems, therefore, that the mār banî form at least part, if not all, of the assembly who question the defendant and come to the decision.74 Closer examination of the evidence of the “Eanna style B” decision records reveals the adjudicating role of the individuals designated as either lu2mukinnū or lu2mār banî. Thus, the role of the named individuals in these texts is not the same as the role of the named individuals in other, formally-similar types of texts. The named individuals are not simply there to observe and attest to the decision that was made. In the “Eanna style B” records, at least, the named individuals were among those who actually decided the case. Like the “Eanna style B” decision records, the “Eanna style A” decision records also name individuals designated as lu2mukinnū. One might suggest that these individuals, like the ones in the “Eanna style B” decision records, also served in some adjudicating capacity. For example, in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101, the text separates the witnesses, Additional support for the identity of the “assembly of the mār banî ” and the “assembly” mentioned in lines 21–22 may come from the restoration of line 24. Based on Tremayne’s drawing, the line may be restored mEN-šu2-nu ina [UKKIN lu2DUMU. DU3] UGU ram-ni-šu2 u2-kin-[ni . . . 74

300

chapter nine

designated by the term lu2mukinnū, from the authorities (the šatammu and the administrator) whose names follow the phrase ina DU.ZU. The decision itself is made “in the assembly,” which indicates that people other than just the šatammu and the administrator were involved. Based on the evidence of the “Eanna style B” decision records, it is possible to argue that the individuals designated as “witnesses” are actually members of the assembly. Other “Eanna style A” decision records in which only the designation lu2mukinnū is used may describe a similar situation, especially in those texts that mention the adjudicatory activities of an assembly.

CHAPTER TEN

THE NEO-BABYLONIAN TABLET TRAIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Until this point, the discussion of Neo-Babylonian court procedure has been primarily synchronic; it has focused on texts pertaining to one particular period in Mesopotamian history. The Neo-Babylonian litigation records, however, are just part of a long history of legal writing in Mesopotamia. In order to properly understand the Neo-Babylonian texts, then, one must also consider them diachronically, that is together with litigation records from other periods in the history of Mesopotamian law. The results of this comparative examination are obviously relevant to a general understanding of the history of legal procedure in the ancient Near East. Any diachronic history, legal or otherwise, can only be written by studying records from several different periods. More specifically, however, comparative study is directly relevant to the understanding of the Neo-Babylonian litigation records themselves. The comparative approach promises to shed light on aspects of legal procedure that may not be fully understood based only on the Neo-Babylonian texts. The discussion in the earlier chapters reached conclusions about text-typology and legal procedures based only on the internal evidence that the Neo-Babylonian litigation records provide. The identification of parallel texts and legal procedures among other ancient Near Eastern litigation records provides corroborative evidence for these conclusions. From this perspective, the purpose of the comparative approach is to support the interpretation of the Neo-Babylonian material by referring to similar legal phenomena in earlier periods in Mesopotamia. This chapter does not undertake a comprehensive comparative discussion of the Neo-Babylonian litigation records, which would require reviewing all the litigation records from all other periods in Mesopotamian history as well as those from neighboring Near Eastern societies. Instead, this chapter hews closer to the focus of the earlier parts of the study. It identifies textual parallels to the Neo-Babylonian text-types and points to some of the procedural parallels that can be identified in the textual record from earlier periods. To do so, it draws

302

chapter ten

on the existing studies of pre-Neo-Babylonian court procedure which were surveyed in the introduction to this book. All of these studies have recognized the need for text-typology, which makes the results they provide particularly useful. 10.A 10.A.1

The Decision Record

The Legal Function of the Decision Record

The long history of the decision record begins with the very oldest records from Mesopotamia that pertain to adjudication, the Neo-Sumerian texts known by the title d i. t i l. l a (“completed legal matter”). Falkenstein, who studied the texts with this title, classified some of them as “Prozeßprotokollen” (“protocols”). This classification refers to texts that, like the Neo-Babylonian decision records, mention a dispute between two parties and the matter under dispute, as well as the decision of the adjudicating authorities.1 Typological studies of texts from later periods have identified similar text-types, as well. These include the Old Babylonian “lawsuit records,” as Fortner labels them,2 or Dombradi’s “Urkunden über Prozeßverfahren” (“documents regarding trial proceedings”),3 and the texts from Nuzi that Hayden calls “lawsuits.”4 The modern identification of the decision record is confirmed by the existence of ancient terms that seem to refer to this specific texttype. In the Neo-Babylonian period, the term uppi dīni (“tablet of legal proceedings”) is used for this text-type.5 Dombradi and others have recognized that the term uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”) is used to describe many of the Old Babylonian decision records.6 Similarly, the scribes at Nuzi designated the “lawsuit” texts as uppi ša lē ûti (“tablet

Falkenstein, Neusumerische Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 15. The criteria of the “lawsuit records” are summarized in Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 71. 3 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 166. 4 Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 72–171. Jas, SAAS 5, classifies the Neo-Assyrian texts according to strictly formal criteria (see Jas, SAAS 5, pp. 2–3). This non-functional typology does not result in a separate Neo-Assyrian text-type equivalent to the NeoBabylonian decision record. However, Postgate’s classification, cited in Jas, SAAS 5, p. 3 n. 11, might yield a Neo-Assyrian parallel. 5 See section 1.A above. 6 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 165–166 and Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 2, p. 119 n. 681 and p. 143 n. 945. 1 2

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 303 of prevailing”).7 These native terms demonstrate that the identification of the decision record is not simply a modern convention. Instead, the ancient scribes themselves apparently recognized the decision record as a distinct text-type with its own designation. Thus, the identification of the features of the decision record is relevant not only for the purposes of text typology, but, more importantly, results in the description of a natively recognized genre of legal writing. Of the three native terms for the decision record—Old Babylonian uppi lā ragāmim, Nuzi’s uppi ša lē ûti and Neo-Babylonian uppi dīni—the Neo-Babylonian term is the least descriptive. Although the term uppi dīni (“tablet of legal proceedings”) does refer to the contents of the decision record, it does not properly describe this text-type’s legal function as the prevailing parties’ records decisions in their favor. On the other hand, the terms uppi lā ragāmim and uppi ša lē ûti are accurate expressions of the reasons for which decision records were composed. The term uppi ša lē ûti (“tablet of prevailing”) points to the most important fact written in the decision record: that one of the parties prevailed in a legal case. The term uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”) expresses the reason for which the decision record was composed: to prevent reopening of the legal case. Although the Neo-Babylonian term uppi dīni does not inherently express the legal function of the decision record, it is nevertheless clear that the Neo-Babylonian decision records share the same legal function as their older counterparts. The typological discussion demonstrated that the Neo-Babylonian decision records are written to provide the prevailing parties with evidence of a legal decision in their favor. The need for proper documentation of a decision stems from a concern with preventing future claims against the prevailing party. Some Neo-Babylonian decision records state this concern explicitly. One example occurs in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:32–35, which describes how the judges give the prevailing party, mBēl-rēmannu, the tablet as a record. The text states: 32. ¢i-naÜ up-pi KI.LAM-šu2 ušziz-¢zuÜ [u2] aš2-šu2 ma-ti-ma

7

Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 199 n. 96.

(31–32) They reaffirmed mBēlrēmannu’s (rights) in his tablet of sale.

304

chapter ten 33. [la sa- a]-ri-im-ma la ra-ga-mu lu2 DI.KU5.MEŠ 34. [ up-pi ] iš- u-ru-ma i-na na4 KIŠIB-šu2-nu 35. [ib]-ru-mu-ma a-na mdEN-reman-nu [id-din]-nu

(32–35) And in order to prevent [reneg]ing and bringing a suit in the future, the judges wrote a [tablet], [si]gned it with their seals, and gave it to mBēl-rēmannu.

Similarly, a number of Neo-Babylonian texts state that the judges give that particular record, marked with their seals, to the prevailing party “so that (the decision) will not be changed” (ana lā enê).8 As might be imagined, the need to prevent future claims against the prevailing party, expressed in the quotations above, does not suddenly emerge in the Neo-Babylonian period. The Akkadian terms uppi lā ragāmim and uppi ša lē ûti allude to this concern. Furthermore, the formulation of pre-Neo-Babylonian decision records reveals that these texts are written with the same concern in mind.9 In the Neo-Sumerian d i. t i l. l a texts, this concern is addressed by what Falkenstein calls the Verzichterklärung (“declaration of renunciation of future claims”) which is made under oath or symbolized by “dragging the cloak” (t u g2.u r3).10 Similarly, the Old Babylonian decision records often end with notices regarding future litigation. Dombradi refers to these notices as Schlußklauseln (“end clauses”). Below are some of the forms of the Schlußklauseln that Dombradi identifies, followed by one example of each, all drawn from actual Old Babylonian decision records:11

8 Scheil RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34–36; Dalley, Edinburgh 69:44; Nbn 1128:26–28; Durand, Textes babyloniens Nos. 58/59:23–25. For similar expressions, see Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9:9–12; Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:10–12. See the remarks on Durand, Textes babyloniens Nos. 58/59:23–25 at the beginning of the typological discussion. 9 For decision records pertaining to reopened cases, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 184–188 and R. Pfeiffer and E. A. Speiser, One Hundred New Selected Nuzi Texts (AASOR 16) (New Haven, 1936), No. 71. 10 Falkenstein, Neusumerische Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 79. 11 All of the examples are drawn from texts that Fortner classifies as “lawsuit records” and that Dombradi classifies as Zivilprozesse (“civil trial proceedings”) documents. The only exception is TCL 1, 104, which Fortner classifies as a “lawsuit record,” but which Dombradi does not cite as an example in her typology. The Schlußklauseln listed here are those that are most directly relevant to the concern with future litigation. In all, Dombradi identifies six forms of Schlußklauseln that occur mainly at the end of Zivilprozesse documents (Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 113). For Dombradi’s typological system, see the introductory chapter and Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 161–204. The Zivilprozesse-type is described in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 169–188. All cuneiform transcriptions follow Fortner.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 305 1) Invalidation of previous documents ( epi-clause) Example (TCL 1, 104:26–28): ul-la-nu-um A.LA-ti-šu-nu DUB i-¢i Ü-[tum] ša i-na qa2-ti-šu-nu i-li-a-am sa-ar i-pi2 Apart from the tablet of their inheritance portion, any fraudulent tablet that shall turn up in their hand is false; it is invalid. 2) The uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”)-clause Example (CT 2, 39:8–12): da-ia-nu . . . ku-nu-kam ša la ra-ga-mi u2-še-zi-bu-šu The judges . . . made him issue a sealed document of no contest. 3) Renunciation-clause (“Verzichtsklausel ”) Example (CT 2, 46:23–27): u2-ul i-ta-ru-ma a-na PN1 u2-ul i-ra-ga-mu MU dUTU dA-a dAMAR.UTU u3 30-mu-ba-li2-i IN.PAD3.DE3.EŠ (That) they shall not turn and shall not raise a claim against PN1 they swore by Šamaš, Aya, Marduk and Sin-Muballi . 4) Sanction clause Example (Greengus Ishchali, No. 25:26–27): ra-gi-im i-ra-ga-mu ¢1Ü MA.NA KU3.BABBAR I3.LA2.E Any claimant that raises a claim shall pay 1 mina of silver.

All of these clauses are written to prevent future litigation in some way. The first clause invalidates any additional tablets, that is, any additional evidence that may be presented. In the second, the judges order the litigant who has lost the case to renounce, in writing, any further claim. In the third, the litigants who lose the case swear that they will not reopen the case. The fourth clause prevents subsequent claims by imposing a fine on any future claimant. Despite these differences, however, all four clauses reflect the same concern with the reopening of the case.12 In addition to the Old Babylonian examples, clauses intended to prevent the reopening of the lawsuit occur in decision records from the Mesopotamian periphery, as well. One example, drawn from a text written at Emar (Meskene), reads as follows.13 12 Compare these clauses with LH §5, in Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Atlanta, 1997), p. 82. 13 Akio Tsukimoto, “Akkadian Tablets in the Hirayama Collection (III),” Acta Sumerologica 14 (1992), No. 44:8–13. For the dating and background of the texts from Emar

306

chapter ten ur-ra-am še-ra-am mPN1 a-na UGU- i mPN2 la-a i-ra-gu-um u3 mPN2 a-na mPN1 la-a i-ra-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um up-pu an-nu-¢u2Ü i-la- -e-šu2 In the future, PN1 shall not raise a claim against PN2 and PN2 shall not raise a claim against PN1. Whoever raises a claim—this tablet shall prevail over him.

Like the Old Babylonian Schlußklauseln, this quotation expresses the same concern with reopening the lawsuit found in some of the NeoBabylonian decision records. Its formulation clearly demonstrates that the purpose of writing the decision record is to prevent any future litigation. The tablet, i.e., the evidence the tablet records, will “prevail” (le û) over any future claimant. 10.A.2

The Form of the Decision Record

The native terms for the decision records and the statements contained in the decision records demonstrate that the Neo-Babylonian texts share a common legal function with their earlier counterparts. Comparative examination of the Neo-Babylonian texts demonstrates that the decision records share formal compositional characteristics with Mesopotamian analogues, as well. The comparative study of the structure of the decision record benefits from Dombradi’s extensive work on the Old Babylonian material. In her study, Dombradi identifies the outline of a text-type that she calls the Zivilprozeß-type of Prozeßverfahren (“the civil-trial type of documents regarding trial proceedings”).14 By identifying this outline, Dombradi demonstrates that, contrary to the regnant scholarly opinion, Old Babylonian decision records are not freely-composed.15 Instead, when the Old Babylonian scribes recorded legal decisions, they followed an identifiable compositional framework.

see Jean-Claude Margueron and Marcel Sigrist, “Emar” and John Huehnergard, “Emar Texts” in Eric M. Meyers, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, Vol. 2 (New York, 1997), p. 236–239. For examples of notices with similar intent in decision records from other locations and times see: Jas, SAAS 5, No. 10:7–10 (Assyria); MDP 22, 160:13–43 (Elam); W. W. Hallo and H. Tadmor, “A Lawsuit from Hazor,” IEJ 27 (1977), pp. 1–11:7–9 (Hazor); PRU 3, pl. 99 (pp. 71–72):7–15 (Ugarit). 14 This outline is an adaptation of the outline presented in Dombradi, Darstellung, p. 170, based on the discussion in Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 33–160. Note that not all of the components are present in every text. 15 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 4, pp. 161–164.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 307 The Neo-Babylonian decision records, in general, and especially those written in the “Royal Judges” styles, demonstrate that the NeoBabylonian scribes, like their Old Babylonian predecessors, followed certain frameworks in composing the decision records. There are, of course, important differences between the Neo-Babylonian and Old Babylonian outlines. Among the most striking differences is the fact that Dombradi considers the notice about compliance part of the decision record. Neo-Babylonian decision records, on the other hand, do not include notices of compliance; the Neo-Babylonian texts with this kind of notice belong to a separate text-type.16 Furthermore, whereas the Old Babylonian texts always include some “ending clauses,” the NeoBabylonian texts usually do not. Dombradi’s outline also ends with the names of witnesses, while the outline of the “Royal Judges” styles ends with the names of judges. Despite these notable differences, however, the overall structures of the Old Babylonian and Neo-Babylonian outlines are similar. Like the Neo-Babylonian decision records, the Old Babylonian texts begin with introductory clauses, which often include verbal phrases, like dīna gerû, that refer to an initial confrontation between the parties. These decision records continue with the narration of the proceedings in court, including actions like summoning and questioning, followed by the final decision.17 Similarly, the abundance of lawsuit records from peripheral sites such as Nuzi, Emar, Alalakh and Ugarit show that decision records in the Middle Babylonian period also include the same information and follow the same three-part outline of introduction—actions in court—decision.18 Because of their general structure, the decision records in the Old, Middle and Neo-Babylonian periods provide a comprehensive picture of the adjudicatory process in each period. The comprehensive description that these texts provide, however, is ancillary to their legal function of serving as private individuals’ proof of a ruling in their favor. The form provides more information than is necessary to fulfill the function of the decision records. A much simpler document could 16 Note, however, that in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 170, this section of the outline is considered “optional” ( fakultativ). 17 See the outline presented in Dombradi, Darstellung, p. 170 and the discussion of the different legal phrases in Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 33–160. Although Dombradi’s outline is quite complex, the basic three-part structure is maintained. 18 For examples from Nuzi and Ugarit see the texts edited in Joannès, Justice, pp. 141–169.

308

chapter ten

have recorded a ruling in favor of the prevailing party. Even though it is clear that the decision records are not minute-by-minute accounts of court proceedings, they do seem to resemble court protocols, which would have been kept as a public record, rather than documents written for private individuals. Yet, it seems that the decision records in all periods were not held by courts, but were, in fact, held in private archives.19 This contradiction between the form of the decision records and their function suggests that the form is not simply a means of fulfilling the decision records’ legal function. In other words, the form does not seem to have arisen only in response to the needs of keeping records; a simpler form could have met these needs.20 Even though the form of the decision records is not the most practical means of fulfilling their legal function, Babylonian decision records written at different times continue to fulfill the same legal function with the same form. Because the form does not seem to be an intuitive response to the legal need for a decision record it seems that the form did not arise independently to meet the same need in different periods. Instead, there seems to be a historical connection between the Babylonian decision records from the different periods. One might suggest that the form of the Akkadian decision record is part of the wider phenomenon that has been called the Mesopotamian “stream of tradition.”21 Cuneiform scribes, whose training included the composition

19 The texts from Nuzi provide the strongest support for this interpretation. Many of the decision records come from the Te ip-tilla family archive, which was discovered in a private house. See Joannès, Justice, p. 142 and Pedersén, Archives, pp. 24–26. For discussion of the provenance of the Old Babylonian texts, and the suggestion that they belong to private, rather than public archives, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Volume 1, pp. 9–10. The internal evidence of the “Royal Judges” decision records points in the same direction. Unfortunately, the archeological data that might confirm the assigning of texts to private archives is still lacking. For discussion, see Pedersén, Archives, pp. 181–213. 20 It should be noted that recording the actions in court, and not just the decision, might have had a functional purpose, as well. A document with this information could serve as a record of the evidence presented during the proceedings and could prove that the decision was reached according to proper procedure. Nevertheless, the formulaic character of the decision record, in all periods, cannot be denied and warrants historical consideration. 21 A. Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization (Chicago, 1977), p. 13. Oppenheim uses the term to describe the “corpus of literary texts,” which comprise the “first level” of cuneiform texts. Opposite these are, according to Oppenheim, texts from the “second level” that are “used to record the day-to-day activities of the Babylonians and Assyrians.” Ostensibly, decision records come from the “second level.” If the suggestion above is correct, then decision records illustrate Oppenheim’s observation that “one has to realize that the texts of the second level

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 309 of legal documents, maintained this tradition throughout the long history of Akkadian law and legal writing. 10.B

Settlements

In addition to the decision records, the Old Babylonian documents include records of disputes settled out of court. Like their Neo-Babylonian counterparts, these texts begin with dispute terminology (such as the verbs ragāmu or baqāru) but do not mention any adjudication of the dispute before authorities.22 This text-type reflects a situation in which a dispute is settled without the intervention of legal authorities. Dombradi labels this text-type vorprozessualen Vergleiche (“pre-trial settlements”).23 The discussion of the Neo-Babylonian settlements raised a number of possibilities regarding the formality of the proceedings described in the settlements and the degree to which adjudicating authorities are involved. One possibility raised was that the dispute terminology in the settlements refers to a formal pre-trial procedure involving adjudicating authorities.24 The Old Babylonian texts, which use similar dispute terminology, raise the same possibility, but Dombradi rejects it.25 In addition to the arguments that she presents, one may point to the existence of a separate Old Babylonian text-type that actually describes disputes brought before adjudicating authorities but which were settled before the authorities reach a decision. Dombradi calls this text-type the imtagrū-formulary of the decision record, in which the verbal form imtagrū (“they agreed with each other”) describes the mutual agreement between the disputing parties.26 According to Fortner, several of these texts are “unfinished suits” which detail “litigations which are resolved at the place of the oath and therefore are not returned to the judges

could never have been written without that cultural continuum maintained so effectively by the scribal tradition.” 22 Note, however, that two of the texts that Dombradi includes in her table of pretrial settlements (Meissner, BAP 80 = Si 3 and VAS 8, 109 = Si 63) do mention judges. Dombradi’s discussion in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 2, p. 149 n. 1011 does not fully explain why these two texts should be classified as “pretrial” records. 23 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 181–184. 24 See section 2.C above. 25 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 183–184. 26 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 176–177. Also see Dombradi’s discussion of the mitguru-Prozesshandlungen in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 197–198.

310

chapter ten

for verdict or decision.”27 It is this separate text-type that is used to record disputes ended after a formal complaint but before the judges render a decision. In contrast, the pre-trial settlements, which do not mention the judges at all, reflect disputes resolved even earlier in the adjudicatory process, before a complaint had to be brought before legal authorities. 10.C

Preliminary Protocols and Records of Statements in Court

As was already noted in the introduction to this book, all studies of Mesopotamian court procedure distinguish between texts that describe entire trials and texts that describe only part of the proceedings. Thus, in her study of the Old Babylonian material, Dombradi separates “Urkunden über Prozeßverfahren” (“documents regarding trial proceedings”) from “Urkunden über Prozeßhandlungen” (“documents regarding trial actions”). The first group consists of texts that describe the entire course of a trial and the second consists of those texts that describe only one specific action.28 Similarly, Fortner distinguishes between what he calls “lawsuit records” and “associated documents.” “Lawsuit records” contain “ ‘core’ proceedings” and are separate from “associated documents” that “surround and support litigious activity” by detailing “ancillary legal actions.”29 Hayden, in his study of court procedure at Nuzi, separates “lawsuits,” which describe entire cases, from “declaration tablets,” which

27 Fortner Adjudicating Entities, p. 77. Note that Fortner’s typology distinguishes between texts that simply record an appearance before the judges followed by an agreement (“lawsuit records” proper) and texts that also mention an oath (“unfinished suits”). Dombradi’s typology does not distinguish between these two situations. 28 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 166–167. 29 Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 2. For the complete list of the features of “lawsuit records,” see Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 71, especially item “f,” and n. 1. Note, however, that Dombradi and Fortner do not always agree on which texts describe complete trials and which texts describe only part of the proceedings. For example, Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 176 classifies all but one of the texts that Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 77 considers “associated documents type A” among the Prozeßverfahren (“trial proceedings”) types, rather than among the Prozeßhandlungen (“trial actions”) types. Note that Dombradi places these texts in the same type with several other texts (BE 6/1, 6; CT 4, 13a; CT 47, 12/12a; CT 48, 1; VAS 7, 7/VAS 7, 152) that Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 73–76 classifies as “lawsuit records.” Also compare the classification of TCL 11, 245 in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 188 n. 1038; Vol. 2, p. 152 and Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 78.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 311 record testimony or other statements in court, and which may have “formed the brief upon which the decision was based.”30 The distinction between texts that describe entire trials and texts that describe only part of the proceedings emerges primarily from the actions that the texts describe. In the texts from Nuzi, this distinction in content results in a formal distinction between the opening lines of the “lawsuits” and the opening lines of the “declaration tablets.” Generally speaking, the “lawsuits” begin with the statement “PN1 itti PN2 ina dīni ana pāni dayyānē ītelûma” (“PN1 appeared with PN2 in court before the judges”).31 “Declaration tablets,” on the other hand, come in two forms, one that begins “lišānšu ša PN” (“declaration of PN”) and one that begins umma PN (“thus [said] PN”). Both of these forms are introductions to the quoted statements that follow in the text.32 In contrast to the texts from Nuzi, in the Old Babylonian corpus the formal distinction between texts that describe entire trials and texts that describe only part of the proceedings is not a direct consequence of the contents of the different texts. Instead, in the Old Babylonian material, the formal difference occurs in the placement of the names of the witnesses. Dombradi observes that in Prozeßverfahren-texts, the names of the witnesses always occur at the end, after the narration of the entire proceedings. Many of the Prozeßhandlungen-texts, however, have the names of the witnesses at the beginning, followed by a formula that introduces the description of the specific action.33 To a certain extent, similar formal distinctions can be made between the Neo-Babylonian decision records and preliminary protocols. The “Royal Judges” styles are formally distinct from other text-types. The evidence of the texts from the Eanna, however, points in the opposite direction. The only feature that distinguishes the “Eanna” style decision records from the preliminary protocols is a record of an actual decision. In terms of form, however, the formulation of the “Eanna” style decision records is not distinct from the formulation of preliminary protocols. Unlike the texts from Nuzi, the Neo-Babylonian texts 30 Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 175. For description of this type, as well as others, see Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–181. Note, however, that the sections devoted to the “lawsuits” also include some texts of other types. 31 Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 25. 32 For discussion of the differences between the lišānšu and umma “declaration tablets” see Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–177. 33 Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 21–22. For the placement of the names of witnesses in specific Prozeßhandlungen-texts, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 191–199.

312

chapter ten

are not easily distinguished based on opening words. And unlike the Old Babylonian texts, the distinction between decision records and preliminary protocols is not manifest in the placement of the names of the witnesses. There are preliminary protocols in which the names of the witnesses appear at the beginning (style B) as well as at the end (style A), just as there are Eanna decision records with names at the end (style A) and at the beginning (style B). 10.D

Memoranda

The Neo-Babylonian memoranda were meant for the scribe’s own use, to serve in the composition of more formal documents. They are defined by the absence of a scribe’s name and by the appearance of the words ta sistu lā mašê (“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) in many of them. The closest parallel to the Neo-Babylonian designation ta sistu lā mašê (“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) occurs in the texts from Nuzi.34 A number of litigation records from Nuzi end with the two-word description uppi ta silti (“memorandum tablet”). Hayden demonstrates that from the point-of-view of composition and contents, the memoranda from Nuzi closely resemble the “lawsuit records.” The only difference between them and the “lawsuit records” from Nuzi is that the memoranda lack the decision of the judges.35 Unlike the NeoBabylonian memoranda, the memoranda from Nuzi include the name of the scribe and are sealed. Thus, despite the similarity in terminology, the memoranda from Nuzi and the Neo-Babylonian memoranda serve different functions. The Neo-Babylonian texts are an informal note, while the the texts from Nuzi are a formal record of a trial awaiting a decision.36

For disucssion of the Old Babylonian memoranda, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 201. 35 Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 177. See also Hayden’s discussion of the memoranda listed in Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 204 n. 143. 36 For a closer parallel to the Neo-Babylonian use of the memoranda in a text that is not a litigation record, see Gerfrid G. W. Müller, “Ein Massenprozeß in Nuzi? Zur Bedeutung von uppi ta silti,” ArOr 67 (1999), pp. 221–230. 34

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 313 10.E

dabābu-Type Summonses

In the Neo-Babylonian decision records, the procedure of summoning the defendant to court is described by the verbs abāku or abālu (“to bring”), without much additional information about how this procedure was carried out. The discussion of this text-type suggested that the dabābu-type summonses are a written record of the summons procedure. Although the records from Nuzi do not include actual dabābu-type summonses, the “lawsuit records” do include a description of the summoning procedure itself. In the records from Nuzi, the verb šasû (“to call, to summon”) denotes the procedure of summoning a defendant to court. According to descriptions in several texts, this procedure involved sending a group of named court officials, known as the manzadu lu, to order the defendant to come to court.37 The explicitly oral nature of the procedure at Nuzi raises the possibility that a similar oral summoning may have accompanied the issuance of the written dabābu-type summonses in the Neo-Babylonian period.38 If this is correct, then the dabābu-type summonses are not the written means of summoning the defendant. Instead, they are written records that the oral summoning procedure had actually occurred, or that a higher court had authorized this procedure.39 Conversely, the existence of the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summons as a written document raises the possibility that similar documents were issued by the courts at Nuzi. The closest textual analogues to the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summonses are two Neo-Assyrian texts from a lawsuit regarding a donkey and other property: Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 and Jas, SAAS 5, No. 54.40 Although the beginning of the latter is broken, what remains of

37 The manzadu lu would call the summoned individual three times and would report the summoned individual’s response after each time. The procedure is discussed in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 13–14. For examples of texts that describe the procedure, see Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 195, n. 45. 38 See, for example, the procedure described in YOS 7, 159. 39 The fact that many of the dabābu-type summonses come from temple, rather than private, archives, suggests that they were not delivered to private individuals. However, the possibility that a (now lost) copy was actually delivered to the summoned individuals should not be ruled out entirely. 40 For the correlation between the two texts, and discussion of the different items besides the donkey see Jas, SAAS 5, p. 15 and p. 84. Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15 may be a third analogue to the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summons. It does not use the verb dabābu, but it does require litigants to “approach” (qarābu) an authority (the šaknu) on the day that a named individual arrives. If they do not comply with this requirement, one litigant must pay the other a penalty of one mina of silver.

314

chapter ten

the body of the text closely resembles the formulation of a Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summons: 2’. ina URU ni-nu-¢aÜ [ina UGU] 3’. ANŠE.NITA2 ina UGU 10 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR

(2’–5’) . . . in Nin eveh, s hall a rgue a case [regarding] a male donkey and regarding 10 šeqel of silver against (the c laim of ) mA i-pada son of m Zan î.

4’. TA mPAP-i-pa-da A mza-ani-i 5’. de-e-nu i-DUG4.DUG4 šum2ma 6’. a-na de-ni-šu2 la kar-me

(5’–9’) If he is not present at his lawsuit, mLaqīpu shall repay a donkey with its cart and ½ mina of silver to mA i-pada.

7’. ANŠE.NITA2 a-di tal-lak-tešu2 8’. ½ MA.NA KU3.BABBAR m la-qi-pu 9’. a-na mPAP-i-pa-da u2-šal-lam

Laqīpu must argue his case in Nineveh or make a payment to mA ipada. Like the Neo-Babylonian texts, this text also consists of two clauses, a summons clause (lines 2’–5’), which requires the summoned individual to “argue the case” (de-e-nu i-DUG4.DUG4) against his opponent, and a penalty clause (lines 5’–9’), which imposes a penalty upon the summoned individual for failure to argue. The formulation of Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4, the other Neo-Assyrian text pertaining to this lawsuit, is somewhat different. The body of the text does not contain a summons clause. Instead, it consists only of a penalty clause, which begins as follows: BE-ma ina U4 1-kam2 ša2 ITI GU4 mla-qi2-pi mmu-še-zib-dPA TA mPAP-pada . . . la i-da-bu- la ip-ru-su If, on 1 Ayyāru, mLaqīpi (and) mMušēzib-Nabû . . . do not argue against (the claim of ) mA i-pada (and) they do not reach a decision . . . 41

41

Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4:3–6.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 315 The result, according to the text, is that mLaqīpu must pay mA i-pada a double penalty.42 The nature of the obligation that this text imposes is analogous to the obligation imposed by the Neo-Babylonian dabābutype summonses. Even though the Neo-Assyrian text does not contain a summons clause, the penalty clause makes it clear that the text’s purpose, like the purpose of the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summonses, is to obligate litigants to argue. In addition to its significance as a typological parallel to the NeoBabylonian summonses, Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 provides comparative evidence for the legal function of the summonses. As was noted earlier, the Neo-Babylonian texts have been interpreted either as contracts between two parties or as summonses issued by adjudicating authorities (4.A above). The discussion in the typological section mustered the evidence in favor of interpreting the Neo-Babylonian texts as summonses. The first lines of Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4, before the body of the text, support this interpretation. These lines describe the text as “the judgment which Arbaya, the mayor of Kal a, imposed” (de-e-nu m ar-ba-a lu2 a-za-nu ša2 urukal- a e-mid-u-ni ).43 This heading makes it clear that the text was issued after the mayor had heard mA i-pada’s complaint against mLaqīpi. Thus, the text is not simply an agreement between the two parties to argue the case, but is, instead, the record of a decision by an adjudicating authority.44 Another Neo-Assyrian text that sheds light on the dabābu-type summonses is Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46. This text records the conclusion of a dispute over a debt. Lines 4–8 describe some of the proceedings that came before the case’s conclusion. They read as follows: 4. e-ger2-tu ša de-e-ni 5. ina bir-tu-šu2-nu is-sa-a -ru 6. ma-a ki-ma mPN

(4–7) They wrote a document of proceedings between them, stating: ‘When mPN arrives, he will establish ( justice) between them.’

The exact nature of this double payment is not clear, nor is the role of mMušēzibNabû, who is mentioned in the protasis but not in the apodosis of the penalty clause. See Jas, SAAS 5, p. 15. 43 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4:1–2. Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15:1–3 provides similar evidence, if one assumes that the reason the litigants must “approach” the šaknu is for a hearing. 44 A similar conclusion emerges from JEN 390 (edited with discussion in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 92–95), a memorandum from Nuzi that describes the proceedings which lead the judges to order a defendant to appear. See Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 52. 42

316

chapter ten 7. it-tal-ka ina bir-tu-šu2-nu u2-kan 8. mPN it-ti-in

(8) mPN judged (the case).

According to these lines, before the case was actually judged, a preliminary document was drawn up to indicate that mPN would judge the case. The formulation of this document, as it is quoted in lines 6–7, does not resemble the precise formulation of the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summonses: it does not mention any obligation of litigants to “argue a case” nor does it mention a penalty. Of course, the Neo-Assyrian document itself was probably longer than the quotation, and its unquoted sections may have been closer to the Neo-Babylonian analogues. Even if this was not the case, however, it is reasonable to assume that the Neo-Assyrian document, like the dabābu-type summonses, required the litigants to make their cases once the adjudicator had arrived. At first glance, the verb in line 5 (is-sa-a -ru) seems to indicate that the opponents themselves wrote the document, after reaching an agreement on their own. Jas, however, construes the ambiguous verb as an anonymous plural expressing the passive (“was written”). According to Jas, these lines are a description of “the issuing of a preliminary court document.”45 The Neo-Assyrian term for the document that was drawn up, e-ger2-tu ša de-e-ni, supports Jas’s interpretation. This term resembles the Neo-Babylonian term for the decision record, uppi dīni. In the Neo-Babylonian term, the noun dīni refers to what is described in the decision record: the entire proceedings and to the decision in court. The appearance of the same noun in the Neo-Assyrian term suggests that the document was also drawn up as part of a court procedure. Furthermore, the word dēnu occurs in the first lines of Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4, the Neo-Assyrian analogue to the dabābu-type summons discussed above. There, the word describes the summons itself as a “judgment.” Thus, the document described in Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46, was drawn up as a record of the decision of an adjudicating authority, not as an agreement between the litigants.

45

Jas, SAAS 5, p. 72.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 317 10.F

Text-Types Calling for Evidence

The typological discussion identified three main text-types which are the different means of calling for the presentation of evidence: the kunnu-type summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties pending evidence. These text-types belong to the procedures for obtaining evidence that are described in the Neo-Babylonian decision records and preliminary protocols. Both the Old Babylonian texts and the texts from Nuzi describe similar procedures as part of their narrations of legal disputes. Like the Neo-Babylonian texts, several Old Babylonian texts use the verb erēšu to indicate that the judges “demand” evidence from one of the litigants.46 One text from Nuzi, JEN 344, records the actual wording of the judges’ demand for witnesses from the litigant and their imposition of a penalty for failure to bring them.47 Another related text from Nuzi, JEN 355, indicates that the judges give the litigant five days in which to bring his witnesses or face the penalty. In addition to the information available from litigation records, Hammurabi’s Code also provides information on the judicial demand for evidence. CH 13 reads as follows: šum-ma a-wi-lum šu-u ši-bu-šu la qir-bu da-a-nu a-da-nam a-na ITI 6-kam2 i-ša-ak-ka-nu-šum-ma šum-ma i-na ITI 6-kam2 ši-bi-šu la ir-di-a-am a-wi-lum šu-u2 sa-ar a-ra-an di-nim šu-a-ti it-ta-na-aš-ši If that man’s witnesses are not present, the judges shall set a time of six months for him. If he does not present his witnesses in six months, it is that man who is a liar. He shall bear the penalty of that case.

The situation described in this law48 is analogous to the situation in which an exculpatory kunnu-type summons would have been composed. In the law, a man has made a claim which remains to be proven by witnesses. The judges allow him six months to prove his claim. If he fails to present the witnesses, then he faces a penalty. The kunnu-type summonses are composed under precisely these circumstances; they are the written means of obligating claimants to substantiate their claims. This similarity between the law and the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the kunnu-type summonses suggests that the kunnu-type

Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 87 (c) (witnesses) and p. 89 (b) (tablets). JEN 344:16–24. 48 For additional details on this law and its relationship to the earlier laws, see G. R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1956), pp. 95–105. 46 47

318

chapter ten

summonses are the documentary manifestation of the judges’ action in the law. In other words, one may suggest that when the judges “set a time,” they do so by means of a document that resembled a kunnutype summons. As with the dabābu-type summonses, a close textual analogue to the Neo-Babylonian kunnu-type summonses comes from the Neo-Assyrian corpus.49 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 53 apparently pertains to a dispute over whether or not a debt of 37 šeqel of silver has been repaid. The main legible portion of the text, as it has been reconstructed by Jas, reads as follows: 4. IGI.MEŠ-šu2 u2-ba-la TA [x x x] 5. u2-ka-nu ki-i 37 [GIN2.MEŠ KU3. BABBAR] 6. mdMAŠ-PAP-PAP a-na mm[u-tak-kild ŠU2]

(4–7) . . . will bring his witnesses, with [. . .] they will establish that mNinurta-a u-u ur gave m M[utakkil-Marduk] 37 [ šeqel of silver].

7. i-din-u-ni šum-[ma IGI.MEŠ-šu2] 8. uk-tin-nu ma-a [lu2LUL] 9. šu-u mdMAŠ-PAP-PAP [x x]

(7–9) If they establish (the case) saying, “he is a debtor,” m Ninurta-a u-u ur [ will . . .].

10. šum-ma IGI.MEŠ i-tu-[bil] 11. KU3.BABBAR a-di ru-bi-šu2 md [MAŠ-PAP-PAP] 12. a-na mmu-tak-kil-dŠU2 i-[dan]

(10–12) If he brin[gs] witnesses, m[Ninurta-a u-u ur] will g[ive] mMutakkil-Marduk the silver with its interest.

This text governs three situations: if mNinurta-a u-u ur brings witnesses to establish that he has paid the debt (lines 4–7); if the witnesses testify that m Ninurta-a u-u ur is actually a debtor (lines 7–9); or if mMutakkilMarduk brings witnesses that mNinurta-a u-u ur still owes him the debt (lines 10–12).50 The inclusion of all three of these possibilities indicates that at the time of the text’s promulgation, neither m Ninurta-a u-u ur nor mMutakkil-Marduk was able to substantiate his claim. This text, then, is a Neo-Assyrian equivalent to the Neo-Babylonian general kunnutype summons. It was composed in order to obtain witnessed testimony to substantiate disputed claims. This chapter has explored some of the points of contact between the Neo-Babylonian tablet trail and litigation records from earlier periods. The identification of parallel text-types and procedures situates the

49 See also Jas, SAAS 5, No. 30 and the discussion on p. 49. For summonses to oaths, see SAAS 5, No. 55 and No. 56. 50 For this interpretation of the text, see Jas, SAAS 5, p. 83.

the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 319 Neo-Babylonian texts within the broader spectrum of cuneiform law. This allows one to consider the historical relationship between the legal practices in different periods. Are the procedural similarities the result of the universal needs of legal systems or do they attest to a deeper continuity? This question comes into sharp focus with regard to the tablet trail itself. Do similarly-worded text-types reflect a tradition of legal writing? The evidence may require distinguishing between the decision records and other text-types. The decision records are attested throughout the history of cuneiform law and show strong connections in both form and function between the texts in different periods. This suggests that they were composed in a manner influenced by tradition. The parallels between other text-types attest to the fact that courts throughout the history of cuneiform law documented not only their final decisions, but also various other stages of the adjudicatory process. Nevertheless, the poor attestation of the other text-types and the formal variation between the parallels warrant questioning the influence of tradition in their composition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abraham, Kathleen. Business and Politics under the Persian Empire: The Financial Dealings of Marduk-nā ir-apli of the House of Egibi (521–487 B.C.E.). Bethesda, 2004. A mad, Ali Yaseen. “The Archive of Assur-matu-taqin Found in the New Town of Assur and Dated Mainly by Post-canonical Eponyms.” Al Rafidan 17 (1996), 207–288. Arnaud, Daniel. “Un document juridique concernant les oblats.” RA 67 (1973), 147–156. Augapfel, Julius. Babylonische Rechtsurkunden aus der Regierungszeit Artaxerxes I. und Darius II. Vienna, 1915. Baker, Heather D. The Archive of the Nappā u Family (AfO Beiheft 30). Vienna, 2004. Beaulieu, Paul-Alain. The Reign of Nabonidus. New Haven, 1989. ———. “Neo-Babylonian Larsa: A Preliminary Study.” Or. 60 (1991), 58–81. ———. “New Light on Secret Knowledge in Late Babylonian Culture.” ZA 82 (1992), 98–111. ———. Legal and Administrative Texts from the Reign of Nabonidus (YOS 19). New Haven, 2000. Beljawski, Vitali A. “Den Politische Kampf in Babylon in den Jahren 562–556 v. Chr.” In Unger Mem. Vol. (Baden-Baden, 1971), 197–215. ———. “Die Sklavenelite des Hauses Egibi.” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1973/1, 133–158. Bloom, John Arthur. Ancient Near Eastern Temple Assemblies: A Survey and Prolegomena. Ph.D. Thesis, Annenberg Research Institute. Philadelphia, 1992. Böhl, Franz Marius Theodor. Mededeelingen uit de Leidsche verzameling van spikerschrift inscripties III: Assyrische und Nieuw-Babylonische oorkonden (1100 –91 v. Chr.). In Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde 82 no. 2 (1936). Boissier, Alfred. “Notes assyriologiques I: Extrait de la chronique royale d’Uruk.” RA 23 (1926), 13–17. von Bolla, Sibylle. Untersuchungen zur Tiermiete und Viehpacht im Altertum (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte 30). Munich, 1940. ———. “Drei Diebstahlsfälle von Tempeleigentum in Uruk.” ArOr 12 (1941), 113–120. Bongenaar, A. C. V. M. The Neo Babylonian Ebabbar Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and Its Prosopography. Istanbul, 1997. Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. P. T. Daniels, Trans. Winona Lake, Indiana, 2002. Cardascia, Guillaume. Les archives des Murašû: une famille d’hommes d’affaires babyloniens à l’époque perse (455–403 av. J.-C.). Paris, 1951. Clay, Albert. Business Documents of Murashû sons of Nippur dated in the Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods, chiefly from Nippur (BE 10). Philadelphia, 1904. ———. Legal and Commercial Transactions dated in the Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods, chiefly from Nippur (PBS 8/1). Philadelphia, 1908. ———. Business documents of Murashû sons of Nippur dated in the reign of Darius II. (PBS 2/1). Philadelphia, 1912. ———. Babylonian Records in the Library of John Pierpont Morgan (BRM 1). New York, 1913. Cocquerillat, Denise. Palmeraies et cultures de l’Eanna d’Uruk (559–520). Berlin, 1968. ———. “Recherches sur le verger du temple campagnard de l’Akītu (KIRI6 allat).” WO 7 (1973–1974), 96–134.

322

bibliography

Cuq, Edouard. Études sur le droit babylonien, les lois assyriennes et les lois hittites. Paris, 1929. Dalley, Stephanie. A Catalogue of the Akkadian cuneiform tablets in the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh, with copies of the texts. Edinburgh, 1979. Dandamaev, Muhammad. “The Testimony of Slaves in Babylonian Courts.” VDI 1968/1, pp. 1–12. (Russian with English summary) ———. “The Neo-Babylonian Popular Assembly.” In Šulmu: Papers on the Ancient Near East Presented at International Conference of Socialist Countries (Prague, 1968), 63–71. ———. “The Neo-Babylonian Elders.” In Societies and Languages of the Ancient Near East: Studies in Honour of I. M. Diakonoff (Warminster, 1982), 38–41. ———. Slavery in Babylonia from Nabopolassar to Alexander the Great (626–331 BC). Victoria A. Powell, Trans. De Kalb, Illinois, 1984. ———. “Babylonian Popular Assemblies in the First Millennium B.C.” Bulletin of the Canadian Society for Mesopotamian Studies 30 (1995), 23–29. ———. “The Composition of the Citizens in First Millennium Babylonia.” Altorientalische Forschungen 24 (1997), 135–147. von Dassow, Eva. “Introducing the Witnesses in Neo-Babylonian Documents.” In Robert Chazan, et al., e.ls. Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical and Judaic Studies in Honor of Baruch A. Levine (Winona Lake, Indiana, 1999), 3–22. Demuth, Ludwig. “Fünfzig Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden aus der Zeit des Königs Kyros (538–529 v. Chr.),” Beiträge zur Assyriologie und Semitischen Sprachwissenschaft 3 (1898), 393–444. Dombradi, Eva. Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozessurkunden (Freiburger altorientalischen Studien 20/1–2). Stuttgart, 1996. Donbaz, Veysel and Matthew W. Stolper. Istanbul Murašû Texts. Leiden, 1997. Doty, Laurence Timothy. Cuneiform Archives from Hellenistic Uruk. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University. 1977. Dougherty, Raymond Philip. Archives from Erech Time of Nabonidus (555–538 B.C.) (YOS 6). New Haven, 1920. ———. The Shirkûtu of Babylonian Deities. New Haven, 1923. ———. “Cuneiform Parallels to Solomon’s Provisioning System.” AASOR 5 (1925), 23–65. ———. Nabonidus and Belshazzar: A Study of the Closing Events of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (YOR 15). New Haven, 1929. ———. “The Babylonian Principle of Suretyship as Administered by Temple Law.” AJSL 46 (1929–1930), 73–103. ———. “A Babylonian City in Arabia.” AJA 34 (1930), 296–312. ———. Archives from Erech (GCCI). New York, 1980. van Driel, G. “The Rise of the House of Egibi: Nabû-a ē-iddina.” JEOL 29 (1985–1986), 50–67. ———.“The Murašûs in Context.” JESHO 32 (1989), 203–226. ———. “The ‘Eanna Archive.’ ” BiOr 55 (1998), 59–79. Driver, G. R. and John C. Miles. The Babylonian Laws, Oxford, 1956. Durand, Jean-Marie. Textes babyloniens d’époque récente. Paris, 1981. Ebeling, Erich. “Kriminalfälle aus Uruk.” AfO 16 (1952–1953), 67–69. ———.”Der Eid der Pachtabgabeaufleger (êmedu) von Uruk in neubabylonischer und persischer Zeit.” WO 2 (1954–1959), 46–51. Evetts, B. T. A. Inscriptions of the of the reigns of Evil-Merodach (B.C. 562–559), Neriglissar (B.C. 559 –555) and Laborosoarchod (B.C. 555). Leipzig, 1892. Falkenstein, Adam. Die neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden. ABAW Neue Folge 39, 40, 44. Munich, 1956–1957. Figulla, H. H. Business Documents of the New Babylonian Period (UET 4). Philadelphia, 1949. ———. “Lawsuit Concerning Sacrilegious Theft at Uruk.” Iraq 13 (1951), 95–101.

bibliography

323

Fortner, John David. Adjudicating Entities and Levels of Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian Era. Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion. 1997. Frame, Grant. “Nabonidus, Nabû-šarra-u ur, and the Eanna Temple.” ZA 81 (1991), 37–86. Garner, Brian A., ed. Black’s Law Dictionary. St. Paul, 1999. Hallo, W. W. and H. Tadmor. “A Lawsuit from Hazor.” IEJ 27 (1977), 1–11. Hayden, Roy Edmund. Court Procedure at Nuzu. Ph.D. Thesis, Brandeis University. 1962. Hilprecht, H.V. Business Documents of Murashû Sons of Nippur dated in the Reign of Artaxerxes I (464–424) (BE 9). Philadelphia, 1898. Holt, Ivan Lee. “Tablets from the R. Campbell Thompson Collection in Haskell Oriental Museum, The University of Chicago.” AJSL 27 (1911), 193–232. Holtz, Sholam E. “The Career of a Neo-Babylonian Court Scribe.” JCS (forthcoming.). Huehnergard, John. “Emar Texts.” In Eric M. Meyers, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, Vol. 2 (New York, 1997), 239–240. Hueter, Gwyneth. Grammatical Studies in the Akkadian Dialects of Babylon and Uruk 556 –500 B.C. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford. 1996. Hunger, H. “Kalender.” RLA 5, 297–303. Jakob-Rost, Liane and Helft Freydank. Spätbabylonische Rechtsurkunden und Wirtschaftstexte aus Uruk (VAS, Neue Folge 4). Berlin, 1978. Jas, Remko M. Neo-Assyrian Judicial Procedures (SAAS 5). Helsinki, 1996. Joannès, Francis. Archives de Borsippa: La Famille Ea-ilūta-bāni. Geneva, 1989. ———. “Textes Babyloniens de Suse D’Epoque Achemenide.” In F. Vallat, ed. Contribution à l’histoire de l’Iran: Mélanges offerts à Jean Perrot (Paris, 1990), 173–180. ———. “Les temples de Sippar et leurs trésors a l’époque néo-babylonienne.” RA 86 (1992), 159–184. ———. “La pratique du serment à l’époque néo-babylonienne.” In Sophie Lafont, ed. Jurer et maudire: pratiques politiques et usages juridiques du serment dans le Proche-Orient ancien (Méditerranées 10–11, 1996), 163–174. ———, ed. Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie: Archives Judiciares du Proche-Orient ancient (III e–I ermillénaires avant J.C.). Saint Denis, 2000. Jursa, Michael. Die Landwirtschaft in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit (AfO Beiheft 25). Vienna, 1995. ———. “Akkad, das Eulmaš und Gubāru.” WZKM 86 (1996), 197–211. ———. Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni. Leiden, 1999. ———. “Auflragamord, Veruntreuung und Falschussagen: Neues von Gimillo.” WZKM 94 (2004), 109–132. ———. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents: Typology, Contents and Archives. (Guides to the Mesopotamian Textual Record 1). Münster, 2005. Keiser, Clarence Elwood. Letters and contracts from Erech written in the neo-Babylonian period (BIN 1). New Haven, 1918. Kennedy, D. A. Late Babylonian Economic Texts (CT 49). London, 1968. Knopf, Carl Sumner. “Items of Interest from Miscellaneous Neo-Babylonian Documents.” Bulletin of the Southern California Academy of Sciences 32/2 (1933), 41–76. Köhler, Josef and Felix Ernst Peiser. Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben I–IV. Leipzig, 1890–1898. Köhler, Josef and Arthur Ungnad. Hundert Ausgewählte Rechtsurkunden aus der Spätzeit des babylonischen Schrifttums von Xerxes bis Mithridates II (485–94 v. Chr.). Leipzig, 1911. Koschaker, Paul. Babylonisch-assyrisches Bürgschaftsrecht. Leipzig, 1966. Krückman, Oluf. Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungstexte ( TuM 2–3). Leipzig, 1933. Kümmel, Hans Martin. Familie, Beruf und Amt in spätbabylonischen Uruk (Abhandlungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft 20). Berlin, 1979.

324

bibliography

Lambert, W. G. “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice.” Iraq 27 (1965), 1–11. Lautner, Jacob. Die richterliche Entscheidung und die Streitbeendigung im altbabylonische Prozessrechte. Leipzig, 1922. Legrain, L. L. Historical Fragments (PBS 13). Philadelphia, 1922. Leichty, Erle. Review of D. Weisberg, Guild Structure and Political Allegiance in Early Achaemenid Mesopotamia (YNER 1). JNES 29 (1970), 296–298. ———. Catalogue of the Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum 6, 7, 8. London, 1986– 1988. ———. “A Legal Text from the Reign of Tiglath Pileser III.” In Francesca RochbergHalton, ed. Language, Literature and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (AOS 67) (New Haven, 1987), 227–229. Lieberman, S. “Nippur: City of Decisions.” In Maria de Jong Ellis, ed. Nippur at the Centennial: Papers Read at the 35e Rencontre Assyriologique Interationale, Philadelphia, 1988 (Philadelphia, 1992), 127–132. Liebesny, Herbert. “The Oath of the King in the Legal Procedure of Nuzi.” JAOS 61 (1941), 62–63. ———. “Evidence in Nuzi Legal Procedure.” JAOS 61 (1941), 130–142. ———. “The Administration of Justice in Nuzi.” JAOS 63 (1943), 128–145. Lutz, Henry Frederick. “Neo-Babylonian Administrative Documents from Erech.” UCP 9 (1927), 1–115. ———. “A Recorded Deposition Concerning Presentment for Tax Payment.” UCP 10 (1940), 257–263. MacGinnis, John.”The Royal Establishment at Sippar in the 6th Century BC.” ZA 84 (1994), 198–219. ———. “Ordering the House of Šamaš: Texts from the Management of the NeoBabylonian Ebabbara.” Iraq 60 (1998), 207–217. Magdalene, F. Rachel. On the Scales of Righteousness: Neo-Babylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job (Brown Judaic Studies 348). Providence, 2007. Marchesi, Gianni. “On the Divine Name dBA.U2.” Or. 71 (2002), 161–172. Margueron, Jean-Claude and Marcel Sigrist. “Emar.” In Eric M. Meyers, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, Vol. 2 (New York, 1997), 236–239. Marx, Victor. “Die Stellung der Frauen in Babylonien gemäss den Kontrakten aus der Zeit von Nebudanezar bis Darius (604–485).” Beiträge zur Assyriologie und Semitischen Sprachwissenschaft 4 (1902), 1–77. McEwan, G. J. P. The Late Babylonian Tablets in the Royal Ontario Museum. Toronto, 1982. Meissner, Bruno. “Ein neubabylonischer Erbschaftsprozess.” AfO 11 (1936–1937), 153–154. ———. Studien zur Assyrischen Lexikographie 4 (MAOG 13/2). Leipzig, 1940. Moldenke, Alfred B. Cuneiform Texts in the Metropolitan Museum of Art. New York, 1893. Moore, Ellen Whitley. Neo-Babylonian Business and Administrative Documents. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1935. Müller, Gerfrid G. W. “Ein Massenprozeß in Nuzi? Zur Bedeutung von uppi ta silti.” ArOr 67 (1999), pp. 221–230. Nies, James Buchanan and Clarence Elwood Keiser. Historical, Religious and Economic Texts and Antiquities (BIN 2). New Haven, 1920. Oberhuber, Karl. Sumerische und akkadische Keilschriftdenkmäler des Archäologischen Museums zu Florenz. Innsbruck, 1960. Oelsner, Joachim.”The Neo-Babylonian Period.” In Raymond Westbrook and Richard Jasnow, eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2001), 289–305. Oelsner, Joachim, Bruce Wells and Cornelia Wunsch. “Neo-Babylonian Period.” In Raymond Westbrook, ed. A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2003), 911–974. Oppenheim, A. Leo. “Deux notes de lexicographie accadienne.” Or. 9 (1940), 219–222.

bibliography

325

———. “Assyriological Gleanings II.” BASOR 93 (February 1944), 14– 17. ———. “Assyriological Notes to the Old Testament.” JQR 36 (1945–1946), 171–176. ———. “Essay on Overland Trade in the First Millennium B.C.” JCS 21 (1967), 236–254. ———. Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization. Chicago, 1977. Parker, Richard A. and Waldo H. Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.–A.D. 75. Providence, 1956. Pedersén, Olof. Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East, 1500–300 B.C. Bethesda, 1998. Peiser, Felix Ernst. “Eine babylonische Verfügung von Todes wegen.” ZA 3 (1888), 365–371. ———. Babylonische Verträge des Berliner Museums (Anhang). Berlin, 1890. ———. Texte Juristischen und Geschaftlichen Inhalts (KB 4). Berlin, 1896. Petschow, H. “Ein Neubabylonischer Bürgschaftsregress gegen einen Nachlass.” Révue d’histoire du droit 19 (1951), 25–57. ———. Neubabylonisches Pfandrecht (Abhandlungen der Sächsichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philologisch-historische Klasse 48, 1). Berlin, 1956. Pfeiffer, R. and E. A. Speiser. One Hundred New Selected Nuzi Texts (AASOR 16). New Haven, 1936. Pinches, Theophile G. “The Law of Inheritance in Babylonia.” Hebraica 3 (1886), 13–21. ———. PSBA 19 (1897), 142–143 (no. 5). ———. “Two Tablets of Historical Interest.” PSBA 38 (1916), 27–34. ———. “Tablets Belonging to Lord Amherst of Hackney.” JRAS 1926, 105–113. ———. Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid Economic Texts (CT 55). London, 1982. Pohl, P. Alfred. Neubabylonische Rechtsurkunden aus den Berliner Staatlichen Museen (AnOr 8). Rome, 1933. Powell, Marvin A. “Der neubabylonische Familienname Ašgandu und die Urkundengruppe Nbn 314, TCL XII 122, Nbn 668.” ArOr 40 (1972), pp. 124–129. Renger, Johannes. “Notes on the Goldsmiths, Jewelers and Carpenters of the NeoBablyonian Eanna.” JAOS 91 (1971), 494–503. Ries, Gerhard. “Ein neubabylonischer Mitgiftprozeß (559 v. Chr.).” In Dieter Nörr and Dieter Simon, eds. Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Kunkel (Frankfurt, 1984), 345–363. da Riva, Rocío. Der Ebabbar-Tempel von Sippar in frühneubabylonischer Zeit (640 –580 v. Chr.) (AOAT 291). Münster, 2002. Roth, Martha T. “Homicide in the Neo-Assyrian Period.” In Francesca RochbergHalton, ed., Language, Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (AOS 67) (New Haven, 1987), 351–365. ———. “A Case of Contested Status.” In Hermann Behrens, et al., eds. DUMUE2-DUB-BA-A: Studies in Honor of Åke W. Sjöberg (Philadelphia, 1989), 481–489. ———. “The Material Composition of the Neo-Babylonian Dowry.” AfO 36/37 (1989/1990), 1–55. ———. Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. Atlanta, 1997. ———. “Tašmētu-damqat and Daughters.” In J. Marzahn and H. Neumann, eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster, 2000), 387–400. ———.”Reading Mesopotamian Law Cases—PBS 5 100: A Question of Filiation.” JESHO 44 (2001), 243–292. Rutten, M. “Contestation au sujet d’une donation mère à ses fils.” RA 41 (1947), 99–103. Sack, Ronald H. “The Scribe Nabû-bāni-a i, son of Ibnâ, and the Hierarchy of Eanna as seen in the Erech Conracts.” ZA 67 (1977), 42–52. ———. Cuneiform Documents from the Chaldean and Persian Periods. London, 1993. ———. Neriglissar—King of Babylon (AOAT 236). Neukirchen, 1994.

326

bibliography

———. “Royal and Temple Officials in Eanna and Uruk in the Chaldean Period.” In Manfred Dietrich and Oswald Loretz, eds. Vom Alten Orient zum Alten Testament (AOAT 240) (Neukirchen, 1995), 425–432. Sacks, Abraham J. Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia. Vienna, 1988. San Nicolò, Mariano. “Über Adoption und die Gerichtsbarkeit der mâr-bânî im neubabylonischen Rechte.” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 50 (1930), 445–455. ———. Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte im Bereiche der keilschriftlichen Rechtsquellen. Oslo, 1931. ———. “Parerga Babylonica VII: Der §8 des Gesetzbuches ammurapis in den neubabylonischen Urkunden.” ArOr 4 (1932), 327–344. ———. “Parerga Babylonica VIII: Zu den Klauseln der neubabylonischen Pachtverträge über Dattelpalmengärten.” ArOr 4 (1932), 344–348. ———. “Parerga Babylonica IX: Der Monstreprozeß des Gimillu, eines širku von Eanna.” ArOr 5 (1933), 61–77. ———. “Parerga Babylonica XI: Die maš altu-Urkunden im neubabylonischen Strafverfahren.” ArOr 5 (1933), 287–302. ———. “Parerga Babylonica XII: Einiges über Tempelpfrunden (isqu) und hemerai leitourgikai in Eanna.” ArOr 6 (1934), 179–202. ———. Zur Nachbürgschaft in den Keilschrifturkunden und in den gräko-ägyptischen Papyri (SBAW 1937, 6). Munich, 1937. ———. “Bürgschaft.” RLA 2 (1938), pp. 77–80. ———.”Ein Urteil des Königlichen Gerichtes in Babylon aus der Zeit des Nabonid.” In J. Friedrich, et al., eds. Symbolae ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pretinentes Paulo Koschaker Dedicatae (Studia et Documenta 2) (Leiden, 1939), 219–234. ———. Beiträge zu einer Prosopographie neubabylonischer Beamten der Zivil- und Tempelverwaltung. SBAW 1941 2,2. Munich, 1941. ———. “Eine kleine Gefängnismeuterei in Eanna zur Zeit des Kambyses.” In Wenger AV (Munich, 1945), 1–17. ———. “Bestellung eines Pförtners für das Akîtu-Festhaus der Ištar von Uruk.” In Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati (Studi e Testi 126) (Vatican City, 1946), 499–508. ———. “Zum atru und anderen Nebenleistungen des Käufers beim neubabylonischen Immobiliarkauf.” Or. 16 (1947), 273–302. ———. “Neubabylonische Urkunden aus Ur.” Or. 19 (1950), pp. 217–232. ———. “Materialien zur Viehwirtschaft in den neubabylonischen Templen. IV “ Or. 23 (1954), 351–382. San Nicolò, Mariano and Arthur Ungnad. Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden. Leipzig, 1935. Sayce, A. H. “Some Unpublished Contract-Tablets.” The Babylonian and Oriental Record 4 (1889), 1–6. Scheil, V. “La liberation judiciaire d’un fils donné en gage sous Neriglissor en 558 av. J.-C.” RA 12 (1915), 1–13. ———. “Notules (No. 34).” RA 13 (1917), 157–158. ———. “Notules.” RA 14 (1917), 139–163. Shiff, Laurence Brian. The Nūr-Sîn Archive: Private Entrepreneurship in Babylon (603–507 B.C.). Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. 1987. Snyder, John W. “Babylonian Suretyship Litigation: A Case History.” JCS 9 (1955), 25–28. Spar, Ira. “Three Neo-Babylonian Trial Depositions from Uruk.” In Marvin A. Powell, Jr. and Ronald H. Sack, eds. Studies in Honor of Tom B. Jones. AOAT 203 (Neukircher-Vluyn, 1979), 157–172. Speiser, E.A. “New Kirkuk Documents Relating to Family Laws.” AASOR 10 (1928/1929), 1–74.

bibliography

327

Stigers, Harold G. Achaemenian Tablets in the John Frederick Lewis Collection of the Philadelphia Free Library. Ph.D. Thesis, Dropsie College. 1953. ———.”Neo- and Late Babylonian Business Documents from the John Frederick Lewis Collection.” JCS 28 (1976), 3–59. Stolper, Matthew W. “The Genealogy of the Murašu Family.” JCS 28 (1976), 189–200. ———. Entrepreneurs and Empires: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm and Persian Rule in Babylonia. Leiden, 1985. ———. “Bēlšunu the Satrap.” In Language, Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (AOS 67) (New Haven, 1987), 389–402. ———. “The Governor of Babylon and Across the River in 486 B.C.” JNES 48 (1989), 283–305. ———. “Late Achaemenid Texts from Dilbat.” Iraq 54 (1992), 119–139. ———. “ ‘No-one Has Exact Information Except for You:’ Communication Between Babylon and Uruk in the First Achaemenid Reigns.” Achaemenid History 13 (2003), 265–287. Strassmaier, J. N. Inschriften von Nabonidus, König von Babylon. Leipzig, 1889. ———. Inschriften von Nabuchodonosor, König von Babylon. Leipzig, 1889. ———. Inschriften von Cyrus, König von Babylon. Leipzig, 1890. ———. Inschriften von Darius König von Babylon. Leipzig, 1893–1897. Streck, Michael P. Zahl und Zeit: Grammatik der Numeralia und des Verbalsystems im Spätbabylonischen (Cuneiform Monographs 5). Groningen, 1995. Tremayne, Arch. Records from Erech: Time of Cyrus and Cambyses (538 521 B.C.) (YOS 7). New Haven, 1925. Tsukimoto, Akio. “Akkadian Tablets in the Hirayama Collection (III). Acta Sumerologica 14 (1992), 289–310. Ungnad, Arthur. “Babylonische Kriegsanleihen.” Or. 6 (1937), 245–251. ———. “Das Haus Egibi.” AfO 14 (1941–1944), 57–64. ———. “Neubabylonische Privaturkunden aus der Sammlung Amherst.” AfO 19 (1959–1960), 74–82. Waerzeggers, Caroline. “The Babylonian Revolts Against Xerxes and the ‘End of Archives.’ ” AfO 50 (2003/2004), 150–173. Walker, C. B. F. “Cuneiform Tablets in the County Museum and Art Gallery, Truro, Cornwall.” AfO 24 (1973), 122–127; Plates XVII–XXIV. Wallis, Gerhard. “Aus dem Leben eines jüdischen Sklaven in Babylon.” In . . . und fragten nach Jesus: Beträge aus Theologie, Kirche und Geschichte (Berlin, 1964), 14–20. Weidner, Ernst. “Hochverrat gegen Nebukadnezar II.” AfO 17 (1954–1956), 1–9. Weisberg, David B. Guild Structure and Political Allegiance in Early Achaemenid Mesopotamia. YNER 1. New Haven, 1967. ———. “Kinship and Social Organization in Chaldaean Uruk.” JAOS 104 (1984), pp. 739–743. Wells, Bruce. The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes. (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte 4). Wiesbaden, 2004. Westbrook, Raymond. Review of Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßurkunden, by Eva Dombradi. Or. 68 (1999), 122–127. ———, ed. A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law. Leiden, 2003. Westbrook, Raymond and Richard Jasnow, eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law. Leiden, 2001. Wilcke, Claus. “šum ulum ‘den Tag verbringen.’ ” ZA 70 (1980), 138–140. Wunsch, Cornelia. Die Urkunden des babylonischen Gesschäftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit Naturalien im 6. Jarhundert v. Chr. (Cuneiform Monographs 3). Groningen, 1993. ———. “Die Jugendsünden eines Babyloniers aus gutem Hause.” Altorientalische Forschungen 24 (1997), 231–241.

328

bibliography

———. “Neu- und spätbabylonische Urkunden aus dem Museum von Montserrat.” AuOr 15 (1997), 139–144. ———. “Und die Richter berieten . . .: Streitfälle in Babylon aus der Zeit Neriglissars und Nabonids.” AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), 59–100. ———. “Eine Richterurkunde aus der Zeit Neriglissars.” Altorientalische Forschungen 17–18 (1999–2000), 241–254. ———. Das Egibi Archiv: Die Felder und Gärten (Cuneiform Monographs 20A, 20B). Groningen, 2000. ———. “Die Richter des Nabonid.” In J. Marzahn and H. Neumann, eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster, 2000), 557–597. ———. “ ‘Du hast meinen Sohn geschlagen!’ ” In Cornelia Wunsch, ed. Mining the Archives: Festschrift for Christopher Walker on the Occasion of His 60 Birthday (Babylonische Archive 1) (Dresden, 2002), 355–364. ———. Urkunden zum Ehe-, Vermögens-, und Erbrecht aus verschiedenen neubabylonischen Archiven (Babylonische Archive 2). Dresden, 2003. Zadok, Ran. Répertoire Géographique des Textes Cunéiformes 8: Geographical Names According to New- and Late-Babylonian Texts. Wiesbaden, 1985.

INDEX OF CUNEIFORM TEXTS CITED

AASOR 16, No. 71 304 (n.) Abraham, Business, No. 17 119 (n.); 123–128; 209 (n.) Abraham, Business, No. 45 119 (n.); 124–128; 209 (n.) Abraham, Business, No. 85 176–177; 179 AnOr 8, 21 102 (n.); 107; 111 AnOr 8, 27 91; 273–275; 288 (n.); 289 AnOr 8, 37 122 (n.); 123 (n.); 126; 254 (n.); 257 AnOr 8, 38 94 AnOr 8, 39 151 (n.); 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 AnOr 8, 45 198; 200 AnOr 8, 46 198; 201 AnOr 8, 47 (=TCL 13, 138) 94; 270 (n.); 283 (n.); 285 (n.) AnOr 8, 50 122; 127; 254 (n.); 257 AnOr 8, 55 115–116 AnOr 8, 56 95; 283–284 AnOr 8, 61 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 153 (n.); 158 (n.); 161; 294 (n.) AnOr 8, 79 63 (n.); 66; 203 (n.) BE 6/1, 6 310 (n.) BE 8/1, 29 74 (n.); 77; 79 BE 8/1, 48 126 BE 8/1, 107 242 (n.); 259–260; 265 BE 9, 24 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 153; 159; 162 BE 9, 69 70 (n.); 71 (n.); 73 BE 10, 9 83; 250 (n.) BIN 1, 113 134 (n.); 135–137; 140–142; 145; 277 (n.) BIN 1, 141 79 (n.); 83; 231 (n.) BIN 1, 142 99; 101 BIN 1, 169 209 (n.); 217 BIN 2, 108 114 (n.); 115–116 BIN 2, 115 (=YOS 7, 23) 102 (n.); 105; 108 BIN 2, 116 217; 294 (n.) BIN 2, 134 34; 36 (n.); 40 (n.); 44; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 283 (n.)

Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3, No. 874 (n.); 256; 259; 264 BRM 1, 70 115 (n.)

44; 243

Camb 329 90; 97; 99 Camb 412 63–66 Camb 426 115–116 CH 13 317 CT 2, 2 99; 101; 284 (n.) CT 2, 39 305 CT 2, 46 305 CT 4, 13a 310 (n.) CT 46, 45 223 (n.); 262 (n.) CT 47, 12/12a 310 (n.) CT 48, 1 310 (n.) Cyr 184 66 Cyr 199 107; 112 Cyr 243 112 Cyr 293 113 (n.); 115–116 Cyr 301 27 (n.); 34 (n.); 44; 254 (n.); 257; 264 Cyr 307 212; 216 Cyr 311 143 (n.); 148; 151; 165 (n.) Cyr 312 34; 35 (n.); 37 (n.); 44; 148; 226 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 251 (n.); 257; 264–265 Cyr 318 115–116 Cyr 328 102 (n.); 105; 109 Cyr 329 90 (n.); 95 Cyr 332 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 44; 65; 224 (n.); 226 (n.); 233 (n.); 239 (n.); 240 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.) Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 25 (n.); 38; 45; 227–229; 231; 236 (n.); 240 (n.); 242; 253; 304 (n.) Dar 53 261 (n.) Dar 128 102 (n.); 109 Dar 149 260 (n.); 265 Dar 159 132 Dar 187 115 (n.) Dar 189 125 (n.); 127 Dar 229 130–131 (n.); 202; 206–207; 210 Dar 260 79–81; 83; 250 (n.)

330

index of cuneiform texts cited

Dar 299 198–199; 201 Dar 358 198 (n.); 201; 252 (n.); 292 (n.) Dar 410 64; 67; 260–261; 265 Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 6 272 (n.) Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 23–25; 34–35; 36 (n.); 41; 238–239; 243 (n.); 245 (n.); 247–248; 253 (n.); 264; 304 (n.) Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 34; 35 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 43; 57–59; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 243 (n.); 245 (n.); 246; 247 (n.); 248 (n.) Evetts, Ner. 36 Evetts, Ner. 55

83 198–200

Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 47–52; 55; 61; 279 (n.); 295; 296 (n.); 299 GCCI 1, 380 151–152 (n.); 153 (n.); 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 160 GCCI 2, 115 171; 179 GCCI 2, 195 113 Greengus Ishchali, No. 25 305 Hallo-Tadmor, IEJ 27 (1977), pp. 1–11 305 (n.) Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 313–316 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 10 306 (n.) Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15 313 (n.); 315 (n.) Jas, SAAS 5, No. 30 318 (n.) Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46 315–316 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 53 318–319 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 54 313–314 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 55 318 (n.) Jas, SAAS 5, No. 56 318 (n.) JEN 344 317 JEN 355 317 JEN 390 315 (n.) Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251 25 (n.); 63; 67; 231 (n.); 260 (n.); 265; 304 (n.) Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268 198 (n.); 200; 252 (n.); 292 (n.) Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276 128 (n.); 131–132 Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129 64; 67; 231 (n.); 240 (n.) Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211 285 (n.); 289 (n.)

MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4 126; 128 (n.); 130–131 (n.) MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 9 90 (n.); 91 McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38 70 (n.); 71 (n.); 72; 231 (n.); 236 (n.) MDP 22, 160 306 (n.) Meissner BAP 80 309 (n.) Nbk 52 129 (n.); 134 (n.); 138 (n.); 144; 164 (n.); 239 (n.) Nbk 104 151 (n.); 160 Nbk 109 77; 79; 261; 263–264 Nbk 116 261 (n.) Nbk 183 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 138 (n.); 144; 164 (n.); 241 (n.) Nbk 227 142; 144; 239 (n.) Nbk 266 134 (n.); 135 (n.); 140–141 (n.); 142; 144; 239 (n.) Nbk 344 111 Nbk 361 134 (n.); 144; 241 (n.) Nbk 363 144; 241 (n.) Nbk 365 134 (n.); 138–139; 141 (n.); 142; 144; 164 (n.); 241 (n.) Nbk 366 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 135 (n.); 138 (n.); 143 (n.); 145; 164; 241 (n.) Nbk 379 129; 132 Nbk 419 138 (n.); 141 (n.); 143 (n.); 145; 164 (n.); 241 (n.) Nbn 13 27 (n.); 34 (n.); 35; 36 (n.); 40; 41; 122 (n.); 224–226; 233 (n.); 239 (n.); 240–241; 242 (n.); 243 (n.) Nbn 64 44 Nbn 68 99–101; 240 (n.) Nbn 69 113 Nbn 102 120–122; 126 Nbn 343 143 (n.); 148–150 Nbn 355 26; 259–260 Nbn 356 32; 42; 226; 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243–244; 253; 255; 259 Nbn 495 39 (n.); 40; 46; 229; 231 Nbn 668 70–72; 254 (n.) Nbn 679 134 (n.); 137–138; 145; 215 (n.); 240 Nbn 682 213; 215–216 Nbn 738 256; 264 Nbn 954 198 (n.); 200; 252 (n.); 292 (n.) Nbn 958 110; 113 Nbn 1113 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 45; 230; 235–237; 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 256; 264

index of cuneiform texts cited Nbn 1128 25 (n.); 35; 38 (n.); 40; 45; 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 245; 304 (n.) Oberhuber, Florenz, No. 155 92; 269 (n.) OIP 122, 34 134 (n.); 138 (n.); 141 (n.); 144; 164 (n.) OIP 122, 35 154; 160 OIP 122, 38 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 44; 122 (n.); 226 (n.); 233 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 253 (n.); 257–258; 265 PBS 2/1, 85 171 (n.); 175; 177; 179 PBS 2/1, 126 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 145 PBS 2/1, 140 67; 231 (n.) PRU 3, pl. 99 305 (n.) Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989/1990), No. 1 38 (n.); 39; 46; 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.) Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 63 (n.); 64; 66; 231 (n.) Sack, CuDoc, No. 77 112 Sack, CuDoc, No. 78 112 Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 143 (n.); 147–148; 149 (n.); 150; 165 (n.) Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13 25 (n.); 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 38 (n.); 41; 224 (n.); 226 (n.); 232–234; 235 (n.); 236–237; 242 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 247; 248 (n.); 264; 304 (n.) Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 183 (n.); 188 (n.); 191–194; 277 (n.) Spar, AOAT 203, No. 1 93; 293 Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2 96; 270 (n.); 279 (n.); 283 (n.) Spar, AOAT 203, No. 3 95 Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 1 198 (n.); 200 Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 6 112 Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 39 111 Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106 70 (n.); 71 (n.); 73; 231 (n.) Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109 70 (n.); 71 (n.); 73; 250 (n.) Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110 64; 67; 231 (n.) TCL 1, 104 304 (n.); 305 TCL 9, 102 28 (n.) TCL 11, 245 310 (n.)

331

TCL 12, 50 151 (n.); 160 TCL 12, 60 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 160 TCL 12, 70 151 (n.); 154–156; 160 TCL 12, 77 171 (n.); 172–175; 176 (n.); 178 TCL 12, 86 34 (n.); 42; 238 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.) TCL 12, 89 171 (n.); 174–175; 176 (n.); 178 TCL 12, 96 143 (n.); 148; 149 (n.); 150; 163 (n.) TCL 12, 106 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 TCL 12, 117 93; 268 (n.) TCL 12, 119 47 (n.); 60; 240 (n.); 276 (n.); 283 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.) TCL 12, 120 256; 264 TCL 12, 122 26 (n.); 43; 70; 72; 253 (n.) TCL 13, 125 102 (n.); 105; 109 TCL 13, 131 171 (n.); 175 (n.); 176 (n.); 179 TCL 13, 132 90; 94; 276 (n.) TCL 13, 133 94 TCL 13, 134 109; 120 (n.) TCL 13, 138 (=AnOr 8, 47) TCL 13, 142 212; 216 TCL 13, 147 47 (n.); 61; 296 (n.) TCL 13, 157 171 (n.); 184–185; 188; 195 TCL 13, 161 197; 201 TCL 13, 170 48 (n.); 61; 249 (n.); 270 (n.); 285 (n.); 290 (n.) TCL 13, 179 96; 290 (n.) TCL 13, 181 98; 290 (n.) TCL 13, 212 74 (n.); 78–79 TCL 13, 219 (=Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90) 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 43; 243 (n.); 245 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 253 (n.) TCL 13, 222 198; 201; 223 (n.); 258 Tsukimoto, Acta Sumerologica 14 (1992), No. 44 305 (n.) TuM 2–3, 213 132 UCP 9/1, 53 VAS 4, 87 VAS 6, 38 VAS 6, 43 VAS 6, 45 VAS 6, 89 VAS 6, 97 VAS 6, 99 257 (n.)

209 (n.); 213–216

73; 261 (n.) 74 (n.); 77–79 261 (n.) 110; 113 74–77; 79 197; 200 118 (n.); 122–123; 126;

332

index of cuneiform texts cited

VAS 6, 120 198 (n.); 201 VAS 6, 127 81–83 VAS 6, 154 202; 204–205; 210 VAS 6, 171 63; 66; 263 VAS 6, 253 113; VAS 7, 7/VAS 7, 152 310 (n.) VAS 8, 108 309 (n.) VAS, Neue Folge 4, No. 126 93; 286 (n.) Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5 72; 239; 262 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 41; 238 (n.); 239 (n.); 243 (n.); 253 (n.) Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 6 25 (n.); 32; 41; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 239; 243 (n.); 303–304 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 13 44; 70; 72 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 19 43; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.) Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 20 42 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21 32–33; 36 (n.); 42; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 246; 253 (n.) Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 22 44 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 23 44 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 25 44 Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 37 44; 247 (n.) Wunsch, Altorientalische Forschungen 24 (1997), pp. 231–241 242 (n.) Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 90–91; 250 (n.) Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254 27 (n.); 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 45; 198 (n.); 230; 236 (n.); 239 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 254 (n.) Wunsch, BA 1, pp. 356–357 126 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9 25 (n.); 64; 66; 304 (n.) Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42 14 (n.); 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 45; 228–231 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 14 (n.); 44; 233 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 246; 248–249; 251–252; 293 (n.) Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45 14 (n.); 44; 241 (n.); 244 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 250 (n.); 251 (n.); 261 (n.)

Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46 14 (n.); 44; 233 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 250 (n.); 251 (n.); 252 (n.); 293 (n.) Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47 14 (n.); 44; 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 249 (n.) Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48 14 (n.); 72; 122 (n.); 242 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.) Wunsch, CM 20, No. 59 83 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 84 14 (n.); 43 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90 (=TCL 13, 219) Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 14 (n.); 25–26; 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 46; 229; 231; 238 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.) YNER 1, 2 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 162; 293–294 YOS 6, 18 (=YOS 19, 100) 83; 231 (n.) YOS 6, 57 102 (n.); 111 YOS 6, 64 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 188 (n.); 190; 194; 277 (n.) YOS 6, 77 91; 286 (n.); 288; 289 (n.) YOS 6, 79 108 YOS 6, 88 102 (n.); 111 YOS 6, 92 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 42; 55–56; 226 (n.); 227 (n.); 233 (n.); 237 (n.); 242 (n.); 296 (n.) YOS 6, 108 143 (n.); 150 YOS 6, 116 92; 100; 283 (n.) YOS 6, 122 152–153; 155 (n.); 160 YOS 6, 123 48 (n.); 60; 171 (n.); 173–175; 178; 282; 283 (n.) YOS 6, 131 102 (n.); 106–108; 279–280 YOS 6, 134 151 (n.); 153 (n.); 155 (n.); 160 YOS 6, 137 91; 286 (n.); 287 (n.); 289 (n.) YOS 6, 144 198–200; 285–286 YOS 6, 148 155 (n.); 160 YOS 6, 152 171 (n.); 175 (n.); 178 YOS 6, 153 142; 145; 148 (n.) YOS 6, 156 93; 270 (n.); 283 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.); 293 (n.) YOS 6, 160 151 (n.); 160; 163 (n.) YOS 6, 169 (=YOS 6, 231) 48 (n.); 60; 164 (n.); 283 (n.); 291–294 YOS 6, 175 150 YOS 6, 177 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 YOS 6, 179 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 YOS 6, 180 151 (n.); 161; 163 (n.) YOS 6, 183 107 (n.); 111 YOS 6, 191 151 (n.); 156–158; 161; 164

index of cuneiform texts cited YOS 6, 193 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 YOS 6, 194 184–185; 187–188; 189; 194 YOS 6, 202 198 (n.); 200; 292 (n.) YOS 6, 203 151 (n.); 155 (n.); 161 YOS 6, 204 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 YOS 6, 206 189; 194; 277 (n.) YOS 6, 208 143 (n.); 146–147; 150; 165 (n.) YOS 6, 213 188 (n.); 190–194; 277 (n.) YOS 6, 214 151 (n.); 155–156 (n.); 158 (n.); 161; 164 YOS 6, 222 91; 273 (n.) YOS 6, 223 85 (n.); 92; 286–288 YOS 6, 224 92; 290 (n.); 291 YOS 6, 225 48 (n.); 60; 249 (n.); 270 (n.); 276; 284 (n.); 285 (n.) YOS 6, 231 (=YOS 6, 169) YOS 6, 235 92; 164; 270 (n.) YOS 7, 7 47 (n.); 54; 55 (n.); 60; 269–272; 275; 278–279; 283 (n.); 295; 296 (n.) YOS 7, 10 102 (n.); 103–104; 108; 289 YOS 7, 14 108 YOS 7, 18 116 YOS 7, 22 112 YOS 7, 23 (=BIN 2, 115) YOS 7, 24 151 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 25 171 (n.); 178 YOS 7, 26 151 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 27 171 YOS 7, 31 118; 120; 123 (n.); 126; 223 (n.); 257 YOS 7, 35 133 (n.); 136 (n.); 140–141; 145; 281–282 YOS 7, 42 94; 279 (n.); 286 (n.); 288 (n.) YOS 7, 44 197 (n.); 201 YOS 7, 50 202–203; 210 YOS 7, 56 212; 216 YOS 7, 58 171 (n.); 179 YOS 7, 66 48 (n.); 50; 54; 55; 62; 270 (n.) YOS 7, 68 169–172; 175; 178 YOS 7, 77 212 (n.); 217 YOS 7, 78 90; 95; 279 (n.); 283 (n.); 288 (n.), 289 YOS 7, 88 93; 270 (n.); 272–273; 275 (n.) YOS 7, 91 94; 100 (n.); 283 (n.) YOS 7, 92 216 YOS 7, 96 143 (n.); 146 (n.); 151 YOS 7, 97 95; 270 (n.); 273 (n.); 276 (n.); 279 (n.); 283 (n.)

333

YOS 7, 102 96; 270 (n.); 275 (n.) YOS 7, 106 96 YOS 7, 107 112 YOS 7, 109 171; 179 YOS 7, 111 180 (n.); 183; 188 (n.); 190; 194; 277 (n.) YOS 7, 113 197; 201 YOS 7, 115 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 188 (n.); 195 YOS 7, 128 62; 249 (n.); 269–270; 276 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.); 296 (n.); 298–299 YOS 7, 137 180–184; 186; 188 (n.); 190; 195; 254 (n.); 258; 265 YOS 7, 140 86–88; 98; 283 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.) YOS 7, 141 151 (n.); 155–156 (n.); 162 YOS 7, 146 97; 284 (n.); 285 (n.) YOS 7, 149 97; 270 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.) YOS 7, 152 97; 290 (n.) YOS 7, 153 115–116 YOS 7, 158 96; 270 (n.) YOS 7, 159 96; 122 (n.); 254 (n.); 258; 265; 270 (n.); 277–278; 313 (n.) YOS 7, 161 47 (n.); 52; 55–56; 59; 61; 86; 88–89; 258; 265; 295 (n.) YOS 7, 165 114–116 YOS 7, 170 188 (n.); 195 YOS 7, 177 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 195 YOS 7, 189 121; 122 (n.); 127; 254 (n.); 257 YOS 7, 192 134 (n.); 137–138; 140 (n.); 145 YOS 7, 194 202; 207–210 YOS 7, 198 98 YOS 17, 32 151 (n.); 154; 160; 163 (n.) YOS 17, 320 78–79 YOS 19, 90 62; 268 YOS 19, 91 62; 250 (n.); 276 (n.); 285 (n.); 297–298 YOS 19, 92 92; 100 (n.); 240 (n.); 283 (n.) YOS 19, 95 111 YOS 19, 97 151 (n.); 160 YOS 19, 98 151–152 (n.); 153 (n.); 158 (n.); 160 YOS 19, 100 (=YOS 6, 18) YOS 19, 101 28–32; 43; 226 (n.); 237; 240 (n.); 242 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 253 (n.) YOS 19, 110 209 (n.); 211–213; 216

INDEX AND GLOSSARY OF AKKADIAN TERMS DISCUSSED

abāku (“to bring,” used to denote summoning) 90; 134; 142 (n.); 163; 167–168; 197; 233–234; 241; 275; 277–278; 291–292; 313 type of summons 142 (n.); 167–177; 187; 189; 197; 203; 280–281 abālu (“to bring,” used to denote summoning) 34; 226; 233–234; 246; 248–249; 251–252; 275; 277–278; 299; 313 adi (“by” a certain date) 130; 206–207 alāku (“to go, to come”) 118; 234 amāru (“to see, to inspect”) 273; 283 amātu (“words, statements”) 35; 243 ana (“to”) 102; 119; 133; 207 ana ma ri (“before” the judges) 34; 40 ana pāni (“before, in the presence of ”) 183 (n.); 198 awātam amārum (Old Babylonian term for “to see to the matter”) 7 (n.) baqāru (Old Babylonian term for “to raise a claim”) 7 (n.); 309 bīt dīni (“court of law”) 119; 223; 257–258; 262 bu û (“to search”) 246 dabābu (“to argue a case”) 77–78; 82; 118; 121; 124–128; 130; 197; 208–209; 230; 234–238; 313 (n.) itti PN (“against PN”) 120; 209 (n.) type of summons 117–131; 140; 163–164; 206–208; 257; 313–316 dayyānu (lu2DI.KU5) (“judges”) 65; 77; 254 ša šarri/ša RN (“of the king”/“of RN” denoting “royal judges”) 27 (n.); 224; 254–263 dibbu (“argument”) 35–36; 119; 124; 128; 207; 237; 243–244 dibbīšunu šemû (“to hear their arguments”) 30; 33; 35; 243–244 dibba quttû (“to end a case, to settle”) 129; 206

dīnu (“case, lawsuit”) 10; 78; 119; 124–125; 128; 209 (n.); 223; 268; 315–316 dīna dabābu (“to argue a case”) 40; 79; 234–238; 314 dīnam dânum (Old Babylonian term for “to judge a case”) 7 (n.) dīna epēšu (“to judge a case”) 34 dīna gerû (“to bring suit”) 39; 79; 82; 224; 228–232; 238; 307 dīna rašû (“to have a legal case”) 39; 229–231 dīnam šū uzum (Old Babylonian term for “to instruct regarding a case”) 7 (n.); 244 (n.) erēšu (“to demand”)

246; 317

ī u ša šarri/ša RN (“punishment of the king/of RN”) 171 (n.); 180 idātu (“signs, proofs”) 246; 294 inanna (“now”) 39 ina ma ar (“before, in the presence of ”) 37; 40; 63–64; 233 ina pāni (“before, in the presence of ”) 77–78; 82; 99–100; 102; 119; 183; 198 (n.); 224; 268; 296; 298–299 dabābu ina pāni (“to argue in the presence of ”) 77–78 mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses before whom”) 54; 296 ina piršāti (“falsely”) 212 ina qāt šibitti (“in possession of stolen goods”) 153 ina sarti (“unlawfully”) 104 ina ša āri uppi šuāti (“at the writing of this tablet”) 37–38 ina šemê dīni šuāti (“at the hearing of this case”) 37 ina ūmu (“on the day that”) 134; 151; 209 ina ušuzzu (DU.ZU) (“in the presence of ”) 51; 54; 89–90; 100–102;

index and glossary of akkadian terms discussed 128 (n.); 140; 155; 187; 212; 240 (n.); 268; 275; 283 (n.); 296; 300 itti (“with,” often in adversarial sense of “against”) 119; 125 īzuzu (“to stand”) 269 (n.) kanāku (“to seal”) 273 kašādu (“to arrive, to catch”) 40; 90; 228–229 kašādu ana mu i (“to proceed against”) 82 (n.) kî (“if, when, that”) 134; 209 (n.); 250; 290 kinattû (“colleagues”) 260–261 kullumu (“to show”) 133 (n.); 239; 241; 294 kunnu (“to establish, to testify”) 133–143; 197; 239–242; 248; 263; 279; 282–283; 288 (n.) type of summons 132–143; 149–150; 162–164; 172; 197; 205; 239; 242; 246; 277 (n.); 280–282; 317–319 lā ābātu (“treason”) 181 (n.) lišānšu (ša) (“declaration of,” form of text at Nuzi) 311 ma āru (“to approach) 34 ma ar (“before, in the presence of ”) 224; 240; 268; 283 maš altu (“interrogation”) 90; 279 (n.); 284–290 mitluku (“to deliberate”) 30; 33; 36; 38; 245 (n.); 252–253; 295 mukinnu (“witness”) 51; 54; 65; 78; 89; 99; 134; 223; 241; 296; 298–300 mukinnūtu (“testimony”) 107; 115; 143; 241; 243; 283–284; 295 našû (“to carry, to bring”) 100 pūta našû (“to assume responsibility, to guarantee”) 133; 143; 171 (n.); 177 rēša našû (“to summon”) 277–278 nadānu (“to give, to pay, to hand over”) 167–168; 253 nīš DINGIR.MEŠ zakāru (“to pronounce the oath the gods”) 248; 250–251; 290 paqādu (“to deposit”) 273 paqāri šubšû (“to raise a claim”) 229; 231

39 (n.);

335

parāsu (“to decide”) 50; 253; 295 pu ru (UKKIN) (“assembly”) 110; 268; 296 puqquru (“to claim”) 110; 231 (n.) purussû (EŠ.BAR) (“decision”) 35 (n.); 252–253 ina purussê dīni šuati (“at the decision of this case”) 31; 33; 37–38; 223; 253 purussâ šakānu (“to establish a decision”) 34; 198 qabû (“to speak, to say”) 34; 104 (n.); 113; 228; 238; 248–250; 279; 282; 290 PN iqbi umma (“PN said thus”) 34; 90; 101–102; 226; 250 quttû (“to end, to settle”) 119 (n.); 130; 197 type of summons 117; 128–132; 163–164; 206–207 rēša našû (“to summon”) 277 ragāmu (“to bring suit”) 7 (n.); 39; 81; 229–232; 236; 238; 309 rakāsu (“to tie, to bind”) 273 šakānu (“to place, to present”) 78; 275 šasû (“to call, to read”) 278 (n.); 283; 313 šemû (“to hear, to evaluate arguments”) 35–37; 233; 237; 241; 243–245; 249 šunnû (“to relate”) 228 šuzkuru (“to cause to speak, to impose an oath”) 293 ša ālu (“to question”) 241–242; 247–251; 283–285; 289–290; 293 (n.) ta siltu/ta sistu (“memorandum”) 74; 76–77; 312 ta sistu lā masê (“memorandum, not to be forgotten”) 74; 99; 312 temû (“to swear”) 113; 290 ina DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by DN and the oaths of RN”) 250; 290 (n.) uppi dīni (“tablet of legal proceedings”) 26; 302–303; 316 umma (“thus”)

230; 311

zakû (“clear”)

138; 155

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure (Cuneiform Monographs)

Disease in Babylonia (Cuneiform Monographs)

Practice Notes : County Court Procedure (Practice Notes)

Mesopotamian Protective Spirits: The Ritual Texts (Cuneiform Monographs)

Seleucid Archival Texts in the Harvard Semitic Museum (Cuneiform Monographs,)

Birth In Babylonia & The Bible (Cuneiform Monographs, 14)

The Procedure

De Procedure

De procedure

De procedure

Criminal Procedure

De Procedure

The Procedure

Cuneiform Inscriptions in the Collection of the Bible Lands Museum Jerusalem: The Old Babylonian Inscriptions (Cuneiform Monographs)

NORAD Intercept Procedure

Clear Procedure Issue One

MySQL Stored Procedure Programming

MySQL Stored Procedure Programming

Criminal Law and Procedure

On Civil Procedure

Senate Procedure and Practice (Senate Procedure & Practice)

Cuneiform Luvian lexicon (Lexica anatolica)

Midnight Court

Court Martial

Ravensdene Court

Court Martial

Hampton Court

Appeals Court

Court Martial

Court Duel

Court Appointed

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure (Cuneiform Monographs)

Disease in Babylonia (Cuneiform Monographs)

Practice Notes : County Court Procedure (Practice Notes)

Mesopotamian Protective Spirits: The Ritual Texts (Cuneiform Monographs)

Seleucid Archival Texts in the Harvard Semitic Museum (Cuneiform Monographs,)

Birth In Babylonia & The Bible (Cuneiform Monographs, 14)

The Procedure

De Procedure

De procedure

De procedure

Criminal Procedure

De Procedure

The Procedure

Cuneiform Inscriptions in the Collection of the Bible Lands Museum Jerusalem: The Old Babylonian Inscriptions (Cuneiform Monographs)

NORAD Intercept Procedure

Clear Procedure Issue One

MySQL Stored Procedure Programming

MySQL Stored Procedure Programming

Criminal Law and Procedure

On Civil Procedure

Senate Procedure and Practice (Senate Procedure & Practice)

Cuneiform Luvian lexicon (Lexica anatolica)

Midnight Court

Court Martial

Ravensdene Court

Court Martial

Hampton Court

Appeals Court

Court Martial

Court Duel

Court Appointed

Recommend Documents