Nature and History: A Study in Theological Methodology with Special Attention to The Method of Motif Research

STUDIA T H E O L O G I C A LUNDENSIA SKRIFTER UTGIVNA AV TEOLOGISKA FAKULTETEN I LUND

19

NATURE AND HISTORY A STUDY I N T H E O L O G I C A L M E T H O D O L O G Y W I T H SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE METHOD OF MOTIF RESEARCH BY

BERNHARD ERLING

C V K G L E E R U P • L U N D 1960

The Scripture quotations in this publication are from the Revised Standard of the Bible, copyrighted National

Council

1946 and 1952

of Churches

by the Division

of Christ in the United used by

of Christian

Version

Education,

States of America,

permission.

Printed in Sweden Lund 1960 Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri

and

9o

i fie

^ïtLemory

of

my

Barents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS FOREWORD . . INTRODUCTION PART ONE: THE CRITICAL THEORY OF EXPERIENCE . I. THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 1. Philosophy as the Universal Science . . . 2. Value Judgments and Historical Description 3. The Validity of Experience . . II. THE NATURAL SCIENCES . . . . III. THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES—ETHICS . 1. The Concept of Critical Ethics 2. The Analysis of Ethical Validity . 3. The Nature of Ethical Valuation . 4. The Ethical Motifs . . . . . . IV. THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES—RELIGION . . . 1. Religious Validity and the Relation between Form and Content 2. Metaphysical and Historical Types of Religious Interpretation ; 3. The Transcendental Deduction of the Religious Category V. THE THEORY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 1. Analytic Validity and Synthetic Truth . 2. The Concept of Symbolic Form 3. Metaphysics as Symbolic Form PART TWO: THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND DESCRIPTION . VII. THE METHOD OF MOTIF RESEARCH VIII. MOTIF RESEARCH AND HISTORICAL ACTUALITY IX. MOTIF RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY SUMMARY . . BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

6 7 9 25 27 27 39 49 80 92 95 104 hi 118 133 136 150 159 192 193 196 202 211 213 226 243 254 273 275 283

ABBREVIATIONS A E — Agape and Eros D V G — Dogmatikens vetenskapliga E G — Etiska

F K E — Filosofisk F M — Filosofi

och kristen etik

och

Kr. d. r. V . — Kritik N T U — Nordisk

motivforskning der reinen

teologisk

R A — Religiöst

Vernunft

uppslagsbok

apriori

R G — Det religionsfilosofiska S T K — Svensk

grundläggning

grundfrågor

teologisk

U U Â — Uppsala

grundproblemet

kvartalskrift

universitets

årsskrift

FOREWORD Theology has traditionally been divided into historical and systematic branches. Since, however, historical description presupposes some systematic understanding, while any systematic presentation must presuppose acquaintance with the theological tradition which has preceded it, the difference between historical and systematic theology is best expressed in terms of intent. In historical theology the intent is to describe a theological position belonging either to the past or the present. In systematic theology the intent is to formulate a theological position. Such a systematic presentation may depend to a large extent upon the writings of others. It need not claim originality, but it must be set forth as a constructive answer to the problems in question. This study of theological methodology, in which special attention is given to the writings of Anders Nygren, is systematic in the above sense. While it is hoped that those not acquainted with certain of Nygren's earlier writings here discussed will be aided in their understanding of Nygren's thought through this discussion, the primary intent of this study will not be to provide a description of Nygren's own position. Rather the discussion of Nygren's writings will have the systematic intent of developing the theological method of motif research. That which several years ago attracted the author's attention to this theological method was a statement in Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning (The Scientific Foundations of Dogmatics) in which Nygren says that Christian theology "must be at the same time positively Christian and strictly scientific," insisting that these two requirements, rather than being in necessary and inescapable tension with each other, actually mutually support and imply one another. The author has become convinced through further study of Nygren's writings that the method of motif research does go far to 7

meet these requirements. While this method has thus far been regarded as characteristic of what is known as Lundensian theology, it represents a methodological approach to theology meriting general systematic consideration. It is to contribute to such a systematic discussion of this method that this study has been written. It is a pleasure to express appreciation to many who have helped me prepare this study. It was begun as a dissertation submitted to the Department of Religion of Yale University entitled "The Theological Methodology of Anders Nygren with Especial Attention to Motif Research." A year was then spent at the University of Heidelberg, where seminars with Professor Edmund Schlink proved particularly stimulating. Later at Lund I benefited from the searching critique of Professor Harald Eklund and Professor Gustaf Wingren. The study as it now appears has been written under the direction of Professor Ragnar Bring, whose penetrating analysis and wise counsel have been invaluable. It has been a rare privilege to be able to discuss interpretive problems with Bishop Anders Nygren, and with his son, Docent Gotthard Nygren. Others who have read the manuscript in various stages of its preparation are Docent Bengt Hägglund, Docent Gunnar Hillerdal, Professor Regin Prenter, and Professor Daniel Day Williams. Finally thanks are due to my wife, Marilyn, without whose help and constant encouragement this study could not have been completed.

8

INTRODUCTION Ever since the Enlightenment the problem of theological methodology has continued to present itself. For the theologians of the Enlightenment the problem was posed by the contrast between the contingent truths of revelation and the religion which they believed could be defined in terms of the necessary truths of reason. For the nineteenth century, on the other hand, the Kantian critique of metaphysics made any rational doctrine of God and divine things, however derived, problematical. Those theologians, in turn, who ignored philosophical problems and sought to retain a strictly biblical orientation, were confronted by the fact of biblical criticism, which, in so far as it was recognized, made the simple authoritative appeal to the Scriptures increasingly problematical as a methodological principle. Characteristic of the nineteenth century were theologies of the religious consciousness, fashioned in the tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher and with an emphasis upon value experience. There was difficulty, however, in expressing the unique content of Christianity. The History of Religions school, for example, tended to relativize the Christian revelation, finding countless parallels to its teachings in the other religions of the world. In so far as Christianity was preferred, it was argued that it represented the highest exemplification of the human spirit. It was against this tradition of nineteenth century liberalism that the Dialectical theology rose in violent revolt. It was insisted that theology must speak about God rather than man, but this meant that human consciousness must be transcended. Thus this theology proclaimed a Word of God which addressed man, judging as well as redeeming and creating him. This Dialectical theology has, in turn, divided into two schools 1

1

One thinks in this connection of Lessing's famous dictum: "Contingent historical truths can never serve as proof for necessary truths of reason."

9

over the question of natural theology. One school, identified with Karl Barth, has sought to retain the strictly kerygmatic approach, denying the necessity of defining any Anknüpfungspunkt in man as the prior condition for his reception of the gospel. Another school, identified with Rudolf Bultmann, has increasingly concerned itself with existential analysis of the human situation, by which it has derived the question to which the Christian gospel provides the saving answer. In Scandinavia, and more particularly Sweden, however, a different answer had been given to the problem posed by the History of Religions school. Swedish theology at the turn of the century emphasized the uniqueness of Christianity. In an essay published in the first theological Festschrift to appear in Sweden in 1903, Nathan Söderblom distinguished Christianity as a prophetic religion characterized by "personality mysticism" as over against the "infinity mysticism" of the nonprophetic nature or culture religions. In Einar Billing's De etiska tankarna i urkristendomen, which appeared in 1907, one finds the same quest for the uniqueness of Christianity, as well as an anticipation of a fundamental concept of what has later been called motif research, the search for coherent structures in history. The comparative methods of the History of Religions school 2

3

4

2

The use of the term "school" is here somewhat misleading, however. This

group should include Emil Brunner, whose insistence on the need for an knüpfungspunkt

in man precipitated the controversy over this matter. Paul Tillich,

on the other hand, though he was not originally numbered among the Dialectical theologians, strongly emphasizes existential analysis. 3

Nathan Söderblom, "Uppenbarelsereligion. Några synpunkter i anledning af

Babel-Bibeldiskussionen,"

Skrifter

domprosten

på hans nittioårsdag af forne och nuvarande

C. A. Toren

teologiska fakulteten

i Uppsala

i teologiska

och

kyrkliga

ämnen

vid

(Uppsala, 1903), pp. 1 9 9 — 2 5 3 . Söderblom's essay

has been separately published under the title, Uppenbarelsereligion 1930). The Nature of Revelation

tillägnade lärare

(New York, 1933)

1S

(Stockholm,

the English translation by

Frederic E. Pamp. Söderblom's interest in this essay was not to establish the specific uniqueness of Christianity. In the category of prophetic religion he included also Persian Parsism and Judaism. Yet the tendency to identify distinct religious types is evident. 4

" T h e viewpoint from which we begin . . . is the historical-systematic^ with

the emphasis being made at least as strong on the second term of the combination given. What interests us most is not the origin of the several ethical ideas, but their content and coherence, . . . not the contingent historical-psychological con-

IO

have been used by Swedish theologians, not to relativize the uniqueness of Christianity, but rather to emphasize its distinctiveness as over against non-Christian religions. For this reason there is nothing comparable to the reaction of the Dialectical theology in Sweden. In two recent Swedish discussions of theological methodology, however, dissatisfaction is expressed with the method which Swedish theologians have been using. Gustaf Wingren has charged that it is unable to go beyond historical description and has proposed a method, in which the biblical orientation of Karl Barth, the contemporary existential analysis of Rudolf Bultmann, and some use of the method of the history of ideas to define the nature of the gospel are recognizable. Axel Gyllenkrok, on the other hand, has been more interested in recent British thought and the linguistic analysis with which it has been engaged. His conclusions are that a scientific systematic theology is unattainable, but that a scientific and normative ethics may be possible. In the discussion which follows we shall inquire whether the 5

6

7

8

nectedness, but the inner, so to speak, dormant connection, which on the basis of their own content shows itself as existent among them, and through which they come forth as pans of one and the same total view, a characteristic whole: what we, for lack of a better expression, might call the logical connectedness. What is the uniqueness of the ethical view of primitive Christianity and in what is it grounded?—These are the questions we most want to answer. It is, in other words, the ethical type of primitive Christianity which we seek." De etiska tankarna i urkristendomen,

2nd ed. (Stockholm, 1936), p. 1 1 . The passage cited

is also to be found in the 1907 edition. 5

Gustaf Wingren calls attention to the emphasis which has been placed on

comparative religion in the theological faculties in Sweden. Nathan Söderblom began to teach at Uppsala in 1901 after having studied the history of religion in Paris. Edvard Lehmann came from Berlin to Lund in 1 9 1 3 as professor of comparative religion. Both Gustaf Aulén and Nygren began as docents under professors in comparative religion. "Swedish Theology since 1900," trans. Ross Mackenzie, Scottish Journal 6

of Theology,

I X (1956), pp.

113—114.

Leiv Aalen states, " I n Sweden not a single pupil of Karl Barth and not one

competent

representative

of

the so-called

Dialectical

theology

has

emerged."

"Principal Systematic Problems of Present D a y Scandinavian Theology," Lutheran World, 7

Conflict 8

III (1956), p. 45.

Teologiens

metod fråga (Lund, 1954), trans. Eric H . Wahlström, Theology

in

(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958).

Systematisk

teologi och vetenskaplig

metod med särskild hänsyn till

etiken,

Uppsala universitets årsskrift 1959: 2.

11

critique of Wingren and Gyllenkrok is justified. Our concern at the moment is to determine whether their constructive proposals speak adequately to the present situation. The two philosophical movements which are most characteristic of the mid-twentieth century are existentialism in its various forms and the several patterns of linguistic analysis which have grown out of logical empiricism. While both of these philosophical schools are extremely relevant for theological methodology, a theology which is primarily concerned with the Word of God might well begin with a consideration of linguistic analysis. Gyllenkrok's study, despite other tendencies which it reveals, is therefore significant in so far as it points in this direction. There are two requirements which theological language must meet. The first requirement is that the subject matter of theology must be grasped in its uniqueness and essence. The second requirement is that it must be possible to communicate effectively this specific content. It is through the medium of language that these requirements are most intimately related to each other, for the theologian has no other language to define the content of the Christian faith than that which is used to communicate its content. The problem of stating what precisely the Christian faith is may thus not be abstracted from the problem of its communication, for language apart from the process of communication loses its meaning. It is in this context that its capacities for description, as well as the rules for its use, are deter9

9 See infra, pp. 28—29, 1 2 1 — 1 2 2 , 1 3 9 — 1 5 0 , 246—250. In considering these critiques of Nygren's theological method, the positive evaluation which is implied and indicated should not be overlooked. Wingren suggests that Nygren's method represents one of the three most relevant options at the present time, the other two being Barth and Bultmann. Theology in Conflict, pp. xvii—xviii Sw. 16* (In the following, where English translations are available, such editions will generally be cited, with the equivalent Swedish page references immediately following. Where the author's own translation of the Swedish text is preferred, the equivalent English page reference will follow.) Gyllenkrok specifically states that in his opinion Nygren's attempt to establish the scientific nature of theology is the most significant in recent times outside of the context of the Thomistic philosophy. Systematisk teologi och vetenskaplig metod, p. 10. Hjalmar Lindroths discussion, "Anders Nygren und der Kritizismus," Studia theologica, vol. X fasc. II (1957), pp. 9 1 — 1 8 8 , despite the negative conclusions regarding the value of this method, is also further evidence of the continuing relevance of Nygren's method.

12

mined. Semantic analysis is, therefore, of particular relevance for the consideration of the methodological problem in theology. In so far as philosophy can be defined as consisting primarily in linguistic analysis, a new approach to the problem of the relation between theology and philosophy is here indicated. In recent semantic analysis an effort has been made by logical empiricists to divide the realms of discourse into cognitive and noncognitive areas, using as a criterion the factor of verifiability. 10

11

12

10

Willem F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1958), p. 13, Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York, 1946), ch. 2 and 3, Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 2 1 — 2 2 . 11 Efforts have been made to use the methods of analytical philosophy in developing a philosophy of religion. Zuurdeeg's study, as the title indicates, is such an attempt. Ian T . Ramsay Religious Language, An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, (London, 1957), represents another such attempt which is more apologetic in nature. Further British interest in this direction is indicated in two recent collections of essays, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, eds. Antony Flew and Alasdair Maclntyre (London, 1955) and Faith and Logic, Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Basil Mitchell (London, 1957). See esp. the introduction to the latter volume, pp. 1—8. Use of the methods of analytical philosophy is also to be seen in some of Harald Eklund's recent essays. See Tro, erfarenhet, verklighet (Stockholm, 1956) and Personligt och sakligt i religionsfrågor (Stockholm, 1958). 12 Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York, 1949), p. 7 f. The critique of Nygren's theological method by representatives of the so-called "Uppsala Philosophy" might be considered in this connection. In its origin in the writings of Axel Hägerström and Adolf Phalén, this school sought to remove all traces of metaphysics from philosophy. Phalén pointed out that the epistemological distinction between subject and object itself involved metaphysical presuppositions. "Kritik af subjektivismen i olika former med särskild hänsyn till transcendentalfilosofien," Festskrift tillägnad E. O. Burman (Uppsala, 1910), 1 1 8 — 1 6 7 . Hence the role of philosophy became that of describing experience in noncontradictory terms. For Hägerström the problem of value judgments arose in this connection. See "Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien," Festskrift tillägnad E. O. Burman, pp. 16—75 and "Om moraliska föreställningars sanning," Socialfilosofiska uppsatser, ed. Martin Fries (Stockholm, 1939). Hägerström could not see how value judgments could be fit into a system of noncontradictory propositions, and thus he was driven to value nihilism. It might be noted, however, that his theory of magic would seem to suggest greater possibilities toward a positive understanding of the significance of value experience in terms of his philosophical position than he himself was able to indicate. See Karl Olivecrona's "Editor's

13

A proposition is defined as having cognitive meaning if it is analytically or empirically verifiable. By analytically verifiable propositions are meant logic and mathematics, as well as the general linguistic analysis which philosophy itself is to represent. By empirically verifiable propositions are meant factual propositions representing probable hypotheses, which observation can at least in principle establish as being either true or false. Noncognitive meanings, 13

Preface," in Axel Hägerström, Inquiries

into the Nature

of Law

and

Morals,

trans. C . D. Broad (Uppsala, 1953), p. xvii f f . Martin Fries, a contemporary interpreter of Hägerström, has devoted considerable attention to Nygren's

theological

method in Metafysiken

i

modern

svensk teologi (Stockholm, 1948). Fries argues that there is an inescapable tendency toward metaphysics in theology since theology must deal with a reality which transcends space and time, while our knowledge is limited to the spatiotemporal order. In theology there is, accordingly, a constant tendency to identify feelings with the conceptual element in faith. Faith, in turn, is then regarded as the organ of knowledge which gives knowledge of the transcendent reality, at the same time that it responds to this object, thus producing itself, pp. 1 4 — 1 6 , 87—88, 2 5 4 — 2 6 3 . The presupposition which underlies Fries' argument is that the only propositions which can meaningfully be affirmed in the context of human experience are the strictly cognitive ones. All other utterances simply express subjective human feelings. A similar presupposition is implied when Ingmar Hedenius says that religious faith involves holding verify. Tro

various propositions

och livsåskådning

to be true which

science

cannot

(Stockholm, 1958), p. 27. There is ambiguity in

his reference to truth, however. On the one hand, he says that truth is to be understood in its "ordinary" meaning. On the other hand, he refers to a theoretical propositional calculus from which expressions such as commands, wishes and exclamations are to be excluded, pp. 1 9 2 — 1 9 3 , 230. Furthermore, Hedenius points out that it has now become naive to attempt to describe micro-physical phenomena in terms of models, since such attempts can lead to contradictions which can be overcome only by the use of exact mathematical speech, pp. 2 3 6 — 237. One is impressed by the fact that truth is not as ordinary as it once seemed to be, and that the problem of contradiction, when one seeks both to conceive and describe, has been recognized even by the physicists. As to Hedenius* postulate that religious propositions must be communicable, so that they can be understood by those not accepting them, p. 30, this, as indicated above, is an important methodological

requirement,

representing a goal toward

which

theology

must strive. It does not follow from this postulate, however, that the would-be critic of

Christianity

therefore has little difficulty in determining

what

the

Christian faith is. C f . Ragnar Bring, "Teologi och religionsfilosofi," S T K , X X I I I (1947), p. 67. 13

14

Feigl, p. 9 f., Ayer, pp. 9, 35 f f .

on the other hand, may be pictorial, emotional, or volitional-motivational. The aesthetic, as well as the ethical and religious areas of discourse, are for the most part placed by the logical empiricists in this category. When one examines this analysis, one finds that language that is termed noncognitive does not synthesize. It includes emotive appeals of various sorts, exclamations, interjections, words of praise or blame, suggestions, requests, imperatives, commands, questions and prayers, but there is no synthesis. This is because the synthetic bonds in reality are of one kind, the chains of causal relations common, according to this analysis, to rocks and trees, stars and atoms, radiations and forces, human minds and social groups, historical events and economic processes. In so far as a unitary system of explanation is sought in the sciences, such a universal law of causality is presupposed. Thus no other aims or methods are recognized in the social and cultural sciences than exist in the natural sciences, though it is granted that in the area of human behavior these basic procedures are more difficult of achievement. Two questions suggest themselves at this point. The first is whether emotive language can be abstracted to this extent from the broader tissue of cognitive speech. Many would deny that such abstraction is either possible or desirable, insisting that emotive language involves the whole person. Therefore analysis in this area would have to be more inclusive, becoming situational analysis, or what is sometimes termed "pragmatics." When the scope of analysis is broadened in this way, semantic analysis approaches existential ana14

15

16

17

18

14

Feigl, p.

16

Ibid., p. 16.

16

Ibid., p. 22, cf. also The University of California Associates, " T h e Freedom

ii.

of the W i l l " in Readings in Philosophical 17

Analysis,

p. 6io.

Zuurdeeg, pp. 17, 23 f., 64. In a recent lecture, Archibald MacLeish has

stated this point very strongly, Poetry

and Journalism

(Minneapolis, 1958). H e

argues that poetry and all art are dependent "on human experience of the actual world." p. 10. Poetry and history "are not opposites and cannot be opposites and the notion that they are is a delusion." p. 13. H e deplores the divorce between knowing and feeling. "Knowledge without feeling is not knowledge . . . " p. 17. " W e need . . . to recover the virility of the imagination . . . by which 'the whole soul of man' may be brought to activity, and knowledge may be known" 18

pp. 2 0 — 2 1 .

Feigl, p. 7.

15

lysis. It would seem, therefore, that the study of ethical and religious language would be particularly fruitful in bringing about a rapprochement between the two leading schools of contemporary philosophy, logical empiricism and existentialism. A second question is whether such situational analysis might not reveal unique forms of synthesis in the area of human behavior. If, as Herbert Feigl has stated, "teleology . . . can be analyzed as a form of macro-causal relation typical of organized systems," it is conceivable that in the area of human behavior this "macro-causal relation" might be found to be structured in ways such as to cast new light on the problem of human freedom, as well as the implications of this freedom for the interpretation of history. In considering these questions, the method of motif research presents itself as a form of situational analysis which is particularly relevant. Though this theological methodology was developed particularly by Anders Nygren, in terms of problems defined in an earlier philosophical situation, it provides a most helpful way of confronting the issues posed by present day linguistic and existential analysis, suggesting significant alternatives not thus far envisaged in this analysis. In contrast to most forms of existential analysis, where the human situation tends to be described univocally in terms of one existential pattern, the motifs represent fundamentally different ways in which man's existence may be structured. In contrast to the univocal interpretation of the causal relation presupposed in 19

20

21

19

Zuurdeeg, p. 1 7 f.

20

Feigl, p. 2 1 .

21

In Paul Tillich's method of correlation, theology gives answers to questions

which the philosophical existential analysis poses. Systematic (Chicago, 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. vii, 6 ff., 24 ff., 30, 59 ff., 66.

Theology,

vol. I

The philosophical analysis

is at least in intent scientific and universal, whereas the theological answer is particular, being found in the "theological circle." It is interesting that in vol. II Tillich describes the theological circle as an ellipse, containing two central points, the existential question and the theological answer. (Chicago, 1957), p. 14 f. H e also denies the possibility of a "scientific philosophy," since philosophy must always involve existential elements. Yet its intent continues to be non-existential. Ibid., p. 26. Rudolf Bultmann conceives the relation between theology and philosophy in similar terms. Here again there is one philosophical analysis, which theology does not correct or enlarge upon. Glauben und Verstehen, vol. I, 2nd ed. (Tübingen 1954), p. 309. C f . Nygren, " T i l l teologiens mçtodfrâga," S T K , X X X I I (1956), p. 25.

16

logical empiricism, it shall be argued that the motifs may be understood as representing different ways in which the causal relationship, in which man stands in the ethical and the religious domains, may be characterized. It is therefore the thesis of this study that while the method of motif research, as Nygren has defined it, may at points need critical revision, in substance it is to be retained as a very fruitful approach to the methodological problems of theology. The fact that some Swedish theologians, such as Wingren and Gyllenkrok, are not satisfied with it and are looking beyond Scandinavia for methodological models, does not alter the fact that the wider theological world could profit from a better knowledge of the Swedish methodological tradition. Some acquaintance with motif research can be presupposed throughout the theological world, since Nygren has become widely known through translations of Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna. This book, a study in the history of Christian doctrine, is best understood, however, when seen in its relation to other of Nygren's writings, which deal more specifically with methodological problems. In the context of the methodological discussion which these titles represent, Den kristna kärlekstanken is a demonstration of the method of motif research, a method which Nygren proposes for use not only in historical, but also in systematic theology. Unfortunately those whose acquaintance with Swedish theology is limited to translated works have been able to gain but a fragmentary grasp of what this method implies. Surveys of modern 22

23

24

25

22

2 vols. (Stockholm,

1930—1936),

Agape

and Eros,

rev. trans. Philip

S.

Watson (London: S. P. C. K . and Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953). 23

The main titles are: Religiöst

teologiska konsekvenser

apriori,

dess filosofiska

in German with the title, Die

Gültigkeit

1922), Dogmatikens vetenskapliga

der religiösen

grundläggning

24

Erfahrung

och

(Gütersloh,

(Stockholm, 1922), Filosofisk

kristen etik (Stockholm, 1923), Etiska grundfrågor sofi och motiv forskning

förutsättningar

(Lund, 1921), an abridged version of which has appeared

(Stockholm, 1926), and

och Filo-

(Stockholm, 1940).

With respect to the value of motif research for systematic theology, Nygren

states, "Motif research is actually the basic and thereby the most important part of systematic theology." F M , p. 89. See the entire chapter, "Systematisk teologi och motivforskning," pp. 7 3 — 8 9 . 25

Most

2 — Erling

of

the literature

describing

this method

remains

untranslated.

In

17

Swedish theology are of some assistance, but these studies are, for the most part, reviews of the entire field of recent Swedish theology, or of some particular area, such as Luther research. Hence one does not find in them detailed discussion of methodological problems. While it would seem that this problem could be solved by additional translation, one discovers, in considering this possibility, that there is no one title in which Nygren definitively outlines the method he uses. Even were one to consider all of the early methodological writings as constituting a statement of his method, there is further methodological development in the later writings which must also be considered. At the same time the interpretation of the earlier writings presents a problem, for the changing intellectual scene has provided a new situation, with a new terminology and a new statement of problems, in terms of which they must be understood. Thus Nygren himself has recently stated that renewed attention must be given to philosophy of religion, taking into account the problems 26

addition to Nygren's works, the following might be mentioned: Ragnar Bring, Till

frågan

om den systematiska

teologiens uppgift

(Lund, 1933), Teologi

och

religion (Lund, 1937), "Teologi och religionsfilosofi," S T K , X X I I I (1947), pp. 37 —70, "Kristen tro och vetenskaplig forskning," S T K , X X V (1949), pp. 2 0 1 — 2 4 3 , Gustaf Aulén, Den allmänneliga

kristna trony 5th ed. (Stockholm, 1957), trans.

4th ed. Eric H . Wahlstrom and G. Everett Arden, The Church

Faith of the

Christian

(Philadelphia, 1948), part 1, "Faith and Theology," pp. 3 — 1 1 4 Sw. 7 —

107, Valter Lindström, "Lundateologi," N T U , II, 862 f f . 26

Nels F. S. Ferre's book, Swedish

Special

Reference

to Lundensian

Contributions

Thought

to Modern

Theology

with

(New York, 1939), might appear to

be an exception at this point. Yet Ferré has not given sufficient attention to the method of motif research. Some important essays, in which Nygren describes this method, had appeared prior to their publication in Filosofi

och motiv forskning

(1940), but these essays had apparently not come to Ferre's attention. For other surveys of modern Swedish theology, see Walter Marshall Horton, Continental

Theology

(New York, 1938), Edgar M. Carlson, The

tion of Luther (Philadelphia, 1948), Hjalmar Lindroth, Recent search in Sweden:

A

Luther

Renaissance,

trans. Gustav

Contemporary Reinterpreta-

Theological

Carlberg

Re-

(Hongkong,

1950), Carl Gustav Carlfelt, "Recent Swedish Theologians and Their Theology," Journal

of Theology

of the American

Lutheran Conference,

V I I (1942), pp. 481

— 510, J . W . Heikkinen, " T h e Basic Principles of Anders Nygren's Theological Thought," The

Lutheran

Quarterly,

I (1949), pp.

123—134,

Gustaf

Wingren,

"Swedish Theology since 1900," pp. 1 1 3 — 1 3 4 , and Leiv Aalen, "Principal Systematic Problems of Present-Day Scandinaivan Theology," pp. 44—49. See also Wolfgang Schweitzer, Schrift ch. 9.

18

und Dogma

in der Oekumene

(Gütersloh,

1953),

posed by present day logical empiricism, semantics, and existentialism. Even within the context of modern Swedish theology a restatement of the method of motif research would be of value. In his inaugural lecture as Nygren's successor in the chair of theological ethics at Lund, Wingren called attention to a tendency in modern Swedish theology, especially the Lundensian school, to ignore the philosophical backgrounds of its method, while at the same time continuing to apply it to the subject matter of theology. This use of method, with no concern to maintain its methodological foundations, Wingren called positivistic. Wingren has since sought to remedy this situation. His recent study, Theology in Conflict, while it is largely a critique of the three theologians discussed, must also be regarded as a constructive contribution to the methodological discussion. The question, however, is whether the hermeneutical method Wingren proposes succeeds in avoiding the positivistic tendency he earlier criticized. An example of the problem here involved can be seen in Gustaf Aulén's discussion of the scientific nature of systematic theology. While Aulén recognizes the need for a critical philosophy of religion, and the relevance of the method of motif research for the description of the content of the Christian faith, he does not relate the scientific nature of theology to the methodological analysis 27

28

29

30

31

27

" T h e Religious Realm of Meaning," The

Christian Century,

July 1 6 , 1958,

p. 824. See also " S v a r till fil. lic. Lennart Âquist," S T K , X X X V 28

(1959), p. 69.

This designation is used for the theology developed during the past decades

at the University are Gustaf

of

Lund. Leaders in the school, in addition

Aulén and Ragnar

Bring.

See Valter Lindström,

to

Nygren,

"Lundateologi."

Cf., however, Nygren's disclaimer, "Ytterligare till teologiens metodfråga," S T K , X X X I I ( 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 145. 29

"Några

karakteristiska

drag

i

modern

teologi,"

STK,

XXVII

(1951),

pp. 2 4 1 — 2 4 7 . 30

The Faith of the Christian

31

Ibid.,

pp. 5 f., 7 7 — 7 9

Church, p. 12 f. Sw. 18 f.

Sw. 1 1 f., 7 3 — 7 5 . It should be noted that Aulén

and Nygren use the term " m o t i f " somewhat differently. Whereas Nygren uses the term to refer chiefly to the basic motifs, agape, eros, and nomos, Aulén uses the term more generally, speaking of several motifs within the context of the Christian faith. C f . pp. 226 f., 257 f. Sw. 2 1 2 f., 242. Yet Aulén does recognize the importance of describing the Christian faith in terms of agape, pp. 129 f f . Sw. 1 2 3 f f .

19

here involved. This is unnecessary, for, in his opinion, the scientific nature of theology poses no particular problem. Theology with confidence takes its place among the sciences. It has its province to study and clarify, namely the Christian faith, and it carries out this task using the method of the history of ideas. The only presupposition it has is the presupposition basic to all science, that the subject matter must be understood according to its nature. Aulén does not discuss, however, the question as to whether a given subject matter and an objective method of description are sufficient to justify the formation of the special science, which systematic theology represents. Until such explanation is given, it would seem quite possible that the subject matter of the Christian faith could be described within the context of already existing sciences, without the formation of the special science of theology. Furthermore, if the need for a special science of theology were recognized, could a uniquely Christian theology be defended on scientific grounds? The question can be raised, however, Under what conditions is the method of the history of ideas itself an objective method of description? Recent Swedish theology has been characterized by a general acceptance of this method. Since this method is believed to be common to all of the humanistic disciplines, no attempt has been made to define its specific meaning in the theological context. We must inquire whether the positivism of modern Swedish theology is not to be found precisely in this uncritical use of the method of the history of ideas, particularly when it is used, as Wingren has used it, to attack the method of motif research. 32

33

34

35

32

Ibid., pp. 2 0 — 2 2 Sw. 2 5 — 2 7 . See also "Troskunskap och vetenskap," S T K ,

1 (1925), p. 361 £. and " N y svensk litteratur på systematikens och den kristna idéhistoriens område," S T K , V I (1930), p. 379 f. 33

These questions, relevant to any consideration of the scientific nature of

theology, are discussed by Nygren in Dogmatikens

vetenskapliga

grundläggning,

pp. 1 7 ff., 143 f f . 34

Cf.

Gunnar

Hillerdal,

Teologisk

och

filosofisk

etik

(Stockholm,

1958),

p. 210. One looks in vain for any discussion of the method of the history of ideas in the recently edited Nordisk

teologisk

uppslagsbok

(Lund and Koben-

havn, 1 9 5 2 — 1 9 5 7 ) . Some discussion of the problems here involved is to be found in Bengt Hägglund, "Die Bedeutung der 'régula fidei' als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen," Studia theologica, X I I : 1 (1958), pp. 42—44. 35

2O

For the controversy between Wingren and Nygren, in addition to

Theology

As used in the various theological disciplines, the method of the history of ideas is a search for patterns of organic structure, particularly in the literary remains of the past. As such it distinguishes itself from evaluation of these patterns, as well as from historicalgenetic research, which seeks to trace causal connections and thus account for origins. One must ask, however, whether there is any principle of selection according to which the thought patterns to be studied are chosen. If the method is concerned with forms of thought, does it have to consider what the possibly relevant forms in any given area of human experience may be? Gunnar Aspelin's recent discussion of the interpretation of philosophical texts is suggestive in this connection. He points out that among the common philological problems which arise in all areas of textual interpretation are determining the meaning of words in their original setting, as well as the particular emotional and connotative values words may have had in different linguistic systems. 30

37

in Conflict,

see the series of six articles in S T K , X X X I I

(1956), pp. 2 0 — 4 1 ,

1 2 2 — 1 6 0 , 2 8 4 — 3 2 2 . For Wingren's rejection of the method of motif research, see Theology

in Conflict,

pp. 16—17,

92, 1 5 2 Sw. 40, 128,

196,

"Teologiens

metodfråga," S T K , 1956, pp. 37, 39 f., "Nomos och agape hos biskop Nygren," ibid., pp. 125 ff., 129, and "Filosofi och teologi hos biskop N y g r e n , " ibid., p. 285. Wingren does not define the historical method he does use as clearly as would be helpful. H e calls it simply historical or exegetical research, Theology flict,

in

Con-

p. 90 Sw. 126, " Filosofi och teologi hos biskop N y g r e n , " p. 295 ff., or

interpretation of texts, ibid., p. 302. Yet he does also indicate his acceptance of the method of the history of ideas, Theology

in Conflict,

S w . 200, 209 f., and states that he regards " l a w "

pp. 1 5 6 — 1 5 7 , 164 f.

and "gospel" as concepts

analogous to what the nomos and agape motifs represent. Wingren's point is that both are needed for a description of the Christian faith, but they are not reducible to one motif. "Filosofi och teologi hos biskop N y g r e n , " pp. 289, 291 f f . 36

C f . these descriptions of the method as used in different theological disci-

plines, Nygren, Agape and Eros, 3 5 — 4 0 Sw. I, 1 7 — 2 2 and Johannes Lindblom, Israels

religion i gammaltestamentlig

tid (Stockholm, 1936), p. 269 f. C f . also

Gotthard Nygren's distinction between philological and systematic analysis, Das Praedestinationsproblem

in der Theologie

Augustins, Eine

systematisch-theologische

Studie, Studia theologica lundensia 12 (Lund, 1956), pp. 1 4 — 1 8 . The distinction between the history of ideas and historical-genetic research is not always made. See Gyllenkrok, p. 30. In such a case there must be clarity as to what is meant by the connectedness which historical-genetic research examines. 37

" O m tolkningen av filosofiska texter," Insikt och handling I, Studier utgivna

av Hans Larsson samfundet (Lund, 1955), pp. 1 6 — 2 7 .

21

Then he adds, "There is another problem, which textual interpretation must often work with. Suppose that certain symbols have a definite value in one given context of meaning. Now they are assimilated in a foreign system of symbols, which expresses a wholly different way of thinking and emotionally reacting to reality. The question then presents itself: What changes in meaning tend to take place during this process of assimilation? An example in world history is the carrying over of philosophical concepts from Plato and Aristotle to the Arabic, Judaic, and Christian world of thought. Avicenna, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas sought as philosophers to build on the thought of the great Greek masters. But at the same time they were influenced by a world view, the essential motifs of which were foreign to the Hellenic pattern of thinking."™ One's attention is immediately drawn to the expressions which have been italicized in the above citation. Aspelin speaks of "contexts of meaning," "systems of symbols," "ways of thinking and emotionally reacting to reality," "essential motifs," and "patterns of thinking." Textual interpretation presupposes that these are understood. But what are they? How many such possibilities exist? Are they innumerable, or may there be certain basic alternatives with which one has to reckon? What relation do "ways of thinking and emotionally reacting to reality" have to the religious and ethical areas of human experience? Could it be that all philological interpretation presupposes understanding of this area of human experience, so that the influence which its motifs and contexts of meaning have on the meaning of the symbols used in linguistic communication can be properly recognized? If so, how can the patterns of thinking which the history of ideas apparently must presuppose be grasped? Here the method of motif research offers significant assistance. Its function is to define the relevant alternately possible ideational structures to be found in the realms of religious and ethical experience. The thesis of this study will therefore be that the method of the history of ideas presupposes the method of motif research as its necessary foundation. It follows that though there will probably continue to be a necessary tension between these two methods, the former may not be used to destroy the latter. 38

22

I bid.y p. 18.

If we now draw together the two theses thus far outlined, we find that, on the one hand, the motifs represent different ways in which the causal relationships, in which man stands in the ethical and religious domains, may be characterized, while, on the other hand, the motifs represent the relevant alternately possible ideational structures to be found in the realms of religious and ethical experience. These two theses point to the two functions which motif research may have. On the one hand it is a method for the interpretation of the concreteness of man's historical existence. On the other hand it is a method for the interpretation of the texts by which man's historical existence has been interpreted. We will therefore regard the development of the method of motif research as Nygren's most important contribution to theological methodology. This will provide the vantage point from which his earlier as well as his more recent writings are examined. Whereas there has been a tendency in recent criticism of Nygren's theological method to interpret motif research in terms of the transcendental deduction of the religious apriori defined in Nygren's early writings, the approach of this study will be to interpret the method of transcendental deduction in terms of the method of motif research. We shall therefore ask, What revisions does this method of historical interpretation, as it is developed in Agape and Eros, require in the interpretation of the earlier religio-philosophical writings? Furthermore, what additional developments of the method seem called for, what extrapolations are suggested as one examines its implications? The purpose of the study will therefore be primarily systematic, seeking to find a fruitful method for theology and using in this connection Nygren's writings as a point of orientation. In accord with this systematic intent, some of the same freedom which Nygren has exercised in his use of the writings of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schleiermacher will in turn be exercised in the use of his writings. Other literature relevant to the understanding and development of this method will also be introduced. In each case it will 39

40

30 Aspelin uses the term "extrapolation," pointing out that such an interpretive procedure is necessary for deeper critical understanding. Ibid., pp. 26—27. 40 C f . Nygren's discussion of Kant and Schleiermacher in Religiöst apriori and Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning.

23

be the systematic intent of this study which will govern the selection and use of the authors cited and topics discussed. This study will begin with a discussion of the role of philosophy understood as a method of critical analysis in the several areas of experience. In this connection the problem of the application of such analysis to the area of religious experience will be examined. Since it will be found that Nygren's analysis of religious experience presupposes the analysis of the experience involved in the natural sciences and ethical experience, an examination of these areas of experience will precede the analysis of religious experience. In the discussion of ethical and religious experience, which two areas of experience will be grouped together as constituting the realm of history in contrast to the realm of nature, it will be pointed out that a recognition of the several motifs, which characterize experience in these domains, is fundamental for an understanding of the validity which these types of experience represent. These motifs will be defined as representing possible forms by which the concreteness of historical experience may be interpreted, and as such they will be compared to other symbolic forms by which other areas of human experience may be interpreted. The second part of this study will be devoted to an examination of the interpretation of history which the method of motif research provides. The close connection between this description and the critical analysis discussed in the first part of the study will be emphasized. An attempt will then be made to define the method of motif research, noting the differences which arise as the method is applied to the interpretation of a series of events, as compared with texts which are themselves interpretations of such events. The problem of the relation of this method to questions of historical actuality will then be discussed. In a final chapter we shall inquire whether a systematic theology can be developed within the context of this method. Some concrete examples of the implications of motif research for systematic theology will be indicated.

PART ONE

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

Chapter I

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS i. Philosophy as the Universal Science

The problem of theological methodology, as Nygren understands it, must be seen in a broad context. In order to understand Christianity, we must understand religion. But in order to understand religion, we must understand the human spirit. Thus we must begin with the problem of the human spirit and its experience viewed in the most general terms. Such an approach to experience is made by philosophy in its role as the universal science, functioning as a critical theory of experience. Nygren has consistently defined philosophy in such analytical terms. Philosophy, as he conceives it, when compared with the special sciences, has no special domain of its own. There is, however, "the whole sphere of common fundamental concepts which the different sciences work with, but which none of them regards it as its task to analyze more closely." It is because philosophy examines these common concepts that it has universality. In examining these concepts critically, rather than dogmatically, philosophy retains its scientific nature. It is, therefore, the function of scientific philosophy to investigate critically the ultimate principles which are used and necessarily presupposed in all the domains of experience. 1

2

3

1

Det bestående i kristendomen

(Stockholm, 1922), pp. 1 5 — 1 8 .

2

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," Bibelforskaren, X X X V (1918), p. 1 3 7 , F M , pp. 17, 39, "Filosofiens centrum och periferi," Festskrift till Anders Karitz (Uppsala, 1946), p. 1 3 1 , " T h e Religious Realm of Meaning," The Christian Century, July 16, 1958, p. 824 ff. 3

I bid.y p. 825.

27

When philosophy is understood in these terms, it should be evident that no area of experience need lose its autonomy as a result of such philosophical analysis. When fears are nonetheless expressed that this may happen, as when, for example, Torsten Bohlin, and more recently Gustaf Wingren, insist that such analysis makes theology dependent for its scientific nature upon the alien science of philosophy, this simply means that philosophy is not being understood in the terms in which Nygren defines it. If philosophy, as Nygren insists, is the critical analysis of the several domains of experience, 4

4

Bohlin's criticism is to be found in his essay, "Vetenskap-troslära-förkun-

nelse," Gåva och krav, Skrifter

tillägnade Manfred

Björkquist

(Stockholm, 1934),.

pp. 4 6 — 7 7 . In an obvious reference to Nygren, Bohlin speaks of a transcendental deduction by which presumably the scientific nature of theology is established,, but which deduction takes place outside the domain of theology, and continues, "But thereby theology, in so far as it claims a scientific character, enters inta a relation of dependence upon philosophy. Nor is there any question of reciprocity. While on the one hand the scientific character of philosophy may be asserted wholly independent of theology, theology must on the other hand build upon

results which

philosophy

alone

has achieved,

and

is thus advised

to-

'borrow* its scientific character from a domain alien to theology." p. 70. Referring at a later point in his essay more specifically to the scientific nature of Christian ethics, Bohlin states, "Its scientific character must not depend on any non-theological trains of thought whatsoever and their possible results." p. 78 • The relevant passages in Wingren's Teologiens

metodfråga

are the following:

" I t is presupposed (in motif research) that the categorical basic questions are already determined in a science other than theology." p. 39 Eng. 15. "One can learn from philosophy in the same w a y that one can learn from all the other sciences. It is something quite different to suppose that by laying a concrete philosophy as a foundation for the theological work, one can assure it 'a scientific nature,' which it without such a foundation would lack." p. 1 1 5 Eng.

81.

" W e here consider it self-evident that philosophy from its vantage point deals with the same material that systematic theology deals with. . . . What, on the other hand, must be rejected is the thesis, that the method for systematic theology can be determined in another science than systematic theology, e.g., in philosophy of religion or philosophical ethics or in any other discipline whatsoever." p. 2 1 2 Eng. 166. It is quite evident that Wingren regards philosophy of religion as one of the special sciences, since he compares it with psychology of religion. " T e o logiens metodfråga," p. 36 f. It is also significant that in Teologiens

metod fråga

he discusses Nygren's critical analysis under the heading "Anthropological presuppositions." This suggests the content of the analysis of existential philosophy, and is thus best suited for the discussion of Bultmann. Nygren vigorously protests against such a "transcendent" critique of his method. " T i l l teologiens metodfråga," p. 26 f.

28

the only way in which it could impose a method upon a certain subject matter which was alien to it, would be by unjustifiedly using a method applicable in one area of experience in other areas of experience. But such a procedure would be as objectionable on philosophical grounds as it would, in the case of religious experience, be objectionable on theological grounds. The critical theory of experience does not, then, have as its purpose to grant validity to the several domains of experience, but rather examines the forms of validity to be found within experience. 5

6

5

It must, of course, remain possible to accept in principle Nygren's method

of critical analysis, but criticize the manner of its application. Such criticism will be offered at various points in that which follows. 6

F K E , p. 128 f. A possible objection to the critical theory of experience which

should be considered in this connection is the one made by Friedrich Karl Schumann, Der Gottesgedanke

und der Zerfall

K . E. Logstrup, Der erkendelsestheoretiske filosofiske

Idealisme

og

Teologien

der Moderne Konflikt

(Kobenhavn,

(Tübingen, 1929), and

mellem den 1942).

They

transcendentalinsist

that

the

critical epistemology of transcendental idealism, in which category Nygren is reckoned, Logstrup, p. 72, is unable to grasp and do justice to the objective element in the Christian faith. Hence a mystical religiosity growing out of the creative depths of the human spirit tends to take its place. Schumann, pp. 42, 1 1 3 — 1 1 4 . Logstrup carries this critique further, insisting that the solution Schumann derives from Johannes Rehmke deals only with the psycho-physical problem, the relation of mind and matter. The real problem, however, is, H o w can I understand something which is not myself? Logstrup, pp. 2 1 ,

38. Logstrup

argues that in critical idealism everything is understood in terms of the productive and creative self. pp. 62, 78, 83—87. This epistemology is a monologue, seeing without hearing. It is solipsistic in tendency and

logically

results in

egocentric isolation, pp. 1 2 2 — 1 2 3 , 1 3 3 . In contrast to this the Judaeo-Christian faith affirms that man does not create, but is created and is to be understood in community, pp. 90, 1 1 6 . Logstrup seems to view the problem of creation in terms of the subjectobject antithesis, however. It may be that man and the world are not created in abstraction from each other, and that this creation is precisely a continuing creation, p. 154. Ernst Cassirer's analysis of the development of language, Philosophy

of Symbolic

Forms,

The

vol. I: Language, trans. Ralph Manheim (New

Haven, 1953), to which Logstrup also refers, pp. 67—69, is illuminating in this connection. That which is fundamental from the Christian point of view, however, is neither the perception

nor the understanding

response to other persons and ultimately

of

objects, but

to God. It is true that man

man's may

attempt to understand his fellow men and also God in the same w a y that he understands nature. T o the extent that Schumann and Logstrup point this out, their analyses are helpful. It will be argued in that which follows that this must

29

Nygren is not of the opinion that such an approach to philosophy will unduly narrow its boundaries. Actually the critical philosophy makes possible an even wider domain of philosophical analysis. Since the critical philosophy does not demonstrate the validity of experience, but rather discovers that validity, it can recognize as many forms of valid experience as an analysis of experience will reveal. It should be noted that Nygren prefers to speak of validity rather than reality as the object of philosophical analysis. The concept of reality has a twofold significance. On the one hand, it may be used to distinguish the real from the unreal. On the other hand, reality may refer to the content of that which is real. Here different types of reality may be recognized, and there may also be a distinction between reality in abstract terms and various forms of concrete reality. The concepts of validity and experience correspond to 7

6

9

10

be recognized as one of the ethical and religious alternatives. The fact that the Christian faith rejects this alternative does not mean that it need also reject it as a religious possibility, however. But it is not the only possibility. It will be argued that the method of critical analysis can be used to discover other possibilities. In short, in so far as a critical philosophy becomes metaphysical in nature, providing in the final analysis for only one ethical and religious possibility, Schumann's and Logstrup's critique holds. In so far as it is able to describe basic alternatives, as motif research will be found to do, their objections do not apply, A suggestive essay in this connection, with respect to the growing awareness of man in community in our time in contrast to previous periods, is M. B. Foster's " ' W e ' in Modern Philosophy," Faith and Logic, esp. pp. 2 1 3 — 2 2 0 . 7

" T h e whole tendency to view the relation between the metaphysical and

the critical philosophy in reductionist terms must be branded as totally misleading. Rather it is the case that the old problems of philosophy return also within the critical-scientific philosophy, only with new meaning and freed from the metaphysical characterization." F M , p. 36. 8

"Den

metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," pp.

136

—1379

"Transcendentala

metodens användbarhet

inom

religionsfilosofien,"

Bibel-

forskaren, X L (1923), pp. 2 7 3 — 2 7 4 . 10

This is a metaphysical distinction. C f . Axel Hägerström, Die

der Gegenwart

in SelbstdarStellungen,

Philosophie

ed. Raymund Schmidt, vol. 7

(Leipzig,

1929), p. 136, " A l s Metaphysik ist jede Anschauung zu bezeichnen, die aus der Wirklichkeit selbst—der Wirklichkeit an sich—etwas Wirkliches macht."

Such

an approach to reality involves the difficulty of relating "reality in itself," which has been identified with a particular form of reality, with other forms of reality. C f . also Ragnar Bring, Till frågan om den systematiska teologiens uppgift, särskild

30

hänsyn

till inom svensk

teologi föreliggande

problemställningar

med

(Lund,

these two dimensions of meaning which reality may have. The term "validity" suggests only the distinction between the valid and the invalid. It is a generic term and may be used to distinguish truth from falsity, but also right from wrong or good from evil. It may, furthermore, be used to refer to any other similar basic distinction in experience, which is capable of being justified, supported, or defended. The term "experience," on the other hand, is used to designate the content of that which has validity. This also is a neutral term. One can speak of experience in the realm of the natural sciences, as well as religious and ethical experience. It then remains the task of the critical theory of experience to discover and define the nature of the validity to be found in these domains. Although Nygren uses the concept of validity generically, as it will appear in the discussion that follows, validity nonetheless does have different meanings as it appears in different contexts. In each area of experience validity first means that the distinction which 11

1933), p. 26, Wie ist nichtmetaphysische

Philosophie

möglich? (Lund, 1940), p. 6,

and F M , p. 14. 11

"Den

metafysiska

filosofiens betydelse

för

religionsvetenskapen,"

Bibel-

forskaren, X X X V (1918), pp. 1 3 6 — 1 3 7 . Here experience is defined as that which is valid, whether it be practical, theoretical, aesthetic, or religious experience. This is similar to defining reality, in the sense of content, as that which is real, in the normative sense. In Nygren's discussion with Einar Tegen, he emphasizes that the approach he makes, from the vantage point of validity to the philosophy of religion, avoids the question of the existence of God, or of any object of faith whatsoever. "Transcendentala

metodens användbarhet inom religionsfilosofien,"

p. 282. However, as is apparent in Nygren's discussion with John Cullberg, this simply means that an approach is made to experience prior to the distinction involved in the subject-object antithesis. " Ä r evighetskategorien en religiös kategori?" Kristendomen

och vår tid, X V I I (1922), p. 229. This does not mean that

such a distinction cannot be made within the context of the experience which is being dealt with, unless one has taken the position of the consistent phenomenalism where any reference to the self apart from experience is rejected. If, from the point of view of such a consistent phenomenalism, reality is identified with this experience, to assert the validity of experience of a fundamentally different nature would be tantamount to affirming the existence of a different form of reality. But to affirm the validity of fundamentally different forms of experience would not necessarily mean that one had abandoned the phenomenalist position and was thinking in subject-object terms. The problem would simply be in what sense fundamentally different forms of experience could be affirmed as being valid.

31

constitutes this domain can meaningfully be made. It must be meaningful, e. g., to distinguish between truth and falsity, between right and wrong, or good and evil. Furthermore, if we are to speak of different areas of experience, the basic types of distinctions must be validly distinguishable from each other. The distinction between right and wrong cannot be the same as the distinction between truth and falsity. One can speak also of validity within each of the areas of experience. Not only is it valid to distinguish between truth and falsity, but that which is true is valid and that which is false is invalid. It would seem correct, accordingly, to say that within the realm of ethical experience that which is right is valid and that which is wrong is invalid. But we shall discover that within the areas of ethical and religious experience several definitions of that which is valid can apparently be given, each of which brands the others as invalid. How then can we speak of validity at all within these areas of experience? This is indeed the problem which the critical analysis of these areas must consider. One possible solution to this problem is to say that with respect to these areas of experience validity has to do only with the basic distinction which characterizes these domains. Just as it is valid to distinguish between truth and falsity, so it is valid to distinguish between right and wrong. Yet we shall find that even the use of this terminology implies one of the ethical answers to the exclusion of others. The problem here involved is closely related to the problem of defining the basic questions. According to Nygren the most ultimate principle by which our experience can be understood is to see it as giving answers to basic questions. These basic questions may also be termed "categories" or "contexts of meaning." It is in the context of these categorical questions that our experience, in so far as it takes the form of judgments, derives its meaning. To determine whether the ultimate questions are one or many, we must work with the questions themselves, seeking to find whether they can be resolved into each other. Nygren lists at least four basic questions. They are 12

12

For a discussion of the categorical questions, see F M , pp. 40—47.

"The

categories are basic questions, to which the individual judgments give specific answers, and the answer receives its meaning through the question, for which it constitutes the answer." FM, p. 4 1 .

32

suggested in the traditional division between the true, the good, and the beautiful, to which Nygren adds the religious question. Care must be taken in the statement of these questions so that relevant answers are not excluded by the way in which the question is phrased. This problem does not exist when the question, What is true? is asked, for truth presupposes one system of verification. In the ethical domain, however, the use of predicates such as right or good can imply particular answers to the exclusion of others. In the subsequent analysis we shall seek to avoid this difficulty by phrasing the questions in these areas in such a way as to avoid predicate substantives, such as right or good. Rather the questions will distinguish different functions, e.g., What should I do?, What may I believe and hope? It should be noted, however, that the questions so stated do not as yet involve distinctions. Since validity presupposes the making of distinctions, not only between the areas of experience, but within them as well, it will be necessary in examining the validity of these areas of experience to indicate the alternately possible distinctions by which validity may be defined in these domains. In so far as the traditional distinction between the true, the beautiful, and the good nonetheless remains, it should be noted that this analysis does not presuppose the psychological distinction between thought, feeling, and will. Whatever the status of the tripartite psychology, Nygren's methodology does not presuppose it, 13

14

13

"Quite early in the history of thought we find the great fundamental

questions asked concerning the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, and—to crown them all—the Eternal. For our Western civilisation the formal statement of these questions was the work of Plato, though the materials for it were in existence long before his time. And great as the changes may be which these questions have undergone since, we can none the less say that we are still occupied ultimately with these same great questions today when we speak of the problems of Knowledge, of Aesthetics, of Ethics, and of Religion. Indeed, we might very well describe the whole development of civilised thought as a constantly renewed attempt to state these questions and fix their meaning."

AE,

p. 42 Sw. I, 24. B y permission. 14

There is, of course, a difference between the analytical truth of the formal

sciences and the synthetic truth of the empirical sciences. It is usually possible to account for these two dimensions of truth within one system of verification, however. Problems do arise when an attempt is made to extend description beyond the domain of the natural sciences. C f . infra, pp.

3 - Erling

theoretical 144—147.

33

nor is his argument, therefore, affected by the objection that apparently no specifically religious faculty can be discovered in the human consciousness. This is not to deny the significance of such psychological distinctions, but to affirm that this analysis of experience is not accomplished by making psychological divisions in the human spirit. Rather the unity of the human spirit is retained, for it is the whole spirit that finds answers to the various questions with which it is confronted. It is only as we investigate more thoroughly the nature of the several questions that we discover whether the list given is exhaustive and whether any of them can be subsumed under any of the others. Though Nygren holds to the individual autonomy of each of the four domains indicated, it is not his concern to exclude other autonomous domains of experience, should there be such. Thus there could conceivably be a fifth and a sixth basic question. There are indications, for example, that Nygren has considered the possibility of eudaemonistic valuation as constituting a domain having its own categorical question. He also on another occasion refers to the domains of the law and history as possibly representing distinct categories. On the other hand, the autonomy of the domains should not be interpreted to mean a denial of their complete interrelatedness. We consider them in abstraction for the purposes of study and to recognize the autonomous standards of validity in each domain. It should not be assumed that there need be immediate awareness of the necessity of such distinctions within experience. Our daily experience with the objects of the natural order has led to a quite general recognition of the nature of the truth question. Art forms are as old as human civilization, but their bewildering variety has made it difficult to arrive at intellectual clarity in this field. The problem of human behavior has always been recognized, but the uniqueness of the nature of the ethical question is a relatively late discovery. So, finally, there is nothing new about the fact of religion. There is no stage of human history where its phenomena are absent. Nonetheless the fact that religion has throughout much of human history been determined predominantly by authoritarian patterns has 15

16

17

15 16 17

34

R A , pp. 195—196. E G , pp. 1 0 — 1 1 . Cf. infra, p. h i . "Filosofiens centrum och periferi," pp. 1 3 1 , 135.

prevented any intimate acquaintance with the particular nature of this domain. The aesthetic, ethical, and religious categorical questions share the common characteristic of dealing with value experience. Sometimes Nygren distinguishes these three domains of experience, which deal with values, by terming them "atheoretical" in nature, in contrast with the theoretical domain of experience, where the categorical question is, What is true? This distinction can lead to misunderstanding, particularly when one seeks to explain how there can be a theoretical description of that which is atheoretical. In one sense, all that is described is atheoretical, for there is always a difference between the description and the subject matter which is described. A chemical reaction is not identical with a chemical formula, any more than an ethical judgment is identical with a description which may be made of it. An important difference between such subject matter as chemical reactions and such subject matter as ethical judgments, however, is that in the former case one can abstract from human relationships, which is not possible in the latter case. Values require a valuer. In connection with a discussion of ethical values, Nygren compares a theoretical proposition with a proposition asserting a value judgment. At first sight the two propositions may look alike. The judgments, "This is good" and "This is bad" seem outwardly quite similar. The question, however, is whether the copula "is" has the same meaning in both sentences. Nygren concludes that in the one sentence the copula affirms the existence of a factual relationship* while in the other it indicates that a valuational relationship is being; brought into being, which would not otherwise exist. 18

19

20

18

F M , pp. 4 1 — 4 2 , D V G , pp. 3 6 — 3 7 . C f . infra, p. 39 f., note 30.

19

In the following citation, Nygren discusses ethical values, but the principle

involved applies to religious and aesthetic values as well. " A life-ideal must be ideal for someone. T o speak of something as ideal in and of itself is meaningless. And, more specifically, it must be ideal for a valuing subject. It is valuing which constitutes the relationship between the subject and its ideal and makes this latter to be what it is." F K E , p. 126. 20

"Herewith one notes without difficulty that the content of the concept

'good* excludes the possibility of its being predicated in the usual theoretical sense. In the theoretical judgment the predicate is attributed to the subject as one of its qualities, but in the ethical judgment, or—better stated—in an ethical

38

This must not be taken to mean that value experience does not require an objective component, but that the subjective component is always essential. When value experience is described, it must always be borne in mind that two types of judgments are involved. There is on the one hand the descriptive judgment, which is theoretical in nature, answering the truth question, and comparable to judgments descriptive of the factual relationships of the natural sciences. There is, however, also the value judgment itself, which, while it is a judgment, is not theoretical in nature. The distinction between the theoretical and the atheoretical domains of experience calls attention, therefore, to types of judgments, which may have validity of their own and which may be described, but which are not theoretical in nature. Thie descriptive sciences, on the other hand, are by definition theoretical in nature. If, as Nygren insists, valuation lies outside the competence of science, the question arises as to whether there can be any science at all of that which is subjectively conditioned. In another context Nygren discusses more exactly the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. He points out that there are four senses in which the term "subjective" may be used, two of them which may in another sense be considered scientifically objective. By subjective may be meant a content of consciousness as opposed to the thing in itself, the psychical as opposed to the physical, the value-characterized as opposed to the value-free, or the arbitrary as opposed to the necessary. Science may be subjective in the first 21

22

23

appraisal, goodness is not attributed to the subject as a quality which belongs to it. When

I appraise something as goody 1 do not intend to define a

relationship,

but to make a valuation.

factual

In other words, the valuing subject does

not by means of simple observation perceive value in the valued object, rather the subject by means of a valuational decision gives value to the object." E G , pp. 45—46. The italics are my own. 21

"Theoretical

and universally valid propositions

...

are characteristic of

science." D V G , p. 17. " A l l scientific striving sets forth to make valid judgments, true statements." F M , p. 12. 22

"Science does not ask about what is valuable, but about what is true. Its

province is not to evaluate, but to understand. It lies in the nature of evaluation that it is subjectively conditioned, while science by nature is objective." D V G , p. 3

6.

23

36

F M , pp.

181—183.

two senses, but it must be objective in the last sense. Science, however, may have as subject matter that which is subjective in the third sense, provided that the value experience in question is not characterized by arbitrariness. Value experience, while it does not have the same kind of necessity which characterizes theoretic description, may nonetheless be characterized by a necessity of its own. A suggestion as to the nature of the sciences which deal with value experience is to be found in Nygren's discussion of Schleiermacher's distinction between the pure and the positive sciences. The pure sciences are determined by a 24

25

26

24

" T h a t which is constitutive for all science is its objectivity in the sense of

necessity, or its freedom from arbitrariness." D V G , p. 1 5 1 . 25

Ragnar Bring insists that it is possible to find both reality and validity in

the realm of the subjective. " T h e circumstance that a relationship is connected with a 'personal decision* or feelings, and in this sense is subjective, docs not involve its being subjective in the sense of being arbitrary. Rather it is possible that here also there can be something which is real in the sense that it actually is so, that is, it is valid." "Kristen tro och vetenskaplig forskning," S T K , (1949), p. 205. C f . Till

frågan

om den systematiska

teologiens uppgift.

XXV Apart

from Bring's criticism of metaphysical remnants in various contemporary theological systems, his chief intention in this book is to affirm that a scientific description of faith judgments is possible. See pp. 28, 93, 97, 1 0 0 — 1 0 2 , 105, 2 1 1 . See in this connection the discussion of the problems involved in the description of value experience, infra, pp. 1 4 4 — 1 4 7 . There it is argued that the necessity which characterizes the description

must correspond

to the necessity

charac-

terizing the value experience. B y this is meant that different problems are involved when one is describing causal relations in the natural sciences, as compared to the faith judgments by which a religious motif is expressed. While this argument suggests that theoretical description must adjust itself to the necessity to be found in value experience, Harald Eklund feels that valuational experience must be tested theoretically, in so far as it is characterized by such factors as possibility, probability, inner coherence, non-contradiction, reasonableness, and truth content. Troslärans

perspektiv,

Acta academiae aboensis, Huma-

niora X V : i (Abo, 1944), pp. 4 4 — 4 5 , 4 7 — 4 8 , 85. What Eklund overlooks is the fact that theoretical testing allows for only the contrast between truth and falsity. It will be found, however, that value experience provides for alternate patterns of coherence and different structures of reasonableness. T o absolutize any one of these, as a means of testing the "truth content" of value experience, is an inacceptable metaphysical procedure. On the other hand a certain immanent critique within each of the alternate value structures could be allowed, though it would be somewhat misleading to call this "theoretical testing." 26

D V G , pp. 20—22.

37

series of constitutive principles by which the data of experience may be bound together into coherent wholes. Thus there is a constitutive principle of the science of physics, by which the different phenomena of energy, heat, and electricity are knit together into a coherent whole. Yet by use of a different constitutive principle, energy could be found to be a phenomenon within the science of biology. These constitutive principles, however, may not be arbitrarily chosen. A collection of stones could be described according to the constitutive principles of archeology or geology, but if a collector of souvenirs were to seek to make a special science of the description of his collection of stones, using as a constitutive principle their color or shape, or the places where the stones were found, such an ordering of the stones would not thereby become scientific, nor would a special science have been formed, for the constitutive principle would have been arbitrarily chosen. Schleiermacher believed that there was an idea of the sciences, by which they formed a hierarchy reminiscent of the Platonic realm of ideas, so that a science could be validated by showing that it had a place in this organon, and that there would be a gap in the sphere of knowledge, were it to be omitted. Nygren also holds that between themselves the sciences deal with all experience, though he would not argue that the particular sciences could be deduced from the idea of the sciences. As additional data appeared, it would simply be necessary to develop a new science to take care of this data. There is, then, no area of human experience from which science may be barred. There are, however, in addition to the "pure" sciences, by which the above mentioned description takes place, also what Schleiermacher calls "positive" sciences. A positive science is a science brought into being by a value consideration. Here a value judgment provides a new organization to a given subject matter which is of such importance that the creation of a new science is warranted. The positive sciences do not provide additional data, except for the value judgment, which is the new constitutive principle by which the data is ordered. Theology is such a positive science. The data with which theology deals is also dealt with by other sciences, such as philology, psycho27

27

38

D V G , pp. 2 2 — 2 3 .

logy, history, ethics, and philosophy of religion. However, theology, on the grounds of the value which belongs to Christianity, draws together all the knowledge which will serve toward its scientific illumination, and thus an entirely new science is formed. An important consideration at this point is that the value judgment must be of sufficient importance to warrant the creation of a positive science. Every value judgment will not serve such a purpose. The souvenir collector's value judgment, for example, is not of sufficient importance to warrant the creation of a special positive science to describe his stones. On the other hand, the collection of books known as the Bible is presumably of such importance. What is the scientific basis for making such a distinction between the value judgments involved in the souvenir collector's stones and the church's Bible?

2. Value Judgments and Historical Description

With respect to the problems involved in the description of experience ordered by value judgments, it may be helpful to consider the more detailed analysis to be found in Wilhelm Windelband's Strassburger Rektoratsrede of 1894, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," and Heinrich Rickert's Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, In these writings the problem of the scientific description of value experience is approached in terms of a distinction which is made between nature and history. An analysis 28

29

30

28

Präludien,

29

4th ed. (Tübingen, 1 9 2 1 ) .

30

Nygren refers to Windelband and Rickert at several points in his earlier

vol. II, 4th ed. (Tübingen, 1 9 1 1 ) , pp. 1 3 6 — 1 6 0 .

writings. See "Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för pp. 1 3 4 — 1 3 6 , Det religionsfilosofiska pp.

5—7,

126 f. The terminology

grundproblemet "nature

religionsvetenskapen,"

(Lund, 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 58, R A ,

and history" is in many

respects

equivalent to Nygren's distinction between the theoretical and the atheoretical domains of experience. The term "theoretical" in Nygren's usage has the same dual meaning as the term "nature" has. On the one hand, the theoretical domain of experience refers primarily to the experience which is described by the natural sciences. On the other hand, the theoretical refers to description as such, so that a theoretical account can be given of all that can be described. The term "nature" similarly refers, on the one hand, more specifically to the realm of the natural sciences, but, on the other hand, one can speak more generally of the nature of

39

of this distinction in these two writings will not only be helpful toward providing a background for an understanding of the method of motif research, but will also reveal certain of the problems which will be raised in the subsequent discussion of this method. One of the significant contributions of Neo-Kantianism is its discussion of the relation between nature and history. The distinction between nature and history had been made throughout German idealism, but in the writings of Neo-Kantians, such as Windelband and Rickert, the distinction is not simply affirmed, but an earnest attempt is made to understand it. Windelband criticizes drawing the distinction between nature and history in terms of the Geisteswissenschaften as over against the Naturwissenschaften, his criticism at this point possibly being directed against Wilhelm Dilthey. Windelband seeks instead for a logical distinction between the sciences, centering his attention upon the different ways in which 31

32

33

man, or of the nature of Christianity. It is with respect to the term "atheoretical" that it appears that the term "history" is the more helpful designation. In so far as Nygren gives positive content to what he calls the atheoretical domains of experience, it appears that he is thinking primarily in terms of ethical and religious experience. The method of motif research, moreover, by which the basic religious and ethical motifs are discovered, is a method for the interpretation of history. Hence it seems legitimate to find the positive content of the atheoretical in the historical. In the subsequent discussion, the term "theoretical" will be used with the dual meaning suggested, the context indicating which of the two meanings is more specifically intended. The term "historical" or specific reference to the ethical and religious domains of experience will, however, often be used in the place of the term "atheoretical." 31

C f . R . G. Collingwood, The

Idea

of History

(Oxford, 1946), p. i 6 j f f .

Collingwood criticizes both Windelband and Rickert for identifying the essence of history with the individual. H e holds that this was due to positivistic influences which had not been overcome. Positivism regarded nature as consisting of separate facts knit together by natural law. The positivistic program for the study of history was, accordingly, to assemble historical facts and then search for the laws by which they could be united. Windelband and Rickert did not go beyond the first stage of this program, defining historical events in terms of their individuality. A partial explanation for the fact that they did not go further to examine connections between historical events may be found in the fact that they recognized only one causal nexus, the one which the natural sciences describe. I bid. y pp. 126 ff., 169. C f . infra, p. 47 f f . 32

Op. cit., p. 142.

33

C f . Wilhelm Dilthey, Einleitung

Schriften,

40

I (Leipzig & Berlin, 1922).

in die Geisteswissenschaften,

I,

Gesammelte

the natural scientists and the historians approach their subject matter. This distinction Windelband finds in what he terms the "nomothetic" as over against the "ideographic" sciences. The nomothetic sciences search for universal laws, making general apodictic statements, while the ideographic sciences describe special historical events, making singular assertoric statements. This does not mean that they for this reason work with different materials. Rather it is the method which a science uses and not the subject matter with which it deals, which determines the nature of the science. Thus precisely the same object can be studied by both the nomothetic (natural) and the ideographic (historical) sciences. Windelband furthermore points out the relation between the unique and the valuable, suggesting that the essence of historical individuality lies in the fact that it can not be repeated. Rickert's comprehensive study of the relation between the natural and the historical sciences begins with these suggestions and seeks to carry the logical analysis further. Rickert agrees with Windelband that the distinction betwen nature and history is not the distinction between the spiritual and the material, and also seeks for a logical distinction between nature and history, which he suggests consists in the fact that the natural sciences generalize, while the historical sciences individualize. However, since every physical or psychical event is an individual, in Rickert's meaning of the term, some way must be found to distinguish the individuals which actually become the subject matter of historical investigation. The difference is not to be found in the kind of subject matter, for the same subject matter is nature, when viewed under the vantage point of generality, and history, when viewed under the vantage point of individuality. The problem, therefore, is to understand what is meant by the historical individual. That which is involved at this point is a difference of interest. Instead of abstracting from the individual to form general concepts, as in the natural sciences, 34

35

36

37

38

30

84

Op. cit., pp. 1 4 4 — 1 4 5 .

35

Ibid., pp. 1 4 5 — 1 4 6 . C f . F M , p. 173.

36

Op. cit., pp. 1 5 5 — 1 5 6 . Op. cit., p. 144.

37 38

Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., p. 1 7 3 .

41

one here uses general concepts to define a unique, unified configuration which constitutes the historical individual. A decisive factor in this connection is the indivisibility of the historical individual. That which makes the historical individual indivisible is the value judgment. Rickert illustrates by comparing the Kohinoor diamond with a piece of coal. Both are individuals and are actually unique, but whereas we do not hesitate to break the individuality of the piece of coal so that a host of smaller individùals are formed, we treasure the unique individuality of the Kohinoor diamond. Rickert insists that this same principle applies also to distinctions made between human personalities, the difference being simply that there is no human being whose individuality we regard with the indifference we feel about the individuality of a piece of coal. The historian's task is, accordingly, to describe the value judgments by which historical individuals are formed. Here Rickert makes a distinction, which has already been touched upon above, between practical valuing and the theoretical description of value judgments. Rickert holds that a sharp distinction at this point is possible. He says that in addition to positive or negative evaluations a purely theoretical description of values is possible. History does not examine the justification by which valuing takes place, but simply establishes the fact that objects can be divided into valuerelevant and value-indifferent categories, and describes the various ways in which historical individuals are valued. If an object somehow becomes value-relevant, it must be considered as an historical individual, for those who will not grant this principle have no reason to prefer any objects, historically speaking, to any other. At the same time a purely theoretical description of these individuals is possible, quite apart from any actual positive or negative valuation which may take place in relation to them. 40

41

42

43

44

40

Ibid.y pp. 166, 232 f f .

42

Supra, pp. 35—37-

41

Ibid., pp. 240—243.

43 " E s gibt ausserdem noch eine Betrachtung mit Rücksicht auf Werte, die nach dem Wert oder Unwert der Dinge, nach ihrer Eigenschaft als Gut oder Übel nicht fragt. Sie greift vielmehr lediglich das aus der unübersehbaren Mannigfaltigkeit heraus, was überhaupt in einer Beziehung zu Werten steht, so dass es mit Rücksicht auf die Werte irgendwie different wird, und diese Art der Wertbeziehung allein kommt hier für uns in Frage." Op. cit., p. 2 5 1 . 44

42

"Bezeichnen

wir

also das, wodurch

eine/ den verschiedensten

Wertbeur-

There is an important qualification which must be made at this point, however. The description of values in order to be scientific must have reference to universal values. It is not the arbitrary value system of each individual that is to be described, rather the description presupposes a general theory of value. The values described must be relevant to all. For this reason such a theory of value can be used to establish the uniqueness of a historical individual. To illustrate Rickert compares Goethe and an average man. He argues that quite apart from the particular value such an average man might represent for various individuals, in terms of universal values he could be replaced by any other average man. Goethe, on the other hand, in terms of these same values would stand out in contrast to the average as a uniqué individual. This does not mean that there is a scientific basis for making a positive value judgment with respect to Goethe. It simply means that his uniqueness as a historical individual can be scientifically established. A similar example would be Luther. Whether Luther was good or bad cannot be determined by scientific history, but that he has had an effect on all subsequent values in Western Christendom can be affirmed. Rickert interprets this general theory of value as providing a common understanding of reality, a world of historical individuals shared by all. He uses phrases such as: "Eine den verschiedensten Wertbeurteilungen gemeinsame Auffassung der Wirklichkeit. . . . Durch das blosse Beziehen entsteht dementsprechend eine Welt von Individuen für alle in derselben Weise." It appears that Rickert is of the opinion that all values can be conceived in terms of one all-inclusive scale of value, which world of values can be described, on the one hand, or made the occasion for positive or negative value judgments, on the other. As an example, he speaks of a democrat 43

46

47

teilungen gemeinsame Auffassung der Wirklichkeit entsteht, die als solche weder negativ noch positiv gewertet wird, so kann man diese Beziehung als rein theoretisch streng von der praktischen Bewertung scheiden. "Werten ist stets entweder positiv oder negativ. Beziehen auf Werte ist keines von beiden. . . . Durch das blosse Beziehen entsteht dementsprechend eine Welt von Individuen für alle in derselben Weise. Der Wert dieser Individuen dagegen kann sehr verschieden geschätzt werden." Ibid., p. 253. 45 46 47

Ibid., pp. 2 4 5 — 2 4 7 , 2 5 1 . Ibid., pp. 2 5 1 — 2 5 2 . These phrases may be seen in their context in note 44, supra.

43

and an aristocrat debating the question of foreign trade, the former arguing for free trade and the latter for protective tariffs, while both share a common "Wirklichkeitsauffassung." Yet in this case, it would appear, this common concept of reality is not simply the world of facts which is common to both the natural and the historical sciences. There is also, by virtue of the general theory of value, a common conception of the value of commerce shared by both, which leads the one, who represents those who have presumably nothing to protect, but much to gain from increased foreign trade, to favor free trade, while the aristocrat, who represents those for whom increased foreign trade will mean difficult competition, at least with respect to some commodities, prefers a system of protective tariffs. One need not, therefore, take the position of either the democrat or the aristocrat to understand and describe how each makes the value judgments he actually does make. Since our concern more nearly relates to the description of religious value judgments, or historical individuals religious in nature, we might inquire how Rickert's principles would apply in this area. How would one describe the value judgment the Apostle Paul makes, when he writes to the Corinthians, "We preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." (i Cor. 1:23—24)? In terms of which general theory of value could Paul's statement be interpreted? While a theory of value might be conceived in terms of which a comparison of the Kohinoor diamond with a piece of coal, or the differing attitudes of the democrat and the aristocrat with respect to tariffs, or even the contrast between Goethe and the average man might be understood, it is not at all certain that such a general theory of value could be extended so that Paul's comparison might be made intelligible in terms of it. The problem at this point is that whereas Rickert thinks in terms of one general theory of value, in terms of which individuals are defined as value-relevant or value-indifferent, with positive or negative value judgments thereupon being described with respect to these value-relevant historical individuals, Paul seems to be thinking in 48

48

44

Op. cit., p. 2 5 1 .

terms of fundamentally different theories of value in terms of which men may react to the preaching of the cross. The reactions by which some term this preaching "folly" or a "stumbling block" are not simply negative value judgments with respect to the same values to which Paul is reacting in a strongly positive manner. Rather these negative reactions represent entirely different value structures. Something for which Nietzsche coined the phrase "the transvaluation of all values" is involved here. How, then, can an understanding of Paul's preaching of Christ crucified be gained? Rickert's principle, that it is an understanding of the theory of value fundamental to evaluation which makes possible a theoretical description of value judgments is helpful at this point and must be retained. Theoretical description of values cannot be simply the registering of positive or negative value judgments whereby individuals become identified as historical individuals. What is involved here is more than a kind of axiological polltaking. The value structure in terms of which value judgments are made must also be understood. If there are several such value structures, as Paul's statement seems to indicate, these must also be recognized and defined. A description of a value judgment must, therefore, always have a twofold objective reference. There is, on the one hand, the object about which the judgment is made. In the case of Paul's statement this would be the Christ event. There is, on the other hand, the value structure in terms of which the judgment is made. We shall not at the moment seek to define what this would be in the case of the New Testament, except to say that it too must exist objectively so that critical interpretation of the New Testament thus also becomes possible at this point. 49

50

49

and

See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, first essay, Beyond Evil,

aph. 195, Thus

Spake

Zarathustra,

Good

"Introduction by Mrs. Förster-

Nietzsche," pp. 1 0 — 1 2 , ch. i, 15, 34, The Philosophy

of Nietzsche

(The Modern

Library edition, N e w York). C f . A E , p. 57 Sw. I, 38. 60

Nygren's statement that the agape motif

mjukat—Philip

has been "softened u p " (upp-

Watson translates "weakened down," A E , p. 150) in the Fourth

Gospel could be regarded as an example of the application of this principle. A E , p. 147 f f . Sw. I, 1 2 3 ff. Nygren has been much criticized at this point. See the discussion

between

Wingren and Nygren, Teologiens

metodfraga,

p.

125

Eng. 89, S T K , 32 (1956), pp. 33, 1 2 2 f., 150 f., 303 f. It should be noted that

45

A description of Paul's interpretation of the Christ event would, therefore, have to be critical in both of these respects. It would first have to be recognized that since Paul is interpreting historical events, a description of his interpretation would itself also have to be an interpretation of these events. If it were not such an interpretation it could not claim to be a correct description of Paul's interpretation. As such, the description would have to be critical in the sense that a present judgment with respect to the probabilities which the historical evidence suggests would be necessary. But more important than this would be relating the structure of Paul's interpretation to the interpretative possibilities which exist in the domain of experience in question. Even if Paul's writings or the New Testament were to be found to be the primary source with respect to the particular interpretative possibility in question, it would still have to be possible to examine Paul's writings critically in terms of this interpretative possibility. Paul himself seems to insist that such testing take place when he writes to the Galatians, "But even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to that which we preached to you, let him be accursed." (Gal. i : 8) If we now return to the distinction previously made between practical valuing and the theoretical description of values, while this distinction can be helpful, it must be insisted that in view of the fact that valuing involves not only the choice between alternately possible values, but also a choice between alternately possible value systems, adequate description must be able to conceive these posWingren's insistence that, "When the interpretation differs from the text, the critical problem must be concerned with the interpretation, Testament." Teologiens

metodfråga,

not with the N e w

p. 125 Eng. 89, and " I t was the task of the

church fathers to interpret the whole of the N e w Testament, not a part of it." S T K , X X X I I I (1956), p. 304, could mean that Luther's critique of the Letter of James would also be regarded as inadmissible. Those who interpret Luther in such a w a y as to reject any possibility of criticizing the contents of the canonical scriptures exclude the antilegomena (Hebrews, James, Jude and Revelation) from the canon. M. Reu, Luther H . H . Kramm, The

C f . Bengt Hägglund, Die Johann

Gerhards

and the Scriptures

Theology

of Martin

heilige

Schrift

Luther

(Columbus, 1944), pp. (London, 1947), pp.

und ihre Deutung

in der

46

Theologie

(Lund, 19 51), p. 99 f f . There is no indication that Wingren

makes such a distinction in the N e w Testament canon. See Predikan pp. 44—47,

38—48, hi—115.

53—54-

(Lund, 1949),

sibilities. Thus the difference between the theoretical and the practical in the realm of value judgments lies in the fact that the theoretical calls attention to the fact that the realm of the possible is more extensive than the realm of the actual, not only with respect to the fact that in a given situation several possible values may exist, but also due to the fact that there are several fundamentally different possible frames of value reference as well. We now turn to an examination of the effect which this factor of possibility has with respect to the sense in which the natural and the historical sciences may be said to deal with the same reality. Is it true that the same event looked at from one vantage point can be described in terms of the natural sciences, but looked at from another vantage point, in terms of the historical sciences? Here we must determine what is meant by an historical event. As suggested above, an historical event is not simply an event as such, but an event which has been valued. Rickert states that without reference to values the historical difference between individuals becomes as insignificant as the difference between leaves, or the waves in the sea. But values require a valuer. Whereas it is also true that a natural event as described by the natural sciences requires an observer, it seems possible to abstract from this fact in the natural sciences in a sense in which one may not so abstract with respect to the value judgments which are basic to the historical sciences. If one, then, views the events in question as, on the one hand, including the natural event and the observer, and, on the other hand, the historical event and the valuer, are we dealing with the same reality in both instances? A preliminary answer would be negative, since, as has been indicated, in the former instance we may abstract from the observer, whereas in the latter we may not abstract from the valuer. But suppose we sought to view both the valuer and the value judgment from the vantage point of the natural sciences, could this be done, and, if so, would we then be dealing with the same reality? Such a description would imply seeking for a pattern of necessary causal relationships in a series of historical events. This raises the question as to whether the reality which historical science examined 51

51

Op. cit., p. 254.

47

is causally determined in the same sense that the natural order is. Rickert is of the opinion that it is. Rickert distinguishes between causal law, which can be found in the repeatable patterns of the natural order, and an historic causal context, which is unrepeatable, but nonetheless determined. Thus in this sense both the natural and the historical sciences share the same principle of causality. Consequently the difference between nature and history is not the difference between freedom and determinism, but the difference between the individual and the general. Rickert doesn't intend to say anything against the possibility of a "transcendent free will," but he doesn't think any influences from it can be seen in history, or that a coherent account of it can be given. Though Rickert does not go into any discussion of how the relation between cause and effect is to be understood, he does state that the concept of this relationship must be the same in historical causality as well as in the causal laws of the natural order. The difference which Rickert finds between natural science and history is simply this, that while natural science observes a causal sequence, generalizing from this event to the natural law which it exemplifies, historical science observes the same causal sequence in its individuality. When attention is paid to individuality, effects and causes are seen to differ in this respect, and thus in this sense the law of causa aequat effectum does not apply in the historical sciences. Rickert's difficulty with the concept of freedom arises out of the fact that he can conceive freedom only in terms of uncaused behavior. If, however, human choice has to do not only with 52

58

54

55

56

57

52

"Die Anhänger einer naturwissenschaftlichen Universalmetode sind vielmehr

durchaus im Recht, wenn sie die durchgängige kausale Bestimmtheit auch aller historischen Tatsachen behaupten und ihre Berücksichtigung von der Geschichtswissenschaft verlangen. . . . W i r kennen nur eine empirische Wirklichkeit, die das einzige Material

der naturwissenschaftlichen sowohl als auch der

Disziplinen bildet, und die allgemeinen

Formen

historischen

dieser Wirklichkeit,

z. B. die

Kausalität, müssen für die generalisierenden ebenso wie die individualisierenden Wissenschaften von Bedeutung sein." Ibid., p. 282. 53

Ibid., pp. 285—286.

55

Ibid., p. 288.

56

57

48

Ibid., pp. 283—284.

54

Ibid., p. 289—290.

Ibid., p. 286.

alternately possible values, but also alternately possible value structures, which are not themselves reducible to a more inclusive value structure, human freedom may point to the way in which these value structures are related to each other. We shall have occasion in what follows to examine more closely the meaning of the principle of causality in so far as it is presupposed in the natural and the historical sciences. Here it may simply be observed that it seems difficult to make intelligible the alternate possibilities which are basic to value experience, if it is presupposed that all experience can be interpreted in terms of the concept of causal necessity basic to the natural sciences. In the discussion which follows, therefore, we shall seek to discover whether the factor of causality is of such a nature that it can provide a clue for the understanding of the distinction between nature and history.

3. The Validity of Experience

As has been indicated, the critical theory of experience, rather than granting validity to the several domains of experience, examines the forms of validity to be found within these domains. The method used is analytical in nature, with analysis taking place at two levels. The first level of analysis may be called concept analysis or uniqueness analysis. On this level the fundamental concepts of experience are tested to see whether they contain contradictions and whether they have unity and coherence. Analysis at this level, however, also concerns itself with whether a given area of experience makes claims to a unique form of validity. If no such claims are discovered, or if the validity in question is such that it can be accounted for in terms of forms of validity, the nature of which has already been clarified, no further analysis is necessary. If claims to unique validity are discovered, a second level of 58

59

58

"Filosofiens centrum och periferi," pp.

59

128—129.

Though this terminology is not used, it seems warranted to consider the tions of R A and F K E , where an effort is made to determine whether religious ethical experience make claims to unique forms of validity, as representing level of analysis. See especially R A , pp. 1 9 1 — 2 0 5 , F K E , pp. 1 4 0 — 1 4 4 . C f . E G , pp. 5 - 3 8 .

4 - Erling

secand this also

49

analysis is required. This level of analysis may be called transcendental analysis or presupposition analysis. An attempt is made to discover the inescapable logical presuppositions which are involved in a given form of validity. In each of the special sciences basic concepts are presupposed, without which these sciences would be unable to proceed to their tasks. Philosophy, as the critical theory of experience, investigates these concepts, analyzing and clarifying them, and examining in turn the presuppositions upon which they are based, as well as the relation of these presuppositions to each other. By means of such analysis the unity of a given domain of experience is indicated. It is, for example, discovered that a common concept of causality is the presupposition of the description and experimentation which takes place in the natural sciences. At the same time the uniqueness of a given domain of experience is also thereby thrown into sharper relief, in so far as its ultimate presuppositions are found to be necessarily distinguished from the ultimate presuppositions of the other domains of experience. Philosophy as a critical theory of experience begins with the assumption that valid experience exists. In making the assumption that there is valid experience, philosophy frankly admits that this can in no way be demonstrated. But it makes this assumption, because without it we are left in absolute scepticism, which is an impossible position. The rejection of scepticism implies the assumption of the possibility of a valid judgment. Since Nygren's concern is to develop a critical theory of experience and not simply a critical 60

61

60

" T h e task of philosophy is to be a general theory of experience. Through

an analysis of the given experience, it must seek to press back to the presuppositions therein implied, the presuppositions which ultimately give the individual judgments coherence and meaning. Philosophy is, in brief, the logical of presuppositionså" 61

analysis

F M , p. 39.

" T h e starting point is gained through demonstrating that absolute scepti-

cism involves a self-contradiction, and that therefore no theory can be built on its foundation. But if in this manner absolute scepticism is excluded, one must seek a point of departure in its contradictory counterpole; one must proceed from the possibility that a valid judgment can after all be made. When the point of departure in this w a y remains certain, it remains only to analyze what is involved in this concept: 'the possibility of a valid judgment.'" "Den religionsfilosofiska apriorifrågan," Kristendomen

och vår tidy X V I I (1922), p. 68. C f . R G ,

pp. 67—68, R A , pp. 2 1 0 — 2 1 1 , and F M , p. 37.

SO

epistemology, it is of fundamental importance that there be clarity as to what is meant by the assumption of "the possibility of a valid judgment." Does this mean that, in so far as our experience in the several domains can be expressed in the form of concrete individual judgments, it is the validity of such judgments which is assumed, or is the assumption of validity upon which the critical method builds to be understood in some other sense? To answer this question we must examine Nygren's description of the critical or transcendental method somewhat more closely. Nygren's first discussion of the critical or transcendental method is to be found in "Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen" (1918). Here he presents an interpretation of Kant, which interpretation it is apparent he also accepts as defining his own position. He points out that after Kant showed that philosophy as metaphysics was impossible, the question arose as to what philosophy should concern itself with. Kant's answer was that philosophy should become epistemology. Kantian epistemology is to be distinguished from earlier developments in this direction to be found in Locke and Hume. Since Locke and Hume were primarily interested in investigating the psychological origins of knowledge, this pre-Kantian epistemology became only a branch of psychology, according to Nygren. Kant's new contribution was to center attention on the validity and value of knowledge rather than its origins. But thereby, Nygren states, a broader field was given to philosophy, 02

63

62 "Here Kant has shown the way one had to enter upon, when he in the place of metaphysics introduced epistemology as the chief task of philosophy. Instead of giving metaphysical explanations of existence, philosophy's primary responsibility, according to Kant, is to investigate how far our knowing, that is to say, our capacity for knowledge, extends, measure its ability, and draw up its boundaries." "Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen." P- 1 3 5 . 63

"Altogether independent of the origin of the content of knowledge, there is a difference within this content with respect to validity and value, a distinction which everyone unconditionally makes and recognizes, in that he characterizes some conceptual representations and associations as true (theoretically valid and valuable), others, on the other hand, as false (theoretically invalid and valueless). The Kantian (critical) epistemology's main interest is to demonstrate the basis of and the justification for the fact that we thus accord various elements of knowledge different value and validity." Ibid., pp. 1 3 5 — 1 3 6 . T h e italics are Nygren's.

5

1

for the distinction between the valid and the invalid is to be found not only in the realm of knowledge, but also in the ethical and the aesthetic domains. Nygren points out that the concept "experience" is a value concept, and serves as a common term for all that is valid and valuable in the theoretical, practical, and aesthetic domains. By experience, thus, is not meant experience in contrast to reason, or in contrast to the apriori. Rather its converse is illusion. The Kantian philosophy, therefore, in its relation to the special sciences may be called a universal theory of experience. Nygren's statements in this first essay can be interpreted two ways. On the one hand, he states that we actually do make a distinction between the valid and the invalid, and that it is the task of the critical epistemology to show the grounds and the justification for making such distinctions. In this connection he uses an example from the ethical domain, pointing out that we grant conscientious behavior a different validity than behavior which follows from an egoistic principle, to which he adds, "To show the grounds for doing so becomes the task of the theory of ethics." Such an analysis would not necessarily presuppose the validity of individual ethical judgments. Indeed it is conceivable that such judgments, as well as the whole domain of experience which they represent, could be found to lack the necessary grounds for the affirmation of validity. On the other hand, Nygren states that by "experience" he means "those experiences which can document themselves as genuine and valid." He states, furthermore, that with respect to this experience, the task of philosophy is to seek to "determine the form of experience, i.e., determine that which is constitutive for it." Here it 64

65

66

67

68

64

"Philosophy has concern with the different validity, which we attribute

various relationships in our existence, i.e., in our experience. The task of philosophy is thus critical, its object is experience in general, but not so that it seeks to transform the rich content of experience into its concepts, but so that it seeks to determine the form of experience, i.e., determine that which is constitutive for it." Ibid., p. 136. 65

" W e call 'experience' in this sense all experiences which can document them-

selves as genuine and valid, whether they be practical, theoretical, aesthetic, or religious." Ibid., p. 1 3 7 . 66

52

Ibid., p. 136.

67

C f . supra, note 65.

68

C f . supra, note 64.

seems that we have to do with valid experience, which could be expressed in the form of concrete individual judgments. If an experience can document itself as valid (and the context of the statement indicates that it is not the domains of experience which are meant, but experience within the several domains), it would seem that it would have to be possible to define individual judgments as valid. This would not mean that there would have to be clarity as to all that was implied in affirming their validity. In this sense the "form" or that which was "constitutive" for this experience might remain to be more exactly determined, but the validity of the individual judgment would be fundamental in relation to such an analysis. This validity would neither be increased, nor could it be diminished, as a result of such an analysis, though possibly its identity in form with other instances of validity could by such an analysis be discovered. If these are two possible interpretations which may be given to Nygren's statements in the essay in question, tension arises between them only in so far as it is denied that the validity which the critical theory of experience examines is to be found in the form of concrete individual judgments. That Nygren considers the discussion to be found in this first essay of considerable importance is indicated by the fact that the substance of his argument is to be found in an expanded form in two essays contributed to the Festschrifts to Axel Hägerström (1928) and Adolf Phalén (1937) and later reprinted as the two introductory chapters of Filosofi och motiv forskning (1940). If we examine the first essay, "Hur är filosofi som vetenskap möjlig?" asking the question, Does the critical method assume the validity of concrete individual judgments, or validity in some other sense?, it seems that the answer must be the former of the alternatives. In this essay Nygren defines the task of scientific philosophy as being "to examine critically the universal principles of experience; . . . the inescapable logical presuppositions, which are involved in all knowledge and validity whatsoever." He then goes on to point out that such an investigation cannot be made deduc69

70

69

T o these two essays may be added "Filosofiens centrum och periferi," an essay contributed to the Festschrift for Anders Karitz (1946), and " T h e Religious Realm of Meaning" (1958). 70

FM, p. 17.

53

tively, for the principles sought are those from which deduction is made, nor inductively, for these principles are the presupposition of all induction. Nygren then outlines the two methods which philosophy can use, the method of concept analysis and the transcendental method, which have been described above. It is the latter of these two methods which begins with an assumption of validity. Nygren suggests that this assumption can be the validity of the scientist's use of the principle of causality. Though Nygren at this point does not suggest any particular instance of such a use of the principle of causality, it is apparent that he implies there are valid causal judgments to be found in the natural sciences. If there is any doubt as to what Nygren means, he makes his position entirely clear in the concluding portion of his essay. Here he calls the transcendental method an entirely new approach to the epistemological problem. The problem which has led to the development of the transcendental method is not a lack of objectivity in the special sciences, but rather that "philosophy in relation to its 71

72

73

71

F M , pp. 1 8 — 2 3 . With respect to the discussion of induction, the argument

is similar to the one outlined by Axel Hägerström in Botanisten

och

filosofen

(Stockholm, 1910). 72

" F o r even if the conscious conception he (the scientist) has of what causality

means is beset with contradictions, the use which he makes of the principle of causality in his scientific work can be entirely free from all objections. Theories about the meaning of causality can vary, but in the use of the principle of causality there is in the main agreement." FM, p. 28. 73

It must be such judgments which are meant when Nygren writes, "Further-

more, it is characteristic for the transcendental analysis, that that which shall be able to serve as its point of departure must be something universally recognized, something the validity of which is not subject to doubt. Only in such a case can it serve as a basis for demonstrating the validity of the principles." F M , p. 29. In a more recent essay, "Filosofiens centrum och periferi," Nygren

explains

more fully his distinction between the "concept" and the "use" of causality. Here it appears that by the concept of causality is meant an effort to explain the causal relationship, whereas the "use" of the causal principle refers to actual experimental procedure, pp.

130—131.

Concepts are, of course, involved here

as well. The scientist would very likely be able to describe the principle in terms of which he interprets his data, even if he were unable to explain more fully what was meant by it. If, as Nygren states, a scientist's use of the principle of causality can be completely free from all objections, it must be possible to assume that valid concrete individual judgments are to be found in the scientist's descriptions of his experiments.

54

subject matter, the principles, did not seem to be able to reach a similar objectivity." The transcendental method then ties the philosophical investigation of the first principles to the special sciences, and thus gives it precisely the same objective validity which these sciences have, while at the same time the principles and necessary presuppositions of these special sciences are thereby clarified. Here Nygren has made it as clear as possible that the transcendental or critical method does not grant validity to the individual judgments, the presuppositions of which it analyzes. Rather the nature of the validity to be found in these judgments, which validity is assumed at the outset, is simply clarifiécf by such an analysis. In this same essay Nygren states that how widely the concept of experience is to be extended must be left an open question. The implication is clear, however, that the method for the analysis of the ultimate principles of experience is to be the same in all the areas of experience, i.e., one assumes the validity of concrete individual judgments, the presuppositions of which are then examined. In the next essay, "Motivforskning som filosofiskt och historiskt problem," Nygren discusses the problem of validity in these other areas of experience. By way of introduction, he reaffirms the position which has already been outlined in the previous essay. He states again that the critical method does not have the task of defending the possibility of knowledge as over against absolute and universal scepticism. The assumption of the possibility of knowledge, furthermore, does not mean that factual knowledge can only be reckoned with after this possibility has been established as a result of the analysis. Rather the existence of such knowledge is recognized at 74

75

74

F M , p. 33. "When the transcendental analysis beginning with experience

works

back

to its presuppositions

and

principles,

it has

not

in

any

sense

strengthened the validity of empirical knowledge through demonstrating these principles. But this is also unnecessary. The special sciences certainly do not need the support of philosophy in order to obtain the rank of objective science." Ibid. 75

"Philosophy is a science of principles. Its task is to examine critically the

ultimate presuppositions or principles of experience (in which connection it must be left open, as to how widely the concept of experience shall be extended, whether it should be limited to the realm of scientific knowledge, or extended so that one can also speak of ethical, aesthetic, and religious experience)." F M , p. 29.

55

the outset of the analysis. Nor is the validity of the particular sciences strengthened when the validity of the ultimate principles and presuppositions upon which they build is clarified. Such a viewwould mean a return to a metaphysical epistemology, where the validity of individual judgments is based upon the validity of principles valid in themselves. Critical epistemology knows of no such principles valid in themselves. It knows only of principles which are found to be the presuppositions of the validity of "individual, concrete empirical judgments, which no one thinks of challenging." Here again Nygren answers the question we have been considering by clearly stating that the critical method assumes the validity of individual, concrete empirical judgments, which validity is not further established by the deduction, but simply clarified in all its implications. In the second section of this essay, Nygren goes on to distinguish 76

77

78

76

" I t (the critical epistemology) does not ask if knowledge is at all possible.

Rather it begins with actually existing knowledge as a recognized fact, and asks only

how

and

under which presuppositions

this knowledge

is possible.

The

question of the possibility of knowledge becomes therefore identical with the question of the presuppositions

of knowledge." F M , p. 37. Nygren says further

of the analysis of these presuppositions: " T h e interest which thereby impels it is not in this w a y to lay a sound foundation for the sciences and experience—these do not need any such philosophical foundation—but the investigation takes place exclusively in the purely theoretical interest of reaching full clarity with respect to the fundamental presuppositions, which actually and logically are involved in every empirical and cognitive judgment." F M , p. 38. 77

" T o demonstrate the validity of the universal presuppositions of knowledge

is, therefore, nothing else than to demonstrate them as necessary presuppositions. And the kind and degree of their validity consists just in this their connection with the individual empirical judgments. The w a y in which these principles are valid can be expressed in this w a y : if we are to be able to maintain the claim to validity

for the individual,

of challenging,

concrete empirical judgments, which no one thinks

we must also acknowledge the validity of the consciously

or

unconsciously made presuppositions implied in them. But under such circumstances it is immediately

seen that these principles do not possess any

independent

validity, which could, so to speak, be transplanted to the individual judgments." F M , p. 39. The italics are my own. 78

These judgments are accepted as representative judgments, i.e., one suffices

for the analysis, but should it be found to be erroneous, the analysis does not fall for this reason, unless the judgments of which it is representative are also found to be erroneous.

56

between the theoretical and the atheoretical domains of experience (by which he means especially ethical and religious experience), pointing out that in these latter domains one cannot go directly from the categorical question to the individual judgments which provide answers to this question, just as particular causal judgments provide answers to the question, What is true? Rather basic motifs are to be found between the categorical questions and the individual judgments, in terms of which these individual judgments must be understood. We shall not enter into a discussion of the method of motif research at this point. We wish only to point out that although Nygren in this essay insists that the transcendental method must presuppose the validity of individual judgments, he gives us no indication of the way in which this principle is to be applied in the atheoretical domains of experience. While Nygren's description of the method of motif research may be found to suggest a way in which the validity of individual judgments can be assumed in the ethical and the religious domains of experience, this essay, at least, does not indicate how this problem is to be solved. We turn now to Religiöst apriori to examine the nature of the validity which is assumed in the transcendental deduction of the religious category. Nygren introduces his systematic presentation with a discussion of the transcendental concept of the apriori as it was developed by Kant. One notices in this discussion that Nygren fails to call attention to Kant's ambiguity in the use of the term "experience." This is somewhat surprising when one notes that in an earlier essay Nygren has called attention to this ambiguity in Kant, concluding that the critical philosophy requires that the concept of "experience" be understood as the inclusive name for all objective validity. In Religiöst apriori, however, the presentation of the critical method is such that Kant's own ambiguous use of the term occurs, with results which can only be confusing with respect to the validity which is presupposed in the transcendental deduction. 79

80

81

79

F M , pp. 40—43.

80

R G , pp. 54—55. C f . also supra, p. 51 f.

81

Norman

Kemp Smith describes Kant's ambiguous use of the term

perience" as follows: "Throughout the Introduction Vernunft)

the term experience

(of the Kritik

der

"exreinen

has (even at times in one and the same sentence)

57

It is, thus, apparent that Nygren is not using the term "experience" as an inclusive name for all objective validity when he introduces two quite distinct meanings, (i) as product of sense and understanding acting co-operatively, and (2) as the raw material (the impressions) of sense. Considerable confusion is thereby caused." A

Commentary

on Kant's

Critique

of

Pure Reason, 2nd ed. (New Y o r k : Humanities Press, 19jo), p. 52. Smith implies that Kant's use of the term "experience" to mean sense perception is limited to the Introduction.

That such a usage is found there is beyond doubt. The opening sen-

tence of the Introduction

in the first edition reads, "Erfahrung ist ohne Zweifel das

erste Produkt, welches unser Verstand hervorbringt, indem er den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Empfindungen bearbeitet." Immanuel Kant, Kritik ed. Raymund

Schmidt (Hamburg,

der reinen

1952), A 1. (Hereafter cited as

Vernunft, Kr.d.r.V.

Page numbers refer either to the first or second original editions, the letters A or B indicating which is intended.) Another similar statement is as follows, " E s heisst aber jede Erkenntnis rein, die mit nichts Fremdartigen vermischt ist. Besonders aber wird eine Erkenntnis schlechthin rein genannt, in die sich überhaupt keine Erfahrung oder Empfindung einmischt, welche mithin völlig a priori möglich ist." K r . d . r . V . ,

Au.

There is a tendency in the second edition to revise such references, though the ambiguity remains, as this reference indicates: "Wenn

aber gleich alle unsere

Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es könnte wohl sein dass selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntnis ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke

emp-

fangen, und dem was unser eigenes Erkenntnisvermögen . . . aus sich selbst hergibt." K r . d . r . V . , B 1. C f . also B 2 — 3 . When we come, however, to the reference, which, according to Nygren, can be viewed as a classical expression of the transcendental method, it becomes apparent that the principle Kant expresses loses its meaning if any ambiguity is allowed to remain in the use of the term "experience." "Die transz. Deduktion aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Prinzipium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muss, nämlich dieses: dass sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen, (es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig." Kr. d. r. V . , A 9 4 / B 126. N o t even the term "Anschauung" retains the other meaning of

experience

indicated in the citations given above, where it is identified with sense perception and distinguished from the apriori, for Erfahrung, which can here only mean valid experience, can presumably be encountered in Anschauung or in Denken. Smith writes, "Experience is a highly ambiguous term, and to fulfil the role assigned to it by Kant's transcendental method—that of establishing the reality of

the conditions

of

its own

possibility—its

actuality

must lie beyond

the

sphere of all possible controversy. It must be itself a datum, calling indeed for explanation, but not itself making claims that are in any degree subject to possible challenge." Op. cit., p. 241.

58

his presentation of the Kantian concept of the apriori with an extended discussion of the "negative characterization" of the apriori, namely, that it is independent of experience. He describes "empirical knowledge" as always contingent, reaching only a certain degree of probability, and as possessing a certainty which is only momentary. Going on to a discussion of the "positive characterization" of the apriori, he points out that there are, on the other hand, forms of knowledge which claim quite a different kind of validity. As an example Nygren suggests the proposition that every change must have a cause, which principle, he states, is valid independent of all experience, even should experience present apparent exceptions to it. Nygren presents as an additional example of such a priori knowledge the mathematical sum 2 X 2 = 4. In this connection he discusses in more detail the negative characterization of the apriori, namely that it must be independent of experience, pointing out that this is not to be understood psychologically, with respect to the temporal origin of such knowledge in human experience. Rather, what is meant is that the apriori derives no support from experience. The truth of a mathematical sum like 2 X 2 = 4, according to Nygren, is first seen to be evident by reference to sense perception, but that it is entirely independent of experience is seen by the fact that once it is intuited it no longer needs to be verified by further reference to experience. The positive characterizations of the apriori, to which Nygren attaches the greater importance, are necessity and universal vali82

83

84

s2 "When knowledge is termed a priori, this does not mean that it temporally precedes all experience, but that it is, with respect to its validity, independent of and raised above experience." R A , p. 108. 83

" T h e proposition that every change must have a cause does not only give

expression to a relationship, the factuality of which has in many individual cases been established, but advances with the claim to be valid always and under all conditions, necessarily and without exception. This proposition is valid

indepen-

dent of all experience, and even if we are not able in experience to establish its validity in individual cases, yes, even if experience should indicate apparent exceptions to it, we nonetheless attribute it unbroken validity. Judgments which have such a validity are a priori judgments." Ibid. The italics are my own. 84

R A , p. 109.

59

dity. But the fact that such knowledge exists cannot simply be asserted, it must be demonstrated. Here is where the transcendental method, which Kant has developed, is needed to determine "which those forms of knowledge are, which rightly make claims to necessity and universal validity, and therefore have to be valid as a priori knowledge." Most briefly stated, the transcendental method may be defined as follows: "That which must be valid if experience is to be possible at all is valid with necessity and universal validity, and is thus a priori. . . . In connection with the demonstration that knowledge is a priori, it is thus necessary to show that without the presupposition of its validity, no experience is possible." This is, then, the method which can be applied not only in the theoretical, but also in the ethical, aesthetic, and religious domains, so that in each of these domains one can speak of an apriori. In this latter citation it is apparent that experience has a different meaning from the meaning it has in the citations in which experience and the apriori are sharply distinguished from each other. If experience is understood as that which must be distinguished from the apriori, so that the apriori becomes independent of experience, it is difficult to understand how such experience must be made possible by the apriori. It would seem that the experience which the apriori makes possible would have to be understood as valid experience, experience of the kind which Nygren in another connection describes as not to be contrasted with the apriori, but with illusion. There is, however, in this section no clarification on Nygren's part of the ambiguity which exists in the transcendental method in so far as this dual use of the term "experience" remains uncorrected. For this reason it does not become clear as to what the nature of the validity which the transcendental method assumes really is. A statement such as the following would seem to indicate that the validity of experience cannot be assumed. "For Kant the situation is . . . such, that he goes to experience as something given, but not 85

86

87

88

8Î>

85

"Notwendigkeit

und strenge Allgemeinheit sind also sichere Kennzeichen

einer Erkenntnis a priori." Kr. d. r. V., B 4, R A , p. 109. 80 87

60

R A , pp. 1 0 9 — 1 1 0 . Ibid.

88

R A , pp.

89

See supra, p. 52.

in—112.

to examine it empirically, but to test it with respect to whether an clement of validity can be established within it, an element a priori." This is clearly quite different from speaking of "individual, concrete empirical judgments, which no one thinks of challenging." Here it seems that one may be coming to experience with a priori judgments and in terms of them determining whether the experience in question contains an element of validity. Such an approach to experience could, however, lead to neglect of the important inductive principle enunciated by Francis Bacon, "In the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two." If experience can be interpreted as revealing "apparent exceptions" to laws which must nonetheless have unbroken validity, no means is any longer provided by which revision of principles believed to have universal a priori validity can take place. If one, on the other hand, begins with the validity of individual judgments, one may search for the presuppositions 90

91

92

93

94

90

RA, p. u z .

91

F M , p. 39. See supra, p. 55.

92

Novum

Organum,

I, 46,

The

English

Philosophers

from

Bacon

ed. Edwin A . Burtt ( N e w York, 1939), p. 36. C f . H . W . B. Joseph, An

to

Mill,

Introduc-

tion to Logic, 2nd rev. ed. (Oxford, 1946) pp. 3 9 2 — 3 9 3 . 93

See supra, note 83.

94

One is led to think of a comment by Hans Reichenbach, made with special

reference

to

the Kantian

assumption

of

the

universal

a priori

validity

of

Euclidean geometry, " W h a t has happened, then, in Einstein's theory is a proof that knowledge within the framework of Kantian principles is not possible. For a Kantian, such a result could only signify a breakdown of science. It is a fortunate fact that the scientist was not a Kantian and, instead of abandoning his attempts of constructing knowledge, looked for ways of changing the socalled a priori principles. Through his ability of dealing with space-time relations essentially different from the traditional frame of knowledge, Einstein has shown the w a y to a philosophy superior to the philosophy of the synthetic a priori." " T h e Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity," Albert Philosopher-Scientist,

Einstein:

vol. V I I , The Library of Living Philosophers, ed. P. A .

Schilpp, 2nd ed. (Tudor Publishing Co., 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 309. One need not draw the conclusions Reichenbach draws at this point to recognize that there is an important difference between granting fundamental validity to experience in the form of individual judgments, an analysis of which experience can, in turn, lead to the discovery of a priori principles implied by it, and an approach to experience in which fundamental validity is granted to a priori principles, in terms of which the validity of individual judgments is to be tested.

61

which this validity implies. A clearer understanding of these presuppositions may, in turn, help one to understand wider ranges of experience. But it could happen, as has been the case in recent physical research, that such wider experience might contradict principles which have been taken to be a priori in nature. If one presupposes the validity of individual judgments, this provides no fundamental problem. It simply means that one has not succeeded as yet in interpreting the new data which appears to conflict with the presuppositions with which one has been working. Rather here is a validity of another sort which remains to be discovered. When it is discovered, it may have implications for the validity of other judgments, with respect to which one has already reached relative clarity. While the validity one has already grasped will not be destroyed, it may be reinterpreted, so that what was thought "tobe valid always and under all conditions, necessarily and without exception," in which terms Kant conceived Euclidean geometry, will be seen to be a special case of a more general and inclusive theory, having its validity within a defined frame of reference. Is it meaningful, however, to speak of the possibility that even the principle of causality could be subject to revision as a result of empirical research? Here the answer would seem to be that, in so far as the principle of causality functions as an a priori presupposition, it functions in some concrete form, as causa efficiens or causa finalis, as causality which is determined or in some sense free. There has been a tendency to interpret all phenomenal experience in deterministic, mechanistic terms. Experience, however, has made necessary revision of the applicability of this a priori principle so conceived. The distinction being suggested at this point may seem to be a rather subtle one, for in any case it would seem that the principle of causality must be presupposed, if experience is to be valid. The question, however, is how one presupposes the apriori. Does one presuppose it in its concrete form in experience, abstracting by analysis only for the purpose of understanding more clearly the nature of this presupposition? Or does one abstract before the presupposition of validity takes place, so that only the validity of the abstract apriori is presupposed? This latter approach, it would seem, 95

95

62

See supra, note 83.

reveals a dogmatic tendency, and may lead to the misinterpretation of certain areas of experience, as, for example, the inability to recognize the existence of human freedom in terms of the phenomenal order. The ambiguity with respect to the use of the term "experience," which we have found in the passages in which Nygren more specifically outlines the Kantian concept of the apriori, is to be found elsewhere in Religiöst apriori also. In referring to knowledge as resting upon a priori presuppositions, which presuppositions can be justified only by showing that without their validity experience would not be possible, Nygren asserts that the same transcendental approach is necessary in the ethical, aesthetic, and religious domains of experience as well. Again we note ambiguity with respect to the term "experience." For example, in the following reference the term "knowledge" could be substituted for the term "experience," so that the statement could be read alternately, "Here concerned are . . . the presuppositions upon which all knowledge rests, which can only be justified transcendentally by demonstrating that without their validity no experience (knowledge) at all is possible." But such a substitution would not make sense in this statement, "That 96

97

98

88

A n instance of sharp distinction between experience and the apriori is to

be found in Nygren's comments on Hans Vaihingens interpretation of the Kantian reference to the apriori as being independent of experience. Vaihinger holds that the reference in its genetic meaning can signify two things: "durch Erfahrung nicht veranlasst sein" and "aus der Erfahrung nicht abgeleitet oder aus ihr nicht herstammen," and that Kant uses the phrase only in the second meaning. Nygren argues that neither of these meanings can be allowed, and that the reference must simply be the negative expression for the same situation which is expressed by the concepts universally valid and necessary. " T h a t knowledge is a priori thus means for the critical philosophy, positively expressed, that it is necessary and universally valid, negatively expressed, that it is valid independent of experience, that in order to make evident its validity one neither needs nor can appeal to the testimony of experience, since this cannot guarantee necessity and universal validity." R A , pp. 1 3 1 — 1 3 2 . What is being rejected here is the genetic interpretation of the Kantian reference altogether, which tends toward a psychological understanding of the apriori. While no indication is given as to the concrete validity, which the transcendental method may assume, the implication is, however, that it is not valid experience, for if it were, there would be little point in saying that experience is valid apart from experience. 97

R A , pp. 1 4 8 — 1 4 9 .

98

R A , p. 149.

66

knowledge is a priori thus means for the critical philosophy . . . that it is valid independent of experience (knowledge)." That the term "experience" might be used with different meanings being intended need not cause great difficulty, but at no point in Religiöst apriori does Nygren indicate how such distinctions are to be understood. Since the point at which validity is assumed in the transcendental deduction is intimately related to the way in which experience is understood, lack of clarity at this point is particularly unfortunate. Nygren's most decisive discussion in Religiöst apriori of the problem with which we are concerned is to be found in chapter IV, which has the title "The Transcendental Deduction of Religion." Here the transcendental deduction is defined as a deduction which indicates what must be valid if anything is to be valid. Nygren insists that such a method is not circular, using the validity of experience to establish the validity of the first principles, on which in turn the validity of experience is made to rest. This criticism would be relevant if validity were to be established, but the question is not whether there is validity, but what the presuppositions are if anything at all is to be valid. The critical method does not begin with universal doubt, for if it did it would get no further. It makes one undemonstrated, but not arbitrary presupposition. It presupposes that there is a difference between the valid and the invalid. Its reason for making this presupposition is that without it no critical investigation would be possible. Thus the critical method is safeguarded from both uncritical scepticism as well as dogmatism. It assumes that there is a difference between valid and invalid, true and false, right and wrong, but not what that difference is. This is rather the subject for its critical investigation. 99

1

2

3

4

99 1

See supra, note 96. R A , p. 208. " I f one can show that something must be valid if it is to be

possible even to speak of validity, then one has reached a level of validity which cannot be excelled. Thus the transcendental method is a negative demonstration. It seeks to show that no validity and no experience is possible unless this axiom is acknowledged. Only those presuppositions which in this sense can be said to condition experience and establish validity are acknowledged as transcendentally valid." R A , p. 209.

64

2

R A , pp. 209—210.

3

But cf. supra, p. 60 f .

4

R A , p. 2 1 1 .

Now we must ask what is meant by the presupposition that there is a difference between the valid and the invalid. In connection with a discussion of Ernst Troeltsch's interpretation of the religious apriori, Nygren contrasts the transcendental approach with Troeltsch's approach, in which the apriori is used to distinguish in religious experience between that which is merely factually given, and that which is normatively valid. Nygren says, on the one hand, that the transcendental method does seek to discover the truth to be found in religious experience. But this method does not, as Troeltsch imagines, enable one to distinguish between the valuable and the valueless in religion, or between truth and appearance. The problems involved in making such distinctions are to be left to the special sciences. The critical philosophy, on the other hand, examines the most general presuppositions of the validity to be found in the various domains of experience. To the extent that this distinction has been neglected by Troeltsch, Nygren holds that Troeltsch has departed from the viewpoint of the critical philosophy. Does this discussion help us determine the nature of the preliminary presupposition, that there is a difference between the valid and the invalid? If one can leave to the special sciences the problem of determining whether individual religious experiences are valid or not, does this mean that one assumes the validity of these special sciences, so that it is the nature of the truth to be found in them which is to be examined? But if such is the case, what is the meaning 5

0

7

5

" T h e purely transcendentally conceived religious apriori . . .

sets forth to

learn the truth to be derived from the psychological-historical reality of religion. It begins with the factual experiences of religion and sets up the question of their objective validity and truth value." R A , p. 162. 0

" F o r (the critical philosophy) with its formal concept of the apriori, it is

impossible

to

determine

which

individual

experiences

possess

validity.

This

question philosophy confidently leaves to the special sciences, and will not involve itself in their tasks. Rather as its own task it sees the question of the general presuppositions required if such experiences are to possess validity at all, and in this connection arranges for investigation of the large, comprehensive forms of experience, in order to determine the extent to which the above mentioned general presuppositions of validity are to be found within them." 7

Ibid.

It may be easier to think in terms of the natural sciences, for what this

would mean in the religious sciences would be most difficult to specify in this context.

5 — Erling

of contrasting the transcendental method with the dogmatic method by saying that it may not, like the dogmatic method, presuppose what is valid, what is true, etc., since this is to be the subject of its critical investigation? It would seem that presupposing the validity of a special science is precisely presupposing what is true. There is obviously a difference between this presupposition and the dogmatic presupposition of validity, but the suggestion that the critical presupposition of validity is in some sense "minimal" can be misleading, if it is not recognized that at the same time this presupposition is vast and eminently complex, involving the whole content of valid experience, and not just a few first principles dogmatically affirmed as necessarily valid a priori. Nygren's reference to the critical presupposition of validity in quantitative terms occurs in connection with his discussion of the criticism that the presuppositions of the critical method involve a logical circle. He admits that the demonstration of validity which the critical method offers, due to the assumption of validity upon which it is based, can from a purely logical point of view be considered circular, but argues that this criticism is not damaging. He then goes on to suggest that the critical method in reducing the presuppositions to the least possible number has removed, or at least reduced, the logical offence of this procedure. Nygren's introduction of a quantitative consideration at this point seems due to the fact that he is assuming that the initial philosophical presuppositions 8

9

10

8

R A , p. 2 1 4 .

9

"Even though one can say that the critical philosophy's proof of validity

is to a certain extent circular from a purely logical point of view, in that it does not begin absolutely at the beginning, but presupposes that something valid must be given, one must still, on the other hand, acknowledge that this circle is methodologically justified, and that it is an inescapable as well as completely harmless circle." R A , p. 2 1 2 . 10 "This kind of a circle no philosophy can escape. One therefore does an injustice to the critical philosophy, if one designates this as its particular failing. Rather the critical philosophy is that philosophical position, which has succeeded in reducing this inescapable circle to a minimum, and thus enters it 'reinlich.'" Ibid. " T h e transcendental method . . . succeeds in reducing the philosophical presupposition to a minimum."

Ibid.,

p. 2 1 4 . (The italics are my own.) In this

connection a question raised by Einar Tegen may be in order. If there is actually a circle, does the size matter? See " Ä r en transcendental deduktion av religionen möjlig?" Bibelf orskaren, X X X I X (1922), p. 319.

66

are the categories, such principles as the principle of causality. His argument here is directed against the view that, since something must be presupposed, it be the mind's confidence in itself, with a resultant dogmatic affirmation of the validity of the basic ideas of reason. When these ideas are compared with the critical presupposition, that there is a difference between valid and invalid, true and false, right and wrong, it does appear that the latter presuppositions are quantitatively fewer in number. But if it is recognized that these critical presuppositions cannot be abstracted from the concrete experience in which they are embodied, except in a fictional sense, then one must reckon with the wealth of experience also involved in these critical presuppositions, as well as with the possibility that additional presuppositions will be recognized, as this experience is submitted to further critical analysis. If it is believed that there can be real abstraction from what is valid, with concentration simply on the presupposition that there is a distinction between the valid and the invalid, it would seem that this is a presupposition which the sceptic also in a certain sense could grant. He would only add that there is no possible way in which we can know what this distinction is. It may be true that the sceptic could be shown to be inconsistent in granting that there was a distinction between the valid and the invalid, while denying that the distinction could be known. But the critical philosopher has the burden of proof at this point, and he may not be able to convince the sceptic that the distinction between the valid and the invalid must be knowable, if it is to be meaningfully affirmed, until he has indicated what this distinction is. It is precisely for this reason that it must be possible to pressuppose not only that there is a difference between the valid and the invalid, but also what that difference is. Yet as we continue our examination of Nygren's presentation of the method of transcendental deduction in its application to religion, we find that in this domain not even that there is a difference between the valid and the invalid seems to be presupposed. In Nygren's discussion of the lack of the transcendental method in Kant's philosophy of religion it becomes evident that the transcendental 11

11 This is the position of the Fries school, particularly as outlined by L. N e l son. R A , p. 2 1 3 .

67

method at this point, as Nygren understands it, does not examine the validity of religion, but religion's claims to validity. Nygren writes, "We must seek to make evident that in religion is to be found an element, without the recognition of which there can be no validity or experience at all in the true sense of the word." This statement could mean that we may begin with the assumption of valid religious experience and then examine the presuppositions thus required in order that this experience is to be possible. We could then not only examine the relation of these presuppositions to religious experience, but to experience in general. But on the same page there is another statement referring to Kant's philosophy, which indicates that another interpretation is called for. "In accord with the idea of the transcendental deduction one could expect that Kant here (with respect to religion) would take his point of departure in religious experience in its given forms and set up the question of the basis for the claims to validity of this form of experience." Here it becomes evident that the validity of religious experience cannot be presupposed, for it is the claim to validity of this form of experience which is to be examined. Apparently an attempt will be made to establish religious validity by building on some other experience, the validity of which can be presupposed. Yet Nygren is of the opinion that such an approach to the problem of religious validity would be the same as the transcendental approach in the other domains of experience. But the transcendental method in 12

13

14

12

R A , p. 2 1 5 .

13

Ibid. The italics are my own.

14

" T h e method of answering this question would be the same here as in the

other domains of philosophy. The question would be raised as to whether an a priori element is to be found in religion, which guarantees religion's place in the life of the spirit as a necessary and universally valid form of experience, and the answer would be sought in a transcendental manner." Ibid.

There is one

passage where Nygren affirms that also with respect to religious experience the use of the transcendental method assumes the validity of the experience that is being examined. " W e have seen that there is a basic fact, which is the point of departure for all the different views of the apriori; this basic fact is the validity of experience in its various forms, i.e., the validity of theoretical, aesthetic, and religious experience and whatever other forms of experience that there may be." R A , p. 1 3 3 . C f . Lindroth, "Anders Nygren und der Kritizismus," pp. 1 7 6 — 1 7 8 . Nygren at this point is seeking to define in general terms the transcendental approach to the problem of the apriori as over against psychological-genetic and

68

what Nygren terms the theoretical domain, for example, does not work with claims to validity alone. It works with the presupposition of the validity of the experience to be found formulated in the natural sciences and analyzes the nature of this validity. It does not, on the other hand, determine whether such validity exists. But this is presumably what the transcendental deduction of religion sets forth to do. Nygren himself later in his discussion admits that the transcendental deduction of religion cannot be carried out in the same way as the deduction can be carried out in the other domains of experience. He says that if one sought for the presuppositions that were required if religious experience were to be possible, and imagined that one had thereby completed the transcendental investigation of religious validity, one could rightly be charged with having presented a demonstration which was viciously circular in nature. But why would a vicious circle be involved in such a deduction? If it is of the essence of the transcendental method to assume that valid experience exists and then examine the nature of this validity, discovering those presuppositions which must be granted if this experience is to be possible, why cannot this be done in the religious domain? If valid religious experience can be assumed, 15

16

metaphysical approaches. It is later in his discussion that he states that the religious apriori presents special problems with respect to the primary assumption of validity. is Nygren does at one point in his earlier writings say that the transcendental method examines the "evidence feeling" (evidenskänsla) which characterizes our experience at certain points, as, for example, when we affirm a causal relationship. R G , pp. 56—58. Such an "evidence feeling" could be interpreted as a claim to validity, for which a further basis would have to be found if this validity were in the final analysis to be maintained. This approach to the problem of the validity assumed in the transcendental deduction is, however, in so far as the theoretical domain is concerned, not developed in further detail in later writings. 16

"One could think that even the philosophy of religion could reduce its

burden of proof to the extent, that it had completed its transcendental task by demonstrating, that without the recognition of the basic religious categories no religious experience was possible. But if the philosophy of religion claimed to be able to undertake such a reduction, one could rightly charge its demonstration with being viciously circular. Here we find the strange situation, that that which is considered permissible in the other domains becomes a fault when it is carried out in the philosophy of religion." R A , p. 234.

69

no logical circle is involved in examining the nature of this validity. If valid religious experience, on the other hand, cannot be assumed, obviously a vicious circle would be involved were one to seek to show that without certain basic religious categories no religious experience would be possible. But why cannot the validity of religious experience be assumed? Nygren suggests that there is a fundamental difference between the experience of the religious domain and the experience of the other domains. This difference may be noted in the essentially passive or receptive nature of religious experience as contrasted with the active and productive character of experience in the theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic domains. This contrast between religion and these cultural forms has an interesting consequence. Those who will not accept the presuppositions of the particular cultural realms cut themselves off from the fellowship which the activity involved in each of these domains forms. This can be shown to lead to intolerable situations. Those who will not accept the presuppositions of the theoretical domain are excluded from all discussion and left in absolute scepticism. Those who will not accept any ethical presuppositions are excluded from the ethical community, which cannot exist apart from such presuppositions. Nygren does not, unfortunately, indicate how this principle applies with respect to aesthetic experience. He does say, however, that this form of the transcendental deduction cannot be used with respect to religious experience. 17

18

17

R A , pp. 2 3 4 — 2 3 5 , cf. also pp. 1 7 5 — 1 8 0 .

18

" I f one should seek to use a similar reduction of the transcendental deduc-

tion in the religious domain, and thus permitted its demonstration to emerge in the following proposition: H e who rejects the basic religious value thereby excludes himself

from the religious fellowship, then this would certainly

be a

proposition, which from a religious point of view would have to be accepted and regarded as demonstrative. For if only religion is recognized as something of value, then it quite simply follows that one must recognize the basic religious value, without which religious experience is impossible. From a scientific point of view, however, such a demonstration would be invalid. For the opponent could object: If without the recognition of this fundamental religious category there can be no religious experience and no religious fellowship, then this only proves that we must abandon the so-called religious experience and fellowship. And he would be able to maintain this objection without it being possible for us to show the untenability of such a position, by indicating the objective consequences

70

It must be borne in mind that what we are discussing here is a form of the transcendental deduction which presumably can be used in the theoretical and the ethical domains (by implication it should also be usable in the aesthetic domain, though it seems that the difficulties would be even greater here than in the religious domain), but which cannot be used in the religious domain. We must ask, however, Can this deduction really be used in the ethical domain? Nygren states that he who rejects the ultimate transcendental ethical presuppositions places himself outside of the cultural fellowship which only has meaning in so far as these presuppositions are granted. But what are these most ultimate ethical presuppositions? Nygren suggests as one of them the unconditioned categorical imperative. Yet, is it true that he who will not accept this presupposition finds himself in an impossible position due to the consequences which follow from rejecting it? While such a person may be excluded from the fellowship of those who recognize the categorical imperative, even this may not happen. It is quite possible for a consistent egoist, who recognizes no other imperative than his own personal wishes, to develop counsels of prudence which will enable him to live with no particular difficulty in an ethical community, the presuppositions of which he fully rejects. To this it may be answered, that if a person does not have one ethical presupposition he must have another. But if this answer is made, the fundamental difference between ethical and theoretical experience has been recognized. Of theoretical experience it is true that there is not freedom of choice with respect to the fundamental presuppositions. There is not a community of those who accept the principle of causality, and another of those who accept instead the principle of chance. There is not a community of those who accept the law of noncontradiction, and another community which accepts instead a law of contradiction, whatever that would be. In so far as these ultimate principles are placed in question, it is in order to find more ultimate principles, or to define more exactly their frame of reference. Thus it would seem that the difference to which Nygren 19

which follow, as this was possible in the case of the cultural forms." R A , pp.

235—236. 19 RA, p. 241.

71

calls attention does not exist between the various cultural forms and religious experience, but rather between nature (the theoretical) and history (the ethical and religious domains). If this is the case, similar problems are to be encountered when the transcendental deduction is applied in the ethical and the religious domains. In the ethical as well as the religious domains we have to deal with the possibility of fundamental alternatives, which reach even into the realm of the most ultimate presuppositions. The problem, therefore, is in what sense the initial validity can be found, which the transcendental method must be able to assume, if it is to be possible to carry out such an analysis. From the foregoing we can conclude that in so far as Nygren discusses the critical method in terms of its use in the theoretical domain, especially as we find this discussion in his essays of 1928 and 1937, it is expressly stated that the validity which the critical method assumes, in order to carry out its analysis, is the validity to be found in individual judgments as we encounter them in the special sciences. However, when the critical method is to be applied to the religious domain, though there are scattered suggestions that here also the validity of the judgments to be found in the special religious sciences may be presupposed, in the final analysis such an initial assumption does not seem to be possible. Rather the problem here becomes that of determining whether there are valid religious judgments or not. We turn now to Nygren's discussion of the problem of ethical validity as it is to be found in Filosofisk och kristen etik. While Nygren has not completed the transcendental deduction in the ethical domain, he has described the nature of such a deduction in sufficient detail, so that it is possible to determine the validity which this deduction can assume. It is immediately evident that the validity of ethical experience cannot be assumed, for critical ethics has the task of determining whether ethical experience is illusory or not. Thus the claims of ethical experience are examined. It is found that ethical experience makes claims to primary autonomous validity, rejecting the interpretations of both ethical scepticism and 20

21

72

20

For thi-s terminology, see supra, p. 39

21

F K E , p. 113 f.

note

3C-

ethical heteronomy. It is, then, these claims which must be tested. It is entirely possible, however, that these claims may be found to be without foundation. Yet the claims which ethics makes are important. If it did not make these claims there would be no reason for the development of a critical ethics. Now that the claims are made, these questions must be asked, "Is the ethical a universally valid experience? Is it an integrating element in the spiritual life? Is the ethical attitude necessary and inescapable?" Nygren then lists three possible methods by which these claims can be tested, the empirical, the rational, and the transcendental method, indicating that only the latter is able to serve this purpose. This method seeks to legitimize the validity of the ultimate principles by showing that all validity depends upon them. At this point the reader is referred to the sections in Religiöst apriori and Die Gültigkeit der religiösen Erfahrung where the transcendental method is discussed, so that no significant alteration in the presentation of the method is intended at this point. What is new in relation to the discussion of religious validity is the suggestion that for such a deduction only one indubitably ethical judgment is required. 22

23

24

25

26

"

F K E , p. 143.

23

" T h e possibility still remains that the ethical in its judgment of itself makes

claims to a validity, which it actually does not possess, and that that, which in the moment of ethical decision appears to be primary validity, actually is only secondary, or possibly only a psychological necessity, which has nothing to do with validity at all." Ibid.,

pp. 1 4 3 — 1 4 4 . Gunnar Hillerdal does not note this

shift in Nygren's position as to the validity of ethical experience between R A and F K E , in so far as the presuppositions involved in the transcendental deduction are concerned. See Teologisk

och filosofisk

etik, pp. 139, 145.

24

F K E , p. 144.

25

"Its question is, Which ultimate principles are of such a nature that one

must recognize them if one is to attribute validity to anything at all? Only when it can demonstrate, with respect to a principle or fundamental proposition, that a denial of its validity would mean that one no longer could speak of any validity at all in this or any other domain, can one recognize it as having primary validity." F K E , pp. 1 4 6 — 1 4 7 . 26 "When this method is to be used in the domain of ethical experience, no extensive inductive material is therefore required. It is altogether sufficient if one only has at hand one indubitably ethical judgment, which must then be analyzed with respect to the element of validity to be found within it." F K E , p. 147.

73

It is interesting to note that this judgment must be indubitably ethical, though it need not be assumed to be valid. Since the problem is to establish the validity of ethical experience, which validity has thus far only been claimed, it must be concluded that that part of the deduction which demonstrates that without the granting of the validity of certain fundamental ethical principles no ethical experience will be possible cannot be conclusive, in accord with the principle already enunciated in relation to religious experience in Religiöst apriori. Nygren says in Religiöst apriori that such a deduction would be adequate with respect to ethical experience, though not with respect to religious experience. But if one begins with the assumption that ethical experience can be illusory, it is also obviously a circular argument in this instance to argue that ethical experience is not illusory because the validity of certain principles must be granted in order for ethical experience to be possible. Thus the possibility of the deduction must depend upon the possibility of showing that nonethical validity is impossible without granting the validity of the ethical presuppositions. But what is this nonethical validity? It would seem that it would have to be a validity which could be assumed without demonstration, otherwise one is left in the position of ultimate scepticism. But the only validity which can be assumed is the validity of causal judgments in the natural sciences, as well as the validity of mathematical necessity. Nygren's problem is to show how it is possible on the basis of these assumptions to establish the validity of religious and ethical experience. While he has sought to derive religious validity from the presumably eternal nature of the validity of causal and mathematical judgments, he has not indicated the direction in which a demonstration of ethical validity is to be found, if one is limited to such preliminary assumptions. It should be recognized, however, that Nygren's argument in Religiöst apriori is based upon an analysis of the validity of not only the theoretical domain, but the ethical and the aesthetic domains of experience as well. Nygren seeks to show that religion's claim to validity is justified in that the eternal, which is the religious 21

28

27 28

74

R A , pp. 2 3 5 — 2 3 6 . See supra, pp. 69—70.

category, is a presupposition the validity of which must be granted if the validity of the other domains of experience, which can be assumed, is to be possible. We shall have occasion later to examine more closely Nygren's approach to the problem of religious validity. Our concern here is simply to examine the nature of the assumption upon which the argument is based. Nygren holds that the category of eternity is a presupposition required by theoretical and ethical experience, as well as aesthetic experience. In his subsequent discussion with John Cullberg, Nygren states that he is not certain that aesthetic experience constitutes a category in the same sense that ethical and theoretical experience do. He states that he has simply referred to aesthetic experience in view of the fact that there are those who do view aesthetic experience as constituting a category in itself. This means, therefore, that the deduction actually depends upon the two domains of experience, the theoretical and the ethical. As we have noted, in Nygren's subsequent discussion of ethical validity it becomes apparent that the assumption of the validity of ethical experience poses some difficulties. In Filosofisk och kristen etik Nygren indicates that the validity of ethical experience cannot be assumed, but at the same time limits himself to a description of what a transcendental deduction of the ethical category would have to be. We cannot say that at any point in Nygren's writings the objective validity of ethical experience is demonstrated. Nor is the reader referred to such a demonstration by another author which Nygren regards as conclusive. In view of this fact it does not seem that the assumption of the validity of ethical experience can constitute one of the bases upon which the transcendental deduction of the religious apriori, as Nygren has outlined it in Religiöst apriori, may rest. At this point it might be asked whether it would not be possible to subject the theoretical judgments, whose validity apparently can be assumed, to even further analysis. Could not the transcendental deduction of both the ethical and the religious categories be carried out with simply the presupposition of valid theoretic experience? 29

30

29

RA, p. 238.

30

"Den religionsfilosofiska apriorifrågan," p.

66.

75

In this connection a consideration of Nygren's discussion with Einar Tegen in Bibelforskaren, vol. 39—40 will prove instructive. Tegen is writing in criticism of Nygren's transcendental deduction of the religious category in Religiöst apriori. He distinguishes between what he terms "narrow" and "broad" ways in which a transcendental deduction may be carried out. The "narrow" way refers to the analysis of the necessity to be found in a particular domain of experience. The concern is to find the nature of the necessity which characterizes a certain domain of experience and to demonstrate that without the presupposition of this necessity the experience to be found in this domain would be impossible. Tegen holds that this kind of deduction is to be found in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, but that if it were used with respect to religious experience it would result only in the assertion of religion's claim to validity, while not establishing the fact that religion has a validity equal to the validity of other domains of experience. If there were but one domain of experience there would be no need for distinguishing between "narrow" and "broad" deductions. Since, however, there are several domains of experience claiming unique forms of necessity, the question arises as to what the relation is which these several forms of necessity have to each other. Are they so autonomous that they have absolutely no relation with each other, or are they interrelated so that without losing their autonomy they reciprocally presuppose one another? It is evident that the term, "experience" as Kant uses it in his description of the transcendental method., can be interpreted in two ways. The experience in question* as Kant quite likely himself intended the reference, can be the experience of spatiotemporal causal relations in the theoretical domainBut the concept of experience may also be broadened to include ethical and religious experience. Nygren argues that the transcendental approach to the problem of the validity of experience itself calls for such broadening. In 31

32

33

31

" Ä r en transcendental deduktion av religionen möjlig?" pp. 305—306, 3 1 5 —

316. 32

See supra, p. 57 f., note 81. " O n l y that presupposition, without which no experience and no validity at all is possible, is basic and fundamental enough to be characterized as philo33

76

this connection Nygren argues that there is only one transcendental deduction in the final analysis. If there is ultimately but one transcendental deduction, which must be carried out in the "broad" way, this could mean that the several particular deductions were not completed until their relations with the other domains of experience were seen, in which case one would still have the problem ' of finding experience in the several domains, the validity of which could be assumed, so that the deductions could get under way. Or, this could mean that one could ultimately establish the validity of all the domains of experience by examining the presuppositions of one valid judgment, whatever the domain from which this judgment was taken. Since there seems to be difficulty in finding judgments, the validity of which can be assumed, in all but the theoretical domain of experience, this would probably mean that a judgment from this domain would be submitted to such analysis. Even were one to grant the possibility of such a "broad" deduction, it should be clear that there is a fundamental difference between the critical method as it is applied in the theoretical and the atheoretical domains. In the theoretical domain one may begin with the assumption of the validity of individual judgments, and the only problem is that of analyzing this validity to discover the presuppositions which it necessarily requires. In the atheoretical domains, on the other hand, one must begin with the possibility of illusion, and one can only seek to derive the validity of these forms of experience by showing that the ultimate presuppositions of these forms of experience are also presuppositions which are required if the validity of the judgments of the natural and mathematical sciences is to be possible. The difficulties confronting such an approach to ethical and religious experience are obvious. Perhaps a more helpful approach to this problem would be to 34

7

sophical." "Transcendentala metodens användbarhet inom religionsfilosofien," p.

288. 34

"Just because philosophy, as is no particular deduction in the same process of deduction in the of the 'particular deductions' is deductions' are carried out and dependent presuppositions." Ibid.,

Tegen emphasizes, is one and systematic, there actual meaning of the word, but one and the several domains. But for this reason also, none fully carried out, until all of the 'particular united in one systematic whole of mutually p. 289.

77

consider the nature of the validity which the critical method establishes. If we begin with the assumption of validity, in what sense is it established? Is it meaningful to speak of the transcendental deduction being used to examine whether a particular type of experience is illusory or not? Do the results of the deduction add to our confidence in the validity which we assumed at the outset of the deduction? Here it seems that we must say that if validity is assumed at the outset, the critical method can only have the purpose of examining the nature of that validity. The only sense in which that validity could be found to be illusory would be in the case that its uniqueness were found to be illusory. If ethical and religious judgments were found in the final analysis to be completely determinable by theoretical considerations, there would be no point of continuing to speak of a particular kind of validity in these domains. Their subject matter would remain, the validity of the individual judgments would be uncontested. They would simply be found to be particular instances of a more general theoretical validity. Is there, then, any way in which the validity of ethical and religious experience can be assumed? If it is the function of the critical method to examine the validity of experience in whatever form this validity manifests itself, the possibility should be considered that in certain forms of experience this validity may not appear in the form of single judgments, which may as such be assumed to be valid at the outset of the analysis. By this is meant that the a priori assumption of validity in the historical sciences, which involve value judgments, may be somewhat different from this assumption in the natural sciences. An interesting example of the possibility being suggested is to be seen in the quantum theory. Here it has been found necessary to use both the wave and the particle theories to account for certain phenomena. With respect to description of such phenomena, the judgments, the validity of which would be assumed for the purposes of further analysis, would have to be stated in such a way as to recognize alternately possible mutually exclusive interpretations for the same event. Here even in the natural order would be a realm of phenomena indicating that the distinction being suggested between the natural and the historical sciences is not in every sense an 78

absolute distinction. Yet in the case of the quantum theory it is possible to state exhaustively what the possibilities are and to affirm that in a given observation one or the other is the case. Possibly this is the approach which must be made to the validity which may be assumed in the historical sciences. But then we must not seek to derive this validity from the validity of theoretical judgments. We would not, therefore, have to press the analysis of the validity of the theoretical domain any further than was necessary for an understanding of this validity. We would instead begin our analysis of ethical and religious experience, not expecting that the assumption of validity to be found here would be the same as this assumption in the natural sciences, but accepting these domains of experience for what they are found to be. There are, then, the following tasks to which the critical method should address itself: It should show that the validity examined within the theoretical domain or the natural sciences is not exhaustive with respect to the validity of experience in general. It should then examine these other areas of experience, considering the possibility that the validity to be found here may appear in the form of alternate, mutually exclusive possibilities, where decision for one or another of the alternately possible interpretations is required, each interpretation in turn being found to have its own internal necessity. 35

95

N . H . Soe's argument, that the fact that a table is six feet long does not

seem to require a presupposition ultimately religious in nature, could be granted. Religionsfilosofi

(Kobenhavn, 1955), p. 51.

79

Chapter II

THE NATURAL SCIENCES There is one sense in which all science is "natural" science, for science seeks to describe the nature of things, whether its objects are the data of the physicist or the thoughts of the theologian. All of the sciences are therefore fundamentally theoretical in nature, for they seek to answer the categorical question which defines the theoretical domain, What is true? The differentiation among the sciences is determined by the different forms of objective necessity which the sciences describe. There are the formal sciences, such as mathematics, where the necessity is analytical in nature. There are the empirical sciences, on the other hand, where the relations described are synthetic. In this category are found the natural and the social sciences. Basic to this description is the presupposition of causality. In our examination of the nature of the validity to be found in the natural sciences, our concern is more particularly with the nature of this causal relationship. Our question is as follows, Is the causal relationship necessarily of such a nature, that all description in causal terms must conform to the pattern established in the natural sciences? Since we think of the principle of causality primarily in terms of the description of causal relationships which takes place in the 1

2

3

1

Bring, Till frågan om den systematiska teologiens upp gift, p. 193. C f . supra,

note 30, p. 39 f. 2

Carl G. Hempel, " O n the Nature of Mathematical Truth," Readings in the

Philosophy

of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953),

pp. 1 4 8 — 1 6 2 . 3

On causality in the social sciences, see Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim,

" T h e Logic of Explanation," ibid., p. 325 ff., Morris R. Cohen, "Reason in Social Science," ibid., p. 670 ff., and Ernest Nagel, " T h e Logic of Historical Analysis," p. 697 ff.

80

natural sciences, there is a tendency to think of causality in the social, or, as we shall call them, the historical sciences, as a much more complicated relation, but in principle essentially the same relation as that which the natural sciences describe. Immanuel Kant contributed to this pattern of thought. He held that the principle of causality was one of the a priori categories of the human mind, and that all empirical description must necessarily presuppose this principle. While many scientists no longer accept the concept of the Kantian apriori, their thinking continues in practice to be determined by the presupposition he described, in so far as this presupposition is relevant for an understanding of human freedom, as well as the possibility of affirming the occurrence of unique revealing events in the historical process. It is therefore in order that this presupposition be given further analysis. Such analysis is particularly important for an evaluation of Nygren's theological method, since, as has been noted, Nygren illustrates his method of transcendental deduction by suggesting the way in which it may be applied to the use of the principle of causality in the natural sciences. We have furthermore discovered that this analysis of the nature of the validity to be found in the theoretical domain appears to be the basis upon which the deduction of the religious category itself ultimately rests. Kant, as is well known, distinguished sharply between the causal 4

5

6

4

See Herbert Feigl, "Notes on Causality," ibid., pp. 4 1 5 f f .

5

A t this point there has been a return to Hume. Yet Hume himself provides

us with an example of this presupposition in Concerning The English Philosophers

Human

Understanding,

from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A . Burtt. One would

assume that Hume's critique of the principle of causality, " I t being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connection together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction." p. 654, could lead him to give some credence to the possibility of human freedom, as well as reports of

miracles.

Instead

he

denies

both.

Since

necessary

connection

cannot

be

observed either between cause and effect in the material order or motive and action in human behavior, he reasons that we can conclude from this that there is a similar necessity in both cases! pp. 6 4 1 — 6 4 2 . With respect to miracles, he finds it easier to believe that all who testify to such events are deceivers or deceived, than that the laws of nature could be violated, pp. 656—657. C f . supra, p. 16 f. 6

See supra, p. 74 f f .

6 — Erling

8l

order of nature and the concept of freedom. In view of the fact that Kant identified the order of nature with the phenomenal order, we must ask whether the category of causality, derived by the transcendental deduction of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, must be so defined that it excludes the possibility of the factor of freedom, and as such must be applied to all phenomena. In his discussion of the schema of causality, Kant states that in a causal situation, though there is an empirical factor of "power" which is not known a priori, the form of causality can be known a priori. It is this a priori knowledge of the form of causality which we must now examine. We shall first consider Kant's deduction of the category of causality. It must be borne in mind that Kant makes no effort to explain the nature and possibility of causal connection. He simply seeks to show that involved in the consciousness of time is the general principle that every event must have some cause in what immediately 7

8

9

10

7

"Das Gebiet des Naturbegriffs under der einen, und das Freiheitsbegriffs under der anderen Gesetzgebung sind gegen allen wechselseitigen Einfluss, den sie für sich . . . aufeinander haben können, durch die grosse Kluft, welche das Ubersinnliche von den Erscheinungen trennt, gänzlich abgesondert. Der Freiheitsbegriff bestimmt nichts in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntnis der Natur; der Naturbegriff ebensowohl nichts in Ansehung der praktischen Gesetze der Freiheit; und es ist insofern nicht möglich, eine Brücke von einem Gebiete zu dem anderen hinüberzuschlagen." Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Karl Vorländer, (Hamburg, 1954), pp. L U I — L I V . 8

It is human freedom that is meant at this point. It is not enough to say that man is free from external compulsion. That "human actions are theoretically predictable from a sufficient number of antecedents" must also be denied. See Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause, with Applications to the Free-Will Problem," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, p. 402 ff. 9 " W i e nun überhaupt etwas verändert werden könne; wie es möglich sei, dass auf einen Zustand in einem Zeitpunkte ein entgegengesetzter im anderen folgen könne: davon haben wir a priori nicht den mindesten Begriff. Hierzu wird die Kenntnis wirklicher Kräfte erfordert, welche nur empirisch gegeben werden kann . . . Aber die Form einer jeden Veränderung, die Bedingung, unter welcher sie, als ein Entstehen eines anderen Zustandes, allein vorgehen kann, . . . mithin die Sukzession der Zustände selbst . . . kann doch nach dem Gesetze der Kausalität und den Bedingungen der Zeit a priori erwogen werden." Kr. d. r. V., A 206— 207/B 253. C f . also A 199/B 244. 10 Ibid., A 189/B 3 3 2 — A 2 1 0 / B 2 5 6 . The following will be a summary of the account which Norman Kemp Smith gives of the central argument of the second analogy of experience in the Kr. d. r. V . Op. cit., pp. 364—369.

82

precedes it, although what the cause in each case may be can only be discovered empirically. The starting point of his proof is our consciousness of an objective order in time. We have the power of distinguishing between subjective and objective succession. Kant uses as examples looking at different parts of a house and seeing a ship move down stream. In the former case the sequence is determined by the order of our attention. In the latter case the sequence is given as such. Kant's question, accordingly, is, How is consciousness of objective change, as distinguished from subjective succession, possible? This distinction by which objective succession is defined, Kant says, is due to the presence of a rule compelling us to combine events in some particular successive order. In our apprehension of an event B in time, this apprehension follows the apprehension of a previous event A. Since we cannot reverse the order, the mind is compelled to view the order of succession in terms of the category of causality as necessitated, and therefore as objective. The succession need not be conceived as a causal one, but in order to be conceived as objective succession, it must be conceived as rendered necessary by connections that are caused. This leads to the proof of the principle of causality. The schema of causality is necessary succession in time, and it is through the aspect of time that Kant approaches the problem. He fixes attention on change. To be conscious of change, we must be conscious of an event, something happening at a particular point in time, dated by reference to other events. But objective experience can be fixed in its position in objective time only if it be conceived as related to preceding events according to a necessary law. This law of necessary connection in time is the law of causality. In order then that something that has taken place may be apprehended as being an objective change, it must be apprehended as necessarily following upon that which immediately precedes it in time, i.e., as causally necessary. Thus the admission of the consciousness of a sequence of events, which Hume granted, is all that is necessary to establish the principle of causality. It is evident that Kant regarded the a priori category of causality, as he understood it, as inconsistent with the concept of freedom. His discussion of the relation between the two is to be found in his discussion of the third antinomy of the transcendental analytic 83.

in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Here he sets a thesis, to the effect that freedom as well as causality according to the laws of nature are required to account for the appearances of the world, against an antithesis, which denies that there is any freedom. Everything in the world proceeds solely in accordance with laws of nature. The argument has to do with whether the concept of causality requires a first cause or not. Freedom is identified with such a concept of a first cause and is taken to mean "an absolute spontaneity, whereby a series of appearances, that proceed according to laws of nature, begins by itself." In Kant's later solution of the third antinomy and the problem of the relation between freedom and causal necessity which it poses, he consigns freedom to the realm of the noumenal, both in the sense of a transcendent first cause, by which the world can be conceived as created ex nihilo, but also in the sense of man's freedom as a moral agent. Man also in the realm of the noumenal has creative spontaneity. It is in such terms that Kant interprets man's moral freedom. Before considering the problem of human freedom, however, we must first examine the use of the category of causality in the natural sciences. In making this examination we shall refer particularly to a number of essays in C. F. von Weizsäckers Zum Weltbild der Physik, especially the essay entitled "Das Verhältnis der Quantenmechanik zur Philosophie Kants." Weizsäcker's argument in this essay, briefly stated, is that modern quantum mechanics has demonstrated the validity of Kant's phenomenology, but at the same time revealed the relative nature of the a priori knowledge which Kant tended to absolutize. 11

12

13

14

15

11

Ibid., pp. 492—495.

12

Ibid., p. 492.

13

Kr. d. r. V . , A 532/B 5 6 0 — A 564/B 592.

14

" I n Kant's view . . . practical Reason is regarded as a cause completely

capable, independently of all empirical conditions, of determining the act." Smith, p. 516. Smith does not find Kant's argument for human freedom in such terms defensible, however. " W e seem constrained to conclude that Kant has failed to sustain his position. A solution is rendered impossible by the very terms in which he formulates the problem. If the spiritual and the natural be further viewed as a unitary system, individual moral freedom is no longer defensible. Only the 'transcendental freedom' of the cosmological argument can be reckoned as among the open possibilities." p. 518. 16

84

Zum Weltbild

der Physik,

6th ed. (Stuttgart, 1954), pp. 1 1 6 — 1 1 7 .

Kant answered his empiricist critics by showing that a priori knowledge is the presupposition of empirical knowledge, but he did not show concretely how empirical knowledge is based upon a priori knowledge. At points he was satisfied with what Weizsäcker terms a psychological rather than a transcendental deduction of a priori knowledge. Two such examples are Kant's argument for the a priori nature of space, and his demonstration of the synthetic nature of the sum 7 + 5 = 12. Weizsäckers criticism at this point is not to be taken to mean that the empiricist as over against the Kantian position is being adopted, but that the a priori concepts at which Kant arrived stand in need of further analysis, particularly in view of the absolute claims he made for them. The concept of the apriori for Kant included analytic judgments, the forms of perception, the categories of the understanding, and several other synthetic judgments, such as the axioms of arithmetic and Euclidean geometry. With respect to physics, whereas Kant began by considering certain principles, such as the preservation of matter, inertia, the equality of action and reaction, and gravitation as a priori, at length, as is apparent in the Opus Posthumum, he came to consider practically all the principles of classical physics as a priori. Furthermore, Kant tended to make absolute claims for this a priori knowledge. Weizsäcker points out that discoveries in the field of quantum mechanics have necessitated revision of Kant's doctrine of the apriori. It has been found necessary to use both the wave and the particle theories to account for the phenomena of quantum mechanics, with the consequence that it is impossible to objectify these phenomena in terms of the space-time known by classical physics. Furthermore, since it is theoretically impossible to have complete knowledge of 16

17

16

" M a n kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein Raum sei, ob man sich gleich ganz wohl denken kann, dass keine Gegenstände darin angetroffen werden." Kr. d. r. V., B 38. " . . . und ich mag meinen Begriff von einer solchen möglichen Summe noch so lange zergliedern, so werde ich doch darin die Zwölf nicht antreffen." Kr. d. r. V . , B 15. Zum Weltbild der Physik, pp. 108—109. 17

Ibid., p. 1 0 1 . "Eine Erkenntnis a priori sollte nach Kant nicht nur V o r aussetzung, sondern auch Bestandteil jeder möglichen, auf ihr Objekt bezüglichen Wissenschaft sein." p. 107.

85

both a wave and a particle at once, causal predictions can only be made with probability. At the same time, it does not follow that classical physics as such has been abandoned, for it is on the presupposition that the principles of classical physics apply to all phenomena in so far as they can be observed that these conclusions have been reached. The important principle to be noted here is that it is possible with one set of presuppositions to discover phenomena which must be understood in terms of a new set of presuppositions. Weizsäcker suggests that a new understanding of the apriori is called for. Rather than possessing logical necessity, he suggests that it should be viewed as possessing factual necessity. Furthermore, it must be seen that that which in one context is empirical can in another relationship become a priori. Thus classical mechanics, which as such is neither purely empirical or a priori, becomes as a whole the a priori presupposition for electrodynamics, and these together, in turn, as classical physics, are the apriori of quantum mechanics. But then it also is the case that that which is known a posteriori makes possible an understanding of that which was previously presupposed a priori. Weizsäcker also calls attention to another limitation of Kant's understanding of the problem of knowledge, namely his neglect of the factor of experiment. An experiment involves not only thought and perception, but also human activity, which introduces the factor of the will. This factor becomes particularly decisive in quantum mechanics where a decision must be made as to which of the two ls

19

20

18

" S o ensteht eine nichtklassische Physik der Atome, welche den apriorischen

Charakter der klassischen Physik gleichwohl nicht leugnet, sondern voraussetzt."

Ibid., p. io6. 19

"Die Mechanik ist das methodische Apriori der Elektrodynamik, und die

ganze klassische Physik

dasjenige der Quantentheorie.

Inhaltlich hingegen ist

das Verhältnis umgekehrt. Die Quantentheorie ist eine fundamentalere Naturerkenntnis als die klassische Physik und erklärt z. B. selbst erst die Möglichkeit der Existenz fester Körper, die doch in der klassischen Physik notwendig sind, um überhaupt die elementaren räumlichen Massbestimmungen zu realisieren. In diesem spezifischen Sinn erklärt also die Erkenntnis a posteriori nachträglich erst, was in der Erkenntnis a priori schon vorausgesetzt war. Es ist ein Fehler vieler erkenntnistheoretischer Ansätze, diesen fruchtbaren Zirkel aller Erkenntnis nicht beachtet zu haben." Ibid., p. i n . 20

S6

Ibid., p. 170.

possible types of phenomena, waves or particles, is to be observed. To underscore this importance of the human factor, Weizsäcker suggests an understanding of the apriori in terms of what he calls "stages of meditation" whereby historically and systematically one stage becomes the presupposition and the prerequisite for the attaining to a subsequent stage. In this sense, that which is given in experience depends not only upon such a priori categories of the understanding as Kant defined, but upon all the previous experience of the individual in question, and not least the discipline to which the individual has been willing to submit himself. The generality of the principle Weizsäcker is proposing at this point is indicated by the fact that he is willing even to apply it to interpersonal relations. Our particular concern in this discussion has been to discover what further analysis of the principle of causality might reveal. We have found that its a priori nature in different contexts can best be understood in terms of "stages of meditation," by which different areas of experience may be related to each other. This basic differentiation, in terms of which the principle of causality must be understood, appears not only when classical physics and quantum mechanics are compared with one another. Interesting differentiation 21

22

23

21

"Dass die zur Hervorbringung einer bestimmten Erscheinung notwendigen

experimentellen

Hilfsmittel das Auftreten gewisser anderer Erscheinungen

un-

möglich machen, fehlt nun aber das Analogon in der Lehre Kants. Das hängt eben

damit

zusammen,

dass Kant

die Rolle

des Willens

empirischen Welt nicht genug berücksichtigt." Ibid., 22

beim

Aufbau

der

pp. 1 0 5 — 1 0 6 .

"Alle höhere Erkenntnis aber kann nicht ohne eine bewusste Einstellung des

Willens auf den Erkenntnisvorgang gewonnen werden, und es gibt Erkenntnisse, die nur auf dem im strengen Sinn meditativen Wege zugänglich sind."

Ibid.,

p. 1 1 4 . See p. i n f f . 23

" I m unmittelbaren persönlichen Kontakt sind mir viele von den Seelen-

regungen meiner Mitmenschen gegeben; durch eine veränderte Einstellung aber, z. B. durch Misstrauen, können sie mir verlorengehen. Die Bedeutung der Einstellung des 'Glaubens* für das Bewusstscin beruht nicht darauf, dass der Glaube Unbewiesenes für wahr hält, sondern darauf, dass er durch das Wegräumen des im Zweifel liegenden 'Misstrauens* die Voraussetzung

dafür schafft, dass uns

gewisse nicht leicht zugängliche Sachverhalte 'gegeben werden' können. In diesem Sinne kann man nun auch sagen: Die Meditation verändert das Bewusstsein so, dass ihm etwas gegeben wird, das ihm vorher nicht gegeben werden

konnte."

Ibid., pp. 1 1 4 — 1 1 5 .

87

is to be found even within the realm of classical physics, as Weizsäcker^ discussion of the path chosen by a light ray when passing through different media indicates. Fermat's principle, that light always chooses the path by which it can reach its goal in the shortest possible time has led to some quite surprising observations. While through space light travels fastest in a straight line, this is not the case when light must pass through different types of media, such as water, which alter its velocity. It has, however, been possible to explain the angle of refraction, which occurs as light passes through such media which impede its velocity, by the hypothesis that light moves a longer distance through the air in order to move the shortest possible distance through the medium in which its velocity is somewhat decreased, so that it can thus reach its goal in the shortest possible time. But this would seem to indicate that the behavior of light cannot be explained mechanistically, for a light ray appears to be determined not solely by an efficient cause lying behind it, but also by the goal toward which it is directed. At the same time it is possible to retain a strictly deterministic interpretation of the behavior of the light ray's motion, for on the basis of the variational principle, by means of differential equations, the goal a light ray will reach when directed in a certain course can be calculated at any point along the path the ray takes. Weizsäcker suggests that such phenomena might be understood in terms of a new formulation of the causal principle, whereby efficient cause and final cause are united in a higher principle having some relationship with Aristotle's causa formalist Does this analysis of causality suggest any implications which might be drawn with respect to the problem with which we began, namely, the presupposition of the category of causality in the natural sciences, in its relation to the validity of the forms of necessity to be found 24

25

24

Ibid., p. 162.

25

"...

vor allem bleibt der finale Vorgriff auf die Zukunft erhalten; der

Lichtweg bleibt durch seinen Endpunkt bestimmt." Ibid., p. 164. 26

"Gerade

die mathematische Formulierung

der Naturgesetze hat die grob

mechanische Tendenz der neuzeitlichen Physik, die Ableitung aller Dinge aus 'Druck und Stoss', schliesslich überwunden." Ibid.,

p. 167. "Die mathematische

Form, in der T a t eine Art einer causa formalis, bleibt in der Physik als letzter fassbarer Gehalt unserer alten Kausalbegriffe übrig." p. 168.

88

in the historical sciences? There would seem to be a number of conclusions which could be drawn. The first is that the concept of causality, which it may be helpful to presuppose in order to develop a theory of mechanics, need not be absolutized so that all phenomena are interpreted in terms of it. Rather the category of causality seems capable of progressively greater generalization, retaining in some sense the characteristic of necessary connection, but ultimately being determined by the form of necessary connection found in the phenomena under investigation. Thus the form of a light ray calls for a different application of the causal principle than does the form of a falling stone. But what is the form of a causal situation in which the human factor has entered? Here a second conclusion presents itself. The human subject must also be considered as a causal factor. Here, while we may use all of our theoretical knowledge as an a priori "stage of meditation" toward the understanding of the human subject as a causal factor, there seems to be no reason why the causal patterns which exist in the natural order need to be imposed upon the realm of interpersonal relationships, although these causal patterns of the natural order may also be presupposed in various ways in the interpersonal order. Just as a light ray may well be observed by experimental devices based on the presupposition of mechanistic causality, but appears to be found in some degree free from complete determination a tergo, so also, it may be possible that the human subject, while observed in the context of the determined natural order, may be observed as in some respects free from determination as such. What is needed, therefore, is a theory of causal relations, in so far as the human subject enters into them, whereby the objectivity of the particular kind of necessity which exists in this domain can be recognized. As has been noted above, the approach that Kant makes to this problem is to understand freedom in terms of the absence of causal 27

28

27 "Die heutige Physik zwingt den Physiker zur Besinnung auf sich selbst als Subjekt." Ibid., p. 174. 28

"Solange dem Forscher die Aufmerksamkeit auf das Menschliche bei jedem seiner Experimente nicht ebenso selbstverständlich geworden ist wie die Sauberkeit in der technischen Durchführung, kann von der Wissenschaft kein Heil kommen." Ibid., pp. 1 8 2 — 1 8 3 .

89

determination, so that freedom means absolute spontaneity. Such spontaneity is, of course, difficult to conceive in terms of our experience. Thus it seems almost necessary to postulate something comparable to a noumenal order if one is to maintain the reality of freedom so conceived. Another possibility, however, is to see the phenomenon of freedom as being related not to the absence of causes, but to the presence of several possible causes. The free man is the man who can be determined in more than one way. How then is the decision between these possibilities to be made? This need not present a problem in the natural sciences, for several causes may either combine to form one effect, or else the laws by which they exclude one another can be determined. In mechanics the parallelogram law of vector analysis is such that if we assume the coincidence of forces at a given point, they combine to form a vector of forces, which determines the resultant effect. But let us suppose a situation in which these forces coincide, but are incommensurable so that they cannot combine to form a vector. Let us further suppose that there is no law by which it can be determined which will gain the precedence. One or another of them must itself determine the situation. Yet it is impossible to predict which it will be. It is in the moment of decision that this determination occurs. Once the decision is made it will be assumed that the cause which determined the situation was the "stronger," but this will be a de facto judgment. At the same time the formal requirements of the category of causality have been met. Every event is found to have some cause in what immediately precedes it. It is in some such terms that we shall seek to interpret the phenomenon of human decision and the significance of the human causal factor. At this point there is an explanation which must be made lest the argument lead to misunderstanding. The foregoing reference to the human subject as a causal agent does not follow from an argument that the subject exists in contrast to objects, and therefore it is in order to inquire as to the nature of its causal relationships. Instead a particular causal relationship has been discovered in experience, which does not seem to be accounted for in terms of the explanations which may be used to account for other causal relationships which we experience. If there is always a choice which determines the nature of an experiment, the question may be asked whether the 9°

way in which these choices occur can be made intelligible. Here that theory which could give the most illuminating explanation of these phenomena would seem to be the most helpful. To provide such a theory is the task of ethics, as we understand it. A theory of the human subject as such would no doubt play a role in such an ethical theory, though the subject as such would be an abstraction from the totality of experience, and would be known primarily through its acts, just as the theoretical object is known through its causal relationships, and in abstraction from them does not exist. That further analysis of our experience might lead to the recognition of other dimensions of causal relationships, requiring an interpretation religious in nature, is an aspect of the argument which need not be anticipated at this point. It need, furthermore, hardly be added that the foregoing discussion has not intended to present an exhaustive presentation of the problem of causality in the natural sciences, nor will the argument which follows presuppose the validity of the conclusions which Weizsäcker has drawn with respect to modern research in the field of quantum mechanics. The discussion has been presented, however, because recent findings in the field of quantum mechanics have made possible new approaches to the problem of causality in the natural sciences. The principle of causality, conceived in the terms of classical physics, need no longer determine the interpretation of all the events of the phenomenal order, as Kant conceived it must, so that all ethical and religious interpretation must somehow adjust themselves to such an interpretation. In this connection Weizsäcker is of interest, for he has sought to make the revisions in the Kantian concept of the apriori which seem necessary, and at the same time he has raised the moral questions which have become so urgent in connection with modern scientific research.

91

Chapter III

THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES—ETHICS The historical sciences as here defined, in cpntrast to the natural sciences, deal with human behavior, and more particularly the factor of decision which this behavior involves. Decision takes place at two levels. There is the level of moral decision, which it is the task of ethics to examine. There is the level of decision represented by religious faith, which the science of religion examines. In the analysis that follows, we shall first examine the former of these areas of decision. A significant part of this analysis has already been accomplished. We have already shown that the question, What should I do? is an inescapable question if the validity of knowledge within the natural sciences is acknowledged. Human decision is inescapable in the choices which must be made in the process of research, as well as in the use that is made of the knowledge which is attained. We must now inquire as to what the possible distinctions are which these choices may reveal. The first question confronting us is whether such an examination can be scientific. Can there be a science of human behavior at this level? This is the problem with which Nygren has been chiefly concerned in his analysis of ethical experience. However, although he has written two books in the field of ethics, Filosofisk och kristen etik and Etiska grundfrågor, he has not fully carried out the transcendental deduction of the ethical category, which at one point in his writings he promises to do. At the same time he has carried out this deduction in part. It is in order to determine, therefore, what has been done and what remains to be done in order that the critical analysis of the ethical category may be completed. 1

1

92

FKE, p. 151.

As has been indicated above, the critical analysis of experience may be carried out in two ways. In Nygren's discussion with Tegen these two ways were characterized as the "narrow" and the "broad" way respectively. The "narrow" way refers to an analysis of the necessity to be found in a particular domain of experience, in which there is an effort to determine the nature of the necessity which characterizes this domain and to demonstrate that without the presupposition of this necessity, the experience to be found in this domain would be impossible. The "broad" way refers to an analysis whereby an effort is made to show that the various domains of experience are related to each other in such a way that, while retaining their unique forms of validity, they mutually imply one another, so that the validity of one form of experience requires presuppositions establishing the validity of other forms of experience. It should be noted, in so far as this method is related to Kant, that Kant himself did not develop deductions of the "broad" type. The deduction of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft is not extended so as to reveal ethical categories as the necessary presuppositions of theoretical knowledge, nor does Kant present a transcendental deduction of the practical reason which is analogous to the deduction of the theoretical reason. Nygren explains that the reason that Kant does not carry out a transcendental deduction of the ethical category is that the categorical imperative, as Kant develops it, becomes a source of normative content and is thus no longer a formal category, which such a deduction would require. Kant has not recognized the need for a distinction between the critical task of examining the validity of ethical experience and the descriptive task of subsequently describing 2

2

" M i t der Deduktion, d. i. der Rechtfertigung seiner (der oberste Grundsatz

der praktischen Vernunft) objektiven und allgemeinen Gültigkeit und der Einsicht der Möglichkeit eines solches synthetischen Satzes a priori, darf man nicht so gut fortzukommen hoffen, als es mit den Grundsätzen des reinen theoretischen Verstandes anging. . . . Also kann die objektive Realität des moralischen Gesetzes durch keine Deduktion, durch keine Anstrengung der theoretischen, spekulativen oder empirisch unterstützten Vernunft bewiesen und also, wenn man auch auf die apodiktische Gewissheit Verzicht tun wollte, durch keine Erfahrung bestätigt und so a posteriori bewiesen werden, und steht dennoch für sich selbst fest." Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen

Vernunft,

ed. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg,

1952), pp. 80—82. (Pagination from the original 1787 edition.)

93

a particular ethical ideal. But, one may ask, if Kant had recognized the need for this distinction in the ethical domain, would he have developed a deduction of the "broad" type for the practical reason? It is true that he does state that the critique of the practical reason must ultimately set forth the unity of the practical and the speculative reason. However, the implication is that such an extension of the critique has to do with its "Vollendung," which, while desirable, might not be as important for an understanding of ethical experience as the preliminary investigation of the nature of ethical validity. Thus it would seem that in any case a deduction of the "narrow" type would precede a deduction of the "broad" type, so that these two types would complement rather than exclude one another. Whatever our conclusion at this point, we may characterize Nygren's analysis of the validity of ethical experience as a deduction of the "narrow" type. There has been no demonstration of a relation of necessity existing between ethical experience and other forms of experience. It has not been shown that ethical validity must be presupposed if there is to be valid experience of any kind, theoretic, religious, as well as ethical. In this sense the transcendental deduction of the ethical category has not been completed. On the other hand, in so far as the validity of ethical experience can be presupposed 3

4

5

3

E G , pp. 1 2 3 — 1 2 4 .

4

"Teils erfordere ich zur Kritik einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, dass, wenn

sie vollended sein soll, ihre Einheit mit der spekulativen in einem gemeinschaftlichen Prinzip zugleich müsse dargestellt werden können, weil es doch am Ende nur eine und dieselbe Vernunft sein kann, die bloss in der Anwendung unterschieden sein muss." Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung

zur Metaphysik

der

Sitten,

3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1955), p. 27. 5

F K E , p. 148. John Cullberg has sought to make such a deduction in Religion

och vetenskap

(Stockholm, 1930) and Das Du und die Wirklichkeit.

logischen Hintergrund

der Gemeinschaftskategorie

Zum

onto-

(Uppsala, 1933). A more recent

summary of his position is to be found in Tro och verklighet

(Stockholm, 1955).

His argument in brief is as follows: In the final analysis our knowledge of reality is based upon our recognition of the existence of other selves with whom we are able to compare our experience. Indeed our knowledge of our own selves is thus dependent, for there is no I without a thou. But there is no thou without fellowship, and no fellowship without a will to serve. Thus a moral argument is introduced for a divine Thou, for only if such a Thou is recognized can I actually treat my fellow men as thous.

94

apart from such a demonstration, a rather extensive analysis of the nature of ethical validity is to be found in Nygren's writings. Nygren's analysis of ethical experience consists of an effort to define the discipline of ethics as critical and descriptive in nature, a distinction between various levels of validity with respect to ethical experience, an attempt to distinguish the specific nature of ethical valuation, and a suggestion as to the nature of the ethical category, together with the several ideals in which it may find its realization. These four stages of the analysis shall now be considered in turn.

i. The Concept of Critical Ethics

The distinction which Nygren makes between the critical and the descriptive aspects of the discipline of ethics appears at the outset to correspond to the distinction which he generally makes in his discussion of the sciences. The physicist, on the one hand, describes certain causal relationships which he finds in the natural order. On the other hand, the critical philosopher examines more exactly the factor of causality which the physicist presupposes in his description. However, when Nygren suggests that the critical analysis with respect to ethics has as one of its tasks to determine whether ethical experience is illusory or not, it would seem that the relation between the descriptive and the critical is not the same here as in the physical sciences. It does not seem that the physicist must wait to have the critical philosopher tell him whether his experience is illusory or not, while this apparently is the case in the realm of ethics. Of course, it might be answered that the difference here is due to the differing levels of development upon which the physical and the ethical sciences stand. There conceivably was a time when there was a primitive physics about which it was impossible to say whether it was a description of an illusion or not. Yet, with respect to such a primitive physics, we would probably not say it was uncertain as to whether the subject matter of physics was illusory. Rather we would say there was uncertainty as to the validity of the principle of description which had been used, e.g., an animistic explanation 6

6

F K E , p. 1 1 3 .

95

of causal relations. It should be noted, parenthetically, that the uncertainty could be related to the validity of a mechanistic principle of interpretation, where the physics in question would not be primitive at all! The question now arises as to whether it is possible to abstract the principle of description and its validity or invalidity from the description itself. Nygren is of the opinion that descriptive ethics can abstract from the question of validity or invalidity. It need not determine how high its subject matter stands on the scale of validity. Nygren is of the opinion that a descriptive ethics would be possible even if the subject matter of ethics were illusory. Ethical facts, psychological, sociological, and historical in nature, would in any case have to be described. When this description had taken place, it would then be in order to examine that which had been described in order to determine whether or not it could claim validity. But is it true that ethical facts can be described in the same way by two scientists, one who considers these facts universally valid experience, and the other who considers them as illusory? The contrast between Kant and Hume with respect to our experience of causal relations is perhaps what Nygren has in mind. Here it seems that both Kant and Hume would be agreed as to the facts to be described. Then the critical philosophy would show that the validity of the principle of causality was necessarily presupposed in such description, not only in Kant's description, but in Hume's as well. It would be the fact that causality could be shown to be a necessary presupposition of such description which would overcome the sceptical theory of illusion with respect to this experience. But can we assume that there would be similar agreement about 7

8

9

7

See Sigmund Mowinckel's discussion of what he calls "the magical world-

view." Religion 8

o g kultus (Oslo, 1950), pp. 1 9 — 2 3 .

The reference to a scale of validity is related to the distinction

Nygren

makes between primary, secondary, as well as tertiary validity. For a discussion of this distinction, see infra, p. 104 f f . Such gradation, however, has nothing to do with illusion, so that one approaches illusion as one goes down the scale. Illusion would enter only if one mistook one level of validity for another. 9

" I n the final analysis it is even a matter of indifference whether the ethical

as such is to be considered universally valid experience or as illusion. Facts remain, however they are interpreted, and only with these facts is descriptive ethics concerned." F K E , p. 1 1 3 .

96

ethical facts, so that the descriptions in question would be identical, the only problem remaining being that of examining the presuppositions involved in these descriptions? Here it would seem that the presuppositions would tend to determine the nature of the description, and that they could well be quite different in nature. While our experience in the natural order appears to be such that we find it relatively easy to come to agreement as to the nature of the facts in question, and this agreement is found, furthermore, to reveal a similar agreement, in the final analysis, with respect to presuppositions, this does not seem to be the case with respect to ethical experience. Here it is not at all certain as to what are to be accounted ethical facts, either psychologically, sociologically, or historically, nor is there found to be one ethical presupposition to be compared with the principle of causality, upon which all interpreters are actually in agreement, whether this agreement is consciously expressed or not. This does not mean that ethical agreement is impossible to achieve, but it does mean that the path to such agreement is not found by sharply abstracting the descriptive and the critical approaches to ethics. That such abstraction may be impossible in the realm of ethical experience becomes more apparent when we consider Nygren's discussion of metaphysical and critical ethics. The contrast between ethical experience and our experience of the natural order is at once apparent, for while the term metaphysics suggests that which is "beyond" physics, ethics and metaphysics do not seem mutually to exclude one another in the same sense. Metaphysical ethics, whatever its validity, is at least an intelligible concept. Nygren describes metaphysics as a subjective attempt to arrive at a world view. In order to be coherent, it takes a particular starting point and becomes one-sided. That which doesn't fit is either neglected or reinterpreted. The data is treated like an artist treats a landscape. Thus metaphysics is more an aesthetic than a scientific enterprise. The difficulty, therefore, with metaphysical ethics is that it is determined by the metaphysical system, often being worked into the system only with the greatest difficulty. Critical ethics, on the other hand, 10

11

10 11

FKE, pp. 115—123. FKE, pp. 116—118.

7 — Erling

97

works with the ethical data just as it is, not forcing it to comply with any alien criteria. Metaphysical ethics breaks down on two counts. It cannot be considered scientific because it is not objective and universally valid. On the other hand, metaphysical ethics does not do justice to the uniqueness of the ethical phenomena. Finally, however, Nygren adds that metaphysical ethics does have the value of furnishing types for scientific study, which are helpful precisely because of their one-sidedness. This latter suggestion indicates that metaphysics may have a relation to ethics which should be given further examination. One of Nygren's objections to metaphysical ethics is that here ethics becomes determined by the system. But the question may be raised, What is it that determines the system? If metaphysics is an attempt to arrive at a world view, what is it that determines this attempt? Suppose it were a religious and an ethical ideal. In such a case one could not object that the ethical data were being forced to comply with an alien system, except in so far as an attempt were made to account for one ethical ideal in terms of another. But this would be a serious objection only if it were held that only one ethical ideal was ultimately valid, which position Nygren does not hold. Nor would the connection with a religious ideal, which such a metaphysics would involve, need mean that the ethical was being forced into an alien system, for Nygren himself recognizes the close relation between the religious and the ethical in the case of Christianity, where the agape motif serves as both the religious and the ethical motif. The objection that no metaphysical system is scientifically objective and universally valid could be countered with the reply that neither is any ethical ideal as such objective and universally valid. But at the same time ethical ideals and metaphysical world views might be found to have the kind of objectivity which Nygren describes in "Om teologiens objektivitet." The error of metaphysics would then be its claim to rational necessity and universality in so far as it was believed that only one metaphysical system was in the 12

13

14

12 13 14

98

FKE, pp. 119—122. FKE, p. 123. FM, pp. 181—182.

final analysis rationally defensible. When, however, metaphysics was seen instead as one of the possible types of ethical description, it would seem that a wholly harmonious relationship could exist between metaphysical and critical ethics. Indeed it might even be said that only when the description of the ethical data had proceeded to the point that several metaphysical types had been recognized, could the critical analysis of the presuppositions involved in these several types be profitably carried out. After discussing critical and descriptive ethics and critical and metaphysical ethics, Nygren goes on to distinguish between critical and normative ethics. Here Nygren utilizes a distinction made by Axel Hägerström to the effect that moral science cannot be a teaching in morality, but can be only a teaching about morality. The objections to a normative ethics are made primarily on scientific and ethical grounds. The scientific objection to the normative role of scientific ethics is that the decision between two ethical ideals cannot be made on the basis of a scientific judgment. Rather such a decision must be made on the basis of the relative power of the ideals themselves. Ideals come into being through valuing, but this science cannot do. Science can deal with what is true, it cannot establish what is valuable. It is, of course, true that the ethical ideal does carry the note of obligation with it. If it did not it would not be ethical. But it is not possible to draw the conclusion that therefore scientific ethics, working with such an ideal, should establish obligations and duties, for then one is confusing the science with its subject matter. The relation of science to ethics has only the purpose of understanding that which spontaneously grows out of the ethical "root." When I ask, Is this good? Is this ethically justified?, I am not appealing to a scientific judgment, but to a judgment of the ethical consciousness. The ethical judgment is primary. Without it science would have no 15

16

17

15 Axel Hägerström, »Om moraliska föreställningars sanning," uppsatser, ed. Martin Fries (Stockholm, 1939), pp. 63—65.

Socialfilosofiska

16 " T h e only relation which science can have to subjective valuation is to determine what is factually valued and through objective comparison between different value relationships seek to determine that which is characteristic for each." F K E , p. 126. 17

F K E , p. 127.

99

subject matter. The thought that the role of ethics is to help us clear up situations where the ethical judgment leaves us in doubt is based on a misunderstanding of the fact that science is not at this point creative, and involves a confusion of the ethical judgment as such with the scientific judgment concerning the ethical. Nygren insists that normative science is a contradiction in terms. Grammar does not prescribe rules for language, but finds rules there. Logic as methodology does not prescribe rules for the various sciences, but finds its rules in these sciences and using this empirical material it develops what is the contemporary scientific methodology. This methodology, however, can claim to be nothing more than conscious reflection upon the methods which are actually in use, though perhaps in an unreflective way. Aesthetics does not establish aesthetic ideals, nor does philosophy of religion establish norms for religion, but rather investigates religion as a given datum. When ethics in order to be scientific tries to get away from the position of being normative and law-establishing, this is not an isolated effort on the part of ethics, but an aspect of a general development. Since the issue here is fundamental, not only for Nygren's understanding of ethics, but also for his understanding of religion, it is in order to examine the argument here closely. It seems that there are two different problems involved in the foregoing discussion. The one has to do with the choice of an ethical ideal, the other with the choice of a particular act in accordance with this ideal. When it is said that science can deal with what is true, but cannot determine what is valuable, what may be meant is that a choice of one of the metaphysical value types cannot be made on scientific grounds. Here it is the relative power of these ideals themselves that is determinative. It may be found that these ideals are relatively limited in number, that they involve interior coherence and consistency, and mutually exclude one another, so that a synthesis of two or more of them is impossible, in so far as the nature of these ideals is clearly understood, and that every individual is necessarily committed to one or another of these ideals, whether he is conscious of the nature of his commitment or not. If normative ethics should mean the 18

18

100

FKE, pp. 128—129.

attempt to show that only one of these ideals is rationally valid, this would obviously be metaphysics of the old inacceptable type. At this level, where the description of one's own and other possible ideals is involved, there can only be teaching about morality. There is, however, another problem to be faced, and that is the problem of acting in accord with the ideal which one has chosen. Here Nygren states that scientific ethics can be of no assistance, though it may describe the ethical judgments which spontaneously grow out of the ethical root. The question, however, is how particular ethical judgments are related to the ethical ideal. Are they purely spontaneous, or is there a necessity by which they are related to the ideal? If there is a necessity to be found, it would seem that it could not only be described, but that it could also be logically developed. Thus the rules of grammar and logic are not simply positivistically given, but they are found to contain an interior coherence, which may be examined and developed. Similarly the role of mathematics in relation to modern physics is not simply a matter of describing a coherence to be found in the natural order, but rather it has been found possible to develop highly complex mathematical hypotheses which later have been verified experimentally. Here science has not been limited to description, nor has it proved necessary to distinguish as sharply between science and its subject matter as Nygren seeks to do. Why such operation with the possibilities suggested by mathematical forms can be scientific, while the attempt to develop the possibilities suggested by an ethical ideal cannot be scientific, is not at all clear. It seems that here Hägerström's ethical subjectivism, which does not recognize the possibility of any necessity whatsoever in the ethical domain, is proving all too determinative. Hägerström finds necessity only where one is able to abstract from the subject, considering only a world of objects and their interrelations. Since such abstraction is impossible in the case of valuation, no necessity at this point can be found, and there can consequently only be description of valuations, where these are viewed as objects and thus have a place in the world of objects which science describes. If, how19

20

19

F K E , p. 127. Axel Hägerström, "Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien," Festskrift E. O. Burman (Uppsala, 1910), pp. 61—62, 68, 74. 20

tillägnad

IOI

ever, one can speak of science wherever necessity of some kind is to be found, it does not seem that science need be limited to a purely descriptive task. Otherwise it would seem, to use Hans Vaihingens terminology, that science could only describe fictions, it could not use them, as it can its hypotheses. But in actual fact, such a limitation of science is based upon a negative metaphysic and is in no sense required by the nature of science itself. The ethical objections to a scientific normative ethics are three in number: a scientific normative ethics leads to casuistry, takes away the autonomy of the ethical, and strives with the uniqueness of ethical obligation. The criticism of casuistry is that thereby the responsibility of the individual is taken away. It should be noted, however, that the kind of normative ethics which is here being proposed is a discipline by which the individual can be taught how to exercise individual responsibility. If no pattern of necessity can be found from which implications can be drawn, the individual must either act out of sheer inspiration or imitate actions which he has been told are in accordance with the ideal to which he is committed. In neither case would it seem that individual responsibility would be safeguarded. It should not be assumed that the awareness of a pattern of necessity from which implications relating to moral acts could be drawn would lead to a prescription of particular duties in particular situations. On the one hand, the uniqueness of every particular situation would have to be realized. On the other hand, it might well be that in many situations several acts would be alternately possible, nor would there be any purpose in seeking to give an exhaustive list of the possibilities, nor to try to arrange them according to their relative degrees of value. There would seem to be value, however, in being able to trace the necessary connection between every acceptable act and the ethical ideal with which it claimed relation, as well as to be able to state when and the manner in which acts were in contradiction with their respective ethical ideals. Nygren argues that scientific normative ethics takes away the autonomy of the ethical, for it introduces other considerations in 21

22

21

For Vaihingens distinction between fictions and hypotheses, see Die

sophie des Als Ob (Berlin, 1 9 1 1 ) , pp. 1 4 4 — 1 5 0 . 22

102

F K E , pp. 1 2 9 — 1 3 3 .

Philo-

addition to the ethical judgment which become determinative in the moral situation, such as the scientific judgment which thus becomes raised above the ethical judgment. We have argued, however, that it is possible for the ethical judgment itself to be scientific, in so far as it examines the necessity to be found within a particular ethical ideal. Nygren's third argument in this connection is that a normative scientific ethics endangers the uniqueness of the ethical obligation, which directs itself to the will, whereas scientific propositions direct themselves to the intellect. It would seem that the goodness of the ethical act could be presented to the intellect, whereupon it would be up to the person to decide whether or not to will this act. But the decision as to the goodness of the act is itself an ethical judgment. If this were not the case, a group of people on the same intellectual plane, but who stood on different levels of ethical development, could all be made to see the goodness of a certain act. The difference between them would only be the relative warmth or coldness with which they responded to it. Or it would mean that the person who is ethically abnormal, if he had sufficient intellectual insight, would be able to understand his duties, the only difficulty being that he would not do them. But the situation is just the opposite. For the ethically abnormal, the concept of duty is but an empty word. Thus ethical experience is never correctly understood when it is narrowed to mean only the ethical act, which is thought to be preceded by a purely theoretical deliberation, called the ethical judgment. The ethical judgment itself is an ethical decision. Thus there can be no scientific ethics that is normative. Here we shall not consider such problematical concepts as "different levels of ethical development" or "ethical abnormality," nor the tenability of distinguishing between the scientific and the ethical in terms of the psychological distinctions of thought and will. In insisting that the ethical judgment is itself an ethical decision, Nygren himself seems to reject the validity of such a distinction. The question, rather, is whether this ethical decision can involve a scientific element, in that it is related to reasoning in terms of a pattern of necessity. We have argued that this can be the case, nor 23

23

C f . F K E , p.

161.

103

does it seem that thereby in any way the uniqueness of ethical obligation need be endangered. We conclude, therefore, from the above analysis of Nygren's discussion of critical, descriptive, metaphysical, and normative ethics, that the distinction between critical and descriptive ethics is helpful, but that these two disciplines must not be sharply abstracted from one another. Furthermore, while critical and metaphysical ethics must be distinguished from each other, they do not mutually exclude one another. Rather, when the nature of metaphysical ethics is properly understood, it is seen to be an advanced stage of descriptive ethics, by which alternately possible ethical ideals may be defined. Since these ideals contain internal necessity, it is possible to work out the implications of this necessity in relation to particular situations. Thus, while there can be no normative ethical ideal, there can be normative scientific ethics within each of the ideals, though it is also obvious that the nature of this normative scientific ethics will vary widely in accord with the particular nature of the ideal in question. 24

2. The Analysis of Ethical Validity

Thus far Nygren's attempt to distinguish critical ethics as a distinctive discipline, over against descriptive, metaphysical, and normative ethics, has been described. We must now consider what is meant by the "ethical validity" which critical ethics analyzes. Fundamental to an understanding of Nygren's analysis of ethical validity is an understanding of the distinction which he makes between "primary" and "secondary" validity. By validity Nygren means a "special dignity" which is ascribed to a judgment. But this dignity which valid judgments have can vary in such a way that 24

Axel Gyllenkrok defends the concept of a normative ethic in somewhat

similar terms, though he thinks in terms of only one ethical ideal, the basic principle of which is established by a moral intuition. Systematisk vetenskaplig

teologi

och

metod med särskild hänsyn till etiken, Uppsala universitets årsskrift

1959: 2, pp. 9 1 — 1 0 0 . If a normative ethic can be achieved in this way, it would be possible to suggest answers to contemporary problems, which Hillerdal argues is otherwise not possible in terms of a purely descriptive Christian ethics. logisk och filosofisk

104

etik, pp. 1 4 8 — 1 4 9 .

Teo-

it is possible to construct a scale of validity, upon which scale the lower judgments for their validity must presuppose the validity of the higher judgments. As an example Nygren suggests that the validity of the proposition, "The sun warms the stone," presupposes the validity of the causal law. Thus the causal law has primary validity, while the individual judgment, "The sun warms the stone," has a derived, secondary validity. This individual judgment becomes invalid the moment the causal law is found to be invalid. The causal law, in turn, cannot be derived from anything else, but is itself the basis for the validity of other judgments. A similar principle applies when the example is taken from the realm of ethical experience, with the difference that the scale of validity to be found here can be divided into three rather than two divisions. Whereas in the example drawn from the natural sciences we have the causal law on one level, and the individual causal judgments on another, here we find, as was indicated earlier, that the ethical question in its most abstract terms, What should I do? does not yet involve any distinction by which validity within ethical experience can be defined. In the case of the question, What can I know? the very concept of knowledge involves a theory of verification. The concept of doing, on the other hand, allows for alternately possible systems of ethical distinction. Thus while we can say that it is valid to ask the ethical question, What should I do? we have no understanding of the specific nature of ethical validity until the several systems of ethical evaluation are identified. When these are specified, there are finally the individual judgments, corresponding to the individual causal judgments in the theoretical domain. At this point it is important to note that Nygren regards the validity of the causal law as analogous not to the several systems of ethical evaluation, but to what he terms "the validity of the ethical as such," by which he apparently means simply the ethical question. 25

26

27

28

25

6.

F K E , p. 13 26 "Without this (the causal law) we would not be justified in affirming any necessary connection between the sun's rays and the raised temperature of the stone." Ibid. 27 28

See supra, p. 33. F K E , p. 1 3 7 .

105

He fails to recognize that the category of causality refers not only to the epistemological question, which in its most abstract terms is analogous to the question, What should I do? but also to the theory of verification by which truth and falsity are distinguished. It is because only one system of verification need be reckoned with that no distinction need be made between the question, What can I know? and the system of verification in terms of which knowledge is defined. In ethical experience there are, however, several alternatives and hence such a distinction must be made, with the result that the distinction between truth and falsity, implied by the category of causality, must be regarded as analogous to the several alternately possible patterns of distinction which the ethical motifs represent. In this connection we must examine Nygren's assertion that whereas there are several forms of secondary validity, there is only one type of primary validity to be considered, which is the same in all the domains of experience. Nygren calls this primary validity "presuppositional validity," for it points to the fact that if an individual judgment is valid, certain presuppositions must be valid. This formal relationship between the validity of a concrete judgment and the validity of its necessary presuppositions is the same in all the domains of experience. Whether the necessary presupposition is the principle of causality, or an ethical or religious principle, its relationship to the validity of the concrete individual judgment is the same. It is in this sense that one can speak of a common "primary validity." At the same time it must be remembered that the particular form of the necessary relationship between the individual judgments and their unifying principles varies with the different areas of experience. Furthermore this "primary validity" can be abstracted only fictionally in each instance from the particular concrete judgment. In 29

30

29

F K E , p. 139.

30

" T h a t primary validity in all domains has one and the same nature is

inextricably connected with the fact, that one must use the same method of legitimation for establishing this primary validity in the several domains. Everywhere one could express it with the same formula: That which has primary validity is valid because it is the presupposition for something else being valid. Primary validity can therefore even be termed presuppositional validity, a priori validity, or transcendental validity, and herewith also its characteristic nature is indicated." F K E , p. 148.

106

no case does it establish the validity of the individual judgments Rather we affirm the validity of an individual judgment, such as, "The sun warms the stone." We then ask what the necessary presuppositions are if such a valid judgment is to be possible, and find one of them to be the principle of causality. But this principle does not grant validity to the judgment itself. It is instead a clarified understanding of the nature of the validity of that judgment, suggesting the way in which that judgment may be related to other judgments, also descriptive of the causal interrelatedness of the natural order. It may well be that this relatedness is limited in its extension, so that if, in describing the incident recorded in Acts 7: 58, we were to say, "A man threw the stone, which had been warmed by the sun, at Stephen," we would be affirming two causal relationships, which on analysis might well be found to involve differing presuppositions. A study of the individual judgments themselves would be needed in order to reveal these varying types of presuppositions. The fact that the presuppositions in each case would have a common formal relationship to the validity of the particular individual judgment is undoubtedly true, but seems also somewhat trivial. Nygren's purpose in distinguishing between primary and secondary validity is related to his effort to establish the validity of ethical experience. He states that if ethical experience as such were shown to possess primary validity, it would be sufficient to show that something were ethical to show that it was also valid. At this point in the analysis all depends upon how the primary validity of the ethical is understood. We have distinguished thus far between 1) establishing the necessity of putting the questions which constitute the several areas of experience, 2) recognizing the distinctions involved in answers to these questions, by which validity within the several domains of experience is defined, and 3) defining the par31

31 "In that something has been shown to be ethical, nothing as yet follows with respect to its validity. On the other hand, if the ethical as such has primary validity, and is therefore to be considered as a transcendentally necessary form of experience, it then follows that the individual ethical judgments can only be legitimized ethically. T o demonstrate something as ethical and to demonstrate it as valid are no longer two different tasks. In that something is known to be ethical, it is also known to be unconditionally valid." F K E , p. 149.

107

ticular judgments which embody these distinctions. We have noted also that in the theoretical domain the question and the principle of distinction characterizing this domain, namely, the category of causality, are united with one another in a way not possible in the area of ethical experience. By reason of this unity of the theoretical question and the theoretical principle of verification, primary validity in the theoretical domain necessarily includes elements i) and 2). In the ethical domain these elements are not united in this way, however, and as we have discovered, Nygren identifies primary validity only with element 1), while both elements 2) and 3) are regarded as having secondary validity. Yet if by primary validity is to be meant the way in which the validity of experience within a given domain is defined, the principle or principles by which distinctions are made within that domain must also be recognized. Thus while the recognition of the necessity of asking the ethical question, What should I do? is itself important, it does not help us determine the validity of individual ethical judgments. If, for example, the question, What can I know? could be abstracted from any principle of verification which it might imply, it would not follow that all statements which were presented as answers to the question of knowledge would be valid simply because they were intended to answer this question. A proper relation to the principle of verification would also be required. In the ethical domain there is no one such principle, but what would be required here would be to show that the judgment in question was properly related to one of the alternately possible structures of ethical valuation. Primary validity may, however, according to Nygren, have another meaning which should be examined. The primary validity of ethical experience may mean that this form of experience as such is shown to be the presupposition of the validity of another area of experience. In such a case one would begin the analysis by examining one unmistakably ethical judgment, but the validity of this judgment would not have to be assumed. Rather one need only consider its claim to validity. The deduction would be of the "broad" type, which is the kind of deduction which Nygren in another connection 32

32

108

FKE, pp. 143—144.

states is preferable. One would ultimately seek to show that the validity of the ethical as such was presupposed in the validity of another domain of experience, e.g., the theoretical domain. It is conceivable that Nygren has such an analysis in mind when he emphasizes the neutral nature of primary validity. Since Nygren has not carried out the transcendental deduction in the ethical domain, we must be content with conjecture at this point, though an analogy drawn from Religiöst apriori could suggest some such type of deduction. Even if such a deduction were carried out, however, it would be necessary, as we have indicated, to distinguish between the ethical question and the alternately possible patterns of ethical distinction. That the ethical question in its most general form, What should I do? can be shown to be inescapable, it would appear has already been indicated. Possibly the validity of some forms of experience could even be shown to presuppose this question. But in any case, the validity of ethical judgments would not be properly understood until the various patterns of distinction, which possible answers to this question reveal, were recognized. The problem which recognition of these various patterns of ethical distinction poses is illustrated in Nygren's discussion of various positions which may be taken with respect to the problem of ethical validity. He contrasts ethical scepticism, ethical heteronomy, and ethical autonomy, pointing out that ethical scepticism is seldom genuine, for it usually simply means that the sceptic is casting doubt 33

34

35

36

33

See supra, p. 75 f f .

34

See supra, p. 106, note 30. " O f what kind this 'other' is, for the validity

of which that which has primary validity is the indispensable

presupposition,

has no effect at all upon the w a y in which the latter is valid. This 'other* can be knowledge, an ethical relationship, a religious experience, or anything else. One comes from it to that which has primary validity by one and the same w a y , namely

by demonstrating that the latter is the transcendental

presupposition

for the 'other,' and just this relationship is the only legitimation which can be given for that which has primary validity." F K E , p. 148. This neutral nature of primary validity may, however, simply mean that a common formal relationship between the basic presuppositions and the individual judgments depending on them is being pointed out, without the suggestion being implied that a deduction of the "broad" type is called for in the ethical domain. 35

F K E , pp. 147, 1 5 1 .

36

F K E , p. 140 f f .

109

upon a number of ethical alternatives, while at the same time he actually accepts another alternative, of which fact he may not be fully conscious. By ethical heteronomy Nygren means an attempt to establish ethical validity in a eudaemonistic way. He mentions also in passing the attempt to find an evolutionistic foundation for ethics, but his chief argument at this point concerns eudaemonistic ethics. In the discussion which follows, we shall attempt to show that eudaemonistic ethics actually represents an alternative ethical ideal, one of the ethical motifs. The fact that it is rejected as not being ethical at all by one of the other ethical motifs does not alter this fact. This means, however, that ethical experience's claim to validity becomes ambiguous, for this claim now apparently becomes a chorus of strident voices. Not only does ethical experience seek to assert its validity in relation to the validity of other forms of experience, but this domain of experience is found to reveal internal strife of such gravity that some ethical motifs will not even acknowledge the ethical nature of other ethical motifs. It is precisely for this reason that it seems necessary for the critical analysis to concentrate upon an examination of concrete ethical judgments, not just one indubitably ethical judgment, but as many alternate types as there seem to be. Were it possible to reduce ethical judgments to one type, then its claim to validity could be placed on record, and an attempt could be made by means of a transcendental deduction of the "broad" type, analyzing possibly the ultimate presuppositions of the judgments of the natural sciences, to show that this claim to validity was well founded. But if there are instead conflicting claims to validity, it is perhaps this relationship of conflict which needs analysis. If some way can be found to adjudicate these conflicting claims, it may be that many of the difficulties associated with the problem of ethical validity will have been solved. For it appears that it is precisely these conflicting claims which give rise to the theory of ethical scepticism. Thus analysis at this point may be the most effective way of overcoming this challenge to the validity of ethical judgments. 37

S7

"Thus one has many times in the history of ethics sought to establish the

validity of ethics by relating it closely, for example, to the quest for happiness." F K E , p. 1 4 1 .

no

3- The Nature of Ethical Valuation

Nygren's analysis of ethical experience leads him to define the ethical as such in terms of the absolutely good. Ethical value must be valued in and of itself without reference to other considerations. In this way ethical valuation is distinguished from utilitarian and hedonistic valuation. Utilitarian valuing involves a threefold act. First some good end is valued, then there is a theoretical judgment by which something else is seen to be a means to this good end, and finally this means is valued for this utilitarian reason. Without depreciating the importance of utilitarian valuation, Nygren insists that we mean something quite other than this when we say that something is ethically good. This does not mean that we may not judge an ethical act from a utilitarian viewpoint, according to its good or bad consequences, but thereby nothing is established with respect to the ethical nature of the act. These two kinds of valuation do not mutually exclude one another, but they are entirely independent of one another. In hedonistic value it seems that we come closer to ethical value, for here we do not look away from the present experience, rather we term it good, fixing upon the pleasure involved in it. However, Nygren points out that this is valuing in a limited sense. We value a particular relationship for the pleasure that is gotten from it. Nygren suggests that it is possible to go beyond this limited interest in a relationship and value it for itself, whether it leads to pleasure or pain, whether it involves good or bad consequences. Whereas both utilitarian and hedonistic valuing are relative, in that they involve a limited interest, the specifically ethical value is absolute, its object being valued in and for itself. 38

30

40

38

E G , p. 49 f f . One is reminded of Kant's introductory sentence in

legung zur Metaphysik

der Sitten:

Grund-

" E s ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja über-

haupt auch ausser derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille." p. 30. 39 40

EG, pp. 1 0 — i i . E G , pp. 50—53. It should be noted that the intrinsic values with which

an axiological ethic deals need not be hedonistic in nature. If one thinks of the Platonic ethic, for example, there are many values here which involve pain and quite generally such an ethic can counsel the rejection of pleasure, while at the

114

It would seem near at hand at this point simply to proclaim the ethical disposition as the only absolute good in contrast to instrumental and intrinsic values, but Nygren seeks to establish the primacy of dispositional ethics in a somewhat different way. He suggests that an analysis of an ethical situation indicates that a motive, an act, and an end are involved. The question, therefore is which of these three is meant when the ethical predicates of good or evil are used. If we suppose that the three factors of disposition, act, and end are involved in every ethical situation, being related to each either causally or teleologically, it might be argued that a combination of two of them determine the moral situation rather than one alone. Thus the moral situation could be such that attention must be given both to the moral disposition and to certain moral values which the moral disposition is obligated to advance. Nygren's argument at this point is that either these two aspects, from which a moral situation may be judged, will in every instance lead to the same results, in which case there is no need for using both standards, or else they may lead to contradictory moral judgments. But then they will also lead to unethical behavior, for in so far as they contradict each other, one or the other will define whatever is done as unethical. This cannot be accounted for by reference to the tension which must ever characterize the ethical life, for this tension, according to Nygren, is to be viewed as a psychological limitation, which it is the ethical judgment's task to overcome. This tension must not be made an essential and inescapable conflict, which would be the result if contrary ethical standards were introduced into the moral consciousness itself. Just as there must be one standard of truth if knowledge is to be possible, so there must be one ethical standard if ethical experience is to be possible. In this connection it may be asked whether analogies should be drawn from the theoretical domain with respect to this problem. It may well be that a tension which would be wholly inacceptable in the realm of theoretical knowledge is utterly inescapable in the realm of moral experience. Yet even the realm of knowledge has 41

same time it is true that the values which it does advance may none of them in themselves be absolute. 41

112

F K E , pp. 1 6 9 — 1 7 1 .

its tensions. Strictly speaking there is no one standard of truth, but rather rational and empirical factors, which in some instances remain stubbornly in contradiction with each other. While such tensions need not be accepted as ultimate, we are unable to resolve them by using but one standard for truth. Actually the problem of moral tensions will be found to vary with the moral ideal. Both axiological and deontological ethics avoid moral tension for the most part by having but one standard for judging a moral situation. What tension there is arises in the effort to apply the standard, in determining the highest good, or the primary duty. But in dispositional agape ethics, moral behavior takes into account both values and laws, and it is not possible apart from concrete situations to determine which is to be given the primacy. Here real tensions can arise as there is an attempt to decide when the law, which admits of no exceptions, should rule, and when the values involved would seem to call for exceptions. The fact that agape itself is a positive guide does not alter the fact that there are situations in which agape seems realizable equally well either through behavior which conforms itself to law, or behavior which is oriented toward the realization of values. If we assume that moral behavior must ultimately be determined according to some pattern of consistency by one or another of the three standards of dispositional, legalistic, or teleological ethics, the problem becomes that of examining each of these three possibilities with respect to their ethical adequacy. Nygren excludes legalistic ethics rather summarily on the grounds that in such an ethics all externally equal acts must have equal moral value. Furthermore it might well be possible to achieve such acts more effectively by sacrificing the ethical disposition and bringing other motives into play. Yet this critique presupposes the primacy of the ethical disposition, for it is no argument against the legalistic position, but simply a statement of it to say that according to it all externally equal acts are equal. To say that they have equal moral value is to introduce a value factor which would be absent in the legalistic framework. Here acts are either right or wrong, and the standard is simply whether they conform to the law. As to Kant's distinction between "Legalität" and "Moralität," to which Nygren refers in his 42

42

8 -

FKE, pp. 171—172. Erling

criticism of legalistic ethics, it must be remembered that according to Kant reason binds itself with moral law. The law is in no other way given. It is for this reason that behavior which does not proceed from "Achtung für das Gesetz" may well be "Legalität" but would never be "Moralität," for the coincidence of such behavior with the rational moral law would be purely contingent. If the moral law, on the other hand, were positively given, there would not be the same need for such a distinction. Nygren's arguments against teleological ethics are somewhat more detailed. He states that the primary ethical good cannot be found in good ends, for good ends may be related to bad or ethically indifferent dispositions and acts. Yet, if this is a valid argument against teleological ethics, it would seem that it would be an equally strong argument against dispositional ethics to point out that a good disposition may be related to bad consequences. This argument, just as the argument above against legalistic ethics, is convincing only if one presupposes the ethical primacy of the ethical disposition. In another argument Nygren distinguishes between instrumental and intrinsic goods, holding that only a disposition can be intrinsically good. Yet it would seem that an intrinsic good could be good for someone without its being instrumental in the same sense that a certain lotion may be good for the skin. Here it seems that the distinction which Nygren has in mind is that a disposition can be absolutely good in the sense in which the values of a teleological ethic cannot. Such values, while they be intrinsic in nature, may not be absolutely good, but may be relative to certain times and places, and share their status with many other intrinsic goods. Yet it may be argued that such relative intrinsic goods are the material with which ethics deals. The fact that there may be forms of ethics which are primarily concerned with that which is absolutely good would not seem a priori to exclude the possibility of other ethical systems, which are concerned with relative values, as is the case in several axiological ethical systems. Yet another argument concerns the autonomy of ethics. Nygren suggests that it may be possible in an ethics of ends for scientific or technical judgments to usurp the function of ethical judgments and 43

43

114

FKE, pp. 173—182.

118

eventually determine the nature of the good. A normative and casuistic ethics would thus result, against which Nygren has already registered objections. The concept of the "autonomy of ethics" is related to Nygren's contention that there are several domains of experience, each of them having their specific nature and particular standards of validity. This is a positive way of stating that ethical experience differs fundamentally from theoretical experience, and is not to be judged by standards of truth and falsity. A theory of ethics, which sought however to establish the existence of objective values, would tend to affirm that the standards of truth and falsity were applicable to value experience, and thus would not be interested in maintaining the autonomy of ethics in the sense that Nygren defines it. If the autonomy of ethics were granted, on the other hand, it would not follow that teleological ethics becomes inacceptable, for if, as we have argued above, patterns of necessity may be found within ethical ideals, the kind of normative determination of the good which a teleological ethics requires would seem to be possible. In another variant of this argument regarding the autonomy of ethics Nygren points out that in some types of teleological ethics the ethically good ends are science and art. But he asks, Why are these ethical ends? Is there not already a transcendental validation for them? Do we not have here a confusion between ethical and transcendental validity? Here ethics loses its autonomy, for it becomes in the last analysis a means to nonethical ends. Yet in answer to Nygren's objection, it would seem it could be said that ends, whatever other validation they may have, become ethical in the context of teleological ethics by the very fact that they are desired and striven for. We must conclude that Nygren's arguments against the ethical validity of teleological ethics are not fully persuasive. This may be due to the fact that Nygren's conversation has been largely with authors who presuppose a dispositional ethics, and are seeking only to supplement it with a theory of material values. The possibility of basing an ethical theory entirely upon a teleological foundation,, whether these ends were objectively or subjectively defined, is a. possibility which Nygren has not seriously considered. 44

45

44

See supra, pp. 99—104.

45 Nygren's discussion is oriented primarily toward German authors, who im one w a y or another are influenced by the Kantian tradition. H e has not given

Nygren's conclusion following his analysis of legalistic, teleological, and dispositional ethics is that the primary ethical good is to be found in the good disposition, with the goodness of ethical acts and ends causally related to it. With respect to the question as to what the good will is, Nygren leaves two possibilities open. The one is the Kantian concept of duty regulated by the categorical imperative. The other, which Nygren seems to prefer, is the will which is directed toward the establishment of community. 46

47

much consideration to British ethical theory, which is more fundamentally axiological in its orientation. 46

"Dispositional ethics . . . originates in the disposition which is as an ethical

spring out of which ethical acts and ends flow with inner necessity. If only the origin is ethical, all that follows takes on an ethical character. When the ethical disposition expresses itself, ethical acts proceed with necessity, which also with necessity lead to ethical goals." F K E , p. 183. 47

" I t is not possible at this point to demonstrate the ethical categories or to

present a deduction of them. It must suffice to show by means of an example the sense in which they must be thought of in formal terms and left open for different kinds of content. For this purpose we choose the category of fellowship. It might seem more in order to use the concept of duty as the category lying at the basis of all that is ethical. W e must leave open the question as to which of these two categories is primary. In any case, they stand in the closest relation to one another, and there seem to to be certain difficulties in speaking of obligation without continuous reference to fellowship. It could even be questioned whether duty would have any meaning for an individual who stood outside of fellowship altogether, as well as even the possibility for fellowship." F K E ,

188.

Hans Nystedt, who has written a critical study of Nygren's ethics, Plikt

och

kärlek, Studier i Anders

Nygrens

etik (Stockholm, 1 9 5 1 ) , places greater emphasis

upon passages in Etiska grundfrågor,

where Nygren defines the ethical category

in terms of the categorical imperative, p. 90 f f . H e then argues that this formal concept of duty cannot have the disposition of love as its content, for these tend mutually to exclude one another, p. 136 ff., cf. pp. 2 1 2 — 2 1 3 . Nystedt's study is of interest because he has devoted considerable attention to British ethical theory. Yet the value of his critique of Nygren is diminished by the fact that he does not consider sufficiently the possibility that fundamentally different ethical ideals actually exist. He sees no reason to doubt the presupposition that the moral consciousnesses of most normal individuals operate in a fundamentally similar way. p. 3 6.

While he does recognize to some degree the distinction be-

tween dispositional, legalistic, and teleological ethics, he does not feel that these represent exclusive types, pp. 1 6 5 — 1 6 6 . H e prefers to think in terms of the distinction between normal and abnormal ethical behavior, pp. 1 7 7 — 1 7 8 , and different levels of ethical development, pp. 2 1 6 — 2 1 7 .

That

such distinctions

exist, particularly when viewed from the vantage point of one of the ethical

Ïl6

If the category of fellowship or community is chosen, the specific nature of the community to be established is not determined. The ethical category is purely formal and it is impossible to move from it by way of deduction to any particular content which it may have. Nygren suggests three alternative possibilities of ethical ideals which might constitute such content. The first is a community determined by a Nietzschean power ethic, where the weaker individuals are used by the stronger. The second is a community determined by a Stoic-Kantian view of rights, where all individuals are abstractly considered equal and there is concern not to trespass on the rights of others. The third is a community determined by Christian love of the agape type, in which all such boundaries are spontaneously passed over. At this point some critical questions arise, for these three alternatives are strangely similar to the three types of ethics which have just been analyzed: teleological ethics, legalistic ethics, and dispositional ethics. The Nietzschean power ethic may not seem to correspond fully with teleological ethics. Yet the Nietzschean ethic is an attempt to return to the ancient Hellenistic values, which included a teleological eudaemonistic ethic. The Stoic-Kantian ethic is more easily identified with legalistic ethics. Kant's strictures against "Legalität" simply mean that his ethics becomes more rather than less legalistic. The law is to determine not only our behaviour, but our motives as well. That the Christian ethic of love is primarily a dispositional ethic is quite apparent. But if this is the case, it seems that a scientific demonstration has been given for the ethical primacy of the Christian agape ethic. This has not been Nygren's avowed intention, but it seems to have been the result of his argument. It is out of fear that such a demonstration could in proving too much destroy the 48

49

ideals, may be granted. But these distinctions will also have a different significance when the vantage point is one of the other ethical ideals. 48

F K E , pp. 1 8 8 — 1 8 9 .

49

"Das Wesentliche alles sittlichen Werts der Handlungen kommt darauf an, dass das moralische Gesetz unmittelbar den Willen bestimme. Geschieht die Willensbestimmung zwar gemäss dem moralischen Gesetze, aber nur vermittelst eines Gefühls, . . . mithin nicht um des Gesetzes willen, so wird die Handlung zwar Legalität, aber nicht Moralität enthalten." Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, pp. 1 2 6 — 1 2 7 .

117

effectiveness of the transcendental method, not only in its use in the ethical domain, but also in its use in the religious domain, that a critique has been made above of Nygren's arguments for the primacy of dispositional ethics. 50

4. The Ethical Motifs

Since the alternate forms of ethical ideals tend to be either dispositional, deontological, or axiological in nature, the question arises whether it is possible to find an ethical category in terms of which these possibilities can be expressed. As we have seen, Nygren's attempt to define ethical valuation solely in dispositional terms actually excludes only axiological ethics. This exclusion of axiological ethics is furthermore coupled with a definition of the ethical category in which it becomes difficult sharply to distinguish dispositional and deontological ethics from each other. Actually it is deontological ethics, rather than the category of ethics as such, which excludes axiological ethics. In these two types of ethics different ethical terms are brought into use, so that in one context one speaks of the distinction between right and wrong, and in the other of the distinction between good and bad. It is for this reason that we have not used these terms in defining the ethical question, for a choice between them would tend to exclude one of the possible ethical answers. Nygren has made use of the terminology of both of these ethical types. In so far as he inclines toward defining the ethical category in terms of the categorical imperative, he uses the language of deontological ethics. Yet in retaining the concept of valuation as basic to ethics, he also retains something of the axiological approach to ethics. 51

50

There are tendencies toward an apologetic for Christian dispositional agape

ethics at points in Nygren's argument. For example he says, " T h e Christian ethic, which is not limited to that which is philosophically demonstrable, but originates in the given fact of the Chrisitan moral ideal, is one of the possibilities—and the foremost—with which the formal ethical category is filled with real content." F K E , p. 324. C f . Hillerdal, Teologisk 51

The

Right

and the Good

etik, pp. 143, 148, 262, n. 42.

(Oxford, 1930) and Foundations

1939)» PP- 3—5> 285—286, 3 1 1 — 3 2 7 .

118

och filosofisk

C f . the discussion of "good," "right," and "moral goodness" in W . D. Ross, of Ethics

(Oxford,

While deontological and axiological ethics tend to exclude one another, dispositional ethics need not choose between the alternatives which they present. These alternatives and the relation of dispositional ethics to them can more clearly be seen when one considers the old dilemma: Is a thing good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? Nygren sees in this dilemma an attempt to derive the religious from the ethical, or the ethical from the religious, and suggests that when the autonomy of these two forms of experience is recognized, the dilemma falls to the ground. Religion is the inescapable ground for the ethical, and the God-relationship contains within itself the right ethical disposition, but these two areas of experience nevertheless remain distinct from each other. Yet it should be noted that Nygren at this point in Filosofisk och kristen etik is discussing the Christian ethical ideal. This dilemma, however, is a problem for all ethical ideals, and the solution to the dilemma differs in the several ethical ideals. The deontological and the axiological ideals divide, so that the deontological ideals are related to religions in which God's will determines what is good. In religions related to the axiological ethical ideal, God is conceived in value terms, and the concept of God's will tends to disappear, while God and the good simply coincide. The dilemma arises as these ideals are set against each other. The deontological ideal protests against anything being made superior to God's will, while the axiological ideal protests against the concept that that which was evil could be good because God willed it. It is only in the disposition of love that a factor has been found which transcends this dilemma, and which in a dialectical manner can take into its service both the structure of law and the hierarchy of value. This must not be taken as an apologetic for the Christian ethic, however, for a closer analysis of both the deontological and the axiological ethical ideals will indicate that one can within the structure of each make room for the fact of the other. There is no rational necessity, therefore, which makes it necessary to consider the possibility of the Christian dispositional ethic. Rather it is the existence of an historical actuality, which Paul describes as a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to the Greeks, which makes it neces52

02

FKE, pp. 303—304.

119

sary to examine whether there may not be a third ethical possibility beyond the deontological and the axiological types. Thus we must seek for an ethical category inclusive enough to account for all three of these ethical types. Such a category could be defined as simply the human element considered as a causal factor in experience. The question is whether, in so far as abstraction is made at this point, any patterns of causal relationship are to be discovered other than those which are otherwise accounted for within the natural sciences. Here, it may be recalled, two general causal patterns have been suggested, efficient and final causality, which may be grouped together under the more inclusive rubric of formal causality. In terms of these two patterns of causality it is possible to explain the phenomena of human behavior to a large extent, but it does seem that there are other causal factors which are at work in our experience. It has been suggested above that the concept of causality might be generalized, so that the possibility of the human element as introducing a unique kind of causal relationship might be recognized even within the context of an analysis of the judgments of the natural sciences. Since this argument is related to certain findings within the realm of quantum mechanics, the interpretation of which is still disputed, the whole analysis of ethical experience should perhaps not be made to rest upon it. That the human factor introduces a different element into the realm of experience is in any case recognized. One need only turn to the distinction which is made between facts and feelings in much modern philosophical discussion. The distinction between them is not that feelings have to do with the human psyche and therefore are not facts like sticks and stones, for there are many psychological "facts". The problem is simply that there is here a realm of experience where other causal principles are apparently at work, and where it seems impossible to find any necessity. While there are some who continue to seek to account 53

54

53 54

See supra, pp. 89—91.

C f . these statements of Bertrand Russell: "When we assert that this or that has 'value/ we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal feelings were different." Religion and Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 230 f. " I n a scientific question evidence can be adduced on both sides, and in the end one side is seen to have the better

20

for the values and ethical feelings which characterize this realm of experience in terms of physiochemical laws, as long as such a hypothesis thus far has not been conclusively substantiated, there is reason to examine whether an explanation of another kind is available to order our experience in this domain. One of the reasons that there has been difficulty in discovering the nature of the causal relatedness to be found in the ethical domain is that concentration has been centered upon values and duties. Here it seems almost impossible to find any pattern of necessity. 55

case—or, if this does not happen, the question is left undecided. But in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate Good, there is no evidence either w a y ; each disputant can only appeal to his own emotions, and employ such rhetorical devices as shall rouse similar emotions in others." Ibid.,

p. 229. A t the same

time, such an analyst as Charles Stevenson does not hesitate to refer to causal connection between beliefs and attitudes in the realm of ethical experience. and Language

Ethics

(New Haven, 1958), pp. 5, 7, 1 1 n, 14, 28. This would seem to

suggest that some objective factors are discoverable in this area. 55

The careful analysis of ethical terminology, which Stevenson's Ethics

Language

and

represents, is not as illuminating as it might be, with respect to the

approach to the ethical situation here being made, for it concerns itself primarily with "values and duties." While Stevenson recognizes the wide variation in attitudes which moral behavior reveals, he does not recognize the fundamentally different ethical types suggested above. See his discussion of the distinction between the terms " g o o d " and "right." p. 97 f f . Stevenson's analysis is accordingly helpful in considering the problems arising within the context of each of the several ethical ideals, in which connection his insistence on the persuasive power of ethical terms is most important, p. 33. Perhaps more important, however, is the persuasive power of the ethical ideal itself. Therefore an important factor in the process of moral persuasion consists in relating the behavior being recommended to the larger context of the ethical ideal, from which it follows by w a y of implication, if it can be assumed that commitment to this ideal is shared. If not, the process of persuasion must involve contrasting different ideals, in the hope that one will prove more powerful than the other. Axel Gyllenkrok has called attention to the importance of general norms in his critique of Stevenson. Systematisk

teologi och vetenskaplig

metod, pp. 7 3 — 7 5 . Gyllenkrok also,

however, tends to overlook the fundamental alternatives which the ethical situation reveals. In making " Y o u shall love your neighbor as yourself" the fundamental ethical norm, which Gyllenkrok holds needs no longer involve a religious element, he overlooks the ambiguity of this principle. If love means "care for the needs o f , " there need be no conflict between love of the neighbor and love of the self. But in so far as the problem of preference arises in rendering such care, conflict can arise. Then one must determine whether one is to care for one's own needs in order to care for the needs of the neighbor, or whether one is to

121

But another possibility is to center attention upon the human causal factor as such. How does it operate in the ethical situation? Here there are various possibilities. The human causal factor may operate ideologically to seek its own good, or it may conform its behavior to a legal structure which is required if there is to be community, or it may create a beloved community. Each of these possibilities represents a distinct pattern of causal relatedness. It is in order to examine these possibilities a bit more closely. Since Nygren suggests that the ethical category might be defined in terms of fellowship, in the analysis that follows we shall pay particular attention to the implications of the ethical alternatives being distinguished for the establishment of community. In the first of the patterns to be considered it should be noted, however, that the primary intent is not to establish community. The individual human causal factor operates instead teleologically to seek its own good. Community, in so far as it has ethical significance, is understood as a means to this end. In so far as egocentric behavior, furthermore, is the only possibility to be reckoned with, no ethical distinctions can be seen at this point. It is therefore possible to a large 56

care for the neighbor's needs in order to care for one's own. A t this point two fundamental alternatives appear, which alternatives, furthermore, imply different religious faiths. This the N e w Testament also appears to recognize, as the simple exhortation to love the neighbor or the brother is set forth in the epistles as the fulfillment of the law. Rom. 1 2 : 8—10, 1 John 3: 1 6 — 1 8 , 4 : 7 — 2 1 . The Christian ethic is always an ethic of response. It is as one believes that one's own needs are cared for that one is gratitude responds in caring for the needs of

the

neighbor. See Luther's presentation of the Christian ethic in these terms in " T h e Freedom of a Christian," Luther's Works, American edition, vol. 31 (Philadelphia, 1957), pp. 365—368. It is not enough to say, as Gyllenkrok does, that power beyond one's own is needed to achieve moral perfection. Op. cit., pp. 1 0 2 — 1 0 3 . It is only because such power exists that the moral ideal calling for the perfection in question is relevant. 68

It might appear that no concept of community could emerge from such an

ethic. There are, accordingly, several ethical systems which seek to synthesize axiological and deontological ideals. See Daniel D a y Williams, God's

Grace

Man's Hope ( N e w York, 1949), pp. 7 1 — 7 2 , and What Present-Day

Theologians

Are Thinking

and

(New York, 1952), pp. 86—97, for an example of such synthesis.

Attempts are made to show that the interests of the individual and the group can both be served without sacrificing the welfare of either. The altruism of the individual is emphasized, while the values for the individual of life in a social

122

context are stressed. Y e t as situations of ethical conflict arise, such syntheses break

degree to abstract from this egocentric orientation, with the whole attention being centered upon the values for which the individual strives, together with the social structure which is instrumental for the attainment of these values. With respect to the social structure which such an ethic calls for, there is a deep difference of opinion that has obtained among political and economic theorists. There are some who would regard the social structure within which the maximum human values could be attained as a creation of human reason, as in the social contract theory of the state. Others, however, 57

down, and it becomes possible to determine the nature of the ethical ideal by noting the predominant direction in which the human causal factor moves. 57

This theory of the origin of the state can take widely varying forms, as

a comparison of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan Concerning

Civil

Government

with John Locke's second treatise

will indicate. Both share the presupposition that

man fundamentally seeks his own good, and that this is justifiable on the grounds of natural law. The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A . Burtt ( N e w York: The Modern Library, 1939), pp. 1 6 1 , 163, 405, 4 1 3 . Hobbes, however, concludes that the state of nature will therefore be a state of war. pp. 159 — 1 6 2 . The social contract is thus established to gain peace, pp. 1 6 3 — 1 6 7 . Since Hobbes regards peace under any conditions as preferable to war, he sees no justification for revoking the authority once given the sovereign, and he regards an absolute monarchy as the best form of government, pp. 1 7 8 — 1 8 0 ,

184—188.

Locke, on the other hand, distinguishes between the state of nature and the state of war. pp. 404—406, 4 0 9 — 4 1 1 . Since he believes that natural laws guaranteeing the preservation of property are in effect in the state of nature, being enforced by

the individual,

the purpose of

the social

contract

becomes not

that

of

establishing some sort of peace, but of assuring the more effectual preservation of

property, pp. 4 5 3 — 4 5 5 ,

458. Locke accordingly

does not fear

temporary

dissolutions of government, should the interest of preservation of property require them. pp. 493—494, 496—497, 503. He insists that sovereignty must be so defined that the executive is always subject to the law, which in effect calls for a balance of power, p. 440. Thus no party to the social contract ever loses sovereignty, in so far as he is willing to be represented by the majority, nor is anyone raised above the law which such a majority would define. The net result of Hobbes' political theory is that all the parties to the social contract, except the person or persons to whom sovereignty is given, become entirely subject to the absolute authority which the social contract creates. Thus the social contract for Hobbes is an escape from man's natural estate and not an expression of the egocentric striving which characterizes this condition. In some respects his thought at this point anticipates Kant's doctrine of

radical evil, though he can provide no

concept of law other than the positive will of the sovereign to control this evil. T h e Lockean state, on the other hand, may be interpreted as the instrument of

123,

regard the social structure which would provide the optimum conditions for the realization of human values as resulting from the operation of basic economic laws, by which man's self interest is led, as it were, by an "invisible hand" to promote ends it does not intend. Efforts at rational social planning could only interfere with this natural harmony. At the same time it is evident that some sort of government is needed. The resultant compromise has been described as "anarchy with a constable." It is apparent that the structures of political and economic order in such an ethic have a purely functional and instrumental status. They provide the context within which many individuals can most effectively gain their own ends. There are problems, however, which such an ethic faces at this level. For example, the state, if organized according to Lockean principles, may include those who are actually not considered equal, e.g., slaves or segregated minorities, for whose benefit the governmental structure has not been devised. For them there is no answer in terms of this ethic other than that they must gain sufficient power to enable them to claim a part in determining the nature of the social contract. Within the economic order, organized groups, such as labor unions, may seek greater benefits for their members, either through exerting political influence or through collective bargaining. Such procedures clearly interfere with the operation of the economic laws which Adam Smith described. ^ 58

59

6

the collective egoism of the majority. It is assumed, however, that the members of this majority will recognize the principle of equality, pp. 404, 424. This is what is involved in assuming that a distinction can be drawn between the state of nature and a state of war. If this assumption cannot be made, one must either take Hobbes' arguments more seriously, or place one's trust in some principle of universal harmony by which the natural state of war will actually accrue to the benefit of all. 58

The classic statement of this view is to be found in Adam Smith,

Wealth

of the Nations

The

(New York: The Modern Library, 1937). See pp. 4 2 3 ,

650—6 51. 59

The phrase is Carlyle's. Ibid., p. ix. The existence of government as such

constitutes a constant problem for Adam Smith, for government tends to interfere with the operation of the laws of supply and demand, which are to produce the conditions of

the greatest well

being. The

Western democracies

represent

a

compromise between the proponents of planned economy and the defenders of laissez faire policies. The threat of a totalitarian system of the Hobbesian type remains, should this compromise fail.

124

A society of this kind is not static, but is dynamic, constantly undergoing change. Such a process may be witnessed within the community of nations, for what is called nationalism is this ethic writ large on the international scene. On the other hand, within the structures of our society the phenomenon of "secularism" is chiefly this ethic in its many implications. In summary we may say of this ethic that there are three factors to be considered: individual egocentricity, values conceived in varying ways, and a complicated legal structure (law being understood here in a very general sense) in terms of which many individuals are able to seek their own good. In this ethic, since egocentricity is a constant factor, no particular consideration need be given to it, while the whole attention is fixed upon the intrinsic values and the instrumental structures with the aid of which these values may be attained. It is possible, however, to elevate the legal structure itself to the status of an intrinsic good. While Adam Smith taught that when each sought his own interest the interests of all would be most adequately served, Kant, with his doctrine of radical evil, was not at all certain that such behavior would result in acceptable social order. But it is possible for human reason to conceive of a structure of moral law which would provide a proper social order. The fundamental principle is, "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne." Kant distinguishes between the instincts by which man seeks his 61

62

60

Smith regarded labor as a commodity which would be controlled by the

law of supply and demand. Ibid., pp. 7 9 — 8 1 . 61

For Kant's doctrine of radical evil and for his insistence upon the need for

the fundamental reorientation of the "natural" man, see Die Religion der Grenzen

der blossen Vernunft

innerhalb

(Leipzig: Reclam, 1879), p. 46 f f . Pagination

from the original 1793 edition. 62

Kritik

der praktischen

Vernunft,

p.

54. Nygren

at times identifies the

categorical imperative as the ethical category. R A , 1 6 0 — 1 6 1 , 2 4 1 . Y e t he does not accept Kant's statement of the categorical imperative because Kant derives normative content from it. T o this extent Nygren holds Kant has abandoned the critical method. E G , pp. 1 0 8 — 1 2 4 . Nygren does not explain, however, how the categorical imperative might be conceived without its being normative. If simply a sense of duty is meant, even here one has a kind of normativeness

125,

happiness and the practical reason by which man recognizes and acts in accord with moral law. Thus a fourth factor has been introduced into the ethical situation. Whereas above we found individual egocentricity, values, and the legal structure, here we have instincts and values on the one hand, and reason and the legal structure on the other. Here tension between reason and the instincts is recognized and the whole problem of ethics is centered in the realm of reason and the legal structure, while instincts and the search for happiness tend to be excluded from the ethical domain. Yet the Kantian formalism, which seeks to reject a this-worldly eudaemonism, does so only to embrace an other-worldly eudaemonism. Here, however, the happiness which is rejected in this world is received not as a result of teleological striving, but as a reward for obedience. In so far as analogy with the causal patterns to be found in the natural sciences is helpful, the pattern here is that of efficient causality rather than final causality. For immortality is not achieved as a result of human striving toward the highest good. Rather the highest good is a transcendent cause which has the power to grant immortality as a reward of virtue. In this way the moral argument for the existence of God is established. 63

04

which excludes the eros ethic described above. It is evident that Kant's statement of the categorical imperative excludes other ethical alternatives. One is unable to account for either the eros or the agape ethics in terms of it. The categorical imperative clearly strives against the eros ethic, for which hypothetical imperative provides the basic form. However, it also strives with the agape ethic, for it requires a universality of every act, which the agape ethic does not require. T h e agape ethic must be able to say to the rich young man, " G o , sell what you have, and give to the poor, . . . and come, follow me." (Mark 10: 21) without meaning that this must become a universal rule. The freedom which the categorical imperative cannot grant, since its purpose is to control human egocentricity, the agape ethic requires, in so far as the motivation of self giving love exists. 63

A succinct statement of this principle is to be found in Thomas Aquinas:

" A s in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards." The

"Summa

Theologica"

of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 8, 3rd ed. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd. and N e w York: Benziger Bros., 1942), I I — I , Q. 99. Art. 6. 04

Kritik

der praktischen

Vernunft,

* p. 2 1 9 ff. Note the reference to causality

in this passage: "Also ist das höchste Gut in der Welt nur möglich, sofern eine oberste Ursache der Natur angenommen wird, die eine der moralischen Gesinnung.

126

There exists, however, a third pattern which the human causal factor may adopt, in which it acts to create a beloved community. Here yet another factor enters the picture. Whereas thus far we have considered individual egocentricity, values, the practical reason, and the legal structure, in this ethic the factor of non-egocentric, creative love is seen to function. It therefore can no longer be taken for granted that the individual must necessarily seek his own good. For this reason the legal structure, which the practical reason erects to curb the instincts and thus must absolutize, lest it become the instrument of egoism, can now become the instrument of love. Now in quite a new way it becomes true that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. Furthermore, quite a new attitude may be taken to values. Whereas in the Kantian legalistic ethic, the law is to be obeyed regardless of the consequences good or bad as far as values are concerned, in this ethic there is a real concern for persons, in so far as their welfare is affected by the structure of the social order. Values, on the other hand, are not what individuals strive for, but the means by which they serve one another. Nor are they ultimately intrinsic. Just as the legal structure is instrumental in its relation to love, so values are instrumental as well. The fact that it is difficult to devise a hedonistic calculus or define the highest good is no longer of primary importance. It is quite possible to recognize the high degree of relativity which 65

66

67

gemässe Kausalität hat." p. 225. It may be observed that the fundamental rationale for the system of law which reason establishes is that each person thereby will receive presumably equal opportunity to seek his own happiness. That this is the meaning of existence is never questioned. The moral law is imply introduced so that the quest for happiness will not be a war of each against all, nor does Kant have confidence in such a device as the social contract as an answer to this problem. 65

Good descriptions of such a beloved community are to be found in Rom.

12 and i Cor. 12. See also Gal. 6 : 2 , Mark 1 0 : 4 2 — 4 5 , John 1 3 : 3 4 — 3 5 . It is interesting to note the common metaphorical use of the term "member" as referring not to parts of a physical body, but to those belonging to a social group. Yet it is questionable as to whether a social " b o d y " can really exist without being knit together by the love which the N e w Testament describes. 68

The classic description of this kind of love is 1 Cor. 13.

67

This freedom in the use of other ethical systems is suggested in Paul's

description of his missionary strategy. 1 Cor. 9: 1 9 — 2 3 . C f . Luke 1 3 : 1 0 — 1 7 , Matt. 1 1 : 19.

130,

characterizes values, since they are instrumental to the relationship of love which they are designed to serve. While an axiological ethic tends ultimately to strive toward values which are otherworldly in nature, and while a deontological ethic appeals to rewards and punishments which only an afterlife can adequately provide, such a dispositional love ethic is profoundly this-worldly in nature. Its religious aspect is not metaphysical, as is the case with these other two ethical systems, but revelational in nature. For the love which is its center and source, while it is not in one sense a human possibility, in another sense it is at the same time an historical actuality. Yet the hopes and expectations of this ethic are in no way limited to this world. But that which shall be already is. The faith which this ethic requires is not based upon metaphysical beliefs, but upon historical revelation. The question may be asked as to whether we have not in this analysis of ethical experience also shown, as Nygren has sought to do, that primary ethical validity must be dispositional in nature. Is not the human causal factor to be identified with the ethical disposition? The answer is that while this may be the case the ethical disposition does not function as actually determining the nature of the ethical ideal in any but the last of the possibilities indicated. In the axiological ethic, as we pointed out, it is viewed as a constant factor and thus it may be disregarded, while the ethical problem becomes that of setting up a standard of values. In the deontological ethic a distinction between instinct and the practical reason is recognized, but the practical reason is reason determined by law. The disposition here enters the moral situation in that it is not only required that actions be governed by law, but the practical reason must also be governed by law and will right actions. But this means not that the disposition becomes an end in itself, but that the law becomes an end in itself, for the difference between "Legalität" and "Moralität" does not lie in the nature of the act, but that in the latter case the act is willed for its own sake, or more exactly, for the sake of the moral law which the act exemplifies. In the dispositional love ethic, however, thç disposition actually becomes a determining factor in the moral situation. This means 68

68

128

i John 1 : 3 , 4: 19.

that the disposition is not determined by a standard of values, though it must take values into consideration in any act that is designed to serve another person. Nor is the disposition determined by law, though it recognizes the importance of the law as providing a context in which it finds it possible to realize itself. It is in this ethic, furthermore, that conflicts of conscience actually arise, for the Christian love ethic, or the agape ethic, recognizes the validity in a limited sense of the standards of valuation of both of the other ethical ideals. Agape will at times break the law so that values may be gained, but in another context it will hold to the law despite the consequences, and there are also situations where as apparently "verlorene Liebe" agape will neither follow the letter of the law, nor increase any values. Such spontaneity is possible because agape itself is creative in nature, bringing into being the beloved community. Yet this does not occur without tension. There is no way in which it may be casuistically determined how far law is to have its rights, or values taken into consideration, or both renounced as agape goes the way of the cross. Nygren, as has been indicated above, states that if more than one ethical standard is to be used, behavior will always be unethical. While this problem is not to be found in the axiological or deontological ethics, it does arise in the agape ethic, which is profoundly unethical according to both of the other ethical types. Agape does not reject eros and nomos in every sense. For that reason, while the eros ethic at times can praise agape behavior, at other times this behavior becomes foolishness. On the other hand, while agape behavior, in so far as it conforms to the standard of the law, is not "Legalität" in the same sense that eros behavior is never more than that, at the same time agape's obedience to the law is never "Moralität." Thus agape's behavior is always a stumbling block to nomos. And since agape takes these judgments seriously, it is always involved in tension. But this tension is at the same time the matrix of the creative power which the agape ethic possesses. It is also in this capacity, not only to choose one ethical ideal as over against others, but also to use the structures of the ideals which have not been chosen as ex69

70

09 70

A E , pp. 9 0 f . , 7 3 1 — 7 3 3 Sw. I, 7 0 f . , II, 5 4 9 — 5 5 1 . See supra, p. 1 1 2 .

9 - Erling

I29

pressions of its own spontaneity, that new dimensions of human freedom may be recognized. On the basis of the data which has thus far been presented we return to the general problem of human freedom. According to our analysis the ethical situation is such that the three motifs described are all relevant answers to the ethical question and can simultaneously be present as possible alternatives at any moment of moral decision. But they are also incommensurable. Each of them offers an intelligibly structured pattern of behavior, but the choice of one of these patterns rather than another cannot ultimately be rationally motivated, for there is no standard above them in terms of which they can be compared. An appeal can be made to the religious faith and hope which each of these moral ideals presupposes, but here again faith may be set against faith, nor is there any common standard in terms of which the rival faiths can be made commensurable. There is an interesting passage in Axel Hägerström's "Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien," where he is arguing against the theory that a value judgment is a recognition of the property of an object. According to this view, just as one recognizes color in a flower, so one would recognize value in a given object. Hägerström suggests a hypothetical situation, however, in which an ascetic, when confronted with two objects, chooses the one that is the less desirable. Such a person, Hägerström argues, will call the object he chose the better of the two. He will not call the object which would have been the more pleasurable better, when he actually chooses the less pleasurable one. Hägerström therefore concludes that the concept of better or worse is not determined by any properties an object may have, but only by choices actually made. This example is of interest because if we contrast the ascetic and the hedonist, it seems that we may actually have two ethical motifs, or basic variants within one motif, represented. It is not likely, however, that the ascetic was so from birth. At some time in his life the transition from choosing that which gave most pleasure to that which gave less pleasure took place. But how did this happen? Why 71

72

71

"Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien," p. 59.

72

Ibid., pp.

130

60—62.

134,

did the ascetic ideal become the stronger? In some cases one could construct an overarching pattern of valuation, possibly religious in nature, in terms of which the one ideal was preferred to the other. In other instances it may have been the persuasive emotional appeal with which the ideal was presented. Undoubtedly such explanations are possible in many cases, but they do not establish any necessity which could provide a basis for prediction. Even when conversion is not to the Christian faith, it is nonetheless true, "The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes; so it is with every one who is born of the Spirit." Consider the case of the agape ethic which Friedrich Nietzsche called the transvaluation of all values and sought to explain in terms of ressentiment. Nygren suggests that Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity's radical difference from all ancient values is correct, but that his explanation as to its origin is in error. But how could such a radical transvaluation take place? We can attempt to explain, but we are in no position to predict: Given such and such conditions, this must necessarily follow. Here we must reckon with the strange phenomenon of human freedom. Luther preferred to think of the transformation which conversion represents in quite different terms. He did not hold that man was free at all, but that he was bound. In De servo arbitrio he compares man to a beast ridden either by God or the devil. The beast does not choose, but the riders contend as to who shall have the mastery. In this analysis man is in bondage to the devil, but becomes free when God triumphs over the devil. The decision is not made by man. Rather the issue is determined by the struggle of the powers themselves. To look at the ethical situation in such terms does not basically alter the analysis, however. The point is that this struggle is not such that the issue can be predicted according to any natural or rational law. Rather in this struggle between the motifs the proponents of each motif may do that which is consistent with the nature of the 73

74

75

73

74 75

John 3: 8.

AE, pp. 64—66 Sw. I, 46—47. Cf. Ramsay, Religious Language, p. 79.

motif in question to further its cause, and the drama of historyreveals the issue of the struggle. This is the reality and the mystery of human freedom. . It should not be supposed, however, that the moral life is thereby surrendered to hopeless irrationality. Each of the alternatives is itself intelligibly structured and provides a sufficient reason for human behavior. Thus every event has some cause in what immediately precedes it. Even the preference has a cause, but it is not one that could have been predicted. While at the outset it was said that the moment of moral decision was such that all of these alternatives could be simultaneously present as real possibilities, in actual fact there are few such moments of decision. Most of the moral life is spent living out the implications of one or another of these alternatives, even if the struggle to do so can become quite intense, as Romans 7 indicates. It may well be that it is in the context of the agape motif that the alternatives continue to be most actual, and that for this reason a Christian ethic is most concerned to affirm the reality of human freedom. 76

76

C f . Ross, Foundations

of Ethics, p. 246. It should be noted, when there is

reference to "struggle between the motifs," that the term " m o t i f " has the same double meaning that the term "history" has. On the one hand, it is the interpretation itself; on the other hand, it is the reality interpreted. The specific meaning intended must be derived from the context.

132,

Chapter IV

THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES—RELIGION Thus far in our discussion we have found that the factor of human decision, as it affects the search for as well as the use of the truth of the natural sciences, calls for analysis of the ethical dimension of human existence. In this analysis three ethical ideals in competition with one another for man's allegiance were discovered. It now remains to inquire whether these ethical ideals in turn require an extension of our analysis into the realm of religious experience. We must, accordingly, subject the situation of human decision to further analysis. We have found it helpful to regard ethical decision as a unique kind of causal relationship, characterized by the fact that several causal patterns may present themselves, which are not commensurable, so that it is possible to predict which of these patterns will gain the upper hand in a given situation. Rather decision is necessary. This may be interpreted as the free action of the moral agent, or it may be interpreted as the issue of a struggle between the motifs themselves. We must now inquire as to the origin of these alternately possible causal patterns. A theoretical description of the natural order, such as is provided by the natural sciences, does not account for them. We do find them in the area of ethical experience, but our attention here is focused upon the implications for human behavior which follow from decision for one or another of these motifs. Human decision involves, however, not only the question, What should I do? It also involves the question, What may I believe and hope? Indeed it is the answer to this question which determines the answer to the ethical question. We could have conducted our analysis in such a way that we began with the religious question, showing how the ethical question follows as a natural response to a particular 133

religious answer. We have chosen the other course, however, for methodological reasons. A part of our problem has been that religious experience does not provide us with a relatively well defined descriptive content, the nature and validity of which we might examine. We have therefore begun with the more familiar, and have moved to new areas of experience as problems have arisen in each area suggesting the need for such a transition. When we define the religious question as, What may I believe and hope? this is in recognition of the fact that this area of experience is characterized by several motifs. It is because there are several incommensurable alternatives, and decision for one or another of them is inescapable, that decisions in this area are instances of faith rather than knowledge. Where knowledge is possible the validity of a judgment can be established in the present situation, since the alternatives are truth and falsity, or some specifiable degree of probability. The ultimate validity of a faith judgment cannot, however, be established here and now. Faith, while it may be grounded on present experience, appeals also for its validity to that which is not yet, but which shall be. Faith, therefore, includes a dimension of hope. For this reason we have phrased the religious question, What may I believe and hope? As has been noted, Nygren makes a somewhat different approach to the problem of religious validity. He does not believe that the validity of religious experience can be assumed. Rather it is religion's claim to validity which occasions the transcendental deduction of the religious category. This poses difficulties, however, in the use of the transcendental method, for this method begins with the assumption that there is valid experience and then searches for the necessary presuppositions which such valid experience requires. The transcendental method does not establish validity. It assumes that validity exists and inquires as to its nature. Thus the transcendental method cannot begin with scepticism, yet, according to Nygren, that is apparently what we must begin with as we investigate the religious domain. The only course open to Nygren is, therefore, to apply the method of transcendental deduction to experience, the validity of which can be assumed, to see whether further analysis of this experience will reveal what might be called the religious category. Thus Nygren's transcendental deduction of the religious category 134,

is not primarily an analysis of religious experience as such. He analyzes the other forms of experience, subjecting the presuppositions here involved to further analysis, seeking thereby to find a foundation upon which religion's claim to validity can be used. In this connection he suggests that the discovery of the uniqueness of religious validity will follow as a consequence of the demonstration of its universal necessity. In the foregoing discussion we have argued that the problem of validity in the areas of experience with which the historical sciences deal is twofold. On the one hand there is the problem of the validity of the questions themselves, by which the several areas of experience are defined. On the other hand there is the problem of the validity of the distinctions by which these questions are answered. In our opinion the former of these problems is not the pressing one. Our problem is not basically whether it is relevant for man to ask, What should I do? or, What may I believe and hope? Our problem is whether any distinctions may be found in these areas which are intelligibly structured and thus objectively describable. But to find these distinctions we must submit religious experience itself to analysis. Such an approach, we feel, is in accord with the critical or transcendental method, as well as with the method of motif research, as Nygren has developed it in his later writings. When such an approach is made to the problem of religious validity, it is evident that the descriptive and the critical tasks cannot be separated from each other. The critical method cannot be applied until there is descriptive material to be examined, but the description implies that the necessity or relatedness, which the critical method examines, shall to some degree have been grasped, although possibly not with full clarity. Yet, since a description cannot be abstracted from the relatedness characterizing the subject matter described, the description will consequently be adequate to the extent to which this relatedness is grasped with clarity. Thus we might say that the descriptive and the critical tasks are dialectically related to each other, and may be distinguished from each other only by fictional abstraction. 1

2

1

RA, pp. io—II.

2

For further discussion of the dialectical relation between critical analysis and description, see infra, chapter V I .

35

This close relationship of the critical and descriptive tasks implies a different conception of the relation between form and content, than is to be found in Nygren's analysis. We shall therefore begin by discussing the problem of their relationship. We shall then examine the various alternative patterns of interpretation which religious experience affords. Finally we shall inquire whether Nygren's transcendental deduction of the religious category is such that it provides for these alternatives.

i. Religious Validity and the Relation between Form and Content

The concept of the religious apriori which Nygren is seeking to develop is primarily a philosophical concept. Yet, though the concept in question is philosophical in nature, it is also the element of validity to be found in religious experience. The validity of religion has its source in the formal religious apriori. At the same time Nygren is concerned to insist that no content can be derived from this formal apriori. Just as no particular causal relationship can be derived from the category of causality, so no particular religious content can be derived from the formal religious apriori. We note in Nygren's discussion of the apriori two types of affirmations. On the one hand he refers to the apriori as the source of validity. On the other hand he stresses the importance of the content as over against the form, speaking of the religious apriori as "merely" religion's form. 3

4

5

6

3

" F o r suppose that the concept of the religious apriori were determined with

attention fastened exclusively upon the religious. In such a case it would, even if it stood in the closest harmony with religious experience, be completely valueless as a scientific concept, if it did not permit itself to be set into the philosophical a priori system." R A , p. 130. 4

R A , p. 155.

5

R A , p.

164. "When

philosophy of religion seeks for a specific religious

apriori, it seeks precisely for the specifically religious in the religions." R A , p. 12. 6

"ßut since the religious apriori is not the same as religion, but is merely

'religion's form/ it can easily be seen, that the content of religion must be conceived as something factually given, which can never be speculatively constructed by the intellect, but which simply must be taken as it is given." R A , p. 164.

136,

At this point a closer analysis of what is meant by the distinction between form and content would be helpful. This distinction has a long history. One thinks of Aristotle's distinction between form and matter, and of the distinction between form and content suggested by formal logic. Our concern in this connection is to determine what meaning this distinction must have in the context of the critical philosophy as defined by Kant. Since the chief example of an a priori form which Nygren cites is the principle of causality, we shall examine the distinction between form and content which this principle suggests. Kant's problem was how synthetic judgments were possible a priori. In this connection he was particularly concerned about the necessary relationship presupposed in the affirmation of causal judgments. The conclusion at which he arrived was that our experience of objective temporal sequence presupposes the category of causality. If such experience is to be possible, the principle of causality must be valid, which in turn means that individual causal judgments are also valid. The form in terms of which the validity of individual causal judgments is affirmed, accordingly, represents a particular way in which experience can be synthesized and structured. While it is true that the category of causality is to some degree indifferent with respect to the particular causal relationship in which it is exemplified, at the same time there seem to be certain forms of causal relationship which cannot be properly understood in terms of this category as Kant understood it. It is the validity of these forms of synthesis, as we find them in the areas of ethical and also religious experience, with which we are concerned. If we are to find categories, analogous to the category of causality as used in the 7

8

9

7 " T h e categories are forms of synthesis, and accordingly express functions or relations." N . K . Smith, p. 1 9 1 . C f . Friedrich Brunstäd, " L o g i k , " Handbuch der Philosophie, /. Die Grunddisciplinen (München and Berlin, 1934), "Gerade der Gedanke der leeren blossen Form wird durch die Grundbegriffe Kants ausgeräumt." p. 84. "Wenn gegenständliche Beziehung Synthesis a priori ist, so heisst das, diese Logik hat es mit den Funktionen ursprünglicher synthetischer Einheit zu tun, mit bestimmender, bildender, nicht mit leerer blosser Form wie die überlieferte Logik, welche Kant als allgemeine noch anerkannt." p. 88. 8 9

R A , p. 160. See s ipra, pp. 8 1 — 9 1 .

137,

natural sciences, in terms of which the validity of judgments in these areas of experience can be understood, these must be categories in which specific forms of synthesis are defined. But it will then be misleading to refer to them as wholly empty. This will particularly be the case if it is found that in these areas of experience, in contrast to the area described by the natural sciences, several alternate forms of synthesis must be recognized. The example of the ethical apriori which Nygren cites is illuminating in this connection. In Religiöst apriori Nygren regards the categorical imperative as an adequate statement of the ethical apriori. We have argued, however, that the categorical imperative as Kant defines it actually expresses only one of the possible ethical ideals, rather than being a containing ethical form expressive of the several possible ethical ideals. What is common to the ethical domain is the ethical question, What should I do? But this question does not express any form of synthesis. It would be like the question, What can I know? abstracted from any theory of verification. If, on the other hand, the ethical category is to be defined in terms of synthesis, no single definition of this category can be sufficient. It is necessary that the possible ethical alternatives be defined. If definition of the ethical apriori in terms of the categorical imperative can be criticized because it tends to exclude relevant ethical alternatives, Nygren's definition of the religious category as the category of eternity can be criticized because it does not syn10

11

12

thesize. While the specific instances of synthesis which any area of experience represents are to be found in its individual judgments, the form of that synthesis must be found in its category. For it is

in terms of its form of synthesis that a valid judgment can be distinguished from an invalid judgment, and that thus the distinctions characteristic of valid experience can be made. Again, if the specific forms of synthesis to be found in the religious domain are to be defined, no one statement of the religious category will suffice. While it may be possible to define one religious question, such as, 10 Nygren, » Ä r evighetskategorien en religiös kategori?" pp. 2 2 5 — 2 2 7 . 11

R A , pp. 1 6 0 — 1 6 1 , 2 4 1 . C f . » Ä r evighetskategorien en religiös kategori?»

p. 227. 12

138,

See supra, p. 125 f., n. 62.

What may I believe and hope? the basic forms of synthesis by which that question is answered will very likely be several in number. Against the background of this discussion we may now consider certain criticisms that have been directed against Nygren's transcendental deduction of the religious category. Regin Prenter has questioned the relevance of the religious category, as Nygren defines it, for theological methodology. On the one hand he grants the possibility of a valid deduction of a religious category. On the other hand he argues that such an analysis involves an inescapable tendency for religion to be regarded as an aspect of human culture, which in turn must influence the interpretation of the biblical witness. If, however, as we have argued, there is no one religious category, so that Nygren's analysis should actually be criticized at this point, then there is no reason to regard all the different forms of religion as manifesting in the same way the productive function of the human spirit. There are undoubtedly religions which are to a large extent creations of the human spirit, but it would appear that religions which are radically historical in nature would be characterized by response to events which man would be required to interpret, but which he would not have produced. At the same time such religions could either be described by the method of motif research, or their message proclaimed. At this point the difference would lie in the situation, whether it was the pulpit or the classroom. Axel Gyllenkrok has compared the transcendental deduction of the category of eternity in Nygren's earlier writings with the program of motif research carried out in Agape and Eros. He has sought to identify a tendency hostile to an empirical approach in the former, 13

14

13

If this distinction between the question and the possible forms of synthesis,

which must also be specified in defining a category in transcendental terms, is recognized, the various forms in which

Nygren states the religious question

(e.g., What is the Eternal? What is the God relationship?) may be retained. In any case the religious category is defined in terms of the alternately possible forms of synthesis. The more general form of the religious question, What may I believe and hope? prevents misunderstanding at this point. 14

Skabelse

og genlosning,

2nd ed. (Kobenhavn,

1955), PP-

2 6

— 3 I

n

this

connection Prenter refers to Logstrup's analysis of the transcendental philosophy. For a discussion of Logstrup, see supra, p. 29 f., n, 6. C f . Soe, Religionsfilosofi,

p. 54.

139,

which is not overcome in the latter research. This analysis is coupled with a seeming unwillingness on Gyllenkrok's part to find any unifying center in terms of which the New Testament writings or the Christian faith might be understood. He implies that the method of the history of ideas leads not to the discovery of basic unity, but of necessary disunity in the New Testament writings. * Unfortunately, though he suggests that the method of the history of ideas is the method systematic theology should use, he does not examine its presuppositions. In this study it is being argued that when the presuppositions of the method of the history of ideas are properly understood, the possibility of an interpretation of the data, with which the systematic theologian must work, is recognized, in which basic religious types are distinguishable. This critical and descriptive task can lead both to the definition of the basic structuring forms of the religious category, as well as to the setting forth of the Christian faith. A part of Gustaf Wingren's critique has concerned the problem of the relation between categorical questions and the answers which may be given to them. This problem is similar to the problem of the relation between form and content. When we ask in what sense the categorical questions are formal, the answer is that though they may be answered in different ways, they are also, at least by implication, structured so that only certain kinds of answers are relevant. Thus, for example, the question, What can I know? is not formal in the sense that anything whatsoever can be offered as an answer to it. Rather in the asking of the question is implied a concept of truth and a theory of verification. Apart from these the asking of the 15

1

17

18

10

15

Systematisk

18

Ibid., pp. 23, 3 1 . In the latter reference it is not clear whether Gyllenkrok

teologi och vetenskaplig

method, pp. 1 7 — 2 3 .

means that the meaning of biblical texts cannot be established scientifically, in which case even the method of the history of ideas would lose its scientific character,

when

applied to this material,

or simply

that

in actual

"religious and ecclesiastical interpretations" are determinative

practice

for the use of

texts in preaching. In such a case a necessary tension between religious and scientific interpretation would seem to be presupposed. C f . D V G , 1 1 . 17

Systematisk

teologi och vetenskaplig

metod, p. 30. See supra, p. 20 f f . and

infra, p. 144 f f . 18

C f . supra, p. 32 f.

19

C f . Susanne K . Langer, Philosophy

140

in a New

Key,

pp. 3—4.

question would be quite meaningless. A concept of truth and a theory of verification mean, in turn, that one already knows some answers to the question of knowledge before one asks it. Since, furthermore, in the critical theory of experience, we begin in the midst of experience, and do not seek to explain experience by reference to its origins, it is meaningless to ask which comes first, the question or the answer. Rather they exist in a dialectical relationship to each other. Wingren, however, understands Nygren's position to be such that categorical questions must be purely formal, and on this basis he has directed an immanent critique against Nygren. He states that if the historical material, by which he means the Bible, should answer "to the side of" the religious question which the philosophical analysis formulates, this would indicate that the question was not wholly formal. For if the question were wholly formal, it would also be empty, and all "the historical stuff" could then enter it without friction. If Wingren's interpretation of Nygren's understanding of the categorical questions is correct, our critique, in view of the foregoing analysis, would have to be just the opposite. Categorical questions which made no resistance whatsoever to answers which might be given them would be meaningless. Let us suppose that the question with which we approached the Scriptures were not the religious question, which inquires concerning the interpretations of the historical facts to be found recorded in the Scriptures, but rather the theoretical question, which inquires as to the nature of the facts themselves, in so far as it is possible to determine what they were. Such a question is presumably a formal question, and Wingren feels that it ought to be asked. But would this question be seen to be lacking in sufficient formality if something were to be found in the 20

21

20

" I f the historical material should answer, so to speak, to the side of the philosophically defined question, this would only indicate that the philosophically defined question was obviously not wholly formal. Formality means void of content, and such emptiness shows itself in that the question does not oppose any concrete content. All historical content goes without friction into the form, if it is really empty. The task of the critical philosophy is to purify the basic questions, so that they achieve complete formality." Teologiens metodfråga, p. 39 Eng. 16. 21

Ibid., pp. 42, 1 8 4 — 1 8 5 Eng. 1 8 — 1 9 ,

143—144.

141

Scriptures which "went to the side of it" or which were found to be false? It would make no sense at all to empty the theoretical form to such an extent that everything in the Bible could without friction be fit into it. A common contemporary approach to the question, What can I know? is to define it in such terms that it can only be answered by such propositions as are at least hypothetically verifiable. It is apparent that what would be considered verification could be defined in various ways. But it does not seem unreasonable to assume that even with a very broad definition of verification, there could be statements in the Bible which, while meaningful, were not theoretically verifiable and therefore "went to the side of" this question. This would not mean that the question was not sufficiently formal. It would simply mean that the question was structured to the extent that it was helpful to use it. When the Bible is approached with the religious question, there are some statements in the Bible, which at least in their isolation, can not be viewed as answers to the religious question, just as there are statements in the Bible which as such are not answers to the ethical question. In this respect there is parallelism between the religious and the theoretical questions. However, the religious counterpart to theoretical falsity is the fact that there are several possible religious interpretations. In the sense, of course, that a false statement can represent a failure to make a true statement by reason of incorrect observation or reasoning, similar failures to state a particular religious interpretation, though the intention of stating it was actually present, might be conceived. But the important distinction between the theoretical and the religious questions is that for the latter there exist alternate possibilities, whereas for the former this is not the case. It is also conceivable that to some degree these alternate possibilities are to be found among the interpretations which are included in the canonical Scriptures. It is the double concern of finding that in the Scriptures which is first of all religious, and secondly Christian, which makes it impossible to approach the Scriptures with a religious question which is not in any way structured. 22

22

142

C f . Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 35. See alsa supra, p. 13 f f .

Yet it seems that Wingren is actually seeking to approach the Scriptures with a question of this sort. He passes judgment on both Nygren's critical philosophy of religion and his method of motif research, saying that the former prevents an understanding of the biblical material, while the latter hinders radical confrontation with the problems of systematic theology. Wingren feels that he has arrived at his position through a scientific study of the Scriptures. The standard by which Nygren's method is judged is presumably purely scientific and scriptural. Wingren is of the opinion that his is a more scientific interpretation of the Scriptures than the one which Nygren has developed on the basis of the methods of transcendental deduction and motif research. Wingren does not believe that 23

24

23

"One thing is certain, that the manner in which Nygren- has defined the

task and method of theology is not tenable. The analyses, which are necessary for an understanding of the biblical material, are in principle excluded by the methodological approach itself which Nygren proposes, the combination of philosophy and motif

research." Teologiens

metod fråga,

pp. 4 5 — 4 6

Eng.

21—22.

" I t is not unfair, but rather indicates the actual situation, if one says that motif research, considered

as a systematic method, actually prevents radical presenta-

tion of the problem of systematic theology. This is the main objection which must be directed against Nygren and his method." Ibid., p. 143 Eng. 107. The positive position from which this judgment is passed may be expressed in the following theses which are basic to Wingren's entire polemic:

1) For the

Christian faith, law and gospel in this aeon are independent loci, which cannot be interpreted in terms of one religious motif. "There are definite historical realities, e.g., definite elements in the structure of the scriptural word, which become obscured by reason of the fact that the biblical writings are read as containing 'religious propositions,' supported by a basic motif." Ibid., p. 128 Eng. 92. C f . pp. 1 3 2 — 1 3 3 , 1 3 7 Eng. 96—97, 1 0 1 . 2) The nature of the law need not be derived from the Bible, as is necessary in the case of the gospel, but may be derived from an analysis of the present situation. " T h e law meets us certainly also in the Bible. The law is God's will as judging and coercive vis-a-vis sin and the despoilment of life, and this will is to be found everywhere where God acts. But the books of the Bible have not been written to acquaint us with it. Then the Bible would only tell us what we already knew, independently of the Bible." Ibid., p. 139 Eng. 103. C f . pp. 40, 43, 107, 204 Eng. 16—17,

19, 74, 160. 3) Since

the systematic problem is the relation of law and gospel, an interpretation of the nature of the gospel, as it is found in the Bible, does not solve the contemporary systematic problem. " T h e historical and the systematic tasks are two tasks, not one. They can not be identified with each other." Ibid., p. 197 Eng. 1 5 3 . C f . p. 140 Eng. 104. 24

Ibid., pp. 9, 12 j Eng. xi, 89.

143,

it is necessary to lay a methodological foundation for a scientific interpretation of the Scriptures. A method need not be developed as a prolegomena to dealing with a certain given historical material, but rather develops as one works with the material. That which leads Wingren to believe that such a "working with the material" without particular methodological presuppositions can be fruitful is his conviction that a theoretically scientific interpretation of the Scriptures is possible, quite apart from the methodological presuppositions which Nygren has outlined, or, it would seem, any other methodological presuppositions which might be substituted for them. As was noted earlier, Wingren retains the method of the history of ideas in interpreting the Scriptures, which method he holds is purely theoretical and scientific. It is its use to solve systematic 25

20

27

28

25

" I f the task is to work with a certain material, the method must then be

developed as we work with the material." Ibid., p. 2 1 4 Eng. 168. It is unfortunate that chronological considerations should have entered into what is basically a logical distinction. C f . p. 2 1 3 Eng.

167. It is also a misunderstanding of the

critical method to assume that it does not work with the material in question. 26

Wingren's approach

to the Scripture

is in many

respects analogous to

Rickert's approach to the description of value judgments. Just as Rickert did not realize that the description of value judgments presupposes an understanding of the possible standards of valuation according to which value judgments can be made, cf. supra, p. 42 ff., so Wingren fails to realize that a description of the religious content of the Scriptures calls for an understanding of the various possible patterns

of

religious interpretation.

His

failure to reckon with

the

implications of the fact that such alternate possibilities exist at this point leads him to assume that objective argument in the domain of scriptural interpretation can easily be carried on. H e states that controversies with respect to the interpretation of the gospel are bound to a concrete historical material, so that purely factual argument is always possible. Nothing need be referred to which cannot be observed and understood by every individual. Theology

in Conflict,

pp. 1 6 1 —

162 Sw. 205—206. Referring to past as well as present interpretations of the Bible, Wingren states that their claims to be correct interpretations of the original biblical statements can be tested. If this is not possible, he says that the validity of the method of the history of ideas as such cannot be established. Ibid., p. 165 Sw. 210. Unfortunately Wingren doesn't pursue this question further. Such a discussion would be very helpful, however, for it is precisely the validity of the method of the history of ideas which needs examination. 27

See supra, p. 20 f.

28

Theology

144

in Conflict,

pp. 1 6 2 — 1 6 3 Sw. 206—207.

problems which he particularly opposes. We must now examine again the extent to which the method of the history of ideas can be accepted as a scientific method, when the method of motif research, or a similar methodological analysis, has been abandoned. Here a consideration of Ragnar Bring's discussion of these problems in Till 29

frågan om den systematiska teologiens uppgift can be illuminating.

Bring distinguishes between religious faith propositions and the theological description of the same, holding that whereas the former are not scientific, the latter can be both scientific and theoretical. The point Bring is making is that a personal faith decision is not as such a scientific judgment, but scientific judgments can very well be made describing such a faith decision. Bring is of the opinion that the scientific nature of such descriptive propositions is assured by the fact that they are answers to the theoretical truth question. In relation to the faith judgments being described, therefore, these descriptive judgments belong to a different realm of experience, the theoretical as over against the religious domain. The question to be raised, however, is what meaning truth must have in this context if a scientific description is to result. Quite obviously the truth that is sought cannot be instances of causal connection, in the sense that these are determined in the natural sciences. Rather a specific kind of relatedness expressed in the faith judgments must be grasped. Yet how can this be done? 30

31

32

29

Ibid., pp. 107, 163 Sw. 143, 207.

80

Till frågan om den systematiska teologiens uppgift,

31

Ibid., pp. 1 5 — 1 6 .

32

Ibid.,

pp. 93,

100,

102,

105,

pp. 16, 19, 58.

199. The more general term

"relatedness"

rather than "necessity" is being used to characterize the coherence internal to the religious domain. The term necessity is somewhat misleading, for in both the ethical and the religious domains, while it is necessary that some answer be given to the questions of these domains, the particular answer given is not chosen with necessity. Furthermore, the nature of the coherence within the particular answers is not quite as strictly determined as the term necessity implies. While the alternative answers may be identified as different motifs, considerable freedom in the development of these motifs yet remains. Zuurdeeg indicates the distinction being suggested here to some extent when he says that the natural scientist "uses" language to describe his experiments, while the theologian language to describe his convictions. An Analytical

Philosophy

"employs"

of Religion,

pp.

56—61.

10 — Erling

MS

With respect to this problem an example might be drawn from the area of the natural sciences. In C. F. von Weizsäckers volume, to which reference has been made previously, there is an interesting discussion of problems involved in the description of an Icelandic calcite crystal. Weizsäcker points out that, whereas such a description may begin with recounting the external physical qualities of the crystal, it at length involves a much more comprehensive understanding of the crystal's structure and properties. For example, to describe the crystal's property of double refraction, which led to Huygen's proof of the wave theory of light, it is necessary to understand the peculiar structural formulas of the crystal's molecules. To describe its property of nonconduction of electric, current, recourse must be made to the atomic models of the quantum theory. Such a description may furthermore find it significant to focus attention upon the historical information which may be derived from a study of the crystal, as one takes into account the temperature changes, the pressures, the chemical conditions, which must have existed at the time at which the crystal was formed. Description is obviously no simple matter. It presupposes a fully developed scientific theory in terms of which the subject matter to be described is understood. If this is true for the description of such a relatively simple object as an Icelandic calcite crystal, it would appear to be all the more true when the object to be described is a thought complex, such as a scriptural text represents. Let us suppose, then, that such a text is to be described, and that it has been established that the subject matter is of such relevance that it warrants description. To what category shall the descriptive judgments in this case appeal for their validity? Not to the category of causality as presupposed in the natural sciences. The only way in which this category enters is in the very general sense that the description is causally related to the subject matter that is being described. The validity of what is said about this subject matter must, however, presuppose other standards of verification. These may be formal and analytical, so that the description is analogous to the description of a mathematical system or some other logical structure. But if what is being described claims to be more than 33

38

146

Zum Weltbild

der Physik,

pp. 1 3 — 2 6 .

a logical structure, if it claims to be an interpretation of history, if it asserts real synthetic relations, yet other categories must be considered. These are problems with which theological methodology deals. By means of the method of transcendental deduction the basic forms of coherence in our experience are examined, and the possible ways in which this coherence may manifest itself are defined, though, of course, such definition is never exhaustive or completed. In connection with this analysis the natural and the historical sciences have been defined, theology finding its place in the latter category. These sciences are not presuppositionless, though that need not be a source of embarrassment. Actually there is no presuppositionless science. The only requirement is that the presuppositions be not arbitrarily chosen. That which makes theology scientific is the fact that its presuppositions are found to be necessary if the experience with which it deals is to be understood. That which is decisive is not simply that theological description attempts to answer the question of truth, but the way in which this question is answered. Only in so far as the unique relatedness which characterizes this area of experience has been grasped has the theoretical question been properly answered. If the scientific nature of theology is determined by such considerations, there seems to be no reason for granting scientific dignity to the description of a faith view, while denying it to the development of a faith view, since the relatedness in question would be the same in either case. Bring hesitates to regard the development of a faith view as scientific, for such development tends to presuppose faith's decision for the view being developed. This decision cannot be made on scientific grounds, but the relatedness which is implied in the faith view can be objectively developed, quite in abstraction from the fact that it is also believed. This Bring himself implies when he states that it is possible to set forth that which is uniquely 34

35

36

34

Nygren, "Filosofiens centrum och periferi," p. 125 f. C f . Bengt Hägglund,

"Die Bedeutung der 'régula fidei' als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen," pp. 43 '44'

35 C f . B ring's statement of the presuppositions of theology. Till den systematiska teologiens uppgift, p. 207. 88

frågan

om

Ibid., pp. 109, 172.

M

7

Christian without direct reference to historically given interpretations of Christianity. Also if it is to be possible in motif research not only to establish what historically has appeared in Christian thought, but what rightly belongs there, it would seem that such a systematic development of the Christian faith would be called for. Such a systematic theology, set forth in contemporary language, could be the "working hypothesis" of which Bring speaks. The reality in terms of which this hypothesis would be judged would be the living revelation witnessed to in the Scriptures and the creeds and confessions, but found to be also a continuing reality. Here something of what Billing suggests as the continuing "prophetic" task of theology would be suggested, in so far as tendencies in the direction of an apologetic intent to prove scientifically that Christianity was superior to other religions were carefully excluded. This problem is closely related to our discussion above of the possibility of a normative ethics. It was pointed out in that connection that no single normative ethic could be achieved, but that each of the ethical ideals was found to possess an internal structure, which could be examined with respect to its implications and consequences, Furthermore it was seen that the examination called for was not simple description in the sense of seeking to reproduce in some photographic manner the subject matter, but rather a grasping of the coherence in question, which in turn could involve further development of the implications of that coherence. In a similar sense, both in the interpretation of the Bible and in systematic theology, such a grasping of the peculiar relatedness, by which the propositions of a certain interpretation in the Bible as well as in a systematic theology cohere together, is necessary. But if this relatedness is grasped to the extent that meaningful description can take place, systematic development of this relatedness also becomes possible. As to the factor of personal faith, in relation to the scientific 37

38

39

40

41

37

Ibid.y p. 115.

38

Ibid., pp. 2 1 1 , 228—229.

39

Bring describes the concrete setting forth of a basic motif in such terms.

Ibid., pp. 1 2 5 — 1 2 6 . 40

Ibid.y pp. 120, 154. Einar Billing, Försoningeriy 2nd ed. (Stockholm,

p. 124. 41

148

Supra, p. 100 f f .

1921),

nature of a faith view or the description of the same, it is important to note that personal faith may be related to both the development and the description of a faith view. In both cases it would seem that it would have no decisive role with respect to the scientific nature of the discipline, except that it might qualify the person in question to understand more fully the faith view he was either developing or describing. Another factor of importance would be to determine whether or not every individual necessarily finds himself in a particular faith position. It could be possible that no neutral position can be found, that just as the human body within the earth's atmosphere must be supported either on land, or water, or in the air, so it is simply a question as to which faith position one is to hold. In such a case, an attempt to be neutral and "presuppositionless" would be self-delusive and to that extent lead to unscientific results. At the same time it might well be possible from one faith position to develop and describe another faith view. The conclusions which we draw from the argument given above are that whereas there is a difference between developing a faith view and describing a faith view, it cannot be held that one can be scientific whereas the other cannot. Nor is the variant of this position which Wingren adopts tenable, namely, that preaching is, due to its kerygmatic nature, unscientific, while theological criticism of preaching can be scientific. A further conclusion is that if the method of the history of ideas is to be scientific it presupposes methodological foundations such as are found in Nygren's methods of transcendental deduction and motif research, or other methodological foundations which will serve the same purpose. It is because Wingren has failed to recognize the importance of these methodological principles that his criticism of Nygren's interpretation of the agape motif loses much of its relevance. At the same time his 42

42

Theology in Conflict, p. 1 5 7 Sw. 200—201. This is not to deny that other factors than the scientific setting forth of the Christian faith also enter into the preaching situation. Preaching is an " a r t " as well as a science. It must also take into account the particular situation to which the sermon is addressed to an extent that a theological treatise need not. What is being insisted, however, is that the kerygmatic nature of preaching need not render it unscientific. Rather, if the sermon is to be the living proclamation of the Word of God, every effort must be made to achieve theological validity in that which is said.

149

critique can be made the occasion for recognizing that form in contrast to content, whether we think in terms of the apriori or the categorical questions, is internal and structuring rather than external and containing in nature. This means that one cannot sharply draw the boundaries between form and content. When the form is the external container this can be done, but not when it is the internal structure. Furthermore, if the form is internal and structured, then in so far as there appear to be alternate possibilities, the apriori will not be a containing category under which these alternatives may be grouped, but rather these alternatives themselves. It should not be imagined that somehow there can be a form of such forms. Just as there is no form of a child, which transcends the division into boys and girls, so also in the ethical and religious domains, there is no

containing form under which the alternate possibilities to be found here can be ordered. Rather these alternate possibilities themselves collectively constitute the structuring forms of the ethical and the religious categories.

2. Metaphysical and Historical Types of Religious Interpretation

We must now seek to indicate what some of the alternate patterns of religious interpretation are. In making such an investigation we are confronted at the very outset with the claims of metaphysical philosophies of religion, which deny that there are several religious alternatives, insisting that only one pattern of valid interpretation is to be found in the religious domain. Nygren strongly objects to such a philosophy of religion. Just as in his discussion of metaphysical ethics he holds that there are both scientific and ethical objections against such an ethics, so he holds that there are both scientific and religious objections to a metaphysical approach to religion. At one point he rather drastically charges this approach with intellectualizing religion and mysticizing philosophy, becoming a bastard form between religion and philosophy recognized by neither parent! 43

43

150

RG, p. 19, RA, p. 4.

Yet, when Nygren states that such a metaphysical approach strives with religion, one wonders whether it is religion as such which is being striven against, or whether the strife is between differing religious ideals. In Nygren's criticism of metaphysical philosophy of religion it seems that we have a combination of the criticisms of Luther and Kant as regarding metaphysics. Yet, while Kant's criticism may be called philosophical, Luther's criticism is not correspondingly religious, for Luther's criticism was not made on the grounds of religion as such. Rather he set the religion of the Christian revelation over against the religion of the natural man. Kant's criticism, on the other hand, would apply not only to metaphysical philosophy of religion of the Platonic-Aristotelian type, which to Luther was the religion of the natural man, but to any theology which claimed that its propositions about God and divine things were true in the same sense that the theoretical judgments of the natural sciences are true. In Nygren's later writings, especially in Agape and Eros, the eros motif is recognized as one of the possible religious alternatives. Yet, since the eros motif is fundamentally metaphysical in nature, this means that Nygren grants the possibility of a metaphysical answer to the categorical religious question. At least he does not hold that the choice between the agape and the eros motifs can be made on rational grounds, which his earlier critique of metaphysical philosophy of religion would seem to suggest. Our conclusions with respect to a metaphysical approach to 44

44

The metaphysical eros motif may be described as egoistic religion. While

Nygren from the very outset grants that alternate religious possibilities exist, in the earlier writings the polemic against egoistic religion is sometimes such as to exclude it from the religious category altogether. See Religiositet

och

kristendom

(Uppsala, 1926), pp. 3 0 — 3 3 . It should be noted, however, that this book is a more popular presentation, and by "religion" may simply be meant Christianity. In Urkristendom

och reformation (Lund, 1932), p. 98 ff., where religion is defined

as fellowship with God, in connection with which egoism presents formal difficulties, egoism is nonetheless accepted on a descriptive basis, though it is indicated that it could be excluded from the religious category, were a valuational approach being made. In A E , p. 38 ff. Sw. I, 20 ff., it is insisted that the approach is purely descriptive, and all judgments upon the eros motif are made from the vantage point of the agape motif and not religion as such. While Agape

and

Eros may be viewed as marking a somewhat changed attitude on Nygren's part toward the eros motif, certain references in "Filosofiens centrum och periferi"

151,

religion are therefore similar to our conclusions with respect to a metaphysical approach to ethics. Such an approach to religion strives, to be sure, with certain religious ideals, but this is because it is itself a religious ideal. On the other hand, in so far as it claims to be an extension of the rational necessity to be found in the realm of nature, it may be subjected to philosophical criticism. However, the fact that there should be an attempt to describe a necessity to be found beyond the realm of the natural sciences, i.e., meta-physica, cannot as such be objected to. If, as we argue, this realm is a realm where a decision must be made between alternately possible interpretations, it should be conceivable that among these alternatives there are such as reject the possibility of other alternatives, i.e., are metaphysical in nature. If the metaphysical approach to religion is a real alternative, it must be seen that the problem of affirming its objectivity is not the same as is this problem with respect to alternatives which are nonmetaphysical in nature. We have the peculiar situation that the philosophical criticism of metaphysics, in so far as it is valid, refutes metaphysical philosophy of religion in so far as it is straight metaphysics, but not in so far as it is a religious ideal. But as a religious ideal, metaphysical philosophy of religion claims to be straight metaphysics. We are confronted here with the troubling problem as to whether a religious ideal may take advantage of its privileges as a religious ideal to make existential and ontological judgments which are in any sense analogous to judgments made in the natural sciences. On the one hand, we must prevent the philosophical critique of metaphysics from ruling out the possibility of valid religious judgments altogether, as has happened in logical positivism. On the other hand, we must be on guard lest the admission of the possibility of religious ideals becomes simply a device by which an actual religious metaphysics is protected from philosophical criticism. Nygren's method of avoiding this latter danger is by seeking to reject the 45

(1946), esp. pp.

132—135,

seem to indicate a more positive attitude

toward

attempts to develop a metaphysical world view. It is not recognized, however, that such attempts are fundamentally religious in nature. 45

Willem Zuurdeeg states that man speaking convictionally

establishes his

existence in drafting world views which may be open or closed systems. The latter are metaphysical in nature. An Analytical

152,

Philosophy

of Religion,

chs. 3 and 4.

metaphysical approach to religion on religious grounds. This, however, seems in the final analysis to be an apologetic for historical, revealed religion as over against natural theology, analogous to his rejection of axiological ethics. We believe that the critical nature of the transcendental method is endangered by such efforts to exclude axiological ethics from the ethical category, or nonhistorical religions from the category of religion. . Another way of relating the validity discovered in the religious domain to the remainder of our experience is to assert the pluralism of experience. This was Kant's solution to the problem of the relation between the pure and the practical reason. There are some indications that Kant held that an ultimate unity must exist between the pure and the practical reason, but at no point did he indicate how this ultimate unity could be demonstrated. In any case, whether such pluralism of experience was ultimate or provisional in nature would not necessarily be decisive with respect to the objectivity of the experience in question. Actually the pattern of holding to a provisional pluralism is quite common, not only in systems of a Kantian type, where there is a basic distinction between the theoretical and the, practical reason, but also in theologies based upon revelation in so far as the relation of the content of this revelation, to the remainder of experience has not been definitely determined. However, pluralism of experience may also refer to the possibility of several alternate, mutually exclusive, interpretations as characterizing certain domains of experience. Thus it is possible to affirm a pluralism of the former type, whether ultimate or provisional in nature, but to deny a pluralism of this latter type. Furthermore, if one affirms a provisional pluralism of the former type, but denies a pluralism of the latter type, it is apparent that should the provisional pluralism of the former type be overcome, the result would be a metaphysical religious interpretation of the nonhistorical, ontological type. Thus it should be noted that theologies based upon authoritative, written canons and theologies based upon metaphysical, ontological foundations can ultimately be found to be of the same methodological type. Nor is a synthesis of the nature-supernature type of these two theological approaches difficult to conceive. 46

48

See supra, pp. 93—94, note 4.

153,

The real alternative, therefore, to the metaphysical-ontological approach to religion is not simply to affirm a pluralism of experience, which may in the final analysis be merely provisional in nature, but a pluralism of interpretive possibilities within the religious domain, just as such pluralism has already been affirmed with respect to the ethical domain. It is this kind of pluralism within the religious domain that Nygren is calling for when he argues that the philosophy of religion has as its task determining the grounds for religious validity, but not the grounds for religious faith. The difficulty, however, is that this argument turns out to account for the existence of several religious interpretations, but in effect, in so far as some of these interpretations reject pluralism of this latter type, there seems to be but one type of religious interpretation which can accept the terms which this kind of demonstration of religious validity offers. For if it can be shown that all but one of the alternative types of religious interpretation turn out to be metaphysical in nature in one sense or another, then even though they are accounted for in terms of Nygren's analysis, only a nonmetaphysical interpretation is able to build upon the foundation of religious validity which Nygren lays. But what are the several alternately possible religious interpretations? Are there several nonmetaphysical types, so that an exclusion of the metaphysical types would still reveal real alternatives, or is the variety to be found of such a nature that only one real nonmetaphysical alternative exists? Some suggestions toward an answer to this question can perhaps be indicated by an analysis of various differing hermeneutical types appearing within the Christian tradition, noting the metaphysical implications of these differing methodological approaches. While the following analysis will be limited to the Hebrew-Christian tradition, the intention will be to suggest that the types described may be found in other religious traditions as well. 47

48

47

R A , pp. 2 1 — 2 2 .

48

It is not intended that what follows should be in any sense a survey of the

important field of hermeneutics. For a survey of contemporary developments in this field, including an interesting analysis of Nygren and Aulén, see Wolfgang Schweitzer's Schrift

54

und Dogma

in der Oekumene,

Einige

Typen

des

heutigen

Religion in the Hebrew-Christian tradition is intimately related to the authority of the Bible. The affirmation of the authority of the Bible poses the hermeneutical problem, for it is necessary to state what the message of the Bible is and to make this message relevant in the contemporary situation. In the attempt to make the message of the Bible relevant, the problem of the relation between the knowledge found within the Bible and other knowledge arises. This problem becomes particularly acute through the development of the special sciences. The question arises whether that which is found in the canonical scriptures can be accounted for without loss in the realm of the special sciences. In so far as the scriptures include religious content, it must be determined what religion is in distinction from natural science, history, civil law, philosophy. As rational and empirical methods are developed and found to yield helpful results in many fields, there is a general revolt against authority. There is consequently the hypothesis that it may be possible to apply such methods generally, so that all that heretofore has been known by recourse to authority might now be known through these methods. But what is to be known? While in such disciplines as medicine, physics, geography, the proper subject matter is clearly recognized, and it is possible with the development of these disciplines to abandon the authoritative source, difficulties arise with respect to religion. In the face of this problem, instead of developing a new scientific approach to religion, an effort may simply be made to establish the validity of the contents of the canon by a rational proof of some kind. There may be an effort to prove that the God of whom the canon witnesses exists, so that from such a proof the whole canon may follow, now in some sense rationally comprehensible. Yet such rational arguments, which simply serve to reestablish the authoritative principle, leave the problem of interpreting the 49

Schriftgebrauchs dargestellt als Beitrag zur Diskussion über das Problem der biblischen Hermeneutik (Gütersloh, 1953). 49 In this connection it is interesting to note that the method of proof may be reasoning on the basis of what in effect are other religious canons. One accepts one's own canon by faith, but in so far as one accepts the principles of other canons, e.g., the dogmas of Greek metaphysics, which are fundamentally religious in nature, one is persuaded that one accepts these principles on rational grounds, which rational argument can then be used as a support for the truth of one's own canon.

155,

content of the biblical messàge unsolved. In the process of attempting to develop a hermeneutical principle it is possible that the uniqueness of the contents of the scriptures may be discovered, so that its specific religious nature need no longer rest upon beliefs regarding its divine source. Let us now consider three possible hermeneutical principles and the metaphysical implications which these hermeneutical principles may be found to have. The first possibility is an interpretation of the Bible in which it is set forth as being primarily a code of laws to be obeyed. In such a case there need be no internal necessity uniting the particular laws other than that they all happen to belong to the same legal code. Similarly this is also the case when the obedience required is not the keeping of certain commandments, but rather the belief of certain doctrines. Here there need be no internal necessity uniting the several loci. On the other hand, the giver of the laws or the revealer of the doctrines must exist, and there must be objective rewards and punishments for the obedient and the disobedient, either in this world or in the world to come. While the social group itself may be able for a time to identify this objective divine authority with its own will, in time the inescapable relativism which characterizes every social group will necessitate a distinction between the social group and the God to which it appeals. In the effort to develop such a concept of a cosmic law or doctrine giver, and an appropriate scheme of rewards and punishments, a metaphysics becomes involved. In this connection a distinction between natural and revealed theology may arise. The revealed theology, i.e., the canon, may be "supernatural" in its transcendence of logical canons and the requirements of coherence, but attempts will continue to be made to show that it is "natural," i.e., that there are objective grounds for asserting that there should be such a "supernatural" revelation. The world view which would be developed in this connection would quite likely be conceived as universally true in an ontological sense. There would be no necessary reason for viewing it as having a validity uniquely religious in nature. 50

50

It should be recognized in this connection that the law which the Bible

contains need not be viewed as supernatural in nature. Particularly

as it is

recognized that the law in question is fundamentally similar to laws having other sources, e.g., the code of Hammurabi, the tendency may be to distinguish

ij6

In connection with the metaphysical implications of the legalistic view, the possibility of a second interpretation of the Bible presents itself. Here attention becomes focused on the metaphysical substructure upon which the biblical revelation presumably rests. As increasing emphasis is placed upon this metaphysical foundation, the development which Nygren traces in his discussion of the distinction between articuli puri et mixti in the period of Protestant orthodoxy takes place. The philosophical doctrines of God and divine things, by which the truth of revelation is guaranteed, become viewed as sufficient in themselves, the result being the rational religion of the Enlightenment. It should be noted that this rational religion may be of the Kantian type, but it may also be a religion characterized by man's striving to achieve eternal values, rather than his obedience to moral law. It is significant that Kantian natural religion develops out of Pietism, and is a rationalizing of the moral law, while other natural religions are a return to the hierarchy of values of ancient Greek philosophy. Thus there are natural theologies of both the eros and the nomos types. It is obvious that in a rational religion of the eros type the requirement of unique religious validity again does not exist. On the contrary the attempt will be made to show that such knowledge is ultimate ontological truth in a metaphysical sense. There is also a third approach to an interpretation of the Bible. Here revelation is found in the history which the Bible records, events in this historical record being interpreted as "saving events." In so far as such an interpretation is strictly based upon the revelatory events themselves, a unique coherence between these events will have to be recognizable, for it is only in this way that the events can be related to each other. The moment that a loci method has been admitted, so that no necessity relating the events is required, it is evident that unity is being derived from another source than from the revelatory events themselves. By this is meant that a loci 51

between natural and supernatural elements within the law, or to interpret the law in toto as ultimately rational in the Kantian sense, deleting those portions which cannot be so interpreted. Just the same, the existence of God and the belief in rewards and punishments become the moral postulates of such a rational law, so that the metaphysical implications tend to be the same. 51

D V G , pp. 7 — 8 .

57

1

theology cannot be a theology radically based upon historical revelation. With respect to the objective existence of the events found revelatory, since these events are a part of the ordinary spatiotemporal experience, no particular problem arises at this point. Consequently no metaphysical arguments are necessary to assure their objective existence. The problem of their objectivity at this point is no different from the problem of the objectivity of our ordinary experience. The objectivity of these events as a source of revelation will, on the other hand, depend on the unique pattern of interrelatedness which has been recognized as knitting these events together. This interrelatedness can be interpreted in such a way as to imply a particular metaphysical world view, which in turn may be found to be vulnerable at many points. Attempts may even be made to use the revelatory events as historical arguments for such a metaphysical world view, which is defensible on no other grounds. Philosophical criticism in this connection could lead to the sceptical rejection of the revelation here involved altogether. Yet the objectivity of the fundamental experience, by which is meant the events themselves together with the unique coherence by which they may be found to be related, must be regulative of the objectivity of any further interpretation based upon this experience. Thus as long as the events remain and the pattern of interrelatedness by which they become revelatory remains, the objectivity of such interpretations is secured. On the other hand, in so far as there are several possible coherent patterns by which these events may be related, some making metaphysical claims which others do not make, these several schemes of interpretation may remain as alternate hypotheses. It may even be found important to insist that several such alternate hypotheses must be permitted to exist in dialectical tension with each other. That this third method of interpretation will operate with the concept of the uniqueness of religious experience is apparent, since revelation here is understood not as a unique source of knowledge, which in content may not otherwise be unique, but as a unique relationship as such. If we consider the methodological problem in relation to the rj8

metaphysical implications of these three methods, it is evident that these three types of religious interpretation reveal fundamental methodological differences. Whereas the first two hermeneutical types may not seek to establish any unique form of objective validity in the religious domain, they will be concerned to establish the objective existence of a reality which is in the final analysis metaphysical in nature. On the other hand, a principle of religious interpretation based radically on historical revelation will in turn base its objectivity upon a unique interrelatedness found to exist among the revelatory events. This interrelatedness will be found within the realm of experience, while the objective existence which the other methods will seek to establish will largely be found outside of experience. As this survey of the hermeneutical problem has indicated, there seem to be primarily two alternatives: interpretations which in the final analysis involve ontological affirmations, metaphysical in nature, and an interpretation which is fundamentally historical in nature. The problem, therefore, is how, if these are the actual alternately possible religious interpretations, a transcendental deduction of the religious category can be carried out. How can the method which Nygren has developed in Religiöst apriori and Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning be related to both metaphysical and nonmetaphysical types of religious interpretation? We shall now examine more closely the nature of the religious apriori as Nygren defines it by use of the critical transcendental method.

3. The Transcendental Deduction of the Religious Category

We have thus far concluded that the descriptive and the critical approaches to the problem of religious validity may not be distinguished as sharply as Nygren seeks to distinguish them, and that a descriptive-critical analysis of the various religious types indicates that they tend to divide into two fundamentally metaphysical types, as over against one fundamentally nonmetaphysical type. We have furthermore concluded that these several types together constitute the structuring form which characterizes the religious category. 159,

Our question now is, Is Nygren's transcendental deduction of the religious category, as it is to be found outlined in Religiöst apriori and Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning such that a religious category characterized by alternately possible structuring forms can thereby be derived? That is, Is the transcendental deduction of the religious category, as Nygren outlines it, primarily designed to establish the existence of a transcendent reality, or is it designed to define the alternately possible forms of concrete relatedness to be found in the religious domain, whether they be conceived in metaphysical or nonmetaphysical terms, relating them in turn with the necessity to be found in the other domains of experience? To answer this question we must examine Nygren's argument as it is to be found in the two books mentioned above. Though in Religiöst apriori Nygren develops his concept of the apriori against the background of an analysis of the concept of the apriori in Plato, the Stoics, Neoplatonism, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fries, Simmel, Vaihinger, Lotze, Windelband, and Rickert, his transcendental deduction of religion, as the name implies, is more specifically related to the transcendental apriori to be found in Kant, and later developed in relation to religious experience by Schleiermacher and Carl Stange. The positive presentation of the transcendental deduction is to be found in the description and criticism of the transcendental deduction in Schleiermacher and Stange, followed by Nygren's own development of the deduction. In Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning Schleiermacher's deduction is presented in greater detail. Thus in the following, the discussion of Schleiermacher will largely be drawn from Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning, while the discussion of Stange and Nygren's own statement of the transcendental deduction of religion will be drawn from Religiöst apriori. From Kant Nygren takes only the idea of the transcendental deduction, as it is found expressed in this statement: "Die transz. Deduktion aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Prinzipium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muss, nämlich dieses: dass sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen, . . . . Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig. 52

52

160

RA, pp. 98—136.

Die Entwicklung der Erfahrung aber, worin sie angetroffen werden, ist nicht ihre Deduction (sondern Illustration) weil sie dabei doch nur zufällig sein würden. Ohne diese ursprüngliche Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, in welcher alle Gegenstände der Erkenntnis vorkommen, würde die Beziehung derselben auf irgendein Objekt gar nicht begriffen werden können." While Kant no doubt intended this reference primarily to apply to the spatiotemporal causal relations in the theoretical domain, Nygren finds in this statement "the idea of the transcendental deduction" and interprets the concept of experience so as to include ethical and religious, as well as theoretical experience. Hjalmar Lindroth has directed criticism at Nygren at this point, arguing that when one considers the citation from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in its context one finds that Kant is concerned with the question as to how knowledge of an object is possible, and that therefore the concept of validity cannot be abstracted from the problem of objective reality. Lindroth does not take into account, 53

54

53

K r . d . r . V . , A 9 4 / B 1 2 6 . Cited by Nygren, R A , p. 207. The omission indi-

cated in the citation is a parenthesis, which reads as follows: "(es sei der A n schauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens)." C f . supra, p. 57 f., n. 81. 64

"Anders Nygrens kriticism," Nordisk

Bring den 10 juli 1955

teologi, Idéer

och mäny till

Ragnar

(Lund, 1955), p. 1 7 2 f f . Lindroth develops his critique in

greater detail in "Anders Nygren und der Kritizismus." In this discussion he seeks to show that Nygren's critical theory of experience does not correspond with the critical philosophy, as it may be historically defined in terms of the writings of Kant and Schleiermacher, pp. 146,

155. Since, however,

Nygren's

use of Kant and Schleiermacher is primarily systematic, this is to be expected. More important is the concept of the critical method as such, as contrasted with dogmatism and scepticism. Lindroth states that in the theoretical domain the critical method consists of an investigation of the possibility of factual knowledge. But he thereupon

tends to hypostasize

"factual" and "possible"

elements in

knowledge, pp. 1 0 4 — 1 0 6 , 1 1 6 , so that the critical method consists in bringing these two elements together. While Schleiermacher may have thought in some such terms, pp. 1 1 2 — 1 1 3 ,

139—140,

145, for Kant the possibility of factual

knowledge did not consist in abstracting possible knowledge from it, but in recognizing presuppositions which must be valid if the knowledge in question is to be valid. If one generalizes this procedure, so that it can be applied to all forms of experience, one has the expression Nygren uses, " T h a t which must be valid if anything at all is to be valid." pp. 93, 129, 147. The

relationship between

the presuppositions

and the validity

of

specific

instances of knowledge, or of other forms of experience, is to be sure logical.

II — Erling

161

however, the fact to which Nygren has drawn attention, that Kant in his other two critiques is also concerned to define the nature of the apriori. The fact that validity here is not bound to knowledge of an object in the same sense that Lindroth feels it is so bound in the theoretical domain would seem to suggest that possibly an abstraction centering attention primarily on validity as such could be made in the theoretical domain as well. It must be granted, however, that Nygren does not derive much more than the idea of the transcendental deduction from Kant. Nygren argues that Kant did not apply the transcendental method to religion, that whereas there is a theoretical, an ethical, and an aesthetic critique, Kant has worked out no corresponding critique in the religious domain. Kant instead views religion under the category of ethics and does not recognize its uniqueness as over against ethical experience. Nygren attributes this to Kant's deficient acquaintance with religion and states that in order to find the transcendental deduction carried out in relation to religion we must turn to Schleiermacher. 55

56

57

But this is an abstraction which takes place within experience in order to grasp the nature of its validity. In defining this validity with respect to the factual knowledge of the natural sciences, the category of causality has more importance than Lindroth grants it. pp. 97—98. Cf., however, p. 1 1 7 . In the deduction of the schema of causality the forms of perception are also involved. See supra, p. 82 f. and infra, p. 1 8 1 . See also Charles W . Hendel, "Introduction," Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy A 146—147/B 185—186.

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. 1, pp. 1 2 — 1 5 and Kr. d. r. V.,

The question which the critical theory of

experience

raises is whether some such categories can be found to be basic to other areas of experience as well. 55

R A , p. 2 1 5 .

56

For the distinction between validity and reality, see supra, p. 30 f f . The

purpose of making this distinction is to center attention upon different forms of synthetic relations in experience. Lindroth, apparently, does not see the possibility of interpreting the apriori in such terms. H e identifies theoretical validity with the logical apriori, p. 172, which would suggest analytic rather than synthetic validity, failing to recognize sufficiently, as indicated above, the importance of the causal category in this connection. If

experience, however, is viewed as

revealing different forms of synthetic relations, despite the difficulty Lindroth has with such a concept, a critical theory of experience could well be needed to examine these different forms, pp. 147, 175. 57

162

R A , pp. 2 1 5 — 2 1 8 , D V G , pp. 65—66.

Yet this judgment with respect to Kant should perhaps be subjected to closer scrutiny. When we compare Schleiermacher and Kant we find that Schleiermacher has not actually added another critique to the three which we find in Kant. When Kant states that the two fundamental divisions in philosophy are the theoretical and the practical, the former dealing with the concept of nature, the latter with the concept of freedom, this corresponds to Schleiermacher's division of the sciences into physics and ethics. Both Kant and Schleiermacher deal with the problem of how these two domains of experience are to be related with each other. Kant develops his Kritik der Urteilskraft to serve this purpose, while for Schleiermacher the Dialektik to some extent has this role. The problem, therefore, is where religion is to be found in this triad, in the realm of nature, or freedom, or what might be considered their unity. Kant places religion on the side of freedom, relating it, however, also to the concept of teleology outlined in the Kritik der Urteilskraf t. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, stresses the relation of religion to the feeling of dependence rather than the feeling of freedom, and thus, while he relates religion to the unity of the ideal and the real, both with respect to thinking and willing, in so far as the religious object enters into experience (for the unity which is presupposed in thinking and doing is as such not experienced), it tends to be the feeling of absolute dependence to be found on the side of nature. In accepting Schleiermacher's definition of religion to the extent that one must conclude that Kant had no understanding of religion,, one may simply be preferring an antinomian Herrnhutist pietism to the more legalistic type of pietism in which Kant was reared. If we must grant the religious validity of the nomos motif, we must: expect that when it appears religion will be interpreted largely in 58

59

60

61

58

Kritik

59

The Christian

der Urteilskraft,

pp. x x — x x i .

Faith, eds. H . R. Mackintosh and J . S. Stewart, trans. 2nd

German ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), par. 2, postscript 2. 60

Dialektik,

61

For Schleiermacher's relation to Herrnhutism, see Hjalmar Lindroth, Schleier-

ed. Rudolf Odebrecht (Leipzig, 1942). See esp. pp. 265—297.

machers religionsbegrepp,

vol. I (Uppsala universitets årsskrift 1926, teologi I),

p. 24 f f . Gösta Hök, Zinzendorfs

Begriff

der Religion

(Uppsala universitets års-

skrift 1 9 4 8 : 6 ) , pp. 5—6, argues that Zinzendorf cannot properly be considered a pietist, but is rather a catholic spiritualist. In any case, however Zinzendorf should be characterized, the contrast suggested above would remain.

163,

moralistic terms. While such an interpretation of religion may be subjected to criticism, it should be recognized that such criticism is probably not derived from the concept of religion as such, but from another religious motif standing in contrast to the nomos motif. This need not be taken to mean that Kant's philosophy of religion is to be preferred to Schleiermacher's. What we are seeking is an understanding of religion which is of such a nature that the Kantian approach can be recognized as one of the possible religious types. Kant's philosophy of religion was not such that he presented his religious views as one possible religious type among other possibilities. Therefore his philosophy of religion cannot be viewed as fully critical, but rather as metaphysical and ontological in the final analysis. But the fact that Schleiermacher's analysis excludes the Kantian possibility gives reason to doubt that Schleiermacher either can rightly be called "the critical philosopher of religion par préférence." If Schleiermacher's transcendental deduction of religion is such that the nomos motif is excluded, the further question is whether other real alternate possibilities are provided for in terms of Schleiermacher's category of religion. According to Nygren two transcendental deductions of religion are to be found in Schleiermacher's writings, one which appears in the Dialektik and another which appears in The Christian Faith. These two deductions seem to represent two different approaches to religion which Schleiermacher never fully reconciled. Nygren distinguishes between these two approaches by pointing out that one is related to the identity philosophy, while the other is psychological in nature. Since the term "psychological," as Nygren uses it, contains dif02

65

64

65

62

Kant was of course more interested in ethics than in systematic theology.

Yet the explanation as to w h y his religious views have been regarded as particularly deficient is probably due to the fact that one has wanted to accept his ethics, but not the religious implications Kant felt were bound up with it. 03

D V G , p. 69. 04 Nygren also discusses a deduction to be found in the Ethics, but this does

not seem to represent a third type in contrast to these two. C f . D V G , pp. 9 1 — 9 3 . 65

D V G , pp. 86, 94—96. Lindroth insists that the deduction to be found in

the Dialektik

is not a religious deduction, but rather a deduction of a

philo-

sophical idea of God. The philosophical idea of God and the religious consciousness of God, accordingly, lie on wholly different planes. "Anders Nygren und

16 4

ferent meanings in different contexts, it may be helpful to state this distinction in different terms. If we return to the triad suggested above of nature, freedom, and the unity of the two, and remember that for Schleiermacher this was an exhaustive analysis of the basic categories, the problem is where religion is to be found. There are three possibilities, one of which Schleiermacher rejects, i.e., the Kantian answer of finding religion to be an aspect of freedom or the practical reason. As to the other two possibilities, one is suggested in the Dialektik the other in The Christian Faith. According to the former, Schleiermacher deduces a philosophical idea of God as the unity of the ideal and the real, both with respect to knowing and doing. According to the latter, Schleiermacher places religion on the side of absolute passivity as over against activity, i.e., on the side of nature as over against freedom, and no attempt is made to account for their unity. Yet, we must ask what unity means for Schleiermacher. Is it unity between nature and freedom with which he is concerned? Is it not rather the identity of the real and the ideal with respect to nature on the one hand, and with respect to morality on the other? Schleier06

67

y

der Kritizismus," pp. 1 3 1 — 1 3 5 . The problem involved is similar to Nygren's attempt to conceive the category of eternity in a philosophical as well as a religious sense, R A , p. 239, though Lindroth in criticizing Nygren's attempt does not note this similarity. "Anders Nygren und der Kritizismus," pp.

163—170.

It would seem that whenever the concept of God appears there are ipso facto religious implications. Our concern at this point, however, is not how these two conceptions of God can be combined, but with whether Schleiermacher's deductions permit alternate religious possibilities. 68

There are various ways in which Nygren understands the meaning of the

term "psychological" in relation to religion. H e defines psychology of religion as one of the descriptive genetic sciences of religion. R A , p. 5, R G , p. 1 1 . In another connection he contrasts "psychological necessity" with

"transcendental

necessity." R A , p. 146. Here it seems that psychological necessity refers to a causal determinism of the kind to be found in the natural sciences. It is not indicated, however, why deterministic

in

a

the necessity found in the human psyche must be

quasi-mechanistic

sense.

When

Nygren

refers

to

various

approaches to the religious apriori as being psychological in nature, yet another meaning of psychological is in question. Psychological here means an attempt to interpret the whole of religious experience in terms of its psychological source, such as Rudolf Otto's theory of an original religious disposition. R A , pp. 1 5 2 — 154. 67

The Christian Faith, par. 3 : 3 .

165,

macher's concern is primarily epistemological, and his concern is of this nature even with respect to the unity of the ideal and the real in the ethical domain. It does not seem that the unity of the theoretical and the ethical is the basic concern. As soon as one seeks to conceive the meaning of identity at this point, and even when one inquires as to the meaning of the ideal and the real in the ethical domain as such, special problems arise. This becomes especially apparent if the existence of real alternate ethical possibilities is granted. It is possible to conceive an identity of the ideal and the real in an epistemological sense, viewed in analogy to the transcendental unity of apperception, since with respect to knowing there appears to be but one possibility. Here we have to do with identity, a fundamental unity. But this is not the case in ethics. If there is to be identity of the real and the ideal, with which ideal is the real to be identified? If one denies that there is more than one ideal, there need be no problem, but then this identity has quite likely become the metaphysical identity of an axiological ethics, where in the final analysis there is no distinction between nature and freedom. But if identity, primarily epistemologically conceived, is what Schleiermacher is interested in, we can see how passivity becomes the fundamental point of departure. Consequently his distinction between feeling, knowing, and doing in The Christian Faith, paragraph 3, while it is expressed in psychological terms, is intimately related to his distinction between dependence and freedom in paragraph 4. Ultimately it is feeling which stands over against knowing and doing. "It belongs altogether to the realm of receptivity, it is entirely abiding-in-self But as such it is a receptivity which must in the final analysis be characterized by an absolute dependence. Thus it becomes knowing which has the mediating role, for while knowing is also mainly receptive, it is also active, and as such it mediates, with all other activity in the final analysis presupposing this mediation. 68

69

70

68 Nygren finds it difficult to relate these two paragraphs since in par. 3 the analysis is psychological and in par. 4 it becomes transcendental in nature. D V G , p. 94 ff. 69

The Christian

70

Hence also the mediating role of the Dialektik,

Faith, par. 3 : 3 .

knowing, in Schleiermacher's system. See supra, p. 163.

166

which is an analysis of

Yet our concern is not to enter further into a discussion of the distinctions Schleiermacher makes at this point, but simply to discover whether Schleiermacher's category of religion admits of alternate possibilities. In limiting religion to the realm of passive receptivity, Schleiermacher has, it would seem, excluded those possibilities in which religion is viewed either in terms of activity, or in terms of a dialectical relationship between receptivity and activity. Does Schleiermacher, however, within the context of consciousness of absolute dependence leave room for real alternate possibilities? Here it would appear that Schleiermacher's concept of individuality and historical religion might call for an affirmative answer. In contrast to the philosophy of religion of the Enlightenment, which held that there was a natural religion containing the core of rational religious truth to be found in all religions, while the positive, historically conditioned supplementary material to be found in the several religions in addition to this inner essence was viewed as only negative in its significance, Schleiermacher insisted that there is no natural religion. Rather all true religion is positive and historical. In this view the variety and the differences of the religions are necessary and inescapable, not as limitations of religion, but as proceeding from its essence. Nygren approves wholeheartedly of this emphasis on historical rather than natural religion. But when he examines more closely the way in which Schleiermacher develops his analysis of the historical religions, he finds it necessary to criticize Schleiermacher's effort to distinguish between the various historical religions, using the evolutionary concept of differing stages of development. Here it seems to Nygren that Schleiermacher is using a speculative rather than a purely critical approach to the problem of religious classification. This tends to mean that the most significant differences to be found among the historical religions will not be different forms on the same level of development, but the different levels of development themselves, i.e., fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. Here an evolutionary concept closely related to the cultural development of a world view has become a determinative factor with respect to the method of classification being used. 71

71

DVG, pp. 138—139.

167

When we consider the highest form of religious development, namely monotheism, upon which level Christianity appears, the question arises as to whether or not here the alternate possibilities for which we are seeking may be found. According to Schleiermacher, Christianity is monotheistic, with reference to its stage of development, teleological, with reference to its kind, whereas its individual nature depends upon its close relation to the person of its founder, Jesus. What Schleiermacher means by different stages of development has already been suggested. The distinction with respect to kind refers to the contrast between teleological and aesthetic religion, the former being ethical in nature, the latter passive and resigned. Schleiermacher finds this contrast most clearly evident between Greek polytheism and Christianity, where there is difference also with respect to stage of development, but he finds this difference also manifesting itself on the monotheistic level as Christianity and Judaism, which are teleological, are compared with Islam, which is aesthetic in nature. Thus at this point there may be a basis for a real distinction on the same level of development, though it should be understood that even here the difference does not appear with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence. The remaining concept in the definition of Christianity which has not been accounted for is the concept of redemption. This concept is introduced because when we speak of any particular realization of the religious category of absolute dependence, it is evident that the ideal of the religious life would be that the feeling of absolute dependence were continually dominant. Empirically we know that this is not the case. The feeling of absolute dependence comes to dominance only through redemption. The situation in which man actually finds himself can be described as "an absence of facility for introducing the God-consciousness into the course of our actual lives and retaining it there. . . . This condition is nothing but a kind of imprisonment or constraint of the feeling of absolute depen72

73

74

72

The following discussion of Schleiermacher's effort to define the essence

of Christianity follows very closely Nygren's critique in D V G , pp. 1 4 4 — 1 5 0 . 73

The Christian

74

" T h e feeling of absolute dependence is in itself perfectly simple, and the

Faith, par. 1 1 .

conception of it provides no basis of differentiation." Ibid., par. 9: 1.

168

dence." The various religions have as their purpose, therefore, to bring the feeling of absolute dependence, or the God-consciousness, to uninhibited supremacy. Thus Christianity is the religion where the God-consciousness is awakened and strengthened through the influence of the person of Jesus. The religious significance of the person of Jesus consists in the fact that the imprisoned feeling of absolute dependence is liberated as one comes into relation with Jesus. Redemption, therefore, becomes a mediating concept between the feeling of absolute dependence and the person of Jesus. Christianity is a religion of redemption where there is redemption through Jesus. Both of these determinations are equally essential and reciprocally condition each other. Actually all historical religion seeks to lessen the constraint on the feeling of absolute dependence. An evidence of this fact is seen in the many offerings and rites of purification which we are accustomed to find wherever we find religion. Christianity is distinguished at this point in only two ways. First and foremost, redemption in Christianity is not only a single religious element along side of others, but is itself the center. The other is that redemption is completely realized through Jesus. On the other hand, such elements in Christianity as are not related to redemption and the Redeemer belong no more intimately to Christianity than to any other monotheistic faith. We must ask, however, whether Christianity has really been distinguished from other religions by this definition. To answer this question we must determine what redemption actually means for Schleiermacher, and we find it determined entirely by the concept of the feeling of absolute dependence. Redemption means nothing else than liberating the constrained feeling of dependence. Under such conditions it is apparent that the concept of redemption by no means guarantees the distinctive character of Christianity. The only thing that could serve as such a guarantee would be reference to the person of Jesus. But in Schleiermacher's opinion this would mean that the difference between Christianity and other religions would be merely external in nature, that the religious elements in these religions would be the same, only the personality of the 75

76

75

Ibid., par. 1 1 : 2 .

76

Ibid., par. 1 1 : 3.

169,

founder would be different. Rather Schleiermacher insists the difference is "that only through Jesus, and thus only in Christianity, has redemption become the central point of religion." Here Nygren insists that Schleiermacher has unknowingly directed criticism against his own position. For even if we overlook the rather dubious assertion that in Christianity alone redemption is the central element, we cannot grant that the distinction between Christianity and the other religions, which Schleiermacher has sought to make by means of the concept of redemption, actually is adequate. For even after the concept of redemption is brought in, Schleiermacher is ultimately acquainted with religious elements of only one sort. Through it all the feeling of absolute dependence continues to be decisive. Whether we meet it at the beginning as the transcendental presupposition lying at the ground of all religion, or now as the liberated feeling of dependence brought about through the redemption of Jesus of Nazareth, it has the same content in both cases. Redemption through Christ in no way puts its characteristic stamp upon the feeling of absolute dependence. This continues to maintain what is from a Christian viewpoint its completely indifferent nature. Christianity has its great significance en route toward the feeling of absolute dependence. In Schleiermacher there is even the suggestion that Christianity is the only religion which really does liberate the constrained feeling of absolute dependence. But when we have arrived at the goal, every trace of the specifically Christian is obliterated. Here we have to do only with the feeling of absolute dependence which lies beyond the differences between the various historical religions. Nygren traces Schleiermacher's difficulty in distinguishing that which is specifically Christian to the fact that he has abandoned the critical method which he acknowledges at the outset, which would have led him, after having defined the religious category, to set forth empirically the way in which this category is historically realized. In attempting to derive everything from the feeling of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher is unable to distinguish between the various religions without abandoning the principle of religious autonomy, for there is no basis in the feeling of absolute dependence 77

77

I/O

Ibid., par. 1 1 : 4 .

-for the differentiation which we find in the history of religion. The basis for this differentiation must therefore be found in nonreligious factors. In the various levels of religious development, it is the height of the development of world and self-consciousness that is decisive, while the kinds of religion are distinguished by their relation to the natural and the ethical. In both instances we have to do with religiously heteronomous criteria. In setting forth the unique nature of Christianity, Schleiermacher makes use of distinctions drawn from the psychology of religion. He distinguishes between the feeling of absolute dependence as free or bound, actual or passive. The situation into which Christianity enters is one marked by a dormant feeling of absolute dependence. The significance of Christianity lies in the fact that it frees and actualizes the feeling of absolute dependence, and the way in which this happens is that a person is set in relation to Jesus Christ, who is distinguished from all men "by the constant potency of his Godconsciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in him." A brief formula expressing the essence of Christianity would be: Christianity is the feeling of absolute dependence, awakened and liberated through the feeling of absolute dependence of Jesus Christ. Nygren holds that Schleiermacher in coming to such a conclusion has deserted his original critical position. The feeling of absolute dependence, which originally meant the transcendental religious category, and which as such had only formal character, now has been changed into the actual content of religion, and there is consequently little to distinguish such a religious category from the natural religion of the Enlightenment. In any case it seems apparent that Schleiermacher has not succeeded in defining the religious category in such a way that it provides for fundamentally different religious types. It should be added that Schleiermacher also makes use of the term "individual" to distinguish different religions of the same

78

79

80

78

See supra, p. 168, n. 74. The Christian Faith, par. 94. 80 W e note here the difficulty of abstracting form from content, particularly if the form is to be viewed as the element of validity to be found in religious experience. C f . supra, p. 1 3 6 f f . 79

171,

kind. Here we might have a conception of the differences within the historical realization of the religious category which Nygren would find acceptable. However, Schleiermacher draws his analogy of individuality from the natural sciences, indicating that these differences are not fundamental in nature. He will not grant that there can be actual alternate religious possibilities on the same level of religious development. Rather, "it is only in appearance that each faith has some element which is entirely absent in others." The individuality of which he speaks in no way enters into the essence of religion. At this point we must ask, Could Schleiermacher's transcendental deduction of religion be adapted to Nygren's method of motif research if it were carried out in a more strictly critical manner? Nygren, who charges Schleiermacher's errors to his abandonment of the critical method at decisive points, is apparently of this opinion. The crucial question here would seem to be, In what sense is the religious category related to the validity of its religious content? If the validity is to be found in the category, the differences to be found in the content could be either nonreligious in nature, or fundamentally irrelevant with respect to the problem of validity, e.g., differences of "color and tone." If, however, there were to be valid religious differences of a more fundamental nature, it would seem that the category would have to be conceived in such a way that the possible nature of these differences was defined. Thus if Schleiermacher's method were to be revised, it is not simply the possibility of fundamental religious differences which would have to be allowed, but the nature of the religious category would have to be redefined to provide for these differences. But this would possibly call for a fundamental revision of the transcendental deduction throughout. 81

82

83

81

The Christian

82

Ibid., par. 10: 2.

83

" I n every individual religion the God-consciousness, which in itself remains

the same everywhere

Faith, par. 10.

on the same level, is attached to some relation of the self-

consciousness in such an especial w a y that only thereby can it unite with other determinations of the self-consciousness; so that all other relations are subordinate to this one, and it communicates to all others its colour and its tone." Ibid., par. 10: 3. The italics are my own.

172

In Religiöst apriori Nygren, prior to presenting his own transcendental deduction of the religious category, outlines such a transcendental deduction as it is to be found in the writings of Carl Stange. We must seek to determine, therefore, whether Stange presents an analysis of the religious category, which is such that real alternate possibilities are conceivable. When one reads Stange's Das Problem der Religion, one finds at many points the same approach to the problem of religious validity which Nygren makes. Stange also finds that Kant and Schleiermacher have outlined the correct approach to this problem. "Hier in der Tat die sicheren Grundlagen eines wissenschaftlichen Verständnisses der Religion gegeben sind." He points out, also, that while Kant's understanding of religion is deficient, his understanding of the scientific task of the science of religion is of abiding significance. Schleiermacher's importance is that he applies with greater consistency the critical method in the field of religion. Stange thereupon proceeds to criticize Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence, pointing out that it is not possible in terms of it to account for the variety to be found in religion, so that all that makes for variety in religion becomes either heterogeneous or indifferent thereto. Stange, therefore, feels that Schleiermacher's concept of God needs supplementation. He suggests that the feeling of absolute obligation and the feeling of absolute blessedness be added to the feeling of absolute dependence, so that the object of religious experience will thereby appear as invisible power, infinite spirit, and unconditioned will. It is to the degree that these various 84

85

86

87

88

89

84

Christentum

und moderne

Weltanschauung

I. Das Problem

der

Religion,

2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1 9 1 3 ) . 85

Ibid,y p. 22.

86

Ibid., pp. 37, 4 1 .

87

"In diesen Ausführungen Schleiermachers zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte

der Religionsphilosophie die Idee einer exakten Wissenschaft von der Religion uns entgegentritt." Ibid., p. 47. 88

" E s liegt in der Natur der Sache, dass das Gefühl der schlechthinigen A b -

hängigkeit selbst eine mannigfaltigkeit nicht zulässt. . . . Das Moment der Vielheit kommt infolgedessen in das Gottesbewusstsein immer nur durch die Vermittlung des Weltbewusstseins." Ibid., p. 52. 89 " U n d so würde dann neben das Gefühl der schlechithinigen Abhängigkeit das Gefühl der absoluten Verpflichtung und das Gefühl der absoluten Seligkeit

173,

factors come to full realization in a religion that the value of this religion is judged. That which particularly interests Nygren in Stange's analysis is his use of the Kant-Schleiermacher method of transcendental deduction to demonstrate epistemologically that religion is a necessary and integrating aspect of the life of the human spirit. Stange analyzes the concept of experience and the intuitions by which we assert the reality of our experience. With respect to our sense experience, there are two intuitions which we use, the external sensory intuitions, the concreteness of which enables us to assert objective reality for our experience, and internal intuitions of the concrete character of the self, by which we are able to assert that our knowledge belongs to the unity of our personal experience. Thus through intuition our experience is united with reality and is distinguished from what would be simply a realm of ideas. But through intuitive sense experience just one side of the relation between experience and reality is determined. It is established that it belongs to the essence of experience that it is real. But with logical necessity one must ask the converse. Does it belong to the essence of reality that it be sense experience? That is, is sense experience the whole of reality, or are there forms of reality that do not present themselves in the form of sense experience? This is a question which cannot be answered within the realm of sense experience. Thus there must be an additional special kind of intuition which concerns itself with that which lies beyond sense 90

01

92

93

treten und in diesen drei Grundformen des frommen Gefühls würde man dann viel eher eine vollständige und erschöpfende Darstellung des Gottesbewusstseins sehen können." Ibid.,

p. 56. "Die drei Begriffe des Übersinnlichen, des Unend-

lichen und des Unbedingten stellen die drei elementaren Kategorien dar, an denen alle religiösen Vorstellungen orientiert sein müssen; indem aber diese drei elementaren Kategorien auf die durch die religiöse Anschauung gegebene Wirklichkeit bezogen werden, erscheint der Gegenstand der religiösen Erfahrung als übersinnliche Macht, als unendlicher Geist und als unbedingter Wille." Ibid., 90

p. 1 0 1 .

"Der Wert der einzelnen Religion hängt davon ab, ob und in welchem

Masse in ihr die Kategorien des Ubersinnlichen, unendlichen und Unbedingten in der Anwendung auf die der religiösen Anschauung gegebene Wirklichkeit eine Rolle spielen." Ibid., p. 105. 91

R A , pp. 224, 2 2 7 f., Das Problem der Religion, p. 83.

92

Das Problem

93

Ibid., pp. 80—81.

174,

der Religion, pp. 74—78.

experience. It is in pointing to this nonsensory intuition that the transcendental method, as Stange uses it, has reached its goal. Stange holds that he has established that religion is not an arbitrary phenomenon, but is inescapably bound with the essence of consciousness. Since, furthermore, in every moment we must decide whether sense experience is exhaustive of reality, there is no moment of experience when the religious question is not faced. Nygren finds difficulty with Stange's theory at the point of his concept of the religious intuition. One of the marks of intuition is its character of being positively given, by which it distinguishes itself from conceptual thinking, whereby the objects of intuition are related to each other. Sense intuitions undoubtedly have such a positively given character, by which they are legitimized as intuitions. The status of the internal intuition of the self is more doubtful. The self which is here in question, which Kant called "the transcendental unity of apperception," is no doubt present as an element in every experience, but whether it is present as an immediate intuition is a question which cannot be answered affirmatively without further investigation. The epistemological difficulties become even greater when an effort is made to include a religious intuition, for here definition seems possible only in negative terms. Such negative characterization seems to be all that Stange wants to achieve. He is only concerned to develop epistemologically a conceptual construction of the religious intuition. Under such circum94

95

96

97

94

Ibid., p. 83.

95

Ibid., pp. 84, 87—88.

96

"Even if it is granted that such a religious intuition lies at the basis of the

religious life, it is difficult to see how the positive character of this intuition can be validated by means of a sense experience oriented epistemology, and how this religious intuition can be made parallel with the external sense intuition and the internal intuition of the self." R A , p. 228. 97

"But the difficulty becomes even greater epistemologically when the concept

of intuition is extended to include also the religious intuition. For here it is seen that every attempt to determine epistemologically the concept of the religious intuition must use negative determinations, such as the intuition of the nonsensory, the unmediated conviction that the reality given in sense experience is not the whole of reality, etc. This would seem to mean that as long as one stays within

the limits of

epistemology

it is impossible to speak

positively

of

a

religious intuition, that is to say, that it cannot be positively established, but only negatively postulated." R A , p. 228—229.

175,

stances it is enough simply to determine it negatively, for all that is needed is to show the point where the question of the completeness of experience arises, the question which the religious intuition is concerned to answer. Nygren holds, however, that the transcendental method would go further than this. It is not enough to show that the religious question necessarily arises, or that a position must necessarily be taken with respect to this question. It must also be shown in what direction the answer is to be made. According to Nygren, Stange has not taken this last step since in order to establish the realistic reference of religion he has gone outside the realm of the transcendental method, pointing out various kinds of intuitions. If, then, Stange were to show how the religious intuition is the necessary condition for experience in general, he would have to develop its positive epistemological content, which he does not want to do, preferring to appeal to revelation as giving content to the religious intuition. Our concern in this connection, however, is not to determine whether Stange has gone as far within the context of the transcendental method as it is possible to go, but whether the category of religion which he defines is such that it admits of fundamentally different religious alternatives. Here it seems that the answer must be in the negative. Stange seeks to establish the existence of a religious reality in addition to the spatiotemporal reality which the natural sciences examine. Can this reality, then, be one or many? There is no indication that Stange conceives of any real alternate possibilities. He seeks to supplement Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence, but only in order to secure two other factors, infinite spirit and unconditioned will, by which it is possible to measure the value of the several religions. By means of this threefold characterization of the God-concept Stange feels it is possible to find a standard for the comparison of the historical religions, which the concept of evolutionary development cannot provide. 98

99

1

98

" T h e transcendental method seeks to go a step further and show that it is

necessary to recognize the basic value of religion, taking a positive position in relation to it, for this is 'the condition for the possibility of experience.' "

Ibid

p. 229. C f . supra, pp. 107 ff. and 134 f. where this requirement is interpreted in a somewhat different way. 99 1

176,

Das Problem der Religion, pp. 1 1 — 1 2 . Ibid., pp. 106,

hi—112.

We must conclude as a result of this investigation that neither of the two authors, to which Nygren refers in presenting his own transcendental deduction of the religious category, presents us with deductions which admit of fundamentally different forms of religious necessity as constituting the content of the religious category. Furthermore, one is led to believe that revision of their deductions, which would provide for such a possibility, would have to be quite basic and thoroughgoing in nature. Our question now becomes, Is Nygren's revision of the method of the transcendental deduction of religion such that a category providing for real alternate possibilities can be defined thereby? We must now examine his development of the transcendental deduction of religion. In contrast to Stange, Nygren believes that it is possible to remain within the realm of consciousness, as the transcendental method does, and find not only grounds for the existence of religion, but also indications as to the nature of its validity. In order to do this we must consider the problem of validity at a point prior to the distinction between idealism and realism. For both idealism and realism there is a distinction between the valid and the invalid. They are also agreed that necessity and universal validity must be acknowledged for that which lies at the basis of validity, without the validity of which there can be no validity. From this point on the paths separate, as realists seek to establish validity by correspondence with objectively existing reality, while idealists are content to remain within the immanent orderedness of the consciousness. But this is a secondary problem, and it is the prior problem with which the transcendental method is concerned. Nygren is seeking to show that there is no validity other than on a religious basis. If this can be shown, then religious experience will no longer be isolated from the other forms of experience. Even though religious experience cannot be regarded exclusively as a form of culture, yet it is not inferior to the other forms of culture in validity and certainty. Rather it is more basic than any of them, in that they rest 2

3

2

R A , p. 232.

3

"In the transcendental deduction of religion it is required that we find an element in religious experience which is such that without it no experience is possible, . . . an element the validity of which must be acknowledged if there is to be any validity at all." R A , p. 233.

12 — Erling

I77

on religious presuppositions and would swing in the air if this foundation were taken away. Nygren's argument, therefore, is as follows: The theoretical, aesthetic, and ethical categories or domains all have this in common that they share and presuppose what might be termed the category of validity. This category or presupposition transcends each of the above categories, for it is not to be accounted for in terms of any of them, nor all of them taken together, but rather it is the category to which all of them appeal. This is made evident by the fact that when one speaks of validity in ultimate terms, one cannot distinguish between theoretical, aesthetic, and ethical validity, for in this sense there is basically only one kind of validity. According to Nygren, the particular way in which the category of validity transcends the categories mentioned may be seen in its relation to the conditions of space and time. Truth, for example, is independent of time and place, even of human consciousness. The presupposition of validity is that we are justified in this regard in raising something over the sphere of space and time. This presupposition, however, by which human life is raised from the realm of the temporal to the realm of the eternal, is fundamentally religious in nature. We find some suggestion of this category in ordinary 4

5

6

7

8

4

R A , pp. 2 3 6 — 2 3 7 .

5

R A , p. 238.

6

Nygren makes this point in Filosofisk och kristen etik. " T o speak of different

kinds of validity can have meaning only with respect to secondary validity. On the other hand it is completely meaningless to seek to distinguish between different kinds of validity on the level of primary validity. . . . Of what kind this primary validity is will have to become apparent at a later point, but this much is now evident

that

one cannot

with

reference

to it distinguish

between

theoretic,

aesthetic, and religious validity." pp. 1 3 9 — 1 4 0 . See the discussion of primary validity, supra, p. 104 f f . 7

"When we attribute validity to something, whether it be an item of know-

ledge, an inclination of the will, or a line of conduct, we thereby raise it above the conditions of sense experience, over the limits of space and time. When we say something is valid, we do not mean that it is valid at that particular time and place, but that it is valid without reference to space and time." R A , p. 238. 8

"But

this presupposition upon which the whole cultural life builds, but

which no single form of culture can establish, nor the several forms of culture taken together, is of a religious order. For religion makes just this claim of raising human life over the sphere of the sensory and finitely given, . . . from the realm of the temporal to the realm of the eternal." R A , p. 239.

178,

language. When we want strongly to assert the validity of something, we say it has eternal validity. This is tautological in the sense that it adds nothing to the concept of validity, but this use of the concept of eternity is not a cultural reference. Rather it is essentially religious. Other designations are used in religion, such as the God concept. But the fact that there are religions, such as Buddhism, which do not use a God concept, suggests that we must use a category by which they also may be included. By the eternal is not meant extension in time, but existence not subject to finitude. Philosophically this means a validity raised over the limits of space and time. Religiously it is that which participates in the life of God. Thus in religious experience we are aware that the reality given us theoretically and practically in sense experience is not the whole of reality, as Stange argued. There is also an eternal world, which, however, does not stand in such an antithetical relation to this world that one must leave this world to participate in the eternal. Rather it is the art of piety to seek in all that is and happens the aspect of eternity, and the stronger it is, the less of the temporal is lost from the eternal world. Thus more and more each moment of life becomes also a religious moment, and all existence is placed sub specie 9

10

ae ternit atis.

11

Religion is in this way shown to be necessary and universally valid and inseparable from the essence of man. As certainly as the rising from the stage of nature to the stage of culture is proper to 9 " T h e category of eternity is the transcendental category of religion, the basic a priori form in which all religious experience exists." Ibid.

10 " I f the category of eternity is to be the religious category, it must be recognized that the concept of eternity must not be interpreted in the vulgar sense of extension in time, but in the purely philosophical and religious sense of the form of existence not subject to the conditions of finitude. From a philosophical point of view this is, negatively, that which is raised over the limits of time and space, and positively, that which is valid. From the religious point of view, that which is eternal is that which participates in the life of God, and must therefore not simply be identified with the eschatological. The pious person is aware of participating in the life of God, not only in the distant future, but here and now. Just as in experience there can be an element of validity which does not have its ground in experience, so also in the temporal there can be that which 'is not of this world' but which has the character of eternity." Ibid. 11

R A , pp. 239—240.

179,

the development of mankind, so also religion is an integrating aspect of human life. Hereby nothing is said as to the content of religion. The category of eternity is truly transcendental in that it is purely formal. Just as the ethical category does not give special directions as to what the ethical content is to be, except that it must stand in a necessary relation to the categorical imperative, so the transcendental apriori of religion represents religious experience only in its most general form, namely that that which is to be religiously valid must stand under the aspect of eternity, sub specie aeternitatis. There are two principles basic to Nygren's argument. The one is that there are several domains of experience which all share the common concept of validity. The other is that there is a reference beyond space and time in the concept of validity, and that thus the category of validity can be identified with the category of eternity. We have previously discussed the problems involved in view of the fact that the validity of the ethical and the aesthetic domains of experience, while it is presupposed in this argument, has not been subjected to the kind of analysis to which theoretical validity has been subjected, i.e., it is not entirely clear as to what is meant when it is suggested that ethical and aesthetic validity can be presupposed. We must now examine the contention that there is a reference beyond space and time in the concept of validity, and that the category of validity can therefore be identified with the category of eternity. Nygren's argument at this point is related primarily to theoretic experience, and he implies that what is true for this domain is true for the entire cultural order. The decisive passage reads as follows: "When we designate something as valid, the meaning therewith is not that it is valid at this particular point in space and time, but that it is valid without reference to space and time. That which is true today was also true yesterday, yes, it was even true before anyone knew about it, and therefore possessed validity, even if it was not recognized as true by any individual consciousness, just as it will continue to be true, even if all consciousness were extinguished. Even if we prefer to think of a consciousness, for which something is true, and find it difficult to follow the thought to its 12

13

12

R A , p. 2 4 1 . C f . supra, p. 1 3 6 f f .

13

See supra, pp. 7 0 — 7 5 .

180

conclusion, as to what meaning truth would have without a consciousness for which it was valid, it is on the other hand an absolutely self-contradictory thought, that truth could ever be anything else than true, and that its logical character should change because a psychological or psychophysical alteration takes place, so that the consciousness, which had given it its recognition, ceases to function." In the first sentence of the citation the more general term of validity is used. Since, however, in the following sentences the reference is to truth, which for Nygren is the kind of validity to be found in the theoretical domain, we shall interpret the first sentence as having reference to truth as well. What is meant in asserting that something is true without reference to space and time? Obviously a distinction is being made between the forms of perception (space and time) and the categories of understanding, such as substance and causality. While it seems meaningful to say that something might be true without reference to space and time, it would be meaningless to say that a causal judgment was true without reference to causality. However, it is doubtful whether Kant would agree to such a separation of the forms of perception from the categories of understanding. Carl Stange points out that in Kant's Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, which is patterned after the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and thus gives Kant occasion in the introduction to discuss the structure of the former book, the transcendental aesthetic is viewed as a part of the transcendental analytic. In a later context in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant discusses nontemporal causality and the Ding an sich, and finds here a way of understanding the freedom of ethical acts as well as divine creation. But it cannot be truths of this kind which Nygren has in mind when he speaks of theoretical truths which are raised above reference to space and time. 14

15

16

14

R A , p. 238.

15

Stange, Die Ethik Kants (Leipzig, 1920), p. 2, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, pp. 3 1 — 3 2 . Norman Kemp Smith points out that Kant's separation of the problems of space and time in the Aesthetic from the treatment of the categories in the Analytic is most unfortunate. N o t only are time and space necessary for an understanding of the categories of causality and reciprocity, but Kant demonstrates in the Analytic that the principles of causality and reciprocity are necessarily involved in the apprehension of time and space. Op. cit., p. 390. 16

Kritik

der praktischen

Vernunft,

pp. 1 7 6 — 1 7 8 ,

182—184.

181

It is interesting to attempt to determine what meaning such a reference to eternal truth might have in view of Einstein's theory of relativity. Actually the term "relativity" in this context is somewhat deceptive, for the theory seeks to establish quite the opposite from what is commonly understood by the term. As Arnold Sommerfeld points out, the theory of relativity does not relativize the perceptions of space and time, but makes natural laws, especially those of electrodynamics and optics, independent of the standpoint of the observer. Louis de Broglie states further that the theory of relativity "rests essentially upon the notion that all the laws of physics can be expressed by 'covariant' equations, that is to say, equations which have the same mathematical form regardless of the system of reference selected or the space-time variables used." Here it seems that we have a way of understanding theoretical truth so that it is not limited to particular points in space and time, but is understood in a more universal sense. Yet it should be recognized that in the theory of relativity there has not been abstraction from space and time. Rather the absoluteness of Newtonian space time has been abandoned, with space time being taken into the equations themselves, which are used to characterize natural law, not as the universal and necessary form of any possible empirical experience in a Kantian sense, but as a systematic relatedness "discovered by a free play of the formal, mathematical, intellectual imagination, and . . . tested by a long sequence of deductive implications, the resultant theorems of which are correlated with observable data." In so far as there are religious implications of such a theory, they tend to be Spinozistic in nature, and it is interesting that it seems to be precisely these aspects of Einstein's position which pre17

18

19

20

17

John Cullberg raises this question. "Den religionsfilosofiska apriorifrågan,"

Kristendomen

och vår tid, X V I I (1922), pp. 1 2 — 1 3 . In a later statement Cull-

berg insists that the concept of validity itself requires analysis. Need validity be understood in absolute terms, or could it be maintained in a relativized form? "Apriorifrågan än en gång," Ibid.,

p. 242. For an analysis of the concept of

validity which moves in a somewhat different direction than the one Cullberg suggests, see infra, p. 187 f f . 18

Arnold

Einstein:

Sommerfeld,

"To

Philosopher-Scientist,

Albert

Einstein's

Seventieth Birthday,"

19

Louis de Broglie, " T h e Scientific Work of Albert Einstein," Ibid.,

20

F. S. C . Northrop, "Einstein's Conception of Science," Ibid., p. 395.

182

Albert

p. 99. p. 1 1 7 .

vented him from accepting fully the developments in quantum mechanics, even though these developments are in many respects simply further elaborations of his own earlier research. We move on now to an examination of the second sentence in the passage cited above. "That which is true today was also true yesterday, yes, it was even true before anyone knew about it, and therefore possessed validity, even if it was not recognized as true by any individual consciousness, just as it will continue to be true, even if all consciousness were extinguished." Whereas the first statement referred to both space and time, this statement refers to time alone and asserts that that which is true at the present moment was also true in the past and will be true in the future. We must attempt to specify more exactly what is meant by the truth which has such an eternal nature. It is obviously not the truth of sense-certainty, which Hegel discusses, using the example, the Now is nighttime. This problem could be overcome by defining truth in a Hegelian sense as referring ultimately to absolute knowledge. But there is another difficulty which arises. This difficulty is that to assert that what is true today was also true yesterday is to assert complete determinism. This is, of course, what Kant affirmed with respect to the truth of the phenomenal order. This seems also to be one of the presuppositions of the principle of causality as conceived in terms of classical physics. 21

22

23

21

For Einstein's Spinozistic faith, see Louis de Broglie, op. cit., p. 103, Philipp

G. Frank, "Einstein, Mach, and Logical Positivism," Ibid., Einstein's criticism of

quantum mechanics,

pp. 285—286.

see "Autobiographical

Notes"

For and

"Remarks to the Essays Appearing in this Collective Volume," Ibid., pp. 8 1 — 8 7 , 666—676. 22

G. W . F. Hegel, The

Phenomenology

of Mind,

trans. J . B. Baillie, 2nd

rev. ed. (London, 1949), pp. 1 5 1 — 1 6 0 . 23

"Given at any time the complete knowledge of the state of a physical

object (which may be a mechanical system, an electromagnetic field, etc.), the future development of the object (or for that matter, its previous development until

it has reached

the state in question)

follows then with

mathematical

certainty from the laws of nature, and is exactly predictable." Walter Heitler, " T h e Departure from Classical Thought in Modern Physics," Albert Philosopher-Scientist,

pp.

181—182.

Heitler continues, stating

Einstein:

that while

the

theory of relativity has not fundamentally changed this classical structure, in so far as the causal development of events is concerned, recent research in the micro-

183,

Such determinism presents problems, however, in the field of moral experience. Here it does not seem that Kant's solution, that the moral agent in the moment of decision may act as a free intelligible noumenal cause, while his actions viewed in a phenomenal time series may be seen as necessarily causally determined, can be accepted as adequate with respect to the problems here involved. The moral consciousness claims a freedom which is also phenomenal in nature, so that it is meaningful to say that the time series could have been different. If this is not the case, one wonders in what sense it is meaningful to speak of real alternate possibilities in the ethical domain. The sentence we are considering also asserts that that which is true today must also be true tomorrow, and that it must continue to be true even if consciousness should cease to exist. To this Nygren adds, "Even if we prefer to think of a consciousness, for which something is true, and find it difficult to follow the thought to its conclusion, as to what meaning truth would have without a consciousness for which it was valid, it is on the other hand an absolutely self-contradictory thought, that truth could ever be anything else than true, and that its logical character should change because a psychological or psychophysical alteration takes place, so that the consciousness, which had given it its recognition, ceases to function." Here the problem is the possible extinction of human consciousness. Since truth seems to have no meaning apart from consciousness, but since human consciousness cannot be conceived as eternal, it appears necessary to postulate a transcendental consciousness, analogous to the transcendental unity of apperception, but eternal in nature. This aspect of Nygren's argument is similar to Schleiermacher's deduction in the Dialektik. In Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning, Nygren compares Schleiermacher's necessary transcendental religious presupposition of knowing and willing with Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. Just as the "I" that thinks is never given as the knowledge content of a psychical moment, but at the same time is the presupposition of all knowing and willing, so the Absolute, or the God-consciousness, is the pre24

scopic world and in quantum mechanics has wrought changes in these concepts. Ibid., p. 182. 24 See the discussion of human freedom, supra, pp. 89 f f a n d 130 ff.

184

supposition of every act of willing and knowing. Furthermore, just as knowing and willing are constitutive of the essence of man, so also the God-consciousness is inseparable from that essence, a necessary and integrating part of the life of the spirit, without which the latter pines away. We have already discussed the implications of the identity Schleiermacher presupposes with respect to alternate ethical possibilities. We must now consider more closely its implications with respect to theoretical truth. It should be noted that Schleiermacher's problem is the possibility of knowledge, not the continuance in being of knowledge, once it has come to exist, which seems to be Nygren's concern at this point. But if with respect to its origin knowledge is by definition the unity of subject and object, it seems unnecessary to postulate a prior unity to make this unity possible, unless one intends to affirm a fundamental difference between the Absolute and the content of knowledge. Thus if one is concerned to affirm undifferentiated being as the ground of knowledge, such a distinction between conceptual knowledge and this absolute ground, possibly known intuitively, would be necessary. But in such a case knowledge is not made eternally valid. Indeed quite the contrary. Precisely its eternal validity would thereby be denied, as knowledge was relegated to the realm of spatiotemporal appearance. With respect to the continuance in being of knowledge, once it has come to exist, the fact that we cannot conceive of any meaning, should human consciousness and thereby all consciousness whatsoever cease to exist, does not suggest that we should postulate an eternal consciousness to provide for such an eventuality. This would mean absolutizing the human consciousness and insisting that all existence be understood in terms of it. 25

26

27

25

D V G , pp. 81, 87—88.

26

Hegel, The Phenomenology

of Mind, p. 7 1 f f .

27

Since we are proposing a somewhat different conception of the religious apriori, we have not thought it necessary in the foregoing discussion to inquire whether the philosophical and the religious aspects of the category of eternity can actually be combined, as Nygren feels they can. R A , p. 239. John Cullberg, "Den religionsfilosofiska apriorifrågan," pp. 1 8 — 1 9 , and more recently Gunnar Hillerdal, Teologisk och filosofisk etik, pp. 1 4 5 — 1 4 6 , have criticized Nygren's transcendental deduction at this point. C f . the discussion of Lindroth's critique, supra, p. 164 f., n. 65. C f . also Soe, Religionsfilosofi, pp. 50—52.

185,

More important than these objections, however, is the question with which we began this discussion: Is the transcendental deduction of the religious category, as Nygren outlines it, primarily designed to establish the existence of a transcendent reality, or is it designed to relate the alternate forms of concrete relatedness to be found in the religious domain with the necessity to be found in the other domains of experience? It seems that in so far as Nygren's argument is based upon the reference beyond space and time, which validity primarily conceived in theoretical terms is presumed to make, we have a form of transcendental deduction of the former sort, i.e., it in the final analysis seeks to establish the existence of a transcendent reality. However, there is another aspect of Nygren's argument which bears further analysis than he has given it, i.e., the fact that it seems meaningful to speak of several domains of experience as sharing the common concept of validity. What might further analysis suggest at this point? When Nygren's deduction is compared with Stange's these three possible problems arise: i) Is it meaningful to speak of religion as constituting a domain of experience in its own right? 2) What is the relation of religious experience to other forms of experience? 3) In what sense may concrete religious experience be affirmed to be valid? Stange is primarily concerned with problems 1) and 3), while Nygren is concerned with problems 1) and 2). The key concept for Stange is reality, while for Nygren it is validity. If one thinks in terms of Stange's deduction, this deduction is, of course, considerably strengthened if it is made to include a stage which treats with problem 2), particularly if it should be found possible to show that the reality with which religion deals is of such a nature that it underlies all other reality which we experience, and makes our experience of this other reality possible. Nygren's substitution of the concept of validity for the concept of reality seems to take care of this deficiency, serving the double purpose of making the method Stange outlines fully transcendental and critical in nature, and laying a foundation for religious validity, which not only establishes this validity, but establishes it in such a way that all other validity is seen to rest upon it. However problem 3) in any case remains. The fact that religion as such has been proved to be valid does not mean that any particular religion is valid. 186

One possible answer at this point, of course, is to say that this is not a problem for the philosophy of religion, but rather a problem for faith. It is faith which must decide whether a particular religion is valid or not. The assistance which the transcendental deduction of religion provides is to assure faith that religion as such is valid, though it cannot indicate which particular religion is valid. Yet the problem is not simply that of choosing between religions, but that of recognizing what religion in its concreteness is. Here the religious category must be defined more specifically than Nygren defines it, for while faith may be able to decide between religions, and may indeed be the only arbiter at this point, it does not appear that faith can decide what is religious and what is not. For example, is it faith or is it the critical theory of experience which decides whether Kant's conception of religion is religion, or simply moralism? Furthermore, is faith in a position to decide whether the historical religions are ultimately one or many? Stange is apparently of the opinion that historical religion, wherever found, has the same basic structure. Can faith decide whether his analysis is correct or not? The foregoing analysis has been predicated on the assumption that we are to think in terms of Stange's transcendental deduction of religion. But suppose one does not begin with Stange at all. If instead of asking whether our spatiotemporal awareness of reality is exhaustive of reality, as Stange does, one were to begin with the concept of validity, the natural procedure would be to begin with a concrete form of validity and inquire as to its relation to other forms of validity. One need not postulate a category of validity to make possible the validity which the various domains of experience have in common, thus deriving a new domain of experience, for such a procedure could be repeated ad infinitum. It would be 28

29

30

28

This is the answer which Nygren tends to give to this problem. See R A , pp. 247—249. 29 "Das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Religionen unter einander lässt vielmehr auch dann eine verschiedene Abvertung zu, wenn grundsätzlich jede einzelne Religion auf den gleichen Bedingungen ruht. Die drei Ideen, welche das Wesen des Gottesbewusstseins ausmachen, müssen allerdings überall da sich nachweisen lassen, wo überhaupt von Religion die Rede sein soll." Das Problem der Religion, p. i n . 30

This is to some extent Tegen's criticism, when he holds that the category

187,

more helpful to examine what is meant by the concept of validity itself. What is it that a theoretical and an ethical judgment have in common when we say that they are both valid? Here we may distinguish between analytic and synthetic validity. Analytic validity does not pose any particular problem, in so far as one has grasped the implications of the logical structure with which one is dealing. What is it, then, that distinguishes synthetic validity from analytic validity? In the theoretical domain this distinction is best expressed by the factor of causality. But is this factor also present in the other domains? May we be talking about causality in some sense when we say that an ethical judgment is valid? And if so, could there even be further dimensions of experience in which causality was a relevant factor? In a previous chapter we have suggested that the category of causality is such that it may be understood on different levels of generalization, and that such a process of generalization takes place even within the theoretical domain as causa efficiens and causa finalis are distinguished, but at the same time seen together under the more general rubric of causa formalist We have found, furthermore, that an understanding of theoretical experience in the final analysis calls for an understanding of the factor of human causality. Here is a new understanding of the category of causality in which the concept of freedom enters, as one must reckon with alternate possibilities according to which human causality may realize itself. But these alternate possibilities in turn suggest even broader generalization of the concept of causality. As man determines how he shall act he does so in response to what he may believe and hope. Here again there are the alternate possibilities which the varieties of historical interpretation illustrate. These are the religious motifs* each of them with its ethical implications. We have chosen to approach them via the route of ethical experience, since our analysis began with the natural sciences and the necessity for human decision 1

32

of eternity, if derived in this way, would seem to become a neutral category presupposed even by religious experience, if such experience were valid, rather than being the religious category as such. " Ä r en transcendental deduktion av religionen möjlig?" p. 307 f. 31

See supra, p. 87 ff.

32

See supra, p. 120 ff.

188

which both pure research and technology occasion, but our analysis could just as well have moved in the opposite direction, so that from an analysis of religious experience, revealing the several motifs, we might have been led to examine their ethical implications. We have chosen in this analysis of the several domains of ex-

perience to use as a key to their understanding a generalization of

the category of causality. This has required abandonment of the absoluteness of the mechanistic interpretation of this principle and, accordingly, of the phenomenal order, as in classical physics. Causality in the theoretical domain remains a mystery. We are able to describe uniform recurrences by means of it within certain limited conditions, and even here it is not entirely clear as to how causality is to be understood, whether as efficient, final, or as formal cause. Ethical experience adds to our understanding of causality, as we recognize the freedom which the alternate ethical possibilities

imply. It is, however, in religious experience that all of the various meanings of causality are brought together in the concrete relatedness which the several religious motifs represent. As in the case of ethical experience, the experience in question is historical. However as theology interprets this experience, it seeks as much as possible to avoid abstraction. The experience with which it deals includes both theoretical and ethical aspects, as well as any other dimensions which may be found, and in this broad context the attempt is made to find patterns by which the phenomena of history may be understood. Does history give evidence of a cause-effect relationship similar to that with which we are familiar in the inorganic natural order? Or is the causal relationship a teleological one similar to that which we find in the organic order? Or does the causal relationship here to be found reveal other possibilities? It should be understood that these possibilities are not in every respect mutually exclusive, and that to a certain extent they may be ordered so as mutually to imply one another. Though there are suggestions in the direction of such an interpretation in Nygren's writings, he is unable to generalize the concept of causality because he tends to presuppose the absoluteness of the theoretical apriori in terms of classical physics. While he insists that the religious category is to be understood in terms of necessity, in the final analysis this silent presupposition of the absoluteness of 189

the concept of causality, as found in classical physics, prevents the religious category from being defined in terms of concrete relatedness. There is consequently a tendency for this necessity to be understood in terms of a transcending objective reference, similar to the Bewusstsein überhaupt, But to this extent a metaphysical element enters the system, for the apriori in the final analysis represents objectivity in terms of necessity or relatedness, rather than in terms of existence. In so far as there is objective existential reference, this reference is either presupposed, or called for by the relatedness which is being analyzed. As Nygren himself points out, the critical method must take care lest through a kind of conceptual realism the forms of validity are hypostasized, for their reality consists exclusively in the fact that they are valid. But forms of validity must either be hypostasized, i.e., interpreted in terms of an objective existential reference, or recognized as concrete forms of relatedness. This means that if the religious category is not understood in analogy to the causal relationships to be found 33

34

83

Nygren, "Den religionsfilosofiska apriorifrågan," p. 7 1 . C f . supra, p. 184 f.

84

R A , p. 35. Such hypostasization of the religious apriori is exactly what

takes place in Soren Holm's deduction of the religious apriori.

Religionsfilosofi

(Kobenhavn, 1955), pp. 95—96, 98, 1 5 0 — 1 5 1 , 154, 156, 158. His discussion is of interest because his concept of the religious apriori is in many respects similar to Nygren's. pp. 92—95. It is to provide the basis for the validity of

the

theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic domains. It is eternal in the sense that it transcends space and time. It also transcends the categories of substance and causality. This poses a problem for the validity of truth in the realm of the natural sciences, which in large part consists of affirmations of causal relations. If the validity of the natural sciences apart from the religious apriori remains "hypothetical and fictional," p. 95, cf. supra, pp. 50—57, it is hard to see how this validity is established by an absolute, unconditioned category, in which relations of this kind are in effect denied. Holm, pp. 2 5 8 — 2 5 9 , 342. The ethical and aesthetic domains do not fact this difficulty, for their norms are, according to Holm, also eternal in nature, as are also mathematics and logic, pp. 69, 73, 83—84. What the religious apriori seems to be is a hypostasization of formal, analytical validity, as over against the synthetic relatedness which characterizes our experience. As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, we have not sought to understand the validity of the several domains of experience in abstraction from the category of causality, but rather in terms of a differentiated conception of this category. This is not to say that analytical validity is of no significance, as the next chapter will indicate. Yet the validity of our experience is not established by identifying such analytical validity with the existence of God.

190

in the theoretical domain and the relatedness of ethical judgments, it will be understood as analogous to theoretical objects or ethical subjects. But theoretical objects and ethical subjects are abstractions from situations of theoretical or ethical necessity. The object apart from the causal relationship and the subject apart from the ethical act does not exist, and it is through the latter that the former is discovered. The opposite procedure becomes metaphysical in nature. Therefore the religious category must be understood in terms of concrete religious relatedness. This, as we have indicated, does not mean that there can only be one possibility at this point. Just as there are several ethical possibilities, and even in a sense several theoretical possibilities, so there are several religious possibilities, with the choice at this point having implications all down the line.

191

Chapter V

THE THEORY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS We have thus far examined the domains of experience which three of the basic questions distinguished by Nygren define. Nygren also states that there is an ultimate question which defines the realm of aesthetics, the question of the beautiful, which he implies cannot be subsumed under any of the other ultimate questions. He lists the aesthetic domain as one of the four divisions of experience, and adds that in it values are to be found claiming validity, but he does not go on to discuss the specific nature of aesthetic values, nor the kind of validity to be found in this domain. At one point, as has been indicated, he expresses uncertainty as to whether aesthetic experience constitutes a category in the same sense that ethical and theoretical experience do, yet he also subsequently refers to aesthetic validity. Though Nygren has not developed a theory of aesthetics, there are some indications in his writings as to the direction in which such a theory might be developed. He suggests that metaphysics, which in its traditional form he vigorously attacks, may from the vantage point of the critical philosophy be viewed as an aesthetic enterprise, and goes on to point out that the positive value of such a metaphysics lies in its development of the various possible forms or types of ethical and religious experience, which may then be made the objects of further scientific study. In seeking to explain what is meant by a "fundamental motif," which is the basic concept of the method of motif research, he refers to motifs in the realm 1

2

3

4

1

R G , pp. 5 8 - 5 9 .

2

See supra, p. 75.

3

F K E , p. 140.

4

F K E , pp. 1 1 7 , 123. "Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsveten-

skapen," pp. 1 5 2 — 1 5 7 .

192

of art. A definite relationship between motif research and aesthetic forms is suggested which indicates that an understanding of the nature of aesthetic experience might contribute toward an understanding of motif research. In the analysis that follows, therefore, while we shall not seek to develop a complete theory of aesthetics, we shall seek an understanding of an aspect of experience different from those aspects which we have thus far considered, which may cast light upon the problems involved in the interpretation of both nature and history. 5

i. Analytic Validity and Synthetic Truth

In the domains of experience which we have thus far discussed, the fundamental unit of validity with which we have been concerned has been the proposition. Both in the natural and the historical sciences the analysis of the validity to be found in these domains begins with propositions, and more precisely with synthetic propositions. Kant's famous question was, How are synthetic judgments possible a priori? If a priori is understood as referring to validity, it is this question which has been before us throughout the foregoing discussion, as we have considered the problem of validity in the natural sciences, as well as in the historical sciences of ethics and religion. Of interest in the development which has followed since Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft is the fact that mathematical propositions, which Kant held to be synthetic, are now according to many scholars held to be analytic in nature. At the same time these analytic judgments can be used to express the essentially synthetic causal relationships which the physicist examines. The important role of mathematics leads Alfred North Whitehead to suggest that 6

7

6

" T h e primary associations of the term are perhaps with the realm of art. The fundamental motif is that which makes a work of art into a unified whole, determines its structure, and gives it its specific character. It is the theme that constantly recurs in new variations, imparting its own tone and colour to the whole." A E , p. 42 Sw. I, 2 3 — 2 4 . 6

Kr. d. r. V., B 14.

7

Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, don, 1950), offers such an interpretation of mathematics.

13 — Erling

2nd ed. (Lon-

193

Plato and Pythagoras stand nearer to modern physical science than does Aristotle, since they were mathematicians and thought in terms of measurements, while Aristotle was more of a biologist and thought in terms of classification. Classification Whitehead terms an insufficient degree of abstraction, "a half-way house between the immediate concreteness of the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical notions." In a similar way, in some respects, Leibniz may be viewed as standing nearer to much of recent scientific research than does Kant. Kant accepted the ultimacy of the Aristotelian formal logic, and thought of mathematics in synthetic terms. For this reason traditional logic and mathematics and geometry were for Kant relatively independent formal structures. Their unification in terms of the complete abstraction, to which Whitehead refers, becomes more possible if one reckons with a thoroughgoing analytical necessity of the Leibnizian type. It is interesting to compare Leibniz, Kant, and the contemporary logical empiricists. Often there is a tendency to think only of the empiricist heritage which this philosophical school represents. However, the theory that all necessary propositions that are really valid can be expressed by explicit tautologies has close relations to Leibniz. It is only due to the fact that the system of analytical proposi8

0

10

11

12

8

"Classification is a half-way house between the immediate concreteness of

the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical notions. The species take account of the specific character, and the genera of the generic charater. But in the procedure of relating mathematical notions to the facts of nature, by counting, by measurement, and by geometrical relations, and by types of order, the rational contemplation is lifted from the incomplete abstractions involved in definite species and genera, to the complete abstractions of mathematics. Classification is necessary. But unless you can progress from classification to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you very f a r . " Science and the Modern World 9 10

(Cambridge: University Press and N e w York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 43.

Kr. d. r. V., B viii, N . K . Smith, op. cit., pp. 3 3 — 3 6 , Ibid.,

Philosophy 11

pp. 601—603. of Leibniz,

C f . Bertrand Russell, A

184—185.

Critical

Exposition

of

the

2nd ed. (London, 1937), pp. viii—ix.

Some British representatives of the school prefer to emphasize this side

of the school's parentage. C f . A . J . Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 3 1 . In this book Leibniz is only mentioned quite incidentally in a note, p. 1 5 1 , with reference to the need for a universal scientific methodology. 12

Karl Britton, Communication,

A Philosophical

Study of Language

!939)> P- 146' C f . Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity,

194

(London,

A Study in Semantics

198,

tions can be extended almost as broadly as Leibniz conceived such extension possible, that the empirical method of verification used by the logical empiricists becomes meaningful. When a few observations, such as astronomical data derived in connection with a solar eclipse, can be used to verify the theory of relativity, one has come a long way from an empiricist theory of generalizations based upon invariant recurrence of similar experiences. Einstein himself states that complicated mathematical forms are utterly necessary for interpreting the data of the natural sciences, but that at the same time these forms cannot be derived from empirical observation. Thus it appears that both Leibniz and the contemporary logical empiricists agree in including much more in the realm of analytical necessary truths than Kant believed was to be found there. However, the logical empiricists have not accepted Leibniz's explanation of causality in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. Neither, on the other hand, do they want to view the principle of causality as a synthetic a priori judgment. Indeed, they prefer to abandon the class of synthetic a priori judgments altogether. It follows that there is no explanation of the principle of causality in terms of their system. From the fact that apparently a successful critique can be leveled against Kant's concept of the synthetic apriori in terms of the transcendental aesthetic, they have concluded that all of experience can be reduced to analytical judgments and probable hypotheses. * 13

14

15

1

and Modal Logic, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1956), pp. 8—10. Herbert Feigl specifically states that one of the two historical roots of logical empiricism goes back to Leibniz. "Logical Empiricism," Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Dagobert Runes (New York, 1947), p. 406. 13

A. Sommerfeld, op. cit., p. 101. " I have learned something else from the theory of gravitation: N o ever so inclusive collection of empirical facts can ever lead to the setting up of such complicated equations. A theory can be tested by experience, but there is no way from experience to the setting up of a theory. Equations of such complexity as are the equations of the gravitational field can be found only through the discovery of a logically simple mathematical condition which determines the equations completely or (at least) almost completely." "Autobiographical Notes,"" P. 89. 15 Britton, op. cit., pp. 143, 147. 16 Ayer, op. cit., pp. 7 1 — 8 7 . C f . Reichenbach, op. cit., p. 310. A t this point Hägerström's discussion of the presuppositions of probability in Botanisten och filosofen could provide a needed corrective. 14

Einstein, however, has called the attention of the logical empiricists to the distinction which must be drawn between the Kantian synthetic apriori in relation to causal connection, on the one hand, and geometry, on the other. It seems that what is required for an understanding of recent developments in the natural sciences is a Leibnizian conception of analytical possibility in mathematical terms, coupled with a Kantian conception of synthetical actuality in a priori causal terms. In the modern natural sciences we seem, therefore, to be confronted with two patterns of necessity. On the one hand there is the analytic necessity of mathematics and modern symbolic logic. On the other hand there is the synthetic necessity of the causal relationships of the natural order. Scientific research has made its extraordinary progress because it has been able to use the forms of analytic necessity to interpret the synthetic necessity which the natural order reveals. There has been constant interplay between the hypothetical development of possible forms and empirical research, by which the fruitfulness of these patterns of interpretation has been indicated. The question now arises as to whether an analogous approach could be made to the historical sciences. Could there be a "mathematics" of history? Are there counterparts to Euclidean and nonEuclidean geometries which might here be devised to interpret the causal patterns which develop when the reality of the factor of human decision, both in its religious and its ethical dimensions, is fully recognized? In this connection it is significant that the concept of symbolic form, of which mathematics and symbolic logic are examples, has recently been broadly generalized, and it is to this discussion that we now turn. 17

2. The Concept of Symbolic Form

Susanne K. Langer points out that we have entered upon a new philosophical period in which the generative idea is the discovery of the power of symbolization. This new awareness of symbolism 18

17

"Remarks to the Essays Appearing in this Collective Volume," pp. 678—679.

18

Philosophy

1957), p. 2 1 f f .

196,

in a New

Key,

3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

as the key to mental life which is characteristically human transcends old philosophical divisions, such as the division between empiricists and idealists. The most obvious form of symbolism expressive of human thought is language, but language is not our only articulate product. Rather meaning accrues essentially to forms, and among such significant forms Langer would reckon also nonverbal types, such as ritual, music, and the various other art forms. Langer points out that the Gestalt psychology has shown that there is no one form to the real world, e.g., that of physics. Just as there are mathematical abstractions, which form the world of physics, so there are the abstractions of the sense organs, which form the sense world, with its red, blue, and green things, its wet or oily or dry substances, its fragrant flowers, and its shiny surfaces. She states, furthermore, that there seems little reason for calling one of these worlds more real than the other. Nor, if this is the case, is one bound to accept the claims of an "ideal language," relegating all that could not be expressed in its terms to the limbo of feeling. In this connection Langer distinguishes between "discursive" and "presentational" symbols. Language is essentially discursive, by which is meant that it is composed of units of meaning which can 19

20

21

22

23

19

Ibid., pp. viii, xiv.

20

Ibid., pp. 1 4 1 — 1 4 3 .

21

Ibid., pp. 9 1 — 9 2 .

22

Ibid., p. 86.

23

"Language in the strict sense is essentially discursive; it has permanent units

of meaning which are combinable into larger units; it has fixed equivalences that make definition and translation possible; its connotations are general, so that it requires nonverbal acts, like pointing, looking, or emphatic voice-inflections, to assign specific denotations to its terms. In all these salient characters it differs from wordless symbolism, which is nondiscursive and untranslatable, does not allow of definitions within its own system, and cannot directly convey generalities. The

meanings given

through

language

are successively

understood,

and

gathered into a whole by the process called discourse; the meanings of all other symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate symbol are understood only through the meaning of

the whole, through their relations within

the total

structure. Their very functioning as symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a simultaneous, integral presentation. This kind of semantic may be called 'presentational symbolism/ to characterize its essential distinction from discursive symbolism, or 'language* proper." Ibid., pp. 96—97.

197

be defined and translated, which meanings are successively understood and gathered into a whole by the process of discourse. Art forms, on the other hand, are presentational in nature, in that they must be understood as wholes in "a simultaneous, integral presentation." Langer's view that language cannot also involve presentational symbolism has, however, been criticized by Paul Welsh, who argues that Langer has accepted a narrow positivist theory of language, which she ought to have rejected, and for this reason has been driven "to postulate a second kind of symbolism which shall do what language already does." ' It does seem that the kind of symbolism which Langer calls presentational could well appear in verbal form, even if this symbolism can most easily be defined in terms of the graphic arts. In so far as she regards myth as nondiscursive, she does, of course, recognize such a possibility. Myth presents a problem, however, for it tends always to be superseded as the question of truth is posed. "The origin of myth is dynamic, but its purpose is philosophical. It is the primitive phase of metaphysical thought, the first embodiment of general ideas. It can do no more than initiate and present them; for it is a nondiscursive symbolism, it does not lend itself to analytic and genuinely abstractive techniques. The highest development of which myth is capable is the exhibition of human life and cosmic order that epic poetry reveals. We cannot abstract and manipulate its concepts any further within the mythical mode. When this mode is exhausted, natural religion is superseded by a discursive and more literal form of thought, namely philosophy. . . . The first inquiry as to the literal truth of a myth marks the change from poetic to discursive thinking. As soon as the interest in factual values awakes, the mythical mode of world-envisagement is on the wane." Ernst Cassirer has devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of myth as a symbolic form. He points out that all the basic forms 24

2r

26

27

24

"Discursive and Presentational Symbols," Mind, L X I V (1955), pp. 1 8 1 — 1 9 9 .

25

Ibid., p. 1 9 1 . It should be noted that Mrs. Langer does say that language

in the strict sense is essentially discursive, though this qualification is perhaps not sufficient to enable her to escape Welsh's criticism. 26

Philosophy

27

The Philosophy

in a New

Key, pp. 2 0 1 — 2 0 2 .

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. I I : Mythical

Thought, trans. Ralph

Manheim ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), Wesen und Wirkung Symbolbegriffs

198

(Darmstadt, 1956).

des

of cultural life have their origin in the mythical consciousness. The development of human culture is thus to a large extent the transcendence of mythical forms of thought, at the same time that some of these forms remain. Our concern in this connection is to inquire whether there are some of these forms which deserve to remain and if so, whether they have any significance for the interpretation of history. One of the points at which Cassirer notes the sharpest opposition between mythical and scientific modes of thought is in the concept of causality, as it appears in these two contexts. This distinction can be seen in the different ways in which myth and science apprehend the individual event. "Science is content if it succeeds in apprehending the individual event in space and time as a special instance of a general law, but asks no further 'why' regarding the individualization as such, regarding the here and now. The mythical consciousness, on the other hand, applies its 'why' precisely to the particular and the unique. It 'explains' the individual event by postulating the individual acts of will." We might say that myth personalizes nature, whereas natural science depersonalizes it. In this personalization of nature we find somewhat the same process taking place with respect to the principle of causality, which Cassirer notes earlier in his analysis of the development of language. Such concepts as space, time, and number are defined in terms of man's orientation of himself in his environment. Just as spatial relations are defined in terms of parts of the body, and counting is done on the fingers, causality is understood in terms of the human will. The development of language represents the transcendence of these primitive beginnings. Yet traces of these origins remain, providing "the sensuous vehicle" of what has become "a purely ideal signification." We must inquire, however, whether the concept of causality, interpreted in terms of human will, deserves to remain in some fashion, 28

29

30

31

32

33

34

28

The Philosophy

29

Ibid.j pp. 1 4 — 1 5 .

30

Ibid., p. 48.

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. II, pp. x i v — x v .

31

The Philosophy

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. I : Language. C f . vol. II, p. 90.

32

The Philosophy I bid.y p. 229.

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. I, p. 207.

33 34

Ibid., p. 318.

199

even when mythical forms of thought have otherwise been largely superseded. The obvious point at which it would seem to deserve to remain is in man's interpretation of himself. If the savage is in error in generalizing his own behavior, so that he interprets the behavior of sticks and stones in terms of it, the natural scientist may also be in error, when he interprets his own behavior as in every respect governed by the same type of laws which explain the behavior of sticks and stones. If man may legitimately interpret his own behavior in volitional terms, he may also interpret the behavior of other men in these terms. To this extent it is entirely proper that man should personalize his environment. As we have sought to show, however, the concept of the will, or human decision as distinguished from the necessity of the natural order, provides for alternate possibilities. And in relation to these alternatives there is finally the question as to how the totality of man's environment is to be interpreted. If man finds that there are various ways to understand himself, he finds that corresponding thereto are various ways to interpret the totality of that which stands over against him. We have described the problem of historical interpretation in its ethical and religious dimensions. In some respects Cassirer's discussion of time in the mythical and religious consciousness is the most interesting part of his study. He has pointed out earlier that the achievement of a concept of time is extremely difficult and that it is somehow bound up with the understanding of causal inference. It would therefore have been interesting to examine the different conceptions of causality which are presupposed in the different religious interpretations of time and history. This Cassirer does not do. He states that an analysis of the different historical types would be of interest, but aside from a brief discussion of Persian religion and the Hebrew prophets, his chief attention is devoted to Indian, 35

30

37

35

Reference could be made at this point to the neutral monism of Whitehead's

metaphysics, in which all actual entities, in which category man, sticks and stones, other men, and God are all included, feel and exercise causal efficacy. "Whitehead's system does not provide for the fundamental alternatives which we are seeking, however. A t the same time it may be regarded as a suggestive contemporary statement of one of these alternatives. C f . Process and Reality York, 1929). 36

The Philosophy

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. I, pp. 2 1 8 ,

37

The Philosophy

of Symbolic

Forms, vol. II, pp. 1 1 7 ,

200

222. 120—121.

(New

Chinese, and Greek religious thought. In each of these religions the problem is that of negating mere temporality. In India this takes place by methods of speculative thought, while in China it is achieved through a political-religious ordering of life. Greek thought has close similarities with Indian thought, but differs from it in its positive speculative victory over time and change, so that what Buddha is driven to deny, Greek thought finally is able to affirm. There is a tendency for Cassirer to regard this latter pattern of religious development as representing its highest stage. As religion transcends myth, its problem becomes the relation of the image to the meaning to which it points. "The striving beyond the mythical image world and an indissoluble attachment to this same world constitute a basic factor of the religious process itself." This process reaches its ultimate stage in mysticism, while the dialectic here involved is in a sense overcome in art. This latter analysis can perhaps be regarded as Cassirer's own confession of faith. What is of more interest in this connection is his suggestion that different religions can be studied by noting in them different "forms." "It is not the content of a doctrine, but solely its form, that can serve as a criterion for its classification as a religion. What stamps a doctrine as a religion is its affirmation not of any being, but of a specific 'order' and meaning." If one remembers Cassirer's insistence that his philosophy is intended to be solely a phenomenology presented as a prolegomena to a future philosophy of culture, then the program for the analysis of religion which Cassirer outlined in 1922 in "Die Begriffsform im mythischen 88

39

40

41

42

43

44

88 Ibid.y p. 128. Egypt represents another possibility where this negation is "achieved by immersion in the purely intuitive, plastic, and architectonic form of things. In its clarity, concreteness, and eternity this form triumphs over all mere succession, over the ceaseless flux and transience of all temporal configurations." Ibid. 89

I bid., pp. 1 2 8 — 1 3 6 .

40

Ibid., p. 239.

41

Ibid., p. 252.

42

Ibid., pp. 248, 258, 260—261. Langer has a similar conception of the relation between art and religion. Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 202—203. 43 The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. II, p. 247. 44 Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs, p. 229.

201

Denken" yet remains. Here Cassirer suggests that each religion is to he understood in terms of its form, which provides a center about which all natural and spiritual existence is ordered. In this connection he distinguishes between the religious interest, which determines the nature of this center, and the articulation of this form, which mediating thought achieves. While each religion builds its own world in its own way, there are yet common categories which are recognizable in all religious thought. Whatever might be said about the details of this proposal, as well as the way in which Cassirer has sought to carry out such a phenomenological analysis, it does have remarkable similarities to the method of motif research, a fact to which Gyllenkrok has called attention. What is most significant is that this appears to be an approach to the study of religion in which a great many scholars from varied fields of study could join. 45

46

3. Metaphysics as Symbolic Form

The closest Nygren comes to developing a theory of symbolic forms of the type suggested above is in his discussion of metaphysics. Much of this discussion is a polemic against metaphysics in 45

" F ü r das religiöse Bewusstsein gilt ja in ganz besonderem Masse, dass sich

sein eigentlicher Gehalt niemals in einem festen Bestand von Dogmen und Glaubenssätzen aussprechen lässt, sondern dass sich in ihm eine durchgehende Form, eine eigene Richtung der Weltbetrachtung ausdrückt; ja dass dieser Gehalt wesentlich in dieser bestimmten Blickrichtung besteht, durch welche der gesamte Inhalt des Seins in eine neue Beleuchtung gerückt wird und damit eine neue Gestalt gewinnt. Jede wahrhaft selbständige Religion schafft gleichsam eine neue geistige Mitte des Seins, um die sich ihr fortan alles natürliche und seelische Dasein und Geschehen gruppiert, und von der aus es erst seinen eigentlichen 'Sinn* erhält. Welcher A r t diese Mitte ist, das hängt von der spezifischen Qualität und Grundrichtung des religiösen Interesses ab — die Art aber, in der nun die gesamte Peripherie des Daseins mit dem religiösen Zentrum in Beziehung gesetzt wird, ist eine Leistung des vermittelnden Denkens, die als solche einer logischen Bestimmung und Charakteristik fähig und zugänglich ist. So kann jede Religion ihr Sein und ihre Welt in eigener Weise aufbauen, und es können sich nichtdestoweniger in diesem Aufbau bestimmte gleichbleibende Kategorien des religiösen Denkens aufzeigen lassen." Ibid., pp. 5 6 — 5 7 . 46

202

Systematisk

teologi och vetenskaplig

metod, p. 19.

its traditional sense, in which Nygren insists that metaphysics cannot be granted the status of a scientific discipline. By and large Nygren accepts the Kantian criticism of metaphysics. He reminds us that though Kant sought to find a new foundation for metaphysics, what he found was something quite different, the critical epistemology with its method of transcendental deduction. This criticism of metaphysics does not mean, however, that the real concerns of the old metaphysics are to be abandoned. As has been indicated above, Nygren is of the opinion that these problems are dealt with even more adequately within the context of the critical philosophy. We have already seen an example of this development in relation to the problem of knowledge, as the critical epistemology leads to a critical theory of experience, which examines the experience to be found not only in the domain of the natural sciences, but also in the ethical and religious domains as well. We must now examine whether it is possible in terms of such a theory of experience to understand the development of the "world view" type of metaphysics. In "Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen" Nygren discusses such world view philosophies, contrasting them with what he terms "scientific" philosophy. He calls attention to the close connection between metaphysics and temperament. A metaphysical system is not forced upon us by our environment, rather it is an understanding of reality which becomes determinative for our understanding of our environment. In this respect, of course, metaphysics is not fundamentally different from scientific philosophy. Here also the mind is not passive in its approach to the world. The scientific philosophy, however, seeks to show that the subjective forms of understanding which it examines are the basis for all objectivity. The essential difference between the subjective forms of the scientific and the metaphysical philosophy, therefore, consists in the fact that anyone who would have experience must have it by means of the forms of understanding which the scientific philosophy seeks to clarify. In so far as there is difference of opinion and one view strives against another, there is an inescapable either/or. One must show that his categories must necessarily be used even by 47

48

49

47

F M , pp. 1 8 7 — 1 9 6 .

48

See supra, p. 30, n. 7.

49

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," p. 148.

his opponent if they are to be justified. A corresponding necessity to accept one of the fundamental metaphysical categories is, however, not to be found. For this reason metaphysics in Nygren's opinion lacks scientific necessity, having a subjectivity which is individually colored. In metaphysics we may have a both/and rather than an either/or. Here opposing theories need not be excluded. The various metaphysical theories arise due to the richness of reality and also the wide variety to be found within the human spirit. This variety exists not only between various individuals, but within the individual as well. Confronted by the evil of existence, the individual is led to a pessimistic interpretation. Confronted by its beauty and goodness, the individual is led to an optimistic view. It would be an error to seek to determine which of these views corresponds most closely to reality. In another context Nygren seeks to explain why a world view philosophy cannot be scientific, pointing out that it sees the world from only one viewpoint. Both such a philosophy and the sciences seek to say something about an object, but whereas the sciences can observe their objects from as many vantage points as possible, which vantage points when they have served their purpose may be put aside, for a world view philosophy the changing of viewpoints destroys the unity of the world view. For this reason one viewpoint is chosen and all is seen from this viewpoint. But this cannot be scientific, for it cannot claim universal validity and objectivity. Such a viewpoint, no matter how axiomatic it may appear, is but one of many and does not in itself have the right to determine the world view. The arbitrary and voluntaristic aspect becomes therefore an irrational element. As one compares these criticisms one notes that the objection of the critical philosophy is that the metaphysical categories are not universally necessary if experience is to be possible, while the objection of the descriptive sciences is that metaphysical description is not universal, since reality is seen from but one standpoint. One wonders, however, as one reads these criticisms, whether Nygren may not simply be indicating the difference which exists between 50

51

52

50

Ibid., pp. 1 4 9 — 1 5 0 , F M , pp. 3 0 — 3 1 .

51

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," p. 150.

52

R G , p. 29—30.

204

physics and meta-physics, or between the natural and the historical sciences. As we have seen, Nygren has difficulty in defining the categories which are universally necessary if ethical and religious experience is to be possible. In the natural sciences the category of causality is such a necessary form of understanding, but when we seek for a corresponding category in the ethical domain we must find a way of understanding human freedom. How are the causal relations in which this human factor appears to be termed good/right or bad/wrong? In the natural sciences, at least within the realm of classical physics, it seems possible to interpret our experience in terms of one causal category. Disagreements can be overcome by showing that either one or the other of two possible explanations must ultimately be adopted by both of the parties to the disagreement, unless both of them are wrong, in which case it can be shown that they must ultimately agree on a third explanation. But in the historical domain either/or has a somewhat different meaning, referring to the fact that each individual in answering the basic historical questions of ethics and religion must choose one or another of various alternately possible answers. Thus it is quite possible that there will be ultimate disagreement between two individuals, as one chooses one alternative and the other another. We may speak of a both/and with respect to these alternate possibilities for each individual, in so far as the realm of possible forms is concerned. We may also speak of a both/and with respect to historical actuality, in so far as in different contexts one or another of these possibilities is realized. However, in any given situation these possibilities mutually exclude one another, and one must reckon with either one or the other. 53

53

A criticism of metaphysics on the grounds that it cannot achieve universal

validity and objectivity, and the conclusion that it is therefore unscientific, is to be found in F K E , pp. n 6 — 1 1 8 . Some awareness of the problems suggested in the foregoing discussion is found in the essay " O m teologiens objektivitet" first published in 1922. F M , pp. 1 6 8 — 1 8 6 . See supra, pp. 3 6 — 3 7 , 98—99. Nygren has drawn no conclusions from this essay with respect to the objectivity of metaphysics, however. In a more recent discussion of world view philosophies, "Filosofiens centrum och periferi" (1946), Nygren distinguishes between logically

and

psychologically

necessary presuppositions, p. 132. The latter arise in connection with the effort to arrive at a world view, which can only be achieved from a particular point

205

If this is the case, the various subjective metaphysical possibilities become of considerable interest, and there is value, as Nygren suggests, in working out their implications. The question arises as to whether the possibilities are in any respect limited, or whether we must reckon with an infinite range of possible interpretive forms at this point. Nygren sometimes suggests the latter. He speaks of the relation between such subjective forms and human temperament, saying that they are individually colored, and that they may vary with optimistic and pessimistic moods in the same individual. In another connection, speaking of the value of metaphysics for an understanding of religion, he states, "Each metaphysics brings forth a special life form in its typical expression, a special modus vivendi. Just as existence is infinitely rich and the soul infinitely rich in thoughts and moods, so also religion is infinitely rich." This same theme is to be found in Filosofisk och kristen etik, where Nygren describes metaphysics as giving in each of its possible forms "in refined form . . . one of the in principle infinitely many possible aspects, under which existence can be viewed." In these references we find two areas of possibility indicated. On the one hand we have the range of possibility within the human subject, the "thoughts and moods" of the human soul. On the other 54

55

56

57

58

50

of view. p. 1 3 3 . While the constant error of philosophy is to mistake these psychologically necessary presuppositions for logically necessary presuppositions or categories, Nygren grants that efforts to achieve a world view are inescapable, and says that such efforts should be made by those best able to make them, namely, the philosophers who are well schooled in the critical philosophy. T h e "basic error" of metaphysics is, however, to be avoided, i.e., the thought that such a world view can be rationally demonstrated, p. 134. The relations of these world views to the religious category is unfortunately not discussed in this essay, though it is indicated that theological systems have been characterized by world views. On the other hand, Nygren does state in an earlier essay that metaphysics may

be regarded

as "emancipated

religion"

which

loses its meaning

against the background of religion. "Religionen, andelivets Religionshistoriska

studier tillägnade Edvard

Lehmann

except

konvergenspunkt,"

(Lund, 1927), p. 143. C f .

supra, p. 1 5 1 f., n. 44. 54

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," p. 150.

55

Ibid., p. 148.

56

Ibid., p. 149.

57

Ibid., p. 150.

58

Ibid., p. 156.

59

F K E , p. 1 1 7 .

206

hand we have the various aspects to be found in the objective reality to be interpreted. Nygren does not emphasize this distinction, and it may be that it can not ultimately be maintained. Our interest at this point is simply to suggest that if one is speaking of various vantage points from which reality may be viewed, they need not be infinite in number, even if analogies at this point may be drawn from the many possibilities confronting the artist who seeks to paint a landscape. When Nygren does indicate more concretely how such metaphysical possibilities could be developed, his examples are using as a principle of interpretation the value-indifferent category of causality and arriving at a mechanistic metaphysic, or beginning instead with value experience and arriving at a teleological understanding of existence. The types suggested here seem to be metaphysical systems based upon generalizations of efficient and final causality respectively. If the generalization of causal concepts were made the key by which metaphysical systems could be understood, certainly in such a case the alternate possibilities would appear to be somewhat limited. In Nygren's discussion of the relation between scientific and philosophical ethics, he has included an illustration of two overlapping circles, one which represents scientific ethics, and the other which represents philosophical ethics. The area which these two circles have in common is called critical ethics, which Nygren describes as both scientific and philosophical. The remainder of the philosophical circle Nygren calls metaphysical ethics, while the remainder of the scientific circle is called descriptive ethics. While in general Nygren is critical of metaphysical ethics, he does grant that efforts made in this field are helpful as interpretive devices. In the final analysis it is by means of the types which metaphysical ethics develops that it is possible to carry out the task of descriptive ethics. Thus we have here an anticipation of the method of motif research. 60

61

62

60

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," p. i j i .

61

F K E , p.

62

ii6.

" A s objects for scientific study the metaphysical ethical theories have an important contribution to make. Just their strong onesidedness, which makes them unacceptable as scientific theories, makes them unusually helpful objects for scientific investigation. Here scientific ethics finds refined types, which in their

210

If it is furthermore true that scientific ethics can be no more than a description of alternate ethical types, so that collectively these types as alternate possibilities for moral behavior represent the validity to be found in the ethical domain, the relation between metaphysical and scientific ethics becomes an even more intimate one. Nygren also discusses the relation of metaphysics to theology and points out a relationship analogous to the one indicated with respect to ethics. While theology should not relate itself to any particular metaphysics, metaphysics does have value for theology in that by means of it particular forms of consciousness are crystallized and worked out, and thus it becomes possible to comprehend them. Having worked through a metaphysical system one becomes more able to discover forms of the religious consciousness in the historically given. "He who has seriously come to grips with the driving power of a metaphysical system, has then a much clearer apprehension of the same motifs presence out in the freely growing religious life." It is particularly interesting to find the appearance of the term "motif" in this essay which is the first of Nygren's published writings, and particularly suggestive to note the way in which the term seems to be a mediating concept between metaphysics, which we suggest can be understood in terms of possible symbolic forms, and "the freely growing religious life," which points to the actual historical reality to be interpreted. Nygren does not go on at this point to indicate in any detail how such cooperation between metaphysics and descriptive religious science might be carried out, but he does state that our present understanding of certain less clear forms of the religious consciousness, such as mysticism, have been made possible in large part through metaphysics. Metaphysics thus provides the theologian with mental gymnastics, The science of religion needs this, for its subject matter is not easily grasped. It has to do with life's hidden depths, at the 63

64

isolation and purity are more manageable than the more complicated phenomena of the concrete moral life. Here is to be found already prepared material, and in this sense metaphysical ethics can serve an important preliminary function for scientific ethics." F K E , p. 123. 63

IJ7-

64

208

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," pp. Ibid., p. 1 5 7 . The italics are mine.

156—

same time subtle, saturated with feeling, and personal. Both a great love for the subject and great skill are needed to deal with it, and a portion of the skill needed may be obtained through the discipline of metaphysics. Metaphysics so understood is a heuristic device. It can be "the hand which grasps reality when the eye of science is no longer able to penetrate the darkness." But that which it finds is not primarily an answer to the question of what is true. Rather the answer is quite likely an answer to the question, What is significant form? Such answers, Nygren suggests, have great value for ethics and religion, which, in turn, seek to answer other basic questions. It would seem, therefore, that Nygren makes of aesthetics, in so far as he discusses this domain of experience, a category of interpretation. This enterprise is the delineation of possible symbolic forms, and it is to be judged by the clarity and consistency with which it performs its task. Such a study of symbolic forms may be pursued for its own sake, but these forms may also be found to be of interpretive value in other domains of experience, particularly the ethical and the religious domains, which provide the subject matter of the historical sciences. When it is understood that the development of these forms of interpretation does not take place in abstraction from concrete experience, but is rather a recognition of and a concentration upon the possibilities which experience 65

66

67

reveals, we may find here a kind of "historical logic " defining the forms by which the synthetic relations of which the historical process consists may be interpreted. 65

Ibid. C f . Urkristendom

86

"Den metafysiska filosofiens betydelse för religionsvetenskapen," p. 140.

67

"The only critique which is here in order is the immanent critique, which

och reformation,

pp. 3 1 — 3 2 .

seeks to show inconsistencies between the basic presupposition and the attempt going out therefrom to interpret existence." Ibid., p. 149.

14 — Erling

209

PART TWO

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Chapter VI

CRITICAL ANALYSIS A N D DESCRIPTION In the foregoing discussion of the critical theory of experience we have sought to show that the critical and the descriptive tasks mutually imply one another, so that the critical approach to experience presupposes that some valid description has taken place, and valid description, in turn, presupposes an implicit analysis. If, then, the critical and the descriptive tasks are so intimately related with each other, is it at all possible to distinguish them? This question concerns the relation of the categories to the areas of experience which they define. To answer it we must first consider what Nygren calls the "realization" of the categories, and then the relation of the categories, particularly in the historical domain, to the "possibility" of experience. Nygren seeks to define the religious apriori in transcendental terms as over against metaphysical and psychological interpretations of the religious apriori. The distinction between these various interpretations is seen most clearly when one examines the relation of the apriori to experience. To the extent that the apriori is conceived in metaphysical terms it becomes possible speculatively to derive the content of experience from the apriori. When, on the other hand, the apriori is interpreted in psychological terms, attention tends to shift from the problem of the validity of experience to the problem of its origins. Nygren finds tendencies toward a metaphysical interpretation of the religious apriori in Ernst Troeltsch, despite the critical method 1

1

Nygren insists that these two problems must be carefully distinguished that the transcendental method is concerned only with the former. H e attention to the w a y in which Kant characterized his philosophy, when he "dass hier nicht von dem Entstehen der Erfahrung die Rede sei, sondern dem, was in ihr liegt." R A , 132.

and calls said von

213

Troeltsch otherwise seeks to use, in so far as he makes of the religious apriori a standard for judging the comparative values of the several historical religions. Troeltsch contrasts, much as Nygren does, the dogmatic, the sceptical, and the critical methods of approaching the problem of religion. By the dogmatic method he means both supernaturalism, which has been made untenable by the development of historical criticism, and the speculative attempts at historical interpretation to be found both in Schleiermacher and Hegel, which have also foundered upon the rocks of historical reality. By the sceptical method is meant the position of the radical individualistic sceptics, such as Nietzsche and Renan, but also the position of psychologism, where values are simply a way of characterizing certain aspects of psychological behavior, but in no sense necessary, determining factors in that behavior. Troeltsch is trying to determine how rational necessity can be found in the realm of values. This he conceives as involving the question, "wie denn überhaupt Normen aus der Historie sich gewinnen lassen." He is not persuaded that Rickert succeeds in abstracting the problem of the description of values from the problem of defining the norms to which these values are related. Nor does he feel that Rickert's discussion of causality in the historical domain is adequate. Troeltsch does not believe that psychological causal relations are understandable wholly in terms of the natural sciences. He is of the opinion that these problems are thus far unsolved, and that they may indeed thus remain. But he seeks nonetheless to 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

und

R G , pp. 5 0 — 5 1 , R A , pp. 3 1 — 3 3 , Erkenntnistheorie

y i — 5 3 , Gesammelte

in der Schriften,

1 5 9 — 1 6 0 . Ernst Troeltsch,

Religionswissenschaft,

(Tübingen,

vol. I I : Zur religiösen Lage,

Psychologie

1905), pp.

27,

Religionsphilosophie

nnd Ethik (Tübingen, 1 9 1 3 ) , pp. 495, 820. 3

Ibid., pp. 759, 7 4 4 — 7 4 5 ,

4

Ibid., pp. 7 1 6 — 7 1 7 .

5

Ibid., p. 676.

6

Ibid., p. 7 6 1 .

7

Ibid., p. 676.

766.

8

Ibid., pp. 696—697, 7 0 0 — 7 0 1 , 704.

9

Ibid., pp. 7 1 9 — 7 2 0 .

10

" E s ist nur eben bisher eine Unmöglichkeit für alle Philosophie gewesen,

dieses Ineinander von Natur und Geist, von kosmischem Ablauf und produktiver Freiheit wirklich begreiflich zu machen, und vermutlich wird das immer unmöglich bleiben und stets nur als dem Leben immanente Voraussetzung bezeichnet

214

achieve a rational understanding of human freedom, regarding the problem of the relation between nature and history as the problem of the relation between mechanistic necessity and value characterized freedom. This concern with freedom and the attempt to find value norms, so that human behavior can be given rational direction, leads Troeltsch to interpret the religious apriori as a means whereby it is possible to overcome the various forms of error to be found in religion's psychological-historical reality. The determination of the religious apriori represents struggle against that which is merely factual in religion. Here Troeltsch approaches the Enlightenment's concept of "natural religion," with its distinction between the rational core of religious truth common to all religions, and the temporally conditioned, "positive" supplementary material, of which each religion has more or less, but which positive material has but negative significance. Nygren at this point is in full agreement with Schleiermacher, who insisted that there is no natural religion, that all true religion is positive and historical. Nonetheless the problem of the relation of the religious apriori to these positive religions remains. The discussion of the relation between natural and positive religion to be found in Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften is of interest in this connection. Hegel points out that since there is only one human nature there can be only one natural religion. But then he goes on to say that to define natural religion in contrast to positive religion, it is necessary to have a clear concept of what human nature is, and he implies that it will take some time until such clarity with respect to human nature has been achieved. That Hegel later felt that he had achieved such clarity, in terms of which he sought to interpret positive religion as one of the necessary stages 11

12

13

14

13

werden können, die man zwar in ihre Bestandteile trennen, aber nicht wieder begrifflich zusammensetzen kann." Ibid., p. 764. 11

Ibid.,

wissenschaft, 12

pp. 709, 764, Psychologie

und Erkenntnistheorie

in der

Religions-

pp. 36—43. C f . R A , pp. 35, 38.

Psychologie

und

Erkenntnistheorie

in

der

Religionswissenschaft,

p.

33.

C f . R A , p. 158. 13

D V G , pp. 1 1 8 — 1 1 9 .

14

Theologische

15

Ibid., pp. 1 3 9 — 1 4 0 .

Jugendschriften,

ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen, 1907).

215,

in the development of the absolute Spirit, is well known. There are also anticipations of this view in the Jugendschriften. One need not, however, accept Hegel's philosophy of religion to see the value of the approach to human nature which he suggests, seeing human nature as a problem the answer to which is related to an understanding of religious experience. But an analysis of human nature* which considered all the relevant data, might not lead to one understanding of human nature. This is the significance of the positive and historical religions. They make us aware of the fact that fundamental differentiation is necessary in the definition of the religious apriori. It is for this reason that a close relation between description and critical analysis is necessary, so that the fundamental alternatives which religious experience reveals are not made to disappear. Another approach to the religious apriori is to view it as a psychological disposition, and thus a means of accounting for religious origins. Here religious experience is viewed as an "actualization" of the religious apriori. Such tendencies are also to be found in Troeltsch* who speaks of the religious apriori as being "actualized" in mystical experience. Though the term "actualization" does not appear in Rudolf Otto's discussion of the religious apriori, Nygren finds that Otto understands the relation of the religious apriori to religious experience in this way. Otto seeks to explain how religion comes into being. He wants to know how beings who have their origin in the awful and the tremendous become gods, who are prayed to and trusted in, and who provide the sanctions for law and justice. * 16

17

18

1

16

Ibid., p. 1 4 1 .

17

Psychologie

18

It is such an interpretation that Nygren gives to the following citation:

und Erkenntnistheorie

in der Religionswissenschaft,

pp. 4 7 — 4 9 .

"Religion wird in der Geschichte erstens, indem in der geschichtlichen Entwicklung des Menschengeistes im Wechselspiel von Reiz und Anlage letztere selber Aktus wird, mitgeformt und bestimmt durch jenes Wechselspiel; zweitens, indem kraft der Anlage selber bestimmte Teile der Geschichte ahnend werden als Erscheinung des Heiligen, deren Erkenntnis auf Art und Grad des ersten Moments einfliesst; und drittens indem auf Grund des ersten und zweiten Momentes Gemeinschaft mit dem Heiligen in Erkenntnis, Gemüt und Willen sich herstellt." Otto, Das Heilige,

13th ed. (Gotha,

1925), pp. 1 9 7 — 1 9 8 . C f . R A ,

174—175^

D V G , pp. 1 2 4 — 1 2 5 . 10

"Woher diese überraschendste Tatsache der Religionsgeschichte, dass Wesen*

die offenbar ursprünglich aus Grauen und Schrecken geboren sind, Götter werden: Wesen, zu denen man betet, denen man Leid und Glück vertraut, in denen mart

216,

Answers to these questions are to be found through the study of man. "Menschheitsgeschichte fängt mit dem Menschen an. Ihn setzt man voraus, um sie zu verstehen aus ihm." This is meant as a criticism of efforts to use the theory of evolution in such a way as to explain religion in terms of phenomena to be found in earlier stages of animal life. It is over against such theories that Otto develops his interpretation of the religious apriori as a religious disposition to be found in the human consciousness. This disposition exists in three forms: as a capacity for receiving and judging religious experience, which all have, a capacity for divination and the production of religious experience, which is possessed only by the prophets, and finally this disposition exists in its ultimate form in one who is more than a prophet and must be termed the Son. Nygren's criticism of this theory of the religious disposition is that it is tautological, analogous to the use of the mythological concept of vital power in biology to explain the phenomenon of life. Otto himself is aware of the inadequacy of explanation which consists simply in coining new terms. He is of the opinion, however, that that which constitutes the religious disposition has a selfevidence, once it is pointed out, which perhaps could be compared to the self-evidence with which a mathematical relationship is grasped, once it is clearly understood. The weakness of his theory, however, is that if this is the kind of intuitive certainty to which he appeals, it is not clear why it cannot be religious experience itself which is grasped in this way, rather than a psychological disposition out of which this experience develops. If human history begins with 20

21

22

23

24

Ursprung und Sanktion von Sitte, Gesetz, Recht und Rechtskanon erblickt, und dieses alles immer so, dass, wo solche Ideen einmal wachgeworden sind, es immer zugleich als einfachste, einleuchtendste Selbstverständlichkeit verstanden wird, das dem so ist." Das Heilige, pp. 1 5 6 — 1 5 7 . 20

Ibid., p. 1 3 2 .

21

Ibid., pp. 1 9 8 — 1 9 9 .

22

R A , p. 1 5 3 .

23

Criticizing attempts to account for such rational ideas as

"Absolutheit,

Vollendung, Notwendigkeit und Wesenheit" by the use of Greek terminology, Otto states, "Alle 'Epigenesis', 'Heterogonie' und wie sonst die Kompromiss- und Verlegenheits-Ausdrücke hier lauten, verdecken nur das Problem. Die Flucht ins Griechische ist hier, wie so oft, nur das Eingeständnis der eigenen Unzulänglichkeit." Das Heilige, 24

p. 130.

Ibid., pp. 1 5 6 — 1 5 9 .

217

man, why can it not also "begin" with man as he now exists, with "realized" religious experience, rather than with some earlier stage where this experience remains yet to be actualized? Such an approach would in no sense mean a denial of the obvious fact of historical religious development, nor the importance of study of this development. It would simply mean that instead of seeking to understand the present from some arbitrarily fixed point in the past, which might be regarded as a kind of "first cause," one achieves an understanding of religious validity by analyzing the realized religious experience which characterizes the present. "Realization" of the religious apriori, which is the term Nygren prefers, can be seen as a refusal to seek to understand religion either in metaphysical terms or in terms of origins, psychological or otherwise. The emphasis upon viewing the relation of the religious category to religious experience as one of realization involves an affirmation of the unity of experience. It reminds us that the distinction in experience between the apriori and the empirically given is a logical distinction that does not refer to two actually different elements, which in turn work together to create our experience. Rather the apriori may be considered a fictional abstraction, a distinction made within the unity of experience, whereby it becomes possible for us to understand the validity of our experience. This principle of realization holds for all the categories in their relation to experience. The various basic categories are of importance only in their relation to the content of the various areas of experience. Apart from such content the categories are meaningless, empty schemata, abstract possibilities. Nygren illustrates how this is the case with the critical epistemology. Here there is the presupposition that there is a distinction between valid and invalid judgments, which distinction the critical epistemology examines in two respects. First there is the transcendental investigation with its question as to which categories must be acknowledged if any knowledge at all is to be possible. But when this has been done only part of the task of the critical epistemology has been accomplished. It has only been shown that certain of the 25

26

27

25 26 27

218

RA, p. 175, DVG, pp. 125—126. RA, pp. 169—170. DVG, pp. 126—127.

most general categories are valid. But these have no content. They are but the presuppositions of all knowledge. If the task of defining the distinction between valid and invalid judgments is to be completed, there must be a second investigation moving in the opposite direction, from the most general presuppositions down to the particular sciences. Here the realization of the categories is to be examined. The question now is, Where do we find sciences so ordered that these categories ingress as elements and thereby define validity? Care must be taken so that Nygren's language at this point is not misinterpreted. It must be remembered that the distinctions which have been made are wholly logical. There is no actual stage in which one finds oneself with empty categories looking about for content with which they may be filled, for it is the possibility of actual knowledge which the transcendental method examines. It asks how the knowledge which is actual can be possible. Thus the actual is the occasion for raising the question of the possible, and not vice versa. In such a case the meaning of the realization of the apriori is apparent. Since the deduction begins with such realization, and the apriori which it defines is only an abstraction from this realization, it is obvious that the category thus derived cannot have any independent existence as an empty schema, a purely abstract possibility, a form without content. One need not go to history, for example, in the case of the religious apriori, to find the realization of that which is only a "fictional abstraction," for the simple reason that one is already there. If this is not recognized as selfevident, it is apparent that the religious apriori has been hypostasized, and the critical approach to experience has been abandoned. Does this then mean that the critical and the descriptive tasks become identical in the final analysis? Here the answer must be in 28

29

30

28

These two investigations might be formulated in this w a y : " i ) H o w is knowledge (or science) in general possible? Answer: Only under the presupposition that such and such categories are valid. 2) Where are these categories realized? Are there among the judgments that lay claim to be valid knowledge some which may be shown to realize these categories? In such a case their claims are legitimized. If, on the contrary, they cannot be found to be realizations of these categories, their claims to validity are refuted." D V G , p. 127. 29

See supra, p. 50 f f .

30

See supra, pp. 1 9 0 — 1 9 1 .

219

the negative. Critical analysis and description differ in that while critical analysis defines the form, the descriptive task is to determine the extension of a given form. Thus in the natural sciences, whereas one causal judgment is sufficient for the critical analysis, the descriptive problem is to discover the range of the validity of the particular causal relationship which the critical analysis defines. In the process of this description the critical analysis takes no particular interest in the positive instances by which the validity of its analysis is confirmed. On the other hand, the critical analysis is deeply interested in any negative instance. If it is found to be a true negative instance it must be made the object of critical analysis, so that the presuppositions which make such an instance of knowledge or experience possible can be defined. Thus one may say that at the "center" of any domain of experience and also at its "boundaries" the critical and the descriptive tasks are found to be most intimately related. On the other hand, the area between the "center" and the "boundaries" is left to the explorations of the descriptive sciences. It is in this sense only that it is possible to say that critical analysis defines the form, whereas the descriptive task is to examine its content. In the historical sciences, however, we have argued that the critical analysis must define several possible forms. For this reason special problems arise in relating description to the "possibility" of experience. The "possibility" of experience in the context of the natural sciences refers to presuppositions, such as the principle of causality, in terms of which the validity of experience in this domain is defined. However, "possibility" of experience has a somewhat different meaning when we consider historical experience. Here alternate possibilities are to be found which do not exist in the natural order. It seems meaningful to speak of alternate possibilities with respect to that which will be. Alternate possibilities exist also with respect to the interpretation of the past. For this reason the possibility of a science of history presents problems which are different from those related to a science of nature. This may in part account for the fact that whereas even in primitive society natural science to some extent exists, some authors date the beginnings of scientific history as late as the 19th century. 31

81

220

R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History

(Oxford, 1946), p. 138 ff.

The difference between natural and historical science can be indicated in this way. Whereas the observation of a causal relationship need only to be expressed in the form of a proposition to be scientific, such description of historical events does not constitute scientific history. This is not the case for two reasons. The first is that scientific history requires that the arbitrariness in the selection of events described be overcome. The selection which description in the natural sciences implies need not be justified, since the selection of one set of data does not exclude other data from the realm of the natural sciences. But justification of selection is essential in the historical sciences, since events become historical through being selected. Yet how shall arbitrariness be overcome at this point? Only by moving beyond the single event to its broader context, for events in their isolation, viewed atomistically, are not truly historical. They must be understood in their relation to other events. Motif research represents, accordingly, a method by which particular events may be understood by placing them in the coherent contexts to which they belong. But even when such a context has been grasped, a second requirement remains before history can be truly scientific, for this context must be seen in its relation to the alternate historical possibilities. Nygren defines the requirements involved in the history of ideas as follows: "What is required for a historical understanding of a given period? . . . i) The task is first to give a presentation true to reality of the different thoughts and concepts, which during this period clashed with each other and struggled for supremacy. 2) But thereto must be added the second not less important task of presenting the self-evident presuppositions which are characteristic for 32

33

34

32

F M , p. 49. "Something

immediately historically given actually

does not

exist. As soon as material can be termed 'historical,' it has already undergone a certain selective, ordering, and interpretive reworking. Only a chaotic variety of impressions (persons, things, happenings) is 'immediately given.'" FM, p. 47. 33

See supra, pp. 4 1 — 4 2 , 47.

34

" F o r chronos, time in its historical meaning, means just that similar elements

receive an entirely different meaning as they appear in different contexts. T o understand historically a given phenomenon means just to put it in the context in which it factually stood, not to pluck it out from that context, as if it would retain its meaning also in some imagined timeless sphere. . . . Thus the context reveals itself to be constitutive for any real historical understanding." F M , p. 72.

221

the period, and so to speak constitute the common platform on which the different tendencies struggled with one another. Only when both of these tasks have been fulfilled do we receive a picture of the period in question which is true to reality"™ In this citation the emphasis is on the context, both that portion of it which is evident and other aspects of it not so easily grasped because they are accepted as self-evident, which must be understood if the historical task is to be properly carried out. But even when this context has been grasped, it cannot be set forth in the same sense that one might describe a context of causal relations in the natural order. This cannot be done because the context must be presented as one of several alternate possibilities. Even if a period was actually entirely dominated by one particular context of ideas, a description which was true to reality would have to indicate that this predominance nonetheless represented decision on the part of those who lived during that period. But to understand the meaning of such decision one must also understand the alternate possibilities. If one, however, understands them, one may discover minor themes in the symphony of a given historical epoch, which might otherwise be overlooked. Thus the question may be raised as to whether a historical period can be characterized by any one rubric. Nygren gives the example of a historical museum, where one finds in different rooms the milieu of different periods revealed in the aesthetic motifs which were dominant in architecture, furniture, clothing, painting, and sculpture. Thus with reference to architecture one speaks of Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, and Rococo periods. These characterizations are undoubtedly illuminating, yet even on the purely aesthetic level the question arises as to whether an aesthetic motif has the same meaning in different art forms. For example, is there any connection between Baroque and Rococo architecture and the music of Johan Sebastian Bach, written during the same period? An even more important question is, Have these successive aesthetic motifs any relation to more fundamental historical motifs, and if so, is a given period characterized by one or more than one basic historical motif? 36

35

F M , pp. 66—67.

36

F M , p. 63.

222

The italics are mine.

In this connection Nygren's opinion that the entire Middle Ages is dominated by the "Alexandrian world scheme" is suggestive, for this pattern of thought, according to Nygren is an expression of the eros motif. If the differences between Aristotelianism and Platonism during the Middle Ages can be termed as merely "ripples on the surface" which do not disturb the underlying unity characterizing this period, can the same be said with respect to the difference between the Romanesque and the Gothic architectural styles, and the different conceptions of human existence which these styles suggest, both of which also were developed during the Middle Ages? Another question is in what sense the concept of evolution, which according to Nygren has been a basic idea during the past two centuries, can be compared with such a thought structure as the Alexandrian world scheme. Are these two opposed to each other, or can the concept of evolution be seen as a modern expression of the same idea which dominated the Middle Ages, or are both to be seen in the larger context of one or several of the basic religious motifs? It should be remembered that in the essay in which these examples appear Nygren limits the discussion to the history of ideas rather than thinking in terms of the broader context of basic motifs. Yet it would seem that the theme of the essay, which has to do with coherence in history, would require an ultimate reference to such a broader context. If, then, basic motifs constitute the broadest context in terms of which history can be understood, are historical periods characterized by one or by several motifs? Here much depends upon what one bases one's judgment upon. If the literature and art of the period is made the basis for the judgment, there might be one conclusion. If, on the other hand, more attention were paid to the ordinary life of the common people, the conclusion might possibly be quite different. To avoid exaggeration of the roles of individual leaders, as in Thomas Carlyle's On Heroes and Hero Worship, the basic 37

38

39

40

41

42

87 38 39 40 41 42

FM, pp. 67—70. AE, pp. 186—189, 3jo—353, 613 Sw. I, 160—163, II, 143—146, 429. FM, p. 68. FM, p. 70. FM, p. 66. Ed. Archibald MacMechan (Boston, 1901).

223

importance of the beliefs and customs of the common people as a determining factor in history must be recognized. It is here that a great many creative individuals are formed, whether they later abandon their native heritage or not. We must, therefore, reckon with at least two motifs in any given historical period, one which is primarily nomistic, characterizing the beliefs and customs of the common people, the other an eros motif, characterizing the aspirations of individuals who have been emancipated by the opportunities of higher education or wealth, or other forms of personal power, and who may occupy various positions of leadership. There is also a third motif, the Christian motif of agape, which can exist among the common people, and which may also characterize the lives of emancipated individuals, who could be free in an egocentric way. Such emancipated individuals can be expected to return to the common people, as do the viewers of the ideas to Plato's cave, but their interest may not be to seek to release the prisoners and encourage them to escape. Rather the behavior of Paul and Silas in the Philippian prison provides another model in which the possibility of transfiguration of the conditions of human existence is suggested, enabling profound acceptance of what would otherwise appear to be bondage. The foregoing analysis is an example of a working hypothesis indicating the kind of imaginative understanding which scientific history requires. For if history is to be true to reality, it must take into account the alternate possibilities which characterize human existence. While a full awareness of these possibilities is not necessary for having historical experience, such awareness is necessary if this experience is to be scientifically described. Nygren states, "That which is constitutive for all science is . . . its freedom from arbitrariness." But such freedom from arbitrariness is only approached in so far as critical analysis reveals the alternate possibilities which 43

44

43

Acts 16: 25—28. Other possibilities should perhaps also be considered in

the above analysis. There are certainly leaders who remain within the context of the nomos motif. On the other hand it may be that one can no longer take for granted, in some parts of the world at least, that the great masses of the population are any longer characterized by the nomos motif. Their emancipation in the direction of the eros motif may be what is meant by "secularization." 44

224

D V G , p. 1 5 1 .

exist in the historical domain, on the basis of which description may then proceed. It should be remembered that these possibilities are not abstract. Not only have they existed concretely in the past, but they coexist in the present. The descriptive problem is to describe the extent to which one or another possibility characterizes the concreteness of a given period, and to examine the interrelations of these possibilities with respect to these concretions. Thus again in so far as positive instances serve to confirm the hypothesis, which has been derived by means of the critical analysis, such a gathering of evidence is not of particular interest as far as the critical analysis is concerned. On the other hand, in so far as true negative instances are found, further critical analysis becomes necessary. It follows from what has been said above that a description of the method of motif research, which is a descriptive method, at the same time remains within the domain of the critical analysis. The fact, of course, that we have in the previous discussion found it necessary to anticipate so many aspects of this description has already made this evident. We shall, however, now seek to complete the account thus far given, our concern being to understand the sense in which the method of motif research can be viewed as a general method to be used for the interpretation of history, at the same time that it retains its specific theological significance.

15 — Erling

Chapter VII

THE METHOD OF MOTIF RESEARCH The recurrent theme of this study has been that the problem of theological methodology is to be understood in terms of the distinction between nature and history, and that the method of motif research indicates a way in which history may be interpreted. The question now arises, How is such an understanding of theological methodology related to Nygren's own account of the method of motif research? While Nygren does not in so many words distinguish between nature and history, it has been argued above that his distinction between facts and values, between pure and positive sciences, between different meanings of objectivity, between the categorical questions as being theoretical and atheoretical in nature, can properly be understood as being the distinction between nature and history. The fact that Nygren has used his own terminology has made it possible for him to avoid certain misunderstandings which might otherwise have arisen, and has enabled him to develop his own views with striking clarity. Now it would seem advantageous, however, to indicate the broad implications which are involved in his position, which, in the opinion of the author, can best be done by understanding the contrasts which Nygren has defined in terms of the distinctions between nature and history. It is in connection with the distinction between the theoretical and the atheoretical contexts of meaning that Nygren introduces his discussion of motif research. Nygren says that the important difference to be noted here is that whereas in the theoretical context of meaning it is possible to move directly from the category of causality to the scientific task of description, in the atheoretical 1

1

226

See supra, pp. 39—49.

contexts of meaning it is necessary to take into account a third factor in terms of which the individual judgments in these domains of experience must be understood. In these domains we must therefore reckon with secondary contexts of meaning, each of which is characterized by its unique "fundamental motif." Thus the individual judgments must be interpreted by recognizing them as answers to categorical questions, but also as answers of a particular type characterized by one or another fundamental motif. Lest the distinction between the theoretical and the atheoretical contexts of meaning become greater than it actually is, it is well to remember that there are three factors which may also be distinguished in the analysis of a causal judgment. There is the question, What can I know? or, What is true? to which the individual judgment provides an answer, but there is also the category of causality by which this answer is structured. Thus, while the ethical and religious questions (for it is ethical and religious experience which Nygren primarily has in mind when he speaks of the atheoretical contexts of meaning) may be compared to the theoretical question of truth, the fundamental motifs may be compared to the category of causality. If it is furthermore true, as has been suggested above, that we must think in causal terms in the ethical and religious domains as well, the important difference is that here one must reckon with alternate causal possibilities, not with respect to different areas within ethical and religious experience, for which certain analogies may be available even in the natural order, but with respect to each particular judgment alternate possibilities are relevant. There is, of course, an important difference between describing; ethical and religious judgments and actually making such judgments. Nygren appears, however, not to be thinking only in terms of the. description of fundamental motifs, for he suggests that in the atheoretical domains one is concerned with personal decision. This 2

3

4

5

6

2

F M , pp. 40—42.

3

F M , pp. 43—44-

4

See supra, pp. 1 0 5 — i c 6 .

5 6

pp. 42—43" I t would take us too far afield to examine more closely the reason f o r

this difference between the theoretical and the atheoretical. This much, however, seems to be clear, that it in some w a y is connected with the fact that within the theoretical domain one is only concerned with stating factual relationships,,

227

fact that in the atheoretical domains one has to do with personal decision suggests that an understanding of the circumstances governing such personal decision will not only help one to describe the decisions of others, but also to make one's own with more clarity and consistency, particularly if one in this connection considers the multitude of secondary decisions within the context of the particular fundamental motif to which one finds oneself committed. By a fundamental or basic motif Nygren means "a basic answer given to a question of categorical nature, by which the individual judgments, values, and existential decisions of a certain outlook are held together in a coherent context." A similar definition is found in Agape and Eros, "A fundamental motif is that which forms the answer given by some particular outlook to a question of such a fundamental nature that it can be described in a categorical sense as a fundamental question." As has been indicated, the basic motifs are to be found as answers to the ethical and religious categorical questions. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the same motif may serve as an answer to both the ethical and the religious questions. In this way the organic relationship of ethical and religious experience is indicated. The ethical and the religious questions share the common problem of man's relationship, with other persons on the one hand, and the more ultimate relationship, which Nygren calls the relationship with the Eternal, or the God-relationship. Nygren at one point suggests that there is something about the question of relationship itself which makes answers in terms of basic motifs necessary. Speaking with particular reference to the problem of understanding the Christian faith, he says that it is because Christianity is a relationship and not simply a religious teaching, that description in terms of a basic motif is called for. In so far as Nygren thinks in terms of the Christian 7

8

9

10

11

whereas in the atheoretical domains one is concerned with personal

decision."

F M , p. 44. 7

FM, p. 44.

8

A E , p. 42 Sw. I, 24.

9

Ibid., pp. 44—46 Sw. I, 26—28.

F K E , pp. 2 3 5 — 2 4 1 .

10

See the discussion of the religious question, supra, p. 138 f., esp. n. 13.

11

" A l l real religion seeks to be God-relationship. This means that we cannot

remain with a number of Christian motifs, but must press on to the basic motif. If Christianity were only a religious teaching it would be possible to point to

228

faith, his phraseology is related to the common usage of the Christian faith, where we think in terms of the God-relationship. If the concept were to be generalized so as to refer to all religions, the term used could perhaps be relationship to the Eternal, or one could use Paul Tillich's phrase and speak of "ultimate concern." In other words, the qualification would be introduced with respect to the nature of that with which we are related, whether or not it is fitting to use the designation "God." However, the question of an ultimate relationship would remain. The fundamental question of man's relationship, with its religious and ethical dimensions, is what Nygren has in mind in defining the nature of a basic motif. This question has not been arbitrarily chosen, as the critical analysis described in the foregoing chapters indicates. "Motif research does not come with any question whatsoever to the historical material, and therefore neither can anything whatsoever in this material be seized and set forth as a basic motif. It is for altogether determined questions that motif research seeks answers; therefore only that which is adaptable as an answer for such a categorical question can be a valid basic motif." At the same time that Nygren affirms a close relation between the fundamental questions and the motifs, so that in a sense the questions determine the answers, nevertheless he insists a sharp distinction must be maintained between the two. Any blurring of the distinction between question and answer is a metaphysical tendency, which leads to the belief that through philosophical analysis the answer can be derived from the question. 12

13

14

a number of its characteristic views and thought-motifs. It would also then seem somewhat arbitrary if one of these views were distinguished and given the rank and value of a basic motif. The situation becomes altogether different when one thinks of Christianity as God-relationship. Then one must ask, Of what kind is the relationship Christianity establishes between God and man? The answer to this question will be the basic Christian motif." F M , pp. 80—81. C f . Nygren, "Systematisk teologi," N T U , III, cols. 8 1 2 — 8 1 3 . 12

Systematic

Theology,

vol. I, pp. 1 2 — 1 4 .

« F M , p. 45. 14

"At

this point there is an obvious difference between the metaphysical

systems and every religious outlook. . . . The metaphysician always tries in one w a y or another to deduce his answer as "necessary," while the religious mind firmly refuses to do so, but insists on its answer as axiomatic and thus maintains a synthetic relation between question and answer." A E , p. 43 Sw. I, 25.

229

It may now be asked whether our insistence, that the definition of the form of the synthetic relation, which answers to categorical questions must reveal, also belongs to the critical analysis of the various areas of experience, is such a metaphysical tendency. We would argue that it is not for two reasons. First, it is wholly analogous with the critical analysis of our experience in the natural sciences, where the synthetic relation which causal judgments reveal is specified in the analysis. Second, it is not metaphysical because it provides for alternate possibilities. There is no attempt to establish one "true" answer to the religious or the ethical question. While several alternately possible forms of synthesis are defined, other real possibilities are not excluded, should they present themselves in the course of the critical and descriptive investigation of the ethical and the religious areas of experience. Of interest is the fact that Nygren refers to motif research as dealing with "the given historical reality," as standing between "philosophy and history ," as involving "a historical problem." How generally can these references to history be interpreted? Is the method of motif research historical in nature because the religious and ethical material with which it deals is historical in nature, or can more extensive claims be made for the method? Is the method of motif research presented as an interpretation of history as such? At one point Nygren does make a statement which could be interpreted in this way, saying that something of the same interest which led to philosophy of history now appears in motif research, only freed from its metaphysical character. When we remember that Nygren likes to think of the critical theory of experience as in no sense involving a narrowing of the traditional boundaries of philosophy, it does not seem strange that he might think of the possibility of viewing the method of motif research in this broader context. 15

16

17

15

F M , pp. 4 4 — 4 5 . The italics are mine. C f . A E , pp. 3 5 — 3 8 Sw. I, 1 7 — 2 0 .

16

"Is it perhaps something of the same interest which led to the philosophy

of history, which now appears in motif research, only freed from its metaphysical character? In such a case one might here speak of a scientifically legitimate continuation of an old metaphysical problem, in the same sense as the metaphysical epistemology has received a scientifically legitimate heir in the critical epistemology." F M , p. 62. 17

230

F M , pp. 3 5 — 3 6 .

We have already noted that Nygren conceives of history in terms of contexts of meaning, so that coherence or connectedness are constitutive for history. Thus he insists that a historical event cannot be understood in isolation from its context. Those historians who seek to stick only to facts, abandoning all interest in interpretive patterns and the presuppositions of a given period, forget that the relationships between events are also empirically given. A comparison at this point may be drawn between Nygren's analysis of the problem of historical knowledge and Plato's analysis of the problem of knowledge in general, as it is defined in the Theatetus. There Plato arrives at the conclusion that though we are in touch with reality in our perceptions, these perceptions are blind. It is only as we move from them to the reflection of the mind upon them, in which reflection these perceptions are ordered by the forms, that we have knowledge. So also the factual givenness of history is meaningless except as it is structured. But the comparison is not entirely analogous, for Nygren holds that the connectedness is "empirically given," and also in the historical realm, according to Nygren, there are alternate possibilities for its structuring rather than one set of forms, as in the realm of knowledge with which Plato was concerned. Hence there is need for decision as to how history is to be structured. 18

19

20

18

FM, p. 7 1 . C f . supra, p. 2 2 1 .

19

"The

connectedness is equally actual, equally

empirically

given, equally

available and to be grasped as the elements, the individual data of which go into this connectedness." F M , p. 72. " I n order to grasp the meaning of a spiritual phenomenon, it is obviously not enough to know the elements of which it is composed, but we must also know the connection between them; and this connection, it should be noted, is no less empirically given than the elements themselves. When, therefore, motif research concentrates on this connection . . . it has in no w a y departed from empirical ground, but has simply directed our attention from one empirical element to another." A E , p. 36 Sw. I, 1 8 — 1 9 . 20

"Knowledge does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon

them. It is there, seemingly, and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp

existence

and

truth

...

Perception

...

has no part

in

apprehending

truth. . . . Perception and knowledge cannot possibly be the same thing. . . . It is now perfectly plain that knowledge is something different from perception." Theatetus,

186 D — 1 8 6 E, trans. F. M. Cornford, Plato's

Theory

of

Knowledge

{ N e w York: Humanities Press and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 107—108.

231,

Nygren's contention that the "connectedness" with which motif research is concerned is "empirically given" presents some problems. Nygren is apparently thinking here of motif research as applied to written historical texts. Thus one could argue that the element of coherence in certain biblical texts is equally apprehensible as the elements into which this coherence could be analyzed. Here the insight of the Gestalt psychology, that our experience does not consist of discrete moments of perception, but of intuited wholes, seems to be in evidence. But suppose we think of the spatiotemporal series of historical events as such, rather than a written interpretation of these events. Is the coherence here also empirically given? And if so, what would it mean to say that alternately possible structures of coherence were empirically given? Indeed, what is this connectedness? Can it be likened to a form, a pattern, a Gestalt, a structure? Furthermore, what is the difference between this form when found in interpretive texts as compared to its being found in concrete historical events, which are presumably interpreted by these texts? Nygren has greatly assisted his readers by providing a most helpful diagram by which the method of motif research as he understands it can be visualized. 21

• Motif Research
Christ and His Church, pp. 8 9 — 1 0 7 , Kristus och hans kyrka

trans. Alan Carlsten (Philadelphia, 1956), (Stockholm, 1955), pp.

76—91.

239,

proclamation of the gospel. The third is at the level of individual existential decision in the present moment. We shall now consider these three different levels at which this problem may arise in order. With respect to the revelatory events themselves, it would seem that alternately possible interpretations in terms of different motifs would always be possible. Thus various interpretations can be given to the narratives which the Old Testament records, while it is certainly true that the church is characterized by an inescapable ambiguity, and gives adequate ground for both nomos and eros motif interpretations in many of its exemplifications. But what about the life of Christ? Here it seems that we have that which is either a stumbling block or foolishness to the other motifs. Thus we have said above that the possibility of alternately possible interpretations of roughly the same events must be recognized. This does not mean that the identical events need always be capable of such alternate interpretations, though this may also be the case. Yet, since historical interpretation involves selectivity, the interpretations vary in that which they select as significant. Thus the same period can be interpreted in terms of two motifs, with widely differing selections of events resulting. What is important for one interpretation need not be mentioned by the other. What one interpretation places in the foreground, the other may use only as relatively insignificant background detail. Thus, "In those days a decree went out from Caesar 41

41

In this connection Sigmund Freud's Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine

Jones (New York, 1955) is of interest. One can recognize the eros and nomos motifs in Freud's discussion, but there is no evidence of the agape motif. Freud seeks to account analogy a pattern

for Judaeo-Christian

monotheism

through

of neurosis in the race, corresponding

reconstructing

by

to the pattern

of

neurosis in the individual, pp. 9 0 — 1 1 7 . Thus there are early traumatic experiences which are repressed, only to return later in neurotic forms. In the race the early traumatic experience is the killing of the primeval father, which after being repressed returns through the mediation of Moses in the form of ethical monotheism, as the will of the primeval father is now internalized and absolutized, pp. 156, 168. Freud seeks to explain the death of Christ as expiation for this original murder, pp. 1 7 4 — 1 7 6 . Yet Jesus' own life and ministry is not considered in Freud's analysis. H e is interested only in certain aspects of Paul's interpretation of Christ's atoning death and in some interpretations that have been given to the sacrament of H o l y Communion. Thus the concreteness of the Christ event, which is of utmost importance for the Christian faith, has been ignored by Freud.

240

Augustus that all the world should be enrolled. This was the first enrollment, when Quirinius was governor of Syria . . Caesar Augustus, who in another context was worshipped as divine, here has the significance together with Quirinius of fixing the date of the birth of a child. Our conclusion with respect to this level is that the Christian church does well to insist upon a Christocentric theology, for it is only in the Christ event that the agape motif is realized in a normative sense. While we may speak of the church as being in some sense a continuation of the incarnation, this is true only in so far as Christ remains head of the church, and thus only by reference to the Christ event. The second level at which the problem of the alternate possibilities must be considered is the level of the interpretation of the revelatory events in the Scriptures, the dogmatic tradition of the church, and the contemporary proclamation. Here the problem is to a certain extent different, for we are dealing with interpretive forms rather than the events themselves, except, of course, in so far as the documents themselves are viewed as events. But whether they are viewed as events or not, they can be viewed as interpretive forms. As such they can be characterized by a high degree of unambiguity. In so far as the interpreter has clearly grasped that which he is seeking to set forth, his witness may be clear and plain. On the basis of the critical analysis, by which the alternate possibilities are defined, it may be possible to demonstrate that only one interpretation of a given author is possible. In so far, however, as an attempt is made to state objectively that the only fundamental motif in terms of which Christianity can be interpreted is the agape motif, this is only possible on the basis of the sola scriptura principle of the Reformation. This does not mean that helpful interpretations of the Christian faith are not 4 2

43

42

Luke 2: 1 — 2 .

43

This seems to be what Nygren has in mind when he writes, " T h e question . . . is whether it is at all possible by means of scientific analysis to determine the fundamental motif of any given form of religion. The answer can only be an unqualified affirmative . . . What we regard as a fundamental motif need not be a matter of subjective and arbitrary choice, for it is open to objective examination." A E , p. 37 Sw. I, 19.

16 — Erling

24I

to be found outside of the canonical Scriptures, not least in the contemporary proclamation of the gospel. But such interpretations have no independence of the Scripture, rather they may be viewed as the scriptural witness given extended utterance. That despite the perspicuitas which the Reformers felt characterized the Scriptures, subsequent interpretations of them have not escaped ambiguity is patently evident. However, since the Scriptures remain and each generation may return to them anew, the possibility of continued reformation continues. In this connection we have every reason to rejoice over the intensive biblical research which has characterized the last two centuries. But if the Scripture is to be believed, it must be believed both with reference to the events to which it bears witness and with respect to the present situation to which it also speaks. Here at this third level the alternate possibilities return. Thus the Scripture speaks from faith to faith. Nor is it possible for us to determine who is to believe the gospel. Here the principle ubi et quando visum est Deo applies. This formula can be interpreted to mean that the proclamation of the gospel continues in the faith that such proclamation will not be without effect, though this effect escapes human prediction. 4i

44

Confessio

Augustana,

Art.

V.

The

approach

of

motif

research

to

the

scriptural revelation which is here outlined has some similarities to the method suggested by Bengt Hägglund, "Die Bedeutung der 'régula fidei" als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen," pp. 2—4, 34—44. H e insists that the historical reality to which the Bible bears witness must be interpreted. Its coherence must also be recognized. His hesitance to use the terminology of motif research in this connection seems to be due to his fear that this will make the Christian faith an "idea." Yet the agape motif is intended precisely to provide a w a y in which the unity of the saving history to which the Bible and the "régula fidei" bear witness can be interpreted. C f . supra, pp. 1 5 5 — 1 5 9 , and infra, pp. 247—250.

242

Chapter VIII

MOTIF RESEARCH A N D HISTORICAL ACTUALITY In the foregoing discussion of motif research a distinction has been made between the interpretation of historical documents and the interpretation of historical events. It has been pointed out that motifs are empirically recognizable in historical documents, whereas motifs are not recognizable in this way in historical events, but must be presupposed, as the category of causality is presupposed in the natural sciences. This is not the only presupposition to be considered, however, since historical events occur within the context of the natural order. For this reason the category of causality as presupposed in the natural sciences is also involved in historical interpretation. Our problem at this point is to examine the relation of the motifs as causal presuppositions to the causality of the natural order. In what sense can these two patterns of causal interpretation coexist in the interpretation of the same events? In the interpretation of human freedom, where this problem arises, a complementary relationship of these causal patterns in terms of the distinction between the part and the whole is conceivable. The several parts of the human organism may reveal instances of natural causality, while man as a whole appears at significant points to escape the determinism of the natural order. Such a distinction could also be made in the analysis of historical interpretations which presuppose religious motifs. The motifs could represent comprehensive causal patterns in terms of which the total historical process was interpreted, while within this context the causal patterns characterizing the natural order could also be recognized. This distinction would not indicate, however, how particular events such as the biblical miracles or "signs" should be inter-

preted. With respect to such events there can be conflicting causal interpretations. The question therefore arises, How can these events be interpreted in terms of the method of motif research? The hermeneutical problem, which the interpretation of these events involves, has in recent years been widely discussed by reason of Rudolf Bultmann's efforts to "demythologize" the New Testament kerygma. Bultmann insists that the mythological explanations of the Bible must be abandoned, since modern man can no longer think in these terms. Only causal patterns consistent with the modern scientific world view can any longer be considered. Nygren has written two essays which are relevant for a consideration of this problem. In "Bibelforskning och praktiskt bibelbruk" he states that there can be no conflict between the strictest research, with its demand for scientific truth and objectivity, and the practical use of the Bible in the church and in Christian life. Indeed, precisely because the Christian faith is based upon a message about what God has done, it is important that what has taken place be set forth as objectively and as clearly as possible. These saving events have occurred within the context of the spatiotemporal order in such a way that they are amenable to research. Such research is significant for the Christian faith, for faith does not create the events on which it depends, but is a response to what has actually happened. It follows that in so far as Nygren questions Bultmann's demythologizing of the New Testament his objections cannot be directed at the radical New Testament criticism involved. In an essay entitled "Kristus och fördärvsmakterna," which is a discussion of Bultmann's proposals, Nygren argues, however, that much of the so-called mythical language of the New Testament refers to an actual deliverance from powers of destruction that has taken place. The New Testament witnesses therefore to actual events. This does not mean that this witness could not be translated into modern language, but to imply that one were thereby getting nearer to the 1

2

3

1

See Rudolf Bultmann's essay, " N e w Testament and Mythology," and other

essays in discussion of it in Kerygma

and Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans.

Reginald H . Fuller (London, 1953). 2

En bok om bibeln (Lund, 1947), pp. 283—294.

3

S T K , X X V I I ( 1 9 5 1 ) , pp.

Christianity," The Lutheran

244

i—ii,

trans. " O n the Question of Demythologizing

Quarterly,

IV

(1952).

truth could be misleading. Nygren holds that the problem is not so much demythologizing the New Testament as demythologizing the twentieth century, which is prevented by its presuppositions from understanding the New Testament message. Nygren suggests, however, that a later generation may not have the sort of difficulties with the New Testament which we have, but may find the New Testament language a quite acceptable way of discussing the spiritual realities with which the New Testament deals. As evidence of such a trend Nygren points to the present decline of individualism, which has made it easier to understand the Pauline concept of the solidarity of the human race in sin and in redemption. At no point does Nygren directly discuss the question as to the extent to which the biblical miracles are vital to the Christian faith. An answer may be implied in his insistence that man's redemption has not taken place on God's own heavenly plane, but that it has pleased God to come down to man on his own human level. An answer may also be suggested when Nygren says that the objective truth of the message is the fundamental presupposition for its subjective effectiveness. He then goes on to say that we must take seriously the question as to the conditions under which God's word comes to us. We must not determine how God must speak to us, but most conscientiously investigate how he has spoken. We must, then, take the Bible just as it is. Nygren would quite likely object were one to come to the Bible with ready-made ideas as to what can happen in view of the most recent scientific opinion. In this connection Ragnar Bring says that the biblical miracles provide a means for proclaiming the Christian message. They can be wrongfully interpreted. But a view of reality which dogmatically declares them impossible will very likely also misinterpret the Christian message. Should, on the other hand, the study of the Bible itself lead one to a new interpretation of the events which it describes, this would, of course, be a different matter. 4

5

0

4

En bok om bibeln, p. 290.

5

Ibid., p. 287. In view of what is said both in the foregoing and in that which

follows, the concept of objective historical truth to which Nygren refers in this essay poses some difficulties. For the purposes of the present discussion we may say that the results of objective historical research are to be taken seriously. 6 "Kristen tro och vetenskaplig forskning," S T K , X X V (1949), p. 21 j .

*4S

The problems involved at this point are brought to sharpest focus when one considers the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Gustaf Wingren is critical of earlier Lundensian thought at this point, for he believes that the factuality of the resurrection has been surrendered through the use of the method of motif research. He holds that the Christian faith has been identified in motif research with an "idea of love" about which the question of factuality cannot be asked. Therefore such events as the incarnation, the New Testament miracles, and the resurrection can be interpreted as "illustrations" of the Christian idea of love. Their factuality in such a case is not of the utmost importance, and those who ask questions concerning the factuality of New Testament events may be told either that the question has been put in the wrong way and therefore cannot be answered, or that these events are not factual in the ordinary sense of the word. In contrast to such a view, Wingren insists that according to the Christian faith the events upon which Christianity is founded, particularly the factual death and resurrection of Christ, are true. This does not mean that faith is not necessary in viewing these events, for the event is not the same if faith is absent. Yet faith is not valid apart from the fact which it believes. Wingren goes on to assert that to give up Christ's bodily resurrection is to give up the Christian faith. He holds that faith in God's creative power is absent when one can leave the body outside of Jesus' resurrection and yet find in that resurrection any meaningful distinction from immortality. Wingren insists that if faith does not rest upon events, it cannot expect events. In this connection Wingren has been influenced by his study of Irenaeus, in whose writings the implications of resurrection for the present natural order are strongly emphasized. Wingren points out that whereas in the 16th century it was difficult to believe that God could grant forgiveness, that is, restore the social order, now we share the difficulty faced by the contemporaries of Irenaeus, who 7

8

9

10

11

7

Predikan

8

Ibid., p. 166.

9

Ibid., p. 179.

(Lund, 1949), pp.

10

Ibid., p. 182.

11

C f . Wingren, Människan

175—177.

och inkarnationen

enligt Irenaeus

part III, trans. Ross Mackenzie, Man and the Incarnation

246

(Lund,

1947),

(Edinburgh, 1959).

found it difficult to believe that God could create life. Wingren implies that for the Christian faith neither problem should be more difficult than the other, that is, the biological problem should be no more difficult that the social problem. He insists that the present attitude toward the fixed reality of the natural order is actually based on religious faith. The church can speak of grace, but when it speaks of transformation of the natural order there is the same reaction among the learned as there was among the scribes in Jesus' time. Nature now has the same status that law had then. We are, therefore, closer to the Hellenic world, which thought in terms of nature rather than law, to which the early church preached incarnation and resurrection, than to the 16th century, which shared to a large extent the legalistic presuppositions of the Jewish scribes, in which context the preaching of forgiveness and justification was the more relevant. Just as the guilty mind then could not believe forgiveness, the intellectual mind now cannot believe resurrection. Resurrection can no more be made believable by recourse to modern science than forgiveness can be made believable by recourse to anything but God. If, however, Christ's resurrection is impossible, then it is also impossible that God created the world, and then it is also impossible that such a God is able to save us. Wingren's analysis is undeniably acute, and his emphasis upon the importance of relating resurrection to both nature and law is very valuable. However his criticism of the method of motif research at this point should be examined, for it is not necessary to choose between basing the Christian faith either upon the idea of love or upon the factuality of certain crucial events. If certain New Testament events could be referred to as "illustrative" of agape, this does not mean that agape can in any way be abstracted from the events by which it has been revealed. There is no question but that in motif research, in so far as it is applied to the Christian faith, the factuality of real historical events is made primary. However these events become revelatory as they are interpreted. This does not mean that the interpretation once derived may be severed from the events suggesting it. The agape motif is not knowledge of God in this sense. It is rather fellowship or relationship which may never 12

12

Predikan,

pp. 183,

18j—187.

247,

be dissociated from the living reality by which the relationship is constituted. Thus the agape motif depends not only upon past events for its continuing reality. It is not enough that Jesus Christ once rose from the dead. He must continue to live, so that death no more has dominion over him. The Christian faith bears witness not only to the Christ of the Bible, but also to the everliving Christ of the church which is his continuing body. Motif research is therefore in no sense unrelated to historical actuality. The context of that relationship, however, is greatly broadened. While certain events are crucial, they are not isolated from other events, both prior and subsequent. The resurrection of Christ is to be seen against the background of the Old Testament. He rose "according to the Scriptures." The resurrection is to be seen in the context of Jesus' life and ministry, and in connection with his crucifixion. It is also intimately related to the whole history of the Christian church which has followed, and not least the present experience of the Christian community. When the resurrection is seen in this context we may more easily evaluate arguments for the necessity of any particular doctrine as to the nature of the risen body of Christ. Wingren argues that if the resurrection of Christ is not interpreted as referring to his individual physical body, the unitary biblical view of life is lost. For then, he holds, it follows that religion belongs to a special sphere by itself. Life emerges by way of natural causes about which faith has nothing to say. God does not enter the picture until faith enters, nor does God enter to transform the natural order, for the resurrection is not such a transformation. The natural order remains intact and unchanged. It would seem, however, that a particular kind of transformation is being insisted upon at this point. It does not follow from the assertion of the doctrine of creation and the unitary biblical view of life, that a particular understanding of the divine omnipotence with respect to the transformation of the natural order is called for. It is dangerous to say that God must save in a particular way or he is not able to save at all. There is a sense in which the problems involved in the doctrine 13

14

13

It is in this broader context that Einar Billing views the resurrection. See

Försoningen, 14

248

2nd ed. (Stockholm, 1 9 2 1 ) , pp. 26 ff., 48, 102, 1 1 5 f., 1 2 2 — 1 2 5 .

Predikan,

p. 182.

of the resurrection are analogous to those involved in the doctrine of God. There are two possible approaches which can be made to the doctrine of God. One may presuppose the nature of God and inquire as to proofs for his existence, or one may presuppose the existence of God and inquire as to his nature. Similarly one may presuppose a particular understanding of the nature of the resurrection and then seek to prove that it took place in this way, or one may presuppose the fact of Christ's victory over death and inquire as to its nature. We shall make an approach of this latter type as we examine the New Testament witness to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. As was suggested above, no particular area of the divine revelation can be examined in isolation. Thus the Christian faith presupposes a revelation of God in the Old Testament. The question with which it approaches the events of the New Testament is not whether there is salvation or not, for it remembers the saving acts of God which the Old Testament records, as well as the hopes it promises. Rather faith confronts Jesus with the question, "Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?" This question can receive its focus from the Suffering Servant passages in Second Isaiah. Is the prophet here, as Philip suggested to the Ethiopian eunuch, really speaking about Jesus? The Christian faith also presupposes a divine activity which has followed the New Testament era. It is the witness to the resurrection which brings the church into existence, but since the church in turn may be identified with the body of Christ, this in itself establishes the reality of Christ's victory over death. That which knits the church together is not a commonly shared illusion. It is not even a commonly shared conviction founded on the truth. The church is knit together by Christ himself who is its head, so that those who belong to the church become members of his body. If the risen body of Christ is so regarded, a different approach to 15

16

17

18

15

Matt.

16

Acts 8: 3 2 — 3 5 .

17

Nygren

11:3. identifies the church in this way. See Christ

PP- 95—96 Sw. 8 1 — 8 2 . C f . Gustaf Aulén, The

His

Churchy

Faith of the Christian

and

Churchy

p. 332 f f . Sw. 309 f f . 18 i Cor. 1 2 : 2 7 , Rom. 1 2 : 5 , Eph. 1 : 2 2 f., 5: 29 f., Col. 1 : 1 8 , 24,

3:15.

249

the resurrection is made possible. Since there is present certainty that Jesus Christ lives, which is closely related to the reality of the Holy Spirit, the concern in the interpretation of the New Testament witness to the resurrection is to trace the continuity between Christ's earthly ministry and his present activity. The problem which the interpretation of this New Testament witness poses is that it seems that one must reckon with alternate possibilities as to what actually took place. One of the approaches to this problem is to solve it by a tour de force as Wingren does, saying, "To deny the truth of the resurrection narrative in the common and ordinary sense implies a denial of the gospel." Yet here the various meanings which truth may have even within our everyday experience are ignored. Apart from this it is strange to insist that something as extraordinary as the resurrection must be true in an ordinary sense. The tomb could be empty in an ordinary sense, but we have no ordinary categories by which we are able to understand the resurrection, ascension, session, and promised return of our Lord. Even with respect to the empty tomb, contemporary New Testament research reveals wide disagreement. Hans von Campenhausen argues that the discovery of the empty tomb is the main factor which leads the disciples to anticipate the resurrection appearances. The news which the women bring is interpreted by Peter to suggest resurrection. Peter then influences the others to return with him to Galilee, where they hope to meet the risen Christ. According to the oldest resurrection account in i Cor. 15: 3—8, there are appearances to Peter, to the twelve, and to more than five hundred brethren at one time. Campenhausen places all these appearances in Galilee. Hans Grass agrees with Campenhausen that the first appearances 19

20

21

22

23

19

Aulén, The Faith of the Christian

20

Theology

21

C f . Ramsay, Religious

22

Der Ablauf

in Conflict,

Church,

pp. 2 4 9 — 2 5 4 Sw. 2 3 4 — 2 3 9 .

p. 149 Sw. 193. Language,

pp.

127—131.

der Osterereignisse und das leere Grab, 2nd ed., Sitzungsberichte

der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 1958: 2, p. 50. N o attempt is being made in this discussion to survey the literature which would be relevant in this connection. Our interest is simply to contrast certain distinct points of view represented in this literature. 23

Ibid., p. j i . Campenhausen interprets the reference to the "young man" in

Mark 16: $—7

250

as legendary, pp. 4 1 , 49.

took place in Galilee. He does not, however, agree with Campenhausen's interpretation of the role of the report of the empty tomb in this connection." According to Grass the disciples flee to Galilee shortly after the arrest of Jesus. There are appearances in Galilee, which Grass interprets as "objective visions." The disciples return to Jerusalem at Pentecost preaching the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and it is thereafter that legends of the empty tomb develop. In view of the uncertainty which historical research with respect to the New Testament resurrection narratives reveals, some interpreters, like Walter Künneth, have rejected the theological relevance of such research. The resurrection transcends history. It is an Urwunder which like the creation of the world is known only to faith and escapes the categories of historical analysis. To suggest a category in terms of which the resurrection might be understood, Künneth refers to Karl Heim's concept of a dimension transcending space and time. From this first principle a "theology of the resurrection" follows. Harald Eklund in partial reference to Künneth argues, on the other hand, that the New Testament resurrection accounts speak of experience as well as faith. The disciples, through experiences mystical in nature, have come in contact with another reality, a "world of glory." Eklund insists that the factual nature of this experience, as well as its metaphysical claims, must be examined. An interesting attempt to develop a critique of historical reason, in terms of which the theological relevance of the resurrection might be recognized, is to be seen in Richard R. Niebuhr's Resurrection and Historical Reason. Niebuhr seeks to develop a concept of historical causality distinct from an abstract, uni vocal theory of 4

25

20

27

28

29

80

24

Ostergeschehen

und

Osterberichte

(Göttingen,

1956),

Campenhausen's reply to Grass's critique, see Der Ablauf

115—119.

For

der Osterereignisse

pp.

und

das leere Grab, pp. 4 4 — 4 5 . 26

Grass, pp. 1 2 6 — 1 2 7 , 249.

26

Theologie

der

Auferstehung,

Forschungen

zur Geschichte und Lehre des

Protestantismus, Reihe 6, Bd. 1 (München, 1933), pp. 1 1 , 15. 27

Künneth, p. 18.

28

Künneth, pp. 55, 79—84, 92—93.

29

Künneth, pp. 5 5 — j 8 . Tro, erfarenhet, verklighet,

30

pp. 1 3 6 — 1 4 8 . C f . Eklund, Religionen

problem, En orientering i religionsfilosofi

(Stockholm, 1958), pp. 38,

skapar

61—63.

causality, in terms of which history is naturalized, or accounted for in terms of law. He holds that history must be its own interpreter. As such the event of the resurrection reveals some of the spontaneous contingency of the Christian doctrine of creation, at the same time that it manifests the power and the future possibilities of the remembered past. In some respects the method of motif research represents an approach to historical reason comparable to the one which Niebuhr defines. Here too an attempt is made to develop a concept of historical causality. History, however, is found to reveal alternately possible patterns of causal relation. Furthermore, when one of these patterns, such as the agape motif, has been recognized, motif research also recognizes the possibility that there may be several ways in which the divine activity, which the agape motif represents, may realize itself. Not only does motif research take the broader view, defining the agape motif in terms of the whole history of salvation to which the Christian faith bears witness, but it is prepared to consider alternate ways in which the love of God establishes its sovereignty, particularly as far as the structures of the natural order are concerned. It is indeed important that systematic theology should reckon with several of these possibilities, and to suggest such possibilities continued historical research is welcomed. The value of such research, accordingly, is not dependent upon the extent to which it succeeds in removing the element of mystery which characterizes the New Testament resurrection narratives. In 31

82

81

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 1 1 3 — 1 1 7 , 1 5 4 — 1 5 5 , 1 6 2 —

170» 179. 32 Niebuhr, pp. 1 7 0 — 1 7 1 , 1 8 0 — 1 8 1 . "The conflict is between the interpretation of the community's history, and, ultimately, the history of Christendom, in terms of law or of resurrection. . . . Finally the interpretation of the history of the community in terms of itself rather than in terms of a law points to the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the last and only sufficient analogy. . . . The resurrection cannot be converted into a generalization; it remains a single and arbitrary and wholly spontaneous event." p. i $ j . " T h e subjectivity of the disciples must always be taken into account when we try to understand the historical figure of Jesus Christ. . . . Only those who acknowledged his part in their own past, and their part in his past of rejection, suffering, and death, could recognize the risen Christ. . . . As we look back through the church's memory, we see that they were constrained to recognize a Lord greater than death who reigned in their own history." p. 181.

252,

these narratives there is unanimous testimony that Christ is risen from the dead, but at the same time there is basic ambiguity as to exactly how the events by which his resurrection was revealed transpired. Most interpretations of these resurrection accounts seek in one way or another to remove this ambiguity. Yet all of these attempts also in various ways must do violence to the New Testament witness. The nature of the New Testament witness to the resurrection is such that at some point in the continuity between Christ's earthly ministry and the present activity of the Holy Spirit among us, mystery must remain. Motif research is able to accept this mystery, for in defining the Christian faith in terms of the agape motif it affirms the reality of the resurrection, while at the same time it is able to reckon with several possible interpretations of how the events to which the New Testament bears witness actually took place. Attempts to establish particular interpretations of Christ's resurrection are primarily eschatological in their significance, for they are related to efforts to set forth particular interpretations of the Christian hope. While such efforts will probably continue, Paul's reminder, that hope is content not to see, is also of relevance in this connection. "For who hopes for that which he sees? But if we hope for that which we do not see, then do we wait for it with patience." We must then anticipate that further clarity as to the nature of Christ's resurrection will be revealed to us eschatologically. At the ascension the disciples are told, "This Jesus, who was taken up from you into heaven, will come in the same way as you saw him go into heaven." It is as the mystery of Christ's second coming is revealed that the precise nature of his victory over death in the resurrection will be made apparent. 33

34

35

33

i John 3 : 2 , Rom.

34

Rom. 8 : 2 4 — 2 5 .

35

Acts 1 : 1 1 .

8:11.

2

53,

Chapter IX

MOTIF RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Motif research is of basic importance for systematic theology, since the systematic presentation of the Christian faith presupposes interpretation of both events and documents. But systematic theology must go beyond description of the past. It must be a constructive answer to present problems. The question which we must consider is whether such development can adequately take place within the context of the method of motif research. The chief contribution of the method of motif research to systematic theology is to remind us that when the religious question is considered, several possible answers to this question must be reckoned with. Furthermore, each of these answers or motifs is best understood when it is seen in its relation to the other answers or motifs. It is, therefore, against the background of its alternatives that the Christian faith can most effectively be described. 1

2

1

The method of motif research has been used to describe the Christian faith.

The following titles are of importance in this connection: Aulén, The the Christian

Church,

Nygren, Försoningen

en gudsgärning

Faith of

(Stockholm,

The Gospel of God, trans. L. J . Trinterud (Philadelphia, 1 9 5 1 ) Sw.

1932),

Evangelium-

fridens budskap (Stockholm, 1956), Christ and His Church. The two commentaries, Nygren, Commentary

on Romans, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia, 1949)

Sw. Pauli brev till romarna, Tolkning av N y a Testamentet V I , (Stockholm, 1944) and Bring, Pauli brev till galaterna, Tolkning av N y a Testamentet V I I I (Stockholm, 1958) are also significant in this connection. C f . Wingren's judgment that Nygren's later writings represent an abandonment of the method of motif research. "Nomos och agape hos biskop Nygren," p. 128. 2

These alternatives have not, however, thus far been adequately defined in

terms of motif research, for there has been little use made of this method in the study of non-Christian religions. Bring, Till logiens uppgift,

254

pp. 1 1 6 — 1 1 7 .

In A E

frågan

om den systematiska

teo-

the eros, nomos, and agape motifs all

It is precisely at this point that a serious criticism of the relevance of motif research for systematic theology arises. For it is insisted that the problem of systematic theology is not to be understood in terms of fundamental alternate motifs, but in terms of one human predicament to which the gospel provides an answer. This human predicament all religions have in common, though they may seek to answer it in different ways. The question therefore can be put in this way, What is the relation in theology of soteriology to anthropology? Can these doctrines be understood as different implications of one motif, or must one think in terms of philosophical analysis of the human situation, with which the kerygma must be "correlated," or, as in traditional Lutheran theology, of law and gospel as relatively independent theological loci, not derivable from one motif. 3

4

appear, but the context

of

the discussion

is primarily

the

Judaeo-Christian

tradition. While at least a chapter is devoted to the eros motif, the nomos motif is not at all described in its characteristic uniqueness. Both motifs are dealt with only in so far as they have influenced the development of Christian doctrine. A similar orientation is to be found in Aulen's Den kristna gudsbildeny

2nd ed.

(Stockholm, 1941), in which different "pictures" of God comparable to the motifs mentioned are distinguished. Systematic descriptions of the eros and nomos motifs, using the data which present day living religions afford, do not as yet exist. Research is called for to indicate whether or not these motifs actually

are

descriptive of the live religious options, which in addition to the Christian faith now confront mankind. The value of this method is that in so far as it is successful, the bewildering

variety

characterizing

religious phenomena

can

to

some extent be overcome. On the other hand, the method is not speculative, but empirically based. The data must support the interpretation given. F M , pp. 86—87. 5

Paul Tillich would argue that what existential analysis of the human situa-

tion reveals is common to all religions. A t this point there is only one human nature. Such analysis therefore must precede the presentation of the religious answer to the human predicament. The kerygma cannot simply be "thrown" at man. Rather it must be "correlated" with the human situation as present analysis defines it. See supra, p. 16, n. 2 1 . " T h e method of correlation explains the contents of

the Christian

answers in mutual

faith through

interdependence.

...

existential In

respect

questions

and

to content

the

theological Christian

answers are dependent on the revelatory events in which they appear; in respect to form they are dependent on the structure of the questions which they answer." Systematic Theology,

vol. I, The University of Chicago Press, Copyright 1 9 5 1 by

the University of Chicago, pp. 60, 64. 4

For a statement of this position as defined by Wingren, see supra, p. 143,

n. 23. Wingren insists that the religious question is the question of guilt. Hence

255,

We shall discuss this problem in terms of the latter formulation, the relation between law and gospel. Our question will be, Is law

theologically considered a concept which is independent of the motifs which have been described, or is law relative to these motifs, being

found to have different meanings in the different motifs? One of the most important discoveries of motif research is that the same concepts do have widely differing meanings in the contexts of different motifs. Nygren has shown this to be particularly true with respect to the concept of love. Love means one thing in the context of the agape motif. It has quite another meaning in the context of the eros motif, and yet another meaning in the context of the nomos motif. We must now inquire whether this is also true with respect to the concept of law. It has been common in Lutheran theology to think of law in both the old and the new covenants as having the same fundamental meaning. The difference lay not in its authority or the norms which it represented, but in the use which was made of it. In Judaism, as opposed to Christianity, the law was made a way of salvation. By keeping its commandments man sought to achieve righteousness before God. In Christianity the same law had the quite different role of revealing man's sin, so that he might be led to accept righteousness as a free gift by faith. That which is to be noted in the foregoing analysis is that the role of law in the eros motif is not examined. One thinks in terms of works righteousness or faith righteousness, but the fundamentally different orientation which the eros motif represents is not considered. In so far as it is recognized at all, it is as evidence of man's sin and corruption. One does not find in the New Testament real confrontation with the eros motif. When at the Reformation confrontation with the eros motif as found in the medieval synthesis occurs, this confrontation still remains within the context of the Pauline categories of law, gospel, and sin. This is to some degree possible because the medieval synthesis is to a large extent a synthesis of the nomos and eros motifs. For this reason in the critique of this synthesis acquaintance with the biblical concept of law could be presupposed, while the Aristotelian metaphysical elements in this it is posed by a condition already defined in terms of the law. Theology Conflict,

pp. 1 6 — 2 i , 70, 95—99 Sw. 40—45, 102 f., 1 3 2 — 1 3 5 . C f . Skapelsen

lagen (Lund, 1958).

256

in och

synthesis could be rejected as the sinfulness of the natural man in rebellion against the divine law. It is instructive, however, to compare the different understandings of the natural law to be found in Thomas Aquinas as compared with Martin Luther. In Thomas one finds a concept of law which is not only not derived from the Scripture, but which appears to be fundamentally different from the scriptural concept of law. Thomas presupposes that that which ought to be can be determined from an analysis of that which is. He argues in this way: "Good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action. . . . Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this." Thomas then goes on to define what good is. "Good," he states, "has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law." These inclinations, which are fundamentally good, exist on three levels. The most fundamental inclination is that which man has in common with all substances, "inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature." Thus "whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law." The second level refers to the inclinations man has in common with other animals. In this category are sexual intercourse and the education of offspring. "Thirdly," Thomas says, "there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above 5

5 The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vol. V I I I , 3rd ed. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., and N e w York: Benziger Bros., 1942), I I — I , Q. 94. Art. 2.

17 — Erling

257

inclination." This natural law, Thomas states, is the same for all men, it is unchangeable in the sense that nothing may be subtracted from it, though many laws human and divine may be added to it, nor can its common principles be blotted out from men's hearts. It should be noted that Thomas in his discussion of the natural law does not refer to the Mosaic decalog, though he would grant that some of the commandments of the decalog do express the natural law. Luther, on the other hand, discusses the natural law primarily in terms of the Ten Commandments, which he regards as a particularly good summary of the natural law. Luther even regards Paul's one commandment of love in Romans 13: 8—10 as a summary of the natural law. In this connection Luther writes, "Otherwise, were it not naturally written in the heart, one would have to teach and preach the law for a long time before it became the concern of conscience. The heart must also find and feel the law in itself. Otherwise it would become a matter of conscience for no one. However, the devil so blinds and possesses hearts, that they do not always feel this law. Therefore one must preach the law and impress it on the minds of people till God assists and enlightens them, so that they feel in their hearts what the Word says." When one compares Luther's interpretation of the natural law with that of Thomas Aquinas, one notes important differences. If love of the neighbor might be said to be fundamental in Luther's understanding of the natural law, for Thomas self-love is fundamental. The most fundamental inclination man has is to seek to preserve his own being, Thomas says. For Luther man has a fundamental obligation to promote the welfare of his fellow man. Luther presupposes community, and understands law in its terms. Thomas 0

7

8

9

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., I I — I , Q. 94. Art. 4—6.

8

"Against the Heavenly Prophets," Luther's Works, American edition, vol. 40

(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), p. 98. • Ibid., p. 97. For discussions of Luther's concept of natural law, see Bring, "Rättspositivismen, naturrätten och luthersk rättsuppfattning," Studier Hjalmar

Lindroth

und zum Luthertum, x

9 5 8 : 3» P- 9 1

UUA

1943:4,

1934), ch. i.

258,

tillägnade

(Uppsala, 1958), pp. 1—20, Lauri Haikola, Studien zu UUÂ

1 9 5 8 : 2 , pp. 31 ff., 45 f., 104 f f., Usus

Ruben Josefson, Den naturliga teologiens problem Herbert

Olsson,

Grundproblemet

i

Luthers

Luther

legis,

UUA

hos

Luther,

socialetik

(Lund,

262,

begins with the individual and develops a concept of law on the basis of the inclinations of the individual. If both Thomas and Luther did not insist that they were interpreting the natural law it might be sufficient to note the differences between their two interpretations and let it go at that. But since they both claim to be interpreting the same reality, there are only two possibilities. Either one interpretation is correct to the exclusion of the other, or the concept of law is relative to the motif within which it is interpreted. Since Luther used the golden rule as an example of the natural law, we might examine it to see whether it admits of more than one interpretation. For Luther the golden rule obligates me because I make claims on others, hence I must be prepared to permit them to make claims upon me. However an entirely different interpretation of the golden rule is possible. Many people today claim to live according to the golden rule, but they mean by this that they reject the neighbor's claims on them precisely because they make no claims on him. One offers instead goods and services at a price and purchases in turn what one desires where one pleases. Such freedom is preferable to the obligations of neighbor love, and it seems to many that the golden rule approves such noninterference in the neighbor's affairs. Sometimes it is argued that the law of God is implied in the orders of society, the order of the family, the state, and the economic order. In these orders men are coerced to serve one another, hence the law of creation calling for love of the neighbor is here revealed. * Yet it is not utterly necessary that the orders be interpreted this way, at least not the state and the economic order. In the social contract theory of the state, the state is not seen as divine in its origin, rather it is devised, as in the political theory of John Locke, by men in order to preserve their property. So also the economic order may be regarded as operating best when each one follows the dictates of self interest, as in Adam Smith's Wealth of the Nations 1

10

C f . Edgar M. Carlson, The Church and the Public Conscience (Philadelphia» 19$6). Carlson does state, however, that even these orders are not immune from the perversions of man's egocentricity. The law of creation must therefore not be separated from "the revealed law as found in the Ten Commandments and in Jesus Christ." pp. 69—70. 11

See the discussion of Adam Smith, supra, pp. 1 2 3 — 1 2 j .

It becomes more difficult to interpret the order of the family in such terms as these, though the romantic conception of love would suggest that marriage exists to satisfy man's romantic impulses and any marital relationship should be dissolved when those impulses so indicate. One may protest that this is a perverted understanding of life, and so it certainly is from a Christian viewpoint. The question at this point, however, is whether the nature of man and the structure of society coerces man to see this, so that he actually can be made to feel guilt because of the perversions of his egocentricity. What then of Paul's statement in Romans 2: 14—16 regarding the Gentiles who not having the law do what the law requires, indicating thereby that what the law requires is written on their hearts? It should be noted here that Paul's argument at this point is with the Jews. His whole point in this chapter is to show that it is not having the law which counts, but doing the law. "It is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified." It is in this connection that Paul says that the Gentiles who do not have the law may nonetheless be doers of certain things that the law requires, which indicates that the law to this extent has also been given to them, being "written on their hearts." The question here is whether we must generalize at this point, so that the Jews and the Gentiles, to whom Paul here refers, are to represent an exhaustive enumeration of the possibilities which mankind represents. It could be argued that Paul here is noting that the nomos motif is to be found among the Gentiles, and to this extent both the works of the law and an accusing conscience will also be found. Externally viewed some of the same works of the law could also be found in social structures characterized by the eros motif, though here the accusing conscience would be absent. Paul, however, says that "the whole world may be held accountable to God." Men are without excuse since the eternal power and deity of God have been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. We must now turn to a consideration of the locus classic us of natural theology in Romans 1: 18 ff. Does Paul here teach a natural theology, that there is a knowledge of God which can be 12

13

12

Rom. 2: 13. For a discussion of this and other passages from the Letter to

the Romans, see Nygren, Commentary 13

260,

Rom. 3: 19.

on Romans.

gained from a study of the natural order, quite apart from God's historical revelation of himself? Since parallels may be found between the language Paul uses and the apologetic literature of Hellenistic Judaism, in which such arguments were commonly used, many are of this opinion. However it is important to consider what Paul means by "the things that have been made," in which God's eternal power and deity have been clearly perceived. The Greek word Paul uses is 7rotY)(i.aaiv, a derivative of the verb "to do" or "to make," which is commonly used to refer to the act of creation. But this word does not mean simply the creation of the natural order. We find it, for example, in Ephesians 2: 10, "For we are his workmanship (7uoiy)(jloc), created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them." The biblical concept of creation is not such that it is possible to limit it to the origin of the world or distinguish it sharply from God's saving acts. The concept of a God who long ago finished his creation and ever since has been enjoying a sabbath rest is expressly rejected. "Jesus answered them, 'My Father is working still, and I am working.'" It is interesting in the Old Testament to note not only the story of creation as found in Genesis 1—2, but also references to the creation in other Old Testament books. In some of these references the creation is described in terms of victory over the dragon Rahab. In the background is the Babylonian creation myth, where the creation begins with a struggle against the chaos animal, the heavens and the earth being made out of its carcass. Of interest, however, is the fact that in the Old Testament Rahab not 14

15

16

14

See Günther Bornkamm, Das Ende des Gesetzes (München, 1952), p. 13 f f .

16

In this connection Luther's explanation of the first article of the Apostles'

Creed reveals keen understanding of the biblical concept of creation. " I believe that God has created me and all that exists; that he has given and still preserves to me my body and soul . . . , that he daily provides abundantly for all the needs of my life, protects me from all danger, and guards and keeps me from all evil; and that he does this purely out of fatherly and divine goodness and mercy." T o this could be added also what Luther says in explanation of the second article. "Jesus Christ . . . has redeemed me . . . in order that I might be his own, live under him in his kingdom, and innocence, and blessedness." Small

serve him in everlasting

Catechism

righteousness,

(Rock Island, 1939), pp.

This too is 7TOIY)(jLoc as this term is used in Eph. 2: 10. C f . Acts

11—12.

14: 1 6 — 1 7 ,

17:26—27. 18

John j : 17.

261,

only means this chaos animal, but it also means Egypt. Thus in references to the creation it is difficult to determine whether it is the creation of the heavens and the earth or the deliverance from Egypt which is being referred to. However one interprets these passages it is evident that the concept of creation and salvation are commingled. Creation is a continuing process. It is not limited to the beginning of all things. Nor can it be sharply distinguished from redemptive and saving acts. In this connection references in the New Testament to Jesus Christ as the agent of creation are also significant. If we return, then, to Paul's statement in Romans i : 18 ff., it would seem possible to interpret it not as referring alone to the wisdom and power of God revealed in the natural order, but more comprehensively to the divine love as it confronts man also in the historical process, in which context the natural order is also included. To seek to distinguish between God's revelation of himself in nature and history is to abstract in a way that can lead to misunderstanding. Yet, though God is revealed in man's historical existence, man in his wickedness suppresses the truth. From the vantage point of motif research, this can mean that fundamentally different interpretations of man's historical existence are possible, and that they can be related to each other in such a way that from the vantage point of one of these interpretations, the others are condemned as wickedness. What are then the different ways in which "the things that have been made" can be interpreted? The several motifs are fundamentally different answers to this question, each of them representing a different faith with a correspondingly different ethic. In the context of the biblical revelation the concept of the covenant is fundamental to "the things that have been made." God is revealed to Israel as the God of the covenant and Israel is a chosen people. Israel has not been chosen by reason of any achievement on her part. There is no reason other than God's love for Israel. Though the 17

18

19

20

21

17

Is. 30: 7, cf. Ezek. 32: 2 f f .

18

Examples of such passages are Is. 5 1 : 9 — 1 1 and Ps. 74: 1 2 — 1 7 .

19

Col. 1: 1 5 — 1 7 , John 1: 1 — 3 , Heb. 1: 1 — 3 .

20

Rom. 1: 18.

21

Deut. 7 : 6 — 1 0 , Ezek. 16.

262

nature of God's relationship with his people in the Judaic nomos motif comes to be thought of as determined by man's worthiness, the origin of that relationship and its continuance despite man's sin must be given another explanation. God's steadfast love P? ?) when man is unfaithful suggests implications which reach beyond the presuppositions of the nomos motif. Nygren points out that it is conceivable in Judaism that God should show his election and covenant love to a people, but it is not seen that such unconditional love might also be shown toward the individual sinner. There is also a suggestion of universalism connected with the origin of the covenant, for Israel is called to be a blessing to all nations. Yet the nature of this blessing is usually understood to mean that Israel shall bless the nations by ruling them. It is only as Christianity breaks the bonds of Judaism that it becomes possible to use this concept of blessing in such a way that God's unmerited goodness through Judaism becomes extended to the whole world. This is to suggest that the old covenant is to be understood as pointing to a new covenant. God's election of Israel may be interpreted as a decisive saving act pointing to other acts yet to follow. Thus Israel is a community of faith and hope. It celebrates what God has done and it anticipates what God will do, when he establishes a new covenant to fulfil the promises of the old covenant. When we come to the New Testament period, however, Judaism has become characterized by the nomos motif. The law of the old covenant is interpreted as in itself a way of salvation, a means of gaining merit before God. The covenant is interpreted as a legal contract in which as man fulfils his requirements, God is obligated to grant the reward of salvation. Against this interpretation of the law the New Testament raises a mighty protest. The requirements of the law are heightened until it is impossible to fulfil them. Thus 1

22

23

24

22

A E , p. 74 Sw. I, 5 j.

23

Jer. 3 1 : 3 1 ff.

24 In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus makes the law apply not only to the act, but also to the motive. Matt. 5 : 2 1 — 3 0 , 48. Bring points out that Paul refers to the law in two ways, as awaiting fulfilment in Christ, and as a completed basis for works righteousness. Since Paul holds that the true meaning of the law is the former, the attempt to claim righteousness on the basis of the law becomes breaking the law, and puts those who rely on the works of the law under a curse. Galaterbrevety pp. 1 2 7 — 1 5 4 .

2 63

it is made obvious that salvation cannot be earned through keeping the law. To some extent the Reformation represents a similar protest. If the Old Testament law is properly understood as a law given to those who are already included in the covenant people, so also the New Testament commandments are given to those who belong to the new covenant. The Sermon on the Mount is addressed to those who already are disciples, not to those who by meeting its requirements would become disciples. Similarly in the epistles the ethical exhortations are addressed to those who are already brethren in Christ. "I appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship." Yet in the medieval church these commandments had become evangelical counsels for those who would choose a higher way. It was thought possible to achieve merit before God and one interpreted not only ethical requirements, but even the mass itself as something which man could offer to God, thereby gaining merit. Luther in his search for salvation attempted to use the route of works righteousness, but he could not achieve peace with God in this manner. He continued to raise the law's requirements until he was utterly unable to fulfil them. Finally in his study of the Scriptures he found that the righteousness of God is not something which God requires, but which he gives, and thereupon Luther came to see good works as the fruit of the Christian life rather than its entrance requirement. Later in Pietism, particularly of the Franckean variety, such a pattern of religious experience was made normative. It was necessary that every Christian be able to point to a conversion experience which had been preceded by an inner crisis called forth by the proclamation of the law. 25

26

27

28

25

For the relationship between the covenant and the law see Walter Eichrodt,

Theologie

des Alten

Testaments,

vol. I, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1950), p. 25 f f . and

Bernhard W . Anderson, Understanding N . J., 1957)» PP26 Rom. 1 2 : i. 27

the Old

Testament

For a description of the ways of salvation Luther sought to use, as well

as his evangelical experience, see Roland Bainton, Here 1950)» PP- 44—48> 54—67. 28 Bengt Hägglund, Teologins

264

(Englewood Cliffs,

55—59-

I Stand

historia (Lund, 1956), p. 291.

(New

York,

It does not follow, however, that because both in the New Testament and the Reformation the gospel is proclaimed against the background of legalistic religion, all men must be led to salvation through the route of attempted works righteousness. This is not to say that there is no proclamation of the law in the context of the agape motif. Paradoxically it is man's experience of the grace of God that makes him aware of the wrath of God. This does not mean that man does not live under the wrath of God until the grace of God appears. Man's condition is such that he lives under the wrath of God, but it is through Christ that he recognizes this fact. Thus it is important to note that in Paul's Letter to the Romans, his discussion of the wrath of God appears in the context of the discussion of the gospel. Paul says, "I am not ashamed of the gospel: it is the power of God for salvation to every one who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith." This is the background for Paul's statement, "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men . . . " At another point Paul says, "Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin." This passage seems to presuppose that we must know what faith is before we can know what sin is. Sin is thus the reverse side of the coin of faith, and it is when faith is born that sin in its true nature can be seen. But faith, Paul says, "comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ." In this preaching the love of God is predominant. It is a love which enters into fellowship with man where he is. The charge against Jesus was, "This man receives sinners and eats with them." There is nothing man can do to qualify himself for fellowship with God. Not even his feeling of guilt is such a qualification. Repentant faith is a recognition that man comes to God with empty hands. God's will to enter into fellowship with man is wholly unconditioned. The ultimate expression of this will to fellowship, this willingness on God's part to identify himself with man, is to be seen in the cross. As the divine love establishes fellowship between God and man 29

3 0

31

32

33

99 80 81

Rom. i : i6 f. Rom. 1 : 18. Rom. 14: 23.

82 88

Rom. io: 17. Luke 1 5 : 2.

and among men, offering of its fullness that which is needful for man, this love of God also judges man. For it is first of all this love which provides a basis for judgment. That which is in accord with this redemptive, creative love is also in accord with the will of God. That which strives with this love is sin. Thus man is guilty not solely by reason of his acts, but more fundamentally by reason of his intentions. It is man's self-centeredness as such which is his sin, from which he must be delivered. This self-centeredness can manifest itself in the individual, but also in the group as it relates itself to other groups. Whereas God declares his almighty power chiefly in showing mercy and pity, making power instrumental to human need, using it in the service of love, man stands condemned before God because he does not seek power for such purposes. But at the same time that man is judged and found wanting he is loved. It is not man who loves, but God who loves, for God is love, while man is a sinner, and man is a sinner precisely because he does not love his fellowman in the way that God loves. Yet God loves the sinner, not simply the righteous. God loves precisely those whom his justice would destroy. There is accordingly tension between love and wrath internal to God himself. God both loves and hates the sinner. That his love is predominant means that in order to save the sinner he himself suffers in the sinner's place, overcoming the wrath which would otherwise destroy the sinner. God is thus both the reconciler and the reconciled. Paul writes, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself." This reconciliation is at the same time God's creative activity. In so far as creation may be understood as the bringing of order out of chaos or disorder, as the Bible at many points suggests, the new order which the love of God brings into the lives of those it wins is as such creation. These three aspects of the divine activity, which we have been considering, are separate from one another only by abstraction, however. In entering into fellowship with man, God simultaneously saves, judges, and creates. While we may think in individual terms as Luther does in his meanings to the articles of the creed, I believe that the Holy Spirit has called me, Jesus Christ has redeemed me, God has created me 34

y

34

2 66

2 Cor.

5:19.

we recognize also with Luther that the Holy Spirit has called and gathered the whole Christian church on earth, that our Lord Jesus Christ has established a kingdom in which we may serve him, that God has created me and all that exists. As we see God's saving activity in this broader context, we notice first of all that it implies the structure of the social order, which it actually brings into being. The Old and the New Testaments refer to two covenants through which two communities were brought into existence, each of them through God's saving activity. All that God does with the individual presupposes this social structure. Not only is the church "the mother who bears and fosters every individual Christian," but this church exists within the context of the political order. There can be no new covenant without the old covenant. That is why Paul says, "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God." Thus the Christian understands all government in terms of God's covenant with Israel. Just as the prophet Amos insisted that God had not only called Israel out of Egypt, but that he had also led the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir, so the Christian sees all government as resting on divine authority. It is in the context of human community that the concrete distinctions between right and wrong are determined. Law is relative to community and has a dual nature. It says, Thou shalt do this, and it says, Thou shalt not do that. It is always easier to define the law in negative terms than in positive terms, for there is always an openness, an element of hope and promise in the positive commandments. Such commandments call for fulfilment in a new covenant. But the presence of positive commandments and even the fulfilment of a new covenant do not make negative commandments unnecessary. Those who would steal and murder must be restrained. Nor does 35

36

37

38

35 The expression is Luther's in the Large Catechism. of the Christian Church, p. 347 f f . Sw. 327 f f . 38 37

See Aulén, The

Faith

Rom. 1 3 : i. Amos 9: 7.

38

The dual commandment, Mark 1 2 : 2 9 — 3 1 , is an example of a positive commandment. So also is the statement in the American constitution that the government is to provide for the common welfare.

2 67

the gospel of forgiveness in any way relativize the necessity of such restraints. In so far as these commandments are disobeyed the government is "the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer." Nor does the gospel of forgiveness cancel the sentences that are thereby necessary. In contrast to sentimental misinterpretations of the divine love it must be stressed that God's love requires a dependable social order. It may suggest a more humane and redemptive treatment of the criminal, but it underscores the need that he be restrained. Much the same that has been said of the political order could be said of the family and the economic order. These orders provide the contexts in which the love of God manifests itself. Actually, at the same time that these social structures represent order, they also represent a fearful disorder. Here God's answer to man's unrighteousness is to reveal his righteousness. It is in God's saving activity that a source of renewal is to be found, not only for the individual, but also for the social order. At the same time that the social order is presupposed the natural order is also presupposed whenever we speak of God's saving activity. While we have not sought to define a revelation of God in the natural order viewed in abstraction from the historical process, this does not mean that the natural order is excluded from our consideration. Rather it is implied whenever we speak of the historical process. The natural order may be called the stage upon which the drama of history is played. Or it may be regarded as in a sense the flesh in which the Word of God became incarnate. In so far as we today are adopted into divine sonship, this taking on of flesh continues. In this sense creation continues. God is not finished with the natural order. Its basic regularities have long since been established. In this sense the passage in Genesis following the account of the flood is significant, "While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease." But what shall happen within the context of these regularities, how the framework of the natural order is to be used, is by no means finally determined. Here creation continues. Here one can say as Paul does, "The creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God." 80

40

59

268,

Genesis 8: 22.

40

Rom. 8: 19.

If this is how the Christian faith interprets "the things that have been made," we must ask how this faith should be proclaimed to those whose faith is characterized by another motif, who have a different understanding of "the things that have been made." We might think in this connection of the eros motif, for it has been suggested that modern secularization represents a penetration of a vulgarized version of this motif into ever broader areas of our common life. For Western Christendom this represents to a large extent, from the Christian point of view, exchanging the truth about God for a lie and worshiping and serving the creature rather than the Creator, since what God represents in this motif is an intelligible structure rather than a transcendent will. Yet the consequences of such worship need not be the gross immorality which Paul describes. If we are to put "the most charitable construction" on the faith of many of these neighbors, we might consider them as disciples of Plato and examine the eros motif as it is there to be found. Plato regarded himself as a reformer. The eros motif as he developed it may be seen against the background of earlier Greek religion, just as Christianity emerges out of the background of Judaism. There is thus a Greek "Old Testament" just as there is a Hebrew Old Testament. However, while Christianity claims to be a fulfilment of Judaism, Platonism relates itself to much of previous Greek religion by way of radical discontinuity. This is not to say that Plato does not derive many of his basic concepts from previous Greek religion. Nonetheless the transition from anthropomorphic gods to the realm of the ideas culminating in the idea of the Good represents a change so basic that some have interpreted it as the abandonment of religion altogether. Plato's attitude toward the Greek "Old Testament" was somewhat like that of Marcion, who sought to remove the Hebrew law and prophets from the Christian Bible. In Plato's view Homer and the lyric and tragic poets gave an utterly false account of the gods. They portrayed the gods as vengeful, as the authors of innumerable 41

42

43

41

Rom. 1 : 2 5 .

42

Rom. i : 26—32. L. R. Farnell points out that Plato's doctrine of the soul in the Phaedrus

43

comes from Orphic metaphysics despite Plato's criticism of Orphism elsewhere. Outline History

of Greek Religion (London, 1920), p. 84.

269

evils to men, as guilty of crimes, and as being bribed by gifts. On the contrary Plato held that God is truly good, not the cause of evil, the cause only of good. In so far as God is the cause of punishment, the punishment must be just and thus to the benefit of those thereby punished. Therefore it is good and not evil. God could not be the author of evil in any other sense. If there is such other evil in the world, its cause must be sought for elsewhere. Since God is by definition the best, he cannot change. He is immutably fixed. God is also simple and true and never deceives. With most of these reforms in the concept of God the modern reader finds himself quite sympathetic. However, on closer attention one finds that Plato is trying to remove from the concept of God any remnants of fate or fortune. There is no perverse fate which may foil the just man's striving for virtue. "This must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death; for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become jjust and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue." Just as one does not find perverse fate in God, neither is one to seek for fortune there. The wise man does not need fortune, for wisdom is the only good. The man who is not wise must expect to bear the consequences of his ignorance. The gods may not be bribed by offerings, nor is there any divine compassion which might respond to human importunity. All men may expect a last judgment when with unerring justice the wicked will be punished, while those who have striven for virtue will move on toward the goal of absorption in the divine. When we examine these changes which Plato made in the Greek concept of God, his removal of references to fate or fortune, we see that Plato sought to deny that God understood in terms of will was active either for good or evil in human affairs. Rather God is to be understood as intelligibly structured reality, the union of the 44

45

46

47

48

44

The following citations are from The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett,

3rd ed., vol. I — V (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892). Republic, 380, 390. 45 46

270

Republic, Republic,

379—383.

47

Euthydemus,

613.

48

Republic,

280—281.

614—621.

377—378^.

true, the good, and the beautiful, capable of being known by human wisdom. God is the eternal forms culminating in the form of the Good, as well as eros itself, the yearning of the human spirit by which there is an effort to attain unity with the Good. The problem of relationship to God as well as to society for Plato was understood in terms of knowledge of the structure with which one has to deal. Neither in nature in general nor in human nature in particular need one think in terms of independent wills which must disclose themselves before they can be understood, and which could therefore disclose themselves in ways not congruent to our rational expectations. Plato makes knowledge of society analogous to a physician's knowledge of the human body, or a pilot's knowledge of the sea, and he justifies the use of coercion if it is necessary for the benefit of society, for it is theoretically possible for the wise man to know what is best not only for himself, but also for his fellows. Thus rational discovery takes the place of revelation in the sense of personal disclosure. It must be granted that the eros motif is not all that Plato has to say about religion. The religion of eros is for the few. For the many the nomos structure remains for the most part. It is through his delineation of the eros motif, however, which represents an egocentric, individualistic type of religion, where God is thought of in terms of rationalized structure, that Plato has wielded his great religious influence. How, then, would one suggest a different understanding of "the things that have been made" to a contemporary disciple of Plato? There would be no real Anknüpfungspunkt in the concepts of either love or law. But one could describe the gospel itself, in which, as we have indicated, a concept of law is implied, just as Plato's viewer of the ideas returns to the cave to relate to the prisoners what he has seen. The Christian is convinced that such a presentation of the gospel will not be without effect, even though it is impossible to say who will be won by it and who will remain unpersuaded. We conclude therefore from the foregoing analysis that though 49

50

51

49

Phaedrus, 2 4 2 — 2 4 3 . C f . Symposium, 202, where divinity is denied Eros on the grounds that it is characterized by want and unfulfilled desire. 50

Statesman,

51

2 Cor. 4: i — 6 .

296—297.

271,

the same elements may be found in the several motifs, they are so transformed when one or another of them is predominant, that these elements must always be considered in the context which the motif in question provides. For this reason there is "historical" law, but no "natural" law. Though there is some similarity in the concept of sin which the nomos and agape motifs presuppose, at least in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, each of the motifs provides its own understanding of man. There is therefore no understanding of man which is common to all the motifs. Instead we have the critical theory of experience which defines the several motifs as alternate religious and ethical possibilities. Systematic theology has no choice, therefore, but to describe these motifs, contrasting them with each other. In so far as the Christian faith is concerned, it is the presupposition of motif research that the Christian revelation, radically rooted in history and the scriptural witness to this history, has a structure which can be described in contemporary terms in such a way that it is relevant anew to each successive age. When the content of the Christian revelation is adequately described, it continues to manifest its power. Indeed it is by means of such description that this motif exercises its power in relation to the other motifs. Thus systematic theology has to this extent a kerygmatic function. As the systematic theologian describes the Christian faith, setting it forth in its characteristic uniqueness, he may share the confidence of Paul, that "the weapons of our warfare are not worldly, but have divine power to destroy strongholds. We destroy arguments and every proud obstacle to the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ." 52

53

2

52

i Cor. 1 : 2 4 , Gal, 3: 1 — 5 .

53

2 Cor. 10: 4 — j .

7 , 2

SUMMARY In the foregoing discussion the attempt has been made to set forth systematically the theological method of motif research. The first part of this study was devoted to the critical theory of experience. In chapter I this theory was defined as a method of analysis in which the different forms of synthetic validity to be found in experience are examined. In chapter II it was argued that the category of causality, as it is presupposed in the natural sciences, need not be determinative for the whole of human experience. This enabled us to use the category of causality in a more generalized sense as a key concept in the historical sciences, where alternate possibilities rather than the distinction between truth and falsity must be reckoned with. In chapter III the fundamental alternatives which ethical experience reveals were interpreted as different ways in which the human causal factor may be structured. In chapter IV we sought also to define religious validity in such terms. Religious experience reveals different forms of synthetic relationship, which in various ways provide answers to the religious question, What may I believe and hope? In chapter V it was pointed out that these answers, which on the one hand represent different types of a generalized causal presupposition, can also as abstract possibilities be viewed as symbolic forms, analogous to the logical interpretive structures used in the natural sciences. At this point we turned to the second part of our study, the interpretation of history. In chapter VI the close relationship between critical analysis and description was emphasized, the latter having the function of examining the extension of the forms of experience which critical analysis defines. In chapter VII it was pointed out that these forms or motifs may be discovered in historical texts, but that ultimately their reference is to the historical process 18 — Erling

273

which these texts interpret. In the latter context alternately possible interpretations may be possible to an extent which is not the case when one is dealing with texts alone. In chapter VIII the problem posed by the fact that historical events may also be interpreted in terms of the causal patterns of the natural order was examined. It was insisted that the relationship to actual events is particularly important as far as the agape motif is concerned, but that the locus of these events includes the whole of the biblical revelation, as well as the subsequent history of the church. It is in this broader context that the critical problems relating to the nature of the historical actuality of any particular event must be considered. In chapter IX the implications of the method of motif research for systematic theology were considered. It was pointed out that the meaning of the major topics with which systematic theology deals is determined by the motif in the context of which these topics appear. For this reason the method of motif research is fundamental not only for historical theology, but also for systematic theology.

2

74,

278 Aalen, Leiv.

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282

in

INDEX Aalen, L., i i , 18.

1 2 6 — 7 , 132—3» 1 4 5 — 6 , 1 8 8 — 9 1 , 207,

Absolute dependence, feeling of, 1 6 8 — 7 1 ,

2 2 1 , 2 3 7 — 8 , 2 4 3 — 4 , 2 5 1 — 2 ; principle of, 54, 59, 6 2 — 3 , 7 1 , 80—4,

1 7 3 , 176.

87—91,

105, 146, 183, 1 9 5 — 6 , 199—200, 205,

Anderson, B., 264. Apriori, 59—167, 81, 8 5 — 7 , 1 3 6 — 8 , 189

2 2 6 — 7 , 235, 243.

—90, 193, 2 1 3 , 2 1 9 ; religious, 65, 136,

Collingwood, R., 40, 220, 234.

177—86, 213—9.

Content, 1 3 6 — 7 , 1 4 1 , 150.

Aristotle, 22, 88, 1 3 7 , 194, 256.

Creation, 2 6 1 — 2 , 266—8.

Aspelin, G., 2 1 — 3 .

Critical philosophy, 2 7 — 3 0 , 4 9 — 5 3 , 57,

Aulén, G., i i , 18—20, 249, 2 5 4 — 5 , 267.

65, 192, 203—5. Cullberg, J., 3 1 , 75, 94, 182, 185.

Authority, 34—5» ^55A y e r , A., 1 3 — 4 , 142» *94—5-

Decision, 35—6, 90—2, 1 3 0 — 3 , 147, 184, 200, 2 2 7 — 8 .

Bacon, F., 61.

Description, 36, 39—49» 133» x 4 5 — 9»

Bainton, R., 264.

2I

3»

2 1 9 — 2 6 , 234, 272.

Barth, K., 1 0 — 1 . Billing, E., 1 0 — 1 , 148, 248.

Dialectical theology, 9 — 1 1 .

Bohlin, T . , 28.

Dilthey, W . , 40.

Bornkamm, G., 261. Bring, R.,

14,

18, 3 0 — 1 ,

37, 80,

145,

1 4 7 — 8 , 245, 254, 258, 263.

Eichrodt, W . , 264. Einstein, 1 8 2 — 3 , 195—6.

Britton, K., 1 9 4 — 5 .

Eklund, H., 13, 37, 2 5 1 .

Broglie, L. de, 1 8 2 — 3 .

Enlightenment, 9, 167, 1 7 1 , 2 1 5 .

Brunner, E., 10.

Eternity, category of, 7 4 — 5 , 1 3 8 — 9 , 178

Brunstäd, F., 1 3 7 . Bultmann, R., 1 0 — 1 , 16, 244.

—80, 228—9. Ethics,

autonomy

of,

115;

axiological,

1 1 3 , 1 1 8 — 2 0 , 1 5 3 , 166; critical, 9 5 — Campenhausen, H . von, 2 5 0 — 1 .

104, 207; deontological, 1 1 3 ,

Carlson, E., 18, 259.

1 2 5 — 6 ; descriptive, 9 5 — 7 , 104, 2 0 7 — 8 ;

Carlyle, T . , 124, 223. Carnap, R., 1 9 4 — 5 . Cassirer, E., 29, 198—202.

legalistic, 1 1 3 — 4 , 1 1 6 — 7 ; metaphysical,

Categorical imperative, 7 1 , 93, 1 1 6 , 138. Causality, 1 5 — 7 , 4 7 — 5 0 , 9 5 — 6 , 1 2 0 — 2 ,

dispositional, 97—9,

104,

113, 150,

118—20, 207—8;

118—20, 127—9;

normative,

9 9 — 1 0 4 , 1 1 5 , 1 4 8 ; teleological, 1 1 3 — 7 , 122—5.

283

Epistemology, 1 3 , 5 I — 2 > 5*, 166, 1 7 4 — s> Existentialism,

Holm, S., 190.

15—19.

Experience, 49—

Farnell, L., 269.

136—42,

Hope, 134, 253, 267.

Kant, 9, 23, 5 1 — 2 , 57—60, 6 2 — 3 , 6 7 — 8 ,

Faith, 134, 148—9, 1 5 4 , 242.

Form,

Hobbes, 1 2 3 — 4 . Hök, G., 163.

203, 2 1 8 — 9 , 2 3 0 — 1 .

198—9,

201—9;

symbolic, 197—209, 237. Foster, M., 30.

153»

184,

M7>

193—

203, 2 1 3 , 235. Künneth, W., 2 5 1 . Langer, S., 1 3 , 140, 196—8, 201.

Frank, P., 183. Freedom, 82, 84, 89—90,

130—2,

165, 184, 188, 205, 2 1 4 — 5 ,

2

163,

43*

Language, 1 2 — 6 , 1 9 7 — 9 . L a w , 1 1 3 , 126, 143, 255—60, 2 7 1 — 2 . Leibniz, 194—6.

Freud, 240.

Lessing, 9.

Fries, M., 14.

Lindroth, H., 12, 68, 1 6 1 — 5 , 185. Lindström, V., 19.

Golden rule, 259.

Loci theology, 143, 1 5 6 — 8 , 2 5 5 — 6 .

Gospel, 1 1 , 143, 2 5 5 — 6 , 2 7 1 .

Locke, 51, 1 2 3 — 4 , 259.

Grass, H., 2 5 0 — 1 .

Logic, 7 1 , 188, 1 9 3 — 6 , 209, 237.

Gyllenkrok, A., 1 1 — 2 , 17, 2 1 , 104, 1 2 1 ,

Logical empiricism, 1 3 — 6 , 19, 194—6.

139—40, 202.

Logstrup, K., 29—30. Luther, 122, 1 3 1 , 1 5 1 , 2 5 7 — 9 , 261, 264,

Hägerström, 130—i,

A.,

13,

30,

54,

99,

101,

266—7.

195.

Hägglund, B., 20, 147, 242, 264.

MacLeish, A., 15.

Haikola, L., 258.

Mathematics,

Hedenius, I., 14. Hegel, 185, 185, 2 1 4 — 6 . Heim, K., 2 5 1 . Heitler, W . , 1 8 3 — 4 . Hendel, C., 162. Hempel, C., 80. Hermeneutics, 1 5 4 — 8 . Hillerdal, G., 20, 7 3 , 104, 1 1 8 , 185. Historical-genetic research, 2 1 , 2 3 5 — 7 . History of ideas, method of, 20—22, 140, 144—50, 2 2 1 — 3 , 2 3 2 — 3 . History of Religions school, 9 — 1 1 .

284

59, 77,

80,

193—6,

217,

237-8. Metaphysics, 56, 97—9, 150—9, 192, 202 —9. Miracles, 2 4 3 — 5 . Motif, agape, 151,

113,

224, 238,

117,

241,

126—32,

247—8,

149,

254—6,

265—8, 2 7 2 ; eros, 126, 129, 1 5 1 , 1 5 7 , 224, 238, 254—6, 2 6 9 - 7 1 ; nomos, 129, 157,

163—4,

224,

238,

254—6,

260,

263—4, 2 7 1 — 2 . Motif research, 10, 1 6 — 2 4 , 57, 139, 148 —9, 172, 2 2 1 , 2 2 3 — 7 2 .

Motifs, 98, n o , 1 1 8 — 3 4 , 143, 148—9, 164, 188—9, 208, 223, 228—39, 246, 2 5 4 — 5, 262—72. Mowinckel, S., 96. Myth, 198—200.

Revelation, 148, 155—9» 239—42,

Natural law, 123, 257—9, 272. Natural religion, 157, 167, 198, 2 1 5 — 6 . Natural theology, 10, 260—2. Necessity, 59—60, 80, 86, 93, 1 0 1 — 2 , 1 2 1 — 2 , 135, 145, 148, 152, 190. Niebuhr, R. R., 2 5 1 — 2 . Nietzsche, 45, 1 1 7 , 1 3 1 , 214. Northrup, F., 182. Nygren, G., 21. Nystedt, H., 116.

Schleiermacher, 9, 23, 37—8, 176, 184—5.

Objectivity, 36—7, 158—9. Olivekrona, K., 13—4. Olsson, H., 258. Otto, R., 165, 216—7.

Phalén, A., 13. Pietism, 157, 163, 264. Plato, 22, 160, 194, 224, 2 3 1 , 269—71. Preaching, 149. Prenter, R., 139.

Quantum theory, 78—9, 85—7. Question, ethical, 33, 92, 105, 108, 133, 135, 138; religious, 33, 133—5» 1 4 1 — 2 ; theoretical, 80, 105—6, 108, 140—2, 145» " 7 . Questions, categorical, 32—5, 57, 80, 105, 135» 138—42» 226—30. Ramsay, I., 13. Realism, 177. Redemption, 168—70, 2 6 1 — 2 , 265—7. Reichenbach, H., 61, 195. Reformation, 241, 264—5. Relativity, theory of, 182, 195. Resurrection, 246—53.

268. 1 Rickert, 39—45» 214, 234—5. Ross, W., 1 1 8 , 132. Russell, B., 82, 1 2 0 — i , 194.

H.,

47—8» *44>

262, l6o

>

160—74,

Schumann, F., 29—30. Schweitzer, W., 18, 154—5Science, historical, 40—9, 78—9, 81, 220 — 5 ; ideographic and nomothetic, 4 1 ; natural, 4 0 — 1 , 47—8, 50, 7 7 — 9 1 , 145» 152, 155, 199, 2 2 0 — 1 ; pure and positive, 37—9Semantics, 13—6, 19. Skepticism, 50, 67, 70, 109—10, 134. Smith, A., 124—5, 259. Smith, N., 57—8, 82—4, 137, 1 8 1 , 194. Social contract, 123—4, 259. Söderblom, N., 1 0 — 1 . Soe, N., 79, 139, 185. Sommerfeld, A., 182, 195. Stange, C., 160, 173—7» i79» l 8 ï » 186—7. Stevenson, C., 1 2 1 . Subjectivity, 36—7. Synthesis, 137—9. Tegen, E., 31, 66, 76—7, 93, 187—8. Theological methodology, 9—24, 27, 147, 226. Thomas Aquinas, 22, 126, 257—9. Tillich, P., 10, 16, 229, 255. Transcendental deduction, 57, 64—79, 81, 93, 108—9, 1 5 9 — 9 1 . Transcendental method, 4 9 — 5 1 , 54—5, 57—8, 60, 134—5» !7 6 » 219. Troeltsch, 65, 2 1 3 — 6 . Truth, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 4 1 , 145, 184, 193—6. Vaihinger, H . , 63, 102, 160. Validity, 29—34, 49—79, 92—6, 104 — 5 , 135, 1 6 1 — 2 , 1 7 7 — 8 l » 186—8, 1 9 3 — 6 ; category of, 178, 187; ethical, 32, 57, 7 2 — 5 , 9 3 — 1 1 0 ; primary and

secondary, 104—9; religious, 32, 57, 67—70, 74—λ 134—50» 154» M*, 159 —91; theoretical, 31—2, 54—6, 75—7, 80, 193—6. Values, 3 j, 42—3» 46—7. "3—4. "7» 123, 125, 127, 129—30, 157; ethical, 35, hi—8; hedonistic, h i ; instrumental, 112; intrinsic, 112; utilitarian, h i . Verification, theory of, 105—6, 108, 138, 140—2, 146—7, 238.

286,

Weizsäcker, C. von, 84—9, 91, 146. Welsh, P., 198. Whitehead, A., 193—4» 200. Williams, D., 122. Windelband, W., 39—41» 160, 234. Wingren, G., 11—2, 17—21, 28, 45140—5, 149—50, 246—8, 250, 254World view, 167, 203—6. Zuurdeeg, W., 13, 15—6, 145, 152.