Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security

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and Environmental Security

10.1057/9780230611863 - Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security, Jessica LeAnn Urban

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Chung Hua University - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-05

Nation, Immigration,



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and Environmental Security Jessica LeAnn Urban



Nation, Immigration,

NATION, IMMIGRATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978-0-230-60098-0 ISBN-10: 0-230-60098-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Scribe Inc. First edition: April 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.



Copyright © Jessica LeAnn Urban, 2008. All rights reserved.

partner, Daniel Broking. Without your love, support, incredible patience, and daily examples of integrity, intelligence, passion, compassion, and courage, going to school, finding my dream job, and finishing this book (among many other things!) would never have been possible. I hope you both know how much I love and appreciate you and how grateful I am for all of the love and joy you bring to my life. I love you both.



This book is dedicated to my mom, LeAnn Pappas, and to my




Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction: Lifeboats and Scapegoats

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1

Academia and Environmental Security

29

2

The State, Environmental Security, and the Militarization of the United States–Mexico Border

79

3 4

Reporting Immigration and Environmental Security in the United States

131

Constructing Ecological Sensibilities: NGOs and Environmental Security

163

Conclusion

205

Notes

225

Appendix: Documents Used in Interpretive Analysis

231

Other Works Cited

251

Index

275



CONTENTS




Projects like this are always a collective process. Although any problems or mistakes are entirely my own, this book would simply not have been possible without the love, support, and patience of the family members, friends, co-workers, and students I am incredibly thankful to have in my life. In particular, I want to acknowledge and thank my wonderful family: LeAnn, Mike, and Angelina Pappas, my partner Daniel Broking, the Broking family, the Dunsmores, A.J. and Colin Olsen, the Appels, Kristen Downer, Joy McCoy, and Casey Webster for their love and support. My family sustains me (literally and figuratively), challenges me, feeds my passion, and never fails to remind me why it is important to do what I love to do. I also want to thank Kim Berry, who, as the Chair of Humboldt State University’s Women’s Studies Program, Co-Chair of the Multicultural Queer Studies Program, and my dear friend, has made writing this book possible. I am also indebted to my dissertation committee and so many others at Northern Arizona University, especially Geeta Chowdhry, who, as my chair, mentor, and dear friend, lovingly and expertly guides me and who, along with Kim Berry and all my family and friends, continually remind me that I can achieve my dreams. I also want to thank Christina Accomando, Mark Baker, Kim Berry, Maria Corral-Ribordy, Diana Ferris, and many others in Humboldt State University’s Women’s Studies, Multicultural Queer Studes, Environment & Community, and Ethnic Studies Programs: I am really thankful to work in a job that I love alongside folks whom I admire. This also holds true for Gwyn Kirk, Zoe Hammer-Tomizuka, and Betsy Hartmann, whom I have had the great fortune of meeting through this process as well. Betsy Hartmann and Geeta Chowdhry provided me my first introduction to feminist theories of reproductive, environmental, and social justice, which has shaped the course of my life and work in fundamental ways, as has the work and activism of Gwyn Kirk, who really never ceases to amaze me. Zoe Hammer-Tomizuka, and all the amazing members and allies of Border Action Network in Tucson, Arizona, as well as the members and



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgments

allies of the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment, continually inspire me with their dedication to coalition building toward a more just world. I also want to thank the countless students who have helped me work through many of these ideas during classes at Humboldt State University and Northern Arizona University, and always remind me why I love teaching. Thanks also to the Palgrave staff, especially Anthony Wahl, Emily Hue, Erin Ivy, the anonymous reviewer, Jennifer Boeree, and Yvette Chin for their assistance, patience, and support throughout this process. My goal has been to make this book accessible and relevant for a diverse array of readers, including nonacademic and academic readers across a variety of disciplines and grade levels. I have tried to avoid relying heavily on academic jargon and at the same time have tried to explain the discipline-specific language that I do use (from women’s studies and political science). My hope is that this book will be useful for activists and academics alike (which are not mutually exclusive categories!) in areas such as women’s studies, political science, environmental studies, immigration studies, and public policy. Moreover, I hope this book is able to help disrupt the dangerous myths surrounding population issues and environmental destruction that have become conventional wisdom in many areas of academia, the mainstream media, the U.S. state, and even activist spaces. Most importantly, I hope that this book offers tools with which to critically examine the operation of power in the production of knowledge and helps bring about a more just world for all of us. Finally, I am personally donating the proceeds I earn from this book to Border Action Network in Tucson, Arizona, which I encourage readers to visit at http://www.borderaction.org/.



x

N T R O D U C T I O N

LIFEBOATS AND SCAPEGOATS1 IN 1997, I CAME ACROSS A FULL-PAGE ADVERTISEMENT in the Sierra Club’s magazine Sierra for a group named Population-Environment Balance. On the basis of neo-Malthusian theory (especially Hardin’s “Lifeboat Ethics”), Population-Environment Balance scapegoated population growth and illegal immigration for destroying social and environmental resources in the United States and for potentially devastating the “conditions necessary for maintaining our free society in the American tradition” (Population-Environment Balance 1997, 51). Immigration is frequently defined as a population issue, and by the time world population reached 6 billion in 1999, those arguing that there was an environmental and national security threat posed by “overpopulation” in and “mass immigration” from the “Third World”2 enjoyed a surge in popularity and support, as did their calls for more stringent controls on population growth and immigration. Neo-Malthusian understandings of population issues remain popular in the United States today among environmental and other activists, as well as numerous politicians, journalists, and academics across multiple disciplines. Even anti-immigration “vigilante groups” such as the Minutemen,3 Ranch Rescue, and American Patrol have begun including varying degrees of environmental foci within their anti-immigration campaigns. In 2006, Population-Environment Balance joined forces with the Carrying Capacity Network and the Minutemen to protest the G. W. Bush administration’s proposed guest worker program, arguing, “We advocate the absolutely logical strategy of stopping mass immigration altogether with a moratorium because our middle class can’t afford it and our environment can’t afford it” (Population-Environment Balance



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Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security

2006). In its action alert, Population-Environment Balance went on to explain, “THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ALERT WE HAVE EVER SENT YOU, BECAUSE IF THE OPEN BORDERS LOBBYISTS SUCCEED, UP TO TWENTY MILLION ILLEGALS WILL BE LEGALIZED AND WILL BE ABLE TO BRING THEIR FAMILIES, WHICH COULD INCREASE THE USA’S POPULATION COUNTRY FOREVER”

(2006; capitalization in original). Similarly, Carrying Capacity Network (2006) called on its members to join in protest and “demand that members of the Senate uphold their sworn Constitutional duties to protect our borders, our jobs, and our nation from the flood of illegal aliens which threatens to transform this once proud republic into a lawless Third World dumping ground.” These groups are by no means alone in their use of neo-Malthusian–based environmental security arguments, nor are they alone in their representation of peoples from Other (e.g., inferior, subhuman, backward, uncivilized, dangerous, exotic) nations as threats to U.S. national security. They are also not alone in seeing immigration as a “security or civilizational threat to the U.S.” (Persaud 2002, 56). Immigration policy and practice in the United States have been heavily influenced by assumptions equating danger with external anarchy, and social constructions of racialized (e.g., “nonwhite”) and gendered (“feminine”) difference, and conflict on the one hand, versus civilization’s equation with security, modernity, the West, and social constructions of “whiteness,” and “masculinity” on the other. Likewise, claims of sovereignty and fears over economic insecurity underlie contemporary and historical antiimmigrant sentiment, policy, and practice in the United States. However, in the rhetoric deployed by Population-Environment Balance and Carrying Capacity Network, the language of national and civilizational security merges with that of environmental security to form a mutually supportive discursive cluster aimed at rationalizing the need to preserve the boundaries of “American identity” and nationhood against the presumed security threat posed by a flood of gendered and racialized immigrant Others set to destroy “our nation.” Assessing and responding to security threats has been one of the central preoccupations of International Relations (henceforth IR) scholars since the field’s inception. Indeed, “a veritable cornucopia of danger” (Campbell 1998, 2) shapes mainstream IR scholarship and traditional IR security discourse (discussed in chapter 1). More recently, IR scholars have also begun to argue the environmental security threat posed by



BY A HUNDRED MILLION IN A FEW SHORT YEARS, THUS CHANGING OUR

3

population growth in, and immigration from, the Global South. The growing IR subfield of Environmental Security (henceforth ES) is an important case in point. ES theorists suggest that environmental degradation and scarcity can cause conflict and threaten U.S. national security. Many have therefore drawn attention to the necessity of expanded definitions of security and violence in order to recognize environmental security and other issues of “low politics” (issues traditionally given low priority with respect to national security) as legitimate, if not essential, components of IR theory and state policy. As Myers surmises, “Security concerns can no longer be confined to traditional ideas of soldiers and tanks, bombs and missiles. Increasingly they include the environmental resources that underpin our material welfare” (1995, 257). Population issues, including population growth and immigration, are salient concerns for ES proponents. Like the arguments advanced by Population-Environment Balance and the Carrying Capacity Network, dominant ES theory tends to be grounded in a neo-Malthusian framework that regards “overpopulation” in and “mass immigration” from the Third World as root causes of hunger, environmental degradation, and scarcity—and, increasingly, a root cause of violent conflict. As such, population issues associated with the Global South are thought to threaten the environmental and national security of the United States. Further, in its construction and representation of “Third World Others” as enemies of environmental and national security, dominant ES theory on population issues and its neo-Malthusian underpinnings link environmental, national, and civilizational security concerns. A particular enemy-creation process characterizes dominant ES discourse in the United States. This process relies on what Betsy Hartmann (2004) calls the “greening of hate,” whereby environmental degradation is blamed on poor populations of color on the basis of highly xenophobic, classist, racist, and sexist assumptions about uncontrolled fertility, immorality, criminality, selfishness, and danger. These assumptions ground the construction of an enemy—an enemy symbolized by the bodies of women of color—who ostensibly threaten to deplete natural (as well as political and social) resources, create scarcity, engender conflict, and dilute American national (i.e., “white”) identity. “Overpopulation” among peoples of color (especially women of color) and “mass migration” from the Global South are therefore presented as urgent threats to the environmental, national, and civilizational security of the United States.



Lifeboats and Scapegoats


As I have argued elsewhere (Urban 2001), the treatment of population growth in the subfield of ES mirrors traditional IR security discourse, in that constructions and representations of gendered, classed, and racialized Others figure large in the political mobilization of identity, particularly in the interpretation of danger. In traditional security discourse and ES analyses of population issues, Others are constructed and represented as threats to national security, representations that themselves hinge upon definitions of national citizenship (or insider/outsider status, constructed as a value hierarchical dualism4) and are replayed within constructions of nation and national security. Identification of threats and interpretations of danger are integral components of U.S. foreign policy and mainstream IR given that “the boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger” (Campbell 1998, 3), as is a state’s very existence. Thus, like Population-Environment Balance, ES discourse associated with academia and the state link civilizational, environmental, and national security concerns together in their analyses of population issues. Broadly speaking, this book details my exploration of the degree to which mainstream ES discourse in the United States scapegoats immigration—especially female immigrants of color and immigration across the United States–Mexico border—for the environmental ills besetting the United States. I adamantly agree with Hartmann (2006), who argues that the “root causes of poverty, environmental degradation and political instability lie in unjust and inequitable social and economic systems—not in women’s fertility” and not in immigration. I further argue that the greening of hate emanating from the neo-Malthusian foundations of mainstream ES discourse on population growth and immigration is an illustration of systemic privilege. Scapegoating racialized and gendered Others for the ills of the United States not only absolves members of more structurally privileged groups in the United States of the need for self-interrogation and of personal responsibility, but it also colludes with and reinforces interlocking systems of inequality, as well as the consequences that result. Ironically, in its reliance on neo-Malthusianism, mainstream ES discourse actually obfuscates the core causes of ecological devastation and insecurity—systems of power, privilege and oppression, militarization, and neoliberal globalization—leaving both of them to flourish.



4

Lifeboats and Scapegoats AND

METHODOLOGY

My project focuses on of some of the primary characteristics of mainstream ES discourse in the United States and its relationship to discourses of national and civilizational security. I interrogate how environmental security threats are identified and interpreted, and why, and I discuss the extent to which mainstream ES discourse reinforces a neo-Malthusian legacy in its approach to population issues (especially immigration across the United States–Mexico border) and ecological destruction. I also talk about some of the concrete, material implications of mainstream ES discourse, and finally, I explore alternatives to mainstream ES discourse in the United States, particularly ones that challenge the greening of hate and emphasize social, reproductive, and environmental justice, as well as immigrant rights. In examining the different areas of ES discourse, I utilize tools of interpretive analysis, and, most importantly, my work throughout this project is grounded in and guided by a theoretical framework comprised of a combination of intersectional feminist and postcolonial feminist theories. In its most basic terms, intersectional, postcolonial feminist analysis and activism take as its starting point the recognition that racism, sexism, classism, ageism, ableism, heterosexism, and genderism, alongside colonization, neoliberal globalization, and militarism, operate as interlocking and mutually reinforcing systems of power, privilege, and oppression. I discuss this framework in greater depth later in this chapter. As will become obvious, my work straddles the disciplines of women’s studies and IR. It is important to note that feminist research in general has been consciously interdisciplinary for the past three decades (HesseBiber, Gilmartin, and Lydenberg 1999, 1). Importantly, “many feminist scholars have pointed to the need to ignore disciplinary boundaries in the name of altering the production of knowledge,” and in so doing, emphasize the “artificiality of disciplinary boundaries,” as well as the transdisciplinary nature, of fields like women’s studies (Reinharz 1992, 159, 160). Taking this further, bell hooks suggests the particularly political function of an “interdisciplinary bordersite” within which one can “participate in the formation of a counter-hegemonic cultural practice” (qtd. in HesseBiber, Gilmartin, and Lydenberg 1999, 2). Like disciplinary boundaries themselves, the strict definition of methodological tools associated with particular disciplines is consciously critiqued and muddied by a variety of feminist scholars, myself included. One reason for this is my belief that



RESEARCH FOCI, CONCEPTS,

5


neither one’s theories nor one’s methodological tools are benign; they are connected to power and play crucial roles in the (re)production of knowledge. Academic, media, state, and other social institutions in the United States, as well as the products or materials produced within them (including television shows, movies, advertisements, research studies, surveys, and textbooks) play a powerful role in the (re)production of knowledge and systems of inequality by “identifying which ideas are valuable, which are not, and which should not be heard at all. In this way, the ideas of groups that are privileged within race, class, and gender relations are routinely heard, whereas the ideas of groups who are disadvantaged are silenced” (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001e, 223). While cultural institutions can support inequality, they can also be sites of contestation and resistance (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001e, 224). Intersectional and postcolonial feminist scholars promote such contestation and resistance by virtue of their focus on and interrogation of multiple, interlocking systems and ideologies of oppression and privilege, as well as their unique understandings of agency and resistance. I share the belief that one’s theories and methodological tools must serve goals of liberation, and therefore I share the belief that they must reflect Freire’s philosophy of praxis, or “action and reflection upon the world in order to change it” (hooks 1994, 14). To this end, I use interpretive analysis to examine U.S. mainstream ES discourse on population issues, with particular attention to immigration. I use the definition of “discourse” articulated by Milliken: “an ordering of terms, meanings, and practices that form the background presuppositions and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people’s actions and interpretations” (1999, 92). Discourse, then, is more than the simple, objective presentation of ideas; it is the “matrix of social practices that give meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior” (George 1994, 29). Discourse generates “the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained [and] makes ‘real’ that which it prescribes as meaningful” (George 1994, 30; emphasis in original). Discourse involves a relationship between knowledge production and power, including the power to define or represent the “reality” of a situation or issue in a particular way. For IR, discourse allows the naming and characterizing of subjects and objects that “provide ways of relating these subjects and objects . . . in standardized narratives for how one state can threaten others through conquest, or how



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a community of states may collapse from internal divisions” (Milliken 1999, 92). As such, there are concrete, material consequences to discourse. I define U.S. mainstream ES discourse as the dominant assumptions, categories, definitions, theories and knowledge produced by privileged actors within U.S. institutions such as academia, the mainstream media, and the state, as well as the knowledge produced by popular environmental organizations and a number of increasingly popular anti-immigration groups and organizations. Mainstream ES discourse in the United States is (re)produced through speeches, research projects, congressional hearings, articles, position papers, Web site materials, university textbooks, and other cultural products or artifacts, which I interrogate using interpretive analysis. There are many different terms (often depending on one’s disciplinary location) used in reference to the examination of cultural products. Sociologists often use the phrase content analysis, while historians use archival research, and furthermore, different disciplines use different interpretive frameworks to examine cultural artifacts (written records, narratives and visual texts, material culture, and behavioral residue) ranging from discourse analysis to rhetorical analysis and deconstruction (Reinharz 1992, 146–47). I use interpretive analysis to interrogate and reveal patterns in authorship, topics, themes, and strategies of representation. Interpretive analysis allows me to deconstruct phrases, sentences, and patterns within cultural artifacts for their embedded meanings or, as Reinharz explains, to “apply an inductive, interpretive framework to cultural artifacts” (1992, 159). Importantly, interpretive analysis allows me to identify and examine both the inclusions and strategic silences within cultural artifacts, as well as their implications. All of the documents I examine with interpretive analysis through the lens of intersectional, postcolonial feminism are cited in the appendix. THE UNITED STATES–MEXICO BORDER, 1994–2006

I focus on immigration across the United States–Mexico border as opposed to other entry sites into the United States for a number of reasons. During the last three decades, the majority of immigrants into the United States have been “nonwhite,” and many have also been Latina/o (Lindsley 2000). One study indicates that by the late 1990s the majority of the foreign-born population in the United States was comprised of immigrants from Latin America, and today, one of the two most prominent countries of origin is Mexico (Frey, Abresch, and Yeasting 2001,





53). According to Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics (INS is now called U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or CIS, which I discuss in chapter 2), of the 5 million people residing in the United States illegally, and of the 275,000 people that enter the United States without proper documentation each year, the majority are from Mexico (Frey, Abresch, and Yeasting 2001, 62). Moreover, I contend that the overriding representation of “illegal immigration”5 in the United States relies upon homogenous, racialized, xenophobic and gendered constructions of Mexican immigrants, especially Mexican women, as Other and as particularly threatening to U.S. national security. Furthermore, I believe many in the United States perceive immigration through a lens of civilizational security similar to that of Samuel Huntington (2004b), who argues that Mexican immigration, especially “illegal immigration,” threatens “the country’s cultural and political integrity.” In addition, I center my research on the United States–Mexico border given the particularly militarized nature of its enforcement. As a matter of national policy, enforcement is far greater on the United States–Mexico border than the United States–Canada border, not to mention other entry sites into the United States. The United States–Mexico border is “perhaps the key locus of militarization of law enforcement in the U.S.,” as well as “the site of the longest-running manifestation of such efforts (over a decade) and the home of the deepest institutional ties between the military and police bodies” (Dunn 2001, 7). The Southwest border of the United States is also home to one of the most organized anti-immigration movements in the nation. This movement is sometimes referred to as a “frontier justice movement” and more often as a “vigilante” movement. I argue that groups like Ranch Rescue, American Patrol, and Minutemen are more appropriately labeled paramilitary given their relationship with state and local law enforcement bodies, as well as their activities and rhetoric. I also think it is important to explain why I have limited my interpretive analysis to cultural products released between 1994 and 2006. Among other things, 1994 marks the formal initiation of NAFTA, as well as the Clinton administration’s Southwest Border Strategy and the enhanced militarization of the border that followed, an examination of which is crucial to understanding the continued militarization of the border in this post-September 11, 2001 (or 9/11) era. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, where CIS is now housed, and the G. W. Bush administration’s Secure Border Initiative (2005), are two



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significant institutional changes initiated after 9/11. The basic scaffolding beneath many of the “new” policies and practices existed well before 9/11, however. As Eisenstein argues, “So much is said to be new, when most everything is almost always also old” (2004, 4), including the border’s militarization and the myriad ways in which immigrants are simultaneously compelled and encouraged to cross the United States–Mexico border and then criminalized and punished for doing so. This date range also affords me the opportunity to examine the 1998 and 2004 campaigns to change the Sierra Club’s neutral position on immigration, as well as the debates surrounding the “6 billion mark” with respect to global population in 1999. I do not intend to suggest that relations between the United States and Mexico only became pertinent in 1994, nor am I suggesting that 1994 marks the start of the border’s militarization, much less anti-immigrant hostility in the United States, which has its own long and sordid history. From the expropriation of land once a part of Mexico and policies throughout Latin and Central America aimed at keeping Communism (and now terrorism) “out of our backyard,” to trade policies like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the so-called war on drugs, the United States has been intimately connected to Mexico and Latin America for years, and issues of immigration are a central component of this relationship. As Elizabeth Martinez explains, “Speaking only of Latinos, we have seen in California and the Southwest, especially along the border, almost 150 years of relentless repression which today includes Central Americans among its targets” (2001, 112). With respect to Latinas/os living in the Southwest United States, Martinez further argues, “They became part of the U.S. through the 1846–48 war on Mexico and thus a foreign population to be colonized. But as they were reduced to cheap or semi-slave labor, they quickly came to suffer for their ‘race’— meaning as nonwhites. In the Southwest of a super-racialized nation the broad parallelism of race and class embrace Mexicans ferociously” (2001, 112). This history has not vanished, nor have the countless forms of violence characterizing the region. Like Eisenstein, I believe “every political moment is informed by a series of befores and alreadys” (2004, xv) and believe “history resonates in the present even if unconsciously” (2004, 25). These befores and alreadys demand critical attention, as do present realities on the United States–Mexico border.




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Taking a cue from Mohanty’s feminist genealogy in Feminism Without Borders, I want to underscore and honor some of the feminist voices, perspectives, and themes that shape my thinking, teaching, and activism in general and my examination of mainstream ES discourse on immigration in particular. My goal in doing so is not simply to provide readers with a mini literature review, although this is not without value. Instead, I truly believe that acknowledging the deeply collective process by which emancipatory, anti-imperialist, anticapitalist feminist praxis evolves (Mohanty 2003, 5) and honoring the specific scholar-activists who inform the theoretical framework of this book are strategies for challenging the unethical, careerist, intellectual appropriation6 that continues to mark some strands of Western feminism, especially white, middle- and upper-class, liberal or reformist and imperial feminisms in the United States.7 I therefore offer this (very partial) outline in the spirit of feminist solidarity, which Mohanty defines “in terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities” (2003, 7). I am also conscious of the responsibility I carry in deconstructing systemic privilege and oppression in all its manifestations. Like Sturgeon (2001), however, I continuously struggle to understand the ways that unexamined privilege can prevent a thorough understanding of the operation of systemic inequality. As someone simultaneously advantaged and disadvantaged within the U.S. system of white supremacist, capitalist hetero-patriarchy owing to my social location8 as a “white,” female, ostensibly middle-class resident of the belly of the beast that is the United States, I must take responsibility for interrogating my own social location and for being a more effective ally within struggles to end all forms of inequality and violence. As Sturgeon brilliantly argues, “We need to understand the functions of privilege for those of us who are privileged by this system. We cannot just bemoan inequality and oppression without accounting for our being advantaged by it. Privilege protects some of us from knowing fully the horrors of our present global economic system, and saves us from realizing and rejecting our complicity in it” (Sturgeon 2001, 8–9). This must include taking every opportunity to help expose, deconstruct, and eliminate those discourses that “justify” inequality and violence, which is a central goal of this book. As mentioned, I use a combination of intersectional feminism and postcolonial feminism as the primary framework through which I



AN INTERSECTIONAL, POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST FRAMEWORK

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examine mainstream ES discourse on immigration across the United States–Mexico border. Scholar-activists such as Mohanty (2003; 1991a; 1991b), Alexander and Mohanty (1997), Ahmed (1992), Bulbeck (1998), Chowdhry (2002), and Wing (2000) are most commonly associated with postcolonial feminism. My framework is also informed by the work of several United States–based intersectional feminists, such as hooks (2003; 2000), Valerie Smith (1998), Anderson and Hill Collins (2001a–2001f ), and Kirk and Okazawa-Rey (2007a), as well as Anzaldúa and Keating (2002), given the parallels between their work and that of the postcolonial feminists just mentioned; hence my use of the phrase “intersectional postcolonial feminism.” I also include many of the theoretical insights provided by Shiva (2000, 1997), Mies and Shiva (1993a; 1993b), Kirk (1997), Warren (2000; 1997), and Sturgeon (2001), who, as primarily materialist ecofeminists,9 share many of the same assumptions as postcolonial feminists. I also rely on the work of Manzo (1996), Doty (2001; 1999), and Campbell (1998) in deconstructing discourses of nation, nationalism, and national security. Finally, it is important that I highlight the social, environmental, and reproductive justice work (which I discuss later in this chapter), undertaken by members of the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE), including but not limited to Hartmann (2004; 1995), Silliman and King (1999), Silliman and Bhattacharjee (2002), Andrea Smith (2002), and Lindsley (2002; 2000). Their work has been absolutely invaluable, as has the work undertaken by Border Action Network, a grassroots organization supporting immigrant rights, as well as social and environmental justice. They, too, share many of the same underlying assumptions as the intersectional feminists, materialist ecofeminists, and postcolonial feminists just mentioned. I incorporate the work of these diverse scholar-activists despite disagreement over the inclusion of writings from structurally marginalized social groups in the United States within the framework of postcolonial feminism. Like Mufti and Shohat, I refuse “to separate the linked histories of race as well as the contemporary coimplication of communities within and across the borders of nation-states” because “it is impossible to discuss issues of nation and gender in national isolation” (1997, 2–3). My examination of ES discourse on immigration, as well as the causes and consequences of U.S. immigration policy, would be tremendously incomplete without the voices and theories of intersectional and other feminists within the United States. Therefore, I foreground an intersectional,





postcolonial feminist framework inclusive of those just mentioned because I believe it best addresses interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression with an emphasis on past and continuing colonial relations of power, militarization, neoliberal globalization, and global capitalism, which are all elements critical to more fully interrogating mainstream ES discourse on immigration in the United States. Also crucial is the emphasis this framework places on building transnational feminist solidarity toward the eradication of all forms of violence and inequality. INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS AND IDEOLOGIES OF POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND OPPRESSION

I use the term “intersectionality,” and phrases such as “lens of intersectionality”; “matrix of domination and privilege”; “systems of power, privilege, and oppression”; “systems of inequality”; and “white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy”10 to highlight the core understanding among intersectional and postcolonial feminists that systems including (but not limited to) racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ableism, and ageism, as well as processes of colonialism, militarization, and neoliberal globalization form an interlocking, mutually reinforcing structural pattern that “affects individual consciousness, group interaction, and group access to institutional power and privileges” (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001b, 4). An intersectional, postcolonial feminist framework allows interrogation of the discursive and concrete ways in which people are impacted by (post)colonial structures and relations of power. This framework emphasizes questions of how and why knowledge is produced, as well as the material consequences of knowledge production, demonstrating that knowledge (re)produced on the basis of power-over relationships acts as an instrument of power itself. Put bluntly, systems of inequality cannot operate without powerful ideological justifications for their existence, nor could the forms of violence that sustain them. Mainstream IR does not pay enough attention to issues of knowledge production and representation, despite the fact that “unveiling practices of power in IR requires at the very least an engagement with the problem of representation, and its racialized and gendered implications” (Chowdhry and Nair 2002, 16). Building on the groundbreaking work of Edward Said (1978), postcolonial feminists interrogate colonial modes of knowledge production (like Orientalism) and their continuing operation, and work to unravel constructions and representations of Others as well as the broader ideologies that function to “legitimize” inequality and violence.



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In examining the operation of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression, postcolonial feminists emphasize what Chowdhry and Nair (2002) term the imperial juncture, as well as the role of nation, nationalisms, and distributions of power between, not just within, nations. Drawing on Fanon, Persaud explains colonial domination as an “epistemological and ontological system as well as a form of structural violence that was much broader than economic exploitation. It was civilisational, and, most importantly, racial, in content” (Persaud 1997, 170). Drawing on postcolonial theory,11 postcolonial feminists argue that current international hierarchies, relations of power, and geographical boundaries are still determined by relationships characteristic of colonialism (Pettman 1996, 26). Structures and ideologies of domination and privilege cannot be understood separately, and this includes histories of colonialism and contemporary postcolonial relations that, in part, advance the global capitalist project on the backs of Others. Alexander and Mohanty use the phrase colonial legacies “to evoke the imagery of an inheritance and to map continuities and discontinuities between contemporary and inherited practices within state and capital formations,” and highlight the “imbrication of contemporary practices of postcolonial and advanced colonial states with capitalist processes of recolonization” (1997, xxi). Postcolonial feminists such as Mohanty (2003) appear to share McLaren’s belief that “there has been a willful ignorance surrounding the paralyzing effects that the victorious embrace of capitalism has had on the . . . destitute of the world” (2000, 19). But, given that the “goal of the U.S. political elite is to make the world safe for the global domination of capital and the U.S. way of life” through assumptions disguising the logic of capitalism as human nature and proclamations that “Free Trade is Jesus Christ and Jesus Christ is Free Trade,” this willful ignorance is hardly surprising (McLaren 2000, 19). In fact, representations of both capitalism’s savior-like quality and projects defining the advanced-self against the backward-Other were and still are central to colonialist projects. So, just as contemporary relations of ruling reflect those characteristics of colonialism, so, too, do the contemporary methods by which exploitation and inequality are rationalized. This includes state organization and reinforcement of its “citizenship machinery” through nationalism, as immigration policies and practices “promote the interests of the U.S. capitalist nation-state” (Bhattacharjee 1997, 311).





STATES, NATIONS,

AND

NATIONALISMS

“State” and “nation” are prime areas of study for IR scholars, and defining and deploying understandings of “national security” are similarly crucial elements within nationalist projects. Understandings of nation and state as socially produced or “constructed” stand in stark contrast to mainstream conceptions of each as natural entities existing logically of their own momentum and necessity. Further, constructions of state, nation, and nationalisms are intimately connected to structures and ideologies of oppression and privilege, and as Doty (1996) and Manzo (1996) demonstrate, race, gender, sexuality, and class are central in their construction and reproduction. Mohanty similarly points to a world “traversed with intersecting lines of power and resistance, a world which can be understood only in terms of its destructive divisions of gender, color, class, sexuality, and nation” (1991a, 2). These structures intersect, forming a matrix of domination and privilege, but this matrix is fluid. Systems of power, privilege, and oppression operate differently, depending on specific historical, social, economic, and other contexts. Therefore, Mohanty refers to them as “relations of ruling” and suggests that it is at the “intersections of these relations of ruling that third world feminist struggles are positioned” (Mohanty 1991a, 13). Furthermore, “modern nation-states are not that modern” rather, they are “products of a complex interplay of attitudes and orientations toward man, God, nature, and authority that span historical time and global space,” and moreover, they are not pure: “There is no such thing as a pure ‘type,’ national or otherwise” (Manzo 1996, 28). Again, contrary to mainstream understandings of nation and state as “natural,” whereby “the essence of the former precedes the reality of the latter: that the identity of a ‘people’ is the basis for the legitimacy of the state and its subsequent practices,” many argue instead that “the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy. Benedict Anderson, for example, has argued in compelling fashion that ‘the nation’ should be understood as an ‘imagined political community’ that exists only insofar as it is a cultural artifact that is represented textually” (Campbell 1998, 11). Many intersectional, postcolonial feminists disrupt assumptions that characterize “state” and “nation” as objective, innocent “givens.” Nationalist projects take on many forms; however, for the purpose of this project I focus on discourses of danger and security within nationalist projects advanced by the state and other social institutions in the United



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States. I also focus on the (re)creation of boundaries (figuratively and literally) within mainstream ES discourse, of which U.S. or state nationalist projects that identify and interpret danger figure prominently. “Nationalism involves a range of dispersed practices through which boundaries are created and maintained. Nationalism is a scriptural performance, one that constitutes national identity in opposition to alien difference” (Manzo 1996, 38). Nationalist projects undertaken to legitimize state and nation (and create and sustain their identities) need not be directly under the coercive control of the state to be effective. The “common sense” of nation-building is also articulated, enforced, and made consensual through education, the media, churches, and organizations (Manzo 1996, 6). In all, the “boundary-producing and standardizing practices of nationalism” (Manzo 1996, 42) are created, sustained, and articulated through the constitution of difference based on binary dualisms of “self/Other” and “citizen/alien.” Although nationalism is not static and may invent, reinvent, strengthen, and even dissolve racial, gender, and other identity boundaries, nationalism is racial and sexual when it treats “difference (especially difference found within the borders of state territory) as alien, threatening, and a problem to be solved” (Manzo 1996, 19). The continual process by which identity is (re)produced is central, not only to the construction of nation, but more specifically, to the identification and interpretation of threats to the security of the state and nation, within which citizen is most often equated with the rhetoric of national defense, and alien with that of danger and threat. But citizenry in the United States is defined in a very limited way, e.g., “genuine” or “real” U.S. citizens are presumably “white” (or at least “successfully assimilated”), middle- and upper-class male consumers. Takaki draws on the work of Toni Morrison to further explain that “‘[r]ace,’ . . . has functioned as a ‘metaphor’ necessary to the ‘construction of Americanness’: in the creation of our national identity, ‘American’ has been defined as ‘white’” (Takaki 2001, 53). Subsequently, the fullness of rights and responsibilities associated with U.S. citizenship has historically been reserved for these more “genuine” citizens. Constructing the “Third World Other as threat” (whether that “threatening Other” is located outside or inside the geographical boundaries of the United States) is crucial to constructing the First World self. Mohanty (1991a) argues, “an imagined free white liberal democracy” is often positioned against Third World nations and women who are constructed in terms of “underdevelopment,





oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, religious fanaticism, and ‘overpopulation’” (Mohanty 1991a, 7, 5–6). Groups that do not reflect privileged characteristics of U.S. nationhood and citizenry are not always considered “genuine citizens,” regardless of their actual citizenship status. So, in a dialectic play, the United States is simultaneously constructed and constructed against the “backward and uncivilized” peoples of the Third World, becoming the referent point for progressive, modern nationhood with its civilized and liberated (white, male, middleclass) citizens. Campbell argues, “The constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self ’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’” (Campbell 1998, 9), and this process continues as American traditions and life as “we” know it are constructed against, and presumably threatened by, the immoral, uncivilized behavior of those in and from the Third World. Dualistic representations demarcating boundaries of self/other, citizen/ alien, superior/inferior, civilized/backwards, and safety/danger are central to the processes by which geographical boundaries are formed and policed in the service of national security, as “nationalism entails the policing of access to territory by agents of state authority. Immigration laws and their implementation, border patrols, and the apprehension of ‘illegal aliens’ are nationalist practices masquerading as modern statecraft” (Manzo 1996, 38–39). It is important to emphasize that “danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat” (Campbell 1998, 1). The ability to interpret and represent “threat” on the basis of “characteristics reviled in the community said to be threatened can be an important impetus to an interpretation of danger. . . . the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience” (Campbell 1998, 3). Further, “by manifestly linking American identity to danger,” IR scholars and others perpetuate a process by which “the boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger,” which is an integral component in the formation of U.S. foreign policy (Campbell 1998, 3). Interestingly, nature is also embedded within nationalist projects through discourses of danger and security. Materialist ecofeminists demonstrate the links between systems of inequality and global environmental destruction by highlighting the role of white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy in creating Otherness in service of capital



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accumulation (Kirk 1997, 349). Likewise, the dominant, Western development paradigm12 perpetuates ecological devastation. This paradigm is steeped in seventeenth-century Enlightenment thinking that promotes the view that “progress” entails mastery over that which is defined inferior and threatening, including nature, women, and Other peoples. Binary relationships constructed in the service of Western development schemes categorize and seek to control “reality” and privilege civilization over barbarity, culture over nature, order over chaos, intellect over emotion, scientific knowledge over “old wives’ tales,” and so forth. These mutually exclusive categories privilege socially constructed masculine characteristics over feminine, thus inferiorizing that which is perceived as feminine. Rather than viewing nature as a living being, the Enlightenment roots of the dominant Western development paradigm reduce the natural environment to an object, a process essential to industrialization and profit maximization. As Tickner explains, “rendering nature as a dead, inert object was essential for eliminating the fears that the mining of metals and fuels crucial for the coming industrial revolution was a violation of nature’s inner resources” and inherent value (1992, 105). In fact, the “civilization” of nature as an indicator of human progress itself became a justification for imperialism (Tickner 1992). This worldview was globalized with the expansion of both the state system and the market economy. Thus, “empty lands” were “civilized” through the “expertise of a ‘superior culture’” (Tickner 1992, 107). Ultimately, the dominant, Western development paradigm works to rationalize the expendability of women, nature, and Other communities, especially if they are regarded as impediments or threats to the enhancement of the “greater good” of (white, Western) society. The Western development model views nature and women as subservient and disposable; the universalization of these constructions has led to the destruction of nature and the subjugation of women. Furthermore, the foundations of the global capitalist economy are themselves antiecological, with “the oppression of women, racism, and ecological destruction . . . directly linked to economic exploitation” (Kirk 1997, 349). TOWARD

A

MORE JUST WORLD

Intersectional and postcolonial feminism emphasize transformative, progressive change and justice as long term goals (characterized at the very least by the eradication of all systems of inequality rather than simply the





reform of the existing system of power in the United States). This focus relates to my goal of underscoring modes of analysis, activism, and policymaking with respect to immigration and environmental security that do not rely on gendered, racialized or nationalistic constructions and representations of Others. Anti-immigrant hostility is not new; however, in this post–9/11 era, in which immigrants of color are under intense ideological and physical attack in the United States, in which the militarization of the United States–Mexico border retains much political currency, and in which “vigilante” violence remains either troublingly popular or is simply dismissed, interrogating processes by which threats are identified, interpreted, and represented are critically important, as are transnational reproductive justice, environmental justice, and social justice movements working to end ecological destruction without colluding with or reinforcing systems of power, privilege, and oppression. I work from a commitment to reproductive justice rather than a mainstream “pro-choice” framework, because the latter often emphasizes access to contraception and abortion services but minimizes analysis of and resistance to the intersections of racism and classism with sexism in relation to women’s health. Indeed “choice is only meaningful for those with resources” (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007c, 207). Reproductive justice “relates health and reproductive rights to broader issues of social and economic justice,” which provides a far more complex way of thinking about women’s health and well-being on an individual level, as well as community, national and global levels (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007c, 207). The mainstream U.S. largely liberal feminist choice movement still tends to focus on individual choice without adequate analysis of the operation of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression, or histories and contemporary practices of colonization, neoliberal globalization, and coercive population control policies, past or present. Members of Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice, founded in 1989 in Oakland, California, explain that given the limited framework offered by mainstream liberal feminism in the United States, with its largely pro-choice and individual rights agenda, women of color and antiracist white women and allies mobilized to develop theories and forms of coalitional activism to better address interlocking systems of race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, generation, and immigration status (ACRJ 2007, 228). The history and development of reproductive justice analysis and activism are still often erased, or at best marginalized, by and within mainstream U.S. feminism. It is therefore crucial to note that the



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National Black Women’s Health Project, formed in 1984, was the first women of color reproductive health organization. This organization provided inspiration for others like it, including the Mother’s Milk Project on the Akwesasne Reservation in New York (founded 1985), National Latina Health Organization (1986), Native American Women’s Health Education and Resource Center (1988), and Asian Pacific Islanders for Choice (1989, forerunner to Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice), as well as hundreds if not thousands of organizations, conferences, and meetings foregrounding reproductive justice in the ensuing years (ACRJ 2007, 228). In 1994, the specific phrase “reproductive justice” was coined by a Black women’s caucus who named themselves “Women of African Descent for Reproductive Justice” during the Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance Conference, because of the limited individual choice framework in which the larger conference and its attendees were operating (ACRJ 2007, 228). Then, in 1997, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Health Collective was created by sixteen different women of color organizations (ACRJ 2007, 228). Ross, Brownlee, Dixon Diallo, Rodriguez, and the SisterSong Project (2002) provide an excellent overview of the organization itself, and the multilayered, complex, and comprehensive reproductive justice framework under which it operates in the edited book Policing the National Body. Like SisterSong, ACRJ works to expose and eradicate the underlying causes of reproductive oppression and injustice through “a model that is at the nexus of the intersections of gender, race, class, sexuality, ability, generation, and immigration status” (ACRJ 2007, 228). As highlighted in their Reproductive Justice Agenda (which coincides with the “Call for a New Approach” advanced by the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment and discussed in chapter 1), ACRJ works to eradicate all systems of inequality and the ideologies that support them; it places reproductive justice at the center of “critical social and economic issues facing our communities such as domestic safety, labor rights, environmental justice, queer rights, and immigrant rights” and works toward the creation of communities, workplaces, and homes that are free of violence, as well as lives free of sexual and other forms of harassment, clean environments, access to healthy, nutritious, and culturally appropriate foods, comprehensive and accessible health care, living wages, and much more (ACRJ 2007, 229). Again, their work is based on a conception of reproductive justice and its relationship with environmental, economic, and social justice.





The conceptions of reproductive and social justice just noted correspond with the definition and agenda of environmental justice outlined by the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991. Their agenda also coincides with the agendas of the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE) and Border Action Network and all three similarly inform my overarching goal of interrogating mainstream ES discourse on immigration in the United States, including especially the assumptions and ideologies supporting the greening of hate. The Summit convened in 1991 in Washington, DC, included over a thousand national and international activists (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007b, 556). Together, attendees of the Summit developed seventeen principles of environmental justice, all heavily grounded in an analysis of the operation and consequences of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression (First National 2007). The principles are also guided by a commitment to honoring the interdependence and sacredness of all life and the right to environmentally safe livelihoods and political, cultural, and economic liberation from oppression (First National 2007). The seventeen principles illustrate their commitment to struggling for an end to all forms ecological destruction; the eradication of discrimination; the promotion of sustainable living and production; the fundamental political, economic, cultural, and environmental self-determination of all; principles of informed consent; liberatory education; and the eradication of military destruction, as well as the destruction wrought by multinational corporations, to note just a few (First National 2007, 556–57). These principles are consistent with the “Principles of Earth Democracy” advanced by Vandana Shiva (2005) in Earth Democracy: the intrinsic worth of all peoples, species, and cultures and the democracy of all life, as well as the crucial importance of living democracies, living economies, and living cultures that promote peace, justice, freedom, and life-serving goals. In sum, an environmental justice framework addresses diverse forms of environmental destruction ranging from toxic contamination and pollution to habitat and biodiversity loss, clearcutting, wildlife extinction, and more, but it does so with a clear focus on the systems of power, privilege, and oppression that cause environmental destruction with a simultaneous commitment to struggling for environmental, as well as social and reproductive justice, not simply reform of the existing system. Mohanty argues for political projects that simultaneously deconstruct on the one hand and reconstruct on the other (1991b, 51). Dismantling



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discourses that dehumanize and Other interrupts the ideological bases of systemic oppression and privilege. Recognizing the diversity of women’s and men’s lives, experiences, and needs in building genuinely diverse and empowering national and transnational coalitions against all forms of oppression is essential to feminist solidarity and transformative, progressive change. Scholar-activists included in my analytical framework argue for resistance that is historically, materially, culturally, and politically contextualized; nonelitist; and directed toward dismantling the entire matrix of domination and privilege. In this context, people are recognized as agents as opposed to homogenized and inferior victims or dangerous threats. Re-evaluations of history and historicity with women’s and Other men’s self-determination at its core (Alexander and Mohanty 1997, xvi), as well as the creation and recognition of already-existing autonomous, geographically, historically, and culturally grounded feminist struggles (Mohanty 1991b, 51) are central to the forms of resistance elucidated by those included in the analytical framework of this book. Alexander and Mohanty (1997, xvii) use the term recolonization to refer to the global realignments and new forms of colonization that, like “traditional” forms of colonization, are based on hierarchical, racialized, and sexualized constructions and systems of domination. Resistance to this process comes in the form of decolonization, which necessitates thinking and acting oneself out of spaces of domination. In other words, one must develop anticolonialist and anticapitalist lenses, recognize the destructive effects of colonization, and then proceed to build “actively anticolonialist relationships and cultures” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997, xxvii) without reinforcing homogenized constructions of the “Other as victim” or “Other as threat.” Put differently, intersectional and postcolonial feminists speak to the need for a new consciousness, one that sees histories of colonialism, contemporary postcolonial relations, and ideologies and structures of domination and privilege based on race, nation, class, gender, and sexuality as both interlocking and mutually constitutive. Ultimately, resistance is at best useless and at worst harmful (by reinforcing systems of inequality) without analysis of the operation of the matrix of domination and privilege. Many scholar-activists highlighted in my analytical framework similarly emphasize the importance of redefining power in such a way as to speak to physical and ideological violence as well as economic, ecological and social violence, and suggest definitions of power that speak to the significance of resistance as well. The power-over worldview common to IR





scholarship “locks all revolutionary struggles into binary structures— possessing power versus being powerless” (Mohanty 1991b, 71). Thus, recognizing empowerment and “power-with”13 provides possibilities for building revolutionary struggles that eschew the hierarchical relations that power-over understandings of world politics assume. A power-with worldview highlights the potential for collective action against all aspects of the prevailing culture of domination and violence and its replacement with values of love, mutuality, honesty, respect, nonviolence, and interdependence (hooks 2000). Thus, a new vision of society may be promoted—one based on genuine justice for all within a structure characterized by participatory economics, social democracy, and a global ecological vision of responsibility and sustainability (hooks 2000). Simplistic distinctions between the “real world” of resistance and activism versus the theoretical world of academia are also disrupted by numerous intersectional and postcolonial feminists given their focus on modes of political praxis that challenge and seek to eradicate systems of inequality and the ideologies that support them. Without an understanding of intersectionality, one can do little to challenge current inequalities. Similarly, intersectional, postcolonial feminists tend to share Freire’s pedagogical project, which is created in part to “employ knowledge and transformation as weapons to change the world. . . . [K]nowledge alone, as intended by the school, does not transform life. Only the conversion of knowledge into action can transform life. This concretely defines the meaning of practice: the dialectic movement between the conversion of transformative action into knowledge and the conversion of knowledge into transformative action” (Boff qtd. in McLaren 2000, xx). Further, the multiple ways people work for change every day are emphasized within an intersectional, postcolonial feminist framework that helps destabilize representations of the “Other as victim” and/or the “Other as threat” and helps make visible those groups rendered invisible or inferior by such representations. Even more, intersectional postcolonial feminism compels people to “think about changing the system, not just documenting the effects of that system on different people” (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001b, 6). The elucidation of the diverse, lived experiences and forms of power among historically marginalized groups itself functions as a form of resistance by disrupting attempts by social institutions to “suppress the strength of these groups and render them more easily exploited” (Anderson and



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Hill Collins 2001c, 531). Indeed, there is no “typical activist” (despite stereotypes otherwise), and one need not be a superhuman figure or look and talk a certain way to meaningfully engage in social justice work (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001c, 531–34). Rigid definitions of what it means to be a “real activist” not only function as wedge strategies to divide potential allies from one another, they also contribute to feelings of helplessness in the face of the daunting realities of injustice, inequality, and violence. Instead, celebrating and supporting diverse, everyday forms of resistance helps illustrate the complexity and variety of modes of social justice activism and allows folks to imagine (and act on) possibilities for progressive, systemic change. At the same time, recognizing that the theoretical and activist strategies we use have political, social, and ethical implications is absolutely crucial: “The process by which we struggle for the rights of women is important” (Gunning 2000, 277). Therefore, “[g]ood intentions are not enough. Constant vigilance and self-criticism are required for the feminist or progressive who truly intends to bridge the multicultural divides to create sisterhood” (Gunning 2000, 276). Ongoing self-reflexive analysis is essential (Mohanty 2003). In sum, the core assumptions, arguments, and commitment to praxis associated with an intersectional, postcolonial feminist framework as I have described it ground my examination of mainstream ES discourse on immigration across the United States–Mexico border. Intersectional and postcolonial feminist understandings of knowledge construction as a form of power are particularly important for examining the foundations of mainstream ES discourse, as well as the material consequences stemming from ES positions and policies. So, too, are intersectional and postcolonial feminist understandings of intersecting, systemic forms of oppression and privilege, both within and among nations. As Eisenstein notes, “anti-racist feminisms are needed in all parts of the world to build an insurgent people’s movement of struggle, to humanize the globe, and to guide political resistance against masculinist terror-filled wars” (2004, 21), and terror-filled constructions of environmental, civilizational, and national insecurity. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, “for positive social change to occur we must imagine a reality that differs from what already exists” (Anzaldúa 2002, 5).





OUTLINE

OF

THIS BOOK

In chapter 1, I discuss the rise of ES as a subfield of IR, and the field of IR itself. Another primary focus of this chapter is my analysis of university-level, introductory world politics textbooks. Textbooks play a significant role in identifying and framing the topics, voices, and perspectives considered relevant to the field of IR, as well as those of only marginal significance. Thus, I examine world politics textbooks and the ways ES discourse on immigration is framed and addressed. I also discuss the work of several ES scholars, particularly those referred to most frequently in these textbooks. I center my study on introductory textbooks as opposed to more advanced level texts because for many undergraduate students, introductory world politics/IR courses (and associated textbooks) may provide them with their only introduction to the field. Put differently, students who are not majors in the field often take introductory IR courses to fulfill elective or other requirements for their program of study and may not take more advanced courses in political science. As such, the construction of “legitimate” topics, perspectives, and voices within IR, and the manner in which they are represented, play an important role in shaping popular understandings of international relations. This is also significant for students continuing in the field, as these introductory texts lay the foundation upon which their later study is built. The work of Persaud (2002), Doty (1996), and Manzo (1996) suggest that racialized understandings of both American identity and national security are embedded in U.S. immigration policy. With the American nation defined as largely “white,” and threats to nation defined as largely “nonwhite,” U.S. immigration policy has been characterized by (frequently punitive) measures excluding people of color from definitions of and rights associated with U.S. citizenship. The Naturalization Act of 1790 is an important example. As America’s first immigration law, it sought to limit citizenship to “free white persons” only and remained in effect until 1952 (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007). I begin chapter 2 with a nonexhaustive discussion of some of the key U.S. immigration laws, with particular focus on those impacting migration across the United States–Mexico border. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to an examination of the extent to which environmental security concerns over immigration are articulated by actors within the U.S. government, with attention to the ways in which understandings of American identity and national security inform understandings of environmental security. I focus on border policies



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enacted between 1994 and 2006, including the Clinton administration’s Southwest Border Strategy (1994) and the Bush administration’s Secure Border Initiative (2005). I discuss several different kinds of documents including those focusing on national security (such as National Security Strategies), on immigration (such as Department of Justice and Homeland Security documents), and on environmental issues (such as government studies and environmentally focused speeches). Broadly speaking, I discuss the militarization of the United States– Mexico border under both the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations in chapter 2, including the operation of “vigilante” groups organized along the United States–Mexico border and their connection to militarization. Although groups like Minutemen, Ranch Rescue, and others are often dismissed as fringe groups, I am not comfortable doing so. Their positions are quite extreme indeed; however, members may be articulating sentiments held by a notable segment of the U.S. population. Moreover, there is substantial evidence pointing to the role groups like American Patrol play in the militarization of the United States–Mexico border, and certainly, the role they play in exacerbating the fear and violence experienced by communities on both sides of the United States–Mexico border. In chapter 3, I discuss mainstream U.S. media treatment of environmental security and immigration through an examination of articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and op-ed pieces from the U.S. editions of popular news sources including (but not limited to) the New York Times, the Washington Post, U.S. News and World Report, The Los Angeles Times, USA Today, and Time. Owners and employees of mainstream media corporations play an essential role in deciding the stories of import for U.S. (and international) news readers, and in determining the ways that stories are (re)presented in their newspapers. In addition to their reach, sources like many of those examined in this chapter benefit from a disproportionate amount of power in the United States, which is a significant component of what “makes mainstream media mainstream,” according to Chomsky (1997). In addition, privileged social groups in the United States have greater access to institutions like the media, as systemic privilege accords both agenda setting power and cultural authority. As Johnson explains, agenda setting power allows privileged groups to determine rules and standards, as well as how they are applied (2001, 33). Cultural authority provides the influence to “make judgments about others and to have those judgments stick” (Johnson 2001, 33), and overall,





institutional privilege “means being able to decide who gets taken seriously, who receives attention, who is accountable to whom and for what” (Johnson 2001, 33). Hence the importance of investigating the mainstream, corporate media as a key part of this project. In chapter 4 I focus on environmental organizations and the key role groups like the Sierra Club play in disseminating “ecological sensibilities” and persuading people to care about the environment (Wapner 1996). Central to my project is an understanding of the extent to which environmental and other organizations not only spread but also help construct ecological sensibilities around environmental security and immigration. Given its popularity and influence in the Western environmental movement, I explore the positions of the Sierra Club in relation to immigration, environmental destruction, and security, as well as the strategies they propose for protecting the environment. I also examine the work of Border Action Network. I conduct my examination through an analysis of documents including policy statements, research studies, position papers, backgrounders, and FAQs (frequently asked questions). In the conclusion of this book, I summarize the central characteristics of U.S. mainstream ES discourse on immigration, and importantly, I discuss the implications or consequences of this discourse. I also offer recommendations and reinforce paths of analysis and activism for ending environmental destruction that challenge systems of power, oppression, and privilege simultaneously. This book offers a complex study of mainstream ES discourse on immigration emanating from an array of actors and social institutions in the United States. While it may seem simply abstract or theoretical at first glance, I assure you that given their relationship to power and thus the ability to either reinforce or resist systems of inequality and violence, discourse and knowledge production have dramatic, real life consequences. As Everard argues, “States exist by virtue of their practices of inclusion and exclusion,” and “these practices are at their most visible when applied to what we identify as cultural products or symbolic life. Whoever has the means to control or disseminate cultural products controls how a state is viewed in the world, by other states, and by the domestic polity” (2000, 57). Exclusion and inclusion, along with the myriad other consequences associated with knowledge production, are especially salient for social groups who, by virtue of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression, are structurally marginalized. Simply stated, discourse and knowledge production matter.



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My work is deeply informed by the argument that one must be careful to avoid the “dangers of a simplistic analysis” (Silliman 1999, xi), for as Deudney notes, “Taken to an absurd extreme—as national security threats sometimes are—seeing environmental degradation in a neighboring country as a national security threat could trigger various types of interventions, a new imperialism of the strong against the weak” (1998, 309). Given the human rights violation and loss of life on the United States–Mexico border owing to its militarization, not to mention the impact of U.S. foreign and economic policy with Mexico, I think this “new imperialism” is already well underway. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) led a successful lawsuit against members of Ranch Rescue, who held four Mexican and two Salvadorian immigrants against their will and assaulted them. In addition, according to Mexican Consul Miguel Escobar, the Mexican government’s diplomatic office in Douglas, Arizona, documented at least twenty-four human rights abuse cases between April 1999 and April 2000 connected to “vigilante” activities (Blair Smith 2000). “Vigilante” violence on the United States–Mexico border against Latina/o residents (documented or otherwise) is extremely pervasive. In addition to the shooting death of eighteen-year-old Ezequiel Hernandez by a U.S. Marine, state border policies focusing on “deterrence” (forcing migrants to take more perilous routes into the United States) has led to fatalities from exposure, drowning, and dehydration. The American Civil Liberties Union estimates the number of fatalities on the border resulting from the program of deterrence at 4,000 over the last decade (ACLU 2006a). An accurate accounting of death rates in the United States–Mexico border region is nearly impossible, however, because “no one really knows for sure how many have died. Deaths of undocumented immigrants are usually undercounted because officials simply do not learn of the deaths. In the Southwest deserts, a dead body can be dismembered by wildlife within a few days of death” (Doty 2001, 535). In sum, understanding the processes by which discourses on security identify, frame, and interpret danger has life and death consequences. Understanding this process with respect to mainstream ES discourse on immigration is, therefore, the central preoccupation of this book.







H A P T E R

1

ACADEMIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AS CORNEL WEST NOTES, “how we set up the terms for discussing racial issues shapes our perception and response to these issues” (West 2001, 120). How we “see,” explain, discuss, and represent racial issues not only frame but in many ways determine our actions. As a result, how we set the terms of debate for racial—as well as gender, class, sexual, and other—issues can serve either to strengthen or resist structures and ideologies of power, privilege, and oppression. More specifically, bell hooks (1994) argues that the traditional role of the university and its pursuit of “Truth” and knowledge often reinforce structures of inequality. hooks explains that “it is painfully clear that biases that uphold and maintain white supremacy, imperialism, sexism, and racism have distorted education so that it is no longer about the practice of freedom” (1994, 29). Persaud draws on Cheru (1995) and speaks to the points offered by both hooks and West in arguing that “a look at some of the most widely used textbooks on international relations also reveals the erasing practices about the impact of race in global politics. . . . Further, the academic and pedagogical practices of exclusion seem to mirror the more general retrenchment concerning the globally dispossessed who are preponderantly people of color” (2002, 59; emphasis in original). Introductory-level university textbooks on world politics and international relations play a significant role in reflecting and helping set the terms of debate (and what is included and excluded from the debate) around key issues within the field of IR, including race, gender, nation, and environmental security. A statement included in the first chapter of one introductory textbook exemplifies the points just mentioned: “Before Europeans arrived, native cultures in North America did not



C


have extensive agriculture, cities, irrigation, armies, and the other trappings of civilization. Native cultures were exterminated or pushed aside by European settlers” (Goldstein 2001, 25). Not only is this quote inaccurate, but it erases the histories, contemporary experiences, diversity, and complexity of indigenous peoples and cultures in (what is now considered) North America and implicitly blames Native Americans for the genocide resulting from internal colonization by white Europeans. In the 2005 edition of this same textbook, the sentence was changed to read, “Before Europeans arrived, cultures in North America did not have large cities, irrigation, and the other trappings of states. Its indigenous cultures were largely exterminated or pushed aside by European settlers” (Goldstein 2005, 24). I still find these sentences distressing. They remain inaccurate and continue to reproduce a number of extremely problematic representations, including the “myth of the vanishing Indian.” This is part of the logic of genocide and colonialism—one of the three pillars of white supremacy—which holds that indigenous communities are, and must continuously be, disappearing (A. Smith 2006, 68). This “permanent absence” serves to “justify” colonial assumptions of white Europeans’ “rightful” inheritance of indigenous lands, resources, practices, ideologies, and spiritual forms (A. Smith 2006, 68). The revised sentences still ignore the histories, contemporary experiences, diversity, and complexity of indigenous peoples and cultures in North America, including complex forms of political and social organization and “other trappings of states.” As Eisenstein explains, “Ideas like federalism, checks and balances, popular nomination, and women’s suffrage are found early on in the Iroquois League. Both Jefferson and Franklin admired Indian democratic thought and have a debt to it— although the debt is usually forgotten” (Eisenstein 2004, 44–45). This may indeed be the case with regard to the IR textbook quotes above. Deconstructing these types of representation is an absolutely crucial part of bringing about a more just world because constructions and representations of Others provide one foundation for systems of inequality, colonialism, militarization, genocide, and neoliberal globalization. Despite such distortions and erasures, world politics and international relations textbooks reflect, reinforce, and set the terms of debate in IR and provide an important foundation for the field by assisting in the determination and framing of relevant topics, including IR’s engagement with environmental issues. Some textbook authors seem quite conscious of their role in both setting and reflecting the terms of debate



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and providing a foundation for college-level students. Spiegel and Wehling claim that their “Global Issues” chapter “introduces the reader to the most salient issues in the community of nations” (1999, 430; emphasis added). While I am not suggesting that introductory textbooks cover every single issue associated with the field of IR, I am suggesting that the topical choices made by the authors (including the manner in which those topics are represented) are conscious, political choices with concrete, material consequences. This is especially noteworthy given that for many college students, introductory world politics and political science courses may be their only introduction to the field of IR. Nonmajors often take introductory political science courses to fulfill elective or other requirements for their program of study. As such, constructions of “legitimate topics” within course textbooks and the manner by which these topics are represented can play an important role in shaping larger, mainstream understandings of international politics, including environmental security. This is also significant for students continuing their study in the field because introductory textbooks play a key role in laying the foundation upon which later study is built. Introductory world politics textbooks therefore play a significant role in the development of mainstream understandings of political science as well, including understandings of the IR-subfield of ES and thus mainstream ES discourse in the United States. In this chapter, I examine twenty-five university introductory-level world politics and IR textbooks, with primary attention to the process by which security threats are identified and interpreted, as well as the relationship between national, civilizational, and environmental security within mainstream ES discourse in the United States. Analysis of ES scholarship, including especially its articulation within introductory textbooks, provides one opportunity to reveal the (re)production of knowledge around and within the IR subfield and, moreover, to examine the role of academia and academic textbooks in the production of mainstream ES discourse on population growth and movement (including immigration and migration, as well as environmental and economic refugees or “refugee flows,” as they are commonly called). Before discussing the results of my interpretive analysis of the textbooks, however, I begin the chapter with an overview of “mainstream IR theory,” followed by a discussion of some of the key lines of thought informing debates on population issues within mainstream IR, followed by an outline of the IR subfield of ES.





SITUATING ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

IN

MAINSTREAM IR

Assessing threats to national security has been one of the central preoccupations of IR scholars since the field’s inception. Danger occupies the thoughts of IR scholars, and nationalist projects of the state often rely upon the construction and deployment of “myths of the past and visions of the future in efforts to manage current anxieties and rapid change” (Manzo 1996, 28). These projects include the continuous reproduction of narratives of threat, danger, enemies, protectors, and security. The theories that comprise mainstream IR—including realism, neorealism, and pluralism, with some variation—produce a hegemonic security narrative (i.e., mainstream IR security discourse) replete with particular assumptions about human nature and the nature of states, as well as the actors and issues of import within the international arena. These narratives of security and danger were visible before and after the Cold War and 9/11, and these narratives inform the IR subfield of ES. A primary focus of the field of IR is the interaction among states in the international realm. The state is considered the most important actor in international affairs, an assumption dating back to 400 BCE with The Peloponnesian War (Thucydides Reprint 1951) and 4 BCE with Arthasastra (Kautilya Reprint 1986). The field of Western IR came into being as numerous scholars sought practical solutions to the problem of war, particularly as World War I came into full force. Issues of national security are central concerns in the field of IR, and its theories were originally developed to analyze war and the causes of war, ideally to improve the lot of humankind (Groom 1994, 2). Of these theories, the realist school and, to a lesser extent, the neorealist and interdependence-pluralism schools came to dominate the field. Within the mainstream IR framework, realist theory continues to hold great influence (see Morgenthau 1948; Carr 1939; Bull 1977). Realist theory assumes that states (which are perceived as unitary and rational) are the principal actors in the international realm and the primary units of analysis. As Goldstein suggests in his introductory textbook, “the most important actors in IR are states” (2001, 11). Similarly, the security of states in what is considered an anarchic and conflictual international realm is the most important consideration for realists. These key positions reflect particular assumptions about human behavior that, although not absent in Arthasastra or The Peloponnesian War, are generally associated with the Hobbesian construction of human nature (Hobbes 1962). As such, realist scholars assume that all free persons share



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the capacity for reason and rationality, with rationality defined as the desire and ability to maximize benefits, minimize costs and risks, and operate on the principles of prudence and amorality. The drive to maximize benefits through domination is considered a universal characteristic of humans, who are by nature inherently selfish, untrustworthy, and conflictual (Hobbes 1962). Realist assumptions about human nature are aggregated to states, and, given these assumptions, war and conflict are considered basic characteristics of the international realm. This makes the realist model an essentially conflict-driven model in which states engage in zero-sum games to maximize their interests. National interest is defined as power and selfpreservation, with power (primarily military but also economic) seen as the primary means by which states resolve and deter conflict. For realists, the violence that occurs in the world of anarchy is legitimized by national interest. Peace, on the other hand, is elusive for realists like Morgenthau (1948), who argue that there can never be peace, only truces based upon the overwhelming power of dominant states. Significantly, national interest, and thus state power and survival, depend on the ability of powerful states to access and manipulate natural resources. In other words, the natural environment is only important insofar as its resources can serve state interest. The level of analysis for neorealist (a.k.a. structural realist) scholars shifts from the state to the state system (see Waltz 1959; Krasner 1978 as examples). Keohane (himself an interdependence-pluralist scholar) points to Waltz (1959) as the best-known structural realist and highlights his argument that the international system is shaped by, and shapes, state behavior (Keohane 1999, 164). In other words, neorealism allows for the contextualization of action between states. Neorealists reject the assumption that states seek power over all other interests, believing that different systemic conditions force states to define their self-interests in different ways (Keohane 1999, 175). Unlike the realist emphasis on power as an end in and of itself, neorealists consider security the highest goal (Schweller and Priess 1997, 11). Nevertheless, the neorealist framework still refers primarily to security between states, which, as in realism, depends on the exercise of power through military might. In fact, the fundamental assumptions of realism remain largely in tact within neorealism. In both, power is defined as having the ability to force, intimidate, or coerce other actors into doing what they do not want to do, and despite the recognition of some nonstate actors, neorealists still consider





states to be primary (as well as rational) actors. As in realist theory, environmental discourse within neorealist theory also perceives nature as that which can and should be exploited in the service of the state. Although I cannot do justice to the vast array of feminist theories in IR,1 I do want to note the important point that women are essentially “homeless” in mainstream IR, given that “[t]he soldier, the citizen, the political subject, and the state are gendered male” (Sylvester in Pettman 1996, v). Realist and neorealist constructions of the state rely on characteristics of rationality, self-interest, and lack of moral restraint, which are socially constructed masculine characteristics in the United States (Tickner 1994, 30–31). The state is gendered male, and in fact, emotion, interdependence, and idealism (socially constructed feminine characteristics in the United States) not only are regarded inferior but are perceived as liabilities in the conduct of international affairs (Tickner 1994, 31). Furthermore, realism and neorealism have been constructed such that the state, men, and war are positioned as the foundations of theory, privileging goals of mastery and power-over while ignoring the experiences, voices, needs, and insights of women in the international realm. Women are not only homeless in IR but also virtually invisible, and, although they speak from a number of different vantage points, IR feminists generally agree that invisibility poses a number of problems. As but one powerful example, traditional IR definitions of violence and security have obfuscated violence against women. The rape, torture, and murder of women have been largely ignored in mainstream IR under the assumption that these forms of violence are private, domestic concerns, not public, national, or international concerns. By ignoring violence against women, the masculinist discourse of mainstream IR actually perpetuates it. Though not without points of critique and contention, there is a large and diverse range of feminist IR scholarship that challenges this invisibility and forces the recognition that, indeed, women’s rights are human rights (Urban 1998). Moving on, the third component of mainstream IR, the interdependence-pluralism school, recognizes nonstate and state actors in international relations as well as a whole host of issues beyond security, ranging from economic and human rights issues to environmental concerns. In other words, pluralists claim to recognize a plurality of actors and issues in the international arena (see Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1986; Kegley 1993; McMillan 1997). Unlike realists, adherents to this school of thought view human nature as potentially cooperative, as opposed to



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innately and only selfish. Therefore, conflict is not necessarily viewed as the defining or singular characteristic of global politics (D’Amico 1994, 58), and military security does not hold the dominant position. In fact, for pluralists, cooperation and interdependence between states may lessen the potential for international conflict (McMillan 1997, 40). Interdependence theorists and liberal institutionalists (also part of the pluralist school) have made important strides in bringing environmental concerns to light in IR by emphasizing the “interconnections between social and natural systems” (MIT Press 1998, ix). Litfin (1998) argues that sovereignty should be “greened” to account for these interconnections. Sovereignty is a key concept in IR and refers to the sole authority of the state to govern within its own territorial boundaries and to conduct its domestic and foreign policy without the intervention of other states. Litfin suggests that sovereignty be “greened” to account for the transboundary nature of environmental destruction as well as the importance of collective action in addressing environmental problems. In this vein, scholars also claim to have expanded IR understandings of power and national security. Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995) provide a number of examples where actors successfully address environmental issues through cooperation within international regimes, which are sets of rules, procedures, and institutions that guide interactions and provide a degree of order in the international realm (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 215). In fact, Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1995) suggest that regimes are imperative to guiding state behavior toward environmental protection. Broadly speaking, pluralism does challenge the boundaries of IR to some degree by highlighting the importance of low politics and by disputing the assumption that the state is the only actor worth examining in IR. The growing popularity of ES as an IR subfield and the ability to seriously discuss ecological concerns within the field of IR can certainly be attributed, in part, to the work of pluralists as well. Despite its contributions, however, the pluralist school still tends to accept the basic worldview of realism and neorealism. Often, pluralist contributions prove more additive then transformative; proponents add the potential for cooperation to conflict, add nonstate actors to states, add low politics to high politics, and so forth. Furthermore, definitions of security, although slightly broadened, remain fundamentally the same; the security of the nation-state remains paramount, as does security through military means, even though pluralists do highlight negotiation, diplomacy, and international law as tools for promoting global security. Pluralists have




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POPULATION DEBATES

IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

While the debates surrounding population growth in the field of IR may seem merely academic to some, population issues are key areas of analysis within the subfield of ES. More importantly, these debates profoundly influence international and domestic policy and practice in relation to both population and immigration control. A clear understanding of the assumptions associated with the different strands of thought is essential if one is to offer more than band-aid solutions to environmental destruction and avoid perpetuating racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and classism. Moreover, tracing the population debates allows for an illustration of the enemy-creation process characteristic of both mainstream IR and mainstream ES discourse in the United States, as well as the intersection of civilizational security with national and environmental security concerns. Although there are a number of different perspectives on the relationship between population issues and environmental destruction within (and outside) IR, three strands of thought stand out: neo-Malthusian, right cornucopian, and distributionist. Of the three, I contend that neoMalthusian positions have reached the level of conventional wisdom within discussions of environmental degradation, preservation, and security in the United States, although right cornucopian positions do garner quite bit of attention, especially around discussions of Green Revolution technologies and free market answers to solving hunger and malnutrition. By contrast, distributionist approaches remain marginalized within mainstream IR scholarship, and antiracist feminist theories on reproductive and environmental justice remain largely invisible in mainstream IR. This pattern is reflected across the world politics textbooks I examine as well. Because I include the antiracist left feminist-distributionist approaches articulated by Betsy Hartmann and others who work in coalition with the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE) as central components of my analytical framework for this book (e.g., intersectional, postcolonial feminism), I will provide only a limited discussion a of distributionist positions following my overview of neoMalthusian and cornucopian perspectives.



nevertheless failed to fully transform the key concepts or definitions privileged in the field of IR. And importantly, all three frameworks comprising mainstream IR fail to provide the tools necessary to fully examine the operation of systems and ideologies of power, privilege, and oppression on local, community, national, and international levels.

Academia and Environmental Security AND

NEO-MALTHUSIAN THEORIES

Advocates of Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theory are well known for their pessimism in relation to environmental issues, including their vivid doomsday scenarios of environmental catastrophe. In fact, proponents of this strand of thought are often referred to as “cassandras,” in reference to Greek mythology. Cassandra could predict coming tragedies, but no one believed her; in fact, everyone thought her mad. Likewise, popular neoMalthusian theorists often claim that the public and policymakers alike fail to take their claims as seriously as they should. At the heart of the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian strands of thought is the “Essay on the Principle of Population” by Thomas Malthus (1798). Despite his revisions in 1803, the tenets and assumptions associated with this essay (albeit repackaged) continue to frame the contemporary population paradigm within which population control as a “major international development strategy” has held prominence since end of the World War II, although its ideological origins actually date back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Hartmann 1995, 93). Malthus’s propositions are quick and easy-to-follow and remain very popular today: Food production will increase arithmetically, but population will increase exponentially, eventually outstripping food supplies. Consequently, Malthus (1798) originally spoke out against “Poor Laws” and instead advocated “benign neglect” and natural checks on population growth. Neo-Malthusian theorist Garrett Hardin reinforces and applies these claims to environmental degradation more broadly in his essays “The Tragedy of the Commons”2 and “Lifeboat Ethics” (originally published in 1968 and 1974 respectively). Although these are not his only writings, Hardin’s neo-Malthusian propositions in each of these essays have arguably reached the “status of scientific law” and are foundational in environmental studies, resource science, and economics, as well as in the formulation of resource-management policy today (Feeny et al. 1998, 55–56). Like Malthus, Hardin (1968) assumes the unrestrained “freedom to breed” will eventually outstrip the world’s resources (which he and other neo-Malthusians argue are finite) and “bring ruin to all.” Even worse, Hardin (1968) assumes that “overbreeding” results from a lack of morality and suggests that the answer to overpopulation lies in “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.” For Hardin (1968), injustice to some is preferable to the destruction of



THE CASSANDRAS: MALTHUSIAN

37


the commons, which he believes were destroyed by overpopulation and overuse in medieval and post-medieval England.3 The ideas that Hardin proposes in “Lifeboat Ethics” are also treated as conventional wisdom. Here, the lifeboat metaphor pulls double duty as both a population control and immigration control metaphor. For Hardin, overpopulation will force peoples of the Global South to migrate to the Global North after having destroyed the carrying capacities of their own countries. In migrating to the North for sanctuary, “they” will sink “our” lifeboats. Access, then, must be denied (Hardin 1974). Racism, xenophobia, sexism, and the greening of hate, as well as the interconnections between national, environmental, and civilizational discourses, are powerfully exemplified in both essays, a viewpoint reinforced by Hardin’s position as former vice president of the American Eugenics Society and his former position as honorary chair and advisory board member of Population-Environment Balance (Sferios 1998),4 a virulently antiimmigration organization that also engages in the greening of hate. Vandana Shiva (among many others) rejects the scapegoating characteristic of neo-Malthusians like Hardin, explaining, “False perceptions of the problem lead to false solutions. Even if 80 percent of the world’s population—the poor people—were to be exterminated through population control, it would only address a small percent of the environmental problem” (Shiva 2005, 59). The lifeboat would still sink given the behavior and consumption of elite populations in both the Global North and South (Shiva 2005, 59). Moreover, I agree that the largest pressure on resources (natural and otherwise) comes not from population growth “but from the wasteful production systems, long distance trade, and overconsumption [among elites] in the First World. The proposed solution—blaming the victims and failing to address the role economic insecurity and the denial of rights to survival plays in population growth—exacerbates the problem” (Shiva 2005, 58). Despite these critiques, Hardin’s metaphors and theories set the terms of debate for population issues (both population growth and migration) within mainstream ES discourse more broadly and within the environmental chapters of the majority of the textbooks I examine later in this chapter. Paul Ehrlich and other neo-Malthusians reproduce many of the propositions of Malthus and Hardin in their own work. Ehrlich’s infamous “population bomb” metaphor is based on the assumption that the world has a limited resource base and population growth will exceed food production capacities. For Ehrlich, unrestrained population growth is to



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blame for hunger, environmental degradation, and deteriorating quality of life in general. Paul and Anne Ehrlich, along with Gretchen Daily (1993), do present a slightly more nuanced discussion of overpopulation in their piece “Food Security, Population and Environment” than Ehrlich did in Population Bomb (1968). In the 1993 piece, the authors do discuss issues of overconsumption and unequal access to food and other resources, but central focus remains on the belief that “growing population-related stresses on the world’s finite food production systems” will disrupt the provision of a minimal diet for all (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Daily 1993, 4). Thus, although slightly repackaged, the central message for Ehrlich and other neo-Malthusians is the same: Overpopulation is a root cause of hunger and environmental degradation. This pattern is repeated in the majority of world politics textbooks I examine later in the chapter. Furthermore, for neo-Malthusian pessimists, overpopulation is not typically associated with structurally privileged social groups in the Global North. As the authors crassly note, “the future world food situation may be better represented by Rwanda than by Iowa” (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Daily 1993, 23). This argument provides a glimpse into the enemy-creation process that I argue characterizes mainstream ES discourse more broadly: Blame for environmental destruction is placed squarely on the doorstep of the so-called Third World. Not only does “overpopulation” typify the Global South, but the Global South is also constructed as the origin of “illegal immigration,” and in fact, the origin of a whole host of security threats to countries in the Global North. Ehrlich makes similar arguments in his 2006 piece and, in fact, chastises the current Bush administration for ignoring this and other environmental issues. The solution to the food, environment, and population crisis for neoMalthusian pessimists lies in reducing human fertility and halting population growth. This position is reflected in U.S. foreign assistance for reproductive health, with USAID as one example (Hartmann 1999a), as well as international responses to development, hunger, and environmental degradation as illustrated in preparations for the Rio Conference (UN Conference on Environment and Development) in 1992 and in those for the Cairo Conference (UN International Conference on Population and Development) in 1994. During both, proponents of population control “greened” the population agenda by linking it to environmental destruction, a movement reinforced by the USAID declaration that overpopulation poses a key “strategic threat” to the environment and





democracy (Silliman 1999, x). The Clinton administration points to the importance of population stabilization (what it termed “voluntary family planning”), and the Cairo Conference in each of its National Security Strategies released between 1995 and 1998, arguing in one: “The Administration has asserted world leadership on population issues. We played a key role during the Cairo Conference on Population and Development in developing a consensus Program of Action” (Clinton Administration 1995a, 5). RIGHT CORNUCOPIANS

AND

TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES

Arguing from the radical right (as opposed to the conservative right position advanced by Malthus), Julian Simon and Herman Kahn (1984) argue that population growth will not outstrip resources because technological advances and free market economics will ultimately save the day. In the introduction to The Resourceful Earth, Simon and Kahn (1984) challenge, point by point, the arguments advanced in the 1980 Global 2000 Report to the President and counter nearly all of the doomsday prophesies offered by neo-Malthusian pessimists. To paraphrase, Simon and Kahn suggest that by year 2000, the world will be less crowded (although more populated), less polluted, more ecologically sustainable, less vulnerable to resource disruption, and better off overall in terms of the necessities of life (Simon and Kahn 1984, 43). Simon and other cornucopians (also referred to as “optimists” in contrast to the labeling of neo-Malthusians as “pessimists”) demonstrate a remarkable faith in the potential of science and technology and suggest that population growth is not itself a problem but rather a catalyst for the creation of wealth and technological advances. Simon and Kahn argue, for instance, that innovations in technology and science have increased life expectancy, “which is the main cause of the increase in population size, [and] is not only a sign of success in agriculture and public health, but is also the fundamental human good” (1984, 64). In addition, optimists highlight the Green Revolution to demonstrate the power and promise of technology and claim that with more people comes greater opportunity for technical innovation and thus scientific solutions to the problems humans have created. Underlying this approach is a modernist discourse that assumes the relative infallibility of technology and a deep faith in objective, rational scientific approaches for ending all the ills of the world. Its faith in technology has garnered many followers, as demonstrated by the dramatic increase in recent years



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of arguments suggesting the necessity of biotechnology for ending world hunger. Despite cornucopian applause, Green Revolution technologies and approaches have engendered a good deal of environmental destruction around the world themselves, and there is mounting evidence that genetic engineering in agriculture, aquaculture, ranching, and other areas has its own dire environmental, health, and social consequences.5 Moreover, right cornucopians reinforce the Western model of development and the Western model of scientific knowledge production, not to mention systems of power, privilege, and oppression on the global scale. Both cornucopians and cassandras gloss over or simply ignore the negative consequences of militarization, colonialism and contemporary neocolonialism under neoliberal globalization. Policies and practices fostering massive hunger, poverty, genocide, and environmental damage such as Manifest Destiny and the “dirty wars” in Central America during the 1980s, for instance, are rendered invisible or inconsequential. And both strands of thought downplay the ecological consequences of overconsumption among privileged social groups in the Global North and South, not to mention the ecological consequences of myriad “development” programs foisted on Third World countries by Western governments and agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. As the work of scholar-activists included in my analytical framework demonstrate, the dominant Western development paradigm and all its attendant baggage is responsible in large part for the maldistribution of resources causing hunger and poverty to begin with. “Technological fix” approaches fail to address underlying causes of hunger and environmental degradation, which in the end serve only to perpetuate them. LEFT-DISTRIBUTIONIST

AND

ANTIRACIST FEMINIST ALTERNATIVES

Quite simply, left-distributionists contend that the maldistribution of resources is at the root of global hunger and malnutrition, not “overpopulation,” as argued by Malthus and his devotees. As such, cornucopian faith in biotechnology for ending world hunger is also misplaced. At issue is the maldistribution of food and other resources, and systemic inequality more broadly, not food scarcity. The book World Hunger: Twelve Myths (1998) and the vast body of work by Food First (the Institute for Food and Development Policy), has been influential in demonstrating these points. Rather than scapegoating population growth, the authors argue, “Rapid population growth is not the root cause of hunger but is—like hunger—a consequence of social inequities” (Moore Lappé,





Collins, and Rosset 1998, 40). Nowhere in the world does population density explain hunger; like hunger itself, rapid population growth is the result of underlying systemic inequalities that deprive people, particularly women, of economic, political, and social opportunities and security (Moore Lappé and Collins 1998, 40). Shiva similarly argues, “Population growth is not a cause of the environmental crisis but one aspect of it, and both are related to resource alienation and the destruction of livelihoods” (2005, 60). World hunger and environmental destruction are also attributable to the consumption habits of structurally privileged social groups in the Global South and the Global North. As Mira and Vandana Shiva (1993) note, “poor people use insignificant fractions of the resources used by the North and the elites of the South. An average American citizen uses 250 times as much energy as an average Nigerian.” However, it remains the poor and women of color in the Global North and South who are targeted for population control measures. In other words, the issue is not “just” maldistribution, but the maldistribution of resources, power, rights, and justice resulting from the interlocking systems and ideologies that comprise white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy. The work of scholar-activists included in the intersectional, postcolonial feminist framework I utilize in this book are therefore particularly committed to understandings of and movements toward engendering reproductive, environmental, and social justice that simultaneously honor and support women’s reproductive rights and overall health and well-being, challenge theories that scapegoat women of color and working class women for environmental and other global ills, challenge the antichoice agenda promoted by some members of the conservative or evangelical right in the United States and elsewhere, and ultimately, work to eradicate all systems of power, privilege, oppression, and violence. In 1992, members of CWPE worked in coalition with women’s rights and environmental justice organizations from around the world to create “A Call for a New Approach,” which was endorsed by three hundred different individuals and organizations (see Silliman and King 1999, xx) and exemplifies the commitments I just noted. The Call highlights the root causes of environmental degradation “to be social and economic structures, rather than population demographics and women’s fertility,” arguing, “demographically driven population-control programs treat women as objects of control and violate the basic feminist tenets of reproductive choice and bodily integrity for women” (Silliman 1999, xi).



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Importantly, the Call reflects respect for and commitment to working on behalf of reproductive, social, and environmental justice around the world, as opposed to simply reproductive “choice” for a privileged few. Thus, the definition of reproductive choice in this context is the more holistic definition advanced in Reproductive Rights and Wrongs, in which Hartmann (1995) argues that genuine choice includes, not only the right to adequate information on and access to birth control technologies (including abortion, sterilization, and contraceptives), but also equal access to a safe medical environment and treatment, and the right to safely have children, with primary focus on women’s overall health and wellbeing rather than objectifying women as targets of population control. Much of the impetus behind “A Call for a New Approach” was CWPE’s recognition of the growing popularity of the greening of hate, which is itself grounded in neo-Malthusian pessimism. Both construct and represent women (especially women of color and working-class women) in racist, sexist, and classist terms as irrational, oversexed, “breeders” who must be taught “proper” moral responsibility and restraint by outside “experts” in order to prevent environmental catastrophe. As such, neo-Malthusianism ignores the systems of power, privilege, and oppression that organize the current (post)colonial world system. Instead, women are scapegoated for a whole host of environmental, as well as social, political, and economic problems. Scapegoating and the greening of hate underlie countless examples of reproductive injustice in the United States and around the world. Hartmann (1995) illustrates some of the consequences associated with population control stances, ranging from federally funded forcible sterilization programs against Native American and Latina women in the United States to state-funded “sterilization camps” for poor women and men in India, as well as the policies of specific agencies like International Planned Parenthood Federation and USAID. Although the following overview will just barely scratch the surface, it is nevertheless important to illustrate that incidences of forced and coerced sterilization, abortion, and contraceptive use, as well as inadequate access to reproductive and overall healthcare, are by no means anomalous. They are the result of scapegoating women, especially women of color and poor and workingclass women for the ills of the world, which is itself born of interlocking systems of white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy. On such example involves the history of “Mississippi appendectomies” and the “120 formula” in the United States. The American





College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists applied the “120 formula” during the 1960s and 1970s to white, middle-class women in order to prevent them from having the sterilization procedures they requested. Their age multiplied by the number of their children had to equal 120 or more to qualify for sterilization procedures, plus white, middle-class women had to have the endorsement of a doctor and a psychiatrist to proceed with the operation (Roberts 1997, 95). On the other hand, the sterilization of Black women in the southern United States, particularly those experiencing poverty, by government-paid doctors was so common during the 1970s that sterilization procedures came to be known as “Mississippi Appendectomies” (Roberts 1997, 90). Sterilizations were often performed without medical need and without the informed consent of patients (Roberts 1997, 90). Both examples are violations of reproductive justice and human rights. Scapegoating also underlies contemporary attempts at coercing women using welfare services in the United States into accepting longlasting chemical contraceptives as a condition for receiving financial assistance in spite of their serious side effects. “Poor African American and Native American women and Latinas are much more likely than White women to be encouraged to use . . . long-acting contraceptives” like Depo-Provera and Norplant in spite of mounting evidence pointing to their physical, emotional, and psychological side effects, in fact: “Official policy seeks to limit their pregnancies and assumes that these women would be unreliable using other methods, thereby continuing the long connection between birth control and eugenics” (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007c, 205). Kirk and Okazawa-Rey point to the tremendous work undertaken by the Black Women’s Health Network and the National Latina Health Organization in calling for the withdrawal of DepoProvera and in pointing out that women still using Norplant continue to have difficulty finding a doctor to remove it (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007c, 205). CWPE also provides a brilliant analysis of the side effects and other serious problems surrounding chemical contraceptives in their report Sex, Lies, and Contraception, which is available free of charge on their Web site (http://www.cwpe.org/resources/healthrepro/slc). Sterilization abuse has been a key concern of reproductive justice activists for decades. Roberts (1997) provides an amazing analysis of reproductive injustice in the name of eugenics in her book, Killing the Black Body. Among the innumerable examples Roberts provides, she points out the frequency of sterilization abuse as a tool of population



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control in the United States against poor Latina, African American, and Native American women from the 1930s through the 1970s. Government funding privileges and encourages sterilization of poor women and women of color, and sterilization was the only method of birth control available and accessible to poor women in the United States (Roberts 1997, 97–98). According to Roberts, in 1997 sterilization was “the leading method of birth control in the United States, its use [was] especially widespread among Black women,” and further points to the racial disparity in sterilization that cut across class lines, although the frequency of sterilization increases among poor and uneducated Black women (Roberts 1997, 97). Temporary sterilization through the use of long-term chemical contraceptives follows very similar patterns (Roberts 1997, 97–98). Interestingly, population control via Depo-Provera and Norplant has been used against Native American and other communities for some time: “Physicians offer Norplant implants for free but charge more than $300 to have them removed. Women are pressured into a procedure that limits their reproductive capacity. Physicians take advantage of the low-income status of many women by limiting their options for reproductive health” (Ross et al. 2002, 162). Many women have not been given access to enough information to provide truly informed consent to permanent or semipermanent sterilization procedures, be it the result of culturally inappropriate information or health care material, doctors failing to take the time to explain side effects, or even health information materials in inappropriate languages (Ross et al. 2002, 162, 163). Similar patterns of reproductive injustice exist outside the United States as well. Speaking of Bangladesh, population control programs were “devised to serve the commercial interests of the multinational pharmaceutical companies [and] forced on the Bangladeshi people as a pre-condition for aid and credit” (Mies and Shiva 1993b, 292–93). Mies and Shiva further explain, “Women are used as guinea pigs to test new hormonal contraceptives: Norplant was administered to 1,000 women in Bangladesh, none of whom were told that they were participating in a test sponsored by the Bangladeshi Fertility Research Program” (1993b, 292–93). India, too, has a history of state-sponsored and coercive population reduction campaigns, which also treat women as “tubes, wombs, and targets” rather than people (Mies and Shiva 1993b, 290–91). This treatment lies at the core of Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theories, the larger Western population paradigm, and the policies of some





multinational pharmaceutical companies. Concern lies less with women as human beings and more with “the control of some of their reproductive parts: their wombs, tubes, their hormones, and so on. . . . Meanwhile, actual living persons, real people, real communities, their history, culture and diversity have vanished behind the abstraction of aggregate numbers, expressed in population figures, growth rates, pressures and policies” (Mies and Shiva 1993b, 289, 281). Mies (1993b, 190) notes that, after 1975, the international population establishment moved away from educating and motivating people to use contraceptives and toward more coercion and permanent methods like sterilization. India carried out its own massive sterilization campaign from 1975–1977, during which time millions of people, the majority of whom (75 percent) were men, were forcibly sterilized, a campaign about which the United States and other Western countries remain fairly silent (Mies 1993b, 190, 191). Later, in 1983–1984, 85 percent of sterilizations in India were performed on women (Mies 1993b, 191). Framing Third World women’s fertility as an epidemic (Mies 1993b, 191) or an environmental and national security threat implies that it is a state’s responsibility to intervene in women’s reproductive behavior. This intervention is evident in terms of the “international state,” or aid- and creditgranting institutions like the World Bank who also linked credit to population control (Mies 1993b, 191). Similarly, NGOs such as Planned Parenthood have worked with the Puerto Rican government to sterilize women. La Operación was a population control experiment in the 1950s, and by 1968 “more than onethird of the women of childbearing age in Puerto Rico had been sterilized, the highest percentage in the world at that time” (Roberts 1997, 94). A similar campaign targeting Native American reservations in the United States resulted in over 25 percent of Native American women being infertile by the 1970s: “For small Indian tribes, this policy was literally genocidal” (Roberts 1997, 94–95). Kirk and Okazawa-Rey note, “By 1982, 24 percent of African American women, 35 percent of Puerto Rican women, and 42 percent of Native American women had been sterilized, compared with 15 percent of white women,” and today, “sterilization is federally funded under the Medicaid program and is free on demand to poor women” (2007c, 208). Roberts also examines the oft-invisibilized and complicated relationship between Margaret Sanger (founder of Planned Parenthood) and the eugenics movement in the United States. Although Sanger disagreed with some tenets of eugenics, she did work with eugenics movement



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leaders to legitimize birth control and agreed with and promoted “two of the most perverse tenets of eugenic thinking: that social problems are caused by reproduction of the socially disadvantaged and that their childbearing should therefore be deterred. In a society marked by racial hierarchy, these principles inevitably produced policies designed to reduce Black women’s fertility” (Roberts 1997, 80–81). Similar racial and class hierarchies continue to mark the United States today, and I argue that the two perverse tenets just mentioned remain central to neo-Malthusian discourse on population issues and environmental destruction. Given all of these examples and so many more, I find it completely irresponsible to delink discussions of birth control from analyses of interlocking systems of inequality. Histories and contemporary practices and policies of reproductive injustice must be continuously exposed, discussed, and rejected, otherwise reproductive injustice and the ideologies that underlie it will continue. There must be more open, clear-headed, critical discussions of Margaret Sanger’s relationship to the eugenics movement and of reproductive abuse, past and present. I wholeheartedly reject the antichoice agenda (among many others) of the religious right in the United States. At the same time, there needs to be a more explicit commitment by Planned Parenthood and the mainstream reproductive choice movement in the United States in general to actively advancing reproductive justice. This will require a more explicit and public interrogation and rejection of Margaret Sanger’s positions mentioned above and policies of reproductive injustice. Hartmann (1999a) suggests that for some liberal feminists in the United States, “[t]he belief is you can have your cake and eat it too: you can support women’s rights, while scapegoating their fertility for the planet’s ills.” In other words, neo-Malthusian positions and population control prescriptions are sometimes advanced under the banner of “pro-choice” politics, which erodes woman’s right to have children—and women’s rights more broadly—in the pursuit of demographic targets and population control. Some in the mainstream pro-choice movement still behave as though any criticism of the movement in general, or of historical and contemporary abuses of sterilization, birth control, and abortion in particular, will “give support to the enemies of women’s reproductive choice. But there is nothing contradictory about advocating women’s freedom to use birth control while opposing coercive birth control practices” (Roberts 1997, 96). I wholeheartedly agree. As Roberts also notes, “It is amazing how effective governments—especially our own—are at making sterilization and contraceptives available to





women of color, despite their inability to reach these women with prenatal care, drug treatment, and other health care services” (Roberts 1997, 94–95). Historical and contemporary population control programs in the United States and around the world dehumanize women as demographic targets, be it in the service of poverty reduction or environmental security. As Hartmann explains, “Images of overbreeding single women of color on welfare and bare-breasted, always pregnant Third World woman are two sides of the same nasty coin” (Hartmann 1999a). Not all women are scrutinized in the same way within global population politics. Upper-class, white women in the Global North are rarely targeted for population control to “save the environment.” Instead, pessimists imply that there is a lack of conscience, morality, and knowledge among Others who are essentially deemed “unfit to breed.” As Hartmann argues, “The modern-day proponents of population control have reinterpreted Malthusian logic, selectively applying it only to the poor majority in the Third World and, in some cases, to ethnic minorities in the West” (Hartmann 1995, 15). In its scapegoating, neo-Malthusian pessimism relies upon and reinforces racist, sexist, xenophobic, and classist constructions of the Other and fails to challenge (in fact reinforces) entrenched assumptions related to the division of power, wealth, and worth in the world system. Although nearly invisible in debates over population issues within IR, antiracist feminist theories on reproductive and environmental justice, such as those discussed here, are absolutely critical to transformative social change, not to mention genuine security. I find this strategic silence in IR especially irresponsible. Moreover, scapegoating population growth and migration, and the greening of hate more generally, reinforce systems of power, privilege, and oppression and, ironically, perpetuate global environmental destruction by diverting attention away from its root causes. Additionally, it is the greening of hate that reflects and supports the enemy-creation process characteristic of mainstream IR security discourse. Unfortunately, to varying degrees, the greening of hate has captured the imagination of many scholars working within the IR subfield of ES.



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Academia and Environmental Security AND

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Dominant scholarship on environmental security reflects a good deal of appreciation for neo-Malthusian understandings of ecological destruction, with significant focus on population issues, especially population growth, as they relate to the Global South. As mentioned, I contend that neo-Malthusian pessimism commands the most attention in dominant ES scholarship, followed by cornucopian optimism. Distributionist perspectives command very little attention relative to cassandras and cornucopians, and antiracist feminist theories (intersectional, postcolonial feminism, or otherwise) on issues related to environmental security, national security, population, and migration are largely ignored. While not excluding the importance placed on cooperation and collective action, dominant ES scholarship also places heavy emphasis on the relationship between environmental destruction and conflict. Broadly speaking, ES scholars and activists regard environmental degradation as a serious threat to global security and thus U.S. national security. Theorists and activists have been advocating for greater focus on environmental issues for some time. Lester Brown, one of the foremost voices on environmental security, started the Worldwatch Institute in 1974. It wasn’t until the end of the Cold War however, that attention to environmental issues in the field of IR began to spread and take hold. Mainstream IR scholars scrambled to comprehend the “new” security threats posed to Western nations in the post–Cold War international arena, although the actors they recognized, as well as the solutions they offered, varied between theoretical schools. Nevertheless, the need for new enemies emerged in the post–Cold War era, and these enemies came to include “fundamentalist Muslim terrorists,” as Huntington (1993) argued in The Clash of Civilizations, and unpredictable “rogue states,” as illustrated by Klare’s Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (1993), as well as a host of “nontraditional threats,” including the “enemy” of population growth in, and migration from, the Global South and the threat they pose to global environmental security. There is a broad range of voices in and perspectives on ES to be sure. In its simplest form, an ecological perspective on security suggests that “only by understanding the complex functioning of living systems as wholes, and their interactions with their environment, can we hope to solve our contemporary ecological crises” (Tickner 1992, 120). Some, like those featured in the edited book by Dodds and Pippard, link environmental security with human security and resist many of the



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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neo-Malthusian traps I discussed in the previous section, although they do not challenge neo-Malthusianism in depth either. Nevertheless, the authors do not seem to be strong proponents of neo-Malthusianism, despite their doomsday book cover, which problematically features a grenade-shaped earth. Others, like Jon Barnett (2001), interrogate the field of ES through a critical green lens, although the book is disappointingly silent on critical feminist green theories, including the materialist ecofeminism of Shiva (2005; 1993) and Warren (2000; 1997). Jon Barnett (2001) is also unfortunately silent on antiracist feminist theories on reproductive and environmental justice, including those of Shiva, Warren, members of CWPE, and other scholar-activists foregrounded in the analytical framework I use for this book. This last critique also applies to Dodds and Pippard (2005). Despite a variety of perspectives, one thing that does seem to unite ES scholarship is the desire to raise environmental issues to the level of “high politics” (i.e., issues having to do with the security of state and nation), as pluralist scholars in IR in the 1970s and 1980s argued should be done. Similarly, ES scholars, politicians, and activists—including Lester Brown, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, and Al Gore—worked to redefine security to address new post–Cold War realities, including especially resource and environmental threats (Deudney 1998, 305). ES proponents struggle to define environmental degradation as a critical national security issue and therefore work to challenge rigid definitions of sovereignty and national borders. In so doing, many ES scholars define environmental change as a significant source of conflict, arguing, “many societies face graver dangers from environmental change than from traditional military threats” (Conca and Dabelko 1998, 281). The edited book by Manwaring (2002) is an interesting case in point. Thus, while there is an array of voices and perspectives within the subfield of ES and within ES scholarship in general, I argue that there is a dominant or mainstream strand of thought that runs through ES, one that reinforces traditional IR security discourse and reflects—indeed, relies on—neoMalthusian understandings of population issues (including both population growth and migration) in making its case. Importantly, it is within this dominant strand of ES that I see the strongest relationship between environmental, national, and civilizational security discourses, particularly in relation to the greening of hate.



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Academia and Environmental Security OR

MAINSTREAM ES SCHOLARSHIP

AND

DISCOURSE

Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998; 1999) is one of the key architects of ES scholarship and discourse in the United States. For Homer-Dixon, “environmental scarcity” resulting from environmental change, population growth, and the unequal social distribution of natural resources is an increasingly important cause of “social instability, civil strife, and violence within and between societies” (Conca and Dabelko 1998, 281). These three components may act alone or in combination with one another as sources of scarcity and conflict. Because environmental stress can result in chronic internal or subnational conflict, countries may fragment and become more authoritarian. Fragmenting countries are a large source of out-migration, and fragmentation may also cause countries to ineffectively negotiate and implement international agreements. Finally, authoritarian regimes may be more likely to launch attacks against other countries to divert attention from their internal problems (HomerDixon 1998, 296; 1999, 167–68). Given the potential for violence and conflict, Homer-Dixon argues that it is imperative that IR security scholars expand traditional understandings of security to include the ways in which environmental degradation threatens the well-being of states, society, and individuals (Homer-Dixon 1998, 297). Although more in depth than his 1998 essay, Homer-Dixon’s central argument remains the same in his book Environment, Scarcity and Violence: environmental scarcity “contributes to social breakdown and violence” (1999, 4). Though influential, Homer-Dixon’s central arguments are grounded in old neo-Malthusian sensibilities, and ultimately his work fails to substantially expand the boundaries of mainstream IR scholarship on security or rather, traditional IR security discourse. First, like his neoMalthusian predecessors, Homer-Dixon views the earth and its resources as finite and assumes that population growth will eventually outstrip the earth’s resources and cause significant environmental damage. While he does recognize the role of technological innovation in mitigating the consequences of overpopulation (as cornucopians claim), Homer-Dixon argues that environmental scarcity can, in fact, disrupt ingenuity supply and adaptation. Otherwise stated, “environmental scarcities can sometimes hinder adaptive institutional and technological change” (HomerDixon 1999, 44). This is actually one of the main points of his book (Homer-Dixon 1999, 43). Next, although Homer-Dixon does call for an expanded role for the state, like many mainstream IR security scholars, Homer-Dixon’s attention



DOMINANT


remains primarily on the state as opposed to other international or national actors. He argues, in fact, that the state is the most important actor, but that it may be greatly weakened in developing countries by environmental scarcity and its consequences (e.g., population movements and economic decline) (Homer-Dixon 1998; 1999). HomerDixon also relies on the realist assumption that given the presumably innate selfishness of human nature, the commons will be destroyed in the absence of clear property rights guidelines (Homer-Dixon 1999, 48). Overall, as it relates to his conception of the earth and its resources, human nature, and the central actors in world politics, Homer-Dixon’s work presents little transformative challenge to the mainstream IR framework, and given the manner by which he addresses population issues, Homer-Dixon ends up replaying neo-Malthusian understandings of environmental degradation. The same may also be said of ES theorists like Myers (1995), who perpetuate pessimistic images of an anarchical, unstable world in which resources are finite and people are selfish, greedy, and self-interested. This world will only be made worse, he claims, “as growing numbers of people seek to sustain themselves from declining environments” (Myers 1995, 257). This view is often reproduced in the textbooks I have examined in this project. Overall, I see little evidence of a substantial redefinition of traditional IR boundaries or of traditional IR security discourse. While Homer-Dixon (1998; 1999) does note other contributing factors to environmental scarcity, concerns regarding population growth are privileged in his work, as mentioned. For instance, he begins one essay with this statement: “Within the next 50 years, the planet’s human population will probably pass nine billion, and global economic output may quintuple. Largely as a result, scarcities of renewable resources will increase sharply” (Homer-Dixon 1998, 287). Similar focus on population and population statistics pervade Environment, Scarcity and Violence. In both, Homer-Dixon fails to vigorously examine reasons behind rapid population growth. The neo-Malthusian focus on population is even more obvious in the work of Myers, who notes that, although there are a number of factors other than environmental degradation that may cause conflict, “the biggest factor of all in many developing countries is the population explosion, still to enter its most explosive phase” (Myers 1995, 258). Robert Kaplan’s (1994) essay “The Coming Anarchy” is also instructive here. Like Homer-Dixon, Kaplan is frequently cited within discussions



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of environmental security; however, Kaplan takes neo-Malthusian doomsday scenarios much farther than many of his ES colleagues. Kaplan paints vivid pictures of “Third World” cities characterized by “a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle” where “children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants” (1994, 54). Based on his dehumanizing constructions and representations of Others as criminal, alcoholic, unemployed, and uneducated, Kaplan highlights (again and again) the threat that overpopulation in, and mass migration from the Global South pose for the environmental, civilizational, and national security of the Global North, given that “hordes” of migrants will join together in criminal enterprises, will destroy the environment, will bring disease, and will erode states as well as international borders (1994, 45, 49, 46). Kaplan explains, “It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh—developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War” (1994, 58, emphasis in original). In sum, the “revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the people least able to bring up children in a modern society” (qtd. in Kaplan 1994, 44) threatens the national, civilizational, and environmental security of Western nations. The racism, sexism, and xenophobia underlying this article are startling, to say the least. Like the Ehrlichs and Daly (1993), Homer-Dixon attempts to present a more nuanced view of the population-environment problem (certainly more nuanced than Kaplan) by using a language that is a bit more sanitized, but also by noting the environmental impacts of consumption patterns and by discussing unequal distribution of resources within states. Homer-Dixon even calls Malthusian scare-scenarios “simplistic and flawed” because, among other things, they are grounded in generalizations (1999, 73). His research, by contrast, is to provide a specific and detailed model illustrating the links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict (1999, 73). To his credit, Homer-Dixon also argues, “Unfortunately analysts often study resource depletion and population growth in isolation from the political economy of resource distribution” (Homer-Dixon 1998, 289). Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon frequently





emphasizes the role of overpopulation, arguing, for instance, that 90 percent of population growth today is occurring in developing countries, thus reaffirming the assumption that “overpopulation” in these areas is a security threat to the Global North (1999, 56), rather than giving equal time and attention to, for instance, the ways in which overdevelopment and overconsumption among elites in the Global North threaten global security. Countries of the Global North are generally regarded as the great hope for addressing and ending global environmental destruction. HomerDixon explains, “The world’s wealthy regions should not assume that they will be able to wall themselves off from turmoil in societies that do not adapt well to scarcity. We are living cheek by jowl on this planet now. We are all next-door neighbors” (Homer-Dixon 1999, 181). This is followed by his suggestion that research be undertaken on (among other things) the role of democracy in mitigating environmental scarcity and violence (Homer-Dixon 1999, 182). For Homer-Dixon it is primarily the responsibility of the Global North to address issues of environmental scarcity and conflict; this seems even more the case considering the amount of attention he places on the deleterious effects that environmental scarcity and conflict will have on the state (and social institutions) of developing countries. Homer-Dixon also argues against “the spate of revisionist articles” suggesting that population growth is not a problem anymore, arguing that for some countries (like China, Pakistan, India, and Egypt) populations far into the future “will exact a huge toll on underlying environmental resources” (Homer-Dixon 1999, 57–58). Despite his claims otherwise, I contend that Homer-Dixon’s work perpetuates neo-Malthusian linkages between overpopulation, hunger, and environmental degradation and in so doing reinforces an enemy-creation process that constructs women’s fertility as a central threat to the environmental and thus national security of the Global North. It is absolutely crucial to note however, that women themselves are rarely discussed in Homer-Dixon’s (1998; 1999) work. Instead, women are generally treated as objects devoid of value, agency, experience, needs, and desires beyond their role as “breeders.” Another point of interest is Homer-Dixon’s failure to include feminist voices (with one exception) in his discussion of what he considers the “sterile” population debates, despite his stated goal of synthesizing and moving beyond them (Homer-Dixon 1999, 28–29).6



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This last point is peculiar when one considers that Homer-Dixon (1998; 1999) and all of the environmental chapters in the textbooks I examine for this chapter fail to include antiracist feminist theories (intersectional feminist, postcolonial feminist or otherwise) on population, migration, national security, or environmental security. I find this strategic silence indefensible. Am I to assume that women are merely objects or targets of the debates on population issues, rather than subjects, actors, and knowledge producers with widely diverse experiences, worldviews, alternatives, needs, theories, and understandings of environmental degradation? This silence lends evidence to the previously mentioned argument that women are effectively homeless in IR given the manner by which the field is generally constructed, including the actors, definitions, and focal points privileged in the field (Pettman 1996, v). It also further illustrates the failure of Homer-Dixon’s work, among other ES scholars, to substantively challenge the boundaries of IR. Further, the dominant focus within mainstream ES scholarship on the conflict presumed to result from environmental destruction keeps mainstream ES squarely within the traditional purview of mainstream IR. The issues of violence, conflict, and war so central to realist theory in particular, and mainstream IR security discourse more broadly, comes full circle in mainstream ES scholarship, but this time, with an ecological twist. Despite claims of having redefined traditional notions of sovereignty, much mainstream ES scholarship actually reinforces both territorial boundaries and focus on state sovereignty. Similarly, dominant definitions of security continue to privilege national and state security and as such present little transformation in this context either. Moreover, the “new” dangers highlighted by ES scholars are “represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during the Cold War . . . these challenges are represented as dangers, located in an external and anarchic environment, which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence” (Campbell 1998, 7–8). In short, dominant ES scholarship reflects a good deal of appreciation for neo-Malthusian understandings of the threats posed by the Global South, including environmental destruction, population growth, conflict, and migration into the Global North. Neo-Malthusianism within ES scholarship suggests that rather than Communism in our backyard, now overpopulation in, and migration and immigration from, undeveloped countries are security threats to the United States. Third world





women are particularly targeted as threats to environmental security by virtue of their “unrestrained freedom to breed,” resulting in ecological destruction and migration. Furthermore, mainstream ES scholarship credits the environmental destruction wrought by population growth with creating conflict and ultimately “a world in which we all end up losers” (Myers 1995, 256). Therefore, what emerges (or rather, re-emerges) are particular raced, classed, and gendered Others who threaten U.S. national security, threaten the U.S. “lifeboat” (e.g., its carrying capacity and thus, environmental security), and threaten American national (“white”) identity, a central part of American civilizational security. Constructions like this reaffirm colonial relations of power and substantially impact the solutions proposed to contend with environmental dangers. Shiva further notes that in this “paradigm of security, the control over and demand for resource[s] of the powerful is what needs to be protected” as indicated by H. W. Bush at the 1992 Earth Summit and and echoed by Dick Cheney after 9/11, in this statement that: “The American way of life is non-negotiable” (qtd. in Shiva 2005, 57). As Shiva further notes, “If resource-destructive lifestyles are to be protected, some people become expendable” (2005, 57); hence, the greening of hate and both population control and immigration control policies. Mainstream ES understandings of population growth and immigration are framed by neo-Malthusianism, which produces a particular enemycreation process and reflects deep interconnections between environmental, national, and civilizational security discourse. These patterns also characterize the world politics textbooks I examine in the next section. DECONSTRUCTING THE TERMS OF DEBATE IN INTRODUCTORY WORLD POLITICS TEXTBOOKS7

An intersectional, postcolonial feminism–driven analysis of knowledge (re)production around population issues and environmental security helps reveal the intimate relationship between knowledge and power. In discussions of power, mainstream IR theorists still tend to emphasize power in relation to “statist affirmation[s] of its centrality to the ‘national interest’” and examine power in fairly narrow military and economic terms, rather than recognizing the power inherent in the production of knowledge itself and the relationship between knowledge, ideology, and systems of power (Darby and Paolini 1994, 381). Traditional definitions of power conceal ideological power and, similarly, the power behind



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explanations of the “reality” of world politics. Homer-Dixon’s treatment of population growth in ways that target women in the Global South as threats to environmental security is an instructive example. By contrast, intersectional, postcolonial feminism allows for an examination of the material consequences of power and knowledge (re)production and their role in creating and maintaining interlocking systems of oppression and privilege. Examining the messages on population issues (including population growth and migration) encoded within the environmental chapters of introductory world politics textbooks (including both the stories told and the strategic silences) provides one way of revealing and ideally disrupting the gendered, racialized, and other processes by which threats are identified and interpreted within mainstream ES scholarship and discourse more broadly. Moreover, this framework provides avenues by which the true causes of environmental insecurity—systems of inequality, militarization, and neoliberal globalization—may be exposed, challenged, and eradicated. I certainly have not included every IR textbook used in the field, nor do I want to suggest that the textbooks included in my analysis are a completely representative sample of every introductory textbook ever used in political science classrooms in the United States. However, the vast majority of the textbooks I examine have enjoyed the publication of multiple editions and, presumably, enjoy popularity in the field. In fact, the back cover of the sixth edition of Goldstein’s International Relations boasts that it is a “field defining text” and the “top-selling IR text in the field” (Goldstein 2005). In addition, all but three8 of the texts I examine include separate chapters, or at least significant sections, on global environmental issues, which in and of itself supports the argument that environmental issues, once considered fairly irrelevant low politics, have made significant incursions into the field of IR. The textbooks I examine in the rest of this chapter are all cited in the appendix. POPULATION ISSUES, ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION,

AND

SECURITY

Nester opens and concludes his chapter “The Global Environmental Crisis” with the quote: “No more basic threat to national security exists” (American Assembly Conference qtd. in Nester 2001, 483, 514). Although some authors draw a link between the environment and security in more implicit ways, many of the textbook authors explicitly define environmental destruction in security terms, as the proceeding quote from Nester’s textbook suggests. Many also draw from Homer-Dixon’s



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work in explaining the link between environmental destruction and insecurity. For instance, Jones reasons, “By now it should be clear that while it is handy to consider population, resources, environment, and development as separate issues, they are more realistically parts of a single problem. Together they restrain the living standards of the Developing World and leave unresolved a myriad of problems that may at any day erupt in ethnopolitical violence, war, swarms of starving refugees, and so forth” (1997, 427–28). Some, like Spiegel and Wehling reserve their use of the phrase “environmental security” for their chapter on security and instead locate discussions of environmental degradation and population growth within discussions of scarcity and violence, which also reflects Homer-Dixon’s definition of environmental security. In their security chapter, the authors do argue against “expanding the concept of security to include every problem faced by a nation or the world,” but they nevertheless maintain that “clearly, problems like environmental degradation, exhaustion of national resources, rapid population growth, and migration can undermine a state’s security by overtaxing its political, economic, and social systems, leading to instability or even the wholesale collapse of the state” (Spiegel and Wehling 1999, 490). In sum, it seems that the IR subfield of environmental security has found a strong voice in introductory IR texts, which, as mentioned, provides an important foundation for students studying in the field of IR and for the field itself. These textbooks do more than simply advocate for the inclusion of environmental destruction in the realm of “high politics.” Many also share and promote particular assumptions and arguments about the relationship between population issues and ecological security or, rather, threats to ecological security. The authors of the twenty-two textbooks with environmental chapters or significant environmental sections suggest links between population growth and environmental destruction. They also include a good deal of attention to, and often sympathy for, neo-Malthusian theories on environmental destruction. Henderson is therefore not alone in his position: “If there is a starting point for explaining environmental deterioration, it is human population pressures” (1998, 434). Henderson also highlights a 1992 joint statement between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society of London stating that the annual rate of population growth at the time (100 million) was “the principal cause of destruction of the world’s forests, of global warming, and of the unprecedented pace of extinction of species,”



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to which Henderson adds, “Population burdens also contribute to cropland loss, soil erosion, water shortages, and air and ocean pollution, and create mountains of trash” (1998, 435). Henderson even includes a graphic, reprinted with permission from the Sierra Club, of a tree with “OVERPOPULATION The Root of the Problem” written beneath the tree’s roots and everything from urban congestion to starvation and human suffering written within the upper area (in the leaves and branches) of the tree (1998, 436; capitalization and underlining in original). The text above the tree reads “POPULATION STABILIZATION The Real Solution” (Henderson 1998, 436; capitalization and emphasis in original). Other authors, including Hughes, do at least mention concerns over potential links between population control policies and colonialism and genocide, but unfortunately, he does not elaborate on these concerns (2000; 1997). Mingst (2003, 256) also mentions ethnical concerns over curbing population growth, including eugenics, but does not elaborate in the depth I believe is required. So, despite some complication, population stabilization and family planning are discussed frequently across those textbooks with environmental chapters. Improving the status of women is also discussed frequently in the textbooks I examine. However, I contend that these discussions are linked more to reaching demographic targets and population stabilization than they are to engendering transformative antiracist feminist revolutions around the world. In other words, I just don’t believe that women’s empowerment is viewed as crucial and valuable in and of itself within mainstream ES scholarship or discourse; rather, it is seen as valuable insofar as it relates to population sterilization. Perhaps I would feel differently if there were any antiracist feminist voices and theories (especially transnational antiracist feminist theories on reproductive and environmental justice) included in any of these textbook discussions or in the discussions of ES scholars in the previous section. Women are not simply rats to be studied, analyzed, and talked about. Women are producers of knowledge with crucial theories and insights (and the mere fact that I am saying this in the year 2007 is a little sad). Until transnational antiracist feminist theories, discussions, and rejections of historical and contemporary population control practices (not to mention racist, sexist, and xenophobic immigration control policies) are included in mainstream ES (or IR) discussions, I will not comfortably believe that “status of women” discussions in mainstream ES or IR discourse genuinely have much to do with women’s empowerment.





POPULATION, IMMIGRATION,

AND


Moving on, immigration is often defined or treated as a population issue itself, and in eighteen of the twenty-two textbooks with environmental chapters or subsections, migration and immigration are linked to environmental degradation. Hughes9 exemplifies this point in both the 1997 and 2000 editions of his introductory world politics textbooks when he writes, “We move our attention now to two other population-based issues: migration and population control” (2000, 363). Perhaps most interesting, however, is the lack of detailed analysis (with few notable exceptions) of the relationship between immigration and ecological destruction. This is significant for a number of reasons, but perhaps most important in defining immigration as a population issue, the failure to analyze the complexity of international migration leaves students with little choice but to rely on the neo-Malthusian framework included and, in fact, foregrounded in many of the textbooks I have examined in forming their understanding of the relationship between issues of immigration and the environment. It bears reiterating that all of the textbooks with environmental chapters or sections discuss (to varying degrees) both the cassandras and the cornucopians in relation to environmental degradation. Cassandras, or neo-Malthusian pessimists, receive the lion’s share of attention, however. In fact, the Malthusian population growth–food production equation, along with Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and lifeboat metaphors, garner the most attention in the textbooks I examined. After discussing Hardin’s work, Nester explicitly asserts, for instance, “The earth and the humans who inhabit it face the same ‘tragedy of the commons’” (2001, 483). Nester goes on to provide a number of dire warnings to readers of the inevitable onslaught of famine, disease, deforestation, species extinction, and pollution and emphasizes “overpopulation” as the root cause: “These crises boil down to one central problem—a population explosion” (2001, 484; emphasis in original). Moreover, although some of the textbooks reference arguments approximating those of distributionists, absolutely none of the textbooks I examined include antiracist feminist theories on population, immigration, or environmental security in their environmental chapters or sections, despite the wealth of writing on each that exists. And although some of the textbooks provide more complex discussions of the debates around population control policies than others, discussions of actors critical of population control policies are largely restricted to the Vatican and



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Catholicism, and secondarily, to Muslims and “Islamic countries.” Likewise, examples of abusive population control policies are routinely restricted to China’s one-child policy. Although all of these are important and warrant inclusion, there are far more positions, theories, voices, and actors engaged in debates around population issues and policies with respect to the global environment that also warrant, indeed require, inclusion. In World Politics in a New Era, Spiegel and Wehling provide a useful example of the general treatment of population and immigration across the textbooks examined here. They surmise that “rapid growth of the world’s population is the root cause of many global problems.” In highlighting the main themes of their chapter they explain, “In many cases, these problems are closely interrelated; an increase in population, for example, frequently leads to migration and environmental degradation” (Spiegel and Wehling 1999, 430). In International Relations, Snow and Brown go even further in their contention that “in addition to the mounting strains it imposes on the environment, continued population growth threatens to ignite large-scale international population flows as large numbers of people seek to flee the poverty and strife endemic throughout much of the Second Tier” (2000, 333). They go on, like many others, to link this to national security: “The U.S.-Mexican border—one of the few places where the First and Second Tiers directly adjoin one another—provides a picture of what will likely become a much more common international occurrence. By the mid-1990s, U.S. officials had all but lost control over their own borders, as hundreds of thousands of Mexicans illegally entered the United States in search of better economic opportunities. States like Texas and California were nearly overwhelmed by the growing demands for schooling, health care, and social services generated by the illegal aliens” (Snow and Brown 2000, 333). Snow and Brown also make the more general link between rising population, “swelling” migration flows, and political conflict, further demonstrating the linkages they draw between population issues and security concerns (2000, 333). Again, there is surprisingly little in-depth analysis of the link between migration and immigration and environmental security. Prominent instead is the assumption that a relationship exists, along with assertions like: “On a day-to-day basis, population issues intrude on interstate politics primarily through the migration of people among countries” (Hughes 2000, 363). In other words, few of the chapters or sections that





include immigration in their discussion of environmental issues provide an in-depth examination of the supposed relationship between migration and immigration and environmental degradation. Eight of the chapters mention that population growth in countries of origin cause environmental destruction, which pushes migration. Five mention that population growth in countries of origin causes economic stress, which pushes migration into the United States. The majority of the textbooks that include a link to population migration in their environmental chapter provide insufficient discussions of how immigration and environmental destruction are linked, and even fewer chapters discuss the presumed environmental and other impacts of migration for host countries. For the most part, these impacts seem to just be assumed. Certainly, hostility directed at immigrants during times of economic, social, and/or political insecurity is not a new phenomenon. However, few of the authors examine in-depth the “problems” (environmental, economic, or otherwise) associated with immigration; it just seems to be assumed that migration from the Global South is a problem for the Global North. One of the more interesting examples I came across was Caldwell’s 2000 textbook World Politics and You. Caldwell does not explicitly discuss migration in his chapter “Population, the Environment and Economic Development.” What he does do, however, is begin (and frame) his chapter with Hardin’s lifeboat metaphor. At the beginning of his chapter, Caldwell calls on students to “[s]uppose for the moment that a wealthy relative has given you a vacation on a cruise line as a reward for the excellent job that you did in this class!” (2000, 261). Caldwell goes on to provide a condensed and updated version of Hardin’s lifeboat metaphor and confronts students with the “excruciating questions” of how they might decide who gets to come on to the lifeboat (or not) and why. He then explains, “This hypothetical scenario is based on the work of controversial ecologist Garrett Hardin, who has argued that the world is analogous to a lifeboat in that it can support a limited number of people and that its carrying capacity is challenged by the number of people in the world. According to Professor Hardin, wealthy, developed states should not intervene to assist poor, developing states; such action is analogous to allowing more passengers on an already overloaded lifeboat” (Caldwell 2000, 262). Caldwell further highlights his sympathy for a neo-Malthusian approach to environmental issues in the following introductory statement: “This chapter focuses on the ‘lifeboat’ that we call earth and seeks



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to analyze the interactive effects of growth in the population, environmental degradation, and economic development—topics that are profoundly important in contemporary world politics” (2000, 263). So, although Caldwell himself does not discuss migration and immigration in his chapter, I contend that the link between population, migration, and environmental destruction, as well as the particular threat this poses to countries of the Global North, comes through loud and clear. It is even more disappointing that Caldwell does not discuss or critique the implicit assumptions about migration and immigration in the Hardinian framework that guides his chapter. Another area of discussion that is important to note is the distinction that several authors draw between political refugees and others, with the (implicit and explicit) assumption that the movement of economic and environmental refugees, migrants, and “illegal immigrants” result from individual self-interest and greed. For example, in explaining environmental refugees, Spiegel and Wehling claim, “In many other developing countries, hundreds of thousands of people leave their home regions because of soil exhaustion, chemical contamination, lack of access to clean water or inundation of towns or farms, becoming environmental refugees” (1999, 437). Prior to this however, and in explaining U.S. refusals to admit economic immigrants, Spiegel and Wehling claim, “In addition to those seeking economic opportunity, migrants today also flee from war and oppressive dictatorships. These persons are collectively referred to as refugees, because they are forced to flee their home countries for reasons not related to their economic standard of living” (1999, 436). The authors then highlight the United Nations’ 1967 definition of refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution” leaves his or her country (Spiegel and Wehling 1999, 436). Subsequently, “many countries suspect that new arrivals may be claiming some sort of persecution in order to enter a country for the purpose of securing a better job. These countries, including the United States and Germany, tend to accept refugees who are fleeing persecution but refuse to admit economic migrants” (Spiegel and Wehling 1999, 436). Hughes makes a similar argument: “about 140 million people lived outside of their country of birth as legal immigrants, illegal economic immigrants, and refugees (those who have fled from actual physical danger)” (2000, 363; emphasis in original). The “actual physical danger” piece of the sentence does not appear in the same area of the 1997 edition; it seems to have been added to the 2000 edition. Leaving aside the





legal or technical distinction between immigrants and refugees for a moment (definitional distinctions that I do not entirely support), I am distressed by the dismissiveness with which people resisting the structural violence of poverty are treated in the abovementioned textbook discussions. In the intervening years, Hughes apparently came to the conclusion that malnutrition and starvation resulting from the maldistribution of resources, reductions in food subsidies and health services required by Structural Adjustment Programs, environmental degradation produced by multinational corporations, or in sum, the denial of basic economic and social human rights owing to the practices and policies of the United States, do not constitute “actual physical danger,” much less a wellfounded fear of persecution. And as mentioned, Hughes is certainly not the only author to draw this distinction. How might discussions of migration and immigration change should these authors vigorously incorporate Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into their analyses, followed by critical examination of systems of power, privilege, and oppression with respect to denials of basic human rights? Article 25 of the UDHR reads, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of . . . [oneself ] . . . and . . . [one’s] . . . family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond . . . [one’s] . . . control” (United Nations cited by Flowers and HREN 1998, 140). Rather than being seen as exercising their human rights and resisting oppression and inequality, immigrants are often constructed as simply seeking higher paying jobs out of self-interest (greed?), which supports the Hobbesian worldview characteristic of traditional realist understandings of international relations. Hughes further trivializes the desire of migrants to resist and escape situations of grave deprivation with his argument: “Although immigrants clamor for admission to the developed countries, for much of the rest of the world, the issue is refugees” (2000, 363; 1997, 443), implying that the needs behind immigration are not even a particularly important issue for IR scholars or Western governments. Immigrants themselves, their rationales for migrating, and even their sex and gender are discussed very little in the environmental chapters of the textbooks I examine. Only one of the environmental chapters



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(Spiegel and Wehling 1999) disaggregates the number of immigrants on the basis of sex and gender. Failure to disaggregate supports the popular (though erroneous) assumption that immigrants are primarily male. This further invisibilizes the role of gender and sexism, not to mention women’s experiences, in discussions of migration and international relations. Goldstein is one of the few authors who provide a longer discussion of the politics of immigration; however, this discussion is featured not in his environmental chapter (chapter 11) but in his chapter on “the NorthSouth Gap” (chapter 12). In chapter 11, Goldstein explains, “Another source of international conflict connected with demographics is migration from poor states with high population growth to rich states with low population growth. For example, illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States is an irritant to U.S.-Mexican relations. . . . Migration and refugees are population issues, but discussion of them is reserved for Chapter 12 (pp. 561–65) in the context of North-South relations” (Goldstein 2001, 522). This statement reveals a number of things, including the relationship between environmental security and immigration, as well as the conflict supposedly characteristic of this relationship. Conflict and environmental destruction is cited across the textbooks I examine, although few of the textbooks provide much detail on how and why immigration is connected to or causes environmental destruction and conflict in countries of the Global North. Similarly, this quote assumes a connection between population growth, migration, conflict, and security (environmental or otherwise), but it is not discussed. Furthermore, Goldstein’s quote highlights for whom migration is an issue and a problem: the Global North. Responding to an article from her local newspaper, Mohanty suggests, “Of course, the newspaper story primarily identifies the ‘problems’ (for Europe and the USA) associated with these transnational migration trends. One such ‘problem’ is taking jobs away from ‘citizens’” (Mohanty 2001, 40). Indeed, in textbook chapters like Goldstein’s where immigration “from and to” is illustrated, immigrants from the Global South are often constructed as a problem for the Global North. However, with a few notable exceptions, there is not enough analysis. Moreover, the Global North is often located as the site for environmental activism and transformation. As one textbook suggests, sustainable development will help “reconcile Third World emphasis on





economic development and First World concern for the global environment” (Viotti and Kauppi 2001, 392). Although I am not sure why this dualism is being advanced, dualisms like this invisibilize innumerable environmental justice movements (past and present) around the world, including the “Third World” (please see Shiva 2005 and Warren 2000; 1997). In sum, eighteen of the twenty-two textbooks with environmental chapters or sections link immigration to environmental destruction, yet there is very little in-depth analysis of this link. As I try to understand this, two possibilities come to mind: (1) The immigration–environmental insecurity link is considered so obvious as to not require elaboration, or (2) the inclusion of neo-Malthusian perspectives in discussions of “overpopulation” itself frames and explains the relationship between ecological destruction, immigration, and insecurity. I argue that both possibilities apply to the majority of these textbooks. Put differently, I contend that the “obvious” relationship between immigration and environmental degradation is implicitly and explicitly viewed through a neo-Malthusian lens (especially Hardin’s work), hence the relative dearth of substantial discussion on immigration in these chapters. As mentioned, all twentytwo chapters with environmental discussions posit links between population growth and environmental degradation, and many of the authors rely quite heavily on the writings of Malthus and Hardin when making their arguments. Most do incorporate other perspectives, especially the cornucopian approach; however, neo-Malthusianism typically overshadows the other perspectives included. In both the sixth and seventh editions of World Politics, Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2000; 2004) provide a useful example of this dynamic.10 The authors talk about Hardin’s tragedy of the commons at length throughout their chapter entitled “Limits of Sovereignty: Humanity and the Commons.” Like many others, Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2000) rely on Malthus and Hardin extensively, including Hardin’s assumption that ruin of the commons results from self-interest, a lack of conscience, lack of collective responsibility, and morality (e.g., the Hobbesian construction of human nature). In speaking of international distributive justice toward the end of their chapter, Russett, Starr, and Kinsella also note that the goal of distributive justice may include redistributing wealth and improving economic and social development, but that this has ecological costs (2000, 471–73). The authors then quote Hardin’s “case against helping the poor”: “The spaceship earth metaphor can be dangerous when used by misguided idealists to justify suicidal policies for sharing



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our resources through uncontrolled immigration and foreign aid. In their enthusiastic but unrealistic generosity, they confuse the ethics of a spaceship with those of a lifeboat. . . . Metaphorically each rich nation can be seen as a lifeboat full of comparatively rich people. In the ocean outside each lifeboat swim the poor of the world, who would like to get it, or at least share some of the wealth. . . . [W]e must recognize the limited capacity of any lifeboat” (Hardin qtd. in Russet, Starr, and Kinsella 2000, 473; emphasis added). Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2000, 473) do problematize Hardin’s position by suggesting that “Hardin’s lifeboat ethics are abhorrent to many, as he recognizes, but they are addressed to the tragedy of the commons” and by saying “[f ]ortunately, most people don’t see the trade-off in such stark terms (and perhaps neither does Hardin).” They also problematize Northern consumption patterns and Northern responsibility for environmental protection, suggesting that some of the first-class passengers on the lifeboat might get rid of some of their material possessions, could help the better swimmers, and could help folks build their own lifeboat as alternatives to Hardin’s propositions (Russet, Starr, and Kinsella 2000, 473). Nevertheless, their challenge to Hardin’s “case against helping the poor” is incomplete. Like the other textbooks examined, the authors of World Politics do not sufficiently examine the politics of population control, much less include feminist debates and theories on reproductive justice. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella also fail to explicitly challenge Hardin’s racist, xenophobic or sexist assumptions about immigration and environmental degradation. Hardin’s anti-immigration argument (among others) within this direct quote is simply left standing, which is especially significant considering that this is the only time immigration is explicitly mentioned in the context of environmental degradation in the chapter. Hardin’s perspective, in other words, is just taken for granted. Historical and contemporary forms of colonialism are also ignored by Hardin and his followers even though neoliberal globalization itself “constitutes a racialized massive redistribution of wealth, power, and resources from the developing world to the developed—a form of economic apartheid” (Crenshaw in Wing 2000, 5). Among other things, Crenshaw’s argument leaves me questioning Hardin’s perception of how each “rich nation” got rich in the first place and furthermore compels me to question Hardin’s assumptions of “sharing”: how many of the resources Hardin speaks of were appropriated (stolen) in the first place?





Unfortunately, Russett, Starr, and Kinsella do not vigorously ask these questions and fail to adequately take Hardin to task on his exercise of historical amnesia. To quote Hardin without challenging his historical amnesia, not to mention the greening of hate within his work, normalizes both and perpetuates the inequalities that compel migration in the first place. Historical amnesia and the obfuscation of structural inequalities, in tandem with innumerable doomsday scenarios, “substantiate” the supposed threat that immigrations poses to environmental security. For instance, the authors of Global Politics include the following argument: “An earth stretched far beyond its carrying capacity will deteriorate; famines will eradicate large numbers of people; epidemics will sweep uncontrolled across the globe; an environment into which too many toxins and dangerous gases have been poured simply will give up; transportation systems will collapse and cities starve to death; and society will implode, returning at the very best to the level of the Dark Ages” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich qtd. in Minix and Hawley 1998, 509–10). How are undergraduate students new to the study of international relations and unfamiliar with the critical analyses of intersectional, postcolonial, and other antiracist feminists not supposed to fear immigrants after discussions like the above, not to mention the following statement on the domino effect? “Populations have grown too fast and demanded too much from the regions in which they live, rendering that land uninhabitable. Environmental refugees fleeing those wasted lands increase demands on steadily diminishing productive lands elsewhere, thus quickening their degradation and eventual destruction. The result is an environmental domino effect. The number of people and the percentage of the world’s population ravaged by famine, drought, floods, poverty, diseases, and malnutrition of near biblical horror worsens” (Nester 2001, 484; emphasis in original). How are these students not supposed to fear immigrants when it is further implied (or at best not challenged) that it is the Global North being threatened by the Global South by virtue of their “overbreeding” and fleeing? “Although most industrialized countries will achieve zero population growth, America’s population is expected to grow from 250 million to 383 million between 1990 and 2050. Some of that growth will come from the birth rate, but America’s growing population will also swell from political, economic, and environmental refugees from around the world” (Nester 2001, 487). In sum, the continued use of Hardin and other neo-Malthusian responses to environmental degradation within the environmental security positions reflected



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in many of these textbooks reflects a particular process by which national security enemies are identified and interpreted. Put differently, it serves a process of scapegoating informed by the greening of hate. The idea that population growth in the Global South is to blame for triggering “floods of environmental refugees that [will] soon overwhelm yet another region’s carrying capacity” (Nester 2001, 510) has been accepted to such a degree that I believe it operates as conventional wisdom in the United States. This may explain, in part, the ignorance surrounding the experiences of immigrants in the United States: “A black Puerto Rican friend in New York, when we talked about experiences of racism common to Black and brown, said ‘People here don’t see Border Patrol brutality against Mexicans as a form of police repression,’ despite the fact that the Border Patrol is the largest and most uncontrolled police force in the U.S. It would seem that an old ignorance has combined with new immigrant bashing to sustain divisions today” (Elizabeth Martinez 2001, 111). United States–Mexico border policy is supported by an enemy-creation process occurring within the mainstream ES positions articulated in the majority of these textbooks. Constructing the environmental “Other as a threat” is further supported by the historical amnesia of over 150 years of colonization, repression, and exploitation of peoples in the Southwest United States and Mexico, as well as Central and South America, on behalf of “national security” and “development.” Only two of the environmental chapters in this study directly highlight restrictions on immigrant rights and their experiences of human rights violation. How are students supposed to critically examine, much less problematize, the human rights violations and the loss of life associated with U.S. immigration and related policies on the United States–Mexico border within a framework that constructs immigrants as threats to environmental, national, and civilizational security and implicitly as “deserving” of the anti-immigrant hostility and violence they experience in the United States? Further, if students have already been taught stereotypes and misinformation on population issues by high school social studies textbooks, as Hendrixson’s (2001) study demonstrates, the majority of undergraduate world politics texts examined here may only perpetuate scapegoating and the greening of hate. The worst example of the normalization of hatred, fear, and ignorance within discussions of the “threat” posed by population growth and immigration can be found in Nester’s “Global Environmental Crisis” chapter in his textbook International Relations; his is also the most neo-Malthusian





of the textbooks included in my study. Nester states, “in some countries and regions, AIDS may accomplish what family planning has been unable to do” (2001, 490). Is the goal of family planning to eradicate families, friends, and loved ones, especially peoples of color, through unthinkable suffering in the name of curbing population growth? Granted, Nester begins this paragraph with “Tragically, natural forces such as famine and disease may succeed where governments have failed in curbing population” (2001, 490; emphasis added); however, in spite of his use of the term “tragically,” I find both statements dismissive and hateful. Nearly all of the other texts use less insensitive (or, better stated, more sanitized) language and most discuss environmental regimes and treaties, highlighting the importance of productive cooperation in addressing global ecological concerns, including those around population issues. The focus on cooperation is quite reasonable given the transboundary nature of environmental issues. By contrast, even though immigration is often mentioned in the context of environmental security, there is little in-depth discussion of policy responses to immigration itself. On the other hand, while Clemens (Dynamics of International Relations 1998; 2004) does not locate immigration within his discussion of the environment, he does offer a number of disturbing “maxims” (or expressions of general truths) for the Global North and South to follow in cooperatively dealing with global ecological crises. Among them, Clemens includes the troubling suggestion that countries of the Global South “[p]romote family planning among males and females. Do not treat population control as a racist scheme to weaken the South” (1998, 433; emphasis added). Clemens easily and irresponsibly dismisses the vast array of contemporary and historical population control policies targeting Other women in the United States and the Global South, often at the behest of U.S. institutions. Few of the textbooks include any discussion of the problems associated with population control policies beyond the few who, as mentioned, briefly discuss China’s one-child policy. This “maxim” alone, which appears in both the 1998 and 2004 editions of his textbook, exemplifies the sheer necessity of antiracist feminist analysis in relation to both reproductive and environmental justice. Clemens displays yet another example of historical amnesia in his sixth maxim for the South, which reads: “Walk on two legs. Take useful technology and whatever other aid you can from rich countries, but know that sustainable development is mainly up to you. Avoid scapegoating the North” (1998, 433; emphasis added). Again, not only is blame implicitly directed at the Global



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South, but histories of colonialism and contemporary neocolonial relations and policies are also conveniently dismissed as irrelevant. This is also an important example of the operation of systemic privilege in the United States, particularly what Johnson (2001, 24) calls the “luxury of obliviousness.” Finally, many of these textbooks (like the work of many mainstream ES scholars) focus heavily on state sovereignty and often call for a redefinition of security that includes environmental concerns. As previously noted, however, I am not convinced that this redefinition has taken place, and, in fact, I argue that the engagement with environmental security within the majority of the textbooks I have examined largely reinforce a realist worldview within which national security and the state reign supreme. In addition, the majority of the textbooks largely reinforce a particular threat-identification process that I argue is characteristic of traditional IR security discourse more broadly. Kegley and Wittkopf (World Politics 1999; 2004) provide an important demonstration of this and reinforce my belief that mainstream ES scholars (whether featured in introductory textbooks or otherwise) fail to substantially transform the boundaries of IR given their reliance on, and reinforcement of, neo-Malthusian understandings of environmental degradation. Although Kegley and Wittkopf (in the 1999 edition of their textbook) reserve discussion of population growth and immigration for a separate chapter (in the chapter preceding their environmental chapter, entitled “The Ecological Security and Preservation of the Commons”), the authors do foreground the relationship between population growth and environmental destruction in both chapters. Further, their chapter on population growth (chapter 10, entitled “World Demographic Patterns, Problems and Possibilities”) relies heavily on the tragedy of the commons metaphor, which sets the stage for their comparatively lengthy discussion of environmental security in chapter 11 of the 1999 edition of their textbook. The reliance on Hardin’s metaphor as well as Malthus’ understanding of population growth rates continues in, and indeed frames, the 2004 edition of their textbook, where the population and environment chapters are largely merged (“Population, Pressure, Resource Depletion, and the Preservation of the Global Environment”). Kegley and Wittkopf (themselves pluralist scholars) reinforce realist and Hobbesian constructions of human nature in their 1999 ecological security chapter by perpetuating the assumption that destruction of the commons lies in “the absence of restraints on human freedom,”





“self-interest” and the discouragement of self-sacrifice, as demonstrated in their discussion of the ecopolitics of forests and biodiversity, where they assert, “In the Global North, reforestation has alleviated some of the danger. This is not the case in many cash-starved Global South countries, which sell timber for income and to make room for their growing populations seemingly without concern for the long-term consequences of the destruction of their forests” (1999, 333–34; emphasis added). They make a similar claim in the ninth edition of their textbook (2004, 388). Little attention is paid to neoliberal policies imposed by the Global North that significantly contribute to deforestation, like SAPs. Instead, peoples of the Global South are represented as simply “without concern,” which draws on the popular “too poor to be green” stereotype that once again invisibilizes environmental justice and sustainability movements around the world, including those within countries of the Global South (again, see Shiva 2005). The authors also highlight the risks for the Global North posed by population growth in Other countries resulting from this self-interest and lack of concern, explaining, “The consequences of a burgeoning world population cannot be confined to the Global South. . . . The economic, environmental, political, and social consequences of a world population that promises to grow by more than half in the next half-century will be widely shared” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1999, 289). Population growth and environmental destruction are key political issues in the international realm for these authors (2004, 352), who foresee myriad consequences, including conflict, which can threaten U.S. national security (Kegley and Wittkopf 2004, 352). In fairness, Kegley and Wittkopf do note that critiques of Hardin exist, focusing especially on the critiques posed by cornucopian optimists. This is extremely insufficient. Given all of the critiques of Hardin I have discussed thus far, as well as continuing practices of reproductive injustice in the name of environmental, economic, political, and social security throughout the world (including the United States), the single line in their 2004 edition noting human rights critiques of Hardin is in no way enough.11 Using phrases like “family planning” rather than “population control” is not enough, either. For decades now, antiracist feminists inside and outside the field of IR have investigated the politics of population control and its disempowering and deadly consequences. Moreover, antiracist feminists—including, but not limited to, intersectional and postcolonial feminists—have foregrounded the crucial importance of reproductive justice as well as environmental and social justice



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perspectives, alternatives, and movements for decades. One simply cannot dismiss the existence, much less the pervasiveness, of antiracist feminist theories around the politics of population control. In fact, I see no compelling excuse for failing to include interrogations of the racist, sexist, xenophobic, heteronormative foundations of Hardin’s work (and neo-Malthusianism more broadly) within discussions of population growth and the environment, nor the consequences that continue to result from framing environmental, national, and civilizational security in neo-Malthusian terms within these textbooks. In other words, I cannot see any compelling reason for failing to fully interrogate the greening of hate. Until there is commitment to interrogating histories and continuing practices of forced/coerced sterilization and coerced long-term chemical contraceptive use, until there is commitment to investigating the operation of white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy in denying genuine reproductive justice (among other things) to women, and until there is commitment to engaging antiracist feminist reproductive justice theory and activism, I am not willing to assume that talk of family planning, however sanitized the language, genuinely refers to women’s health, welfare, and empowerment, much less reproductive rights. This is not to be taken as support for the antichoice political agendas of the religious right in the United States or elsewhere; I do not support antichoice agendas. Instead, this is a call for greater focus on, inclusion, and understanding of reproductive and environmental justice as I defined in the introduction. Nevertheless, Kegley and Wittkopf support Hardin in fairly explicit terms in their 1999 and 2004 textbooks by referring to the tragedy of the commons on a number of occasions. In their population chapter they explain, “Nonetheless, the balance of both theory and evidence from demography points to a world in which unrestrained population growth will result in lost economic opportunities, environmental degradation, domestic strife, and incentives—perhaps imperatives—for governmental restraints on individual choice. A globe interdependent ecopolitically as well as economically is certain to share the consequences” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1999, 279). Yet it is not all members of “the globe” who must share consequences like restraints on individual choice, but rather a particularly raced, gendered, and imperialistically targeted segment of the world that is scapegoated for environmental destruction and subsequently called upon for population and immigration control. Regardless, it is this refashioned





Malthusian approach to population growth that frames Kegley and Wittkopf ’s chapter on population issues, as well as their 1999 and 2004 chapters on the environment. Although different theoretical frameworks are included (cornucopians or optimists, and distributionists in the context of poverty and the pitfalls of genetic engineering; see 2004, 365–68), neo-Malthusianism overshadows them, and (as in the rest of the textbooks I have examined), antiracist feminist theories on population growth and environmental degradation remain notably absent. In terms of solutions proposed by the authors of these textbooks, given the common reliance on Hardin’s analogies and their general failure to address policy responses to immigration specifically, I argue (as mentioned) that it would be quite difficult for students to come away with anything but a desire to deny access into Northern lifeboats or, in other words, close or at least strongly control U.S. borders. As Kegley and Wittkopf explain in their population chapter, “human rights violations, environmental degradation, international war, and ethnonational clashes and atrocities within states—all in some sense related to the Global South’s rapidly expanding population—push millions beyond their homelands” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1999, 293; emphasis in original). The authors go on to explain, “To many Northern societies, immigration has become the population problem, and shutting the door is increasingly viewed as a solution” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1999, 293; emphasis in original). Again, given the prevalence of Hardinian doomsday scenarios in these introductory textbooks, I cannot see how students could come away with anything other than militarized border control and perhaps even closure as solutions to the “problem” of immigration, as well as environmental and national insecurity. This is especially distressing given the failure of the majority of these textbooks to discuss in adequate detail and depth the level of violence, indeed the Low Intensity War, being waged against communities on both sides of the United States–Mexico border, not to mention the over four thousand deaths that have already resulted from the U.S. government’s programs of deterrence (ACLU 2006a). It would be quite easy for students to walk away from these textbooks thinking that closing the border is a simple, easy, victimless, and obvious solution to the “problems,” environmental and otherwise, of immigration. It is also useful to note that I only found references to anti-immigration backlashes, discrimination, and hate crimes in one of the environmental chapters I examined, Spiegel and Wehling’s (1999) chapter



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“Global Issues.” I also want to take this opportunity to note that Mingst (2003) and Viotti and Kauppi (2001) provide slightly more nuanced discussions of environmental destruction, as well as the debates on the role of population growth in environmental destruction. Mingst (2003), as mentioned, even mentions eugenics in the context of ethical dilemmas around population stabilization policies. Overall, however, underlying assumptions rather than critical analysis pervade discussions of immigration’s relationship to environmental destruction. In sum, the fundamental worldviews and processes by which security threats are identified and interpreted in the mainstream ES positions advanced in many of these textbooks belie assertions that their research provides a substantial departure from traditional IR security discourse. Indeed, mainstream ES positions on immigration appear as nothing more than the swing of the same mainstream IR security discourse pendulum. And despite Nester’s assertion, “[a]lthough ideological extremists shrilly deny these scientific realities, more and more governments and people around the world understand that the steady increase of people and pollution may provoke a global environmental Armageddon” (2001, 484), there is a significant amount of in-depth antiracist feminist analysis, including especially intersectional and postcolonial feminist analysis and activism that strongly challenges the basic assumptions, particularly the neo-Malthusian assumptions, that frame many of these authors’ engagement with environmental security. However, such in-depth analysis remains one of the key areas of strategic silence within the textbooks examined for this chapter. Instead, Hardin’s metaphors serve a triple purpose: to construct environmental threats, extol the virtues of population control, and (implicitly) emphasize the importance of controls on immigration among people of color from the Global South into the Global North. It is here that the greening of hate is most visible in mainstream ES scholarship and discourse, and it is here that the deepest linkages between national, civilizational, and environmental security are revealed. CONCLUSION

As Shiva points out, “To stay free in a period when slavery is sold through spin and propaganda implies that satygraha, the struggle for truth, must extend to the instruments that colonize our minds and thoughts” (2005, 184). Building and sustaining transformative change requires developing better and more widespread strategies aimed at decolonizing our minds and our college textbooks. Blaming population growth and migration for





environmental destruction ignores intersecting systems of power, privilege, and oppression, which create and perpetuate poverty, alienation, and war, as well as environmental devastation in the first place. Scapegoating, in other words, ignores the structural causes of poverty, alienation, war, and environmental devastation. Nevertheless, it appears that the greening of hate tends to characterize the analyses, and set the terms of debate, within mainstream ES discourse, including the dominant knowledge produced by ES theorists in academia and its articulation within introductory textbooks. The greening of hate is connected to an enemy-creation process within which the creation of raced, classed, and gendered “Others as threats” diverts attention away from the real problems and serves to legitimize Western neocolonial efforts and policies aimed at countries perceived as “backward” and “threatening.” The greening of hate, and the enemy-creation process upon which it rests, is explicitly and implicitly supported within the environmental chapters of many of the introductory world politics and IR textbooks evaluated here. So, too, are entrenched and intersecting discourses of national and civilizational security. In fact, both intersect quite well with environmental security discourse in many of the textbooks I examined. Although I provide a number of recommendations in the last chapter of this book, one important and easy suggestion for challenging the overreliance on neoMalthusianism within discussions of population issues that I will mention here is for educators inside and outside academia to examine and utilize “Population in Perspective: A Curriculum Resource,” produced by the Population and Development Program (PopDev) at Hampshire College. The goal of the curriculum is to challenge students “to think critically about national and international population issues” (Population and Development Program, 2007). PopDev works in coalition with CWPE as well as the Civil Liberties and Public Policy Program (CLPP), all of which provide a wealth of accessible educational resources through antiracist feminist, intersectional, anticolonial lenses. Importantly, CWPE also provides a wealth of amazing community education tools on their Web site. Intersectional, postcolonial feminist scholars stress the importance of illustrating “the complex ways in which postcolonial others have been constructed, and discursively mapped and managed” (Chowdhry and Nair 2002, 16). Inequality, oppression, and violence cannot operate



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without powerful ideological “justifications” for their existence. Thus, maintaining systems of power, privilege and oppression “requires the objectification and dehumanization of subordinated peoples” (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007a, 66). Constructions and representations of Others must therefore be brought to light and confronted as one step in eliminating all forms of oppression and violence, as both are implicated in, and support, relations of domination. “In the face of structural inequalities, the issue of identity and representation can literally and metaphorically be a matter of life and death for members of subordinated groups” as constructions and representations of the Other serve to “justify” and perpetuate exploitation and violence, particularly in cases where subordinated groups are “made” to be feared (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007a, 67). Analyzing identity and representation through the lens of intersectional, postcolonial feminism is critical because it allows one to read “at the intersections of constructions of race, gender, class, and sexuality” and destabilize the master narratives of history and “historically constructed meanings of subordinated race, sexual, gender, and class positions” (V. Smith 1998, xiv). Analysis through this lens also illustrates the simultaneous operation of race, gender, nation, and class, for attention to only one category “masks both the operation of the others and the interconnections among them” (V. Smith 1998, xv). Violent, often deadly, population and immigration control policy and practice against immigrants from the Global South are simultaneously created and rationalized by virtue of the status of these peoples and nations as Other, without addressing the structural components that may compel migration, and without fully examining the history of U.S. political and economic policy toward Central and South America. Working to dismantle discourses that render some inferior and thus exploitable and others superior helps interrupt the ideological bases of oppression. Issues such as poverty, ecological degradation, and immigration cannot be fully understood without analyses of the role of neoliberal globalization and the broader system of power, privilege, and oppression of which it is a part, which the majority of the authors of the environmental chapters evaluated here fail to fully engage. Interlocking structures and ideologies of racism, sexism, classism, ableism, heterosexism, and ageism not only exist, but mutually reinforce one another producing relations of inequality. One cannot simply ignore the structural and ideological components of issues concerning security, environmental destruction, and immigration. To do so only reinforces, as many textbook authors have




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done, the justificatory rhetoric that forms the basis of violent population and immigration policies and practices. Furthermore, failing to recognize systems of power, privilege, and oppression allows environmental destruction, not to mention racism, sexism, and all systems of inequality, to continue unabated.


H A P T E R

2

THE STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES– MEXICO BORDER UNDERSTANDINGS OF BOTH AMERICAN IDENTITY and national security are embedded in U.S. immigration policy. As noted in the introductory chapter, immigration policy and practice in the United States have been heavily influenced by dualistic, gendered, and racialized assumptions equating danger with external anarchy, “difference,” and conflict on the one hand, versus “civilization’s” equation with security, modernity, and the West, on the other; put simply, America has traditionally been defined as a “white,” “masculine,” upper-class nation, and U.S. immigration policy has often served this identity construction. The protection of America’s “civilizational security” (Persaud 2002) has been undertaken through policies aimed at excluding “foreigners” (especially people of color from the Global South) from U.S. naturalization and citizenship. Neither the category of “illegal” immigrant nor border control existed prior to the horrendous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Zinn 2007, 14). In fact, it wasn’t until 1924 that the Border Patrol was created and the concept of “illegal alien” targeting Mexicans living in the United States gained more widespread appeal (Fernandes 2007, 56). Three years prior, the Immigration Act of 1921 created a nationalities quota system and cap that explicitly favored northern Europeans (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007a, 69). The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act lifted restrictions on Asian immigration but continued the national origins



C


system, which favored immigrants from Western Europe (Hayes 2001, 14). One Senator went so far as to point out this act’s “striking similarity to the basic racial philosophy officially espoused so unfortunately and with such tragic consequences in Nazi Germany” (Reimers in Hayes 2001, 14). Newcomers from southern and eastern Europe faced marked hostility and violence based on many of the same stereotypes that characterize anti-immigrant hostility and at times hysteria across the United States today. Though so much more may (and should) be said of historical and contemporary immigration policy,1 I focus on immigration across the United States–Mexico border. Furthermore, my discussion throughout this project focuses largely on the intersections of systems of racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia in the production of mainstream ES discourse on immigration and the relationship between ES discourse and national and civilizational security discourses. This should not be taken to mean that systems of heterosexism, ageism, and ableism have not profoundly shaped immigration policy in the United States as well; indeed, they have. Lack of attention to the operation of these systems of power represents a significant gap in my current research—one that I plan to meaningfully address in upcoming works. “All governments seek to regulate their population” (Ride 1998b, 8); a state’s regulatory framework around immigration is directly connected to preserving its borders and exercising its sovereignty, a concept of great import to the field of IR. Sovereignty and border control lie at the heart of a regulatory framework that distinguishes “insiders” from “outsiders” based on particular understandings of national identity. Sovereignty is exercised and preserved through statecraft, which relies on constructions and representations of the “UDA” (undocumented alien), “illegalimmigrants,” (as though it is one word), “illegals,” “aliens,” and other dehumanizing terms casting those without “appropriate” paperwork as threatening outsiders. This enemy-creation process is fundamental to maintaining the boundaries of nation both figuratively (in terms of national identity) and literally (in terms of militarized geographic boundary-lines like the United States–Mexico border). Furthermore, not only are Mexican-Americans enveloped in the definition of “illegal,” but representations of illegality are heavily scripted on the bodies of Mexican residents (and basically anyone who looks Mexican) of the United States, whether they are documented or not. In other words, to be Latina/o in the United States is to be assumed “illegal,” with an array of racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes in tow.



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In this chapter, I focus on the extent to which U.S. government discourse informs and is informed by environmental security concerns around population issues, population growth and immigration. I pay particular attention to a number of different state documents, studies, and speeches released between 1994 and 2006 by the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations, all of which are listed in the appendix. I also examine two of the primary policy packages through which immigration across the United States–Mexico border has recently been addressed, the Southwest Border Strategy and the Secure Border Initiative. I therefore examine the overall militarization of the border under both administrations, including the role of paramilitary groups in the border’s militarization. I interweave these discussions with a (nonexhaustive) discussion of some of the other salient policies and practices impacting immigration across the United States–Mexico border, placing primary focus overall on the relationship between constructions of national, civilizational, and environmental security in relation to the U.S. state. SECURITY, POPULATION ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE

AND

Although some IR scholars and a number of environmental activists expressed concern over environmental insecurity in the 1970s, the U.S. government only recently began clearly incorporating discussions of environmental degradation and conflict into its security discussions. The inclusion of environmental security concerns (and other elements of low politics) into security discourse was made possible in part by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Several Clinton administration documents spoke of dramatic changes in the international realm owing to the end of the Cold War and the subsequent recognition of a whole host of “new” threats to international stability. By 1990 then-Senator Al Gore officially put the environment on the security map when he argued that environmental neglect “threatens not only the quality of life, but life itself. The global environment has thus become an issue of national security” (qtd. in Benjamin 2000, 14). In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, which he shares with the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, former vice president Gore (2007) similarly explained: “Indeed, without realizing it, we have begun to wage war on the earth itself. Now, we and the earth’s climate are locked in a relationship familiar to war planners: ‘Mutually assured destruction.’”



The State, Environmental Security, and the U.S.–Mexico Border


There are multiple institutional examples pointing to this shift in focus. With Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn, Gore created the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) within the Department of Defense in 1990 (Thomas 1997; Benjamin 2000). Gore also established the MEDEA Group and obtained CIA support with the DCI Environmental Center. In addition, Gore supported the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program, which “contributed more than any entity to the development of environmental security policy” (Butts 1999, 117). The Global Environmental Affairs Directorate was also created in the National Security Council, and the EPA also became a notable actor in national security affairs (Thomas 1997), with EPA Administer Carol Browner arguing that the “protection of public health and the environment have become an important part of our national security” (qtd. in Benjamin 2000, 15). As Paul Gaffney II, Vice Admiral of the U.S. Navy, explains, Once the realm only of the scientist and those of the same ilk, who read and review refereed technical and scientific journals, environmental security has grown in importance to the point that lofty generals and admirals responsible for regional security now speak of it often. Once the realm only of a few small nongovernmental organizations . . . determined to make a statement from their puny platforms, environmental security has become a topic of which leaders of countries and transnational corporations now speak in every kind of forum. Once ignored in the formulation of national security policy and strategy, environmental security today is addressed in every serious think piece written on any region of the world. (Gaffney 2002, vii)

In sum, environmental security has been taken seriously since the 1990s as a national security concern by a variety of state actors. By 1991, environmental security concerns also made their way into the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents and remained a significant component of each NSS released during the Clinton administration. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required National Security Strategies from presidential administrations on a regular basis.2 Jon Barnett (2001, 72) regards the NSS as “the most important unclassified statement of US security policy.” Every NSS is to articulate “U.S. interests, such as regional stability, free market economies, and democracy, that must be maintained if America is to survive” and identify plans for maintaining U.S. security, as well as the resources to do so (Butts 1999, 117).



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Manwaring’s edited book Environmental Security and Global Stability features an interesting conversation between the editor and General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.) and General Anthony L. Zinni, USMC (Ret). Compelled by the position that “a key element and root cause of the instability and violence that characterizes the ‘new world disorder’ is environmental degradation” (Manwaring 2002, ix), participants were asked if there were any existing strategies in this post–Cold War environment to address environmental security. According to Wilhelm, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS, which focuses on the implementation of the NSS) together provide a strategic framework with which to address environmental security (Manwaring 2002, x). I examine several NSS and NMS documents in this chapter. I also examine the three-phase security study produced by the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century (henceforth USCNS/21). The USCNS/21 was “established to examine comprehensively how this nation will ensure its security in the next 25 years” (USCNS/21 2000, 5). In fact, members were asked to “provide the most comprehensive government-sponsored review of U.S. national security in more than 50 years” (n.d.[a], 1). Phase I of the report (released in 1999) provides an overview of the “transformations emerging over the next quarter-century in the global and domestic U.S. security environment” (USCNS/21 2000, 5). Phase II (2000) details “U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy,” and Phase III (2001) explores “the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus for 21st century relevancy” (USCNS/21 2000, 5). Although there are notable consistencies between the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations, there are also several important differences between the two. Therefore, I will discuss each administration separately. POPULATION ISSUES

AND


Beginning with the Clinton administration, most of its NSS documents, as well as the USCNS/21 report, mention environmental degradation and environmental security concerns, and many connect population issues (population growth, immigration, migration, and environmental refugees) to environmental degradation. In its 1997 NSS, the Clinton Administration focuses “on the security implications for both present and long-term American policy raised by transnational problems that once seemed quite distant—such as resource depletion, rapid population





growth, environmental degradation and refugee migration” (Clinton Administration 1997c). This statement serves as an example of a “litany statement,” whereby authors imply connections between immigration and the environment (and often a plethora of other problems) without providing a comprehensive discussion of those connections. Other documents draw a fairly direct link between population issues, environmental degradation, and threats to U.S. security. The 1999 NSS explains, “Important national interests include . . . regions in which we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm, and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows” (Clinton Administration 1999a). Years later in their acceptance speeches for the 2007 Nobel Prize for their work on climate change, former vice president Al Gore and Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, also connected population issues to environmental destruction, and environmental destruction to conflict. Although both present more nuanced arguments than those of Kaplan or Myers (discussed in chapter 1), both still rely on a fundamentally neo-Malthusian framework (reminiscent of Garrett Hardin, in particular), in discussing climate change. According to Pachauri, “Migration and movement of people is a particularly critical source of potential conflict” (2007). Likewise, Gore claims, “Climate refugees have migrated into areas already inhabited by people with different cultures, religions and traditions, increasing the potential for conflict” (2007). It is extremely disappointing that “climate refugees,” rather than racism, xenophobia, or intolerance within host countries, are blamed for conflict. It is important to note, however, that far more attention is given to “illegal immigration” in the context of the drug trade and increased crime rates than in the context of environmental security, although the stereotypes behind constructing them as such are in no way dissimilar. Moreover, whether connected to environmental concerns or not, numerous Clinton-era documents define immigration as a national security concern. The 1998 NSS is a representative example in its definition of “illegal immigration” alongside drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and money laundering as “principal security concerns” in the Western Hemisphere, that “produce adverse social effects that undermine the sovereignty, democracy and national security of nations in the hemisphere” (Clinton Administration 1998a, 48).



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When immigration and the environment are discussed, in-depth analysis of the relationship between the two is generally lacking in the NSS and U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) studies I have examined. By contrast, the environmental impacts of rapid population growth are discussed in more detail. This is very significant considering that immigration is frequently defined as a population issue within the NSS and USCNS/21 reports, which mirrors the tendency of many IR and world politics textbooks to classify immigration as a population issue and then discuss “overpopulation” in more detail through a largely neo-Malthusian framework. This neo-Malthusian framework is also critical to the construction of Latinas in the U.S. (documented or not) as “resource depletors,” a construction that is not absent from the environmental, national, and civilizational security discourse of the Clinton Administration. Moreover, this construction, which is grounded in fears about population growth induced by immigration and fertility rates among recent immigrants, plays a crucial role in anti-immigration rhetoric and policy across the United States. On one hand, those crossing the Southwest border are generally represented as either male or simply sex- or genderless, which is interesting considering that “in the global flow from South to North, there are now as many women migrants as men” (Skrobanek 1998, 23), and considering that women constitute the majority of the undocumented Mexican immigrant population in the United States (Lindsley 2002, 178). When women are discussed or (more frequently) alluded to within anti-immigration discourse in the United States, they are “included at best as dependent relatives” (Potts 2001, 442) and as unable to control their fertility; positions articulated on the basis of heteronormative as well as racist and sexist stereotypes. This is an especially important component of neo-Malthusian-based mainstream ES discourse, as well as U.S. national and civilization security discourse. The “resource depletor” representation is also a prime example of the greening of hate. Syd Lindsley examines the important role of the (economic, social, and environmental) “resource depletor” representation within antiimmigration rhetoric, practice, and policy during the 1990s (2002, 176). As Lindsley explains, “The representation of immigrants as an immediate and dangerous threat to the availability of social services for ‘Americans’ constituted one of the primary themes of anti-immigrant discourse in the 1990s” (2002, 178). These representations are directed especially at female Mexican immigrants as reproductive agents who will presumably





pollute and therefore weaken national (“white”) identity. Fear of dilution is not new. Andrea Smith (2002) draws attention to the mass sterilization campaigns against indigenous women in the United States as part of colonial conquest, as well as contemporary wars against Native Americans through (among other things) long-lasting chemical contraceptives like Norplant and Depo-Provera. For Andrea Smith, both are grounded in the perception of Native women as polluting the national body politic (2002, 124). Moreover, women of color more generally are deemed especially dangerous to U.S. civilizational security given their ability to reproduce future communities of color and therefore challenge nationalist constructions of “white America.” The fear that female Mexican immigrants will increase population growth in the United States, deplete social and economic resources, threaten national security, and dilute national identity has been codified in a number of ways. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) discriminated against female immigrants in general by “excluding anyone likely to become a ‘public charge’” and by targeting (primarily female) recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Lindsley 2002, 177). In 1990, fears over the proliferation of phony marriages led to the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment, even though this type of fraud was not common (Lindsley 2002, 181). In fact, it is a myth (and a heteronormative one at that), that marriage to a U.S. citizen is a sure or easy way toward citizenship status (Fernandes 2007, 39). Scapegoating immigrants in times of economic and social insecurity has been a popular wedge strategy for some time. However, immigration is not a strain on resources, nor do immigrants steal jobs from American citizens en masse. Instead, immigrants “enhance economic growth and create employment. They invest money, shop, pay taxes and use services, all of which contributes directly to the local economy. And they add skills, knowledge and labour to the workforce” (“Migration: The Facts” 1998, 19).3 Furthermore, despite the misinformation disseminated by anti-immigrant forces, “[u]ndocumented immigrants are not eligible for public benefits, including unemployment insurance and social security, but they pay for these programs through taxes and payroll deductions if they are employed” (Hayes 2001, 36). Legislation reducing social services is a particularly irresponsible approach to “controlling immigration.” As Lindsley explains, “The attacks on immigrant women’s ability to reproduce and maintain their families form the root of the recent assaults on immigrants, especially



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through policies regulating immigrant’s use of public services. The attacks should be seen as an attempt to regulate and control immigrant women’s mothering” (2002, 185). California’s Proposition 187 in 1994 denied local and state social services, education, welfare, and nonemergency health care (including prenatal care) to anyone unable to prove U.S. citizenship or legal entry (Lindsley 2000). As Lindsley explains, “Proposition 187 proponents placed little value on the reproductive health of undocumented women and their children. Proposition 187’s proposed ban on public education funds for undocumented children was also an attempt to permanently exclude these children from integration into U.S. society” (Lindsley 2000). Proposition 200, which was passed by Arizona voters in 2000, is a mirror image of Proposition 187. Unlike Proposition 187 however, Arizona’s Proposition 200 remains, and frankly, even though Proposition 187 was ultimately overturned on constitutional grounds, other policies initiated similar restrictions. So-called welfare reform, for example, placed limits on food stamps and SSI for legal immigrants; Clinton later restored access to food stamps for many, but not SSI (Hayes 2001, 8). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) also prohibits nonrefugee immigrants from receiving “federal means-tested public benefits” like Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, which replaced AFDC), and the Children’s Health Insurance program for their first five years in the United States; in addition, undocumented immigrants are barred from thirty-one different Health and Human Services Programs that range from those addressing alcohol abuse to services for the disabled (Lindsley 2002, 185). Further, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) gives states the right to deny undocumented workers income-based federal nutrition programs like food stamps as well as health care services (Hayes 2001, 2). Anti-immigration forces surmise that because “illegal immigrants” broke the law by entering the United States, they are not entitled to basic human rights, much less “basic rights guaranteed to participating U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents. Indeed, as lawbreakers, they are portrayed as undeserving of public aid” (Lindsley 2002, 188). Just as immigrant women of color are erroneously cast as social and economic resource leeches, so, too, do documents released during the Clinton administration erroneously construct them as depletors of environmental resources. The President’s Council on Sustainable Development concludes that overpopulation is a security threat and defines immigration as a population issue: “The United States is a nation of





immigrants. Today, addressing immigration is an important aspect of the broad question of population stabilization in this country. Immigration accounts for one-third of total U.S. population growth and is a factor that must be addressed in the overall effort to stabilize population voluntarily” (1996, 152). Like the majority of world politics textbooks, as well as Clinton administration NSS and Security Commission reports, the President’s Council defines immigration as an issue of population growth and defines overpopulation as a significant contributor to environmental degradation, scarcity, and conflict. Moreover, the President’s Council argues that with respect to the United States, “because new immigrants typically have higher fertility rates, immigration will be a powerful factor in future population growth” (1996, 152). Matters are made more difficult by the frequent absence of in-depth analysis around the immigration-environmental degradation link when this link is actually mentioned. The underlying arguments reflect the neo-Malthusian assumption that population growth (including immigration-induced population growth) threatens U.S. carrying capacity and security. Although issues of consumption and environmental destruction in the Global North are addressed, it usually takes a back seat to discussions of population issues. The 1995 NSS states for instance, “Rapid population growth in the developing world and unsustainable consumption patterns in industrialized nations are the root of both present and potentially even greater forms of environmental degradation and resource depletion” (Clinton Administration 1995a, 19). However, the rest of the paragraph (which is the last paragraph of the section), focuses entirely on population growth, not consumption. Following statistics on population growth, the NSS states, “One cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international frictions” (Clinton Administration 1995a, 19). As is visible in the proceeding quote, the Clinton administration documents I examine connect population growth to conflict as well. According to Sustainable America, “growing populations demand more food, goods, services, and space. Where there is scarcity, population increase aggravates it. Where there is conflict, rising demand for land and natural resources exacerbates it” (1996, 4). Given its focus on “women’s fertility [as] the cause and solution to global environmental problems” (Rutherford 2005, 20), mainstream ES



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discourse (including that of the Clinton administration), in tandem with national and civilizational discourse, treat the bodies of women (especially women of color and working-class women) as key battlegrounds in defense of a civilized, secure, and sustainable American nation. Clinton administration documents do talk of “voluntary family planning” and “population stabilization” instead of “population control,” and do speak of improving the status of women. However, until women’s bodies are no longer used to meet demographic targets, and until state actors, NGOs, and the news media seriously acknowledge, interrogate, and speak out against historical and contemporary practices of forced and coerced population control, I simply will not trust “status of women” or “voluntary family planning” rhetoric, however sanitized it may be. Despite the popularity of the “resource depletor” representation in the United States, ES discourse did not by any means supplant traditional security discourse during the Clinton administration, which is not surprising, given that ES scholarship itself provides only a modest redefinition of security and therefore little change from traditional constructions of threat and danger. Instead, these government documents, like mainstream ES scholarship, continue to privilege state security; moreover, ES concerns are scripted onto existing national and civilizational security discourse. In its identification and interpretation of security dangers, ES scholarship continues an old enemy-creation process that constructs and represents security dangers in highly racialized, gendered, and nationalistic terms. The same holds true for the Clinton administration documents examined here, in which Others are constructed and represented as threats to national security. Population growth in, and immigrants from, the Global South are constructed as threats to the carrying capacity (and thus security) of the United States while complex systems of power, privilege, and oppression are ignored and, therefore, allowed to flourish. CONFLICT, WAR,

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OTHER DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS

According to Campbell, “there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an interpretation of danger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat” (Campbell 1998, 3; emphasis in original). Immigrants of color from the Global South represent an alternative mode of being and therefore disrupt myths around the “true identity” of





the American nation. The creation and maintenance of state boundaries (literally and figuratively) rely heavily on representations of danger (Campbell 1998, 3) and representations of Others. Former CIA director William F. Colby went so far as to argue that the movement of undocumented workers across the United States–Mexico border was “a greater threat to the future of the United States then the Soviet Union” (qtd. in Hayes 2001, 32). ES work under the Clinton administration was characterized by “a preoccupation with the threat-based aspects of environmental security,” focusing especially on the potential for conflicts over scarce resources to create international instability (Thomas 1997). Benjamin also points out that the National Defense University has begun identifying potential “flashpoints” of environmental conflict around the world and that NATO has produced studies identifying areas where environmental conflict could affect security, both nationally and internationally (2000, 15). In 1996 then–CIA Director John Deutch told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “a deteriorating environment can not only affect the political and economic stability of nations, it can also pose global threats to the well-being of mankind” (qtd. in Benjamin 2000, 15). Based on my own findings, I agree with Thomas’s (1997) conclusion: “Although many statements of U.S. environmental security policy seem to reference a fairly broad interpretation of the concept, it is the potential threat to U.S. economic and political interests, rather than a broad concern for the global environment, that is driving policy changes in this issue area.” Like Homer-Dixon’s work, many of these security documents focus on the destabilizing effects associated with environmental destruction. USCNS/21 discusses the potential for regional conflicts that could trigger “larger interstate conflicts, [that] grossly violate internationally accepted norms, or create massive flows of refugees, disease, and environmental degradation” (1999a, 48). Similarly, the 1998 NSS (under the heading “Transnational Threats”) argues: “Terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage threaten U.S. interests, citizens and the U.S. homeland itself ” (1998a, 6). Later, under the heading “Environmental Initiatives,” the 1998 NSS claims: “Natural resource scarcities can trigger and exacerbate conflict” (1998a, 13), which is a direct reflection of one of Homer-Dixon’s central points.



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On one hand, traditional IR security concerns remain important within the Clinton administration NSS and USCNS/21 reports, including the maintenance of U.S. sovereignty, the promulgation of American values and institutions, and increasing national prosperity. On the other hand, these documents are unified in their recognition of the post–Cold War international scene as characterized by countless new actors and concerns, which “once seemed quite distant” (Clinton Administration 1998a, 1). Nearly all of the Clinton administration NSS documents, as well as Phase I of the National Security Commission report, point to changes in the post–Cold War arena, and call attention to security threats that are much more vague and diverse than those thought to exist during the Cold War. These post–Cold War threats include environmental destruction as a threat to U.S. national security and international stability more broadly. Environmental concerns have been added to a crowd of seemingly amorphous dangers ranging from population growth and terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, dangers threatening “our open and free society” (Clinton Administration 1996a). I use the word “added” intentionally because the incorporation of environmental degradation has not fundamentally changed traditional IR security discourse or the ways in which enemies are “discovered.” Hayes explains: “As the external threats inherent to the Cold War have dissipated, we have begun to conjure up internal scapegoats, easy targets such as the poor, welfare recipients, and, of course, immigrants, whether legal or undocumented, as foils in this time of global economic insecurity (even in the midst of boom times for some)” (Hayes 2001, xxiii). I argue that the enemy-creation process characteristic of traditional IR security discourse remains intact with respect to environmental security even in this new post–Cold War security environment. Moreover, Clinton administration environmental security discourse still largely assumes an anarchical global environment beset by conflict. In fairness, nearly all of the NSS documents do talk of new avenues for cooperation between states. However, like both pluralist and mainstream environmental security scholarship in IR, the potential for cooperation is simply added to conflict (but remains secondary to it), and while actors like NGOs are recognized, they remain secondary to the state in importance. Furthermore, traditional IR definitions of sovereignty remain intact despite the changes brought by globalization in the post–Cold War environment. The impact of contemporary globalization on the state and





state sovereignty has been a subject of much debate. Positions run the gamut from those who predict the end of IR’s traditional conception of the state in the face of neoliberal globalization, to those who point to a greater consolidation of power within the state apparatus, especially with respect to hegemonic actors like the United States (USCNS/21 1999a). Certainly, as Sassen argues, contemporary processes of globalization have transformed the state in many ways, and while it remains the primary actor in the creation and implementation of immigration policy, “today we can see in all highly developed countries a combination of drives to create border-free economic spaces and drives for renewed border-control to keep immigrants and refugees out” (Sassen 1996b, 7). Several NSS documents discuss the importance of open borders for both trade and people. In fact, the documents I examined from both the Clinton and Bush administrations place heavy emphasis on the promise and success of neoliberalism.4 However, NAFTA has made conditions worse for people on both sides of the United States–Mexico border, and U.S. immigration policy has actually closed U.S. borders for peoples of the Global South. Contemporary immigration patterns and economic exploitation are connected to colonial conquest. Miriam Ching Louie of the Women of Color Resource Center notes a protest sign she saw in England that suggests the relationship between colonialism and immigration. The sign read, “We Are Here Because You Were There,” and as Louie explains, “it has to do with the fact that people in large part come from countries where, in the U.S.’s case, the U.S. has had a long history of military, economic, and political intervention” (qtd. in Barsamian 2001). Moreover, legacies of colonialism and interlocking systems of inequality help maintain the structurally marginalized position of Other groups in the United States today (Grewal and Kaplan 2002, 412). As I argued in the introduction, the historical relationships between the United States and Mexico inspired (in part) my focus on the United States–Mexico border region, but more importantly, these relationships constitute the kinds of interventions to which Louie speaks. Moore and Pinderhughes further explain, “in addition to those Mexicans who were incorporated into the United States after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans have continually crossed the border into the United States where they have been used as a source of cheap labor by U.S. employers. The volume of immigration from Mexico has been highly dependent on fluctuations in certain segments of the U.S. economy” (2001, 252). U.S. policies also play a significant role in causing



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economic insecurity and dislocation in Mexico, thus pushing (as well as pulling) migration, yet not only does the U.S. fail to take responsibility for this dynamic, it creates policies that restrict and penalize entry into the U.S. as well, particularly during times of economic fluctuation and insecurity. Mexican immigrants were specifically targeted in two particularly punitive policies; the “Repatriation Campaign” of 1929–1934 and the 1954–1958 policy sickeningly termed “Operation Wetback.” During each, “the United States moved millions of persons to Mexico, many of whom were American citizens, without benefit of formal deportation proceedings” (Carrasco in Hayes 2001, 13). Similarly, in 1997, Arizona’s “Operation Restoration” called on local law enforcement and INS officials to raid supermarkets, restaurants, and private homes to “round up” suspected “illegal immigrants” (Ruiz 2000).5 In Eureka, Fortuna, Rio Dell, and Arcata, California, ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) officials raided homes and supermarkets in early June 2007, broke apart families, and spread terror throughout the communities. Neoliberal trade policies play a major role in stimulating immigration across the United States–Mexico border despite stated arguments that global capitalism and “free trade” would bring greater development to Mexico and therefore reduce immigration. Glenn writes, “Though seen as primarily a post-World War II phenomenon linked to the drive for capital accumulation in postindustrial societies, labor migration from less advanced regions has been a critical element in the development of American capitalism since at least the mid-nineteenth century” (2002, 479). In fact, the size and scope of migration from less developed to more advanced nations “has led some economists to conclude that migrant labor is essential to development of advanced capitalist economies” (Glenn 2002, 479). Immigration’s essential connection to capitalism is explained in a number of ways, although one of the more popular arguments suggests that immigration is encouraged in order to keep wages down and enhance feelings of insecurity among workers in the United States, which also exacerbates fear and can inhibit unionization among workers. Otherwise stated, “A migratory labor pool is essential to capitalism when economic growth produces a demand for workers that can’t be satisfied by the existing workforce. But, the more ‘controllable’ the workforce, the better. That’s why immigration restrictions are never eliminated. Denying migrant workers the rights of citizenship makes them more vulnerable to arrest, deportation, and separation from their families. . . .





Fear of deportation deters them from organizing for better conditions” (Akers 2001). The necessity of continued growth under capitalism (and the definition of unrestrained growth as progress) requires an available stream of “compliant” labor. Neoliberal globalization has enhanced this need, and policies like NAFTA have played a key role in providing a steady stream of labor. Hundreds of thousands of Mexicans lost both jobs and land after Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution was amended in 1992 in anticipation of NAFTA (Willson 1997). Remaining jobs suffered a drop in wages; in fact at the time Akers (2001) wrote his article, “wages in Mexico [were] one-twelfth what they [were] in the U.S., and they have dropped by 9.5 percent, from $2.10 an hour to $1.90 an hour, since 1994. In the same period, the poverty rate in Mexico, measured as those living on $3 a day or less, has gone up by 3 percent to more than half of the population.” Job and land loss, along with the depression of wages “freed up” a tremendous amount of labor and compelled many to move northward in search of work. In other words, NAFTA stimulated migration within Mexico and immigration into the United States from Mexico. There are certainly many different reasons behind a person’s decision to migrate; however, the “shift to a globalized economy—where every person must have something to sell—means more people have to sell their labour, often by migrating to areas where it is needed” (Ride 1998b, 8). Many migrate “because economic expansion has destroyed local livelihoods” (Ride 1998b, 8). Policies associated with globalization have motivated the migration of over 130 million people today who (contrary to their representation as lazy and criminal) are migrating for many of the same reasons people always have, including resistance to “poverty, unemployment, civil strife, and concern for the well-being of their families. Under globalization, many of these conditions have worsened” (Tactaquin interviewed in Barsamian 2001). The conditions created by NAFTA were not accidental but were precisely “why NAFTA opened the border to trade and investment but kept it closed for workers” (Akers 2001). Despite the exploitative dynamics of contemporary globalization and histories of colonialism, immigration is frequently represented as a predominately individual matter. Sassen explains that U.S. “immigration policy is shaped by an understanding of immigration as the consequence of the individual actions of emigrants; the receiving country is taken as a passive agent, one not implicated process of emigration” (Sassen 1996b,



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2). Moreover, it is precisely the construction of the “immigrant as threat,” in tandem with the dislocations caused by NAFTA, that ensures a steady stream of available and presumably exploitable labor into the United States. Yet, the ongoing consequences of colonization and the United States–led “dirty wars” in Central and South America, as well as the so-called “free trade” policies imposed on countries of the Global South, are ignored in favor of an individualistic understanding of immigration. The “immigration problem” was (and still is) understood as an individual matter and as a threat to both civilizational and national security. As a result, many risk their lives to cross the border “only to face the biggest hurdle of all—the myth that migrants are a ‘problem’ rather than a symptom of the world’s ills” (Ride 1998b, 8). Exploitation of immigrant labor is not based on the needs of capitalism alone but also harkens back to social constructions of national identity in the United States as civilized, developed, and “white” versus that of a transnational racialized and gendered proletariat that must serve the needs of the American capitalist state. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America are simultaneously constructed as servants of American prosperity on the one hand and as threats to U.S. national security and identity on the other. Immigrant women’s productive labor—or better stated, the “Third World/racialized, or marginalized woman worker”—is also central to the operation of capitalism and American nationalism (Mohanty 2003, 143). Attempts at denying immigrant women public services despite their contributions constitutes an attempt to regulate who may be considered American and thus deserving of the rights of citizenship (Lindsley 2002, 192). Therefore, “[t]he denial of full citizenship rights to Mexicans in the United States is a way to address the tension between the temporary surplus labor that capitalism wants/needs and the desire of a dominant white class to maintain its central location in the US national identity. Capital wants labor, but doesn’t want to bear the costs of reproducing it. In an ideal union between capitalism and white supremacy, immigrant women and men of color can continue to provide cheap, surplus labor, while remaining comfortably outside the realm of full citizenship. Thus, capitalist development can be preserved while the imagined white national identity can remain intact” (Lindsley 2002, 192). There are crucial “political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another” (Campbell 1998, 4). In this context, true citizenship and rights are reserved for America’s “white” citizens. By contrast,





Mexican immigrants are represented as threats and criminalized by a bevy of punitive immigration policies that support their vulnerability to exploitation in the service of capital. In concluding this section, I argue that there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that U.S. government security discourse during the Clinton administration did take environmental degradation and environmental security seriously. Most importantly, environmental enemies are defined (through a largely neo-Malthusian lens) in tandem with concerns over ensuring U.S. national and civilizational security. Environmental and civilizational danger lies in the crossing of (especially “nonwhite,” female) immigrants into the United States from Mexico. The “us-versus-them” security orientation is therefore reproduced, which reinforces the belief that people of color from the Global South (including Mexico and Central America) threaten U.S. carrying capacity, stability, and American identity itself. THE SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY

Immigration policy is essentially “an attempt to control who may be considered ‘American’ and to exclude undocumented immigrants, particularly Latinos and Asians, from the rights bestowed on citizens” (Lindsley 2000). Nationalist constructions of “white America” play an important role in rationalizing anti-immigration stances as “the migration of so many non-white individuals to the country threatens to destabilize the core connection between whiteness and ‘American’-ness that comprises the mythology of a homogenous ‘American’ national identity, a prospect that has put many white U.S. residents on edge” (Lindsley 2000). As Louie explains, however, understandings of “white America” are entirely mythical: “This just goes so far back in U.S. history, back to stealing people’s land, to slavery, to contract labor. It goes into sweatshop industries. It’s so much a part of the fiber and history of this country” (interviewed in Barsamian 2001). The idea that America is homogeneously “white” is a social construction, as are the geographical and ideological lines separating the United States from Mexico. They are, however, constructions backed by institutional power and privilege that have informed U.S. immigration policy in general and policy toward the Global South in particular for decades. Anti-immigration forces have long spoken of immigration in terms of “swarms” threatening the security of nation. The size and scope of immigration is indeed significant. Contemporary migration is one of the



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greatest in history, where “one in 100 people live outside the country of their birth” primarily as migrants rather than refugees (Ride 1998b, 8). However, most people actually migrate within the Global South (Ride 1998b, 8; Barsamian 2001). Cathi Tactaquin (founder and director of National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights) further explains, “Only a little over 1 million actually come to the U.S. But right-wing restrictionist forces would have us think that at least 25 percent of the world’s migrants are beating down the doors to come to the U.S.” (Tactaquin interviewed in Barsamian, 2001). Debates in favor of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), for instance, often rested on the assumption “that the country was seriously threatened by an unprecedented surge of undocumented immigration” (Morris qtd. in Hayes 2001, 32). Likewise, in the 1994 report Accepting the Immigration Challenge, the Clinton administration initiated the Southwest Border Strategy and rationalized its existence not in environmental terms but on the basis of national security concerns and the need to address the “difficult problem” of “uncontrolled movement across the Southwest border, and growing concern about the State and local fiscal impact of illegal immigration” (Clinton Administration 1994a, iii). The multi-year Southwest Border Strategy sought to strengthen existing immigration laws, reform the asylum process, increase workplace enforcement, enhance antismuggling initiatives, expedite the removal of “criminal aliens,” and promote naturalization (U.S. DoJ 1995b, 3). It also focused heavily on disrupting what were thought to be popular “illegal immigration” routes into the United States (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a; Clinton Administration 1994a, 5). In outlining the Southwest Border Strategy, Accepting the Immigration Challenge reminds readers that the United States is a nation of immigrants, and asks them to “reject the harsh rhetoric and its underlying anti-immigrant sentiments” (Clinton Administration 1994a, iii). Moreover, the Clinton administration articulates the belief that the Southwest Border Strategy would be a tool to protect immigrant rights (Clinton Administration 1994a, 40). Nevertheless, the Clinton administration constructs the primary problem on the Southwest border as one of uncontrolled, “illegal immigration.” This problem is to be addressed by what Clinton administration officials routinely call “prevention through deterrence” (Clinton Administration 1994a, vi). Thus, a key objective of the Strategy is “to close off the routes most frequently used by smugglers and illegal aliens and to





shift traffic to areas that are more remote and difficult to cross illegally, where INS has the tactical advantage. . . . The overarching goal of the strategy is to make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country illegally that fewer individuals even try” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1996, 3). The objective is to keep people from entering in the first place, rather than apprehending immigrants once they are already in the United States (U.S. DoJ 1994, 28). According to the Clinton administration, this policy is important for restoring the “rule of law” on a border that suffered from years of neglect, therefore becoming “an open invitation” to “illegal immigrants” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1996, 3). The strategy emphasizes deterrence by treating the entire 2,000-mile border between the United States and Mexico “as a single, seamless entity” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a). This is accomplished through several specific operations: Operation Gatekeeper (California), Operation Safeguard (Arizona), and Operations Hold the Line and Rio Grande in Texas and New Mexico (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a, 1). Proponents of the Southwest Border Strategy believed the geography of the desert Southwest would help border officials stop migration. Former Immigration Commissioner Doris Meissner explains, for instance, that she and other officials thought “the sheer harshness of the Arizona desert would discourage would-be border crossers from attempting the journey,” believing that “geography would be an ally to us. It was our sense that the number of people crossing the border through Arizona would go down to a trickle once people realized what (it’s) like” (qtd. in Borden 2000). In 1993, Operation Hold the Line (originally Operation Blockade) was initiated in El Paso, Texas, to stop migration between Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and El Paso, one of the “most porous areas of the U.S.-Mexican border” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1996, 3). Later in 1997, Operation Rio Grande was implemented to cover the border in the Rio Grande Valley along with Operation Hold the Line, and these operations were eventually expanded to cover all of Texas and New Mexico (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a). In 1994 the perceived success of Hold the Line led to the creation of Operation Gatekeeper in California and the implementation of the larger Southwest Border Strategy. Operation Gatekeeper started with the five miles of Imperial Beach that represented nearly “25 percent of all illegal border crossings nationwide” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a). It was expanded with “manpower and machines deployed on the westernmost 14-mile segment of the border, running from the Pacific Ocean to Otay Mesa” (Cantlupe 2001). It was later expanded sixty-six miles into Imperial



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County and then into Yuma, Arizona (Cantlupe 2001). In California leftover landing mats from the first Gulf War were used to build a wall between the United States and Mexico (La Botz 2000, 4). This wall was expanded to a seventy-three-mile, ten-foot high steel wall with secondary fencing on fifty-two of those miles, as well as triple fencing from the Pacific Ocean to the Otay Mountains (Akers 2001). Fencing in this area has been the subject of some controversy, including controversy on environmental grounds, which I discuss in chapters 3 and 4. In 1994 (only days after Gatekeeper was announced) DoJ and INS initiated Operation Safeguard in Nogales and Douglas, Arizona (U.S. DoJ/INS 2000). Safeguard was intended to address the increased traffic resulting from Gatekeeper, monitor popular crossing areas, “and drive the immigrants to the outskirts of the towns, where officials believed they would be easier to spot and catch” (Borden 2000). Officials believe that this would prevent undocumented migrants from disappearing into communities on the United States side of the border (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999a, 2). Safeguard focuses on Nogales, which in 1994 was the busiest migration route in Arizona (U.S. DoJ/INS 2000), and seeks to reduce “illegal immigration” along the nearly 300 miles of border covered by the Tucson Border Patrol Sector (U.S. DoJ/INS 1999b, 1). In 1996, INS linked Operations Gatekeeper and Safeguard, and the Department of Justice also strengthened coordination “with the military as they work at the border on counter drug-enforcement activities in California and Arizona” (U.S. DoJ/INS 1996, 5). The Southwest Border Strategy also brought increases in Border Patrol personnel and funding, and “Congress provided the INS with huge infusions of cash, and Reno privately gave the Border Patrol a virtual carte blanche on resources, according to aides” (Cantlupe 2001). Funds were also appropriated in the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act authorized by the Clinton administration (U.S. Department of Justice 1995a, 2; Clinton Administration 1994a, vi). Much more technology became available for use on the United States– Mexico border as well, including Black Hawk helicopters, underground sensors, night vision telescopes and goggles, infrared scopes, computerized fingerprinting equipment and new vehicles, in addition to allweather roads, and massive, often stadium-style, light structures (Akers 2001; Cantlupe 2001; U.S. DoJ/INS 1996). Broadly speaking, the Southwest Border Strategy strengthened the “militarization of the border [which is] part of a strategy of low-intensity





warfare against the immigrant” (La Botz 2000, 4). Militarization in its most basic sense refers to the use of military rhetoric, ideology, tactics, strategy, technology, equipment, and armed forces on the U.S. border with Mexico (Dunn in D. Martinez 1996). Militarization is also described as a “warlike situation in which troops, weapons and other military hardware are amassed in a particular area—either as a show of force, or in preparation of war” (Border Action Network n.d.[u]) and includes coordination between local and federal law enforcement and the military. With respect to Mexico, much of this coordination came under the 1980s War on Drugs and former President Bush’s National Drug Control Strategy (Palafox 1996). Coordination quickly spilled over into immigration enforcement (Dunn 2001). The U.S. military role in domestic law enforcement and the deployment of troops along the United States–Mexico border were supported by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, even though the 1878 Posse Comitatus Statute prohibited military involvement in domestic enforcement, including arrests, searches and seizures (Dunn 2001). Coordination includes the work of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), which is composed of Army and Marine personnel and was established at Fort Bliss in 1989 as a component of the U.S. War on Drugs (Border Action Network n.d.[k]). Unofficially, however, JTF-6 acts as “one of the government’s main weapons in the ‘war against immigrants’ from Mexico and Central American nations” (Border Action Network n.d.[k]). In so doing, JTF-6 undertakes support missions in three areas: Operational, Engineering (including the construction of walls and roads along the Southwest border), and General Support (intelligence analysis, military training, and surveillance) (Dunn 1996, 135). JTF-6 also assists in “show of force” maneuvers, raid planning, and interrogation techniques” (D. Martinez 1998). Both Demetria Martinez (1998) and Dunn (2001; 1996) provide ample evidence demonstrating that in addition to drug enforcement, much of JTF-6’s work lies in immigration enforcement. The militarization of the United States–Mexico border under the Southwest Border Strategy is built upon Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine. LIC doctrine was designed during the post-Vietnam era to quell civil insurgencies in Latin America and impose “social control over targeted civilian populations” through military, paramilitary, and police forces (Dunn in D. Martinez 1996 and Mumme 1998). LIC is a “particularly insidious strategy of militarization . . . designed to lower the quality of life in areas where it is used” by creating “a climate of fear, wherein



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people subjected to LIC are too afraid of the repressive government apparatus to resist it” (Border Action Network n.d.[r]). This strategy, including the program of deterrence, was “designed by the Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico for the national drug office, which was enacted by the Border Patrol against immigrants. Their strategy is to make the populated areas of the border like San Diego, El Paso, and Brownsville inaccessible and to oblige the immigrants to attempt to go through riskier areas of the border” (Phares 2000). The Pentagon’s Center for the Study of Low Intensity Conflict assisted in creating the Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond, casting immigration and drug trafficking as national security threats (Dunn 2001). The INS also worked with the Pentagon’s LIC Center to create deployment plans for Border Patrol agents and to enhance immigration enforcement (Palafox 1996). Then, in the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration directed the military to help with immigration enforcement in the Southwest (Dunn 2001). In 1996 the DoJ/INS publicized their plan to “double U.S. military and local law enforcement along the border,” which was to “build on the formidable joint militarylaw enforcement infrastructure already in place as part of the Pentagon’s antidrug initiatives” (Palafox 1996).6 Dunn (2001) and others provide extensive analyses attesting to the existence of and consequences associated with both LIC doctrine and the broader militarization of the Southwest U.S. border with Mexico. Proponents of the Southwest Border Strategy and militarization operate under the assumption that “illegal immigration” threatens U.S. national security. In fact, Mexican immigrants are often seen as invaders threatening U.S. national security despite the fact that at the time, undocumented immigrants accounted for only 1 percent of the entire U.S. population (D. Martinez 1996). Yet, if “illegal immigration” is constructed as a national security threat, is it also constructed as an environmental security threat? With respect to many of the Clinton administration immigration documents studied in this chapter, the answer is no. Accepting the Immigration Challenge for instance, does not mention environmental resource issues, although it does come close to articulating a carrying capacity argument in its claim that the “United States cannot accommodate everyone who wishes to come here” (1994a, 8). The report only implies (at best) the link between increases in population growth and decreases in U.S. carrying capacity.



The State, Environmental Security, and the U.S.–Mexico Border 101


The Clinton-era Department of Justice documents I examine do not discuss immigration or population growth in terms of environmental destruction or environmental security, either. Even the annual Attorney General reports under the Clinton administration, which include a specific chapter on the ways that the Department of Justice enforces U.S. environmental laws, does not make the link between environmental degradation and immigration. This could mean a number of things, including the possibility that the Department of Justice and the INS privilege the goal of crime reduction (including drug trafficking). It could also mean that DoJ and INS read, “improving the quality of life” on the United States–Mexico border as inclusive of environmental quality issues. Although the DoJ and INS may not use environmental security rhetoric to support their policies, there is an extremely important environmental element to the militarization of the border: militarization itself is causing incredible environmental damage on the United States–Mexico border, which I discuss in chapter 4. The militarization of the United States–Mexico border under the Southwest Border Strategy and LIC doctrine is a considerable source of human rights violation. Deterring immigration by forcing immigrants to take more perilous routes into the United States has had deadly impacts, leading to (as previously mentioned) 4,000 recorded deaths during the last decade (ACLU 2006a). Further, as evidenced by the extensive human rights documentation undertaken by Border Action Network, entire neighborhoods (particularly communities of color) are “disproportionately targeted for military-style policing” and have therefore been turned into war zones (Border Action Network n.d.[q]). As one human rights advocate explains, “the government continues to lump together undocumented immigrants, drugs, crime, and terrorism to justify increased enforcement and militarization, attitudes toward immigrants will not only not change but will continue translating into open hostility and violence” (Robert Martinez interviewed in Palafox 1996). Dunn also reminds readers that “neither Congress nor the executive branch have debated, much less taken serious policy action, that addresses the underlying economic, political, social and cultural factors that strongly contribute to the cross-border flows of immigrants and drugs” (Dunn 2001). Instead, “Operation Gatekeeper, and U.S. government immigration policies more generally, work to control, intimidate and thus psychologically discipline the hundreds of thousands of Mexican and Central American workers who come here to work” (La Botz 2000, 4). In addition to



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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the American Friends Service Committee also documents the rising number of civil and human rights abuses occurring in the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws as well (Phares 2000). Not only are undocumented workers subject to violation, but so, too, is anyone who looks Mexican (D. Martinez 1998). Human rights abuses on the border include physical assault and illegal detention, and in fall 2000 Border Patrol agents were accused of rape in two different cases (Border Action Network n.d.[r]). Border Action Network’s human rights documentation projects also expose a pervasive pattern of state violence on the United States–Mexico border; their report Justice on the Line is one such project. Members of Border Action Network interviewed over three hundred primarily Latina/o families in Nogales, Douglas, Pirtleville, and Naco, Arizona, about the impacts of Border Patrol on daily life in the region (2003c, 1). What members found was an institutionalized pattern of racial and class profiling, abuse of power, harassment, intimidation, and corruption among Border Patrol agents, and allegations of excessive force, assault, and sexual violence at the hands of border officials. The intent of the report is to draw attention to “these experiences so that they are heard by decision-makers and policy makers” and therefore, help “break the isolation of the many residents we spoke with who expressed tremendous fear of retribution for speaking out and skepticism that the Border Patrol or the federal government would doing anything to end the harassment and intimidation they endure” (Border Action Network 2003c, 1). Members also provide numerous recommendations for Border Patrol, including (but not limited to) an end to racial profiling, training in de-escalation tactics, outside civilian monitoring, and others (Border Action Network 2003c, 14). The grave human rights situation on the border is dramatically evidenced by the shooting death of Ezequiel Hernandez by a member of JTF-6 in 1997; his death actually inspired the formation of Border Action Network. Ezequiel Hernandez was “the first U.S. citizen gunned down by U.S. troops on U.S. soil since Kent State” in the 1960s (D. Martinez 1998). The case against the Marine who shot Hernandez was eventually thrown out by a state grand jury; however, the Justice Department’s own investigation led to the temporary cancellation of JTF-6 patrols on the border (D. Martinez 1998).7 In 1998 the Justice Department also settled with the Hernandez family for $1.9 million (Kamel 1998).





For these reasons and others, many point to the abject failure of the Southwest Border Strategy, despite the fact that nearly all of the Department of Justice documents released during the Clinton administration I examined for this chapter highlight its successes in reducing “illegal immigration,” improving quality of life in the region, reducing crime and drug trafficking, and promoting commerce, tourism, and legal immigration into the United States. It is worth noting that critics charge the INS with misrepresenting the number of apprehensions on the border. During Graham’s research, for instance, border patrol agents and INS management confided in him that in order to avoid the appearance of failure, supervisors were encouraged to lower apprehension statistics for Imperial Beach, California, in official documents (Graham 1996, A-14). Not only were documents allegedly falsified, but also those arrested were sometimes not processed in order to reduce apprehension statistics (Graham 1996, A-14, 15) and therefore make it appear that the program of deterrence was in fact, successfully keeping people from entering the United States. Rhetoric in support of immigration control is also disingenuous in many of the same ways as the rhetoric associated with the War on Drugs. Focus on the United States–Mexico border in the War on Drugs ignores the fact that most drug trafficking occurs through legal ports of entry; in fact, “85% of all illegal drugs, including almost all heroin and the bulk of cocaine entering the country, arrive via legitimate traffic at official ports of entry” (Dunn 1996; 2001). Similarly, in a 1996 article Graham explains, “Over half of all illegal immigrants in this country never go near the Mexican border but enter with legal visas through interior Ports of Entry and simply fail to leave” (1996, A-15). In a 2000 interview, Jimenez also explains that only four in ten undocumented people in the United States crossed the United States–Mexico border, yet 85 percent of INS resources were concentrated on the United States–Mexico border in 2000 (Phares 2000). Further, critics argue that the “seamless web” of enforcement constructed under the Southwest Border Strategy includes cooperation between not only military and local law enforcement officials but cooperation with local civilian groups, too, and these groups are responsible for a whole host of human rights violations themselves. A number of American ranchers living near the United States–Mexico border have embarked on what they call a “frontier justice movement” to halt immigration. I contend however, that members of this movement (such as



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American Patrol, Ranch Rescue and Minutemen) operate as part of the militarization of the border under LIC doctrine, even though Department of Justice and other government officials publicly distance themselves from them, which I discuss later in the chapter. However, I now turn to a discussion of the ways that militarization of the U.S. border has proceed under the G. W. Bush administration, particularly following 9/11. 9/11, HOMELAND SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, AND IMMIGRATION

In its 2002 NSS, the G. W. Bush administration declared that it had “proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration” (2002b, 6). I had originally intended to begin this section of the project with a statement of my own supporting the declaration that 9/11 brought one of the most dramatic reorganizations of the U.S. security establishment since the National Security Act in 1947 (which brought the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and what became the Department of Defense). Yet making this claim would belie the fact that a good deal of the structural and ideological foundations beneath what is considered the “new” post-9/11 security establishment existed before 9/11. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for instance, is commonly represented as the quintessential post-9/11 change in the U.S. security establishment. However, the ideas behind the creation of DHS are not brand new. In Phase III of their report (which was released February 15, 2001), members of the USCNS/ 21 called for the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency based on their concern over potential “mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland” (USCNS/21 2001, vi). To reiterate Eisenstein’s quote (also featured in the introduction): “So much is said to be new, when most everything is almost always also old” (2004, 4). My point is although there have been dramatic shifts in security rhetoric, practice, and policy since 9/11, few if any of these shifts would have been possible without the infrastructure and ideologies in place before 9/11. Moreover, none of the draconian post-9/11 immigration policies and practices would have been possible without an already-entrenched enemy-creation process that casts immigrants of color as threats to the national, civilizational, and, more recently, environmental security of the American nation. By the same token, I would be remiss in suggesting that 9/11 did not bring significant changes to the U.S. security





establishment. In fact, there is a simply amazing amount of information, assumptions, strategies, and documents, not to mention immigration policies, associated with the G. W. Bush administration that require deep, critical, intersectional, postcolonial feminist examination.8 Indeed, it has been difficult to stay focused on the primary themes of this book. I also originally thought this section would include arguments that primarily detailed the ways in which environmental concerns (security and otherwise) had simply fallen off the Bush administration’s radar screen, especially in comparison to the level of focus (however problematic) accorded to environmental security issues by the Clinton administration. This initial reading has proven superficial as well. The G. W. Bush administration does deploy ES discourse consistent with that of the Clinton administration, and its ES discourse also intersects with, and reinforces, civilizational and national (or now “homeland”) security. At the same time, I now argue that for the Bush administration, “the environment” is regarded as valuable only in so far as environmental resources can serve the needs of U.S. empire building. While I am not suggesting that this element was absent from the Clinton administration, I do believe it is far clearer (yet also more Orwellian), under the G. W. Bush Administration. I begin this section with a discussion of the consistencies in ES discourse (as well as national and civilizational security discourses), between the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations, followed by a discussion of some of the discontinuities between the administrations. In so doing, I also discuss DHS as well as the Secure Border Initiative with particular focus on Bush administration rhetoric and policy post-9/11, and policies aimed at “controlling” the United States–Mexico border. As mentioned, there are elements of the Bush administration documents (listed in the appendix) that are consistent with the national, civilizational, and environmental security discourse of the Clinton administration, and mainstream ES discourse in the United States on immigration more broadly. Significantly, this includes documents such as the vision statement for the DHS entitled National Strategy for Homeland Security (henceforth NSHS), among others. Briefly, the NSHS prioritizes border security as part of protecting the “homeland,” given that “our enemies seek to remain invisible, lurking in the shadows. We are actively engaged in uncovering them” (Bush Administration 2002a, vii). With respect to “Border and Transportation Security,” the White House highlights six major initiatives in the NSHS, including so-called smart borders and immigration reform as part of its overriding desire to



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“secure America’s borders” (Bush Administration 2002a, viii, xii). The Bush administration pays a significant amount of attention to “smart borders,” explaining that the “border of the future” will “provide greater security through better intelligence, coordinated national efforts, and unprecedented international cooperation against the threats posed by terrorists, the implements of terrorism, international organized crime, illegal drugs, illegal migrants, cyber crime, and the destruction or theft of natural resources” (Bush Administration 2002a, 22). This last sentence reflects mainstream ES discourse through what I have been referring to as “litany statements” and is similar to those used by the Clinton administration. One NSS deploys another litany statement pointing to the connection between illicit trade (in drugs or human beings), environmental destruction (man made or natural), and pandemics, which while not “traditional” security concerns, can threaten national security if left unaddressed (Bush Administration 2006d, 47). It is especially significant, however, that a litany statement pointing to environmental insecurity and immigration was included in the NSHS, the framing document for DHS. Even more, immigration and the focus on border security are key elements of DHS and “homeland security” under the G. W. Bush Administration in this post-9/11 era. The NSHS provides the “strategic vision” for the DHS, which had not, at the time of its writing, been signed into law by Congress. The establishment of DHS, according to the administration, represents the biggest institutional reorganization since the 1947 National Security Act and brought twenty-two different federal agencies under its umbrella. Overall, DHS focuses “on three national security priorities: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur” (Bush Administration 2006d, 43). Immigration became a central focus of DHS in relation to national security policy as reflected in the transfer of immigration responsibilities from the Department of Justice to DHS (Hyunhye Cho 2003, 19–20). As mentioned in the introduction, the INS became the “U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services” (CIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003, following the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (signed into law by President Bush on November 25, 2002). CIS covers “service and benefit functions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) [which] transitioned into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the U.S. Citizenship and





Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS is responsible for the administration of immigration and naturalization adjudication functions and establishing immigration services policies and priorities,” which include the adjudication of visa, naturalization, asylum, and refugee petitions among other functions (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.). ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) “is the largest investigative branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The agency was created after 9/11, by combining the law enforcement arms of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the former U.S. Customs Service, to more effectively enforce our immigration and customs laws and to protect the United States against terrorist attacks. ICE does this by targeting illegal immigrants: the people, money and materials that support terrorism and other criminal activities” (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2007). The White House, in its estimation, did fulfill its NSHS “National Vision” for Border and Transportation Security by having created “a single entity in the Department of Homeland Security [that] will manage who and what enters our homeland in order to prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating the legal flow of people, goods, and services on which our economy depends” (Bush Administration 2002a, 22). As mentioned, that the NSHS in particular includes a litany statement implying connections between environmental destruction and immigration as security threats is extremely significant. Another example of ES discourse similar to that of the Clinton administration and mainstream ES discourse in the United States more broadly, is the 2003 Pentagon report addressing the national security implications of climate change. Department of Defense planner Andrew Marshall commissioned the report entitled An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security. It was written by Peter Schwartz (formerly of Shell Oil and occasional CIA consultant) and Doug Randall (of the think tank Global Business Network) (Griscom 2004b). Although it got little attention from President Bush himself at the time, the deeply neo-Malthusian doomsday report links population growth, migration, and environmental destruction, and overall, presents a contemporary version of Hardin’s lifeboat analogy. Incidentally, the rhetoric in this report is consistent with (though much more rhetorically extreme than) the ideas and positions expressed in the 2007 Nobel Peace prize speeches by Gore and Pachauri previously mentioned.



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As in mainstream ES discourse in the United States, Others from the Global South are constructed as national and environmental security threats in vastly neo-Malthusian terms with a heavy focus on conflict. The Pentagon report envisions abrupt changes owing to global warming and argues, “With inadequate preparation, the result could be a significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the Earth’s environment” (Schwartz and Randall 2003, 1), leading to conflict. Traditional carrying capacity arguments pervade the report and in fact, the phrase “carrying capacity” is used at least twenty-four times. Carrying capacity arguments in this report and in general should be continuously complicated by the question of “who carries whom.” As Shiva explains, “Most ecosystems in the Third World carry not only local populations, they also carry, by satisfying the demands for industrial raw material, the North” (2005, 59). In other words, the question of who carries whom is crucial to better understanding the complex relationship between the Global North and Global South as well as the root causes of environmental destruction. Nevertheless, the Pentagon report contends that environmental security enemies will migrate in mass numbers across “our” borders and destroy “our” carrying capacity (after theirs has been destroyed)—if, of course, the United States allows them to do so. The authors predict that the United States will more than likely engage in “fortress America” strategies—i.e., the United States will refuse to let anyone on its Hardinian lifeboat. Schwartz and Randall predict, “The United States turns inward, committing its resources to feeding its own population, shoringup its borders, and managing the increasing global tension. . . . The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses around their countries because they have the resources and reserves to achieve self-sufficiency” (Schwartz and Randall 2003, 13 and 18). I agree with Jon Barnett (2001, 53) that it is extremely ethnocentric to assume that only Other countries would resort to violence over scarce resources; it is rare that similar arguments are made of countries of the Global North. Instead, “developed” countries will supposedly find themselves protecting, and restricting access to, their lifeboats. Importantly (especially with respect to U.S. immigration policy today), the authors further claim: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America” (Schwartz and Randall 2003, 18).





I wondered if this report had anything to do with President Bush’s recent interest in addressing climate change at the 2007 G-8 Summit, as the enemy-creation process within the Pentagon report just mentioned coincides with the ideological framework of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 security establishment. I should first back up and note that the Bush administration does mention global warming and climate change in a number of its documents, including several on the White House Web site. But the Bush administration has gone to great lengths to discredit discussions of global warming among scientific and environmentalist communities in the United States and abroad and refuses to be a part of the Kyoto agreement. It never ceases to amaze me how much of a gulf exists between the rhetoric of the administration’s policies on the environment and reality, and I certainly will not be the first or last person to say that even the names of its policies (“Clear Skies Initiative,” “Healthy Forest Initiative,” etc.) are the (Orwellian) opposites of what they actually initiate. So, I am not necessarily surprised that the “new global framework” to address greenhouse gases proposed by G. W. Bush appears to be more of a maneuver to further undermine international coalition-building toward addressing climate change than anything else, especially with respect to Kyoto. Once again, the reality runs counter to the rhetoric, despite repeated pronouncements otherwise, including the 2005 Earth Day statement: “We didn’t create this Earth, but we have an obligation to protect it” (Bush Administration 2005a). This brings me to the argument that rather than viewing the natural environment as important in its own right, the G. W. Bush administration sees natural resources as valuable only insofar as they aid in permanent and preemptive war, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony and empire more broadly. Ignoring histories of slavery and genocide among many other evils, the G. W. Bush administration claims, “Our Nation learned a painful lesson on September 11. American soil is not immune to evil or cold-blooded enemies capable of unprecedented acts of mass murder and terror” (Bush Administration 2002d, 2). Given the combination of two “facts” (that the United States is vulnerable to terrorism given its freedom and way of life and that the spread of technology among terrorist organizations makes the United States vulnerable), the administration contends that “the threat of terrorism is an inescapable reality of life in the 21st century. It is a permanent condition to which America and the entire world must adjust” (Bush Administration 2002d, 2; emphasis added). Based on these



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positions the Bush administration also reasons that “the need for homeland security, therefore, is not tied to any specific terrorist threat. Instead, the need for homeland security is tied to the underlying vulnerability of American society and the fact that we can never be sure when or where the next terrorist conspiracy against us will emerge” (Bush Administration 2002d, 2). The focus on permanent war represents a dramatic shift in national security policy, as does the administration’s focus on preemptive war. As John Gaddis (2002b) explains, Cold War definitions of containment and deterrence will not work with enemies who are not easily identifiable or, as the administration contends, are “lurking in the shadows” (G.W. Bush Administration 2002a, vii). As the Bush administration itself further explains in its NSS, “We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by . . . defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders” (2002b, 6). Because “our enemies” also supposedly seek weapons of mass destruction, preemption must be added to permanent war, and preemption requires hegemony (Gaddis 2002b). The maintenance of that hegemony requires natural resources, as does preemption, permanent war, and deterrence. This leads me to an interesting point raised by Jon Barnett (2001), which I draw upon to help further explain the Bush administration’s engagement with environmental issues. For Barnett, a frustrating element within ES literature is the tendency of its authors to conflate resources with the environment (2001, 51). There is a long tradition of this. As discussed in chapter 1, traditional IR security discourse regards power and survival as dependent in part upon the natural resources nations may control and exploit. Although Barnett (2001) does not focus his argument on the Bush administration, I do contend that a similar dynamic is taking place with respect to the administration: “Resources” are being conflated with “the environment” by the G.W. Bush Administration, and are regarded as valuable only in so far as they can be exploited in the service of homeland security, preemption, and permanent war, or rather, U.S. hegemony, and empire building. Resource issues are discussed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security in ways consistent with this argument. Water, for instance, is defined as an element of “America’s critical infrastructure” under the protection of DHS and the EPA in the “war on terror” (Bush Administration 2002a, 30–32). Energy resources are of course discussed in both the





2002 and 2006 NSS and a number of other documents. The Bush administration also focuses on the U.S. Coast Guard’s responsibility “for national defense, maritime safety, maritime mobility, and protection of natural resources” (Bush Administration 2002a, 23). A more revealing example substantiating my point can be found in the 2002 NSS. Here, the Bush administration emphasizes what it regards as the tendency of rogue states to (among other things) “brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers” (2002b, 14; emphasis added). This seems to be one of the rationales for engaging rogue states and thus “properly” using their natural resources (with Iraq as one example). A similarly revealing phrase can be found in the 2005 National Defense Strategy: “Problem states will continue to undermine regional stability and threaten U.S. interests. These states are hostile to U.S. principles. They commonly squander their resources to benefit ruling elites, their armed forces, or extremist clients. They often disregard international law and violate international agreements” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005, 4; emphasis added). Rather than valuing the environment in its own right, the natural environment is defined (and valued) in purely utilitarian terms, and in terms of its ability to support the needs of the “war on terror” and U.S. hegemony and empire building. Those who misuse their resources are therefore subject to intervention by the United States. Both documents also highlight the colonialist assumption that the resources of so-called “rogue states” can and should be owned and controlled by the United States government. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) shift in focus is also revealing in the context of my argument. This shift came in response to 9/11—or more specifically, in response to the new responsibilities placed on the EPA upon its transfer to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. As Christine Todd Whitman explains in the opening letter to the EPA’s 2002 Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the Environmental Protection Agency’s long-standing mission to protect the environment and safeguard human health in new and important ways” (EPA 2002). Though the letter goes on to explain that the EPA has always been committed to making “America’s air cleaner, its water purer, and its land better protected,” the agency’s focus, as elucidated in both the 2002 and 2004 security strategy documents focused heavily on what steps the agency will take in protecting the United States from, preparing for, and responding to terrorist attacks (EPA 2002). This is the case particularly as



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it relates to protecting water infrastructure, food and agriculture, as well as responding to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. There has been a marked shift in orientation within the EPA from its thirty-year history of (ostensibly) protecting the United States from environmental degradation (EPA 2002) to focusing heavily on implementing the directives and responsibilities accorded to the EPA by the Bush administration and DHS as it relates, almost singularly, to the “war on terror.” I am quite skeptical of suggestions in the 2004 EPA document that the EPA is committed to working with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (among others) “to increase compliance monitoring and civil/criminal enforcement of environmental laws at the border” (EPA 2004, 13). Or perhaps none of the language has anything to do with the compliance of U.S. agencies with environmental laws at all. Perhaps the language instead focuses on terrorist actions that violate U.S. environmental laws: “In addition, EPA will manage its federal, civil, and criminal enforcement capabilities to respond to any terrorist threats and actions that violate the nation’s environmental laws” (2004, 1). Similarly, my sense is that EPA talk of environmental security (a phase the EPA does use) refers to better understanding and responding to environmental security threats by terrorists: “EPA plays an important part in the collaborative effort to prevent, detect, and respond to environmental security threats by ensuring that decision-makers have access to the data they need” (2002, 33). In short, I contend that the role of the EPA has not so much been expanded to include attention to potential terrorist attacks as it has been supplanted by the mission and goals of the DHS, the Bush administration, the “war on terror,” and as mentioned, U.S. hegemony as empire-building. And even if the EPA were still fully committed to enforcing environmental laws in the United States and protecting people from environmental harm and degradation, it would not make much of a difference anyway. The Bush administration has, in the name of homeland security, exempted DHS and related agencies from countless environmental laws and regulations. In addition to a number of Department of Defense exemptions based on the assumption that “military strength is at odds with environmental protection,” military training bases were exempted in 2003 from the provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act to ensure “military readiness” (Griscom 2004a). By 2004, the Bush administration and DHS unveiled several more exemptions to allow agencies under DHS (including Border Patrol) to forgo environmental reviews and assessments required under





NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act (Griscom 2004a). This is reflected in a 2004 Federal Register edition calling for public comment on the proposed changes; environmentalists indeed objected to the changes proposed by DHS. However, under the guise of protecting national security, the administration essentially surmises that (a) DHS activities would not harm the environment and (b) the DHS is best suited to perform its own environmental reviews and oversight. As such, DHS can exclude, revoke, and override any environmental regulation deemed an obstacle to securing the homeland. What this also means is that public awareness and input around the environmental and other impacts of DHS programs will be thwarted in the name of national or homeland security. Thus, “the Border Patrol would be allowed to build roads through national forests with zero public input if DHS decides the projects must be classified for national-security reasons” and exemptions would be provided for the disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous waste, meaning that communities will have no idea about, much less the opportunity to provide public comment about, toxic waste storage in their communities (Griscom 2004a). Given historical and contemporary practices of environmental racism across the nation, this is incredibly disturbing. In a related (and extremely frightening) 2004 directive, the “Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that the nation’s 103 nuclear power plants will no longer be required to reveal security snafus discovered on their premises, lest terrorists get ahold of the information” (Griscom 2004a). All of these moves by the Bush administration and DHS explain in part how and why Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff was given the authority to bypass environmental regulations and complete the fencing project separating Southern California from Mexico (a project that includes shaving off hilltops and filling in a canyon), and ultimately declare that no further environmental lawsuits would be allowed to disrupt the completion of the San Diego fence, similar projects in Arizona, or any other such project now or in the future. I discuss these cases in chapter 3; however, it is important to note here that despite the destructive environmental impacts, the Southern California and other fencing projects on the border are “justified” on homeland security grounds, and on the grounds that border fencing (despite ample evidence otherwise) will also protect the environmental security of the United States by preventing border crossers from “destroying the environment” by walking across the desert (e.g., the footpaths argument).



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In all, I believe Jon Barnett’s (2001) arguments help explain the G. W. Bush administration’s seemingly contradictory approach to environmental security. Even though mainstream ES discourse on immigration is still deployed by the administration, I also contend that resources are being conflated with the environment (2001, 51), and are regarded as valuable only insofar as they support U.S. national interest, security, preemptive war, and permanent war—or rather, U.S. hegemony and empire building. Moreover, ES discourse is deployed alongside discourses of national and civilizational security in ways that continue to reinforce not only policies of deterrence, but also the racialized and gendered boundaries of American identity upon which they are built, thus discursively “justifying” the policing and punishment of those constructed as enemies of United States hegemony and empire: Peoples of color from the Global South who travel across the Unites States–Mexico border. These last points are further demonstrated by the enhanced militarization brought about by the G. W. Bush Administration’s Secure Border Initiative. SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

The Bush administration contends that the United States faces a range of new and old threats, some traditional and some not. According to the 2004 National Military Strategy under the section entitled “A More Complex and Distributed Battlespace”: Adversaries threaten the United States throughout a complex battlespace, extending from critical regions overseas to the homeland and spanning the global commons of international airspace, waters, space and cyberspace. There exists an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists. (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 5)

It is important to highlight their position that terrorist elements seek to exploit “ungoverned spaces,” including border areas (Department of Defense 2005). The G. W. Bush administration greatly enhanced the





militarization of the United States–Mexico border under the claim, in part (as stated in the 2002 NSS), that, “[o]ur border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic” (2002b, 7). Enhanced militarization of the border is also advocated within the NSHS as noted in the previous section. In addition to full enforcement of immigration laws, the Bush administration calls for close collaboration “with Canada and Mexico to increase the security of our shared borders while facilitating commerce within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area” (Bush Administration 2002a, 22). Significantly, the 2006 NSS refers to relations in the Western hemisphere as “the frontline of defense of American national security” and with respect to Mexico and Canada specifically, the Bush administration explains “we must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere to reduce illegal immigration and promote expanded economic opportunity for marginalized populations” (Bush Administration 2006d, 37). The national, multi-year strategy, Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is to reduce “illegal immigration” by securing America’s borders. It “outlines the need for an increase in the number of Border Patrol agents equipped with the right infrastructure to support them, like roads, lights, fences and barriers, along with technology, like remote cameras on poles near the border and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles overlooking the border watching for border intrusions” and will (according to W. Ralph Basham, Commissioner, United States Customs and Border Protection), work in tandem with stronger immigration enforcement within the interior of the United States (Basham 2006). Basham (2006) further notes that the 6,000 National Guard troops mobilized on the United States-Mexico border in May 2006 will be replaced when more Border Patrol agents can be hired, noting that at that point, over 12,000 of the 18,000 agents requested by the President were in place. National Guard troops work with “entry identification teams” as part of Operation Jump Start to, among other things, apprehend illegal border crossers (Basham 2006). Basham also notes SBI’s provision for creating biometric identification technology to be linked to the FBI’s criminal database (Basham 2006). In addition to increased surveillance, investigation and apprehension methods, and new technologies, expedited deportation and removal under Operation Texas Hold ’Em is another key provision, as is a dramatic increase in the number of detention center beds (Bush Administration 2006e). Operation Community Shield, on the other hand, focuses



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on apprehending suspected gang members, terrorists, and human traffickers, which the administration sees as the greatest threats to U.S. security (Bush Administration 2006a). Building more fences, especially “smart fences,” as mentioned, is another central goal of SBI “because fences help Border Patrol agents on the ground have a tactical advantage over the smugglers on the southern side of the border,” whereas apprehension is more difficult in urban settings (Basham 2006). In other words, the program of deterrence initiated under the Clinton administration remains a key component of today’s SBI. Like many other SBI provisions, expedited removal provisions lack some basic due process rights in order to, according to administration officials, “cut through the red tape” (Bush Administration 2006e) and “address the cycle of endless litigation” (Bush Administration 2005b). This approach is also not new. Key pieces of legislation in 1996 also treated immigrants as undeserving of civil and human rights. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for instance, immigrants could be denied political asylum and entry into the United States and be removed from the United States over suspicions of terrorist activity (Global Exchange 2001). According to Global Exchange, “secret evidence” could also be used to remove immigrants, and this evidence need not be provided to the defendant or their legal council during legal proceedings (2001). Global Exchange considers this “an unconstitutional violation of due process” (2001). IIRIRA also monitors and limits the cross-border movement of noncitizens (Cohn 2000, 144), and among other things “requires, retroactively, the deportation of all immigrants who have been convicted of ‘aggravated felonies’—even decades earlier” (“Politicians’ Cruel…” 2000, 6). Felonies in this case, include everything from nonviolent drug offenses and shoplifting, to “the crime of pulling another woman’s hair. . . . Thousands of immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the U.S. are now facing deportation under this draconian law” (“Politicians’ Cruel . . . ” 2000, 6). Even more, this Act eliminated judicial review for asylum seekers (Hayes 2001, 7), which poses serious threats to basic civil liberties and human rights (Global Exchange 2001). Like the Southwest Border Strategy, SBI seeks to create a seamless web of enforcement and enhance the program of deterrence, on the United States–Mexico border. According to Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation, “This additional funding will allow our border agencies to begin implementing a seamless air, land, and sea border that protects the United States against foreign threats while moving legitimate goods





and people into and out of the country” (Bush Administration 2002d, 17). As the Bush administration explains, “America’s air, land, and sea borders must provide a strong defense for the American people against all external threats, most importantly international terrorists but also drugs, foreign disease, and other dangerous items” (Bush Administration 2002d, 16). The ACLU notes that in 2005 there were twice the number of agents on the United States–Mexico border as compared to 1995, yet the “the number of deaths have soared dramatically” (ACLU 2006b, 60). The ACLU goes on to explain that the U.S. Border Patrol is “set to become the nation’s largest law enforcement entity as President Bush aims to have over 18,000 Border Patrol agents by the end of his term. Undoubtedly, the number of deaths will continue to rise exponentially with the number of Border Patrol agents, as migrants will be forced to cross in increasingly remote areas” (ACLU 2006b, 60), which again points to the continuation of the program of deterrence under the Bush administration, as well as its deadly consequences. The civil and human rights violations associated with Bush administration policies are extensively documented by the ACLU (2004; 2006b) and CWPE et al. (2003), among others. It is nevertheless vital to reiterate and further emphasize, “the policing of the already heavily militarized U.S.–Mexico border has intensified, placing severe strains and hardship on border crossers and border communities. Human rights abuses are commonplace” (AFSC and NYAC 2003, 36). SBI and related policies have enhanced the violence and repression characteristic of the border’s militarization under LIC doctrine. Moreover, paramilitary groups operating on the border as part of its militarization under the Clinton and Bush administrations reinforce the Low Intensity Warfare characteristic of the region as well as the national, civilizational, and environmental security discourses characterizing both administrations. Although the rhetoric of paramilitary groups is far less sanitized than that of the Bush and Clinton administrations, the fundamental positions remain the same, an argument that I contend is true with respect to the relationship between paramilitary rhetoric and mainstream ES discourse in the United States as well.



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ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE, MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.–MEXICO BORDER

In 2003 the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), along with Mexican American Legal Defense, the Educational Fund, and Laredo lawyer Ricardo de Anda, filed suit on behalf of six people against members of Ranch Rescue, its leader Jack Foote, and Texas ranch owner Joe Sutton. Sutton contracted Ranch Rescue to help “repel Latinos who regularly cross his property” (SPLC 2003b). SPLC’s clients were harassed, beaten, attacked by a dog, and held against their will until federal agents arrived. Chief trial counsel and SPLC founder Morris Dees explains, “The actions of Ranch Rescue and its volunteers are very similar to those of hate groups that we have sued in the past. . . . This is an important case intended to stop violent paramilitary activity along our border with Mexico. If these groups and the ranchers who conspire with them have to pay for their actions, they will think twice before attacking peaceful migrants seeking a better life” (SPLC 2003b). In 2005, Fatima Leiva and Edwin Mancia won the lawsuit and were granted the property of Casey Nethercott, who illegally detained and assaulted them (SPLC 2005). Interestingly, the property that Levia and Mancia won was known as Camp Thunderbird, the headquarters of Ranch Rescue (SPLC 2005). I agree with Dees, who notes, “It is poetic justice that these workers now own this land” (SPLC 2005). In all, the judgments totaled $1 million against Nethercott and Jack Foote (Ranch Rescue President), another $350,000 judgment in the same case, plus a $100,000 out-of-court settlement with Texas rancher Sutton (SPLC 2005). In 2006 Roger Barnett, a Southern Arizona landowner and rancher also affiliated with Ranch Rescue, was found guilty of “intentionally inflicting emotional distress, negligence, unlawful imprisonment and assault,” and ordered to pay almost $100,000 in damages (Border Action Network 2006b). This victory was due in no small part to the work of Border Action Network, SPLC, and civil- and immigrant-rights attorney Jesus Romo Vejar. Adding to his already long history of violence, Barnett yelled racist obscenities as he threatened Arturo, Ronald, Vanese, and Angelique Morales as well as family friend Emma English, with an assault rifle on October 30, 2004. The three children (nine and eleven years old at the time) were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder following the assault (Border Action Network 2006c). The civil suit was filed by the families as a result of the blatant inaction on the part of public officials in Cochise County, Arizona. SPLC explains that although there was



AND THE


evidence to charge Barnett with eight counts of felony aggravated assault and ten counts of misdemeanor disorderly conduct and intimidation, the Cochise County prosecutor refused to file criminal charges, allegedly telling Ronald Morales, “no jury in Cochise County will ever convict Roger Barnett” (Buchanan 2006). He was wrong. As Jennifer Allen (Director of Border Action Network) noted following Barnett’s guilty verdict, “We’ve already seen the courage the Morales and English girls as well as the jury had for standing up for what is right and fair. Now we are looking for the courage of our public officials to uphold human dignity and end vigilante impunity” (Border Action Network 2006b). These victories stand out because they are among a very short list of legal victories against anti-immigrant groups like Ranch Rescue operating along the United States–Mexico border. The violence and intimidation perpetrated by groups like Ranch Rescue are pervasive and are in fact, part of the broader militarization of the border. Militarization of the United States–Mexico border reflects the tenets of LIC doctrine, which relies in part on collaboration between military, paramilitary and local police forces to establish control over targeted areas (Dunn in D. Martinez 1996). The activities of anti-immigrant groups like Ranch Rescue are analogous to those of paramilitaries in Central America during the 1980s: “LIC has consistently employed the tactic of creating armed paramilitary groups that work in collaboration with government security forces to further the propagation of fear. These groups operate with impunity as they engage in human rights abuses on behalf of security forces, which are afforded a measure of deniability for the worst transgressions of their policy” (Border Action Network n.d.[r]). As such, I prefer to use the term paramilitary (rather than vigilante) in reference to groups like Ranch Rescue, American Patrol, Minuteman, and others. Members of these paramilitary groups argue that their work defends both private property and national security. It is within private property rhetoric that the “environmentalism” of these paramilitary groups is most visible. It is also where national and civilizational security discourse is most visible. In his defense of private property and security, Roger Barnett (Ranch Rescue) promotes the organized hunting down of immigrants and takes the movement a step further in explaining to one reporter, “I am prepared to take a life if I have to” (E. B. Smith 2000). In another news article, Barnett calls for U.S. troops to “‘invade Mexico and take it over’ before the Mexican[s] bring the U.S. ‘to its knees’” (Mackenzie 2000). Barnett and others often represent themselves as patriots and



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heroes in a war against invading, foreign forces. As Roger Barnett explains, “I’m a patriot. God, country, the American flag and sovereignty of our border” (qtd. in Doty 2001, 529). In addition to calling members patriots and heroes, Chris Simcox even goes so far as to characterize his Minuteman Civil Defense Corps as “one of the most important, socially responsible, and peaceful movements for justice since the civil rights movement of the 1960s” (C. Simcox, n.d.). These comments are from the same Chris Simcox who ran Civil Homeland Defense and owned, published, and edited the now defunct Tombstone Tumbleweed in Southern Arizona. In October 2003, Simcox ran a headline stating: “Enough is Enough! . . . A Public Call To Arms! Citizens Border Patrol Militia Now Forming!” followed by a smaller-print statement calling on readers to “Join Together to Protect Your Country in a Time of War!” (qtd. in Moser 2003). This call to arms and subsequent war is to be waged against immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border, who are characterized by Simcox as “a swarm of uncontrolled refugees . . . fleeing a marxist structured government” (qtd. in Moser 2003). As Simcox further explains, “those people don’t come here to work. They come here to rob and deal drugs. . . . They are hard-core criminals” (qtd. in Moser 2003). In short, the peace and civil rights rhetoric Simcox now employs for the Minutemen is more than a little suspect Paramilitary groups often insist that they work with Border Patrol and other government bodies to halt “illegal immigration” by installing underground sensors to track movement, and by evaluating the Border Patrol’s work to “help develop a better strategy for the agency’s limited resources” (Turf 2003). Glenn Spencer (American Patrol) characterizes his group as “a little shadow Border Patrol, an independent assessment, everybody knows (Border Patrol) is a mess, we just don’t know why” (qtd. in Turf 2003). Similarly, Chris Simcox (n.d.) calls on the public to join the Minutemen as “force-multipliers” to assist Border Patrol in “turning back the tidal wave of people entering our country illegally.” In fact, Chris Simcox argues that members of his former group, Civil Homeland Defense, were only “doing what our president has asked us, which is to be vigilant and to report suspicious illegal activities to the proper authorities” (González 2003). Ranch Rescue apparently shares this view. Ranch Rescue featured an October 2001 quote attributed to President Bush and related to 9/11 on their Web site that read: “Every American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this fight” (Ranch Rescue 2002b). Detentions and





abuses by paramilitary groups were happening long before 9/11 however. Nevertheless, these groups often justify their actions on the basis of U.S. governmental rhetoric on national security, especially following 9/11. Despite their self-representation as independent, patriotic citizen organizations simply assisting Border Patrol in their work, groups like American Patrol, Minutemen, and Ranch Rescue (and formerly, Civil Homeland Defense) are paramilitary forces operating as part of the border’s militarization under LIC doctrine. Infrequent government denouncement of their actions, much less their paramilitary role actually reflects tenets of LIC doctrine, as do frequent dismissals of the seriousness of the actions undertaken by paramilitary groups. In response to Spencer’s (American Patrol) underground sensor project for instance, a spokesperson for Border Patrol reasons, “We really don’t have any thoughts on what groups like Mr. Spencer’s is doing. That’s not really ours to be concerned with as long as they’re following the law” (Daniels qtd. in Turf 2003). Arizona Representative Jim Kolbe calls Spencer’s activities “fine because agencies need help identifying illegal entrants” (Turf 2003). According to Sheriff Larry Denver, not only are the actions of ranchers like Barnett (Ranch Rescue) perfectly legal, they are defensible, as “people have been pushed to the point of desperation and exasperation, of feeling they have to take the situation under control themselves because the government’s not going to do it for them” (E. B. Smith 2000). In fact, in 2001 Doty noted that ranchers like Barnett enjoyed the support of sheriffs from four different counties in Southern Arizona including Cochise, Pima, Yuma, and Santa Cruz (Doty 2001, 529). More recently, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (California) publicly praised the work of the Minutemen, arguing, “They’ve done a terrific job. And they have cut down the crossing of illegal immigrants by a huge percentage” (Acuña 2005). Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison also expressed her support of the Minutemen, explaining, “These people have shown a commitment and a caring that should be acknowledged here in the United States Senate” (Moses 2005). By stark contrast, Tombstone Mayor Dusty Escapule called Chris Simcox a “lunatic” who is “going to get somebody killed” (Moser 2003). I agree. Members of these groups do more than just plant sensors to assist Border Patrol. They also engage in “citizen arrests” of suspected “illegal immigrants,” whom they hold “in custody” until the Border Patrol arrives to pick them up, as illustrated by SPLC’s recent lawsuit against members of Ranch Rescue. A good deal of Border Action Network’s work



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lies in documenting and exposing human rights violations by paramilitary groups, as well as government officials and law and immigration enforcement officials. Members of Border Action Network, Partido de la Revolución Democratica (PRD), and a variety of lawyers work together to document and publicize the testimonies of immigrants who have been threatened by, and have experienced violence at the hands of what Border Action (in this press release) refers to as, vigilante groups (Border Action Network 2003d). Gustavo Lozano, a Border Action Network member, argues, “Enough is enough. . . . These groups have hunted Mexicans and other immigrants with dogs, guns and hi-tech surveillance equipment. We’ve heard reports of beatings, deaths and other abuses. But the Arizona Attorney General [Terry Goddard] isn’t taking a stand against these incidents or investigating violations of Arizona laws” (Border Action Network 2003d). Jennifer Allen, Director of Border Action Network adds that in not doing his job, Goddard is also “permitting hate groups to operate on the Arizona border. As a community, we have to stand up for justice” (Border Action Network 2003d). In 2002, Border Action Network worked with members and allies in Douglas, Pirtleville, and Naco, Arizona, to produce the report Hate or Heroism. In talking with 150 residents, Border Action Network (2002c) found that none of them supported the actions of Roger Barnett (Ranch Rescue) or other groups in the area however, community members were often too afraid to speak out publicly, citing fear of possible repercussions. Border Action Network’s (2002c) research demonstrates a pervasive pattern of violence, intimidation, and harassment at the hands of Ranch Rescue, American Patrol, and Chris Simcox’s former group, Civil Homeland Defense, who impersonate law enforcement with camouflage clothing and homemade badges to round up and detain people at gunpoint, which has in some cases led to injury and death. Importantly, their research also found that the membership of groups like Ranch Rescue and American Patrol frequently include retired military, INS, and police officials, which may further explain the level of “law enforcement inaction, which becomes tacit approval of vigilantism and anti-immigrant activities” (Border Action Network 2002c, 1). Roger Barnett and his brother Daniel Barnett also own a tow-truck service that contracts with Border Patrol and both Barnetts are former deputy sheriffs themselves (Buchanan 2006). The relationship between groups like Ranch Rescue, government officials, and law enforcement officials substantiates my argument that they





are playing a paramilitary role within the militarization of the Southwest border region. Moreover, as Border Action Network (n.d.[r]) explains, LIC doctrine has “consistently employed the tactic of creating armed paramilitary groups that work in collaboration with government security forces to further the propagation of fear.” Moreover, human rights abuses are not an unforeseen consequence LIC doctrine but a crucial component of it. Members of Derechos Humanos, an Arizona-based human rights organization, argue that more and more men are engaging in intimidation tactics and human rights abuses against border crossers (Copenhaver 2002). Derechos Humanos also points to the murders of two migrants near Redrock, Arizona, as possibly linked to paramilitaries (Copenhaver 2002). In addition, a sleeping Mexican migrant was shot “by a rancher’s stray bullet” on the Arizona border in March 2000 (E. B. Smith 2000). On May 13, 2000, in Kinney County, Texas, a suspected “illegal immigrant” was shot from behind after having asked for water near the home of Samuel Blackwood, who later confessed to the crime (Hegstrom 2000). On July 5, 2000, five migrant workers (ranging in age from sixty-four to sixty-nine years old) were brutally attacked by eight white teenagers in California (Perry 2002). This attack was prosecuted as a hate crime, and four of the teenagers received jail time for hunting, beating, and shooting the Mexican men while simultaneously spewing racial epithets (Perry 2002). While the arrest, verdict, and jail time (at least for four of the eight teens) is noteworthy, local officials still erroneously claim that such violence is unusual, but “that’s not true. Migrant workers in the areas surrounding San Diego are under constant attack” (Terzakis 2000). Terzakis points to the murder of a seventeen-year-old in 2000, the killing and robbery of a migrant worker (for eighty dollars) in 1999, as well as a series of attacks in 1996 lasting eleven days “in which migrant workers were beaten, robbed, hit in the head with rocks and shot with pellet guns” (Terzakis 2000). It is also important to point out that even though violent crime was down nationwide in 2000, hate crimes, especially against Latinos, actually increased during that time, according to the AntiDefamation League (Terzakis 2000). Unfortunately, however, “the numbers begin to lose meaning. We just know that many people die. Protecting the ‘American way of life’ and the sovereignty of ‘our’ borders requires this” (Doty 2001, 535). U.S. government, state government, and local police representatives deny a relationship with paramilitary groups; however, their complicity is



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evidenced by their general failure to crack down on the activities of groups like Ranch Rescue and others. Survivor testimonies and witness reports provide evidence that “men, women and children are held at gunpoint, chased by dogs, and in some cases beaten or shot” (Border Action Network 2006d), yet in numerous instances, authorities “have taken no action against this surge of racist violence” (Border Action Network 2006d). In 2002, members of Border Action Network and 2,000 residents from Douglas, Nogales, Elfrida, McNeil, Pirtleville, Naco, Tucson, Arivaca, Palominas, and Bisbee met with Goddard and demanded that he take immediate action against violent anti-immigrant groups operating in the region (Border Action Network 2003a). The delegation provided six recommendations, including the recommendation that the Attorney General’s office investigate violations of Arizona law regarding militia activity, civilian arrest, and the impersonation of law enforcement, and that the Attorney General’s office create a special investigator and prosecutor to address the issues (Border Action Network 2003a). Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and G. W. Bush have condemned actions by ranchers on the border, but, as Doty argues, the actions of these groups also legitimize those of the U.S. government and, importantly, make them appear rational: “The more familiar acts of statecraft by government officials would lack the legitimacy and constitutive force they generally have. . . . Government officials sitting in sanitized offices wearing faces of reason and making ‘rational’ policies in a complicated world may seem far removed from gun-toting ranchers . . . but they are all engaged in the same project of statecraft” (Doty 2001, 528). The citizen arrests, intimidation tactics, and abuses perpetrated by anti-immigrant groups, along with the dismissiveness with which many U.S. government officials treat them, not to mention the explicit praise they receive from other officials, supports classifying groups like Ranch Rescue as components of the broader militarization of the border and supports labeling them as paramilitary units operating under LIC doctrine. Claims of sovereignty, as well as racist fears over the presumed threat caused by immigration to America’s security, propel the actions of many paramilitary groups. U.S. “history is replete with incidents of racially motivated violence wielded upon victims by vigilantes who would protect white supremacy or some other presumed higher good” (Huspek 2000). Constructions of Mexican immigrants as criminal threats to the





white body politic are essential to the claims of sovereignty offered by paramilitary groups. The regulation of the United States–Mexico border has been a significant focus in the exercise of U.S. sovereignty by many state and nonstate actors. In sum, the idea that America is homogeneously white is a social construction, but it is an idea backed by institutional power and an idea that has informed U.S. immigration policy and practice toward Mexico and Central America for years. Xenophobia and racism intersect with sexism as female immigrants of color are constructed and targeted as particularly threatening given their ability to reproduce Others and thus, spur both population growth and racial dilution in the United States. These intersections are visible in the neo-Malthusian foundations of the environmental language that some paramilitary groups have incorporated into their anti-immigrant rhetoric. According to American Patrol, “more than 30 million immigrants have settled in the United States since 1970. Now our cities, schools, health care systems, labor markets, and environment all need a break. We cannot provide high quality education, health care, and retirement security for our own people if we continue to bring in endless numbers of poor, unskilled immigrants” (American Patrol 2003). In another article featured on the American Patrol Web site, Dwyer expresses his opposition to the Bush administration’s proposed guest worker program on similar grounds, arguing that illegal immigrants “overpopulate the most desirable parts of the U.S. (like Southern California), overcrowd our schools, our emergency rooms, our highways, and our cities. They pollute air, trash the environment, and often stimulate social tensions between their ‘undocumented communities’ and other residents” (Dwyer 2004). “Illegal immigrants” are also cast as ecoterrorists who destroy ranchers’ land with litter and harm the fragile desert by virtue of their traveling (the footpaths argument once again). In 2002, Ranch Rescue Arizona explained on their Web site that illegal immigrants trespass “on to private property in Cochise County in the tens of thousands each month, leaving behind a trail of environmental damage and property destruction” (Ranch Rescue 2002b; emphasis in original). As mentioned, paramilitary groups in Arizona receive support from some law enforcement officials including Larry Denver (Sheriff of Cochise County), who uses the term “ecoterrorists,” to blame migrants for littering the “once pristine desert” with “tens of thousands of plastic water jugs, food wrappers, abandoned



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pieces of clothing, dirty diapers, human feces and other vestiges of the migrant flow” (E. B. Smith 2000). What groups like Ranch Rescue, American Patrol, the Minutemen, and others fail to discuss is often as interesting and troubling as what they do discuss. All three groups are relatively silent on the environmental and other consequences of U.S. border enforcement policies themselves and instead appear to prefer scapegoating immigrants for environmental destruction (the environmental impacts of U.S. border policy are documented in depth by Border Action Network, which I discuss in chapter 4). Likewise, rather than examining the impacts of neoliberal globalization and specific trade policies like NAFTA, it is apparently more convenient for paramilitary groups to scapegoat “swarms” of immigrants for job insecurity, poverty, and violence. Yet it is not surprising that so little attention is given to border policy, neoliberal globalization, or histories of colonialism. As Anderson and Hill Collins explain, “the ideas of groups that are privileged within race, class, and gender relations are routinely heard, whereas the ideas of groups who are disadvantaged are silenced” (2001e, 223). Thus, President Clinton himself was able to ignore the violent construction of the United States–Mexico border, boast about his “get-tough” immigration policies, and proclaim, “We must not tolerate illegal immigration” (qtd. in Akers 2001). In the face of protest signs such as “we didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us” and “no one is illegal,” however, easy assumptions of sovereign border creation and enforcement, not to mention American identity, are tenuous at best. Yet given the construction of immigrants of color as illegal and threatening, the historical and contemporary realities of structurally marginalized groups are simply expunged from illustrations of America as a harmonious nation whose security must be preserved for its “real” citizens at all cost. Definitions of illegality along with sexist and racist stereotypes of Mexican immigrants also serve capitalism by allowing immigrants to be blamed for social, economic, political, and environmental insecurities instead of the policies of the U.S. state and interconnected systems of inequality. Casting “new immigrant groups as scapegoats in times of social and economic distress has been a recurrent phenomenon in American history” (Portes and Kincaid, qtd. in Hayes 2001, 39). What is relatively new, however, is the identification of Mexican immigrants as environmental as well as national and civilizational security threats. In response to these perceived threats, Ranch Rescue posts flyers at Southwestern U.S.





campgrounds and rests stops calling on vacationers to “help the American Rancher keep his land protected while enjoying the great southwestern desert at the same time. . . . Come and stay at the ranches and help keep trespassers from destroying private property.” The flyers are eerily similar to the calling cards used by the Ku Klux Klan, and like the calling cards, the physical and ideological violence perpetrated by paramilitary groups harms more than just their immediate victims. They send a clear message to all communities of color, immigrant or not, that they do not have (and do not “deserve”) human rights in the United States. Threats and acts of violence have helped turn the Southwest border region into a war zone where communities of color are routinely harassed, profiled, and discriminated against. Moreover, “increasing militarization and aggressive enforcement along the border has created a situation where vigilante actions appear acceptable and even encouraged” (Border Action Network 2000). In short, the seamless web created under the Southwest Border Strategy and continued under the Secure Border Initiative points to more than just cooperation between border patrol sectors along the 2,000-mile stretch between the United States and Mexico. Increasingly, this seamless web includes collaboration between the Border Patrol, the military, various government actors, local law enforcement, and paramilitary groups like Ranch Rescue, American Patrol, and the Minutemen. CONCLUSION

As mentioned, Everard argues, “States exist by virtue of their practices of inclusion and exclusion” (2000, 57). Furthermore, “these practices are at their most visible when applied to what we identify as cultural products or symbolic life. Whoever has the means to control or disseminate cultural products controls how a state is viewed in the world, by other states, and by the domestic polity” (Everard 2000, 57). By controlling and disseminating cultural products like the documents examined in this chapter, the U.S. state can identify and reproduce the images and ideas it deems valuable and exclude those it deems insignificant or threatening to its continued hegemony. This way, privilege is preserved, and systems of inequality are further normalized and reinforced. With the end of the Cold War, scholars and government officials identified many new threats to the physical safety of U.S. citizens, as well as the very identity of the United States as a nation. Among these new dangers, those relating to environmental destruction have become more



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commonly recognized within post–Cold War U.S. government discourse. With 9/11, focus on environmental issues shifted but still rely on the same processes of enemy-creation and still draw on old scripts to identify threats to the security of the American nation. Like the Clinton administration, the G. W. Bush administration continues to recognize a host of “nontraditional” threats (in addition to more “traditional” ones) and, like the Clinton administration, continues to suggest that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them” (2002b, 31). Importantly, the documents I examined from both administrations highlight the dangers posed by the internalization of security threats into the American body politic via “illegal immigration” across the United States–Mexico border. There are important differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations with respect to environmental issues, and there are also important similarities. As Campbell explains, “the role of interpretation in the articulation of danger is not restricted to the process by which some risks come to be considered more serious than others. An important function of interpretation is the way that certain modes of representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers” (Campbell 1998, 2). National identity is (re)produced against that which is marked as dangerous. Biologized constructions of American national identity as “white” are dialectically produced with and against constructions of alien, invading, “nonwhite” threats to the nation. Ultimately, dominant discourses of American national, civilizational, and environmental security in relation to immigration across the United States–Mexico border form a mutually supportive cluster aimed at (re)constructing the boundaries of “America” and “American-ness,” particularly given the reliance of these discourses on neo-Malthusian and other terror-filled doomsday scenarios, as well as racist, sexist, xenophobic constructions and representations of Others. As Seager explains, “gender, race, immigration, and the environment are all militarized zones. At the same time, militaries and militarism, like race, immigration, and the environment, are all gendered zones. And, especially in the United States and other ‘western’ countries, gender, . . . militarization, and immigration are all racialized zones” (2003, 5). In short, despite differences in the rhetoric used by proponents and agents of the border’s militarization, the fundamental arguments behind everything from the Southwest Border Strategy and the Secure Border Initiative, to citizen arrests and assaults by members of Ranch Rescue, are





all are grounded in very particular, and entirely interconnected, discourses of national, civilizational, and environmental security. This is so regardless of whether or not Roger Barnett’s language is less sanitized than that of G. W. Bush. Moreover, the simple fact remains that there are dramatic material consequences associated with all of these strategies. Indeed, the myriad consequences of the border’s militarization are a far cry from Clinton’s contention that “deterring illegal entry is often safer, more humane, and cost effective than making arrests of illegal migrants on the streets and highways of the United States” (Clinton Administration 1994a, 21).



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H A P T E R

3

REPORTING IMMIGRATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES A 1999 TIME INTERNATIONAL ARTICLE BEGINS, “6 billion: The total population of the world last week after Fatima Nevic gave birth to a son in Sarajevo” (26). Another article from 1999, this time from U.S. News and World Report, begins, “Morgan Luta came into the world two months ago, delivered on the dirt floor of a tin shack in a scabrous Nairobi, Kenya, slum” (Satchel 1999, 46). The author goes on to explain, “The birth of another infant to another impoverished family in another African shanty is unremarkable but for the singular coincidence. The world’s population recently hit 6 billion, and who is to say that Morgan Luta isn’t the one?” (1999, 46). These articles are by no means anomalous in their coverage of the “6 billion mark” in 1999. The mainstream media in the United States followed predictable patterns in reporting and representation before and after 1999, patterns characterized by racialized, classed, and gendered stereotypes that frequently target women (especially women of color and poor women around the world), who by virtue of their presumed proclivity to “overpopulate” are blamed for a vast array of environmental, social, and political ills, including conflict and warfare (Urban 2001). Likewise, coverage of immigration, especially “illegal immigration” by “aliens” crossing the United States–Mexico border, follows similar patterns. Like “overpopulation” discourse, anti-immigration discourse follows similarly gendered, classed, and racialized paths—paths that lead to similarly apocalyptic neo-Malthusian scenarios. Taken together, these



C


patterns reflect and reinforce popular opinion, practice, and policy directed at and against “Third World Enemy Others.” Patterns in mainstream media coverage and representation are not innocent, nor are they without ideological and material consequences. Serving as an “enlightened witness” (Jhally 1997) by continuously engaging in cultural critique, including mainstream news media analysis, is a passion that informs my writing, teaching, and activism (which for me, are entirely interconnected). Rather than tuning out the news, I take Media Education’s Foundation’s call to be a “media activist” seriously, with the overriding goal of interrupting the ideological bases of systemic oppression and privilege. Analyzing the U.S. mainstream media (also referred to as the elite or corporate media) is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the cultural authority and agenda setting power enjoyed by privileged actors within this dominant U.S. social institution. Chomsky (1997) argues that members of the capitalist class benefit from privileged access to financial and other resources in the United States, as well as privileged access to social institutions such as the state, education, and the mass media. In 1997, Chomsky also argued that members of the capitalist class own the majority of media outlets in the United States. Media ownership has become even more starkly concentrated today. As Moyers (2007) explains, the “independent press, is under sustained attack, and the channels of information are choked. A few huge corporations now dominate the media landscape in America. Almost all the networks carried by most cable systems are owned by one of the major media common conglomerates. Two-thirds of today’s newspapers are monopolies.” With privileged access to media and other social institutions comes privileged access to both material and ideological power, so much so that mainstream media outlets are able to “set the framework in which everyone else operates” (Chomsky 1997). Owners and employees of mainstream media corporations play a crucial role in deciding the stories of import for U.S. (and international) newsreaders and in determining the ways that stories are represented in their newspapers. In Chomsky’s terms, these elements are what “makes mainstream media mainstream” (Chomsky 1997). The consequences of media monopoly are profoundly negative and far too numerous to adequately discuss here. Independent journalists such as Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez (Democracy Now!), Sonali Kolhatkar (Uprising Radio), and organizations such as Fairness and



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Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) do, however, offer rich and ongoing, critical analyses of media consolidation, dominant media discourse on innumerable international and domestic issues and analysis of the (often problematic) ways in which Other communities, and news stories related to Other communities and individuals, are represented. During a 2006 New York town hall meeting on diversity and media ownership, participants spoke out against FCC attempts at easing regulations designed to prevent media monopoly. Juan Gonzalez (Democracy Now!, New York Daily News, and president of the National Association of Hispanic Journalists) warned of the development of a de facto apartheid system in which “a small group of giant firms, run almost exclusively by white investors and managers, control the production and distribution of news and information to a largely non-white population.” This de facto apartheid system fails to provide news and information for, or about, the vast majority of U.S. residents (Goodman and Gonzalez 2006), or does so in inaccurate and stereotypical ways. Ultimately, “because of media ownership concentration, our democratic discourse has been cheapened and distorted” (Goodman and Gonzalez 2006). This is deeply connected to what Chomsky calls “manufacturing consent” (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Chomsky 1997). To explain, Chomsky (1997) calls attention to the work of journalist, and Creel Commission member, Walter Lippmann. The Creel Commission (the Committee on Public Information) was a state propaganda agency created under the Wilson administration. In one of his essays, Lippmann sought to apply the ideals of the Creel Commission to his understanding of democracy, including the “manufacture of consent,” a phrase that Lippman created and used, which Chomksy and Herman borrowed for their book Manufacturing Consent. Chomsky (1997) paraphrases Lippman and explains: There is this new art in the method of democracy, ‘manufacture of consent.’ By manufacturing consent, you can overcome the fact that formally a lot of people have the right to vote. We can make it irrelevant because we can manufacture consent and make sure that their choices and attitudes will be structured in such a way that they will always do what we tell them, even if they have a formal way to participate. So we’ll have a real democracy. It will work properly.

In his essay “Force and Opinion,” Chomsky (1991) also highlights Lippmann’s arguments to emphasize the power of manufacturing consent and thus, shaping, indeed directing, public opinion. Quoting



Reporting Immigration and Environmental Security in the U.S.


Lippman, Chomsky (1991) highlights one rationale behind manufacturing consent: “So that we may ‘live free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd,’ whose ‘function’ is to be ‘interested spectators of action,’ not participants. And if the state lacks the force to coerce and the voice of the people can be heard, it is necessary to ensure that that voice says the right thing, as respected intellectuals have been advising for many years.” Chomsky (1991; emphasis in original) goes on to explain, “control of thought is more important for governments that are free and than for despotic and military states. The logic is straightforward. A despotic state can control its domestic enemy by force, but as the state loses this weapon, other devices are required to prevent the ignorant masses from interfering with public affairs, which are none of their business.” Chomsky’s (1991; 1997) analysis is similar to that of Allan Johnson, who examines institutional privilege in relation to agenda setting power and cultural authority. As mentioned in the introduction, agenda setting power allows systemically privileged social groups to determine rules and standards, as well as how they are applied; cultural authority provides privileged social groups the influence to “make judgments about others and to have those judgments stick”; and overall, institutional privilege “means being able to decide who gets taken seriously, who receives attention, who is accountable to whom and for what” (Johnson 2001, 33). Both agenda setting power and cultural authority are routinely exemplified by “the lengths to which white people will go to distort current and historical reality in order to maintain the illusion of being the chosen and superior race, the standard against which others are to be measured” (Johnson 2001, 66). The popular myth that America is a homogeneously white nation (and that it should remain as such, which relates directly to civilizational security discourse), is an important case in point. In short, agenda setting power, cultural authority, and ease of access to social institutions like the media grant privileged groups greater capacity to define the “reality” of national and international affairs in ways that serve their self-interest and therefore normalize the (political, social, and economic) status quo. Access to institutional power also means that the elite media is able to interact with “other major power centers—the government, other corporations, or the universities” (Chomsky 1997) thereby dialectically reinforcing the agenda setting power of the mainstream media, the university, and government policy and practice. Looking at U.S. mainstream news media coverage of immigration and environmental security offers important insight into the ways in which



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immigration—especially female immigrants of color and immigration across the United States–Mexico border—are scapegoated for the environmental and other ills besetting the United States. In this chapter I examine articles, letters to the editor, editorials, and op-ed pieces1 largely published between 1994–2006 from a number of different media sources including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, U.S. News and World Report, the Los Angeles Times, USA Today Magazine, Time, Newsweek, the Arizona Republic, the San Diego Union-Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle.2 Although the Arizona Republic, the San Diego Union-Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle may lack the agenda setting power and national reach of sources like the New York Times, I include them in my analyses; they are ideologically mainstream sources with a good deal of influence over the ways in which local stories, including those about immigration, are framed and represented. The Los Angeles Times plays an important role as a national agenda setting media source and an important source of state and local information for Californians. NATURALIZING AND NORMALIZING THE THREAT: ELITE MEDIA, IMMIGRATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

The Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE) has long argued that social institutions such as academia, the U.S. security establishment, and the mainstream media, as well as anti-immigration organizations and some environmental organizations, bear responsibility for naturalizing the perceived link between environmental degradation and immigration, or rather, the greening of hate. The consequences of the greening of hate are far reaching, ranging from restrictions on social services to the continued militarization of the United States–Mexico border, not to mention growing anti-immigrant hostility and violence nationwide. Elite U.S. media coverage of the link between immigration and environmental destruction follows similar patterns as those I have highlighted in academic and governmental discourse. Immigration and environmental destruction are linked within strategies that I have been referring to as “litany arguments” and “footpaths arguments.” In addition, immigrants are blamed for increasing population growth (and therefore causing environmental destruction) within the United States; this strategy is closely tied to the rhetoric of invasion, which operates on the basis of constructions of undocumented workers as “alien Others”





whose entry into the United States ostensibly threatens environmental and national, as well as civilizational security. Another common strategy by which the link between immigration and environmental destruction is deployed is through the construction of female immigrants of color as “resource depletors,” which scapegoats them for depleting social, economic, and environmental resources in the United States; this strategy is closely tied to Hardin’s lifeboat metaphor. It is worth noting, however, that far more attention is given to social and economic resource exploitation arguments (as well as arguments highlighting crime and violence) than to arguments emphasizing the exploitation of environmental resources. Nevertheless, all of these anti-immigration strategies rely on a set stereotypes and representations of Others that mutually reinforce, rather than contradict, one another. So, although my analysis is limited to articles that include connections between immigration and the environment, I begin this chapter with a discussion of U.S. mainstream media coverage of immigration as it relates to social and economic resources. THE ECONOMIC

AND

SOCIAL STRAINS “CAUSED” BY IMMIGRATION

The assumption that Mexican immigrants strain and exploit economic and social resources is a common anti-immigration rationale in the United States, and it comes up often in the mainstream media among both regular and guest contributors. Economic arguments generally suggest that immigration creates competition between “newcomers” and “native workers,” resulting in wage reduction and job loss in the United States. This common wedge strategy reflects raced, gendered, and nationalistic representations of Others as threats to American economic and social security, as well as American identity. As McGeary, McGirk, and Shannon explain in their article for Time, “fear, frustration and low wages drive hundreds of thousands more Mexicans to the U.S. every year, swelling the legions that burden education and social-service systems from Brownsville, Texas, to Los Angeles” (2000, 35). Terms such as “burden” and “swelling,” as well as “flooding,” “swarming,” and others advance neo-Malthusian “overpopulation” arguments to scapegoat immigrants of color for the depletion of resources. This draws attention away from the fact that the largest portion of the U.S. federal budget supports past and current military operations (not social services or education), which in 2005 amounted to 46 percent of the federal budget (or $935 billion), with an additional $5 billion spent on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007d, 483).



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Unfortunately, I find much more attention to and blaming of immigration and immigrants for depleting economic and social resources in the mainstream news media in the United States than I do critiques of militarization or other budgetary priorities of the U.S. government. Immigration is frequently blamed for straining social service benefits like welfare and for reducing access to such benefits for “real” American citizens. For instance, in a 1997 article for USA Today, Yeh Ling-Ling (Diversity Coalition for an Immigration Moratorium in California and Diversity Alliance for a Sustainable America) explains, “These newcomers need jobs, education, welfare, health care, and many other services that can not even be provided to millions of native-born Americans.” She also argues that immigrants pose an economic and social threat to those segments of the U.S. population already experiencing economic hardship, and Yeh Ling-Ling (1997) asks her readers, “If the Federal government continues to allow hundreds of thousands of low-skilled legal immigrants of working age to enter the U.S. every year, how can America’s unemployed, low-skilled workers and welfare recipients be expected to find work?” In other words, she uses a common wedge strategy in representing immigrants as a threat to working class people in the United States. Crime and Mexico are also frequently associated with one another in the mainstream U.S. press. The author of a 2000 U.S. News and World Report article explains, “With the millions of migrants and tons of drugs that pour over the 2,000-mile border, no country has a greater capacity to affect the United States” (“What’s Next . . . ” 2000, 30). Criminal drug traffickers and “illegal immigrants” from Mexico presumably threaten the security of American citizens. In a sidebar to their 2000 Time article, McGeary, McGirk, and Shannon (2000) further state (under the heading “Drug Trafficking”), “Rampant narco-sales and money laundering anger Washington, hamper trade and investment. Kingpins need to be crushed,” followed by this statement: “The government cheats, the police cheat, every system is riddled with rot,” under the heading “Institutional Corruption.” These statements are then followed by the argument that “hundreds of thousands sneak into the U.S., burdening social services and the border patrol” (McGeary, McGirk, and Shannon 2000). Similarly, Katel, Bounds, and Palumbo (2001) represent El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala as “all disaster plagued, crime-ridden, poorer by the minute.” These characteristics compel immigration, as immigrants “had hoped to travel through Mexico and cross its northern border to the





promised land” (Katel, Bounds, and Palumbo 2001). Mexico and Central America are constructed as entirely dysfunctional. America is constructed against this dysfunction as the “promised land,” which is being threatened by the coming flood of immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border. Thus, not only are immigrants identified as threats to U.S. security, but so, too, is the very existence of Mexico and Central America. According to this line of racialized and xenophobic thinking, immigration may also force American citizens into a life of crime and violence: “If mass immigration is allowed to displace native workers, is it being suggested that unemployed Americans should join the welfare rolls or turn to crime to support their families? Do pro-family leaders realize that extended unemployment can lead to family breakdown?” (Yeh Ling-Ling 1997). In short, immigrants are blamed for unemployment and the dearth of adequate jobs in the United States, not the economic or social policies of the U.S. government itself, and certainly not U.S. foreign and economic policy toward Mexico. Yeh Ling-Ling makes similar claims in articles for sources ranging from USA Today Magazine to the Chicago Sun Times, San Diego Union Tribune, and both the Philadelphia Inquirer and Seattle Times. In other words, she is quite busy advancing wedge strategies and normalizing anti-immigration hostilities across the nation. As another example, in his 1997 article for USA Today Magazine, Lamar Smith (then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee) brings together many of the anti-immigrant stereotypes just mentioned when he writes, The availability of taxpayer-funded welfare programs should not be an incentive to come to America—legally or illegally. . . . Americans are willing to help those who need it, but have grown increasingly tired of subsidizing non-citizens, the addicted, criminals, and those who simply refuse to work. . . . Misguided immigration policies contribute to burgeoning welfare use by non-citizens and trap many immigrants in a never-ending cycle of dependency. . . . 50% of the decline in real wages for high school dropouts in the last decade has been caused by immigration. Many of these dropouts wind up accessing welfare programs such as SSI, Medicaid, and food stamps because they do not have enough education to keep steady jobs. Consequently, some of these welfare recipients become gang members and criminals.

In short, “noncitizens” (defined as immigrants, drug addicts, and criminals, who are constructed as one and the same) are exploiting the generosity



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and hard work of American citizens and in turn are causing economic and social misery, even forcing some American citizens into criminal gangs. Smith’s quote highlights the operation of Othering, or better stated, the enemy-creation process connected to the anti-immigration movement in the United States, as well as the construction of powerful wedge strategies. Positions like Lamar Smith’s also speak to an interesting, although not uncommon, contradiction within some of the more popular anti-immigration rationales. Social and economic resource-depletion arguments against immigration often imply that many cross the United States–Mexico border in order to exploit welfare benefits and avoid doing “real work.” At the same time, this welfare magnet argument is often tied to the belief that immigrants cross the southern U.S. border in order to steal jobs away from former welfare recipients, as Smith implies in the aforementioned quote. So, apparently, immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border simultaneously steal jobs away from hardworking Americans and exploit the U.S. welfare system to avoid working. Such contradictions are both unnerving and inaccurate. Furthermore, positions like Smith’s ignore the dynamics of capitalism, which requires a steady stream of exploited labor to function, and continue providing wealth for the capitalist class. Despite these contradictions, claims that immigration across the United States–Mexico border causes economic and social insecurity and that immigrants themselves are exploitative criminals are not uncommon in the U.S. mainstream media. As a result, readers are frequently led to believe that not only are the jobs belonging to vulnerable sectors of American society being stolen, criminals illegally entering the United States are the ones stealing them. Ultimately, this implies that Mexican and other immigrants are not only undeserving of employment but also undeserving of protection and rights under U.S. laws. Moreover, the belief that immigrants exploit economic and social resources coincides with the position that immigration is connected to environmental destruction via the exploitation of natural resources; in fact, it tacitly supports environmentally based arguments for limiting immigration. As mentioned, these arguments rely on similar stereotypes of border-crossers as criminal, untrustworthy, threats to the security of the American nation. It is to the environmentally based anti-immigration arguments that I now turn.




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All of the news articles included in my examination for this chapter discuss immigration and the environment, and twenty-four of them use litany statements to imply a connection between the two. Boustany provides a fairly representative example of this strategy in her 2001 article for the Washington Post. Boustany draws attention to the work of Juan Jose Bremer (Mexico’s Ambassador to Washington) to explain that “matters that experts here now like to call ‘intermestic’—international and domestic—have broadened the scope of Bremer’s brief beyond foreign policy and trade. Besides immigration, ongoing questions over energy, justice, the environment, water rights, truckers’ disputes, janitors’ unions in California, borders and more now affect the United States and involve Mexico” (Boustany 2001). In a 2006 article for Arizona Republic, Janet Napolitano (Governor of Arizona) and Jon Huntsman Jr. (Governor of Utah) provide a more explicit connection in their litany argument: “Although illegal immigration is a national issue, with an impact on our entire economy, Western states suffer a disproportionate financial burden on health care, education, the environment and criminal justice systems.” However, the links between immigration and environmental harm are not elaborated on or examined in any depth. Litany arguments are significant precisely because authors are able to imply connections between immigration and the environment (as well as crime, job loss, and other issues) without providing a comprehensive analysis or discussion of those connections. Instead, this approach relies on readers taking these connections as “givens.” The results of this approach, whether it is used in IR textbooks, government security documents, or the mainstream media, are similar: A relationship is implicitly drawn between immigration across the United States–Mexico border and environmental destruction. IMMIGRATION

AND

U.S. POPULATION GROWTH

Another popular avenue by which the link between environmental destruction and immigration is made is through discussions of population growth in the United States caused by immigration, with population growth constructed as an environmental threat. Like the litany argument, this approach is reflected in both U.S. government discourse and that of many IR textbooks, not to mention ES scholarship. Environmental arguments in this context are connected to the belief that finite



LITANY ARGUMENTS

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environmental resources will be strained by too many people. In short, some in the mainstream press make (or at least assume) neo-Malthusian based carrying capacity arguments in their discussions of immigration across the United States–Mexico border. These arguments however, usually work in tandem with other anti-immigrant rationales, particularly economic and social resource arguments. For instance, in a 1996 article for the Los Angeles Times, Fineman highlights the work of (and quotes) Luis Manuel Guerra, director of a private environmental consulting firm in Mexico City, who reasons that “population will double [again] in 40 years. . . . That’s terrible, because the vast majority of those who will be born will want high energy use and increased urban space. The vast majority of the next 90 million also will be poor. They will be undereducated, and the importance they will give to the environment will be minimal. The prognosis both for the environment and conservation of energy is very dim” (Fineman 1996). Director of Research for Negative Population Growth, David Simcox (1997) makes an even more explicit argument in his article for USA Today Magazine: “Immigration of 1,100,000 persons a year perpetuates population growth and dims prospects for a smaller, environmentally sustainable U.S. population. Since the 1970s, the vast majority of Americans have voted by their fertility rates to stabilize population, but immigration has nullified their choice.” Interestingly, Simcox also views political asylum regulations as an enormous problem for U.S. immigration policy and population stabilization (which he directly connects to environmental sustainability in the United States). Most of the article is characterized by a dramatically negative critique of U.S. policies for political refugees, which warrant further discussion. For one, Simcox casts political asylum policies as a problem in terms of the negative impacts refugees have on the U.S. environment, particularly in relation to population growth. Like both legal and “illegal immigrants,” asylum seekers, according to Simcox, threaten U.S. carrying capacity and thus U.S. environmental security. Second, David Simcox regards policies aimed at addressing genderbased persecution as particularly problematic because (according to Simcox) so many of the women who are receiving political asylum are of childbearing age and are from the so-called Third World, who he assumes have higher fertility rates. It is interesting to note that his is one of the few articles that explicitly mention female immigrants. Yet Simcox (1997) constructs female immigrants as critical targets of immigration control policies given their ostensibly higher fertility rates: “Political asylum, as





presently legislated, is an inherently vulnerable and unmanageable feature of immigration policy that is the antithesis of the discipline and rationality needed to manage immigration in accord with sound population goals.” Therefore, immigration and asylum among women poses a particularly grave threat to U.S. environmental security for David Simcox. On one hand, I agree that distinctions between environmental refugees, economic migrants, and political asylum seekers are growing increasingly fuzzy, as “global events increasingly render untenable such distinctions as those held between the so called ‘political’ and ‘economic’ refugees” (Brah 2003, 614). However, David Simcox’s position is not based on Brah’s more complex understanding of international migration. Instead, Simcox’s position reflects concerns over civilizational security. Immigration, as well as asylum seeking, across the United States–Mexico border by women is constructed and represented as a significant threat to not only the environmental security but also the civilizational security of the American nation, given the ability of immigrant women to (presumably) give birth to future communities of color, and disrupt deeply embedded representations of the American nation as homogeneously white. A similar basis upon which the link between environmental harm and immigration is made comes in the Hardinian argument that population growth and environmental disasters push immigration into the United States. In his 1996 article for the Washington Post, Thomas Lippman points to the Clinton administration position on environmental security, including policy documents stating: “Degradation of the environment leads to poverty, disease and agricultural failure, which in turn lead to political instability, violence and illegal immigration” (1996). This position, along with overpopulation arguments, is also very much in the tradition of Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work, and mainstream ES scholarship more generally. FOOTPATH ARGUMENTS

In a 1996 New York Times article entitled “Scenic Mountains Scarred by Illegal Border Crossings,” Goldberg argues that immigrants hurt the environment as they travel through the desert Southwest: In some canyons, it looks as if hundreds of Hansels and Gretels have scattered trails of trash behind them, marking the route from Tijuana. New paths fork across almost every slope, giving parts of this once-lonely



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mountain the threadbare look of the more trafficked corners of a city park. And a 15,000-acre swath of the mountain ridge is stripped and sooty, burned last month to a Halloweenish landscape of naked black branches and orange dust by a wildfire that the authorities are convinced was sparked by an illegal border-crosser. Who else, they ask, would have been desperate enough to be up on a 4,000-foot peak building a campfire here on a windy autumn night? (Goldberg 1996)

Contradictions and sheer hypocrisy characterize much of the footpaths argument, particularly given the fact that at the same time policymakers force people into more remote areas of the desert through the program of deterrence that lies at the core of both the Southwest Border Strategy and the Secure Border Initiative, they blame migrants for destroying the environment by walking across the desert, starting campfires, and leaving trash behind. Goldberg does mention border policies later in his article; however, the title, the lead paragraph, and the bulk of his article foregrounds the position that migrants are principally to blame for destroying the desert as they cross into the United States. As another example, Goldberg quotes a Federal Bureau of Land Management official as saying, “It’s just been trashed. They’ve cut numerous trails, so that degraded it, and the ultimate degradation was when they burnt it” (1996, 22). Again, immigrants and immigration are constructed as primarily blameworthy.3 In chapter 4, I discuss the fallacies associated with the footpaths arguments in depth, with particular attention to the vast body of research produced by members of Border Action Network, including especially their 2004 report, Environmental Justice on the Line. Suffice it to say at this point, militarizing the border causes far more environmental destruction than people walking across the desert. The footpath argument is quite popular among paramilitary groups, as noted in chapter 2. One Time article discussing the environmental damage that Roger Barnett (of Ranch Rescue) contends is a result of “illegal immigration” (apparently his cattle-ranching is not itself environmentally damaging) explains, “By his count, Barnett has corralled hundreds of aliens and marched them to the border patrol since last year. ‘It’s a jungle out here,’ says the cattleman, trudging through mesquite fields littered with plastic jugs and soiled diapers left by illegals. Larry Vance, a utility-company technician, climbs a 30-ft.-high watchtower in his backyard to spot aliens crossing his 20 acres. Says he: ‘You’ve got to understand that this is an invasion’” (Woodbury 1999, 24). The author’s





use of the term “corralled” is extremely distressing and dehumanizing, as though people (more specifically, racialized and gendered Others) crossing the border must be controlled as one would a herd of ill-behaved cattle. The number of times (seven in all) that the author uses “aliens” or “illegals” is also distressing and dehumanizing. Although the most frequently used phrase is “illegal immigrant” (so frequent that I stopped counting), “illegals” and “aliens” are commonly used terms in the mainstream media as well. All such terms represent people crossing the border as less-than-human “Enemy Others,” who not only destroy the environment, but threaten national security. One of the interesting differences between the analysis performed for this project and the analysis of the mainstream media I performed in 2004 for my dissertation is that there is more mainstream media attention to the environmental consequences of the barriers built on the United States–Mexico border by the U.S. government to halt “illegal immigration.” Thirty of the 141 articles I examined for this project discuss the environmental consequences of U.S.-built fences and walls on the border in Arizona and Texas; however, recently there has been more attention by the mainstream media on fencing projects in San Diego. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration tried to finish and actually increase the amount of fencing separating Tijuana, Mexico, from the Imperial Beach area of California. The double and, in some areas, triple fencing project runs east approximately fourteen miles from the Pacific Ocean to the Otay Mountains. As Ted Robbins (2006a) describes, The first fence was built with surplus military airplane landing mats that were welded together. The second fence is called Sandia fencing, because it was developed at the government’s Sandia National Laboratories. It’s steel mesh, 15 feet high, with the top part slanted inward. In high-traffic areas, there’s a third chain-link fence topped with barbed wire. In between the first two fences is a 150-foot “no man’s land.” . . . Security is augmented by helicopters and hundreds of ground-based Border Patrol agents. Some areas use closely spaced concrete pillars instead of steel mesh for the second fence. And the last 150 yards or so—leading into the sea— is made of steel pillars sunk into the sand.

Fencing projects like this were particularly important to the program of deterrence under the Clinton Administration, and remain so under the G. W. Bush administration’s Secure Border Initiative. The completion of the last 3.5 miles of fencing in particular was challenged (through litigation and protest) by an array of local officials and



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government leaders, the California Coastal Commission, and a number of environmental organizations. In addition to its costs (ranging from $39 million to $58 million, depending on the news source) many object on environmental grounds to the provision that a canyon called “Smuggler’s Gulch” be filled in with approximately 2.2 million (Broder 2005) to 5.7 million cubic yards of soil bulldozed from nearby hills, whose tops will be shaved off (Moran 2005) in order to build a roadway. The canyon drains into a tidal estuary near the Pacific Ocean, which would be severely damaged by silt buildup, and moreover, the project risks destroying a federally protected wetland and wildlife refuge (Broder 2005). The additional fencing would also cut off access to Border Field State Park and the friendship monument, which (ironically) straddles the United States–Mexico border (Alvord 2005). Proponents use footpaths arguments to claim that the additional fencing will actually help preserve the environment by deterring crossing. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff himself reasons, “illegal migrants really degrade the environment. I’ve seen pictures of human waste, garbage, discarded bottles and other human artifact in pristine areas. . . . And believe me, that is the worst thing you can do to the environment” (Sullivan, 2007). The worst? By contrast, Peter Douglas, executive director of the California Coastal Commission, explains: “You cannot build that thing in that way and be consistent with California’s coastal protection law. . . . The exemption based on the so-called terrorist threat is a backdoor way of achieving what they couldn’t do legally. Now I guess in the name of security from terrorism, you can do anything you want. It is a monument to the politics of fear” (qtd. in Broder 2005). Indeed, because the area is considered a prime migration route, the G. W. Bush administration and DHS pushed through plans for completing the fence on national security grounds based on the unsubstantiated claim (at the time of this writing) that terrorists were crossing the Southwest border into the United States. Chertoff was granted authority to finish the fence and “almost total authority to sidestep environmental and labor laws in the process” (Edds 2005) and avoid further litigation. As one New York Times journalist explains, Representative Filner (D-CA) is “incensed by the provision in the recent law that exempts the border project from state and federal environmental, safety and labor laws. He also said the law was based on what he called the specious argument that international terrorists were using the Mexican border as a means of access to the United States. ‘I have never been told that somebody suspected of





terrorism has been arrested along that border,’ Mr. Filner said” (Broder 2005). As one border agent, Angel Santa Ana, explains, however, “Why do you want to leave yourself open? Why take the chance? If there’s an opportunity to get in, let’s make sure we shut it” (Alvord 2004). One Washington Post article problematically states, “With recent revelations by the Department of Homeland Security that al Qaeda operatives are looking to the Mexican border as a way to infiltrate the United States, federal officials have hastened efforts to close off the final stretch between Otay Mesa and the Pacific Ocean, in a canyon known as ‘Smuggler’s Gulch.’ They contend that the area is a national security risk” (Edds 2005). What these revelations were, where they came from, and how credible they are, still remain a mystery. Nevertheless, under the auspices of homeland security and footpaths arguments, a canyon will be filled in and the tops of hills shaved off. The authority granted to Chertoff does not stop with San Diego: “Bruce Reznik, executive director of San Diego Baykeeper, one of several environmental groups [formerly] suing the U.S. government over the fence, said: ‘You’ve just sent the message that whenever we want to do a project as a government, we’ll do whatever is convenient despite the laws that are here to protect Americans. It’s a bad precedent to set” (Edds 2005). Chertoff used this authority to quash litigation, flout environmental regulations, and avoid public input in the construction of fencing in Cochise County Arizona again claiming that any delay would pose “unacceptable risks to our nation’s security” (qtd. in Fischer 2007). Even more, Chertoff used this same strategy to complete another project near the Barry M. Goldwater Range in Southwestern Arizona (Fischer 2007). In addition to invoking September 11, 2001, as a key justification, Chertoff and innumerable proponents reason that people crossing the border (not militarization), is to blame for environmental destruction. Once again, immigrants of color from the Global South are constructed as environmental and national security threats, as is consistent with the greening of hate.4 I do not want to suggest that the critiques of the San Diego fencing project included in the mainstream media articles I have examined necessarily do so from an antimiliarization or immigrant rights standpoint. The majority of those deploying environmental critiques of the fencing projects in the articles I have examined are not necessarily against fencing per se, nor do they necessarily oppose strict immigration control policies



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in San Diego or elsewhere on the border. Instead, many oppose the current design of the fence or argue that the single fence, along with better technology, would successfully reduce immigration into San Diego. Many fault both U.S. government policy and immigration for environmental harm along the border. For instance, Clancy (2006) cites a Defenders of the Wildlife report that suggests both migration and government policies aimed at stopping migration, including fencing, endanger the plants and animals in Southern Arizona. According to Clancy (2006), the report indicates that “thousands of migrants and increasing enforcement of border security have resulted not just in trash heaps and abandoned vehicles, but also in long-term damage to environmentally sensitive areas and degradation of several species: mammals, birds and fish”; however, “much of the blame falls . . . on federal policies designed to reduce immigration by forcing it out of urban areas, which took effect in the mid-1990s. But migration levels did not decline, and now an estimated half a million people are crossing the desert in search of work.” In other words, while concerned over the environmental impacts of the San Diego fencing project, few of these critiques reject or even meaningfully grapple with the militarization of the border and Low Intensity Warfare, nor do they come out in support of immigrant rights or amnesty. Many instead ask for greater cooperation between the various agencies involved, although the authority recently granted to Chertoff will more than likely ensure that no such cooperation or compromise, however paltry, will take place any time soon. SOLUTIONS

TO IMMIGRATION AND

ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION?

Overall, I found little in-depth, comprehensive discussion of solutions for immigration’s supposed impact on environmental security within the U.S. mainstream media. The most frequently cited suggestions include calls for greater restrictions on immigration into the United States including enhancing border fencing projects, enforcement of laws already on the books, guest worker programs, undefined calls for immigration reform, more free trade policies, and calls for population control in countries such as Mexico. Eighteen of the articles do mention the high level of fatality rates on the United States–Mexico borders among crossers. Migrant deaths are often blamed on “coyotes” (a term used for guides paid to escort immigrants across the border),5 however eighteen of the articles do actually include critiques of the militarization of the United States–Mexico border.





Three of the solutions posed in the press (population control, stronger immigration policies, and free trade) deserve a bit more discussion. In perhaps one of the more strongly worded doomsday articles I came across, Pianin (2001) explains to readers of the Washington Post that according to a study by the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, “Within the next five years—for the first time— there will be more people living in cities than in rural areas throughout the world, and most population growth will occur in teeming cities in Asia, Africa and South America” (Pianin 2001; emphasis added). The study also suggests that rapid population growth in “megacities” has kept leaders from meeting the basic needs of their citizens (shelter, water, food, health, education) and has produced environmental destruction, as well as rampant disease (Pianin 2001). Pianin goes on to explain that migration into urban centers like Los Angeles and New York is creating similar problems and again points to the Johns Hopkins study, which “concludes that while many of these cities face unprecedented challenges, a number of steps can make cities more livable and protect the environment. These include increased family planning, better urban planning, more public transportation, better sanitation and water use policies, energy conservation, urban farming, and waste recycling” (Pianin 2001). The inclusion of strategies besides population control is heartening; however, I am deeply concerned about who will be targeted for so-called family planning (i.e., population control), given the innumerable historical and contemporary examples of racist, sexist, and xenophobic population control programs violating the reproductive health and human rights of women of color and workingclass women in the United States, as well as poor women of color around the world, as briefly discussed in the introduction and chapter 1. I do not get the impression that population control programs will target women with systemic race and class privilege in the United States or elsewhere. No one should ever be targeted for forced sterilization or coercive contraceptive use for any reason anywhere in the world. However, all the articles that featured discussions of population growth focused on the “teeming” cities of the “developing world,” which suggests to me that once again, women of color and working-class women are the targets of population control owing to the greening of hate. In fact, Judy Mann (2000) argues that population control in Mexico has already helped mitigate the kinds of consequences argued in the Johns Hopkins study just mentioned: “Thirty years ago, the projected



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population for Mexico in 2000 was 172 million people—which would have led to a nightmare of poverty and environmental degradation and an explosion of immigration across the U.S. border. Instead, a combination of international development and family planning has led to economic growth in Mexico and the reduction of family size from an average of six children to three. While we hear horrible stories of life in Mexico’s urban slums, the situation is not the disaster it would have been without family planning becoming a part of Mexico’s culture” (Mann 2000). Mexico’s family planning apparently came right in time for Mann, who also claims, “misery, poverty, hopelessness, overpopulation, and environmental degradation breed wars” (Mann 2000). In a 1997 article, also for the Washington Post, Mann criticizes the “gutting” of international family planning programs despite, in her estimation, their role in curtailing immigration into the United States: “Although Americans complain bitterly about excessive immigration, Congress last year effectively gutted the international family planning programs—the very programs critical to making developing countries more desirable places for men and women to work, live and raise families” (Mann 1997). She also highlights the work of Population Action International who warn, “pressures on the environment—ranging from increased greenhouse gases to decreased farmland and usable water—will continue to build if world population growth is not slowed” (Mann 1997). She concludes, “In Mexico, which has received extensive aid, the number of children now averages three per family. Think of the pressure on the Texas and California borders today had that aid not been in effect” (Mann 1997). Once again, countries of the Global South and immigrants of color are scapegoated as threats to U.S. security; therefore, population control strategies (among others) are directed their way. The rationales of those eighteen articles that mention family planning as a means by which to reduce immigration into the United States coincide with the neo-Malthusian positions expressed by mainstream ES scholars and proponents of ES in the state. In his USA Today Magazine article David Simcox (1997) provides perhaps the most dramatic example of neo-Malthusianism in relation to both population growth and immigration: “A country already overpopulated in relation to its resources must make these choices within the limits set by an over-all population policy—a careful balancing of fertility, mortality, and immigration that will permit the U.S. population to recede toward a sustainable level in the next century. The message we must send abroad is not an





open invitation to scores of millions more, but an affirmation of our commitment to bring the U.S.’s population size down to the limits of the nation’s and the planet’s life supports. Limitation of political asylum is central in that message” (1997, 14). Despite the frustration over perceived governmental inaction, groups like Federation for American Immigration Reform6 and Glenn Spencer’s American Patrol also use the mainstream media to call for similar governmental solutions to ending immigration across the United States– Mexico border. Both organizations “share fundamental policy goals: large-scale deportations, deep cuts in legal immigration, more border guards and barriers and denial of birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented parents” (McDonnell 2001, 14). Indeed, many immigration foes call for stricter immigration control policies. With respect to free trade and immigration, Washington Post journalist Thomas Lippman (1996) contends that a strong Mexican economy, not sealed borders between it and the United States, is the answer to slowing immigration. Discussing William Christopher (Clinton administration Secretary of State) and Clinton administration positions in general, Lippman (1996) explains, “national security for the United States is defined by the establishment of stability, prosperity and environmental responsibility abroad, not by sealed borders or superior firepower.” This is interesting considering that the Southwest Border Strategy, which essentially sought to seal the border from “illegal aliens” through militarized means, was also a product of the Clinton administration. Even more interesting, however, is Lippman’s further elaboration of Christopher’s position on free trade: “In Argentina, once gripped by repressive military rule and now a democracy, Christopher paid tribute to the commitment of the reformed armed forces to international peacekeeping and toured a vast new Wal-Mart to espouse free trade” (1996). While it may be quite cynical to say that the Clinton administration views Wal-Mart as the answer to dictatorial violence and oppression, it does demonstrate the remarkable faith that many have in free trade policies as solutions to everything from ending state violence to ending environmental degradation. NATION, NATIONALISM, PRIVILEGE,

AND

EXCLUSION

A good deal of frustration and sometimes hostility is leveled against Latino/a immigrants within the editorial and opinion pages of a number of the news sources examined here. Arguably, letters to the editor may



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reflect public sentiment more than the sentiments of the newspapers themselves. The regular contributors to the newspapers, and the newspapers themselves, do not do enough to challenge the racist, sexist, and xenophobic stereotypes underlying anti-immigrant hostility and violence. Moreover, in the articles produced by regular newspaper contributors, as well as the spaces reserved for op-ed pieces, anti-immigration positions (and the stereotypes underlying these positions) are voiced more frequently than the analyses of organizations like Border Action Network, CWPE, and other social justice organizations, much less the Latina/o members of these organizations and/or residents of communities along the United States–Mexico border themselves. Many of the media pieces examined for this chapter tacitly strengthen the assumption that not only is America a homogeneously white nation but that it should also remain as such. Again and again, anti-immigrant forces imply and explicitly state that rights and resources should be reserved for “legitimate” American citizens and should be protected from the supposed abuse and exploitation of “outsiders.” This is reflected in the general lack of in-depth analysis of immigration, the stereotypical depictions of immigrants and immigration, as well as the marginalization of immigrants themselves within the stories and opinion pieces on immigration in the mainstream media. I believe that the articles produced by both regular and guest contributors provide insight into, and indeed impact, their readers’ sense of fear, security and nationhood. As a result, particular understandings of American environmental, national, and civilizational (in)security are also reinforced. ANTI-IMMIGRATION STEREOTYPES

AND

POSITIONS

Hostility is leveled at both Mexico and those crossing the United States–Mexico border within some of the opinion pieces and letters to the editors of mainstream U.S. media sources. Several tie social and economic arguments against immigration together with environmental arguments, as is the case with an opinion piece featured in a 2001 edition of Arizona Republic: “Let American voters decide if immigrants from all over the world should become American citizens. Let the American people (4.5 percent of whom are out of work and cannot find a job) make this decision. Let Americans, whose children are being poorly educated, whose health care system is in trouble, and whose energy needs (such as gasoline and electricity) cannot be met. Ask voters, whose air is already dangerous to breath [sic], whose prices of goods from our markets are





rising each season, if America can afford to share any more of its resources” (Friedman 2001). According to this piece, economic, social and environmental resources rightfully belong to America’s legitimate (and voting) citizens, not “outsiders.” Although regular and occasional contributors to these newspapers tend to provide more nuanced discussions of the debates around immigration across the United States–Mexico border than some of the openly hostile letters to the editor I read, frustration and scapegoating (and sometimes even hostility) are not absent in this context either. Previously discussed articles by Fineman (1996), T. Lippman (1996), Mann (2000, 1997), Pianin (2001), Samuelson (2000), and Yeh Ling-Ling (1997) are instructive examples. Further, discussions of the dynamics behind immigration and environmental destruction, while mentioned, are rarely discussed in the critical depth I deem necessary given the current climate of anti-immigrant disinformation, anger, and violence nationwide. The majority of voices represented in the media articles I examine are government employees—politicians, public officials, border patrol agents, et cetera—and “average citizens” writing to letters to the editor. Immigrant-rights groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and the Political Ecology Group are referenced (or write articles or letters to the editor) on twenty-one occasions. Thirty of the 141 articles include references to (or on occasion are written by) members of antiimmigrant groups such as Federation for American Immigration Reform and the Center for Immigration Studies, as well as individuals like John Tanton, an active anti-immigration figure who I discuss in greater depth in chapter 4. Frankly, I am surprised to see the inclusion of some of the more extremist anti-immigration forces (some with ties to hate groups) quoted and referenced in some of these newspapers at all. Of course, antiimmigration positions are also frequently discussed without mentioning groups like Federation for American Immigration Reform or others specifically. It is also extremely important to note that there is very little inclusion of the voices of those who have survived crossing the United States–Mexico border themselves within the mainstream media sources I have examined; only eight of the 141 articles I examined did so. People who have immigrated into the United States, especially Latinos/as, are largely and erroneously constructed as objects of discussion, rather than people with agency, subjectivity, or voice, much less theories on the international dynamics of migration and the forces pushing and pulling people to



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migrate across the border into the United States. This is consistent with the position expressed by Zoe Hammer-Tomizuka (2007) that those who have crossed the United States–Mexico border are most commonly represented in the mainstream media as either enemies or victims but rarely as agents, political or otherwise. By contrast, Pronk compellingly recognizes migration as a form of resistance: “Others resist. Such a resistance can take different forms: protest, economic action, migration, forming alliances or a political counter-offensive at high level” (2005, 80–81). Yet, in addition to quotes and interviews, it is the Federation for American Immigration Reform that is cited on numerous occasions, and immigration-restriction advocates including David Simcox (Negative Population Growth), Lamar Smith (R-TX and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee), and Yeh Ling-Ling (Founder of the Diversity Coalition for an Immigration Moratorium) have all had full-length feature articles published in mainstream media sources, as mentioned. There is a great deal of continuity in their positions against immigration as well. Part of this continuity however, may lie in the fact that John Tanton founded or cofounded thirteen of the organizations involved in the anti-immigration movement in the United States. Cohn quotes one of Tanton’s central arguments: “population growth threatens the environment. . . . [T]he key to population control in the U.S.A is to reduce immigration” (qtd. in Cohn 2000, 147). In 1994, Tanton asked readers of the San Francisco Examiner, “as whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion?” (qtd. in PEG 1998, 5). Tanton and his thirteen organizations advance an understanding of American environmental and civilizational security based on the construction of racialized and gendered outsiders as threats to the purity and safety of white American nationhood. Leaders and members of paramilitary groups (also armed with definitions of environmental and civilizational security similar to those of Tanton) are also frequently represented in the media. Roger Barnett (Ranch Rescue) is quoted in Los Angeles Times, Time, Arizona Republic, and Newsweek, and Glenn Spencer is the subject of a feature length article in Los Angeles Times. According to this article, Spencer is the leader of American Patrol and Voice of Citizens Together (McDonnell 2001). These organizations exist in addition to Spencer’s own radio show, which reaches more than a dozen cities in the United States (McDonnell 2001). I have already discussed in some detail the rhetoric of groups like American





Patrol, Ranch Rescue, and others, as well as the lengths to which some anti-immigration groups will go to stop immigration across the United States–Mexico border. Significant for this chapter however, is that members of these groups have any access to the mainstream U.S. media at all, especially considering that Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) defines American Patrol as a “hate group” (Southern Poverty Law Center 2002a, 2002b). Thus, the rhetoric of hate groups and paramilitary groups is no longer simply confined to threatening flyers posted at rest stops in Southern Arizona or to random Internet sites. Instead, their virulently racist and sometimes violent language is given national attention by the mainstream U.S. news media. Although not a subject of my interpretive analysis for this chapter, I would be remiss if I failed to discuss Lou Dobbs, whose anti-immigrant positions and guests are now routinely foregrounded in his daily CNN show. Although Dobbs has been using his show as a platform for his antiimmigration and anti-immigrant positions for some time, he does seem to have ratcheted up his rhetoric recently, even to the extent of claiming that undocumented workers are bringing leprosy into the United States, not to mention crime and violence. The SPLC took Dobbs to task on the stereotypes and disinformation on immigration he and his guests share on his show arguing that “in his daily reporting about immigration over the past several years, Dobbs has portrayed undocumented immigrants as violent, disease-carrying criminals invading the United States as part of a secret Mexican plot to ‘reconquer’ the American Southwest” (SPLC 2007a). I agree that it is dangerous for those with privileged media access to use that access to demonize (and dehumanize) entire groups of people (SPLC 2007a). I think it irresponsible of CNN to allow this kind of broadcasting as well. Dobbs’ rhetoric is especially irresponsible given the rise in racist and xenophobic hate groups and violence across the United States. In fact, according to SPLC, hate crimes targeting Latinos/as are increasing (SPLC 2007a; see the SPLC Web site for more information including its Intelligence Report for information on hate group activities across the United States). The mainstream U.S. media (along with some IR textbooks and elements of U.S. government discourse itself ) also empower paramilitary and other anti-immigrant groups by representing immigration as a significant security threat and by including anti-immigrant stereotypes in their articles without sufficiently or consistently challenging or problematizing them. Moreover, the mainstream media brings state and



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national attention to the positions of anti-immigrant organizers with greater frequency than the positions of organizations like CWPE (which was never mentioned in the articles examined here) or PEG, whose representative was given space for one op-ed piece in the Boston Globe in 2001 (PEG was not mentioned in the other articles, however). Furthermore, while Border Action Network has garnered a good deal of attention from local Tucson, Arizona, newspapers, I did not see their organization discussed in the national presses I examined. Highlighting voices of immigration foes over those of immigrant rights groups and immigrants themselves helps normalize anti-immigration positions (and violence) among the American public, especially when anti-immigrant rhetoric proceeds without strong and sustained critique. Additionally, fears of invasion and conquest are not uncommon in the mainstream media, nor are they uncommon in academia, as evidenced by Huntington’s latest work addressing the so-called “Hispanic Challenge” (2004b, see also 2004a). Like Huntington, Spencer (American Patrol) is particularly concerned about “reconquista” (“reconquest”) based on all of the racist, sexist, xenophobic stereotypes I have discussed thus far. Like Spencer and Huntington, Samuelson argues in his 2001 Newsweek article, “many Mexican immigrants have little desire to ‘join the American mainstream’ precisely because their overriding motive for coming was economic and their homeland is so close. . . . The job market, schools and social services can be overwhelmed by large numbers, especially—as is the case with Mexicans—when most immigrants come to only two states, California and Texas. The dangers are balkanizaton— a society increasingly fractured along class and ethnic lines—and a backlash against immigration” (Samuelson 2000). The threat of demographic, social and cultural balkanization (in Samuelson’s terms) or reconquista (in Spencer and Huntington’s terms) of the Southwest United States by Mexican immigrants are perspectives or fears that are growing in popularity. Together, anti-immigrant forces within the media (as well as academia, and the U.S. government) perpetuate a particular reading of nationalism and U.S. identity in the post–Cold War and post-9/11 era, one based on “white American nationhood” and the “new” threats posed by immigration across the United States–Mexico border to U.S. national, civilizational, and environmental security. Moreover, the identification and interpretation of new post–Cold War threats are based on a dynamic similar to that of the Cold War. Cold War rhetoric, in Adrienne Rich’s





words, taught Americans to fear “the horrors of communism” but did not invite them “to consider the butcheries of Stalinism, the terrors of the Russian counter-revolution alongside the butcheries of white supremacism and Manifest Destiny. We are not urged to help create a more human society here in response to the ones we are taught to hate and dread. Discourse itself is frozen at this level” (2003, 35). Rich goes on to suggest that “the discourse has never really changed,” nor has the bipolar Cold War mentality and the attributing of all U.S. problems to an external enemy (2003, 35). I am inclined to extend Rich’s analysis and the conclusions she draws to the enemy-creation process that continues unabated in this post-9/11 era as well. Immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border continue to serve as one of those external threats constructed within a persistent bipolar worldview that casts racialized and gendered Others as enemies of the American nation. This bipolar worldview is normalized by its inclusion in the mainstream media, which is further reinforced by its articulation in the work of many ES scholars, IR textbooks, and U.S. government security and environmental documents. CONCLUSION: NATION, “NEW” RACISM, “NEW” SEXISM,

AND

HATE SPEECH

In considering the anti-immigration rhetoric (environmental and otherwise), contained within some of the news media pieces interrogated for this chapter a few final points warrant discussion: The importance of recognizing different forms of racism and sexism within current debates over immigration and secondly, the operation of hate speech. Beginning with the former, ideological and institutional forms of oppression and privilege do change over time. Referring to Michel Foucault, bell hooks elucidates the ways “power as domination reproduces itself in different locations employing similar apparatuses, strategies, and mechanisms of control” (hooks 2003, 207). Power or domination is transformed, reproduced, and recycled to serve the interests of systemically privileged social groups in the United States. Thus, many intersectional, postcolonial feminists differentiate (and of course, recognize the connections) between, problematize, and simultaneously struggle against both “traditional” and “new” forms of racism, and sexism, and their intersections with other systems of power, privilege, and oppression. Traditional forms of racism, what Matsuda has called “gutter racism,” are based on biologically determinist arguments of racial hierarchy, with



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the U.S. system of slavery and Jim Crow laws, as well as “swastikas appearing on Jewish holy days [and] cross burnings” (Matsuda et al. 1993, 13) as examples. These traditional forms of racism still exist in the United States, as evidenced by the murder of James Byrd and, more recently, the Snohomish County Washington cross-burning case in which two teens were arrested and charged for burning a cross in the front yard of a local black pastor (SPLC 2004b). However, traditional forms of racism exist alongside new or symbolic forms of racism as well. Rather than arguments emphasizing biological distinctions between races (and biologically based superiority and inferiority arguments), “new” forms of racism (a.k.a. symbolic racism) tend to emphasize the position that people of color in the United States, “violate traditional U.S. values and thus do not deserve any special help” (M. Hughes 1997, 45). These “American values” include individualism, self-reliance, the (protestant) work ethic, obedience, and discipline (M. Hughes 1997, 46). Focus on these particular socially constructed values (and importantly, threats to these values) reinforce concerns over American civilizational security. To explain, structurally marginalized social groups are defined not so much as biologically, but culturally inferior, and at the same time, inequality is explained on the basis of “new” stereotypes of criminality, violence, deviance, and dependency that in reality are not really that new at all. The rhetoric has shifted a bit, but the basic philosophies and consequences remain entirely consistent with “old” racist stereotypes and representations of Others. Moreover, “blaming the victim” (i.e., blaming those experiencing the oppression of poverty or violence for example, for that poverty and violence), continues relatively unabated while attention is diverted away from the interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression that create and sustain inequality in the first place. Huntington’s “Hispanic Challenge” is an important case in point. Rather than claiming Mexican immigrants are biologically or genetically inferior, Huntington argues that their “refusal” to assimilate, along with their culturally produced proclivity for avoiding work, is to blame for their comparative poverty and moreover, this “cultural inferiority” threatens both national and civilizational security in the United States. Frighteningly, “new” racism combined with “old” racism permeates (to varying degrees, depending on the source) much of the anti-immigration rhetoric directed at Mexican immigrants in the United States today.





Unfortunately, symbolic racism can be found in many of the news media articles I examined in this chapter as well. Similar arguments can be made around traditional versus symbolic forms of sexism. While biologically determinist sexist arguments still carry much weight in the United States, they work in tandem with more symbolic forms of sexism, including the representation that Latinas have higher fertility rates and therefore threaten the carrying capacity of the United States, which operates alongside a whole host of other stereotypes constructing Latinas as duplicitous and greedy “resource depletors.” Here, symbolic sexism intersects with symbolic racism, as well as nationalism and xenophobia, to construct Mexican immigrant women as not so much biologically inferior but as “culturally inferior” by virtue of avoiding real work, their desire to exploit welfare, and their inability to control their fertility. This line of sexist and racist thinking permeates many of the articles examined in this chapter as well, and certainly permeates antiimmigration rhetoric around the country. As mentioned, both old and new forms of racism and sexism (along with classism, nationalism, and xenophobia) are deployed in order to divert attention away from systems of inequality and thus, the real causes of insecurity and environmental damage. For Chris Martinez (Political Ecology Group), immigration does not cause environmental damage. As he explains in his Boston Globe article, “Environmental problems don’t reduce to simple numbers of people or immigrants. Overemphasis on population growth makes it harder to understand the real causes of environmental degradation,” which include “[c]orporate greed, inappropriate technologies, and overconsumption [which] work hand in hand to wreak an environmental impact that most of the world’s population couldn’t imagine” (C. Martinez 2001). Unfortunately, migrants crossing the United States–Mexico border are instead scapegoated for everything from reductions in social services and economic insecurity to poor air quality. Furthermore, the scapegoating associated with the greening of hate is a powerful wedge strategy, which complicates efforts at coalition building across lines of difference. That the media sources examined in this chapter pay attention to Spencer, Federation for American Immigration Reform, and others does not mean that the media sources themselves promote or consciously seek to normalize their positions. One may argue that the words of anti-immigration forces demonstrate in and of themselves the hate with which they operate. This reflects what some call the “fresh air” position, indicating



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that once such racist and sexist ideas are aired in the public realm, the public will organize against it (see Matsuda et al. 1993 for a discussion and critique of this position). Further, in the free press of a democratic society, it is indeed important that all voices be heard. However, not all voices are routinely or equably heard, nor are the consequences of racist and sexist views, stereotypes, and disinformation equally distributed. When I speak of the rhetoric of anti-immigration groups, including anti-immigrant paramilitary groups, such as American Patrol, I use the phrase hate speech very deliberately. I understand that anti-immigrant forces can argue their “constitutional right to be racist” (Matsuda et al. 1993, 15), but their rhetoric sometimes meets the definition of hate speech developed in Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultative Speech, and the First Amendment. In this foundational book, critical race theorists Matsuda, Crenshaw, Lawrence, and Delgado define hate speech, or assaultive speech, as “words that are used as weapons to ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade,” and they regard racist hate speech as a significant tool in the larger arsenal of institutionalized racism in the United States (1993, 1). Matsuda defines racist hate speech in very narrow terms in order to preserve the First Amendment, and argues that speech must include all of the following in order to constitute hate speech: “1. The message is of racial inferiority 2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group 3. The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading” (1993, 36). The first element refers to speech that attempts to homogenize and deny the personhood of members of the group being targeted by identifying them as racially inferior (Matsuda 1993, 36). Skipping forward, the third element relates to “fighting words,” or rather, inciting action among audience members for instance, including violent action, against the group being targeted (Matsuda 1993, 36). Furthermore, hate speech not only incites violence, but also serves to rationalize and normalize violence against structurally marginalized social groups. The second element of Matsuda’s definition requires a bit more elaboration, particularly because it forms one of the core elements of my analytical framework. The second element of Matsuda’s definition highlights the connection of racist hate speech to the operation of racism as a system of power, based on the crucial distinction she draws between institutionalized racism, on the one hand, and individual bias or hostility (i.e., prejudice) on the other. The distinction between systems of power and the individuals who operate within them (and that would be all of us) is





a distinction that is invisibilized far too often in the United States, even among those attempting to engage in antiracist activism. As such, scholar-activist Beverly Daniel Tatum prefers to use the following definition of racism, “a system of advantage based on race,” and goes on to explain, “This definition of racism is useful because it allows us to see that racism, like other forms of oppression, is not only a personal ideology based on racial prejudice, but a system involving cultural messages and institutional policies and practices as well as the beliefs and actions of individuals. In the context of the United States, this system clearly operates to the advantage of Whites and to the disadvantage of people of color” (2007, 126). Likewise, Ayvazian uses this definition of racism and alters it slightly to define sexism (“a system of advantage based on gender”) as well as heterosexism (“a system of advantage based on sexual orientation”), and so forth (2007, 725). Crucially, the intersectional feminists just mentioned fervently argue that all of these systems of power exist as systems of power, and, importantly, they argue that these systems intersect, interlock, and mutually reinforce one another. This is critical because, simply put, I truly believe that the failure to recognize (as a starting point) the structural realities of racism, sexism, and others, render activist strategies aimed at eradicating inequality and violence ineffective. The words of paramilitary groups noted in this and previous chapters—including, for instance, Chris Simcox’s call for war in the Tombstone Tumbleweed—fulfills all three components of this definition. Moreover, so, too, do the words of Spencer, Barnett, and others. And yet, these voices are represented in the mainstream U.S. media, even though the popularization of their ideas perpetuates structural oppression. What’s more, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, whose members frequently claim space in the mainstream news media, was officially labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center on December 11, 2007 (SPLC 2007b). This designation is based, among other things, on the Federation’s ties to white supremacist groups such as the Pioneer Fund, not to mention the organization’s own virulently racist, xenophobic, sexist views, which incidentally, rely on both old and new forms of racism and sexism (SPLC 2007b). SPLC’s own research documents a 40 percent rise in the number of hate groups since 2000, which they attribute in part to rising levels of anti-immigrant hostility across the nation, and moreover, SPLC points to FBI statistics documenting a 35 percent rise in hate crimes against Latinos/as since 2003 (SPLC 2007b).



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I concur that there is a strong relationship between “naming and reality, knowledge and power” (Matsuda et al. 1993, 5), and, like Brah (2003), I perceive and “address [the] border as a political construct” (2003, 615) and believe that borders are “arbitrary dividing lines that are simultaneously social, cultural and psychic; territories to be patrolled against those whom they construct as outsiders, aliens, the Others; forms of demarcation where the very act of prohibition inscribes transgression; zones where fear of the Other is the fear of the self; places where claims to ownership—claims to ‘mine’, ‘yours’ and ‘theirs’—are staked out, contested, defended, and fought over” (2003, 625). The U.S. mainstream media assists in discursively solidifying this arbitrary border by adding authenticity to the representation of immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border as national, environmental, and civilizational security threats to American citizens.







H A P T E R

4

CONSTRUCTING ECOLOGICAL SENSIBILITIES: NGOS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY WAPNER ARGUES THAT ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS play a key role in disseminating “ecological sensibilities,” or norms, values, ideas, and cultural factors that impact people’s awareness of the environment and direct their behavior toward caring about and preserving the environment (Wapner 1996). My goal is to better understand the ways that organizations not only spread but also help construct ecological sensibilities around environmental security, population growth, and immigration across the United States–Mexico border. I begin this chapter by providing some background on what inspired my examination of the creation and dissemination of ecological sensibilities by the Sierra Club and Border Action Network. Three elements are particularly notable here; the work of Paul Wapner in relation to NGOs and environmental activism, the increasing number of organizations using environmental language in an attempt to justify their anti-immigration positions (i.e., the greening of hate), and finally, the promise of “counter-hegemonic” discourses for bringing about systemic, progressive change and thus the eradication of all systems of inequality. Speaking of immigration, Sassen argues that there are many more actors involved in policymaking than there were two decades ago in North America: “The policy process for immigration is no longer confined to a narrow governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction” (Sassen 1996b, 4). The same holds true of environmental policy. Wapner (1996) contends that environmental NGOs provide semi-autonomous, nonstate alternatives for environmental protection



C


and contends that, in addition to their numbers, “the scope and power of environmental activist organizations has dramatically increased” (1996, 2). For Wapner, the role of environmental NGOs in disseminating ecological sensibilities represents “a significant form of world politics even though it is not a matter of state activity” (1996, 14–15, 156–57). Wapner (1996) examines the work that environmental groups do to “heighten concern for the environment throughout the world” and explains how organizations “persuade vast numbers of people to care about and take actions to protect the global environment” (Wapner 1996, 44). Significantly, Wapner views this work as a political act and an important dimension of world politics (Wapner 1996, 44). I agree with Wapner, although I wish he would more fully address the different ways that NGOs can actually reinforce state-based and state-maintained global hierarchies, not to mention systems of inequality and the ideologies that support them. Wapner does draw on Gramsci’s work, suggesting, “state rule often permeates throughout civil society to consolidate power. In these instances, the state and civil society are practically indistinguishable as schools, councils, universities, churches, and even activist groups are regulated, monitored, or run by the state itself ” (Wapner 1996, 6); however, more interrogation of this dynamic by Wapner is warranted. I am compelled to investigate the significance of NGOs in the transmission and construction of ecological sensibilities in ways that resist and maintain national and international relations of power and inequality (not to mention the U.S. hegemony and empire). This is significant especially given Wapner’s own contention that NGOs can “have control over peoples lives” insofar as the role they play in “ordering widespread human action” (1996, 156). HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE

AND THE

GREENING

OF

HATE

There are a growing number of organizations that target immigration across the United States–Mexico border as a threat to U.S. environmental and national security. I have mentioned some of them already, such as Population-Environment Balance and the Federation for American Immigration Reform. Others include Negative Population Growth, Project USA, Carrying Capacity Network, Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization, and Diversity Alliance for a Sustainable America. I think it is important to discuss these groups in a bit more detail with respect to the



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role they play in constructing ecological sensibilities. Put bluntly, the ecological sensibility each group constructs and disseminates relies heavily on the greening of hate. Population-Environment Balance (hereafter, Balance) is the author of the 1997 advertisement in Sierra I spoke of in the introduction to this book. According to an information sheet mailed to me by the organization, Balance has thousands of members; has testified “numerous times” in front of Congress; has been invited to participate in “hundreds” of conferences; has advised government agencies; and has had its representatives interviewed for CNN, NPR, NBC, USA Today, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Atlanta Constitution, Atlantic Monthly, and other television, radio, and printmedia sources (Population-Environment Balance n.d., 1). If their literature is accurate, then a case could be made that the organization is able to reach a wide audience and disseminate particular ecological sensibilities about immigration’s connection to environmental degradation. Significantly, Balance plays a conscious role in constructing ecological sensibilities, explaining that they play a unique role as the only “national, non-profit grassroots membership organization that focuses on all components of U.S. population growth and their effects,” which allows them to mobilize supporters into action “in support of policies designed to achieve U.S. population stabilization and immigration reduction while educating environmentalists, policy makers and others about the link between population growth and environmental degradation” (Population-Environment Balance n.d., 1). Many anti-immigration, environmental organizations exploited fears over 9/11 to engender support for their positions against immigration. Shariatmadar points to organizations like Negative Population Growth, Project USA, Carrying Capacity Network, and Federation for American Immigration Reform as examples of organizations that conflate the language of environmentalism with that of antiterrorism in their campaigns against immigration (2002, 8–9). Population-Environment Balance also released an “Action Alert” entitled “Open Borders Lobby Pushed New Amnesties for Illegal Aliens Despite 9/11 Tragedy, Lay-offs, and a Weak Economy.” Balance argued against any kind of liberalized immigration policy based on their assumption that immigration threatens national security as well as economic and environmental security (2002e). “Fact #9” printed in their pamphlet “Balance Solutions: Population Growth and Environmental Security” claims quite explicitly, “Mass Immigration



Constructing Ecological Sensibilities


Threatens National Security” (Population-Environment Balance 2002f ). Balance members call for a five-year moratorium on “mass immigration” in order to achieve population stabilization in the United States, explaining, “We face a vast array of potentially devastating cultural and environmental problems threatening our very way of life. . . . Population stabilization is the only rational and achievable long-term solution” (Population-Environment Balance 2002f, 8). The racist underpinnings of organizations like Federation for American Immigration Reform are demonstrable by the fact that they (and others) receive money from the Pioneer Fund, which is labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC 2006). As mentioned in chapter 3, the Federation itself was labeled a hate group by SPLC in December 2007 (SPLC 2007b). Speaking again of the Pioneer Fund, Southern Poverty Law Center (2006) further explains, The Pioneer Fund was started in 1937 by textile magnate Wycliffe Draper with an original mandate to pursue “race betterment” by promoting the genetic stock of those “deemed to be descended predominantly from white persons who settled in the original thirteen states prior to the adoption of the Constitution.” Many of those involved with the fund early on, including its first president Harry H. Laughlin, had “contacts with many of the Nazi scientists whose work provided the conceptual template for Hitler’s aspiration toward ‘racial hygiene’ in Germany,” according to an article in the Albany Law Review.

These positions are consistent with those of Garret Hardin, the Federation’s former advisor and board member, who explained in one Omni article, “it would be better to encourage the breeding of more intelligent people rather than the less intelligent” (qtd. in Sferios 1998). The Federation’s founder, John Tanton, founded or funded at least thirteen of the anti-immigrant groups operating in the United States today, including Population-Environment Balance, Californians for Population Stabilization, NumbersUSA, and American Patrol (SPLC 2002a. See also SPLC 2002b; Border Action Network 2002c). Tanton’s publication Social Contract is also listed as a hate group by SPLC, and many of his groups have ties to white supremacy groups, are listed as hate groups themselves, or both (Willoughby 2004). The environmental rhetoric used by these organizations is often simply a guise for their sexist, racist, and xenophobic anti-immigrant agendas. Although their rhetoric can be extreme to be sure (like that of the paramilitary groups discussed in chapter 2), I am not comfortable dismissing groups like Federation for



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COUNTER-HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE

AND

SOCIAL CHANGE

Gramsci emphasizes the importance of formulating and spreading counter-hegemonic views, theories, and systems for bringing about total systemic revolution. As Albert explains, “the hegemonic struggle . . . itself determines which ‘concept of reality’ will infuse all social relations and thoughts. It is a cultural, ideological, and institutional struggle to establish the dominance of a new revolutionary world view over and above the previous dominance of the old bourgeois world view” (Albert 1974; emphasis in original). Gramsci’s goal, which I support, was to “bring about a transformative process, a unification of theory and practice, which will transcend the division of capitalist society into rulers and ruled, dominant classes and subaltern groups, state and society” (Rupert 1993, 79). Transformation of social reality necessarily develops through “the creation of an effective counter-culture, an alternative world view and a new form of political organization in whose participatory and consensual practices that world view is concretely realised” (Rupert 1993, 79). I believe that the lens of intersectionality associated with intersectional, postcolonial feminism is another absolutely essential tool for bringing about genuinely transformative, revolutionary change. Understanding the operation of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression, and the ideologies that underlie them, is central to the model of social change I employ. So, too, is the recognition that successful social justice work is (at its core) coalitional. Social justice work also occurs on multiple levels and within multiple spaces, including academic, state, and nonstate sites. NGOs may play a role in either reinforcing systems of inequality or aiding in revolutionary activism toward systemic transformation. These are some of the points that drive my focus on NGOs for this chapter. The work of CWPE, in exposing, challenging, and offering alternatives to the greening of hate, is an example of counter-hegemonic discourse, and further, CWPE represents one element of an ongoing and growing movement challenging the hegemony of neo-Malthusian approaches to environmental security, and frankly, mainstream environmental



American Immigration Reform or Population-Environment Balance either, not only because of their growing popularity but also because they share some of the same fundamental neo-Malthusian assumptions as many of the environmental security proponents discussed in previous chapters.


activism in the United States more generally. Theories and actions aimed at dismantling the greening of hate (and all forms of scapegoating) are crucial elements of any counter-hegemonic discourse. Moreover, rather than the greening of hate, a counter-hegemonic discourse on environmental security foregrounds fundamental societal, political, and economic transformation. In so doing, it supports theories and forms of resistance, including especially coalition work, aimed at bringing about genuinely transformative, long-term, progressive revolution aimed at ending all systems and ideologies of inequality and all forms of violence. In sum, questions of how environmental (and other) organizations disseminate ecological sensibilities are important. I think it is even more important, however, to interrogate how and why organizations construct ecological sensibilities. As an aside, it is important to note that this is not an either/or proposition. Activist organizations (like individuals), are able to develop and hold transformative positions on some issues, while simultaneously constructing incredibly problematic, even discriminatory theories on others. In both cases, there are very real, material consequences to knowledge production; in fact, with regard to population issues and environmental degradation, these consequences are life and death. The knowledge and forms of activism developed and disseminated by the Sierra Club and Border Action Network are no different. Organizations like these can go a long way in colluding with and reinforcing the ideologies underlying systems of power, privilege, and oppression, and they also have the opportunity to interrupt the ideological underpinnings of inequality. I turn now to an interrogation of ES discourse on population issues as it relates to the Sierra Club. EXAMINING

THE

SIERRA CLUB1

The Sierra Club is one of the most popular environmental organizations in the United States, as evidenced by their large national membership base and financial stability. As a journalist for the Washington Post explains, “Bolstered by anonymous gifts totaling more than $100 million, the group founded by John Muir, himself an immigrant from Scotland, now boasts an annual budget of $83 million and a membership of 750,000” (Eilperin 2004). The Sierra Club also enjoys a great deal of clout within the U.S. political establishment, the mainstream media, and among the general public. I agree with Mark Potok of SPLC, who explains, “The Sierra Club is the most prominent and influential group in America in terms of environmentalism” (Potok qtd. in Eilperin 2004).



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In addition, Barry (1999) notes an Aspen Institute survey of Congress and the Clinton administration naming the Sierra Club “the most effective environmental group in Washington, D.C. The Club was named more than twice as often as the National Federation of Independent Businesses, which ranked second, and three times as often as the next environmental group, the Environmental Defense Fund.” The Sierra Club garnered even more national attention with the second attempt in 2004 (the first was in 1998) by anti-immigration forces to change the Club’s neutral position on immigration to one explicitly calling for an immigration moratorium based on the linkages proponents assumed between immigration and environmental degradation in the United States. Anti-immigration forces attempted to take over the Sierra Club Board of Directors with anti-immigration campaigners like former Governor of Colorado Dick Lamm, David Pimentel (Cornell entomologist), and Frank Morris (formerly of the Congressional Black Caucus) (Tolerance.Org 2004). In response, antiracist organizations from around the country expressed deep concern, and SPLC not only joined Groundswell Sierra2 in a movement to defeat the anti-immigration candidates but ran its own candidate (Morris Dees) in order to draw attention to the severity of the situation (SPLC 2004a). The 2004 anti-immigration move was defeated once again by Sierra Club members. In fact, members voted for the candidates endorsed by Groundswell Sierra by a margin of about ten to one (Tolerance.Org 2004). As Barry (1999) explains, members voted “not to take a stand on the U.S. immigration policy. Instead, the Club will continue pursuing its goals to stabilize world population, rein in the overall birthrate, slow the spread of pollution and curb our consumption of the earth’s resources.” The Sierra Club was able to maintain its 1998 neutral position, as well as its 1996 Board of Director’s vote on immigration: “The Sierra Club, its entities, and those speaking in its name, will take no position on immigration levels or on policies governing immigration into the United States. The Club remains committed to environmental rights and protections for all within our borders, without discrimination based on immigration status” (Sierra Club 1996). The Sierra Club’s resistance to anti-immigrant forces is also noteworthy given that the Club has actually been a target of John Tanton since 1986, when he wrote about infiltrating the organization in a memo leaked to the press (Willoughby 2004). Potok (SPLC) contends that this focus could have emerged even earlier when Tanton “headed up the Club’s National Population Committee





between 1971 and 1975 and established his first immigration restriction organization, the Federation for American Immigration Reform . . . in 1979” (Willoughby 2004). During the 1998 takeover attempt, Political Ecology Group (PEG) responded to anti-immigration forces with a nine-part plan based on a coalitional, environmental justice approach that pointed out the relationship between anti-immigrant and white supremacist groups, as well as the failure of anti-immigration arguments in environmental as well as social justice terms. PEG explicitly defined the problem as follows: “immigrants and environmentalists were being pitted against one another, while the laws that protect both human rights and the environment were on the chopping block. So, we defined a positive mission: to bring environmentalists and immigrant rights movements together to reframe the debate and to organize to protect the environment as well as the health, human rights and livelihoods of all our communities” (Erickson and Brotsky 1998, 4). PEG condemned wedge strategies and scapegoating, highlighting instead corporate greed and overconsumption (not population growth or immigration) as “the true source of environmental degradation” (Erickson and Brotsky 1998, 4). Moreover, PEG identified immigrants as essential allies in the environmental justice movement, arguing, “We need to protect the environment but restricting immigration will not save one tree. We need to stop logging companies from clear cutting ancient forests and stop corporate polluters from fouling our air and water” (Erickson and Brotsky 1998, 4). SPLC, Groundswell Sierra, and other organizations used similar strategies to protect the Sierra Club and defeat the 2004 takeover attempt. I am relieved that the 1998 and 2004 takeover attempts failed and am inspired by the coalitional tactics used to defeat the anti-immigrant organizations. Taking a neutral position on immigration, however, does not mean that the Sierra Club fails to discuss immigration in environmental terms. Links between immigration and environmental degradation are indeed made within many of the Sierra Club documents I examine for this chapter, which are listed in the appendix. THE SIERRA CLUB

AND

POPULATION GROWTH

As previously discussed, neo-Malthusian positions on population growth lie at the center of the Western population paradigm and deeply inform mainstream ES discourse in the United States. The Sierra Club reflects a



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neo-Malthusian positioning within its Population Stabilization Program, even though their language is far more sanitized than that of the antiimmigration groups I have discussed and that of Hardin and Ehrlich. The Sierra Club tries to use terms like “population growth” rather than “overpopulation,” and “family planning” rather than “population control.” In addition, the Sierra Club does include discussions and analyses of other causes of environmental degradation, including poor city planning and development (especially with respect to urban sprawl), dangerous agricultural practices (especially in relation to chemical pollution), and the impacts of consumption rates in the United States. Stabilizing global population is not the Sierra Club’s sole focus.3 On the other hand, sanitized language does not mean a fundamental shift in perspective. The Sierra Club’s literature makes it abundantly clear that as an organization, it sees population growth as a root cause of global environmental destruction. Furthermore, like neo-Malthusians and similarly positioned ES scholars, the Sierra Club focuses on family planning for women and girls as a primary strategy for population stabilization and thus for saving the environment. The environmental impacts of population growth have been a central concern of the Sierra Club since at least 1965 (Sierra Club 1995), and it is the Sierra Club who persuaded Paul Ehrlich to write The Population Bomb in 1968, a book that, as the Sierra Club (1995) itself explains, “established population as a national environmental issue and triggered population as an essential component of the first Earth Day in 1970. The Club established a volunteer Population Committee at that time as the internal voice for the population issue. The Sierra Club adopted its first population policy in 1969, and began taking positions on legislation shortly thereafter.” Given its history, reach, and authority, the Sierra Club plays a significant role in spreading and building an ecological sensibility around the central role of population growth in environmental destruction. The Sierra Club also mirrored mainstream ES scholarship when it resolved, along with Zero Population Growth that “the foreign policy of the United States should reflect the urgent realities of the population-environment crisis. Adopted by the Board of Directors, June 4, 1970; amended July 8, 1995,” and further argued that “the Earth’s limited reserves of arable and habitable land, as well as mineral and energy resources, are already being so severely strained by the existing population that it is clear that increased population growth threatens our survival as a civilized species. Food and resource scarcity complicates the inequitable





allocation of these resources, promotes competition for these resources, promotes competition between nations, and can lead to destructive economic and military conflict.” These last statements were part of World Population Year policies adopted by the Board of Directors, May 4–5, 1974 and amended July 8, 1995 (Sierra Club n.d.[b]).4 Recent policy language (Sierra Club 2007) offers a more sanitized discussion of “voluntary family planning” and mentions the role of Western consumerism in environmental destruction. However, much of the 2007 document focuses not on Western consumerism, but on population growth. Given the positions just mentioned, I characterize the Sierra Club as part of mainstream ES discourse in the United States. Population stabilization is a primary focus of the Sierra Club, and its positions reflect the theoretical foundations of mainstream ES scholarship. The Sierra Club’s overpopulation rhetoric also mirrors the environmental security discourse of the U.S. government under the Clinton administration and that of the mainstream U.S. news media. By engaging in the greening of hate, the Sierra Club reinforces systems of inequality. The Sierra Club (n.d.[e]) actively works to “educate Sierra Club members, policymakers and the general public about the vital links between population, consumption and conservation.” Although examining consumption rates is important, discussions around consumption within the mainstream environmental movement in the United States often hinge on extremely simplistic analyses of power relations. As Sferios explains, “Despite the fact that the wealthy consume far greater resources than the poor, it is not consumers, but producers—and the social institutions in which they operate—which account for the vast majority of environmental degradation. Most consumers have little control over industrial production and consumption decisions, and most industrial production and consumption decisions are made with little regard for population levels” (Sferios 1998). This is a very striking argument, especially considering simplistic consumption arguments often come back full circle to scapegoating population growth in the Global South. For instance, the authors of the textbooks I examined lament the growing populations of countries of the industrializing Global South (especially China). They also do so based on the assumption that industrializing countries will want to consume “just like us.” Sferios goes on to explain: “Only if one believes the laissez-faire notion that supply merely fills demand . . . can one blame consumers for the environmental degradation resulting from industrial production. . . .



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The notion that higher population equals greater demand, however, and that individual consumer choice fuels production, are basic assumptions underlying the arguments of anti–population growth environmentalists” (Sferios 1998). Speaking again of the Sierra Club, although focus on consumption is laudable, and although nine of the documents I examine discuss policies associated with neoliberal globalization, the Club’s focus on consumption falls into the very traps Sferios speaks of. Further, “Overpopulation is not so much a cause as it is a symptom of the same corporate and government policies that produce both environmental degradation and social injustice. The solutions, therefore, are not coercive population control measures like forced sterilization or militarizing the borders, but rather the radical transformation of the global economic system. On a grassroots level much of this work is already being done, but much more needs to happen” (Sferios 1998). These traps and assumptions not only characterize the Sierra Club but also underlie mainstream ES discourse on population issues in the United States more broadly. The Sierra Club was also extremely active in response to the “6 billion mark” of global population. In one release, members of the Sierra Club explain, “The Sierra Club recognizes that all of our environmental successes may be short-lived if they do not include efforts to address population growth. With our planet now home to more than 6 billion people and almost one-half of them under the age of 25, the choices individuals make today, will have a tremendous impact on the future. Meeting the basic needs for family planning and reproductive health services now is a necessary investment for an improved environmental future” (n.d.[k]). The Sierra Club is certainly not alone in its responses to global population growth or the 6 billion mark. Many organizations believe that population growth is a central cause of everything from food insecurity to urban sprawl, and as mentioned, they often assume that countries of the Global South want to develop and consume “just like us” in the Global North. Variations in cultural values, histories, and goals, not to mention differences in social locations owing to interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression are often lost (or ignored) in this argument, as are differences not only in how much is consumed but also in what is consumed. Again, few individuals have control over production processes. Issues of consumption are far more complicated than simplistic focus on numbers of people and consumer demand suggest.





With population growth seen as a root cause of environmental harm, population stabilization through family planning is seen as the best solution, according to the Club, as “the health of our planet is directly linked to the health of families. Therefore, one of the most comprehensive ways to address rapid population growth is through voluntary family planning programs” (Sierra Club n.d.[d]). The Sierra Club endorsed Zero Population Growth’s platform on population stabilization and its position on the means by which stabilization may be achieved globally: Be it resolved . . . That we must find, encourage, and implement at the earliest possible time the necessary policies, attitudes, social standards, and actions that will, by voluntary and humane means consistent with human rights and individual conscience, bring about the stabilization of the population first of the United States and then of the world; That pursuant to this goal, families should not have more than two natural children and adoption should be encouraged . . . That laws, policies, and attitudes that foster population growth or big families, or that restrict abortion and contraception, or that attempt to constrict the roles of men and women, should be abandoned; That comprehensive and realistic birth-control programs should be available to every member of our society; That environmental, population, and sex education should be readily available. . . . Adopted by the Board of Directors, June 4, 1970; amended July 8, 1995. (Sierra Club, n.d.[b])

Put another way, members of the Sierra Club’s Population Stabilization Program explain that their goals lie in stabilizing population growth and reducing consumption through the promotion of domestic and international family planning (Sierra Club, n.d.[b]), based on the assumption that more people equals more consumption. In fairness, members of the Sierra Club do discuss the importance of reproductive health services, education, and empowerment for women, and members also discuss the importance of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in their literature. However, I contend that the Sierra Club’s vision of “family planning” (with women and girls as the primary targets), has less to do with reproductive justice or human rights, than it does with saving the environment. Women’s human rights seem like a secondary concern, based on the documents I have examined. As the Sierra Club itself suggests: “The Sierra Club’s Global Population and Environment Program seeks to protect the global environment and preserve natural resources for future generations by slowing population growth and reducing



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wasteful consumption. In order to achieve these goals, the Sierra Club recognizes that women worldwide should have access to voluntary family planning so they are better able to choose the size and spacing of their families—improving their quality of life and taking steps toward a more sustainable environmental future” (n.d.[c]). Again, although the Sierra Club does claim a commitment to advancing women’s human rights, this focus is secondary to that of protecting the environment. Instead, control of women’s bodies acts as a path by which environmental sustainability may be achieved and implicitly, women are then scapegoated (by virtue of their fertility) for environmental degradation. This focus is even more troubling in light of myriad historical and contemporary examples of racist and sexist-driven population programs that violate women’s rights through forced and coerced sterilization and long-term chemical contraceptive use. I am not willing to take for granted the Sierra Club’s commitment to women’s reproductive health and rights until it, at minimum, addresses in more depth histories and contemporary practices of reproductive injustice, consistently speaks out against them, and explains in explicit terms how its program’s focus on “family planning” is different. In 1974 (amended 1995), the Sierra Club did call for discussion on “issues of racial or national genocide” claiming that population stabilization does not constitute a threat of genocide (n.d.[b]), but not enough public discussion about this has occurred. Furthermore, I did not find much information from the Sierra Club focusing specifically on men’s access to, or responsibility for, family planning, and I found only a few documents that even mentioned men in passing. Instead, based on the documents I examined, primary focus lies on controlling women’s fertility. The Sierra Club does do a better job than anti-immigration organizations like Population-Environment Balance and others in representing women as agents rather than helpless victims or evil perpetrators of environmental destruction, although I would not say that either representation is completely absent. There are Sierra Club documents that continue to represent women, especially “Third World women,” as irresponsible and unable to control their fertility. For instance, one Sierra Club document explains, “The Sierra Club’s Global Population and Environment Program supports efforts to empower women and families through education about responsible reproductive health and natural resource use— vital components of the global goal to secure a healthier environmental future” (n.d.[j]). In addition, although focus on population growth and





stabilization in the United States is not absent, there is much more focus on population stabilization among “Third World women” than among Western women. The Sierra Club does have a domestic U.S. family planning program aimed at improving women’s access to reproductive healthcare and “helping to prevent over one million unintended pregnancies each year” (n.d.[d]). However, based on my research, I maintain that the preponderance of the Sierra Club’s overpopulation discourse primarily targets women in the Global South for population stabilization (or control) strategies. Similarly, the Sierra Club gives much more attention to the environmental consequences of overpopulation in the Global South for the United States than it does the environmental impacts of U.S. consumption patterns, production practices, or militarization on the rest of the world. This privileging perpetuates an “us versus them” orientation and a particular reading of the American nation and civilizational security, one that locates American intervention as the solution for environmental destruction and one that seeks to protect American security from the dangers posed by the particularly racialized and gendered external threats emanating from a Kaplanesque Third World. Again, until authors, activists, and organizations explicitly commit to interrogating histories and continuing practices of forced or coerced sterilization, forced or coerced abortion, and forced or coerced long-term chemical contraceptive use in the name of “security” (be it environmental, national, or civilizational) and explicitly commit to investigating the operation of white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy in denying genuine reproductive justice (among other things) to women and explicitly commit to engaging antiracist feminist reproductive justice theory and activism (and therefore stop perpetuating representations of “Third World Women” as “enemy Others”), I am not willing to assume that talk of family planning or population stabilization, however sanitized the language, represents a genuine dedication to women’s health, welfare, and empowerment, much less reproductive rights, regardless of how many times CEDAW is mentioned. THE SIERRA CLUB, IMMIGRATION,

AND THE

ENVIRONMENT

Based on the documents I have examined, when the Sierra Club talks about immigration and environmental concerns, it most frequently does so in the context of population issues. Immigration is most often defined as a population issue or as a symptom of overpopulation. Setting the



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terms of debate in this way leads one to the “logical” conclusion that the solution to environmental destruction lies in population stabilization strategies. The Sierra Club calls for population stabilization strategies to address immigration in over half of the documents I examined. Consequently, women and their fertility are targets of strategies aimed at saving the environment in the context of population and immigration control. In reference to the 1998 anti-immigration defeat, Pope explains, “A year and a half ago Club members voted to remain neutral on the issue of immigration. Members still have strong personal feelings on the topic, and it is clear that any official position by the Club would be deeply divisive. The third approach, however, is one that all can support. By opening the doors of education and social participation for the world’s women and children, we can not only help our human family to a better life but reduce our pressure on the planet as well” (1999). To quote Zinn (2002), one cannot remain neutral on a moving train. Choosing to remain neutral is taking a position. Furthermore, even though I see language about women’s human and reproductive rights in the Sierra Club documents I examined, including the essay by Pope I just quoted from, I still come away with the impression that the focus on women’s empowerment has less to do with women than it does with ending the ecological damage that Sierra Club members assume is caused by women’s fertility rates, especially women in the so-called Third World. Women’s human rights are not seen as important only in and of themselves. Instead, women’s fertility is seen as a cause of both immigration and environmental destruction. So, it’s not so much that the Sierra Club refuses to take a position on immigration; the majority of Sierra Club members just see population control as a more effective strategy than an immigration moratorium for addressing the root causes of environmental destruction. As the Club explains, it “takes no position on United States immigration levels and policies. The Club’s membership voted on April 25, 1998, to remain committed to environmental rights and protection for all within our borders, without discrimination based on immigration status. With this vote, our members have shown they understand that restricting immigration into the U.S. will not solve the planet’s environmental problems” (n.d.[a]). Instead, the majority of members believe (based on their votes in both 1998 and 2004) that “the Sierra Club can more effectively address the root causes of global population problems through its existing comprehensive approach,” which includes supporting the right





to reproductive health care and equity for women, as well as addressing “the root causes of migration by encouraging sustainability, economic security, health and nutrition, human rights and environmentally responsible consumption” (n.d.[a]). The Sierra Club believes that “by addressing the issues of girls’ education, women’s empowerment, and access and availability of family planning services,” it can “positively impact population and migration issues” (n.d.[a]). Again, the Sierra Club is not denying that a link exists between immigration and environmental destruction; it simply takes the position that population stabilization strategies will better address the root causes of immigration (that being population growth), which is itself defined as a primary source of environmental destruction around the globe. In sum, the Sierra Club most frequently addresses immigration as a population issue and defines population growth as a core cause of environmental destruction, which implicitly defines migration as a cause of environmental destruction. Rather than a moratorium on immigration, Club members voted to maintain their focus on addressing population issues (both population growth and migration) through family planning and population stabilization programs. This maneuver is also popular within a number of Clinton administration documents and world politics textbooks I examined. The Sierra Club’s contextualization of immigration within population concerns is evident in its 1978 immigration statement. This statement called on Congress “to conduct a thorough examination of U.S. immigration laws, policies, and practices,” including analysis and discussion of “[t]he impact of immigration of different levels on population trends in the United States.…The disproportionate burden on certain states, and….The effect of immigration to the U.S. on population growth and environmental quality in this country” (n.d.[b]). This call was based on the Sierra Club’s stated belief (adopted 1978) that “developed nations must work toward greater conservation of resources as well as population stabilization in order to reduce impact on depletion of non-renewable resources, creation of pollution, and damage to ecosystems. This combination would remove the root causes of international migration, by providing more equitable opportunities for people throughout the world. A major challenge facing the United States is to help influence the world in this direction” (n.d.[b]). This last sentence goes a long way in perpetuating dualisms that once again represent the United States as a savior and source of environmental solutions rather than environmental harm.



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Like U.S. government and media documents, as well as many of the world politics textbooks I examined, the Sierra Club also links immigration to environmental destruction in their discussions of environmental refugees; however, the Club’s discussions of dislocation often include more focus on globalization, militarization, and racism. This does not mean, however, that focus on women and overpopulation is absent here. In the online document “Women’s Health, Earth’s Health,” the Sierra Club explains, “Disasters that send environmental refugees fleeing their homes are exacerbated by growing population and poverty. More than 120 million women worldwide would like help in planning the size of their families, but lack access to contraception” (2000a). This last sentence also relies on the very popular “savior/victim” dualism, which represents the West (especially the United States), as the savior, and represents the so-called Third World as the victim. This binary dualism not only inferiorizes the Global South, but also goes a long way in rationalizing U.S. intervention into Other countries. The Sierra Club discusses environmental refugees in the context of global warming as well. For instance, Glick (n.d.) draws on the work of Leggett and others who suggest that “global warming could force hundreds of millions of people to migrate from areas facing sea level rise, severe drought, or other severe climate impacts. . . . Coupled with the existing problem of rapid population growth, regional and international migration due to the loss of ‘productive’ land would exacerbate the hardship and stress for refugees and the communities to which they migrate.” Readers have little choice but to come away from both articles with the assumption that environmental problems are due in large part to the fertility rates of Third World women. These arguments were reflected and reinforced in the 2007 Nobel Prize speeches by Al Gore and Rajendra Pachauri. As mentioned, even though the Sierra Club does have a domestic U.S. family planning program, more emphasis is placed on both population growth in and environmental destruction emanating from the Global South in the context of immigration (See Sierra Club n.d.[i]; 2005b). The lead sentence to McConahay’s (2000a) article reads, “Where do immigrants come from? Many are fleeing environmental disasters in their homelands-acts of God compounded by growing population, poverty, and corporate greed.” The author goes on to explain, “According to the authoritative annual World Disasters Report of the Genevabased Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 96 percent of the globe’s





environmental refugees come from such developing countries” (2000a). So, immigration is defined as a population issue and “Third World” population growth is defined as a significant cause of environmental degradation. Both are then are constructed and represented as threats to U.S. environmental, and thus national security. There are moments when McConahay does broaden her focus to include the impacts of maldevelopment, especially dam building. Overall, nine of the documents I examine highlight the destructive impacts of maldevelopment project and policies connected to neoliberal globalization. With the World Bank–financed Chixoy Dam in Guatemala as a primary example, McConahay explains: “Some disasters are neither acts of God nor human errors; many environmental refugees are displaced by deliberate development projects” (2000b). Sierra Club members also examine the consequences of NAFTA and the maquiladora industry for both immigration and the environment (Pope 2001; 1998). Indeed, most of the information on the United States–Mexico border that I found from the Sierra Club was delivered in the context of discussions and critiques of NAFTA and the maquiladora industry. Although some articles use footpaths arguments, other documents explicitly critique the environmental impacts of the Southwest Border Strategy itself; and some do both. As previously noted, paramilitary groups use footpath arguments quite frequently to scapegoat immigration for environmental destruction and ignore the key role played by border officials and enforcement in environmental destruction. Sierra Club members are more careful than paramilitary and other anti-immigrant groups to examine policies associated with the Southwest Border Strategy and the “program of deterrence” (continued under the G. W. Bush administration) in pushing migrants into sensitive, remote, wilderness areas. Immigrants are not scapegoated for environmental harm to the degree that they are in the literature of paramilitary groups or groups like Federation for American Immigration Reform and Population-Environment Balance. Notably, Sierra Club worked in coalition with thirty-two environmental and human rights organizations to express concern to Doris Meissner (INS) over the serious environmental threats posed by Southwest Border Strategy, specifically Operation Rio Grande (Sierra Club 1997; see also Conservation Action Network 2002). Also notable is the Sierra Club’s Environmental Justice campaign, which recognizes and challenges environmental racism around the country. This



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presents another significant departure from the rhetoric of paramilitary groups and organizations like Population-Balance Activist and Federation for American Immigration Reform. With respect to immigration, McCloskey argues that, “the quest for environmental justice is based on the principle that environmental protection must serve everyone, not just the privileged. Solutions that shift burdens to the poor, minorities, and the defenseless are no solutions at all” (1999, 3). Pope (2004) also addresses and rejects racism and xenophobia by critiquing what he calls the shamefulness of early eugenics-based calls for population control (specifically those by Henry Fairfield Osborn) and by sharing and denouncing a number of hate-filled e-mails he received in the wake of the 2004 Club immigration debates. There needs to be much more frequent and in-depth discussions and rejections of these histories and contemporary practices both within and outside the Sierra Club, however. In sum, I do not want to paint the Sierra Club with too broad a brush or completely dismiss the environmental protection work they have undertaken. Among other things, the Sierra Club does avoid the overtly racist and sexist language of the Federation for Immigration Reform and other such groups, and the Club does, to some degree, discuss environmental justice, CEDAW, neoliberal globalization and racism in the documents I have examined. Nevertheless, I still contend that neoMalthusian pessimism serves as the dominant lens through which the Sierra Club understands and addresses the link between environmental destruction and population issues (including both population growth and migration). In other words, the Sierra Club ultimately engages in the greening of hate in ways that are consistent with the broader, mainstream discourse of environmental security in the United States. Population growth is still constructed as the key cause of environmental destruction and women, especially women in the Global South, are constructed and represented as the primary targets of family planning. The Sierra Club’s response to controversies over immigration into the United States is also problematic. Despite the defeat of anti-immigration forces, the Sierra Club does link immigration to environmental destruction by defining migration as an issue of population, defining population issues as a key cause of environmental destruction, and then defining population stabilization as the core strategy for ending environmental destruction. Like the rest of mainstream ES discourse in the United States, by engaging in the greening of hate (however sanitized the language), the Sierra Club helps reinforce systems of power, privilege, and





oppression and the linkages between environmental, national, and civilizational security discourses that construct “Third World Others,” especially women of color, as the principle threats to U.S. security. The Sierra Club’s position paper entitled “Our Stance on Migration,” provides another important example of this dynamic. This is a relatively nuanced position paper in that it does focus on systems of inequality and even critiques anti-immigrant stereotypes, as well as dominant immigration policy in the United States. However, the Club includes a very disturbing analysis of population issues. Speaking of U.S. financial contributions to the UN Population Fund, the Sierra Club writes, “The UN estimates that the U.S. share alone prevented almost 2 million unwanted pregnancies annually—far more than even the highest estimates of U.S. immigration. Instead of supporting these successful programs, however, the Bush administration eliminated such funding entirely” (Sierra Club 2005a, 2). Am I to believe that the women, men, and children who presumably migrate to the United States over the course of a year are the products of unintended pregnancies—pregnancies that would have been addressed and perhaps avoided had the Bush administration supported family planning? Given the histories and contemporary abuses of population and immigration control inside and outside the United States—policies and practices that the Sierra Club fails to adequately interrogate—it is not difficult to walk away from this position paper with such an interpretation. Moreover, the sentences quoted above point to the very neoMalthusian dynamic that I argue dominates Sierra Club discourse on environmental security. Moving away from the Sierra Club national (or the Sierra Club “proper”) for a moment, it is important to note that members of Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization (SUSPS) take a much more explicit and overtly xenophobic and racist position against immigration in the debates over Sierra Club policy. In so doing, SUSPS rhetoric more clearly reinforces the connection between civilizational, national, and environmental security discourse. SUSPS has many powerful supporters, including Lester Brown (President of Worldwatch Institute), Herman Daly (co-founder, International Society of Ecological Economics), Dave Foreman (co-founder Earth First!), Martin Litton (former Sierra Club Director, John Muir Award), Norman Myers (senior advisor, United National Population Fund), Charles Remington (co-founder Zero Population Growth), Stewart Udall (Secretary of the Interior 1961–1969, Counselor



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Grand Canyon Trust), and Captain Paul Watson (co-founder Greenpeace, founder, Sea Shepherd) (Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization 1998). Further, even though this position was defeated in 1998 and 2004, a sizable number of Club members supported it and perhaps, continue to. It is important to reiterate that a neutral position on immigration does not mean the Sierra Club is silent on immigration. With respect to the 1998 decision, Pope explains, “This is not to deny that immigration is an important topic. It has economic consequences, it influences our sense of who we are as a people, and it even has local environmental impacts. But while Sierra Club members share the country’s strong (and varied) feelings on immigration, they declined to make it a Club issue. Restricting immigration, they decided, is not the best way for us to protect the environment. . . . Immigration restrictions don’t solve environmental problems, they merely shift them elsewhere” (Pope 1998). As in 1998 and 2004, the Sierra Club board took a neutral position on immigration in 1996; “in February, the Sierra Club national Board of Directors voted that ‘the Sierra Club, its entities, and those speaking in its name, will take no position on immigration levels or on policies governing immigration into the United States. The Club remains committed to environmental rights and protections for all within our borders, without discrimination based on immigration status.’ . . . The Club will continue to aggressively work toward world population stabilization through international family planning, equality and empowerment of women and maternal and infant survival programs” (Sierra Club 1996). Despite this “neutrality,” the Sierra Club allowed Population-Environment Balance to run the advertisement for their organization (and for immigration restrictions) that I discussed in the introduction. Garcia and Erickson responded to the 1997 advertisement in Sierra with a strong critique of the greening of hate so central to Balance’s arguments. Maria Sepulveda of Balance countered with a letter claiming Balance is neither racist nor anti-immigrant. According to Sepulveda (1997), Balance “did not make any comments against immigrants, only about the damaging effects of excess immigration on the environment,” and “the unsustainable immigration policy of the United States.” In response, Erickson and Garcia (1997) argue that if Balance “really opposes racism, why not renounce Garrett Hardin and eugenics? BALANCE’S goal of an immigration moratorium will not help solve our environmental problems but it will militarize the border, criminalize





migrant workers, trample human rights and let polluters off the hook. Only forward-thinking and equitable policies to end overconsumption, overdevelopment and toxic production will result in lasting environmental gains for everyone.” Similarly, if it is not the intent of an author or organization to support racism, sexism, or eugenics, then their work simply cannot support neo-Malthusianism or fail to critique its extremely racist, sexist, xenophobic positions. As PEG and Earth Island Institute also point out, Hardin (who, to reiterate, was Balance’s honorary president at the time and a former vice president of the American Eugenics Society) argues against humanitarian assistance, believing “many Americans can be shamed into sending food to the starving. . . . Tragically, flights of food that save lives increase fertility—which increases the mistreatment of the environment” (Erickson and Garcia 1997). If Balance does not support these positions, it needs to reject them outright. Likewise, I believe that if the Sierra Club genuinely wants to engage in environmental justice work, it should consistently, vigorously, and publicly renounce the work of Hardin and reject neo-Malthusianism overall. The Sierra Club must also explicitly address and renounce oppressive and deadly population and immigration control policies, past and present. Although more nuanced, the Sierra Club’s work ultimately reflects and reinforces the neo-Malthusian foundations of mainstream ES discourse on population issues. Taking a “neutral” position on immigration policy does not do much to counter racism, sexism, and xenophobia. With respect to the 1998 policy debates, Elbel (1998) argues, “Taking ‘no position’ on immigration is a position.” Elbel goes on to argue however, that a neutral position essentially supports unsustainable population growth in the United States. In other words, he advocates that the Sierra Club take a clear stand against immigration (Elbel 1998). I, too, believe that taking a neutral position is unacceptable, but for vastly different reasons than Elbel. While it may avoid fracturing Sierra Club membership (a fear expressed by some members), the Sierra Club’s positions on population issues leave the door wide open for analyses that construct people from the Global South, especially women, as enemies of U.S. environmental security. Simultaneously, it reinforces the construction of America as a civilized, “white” nation threatened by external, “nonwhite” enemies. A neutral position does not challenge the greening of hate, which I find indefensible in this era of increasing hostility and violence toward immigrants of color, including people crossing the United States–Mexico border. The Sierra Club’s “neutrality” is



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simply not good enough. Again, one cannot be neutral on a moving train (Zinn 2002).

The paramilitary group American Patrol calls members of Border Action Network “Fanatical Mexican Invasion Boosters . . . Hardcore Traitors and Open-borders Lunatics” and believes they have close ties “to leftwing radical Morris Dees and his Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘Mexican government agent’—vehement reconquista Isabel Garcia and her Aztlan gang, ‘Derechos Humanos,’ and other anti-American groups” (American Patrol 2007; capitalization in original). The Network does work in solidarity with SPLC and Derechos Humanos in support of immigrant rights and social justice. Social justice requires (in part) an end to the militarization of the United States–Mexico border and therefore an end to the activities of groups like American Patrol; which probably explains American Patrol’s hostility toward Border Action Network. Border Action Network (formerly Southwest Alliance to Resist Militarization) formed in 1999 in response to the shooting death of Ezequiel Hernandez “and works with immigrant and border communities in southern Arizona to ensure that our rights are respected, our human dignity upheld and that our communities are healthy places to live” (n.d.[a]). Border Action Network is a community-based, immigrant-led organization, comprised primarily of residents of southern Arizona border communities and their allies. Members and allies of the Network also include former border patrol officials and former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner who are now speaking out against the militarization of the border and its devastating impacts (Hammer-Tomizuka 2007). The Network is also allied with members of the Tucson coroner’s office (Hammer-Tomizuka 2007), who have seen firsthand the consequences of the program of deterrence central to the Southwest Border Strategy and the Secure Border Initiative. Members of Border Action Network developed and agreed upon twelve core principles to guide the Network and their work. Significantly, these principles were developed around the question of what members needed to live a dignified life (Border Action Network n.d.[a]; n.d.[b]): 1. Permanent Residency 2. Civil & Constitutional Rights 3. Workers Rights



EXAMINING BORDER ACTION NETWORK


4. Human Mobility 5. Family Unification 6. Education 7. Health Care 8. Healthy Communities 9. Dignified Housing 10. Civic Participation 11. Culture & Language 12. Dignity, Respect & Equality

These guidelines reflect the Network’s grounding in and commitment to the communities of which Network members are a part, and a commitment to privileging the voices, needs, analysis, and activism of families and communities most directly impacted by the militarization of the United States–Mexico border: Peoples of color (particularly but not exclusively Latino/a) and low-income residents of border communities such as Nogales, Douglas, and Tucson, Arizona. Members of Border Action Network engage in campaigns of education and resistance against the militarization of the border, immigrant prisons, neoliberal globalization, violence, discrimination, and environmental destruction: “Relying on education, community organizing, direct action, and litigation, Border Action Network is building a movement demanding dignity, rights, and a healthy environment on the U.S.Mexico border” (Border Action Network 2004a, 2). Although I have not seen the specific term used in their documents, I argue that the work of Border Action Network is undertaken through a feminist intersectional lens, given its focus on understanding and resisting multiple systems of power, privilege, and oppression, including the racist, xenophobic, and sexist myths and ideologies that support systems of inequality. Moreover, their work is grounded in a commitment to coalitional politics aimed at exposing and ending anti-immigrant scapegoating and violence and engendering social justice. To this end, members utilize an array of tools and strategies including (but not limited to) human rights documentation, litigation, policy analysis and advocacy, petition drives, and prayer vigils, as well as mass marches and protests in Arizona and Washington, DC. Their strategies are connected by a common dedication to leadership development and coalition work, as well as long-term goals of building “the voice and power of those who are impacted the most by border and immigration policies and to build a national movement that calls for the fulfillment of human rights in this country” (n.d.[a]). As Border Action Network



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(n.d.[c]) explains, “for Hispanics and Mexicans that live along the border, it is clear that the region has turned into a zone where people—citizens, legal residents and undocumented alike—are regularly denied fundamental civil rights.” In response, as an immigrant-led organization, Border Action Network devotes itself to advancing the power of immigrant families and border communities to bring about institutional change, environmental justice, and social justice. Border Action Network members utilize tools with which to train one another to defend their rights and those of their families and communities in the Southern Arizona and Northern Sonora region. As you have probably already noticed, I draw heavily on the Network’s work in my own research and writing, as well as my activism and teaching. I greatly appreciate its grassroots focus and nonhierarchical organizing structure, as well as its commitment to working within communities and with indigenous nations most impacted by the United States–Mexico border’s militarization. I also appreciate the similarities between their modes of analysis and activism and those of intersectional, postcolonial feminism. The members (now over five hundred) and staff (now numbering four) cover a tremendous amount of ground in their multiple campaigns, which only makes sense given the complexity and depth of their analyses. I have found it difficult, however, to restrict my discussion to ES discourse on immigration. Be that as it may, in this section I will prioritize Border Action Network’s analysis and activism around militarization, the greening of hate, and environmental destruction with the recognition that all three are deeply interconnected with the prisonindustrial complex, human rights violations, neoliberal globalization, histories of colonialism, and systems of inequality. I encourage readers to visit Border Action Network Web site, which is itself an important educational and activist tool. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

AND IMMIGRANT

RIGHTS

As Border Action Network (n.d.[l]) explains, the United States–Mexico border region is incredibly beautiful and rich in diversity: From the rare vernal pool habitats of southern California and the gallery stands of cottonwoods along the Rio Grande in southern Texas, to the fragile deserts of Arizona, the Southwestern border environment is truly one of the most majestic places on earth. The communities of the border are a mix of small, rural ranching communities and Indigenous Nations




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The United States–Mexico border region is home to numerous national parks, wildlife refuges, national conservation areas and wilderness areas populated by a vast and diverse array of plant, reptile, amphibian, bird, and animal species (Border Action Network 2004a, 3)—and, of course, diverse communities of people. Border Action Network members conducted their “Border Mapping Project” precisely to document these areas and illustrate the amazing cultural, natural, and historical diversity within them. This project also challenges the strange but fairly popular myth that the desert Southwest is simply a hot, empty, lifeless wasteland. I believe this myth, in part, lies behind support for the decision to shave off hilltops and fill in canyons like Smuggler’s Gulch (California) in the name of protecting the “homeland” and strengthening national security. Border Action Network does link environmental destruction and immigration, though it does so in vastly different ways than the Federation for American Immigration Reform, and on different terms than those set by Sierra Club, the majority of world politics textbooks and U.S. government documents I examine. Unlike mainstream ES discourse in the United States, Border Action Network sees immigration and environmental destruction connected primarily by virtue of their simultaneous violation and exploitation by militarization, neoliberal globalization, and systems of inequality. In other words, persistent violations of civil, human, labor, and immigrant rights, as well as the exploitation of the environment (and the denigration of environmental rights) all have common systemic causes. Immigration and the environment are also connected through the Network’s commitment to defending “human rights, civil rights and environmental protection on the Arizona-Mexico border” (Border Action Network 2003c). In its Border Mapping Project and its report Environmental Protection on the Line (2004a), Border Action Network dramatically illustrates the environmental degradation caused by the militarization of the border and in so doing, challenges the greening of hate. Based on extensive research including border monitoring, interviews, and photo documentation conducted over the course of four years, Network members argue, “While the Border Patrol draws huge amounts of taxpayers’ money for what has shown to be an ineffective border policy, it does not meet the



that straddle both sides of the border, to communities that survive on cross-border trade and bustling urban centers. The people that make up these border communities include recent immigrants from Mexico, longer-term immigrants from Europe, to the original inhabitants of this country, rich with culture, history and significance.

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minimum requirements for environmental protection but rather blames immigrants for its own destructive activities. This report exposes these inadequacies and calls for widespread opposition to continued funding for such devastating and ineffective border enforcement activities” (2004a, 2). Although Border Action Network does not use the phrase, members do challenge the greening of hate (as well as the scapegoating of immigrants for social, economic, and political problems) by documenting and demonstrating the devastating impacts of militarization and other immigration policies and practices. Network members also expose the systemic and systematic violation of civil and political rights by the state and other agents of militarization, including paramilitary groups like American Patrol. Broadly speaking, be it in war or in preparation for war, militarization has extremely negative environmental consequences, and these consequences are direct and immediate, as well as cumulative and long term. I also agree with Jon Barnett, who argues, “Militarisation is arguably the single biggest institutional risk to human beings” (2001, 19). These points hold true for the United States–Mexico border region, where militarization under the Southwest Border Strategy (Clinton) and the Secure Border Initiative (Bush) threatens ecosystems and habitats, areas of cultural, historical, and spiritual significance, as well as life within the region. Rather than repeating my discussions from chapter 2, I will focus on Border Action Network’s analysis of the environmental consequences of militarization for communities along both sides of the border, particularly the border areas of Northern Mexico and Southern Arizona. Please note, however, that my discussion of militarization builds on an understanding of militarization that refers to the combined policies and practices of the U.S. federal government, state governments, and local and national law enforcement bodies—including police, border patrol, National Guard, JTF-6, and other similar units—as well as the actions of paramilitary groups, all of which are coordinated and conducted on the basis of LIC doctrine. The result (and goal of LIC doctrine) is the creation of a climate of fear, indeed a war zone, within which border communities (especially communities of color) are disproportionately targeted for “military-style policing” (Border Action Network n.d.[q]). In addition to violations of human and civil rights, the militarization of the United States–Mexico border region “is threatening fragile border ecosystems, squandering hundreds of millions of tax payer dollars and





violating basic environmental protections and regulations,” (Border Action Network n.d.[i]), including NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) guidelines. Of course, NEPA guidelines have became a moot point, given the G. W. Bush administration’s authorization for Michael Chertoff and the Department of Homeland Security to ignore environmental laws in order to more efficiently “protect the homeland.” As the DHS (2005) fact sheet on SBI states, “DHS will expand infrastructure systems throughout the border where appropriate to strengthen our efforts to reduce illegal entry to the United States—exemplified by Secretary Chertoff ’s announcement to waive certain legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious completion of the 14-mile Border Infrastructure System near San Diego, California” (emphasis added). Environmental regulations, including NEPA guidelines, can be ignored. Border Action Network’s research demonstrates that NEPA guidelines were already being ignored, or at best were being insufficiently implemented, by border enforcement officials for some time (2004a, 2003b). In spite of all of this, immigrants are continuously blamed for environmental damage, especially in the context of what I have been referring to as the footpath argument. Border Action does not dispute the fact that migrants cross the desert (2004a, 11–12). In fact, Border Action Network is among many organizations arguing that the program of deterrence instituted under Clinton’s Southwest Border Strategy (and continued under Bush’s Secure Border Initiative) has actually pushed migrants into more remote and fragile areas of the desert Southwest in the first place. But rather than reinforcing the footpath argument, Border Action Network’s research demonstrates the common-sense recognition that the agents and implements of militarization have a far more harmful effect on the environment than migrants walking across the desert. It is comparatively rare that border enforcement itself is focused upon within mainstream ES discourse in the United States, however. There are a number of different ways in which militarization of the United States–Mexico border harms the environment. After forcing migrants to take more dangerous routes into the United States, border enforcement and other officials have responded with more agents, roads, trails, fencing, and so forth, in once-remote areas of the desert Southwest. Border officials and policymakers often treat these more remote and ecologically fragile areas with the same careless disregard as they have previous crossing routes. The creation of “drag roads,” for instance,



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purposely destroys vegetation to enable border enforcement officials to better see and track footprints left by border crossers (Border Action Network 2004a, 4). Drag roads are maintained at least three times per day (Border Action Network 2004a, 12). Interestingly, border officials often use the excuse that areas are already disturbed to support building permanent roads. What is not highlighted is the disturbance of areas by border officials themselves with the creation of drag roads, as well as trail construction and off-roading. Off-roading by border officials is quite common, according to witness testimonies, and has serious environmental impacts: “Off-road activity has great impacts on the health of the land and wildlife, particularly in desert areas where recovery from such abuse is an extremely long process, one that will not be witnessed by people alive today. Such activity strips topsoil, reduces the ability of soil to sustain vegetation, increases susceptibility to water and wind erosion, forms crusts on the soil that increases runoff and decreases water infiltration, increases sediment transportation and deposition, and degrades habitat for plants and animals. . . . Additionally, stress may produce physiological and behavioral changes that alter wildlife patterns” (Border Action Network 2004a, 13–14). It is worth emphasizing here that the consequences of off-roading, alongside the other practices associated with “sealing the border” through its militarization, are cumulative and long term, and recovery itself is a long process. In addition to allowing access to patrols and other enforcement activities, trails and roads are constructed in the service of building fences and walls. As the SBI fact sheet states, “As in San Diego, DHS will improve border infrastructure in certain areas by increasing physical layers of security, building access roads to enable Border Patrol to speed response efforts, installing stadium style lighting to deter border crossers, and providing surveillance cameras to monitor incursion along targeted areas of the border” (DHS 2005). Road and trail construction, and off-roading, as well as the “physical layers of security” themselves, destroy vegetation, fragment habitat, and, in so doing, disrupt feeding and mating patterns (Border Action Network 2004a, 4, 13–15). Roads and off-roading also contribute directly to the death of wildlife, as wildlife is commonly hit by speeding patrol cars. Incidentally, the danger posed by speeding patrol cars is routinely noted by residents of border communities, particularly in terms of the safety of their children and other loved ones. There are multiple environmental harms associated with wall and fence construction, including habitat fragmentation and disruptions in





movement, feeding and mating patterns among wildlife. Stadium-style lighting further harms the movement, feeding, and mating patterns of nocturnal birds and animals (Border Action Network 2004a). In addition, low-level (under 200 feet) helicopter flights cause stress and negatively impact both feeding and mating patterns among wildlife (Border Action Network n.d.[w]; n.d.[j]), as does the noise from off-roading. As Border Action Network explains, noise pollution “can result in hearing impairment or loss and stress. Hearing impairment can lead to increased predation and difficulty in locating and killing prey, as well as inability to hear mating signals, warning calls, and calls by juveniles” (Border Action Network 2004a, 13–14). Troop deployment and training activities, in addition to all the aforementioned, directly and indirectly kill wildlife as well (Border Action Network n.d.[j]). Moreover, at least 107 already threatened or endangered species are further imperiled by militarization (Border Action Network n.d.[j]). Network members work in coalition with a number of different environmental organizations around conservation and preservation efforts for hummingbird, bat, and butterfly habitats (n.d.[i]), the protection of large cat species in the border area, such as the jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi, mountain lion, and bobcat, as well as the Sonoran pronghorn antelope, which is particularly threatened (n.d.[j]). As Border Action Network explains, Unfortunately, the very existence of these species in the U.S. is threatened by Border Patrol and military activities, especially the hundreds of missions involving fence construction and vegetation clearing. The extremely imperiled Sonoran pronghorn antelope is also highly threatened by Border Patrol and Military missions. At the heart of this threat are low level helicopter flights at less than 200 feet, which have been shown in scientifically documented studies to cause antelope fawns to become separated from their mothers. Only 150 pronghorn remain in Arizona, and the species is in grave danger of becoming extinct within the next 50 years. (n.d.[j])

Overall, “the Southwestern border environment is being sacrificed on the altar of the war against drugs and the war against immigrants” (Border Action Network n.d.[j]). Although I feel I have just barely scratched the surface of the role of militarization in the ecological destruction of the United States–Mexico border area, I want to provide just one more example of the environmental consequences of militarization. I hope that readers will examine the reports produced by Border Action Network about the environmental devastation on the border resulting from its militarization. 10.1057/9780230611863 - Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security, Jessica LeAnn Urban


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What I have been calling the footpath argument is especially popular among members of paramilitary groups, and more recently, among border patrol and land management officials. Central to this argument are the positions that migrants illegally cross into the United States through public and private property and as they do, trample vegetation, kill endangered animals for food, start wildfires, and leave mounds of trash behind in their wake. These positions are flawed on a number of levels. Beginning with the trash argument (which is very popular), suggesting that migrants simply leave trash in the desert is incredibly disingenuous. According to numerous eyewitness testimonies, Border Patrol agents often force suspected undocumented migrants to leave their belongings behind upon arrest (Border Action Network 2004a, 10–11; 2003b). The Environmental Protection Agency is apparently aware of this practice and is quoted in Border Action Network’s report: “It is our understanding that even when illegal immigrants are apprehended, BP does not require them to take their belongings with them and they remain dumped on the ground” (Border Action Network 2004a, 10–11). Despite this acknowledgement, the EPA participates in scapegoating immigration for environmental destruction (i.e., the greening of hate) within a 2002 report for the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriation Committee (Border Action Network 2004a, 10–11). There is remarkable consistency between the positions of border patrol and land management officials, EPA officials, and members of paramilitary groups with respect to the footpath argument. In fact, Border Action Network (2004a) points to a concerted effort among the aforementioned to blame immigration for the lion’s share of environmental problems on the border, as evidenced by the 2002 report for the U.S. House of Representatives prepared by INS/Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Forest Service, and the EPA. The report was to explain and develop a plan to mitigate the environmental damage done by immigration (Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 2002, 1). Although the report does acknowledge that U.S. immigration policy has forced migrants into more remote and ecologically sensitive areas of the desert, the report is virtually silent on the environmental impacts of militarization (Border Action Network 2004a). In this case, scapegoating allows proponents of the program of deterrence (and the larger policy framework provided by Southwest Border Strategy and the Secure Border Initiative today) to garner support for sealing the United States–Mexico border on environmental grounds without having to address their own culpability in environmental 10.1057/9780230611863 - Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security, Jessica LeAnn Urban




destruction. Deterrence-based policies remain popular despite their ineffectiveness in environmental terms and in terms of reducing “illegal immigration.” Border Action Network recommends (among other things) that all infrastructure projects be stopped until full environmental analyses take place, and until alternatives to current immigration policies and infrastructure projects can be genuinely discussed (2004a, 25). Paramilitary groups demonstrate their connection to the militarization of the border by adopting environmental rhetoric to simultaneously justify and hide their own racist, sexist, and xenophobic agendas. The same holds true for groups like Population-Environment Balance and Federation for American Immigration Reform. As mentioned, antiimmigrant groups stepped up their rhetoric following 9/11, conflating the language of environmentalism with that of anti-terrorism, as exemplified by the literature of Negative Population Growth, Project USA, Carrying Capacity Network, and Federation for American Immigration Reform (Shariatmadar 2002, 8–9). For them, immigration-induced population growth in the United States is an environmental and national security threat. Moreover, the “environmentalism” of paramilitary groups often comes in the form of neo-Malthusian private property arguments that reflect the positions of Garrett Hardin (1968) in particular. Paramilitary groups claim they are simply protecting their land from the destruction wrought by migrants. Yet, paramilitary groups are strangely silent on the practices of Border Patrol: Again, what is not shared with the public is that the Border Patrol routinely enters private property without permission and even against the will of property owners. In surveys done for Border Action Network’s report, Justice on the Line, almost 50 percent of residents in Douglas and Nogales were aware of Border Patrol entering private property without permission. Residents have experienced Border Patrol agents entering their homes without their permission, repeatedly going through their backyards, crossing property lines without regard, shining flashlights in their homes, and even trying to kill a person’s dog. Other border residents complain that the Border Patrol crushes water lines, dumps water tanks, scares away livestock and game from stock tanks, rips signs down, knocks fences down, and makes off-road paths wherever they like. (Border Action Network 2004a, 11)

The militarization of the United States–Mexico border is ignored, the behavior of agents of militarization like Border Patrol is ignored, even the consequences of U.S. foreign and economic policy with Mexico is largely



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ignored. Instead, immigration and immigrants themselves are scapegoated for environmental destruction. These are powerful examples of the greening of hate in action. In Hate or Heroism: Vigilantes on the Arizona-Mexico Border, Border Action Network (2002c) documents the environmental damage caused by militarization and further discredits the claims of paramilitary groups and others who routinely blame migrants for destroying their property but ignore the impacts of militarization itself. To reiterate, “[o]verpopulation is not so much not so much a cause as it is a symptom of the same corporate and government policies that produce both environmental degradation and social injustice. The solutions, therefore, are not coercive population control measures like forced sterilization or militarizing the borders, but rather the radical transformation of the global economic system. On a grassroots level much of this work is already being done, but much more needs to happen” (Sferios 1998). Although they are often treated as separate topics, numerous social justice organizations from around the world, including Border Action Network, illustrate the intimate connections between militarization and neoliberal globalization. In a 2003 letter commenting on the Draft Supplemental Environmental Assessment for Infrastructure within the U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor (Cochise County, Arizona), Border Action Network (2003b) drew on the work of the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights to convincingly argue, “Over the last two decades, the deepening domination of North countries over South countries, globalization, has increasingly blurred the differences between refugees and migrants. Forced displacement, whether by tanks or banks, results in communities being forced to abandon their homes; only some end up crossing international borders to survive.” As with historical processes of colonization, neoliberal globalization works in tandem with militarization, especially in the context of quelling popular opposition to a variety of different United States–imposed free trade policies (Border Action Network, n.d.[s]). Border Action Network cites examples from Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa to support its position that the “US and its allies are in reality crushing human rights, labor movements, national sovereignty and sustainable development in order to extract resources and commodify people into cheap sources of labor” (n.d.[s]). This analysis also disrupts flawed (although popular) assumptions that free trade policies represent a “Marshall Plan” for Mexico, bringing greater development and wealth for all. Quite the opposite is true. The “free trade” agenda of neoliberal





globalization promotes violations of human rights and repression of labor movements. It is also extremely important to note the Network’s position that globalization is a primary cause of migration to the United States rather than an antidote for it, as the Clinton administration envisioned (n.d.[s]). During a 1993 speech, Clinton explains that because of agreements like NAFTA, citizens of Mexico will “have more disposable income to buy more American products and there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be able to support their children by staying home” (Clinton Administration 1993b). G. W. Bush similarly explains in his 2006 NSS, “Economic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberty to create and build or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society. Economic freedom also reinforces political freedom” (2006d, 27). In stark contrast (and with starkly different understandings of freedom), the majority of Border Action Network documents that include attention to globalization advocate halting free trade policies like NAFTA and building genuine economic security on the basis of justice rather than the individual “right” or “freedom” to consume and exploit. Opening the United States–Mexico border for goods and services under NAFTA while simultaneously closing it to people, particularly people of color, under the Southwest Border Strategy (and the Secure Border Initiative today) is not accidental. As I have discussed elsewhere, this is a strategy by which U.S. and Mexican elites can create an exploitable pool of labor to serve the needs of capital. Despite stereotypes that immigrants are coming to the United States to “avoid doing real work” (the welfare magnet argument) and despite the contradictory assumption that greedy immigrants cross the United States–Mexico border in order to steal American jobs, the Network highlights NAFTA and the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as having devastated Mexico, as well as many working-class and middle-class communities in the United States. For members of Border Action Network, the way to save lives and promote justice is to end economic policies like Structural Adjustment Programs and NAFTA, which “have impoverished the majority of the Mexican population. Since NAFTA took effect in 1994, wages in Mexico have dropped by 33%, and the number of people living in poverty has risen from 27% to 51%” (n.d.[n]). Some members of Border Action Network took this message to the 1999 WTO protests as part of the “Sonoran Justice Alliance, a coalition of 23 environmental, religious,



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artistic and labor groups from Arizona” including members from “the Sierra Club; the Southern Arizona People’s Law Center; Students, Actors and Writers for Social Justice; Tucsonans for a Clean Environment. . . . Arizona Earth First!; Tucson Arts Brigade; the Center for Biological Diversity; Defenders of Wildlife; and the Southern Arizona Labor Council” (Yozwiak and Hawley 1999). Members of the coalition sought to bring greater attention to the relationship between neoliberal globalization, militarization, environmental destruction, the destruction of fundamental human rights, and the role played by the World Trade Organization in the aforementioned. In addition, Border Action Network took part in the immigrant rights protests of 2006. Despite mainstream media coverage to the contrary, hundreds of thousands of people participated in the nationwide immigrant rights protests and marches in 2006, touched off (in part) by HR 4437. Working in coalition with other progressive groups and building community is central to the Network’s principal guiding themes as well as the strategies members employ to bring about transformative social change. Exposing and eradicating the anti-immigrant myths and stereotypes that underlie scapegoating is also central to Border Action Network’s work. In fact, I contend that members of Network members recognize that violence is predicated on constructions and representations of immigrants as Others; as security threats and often, as less-than-human enemies to American civilizational, national, and environmental security. I see a commitment to challenging representations and constructions of Others especially in the organization’s focus on voice, agency, and empowerment. I agree that “media coverage of vigilante activities tends to grant the greatest amount of air time to their charismatic leaders, offering a small amount of counter-point coverage to human rights groups protesting the widespread abuse of immigrants along the border. The voices of southern Arizona community members, however, barely register and immigrant voices are silenced altogether” (Border Action Network 2002b). Exclusion and silence help perpetuate myths and stereotypes and therefore, help reinforce the constructions and representations of “immigrant Others” that form one basis of violence and systems of inequality. Furthermore, economic insecurity combined with anxieties over changing national demographics and anxieties over national identity help create a situation whereby immigrants are easily scapegoated for social, political, economic, and environmental problems in the United States.





It should not be permissible or possible to speak negatively about, much less blame, immigration across the United States–Mexico for the ills of the nation without, at the very least, listening to the voices, needs, analyses, and stories of immigrants themselves. Similarly, it is crucial that social justice groups work in coalition with immigrant communities (and in Border Action Network’s case, be led by immigrant families and, border residents themselves) to develop forms of resistance that best meet the needs of communities on their own terms. Border Action Network is one of the few organizations that put the needs, voices, theories, and experiences of those most impacted by the border’s militarization at the forefront of the organization. Border Action Network’s guiding principles and organizational strategies reflect Rachael Kamel’s (American Friends Service Committee) vital arguments about social change work: “While it is important for feminists to raise our voices to defend immigrants and all people against prejudice, scapegoating, exploitation, and abuse, it is even more important to recognize the resilience, determination, and creativity that are exercised every day by immigrants of all national origins and economic strata—as they move back and forth across national borders, establish new communities and new identities, participate in the lives of their host communities, and develop a new culture of resistance” (2002, 11). Very few of the documents I examine for this project represent immigration as a form of resistance. In fact, there is little such representation within dominant or mainstream ES discourse on immigration more broadly. As mentioned, Zoe Hammer-Tomizuka of Border Action Network (2007) notes that media representation of immigration across the United States–Mexico border hinge upon the construction of migrants themselves as either criminals or as victims, but rarely if ever, as political agents. Similarly, the positions of paramilitary groups like American Patrol, versus the positions and humanitarian work of organizations like Humane Borders, is often constructed as the “two sides” of the immigration debate within the mainstream news media (Hammer-Tomizuka 2007). Complicated, in-depth discussions of the dynamics of migration within or across borders are rarely found in the U.S. mainstream media. As an aside, it is also interesting to note that the work of Border Action Network is frequently covered in the Mexican media, as well as the media sources in Europe and Australia (Hammer-Tomizuka 2007). Such is not the case with respect to the U.S. mainstream media. These patterns of representation and exclusion are also illustrated by the results



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of my own interpretive analysis of the U.S., corporate news media. One of Hammer-Tomizuka’s roles within Border Action Network is to challenge these modes of representation by providing training sessions aimed at strengthening Network members’ media skills, and thus their ability to disrupt dominant representations of immigration, and challenge the exclusion of those most impacted by the border’s militarization from media discussions of immigration. Border Action Network is also one of the few places (along with CWPE) where I see the strategy of “shifting the center” at work. “Shifting the center” means putting the voices, stories, theories, and perspectives of those systematically excluded from mainstream scholarship, media, and policy at the center of our thinking and work (Anderson and Hill Collins 2001f, 14). I see a commitment to shifting the center in both the research and coalitional activism of Border Action Network and indeed, their research and activism are absolutely interconnected. In the “Community Protection Coalition” for instance, Border Action Network brought a number of different organizations together including “domestic violence and sexual assault victim advocates, civil rights attorneys, immigrant rights advocates, prison activists, and union members” to develop a broad plan to “prevent the increased imprisonment and racial profiling, threats to victims of violence, and erosion of community safety” and to “develop law enforcement policies that prevent officers from enforcing immigration and from calling the INS unnecessarily. To guarantee that the police adhere to this policy, we are calling for an oversight body that will monitor the practices of the police. . . . finally, we believe that an informed community is a safe community—we are working with neighborhood centers and community groups to inform the immigrant community about their rights when stopped by police” (Border Action Network n.d.[g]). Again, Border Action Network is an immigrant-led organization that puts the voices, needs, theories, and experiences of members at the forefront, which are, as just discussed, systematically excluded from mainstream media, as well as government discussions of immigration, not to mention, mainstream ES discourse on population issues and the hegemonic neo-Malthusian analysis on which it is based. It is also important to note that the strategies undertaken by Network members are context specific, meaning that members organize committees and actions in their own communities based on their own community’s needs (HammerTomizuka 2007).





Shifting the center and coalitional activism are crucial to disrupting the process by which people crossing the United States–Mexico border are constructed as “enemy Others” in the rhetoric of nationalism and antiterrorism. Both are also critical to disrupting the ideological foundations of systems of power, privilege, and oppression. In their report Hate or Heroism discussed in chapter 2, Border Action Network points out that since 9/11, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence has escalated, particularly as paramilitary groups have adopted homeland security rhetoric to “justify” their actions. Border Action Network’s work to deconstruct the ideological “justifications” for anti-immigrant policies and practice is also crucial to challenging LIC doctrine, which depends on dehumanization and fear in order to control targeted areas. In all, challenging the ideological pillars of scapegoating, including environmentally based myths and the greening of hate, is a crucial component of strategies aimed at resisting LIC doctrine and the militarization of the border, as well as ending anti-immigrant hostility, discrimination, all forms of violence, and interlocking systems of inequality. It is therefore, a crucial element of counter-hegemonic discourse aimed at engendering genuinely transformative, progressive, and systemic change toward the creation of social, political, economic, and environmental justice. The last example of Border Action Network’s commitment to shifting the center and coalitional activism that I will note here is connected to their 2003 report Justice on the Line. Network members interviewed approximately three hundred residents in four Arizona/Mexico border communities (Nogales, Douglas, Pirtleville, and Naco) to get a sense of the day-to-day experiences of residents with respect to the militarization of the border (Border Action Network 2003c, 1). What emerged from the report is a picture of ongoing intimidation, assault, harassment, and fear perpetuated by border policies and its agents. Once again, members of Border Action Network consciously foreground the stories, experiences, theories, and needs of members of border communities and immigrants themselves, which is absolutely crucial to building alliances and coalitions, to shifting the center, and to eradicating constructions and representations of Others. These examples are also significant because Border Action Network, like CWPE, recognize not only the racist and xenophobic foundations of the “war on immigrants,” but also the ways that sexism informs this war. Border Action Network protests and seeks to end sexist violence, as well as the intersections of systemic sexism with racism, and xenophobic nationalism, by pointing out, “LIC consistently



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results in an increase in violence against women, including physical and sexual assaults and verbal abuse,” and by documenting and exposing specific acts of racist and sexist violence (Border Action Network n.d.[r]). The importance of analyzing the operation of interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression and the importance of forging alliances that do not ignore or minimize difference cannot be overstated. Members of Border Action Network and CWPE do not dismiss difference, but instead, “use difference as a catalyst for personal and social transformation” (Keating 2003, 530). As Keating further explains, “through conversation, through exchanging stories, through exploring our differences without defensiveness or shame, we can learn from each other. . . . As we do so, we’ll begin forging commonalities” (Keating 2003, 530). I believe that a progressive movement that ignores coalition, ignores the voices of those most severely impacted by (in this case) the militarization of the border, and that ignores the operation of interlocking systems of inequality has little chance of achieving its goals. In fact, an organization that ignores the aforementioned runs the very real risk of actually perpetuating systems of power, privilege and oppression, their supporting ideologies, and the violence that results. CONCLUSION

So, what kind of ecological sensibilities are the Sierra Club and Border Action Network constructing and disseminating? To what extent do they inform, and are informed by, mainstream ES discourse on immigration, and to what extent do constructions of Others shape their understandings of environmental threats and dangers? The Sierra Club’s discourse on immigration reflects mainstream ES scholarship on immigration and indeed, serves as a powerful facet of mainstream ES discourse in the United States (which includes mainstream ES scholarship, mainstream U.S. media discourse, and much U.S. government discourse on security). Even though the Sierra Club does technically provide a nonstate alternative for environmental protection (Wapner 1996), I contend that the Club actually reinforces state-based and state-maintained global hierarchies and inequalities given its ongoing reliance on neo-Malthusian understandings and approaches to population issues and environmental destruction, or rather, its engagement with the greening of hate. Moreover, the Club’s grounding in neo-Malthusianism, plus their failure to adequately examine historical and contemporary population control practices and reproductive injustices, and the systems and ideologies of





inequality that underlie them, leave the door wide open for anti-immigration advances into their organization. It also leaves the door open for the co-optation of environmental rhetoric by groups like Federation for American Immigration Reform and Population-Environment Balance. In other words, the Sierra Club exemplifies Lindsley’s position that the “mainstream environmental movement in the U.S. currently suffers from a lack of progressive critical analysis of human rights and social justice issues that is necessary to deflect anti-immigrant advances into environmental terrain” (2001a, 20). Border Action Network provides theories, approaches, and coalitional forms of resistance that I believe, helps create a strong foundation for long-term, progressive, transformative, and revolutionary change. Unlike the Sierra Club, I do consider the work of Border Action Network to be counter-hegemonic. Like intersectional, postcolonial feminists and organizations such as CWPE, Border Action Network refuses and deconstructs xenophobic, racist and sexist constructions of Others as environmental security threats and enemies of U.S. national and civilizational security. In so doing, Border Action Network also refuses the enemy-creation process associated with both mainstream ES discourse and traditional IR security discourse. In the same way, Border Action Network repudiates nationalist constructions of “Third World Enemy Others” and therefore, rejects claims that population growth in and immigration from the Global South must be coercively controlled in order to preserve U.S. environmental, national, or civilizational security. In addition, Border Action Network’s work reflects some of the fundamental elements of Mohanty’s vision of a more just world illustrated in her most recent book, Feminism Without Borders, even though Border Action Network does not explicitly identify itself as a feminist organization. Mohanty’s vision privileges genuine security, inclusive of bodily health and integrity (Mohanty 2003). It is also a vision of “economic stability, ecological sustainability, racial equality, and the redistribution of wealth” at the base of people’s well-being, characterized by “democratic and socialist practices and institutions [that] provide the conditions for public participation and decision making for people regardless of economic and social location” (Mohanty 2003, 3–4). Furthermore, the principles and vision behind Border Action Network’s work seem to reflect those foregrounded by Aung San Suu Kyi (1996, 195): A revolution which aims merely at changing official policies and institutions with a view to an improvement in material conditions has little



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chance of genuine success. Without a revolution of the spirit, the forces which produced the iniquities of the old order would continue to be operative, posing a constant threat to the process of reform and regeneration. It is not enough merely to call for freedom, democracy and human rights. There has to be a united determination to persevere in the struggle, to make sacrifices in the name of enduring truths, to resist the corrupting influences of desire, ill will, ignorance and fear.

Border Action Network attempts to do just this by working to build a coalitional movement that does not seek to minimize difference, but instead, dismantle anti-immigration hostility, scapegoating, and violence, including the greening of hate. Based on my examination, I contend that members of Border Action Network work to envision and create a movement where everyone (regardless of documentation) may work together to bring about a more just and equitable world for all.







I WANT TO BEGIN THIS LAST CHAPTER BY restating the central focus and intent of this project. I define U.S. mainstream environmental security discourse as “the dominant assumptions, categories, definitions, theories, and knowledge produced by privileged actors within U.S. institutions such as academia, the mainstream media, and the state, as well as the knowledge produced by popular environmental organizations and a number of increasingly popular anti-immigration groups and organizations.” I set out to interrogate some of the characteristics of mainstream ES discourse in the United States and its relationship to discourses of national and civilizational security, and to illustrate some of the ways environmental security threats are identified and interpreted, and why, as well as the extent to which mainstream ES discourse reinforces a neoMalthusian legacy in its approach to population issues and ecological destruction. I wanted to demonstrate some of the concrete, material implications of mainstream ES discourse and, importantly, explore alternatives to mainstream ES discourse in the United States, particularly ones that challenge the greening of hate and instead, emphasize social, reproductive, and environmental justice, as well as immigrant rights. My work throughout this book has focused on immigration across the United States–Mexico border in particular and has been guided by interpretive analysis grounded in an intersectional, postcolonial feminist framework dedicated to a reproductive, environmental, and social justice agenda. I remain firmly committed to the position that the “root causes of poverty, environmental degradation and political instability lie in unjust and inequitable social and economic systems—not in women’s fertility” (Hartmann 2006), and not in immigration. Although there are notable exceptions, as well as important differences in emphasis, there are discernable patterns within mainstream ES discourse in the United States, as illustrated in the documents I have examined for this project. Dominant or mainstream ES discourse is largely grounded in a neo-Malthusian framework that regards “overpopulation” in and “mass migration” from the so-called Third World, as root causes of



CONCLUSION


hunger, environmental degradation, scarcity, and conflict. Population issues associated with the Global South are believed to threaten the environmental and national security of the United States. Further, in its construction and representation of “Third World Others” as enemies of environmental and national security, mainstream ES discourse on population issues (and its neo-Malthusian underpinnings), interlace environmental, national, and civilizational security concerns. A particular enemy-creation process characterizes dominant ES discourse in the United States, one that relies on the greening of hate and therefore blames environmental degradation on poor populations of color on the basis of highly xenophobic, classist, racist, and sexist stereotypes of uncontrolled fertility, immorality, criminality, selfishness, and danger. These stereotypes inform the construction of an enemy—an enemy symbolized by the bodies of women of color—who are thought to threaten and deplete natural (as well as political, economic, and social) resources, create scarcity, engender conflict, and dilute American national (“white”) identity. “Overpopulation” among peoples of color (especially women of color) and “mass migration” from the Global South are therefore presented as urgent threats to the environmental, national, and civilizational security of the United States, threats that ostensibly must be controlled through coercive “population stabilization” programs and militarized immigration policies. The scapegoating and greening of hate emanating from the neo-Malthusian foundations of mainstream ES discourse on population growth and immigration simultaneously illustrate the operation of systemic privilege and reinforce systemic oppression. On the other hand, the work of organizations such as Border Action Network and the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE) provide counter-hegemonic alternatives to mainstream ES discourse; alternatives committed to advancing immigrant rights, social justice, and environmental justice without engaging in the greening of hate. In the following pages, I provide a brief summary of the primary elements of this book, followed by a brief set of recommendations for academia (particularly introductory level world politics courses and textbooks), state actors, the mainstream U.S. news media, and both the Sierra Club and Border Action Network. STATE, NATION,

AND

SECURITY

IN

MAINSTREAM ES DISCOURSE

Many of the basic assumptions underlying mainstream IR and traditional IR security discourse are replayed in mainstream ES scholarship.



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States remain the most significant actors and are assumed to operate within a generally anarchic and conflict-driven international realm. Indeed, threat and the potential for conflict remain primary preoccupations within mainstream ES discourse. On a fundamental level, ES discourse is based on the belief that environmental changes may cause or exacerbate conflict and threaten U.S. national interests and security. My contention is that ES scholarship and ES discourse more broadly have proven more additive to than transformative of mainstream IR discourse. Although the potential for cooperation and the potential for a variety of actors have been brought to the table, conflict, the state, traditional notions of state sovereignty, and national security retain primacy. These points are most evident in the U.S. security documents examined in chapter 2, as well as the textbooks examined in chapter 1, although this orientation is not absent in either the U.S. mainstream news media (chapter 3) or the discourse of the Sierra Club (chapter 4). Despite claims of having redefined traditional notions of sovereignty in IR, proponents of mainstream ES have actually reinforced both territorial boundaries and traditional understandings of (and emphasis on) state sovereignty. This is especially evident in the (re)presentation of threats to U.S. carrying capacity, which are translated into threats to U.S. sovereignty and security. Immigration control and reduction strategies (whether enacted through population stabilization campaigns or greater restrictions on immigration across the United States–Mexico border), are often employed as a means by which to protect U.S. carrying capacity. Even though the immigration documents examined in chapter 2 do not speak of environmental security, the militarization of the United States–Mexico border not only reaffirms traditional notions of sovereignty, it also supports the goals of mainstream ES discourse in terms of restricting access to, and ostensibly protecting, U.S. carrying capacity and environmental health. These points are supported by Chertoff ’s (DHS) defense of further militarizing the border. Furthermore, the militarization of the border is itself critical to the production of ES discourse, especially given the government’s sole ability to “legitimately” use force in the promotion of (its perception of ) national interest. A state’s regulatory framework around population and immigration is directly connected to preserving its geographical boundaries, exercising its sovereignty, and constructing and maintaining perceptions (however flawed or imaginary) of national identity. Sovereignty is exercised and preserved through statecraft, which relies in part on the racialized and



Conclusion


gendered construction of “illegals” and “aliens,” which are then contrasted against “legitimate citizens.” The construction of “illegals” is central to securing the boundaries of nation, both figuratively (in terms of national identity) and literally (in terms of geographic boundaries). In mainstream ES discourse, immigrants, especially “illegal immigrants” from the Third World are constructed as threats to national security, not only in terms of the environmental devastation their behavior is assumed to cause, but also by virtue of the threat they pose to state sovereignty, rules or laws of citizenship, and the values and rights associated with nation-based citizenship (Sassen 1996a). Given the threats that these populations ostensibly pose, they are forced to remain outside definitions of citizenship. “Illegality” is only one component of the inclusion/exclusion and insider/outsider dualisms characterizing immigration policy. Speaking of her own imposed label transition from “foreign student” to “resident alien” in the United States during the mid-1980s, Mohanty writes, “I have always thought that this designation was a stroke of inspiration on the part of the U.S. State, since it accurately names the experience and status of immigrants—especially immigrants of color. The flip side of ‘resident alien’ is ‘illegal alien,’ another inspired designation. One can be either a resident or illegal immigrant, but one is always an alien. There is no confusion here—no melting pot ideology or narratives of assimilation—one’s status as an ‘alien’ is primary” (2001, 42–43). Mohanty goes on to argue, “One must be stamped as legitimate (that is, not gay-or-lesbian and not communist!)” by what is now the CIS, and both CIS and ICE remain two of the “central disciplinary arms of the U.S. State. It polices the borders and controls all border crossings—especially those into the U.S. In fact, the INS is also one of the primary forces which institutionalizes race differences in the public arena, thus regulating notions of home, legitimacy and economic access to the ‘American dream’ for many of us” (Mohanty 2001, 43). In sum, even though the Department of Justice documents and some of the others examined in chapter 2 do not reference environmental security concerns as rationalizations for the Southwest Border Strategy or the Secure Border Initiative, they nevertheless support mainstream ES discourse, help strengthen traditional IR notions of the state and state sovereignty, and moreover, perpetuate gendered and racialized constructions of national identity through the identification and interpretation of national security threats.



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The identification of environmental destruction as a threat to U.S. national security within mainstream ES discourse does not appear to have fundamentally transformed traditional realist definitions of conflict or security either. Like traditional IR security discourse, mainstream ES discourse continues to focus on national or state security. It also continues to operate using a conflict-driven orientation to national security. In addressing a broad range of threats to the global environment, proponents of mainstream ES like Warren Christopher (Secretary of State, Clinton Administration) still tend to conclude that environmental damage will contribute to global and regional instability and conflict (Harris 2002, 151–52; Thomas 1997; Dalby 2002, 125). There is a good degree of consistency between the types of danger that environmental degradation poses for national security, and many of them reflect Homer-Dixon’s understandings of the conflict and instability caused by environmental destruction. The 1998 NSS claims, for instance, that “failed states” will “lose their ability to provide for the welfare of their citizens,” which will cause “mass migration, civil unrest, famine, mass killings, environmental disasters and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups,” which may threaten U.S. interests (Clinton Administration 1998a, 7). The 1998 NSS also claims that uncontrolled refugee migrations, environmental damage, and international crime, “threaten U.S. interests, citizens and the U.S. homeland itself ” (Clinton Administration 1998a, 6). Neo-Malthusianism plays a crucial role in the identification and interpretation of danger and insecurity in mainstream ES discourse, including the conflict presumably connected to “mass migration” and “overpopulation.” What I find especially interesting, however, is how little in-depth analysis there is in the majority of mainstream ES documents I examined, about how exactly immigration and environmental destruction are connected, much less in-depth analysis of the dynamics of international immigration. Instead, neo-Malthusian approaches to population growth set the terms of debate around immigration’s role in ecological degradation and, significantly, frame the incorporation of immigration into discussions of environmental security. This particular dynamic is especially evident in a number of the Clinton administration documents, world politics textbooks, and Sierra Club documents I examined. What I have been calling “litany arguments” is another common strategy used within the aforementioned documents, as well as the U.S. mainstream news media pieces I examined.



Conclusion


Another basis upon which the link between environmental harm and immigration is deployed comes in the argument that population growth and environmental disasters push migrants into the United States as “environmental refugees.” Importantly, the Sierra Club pays far more attention to the impacts of neoliberal globalization in environmental destruction and human dislocation than the Clinton and G. W. Bush administration documents I examined do. In fact, as previously mentioned, both administrations demonstrate a surprisingly similar faith in the power and promise of neoliberalism for solving all of the world’s ills. Finally, the “footpaths argument” (which Border Action Network expertly obliterates) is most strongly associated with anti-immigration and paramilitary groups; however, it does receive attention from state actors, as well as the mainstream news media and the Sierra Club. In short, “overpopulation” and “mass immigration” are often connected to environmental destruction, and environmental destruction is considered a national security threat for the United States, with a strong focus on the potential it brings for conflict. I am troubled (as mentioned) by the lack of in-depth analysis given to the dynamics of international migration, and immigration’s connection to environmental destruction, within the documents I examined by the state, academia, mainstream media, and the Sierra Club. Rather than indepth analysis, the cultural products produced by the aforementioned, generally assume and advance neo-Malthusian positions on immigration as it relates to environmental destruction and insecurity. Although there are some interesting similarities between the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations with respect to ES discourse on immigration, the G. W. Bush administration has presented some important shifts as well. For instance, the Clinton and Bush administrations share similar enemy-creation strategies in relation to environmental, national, and civilizational (in)security. Both administrations also rely heavily on the militarization of the United States–Mexico border under LIC doctrine (which includes the activities of paramilitary groups), and both administrations have created a war-like atmosphere for those living near the United States–Mexico border. Speaking of the G. W. Bush administration and the similarities between the ES discourse on immigration it deploys and that of the Clinton Administration, it is extremely significant that border security has been prioritized and addressed as it was in the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), especially with respect to the degree to



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which the militarization of United States–Mexico border was enhanced under the G. W. Bush administration. It is also extremely significant that the administration chose the NSHS (the framework for the Department of Homeland Security) to advance a litany argument implying linkages between immigration and environmental destruction, not to mention the fact that Michael Chertoff (DHS) combined 9/11 rhetoric with footpaths arguments to “justify” militarizing the border. Similarly, Rear Admiral John Sigler (U.S. Navy Ret.) and others contend that G. W. Bush administration NSS documents help provide the framework within which environmental security concerns can (and must in his estimation) be addressed. The strongly neo-Malthusian Pentagon report An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security also reflects the ES discourse that characterized the Clinton administration. As discussed on chapter 2 however, the G. W. Bush administration’s call for permanent war and the policy of preemption are fairly stunning shifts. Both permanent war and preemption require hegemony, and all three are intimately connected to empire building—processes that all require access to an inordinate amount of natural resources. Drawing on the ideas of Jon Barnett (2001), I contend that the Bush administration conflates the environment (and the supposed protection thereof ), with the control of natural resources, which the administration regards as valuable only insofar as natural resources can serve the needs of (or be sacrificed at the alter of ), United States hegemony and empire building. Even this is not a totally new phenomenon, however; the G. W. Bush administration has simply reverted back to a traditional realist understanding of natural resources as valuable in terms of their ability to support the state and its projects—militaristic and otherwise. What is new is the level of resources that will be required to sustain permanent war, policies of prevention, hegemony, and, overall, empire-building. Furthermore, the so-called “environmental policies” of the G. W. Bush administration, with their Orwellian names and amazingly disingenuous rhetoric, have only harmed the natural environment and all of us living within it. This is not to say that I appreciate the Clinton administration’s approach to environmental issues either; I do not. Like dominant ES scholarship, the majority of IR textbooks, and the Sierra Club documents I examined for this project, the Clinton-era documents I examined engage in the greening of hate, however sanitized the language might be.



Conclusion


In sum, I reject the policies of militarization and neoliberal globalization advanced by both the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations. I reject the racialized, xenophobic, and gendered constructions of “enemy Others” that underlie militarization, neoliberal globalization, and the immigration policies associated with both administrations. Moreover, the enemy-creation process of each administration reinforces the relationship between environmental, national, and civilizational security discourses, and ideologies of racism, sexism, and xenophobia provide the “justifications” necessary for the criminalization of migration and the militarization of the United States–Mexico border under LIC doctrine, not to mention the violence and repression that has come to characterize the region. Meanwhile, the root causes of environmental destruction—systems of inequality, militarization, and neoliberal globalization—are also reinforced, while environmental devastation continues unabated. INTERPRETING THREATS TO NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

AND

“Overpopulation” in, and “mass immigration” from the Global South are defined and interpreted as particularly striking sources of peril in mainstream ES discourse, and the United States–Mexico border (rather than other entry locations) is targeted as a particularly dangerous site of security transgression. Focus on the Global South or the United States–Mexico border as a source of danger does not imply a new or original interpretive process vis-à-vis national security. I agree with Campbell that the “new” dangers that emerged after the Cold War have “been represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during the Cold War. . . . [T]hese challenges are represented as dangers, located in an external and anarchic environment, which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence” (Campbell 1998, 7–8). Within mainstream ES definitions and interpretations of danger and security (like mainstream IR), American national identity is itself tied to national security, and the boundaries of nation are reaffirmed through the representation of both racialized and external danger; herein lies the connection between environmental, national, and civilizational security discourse. Immigrants of color from the Global South receive much more attention from proponents of mainstream ES discourse than immigrants from other areas of the world. One difference between ES and traditional IR security discourse is obviously the identification of



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environmental threats among these “new” national security enemies. Yet danger in environmental terms is still frequently understood on the basis of external forces ostensibly threatening U.S. carrying capacity. Interpretations of danger also rest on the threat that external forces pose as they become internal enemies through immigration into the United States. Not only do Mexican and Central American immigrants pose a threat to U.S. carrying capacity within mainstream ES discourse, but they also pose a danger to America’s “white” identity. Moreover, this “white” national identity is simultaneously constructed and reinforced through the greening of hate. Dualistic metaphors and representations demarcating the ideological boundaries between self/Other, citizen/alien, superior/inferior, civilized/backward, and security/danger are central to the processes by which geographical boundaries are formed and enforced in the service of national security. As Manzo contends, “Nationalism entails the policing of access to territory by agents of state authority. Immigration laws and their implementation, border patrols, and the apprehension of ‘illegal aliens’ are nationalist practices masquerading as modern statecraft” (1996, 38–39). In attempting to ensure the neatness of its sovereign borders through constructions of the “legitimate or genuine citizen” versus the “illegal, threatening interloper,” the state also perpetuates constructions of its own identity, and that of the “American nation,” as the “self ” is always constructed, differentiated from, and revalued against the Other. Indeed, like definitions of “home,” constructions of “nation” and “citizen” are profoundly political (Mohanty 2003, 126). The racialized construction of “illegals” and “aliens” are not only central to the construction of national boundaries, but are vital to the representation of American “whiteness” within those boundaries. “Us” is constructed against “them,” leading to state control of “them.” National and environmental security has been framed in terms of preserving America’s “white” identity, with threats to the security of that identity defined in terms of “overpopulation” and “mass immigration” among “nonwhite” populations. As such, these populations are interpreted not only as security threats but also as civilizational threats. Like the body metaphors that, according to Manzo (1996), tend to characterize nationalist projects throughout history, racist and sexist neoMalthusian assumptions around fertility rates and resource usage among those crossing the United States–Mexico border contribute to the casting of immigrants, especially Latinas, as “alien viruses” contaminating an



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otherwise healthy (“white”) national body. Environmental concerns are simply added to the bevy of issues that immigrants of color are scapegoated for in the United States, including everything from crime to overcrowded schools. Mainstream ES discourse bolsters nationalist practices, as well as the value hierarchical dualisms upon which they are often built, without fundamentally transforming them. The boundaries between self and other, citizen and illegal, security and danger are strengthened and redeployed along with the boundaries of nation and claims of sovereignty in the name of environmental security. At the same time, attention is conveniently diverted away from structural causes of environmental harm as “their false logic once again provides a convenient alternative to facing the real causes of resource strain—overconsumption and corporate activity. The truth is that economies could not survive without migration. Even the most highly skilled industries are dependent on migrant labour” (Ride 1998b, 8). The simultaneous construction of (figurative and literal) boundaries is central to the discourses of danger and security that characterize nationalist projects. Race, gender, state, and nation are relational terms inseparable within nationalist projects, and all are inseparable components of broader systems of inequality. In defining “noncitizen,” many proponents of greater immigration controls surmise that “illegals” do not deserve civil or political rights because they have violated the boundaries and laws of citizenship and nation. I share Manzo’s belief that “[n]ationalism’s dominant conceptual partners are not simply nation and state. They are also race and alien,” to which I would add gender and class, “for without the racialized [sexualized, gendered, classed] kind of alien there can be no national kin” (Manzo 1996, 3). Thus, “boundary-producing and standardizing practices of nationalism” (Manzo 1996, 41) are created, sustained, and articulated through the constitution of difference, of self/Other and citizen/alien. Although nationalism is not static and may invent, reinvent, strengthen, and even dissolve identity boundaries, nationalism is almost always racial and sexual when it treats “difference (especially difference found within the borders of state territories) as alien, threatening, and a problem to be solved” (Manzo 1996, 19). In the case of mainstream ES discourse on population issues, “difference” is often constituted on the basis of assumptions and stereotypes about the violation of rules of U.S. citizenship, uncontrolled fertility, and disproportionate use or abuse of environmental resources in the United States.



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Manzo (1996) also points to the construction of “alien intrusion” as a principal security threat within numerous nationalist projects throughout history (including Nazi Germany). I argue that much mainstream ES discourse serves only to add an environmental twist to this rhetoric of invasion and danger. The rhetoric of invasion and neo-Malthusian doomsday scenarios come together to form images of alien intrusion to describe “mass immigration” into the United States across its border with Mexico. This is true of U.S. security documents, as well as the mainstream media, IR textbooks, and at times, the documents associated with the Sierra Club. Intimately related to “immigrant flood” arguments are those born of a combination of economic insecurity, racism, and xenophobia. Blaming or scapegoating immigrants in times of unemployment and recession has been popular throughout U.S. history; only now, there is an environmental twist. Remembering Campbell’s position that, “danger is not an objective condition,” the ability to interpret a national security threat as that which is “alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience” (Campbell 1998, 1, 3). Significantly, in mainstream ES discourse, many implicitly and sometimes explicitly draw on popular racist and sexist stereotypes against Mexican and Central American immigrants to rationalize the construction of population growth and immigration as U.S. security threats. Neo-Malthusian assumptions about fertility rates among women of color, as well as stereotypes of female immigrants as overindulgent and irresponsible, consciously and unconsciously provide a foundation for much mainstream ES rhetoric against both population growth and immigration. Mexican and Central American female immigrants are seen as a threat to environmental security, national security, and the very identity of American nationhood through reconquista as “the fertile woman is the key to the reproduction or subversion of the boundaries of the nation, while the children born of national/alien pairings are considered embodiments of national decline and contamination” (Manzo 1996, 222). Hence, controlling the movement and fertility of immigrant women of color through specific policy projects becomes essential to the maintenance of boundaries and the provision of environmental and national security in the United States, even though the sex or gender of migrants are rarely explicitly identified or discussed. Furthermore, the mainstream ES failure to genuinely challenge or transform mainstream IR discourse aids in the reprivileging of particular



Conclusion


constructions of power, states, and national interest, thus further marginalizing the histories and experiences of less powerful states and their peoples (Persaud 1997, 170). When particular actors are recentralized in the realm of international affairs, others are relegated to secondary status or are ignored all together. Women remain largely homeless in mainstream IR, and the voices of migrants themselves (male or female) are largely ignored in both mainstream IR and mainstream ES discourse. This is further evidence of the erasing practices discussed by hooks (1994) and Persaud (2002) and reinforces systems of power, privilege, and oppression. Only Border Action Network and CWPE (which I do not define as part of mainstream ES discourse in the United States) make conscious attempts to shift the center and therefore consciously configure their analyses and activism around the needs of the diverse communities of which they are a part or are allied with. The government documents, introductory textbooks, Sierra Club pieces, and most of the mainstream news media articles I examined generally fail to include the voices of immigrants themselves. Instead, their experiences, theories, and needs are assumed, more often than not, on stereotypical and inaccurate terms. Certain policy responses are also privileged because of these assumptions, including population stabilization as a means to reduce immigration and greater restrictions on immigration across the United States–Mexico border. Mainstream ES discourse helps reproduce images of immigrants of color as enemies to national security. These images rationalize the denial of immigrants’ basic rights even as, or perhaps because, their labor supports the needs of capitalism. In a system that relies on low-cost, temporary labor, the exploitation of immigrant labor is essential. Mainstream ES discourse on immigration falls short in substantively considering the U.S. role in creating conditions that both “push” immigration (like poverty, war, political upheaval, and reduction of personal freedoms) and “pull” immigrants to the United States (including the possibility of better jobs, education and greater freedoms) (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2007a, 70). Ironically, the documents I examined from both the G. W. Bush and Clinton administrations displayed, as mentioned, a deep faith in the role of neoliberal globalization and free trade policies like NAFTA in creating wealth, democracy, freedom, and peace. As one G. W. Bush administration NSS proclaims, “The concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you can make



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something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living” (2002b, 18). The movement of people (of color) however, is not seen as integral to the promotion of democracy, peace, or freedom. Colonial, as well as postcolonial, forms of domination, including policies and actions targeting the United States–Mexico border, are not simply a matter of structural violence but are also forms of ideological violence. There are consequences associated with the modes of representation we choose to employ. Blaming migrants for environmental destruction ignores the structural causes of environmental devastation, as well as those of poverty and conflict. Nevertheless, it is the greening of hate that largely characterizes mainstream ES discourse on immigration in the United States. It is within the greening of hate that a process of enemy-creation and scapegoating may be identified whereby gendered and racialized Others are defined as threats. Identification of these threats “legitimizes” Western neocolonial policies aimed at countries perceived as undeveloped and in need of Western intervention. Although trade agreements like NAFTA and others tend to be the preferred routes of intervention, they often occur in tandem with more militaristic forms. Militaristic immigration control programs and practices against immigrants from the Global South are simultaneously created and “justified” by virtue of the (constructed) status of these peoples and nations as Other, without fully addressing the structural components that compel migration and without adequately examining the history and contemporary elements of U.S. foreign and economic policy toward Mexico and Central America. In these final pages, I offer several specific recommendations with respect to the primary areas that I have examined in this project. RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR INTRODUCTORY

TEXTBOOKS

Introductory world politics and international relations courses at the university level present a number of difficult challenges to instructors, and these challenges include textbook choices. I understand firsthand the impossibility of covering all of the topics, voices, theories, and readings I would like to in any given introductory course. Nevertheless, I recommend that reading materials on environmental security include as many of the different understandings of ecological security as possible, as well as the material implications of these understandings and associated



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policy positions. I think it is particularly crucial that reading materials not simply assume a neo-Malthusian position on population growth, immigration, and environmental destruction. In fact, rather than perpetuating a narrow, neo-Malthusian lens, I would focus on helping students develop the conceptual tools (especially critical thinking skills) necessary for grappling with environmental destruction in all its complexity. On a basic level, textbooks themselves and course instructors must give equal attention to Malthusian and neo-Malthusian, cornucopian, and left-distributionist approaches as well as antiracist feminist theories, including, for instance intersectional and postcolonial feminisms, within discussions of the root causes of environmental destruction and approaches to ending environmental destruction. Moreover, it is simply irresponsible to assume or advance a neo-Malthusian framework without fully discussing the real, material consequences of population and immigration control policies, past and present. It is simply irresponsible that so many textbooks fail to address histories and continuing practices of coercive population control strategies and their sometimes deadly consequences, as well as the deadly consequences of militarizing the United States–Mexico border, be it in the service of environmental or national security. Ignoring the theories and modes of activism developed by antiracist feminists (inside and outside the discipline of IR) around reproductive and environmental justice is inexcusable. Marginalizing or ignoring the aforementioned does little to help students develop critical thinking skills, much less the ability to make informed decisions with respect to environmental security. Using the edited collections Dangerous Intersections by Silliman and King (1999, especially the chapters by Silliman, Hartmann, and Hynes) and Policing the National Body by Silliman and Bhattacharjee (2002, especially the chapters by Lindsley and Smith) are particularly useful starting points, as are materials from Border Action Network. The curriculum packet developed by the Population and Development Program at Hampshire College entitled “Population in Perspective” is another crucial and extremely useful starting point. I suggest that instructors include substantive attention to the scholaractivists included in the broad intersectional, postcolonial feminist theoretical framework grounding this project and critically examine with students the material implications of policy positions on environmental security. Neo-Malthusian–based responses to environmental degradation (population stabilization, immigration moratoriums, etc.) rely on racialized, gendered, nationalistic, and classist stereotypes to support their



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arguments, as well as the policy positions flowing from them. These stereotypes cannot simply be left standing, as Hardin’s analogies were in several of the textbooks examined in chapter 1. Intersectional, postcolonial feminism allows for an interrogation of the representations of Others informing the greening of hate and provides a means by which to uncover the relations of power that such representations serve. Doing so would also allow students the opportunity for critical awareness and thinking about systems of power, privilege, and oppression and their ideological foundations, as well as the consequences experienced by populations constructed as “environmental enemies” within mainstream ES discourse. An intersectional, postcolonial lens would help instructors to encourage students to shift the center and consciously acknowledge the voices of actors routinely excluded from mainstream debates of environmental security, not the least of which includes the voices and perspectives of immigrants themselves and environmental justice and immigrants’ rights groups like Border Acton Network. In many ways, these recommendations have broader implications for the field of IR as it is currently mapped. Perhaps most important, IR scholars must do more to acknowledge and come to grips with knowledge production as a form of power. Ideally, this may lead to a move away from the positioning of nation and state actors as central and “natural,” and thus, a more comprehensive redefinition of sovereignty and a redefinition of security inclusive of a more genuine ecological understanding of the interconnectedness of all life (human and nonhuman). It may also allow scholars to move away from simplistic analyses that only perpetuate the greening of hate and reinforce white supremacist, capitalist hetero-patriarchy. RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY

Notions of civilizational security inform those around mainstream ES discourse, and the process by which security dangers are identified and interpreted within mainstream ES mirror those of traditional IR security discourse, a process I have called one of “enemy-creation.” The majority of Clinton administration documents and a few of the G. W. Bush administration documents mirror this enemy-creation process in the context of environmental security. Government actors must do more to challenge the bipolar and threat-based orientation of security in this post–Cold War and post-9/11 era. Thus, in addition to interrogating neo-Malthusian orientations to ecological destruction (with respect to



Conclusion


both population growth and immigration), government actors must do more to acknowledge and incorporate the redefinitions of security elucidated by intersectional, postcolonial feminist scholars and activists, as well as organizations like Border Action Network. In other words, the international realm has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War; therefore, approaches aimed at preserving national and international security must truly reflect these changes. At the very least, this requires the recognition that scapegoating based on the greening of hate does not serve international stability; this holds true for the post-9/11 international realm as well. Moreover, attempting to ensure U.S. national or environmental security while simultaneously ignoring the security of Others creates insecurity. Policies such as NAFTA, the Southwest Border Strategy, and the Secure Border Initiative not only have material implications (poverty, dislocation, and human rights violations) for targeted populations, but they also serve to perpetuate systems of domination and privilege (as well as the ecological destruction that results), which will ultimately create insecurity and suffering for all. A more genuine and holistic definition of security would center on the interconnectedness of all life, the interdependency of all nations (regardless of whether that nation is constructed as white or not), and the valuing of human (including economic, social, and political) rights for everyone. Government actors should also take seriously the groundbreaking Alternative Enforcement Guidelines developed by Border Action Network members and allies. Border Action Network and other community organizations worked with and in border communities to develop recommendations for border enforcement policies and practices in 2005, focusing on accountability, human rights, environmental sustainability, and community security (Border Action Network n.d.[x]). No longer should the U.S. government explicitly or tacitly support paramilitary groups like Ranch Rescue and American Patrol. Government and law enforcement officials must dismantle all paramilitary groups operating on the United States–Mexico border. No longer should the needs of capital outweigh the voices, needs, and perspectives of Others within the United States and around the world. Indeed, incorporation of the alternative understandings of genuine security provided by intersectional, postcolonial feminism and organizations like Border Action Network and CWPE necessitate not just a rethinking of policies like NAFTA, the Southwest Border Strategy, and Secure Border Initiative, or



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institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and the WTO, but the dismantling of each of them. Moreover, should U.S. government security and environmental documents acknowledge alternative understandings of security and security threats, government actors would ideally recognize that the perpetuation of systemic forms of oppression and privilege (including racism, sexism, and colonialism and its latest manifestation in neoliberal globalization) and ideological forms of oppression and privilege (including the greening of hate) present the biggest threats to international stability and ecological integrity. RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE

U.S. MAINSTREAM NEWS MEDIA

Given the level of racism, sexism, xenophobia, and violence in the United States around issues of immigration both historically and today, it would be responsible for mainstream news media sources and their contributors to come out consistently and firmly against and blatantly denounce the rhetoric of hate reflective of many anti-immigration positions, be they contained in letters to the editor, op-eds by hate groups such as Federation for American Immigration Reform, or the articles of regular newspaper contributors themselves. At the very least, articles from regular contributors should contain recurring and deliberate critiques, calling much anti-immigrant rhetoric what it is—hate speech based on ethnocentric, xenophobic, racist, and sexist constructions of Others in the furtherance of myths of “white American nationhood,” whether their arguments are environmentally based or not. Journalists should not only directly repudiate the rhetoric of hate groups but should also make more of an effort to consistently challenge (rather than perpetuate) stereotypes of Mexican immigrants as threats to U.S. economic, political, social, and environmental security. One reason why population issues are so commonly blamed for environmental destruction lies in an “alliance between the mainstream media, environmental organizations, and population control advocates, especially in the United States” (CWPE 2007c), which plays a powerful role in spreading neo-Malthusianism as well as the greening of hate. Taking a clear and consistent position against anti-immigrant stereotypes, rhetoric, and violence would therefore go a long way in disrupting the process by which consent for militarized border control strategies, as well as violence against and exploitation of immigrants of color, is manufactured in the United States. It would also go a long way in disrupting the



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process by which attention is diverted away from the systemic causes of economic insecurity and environmental degradation. As members of the Political Ecology Group explain, “scapegoating the politically disenfranchised is morally unjustifiable, divides people, and hides the real causes of our problems” (PEG 2006, 2). The work against hate speech by the authors of Words that Wound was developed in response to “the urgent needs of students of color and other victims of hate speech who are daily silenced, intimidated, and subjected to severe psychological and physical trauma by racist assailants who employ words and symbols as part of an integrated arsenal of weapons of oppression and subordination” (Matsuda et al. 1993, 7). Hate speech (including hate speech against immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border) limits free speech among marginalized groups, thereby obstructing inclusive, critical dialogue around immigration and environmental security in the United States. The authors of Words That Wound call for an understanding of hate speech grounded in the stories and needs of survivors of hate speech, explaining, “Their liberation must be the bottom line of any first amendment analysis” (Matsuda et al. 1993, 9). Disregarding the voices of immigrants, of those resisting systems of inequality, of survivors (and their families) of paramilitary violence, and of survivors of anti-immigrant hate speech and discrimination in the mainstream media helps reinforce relations of oppression and privilege and normalize violence. The enemy-creation process at the core of hate speech and the greening of hate also serves to “justify” oppression by casting immigrants who cross the United States–Mexico border as enemies of U.S. national, civilizational, and environmental security. Therefore, stories “from the bottom” (Matsuda 1993, 19) should be privileged (or at least given more space) within discussions of immigration across the southern U.S. border. I support this avenue with the understanding that “[t]olerance of hate speech is not tolerance borne by the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay,” as a consequence of systems of inequality that result in (among other things), unequal access to U.S. social institutions (Matsuda 1993, 18). A greater dedication to shifting the center and including “stories from below” within the mainstream media may allow a more nuanced discussion of the complicated dynamics behind immigration, including histories of colonization and conquest that continue to impact what is now the Southwest United States. It may also bring greater attention to the mythology of “white America” and the xenophobia and



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racism behind many anti-immigration stances, for as Adrienne Rich rightly explains, “the United States has never been a white country, though it has long served what white men defined as their interests” (2003, 38). By focusing on “stories from the bottom” in the mainstream U.S. media, readers may be better equipped to problematize some of the more common stereotypes of immigrants crossing the United States–Mexico border as well and, hopefully, compel more and more people to become allies in struggle against all forms of violence and inequality. RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

NGOS

Traditional IR understandings of security remain prominent, actually hegemonic, within mainstream ES discourse. Neo-Malthusianism–based approaches to population growth also remain hegemonic within mainstream ES discourse on immigration, just as they do within the Western population paradigm. This orientation has dramatic consequences for immigrants’ rights and environmental justice advocates as immigration across the U.S. border (and immigration in general) is defined as a population issue, and both population growth and immigration continue as subjects of state control and punishment. Providing alternative interpretations of environmental security is essential to resisting the enemy-creation process characteristic of mainstream ES discourse. Given the human rights implications, as well as the ecological implications, of mainstream ES discourse, I argue that it is not enough for the Sierra Club to simply remain “neutral” on issues of immigration. In fact, the Sierra Club’s reliance on neo-Malthusianism for explaining population growth, alongside the tendency for the Sierra Club to define immigration as a population issue, calls the claim of “neutrality” seriously into question. Rapid population growth and environmental degradation, as well as immigration flows, are connected, but this connection is more complicated than simplistic neo-Malthusian constructions allow. Instead, they are connected because they all stem from the same source: inequitable structural and ideological relations associated with interlocking systems of white supremacist, capitalist hetero-patriarchy. To simply scapegoat environmental destruction on Others fails to get to the roots of insecurity and allows ecological damage to actually continue unfettered. If the Sierra Club wants to preserve the natural environment, then more needs to be done on their part to critically interrogate the bases of their arguments, especially those promoting (however implicitly) notions of



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civilizational, national, and environmental security born of neo-Malthusian pessimism. The work of Border Action Network is a powerful example of counter-hegemonic discourse, as is the work of the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment. Both organizations incorporate understandings of coalitional activism advanced by Alexander and Mohanty (1997) and Mohanty (2003). For them, coalitional activism is based on self-determination, contextualized action, and anticapitalist, anti-imperialist politics. In fact, continuing to form broader coalitional relationships (as they have been doing) would help Border Action Network gain further power in deconstructing and ultimately subverting the hegemony of mainstream ES discourse. In addition, both Border Action Network and CWPE work to expose and challenge interlocking systems of power, privilege, and oppression and the forms of violence sustaining this system. Indeed, they provide avenues by which environmental degradation may be addressed and halted without scapegoating and without simply reinforcing the inequality and violence associated with systems of inequality. I would like to see Border Action Network more explicitly challenge neo-Malthusian arguments targeting women of color as environmental, national, and civilizational security threats to the United States. Their framework definitely allows for greater focus in this context. Nevertheless, I am extremely impressed with their work. In the end, there are indeed very real dangers associated with simplistic analysis. Border Action Network and the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment, as well as the framework of intersectional, postcolonial feminism more broadly, provide tools, theories, insights, and strategies with which to honor and promote environmental, reproductive, and social justice and therefore the ability to work toward creating a more just world for all.



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INTRODUCTION 1. The foundation of this book lies in my 2004 dissertation entitled The Politics of “Blame” and draws on my 2001 publication for the Michigan WID Program (Urban 2001). Participants in several International Studies Association conferences and the 2006 National Women’s Studies Association conference deserve a note of thanks as well for their instructive comments on earlier versions of chapters for this book. Elements of this book are also featured in Urban (2006) and Urban (forthcoming). 2. Third World is a very contested phrase. Like the editors of Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, I too use it deliberately and politically to refer “to the colonized, neo-colonized or decolonized countries (of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) whose economic and political structures have been deformed within the colonial process” (Mohanty, Russo, and Torres 1991, ix). I do not use phrases like “Third World” or “non-Western countries” in this project unproblematically. Rather, I use them to draw attention to histories of colonialism and contemporary inequalities of power both within and among countries. The use of these phrases is not intended to suggest homogeneity within the so-called First World or Third World, either. Rather, they are used to highlight inequalities in power within various countries as well. In other words, I recognize that the Third World exists within the First World, and vice versa. Finally, I use phrases like “Third World women” and “Third World men” in a similar way, e.g., to highlight continuing discursive and material colonization of Other peoples that lie at the heart of systems of power, privilege, and oppression today. 3. The Minuteman project recently divided over allegations of financial wrong-doing on the part of Jim Gilchrist. There are now two wings of the Minuteman project: Jim Gilchrist’s Minuteman Project (http://www.minutemanproject.com/) and Chris Simcox’s Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (http://www.minutemanhq.com/). Both share virulent antiimmigration positions, and I contend that both wings of the project may be defined as paramilitary groups. I discuss the rationale behind identifying them as such in chapter 2. 4. Binary dualisms, or better stated, value hierarchical dualisms (such as citizen/noncitizen, modern/backward, and many others) are sets of oppositional, mutually reinforcing, and interlocking categories within which the first term is valued over (and constructed against) the second and the second term is devalued (and constructed against) by the first. Val Plumwood (1993) argues that value hierarchical dualisms and dualistic thought lie at the foundation of systems of inequality because they provide (in part) the ideological justification required to rationalize systems of power, privilege, and oppression, colonialism, and multiple forms of violence including poverty, genocide, and war. 5. I find phrases such as “illegal immigration,” “illegal immigrant,” “alien,” “illegal alien,” and others like them dehumanizing and argue that these phrases play a role in normalizing anti-immigrant policy and practice in the United States including violence and discrimination. I therefore place phrases like those just mentioned in quotation marks to simultaneously highlight and problematize them.



NOTES

Notes

6. I draw on Kadi’s definitions of cultural appropriation and ethical cultural connections in this context. “‘Cultural’ appropriation means taking possession of specific aspects of someone else’s culture in unethical, oppressive ways” while “ethical cultural connections are comprised of respect for the community involved, a desire to learn and take action, an openness to being challenged and criticized, a willingness to think critically about personal behavior, and a commitment to actively fighting racism. . . . It’s not enough to celebrate cultural difference by learning language, music, or history, when people’s whole worlds are at risk. . . . I want discussion around power and privilege, about who benefits from cultural appropriation and in what ways, about who will decide how cultural connections happen and what makes them ethical. I want discussion about actions and the meanings they carry” (2004, 91, 94–95). 7. See hooks (2000) and Bulbeck (1998). For a discussion of imperial feminism see Eisenstein (2004). 8. Social location refers to the intersection of the multiple identities that shape one’s life on individual, community, national and international levels of analysis (Kirk and OkazawaRey 2007a). Given interlocking structures of racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ableism, ageism, and other systems of power in the United States, one’s social location shapes the kinds of systemic advantages and disadvantages one experiences. Moreover, privilege and oppression are often experienced simultaneously given the multiple and intersecting elements of identity and systems of power. Although categories such as “white” and “middle class” (among others) are socially constructed, classism, sexism, racism and others and are very real systems of power with very real consequences. 9. Ecofeminism developed from feminist, as well as nonviolent, anti-war, antinuclear, peace, and environmentalist theories and movements popular during the 1970s and 1980s. Ecofeminism is not a singular, unified theory, nor are all strands of ecofeminism useful to this project. I only include materialist ecofeminist scholar-activists within my analytical framework given their focus on intersecting systems of oppression and privilege that create ecological destruction, as well as their focus on building coalitions aimed at ending all forms of oppression rather than assuming solidarity on simplistic, biologically determinist grounds. 10. See Anderson and Hill Collins (2001a), Kirk and Okazawa-Rey (2007a), hooks (2000). 11. The writings of Said (1978); Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1989); Bhabha (1990); and Prakash (1995) are particularly important here. Please see Urban (2004) for a detailed discussion of the influences on postcolonial feminism including postcolonial theory, subaltern studies, Marxism, Gramscian analysis, and feminist theories of IR, among others. Further, this brief discussion should not be taken to imply that I perceive consensus among scholars regarding the boundaries of postcolonial theory (feminist or otherwise), much less the meaning of “postcolonial” itself. Bhabha contends that “the term postcolonial is increasingly used to describe that form of social criticism that bears witness to those unequal and uneven processes of representation by which the historical experience of the once-colonized Third World comes to be framed in the West” (qtd. in Mongia 1996, 1). Prakash regards postcolonial theory as a critique of “the historicism that projected the West as history” (in Mongia 1996, 5), yet others problematize the “post” in postcolonial theory by arguing that colonialism in its traditional sense as well as new forms of colonialism exist today. To argue that this is a postcolonial period implies that we may ignore current colonial relations in the United States against, for instance, Native American communities. One must therefore be cognizant of the colonial as well as the neocolonial relations of power that continue to structure national and global relationships. For me, “postcolonial” refers to the persistence of colonial structures and relations of power as well as the quest to decenter dominant modes of knowledge production that underlie and “justify” systems of inequality and the forms of violence that sustain them.



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12. An adequate discussion of the complexities of international development is beyond the scope of this project. However, in using the phrase “dominant Western development paradigm,” I am referring to the United States–led neoliberal model of development that gained strength following World War II alongside pillars of the United States–led liberal international economic order (LIEO) including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Shiva (1989) uses the term “maldevelopment,” or development based on reductionism, hierarchy, duality, linearity, power-over, homogeneity, and an Enlightenment model of knowledge production in general. It is largely devoid of ecological and life-serving principles; is supported by gender, racial, class, national, and sexual inequalities; and creates hunger, exploitation, and ecological degradation around the world (Shiva 1989, 4–10). Finally, the dominant Western development paradigm is a central component of contemporary neoliberal globalization. 13. “Power-with” allows a different type of consciousness, one that sees the world as a pattern of relationships. Power-with “is social power, the influence we wield among equals” and grounds the relationships that allow us to resist cultures of domination collectively (Starhawk 1987, 9).

CHAPTER 1 1. See Urban (2004; 1998) for more in-depth discussions of these and other schools of thought in IR. 2. According to Kegley and Wittkopf ’s world politics textbook, this metaphor was first articulated by William Foster Lloyd, an English political economist, in 1833 (2004, 353). 3. Hardin (1968) also advocates privatizing the commons to prevent its exploitation and destruction. Shiva (2005) among many others heavily critiques the foundations of Hardin’s theory, including his position on privatization explaining, “degradation is accelerated when the commons are enclosed, people are displaced, and resources are exploited for private profit” (Shiva 2005, 60). 4. Hardin’s position with Population-Environment Balance and the awards he has received from the Federation for American Immigration Reform (another anti-immigrant organization in the United States) and Planned Parenthood are listed on his vitae on the Garrett Hardin Society Web site at http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/gh/gh_cv.html. 5. See Shiva (2005). Please also visit the Web site for the Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First) at http://www.foodfirst.org/ for resources on genetic engineering, food sovereignty, land reform, and more. 6. Esther Boserup is mentioned in this chapter, but not necessarily in the context of liberal feminism or feminist analyses of issues of development or population (see Homer-Dixon 1999, 31, 34). Although I certainly recognize the difficulty in doing justice to all authors and voices associated with any given debate, I find the exclusion of feminist perspectives on population very disturbing. Homer-Dixon also claims that distributionist perspectives were voiced most widely in the developing world during the 1970s and 1980s, which discounts the tremendous work done in this area since this time—feminist or otherwise. 7. I focus my analysis on environmental chapters or major environmental subsections within the textbooks listed in the appendix. In general there is little in-depth analysis of immigration within the environmental chapters or sections of the textbooks I examine. Therefore, I focus on the authors’ treatment of immigration across national borders and environmental security in general and highlight authors’ focus on the United States– Mexico border where possible.



Notes

Notes

8. The books without environmental chapters or significant environmental subsections include Lentner 1997; Roskin and Berry 1999; and Roskin and Berry 1997. 9. Although Hughes (1997; 2000) uses the terms “Eco-wholism” and “Modernism,” he is basically highlighting the debates between neo-Malthusian pessimists and cornucopian optimists in his textbook. I am not entirely sure what the strategic value is behind this name change; however, what is important to note is that both strands dominate discussions of environmental degradation, and once again intersectional, postcolonial feminist perspectives and other antiracist feminist theories are excluded from Hughes’s discussion of the population debates. 10. The chapter “Limits to Sovereignty” is nearly the same in both editions of this book; however, I directly quote from the 2000 edition. 11. Kegley and Wittkopf note, “Not everyone agrees with the ethics of Hardin’s arguments. Some regard the freedom to parent as a human right” (2004, 353; emphasis in original).

CHAPTER 2 1. See especially Fernandes (2007), as well as Hayes (2001) and Castles and Davidson (2000). 2. According to Gaddis, President Clinton submitted his administration’s first NSS a year and a half late and the Bush administration submitted its first report a year late (2002a). Even so, the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the NSS annually from each administration: The G. W. Bush administration, to the best of my knowledge, has only released two NSS documents. 3. As Fuentes explains, “Without the contribution of Mexican labor, food scarcity and higher prices would hit the United States and many services would go unattended” (Fuentes qtd. in Prashad 2000). Fernandes (2007) highlights a Thunderbird Business School study that points to the financial contributions of Mexican immigrants in Arizona. The study calculated sales tax revenues and federal income tax contributions of Mexican immigrants in Arizona in 2002 to be about $599 million; calculated the total costs of services for Mexican immigrants in Arizona to be $250 million; and calculated $31 million in uncompensated healthcare costs for undocumented Mexicans in Arizona (Fernandes 2007, 60). This left the state of Arizona with a surplus of $318 million (Fernandes 2007, 60). In addition, Fernandes points to federal government statistics indicating that undocumented workers (many of whom purchase false Social Security and/or identification cards rather than being paid “under the table”), contribute $7 billion to Social Security each year, money that, as undocumented workers, they will never see after they retire (2007, 60). For even more analysis of the common myths surrounding immigration, including the myth that “immigrants don’t pay taxes,” “immigrants take American jobs,” and nineteen others, please see A. Chomsky (2007). 4. For in-depth critiques of neoliberal globalization see Brecher, Costello, and Smith (2000); Mohanty (2003); and Shiva (2005). 5. The Coalition for Human Rights sued the city of Chandler for civil rights abuses; the City eventually agreed to a $400,000 out-of-court settlement (Ruiz 2000, 16). 6. Maria Jimenez of the American Friends Service Committee joined a delegation to Washington, DC, where they were able to speak to the Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Jimenez argues that the Assistant Secretary also verified the use of LIC doctrine in the United States–Mexico border region (Phares 2000). 7. In 1998, the Department of Defense did follow the Pentagon recommendation to terminate ground patrols after the investigation of the Hernandez shooting (Kamel 1998),



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although militarization was revived on the United States–Mexico border following 9/11. Moreover, the suspension of ground patrols in 1998 did not mean the suspension of JTF6 activities, nor did it mean an end to the militarization of the border: JTF-6 continued to assist with surveillance and the training of local law enforcement in military-style tactics (Kamel 1998). 8. Post-September 11, 2001, immigration policies have had horrendous consequences for immigrants of color across the United States, in violation of international standards of human rights. As starting points, please see ACLU (2004, 2006b and their Web site in general); Fernandes (2007); Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment et al. (2003), and the Web sites for Amnesty International (http://www.amnestyusa.org), Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org), and the Center for Constitutional Rights (http://ccrjustice.org/).

CHAPTER 3 1. I retrieved these articles largely from online databases (available through Northern Arizona University’s Cline Library Web site at http://www.nau.edu/cline/ and the Humboldt State University Library Web site http://library.humboldt.edu/), such as Lexis Nexis and EBSCOhost. I did not include news summaries by New York Times and others. I did include op-ed pieces, editorials, letters to the editor, and regular articles from each of the chosen newspaper sources. With respect to dates, I included articles published January 1994 through December 2006 as much as possible with the exception of Arizona Republic, whose database only contains articles dating back to 1999. 2. I was unable to add mainstream media sources from New Mexico. Unfortunately, none of the mainstream media sources from New Mexico were available on the article databases I had access to, and articles were not available on the New Mexico newspaper Web sites themselves without a sizeable fee. 3. According to Goldberg women are no longer making the journey across the United States–Mexico border, which is not only incorrect, but also reinforces the invisibility of women within discussions of immigration (save for their fertility rates) and women’s homelessness in IR more broadly, as discussed in chapter 1. 4. There have been a few notable exceptions to this pattern, one being Dan Watman, who has led a number of “border meet-ups” (to promote dialog and beach cleanups), as well as a march to criticize the fencing plans and peacefully protest for making “friends, not fences” (Moran 2005). 5. For instance, one New York Times article begins with the statement: “Local and federal officials painted a devastating picture today of a smuggling operation that killed at least 14 young Mexican immigrants in Arizona,” and goes on to explain that a coyote abandoned them in the desert (Sterngold 2001). 6. Federation for American Immigration Reform often refers to itself (as do others) as “FAIR.” Because I associate this acronym with the media analysis organization Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, I do not use “FAIR” in reference to Federation for American Immigration Reform.

CHAPTER 4 1. I examine several texts from The Sierra Club and Border Action Network such as policy statements, positions papers, reports, backgrounders, and “FAQs” (Frequently Asked Questions), as well as articles and letters from their magazines and newsletters. I tried to find documents released between 1994 and 2006; however, members often directed me to



Notes

Notes

their Web site to find the information I was looking for rather than sending me hard copies. As a result, I have been largely restricted to what was available on their Web sites, which made finding older policy language difficult. Moreover, please note the access dates I include in all of Web document citations listed in both the appendix and works cited sections. I refer to and quote information that was available during the month and year I accessed the particular Web page or document. However, the Web site language may have changed since that time. This is the case for some of the Sierra Club documents I examined; see endnote number four below. In addition, there are a number of Web site documents with no date of publication listed. 2. According to Groundswell Sierra: “We’re a grassroots network of Sierra Club volunteers, rallying to protect the Sierra Club from an outside takeover by supporting qualified, experienced candidates in the 2004 Board of Directors election” (Groundswell Sierra 2004). 3. In addition to recognizing the disproportionate amount of environmental harm caused by Western consumption patterns, Sierra Club (n.d.[a]) also provides a slightly better discussion of carrying capacity than the definition popularized by the Carrying Capacity Network. Sierra Club explains, “What is the ideal population for the earth? No one is sure exactly how many people the earth can support. However, we do know that the earth is affected by how much each person consumes. The more an individual consumes, the more of the earth’s resources are used. Americans represent 5 percent of the world’s population, but account for 25 percent of global natural resource consumption.” 4. The Web address (Sierra Club n.d.[b], in the appendix), for the 1970, 1974, and other years’ policy language no longer takes readers to the document I originally referenced, examined, and quoted. The Web address now takes readers to a different document, in “pdf ” rather than “html” format, which does not mention the Club’s relationship with Zero Population Growth or their 1974 policy language. This new document does have Sierra Club’s 2007 policy language on population, which I cite in the works cited section. Although I do have a hardcopy of the original document, Sierra Club no longer has the original document.



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P P E N D I X

DOCUMENTS USED IN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS CHAPTER 1: WORLD POLITICS

AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS TEXTBOOKS

Caldwell, Dan. 2000. World politics and you. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Clemens, Walter. 1998. Dynamics of international relations: Conflict and mutual gain in an age of global interdependence. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2004. Dynamics of international relations: Conflict and mutual gain in an era of global interdependence. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Goldstein, Joshua. 2001. International relations. New York: Longman. ———. 2005. International relations. New York: Longman. Green, Owen. 2001. Environmental issues. In The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, 387–414. New York: Oxford University Press. Henderson, Conway. 1998. International relations: Conflict & cooperation at the turn of the 21st century. New York: McGraw Hill. Hughes, Barry. 1997. Continuity and change in world politics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ———. 2000. Continuity and change in world politics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Jones, Walter. 1997. The logic of international relations. New York: Longman/ Addison Wesley. Kegley, Charles, and Eugene Wittkopf. 1999. World politics: Trend and transformation. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. ———. 2004. World politics: Trend and transformation. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning. Lentner, Howard. 1997. International politics: Theory and practice. Minneapolis/ St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.



A

Appendix

Mansbach, Richard. 2000. The global puzzle: Issues and actors in world politics. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Mingst, Karen. 2003. Essentials of international relations. New York: W. W. Norton. Minix, Dean, and Sandra Hawley. 1998. Global politics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning. Nester, William. 2001. International relations: Politics and economics in the 21st century. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. Roskin, Michael, and Nicholas Berry. 1997. IR: The new world of international relations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. ———. 1999. IR: The new world of international relations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rourke, John, and Mark Boyer. 2006. World politics: International politics on the world stage, brief. New York: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill. Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella. 2000. World politics: The menu for choice. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s. ———. 2004. World politics: The menu for choice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning. Snow, Donald, and Eugene Brown. 2000. International relations: The changing contours of power. New York: Longman/Addison Wesley. Spiegel, Steven, and Fred Wehling. 1999. World politics in a new era. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. Viotti, Paul, and Mark Kauppi. 2001. International relations and world politics: Security, economy, identity. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

CHAPTER 2: U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS Bush Administration Documents

Bush Administration. 2001. Earth Day statement by the President. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-8 .html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002a. National strategy for homeland security. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf, 1–90 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002b. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, 1–32 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002c. President calls for conservation and stewardship on Earth Day. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/ 20020422-1.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002d. Securing the homeland strengthening the nation. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book .pdf, 1–29 (accessed May 2007).



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———. 2003a. President’s Earth Day message. The White House. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030422-2.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2003b. President updates America on Operations Liberty Shield and Iraqi Freedom. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/03/20030331-4.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2004a. Fiscal year 2005 budget estimates exhibit, R-2, RDT&E budget item justification: Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP). February. http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/ fy2005/budget_justification/pdfs/rdtande/OSD_BA3/O-30603716D8Z _SERDP__R-2(co)_R-2a__Feb_2004.pdf, 1–9 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2004b. President announces wetlands initiative on Earth Day. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040422 -4.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2005a. President celebrates Earth Day. The White House. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050422-7.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2005b. President discusses border security and immigration reform in Arizona. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/ 11/print/20051128-7.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006a. Fact sheet: Comprehensive immigration reform: Securing our border. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/04/20060424-4.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006b. Fact sheet: Comprehensive immigration reform: Securing our border, enforcing our laws, and upholding our values. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/print/20060327-1.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006c. Fact sheet: Earth Day 2006: Developing new transportation technology. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/04/20060422-2.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006d. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, 1–49 (accessed May 2007). Chertoff, Michael. 2005a. Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff at a joint press conference on Community Shield. August 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0712.shtm (accessed May 2007). Chertoff, Michael. 2005b. Ask the White House. November 30. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20051130.html (accessed May 2007). Sandia National Laboratories. 2002. International/vital issues processes, critical infrastructure surety. http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy _offices/hd/assets/downloads/dcip/Studies/SandiaNationalLaboratories/ InternationalVitalIssuesProcesses.pdf (accessed May 2007). Schwartz, Peter, and Doug Randall. 2003. An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for United States national security. Prepared for the Pentagon.



Appendix

Appendix

October. http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/3566_Abrupt ClimateChange.pdf, 1–22 (accessed May 2007). U.S. Department of Defense. 2001. Quadrennial defense review report. http:// www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_125_QDR_2001.pdf, 1–71 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2005. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. http:// www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0503nds.pdf, 1–20 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006. Quadrennial defense review report. http://www.defenselink .mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf, 1–92 and A1–A7 (accessed May 2007). U.S. Department of Homeland Security/DHS, 2005. Fact sheet: Secure border initiative. Press release. November 2. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/ press_release_0794.shtm (accessed July 2007). U.S. Department of State. 2005. Protecting the environment: 30 years of U.S. progress. Special issue, eJournal USA: Global Issues 10, no. 2: 1–53. http:// usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0605/ijge/ijge0605.pdf (accessed May 2007). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2002. Homeland security strategy. http://www.epa.gov/epahome/downloads/epa_homeland_security_strategic _plan.pdf, 1–62 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2004. Homeland security strategy. http://www.epa.gov/OHS/pdfs/EPA -HS-Strategy.pdf, 1–46 (accessed May 2007). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2004. The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States: A strategy for today; a vision for tomorrow. http://www .defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed May 2007). ———. 2006. National military strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf (accessed May 2007). Clinton Administration Documents

Clinton Administration. 1994a. Accepting the immigration challenge: The president’s report on immigration. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. ———. 1994b. Remarks on the observance of Earth Day. The American Presidency Project. April 21. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid =50012&st=Council+on+Sustainable+Development&st1 (accessed May 2007). ———. 1995a. A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. February. http://webharvest.gov/ peth04/20041029025809/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/nss .pdf, 1–33 (accessed May 2007). ———. 1995b. Remarks on the 25th Anniversary of Earth Day in Havre de Grace, Maryland. Clinton Foundation. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/ legacy/042195-speech-by-president-at25th-anniversary-of-earth-day.htm (accessed May 2007).



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———. 1996a. A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. February. http://www.globalsecurity .org/military/library/policy/national/nss9602.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 1996b. Remarks by the President on Earth Day. http://clinton6 .nara.gov/1996/04/1996-04-22-remarks-by-president-on-earth-day.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 1997b. Remarks to the United Nations Special Session on Environment and Development in New York City. Clinton Foundation. June 26. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/062697-speech-by-president-at -un-special-session-on-environment.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 1997c. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. May. http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/ NSC/Strategy/ (accessed May 2007). ———. 1998a. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. October. http://clinton2.nara.gov/ WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf, 1–59 (accessed May 2007). ———. 1998c. Remarks by the President on Earth Day: The Point, Harper’s Ferry National Historical Park, West Virginia. Clinton Foundation. April 22. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/042298-speech-by-president-at -earth-day-celebration.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 1999a. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/ legacy/010500-report-on-national-security-strategy.htm (accessed May 2007). ———.1999b. Statement on world population growth. Clinton Foundation. October 12. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101299-presidential -statement-on-world-population.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 1999c. Statement by the President (Earth Day). Clinton Foundation. April 22. http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/042299-presidential -statement-on-earth-day.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 2000a. A national security strategy for a global age. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. ———. 2000b. Remarks by the President at Earth Day Event: Trail of 100 Giants, Sequoia National Forest. April 15. http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/ 04/2000-04-15-remarks-by-the-president-at-earth-day-event.html (accessed May 2007). President’s Council on Sustainable Development. 1996. Sustainable America:

A new consensus for prosperity, opportunity, and a healthy environment for the future. http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/TF_Reports/ amer-chap6.html (accessed May 2007). U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21). 1999a. New world coming: American security in the 21st century, supporting research and analysis (Phase I). September 15. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/ NWR_A.pdf, 1–151 (accessed May 2007).



Appendix

Appendix

———. 1999b. New world coming: American security in the 21st century, major themes and implications (Phase I). September 15. http://govinfo.library.unt .edu/nssg/Reports/NWC.pdf, 1–8 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2000. Seeking a national strategy: A Concert for preserving security and promoting security (Phase II). April 15. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/ PhaseII.pdf, 1–16 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2001. Road map for national security: Imperative for change, the Phase III report of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century. February 15. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf, 1–139 (accessed May 2007). U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). 1996. Building a comprehensive Southwest border enforcement strategy. U.S. Department of Justice. October. Washington, DC: INS Public Affairs, Federal Publication, Government Documents Collection, Depository Item, 1–8. ———. 1999a. Backgrounder: INS’ Southwest Border strategy. I.N.S. U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/ (accessed January 2004; link now discontinued). ———. 1999b. Fact sheet: Immigration enforcement in Arizona—1994–1999. I.N.S. U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/ (accessed January 2004; link now discontinued). ———. 2000. Backgrounder: Immigration enforcement in Arizona— 1997–2000. I.N.S. U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/ (accessed January 2004; link now discontinued). ———. 2002. National border patrol strategy: Background: The Southwest Border strategy. I.N.S. U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ins.usdoj .gov/text/lawenfor/bpatrol/strategy.htm (accessed May 2002; link now discontinued). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1995. The national military strategy of the United States. February. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms_feb95.htm (accessed May 2007). ———. 1997. The national military strategy of the United States: Shape, respond, prepare now—A military strategy for a new era. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/nms/index.htm (accessed May 2007).

CHAPTER 3: U.S. MAINSTREAM MEDIA DOCUMENTS Abernethy, Virginia Deane. 2004. Prop. 200 is a beacon in resolving border rift. Arizona Republic, August 4, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http://www .newsbank.com/. Althaus, Dudley, and James Pinkerton. 2005. At odds on the border; competing interests. Houston Chronicle, December 28, 3 star edition, section A. http:// www.lexis-nexis.com/. Alvord, Valerie. 2004. Border fence plan runs into a barrier. USA Today, April 20, final edition, news, special. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



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Anderson, John Ward. 1998. No back-slapping for U.S., Mexico: Suspicions strain legislators’ gathering. Washington Post, June 22, final edition, section A. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Arizona Republic. 2001. Last week we asked: Are border water tanks a good idea? March 31, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2002. A monumental problem—Our stand: Ironwood plan must deal with smugglers, drug gangs and target shooters. November 14, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2003. Tribal tribulations—Our stand: One more reason to press immigration reforms. May 4, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2005. Border realities—Our stand: Serious debate at forum on immigration is a message to all Arizonans. July 5, final chaser, opinions. http:// www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2006a. Pearce hits new low on immigration—The issue: Solving our border woes. October 3, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2006b. The issue: Border reforms and fences—A symbol for failure. October 15, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2006c. The issue: Illegal immigration reforms—No excuses from Congress. November 29, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Barnett, Roger. 2000. Dear Governor: Stop the invasion on our border. Arizona Republic, May 25, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http://www.newsbank .com/. Barron, Alexander. 2005. Letter to editor. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 19, opinion, letters to the editor. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Bennet, James. 1997. Clinton and Mexico chief pledge joint effort on border and drugs. New York Times, May 6, section A, foreign desk. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Berestein, Leslie. 2005. Federal judge rejects attempt to block border fence. San Diego Union-Tribune, December 13, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Bloom, Claudia. 2002a. Paying price of immigration. Arizona Republic, July 12, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2002b. No ghost, just fairytale. Arizona Republic, October 8, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2002c. Threats along our border: Immigrants overwhelming nation. Arizona Republic, December 10, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank .com/. Boston Globe. 2005. A bad-faith border watch. October 18, 3rd ed. http://www .lexis-nexis.com/. Boustany, Nora. 2001. Mexico’s new envoy energized by fast-changing ties with U.S. Washington Post, August 31, A section, diplomatic dispatches. http:// www.lexis-nexis.com/. Broder, John. 2005. With Congress’s blessing, a border fence may finally push through to the sea. New York Times, July 4, late edition-final, section A, national desk. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



Appendix

Appendix

Brown, Larry. 2000. Letter to editor. Agenda for candidates. Los Angeles Times, February 17, letters desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost .com/content/. Brown, W. 2002. Insane rush to future. Arizona Republic, May 16, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Brownstein, Ronald. 1997. Tough talk may be right language for the President’s visit to Mexico. Los Angeles Times, May 5, Washington outlook, national desk, home edition. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Burgess, Robert. 2000. Letter to editor. RE: March protests operation gatekeeper. San Diego Union-Tribune, April 21, opinion, letters to the editor. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Burke, Meredith. 1999. Demographics guarantee surge on Latino population. Arizona Republic, June 13, special, final chaser, arts and ideas. http://www .newsbank.com/. Carnerie, Tony. 2003. Letter to editor. Stop illegal immigration from Mexico— and its sand. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 20, opinion. http://www .lexis-nexis.com/. Carroll, Susan. 2006. Fence issue divides residents on border. Arizona Republic, May 27, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Chacon, Richard. 1998. Pollution flows at U.S.–Mexico border; NAFTA brings industry but little cleanup. Boston Globe, September 27, national/foreign. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 1999. U.S. pledges new partnership in Central America. Boston Globe, March 12, national/foreign. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Clancy, Michael. 2006. Immigration puts species in danger. Arizona Republic, February 4, final chaser, valley and state. http://www.newsbank.com/. Cone, Marla, and Patrick McDonnell. 1998. Sierra Club to remain neutral on immigration. Los Angeles Times, April 26, metro desk, home edition, main news. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Crossette, Barbara. 1997. Spending Ted Turner’s money: State Dept. aide gets U.N. job. New York Times, November 20, late edition-final, section A, foreign desk. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Dalton, Betty. 2001. Border mess our own fault: Changing rules not fair. Arizona Republic, August 27, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Edds, Kimberly. 2005. U.S. calls entry point in San Diego a possible security risk; fencing sought to reinforce the border faces opposition from environmentalists. Washington Post, March 10, final edition, A section, special. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Edsall, Thomas, and Cheryl Thompson. 2001. Alliance forms on immigrant policies; business, church, labor groups unite on liberalization. Washington Post, August 7, final edition, A section. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Edwards, Christopher. 2001. Letter to editor. Hard realities on the Rio Grande. New York Times, February 15, late edition-final, section A, editorial desk. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



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Ellingwood, Ken, and Deborah Schoch. 1998. In push to secure border, risk to rare species seen. Los Angeles Times, August 16, metro desk, main news. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Fineman, Mark. 1996. Population of Mexico doubled in 28 years. Los Angeles Times, April 27, foreign desk, home edition, main news. http://connection .ebscohost.com/content/. Fitzsimmons, Elizabeth. 2006. The environmental cost of illegal immigration; witnesses testify at Santee hearing. San Diego Union-Tribune, August 6, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Flint, Anthony. 1994. Culture clashes to mark population control talks. Boston Globe, August 28, city edition, national/foreign. http://www.lexis-nexis .com/. Flores, Corine. 2001. Stop illegal immigration. Washington Post, March 15, final edition, editorial. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Friedman, L. 2001. Save America for voters. Arizona Republic, August 27, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Gaona, Elena. 2004. Canyon dwellings cleared; Pollution concerns prompt city evictions; cleanup begins at Carlsbad migrant camps. San Diego UnionTribune, February 18, zone. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2005a. Migrant camps a challenging problem, panel tells residents. San Diego Union-Tribune, July 9, zone. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2005b. School bars illegal-immigration forum. San Diego UnionTribune, August 6, zone. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Gaona, Elena, and David Graham. 2005. Immigration confrontation contained; Carlsbad forum draws protesters—and 150 law officers. San Diego UnionTribune, August 12, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Glen, B.H. 2006. A liberal look at immigration. Arizona Republic, May 9, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Goldberg, Carey. 1996. Scenic mountains scarred by illegal border crossings. New York Times, November 17, late edition-final, section 1, national desk. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Grillo, Ioan. 2005. New U.S. immigration laws denounced by Mexico. Houston Chronicle, May 13, 3 star edition, section A. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Holmes, Steven. 1995. Surprising rise in immigration stirs up debate. New York Times, August 30, late edition-final, section A, national desk. http://www .lexis-nexis.com/. Hoover, Robin, Reverend, President Human Borders. 2001. Fix the fatal flaws in U.S. border policy. Arizona Republic, July 23, final chaser, opinions. http:// www.newsbank.com/. House, Billy. 2002. Immigration, drug traffic hurts federal land. Arizona Republic, June 30, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2004. State gains funding in U.S. bill. Arizona Republic, November 23, final chaser, valley & state. http://www.newsbank.com/. Howell, Llewellyn. 1995. The end of immigration. USA Today Magazine 124, no. 2604. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



Appendix

Appendix

Howlett, Allen. 1997. Letter to editor. RE: Sierra Club to Vote on Immigration Limits. Los Angeles Times, October 6, letters desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Hurlbert, Irene Woo. 2005. Letter to editor. Sierra Club Myopic on Immigration Issue. San Diego Union-Tribune, April 16, opinion, letters to the editor. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Huslin, Anita. 2006. On immigration, A theorist who’s no fence-sitter. Washington Post, November 26, final edition, style. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Ingley, Kathleen. 2002. California, here we come. Arizona Republic, November 17, final chaser, viewpoints. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2005. Phantom highways. Arizona Republic, May 15, final chaser, viewpoints. http://www.newsbank.com/. Johnson, Bridget. 2006. Trashing the border. USA Today, July 11, final edition, news. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Jones, James, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. 1997. We should not decertify Mexico. Washington Post, March 16, final edition, op-ed. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Kamman, Jon. 1999. The future is upon us; World population nearing 6 billion. Arizona Republic, July 17, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Kammer, Jerry. 2002. Grassroots, politicians differ on immigration. Arizona Republic, February 14, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Kammer, Jerry, and Tessie Borden. 2000. CORR-Mexico’s inauguration draws Albright, Hall. Arizona Republic, December 1, final chaser, front. http:// www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2001. Bush, Fox: New era of solidarity? Arizona Republic, September 2, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Katz, Jesse. 1997. Border lights illuminate two faces of Rio Grande. Los Angeles Times, October 18, national desk, home edition, main news. http://www .lexis-nexis.com/. Kenworthy, Tom. 2006. New outlaws plague Arizona desert refuges. USA Today, August 23, final edition, news. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Knight, Gail. 2006. Letter to editor. Thanks to sheriff. Arizona Republic, December 29, final, Phoenix Community North. http://www.newsbank.com/. Kyle, Jon, U.S. Senator, AZ. 2005. My turn. Arizona Republic, March 9, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http://www.newsbank.com/. Lamm, Richard. 2001. Future in jeopardy unless we change immigration policy. Arizona Republic, August 26, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http:// www.newsbank.com/. Lee, Mike. 2006a. American: Taking it to the limit? San Diego Union-Tribune, August 6, news. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2006b. Need for border improvement cited. San Diego Union-Tribune, March 15, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Lippman, Thomas. 1996. Christopher presses Clinton policy themes on Caribbean trip. Washington Post, March 7, final edition, A section. http:// www.lexis-nexis.com/.



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———. 1997a. Clinton urges common bond with Mexico; Presidential visit focuses on key bilateral issues. Washington Post, May 6, final edition, A section. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 1997b. Political necessity, not choice, draws Clinton to Mexico this week. Washington Post, May 4, final edition, A section. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Los Angeles Times. 1994. World population: Will this runaway train crush us all? December 25, home edition, editorial. http://connection.ebscohost.com/ content/. ———. 1996. Snoozing on a key trade issue. October 6, home edition, opinion, editorial. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. ———. 1999. Strengthen ties between California and Mexico border. May 18, op. ed. desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Mann, Judy. 1997. Time to reverse a family planning fiasco. Washington Post, January 24, final edition, metro. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2000. Proclaiming the wonders of family planning. Washington Post, July 14, final edition, style. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Martinez, Al. 1997. Listen to the wind. Los Angeles Times, October 7, metro desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Martinez, Christopher. 2001. The big idea: Too many people? Is tide of immigrants overrunning America’s natural resources? The greening of hate. Boston Globe, July 22, focus. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/. Martinez, Jaime. 2005. Fair trade or betrayed? Houston Chronicle, April 3, 2 star edition, outlook, editorial opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Martinson, John. 2002. U.N. population fund plays a key role in U.S. security. Arizona Republic, August 26, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http://www .newsbank.com/. McDonnell, Patrick. 1996. Activists see dire immigration threat. Los Angeles Times, August 11, metro desk, home edition, main news. http://connection .ebscohost.com/content/. ———. 2001. Brash evangelist. Los Angeles Times, July 15, magazine desk, home edition. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Mead, Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 2000. Economics: How U.S. can rebuild Mexico. Los Angeles Times, April 30, opinion desk, home edition, opinion. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Moeser, Chris. 1999. Hull seeks new agents for border. Arizona Republic, May 13, final chaser, valley and state. http://www.newsbank.com/. Moran, Chris. 2005. “Make friends not fences,” say border marchers. San Diego Union-Tribune, April 3, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Napolitano, Janet, Arizona Governor, and Jon Huntsman Jr., Utah Governor. 2006. Find a fix for immigration. Arizona Republic, March 2, final chaser, opinions, our turn. http://www.newsbank.com/. Newman, Michael. 1997. Letter to editor. Sierra Club to Vote on Immigration Limits. Los Angeles Times, October 6, letters desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/.



Appendix

Appendix

Pianin, Eric. 2001. Around the globe, cities have growing pains. Washington Post, June 11, final edition, A section. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Parker, Kathleen. 2003. Growth drying up water sources. Arizona Republic, December 31, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Pimentel, Ricardo. 2004. Sierra Club barking up the wrong tree. Arizona Republic, March 25, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Pinkerton, James. 2006. “Chain migration”; Change in laws could divide families. Houston Chronicle, April 23, 4 star edition, section A. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Pitzl, Mary Jo. 2004. Q&A: Carl Pope. Arizona Republic, April 14, final chaser, local. http://www.newsbank.com/. ———. 2005. Patrols, crossers trash border’s pristine desert. Arizona Republic, March 25, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Propsi, Luther. 2002. Overhaul development rules. Arizona Republic, July 22, final chaser, opinions. http://www.newsbank.com/. Purtill, Corinne. 2006. New fences protecting fragile areas on border. Arizona Republic, August 26, final chaser, front. http://www.newsbank.com/. Reinert, Patty, and Karen Masterson. 2001. Fox presses Bush about immigrants. Houston Chronicle, September 6, 3 star edition. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Rodgers, Terry. 2003. Border battle brews. San Diego Union-Tribune, October 7, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2004a. Suit seeks to block extra fence at border. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 11, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2004b. Divided on barrier. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 16, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2004c. Coastal panel rejects plan for the last leg of border fence. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 19, news. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2005a. Critics slam bill that exempts fence from environment laws. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 14, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2005b. Finish the fence. San Diego Union-Tribune, March 30, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Rozemberg, Hernan. 2001. State may help border counties strapped by migrant costs. Arizona Republic, December 15, final chaser, valley & state. http:// www.newsbank.com/. Saldana, Lori. 1996. The downside of the border boom. Los Angeles Times, August 22, op-ed desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost .com/content/. Salinas, Marta. 1997. Letter to editor. RE: Sierra Club to vote on immigration limits. Los Angeles Times, October 6, letters desk, home edition, metro. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. San Diego Union-Tribune. 2001. Promising ties; Bush should match Fox’s border dedication. March 7, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2005. Play by the rules; To build border fence, feds should obey laws. February 15, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



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Sanchez, Leonel. 2002. State fights plan to build 2nd fence at border park. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 23, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Savage, David. 1995. House panel nears OK on cuts in legal immigration Congress. Los Angeles Times, October 18, national desk, home edition, main news. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Elizabeth Shogren. 1999. Clinton, on Mexico visit, lauds nation for drug war. Los Angeles Times, February 16, foreign desk, home edition, main news. http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Sherwood, Robbie. 2005. Goldwater nephew enters gubernatorial race. Arizona Republic, August 3, final chaser, valley & state. http://www.newsbank.com/. Simcox, David, Director of Research, Negative Population Growth Inc. 1997. Political asylum: The Achilles’ heal of immigration control. USA Today Magazine 125, no. 2620 (January). http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/. Slattery, Ryan. 2004. Protecting the parks along the border. Washington Post, April 26, final edition, A section, special. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Staff, Editorial Opinion. 1997. Look south; Attention to Latin American, Caribbean worthwhile. Houston Chronicle, May 7, 3 star edition, section A, editorials. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2000. U.S. and Mexico; Zedillo legacy worth noting north of the border. Houston Chronicle, June 9, 3 star edition, section A, editorials. http:// www.lexis-nexis.com/. Stein, Dan. 2002. Migrant-fueled growth choking Arizona dream. Arizona Republic, July 15, final chaser, opinions, my turn. http://www.newsbank .com/. Sterling, Terry Greene. 2004. “Radical center” tries to shield ranch land. Washington Post, November 13, final edition, A section, special. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Talton, Jon. 2002. We’ve only just begun. Arizona Republic, May 21, final chaser, business. http://www.newsbank.com/. Taylor, Marisa. 2004. Border barrier remains a priority. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 27, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. USA Today. 2006. Tours explore harsher side of reality. July 7, final edition, life. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Veal, William, Chief Patrol Agent U.S. Border Patrol. 2002. Duel on the border. San Diego Union-Tribune, March 14, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Washington Post. A Fine Line for Mexico. 1997. March 3 final edition, editorial. http://www.lexis-nexis.com. ———. 2006. Immigration ugliness. September 22, final edition, editorial. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Wattenberg, Ben, American Enterprise Institute. 2001. Fearing Canada, applauding Mexico. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 16, opinion. http:// www.lexis-nexis.com/. Weston, Dale. 2005. Letter to editor. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 19, opinion, letters to the editor. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.



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Wieber, William. 2005. Letter to editor. Build That Border Fence. San Diego Union-Tribune, February 19, opinion, letters to the editor. http://www.lexis -nexis.com/. Winter, Mayda, Mayor pro tempore, Imperial Beach and manager Southwest Wetlands Interpretive Association, and Patricia McCoy, Imperial Beach City Council. 2002. Duel on the border. San Diego Union-Tribune, March 14, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Woodbury, Richard. 1999. Danger and alarm on a new alien gateway. Time 154, no. 13: 54. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Yates, Edward. 2000. A bridge across the Rio Grande. New York Times, July 21, late edition, final, editorial desk. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Yeh, Ling-Ling, Founder of the Diversity Coalition for an Immigration Moratorium. 1997. Legal immigration must be curbed, too. USA Today Magazine 125, no. 2620 (January). http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2000. Americans’ simplistic perspectives. San Diego Union Tribune, May 14, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Zuckerman, Ben, and Stuart Hurlbert, Directors Californians for Population Stabilization. 2001. Is overimmigration in the U.S. morally defensible? San Diego Union-Tribune, August 3, opinion. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. Zuniga, Janine. 2000. Imperial beach fears second border fence will trap park. San Diego Union-Tribune, December 21, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2002a. 2nd Border fence going up. San Diego Union-Tribune, August 1, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2002b. Border fence plans prompt opposition from imperial beach. San Diego Union-Tribune, August 19, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. ———. 2003. Plan for border fence draws opposition. San Diego Union-Tribune, August 2, local. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.

CHAPTER 4: NGO DOCUMENTS Sierra Club Documents

Barry, John Byrne. 1998. On the border: Where wilderness meets la migra. The Planet Newsletter, Sierra Club 5, no. 10 (December). http://www.sierraclub .org/planet/199810/bord9.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. 1999. Margin notes: The sky is falling? The Planet Newsletter, Sierra Club 6, no. 1 (January/February). http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/199901/ notes.asp (accessed May 2007). Eielson, Olivia. 1999. Sprawl and population: Letter to the editor and editor’s note in response. San Francisco Yodeler, Newspaper of the San Francisco Bay Chapter of Sierra Club, August. http://sanfranciscobay.sierraclub.org/Yodeler/ html/1999/08/sprawl.htm (accessed April 2004; link now discontinued). Elbel, Fred, Chair, RMC Population Committee. 1998. Supporting statement for Proposal A: Why we need a comprehensive U.S. population policy. Peak and Prairie: Sierra Club Rocky Mountain Chapter Online Newsletter XXIII, no.



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1 (February/March). http://www.rmc.sierraclub.org/pandp/1998-02/imma .html (accessed May 2007). García, Arnoldo, Earth Island Institute, and Brad Erickson, Political Ecology Group. 1997. Response to Sepulveda’s letter to the editor “anti-immigrant?” Sierra Club Yodeler Newspaper, San Francisco Bay Chapter of Sierra Club 60, no. 9 (September). http://sanfranciscobay.sierraclub.org/yodeler.html/ 1997/09/03.htm (accessed June 2002; link now discontinued). Glick, Patricia. n.d. Global warming: The high cost of inaction. Sierra Club. Produced for the Sierra Club’s Understanding Green Markets Project. http:// www.sierraclub.org/globalwarming/get_involved/inaction.asp (accessed May 2007). Maybury, John. 2001. Meandering: Oil and terrorism. The Loma Prietan, Sierra Club (December 2001/January 2002). http://lomaprieta.sierraclub.org/ lp0112_Meandering.html (accessed May 2007). McCloskey, Mike. 1999. New challenge to the EJ movement. EJ Times, Sierra Club 1, no. 1 (October–December). http://www.sierraclub.org/environmental _justice/newsletter/1.pdf, 2–3. (accessed May 2007). McConahay, Mary Jo. 2000a. No place to call home. Sierra Magazine. (November/December). http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200011/refugee.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. 2000b. Beneath the Rio Negro. Sierra Magazine. (November/December). http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200011/refugee2.asp (accessed May 2007). Pezzullo, Phaedra. 1999. Si, se puede!: Environmental justice for farm workers. EJ Times, Sierra Club 1, no. 1 (October–December). http://www.sierraclub .org/environmental_justice/newsletter/1.pdf, 10–11. (accessed May 2007). Pope, Carl. 1998. Ways and means: Moving on lessons of the immigration debate. Sierra Magazine, July/August. http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/ 199807/ways.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. 1999. Ways and means: Solving the population problem. Sierra Magazine, September/October. http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/199909/ways.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. 2001. Ways and means: Big river between us. Sierra Magazine, September/October. http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/ways.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. 2004. Ways and means: The virus of hate. Sierra Magazine, May/June. http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200405/ways.asp (accessed May 2007). Schneider, Dick, and Alan Kuper (Alternative A) and Peter H. Kostmayer and Karen Kalla (Alternative B). 1997. The pending vote on immigration policy within the Sierra Club. The Planet Newsletter 4, no. 10 (December). http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/199712/imm1.asp (accessed May 2007). Sepulveda, Maria. 1997. Anti-Immigrant?: Letter to editor. Sierra Club Yodeler, Newspaper of the San Francisco Bay Chapter of Sierra Club 60, no. 9 (September). http://sanfranciscobay.sierraclub.org/yodeler.html/1997/09/03.htm (accessed June 2002; link now discontinued).



Appendix

Appendix

Sierra Club. 1995. Global population and environment: Program history. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/ population/history.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. Club Beat. 1996. Planet Newsletter. http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/ 199605/clubbeat.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. Population Campaign. 1997. Population Report 1, no. 3. http://www .sierraclub.org/population/prfall97.htm (accessed April 1998; link now discontinued). ———. 1999. Operation Rio Grande: The U.S. immigration service’s plan to fence and light the border. Texas Sierra Club Newsletter, Spring. http:// texas.sierraclub.org/Newsletters/LSS/Spring-99/Border.html (accessed May 2007). ———. Global Population Stabilization Program. 2000a. Women’s health, Earth’s health. Sierra Magazine, November/December. http://www.sierraclub .org/sierra/200011/refugee3.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. Global Population Stabilization Program. 2000b. Women’s Health, Earth’s Health Packet/Postcards. Washington, DC: Sierra Club. ———. 2001. A tour by any other name: Tour de sprawl & tour de stench. EJ Times 2, no. 1 (January–March). http://www.sierraclub.org/environmental _justice/newsletter/v2i1.pdf, 6 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2005a. Our stance on migration. Sierra Club. January. http://www .sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/migration011405.pdf, 1–2 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2005b. Why environmentalists care about family planning around the world. Sierra Club. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/Int FamilyPlan2005a.pdf, 1–4 (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(a). Global population and environment: Frequently asked questions. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub .org/population/faq.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(b). Sierra Club policies. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/population.asp (accessed May 2007; original document not available). See endnote number four, Chapter 4. ———. n.d.(c). Global population and environment: All about CEDAW. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/ population/cedaw/ (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(d). Global population and environment: Overview. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/ overview/ (accessed May 2007; original document not available). ———. n.d.(e). Healthy families for a healthy environment. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/ families.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(f ). Living in a water-scarce world. Sierra Club Global Population and Environment Program. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/ water.pdf (accessed May 2007).



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———. n.d.(i). Why environmentalists care about family planning in the United States. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/usfamilyplanning .pdf, 1–4 (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(j). Population and global warming. Sierra Club: Global Population and the Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/factsheets/ pop_and_globalwarming.asp (accessed May 2007). ———. n.d.(k). A mother’s promise campaign. http://motherlode.sierraclub .org/population/California.html (accessed January 2004); specific link now discontinued. ———. n.d.(l). Population, consumption and our ecological footprint. Sierra Club: Global Population and Environment. http://www.sierraclub.org/population/ consumption/ (accessed May 2007). Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization. 1998. Why we need a comprehensive U.S. population policy. Sierra Club Missouri. http://missouri.sierraclub.org/ SierranOnline/news1998/OSO199802pop.htm (accessed May 2007). Snell, Marilyn Berlin. 2004. A tale of two immigrants. Sierra Magazine, November/December. http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200411/immigrants.asp (accessed May 2007). Border Action Network Documents

Border Action Network (formerly Southwest Alliance to Resist Militarization/ SWARM). 2000. SWARM’s INS comments. Border Action Network. http://www.resistmilitarization.org/inshearings.html (accessed June 2002; link now discontinued). ———. 2001a. Annual report. Border Action Network. http://www.borderaction .org (accessed April 2004; link to annual report discontinued). ———. 2001b. Group places body bags at federal building in Tucson, blames U.S. policies for deaths along U.S.-Mexico border. Refuse and Resist! http:// www.refuseandresist.org/imm/071001swarm.html (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002a. Victory—Immigrant prisons cancelled! Border Action Network. http://borderaction.org/campaigns3.php?articleID=21 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002b. Exposé on border vigilante groups. Border Action Network. http://www.borderaction.org/campaigns3.php?articleID=12 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2002c. Hate or heroism: Vigilantes on the Arizona-Mexico border. Border Action Network. http://www.borderaction.org/PDFs/vigilante_report.pdf, 1–27 (accessed May 2007). ———. 2003b. Border Action comments on border expansions in Douglas: Mr. Charles Parsons, Environmental Officer: Re: Comments on Draft Supplemental Environmental Assessment for Infrastructure within U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor, Cochise County, Arizona. Border Action Network. http://www.borderaction.org/campaigns3.php?articleID=30 (accessed May 2007).



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274

9/11 (September 11th 2001, United States), 8–9, 18, 32, 56, 105–8, 110, 112, 121–22, 129, 155–56, 165, 194, 200, 211, 219–20 120 formula, 43–44. See also reproductive injustice, examples of ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), 27, 102, 118, 229n8 agenda setting power, 25, 132, 134–35 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 103, 118, 152, 198, 228n6 American Patrol, 1, 8, 25, 105, 120–23, 126–28, 150, 153–55, 159, 166, 185, 189, 198, 220 Anderson, Margaret, and Patricia Hill Collins, 6, 11–12, 22–23, 127, 199, 226n10 antichoice, agenda and movement, 42, 47, 73 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 117 Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice (ACRJ), 18–19 Ayvazian, Andrea, 160 Barnett, Jon, 50, 82, 109–11, 115, 189, 211 Barnett, Roger, 119–23, 143, 153, 160. See also Ranch Rescue Bhattacharjee, Anannya, 13 binary dualism (a.k.a. value hierarchical dualism), defined, 225n4 Border Action Network, 11, 20, 26, 100–103, 119–20, 122–25, 127–28, 143, 151, 155, 163, 166, 168, 185–201, 201–3, 206, 210, 216, 218, 220, 224, 229n1 Brown, Lester, 49, 50, 182 Bush, G.W. Administration, 1, 8, 25, 39, 81, 83, 92, 105–18, 121, 125–26, 129–30, 144–45, 180, 182, 189–90, 196, 210–12, 216, 219, 228n2 Caldwell, Dan, 62–63

Campbell, David, 2, 4, 11, 14, 16, 55, 89–90, 95, 129, 212, 215 cassandras (a.k.a. pessimists). See NeoMalthusians CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), 174, 176, 181 Chertoff, Michael, 114, 145–47, 190, 207, 211 Chinese Exclusion Act, 79 Chomsky, Aviva, 228n3 Chomsky, Noam, 25, 132–34 Chowdhry, Geeta and Sheila Nair, 12, 13, 76 Civil Homeland Defense, 121–23 classism, 5, 12, 18 Clemens, Walter, 70 Clinton Administration, 8, 25, 40, 81–85, 87–92, 96–105, 106–7, 108, 117, 118, 127, 129– 30, 142, 144, 150, 169, 172, 178, 189–90, 196, 209–12, 216, 219, 228n2 Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment (CWPE), 11, 19–20, 36, 42–44, 50, 76, 118, 135, 151, 155, 167, 199, 200–202, 206, 216, 220–21, 224, 229n8 cornucopians (a.k.a. optimists), 36, 40–41, 49, 51, 60, 66, 72, 74, 218, 228n9 cultural authority, 25, 132, 134 CWPE. See Committee on Women, Population and the Environment Daniel Tatum, Beverly, 160 Depo-Provera, 44–45, 86. See also reproductive injustice, examples DHS. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security discourse, defined, 6 Doty, Roxanne Lynn, 11, 14, 24, 27, 122, 124, 125 Dunn, Timothy, 8, 100–104, 120



INDEX

Index

Earth Democracy, principles of, 20 ecofeminism/ecofeminist/materialist ecofeminism, 11, 16, 50, 226n9 ecological sensibility(ies), 26, 163–65, 168, 171, 201 Ehrlich, Paul, 38–39, 68, 171 Ehrlich, Paul, Anne Ehrlich, and Gretchen Daily, 39, 53 Eisenstein, Zillah, 9, 23, 30, 105, 226n7 enemy-creation process, 3, 36, 39, 48, 54, 69, 76, 80, 89, 91, 105, 129, 139, 156, 202, 206, 210, 212, 217, 219, 222–23 environmental justice, 5, 11, 18–20, 36, 42–43, 48, 50, 59, 66, 70, 72–73, 143, 170, 180–81, 184, 187, 200, 205–6, 218–19, 223 environmental security. See mainstream environmental security discourse ES discourse. See mainstream environmental security (ES) discourse ES scholarship. See mainstream environmental security (ES) discourse eugenics, 38, 44, 46–47, 59, 75, 181, 183–84 Federation for American Immigration Reform, 150, 152–53, 158, 160, 164–66, 170, 180–81, 188, 194, 202, 221, 227n4, 229n6 feminist theories of IR, 34, 227n1 Fernandes, Deepa, 79, 86, 228n1, 228n3, 229n8 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, 20 Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, 41–42, 227n5 footpath(s) argument, 114, 126, 135, 142–47, 180, 190, 193, 210–11 Freire, Paulo, 6, 22 globalization, neoliberal, 4, 5, 12, 18, 30, 41, 57, 67, 77, 91–92, 94–95, 127, 173, 179–81, 186– 88, 195–97, 210, 212, 216–17, 221, 227n12, 228n4 Goldstein, Joshua, 30, 32, 57, 65 Gore, Al, 50, 81–82, 84, 108, 179 Gramsci, Antonio, 164, 167, 226n11 greening of hate, defined, 3–4, 206 Hardin, Garrett, 1, 37–38, 60, 62–63, 66–69, 71–75, 84, 108–9, 136, 142, 166, 171, 183–84, 194, 219, 227n3, 227n4, 228n11 hate speech, 156, 159–60, 221–22 Hartmann, Betsy, 3, 4, 11, 36, 37, 39, 43, 47, 48, 205, 218

Hayes, Helene, 80, 86, 87, 90, 91,117, 228n1 Henderson, Conway, 58–59 heteronormative, 73, 85, 86 heterosexism, 5, 12, 80, 160, 226n8 Hobbes, Thomas, 32–33, 64, 66, 71 Homer-Dixon, Thomas, 51–55, 57–58, 90, 142, 209, 227n6 hooks, bell, 5–6, 11, 22, 29, 156, 216, 226n7, 226n10 Hughes, Barry, 59, 60, 61, 63–64, 228n9 Huntington, Samuel, 8, 49, 155, 157 ICE. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement IIRIRA. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 87, 117 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 41, 221, 227n12 Immigration Act of 1921, 79–80 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment, 86 Immigration Reform and Control Act (ICRA), 86, 97 interdependence-pluralist school. See pluralism/pluralist interpretive analysis, defined, 7 intersectional and postcolonial feminism, defined, 5, 10–23 intersectionality, lens of, defined, 12 Johnson, Allan, 25–26, 71, 134 Joint Task Force 6 (JTF–6), 100, 103, 189, 228–29n7 Kaplan, Robert, 52–53, 84, 176 Kegley, Charles, and Eugene Wittkopf, 71–74, 227n2, 228n11 Kirk, Gwyn and Margo Okazawa-Rey, 11, 18, 24, 44, 46, 77, 79, 136, 216, 226n8, 226n10 left-distributionist theories, defined, 36, 41–42, 49, 60, 74, 218, 227n6 LIC doctrine. See low intensity conflict doctrine Lindsley, Syd, 11, 85–87, 95–96, 202, 218 litany statement, 84, 107, 108, 135, 140, 209, 211 Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine, 100–2, 105, 118, 120, 122, 124–25, 189, 200, 210, 212, 228n6 Low Intensity War/Warfare, 74, 99–100, 118, 147



276

Index

NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 8–9, 92, 94–95, 116, 127, 180, 196, 216– 17, 220–21 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 113–114, 190 National Military Strategy (NMS), 83, 115 National Security Strategy (NSS), 82–85, 88, 90–92, 105, 107, 111–12, 116, 196, 209, 211, 216– 17, 228n2 National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), 106–8, 111, 116, 210–11 Naturalization Act 1790, 24 neo-Malthusian theory/neo-Malthusianism, defined, 1–4, 37–40 neorealism/neorealist theory, 32–35 Nester, William, 57, 60, 68–70, 75 NMS. See National Military Strategy Norplant, 44, 45, 86. See also reproductive injustice, examples NSHS. See National Strategy for Homeland Security NSS. See National Security Strategy Operation Gatekeeper, 98–99, 102–3 Operation Hold the Line, 98

Operation Rio Grande, 98, 180 Operation Safeguard, 98–99 optimists. See cornucopians Other, defined, 2 paramilitary, 8, 81, 100, 118–28, 143, 153–54, 159–60, 166, 180–81, 185, 189, 193–95, 198, 200, 210, 220, 222, 225n3 patriarchy. See sexism Persaud, Randolph, 2, 13, 24, 29, 79, 216 pessimists (a.k.a. cassandras). See NeoMalthusians Pioneer Fund, 160, 166 Planned Parenthood, 43, 46–47, 227n4 pluralism/pluralist theory, 32–36, 50, 71, 91 Political Ecology Group (PEG), 152, 155, 158, 170, 184, 222 Population and Development Program, Hampshire College “Population in Perspective,” 76, 218 population debates in IR, 36–48, 54 Population-Environment Balance, 1–4, 38, 164, 165–67, 175, 180, 183, 194, 202, 227n4 President’s Council on Sustainable Development, 87–88 privilege (systemic), 4, 6, 10, 12, 16–17, 25–26, 39, 41–43, 71, 96, 127, 128, 132, 134, 148, 154, 156, 181, 205–206 pro-choice framework/movement, 18, 19, 43, 47 program of deterrence, 27, 74, 97–98, 101, 104, 111, 115, 117–18, 143–44, 180, 185, 190, 193– 94 Proposition 187, 87 Proposition 200, 87 racism, 5, 12, 156–60 Ranch Rescue, 1, 8, 25, 27, 105, 119–28, 129–30, 143, 153–54, 220 realism/realist theory, 32–35, 52, 55, 64, 71–72, 209, 211 recolonization, 13, 21 relations of ruling, 13, 14 reproductive injustice, examples of, 43–48, 59, 72, 86, 87, 148, 174–78, 201 reproductive justice, 5, 11, 18–20, 36, 42–43, 50, 59, 67, 70, 72–73, 205, 218, 224 resource depletor representation, 85, 87, 89, 136, 158 Roberts, Dorothy, 44–48 Ross, Brownlee, Dixon Diallo, Rodriguez, and the SisterSong Project, 19



mainstream environmental security (ES) discourse, defined, 4–6, 7, 26–27, 205 mainstream IR theory, defined, 32–36 mainstream U.S. media, defined, 25, 132–35 Malthus, Thomas, 37 manufacturing consent, 133–34 matrix of domination and privilege, defined, 12 Matsuda, Mari, 156–57, 159, 161, 222 McCarren-Walter Act, 79–80 Mies, Maria, 46 Mies, Maria, and Vandana Shiva, 11, 45–46 militarization, 4, 8–9, 12, 18, 25, 27, 41, 81, 99–105, 115–19, 119–30, 136, 146–47, 176, 179, 185–87, 188–95, 197–98, 200–201, 207, 210–12 Mingst, Karen, 59, 75 Minix, Dean, and Sandra Hawley, 68 Minutemen, 1, 8, 25, 105, 121–22, 127–28, 225n3. See also Chris Simcox Mississippi appendectomies, 43–44. See also reproductive injustice, examples Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 10–11, 13–16, 20–23, 65, 95, 202, 208, 213, 224, 225n2, 228n4 Moore Lappé, Francis, Joseph Collins, and Peter Rosset, 41–42

277

Index

Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, 66, 67, 68 Said, Edward, 12, 226n11 Sanger, Margaret, 46–47 SBI. See Secure Border Initiative scapegoat/scapegoating, 1, 4, 38, 41–44, 47–48, 69, 70, 73, 76, 86, 91, 127, 135–36, 149, 158, 168, 170, 172, 175, 180, 186, 189, 193, 195, 197–98, 200, 203, 206, 214–15, 217, 220, 222–24 Schwartz, Peter, and Doug Randall, 108–9 Secure Border Initiative (SBI), 8, 25, 81, 106, 115–18, 128, 129, 143, 144, 185, 189, 190–91, 193, 196, 208, 220 sexism (a.k.a. patriarchy), 5, 12, 126, 156, 158, 160 shifting the center, 199–200, 222 Shiva, Vandana, 11, 20, 38, 42, 50, 56, 66, 72, 75, 109, 227n12, 227n3, 227n5, 228n4 Sierra Club, 1, 9, 26, 59, 163, 168–85, 197, 201–2, 207, 209, 210, 211, 215, 216, 223, 229–30n1, 230n2, 230n3, 230n4 Silliman, Jael, 27, 39–40, 42, 218 Silliman and Bhattacharjee, 11, 218 Silliman and King, 11, 42, 218 Simcox, Chris, 121–23, 160, 225n3. See also Minutemen and Civil Homeland Defense Simon, Julian and Herman Kahn, 40 SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Health Collective, 19 Smith, Andrea, 11, 30, 86, 218 Smith, Valerie, 11, 77 Smuggler’s Gulch, 145–46, 188 Snow, Donald, and Eugene Brown, 61 social justice, 18–20, 23, 42, 72, 167, 170, 185–87, 198, 202, 205, 206, 224 social location, 10, 173, 202, 226n8 solidarity, feminist, 10, 12, 21 Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 27, 119–20, 154, 157, 160, 166, 168–70, 185 Southwest Border Strategy, 8, 25, 96–105, 117, 128, 129, 143, 150, 180, 185, 189, 190, 193–94, 196, 208, 220–21 Spiegel, Steven, and Fred Wehling, 31, 58, 61, 63–65, 74–75 SPLC. See Southern Poverty Law Center sterilization, forced and coerced, 43–48, 59, 73,

86, 148, 173, 175, 176, 195. See also reproductive injustice, examples Sturgeon, Noël, 10–11 systems of power, privilege, and oppression, defined, 12 Third World, defined, 225n2 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 64 U.S. Border Patrol/border patrol, 16, 69, 79, 99, 101, 103–4, 113–14, 116–18, 121–23, 128, 144, 152, 185, 188–89, 191–95, 213 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), 8, 107–8 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), 83, 85, 90–92, 105 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 82, 105, 109, 112, 113, 115, 228n7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 8, 105–8, 111–14, 145, 190–91, 207, 211 U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 97–102 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 82, 112–13, 193 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 93, 108 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 8, 107, 108 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 115 USCNS/21. See U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century vigilante groups. See paramilitary groups Viotti, Paul, and Mark Kauppi, 35, 66, 75 Wapner, Paul, 26, 163–64, 201 War on Drugs, 9, 100, 104 wedge strategy, 23, 86, 136–39, 158, 170 welfare magnet argument, 138–39, 196 welfare reform (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act), 87 West, Cornel, 29 Western development paradigm, 17, 41, 227n12 white supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy, defined, 12 World Bank, 41, 46, 180, 196, 221, 227n12 Yeh Ling-Ling, 137, 138, 152, 153



278

Nation, Immigration, and Environmental Security

Radiobiology and Environmental Security

Environmental Security and Ecoterrorism

Energy and Environmental Challenges to Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Environmental Security and Public Safety (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Environmental Security and Environmental Management: The Role of Risk Assessment (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Geographic Uncertainty in Environmental Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Race, Nation, and West Indian Immigration to Honduras, 1890-1940

Immigration and American Popular Culture: An Introduction (Nation of Newcomers)

Immigration

Global Environmental Change and Human Security

Nanotechnology - Toxicological Issues and Environmental Safety (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Global Environmental Change and Human Security

Wastewater Reuse - Risk Assessment, Decision-Making and Environmental Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Immigration and Jihad

Immigration, Diversity, and Education

Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster

Addressing Global Environmental Security Through Innovative Educational Curricula (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Immigration and American Religion

Immigration and Migration

Remote Sensing of the Atmosphere for Environmental Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Strategies to Enhance Environmental Security in Transition Countries (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

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