Nabih Berri and Lebanese Politics (The Middle East in Focus)

Na bi h Be r r i a n d L e b a n ese Pol i t ic s

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THE MIDDLE EAST IN FOCUS The Middle East has become simultaneously the world’s most controversial, crisis-ridden, and yet least-understood region. Taking new perspectives on the area that has undergone the most dramatic changes, the Middle East in Focus series, edited by Barry Rubin, seeks to bring the best, most accurate expertise to bear for understanding the area’s countries, issues, and problems. The resulting books are designed to be balanced, accurate, and comprehensive compendiums of both facts and analysis presented clearly for both experts and the general reader. Series Editor: Barry Rubin Director, Global Research International Affairs (GLORIA) Center Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal Editor, Turkish Studies Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands By Ersin Kalaycıog˘ lu Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos By Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq By Gokhan Bacik The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq By Ofira Seliktar Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization By Eitan Azani Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis Edited by Barry Rubin The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement Edited by Barry Rubin Nabih Berri and Lebanese Politics By Omri Nir

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Na bi h Be r r i a n d L e b a n ese Pol i t ic s

O mr i Nir

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NABIH BERRI AND LEBANESE POLITICS

Copyright © Omri Nir, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10535–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nir, Omri. Nabih Berri and Lebanese politics / Omri Nir. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–10535–5 1. Birri, Nabih. 2. Politicians—Lebanon—Biography. 3. Lebanon—Politics and government—1975–1990. 4. Lebanon—Politics and government— 1990– 5. Amal (Movement) 6. Shiites—Political activity—Lebanon. I. Title. DS87.2.B57N57 2010 956.9204⬘4092—dc22 [B]

2010028506

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: February 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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C on t e n t s

Note on Transliteration

vi

List of Abbreviations

vii

Series Editor’s Foreword

ix

Preface

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Introduction

1

1. Nabih Berri’s Early Years

17

2. From a Marginal Militia Leader to a Key Man

29

3. A Fight for Survival: Leading Amal and the Shi‘ites in the Jungle of the Civil War

53

4. Serving as Speaker: Reaching National Status; Losing Shi‘ite Hegemony

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5. Berri’s Political Stands

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Conclusions

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Notes

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Bibliography

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Index

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No t e on Tr a nsl i t e r at ion

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he book uses a simplified version of the rules adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies to transliterate words in Arabic. In general, I did not use diacritical marks, except the letter ‘Ayn (‘) and the Hamza (’). For persons and places whose names frequently appear in the media in different ways, or in French or English forms, I used these versions (hence Berri and not Birri, Chamoun and not Sham‘un, ‘Aoun and not ‘Awn, Khomeini and not Khumayni). Arabic names of books and articles are translated to English in the endnotes, and written both in their transliteration and translation in the bibliography.

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A bbr e v i at ions

GCLW IDF LBP LCP LF LNM MECS NBN PLO PSP SLA SSIC SSNP UN US

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General Confederation of Lebanese Workers Israeli Defense Forces Lebanese Ba‘ath Party Lebanese Communist Party Lebanese Forces Lebanese National Movement Middle East Contemporary Survey National Broadcasting Network Palestine Liberation Organization Progressive Socialist Party South Lebanon Army Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council Syrian Social Nationalist Party United Nation United States

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Se r i es E di t or’s For e wor d

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abih Berri is one of the most interesting political figures in modern Middle East history, from a country, Lebanon, that has produced more such people than any other place in the region. Berri’s importance springs not so much from his power and personality— though as speaker of Lebanon’s parliament he has been a key figure in the complex maneuverings of modern Lebanese politics—but in a real sense from his failure. The key issue in post–civil war Lebanese politics has been the struggle between two sides or control over Lebanon. On one hand, there is Syria, Iran, Hizballah, Amal, and a number of smaller groups, an alliance that seeks to dominate the country. The key supporters of this within Lebanon come from the Shi‘a Muslim community. On the other hand, there is the coalition of Sunni, Maronite Christian, Druze, and other groups that opposes Syrian influence. This alliance has looked to the West for support, but such aid was usually lacking. In this framework, Berri as the leader of Amal, the Shi‘a group that I will call communal nationalist, is a client of Syria. As such, he has played an important role in this second “civil war.” There is another dimension, however, to Berri’s role. Within the Shi‘a community his group is the competitor of Hizballah and thus features in the broader battle between nationalists and Islamists throughout the region. Although the Hizballah-Amal relationship is not one of open conflict and enmity—they are on the same side of the Lebanese political divide—they are nonetheless rivals for leadership of the Shi‘a community. It is this double role that gives Berri’s story a special degree of interest. Why hasn’t Amal triumphed over Hizballah? How is Shi‘a communal identity and organization shaped? Will Hizballah achieve hegemony over the Shi‘as or could countervailing forces prevent or even reverse its power? This book, then, answers many questions about Berri, Amal, the Shi‘as, Lebanon, and wider questions that lie at the center of the region’s current politics and debates. BARRY RUBIN, Series Editor Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center

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his book focuses on Nabih Berri, one of the most prominent figures in Lebanese and Arab politics in the last 30 years. Berri has been continuously leading the Shi‘ite Amal movement since 1980 and has been Parliament speaker since 1992. During this period, Berri played a part in many of the military and political events in Lebanon and the Middle East. The book is based on a large variety of sources, mainly from Lebanese and Arab media. The fact that Nabih Berri is very open to the media, and expresses his positions on every matter on the public agenda in Lebanon, provides a very wide range of information about him and his world view. Its sources also include memoirs, including those of Berri himself, and materials published by the Amal movement. The Internet was widely relied upon in writing this book, as it affords an easy access to official publications, electronic media, and blogs. Academic publications on the Lebanese Shi‘a, as well as journalistic commentary, also contributed to the understanding of Berri in a wide perspective. Nabih Berri is not only an important Lebanese leader, but he is also a prominent representative of the new Shi‘ite politics in Arab countries. The Shi‘ites in general, and the Arabs among them in particular, have undergone massive change since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran has played a central role in this change, including in the split among Arab Shi‘ites regarding the means they wish to use in order to better the inferior position they hold in their various countries. The Islamic revolution led to the establishment of radical Shi‘ite Islamic movements in Arab countries, movements which have sought to promote a religious agenda inspired by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The same process occurred in Lebanon, where the leadership of the Shi‘ite community is divided between two main streams. The first, led by Nabih Berri and Amal, sees itself primarily as a nationalist Lebanese and Arab movement. The second, led by Hizballah, sees itself primarily as a religious Islamic movement, apart from its Lebanese identity and its close ties to Iran. The literature on the Lebanese Shi‘a has undergone a process similar to the one the community itself has experienced. After years in which the community was perceived as insignificant and was therefore ignored, Western and Arab literature became aware of their presence. At the same time, the Shi‘a in Lebanon started to awaken in the mid-1970s. Tom Sicking and Shereen Khairallah were the first to recognize the Shi‘ite awakening and to

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publish an article about it.1 Amal’s rise in the next decade and the increasing importance of the Shi‘ites during the Lebanese civil war resulted in the publishing of two fundamental books concerning the Lebanese Shi‘a in the mid 1980s, The Vanished Imam, by Fouad Ajami, and Amal and the Shi‘a, by Augustus Richard Norton.2 Both dealt with the rise of Amal and the Shi‘ite younger generation identified with it. Since these two books were published, Amal has gradually become the representative of the moderate secular portion of the Lebanese Shi‘a, which has been neglected ever since in the literature as a result of the increasing importance and dominance of the Islamic fundamentalist stream led by Hizballah. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing through the two following decades, very detailed research concerning Hizballah was published. Among these were the books and articles of Nizar Hamzeh, Hala Jaber, Martin Kramer, Amal Sa‘ad-Ghurayeb, Judith Palmer Harik, R ichard A. Norton, Marius Deeb, and Magnus Ranstorp. 3 Nabih Berri’s faction has not been thoroughly studied in this literature and usually has received only general references. The exception here is the book Shi‘ite Lebanon by Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr concerning the national and religious identities of Lebanon’s Shi‘ites; the book deals relatively broadly with the relevant aspects of this faction.4 At the same time, due to the increasing importance of the Shi‘ite community, research regarding the Shi‘ite presence in Lebanon in the years prior to the 1970s’ awakening were published as well. Among these, the books of Muhammad Jaber al-Safa, and later of Tamara Chalabi, stand out. 5 A general description of the faction represented by Amal can also be found in books that deal with the rise of the Arab Shi‘a in general, such as those of Moojan Momen, Graham Fuller and Rend Francke, Rodger Shanahan, Vali Nasr, and Itshak Nakash.6 The Shi‘ite nationalist Lebanese stream, represented by Amal and Nabih Berri, has not received a thorough investigation since Norton’s book was published in 1987. Nabih Berri and Lebanese Politics seeks to partly fill this gap. The book tells his personal story, and in that way hopes to shed some light on the nationalist Lebanese faction of the Shi‘ite community in the years its power declined. The introduction to this book gives the immediate background of the rise of Nabih Berri by reviewing the “political map” of the Shi‘ite community following the disappearance of its most prominent leader, Musa Sadr, in 1978. It also analyzes the reasons for the growing support of the Amal movement among the Shi‘ite public in the years that followed. Finally, it examines the changes within Amal following that disappearance, which enabled Nabih Berri to rise to the head of the movement. The introduction ends with Berri’s election as secretary general of Amal in April 1980. Chapter 1 focuses on Nabih Berri as an individual. It deals with some aspects of Berri’s background, including his family context, Shi‘ite connections, and Arab nationalist roots. Some of the early experiences in Berri’s life, detailed in this chapter, later affected his social and political perceptions.

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Chapter 2 deals with a period of four years in the early 1980s during which Nabih Berri became the unshakable leader of the Shi‘ite community. It focuses on four main stages in Berri’s career development: (a) Amal’s collisions with leftist militias; (b) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; (c) his success in dismissing most of his rivals from Amal; and (d) his takeover of western Beirut in February 1984. After that point it became clear that any solution to the state of civil war in Lebanon must take Berri’s position into account. Chapter 3 deals with the period in which Berri was already a key leader in Lebanon and the major representative of the Shi‘ites in the national arena. During that time he had to struggle to survive as leader in two complicated struggles—one in the Lebanese political and military arena, and the other in the inner Shi‘ite arena. The chapter also refers to Berri’s fight for physical survival at that time, after several assassination plots were thwarted. Chapter 4 analyzes the paradox of Berri’s political career during his subsequent tenure as speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. On the one hand, he established his position as a national Lebanese leader, while at the same time he lost his hegemony in the Shi‘ite community to a rival movement, Hizballah. This chapter also deals with Berri’s involvement in key issues on the Lebanese agenda during the last 20 years, and attempts to explain the decline in Shi‘ite public support of him and of Amal, in favor of Hizballah. Chapter 5 summarizes Berri’s political outlook on various issues, all relevant to contemporary Lebanon. It refers to issues such as nationalism versus Islamism in Lebanon; the role of the Shi‘ites in present-day Lebanon and in the future; Berri’s attitude toward the Palestinian problem and the Middle East conflict; and his outlook on the Syrian role in Lebanon, as well as other issues. The conclusion tries to explain the ups and downs of Berri’s career and to deduce broader insights regarding the Lebanese Shi‘a. It also analyzes Berri’s current position in Lebanese and Shi‘ite politics, and examines possible conditions under which Berri might once again become the strongman of the Shi‘ite community. I wish to thank those people who helped bring this book to fruition. Thanks to Professor Eyal Zisser, dean of the Faculty of Humanities and head of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, who accompanied the project in its early stages and gave constructive insight into the understanding of the Nabih Berri phenomenon in the wider Lebanese context. I would also like to thank Mr. Hayim Gal, curator of the Press Archive in the Moshe Dayan Center, who gave me access to much of the journalistic material used in this book. I also want to express my gratitude to several people from the Palgrave Macmillan Press who contributed to publishing this book. To Barry Rubin, series editor of The Middle East in focus, and Farideh Koohi-Kamali, the Middle East academic editor, for recognizing the importance of publishing the book and the lacuna it fills in the field; To Erin Ivy and Robyn Curtis,

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and to the anonymous reviewer for his helpful comments; I also wish to thank Rohini Krishnan of Newgen Imaging Systems who was my cordial contact person regarding the copyediting of the book. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Shiri, who not only provided me with the time to complete this book, but also contributed her wisdom and gave the finishing touch to the text. OMRI NIR

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Introduction

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or many years, the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon was a deprived one. During the Ottoman rule, the Shi‘ites tended to keep away from politics and were usually not among the ruling elite. The process of modernization that the Arab Middle East had witnessed in the nineteenth century, influenced by European countries, passed the Shi‘ites by. The gap between them and other religious communities—the Maronite Christians, the Druze, and the Sunni Muslims—in what later became modern Lebanon grew as a result. The Maronites enjoyed France’s patronage, the Greek Orthodox were considered to be under Russia’s, the British supported the Druze, and the Sunnis enjoyed the protection of the Ottoman Empire. The Shi‘ites lacked an external patron to fight for their interests and lessen their deprivation. This was the time when Mount Lebanon and the city of Beirut had become centers of political, cultural and economic activity. The Shi‘ites, who were geographically concentrated on the periphery of both South Lebanon (Jabal‘Amil) and the Lebanon Valley (The Biqa‘), away from the center of political and economic activity in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, were left outside the centers of power and influence. Following the reforms in the Ottoman Empire, beginning in 1858, the Shi‘ite social structure had changed and a new class of prominent families emerged. These families, known as zu‘ama (singular za‘im) mediated between the Ottoman rulers and the peasants, introducing a feudal style of leadership. Their strength derived from the fact that, before the reforms, they had served as tax collectors (Multazimun) on lands they had either bought or received from the Ottoman rulers for that purpose. The social structure of five families leading a sort of a socio-political feudalism was based in Jabal-‘Amil, similar to the one that existed in Mount Lebanon. The al-As‘ad family owned much land in the Marj-‘Ayun and Bint-Jbeil areas. In the Nabatiyeh area, the al-Zein family possessed most of the land. In the cities, notable families (Wujaha’) played a similar role to that of the zu‘ama in the villages. The al-Khalil family ruled the area around Tyre, and the Osseyran was strong in the areas of Sidon and Zaharani. In the Biqa‘, the social order was based on tribal and familial elements, under the leadership of the Haydar and Hamadeh families in the Ba‘albek-Hirmel area, and of the Abu-Hamdan tribe in the Zahle region.1 Gradually, the political awareness among the Shi‘ite zu‘ama and wujaha’ began to increase. Lower on the social scale than the zu‘ama were the religious clerics (‘Ulama). The religious Shi‘ite establishment was formed from people with a

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relatively good economic background, at least in comparison to other community members. This enabled them to devote themselves to their studies. At the head of this group were two to three senior Islamic scholars with juristic authority (Mujtahidun), and below them ‘ulama and sheikhs, according to their degree of scholarship. Over the years, dynasties of ‘ulama were created, but they depended on the zu‘ama for funding their religious activity in Lebanon. The lowest and broadest class included the peasants and merchants, who were also very dependent on the zu‘ama. France established the Lebanese state in 1920, combining the area of Mount Lebanon with four others nearby, including the Shi‘ite peripheral districts of Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘. In the first years after the formation of Lebanon most Shi‘ites opposed the new state and even participated in political and military activities against the French mandate, which was established within the Levant in 1922. Most preferred to be part of a wider entity, a Syrian Arab state within the borders of Ottoman Syria (Bilad al-Sham). Following the French recognition in 1926 of Shi‘ism in Lebanon as a separate religious sect, with its own independent institutions, most Shi‘ite religious scholars began to support the Lebanese state’s existence. A few years later, when the zu‘ama recognized that Lebanon had become a permanent reality they began to see the state as a more suitable framework within which to maintain their socioeconomic and political dominance of the Shi‘ite community. Because of this, since the late 1930s, most of them integrated into the official political institutions as members of Parliament and ministers. In the early 1940s the two major communities in Lebanon, the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims, agreed upon a formula that regulated political life for all communities. This agreement, known in Lebanese historiography as the “National Covenant” (al-Mithaq al-Wattani) 1943, was a compromise between the two sects. The Muslims accepted the existence of a Lebanese independent entity with special ties to the West, in exchange for a partial Christian recognition of the Arab character of Lebanon and a division of political power according to a permanent formula. The Shi‘ite zu‘ama supported the Maronite-Sunni compromise because it gave them greater political influence, compared to that within a wider political entity such as “Greater Syria.” Since the mid-1940s, the post of the speaker of Parliament has been given to a Shi‘ite candidate according to the confessional key, and became a source of power struggles between the leading families. The intercommunal compromise was strongly challenged during the 1950s by the pan-Arab movement, which spread throughout the Arab world under the leadership of Egyptian President Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Under these circumstances, Lebanon split into two main camps, the pro-Nasserists dominated by Muslims, and the pro-Westerns under the leadership of Maronite President Camille Chamoun. This dispute became an issue in Lebanon after the unification of Egypt and Syria in February 1958, when the United Arab Republic (UAR) threatened to “swallow” Lebanon. In the summer of 1958, a civil war between the supporters of both camps broke out. The Shi‘ites played a leading role in the clashes against Chamoun’s supporters and the

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security forces. Their salient zu‘ama, Ahmad al-As‘ad in Jabal-‘Amil and Sabri Hamadeh in the Biqa‘, led their followers in the opposition against the government, expressing the popular sentiments of the Shi‘ite community. Most of the ‘ulama (religious scholars) had a different opinion, which called for a cessation of the violence. Two other processes, which began in the late 1950s, have deeply influenced the Shi‘ite community. One was the “internal repair” policy of President Fouad Chehab (1958–64), which tried to reduce the socioeconomic gap in Lebanese society by massive investments in peripheral areas. The Shi‘ite population centers in Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘ were central targets for these projects. Chehab’s policy led to massive migration of rural Shi‘ites to the cities, mainly to Beirut, because it “shortened” the distance from the village to the city. More important, his policy raised the level of expectations among young Shi‘ites, who were disillusioned a decade later, with the failure of the policy. The second process began in the late 1950s, with the arrival of Musa Sadr to Lebanon and the beginning of his activity among the Shi‘ites. Sadr, a Shi‘ite cleric from a family rooted in Jabal-‘Amil who was born in Iran, decided to take the initiative. His goal was to create a new pattern of leadership among the Lebanese Shi‘a. His populist declarations, aimed at all the deprived in Lebanon, attracted many Shi‘ites. Sadr’s need to enlist the best talents in the Shi‘ite community caused him to court young ambitious men who had met with discrimination and wanted to move forward under the existing political framework. The Maronite leadership supported his activities, assuming it would lead to division among the Muslims of Lebanon. Sadr understood the political rules of the game in Lebanon and moderated his demands. He focused on demanding that the Lebanese political system, which was based on the allocation of power according to the distorted demographic census of 1932, be abolished to become consistent with the true demographic composition. This change, according to Sadr’s plan, would take place within the existing Lebanese political rules. The Shi‘ite population had grown since 1932 in comparison to other religious communities for two main reasons. First, higher standards of education and living of the Maronites and Sunnis led to a reduction in their birthrate, while the Shi‘ites, having the lowest socioeconomic status in the country, witnessed an increase in theirs. Second, there were differences in migration patterns between the major religious sects. While the Maronites settled abroad for the long term, the Shi‘ites tended to return to Lebanon after several years. In May 1969, Sadr was elected head of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council (SSIC, al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi‘i al-A‘ala) which was established by the government under his initiative. The parliament had approved the establishment of the SSIC already in December 1967, as a tool for dealing with Shi‘ite rights and interests, institutions and religious establishments. Up to that point, Shi‘ites had to depend on the Sunni-controlled Supreme Islamic Council of Lebanon. Sadr used the new Shi‘ite council as a political tool against the traditional Shi‘ite zu‘ama to complete the recognition of the Shi‘ites as a separate religious community. His supporters gave him the title

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Imam, associated with the Shi‘ite tradition of the Mahdi, the Imam who disappeared in the ninth century and is expected to return someday (Raj‘a). It added a kind of aura of holiness to Sadr’s charisma, and made it easier for him to recruit supporters. With an impressive appearance and rhetorical talent, dressed in traditional religious clothes unusual at the time in the Shi‘ite community, Sadr managed to attract crowds. His stance against the traditional leadership of the zu‘ama and the use of symbols taken from Shi‘ite history in his speeches made him appear as a cleric affiliated with the Shi‘ite tradition. By introducing moderate ideas, consistent with the framework of the Lebanese state, Sadr could trigger the Shi‘a masses in an unprecedented way, and imbue them with pride and a desire to repair their deprivation. Gradually Sadr’s status became that of the leading Shi‘ite, among both the Shi‘ites and leaders of other communities in the country. As head of the SSIC, Sadr had acquired a strong political position at the expense of the Shi‘ite traditional leaders. This group, in an attempt to stand up to the competition, began to act more forcefully in favor of their clients. In the second half of the 1960s, when the Palestinian militias’ control over Jabal-‘Amil intensified and Israel increased its reprisals against their guerillas, this area became the focus of the Shi‘ite awakening. The SSIC, under Sadr’s leadership, organized unprecedented demonstrations and protests, there and in Beirut, against the Israeli actions and the deprivation among the Shi‘ites. As of 1973, Sadr gathered his supporters in a new movement, called the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin). In 1975, it formed a militia, called Amal. The name was symbolic, as Amal in Arabic means hope, and the initials of its letters in Arabic mean “the Lebanese Resistance Brigade” (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya). On the eve of the civil war in the mid-1970s, the Shi‘ites of Lebanon supported three main political factions. One, headed by the Shi‘ite speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Kamil al-As‘ad, included supporters of the traditional leadership among large landowners, tribal leaders, traditional local religious scholars, and some of the peasants who worked under the system of land rental. A second faction included supporters of leftist movements, mainly Marxist and Ba‘ath party supporters, which comprised the new Shi‘ite intelligentsia: professors, lawyers, journalists, teachers, as well as industrial and agricultural workers. The third faction consisted of supporters of Musa Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived, later Amal, which included most of the new Shi‘ite bourgeoisie which had been created among migrants to the cities: liberal professions, civil servants, teachers, merchants, and young people in Beirut.2 The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in April 1975 found the Shi‘ite community in a passive position and at a stage in which the social and political changes initiated by Musa Sadr had not yet developed. The civil war, which split the country between a mainly Muslim left wing, based in leftist political movements with the support of the Palestinians, and a mainly Christian right wing, based in Maronite militias, removed the social-political struggle from the public agenda, leaving Sadr without a clear alliance. The

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left wing had a Sunni orientation and undermined the foundations of the Lebanese state, an approach rejected by Sadr, while the Maronites fanatically tried to keep their political hegemony, while depriving other religious communities. At the early stages of the civil war, Sadr and the SSIC expressed neutrality and acted to stop the fighting. Sadr tried to bridge the parties and even went on a hunger strike, but as the fighting militias became stronger, his influence declined. The Palestinian control over Jabal-‘Amil burdened the Shi‘ite inhabitants’ lives and in the late 1970s turned the PLO into the Shi‘ites’ main rivals. Politically, Sadr’s positions were similar to those of the left and the Palestinians, who were united in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM, al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya). However, as this movement was basically Sunni in nature, joining it could have harmed the Shi‘ites’ position in Lebanon, returning them to their pre-SSIC conditions. Disagreements between Sadr and the LNM also revolved around President Suleiman Franjieh’s “Constitutional Document” (sometimes called “the Reform Document”) of February 1976, to which Sadr agreed and which the LNM had rejected. This document was supposed to be a key to a solution to end the civil war, based on a new Muslim-Christian calibration. Later on, Sadr supported the Syrian military invasion of Lebanon, presented by him as a means of negotiation, aimed at bringing about the termination of the war. His support enabled him to keep his alliance with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. The leftist camp, on the other hand, objected to the invasion.3 The alliance of the Lebanese Shi‘ites with the ‘Alawite community in Syria related to Musa Sadr’s recognition in 1973 of the ‘Alawites as part of the Shi‘ite Ja‘afari School (Madhhab). During the early 1970s, alAssad’s ‘Alawite regime in Syria fought the Sunni Muslim Brothers organization, and needed to be acknowledged as an Islamic regime. Sadr included the ‘Alawites in the Twelver Shi‘a by appointing, in his capacity as head of the SSIC, ‘Alawite Sheikh ‘Ali Mansur as the Shi‘ite Mufti of Tripoli and northern Lebanon.4 The civil war increased the militia’s importance and removed Sadr and the Shi‘ites’ struggle for social justice from the agenda. Amal’s militia was protecting the Shi‘ite neighborhoods of Beirut, while participating as little as possible in real battles. The way Sadr reacted to the fall of the al-Nab‘a quarter, settling both Maronites and Shi‘ites in Eastern Beirut, was a landmark in his decrease of power. In August 1976, Maronite Phalange militias’ fighters expelled tens of thousands of the neighborhood’s Shi‘ite inhabitants and took over. Sadr was accused of being responsible for the disaster because of his moderate treatment of the crisis. In light of the events, several of Sadr’s opponents from the Shi‘ite religious establishment started presenting an alternative to his moderate line. They offered a radical stance replacing pragmatism, and an attempt to bring about reform through activism. Most of the Shi‘ite population at the time rejected the radical approach. Sadr’s position was already eroding when he left the political arena. In August 1978, he disappeared while visiting Libya. This mystery remains unsolved more than 30

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years later. Ironically, after his disappearance his power increased. Some of his supporters even claimed Sadr was the Mahdi of the Shi‘ite tradition. When Sadr disappeared, the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon was at a crossroads in certain matters. One was the question of leadership of the Shi‘ite community. Sadr’s disappearance left a vacuum, especially in the SSIC and in Amal. The struggle over his replacement led to a split in what had been Sadr’s duties. Another was the Shi‘ite involvement in the civil war. With Sadr out of the picture, the Amal militia’s involvement in the fighting around the Shi‘ite neighborhoods in Beirut and the villages of Jabal-‘Amil intensified. A third matter involved a different political orientation. The erosion in Sadr’s popularity prior to his disappearance placed a question mark over the position he had taken. Early signs of radicalism among the Lebanese Shi‘ites were already apparent and in a few months, following the Iranian revolution, radicalism became a real alternative to Sadr and to his successors. A fourth question related to intercommunal relations. The intercommunal balance system had changed following the civil war. The process Musa Sadr started resulted in the rise of expectations among the Shi‘ites and an increase in their demands to raise their status in Lebanon following the war.

The Struggle for Leadership Following Sadr’s Disappearance The disappearance of Musa Sadr left the Shi‘ite community without its popular leader. In spite of the decline in Sadr’s popularity since the beginning of the civil war, his prominence was still a source of consensus among the different Shi‘ite factions. The disappearance, therefore, created a lacuna in the community’s uniting factor. The struggle over Sadr’s replacement increased as time went by and his fate remained unknown. Unlike the struggles over power before Sadr’s era, this time the competitors included people who did not only belong to the circles of the traditional zu‘ama families. The struggle included religious scholars, young activists from Amal, and people from the SSIC. Traditional Leaders Among the traditional zu‘ama, the most prominent leader was Kamil alAs‘ad, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament since 1972. He embodied the image of the “classic za‘im” of Shi‘ite politics since the mid-1960s. In March 1978, al-As‘ad established the Parliamentary National Unity (al-Tajama‘ alWattani al-Niyabi), a parliamentary bloc that acted under the banner of the resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that month (the “Litani Operation”) and of supporting the Shi‘ites in Jabal-‘Amil.5 The bloc also promoted al-As‘ad’s personal status and attempted to protect the traditional order against the changes preached by Sadr. Al-As‘ad acted on two levels to strengthen his status in the Shi‘ite community after the outbreak of the civil war, corresponding to the decrease in

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Sadr’s popularity. One was to strengthen his image as a loyal ally of Syria. As the Syrian army was already present in Lebanon since June 1976, it was clear that good relations with the Syrians were needed for gaining personal influence. Second was to portray al-As‘ad as the leading combatant against the deprivation of Jabal-‘Amil. This was the background of the parliamentary bloc, which according to some, was the first exception to a long tradition of political neutrality among Lebanese Shi‘ites in the Parliament. 6 Kamil al-As‘ad increased his influence over the Shi‘ite community by using the Council of the South (Majlis al-janub). This council was established by the Lebanese government in June 1970, with the inspiration of Musa Sadr, as a response to a mass strike the latter had organized in Beirut, following an Israeli bombardment of Southern Lebanon, which left massive damage. The strike became a landmark in the Shi‘ite community’s struggle against its deprivation and brought the issue of the South to the forefront of the public agenda. This region was and remains the most neglected one in the country. A week later, the government decided to establish the council, with the aim of promoting welfare in Jabal-‘Amil, using large amounts of money allocated for the matter. In a short time, Kamil al-As‘ad took control of the council, which had become the source of governmental budget corruption. The embezzlement had reached such a level that many Lebanese called it “Majlis al-Juyub” (Council of Pockets) instead of “Majlis al-Janub” (Council of the South).7 Al-As‘ad considered removing Musa Sadr from controlling the council a personal success. While serving as head of the council, al-As‘ad had enjoyed absolute control over its funds. In order to receive financial aid from the government, it was said, one had to hang his picture on the living-room wall.8 As the civil war expanded to vast areas of the country, the government’s sovereignty weakened and the Council of the South became irrelevant. The heads of other zu‘ama families, from the traditional system, were also to take part in the struggle over the Shi‘ite community’s leadership following Sadr’s disappearance. The role they played in the struggle was, however, smaller than Kamil al-As‘ad’s. These individuals, mainly Sabri Hamadeh from the Biqa‘, and ‘Adel Osseyran and Kazem al-Khalil from Jabal-‘Amil, tried to present an alternative to Sadr’s approach. Contrary to the latter’s stance, they opposed the 1976 Syrian involvement in activities against the left and the Palestinians in Southern Lebanon. Much like Kamil al-As‘ad, they preferred reaching a compromise without foreign interference. The Shi‘ite zu‘ama controlled the community’s representatives in the Lebanese Parliament and government. In Salim Al-Hoss’s government, formed in July 1979, for example, two Shi‘ite ministers took part. The first, engineer Anwar al-Sabbah, born 1933, and Kamil al-As‘ad’s cousin and ally, served as the minister in charge of water sources, electricity, industry, and oil. Al-Sabbah, who also served in the preceding government, was at the same time a member of the SSIC. The second minister, ‘Ali al-Khalil, born 1934, a political science professor and a former member of the proIraqi faction of the Ba‘ath party, served as minister of finance.9 Purportedly,

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the Shi‘ite representatives held the two senior economic ministries which dominate the Lebanese economy. Nevertheless, in the Lebanese economic system, in which the country hardly interferes in the capital market, especially since the outbreak of the civil war, these ministries lacked any real substance. Religious Leaders Another type of individuals filled the religious vacuum Musa Sadr left. Prominent among them, and the one who was to lead the radical faction of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community as of the mid-1980s, was Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. His history resembles that of Musa Sadr. He was born in Najaf, Iraq, in 1934, to a family with Lebanese roots from which many religious Islamic scholars in the Shi‘ite seminars of Iraq and Iran had originated. Like Sadr, Fadlallah was also a disciple of Marja‘ Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoei in Najaf. Already in his youth, Fadlallah stood out as a gifted poet and author. In the 1950s and early 1960s, he kept close relations with the Shi‘ite communities of Beirut and Jabal-‘Amil, especially the BintJbeil district, where his family’s hometown, the village of ‘Aynata, is. During this time, Fadlallah wrote religious commentaries and Islamic literature related to Shi‘ite life in Lebanon. In the mid-1960s he decided to reside in the al-Nab‘a neighborhood of Beirut, populated by Maronites, Palestinians, Armenians, and Shi‘ites. During the first decade of Fadlallah’s stay in Beirut, Musa Sadr was busy establishing the SSIC and forming his Movement of the Deprived. As he considered himself more talented than Sadr, Fadlallah did not approve of the populist approaches the former used. As Sadr’s rose, he preferred to devote himself to scholarly writing and publishing, which, among other things, criticized the Shah of Iran. His main scholarly rival in Beirut at the time was Riza Farhat, who enjoyed the support of the Iranian Shah’s regime, and was less controversial than Fadlallah.10 Two events in 1976 intensified the rivalry between Fadlallah and Sadr. The first, in August, was the fall of the al-Nab‘a quarter, where Fadlallah was residing, to the Maronite Phalanges. The quarter’s fall was preceded by an effort by Sadr to reach an understanding with the Phalanges in order to prevent violence, while he agreed to Syrian guarantees. Because of the Maronite takeover, tens of thousands of al-Nab‘a’s Shi‘ite inhabitants had to migrate to Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘.11 Following these events, Fadlallah’s positions became extreme, as expressed in a book he completed afterward, Islam and the Logic of Force (al-Islam wa-Mantiq al-Quwa) which preached a need to transform Shi‘ite political thought. No more political seclusion, defeatism, and constant use of Takiyya, which allows Shi‘ites to disavow their faith in times of danger, but rebellion, confrontation, and pride against the deprivers and plunderers who threaten the Shi‘ites. Indirectly, it was also a critique on Musa Sadr’s hesitant treatment of the events which led to the quarter’s fall. When published, the book was not yet considered as important as it was to become in the 1980s.12

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The second event that intensified the situation between the two was Fadlallah’s becoming the representative in Lebanon of Marja‘ al-Taqlid Abu al-Qasim al-Mussawi al-Khoei.13 By preferring the diligent, ascetic Fadlallah over the charismatic leader, whose star was rising among the Shi‘ites of Lebanon, the admired Marja‘ was criticizing Sadr. For Fadlallah, who considered himself to be more successful and religiously skilled than Sadr, the appointment was a personal achievement which strengthened his spiritual position. Following al-Khoei’s death in 1970, Fadlallah saw himself as a natural candidate to become Marja‘ al-Taqlid, meaning a supreme religious authority in the Shi‘ite world. Another who attempted to claim leadership in the Shi‘ite community was Sayed Hassan Mahdi Shirazi, an Iranian who arrived in Lebanon in the mid1970s and presented himself as an alternative to Musa Sdar. Unlike Sadr and Fadlallah, Shirazi’s family was not Lebanese in origin, but rather a famous ‘ulama family with Iranian-Iraqi roots. He was born in 1931 to a scholarly family that had resided for centuries in the Shi‘a holy cities. Since childhood, Shirazi had received religious education with the best ‘ulama in Karbala, where he moved with his father, Ayatollah ‘Uzma sayed Mirza Mahdi Shirazi. In 1969, he was expelled from Iraq after taking part in opposition activities and had migrated to Lebanon. During his first years there, he focused his activities in the social-religious arena. He established the Al-Imam al-Mahdi (the Vanished Imam) religious seminar in Lebanon and the al-Hawza alIslamiya al-Zaynabiya school in Syria. In the early 1970s, he spent a long time in the ‘Alawi mountains and in the city of Lathqiyah in northern Syria, where he established a social society called al-Jam‘iya al-Islamiyya al-huriyya al-Ja‘afariya (the Free Islamic Ja‘afari Association). The society’s goal was to strengthen the status of the ‘Alawites of the Syrian coastal area.14 Shirazi’s efforts to do this during the early days of the ‘Alawite regime in Syria resulted in the formation of close ties with the Shi‘ite community of Damascus, as well as with other Shi‘ite communities in Sierra Leone and Kuwait. In Lebanon, Shirazi established a Shi‘ite organization called Jama‘at al-‘Ulama (the Association of Religious Scholars), which united several Shi‘ite ‘ulama who acted as opposition inside and outside the SSIC. At the head of the organization stood Sheikh Suleiman Yahfufi and Sayed Shawqi al-Amin.15 In April 1977, Hassan Mahdi Shirazi joined a new group, Itihad al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya (Union of Lebanese Forces). This organization wished to have a religious image and to be an alternative to the existing Shi‘ite leadership of Musa Sadr, which was losing power. The new organization called upon all the religious sects to reach understandings and cease fighting. It was headed by Muhsin Salim, a Shi‘ite lawyer and former Parliament member, who managed to gather around him several scholars and liberal professions.16 After Musa Sadr disappeared, and as his popularity and that of the organizations he established increased, competing bodies, such as Itihad al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya, of which Shirazi was a member, witnessed a natural decrease in popularity. In May 1980, Shirazi was assassinated in Beirut.17

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A third person to pose an opposition to Musa Sadr and see himself as an appropriate alternative for the religious leadership of the Shi‘ite community after Sadr’s disappearance was Sheikh Suleiman Yahfufi, Ba‘albek’s Shi‘ite Mufti. Yahfufi headed the Jama‘at al-‘Ulama, which was comprised of religious scholars, some of whom were members of the SSIC. Yahfufi disagreed with Sadr’s positions, not only because of his appeasing policy which ended with the fall of the al-Nab‘a quarter, after which Yahfufi invited the evacuated Shi‘ites to settle in Ba‘albek, but due to a different orientation in two main areas. Yahfufi lived and acted in Ba‘albek in the Biqa‘, which was a few steps behind Jabal-‘Amil and Beirut in its political awakening. Because of that, and thanks to the social structure of the Shi‘ites in the Biqa‘, which was comprised of several strong rival families, Sadr managed to recruit supporters from the Biqa‘ area relatively easily, using the friction among the rivals to act as an arbitrator.18 Sadr’s surprising popularity in the Biqa‘, which was considered an area with militant inhabitants, harmed Yahfufi’s ability to serve as an alternative. The Biqa‘ people’s radicalism was apparently related to the dominant tribal structure, to a long tradition of noninterference of the government, the feeling of being distant from centers of political activity, and the geomorphologic structure of the Biqa‘ area, which is sealed between Mount Lebanon in the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the east. In this atmosphere of isolation, behavior patterns more extreme than in other Shi‘ite areas were shaped. The religious scholars living in the Biqa‘, such as Sheikh Yahfufi, away from Lebanon’s prominent zu‘ama political stronghold, adopted over the years the extreme militant atmosphere of the tribes. The second matter in which Suleiman Yahfufui and Musa Sadr’s orientation differed was related to Iran. While Sadr supported Ayatollah Khomeini’s opposition activities, aimed at toppling the Iranian Shah, Yahfufi supported the reign of Shah Pahlavi. In fact, the Shah used Yahfufi to transfer humanitarian aid to the Shi‘ites of Lebanon, in an attempt to push Sadr away from the core of the action. Yahfufi received generous financial aid, through Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayed Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari. He could lead the aid activities to those evacuated from the al-Nab‘a, giving the impression that Musa Sadr had abandoned them. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran and the disagreement between Yahfufi and Musa Sadr’s deputy in the SSIC, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Yahfufi left the political arena for a few years. In 1980, after trading loyalty for Khomeini and his reconciling with Shams al-Din, Yahfufi returned to political activity. Cohesion of the Shi‘ite Community The struggle over the leadership of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon witnessed a turnabout following three salient events, which occurred within less than one year, between March 1978 and February 1979. These events united the community members around three leadership centers: that of the SSIC and of Amal, and the senior position of Parliament speaker.

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The first event was the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, known as the Litani operation, in March 1978. In response to acts of terrorism by the Palestinian organizations against Israel conducted from South Lebanon, Israel occupied the area of Jabal-‘Amil up to the Litani River in the North in a lightning operation, expelling the Palestinian military from the area, which was partly known as Fatahland. Approximately a thousand houses of the inhabitants of the South, mostly Shi‘ites, were damaged during the operation and thousands of other residents fled north to the suburbs of Beirut. The massive damage and the high price they had to pay for the Palestinian resistance led many Shi‘ites to the arms of Amal, in order to protect their villages in Jabal-‘Amil from the forced Palestinian presence.19 When Israel withdrew in June 1978, most of the Southern Lebanon area was left under the control of a militia, mainly Lebanese Christian, called the Free Lebanon Army, later was known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA, Jaysh al-Janub). The militia, Israel’s surrogate, was headed by Major Saad Haddad. Although the SLA and the Shi‘ite inhabitants of Jabal-‘Amil had a common interest, objecting to the PLO, no real cooperation evolved. Apparently, the main reason for that was Major Haddad’s attempt to force the Shi‘ite villagers to join his troops. Haddad’s attempts, and the fear of being indirectly identified as an ally of the eternal Israeli enemy, were a uniting factor among the Shi‘ite community and brought about the need to have a strong military militia to protect the community.20 The second event was the disappearance of Musa Sadr. In the summer of 1978 Sadr was involved in diplomatic negotiations over the problems of Southern Lebanon following the Litani operation, in preparation for the Islamic countries conference. In the course of his diplomatic journey between Arab capitals, he arrived in late August in Tripoli, capital of Libya. The last time Sadr was seen for certain was on August 25, when a group of Lebanese tourists saw him leaving the hotel, accompanied by his assistant Sheikh Muhammad Ya‘aqub and journalist ‘Abbas Badr al-Din, on his way to meet Libyan President Mu‘ammar Qadhafi. Sadr’s disappearance, and the mystery that surrounded it, brought his activities back to the public agenda. For a long time, rumors spread among the Lebanese Shi‘ites that Sadr had been seen in one place or another, and that he would soon return to Lebanon.21 The mystery over his disappearance turned him, in the eyes of many Shi‘ites, into the representation of the Mahdi from the Shi‘ite mythology. According to the Shi‘ite faith, Muhammad al-Muntazar, the twelfth Imam, who disappeared at an early age, is due to return someday (Raj‘a). Musa Sadr’s sudden vanishing from the political arena created a uniting momentum in the community. The basis for this momentum was the need to correct the injustice and tragic events that have accompanied Shi‘ite history ever since Hussein Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib was murdered near Karbala in the early days of the Shi‘a, and up to their being victims of another people’s war, namely the Palestinians, in Jabal-‘Amil. The third event which greatly affected the community’s consolidation in Lebanon was the Islamic revolution in Iran, in early February 1979. Apart

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from the personal involvement of some Lebanese Shi‘ites in the activities of the exiled Iranian opposition headed by Khomeini, the revolution contributed immensely to the personal pride of every Shi‘ite. For the Shi‘ites of Lebanon, who had not enjoyed the real patronage of a foreign power for years, the relationship with the only Shi‘ite state was a political and military prop in the harsh environment of the civil war. During the days of the Iranian Shah, the relations between the Lebanese Shi‘ites and Iran were perceived in a negative light. The Pahlavi regime in Iran kept close contacts with the West and Israel and was therefore a source of shame for the many Shi‘ites who joined Pan-Arabic groups in Lebanon during the 1950s and 1960s. The establishment of a revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran was a source of pride for the entire Shi‘ite world. In their perception, this change placed all Shi‘ites at the head of the Islamic struggle against the infidel rulers. The contacts between the Iranian revolutionaries and the Lebanese Shi‘ites also had a practical aspect. The Mujahedin Khalq, a militant group which had opposed the Shah’s regime in Iran, trained Amal fighters during the 1970s. The Lebanese movement wove a net that had smuggled arms into Iran, and bred warriors who took part in the revolution.22 Iranian fighters from the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) arrived in Lebanon in 1979 in order to assist the Shi‘ite villages in Jabal-‘Amil against the Israelis, who were fighting the Palestinians. One of the main activists of Amal was Iranian Mustafa Chamran, who was appointed defense minister in the Iranian government after the revolution, and at the same time remained a member of Amal’s leadership council. Two other main Iranian activists involved in Lebanon were ‘Abbas Zamani (known as Abu Sharif), who was appointed as the Revolutionary Guards’ commander of operations in Iran, and Sheikh Muhammad Montazari (known as Abu Ahmad), son of Ayatollah Montazari.23 The new Islamic regime in Tehran wished to export the revolution to other Muslim countries with large Shi‘ite communities. Therefore, the formation of the new Iranian regime raised an important question for the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, that of their self-identity: Are they first Shi‘ites and then Lebanese or rather first Lebanese and only then Shi‘ites? This issue was intensified due to the fact that many activists from among the Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘ulama were educated in the Shi‘ite holy cities of Iran and Iraq. The cultural-ideological traditions they absorbed included religious Shi‘ite elements, as well as Lebanese nationalist elements. Crystallization around Three Centers of Power These three dramatic events crystallized the Lebanese Shi‘ites around three major power centers. This occurred at a time when other religious and secular Shi‘ite political activists, previously mentioned, were weakening. The temporary leadership triangle symbolized, largely, the prominent factions inside the Shi‘ite community: (a) a moderate religious branch, represented by the SSIC, (b) a pragmatic secular branch represented by Amal, which

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reflected the rise of new powers and supported a popular movement that would actively defend the community’s interests in the broadening war, and (c) a conservative branch, represented by an old order za‘im, who found it hard to cope with the rapid social changes. From among those who led these branches, the person who stood out was Musa Sadr’s deputy in the SSIC, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. The second figure to enjoy renewed prestige was Parliament speaker and head of the Council of the South, Kamil al-As‘ad. The third was Sadr’s substitute in Amal, Hussein al-Husseini. After Musa Sadr disappeared, his duties in the SSIC and in Amal were split. As long as his whereabouts remained a mystery, temporary substitutes were elected. Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shamd al-Din, Sadr’s deputy in the SSIC, was elected to take his place. He carried the temporary title of deputy chairman until 1993, when he officially became head of the SSIC. When Sadr went missing in 1978, Shams al-Din’s status stemmed from his position as the former’s stand-in at the SSIC. Despite its decline in support, which began in the mid-1970s, it was still perceived by all Shi‘ites and other communities as the formal representative body of Shi‘ite affairs. The prestige of the job stemmed largely from the fact that nearly half of the SSIC’s members were secular politicians and activists, and half were religious scholars. The SSIC was therefore acknowledged as an authentic representative of the different factions and interests of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. Shams al-Din was portrayed by Fouad Ajami in the mid-1980s in his book, The Vanished Imam, as a “bureaucratic functionary, attached to his posts and their prerogatives, more comfortable striking political deals than leading newly radicalized men . . . aloof and pedantic, distrustful . . . unable to take up where Musa Sadr had left off.”24 Over the years, however, it became apparent that this assumption was wrong, and Sadr’s substitute in the SSIC was justifiably gaining respect in Lebanon, especially due to his role in the intercommunal dialogue he helped initiate after the end of the civil war in 1990. In the intensive contacts that took place in the Lebanese and Arab arena, in the attempt to find out what had happened to Sadr, Shams al-Din was acting as de facto leader of the community. Less than two weeks after Sadr’s disappearance, Shams al-Din was heading an emergency meeting on the matter, in which the SSIC and all the other Shi‘ite bodies participated. He was also the one to run another meeting, attended by al-Inhiyaz al-Islami (the Islamic Alignment) and al-Jabha al-Wataniyya li-Himayat al-Janub (National Front for the Protection of the South) at the end of the same month.25 In addition, he headed the community leaders’ delegation, which had investigated Sadr’s disappearance, and had met with the president and prime minister as the leader of the Shi‘ite community. Another delegation he headed met the Syrian President al-Assad and his deputy, ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, to discuss the matter.26 The second man to exploit the situation following Sadr’s disappearance and regain his former status was the Parliament speaker, Kamil al-As‘ad. Musa Sadr, his prominent rival, was the main reason for al-As‘ad’s decline

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in power in the first half of the 1970s. The tumult Sadr’s disappearance caused among the politicians in Beirut gave al-As‘ad, as the Speaker, the opportunity to use his political office to regain his status in the community’s leadership. For this reason, and despite his hostility toward Sadr, he engaged in many contacts with heads of state to find out the circumstances of his disappearance. Al-As‘ad assembled Parliament to discuss the matter. He also summoned a special parliamentary meeting to discuss the need to form a united Parliament in light of the situation.27 On October 16, 1979, the Parliament prolonged al-As‘ad’s tenure as speaker, according to the old rules in which the election was renewed with every seasonal session of Parliament.28 Al-As‘ad was supported by the elites of all communities as well as by senior political circles. The rise in al-As‘ad’s position began even before Sadr’s disappearance, as he had become, following the Litani operation, the South’s most prominent spokesperson in the Lebanese Parliament, and also due to the Syrian attitude to the Lebanese crisis. As long as the crisis continued, Syria supported al-As‘ad at the expense of Musa Sadr. The Syrians wished to be perceived as having good relations with all the official bodies and leaders of the state, much like al-As‘ad, while Sadr was considered to be representing a populist group.29 Despite the improvement in Shams al-Din and al-As‘ad’s positions, most of the Shi‘ite population tended to perceive Amal through the lens of the three events that had occurred between March 1978 and February 1979. Amal’s influence over Lebanese politics from 1975 to 1978 was minimal. Almost no item from its political platform was implemented in the second half of the 1970s.30 Loyal to Musa Sadr’s perception of Lebanon, Amal did not oppose the foundations of the existing political system and even blunted the Shi‘ites’ political demands. It preferred and still prefers to use its capabilities inside the existing political order and to focus its agenda on the social and political areas. As Amal was considered a movement without real military power, Sadr entrusted Mustafa Chamram with establishing its militia. Chamram, who arrived in Lebanon in the early 1970s, was the most prominent opponent acting in Lebanon against the Iranian Shah.31 By appointing an outsider, Sadr wished to prevent sectarian or political use of the sensitive position. The establishment of the movement’s military force was kept a secret, apparently because of the desire not to expose the cooperation and help it received from Palestinian organizations. A training accident in a camp near Ba‘albek on July 6, 1975, in which 26 young Shi‘ite warriors were killed, forced Sadr to announce the formation of Amal the next day. Amal’s Leadership The main persons to be appointed to key positions in Amal’s early days were Dr. Hussein Kan‘an as head of the central bureau; Hussein al-Husseini, Sadr’s deputy, and in charge of relations with the Lebanese government and Parliament; Mustafa Chamran, coordinator between the executive chamber

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and the political chamber and Nabih Berri, movement spokesperson, head of the supervision and jurisdiction committee, and member of the committee, headed by Muhammad Sa‘ad, which dealt with Amal’s relations with the Palestinians.32 Following the division of Musa Sadr’s two main duties after his disappearance, religious as head of SSIC, and political as head of Amal, Hussein al-Husseini was appointed acting secretary-general of Amal. Al-Husseini, born in 1937, belonged to a distinguished family from the second rank of Shi‘ite zu‘ama. He inherited from his forefathers a system of intertribal alliances in the Biqa‘ area. At the age of 20, he was leading his hometown of Shmistar, between Ba‘albek and Zahla in the Biqa‘. As the town’s mayor, he became familiar with the political situation in Lebanon and the Shi‘ite deprivation. Al-Husseini was elected Parliament member in 1972, representing his residential area, and served in several political posts, such as head of the public works, water resources, and electricity committee, and as a member of the financial committee.33 A year later he joined the founding team of the al-Mahrumin movement, which had expanded its ranks and needed Shi‘ite political activists. In the public consciousness, his affinity to Musa Sadr is related to an event in March 1974, in which supporters of Parliament Speaker Kamil al-As‘ad beat al-Husseini. The beating of the young Parliament member, known for his support of Musa Sadr and his movement, awoke anger among many Shi‘ites who wished to see a change in communal politics. In an assembly held in Ba‘albek for the ‘Ashura’ holiday several days after the event, and in front of thousands of Shi‘ites, with Hussein al-Husseini at his side, Musa Sadr announced for the first time that Shi‘ites should be recruited to the communal militia.34 In July 1975, when the Movement of the Deprived publicly became a movement with a militia and changed its name to Amal, al-Husseini was appointed Sadr’s deputy. Although his formal education included only high school and he was never considered to have exceptional charisma or leadership abilities, he was nevertheless felt to be an honest man and very close to Musa Sadr. When Sadr disappeared and Amal was gaining power, al-Husseini found himself in the core of Shi‘ite activities, alongside Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din and Kamil al-As‘ad. His position as temporary secretary-general of Amal was extended for an additional year in an emergency statute adopted by the movement in late March 1979. It seems as if the struggle over leadership in the first months following Sadr’s disappearance carried a personal aspect. The approaches of the three leading persons to the main issues facing the Shi‘ite community were not very different. The main issues on the agenda were: (a) The problem of the South. This issue revolved around the approach toward Israel and the Palestinian resistance in the South. Sheikh Shams al-Din expressed well the stance of the entire community leadership, saying that “the South . . . may fall as another pledge to Israel, which holds several collaterals, the largest of which is Palestine, and we cannot let it

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happen. . . . The second way to rescue the South is by the Southerners themselves. This rescue will not materialize by prayers and pleadings, but by arms.”35 (b) The discrimination against the Shi‘ites in the Lebanese political system. Musa Sadr’s principles were kept in this issue as well. In a response to a journalist’s question, Hussein al-Husseini claimed that Amal was acting to abolish Lebanon’s confessionalism, and that the Shi‘ite principles obligate a struggle against an unjust ruler. The movement, therefore, according to him, objects to the classifying of citizens and draws away from the political game.”36 (c) The issue of “Lebanonism” vs. “Shi‘ism.” The matter first reached the public arena following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. The success of the revolution placed the self-identity question on the agenda in full force. The question had three layers. The first related to the fact that for the first time the Lebanese Shi‘ites enjoyed a state patronage, which was a source of pride with deep religious roots. The second related to the personal ties between Lebanon’s Shi‘ite leaders and the heads of the Iranian revolution. The third related to the Iranian radical doctrine of exporting the revolution to other Muslim countries, a doctrine that put the Lebanese Shi‘ite’s self-identity to a test. The clear and unequivocal answer all three prominent Lebanese Shi‘ite leaders gave to the matter was that the Lebanese state was the Shi‘ites’ first source of identification. Hussein al-Husseini expressed the way the Islamic revolution was perceived by the Shi‘ite leadership in Lebanon, when he said explicitly, “We demand absolute loyalty to Lebanon.”37 The expansion of the civil war and especially the increasing clashes between Amal and both Palestinian and leftist pro-Iraqi militias, increased the importance of the Shi‘ite armed militia. Amal had to take an increasing part in battles to defend Shi‘ite neighborhoods in Beirut. In the atmosphere created in the Shi‘ite “street” in Lebanon following the Islamic revolution in Iran, calls for using Amal’s militia to protect the community’s interests were heard, as well as for the readiness of the Shi‘ites to make sacrifices. In this situation, the military force was an asset which brought about Amal’s becoming the most powerful influential element among the Lebanese Shi‘ites. Naturally, the increase in the movement’s importance evoked arguments and struggles among different internal factions. This was the background to Nabih Berri’s election as head of Amal in April 1980.

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Nabih Berri’s Early Years

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abih Mustafa Berri was born on January 28, 1938 in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, West Africa. His family originated in the village of Tibnin in Jabal-‘Amil, about 25 km (15.6 miles) east of the city of Tyre. It is interesting to note that although Tibnin is comprised of four neighborhoods, only one is named after a family, the Berri family, the largest and most dominant in the village for generations. From the late Ottoman period until the 1930s, the residents of Jabal-‘Amil faced difficult times, which caused a massive migration of the village’s residents from Lebanon. Approximately 60 percent of the people of Tibnin emigrated during that period, almost two-thirds of them from the extended Berri family.1 Most immigrants moved to the United States and Canada, especially to Michigan, California, Toronto and Ontario. Many of the Berri family members settled in Detroit, and became an integral part of the city’s life, to such an extent that one of Detroit International Airport’s terminals was named in 1974 after a family member, Michael Berry (Berri), who served in the past as the airport commissioner.2 A small minority of the immigrants who left in the 1930s, three families altogether, went to West Africa. Fouad Ajami indicates in his book, The Vanished Imam, that their arrival in West Africa was accidental. He claims that upon reaching Marseilles, on their way to the “New World,” they discovered that they lacked the health certificates and financial means necessary. Therefore, they became easy prey for cunning agents who offered them transport to West Africa instead. As a result, some of them arrived in Sierra Leone and started working as petty traders in the diamond business and as mediators between Europeans and local farmers.3 Mustafa Berri, Nabih’s father, headed one of these three families. Mustafa Berri was a merchant who suffered during the 1930s economic crisis, and emigrated from neglected southern Lebanon to seek his fortune, as did many other Shi‘ites. His life in Africa was not easy at first. In addition to regular immigration difficulties, he had to cope with harsh conditions and diseases that were prevalent there, especially malaria. He became involved in the rice trade, but following the discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone, he began dealing in this new commercial sector. Soon Mustafa Berri became very successful in his business and was one of the largest Lebanese traders in diamonds. During a visit to his Lebanese hometown Tibnin, he met the

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love of his life in a friend’s house. The woman, Fatima Zaynadin, was the daughter of the Mukhtar (head) of the nearby town of Safed (today within Israeli Galilee). She had come to Tibnin to visit her aunt, who was married to Mahmud Saleh, Mustafa Berri’s friend. The young couple married and traveled back to Sierra Leone to run Mustafa’s business. In Sierra Leone, their firstborn was named “Nabih” (“Nabihu” in Arabic), meaning “his prophet.” When Nabih was less than a year old, his mother became ill and was unable to care for him. As her condition quickly deteriorated, and conditions in Africa were not favorable, Nabih’s parents made a difficult decision to send him to Lebanon. They entrusted his care to his mother’s aunt, “Um al-‘Abdah,” the wife of Mahmud Saleh from Tibnin. Nabih’s father, Mustafa, had to stay in Africa to run his business. His mother, although ill, returned to Sierra Leone to help her husband after bringing Nabih to Lebanon. Nabih grew up in Tibnin in his adoptive family until the age of 12, when his parents returned from Sierra Leone. He referred to both adopting and biological parents as “father” and “mother,” and participated in both families’ events. Mahmud Saleh, who was known for his faith and piety, introduced Nabih Berri to Islam. Before Nabih was five years old, he had been taught the prayers and was ready to learn al-Mashikha, the first stage of Islamic education. When Nabih turned six, he was able to read the Qur’an with the correct pronunciation. This Islamic training remained an important asset in Berri’s life later on, as he needed a “religious confirmation” when contending for power against a movement such as Hizballah. Islamic background was especially important in Lebanese Shi‘ite society, which gradually turned more and more religious following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Nevertheless, all throughout his political career, Nabih was portrayed as the secular option for the Shi‘ites in Lebanon, despite the fact that the Berri family was known as a family of Sheikhs. The fact that Nabih did not wear a turban had not prevented many of his supporters, particularly in Tibnin and Jabal-‘Amil, from calling him “Sheikh Nabih.” Many of his relatives were called “Sheikhs,” whether wearing a turban or not. It is possible that Nabih managed to keep away from the mannerisms of the Sheikh due to the fact that, being young at the time, he despised their way of life, and felt they were neglecting their duties. In his youth, Nabih wrote a short story called “The Sheikh and the Honey.” In the story, the Sheikhs were portrayed as people who prefer to comply with requests, attend weddings and funerals, eat and drink tea or coffee, rather than mobilize the people and lead social reforms.4 However, Berri was grateful to Mahmud Saleh for the rest of his life for teaching him the first lessons of the Qur’an. When his adoptive father was killed after a new house he was building collapsed during a nocturnal storm, Nabih was heartbroken. He felt sorry for “Um al-‘Abdah,” his adoptive mother, who had previously lost her only daughter. From the time of her husband’s death, until she died at the age of 90, she wore only black.5 After receiving an unofficial education from his adoptive father at an early age, Nabih started elementary school in Tibnin. His knowledge of the Arabic

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language, which was already good due to his religious lessons, improved at school. Nabih’s profound knowledge of Arabic became a valuable asset when the young man discovered Arab nationalism, since the language was considered one of the cornerstones of Arabism. As a ten-year-old boy, Nabih experienced the ramifications of the 1948 war in Palestine. One of the Berri family houses in Tibnin functioned for some time as headquarters of the Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh al-‘Arabi), commanded by Fawzi Qa‘uqji, who retreated from Palestine and settled in the village.6 Despite his young age, Nabih was probably influenced by the events, especially by the flow of Palestinian refugees who crossed the new border between Israel and Lebanon, and passed Jabal-‘Amil on their way to the refugee camps which were close to the southern coastal cities of Tyre and Sidon. Some of the refugees continued farther north to Beirut and Tripoli, while others passed the areas of Jabal-‘Amil as they travelled to the refugee camps in the Lebanese Biqa‘. In 1949, Nabih graduated from the school in Tibnin and received a certificate. Since a middle school did not exist in Tibnin, he moved to Beirut. He attended the Hawt al-Wilaya junior high school and then returned to Jabal-‘Amil and enrolled in a second junior high school in Bint-Jbeil. Later, he moved to a third junior high school, this time in the Ja‘afariya school in Tyre. As shifting between educational institutions was not common in Jabal-‘Amil at the time, it might be thought that Nabih was being a problematic child. However, since he himself did not provide explanations over the years, these transitions could imply self-search, social problems, or be a reflection to the lack of educational opportunities for the Shi‘ite children of Jabal-‘Amil, opportunities that children in other regions of Lebanon enjoyed. Bint-Jbeil and Tyre, like other towns and cities in southern Lebanon during the mid-1950s, witnessed the extensive activities of various political parties and movements, representing Arab-nationalist and Arab-socialist ideologies. Young Shi‘ites from the south hoped the leftist-secular movements would extricate them from the dead-end situation in which they were trapped: the political order of the old feudal families. The zu‘ama prevented the young Shi‘ites from climbing the Lebanese social ladder and improving their economic conditions. Among the national and leftist parties operating in the southern towns at that time were the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, the movement of Arab Nationalists (al-Qawmiyun al-Arab), the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima‘i), and the Lebanese Communist Party. After 1956 Nasserite movements entered the scene, especially al-Murabitun. These movements attracted Shi‘ites with slogans that offered an alternative ideological ideal to the sectarian-religious one of the old system, as well as economic improvement. They were considered the ticket to Shi‘ite political involvement independent from the zu‘ama and at the same time voided their inferior status as Shi‘ites. For young ambitious people, such as Nabih Berri, who sought to change the political order which perpetuated their weakness, joining one of these movements was almost an

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unavoidable step. He absorbed this atmosphere as a young boy in the south, and carried it with him to Beirut. Berri attended Imam ‘Ali bin Abi Talib secondary high school, which belonged to the al-Muqasid Islamic association. From there, he moved to al-Hikma high school in the Lebanese capital. One of Nabih’s first experiences outside Jabal-‘Amil, reinforced his feeling of deprivation as a Shi‘ite, and influenced his ambition later in his career. In 1956, he completed his secondary education at Beyt al-Talaba (the Students’ House) in Beirut, and took the matriculation exam. Although he was convinced that he had done well on the exam, he was very surprised to find that his name was not in the list of students who passed it successfully. After waiting for a week, Nabih returned to see if his name had been added to the list, being sure an error had occurred in the registry, but he was disappointed once again. He went to the office and found out that although his score was higher than that necessary to pass the exam, it was marked “failed.” The answer Berri received from the director general of the education department was that although the overall grade was higher than necessary, he had failed because he had passed only 25 percent of the French language part of the test. Despite the fact that it was a new directive, which Nabih had not known about in advance, the director general decided to reject his appeal, leaving the grade “failed.” Back in Tibnin, angry and bitter at the discrimination against students with no French background, Nabih decided to write about the matter to the then president, Camille Chamoun. To his amazement, he was invited to meet the president personally in the presidential residence, situated at the time in al-Qantari Street in Beirut. At the meeting, President Chamoun expressed his admiration of the fact that Berri had written the appeal himself in such clear and excellent Arabic. He said that any young man who wrote like that deserved to receive the matriculation certificate, and sent a letter to the chief executive officer of the Ministry of Culture, ordering him to confirm Berri’s appeal. When Berri was told by the officer that the appeal was received ex gratia, only because of the President’s request, he declined it, saying he did not want the title just as favoritism, but because he deserved it. Disappointed, without a matriculation certificate, Nabih returned to Tibnin. Many years later, he met Chamoun at the Lausanne Conference during the Civil War (1984) and reminded him of the story. Chamoun, who did not remember the case from the 1950s, said that even in Lausanne he reflected on how the young Shi‘ite leader had such bright and beautiful Arabic.7 The matriculation examination experience took the wind out of the sails of Nabih Berri, and he left Lebanon to assist at his father’s business in Sierra Leone. He helped him for almost two years and then decided to return to Lebanon, against the will of his father, who wanted him to stay in the African state. For unclear reasons, the relationship between Nabih and his father seems to have been a cold one from an early age. In a comprehensive TV interview, in which he was asked whether the rumor was correct that his father had kissed him only four times during his life, he replied that although everyone knew his father loved him, his father’s deprived childhood and life

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in Africa had made him tough.8 Berri claims to be a good, sensitive father to all his children, although he admits that in some ways he is similar to his own father in that role.9 Back in Lebanon, Nabih registered at a night school in order to complete the matriculation examination. After passing the exam, he began to study law at the Lebanese University in Beirut. Pursuing a higher education was not unusual for Shi‘ites of his coeval in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as this was a means with which to break from their depressed life-cycle and advance their social status and political influence. Nabih Berri’s time as a student coincided with a period of great change in the higher educational system in Lebanon. During the era of Chehabism (1958–1970), under presidents Fouad Chehab (1958–64) and his successor Charles Helou (1964–70), the accessibility of higher education to poor populations increased significantly. The Lebanese University, subsidized by the government, attracted mainly Muslim students, many of them Shi‘ites. As a result, student life in Beirut flourished, and at the same time their political consciousness was awakened. The intellectual life exposed them to the Cold War, which divided East and West and led many Muslim students to develop a leftist political consciousness. This process intensified in the mid-1960s, with the launching of a protest against the “consumer society” in Lebanon, the Lebanese attitude toward the Palestinians in the 1967 Israel–Arab war, and discrimination against the Shi‘ites in the public sector and the educational system. The concentration of many students on campus, including many Shi‘ites, turned the Lebanese University into a focus for leftist movement activity.10 In the era of Chehabism, the process of urbanization was given a tremendous boost, especially in Jabal-‘Amil. Chehab’s regime, which was centrist, increased the authority of the president at the expense of the parliament. Chehab initiated and implemented intensive development programs aimed at improving the living conditions of residents in the country’s provinces. These programs lessened the gaps between the country’s center and the peripheral areas of Lebanon and accelerated the process of urbanization, as many young people from the provinces moved to Beirut. During these years, the hegemony of the feudal lords in the rural Shi‘ite areas decreased. While attending his first year of law school at the Lebanese University, Nabih Berri met his cousin, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Berri, who came to visit Tibnin from the United States, where he had been living for many years. He later introduced Nabih to his daughter, Layla. The two were subsequently married and moved to Detroit, Michigan, where her family lived. Berri had already begun his political activity while a student. He had joined the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, which represented his social and Arab nationalist worldview better than any other political party. In late 1962, he was elected a member of the student association of the faculty of law and political science. Shortly afterward, he was elected chairperson of the association of the faculty of law, and its representative in the students’ association of the Lebanese University. Berri was later to become chairperson of this student association and the representative of the Lebanese University in the National Union of

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University Students in Lebanon (al-Itihad al-Watani lil-Tulab al-Jam‘iyin fi Lubnan), before being elected chairperson of this union in 1963. As chairperson of the union, most of his work, he said, was trying to unite the Lebanese students around the ideas of Arab nationalism. As part of his job, Berri traveled to Iraq and took the opportunity to visit the holy places of Shi‘ite Islam, while performing his religious duty of ziyarat (visits).11 It is a Shi‘ite popular ritual to visit the tombs of the just of holy Shi‘ite founding fathers (Imams) and sites related to the origin of Shi’a, mainly in Iraq, the land where the Shi‘a was founded in the seventh century. Representing Lebanon, Berri was active in global students’ organizations, where his colleagues called him a “dictator student,” because he aggressively insisted on the improvement of the economic status of students. The first buds of his tendency to mediate between rival parties were seen during his activities in the global students’ organizations, when he sought to join Lebanon to the two organizations operating then, one sponsored by the Soviets and the other by the West.12 Nabih Berri’s political and organizing skills were outstanding, above those of his classmates. One of them, Detroit businessman Nassib Fawaz, described him already in 1985 as intelligent, practical, and low-key, an evaluation that has proven to be true over the course of time.13 One of Berri’s skills is the art of speech. He is fond of poetry and literature, and his speeches are often written as poetry. While serving as head of the students’ association, Nabih Berri met Musa Sadr for the first time, a meeting that changed Berri’s life and put him on track to the Shi‘ite leadership in Lebanon. Sadr, who was impressed with the young political activist, sought bright young Shi‘ites whom he could recruit to his increasing social struggles. Nabih Berri was not enthusiastic about the cleric Sadr at first. On the contrary, he resented Sadr whom he thought no different from the other religious scholars of the Shi‘ite world who came to Jabal-‘Amil to live at the residents’ expense while overlooking local customs. Berri believed that Sadr, who was Iranian in origin, opposed the pan-Arab ideology of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and that he had come to Lebanon in order to accentuate the differences between Sunnis and Shi‘ites. Nabih’s early negative impression of Sadr was brought to the cleric’s attention by Ahmad Qubaysi, a law school student who joined Berri and a group of students to discuss some student matters at the Negresco Café in Beirut.14 Nabih shared his impression of Sadr during a stormy discussion, and Qubaysi, who was associated with the cleric, presumably reported the event to Sadr. However, following a later meeting with Sadr, Nabih revised his feelings and decided to join Sadr’s movements, al-Mahrumin and later Amal. The two met for the first time when Sadr came to the Berri family residence in Tibnin for a condolence call when one of the religious sheikhs passed away. At some point, after hours of staying with the family, helping them to face the mourning and to receive those paying their respects, Sadr asked Nabih directly what he thought of him. The young student spent almost half an hour explaining the reasons for his disapproval of the religious scholar. Sadr responded in detail for almost two hours, explaining his

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approach to Nasserism, to the Shi‘ite society in Lebanon, and the possible ways to deal with the poverty and discrimination in the Shi‘ite community. Following this conversation, Nabih realized that the image of Musa Sadr he had perceived was far from the truth and that they shared common views. Nevertheless, it took a while for Berri to change his ideas about Sadr, particularly due to the atmosphere among his milieu in Beirut, ambitious students with strong Arab nationalist sentiments and admiration of Egyptian leader Nasser. Only after Sadr began acquiring a reputation as a unique person who carried a big promise for change in the poor areas of Jabal-‘Amil, did Berri decide to join him. The triggers for Berri’s decision were two issues with which Sadr dealt. One was Sadr’s efforts to prevent the impoverished people of Tyre from begging in their homeland. He gathered them and forbade them to beg, taking upon himself the responsibility of supporting them. According to Berri, this action had an extremely emotional impact on various segments of Jabal-‘Amil.15 The second trigger was Berri’s understanding that Sadr’s movements had broad goals; they did not aim only at the narrow Shi‘ite framework, or at the Muslims, or at a specific geographic area. He realized this after an incident which took place in Tyre. A Christian man opened an ice-cream shop in the center of the city, but was boycotted by the vast majority of the Shi‘ites due to a Fatwa (a religious verdict) issued by Sheikh Musa ‘Izz al-Din prior to Musa Sadr’s arrival. Following one of his Friday prayers, Sadr headed his congregation in a march toward the city center. People had gathered around him the minute they saw him, accompanying the cleric in the hot day, until they reached the ice-cream shop. Sadr stopped in front of it, went to the door and asked the surprised owner to sell him and his crowd cones of ice cream. After the event, Shi‘ites started buying ice cream at the shop, ignoring the Fatwa. This was the starting point of what Musa Sadr described as the “year of process” in Jabal-‘Amil. The story spread quickly, eventually reaching Nabih Berri. The two stories convinced Berri that Sadr’s vision for Lebanon and the Lebanese Shi‘ites was serious. He drove to Husniyyat al-Imam al-Sadiq in Tyre, where Musa Sadr received visitors, offering the cleric his help. From that day on, Nabih stood by Sadr until the latter’s disappearance in 1978.16 In 1963, Nabih Berri graduated from law school at the Lebanese University, apparently with distinction. His official website indicates that he was rated first in his department.17 Two disappointments Nabih Berri experienced apparently strengthened his desire to advance and succeed in spite of the old socio-political order under the hegemony of the zu‘ama. One was the discrimination against Shi‘ites in the distribution of resources and professional development options. After a governmental scholarship for further studies in France was given to a Christian student from his class, Berri felt he was overlooked on religious grounds. He appealed the decision, fought for his rights, won, and left for one year of advanced studies at the Sorbonne in Paris.18 Upon his return to Lebanon, he joined the firm of

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attorney ‘Abdallah Lahoud, who was also a prominent Lebanese law instructor and literary figure.19 The second disappointment was related to the intersectarian obstacles placed by the “old order,” the feudal zu‘ama , in the path of people like Nabih Berri, who lacked familial status or connections. For Nabih, who had already served as head of the country’s students’ association, the natural route for further political progress was to be elected to the Lebanese parliament. Nabih Berri’s attempt to join the southern parliamentary list of candidates for the 1964 elections, under the leadership of Kamil al-As‘ad, failed. Once again, he found out that the absence of appropriate familial connections, or of readiness to represent the personal interests of the za‘im al-As‘ad, determined his fate and failure. The feudal leader rejected Berri despite his qualifications and experience in student politics, preferring yes men and not-ambitious candidates, who could not endanger his status. This experience with “the master” of Jabal-‘Amil, who despised young academics who lacked ancestral merit, strengthened Nabih’s attraction to the Ba‘ath Party, whose Arabist national platform was far removed from the sectarian politics of Jabal-‘Amil.20 Musa Sadr, whom Nabih had already met, was not yet an alternative, considering Berri’s ambition to succeed in the Lebanese political arena. Alliance with a Persian Shi‘ite cleric was not a good platform for that at the time. After his return from Paris, and until the mid 1970s, Nabih Berri spent periods of time in the United States, since his first wife, Layla, who was born there, wanted to raise her children near her family. One trip of Berri made to the United States, in 1964, affected his perception of discrimination against Shi‘ites in Lebanon. After attending one of the mass meetings of the African American leader Martin Luther King Jr., he drew an analogy between the situation of the black Americans in the United States and the Shi‘ites in Lebanon.21 Just as the African Americans in America had experienced, the gates to high positions and influential circles in Lebanon were closed to most Shi‘ites. Berri felt that the civil rights of his religious sect were trampled on in all social, political, and educational systems, just as has happened with the African Americans in the United States. Having a “green card,” since Layla was an American citizen, enabled him to live alternately in the United States and Lebanon. Reports that Berri had opened a network of service stations in Detroit does not seem correct and have been denied by Layla Berri, who used to work for the Dearborn (Michigan) Police Department.22 Over the years, the couple had six children: Ceylon, Susan, Farah, Mustafa, ‘Abdallah, and India. Berri spent short periods of time during the 1960s in his native country, Sierra Leone, to promote his family’s business. In the early 1970s, Berri was divorced from Layla, who still lives with some of their children in Michigan, and he returned to Lebanon permanently. He married a second wife, Randa ‘Assi, with whom he has three children: Amal, Mayasa, and Basil.23 In 1974 he joined the Deprived Movement (Harakat al-Mahrumin), established by Musa Sadr. As a member of the movement Berri became a candidate for one of the dozen seats allocated for seculars

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in the SSIC, but was not elected.24 Berri’s legal education, rhetorical ability, and independent ideas brought him closer to Sadr. When the latter founded Amal in 1975, he appointed Berri as the movement’s spokesperson and chairperson of the supervisory and jurisdictional committee. Later on, Berri served in other high positions in Amal, including as secretary of the political bureau, coordinator between Amal and the LNM, which was the parent organization of most leftist organizations, and as assistant secretary-general. This was Berri’s position when Amal’s leader, Musa Sadr, disappeared. As mentioned in the introduction, Hussein al-Husseini served as the movement’s secretary general following the special temporary regulations decided upon in March 1979. In accordance with these regulations, a general secretariat with executive authority was established, while the political chamber (al-Maktab al-Siyasi), which was created by the permanent regulations, remained in place. The existence of two sets of regulations created problems and complications between the secretaries’ council, headed by the Secretary General Hussein al-Husseini, and the political chamber. At the head of the political chamber was Nabih Berri. During the year in which the two sets of parallel regulations existed, the frequent friction regarding the question of authority shook Amal’s leadership. Nabih Berri asked that he temporarily refrain from activity, in order to restore peace. It was important for him to follow the movement’s rules as much as possible in order to prevent a split, at least until the end of the special temporary regulations and the convention of the movement’s council. The tension inside Amal was also an outcome of the movement’s increasing participation in the civil war. During the fighting, some young military commanders in Amal, who were in charge of the militia in the regions of Beirut and Jabal-‘Amil, stood out. One of these was Daud Daud, the movement’s military commander in the Tyre area. The rise of both the militant faction and the younger generation affected the power struggles inside the movement’s leadership and disrupted Hussein al-Husseini’s functioning as secretary general.

Berri’s Election as Amal’s Leader After a year of holding a temporary statute, on April 4, 1980, the Amal movement’s general conference took place. Before the conference gathered, Secretary General Hussein al-Husseini resigned. According to al-Husseini and his associates, the resignation came about due to the termination of the temporary emergency statute, and was aimed at finding a new formula. Other sources close to Amal’s political bureau claimed the resignation derived from al-Husseini’s unwillingness to bear responsibility for the movement being in a state of constant conflict and having differing views regarding substantive issues. The Arab newspaper al-Majallah, published in London, indicated al-Husseini was confronted with a popular base that was more inclined toward Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, who assumed the leadership of the movement in his capacity as the deputy chairman of the SSIC after

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Sader’s disappearance. This affected the relations between them and finally led Shams-al-Din, according to al-Majallah, to replace al-Husseini through mutual agreement.25 Al-Husseini had also faced opposition from within the movement because of disagreement between him and some cadres of the movement regarding issues such as priorities and work style.26 Media reports from that time indicate another possible reason for the resignation, which could have been “the straw that broke the camel’s back” for al-Husseini. He told reporters he had decided to resign because of the events of March 11. Apparently, on that day a few shots were fired at his house and he narrowly escaped. This explanation coincides with the image of al-Husseini as someone, who along with his honesty, does not belong to the breed of leaders who are willing to face personal risk in order to gain powerful influence, or for an ideal or an issue. For al-Husseini, who served as secretary general while feeling a heavy burden on his conscience, and the responsibility for Amal after the disappearance of Musa Sadr, the assassination attempt of March 11 was too much.27 Until the election of the top functionaries, Nabih Berri accepted alHusseini’s duties on April 3, 1980.28 The conference’s members, composed of regional committees and various functionaries subordinate to the movement’s leader, decided not to renew the temporary regulations. Instead, they chose a new leadership council of 23 members: Nabih Berri, ‘Akef Haydar, ‘Ali ‘Akush, Hassan Hashim, Hassan al-Masri, Mahmud Faqih, ‘Abbas Maki, Ahmad Hussein, Muhammad ‘Abd ‘Ili, Hussein ‘Obeid, Ahmad Isma‘il, Zakaria Hamzah, ‘Ali ‘Ammar, ‘Atef Aoun, Khalil Hussein, Muhammad Ghadar, Hussein Mussawi, Ahmad Hijazi, and Rbab al-Sadr (Musa Sadr’s sister). Three other members were symbolically elected, although they had not attended the conference: Mustafa Chamran, one of Amal’s founders and head of the organizational department, who served as Iranian defense minister when elected to Amal’s council, and the two who disappeared with Musa Sadr, Sheikh Mohammad Ya‘aqub and journalist ‘Abbas Badr al-Din.29 Three weeks later, on April 25, 1980, Amal’s new leadership council convened to choose the three top positions. The election was preceded by attempts to persuade Musa Sadr’s son, Sadri, to take over for his father, but he preferred to continue his studies in Iran. Nabih Berri was elected as chairperson of the leadership council, Hassan Hashem was elected deputy, and Hussein Mussawi was elected speaker.30 The election of new people to key positions was considered an upheaval. It reflected dissatisfaction with the hesitant approach that had characterized the period of al-Husseini as secretary-general and the need for a new approach, liberated from old obligations, to face the dangers and challenges of the Shi‘ite community. When Nabih Berri was elected chairperson of Amal, the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon stood at a crossroads regarding three issues. One was the attitude toward the Lebanese left. During the previous year, the armed militia of Amal was frequently involved in incidents against Palestinian and proIraqi leftist militias. Among these militias, Amal collided especially with the Lebanese Communist Party and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba‘ath Party. The

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clashes stressed the problematic character of Amal’s joining to the Lebanese leftist camp and caused a debate within the leadership of the Shi‘ites, on the degree of forcefulness the movement’s militia should used. The second issue the Shi‘ites faced in the summer of 1980 was the nature of the relationship between the Lebanese Shi‘ites and the Islamic Republic of Iran. A year and a half after the Islamic revolution in Iran, it still had very little influence over the Shi‘ites in Lebanon and constituted no more than a source for religious pride and identity. For the consolidated new regime in Tehran, who wished to spread the revolution to other Muslim countries, the Shi‘ites in Lebanon were a central target. The third issue concerned the leadership of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. After the division of the two positions Musa Sadr had held, as head of the SSIC and as leader of Amal, and in the absence of a person of his religious status in these bodies, no Shi‘ite figure could establish himself as the foremost leader of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. The election of Nabih Berri as Amal chairperson, in a time when the importance of a fighting force had increased, put him in a position of a major contender for political and military leader of the Shi‘ite community. In Amal’s encyclopedia, which was published by the movement in 2006, a senior man in southern Lebanon had described Nabih Berri as “one of the smartest and most Machiavellian of Lebanese politicians.”31 The following chapters will test the truth of this contention.

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Ch apter 2

From a Marginal Militia Leader to a Key Man

I

n April 1980, when Berri assumed office as head of the Amal movement, the movement and the Shi‘ite community were still of minor importance in the Lebanese arena. The major forces that took part in the Lebanese civil war were the rightist Maronite Lebanese Front (al-Jabhah al Lubnaniyya), the Lebanese National Movement comprised of leftist organizations (alHarakah al-Wattaniyya al-Lubnaniyya), the PLO, and Syrian troops. Israel dealt a severe blow in Lebanon, in reaction to Palestinian provocations. By the summer of 1982, Amal’s involvement in the civil war was limited to clashes with the leftist militias and the PLO. These clashes led to disagreements among Amal leadership concerning the proper role of its militia in the war. The Israeli invasion in Lebanon in June 1982 changed the rules of the game and created the right conditions to establish Berri’s position as the political and military leader of the Shi‘ite community. These conditions became possible because of changes in three arenas: (a) the military one, as Amal had become the strongest militia from the Muslim camp and the leftist camp; (b) the political one, as Berri strengthened his position due to the military strength of Amal and Shi‘ite demographics; and (c) the intracommunal one, as the issue of self-identity of the Lebanese Shi‘ites came up and brought about a struggle between different factions. The ideological struggle between an extreme fundamentalist faction, whose goal was the formation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon, inspired by Iran, and a moderate one whose goal was to improve Shi‘ite socio-political status within the framework of the Lebanese state, divided the Lebanese Shi‘ite community. For the first time, Nabih Berri’s stand was faced with a political alternative. In this atmosphere, Hizballah was formed in late 1982. Its supporters were drawn away from the Lebanese political game, as they did not acknowledge the existing state’s legitimacy. The course of events strengthened Nabih Berri’s political status among non-Shi‘ite political factions, since it illuminated his political pragmatism and the massive support he enjoyed among the Shi‘ites. Struggles existed within the moderate camp as well. During 1982 and 1983, Berri managed to secure his position as

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head of this camp in two stages. First, he placed Amal at the heart of the Shi‘ite moderate camp, opposite to Parliament members led by Kamil alAs‘ad. Then he managed to remove from the movement his main adversaries, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din and Hussein Mussawi. In early February 1984, Berri’s strength increased after he gained military control over west Beirut. The takeover of west Beirut, which was done with the collaboration of Berri’s political ally Walid Junblat, involved defection of Shi‘ite soldiers from the Lebanese Army to Amal and, for the first time, clashes between Amal and the Lebanese Army. The combination of Berri’s military control of western Beirut and his political status turned him into a key person in Lebanese politics at the time.

Clashes with the Left The first burning issue Berri had to face after being elected head of Amal in April 1980 was the question of joining the leftist camp, known as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The Shi‘ites and the left had a common interest in changing the political status quo in Lebanese politics. They also shared a similar leftist social outlook. However, two factors prevented Amal from joining the LNM and led to clashes between the two sides. First, the Shi‘ites objected to the Palestinian control over Southern Lebanon. The latter’s military and terrorist operations against Israel from territories in Jabal-‘Amil harmed the Shi‘ites, who comprised about 80 percent of the inhabitants of the South. They suffered both from the Palestinian attempt to recruit the local population to the struggle against Israel and from Israel’s reaction to the Palestinian attacks. The second issue which prevented Amal from joining the LNM derived from the Iran–Iraq war, which broke out in September 1980. The war led to clashes between Amal and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), who were considered pro-Iranian, and between pro-Iraqi leftist militias, such as the Iraqi faction of the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party (LBP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP). The unstable relationships between Amal’s leadership and the LNM narrowed the chance for both sides to cooperate. Following violent clashes between the two in Beirut during March and April of 1981, and an announcement by the joint headquarter of the PLO and the LNM denouncing Amal as “a gang not related to the national activity,” Nabih Berri commanded Amal to stop any cooperation with the joint headquarters.1 The relationships improved somewhat following the crisis caused by the anti-aircraft missiles placed by the Syrians in the Lebanese Valley (alBiqa‘ ) in May 1981, followed by the shooting down of two Syrian helicopters in Zahle by Israel. Syria’s Lebanese allies feared a new Israeli policy against the Syrian interests in Lebanon. However, Israeli air strikes in Beirut in July, following Palestinian provocations, re-evoked street fights between Amal and leftist militias, mainly the LCP. Amal blamed the leftist militias of backing the Palestinians and indirectly causing Israeli reactions, in which the Shi‘ites were the main sufferers. The street fights

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undermined the delicate balance in Beirut and resulted in Syrian pressure on the parties to stop the clashes. The pressure led to the formation of a Higher Security Council in the summer of 1981, in which representatives from the Arab Deterrence Force, which had been in Lebanon since 1976, the PLO, LNM, and Amal participated. However, the understandings reached in this council did not last and the clashes resumed. Nabih Berri was summoned to Damascus a few times together with PLO leader Yasser ‘Arafat, and they decided to cease the fighting between the two organizations. 2 The intensification in the battles of 1980 and 1981 affected Berri’s status in two opposing directions. On the one hand, as long as the battles continued, his importance as head of a fighting militia grew. The Shi‘ites were united in supporting Amal’s militia in the war between the Shi‘ite community and the Palestinians and leftist movements. Berri, therefore, enjoyed the support of all leading Shi‘ite personnel outside Amal, including members of the SSIC and the Shi‘ite representatives in the parliament. On the other hand, Amal’s deep involvement in battles created a disagreement within the movement regarding the role of the militia and its activation. The major problems revolved around the Palestinian presence in Jabal-‘Amil. Berri, supported by Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, acting chairman of the SSIC, took a moderate stance, supporting the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South in order to retain security. Berri’s deputy, Hussein Mussawi, on the contrary, supported by the Ja‘fari Mufti Sheikh ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan, headed those who wished to increase Amal’s involvement and launch an uncompromising war against the PLO.3 The clashes between Amal and the leftist organizations continued intermittently during 1981 and 1982 reaching a peak in April 1982. The bloodbath of April stimulated severe disagreements inside the Shi‘ite camp concerning Berri’s responsibility for the battles. This time, his critics were led by Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who blamed him for making unnecessary use of the militia and causing excessive loss of life.

Implications of the Israeli Invasion The Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, changed the rules of the game in the Lebanese arena. The new political and military conditions created played a major part in explaining Nabih Berri’s meteoric rise in the period following the invasion and in building his position as the most prominent political and military leader of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon. The Israeli invasion had three implications in this context. The first, mainly military, was the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and its consequences. The second, political, was the formation of a new power balance in the inner Lebanese circle, namely a major political strengthening of Amal and its leader. The third, ideological and intercommunal, was bringing the issue of the Lebanese Shi‘ite self-identity, between Lebanonism and Shi‘ism, to the agenda of the Shi‘ite community’s leadership.

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Strengthening His Military Stand The deportation of the PLO from Jabal-‘Amil and later from Beirut was a big relief for the Shi‘ites. On the eve of the Israeli invasion, the clashes between Amal and the PLO reached an unprecedented point. The relationship between Nabih Berri and Yassir ‘Arafat continued to deteriorate in spite of a ceasefire agreement reached in 1981. This agreement was reached under the patronage of ‘Abd al-Halim Haddam, the Syrian vice president who was in charge of the Lebanese affair on behalf of the Syrian government. Outwardly, Berri continued to express the classical Arab nationalist stand, stressing the importance of the Palestinian resistance to Israel and the need for a united Lebanese front against Israel, although he did admit he feared settling the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permanently if their struggle failed.4 The real atmosphere among the Shi‘ites of Jabal-‘Amil was well expressed by another high-ranking member of Amal, Muhammad Ghadar, who said his movement would provocatively shell northern Israeli settlements so that Israel would attack PLO bases in Southern Lebanon.5 When the first Israeli military convoys entered the Shi‘ite villages of Jabal-‘Amil in June 1982, there was a feeling of liberation among the local inhabitants, who expected to see the termination of violence caused by the Palestinian militias’ dominance. Local residents threw rice at Israeli soldiers, greeting them. The Shi‘ite rural population of the South had tried to avoid the struggles in their area over the years. In most Shi‘ite villages a tradition of friendship between local inhabitants and the Israeli army existed. They also shared a common enemy, the Palestinian militias. The Shi‘ite leadership in Jabal-‘Amil and in Beirut did not immediately condemn the Israeli invasion of Lebanon nor did it engage Amal troops against it. In spite of the temporary euphoria, Berri warned in an interview held only few weeks after the Israeli invasion that a prolonged Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon would lead to a violent resistance, a warning that was later fulfilled.6 Another military effect of the PLO expulsion from Lebanon was a change in the power balance among the militias involved in the civil war. The Israeli invasion strengthened primarily the Lebanese Forces of the Maronite Phalanges (LF, al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya), Israel’s major allies in Lebanon and the Palestinians’ major opponents. Amal was not involved in battles against the LF; on the contrary, it perceived the PLO as a common enemy. Therefore, in the short run, Amal had not been weakened by the strengthening of the Lebanese Forces. Following the PLO’s departure from Lebanon, Amal became the strongest Muslim militia in the country. The LNM, comprised of Walid Junblat’s Druze militia of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), warriors of leftist organizations and from the PLO, ceased to exist as a united coalition of organizations. The arrival of Israeli forces to the Shuf Mountains on June 8, 1982, forced the Druze militia to a defensive stand. The only Muslim militia unharmed by the Israeli invasion was, therefore, Amal. In light of these

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events, it became a significant military force in Lebanon, especially among the Muslim and the leftist camps. Another outcome of the PLO’s expulsion was the creation of a military vacuum in western Beirut.7 This vacuum enabled Berri to take control over the area 18 months later, together with Junblat’s PSP militia. During the years in which the PLO ruled parts of Jabal-‘Amil and Beirut, especially after the Cairo Agreement of 1969 and the evacuation from Jordan in September 1970 (“Black September”), its organizational infrastructure based itself in the western part of Beirut.8 Its headquarters, offices, and areas under economic patronage were all located in this area. The PLO had run, in fact, the daily life of western Beirut since the early 1970s. Therefore, controlling that area had a military importance for the Palestinians during their violent clashes with Amal and the leftist organizations in 1980 and 1981. Unlike the southern slum neighborhoods of the Lebanese capital, populated by tens of thousands of Shi‘ites, the mostly Sunni western quarters of Beirut were of strategic importance. The foreign embassies, the port, the economic centers of power, and the government ministries were all situated there. In the Lebanese reality of the early 1980s, it was impossible to establish a stable regime or to claim to have major political influence without military control over western Beirut. The evacuation of the PLO’s military infrastructure from the city in late August 1982, following the Israeli invasion, created a vacuum in military dominance over western Beirut and enabled Nabih Berri, following Amal’s occupation of the area, to become Beirut’s strongman. The course of events in which Amal occupied western Beirut will be discussed later in this chapter. Strengthening His Political Stand The Israeli invasion contributed politically to Berri’s status as the leading Shi‘ite leader. The invasion, in essence, led to radical changes in the Lebanese political map. The Palestinian factor, with its strong political dominance dating back to the mid-1960’s, left the political arena.9 The direct outcome was the weakening of the Lebanese Sunni Muslim left, which was supported by the PLO. As a result, other factors in the left wing, especially the Druze and the Shi‘ites, strengthened. The Druze political influence in Lebanon is stronger than would be expected from their percentage of the Lebanese population, mainly because of the stubbornness and militant heroism displayed by the PSP headed by Walid Junblat. Although the Druze community is fifth or sixth in size of population in Lebanon (5 to 6 percent), it seems that getting its support was essential to achieving every political solution.10 As for the Shi‘ites, the need to include them in every major political process in the early 1980s was even more important because of their demographic weight. Different assessments estimated the Shi‘ites in Lebanon during these years to be the largest community, between 750,000 to one million people, approximately 30 to 35 percent of Lebanon’s population

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and about 80 percent of the population in the South.11 The Shi‘ites were traditionally considered part of the political center in Lebanon. As they lacked political pretensions, the political communal interests focused over the years upon keeping the status of the zu‘ama families. These families tried to maintain the patterns of the existing political order, in order to preserve their position. This had been best achieved by keeping neutral in the political system. Social changes in Lebanon, derived from Musa Sadr’s activity at the time, and the rise of the Shi‘ites’ socio-political demands, changed the status quo. The desire to remain neutral prevented Sadr, and his successors later on, from joining the LNM. It was only the prolonged Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, together with the anti- Shi‘ite policy of President Amin Jumayil during 1982 and 1983, that pushed Amal into the arms of the leftist camp. The fact that the PLO had been expelled from Lebanon, and that the Druze were constrained to face the Maronites and Israel in the Shuf area, turned Amal into the strongest military element in the Lebanese leftist camp. When the largest community in Lebanon, which had growing political awareness and appetite, had a political movement with the strongest militia in the leftist and Muslim camps, the position of its leader was strengthened, increasing his importance in the Lebanese scene. The increase of Nabih Berri’s political status was also affected by events in the military field. During the civil war in Lebanon, having a military force meant holding political power. Amal’s militia was perceived as a significant military force, not only in the South, but also in Beirut, where political decisions were taken. Berri’s control over the militia, even if not always decisive, gave him political power as he negotiated with other politicians as when seeking solutions to the war in Lebanon were sought. As a result, all those involved in political contacts in post-1982 Lebanon understood that no agreement regarding the Lebanese war could be reached without the approval of an authentic Shi‘ite representation. The massive support of Amal among the Shi‘ite public left no doubt as to which body authentically represented the absolute majority of this religious sect. Therefore, it was obvious that Nabih Berri was the man to represent the Shi‘ite community in national settings. The authority to represent the Shi‘ites ceased to be in the hands of the head of the SSIC or the Shi‘ite speaker of the Parliament. It was now in the hands of the person who was backed by the Shi‘ite public and controlled the Shi‘ite military force. As for Nabih Berri, his new political status was a breakthrough. As the senior Shi‘ite representative he was now invited to all high-ranking political forums, alongside senior politicians from other communities, men of the “old order.” Berri was supposed to take part in the future government that President-elect Bashir Jumayil planned, but it was never formed due to Bashir’s assassination in September 1982. Bashir wanted to appoint Berri a minister in the Cabinet, as the Shi‘ite representative, an intention that was objected by Speaker Kamil al-As‘ad.12After the assassination, when Bashir’s brother Amin was elected president, he based his administration on leaders

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from the “old order,” ignoring almost completely the new Shi‘ite powers and Nabih Berri. Berri was not invited to join the new government he formed, headed by Sa’ib Salam. However, Berri’s participation as the senior Shi‘ite in the two most important national forums during 1982 and 1983 secured his position in the political system as the community’s leader. The first forum Berri participated in was the National Salvation Committee (Lajnat al-Inqaz al-Watani), formed in the summer of 1982 by President Elias Sarkis, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Sarkis, who wanted to form a body that could enforce its decisions, needed the participation of the heads of the strongest militias. He invited Nabih Berri to participate, alongside Bashir Jumayil, commander of the Maronite Phalange’s LF, and Walid Junblat, head of the PSP’s Druze militia. Others invited were politicians of the “old order,” such as Sunni Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, Fouad Boutrus (Greek Orthodox), and Nasri Ma‘aluf. (Greek Catholic).13 Of all the militia’s leaders, only Junblat refused to attend. Eventually, the group served more as a body expressing the national Lebanese consensus against the Israeli invasion than a forum to stabilize daily life. The dilemma of joining this body brought relationship between the Lebanese Shi‘ites and Iran to the heart of the Shi‘ite community’s agenda. The dilemma exposed the harsh disagreements inside Amal and was the trigger for the movement’s decline and split, which, ten years later, led to its loss of dominance among the Shi‘ite public. The issue will be discussed later on. The second forum to which Berri was invited as senior Shi‘ite representative was the Reconciliation Conference assembled in Geneva on October 31, 1983. The conference was held following a ceasefire between the Druze and Maronites in Mount Lebanon on September 25. The ceasefire ended months of brutal fighting, at the end of which the LF had to withdraw from their positions, and thousands of Maronite citizens fled with them from the mountain. The Reconciliation Conference, promoted by President Amin Jumayil, was the first of its kind since the outbreak of civil war in 1975. On the eve of the conference, politicians from all camps came up with proposals as to the best way to end the war. Most of them agreed upon the demand for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and an immediate annulment of the “May 17” (1983) Agreement, enforced by the United States and Israel to create peace between Israel and Lebanon. Among the politicians, in addition to Berri, were Christians such as Raymond Edde, who resided in Paris at the time, and former President Suleiman Franjiyeh; Sunni leaders such as former Premier, the man from the northern city of Tripoli, Rashid Karami; leader of the Nasserite movement al-Murabitun, Ibrahim Qulaylat; and Druze leader Walid Junblat.14 Other leaders expressed more moderate stands, such as Sunni Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and senior Sunni politician Sa’ib Salam, who suggested renegotiating the “May 17” agreement. The major opponents to the annulment of the agreement at this stage were Dani Chamoun and President Amin Jumayil himself. Other leaders

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also came up with suggestions for solutions. The three Armenian parties agreed there was a need to defend the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and the development of a free economy. Leaders of the Greek Catholic community called for the reformation of the National Covenant of 1943, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanese soil. Greek Orthodox leaders suggested a nine-point program, which included the understanding that Lebanon belonged to the Arab world, the secular nature of the political system, and the need to join hands in order to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including those of Israel. The Geneva Conference gathered nine Lebanese politicians, accompanied by observers from Syria and Saudi Arabia, to discuss the issues on the agenda. Nabih Berri was the only one of them who had gained leadership status during the war. In that, he symbolized the rapid rise in the importance and status of Amal and the entire Shi‘ite community. The rest of the participants represented the old traditional Lebanese political order. The Maronite representatives were Camille Chamoun and Pierre Jumayil, from the Lebanese Front, and Suleiman Franjiyeh, who represented northern Lebanon. Franjiyeh was the most pro-Syrian participant. He took part, together with the Syrians, in drawing up the “Reform Document” of February 1976, a document that contains Syria’s vision of Lebanon and was the basis for the Syrian and Arab League’s further suggestions on Lebanon, including the Ta’if Accord of 1989.15 Furthermore, Franjiyeh was the Lebanese president who had invited the Syrian army into Lebanon in April 1976. The Greek Orthodox community, which traditionally took a different stand from that of the Maronites on questions of national identity and political system, were not represented at the conference, and neither were other Christian minorities. The young generation of the LF militia also lacked representation in Geneva. The Sunnis were represented by Rashid Karami, who was considered pro-Syrian, and by former Premier Sa’ib Salam, a conservative politician from Beirut. Walid Junblat represented the Druze community and the Lebanese political left. The Shi‘ite representative, apart from Berri, was a traditional leader, ‘Adel Osseyran, from Sidon. The Shi‘ite speaker of the Parliament, Kamil al-As‘ad, stood out by his absence. He was not invited because of his role in the approval of the Israeli–Lebanese agreement of May 1983.16 The ninth participant was President Amin Jumayil himself. Raymond Edde, who was invited, refused to participate in the conference. Although the conference in Geneva had not achieved actual results, the concluding remarks were very similar to the stand and demands Nabih Berri presented on behalf of Amal. The demands made called for the recognition of Lebanon as a sovereign state, independent and Arab, and the termination of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It also called for the need of overall reforms in the country and the formation of a Lebanese security council that would deal with solutions to security matters.17

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Berri as Perceived by Foreign Factors in Lebanon The pragmatic approach Berri took, compared to the revolutionary Islamist Shi‘ite alternative, portrayed him as a Lebanese partner capable of negotiation in the eyes of foreign forces that were present in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion. The Americans noted the importance of keeping good relations with the Shi‘ites as early as the summer of 1982, and had intensive contact with Berri, ensuring his approval of the reconciliation efforts they carried out. In this realm, Berri met Philip Habib, American President Ronald Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East, and other U.S. officials more than once. Their goal was to convince him to join the National Salvation Committee, which was established in July 1982. Later they sought to convince him to change his mind and support Bashir Jumayil for president in August of that year.18 The depth of the relationship between Berri and the United States is not entirely clear. Some indicate he had acted as a source for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since the presidency of Ronald Reagan, informing the United States on every visit to Iran and maintaining a line of communication between Washington and Teheran.19 Michael Pilgrim, a former U.S. intelligence operative, said that Berri was targeted for CIA recruitment, adding that the United States probably financed his early trips to Iran.20 Additional suspicions regarding information Berri may have given the Americans, including some on the abduction of the CIA branch manager in Beirut, William F. Buckley, who was kidnapped and murdered by Hizballah, were published from time to time in the media. It should be said that the perception of Americans regarding Berri’s contacts with them is different from the way he sees the relationship. Berri used the U.S. need to find channels of communication to its enemies and serve as an intermediary for this purpose. The fact that Berri brought his political analysis to American attention and discussed with them various political and personal issues that were on the table cannot be regarded as espionage or activation of a source, even though Berri promoted goals of the U.S through contacts he held with most parties. These goals were sometimes shared with the United States and sometimes contradictory. The Shi‘ite Parliament speaker during the 1958 crisis, ‘Adel Osseyran, also used to meet an American diplomat in Beirut in the days of the crisis, sharing his views and Lebanese political gossip. Like Berri, at no stage was Osseyran influenced by his interlocutor and certainly did not change his basic positions.21 However, in the second half of 1983 Berri was considered, at least in the eyes of his critics, part of the PaxAmericana in Lebanon. The United States was delusional in thinking it could enforce a sustainable solution in Lebanon by sending in the Marines. On the eve of the American marines’ arrival in Beirut, Fuad Ajami, a historian with Shi‘ite Lebanese roots, warned the Americans in a TV interview not to enter Lebanon, an arena they were unfamiliar with.22 During 1983 the dark script Ajami warned of came into reality, as the United States lost influence over the

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Shi‘ite community and was perceived as a direct enemy. Nabih Berri and the moderate camp were pushed into Syrian hands due to President Jumayil’s anti-Shi‘ite policy and the “May 17“ Israeli–Lebanese accord. The extreme organizations, especially Amal al-Islami, headed by Hussein Mussawi, carried out terror operations and guerrilla warfare against all foreign troops. The peak of this terror was an explosion at the American embassy building in Beirut in April 1983, and a car bomb, detonated by a Shi‘ite suicide bomber at the Marine headquarters in October, killing 241 American troops. As for the French, it seems that the presence of their paratroopers in Beirut was the final straw in their pathetic attempt to retain their historic status in Lebanon. The French patronage of the Maronite community, lasting from the sixteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century, was limited during the 1975–1990 civil war to providing military supplies, humanitarian aid, and attempts to bridge both sides. During 1982 and 1983, the French ambassador to Beirut held meetings with Nabih Berri, as part of the French effort to bring about understanding between the Shi‘ites and Maronites. The French attempt to conduct an independent policy in Lebanon led to their entanglement in a bloody battle, tragically ending with an explosion at the joint French-Italian-American military headquarters, in October 1983. The Israeli approach toward Nabih Berri and the Shi‘ite community was based on the illusion that Lebanon would continue to be run by the old order’s rules. The Israeli strategy generally, of seeking a non-Muslim ally in the Middle East, caused the development of a relationship with the Maronite Phalanges. Ever since Israel began its involvement in Lebanon in October 1976, it tended to regard the Shi‘ite community as a passive element, lacking political or military weight, an element which could, at the most, share its ambition to expel the Palestinians from the South, an aspiration shared also by the Lebanese Christian right-wing camp. In the course of time no real Israeli attempt was made to communicate with the Shi‘ite leaders or the Shi‘ite inhabitants of Jabal-‘Amil. The Israelis ignored the fact that since nearly 80 percent of Jabal-‘Amil’s residents were Shi‘ites, they had to play an active role in a solution to the war crisis. In any future relationship between Israel and Lebanon, regardless of its nature, the Shi‘ites would be the closest neighbors to the Israel–Lebanon borderline. It should be said that no meaningful Shi‘ite faction was willing to be exposed as collaborating with Israel, despite common interests. Following the June 1982 invasion, there were those in the Israeli security system who understood the demographic reality and supported a Shi‘iteoriented policy. The strategy brought about continuous contacts with Amal commander of Jabal-‘Amil, Muhammad Ghadar. The Israeli military upper ranks’ decision to eventually base their policy in southern Lebanon on the South Lebanon Army (SLA) weakened those who supported the Shi‘iteoriented policy. The attempt made by SLA commander, Greek Orthodox Saad Haddad, to bring the southern Shi‘ite villages under his authority, and his efforts to raise an alternative Shi‘ite leadership to Amal, namely the al-Khalil family from Tyre, caused resentment among the Shi‘ites of Jabal-

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‘Amil. Because of that, Israel lost its chance to build a positive relationship with its neighbor population.23 The increase in Berri’s and Amal’s importance in Israeli eyes, starting from late 1982, was a result of Amal’s growing involvement in active resistance to the Israeli occupation. During Berri’s meteoric political rise, and especially following the Israeli expulsion of the PLO forces from Jabal-‘Amil, Amal took control over this area. It was both the strongest local military force and the organizer of the local people’s daily lives. Reaching an understanding with Nabih Berri in order to reduce confrontations between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Amal was therefore a clear Israeli interest. The pro-Iranian faction of the Shi‘ite community, which was still in its infancy, was settled in the Biqa‘ area, relatively remote from Israel, therefore not considered an immediate threat, and was a minor priority for the Israelis. Israel failed to properly and duly evaluate Berri’s influence and the change in the Shi‘ite political state of mind, which he represented in the post-Sadr period. When the Israelis finally realized his influence, they were already one step behind all developments. Even after Amal had become the strongest militia of the South, Israel continued to rely on Haddad’s SLA, failing to conciliate the Shi‘ites. This policy stood in contrast to the demographic reality in that area. When Israel tried to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon in May 1983, it relied on old-order political elements alone, not taking into account the authentic feelings of most of the South’s inhabitants.24 When Israel finally tried to approach Berri, it was only at the point where it was forced to do so, due to the increase in anti-Israeli Shi‘ite military attacks. However, at that stage, some of the Shi‘ite military organizations that acted against Israel were already out of Berri’s control, and he had to go to extremes because of internal Shi‘ite power struggles. Later on, during the mid 1980s, Israel again failed to properly evaluate Berri’s positions and claimed his pragmatic stands were too extreme. When Berri held the Israeli air force navigator Ron Arad captive during 1986 and 1987, asking to exchange him for several hundred Shi‘ite prisoners from al-Hiyam prison, Israel claimed it was an excessive demand. Through Jamil Sa‘idi, a Shi‘ite Lebanese timber merchant who lived in Sierra Leone and kept contact with Berri, Israeli officials arranged meetings with the Amal leader in London. The meetings between Berri and Uri Lubrani, the Israeli top coordinator of Israel in Lebanon, and with intelligence officers, provided the Israelis with proof of life and with a few letters and pictures of Arad.25 Only after Arad’s fate was out of Berri’s hands did Israel understand that his approach, to allow contact with Arad through the Red Cross, and specifying the price for his release, was the pragmatic and moderate approach among the Shi‘ite elements in Lebanon.26 Syrian support of Amal dates back to the days of Musa Sadr, as described earlier. Later on, the Syrian support resulted from its interest in the victory of Amal’s militia in their battles with the pro-Iraqi militias, battles which began in 1980. For a short period after the Israeli 1982 invasion, the Syrians perceived Nabih Berri as part of the U.S. attempt to enforce a solution in Lebanon. Berri had at least once expressed support for the

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evacuation of Syrian troops from Lebanon.27 During 1983, the relationship between the Syrians and Berri improved because of four factors: (a) the Syrian policy in Lebanon at the time favored understandings with most elements in Lebanon, all the more so when it came to the strongest movement of the largest Lebanese religious sect; (b) the importance the Syrians attached to the Shi‘ite resistance to the Israeli occupation, especially in Jabal‘Amil; (c) the interest they shared with Berri in replacing President Amin Jumayil and speaker of the Parliament Kamil al-As‘ad; (d) the decrease of Syrian enthusiasm for the Islamic Shi‘ite faction in the Biqa‘. The fundamentalist Shi‘ites’ extreme attacks against foreign troops in Lebanon, although sometimes serving the Syrian interest, also brought about the harshening of the American attitude toward Syria and its role in Lebanon. In addition, it may be that Syria feared a religious wave in the Biqa‘ area bordering Syria, as a result of Hizballah and the pro-Iranian ideology. Such a wave could have, under certain conditions, led to collaboration with the Muslim opposition to Hafez al-Assad’s regime in Damascus, which he intensively fought until 1982, although the Lebanese extremist faction was Shi‘ite and the Syrian opposition was Sunni. For Berri, building a good relationship with Syria was an opportunity to have a strong patron, and a counterbalance to the Iranian massive support of Hizballah and the Israeli support of the Maronites. Two issues which both Amal and the Syrians opposed pushed Berri into the Syrians’ arms. The first was the Israeli–Lebanese agreement of May 17, 1983, and the second was the resentment of President Amin Jumayil and his policy. The cooperation between the parties reached a peak in the summer of 1983, when Berri met Walid Junblat in Damascus to coordinate with the Syrians their steps against Jumayil.28

Strengthening Berri’s position as a Result of Inner Shi‘ite Struggles The hitherto mentioned discussion dealt with the Israeli invasion’s contribution to Berri’s rise as the leading political and military Shi‘ite leader in the eyes of Lebanese politicians, including those leaders of other religious sects. His increasing strength outside the community affected power struggles inside the community. On the one hand, his position within the Shi‘ite community grew stronger following his growing importance in the overall Lebanese system. On the other hand, his leadership was challenged after he was accused of holding views that were too moderate to protect the community’s interests. It can be claimed that internal Shi‘ite communal struggles in the first years following the Israeli invasion contributed, in the short run, to the increase of Nabih Berri’s position in leading the Shi‘ites politically and militarily. His star rose especially in the eyes of the non-Shi‘ite political high echelons. In the long run, these struggles caused a split in the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon, weakening the moderate wing headed by Berri. These long run influences will be discussed in later chapters.

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The most important internal struggle during the 1980s related to the Lebanese Shi‘ites’ self-identity, which swung between Lebanonism and Shi‘ism. For the first time since leading Amal, a real Shi‘ite alternative to Berri’s secular moderate way appeared. In fact, this issue had emerged on the Lebanese Shi‘ite leadership’s agenda since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Lebanese elements from all sides of the political spectrum have blamed Amal several times for representing Iranians’ interests rather than Arab– Lebanese ones. This impression was strengthened by the Iranian defense minister Mustafa Chamran’s membership on the Amal command board. For Berri, the question of the Iranian connection was clear. He expressed his mind on the matter shortly after being elected head of Amal by saying, “Amal is a Lebanese Arab movement, not Iranian.”29 Berri’s deputy, Hussein Mussawi, took a different approach, supporting the fulfillment of Islamic Iranian aspirations in Lebanon. He therefore opposed participation in common national bodies, such as the National Salvation Committee, in which participants such as Bashir Jumayil took part. The Iranian ambassador to Damascus, who was agreed upon as an arbitrator in the question of joining the National Salvation Committee, and the Iranian ambassador to Beirut, asked Berri not to join this committee, which they perceived as a U.S. alliance.30 For Iran, Amal’s association with a committee symbolizing the Western takeover of Lebanon and preserving the Israeli occupation, was crossing the line. When Berri decided to join the National Salvation Committee in July 1982, it was a clear signal for Iran that Amal under his leadership had adopted an independent line, free of real Iranian influence. Berri declared that Amal was a Lebanese movement, aspiring to maintain Lebanese unity and a secular character, and that it would not be a means to spread the Islamic revolution from Iran to Lebanon. Following these declarations, the Iranians understood they had to establish a Shi‘ite Islamic alternative movement whose loyalty would be primarily to the revolution and to Imam Khomeini. Establishing Hizballah: The Formation of an Alternative to Berri Establishing such a movement as the Iranians desired was made possible with the help of Shi‘ite clerics acting in Lebanon. This group included ‘ulama who originated from Lebanon and studied during the 1950s and 1960s in religious seminars in Najaf, Iraq. These clerics acted mainly in the realm of the Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da‘awa al-Islamiyya) which was formed and acted in Iraq under the leadership of some senior Shi‘ite religious scholars; among them Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr stood out. In the Da‘awa Party, the Lebanese scholars first encountered the radical idea of toppling the secular anti-Shi‘ite Iraqi regime.31In the July 1968 revolution in Iraq, the coalition of the Ba‘ath Party, headed by General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, held the reins, together with a group of officers led by ‘Abd al-Raziq Na‘if. During the following decade, many Da‘awa Party Shi‘ite activists from southern

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Iraq had to leave the country and return to their homelands because of the regime’s persecution. Their return at the beginning of the 1970s brought to Lebanon about a hundred of Baqir al-Sadr’s disciples. In Lebanon, they established religious Shi‘ite colleges in the Najafi style (Huzat ‘ilmiyya), in which hundreds of young Shi‘ite students received activist education. It was from among these students that the Lebanese Da‘awa Party was formed. The party, it should be noted, was part of the Lebanese Muslim Student Association (al-Itihad al-Lubnani lil-Tilabah al-Muslimin).32 Three young religious scholars stood out in this group. The first was Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, born in 1948, in the village of Brital in the Biqa‘, who spent nine years in the religious seminars of Najaf and Qom in Iran. Despite his young age, he was considered the most scholarly ‘alim in the Biqa‘ area. Second, was Sheikh ‘Abbas Mussawi, born in 1952, from the village of Nabishit. After studying for eight years in Najaf he returned to Lebanon, and resided in Ba‘albek. The third outstanding scholar was Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, born in 1953, in a Biqa‘ village near Zahle. After returning from his study in Qom he joined Amal, but left in the summer of 1982 because of different views on the issue of Iranian ties. After spending some time in the Biqa‘, he settled in Beirut.33 The young ‘ulama chose Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah as the Da‘awa’s spiritual leader, as his sermons and writings reflected a clear activist line and he has had a background of activism in the Iraqi Da‘awa Party. During the mid-1970s, when Amal had successfully recruited many young Shi‘ites, the Lebanese Da‘awa Party members examined their attitude toward that movement. Following Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s visit to Lebanon, it was decided that the Da‘awa would join Amal in order for its men to gain inside influence. In April 1980, a few days after Nabih Berri was elected head of Amal, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was executed in Iraq. The Lebanese Da‘awa Party disintegrated as a framework for joint action, and its members joined Amal individually, separating themselves, mainly ‘ulama, from other members. Berri, it should be mentioned, expressed his condolences over Baqir al-Sadr’s death.34 After the change of personnel in Amal’s leadership in April 1980, Berri clearly stated his opinion of the relations with Iran: “Although the movement has many ties and shared goals with the leaders of the Islamic revolution, it would remain a Lebanese movement.”35 Berri’s decisive words made it clear that he would lead Amal as a secular movement, and limit its struggle to changing the Shi‘ite’s socio-political status within the realm of the Lebanese state. The young religious scholars, who came from the religious Shi‘ite seminars, held an extreme activist ideology and saw Imam Khomeini as their sole leader, felt they no longer had room in Amal. The SSIC, headed by Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, also objected to the importation of Islamic revolutionary ideas to Lebanon. The graduates of the religious seminars and the supporters of the Iranian line remained therefore without the economic or political support of any Lebanese body. Toward the end of 1982 and in early 1983, these scholars formed Hizballah (the Party

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of God), which reflected the Iranian desire to have a movement under its authority. The formation of Hizballah marked the most important division in the Lebanese Shi‘ite community to occur since the days of Musa Sadr. The political line the activist ‘ulama in Lebanon supported corresponded to the one being shaped in Iran. In Teheran, the process of pushing the moderate wing, which included people such as Mahdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Qotbezadeh, and Mustafa Chamran, and the rise of the fundamentalist faction, to which ‘Ali Hassan Montazeri and ‘Ali Khamenei belonged, had been completed. As a result of the process, most of Amal’s supporters in Teheran were pushed out of the political system, and the strife between Tehran and Amal intensified. The resignation of Bazargan’s Iranian government in November 1979, and the removal of moderate secular ‘Abulhassan Banisadr from the presidency in 1981, paved the way for the fundamentalist Iranian wing to export the Islamic revolution to other Shi‘ite communities in the Middle East. This served as a catalyst for the creation of an alternative to Amal among the Lebanese Shi‘ites. The conditions enabling the formation of Hizballah had also to do with the demographic and geographic distribution of the Shi‘ite population in Lebanon. Four elements increased Beirut’s importance for the Shi‘ites in the early 1980s: (a) the constant Israeli presence in Jabal-‘Amil since June 1982; (b) the southwestern neighborhoods of Beirut were a center of support and activities for Berri; (c) the Shi‘ite community’s growing part in political decisions was taking place in Beirut; (d) the fighting between Amal’s militia and leftist organizations in the city. As a result, the Shi‘ites in the Biqa‘ were distant from the focus of Shi‘ite political activity, as well as the Shi‘ite military militia, which was present in Beirut and in Southern Lebanon. Another geographical aspect is related to the pro-Iranian group’s inability to organize in Jabal-‘Amil. The tight Israeli control over Southern Lebanon prevented them from organizing there, leaving the Biqa‘ as the only Shi‘ite area possible for their activity. In Ba‘albek, a Shi‘ite center of the Biqa‘, the young religious scholars who were not integrated into Amal or the SSIC found partners who shared their desire to replace the Shi‘ite leadership in Lebanon and act in favor of an Iranian-type revolution. A prominent partner for these ambitions was Hussein Mussawi. Like Berri, he represented the sector of young middle-class Shi‘ites who were promoted in Amal. His educational background was different from those organizing in Ba‘albek, favoring the Iranian line. As someone who belonged to the big al-Mussawi tribe of the Biqa‘, he received a secular education and worked as a high school literature teacher. When Amal started recruiting young supporters, he saw an opportunity to break the status quo circle within the Shi‘ite community, which prevented any chance of making progress in the socioeconomic ladder. He decided to quit teaching and join the movement.36 Berri’s election as chairman of the movement’s leadership and Hussein al-Mussawi as his deputy marked the generational turnover in Amal and the rise of young leaders lacking ancestral credentials. The differences of opinion between the two first became apparent in the Amal leadership

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conference held in Beirut in early April 1982. On the agenda was the movement’s reaction to the severe clashes between its militia and the LNM, PLO, and various leftist organizations. Nabih Berri led a moderate line, defining the controversy between Amal and its rivals as purely tactical, and supporting the launching of Lebanese army units to the South to restore peace. His deputy Mussawi, on the other hand, led a faction supporting a clear proIranian line, demanding an uncompromising fight against the LNM with Iranian assistance.37 Five months later, in September 1982, following Berri’s decision to join the National Salvation Committee, Hussein Mussawi left Amal and established Islamic-Amal (Amal al-Islami). Mussawi’s withdrawal, together with other Amal members from the Biqa‘ region, was accompanied by the seizing of some Amal property in the Biqa‘, including a magazine and offices. Soon after declaring the formation of Amal al-Islami, Mussawi received Iranian support.38 The young religious scholars who began forming Hizballah at the end of 1982 found additional allies in the Biqa‘, namely the fighters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). This force had already arrived in Lebanon in December 1979, when the Islamic Republic sent warriors to assist the Palestinians against Israel. The Shi‘ite leadership in the south at that time, fearing the strengthening of Palestinian power, tried to “gently” convince the Iranians not to send them, declaring that “Iran needed its fighters more” for fighting on the Iraqi front.39As a result of the tension between Iran and the Lebanese Shi‘ite leadership on this point, only a few Iranian volunteers arrived in the Biqa‘ and the South.40 Only in July 1982, after Syria claimed Berri and Amal were part of the pro-American alignment in Lebanon, and aspiring to balance them, did it allow about a thousand Pasdaran to become located near Ba‘albek and place their headquarters in the Syrian–Lebanese border town of al-Zabadani.41 The loss of mutual trust between Amal’s mainstream, headed by Berri, and Iran, did not start in the summer of 1982, but rather dates back to his election. The process increased gradually until the question of joining the National Salvation Committee came up. It had to do not only with the issue of importing the revolution to Lebanon, but also with the fate of two of Iran’s contacts in Amal, who were Berri’s closest Iranian allies. The first, Sadeq Qotbezadeh, formerly a member of Amal’s leadership, was arrested for criticizing the Iranian revolutionary regime. Berri sent an angry, yet polite and deferential, letter to Imam Khomeini, extolling Qotbezadeh’s contribution to the Islamic revolution, and asking for his release from custody.42 The second man was the Iranian defense minister and one of Amal’s founders, Mustafa Chamran. When the news of his death on the Iraqi front arrived in late June 1980, Amal declared deep mourning and commemorated him.43 During April 1982 rumors spread that Chamran was not killed on the battlefield, but rather was assassinated by the Iranian regime’s emissaries. Prior to his death, Chamran was Berri’s closest ally among the Iranian elite. They kept close ties and used to exchange opinions frequently.44 The rumors of Chamran’s assassination, together with Qotbezadeh’s

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renewed arrest in April 1982, caused severe hostility toward Iran among Berri and his Amal supporters. After Berri joined the National Salvation Committee, an act that was perceived by the Iranians as crossing the line, the Pasdaran force became the natural instrument for Iran to accomplish its policy in Lebanon. The young religious scholars, Hussein Mussawi’s group, and the Pasdaran members were joined by other Shi‘ite groups. These were people who had previously taken part in local Beirut militias and failed to find a place following the dismantling of the Palestinian force resulting from Israeli pressure, or who were rejected by Amal. They gave the new organization the operational skills that the scholars lacked. Other elements, such as the Association of the Clerics of Jabal-‘Amil (Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama Jabal-‘Amil) and former members of the Lebanese Da‘awa Party also joined. If so, for the first time Berri and Amal were faced with a real alternative within the Shi‘ite community, in the form of Hizballah and the other fundamentalist pro-Iranian organizations. In spite of, and due to, the sharp segmentation in the Shi‘ite community, Berri was gaining more strength. The apparent contradiction between these two facts is explained by the different ideology the two Shi‘ite movements represented. The vast majority of the Shi‘ites in Lebanon supported the continuation of the Lebanese state’s existence as an independent entity with a secular regime. Nabih Berri and Amal represented this ideological line, which was in accord with the secular tendency of the Shi‘ite public. Hizballah, on the other hand, wanted to see Lebanon become an Islamic country, according to the Iranian model. For most Shi‘ites in Lebanon, an Islamic theocracy there was perceived as having an effect on the individual’s daily life and as a threat to the Lebanese open lifestyle and traditions. In addition, Hizballah’s ideological approach did not attempt to come up with ways to end the civil war in Lebanon, while Amal’s pragmatic approach favored a ceasefire. The fear of Iranian control over the Shi‘ite farmer’s or merchant’s daily life deterred most Shi‘ites, who, at that point, perceived Hizballah as an extremist minority movement, from supporting them.45 The more the ideological difference between Amal and Hizballah was emphasized, the more Berri was identified as leader of the pragmatic line and as the one who could bring about changes in the status of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. Most Lebanese Shi‘ites preferred to be politically represented by a young successful man, with modern clothes and a liberal profession, who held an equal status to politicians of the old order in national forums, rather than a bearded ‘ulama, dressed in traditional turbans and gowns (‘abaya). Most found it easier to identify with Berri than with clerics who seemed to be one step behind modernization. Later on, Berri’s struggle to hold his military power in Beirut, while confronting the growing radical faction, forced him to publicly radicalize his position against the Israeli occupation, and against the al-Hoss government and President Amin Jumayil. The core of military force supporting him came from Beirut’s southwest suburbs, which had fought for Amal since the spring of 1980. Toward the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983, the time of

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Hizballah’s formation, Amal’s enormous military strength as a united force was first felt. As Amal fighters were so close to obtaining their goals, every split among them would have delayed and nullified their military achievements. As the Amal fighters felt more powerful, their political ambitions naturally increased. In order to maintain their support, Berri had to go to the extreme on some issues. Nevertheless, his status among non-Shi‘ite elements was not harmed, as for them he was pragmatically irreplaceable and an authentic representative of the Shi‘ite sect. Hizballah’s extreme fundamentalism contributed further to the image of Berri as the primary Shi‘ite leader in the eyes of non-Shi‘ite political elements. As long as those supporting the Iranian ideology were part of Amal, Berri was subjected to inner power struggles and lacked full control over his movement. The pro-Iranians’ withdrawal from Amal not only intensified Berri’s control over his movement, but also prevented his opponents from being potential partners for any possible solution discussion, due to their extreme stands. The pro-Iranians did not see eye-to-eye with other Lebanese elements and objected to Lebanon’s secularity and independence. In light of this, Berri and Amal were left as almost the sole natural Shi‘ite partners for any negotiation. Berri’s Struggles for Power within the Main Shi‘ite Camp Another leadership struggle among the Shi‘ites was conducted inside the community’s main faction. Three men were considered to be leaders of the moderate faction: Nabih Berri, head of Amal; Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who served as head of the SSIC; and Kamil al-As‘ad, speaker of Parliament. During the course of two years after the Israeli invasion, Berri managed to oppress his Amal opponents and remove them from the movement. At the same time, he strengthened Amal’s position as the representative of the primary faction of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, at the expense of the Shi‘ite parliamentary block headed by al-As‘ad. At the end of 1983, Kamil al-As‘ad started losing power in the only body where he still maintained it, the Parliament. His political life hit bottom in 1984, when he lost the parliamentary speakership to Hussein al-Husseini. Prior to that, in the early 1980s, he had renewed some political status for a short period, gaining importance after being re-elected as speaker in November 1981. When in office in 1982 and 1983, al-As‘ad played an important role in two main dilemmas which were on the agenda of the divided Lebanese Parliament: the campaign to elect Bashir Jumayil president, and the Israeli–Lebanese agreement of May 17, 1983. The process of Jumayil’s election for president in August 1982 allows a glance at the power balances inside the Shi‘ite community then. According to the Lebanese constitution, a candidate for president had to gain the trust of at least two-thirds of Parliament members on the first ballot. Nabih Berri, who was not a member of Parliament, publicly objected to Bashir Jumayil’s election and saw his candidacy as a provocation. He thought of Jumayil as

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a dividing element, not as someone who could unite the country and stop the civil war.46 Other prominent Shi‘ite leaders such as al-As‘ad and Shams al-Din objected to his election for other reasons, as did others from outside the Shi‘ite community, such as Maronite Raymond Edde, Druze Walid Junblat, and the Sunni mufti Hassan Khaled. They all claimed that in light of the Israeli occupation it was not proper to elect a president, therefore the elections should be postponed. In late July 1982, Speaker al-As‘ad surprisingly announced he supported conducting the elections on time as declared in the constitution, meaning during Israeli occupation.47 He claimed only a new president could create conditions for ending the war in Lebanon. The fact that al-As‘ad headed a parliamentary block of 18 legislators gave his stance weight and influenced the Shi‘ite parliament members’ attitude toward the elections. His stance gained further prominence from his role as the Parliament speaker, who had the authority to promote or delay the necessary parliamentary arrangements required for the elections. The reason for his surprising support of the election, which stood in contrast to his previous political position, lies, it seems, in a political “debt” he had to pay the Phalange delegation in the Parliament, which had supported his re-election for Parliament speaker a few months earlier.48 The struggle over parliamentary voices for and against Bashir Jumayil’s election and on the number of those parliament members arriving to the special election session was tight, as at least 62 of them were needed to get the two-third majority. Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din called upon his supporters among the legislators to boycott the voting session. Prominent nonShi‘ite politicians such as Sa’ib Salam, Raymond Edde, Suleiman Faranjiyeh, and others did the same. Representatives of Shi‘ite za‘im Kazem al-Khalil, on the other hand, ensured their appearance in the special session to vote for Bashir Jumayil. As one vote necessary to gain the two-thirds majority was missing in the first round, a second vote took place, in which Bashir Jumayil received his needed 62 votes. The Americans succeeded, presumably after exerting heavy pressure, in convincing Nabih Berri and Hussein al-Husseini to support Bashir’s candidacy and thus paved the way to overall parliamentary Shi‘ite support. Although Berri was not a member of the Parliament he had strong influence on some of the Shi‘ite delegates due to his position with the Shi‘ite public. Twelve of eighteen Shi‘ite Parliament members elected Jumayil. If it had not been for their support, he would not have received the needed majority.49 Another matter in which Kamil al-As‘ad’s role as Parliament speaker had great importance was the Israeli–Lebanese “May 17” Agreement of 1983. Unlike all other Shi‘ite leaders, al-As‘ad supported the agreement and acted in Parliament, alongside President Amin Jumayil, to consolidate a Muslim block to support it.50 His position contradicted Amal’s, and as Amal enjoyed massive support in Jabal-‘Amil, it is possible that by declaring his support of the agreement, al-As‘ad lost the remains of his traditional support base in the Bint-Jbeil region of Jabal-‘Amil.

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As Kamil al-As‘ad’s political decline began in the second half of 1983, it became apparent that Berri’s main rival within the main Shi‘ite faction was Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. The rivalry between the two was, in fact, a struggle over the nature of the Shi‘ite community’s leadership. As acting head of the SSIC (although officially holding the title of “vice president of the council’s chairman,” until vanished Musa Sadr would to be 65 years old, in 1993), Shams al-Din carried the official role of head of the Shi‘ite community. The SSIC, being the state’s official representative of the community, enjoys prestige and consensus, as it is comprised of clerics alongside traditional leaders and politicians. Nabih Berri and Shams al-Din’s views regarding the political issues on the agenda had much in common.51 Therefore, there is no escape from assuming that the conflict between the two stemmed mainly from personal motives, which had to do with their individual desires to lead the community. The atmosphere of political helplessness and chaos in Lebanon contributed to both the moderate and radical clergy’s status and popularity. The two leading ‘ulama of the Shi‘ite moderate wing were Shams al-Din and J’afari Mufti ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan. The rapprochement between Shams al-Din and Berri following the Israeli invasion of June 1982 ended at the beginning of 1983. The prolonged Israeli presence in Lebanon harshened the moderate views of the Shi‘ite leadership, who didn’t want to lose the support of the Shi‘ite public to Hizballah’s radical Islamic ideas. The two started to radicalize their views in order to keep up with the pro-Iranian ‘ulama and by that sharpened the difference of their positions. For Berri, the best way to act was to establish his position as leader inside Amal. The process of pushing out his opponents that had begun earlier with the removal of Hussein Mussawi and other supporters of the Iranian line continued with Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. During the movement’s conference of April 1983, Berri managed to push Shams al-Din out of Amal by reorganizing the movement’s leadership, thereby establishing his control. The conference approved Berri’s plan for re-organization, which included setting up a 16-member political chamber. This chamber replaced the former leadership council, which had 30 members, from which Shams al-Din stood out.52 While Berri enjoyed the support of the majority of the Shi‘ite public, the young generation of Amal, and the Shi‘ite Mufti ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan, Shams al-Din based his power on his national position as head of the SSIC. His main supporters within Amal were some of the movement’s founders, who assisted Musa Sadr with the formation of Amal in the mid-1970s. Prominent among them were businessman Muhammad Hammud, Parliament member ‘Abd al-Latif al-Zein, and Hussein al-Husseini.53 Al-Husseini, whom Berri succeeded as head of Amal in April 1980, was Shams al-Din’s closest ally. The two visited Damascus in January 1984, offering their services to the Syrians, in return for support against Berri. In the summer of that year, Syria engaged its full influence in Lebanon, trying to have Hussein al-Husseini replace Kamil al-As‘ad as Parliament Speaker.54 From his national position as head of the SSIC, Shams al-Din tried to portray Berri as just another Lebanese militia leader, one of those responsible for

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Lebanon’s deterioration. The disputes between Berri and Shams al-Din took the form of serious accusations, following the outbreak of battles between Amal, on one side, and the joint forces of the PLO and leftist pro-Iraqi militias on the other, in April 1982. The SSIC blamed Berri for the unnecessary conflict. Following the severe disputes, rumors were spread that Berri had wanted to resign from Amal’s leadership, but went back on his word.55 At the beginning of 1983, the SSIC announced that Shams al-Din had ceased all contact with Amal leadership.56 He tried to put himself above the innercommunal arguments and by that to become a convenient interlocutor for other religious sects. While trying to present himself as the Shi‘ites’ political leader following his resignation from Amal, Shams al-Din associated himself with other Muslim leaders such as the Sunni Mufti Hassan Khaled, Druze Sheikh Halim Taqi al-Din, former Sunni prime ministers Salim al-Hoss and Sa’ib Salam, and others. Together, they signed an Islamic Position Paper (al-Mawqif al-Islami). The views expressed in the paper were not essentially different from those of Amal, expressing an unreserved commitment to Lebanon’s independence as a parliamentary democracy, aspiring to freedom, equal opportunities, and social justice, and against the idea of dividing Lebanon. The organizational changes Amal carried out during its fifth conference in April 1983 served two of Berri’s goals: first, extracting his opponents and establishing his role as the movement’s strongman; and second, minimizing the movement’s military weight in favor of increasing its political role. He achieved his first goal by stating that the movement’s chairman is “first among equals,” and by removing both his pro-Iranian rivals and the moderate ones. He tried achieving the second goal by reorganizing Amal’s institutions. This included the new 16-member political chamber, a 12-member executive committee, and a presidential council in which he personally appointed its members. ‘Akef Haydar, a Shi‘ite military ex-colonel from the Lebanese army, was elected as head of the new political chamber. He enjoyed popularity outside Shi‘ite community circles and began taking on the role of the movement’s number two man. Haydar’s appointment as Berri’s deputy was aimed at neutralizing Hassan Hashim, Berri’s main opponent following the reorganization, without endangering Berri’s own leadership. Hashim, who was born in Zaharani village in Jabal-‘Amil, was elected in the conference as head of a new executive committee, and enjoyed much support in the movement due to his activities in the South and his participation in the resistance operations against the Israeli invaders. The 12-member executive committee was also comprised of some technocrats, such as Zakariya Hamzah, Haytham Juma‘, and Ghassan Siblani. The new presidential council Berri appointed and headed was in charge of running the movement’s daily agenda. Among the participants in the council were Hassan Hashim, ‘Akef Haydar, Rbab Sadr (the Imam Musa Sadr’s sister), and Mufti Qabalan.57 Establishing the new Amal hierarchy enabled Berri to overcome his internal opponents.

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Occupying West Beirut In February 1984, Berri was faced with the opportunity to have a crucial influential position in Lebanese politics, by militarily dominating the city of Beirut. The struggle over Beirut at the beginning of the month was the outcome of Druze and Shi‘ite’s discontent with President Amin Jumayil’s policies. He neglected the Druze and the Shi‘ites, while cooperating with Sunni leaders of the “old order,” Shafiq al-Wazzan and Salim al-Hoss. For the Shi‘ites, who had supported Jumayil’s nomination for president, as well as the necessary changes in Lebanon, Amin Jumayil was a bitter disappointment. The feeling of bitterness increased especially after he sent the Lebanese army to arrest wanted suspects in the southwestern slums of Beirut, populated with tens of thousands of Shi‘ites. As of Israel’s withdrawal from the Beirut area in October 1982, the Lebanese army, loyal to the president, was deployed in wide areas of the city, alongside soldiers from the European Multinational Force. The results of the Geneva Reconciliation Conference required changes in the Multinational Force’s positions and their evacuation from western Beirut. The Amal militia tried to take advantage of this evacuation to improve positioning, hoping to take control over the airport in Khaldeh and the national television studios. Tension rose between Amal and the Lebanese army following the demolition of several homes in the Shi‘ite southern suburbs (al-Dhahiya al-Janubiyya) by the government for illegal construction. Amal’s spokesperson declared it was part of the government plan to drive the Shi‘ites back to Jabal-‘Amil.58 In late December 1983, Amal conducted battles with soldiers from the Lebanese army, attacking army positions. Syria apparently was somehow behind the antigovernment militia attacks, with the purpose of pressuring Jumayil to void the Lebanese–Israeli “May 17” agreement. The government decided to send in the army with the internal Security Force to the Shi‘ite neighborhoods. Heavy bombardments by the Lebanese army artillery on civilian targets, including schools and hospitals, caused Nabih Berri to openly confront President Amin Jumayil. The battles reached a peak on Saturday, February 4, when western Beirut witnessed an armored battle of Amal and the PSP militia against the Lebanese army, ending with hundreds of casualties. This day was later named “Black Saturday” (al-Sabat al-Aswad).59 Berri tipped the scales by going against his own long-time principles, and for the first time he called upon the soldiers of the Lebanese army to desert. “I do not call upon the Shi‘ites among you only nor the Muslims,” Berri said in a radio broadcast on February 4. “We fought our co-religionists, our brothers . . . and our family members . . . for the sake of preserving the existence of the Lebanese army. . . . Why then does the government want you to shoot your brothers? . . . They are not preparing you to liberate the South. They want you to be a tool in the hand of the hegemony. . . . We want you to be free men in the army of the people.”60 The commander of the Lebanese army’s Sixth Brigade, Lutfi Jaber, announced he and his soldiers

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had deserted the army and affiliated with Amal and hundreds of Christian soldiers had fled to eastern Beirut.61 The very same day, the Lebanese army commander of the Biqa‘ area announced he was also joining Amal troops.62 According to Berri, he managed to pull 14,400 soldiers from the Lebanese army to Amal and to Junblat’s Druze militia during the battle over Beirut.63 Amal troops seized the finance ministry, the national radio station, and the “Voice of Arab Lebanon” radio station (Sawt Lubnan al-‘Arabi). Later that month, the Shi‘ite–Druze occupation of the southern part of Beirut was completed, after the remains of the Lebanese army’s Fourth Brigade and LF fighters withdrew. Berri’s action could have resulted from the Druze success in bringing about the desertion of their soldiers in a similar act during their battles with the Lebanese army in early October 1983. For the Shi‘ites, the events that were later named “the February Uprising” (Intifadat Shbat), marked a historic change. From that point on, national politics were no longer run by the Sunni–Maronite alliance of 1943, which had overlooked the Shi‘ite community. Every solution to the state of war in Lebanon would require, from that point on, changing the status quo of pre– civil war politics, a change that would improve the Shi‘ites status. February 1984 symbolized more than pure political change. For the first time the Shi‘ites ruled the streets of western Beirut, the center of authority and trade in Lebanon. The Lebanese capital was dominated by the Shi‘ites, and as a result Berri, who received massive support in this area, enjoyed the rise in power. The foreign media crowned him as Lebanese new rising political star and saw him as a symbol of the changes brought about by the war.64 The new reality of February 1984, of strength and control, which was unfamiliar to the Shi‘ites of Lebanon, once again placed Berri and the Shi‘ites at a crossroads. On the surface, now that he was in a position of strength, he had to decide on his reaction to matters involving the solution to the Lebanese crisis and ending the civil war, while inwardly it remained to be seen how the Shi‘ite position of strength would affect the various factions that aspired to lead the Shi‘ite community.

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A Figh t for Su rv i va l : L e a di ng A m a l a n d t h e Sh i‘i t e s i n t h e Ju ngl e of t h e C i v i l Wa r

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he uprising of February 1984 (Intifadat Shbat) was the peak of Berri’s meteoric rise, turning him into a key figure in the Lebanese political system. In the years that followed, Berri faced difficult challenges, which decreased his power in that system as well as in the Shi‘ite community. Three major factors affected Berri’s actions during that period. One was the genuine fear among Lebanese elements of the growing Shi‘ite power after February 1984, resulting in the establishment of political alliances to restrain Berri and Amal. The second was the reinforcement of relations between Berri and Syria, along with the “quiet takeover” of Lebanon by the Syrians. Since the mid-1980s Berri has been the most prominent Lebanese ally of the Syrians, mainly because of his central position in the political and military arenas. The third factor was the weakening of the moderate wing in the Lebanese Shi‘a under Berri’s leadership, while the pro-Iranian radical wing, represented by Hizballah, gained strength. The struggle between the two wings, which turned violent in the late 1980s, forced Nabih Berri to take extreme stands regarding issues on the agenda in order to minimize the drift in public support. As far as Berri was concerned, the period after the February uprising was almost a continuous fight to maintain the Shi‘ite community’s leading political and military status. During this period he led Amal into clashes with every possible element in Lebanon. Therefore, the fight for survival was a comprehensive one, taking place in three arenas: (a) in the general Lebanese political arena, where Berri served as a minister in the government on the one hand, but was the main opposition to the same government on the other, operating his militia against every possible element, including the Lebanese army; (b) within the Shi‘ite community, where Berri had to run a double fight for survival: against Hizballah, in an ideological struggle over the direction of the Shi‘ites and over control of the populated Shi‘ite areas, and within Amal, in a personal struggle over leadership and political direction; and (c) his physical survival in the face of assassination attempts. The following pages will discuss these three arenas.

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The Lebanese Political and Military Arenas Two major motives characterized Nabih Berri’s path in the political and military arenas between the 1984 uprising and the parliamentary elections of 1992. One motive was his “double game” as a cabinet minister on the one hand, and as the main opposition to President Amin Jumayil, together with the Druze leader, Walid Junblat, on the other. Berri’s oppositional activity within the Lebanese cabinet included “negative” and “positive” actions. The negative ones included harsh criticism against President Jumayil and a long boycott of cabinet meetings. The positive ones included a series of political initiatives, irrespective of the government, such as establishing of the National Unity Front and signing of the Tripartite Agreement. Berri agreed to the election of Jumayil for the presidency, although he did not declare so publicly. His agreement was received under heavy pressure from the United States.1 Jumayil’s policy, which ignored the Shi‘ites’ demands and needs, slowly changed Berri’s attitude toward him. In the National Reconciliation Convention, gathered in Geneva in October 1983, the two politicians still negotiated in spite of the tension that already characterized their relationship. In late August 1983, Jumayil ordered the Lebanese army to enter the Shi‘ite neighborhoods in southwest Beirut in order to search for wanted offenders and to destroy illegal buildings. The operation deteriorated to the point of using weapons against civilian targets. For Berri, this was the last straw. It was one of the main catalysts for the Shi‘ite uprising of February 1984, in which Berri and Junblat took control of western Beirut. From that point on, Berri was Amin Jumayil’s main opponent in the Lebanese political arena. The second motive, which characterized Berri’s fight for survival in the years 1984–1992, was the use of Amal’s militia against most of the militias in Lebanon. His main adversaries in the military field during the mid-1980s were the Palestinians, whom he fought for three years around the refugee camps in Beirut and Jabal-‘Amil, in the “War of the Camps” (Harb al-Mukhimat). Toward the end of that decade Berri’s military activity focused on the “Brothers–Enemies War” (Harb al-Ukhwa–al-A‘daa’) against his rival Shi‘ite movement, Hizballah. In addition to the Palestinians and Hizballah, his militia also alternately clashed with the Israeli army (IDF), with Western military forces in Lebanon, and with most leftist movements, including the PSP, headed by Berri’s main political ally, Walid Junblat. The National Dialogue in Lausanne When the second National Reconciliation Convention assembled in Lausanne between March 12 and 20, 1984, relations between Berri and Jumayil were worse than they had been during the Geneva Convention. Due to the personal tension, their meeting on the opening evening became a subject of humor. Elie Salem, who served as a deputy prime minister and a minister for foreign affairs in the mid-1980s, and was familiar with the high echelons of

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political power, wrote in his memoirs that Berri later told him that Jumayil had embraced him so strongly that he had rushed to the mirror to check that he was not a woman.2 According to the newspapers, Berri joked with Walid Junblat after seeing Jumayil kissing Junblat’s mother during the reception in Lausanne, saying “she was infected,” but seconds later, when Berri found himself cheek to cheek with the president, Junblat said, “Be careful, the Shi‘ite extremists might reject you now.” Berri said in response to Jumayil, “You won’t set me up, ‘Arafat [the Palestinian leader] kissed the Lebanese hundreds of kisses for eight years and it didn’t help him.”3 A good sense of humor continued to characterize Berri down the road as well. During the discussions, Berri emphatically demanded the resignation of President Jumayil because of his responsibility for the battles in western Beirut in February and for the fighting that broke out between the Lebanese army and the Druze militia in the Shuf area on the eve of the convention. It was reported that Berri left the room after shouting at Jumayil, demanding his resignation.4 The list of propositions Berri presented in Lausanne included 12 sections, which reflected his ongoing demands. The main one was to abolish political confessionalism (section 5). Other demands included supporting the resistance against Israel in the South (section 1), and a united Lebanon with an Arab character (section 10). The other points dealt with specific issues concerning the situation in Lebanon during the convention. Among them were demands for the resignation of the president and proposals for a new constitutional mechanism providing for the election of the three top political positions—the president, premier and speaker (sections 3, 7, 8, 9); cancellation of political appointments by President Jumayil (section 4); prosecution of those responsible for the battles in western Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and in the Harub area (section 2); the establishment of a committee that would be in charge of security until the formation of a permanent security policy (section 11); and the establishment of a national unity government after the implementation of the entire plan (section 12).5 The results of the Lausanne convention were disappointing to all participants. The final statement made clear that the only achievements were the attainment of a ceasefire and a general agreement on the need for a national unity government, further meetings, and the establishment of a committee, by the president, that would draw up a new constitution in six months.6 It was a great disappointment for Berri, as he could not present the Shi‘ites with any meaningful achievement, particularly the abolishment of political confessionalism, which he considered main cause in Lausanne.7 Joining the Lebanese Government The failure of the dialogue in Lausanne brought up an urgent need for establishing a national unity cabinet, which was formed in April 1984. Berri’s joining the cabinet in early May began a long period of his inclusion in several Lebanese governments, almost continuously until the parliamentary elections of 1992. Berri served variously as minister of the South, water

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resources, electricity, and justice in the governments of Rashid Karami (May 1984 to May 1987) and Salim al-Hoss (May 1987 to November 1989). He served as the minister for water resources, construction and housing in the government of Salim al-Hoss (November 1989 to December 1990), and as a minister of state without a specific portfolio in the government of Rashid al-Solh, who served for only five months (May to October 1992). The last stages in the intensive negotiations to establish a national unity government in Lebanon in April 1984 focused on efforts to find a formula that would enable Nabih Berri to join the cabinet. He resisted becoming part of the government, since he could not see any hope for cooperation with the other elements in the cabinet, particularly after being in the political minority at the Lausanne convention. From Berri’s point of view, membership in the cabinet was not only a condition that reflected his own as well as Amal’s importance, but was also a major step in the struggle for leadership within the Shi‘ite community. As a minister, whether he wanted it or not, Berri was identified as a part of the Lebanese establishment. Perhaps one of his considerations for eventually joining the cabinet was the massive Iranian financial support for Hizballah, his main Shi‘ite rival. With that support, Hizballah was able to establish social and educational institutions in Jabal-‘Amil, which attracted Shi‘ite supporters at the expense of Amal. At that time Amal did not enjoy any outside financial support and had some difficulties with cash flow. For this reason Berri insisted on creating a new portfolio, the ministry of the South, in addition to his position as minister of justice. As the new minister, Berri could use governmental money to carry out his own agenda in the South and to partly overcome Amal’s financial difficulties. Under the new ministry, Berri controlled the Council of the South (Majlis al-Janub), which was the economic governmental instrument for developing the region. As would became clear during the next years, Berri saw his entrance into the government as an instrument with which to execute his own political agenda and to influence the high political ranks from the inside. His associate, ‘Akef Haydar, who served at the time as head of Amal’s political bureau, expressed well the condition of Amal following Berri’s entrance into the government by claiming that, “We are not and will not be a part of the regime; our participation in the government does not mean that we have moved from the role of the opposition to a position of support. It is about time that the mentality of the regime changes.”8 Inside the government, the Druze leader Walid Junblat was Berri’s main ally for oppositional activities. The two gained the support of Syria on almost every obstacle with which they confronted President Jumayil. For Syria, they served as a tool to humiliate Jumayil, and as a stable platform on which to base its policy in Lebanon. The Syrian resistance to Jumayil resulted from his “independent” policy, in Syrian eyes, mainly due to the signing of the “May 17” (1983) agreement with Israel. The conflict that had Berri and Junblat on the one side and Jumayil on the other came to the surface in every issue that was put on the agenda. The main points of disagreement were: (a) The “May 17” agreement with Israel; (b) the carrying out of a security plan in Beirut, which forced Berri

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and Junblat to disarm before the Lebanese army entered the city, while they had insisted on the opposite approach; (c) the use of the Lebanese army by the president, and turning the army, according to Berri, into a Maronite army and not a national one; (d) the role of Syria in Lebanon; (e) the abolishment of political confessionalism; and (f) electing a new president of Lebanon. Contrary to his bad relations with the president, Berri had a good relationship with Prime Minister Rashid Karami, who was a counterweight to the president. Karami was a senior politician and a son of the Karami family of Tripoli, one of the dominant Sunni families in Lebanese politics since the state’s founding in 1920. After the formation of Lebanon by the French as an entity under Maronite hegemony, the Karamis led the Arab and Muslim resistance against the separation of Lebanese territories from Syria. During the 1930s members of the family entered Lebanese political life, and following the National Covenant of 1943 that set the communal balance for top political positions, some of them served in the highest Sunni rank as prime ministers. Rashid Karami himself served as prime minister several times in the 1960s. His political positions represented the historical line of his family in modern terms, meaning he was a Lebanese and Arab nationalist who blindly supported the Syrian role in Lebanon, very much like Berri. The common beliefs Karami and Berri held brought them closer in their government roles. Both were loyal allies of Syria in Lebanon and held similar opinions on national issues such as the struggle against Israel and the presence of foreign forces, the unity of Lebanon, and its Arab identity.9 In September 1984, Berri was invited to join Karami at the UN headquarters in New York, to present the Lebanese government’s plan for the evacuation of the Israeli army from Lebanon, according to UN resolution 425. The common journey intensified the affinity between the two.10 Later, as well, despite the fact that Berri boycotted cabinet meetings for a long time, they were regarded as political allies. Rashid Karami was assassinated in early June 1987.11 The National Unity Front As previously indicated, Berri’s oppositional activity included promoting his own independent political initiatives, differing from the President’s stance and outside the governmental framework. One of the main political initiatives in which Nabih Berri was involved was the establishment of the National Unity Front (Jabhat al-Itihad al-Wattani). The front, founded in August 1985, was supposed to lead a political alternative to President Jumayil’s reforms program. It was a common initiative of Nabih Berri and Walid Junblat, and also included other leftist movements, such as the Lebanese Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Ba‘ath Party, the SSNP, as well as independent legislators.12 In the opening session of the Front on August 6, 1985, in the town of Shtaura in the Lebanese Biqa‘, a nine-point comprehensive political program was approved. The program expressed Berri’s routine demands:

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1. The liberation of Lebanon from the Israeli occupation by supporting the National Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya) and promoting the implementation of UN resolution 425 that called for a complete withdrawal without preconditions; 2. The unity of Lebanon according to a national plan, without any religious, communal or cultural divisions, based on liberation, democracy, return of emigrants, and the liberation of all abductees; 3. The Arabization of Lebanon, as was portrayed by the struggle for liberation against the Zionist enemy. In this realm, Lebanon would maintain special relations with Syria and a special support for the struggle of the Palestinian people. The relations with the Palestinians would be based on the Damascus Pact of June 17, 1985. 4. Democratic reforms which would bring about the comprehensive cancellation of the confessional regime, according to the principles of equal rights and duties for all citizens, separation of powers (executive, legislative, judicial), and new electoral and citizenship laws. 5. The military policy and the status of the Lebanese army would be based on national and pan-Arab principles, and would be coordinated with that of the Syrian army. 6. A comprehensive and coordinated economic reform program, which would give preference to agriculture, industry, and delivery of goods to provincial areas which had suffered deprivation for years. The reform was intended to secure the rights of workers and to set the framework of economic relations with other Arab states. 7. A social reform, based on comprehensive educational reform, which would include the regularization of all levels of educational institutions and free formal education for all Lebanese citizens. 8. A solution to the issue of Lebanese immigrants, maintaining the civil rights and privileges of all immigrants since 1975. 9. The formation of a constitutional committee that would carry out the above comprehensive plan.13 In practice, the National Unity Front did not succeed in creating the momentum for the implementation of this plan, especially because of its leftist and pro-Syrian alignment. This prevented other movements in Lebanon from joining the Front, in particular the Maronite ones. The Front existed as a consolidated body for few months, until it was dispersed as a result of its ineffectiveness. Retrospectively, the importance of the National Unity Front was evident in three areas: (a) the prominence of Nabih Berri and Walid Junblat, as the central opponents to the Lebanese administration, in trying to create a momentum that would lead to results outside their own government’s framework; (b) the approach to the Lebanese leftist parties, especially Amal and the PSP, which were confronting one another during the period that had preceded the establishment of the Front; (c) deepening the quiet Syrian takeover of Lebanon, as a result of the unity and coordination between all

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the pro-Syrian elements in the country, including Prime Minister Karami and former Maronite President Suleiman Franjiyeh. The Tripartite Agreement Following the failure of the National Unity Front, the Syrians understood that a solution could not be based only on political parties, but needed to include the leaders of the strong militias in Lebanon. There were Nabih Berri, Amal’s leader; Walid Junblat, head of the PSP’ militia; and Elie Hobeika, commander of the Phalange’s Lebanese Forces (LF). This new Syrian attitude reflected the understanding that the failure of the previous agreements in Lebanon resulted from Syria’s support of politicians who had had no effect over the fighters in the streets. ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the Syrian vice president who was responsible for the Lebanese issue, said in private that he would recommend that President al-Assad base any solution on those who represented the “new Lebanon.”14 This Syrian policy resulted in the signing of the Tripartite Agreement. The agreement was signed on December 28, 1985, following three months of intense Syrian efforts. The Syrian optimism concerning the chances of the agreement to succeed resulted from the fact that for the first time they had brought three persons who controlled the militiamen in Lebanon to a consensus. The agreement’s articles were phrased in a way that almost fully implemented Berri’s consistent demands.15 The signatures on the agreement were like “a slap in the face” to President Jumayil and Prime Minister Karami, since they did not take part in the formulation of the agreement, despite their positions as heads of state. The agreement strengthened Syria’s support of Berri and Junblat, who, from their point of view, considered President Jumayil a sectarian leader and not a unifying factor. Amal saw the agreement as a historical achievement. For the Shi‘ites it provided an answer to six important principles: (a) commitment to the independence and freedom of Lebanon ; (b) commitment to the unity of Lebanon and its democratic character; (c) commitment to the liberation from the Israeli occupation; (d) strengthening of the national spirit instead of the previous communal formula; (e) restoring the Lebanese army to its position as a body that fights for national ideals; (f) commitment to special relations and coordination of security issues between Lebanon and Syria.16 The agreement, however, never came into effect, since two weeks after the signature, on January 15, 1986, Hobeika was ousted as head of the LF by Samir Geagea, the intelligence chief of that militia. It was an action possibly organized by President Amin Jumayil, who felt he was an outsider to the main political developments in his country and feared losing influence in the LF, his family’s militia. Following the failure of the Tripartite Agreement, Syria tried to unite its supporters in Lebanon in other ways. During July 1987, an attempt to unify these supporters by creating “The Unity and Liberation Front” (Jabhat al-Itihad wal-Tahrir) failed, mainly due to Berri’s accusations of the other members in the Front of supporting the PLO.17

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As mentioned, Berri’s oppositional activity included a long boycott of the government meetings. Together with his ally Walid Junblat, Berri was absent from most meetings between 1985 and 1987. During that time, between November 1986 and March 1987, he moved to Damascus in fear of being assassinated. Berri, a minister and a government opponent at the same time, tried to have the best of both worlds. His “double game” in Lebanese politics during the late 1980s was reflected in his adoption of equivocal stands regarding two episodes that were in the focus of the Lebanese agenda, the Michel ‘Aoun issue and the Ta’if Accord. The Michel ‘Aoun Episode When President Amin Jumayil’s incumbency terminated, and the Lebanese rival factions were not able to agree on a new president, political chaos erupted. Syria’s attempt to force the election of one of its candidates for the Lebanese presidency, Suleiman Franjiyeh or Mikhayil Dahir, was harshly resisted by most of the Maronite camp, in particular the Chamoun and Jumayil families. In his last minutes in office on September 22, 1988, Jumayil passed the reins over to the Lebanese army commander, Maronite General (‘Imad) Michel ‘Aoun, nominating him prime minister of an emergency military government. His intention was that the military government would replace the civilian one of Premier Salim al-Hoss, which had served since May 1987 and was in a state of a caretaker government, because of the latter’s resignation.18 This was possible according to the Lebanese constitution; otherwise only a Sunni Muslim could have served in this office. While the Muslim camp in Lebanon refused to recognize ‘Aoun’s military government and supported Hoss’s civilian one, most Christians chose to obey ‘Aoun’s rule. The Syrian attempt to force a candidate for president in Lebanon was, in the eyes of ‘Aoun, crossing a red line. Seeing himself as a Lebanese patriot, he assertively opposed the Syrian takeover of his country and therefore adopted, from the presidential palace in Ba‘abda where he set up his premiership headquarters, an anti-Syrian policy. ‘Aoun hoped to exploit the anti-Syrian sentiments as a political force that would carry him to the office of president. His base of support was mainly the Maronite community, which tended to oppose Syrian dominance in Lebanon. One of his prominent supporters was Dany Chamoun, the leader of the second largest Maronite group, yet he enjoyed some support from all sects and communities, including the Shi‘ites. General ‘Aoun used slogans such as “Lebanon for the Lebanese,” and his supporters declared their willingness to fight to their last drop of blood. The two governments of ‘Aoun and al-Hoss served simultaneously between September 1988 and October 1990. This situation created great confusion among the citizens and revived massive fighting in Beirut. For a long time, as a result of ‘Aoun’s popularity and fear of the international community, particularly the United States, Syria did not launch its army

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against him, in spite of the fact that Lebanon had hit political rock bottom and was in the middle of an economic crisis, which burdened the Syrian economy. It was General ‘Aoun who declared “war of independence” on the Syrian troops in Lebanon in March 1989, which was lasted for months of bloodshed. However, following new local and international circumstances in 1990 and 1991, Syria interfered to forcibly remove ‘Aoun. The Gulf crisis, which began in August 1990 with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, gave Damascus an unwritten authorization to forcibly remove ‘Aoun, since the United States wanted Syria to join the international coalition against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. On October 13, 1990, the Syrian army besieged the Ba‘abda Palace in Beirut, slaughtering ‘Aoun’s followers, while the general himself found political asylum in the French embassy. For the opponents of the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, ‘Aoun became a symbol of Lebanese patriotism and was regarded for years as “the last real Lebanese.”19 Paradoxically, 15 years later, when the Syrian army left Lebanon, ‘Aoun became a political ally of the Syrian supporters in their dispute against the anti-Syrian coalition. March 14, 1989, the day ‘Aoun declared war on Syria, became a symbolic date for the anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon. That symbol was adopted in 2005 by the anti-Syrian alliance as its name (March 14), although ‘Aoun affiliated himself with the rival camp one year later. Prima facie, Nabih Berri and Michel ‘Aoun shared some ideological views in the late 1980s. Both were Lebanese patriots who based their political principles on unity, independence, and social justice for Lebanon. However, two things prevented Berri from openly supporting ‘Aoun’s struggle. One was the different approach regarding the role of Syria in Lebanon, and the other was Berri’s insistence that any end to the civil war must be based on the principle of legitimate reign. While General ‘Aoun saw the Syrian involvement as a disaster for Lebanon, Berri considered the Syrians the key for any solution to the long civil war. One has to remember that the two came from different backgrounds, although ‘Aoun had grown up in a mixed Maronite–Shi‘ite neighborhood, Haret Hreyk, in the poor southern suburbs of Beirut. ‘Aoun is a Christian-Maronite, belonging to a community that had traditionally opposed Syrian demands for a Syrian–Lebanese unification and partially opposed the Arab nature of Lebanon. Berri, on the other hand, was in his youth a member of the pro-Syrian branch of the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, and after 1983 became Syria’s main ally in Lebanon. Supporting Syria was not only a matter of principle for Berri. Besides the fact that Amal depended on Syria’s significant military support, Berri had encountered personal struggles within Amal and needed all the support he could get. But supporting Syria was not obvious for Berri in this matter, because of the strong support ‘Aoun enjoyed among the Shi‘ite community. According to an open-ended survey conducted in the mid-1990s, most Shi‘ites preferred ‘Aoun, even over Berri, as the Lebanese leader.20 Nevertheless, Berri supported the Syrian efforts to subdue ‘Aoun in the late 1980s and early 1990s.21 Berri’s belief that it was essential to legalize the political system for the future of Lebanon was presented with some hypocrisy. When Berri thought

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that President Jumayil had performed illegal actions in early 1984, he acted against the official Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese army, calling upon Shi‘ite soldiers to desert and join Amal. Likewise, General ‘Aoun considered the election of a Syrian candidate for the Lebanese presidency an illegal act. In spite of the controversies, Berri apparently held secret relations with the general and at some stage supported ‘Aoun’s candidacy for president.22 However, Berri’s attitude toward Michel ‘Aoun, previously unfavorable, became “practical” when the two became part of the same political alliance (March 8) many years later, after the parliamentary elections of 2005. When ‘Aoun was still in exile in France in 2003, fearing the Syrians who controlled Lebanon at that time, Berri expressed a negative attitude toward him to the Lebanese journalist Nabil Haytam. Haytam later collected and published his conversations with Berri, in which Berri describes in detail his resistance to President Amil Jumayil’s desire to appoint ‘Aoun as commander in chief of the Lebanese army in June 1984, and even rejected an offer from Jumayil to nominate in exchange a Shi‘ite as director of Lebanese General Security.23 On the other hand, the Beirut weekly Nida’ al-Wattan reported in 1994 that when Berri paid a visit to Paris he met with ‘Aoun.24 The first major rift between the two occurred over Berri’s failure to unequivocally support ‘Aoun for the presidency in 2007. Later the pre-election listing process for the 2009 parliamentary elections caused controversy between the two, who were members in the same political alliance, as Berri has been adamant that he will not accept any decrease in the size of his bloc, and ‘Aoun has been trying to snatch up seats wherever he can. The controversy was focused on the electoral list in Jezzine, where Berri had three loyal seats and resented what he perceived to be an infringement upon his turf when ‘Aoun tried to get the district’s three Christian candidates to join his “Free Patriotic” bloc. While ‘Aoun and his supporters view the predominantly Christian Jezzine as a district that should be in the control of the dominant Christian bloc, Berri views it as part of the South and thus his turf. Berri attempted to reconcile with ‘Aoun in Jezzine by getting a guarantee from ‘Aoun that if the Free Patriotic Movement emerges as the dominant bloc in Parliament he will support Berri’s candidacy as speaker.25 Strife continued during the municipal elections of 2010. A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that ‘Aoun was awaiting the municipal election battle in Jezzine to offer that the Hizballah chief, Hassan Nasrallah, either abandon his alliance with Berri or consider their memorandum of understanding of February 6, 2006 as canceled.26 The issue did not actually come up, but certainly reflected the strained relations between Berri and ‘Aoun. Ta’if Accord The Ta’if Accord of October 22, 1989, was the basis for ending the civil war and for the restoration of Lebanon. In spite of his high position and military importance as leader of Amal, Berri did not participate in the convention nor in the discussions that led to the Accord since it was decided that the

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representatives of the religious sects in Ta’if would be those Lebanese members of Parliament who survived 14 years of civil war and were actually elected in 1972. His ally Walid Junblat also remained outside the Tai’f conference for the same reason. Therefore, as the conference began, the two, along with other politicians such as Marwan Hamada and Akram Shuwabe, set up an operations room at Berri’s home in Barbir. They passed their decisions to two of the legislators who represented them in Ta’if, Zuhir al-Khatib, who represented Berri and Tawfiq ‘Asaf, who represented Junblat. During the convention, Berri delivered a memorandum with six demands: (a) the abolishment of sectarian politics in stages; (b) a confirmation of Lebanon’s Arabism; (c) political and social justice for all Lebanese and Lebanon’s regions; (d) a complete separation of powers; (e) adoption of a standard of efficiency rather than sectarianism; (f) a confirmation of the principle of “no winner, no loser” in Lebanon.27 Berri did not hesitate to pressure Shi‘ite delegates who went to Ta’if, although his efforts failed. According to indications in the New York Times, Amal militia men, operating under Berri’s orders, prevented Anwar Sabbah, a Shi‘ite legislator who took part in the Ta’if negotiations, from returning to his hometown.28 The Ta’if convention strengthened Parliament speaker Hussein al-Husseini’s position in the Lebanese general political system, since as speaker he was the driving force behind the convention. However, the Accord did not strengthen his position within the Shi‘ite community, since it had not gained any significant achievement in Ta’if. After three weeks of discussions the Lebanese legislators agreed upon a political formula to end the long civil war and start new era. The main accomplishment of the Accord was in the area of political reforms. It set a new distribution of political power between the religious sects, instead of the previous one that was set in the National Covenant of 1943. The new agreement shifted some of the political power of the Christians to Muslims, by comparing the number of Muslim MPs to Christian ones, and shifting some powers from the Christian Maronite president to the Sunni Muslim prime minister, and increasing the powers of the Shi‘ite Muslim Parliament speaker. The Ta’if Accord included six major points: (a) Lebanon’s Arab identity, as well as its sovereignty and independence; (b) political reforms, including the gradual abolishing of political confessionalism; (c) de-centralization of administration, justice, economics, education, and other fields; (d) enforcing the Lebanese sovereignty over the entire Lebanese territory, by strengthening the security forces and disarming all militias within six months; (e) the liberation of Lebanon from the Israeli occupation according to UN resolution 425, and supporting the 1949 armistice line as the international border; and (f) emphasizing the special relations between Syria and Lebanon, particularly regarding security issues.29 Berri’s approach with regard to the Accord reflected pragmatism through a gradual change, from absolute resistance to absolute acceptance. At the beginning he named the Accord a “scandal” since it perpetuated political confessionalism.30In a statement which was given in Tehran, where he

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arrived to turn over a new leaf with the Islamic state a few months after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Berri emphasized his resistance to the Accord because of its continuation of discrimination against the Lebanese Muslims. Later he expressed support for the Accord, and at the same time claimed it would strengthen political confessionalism, and promised to continue his struggle to abolish this tradition.31 When it became clear that the Accord would be the political formula for the coming years, Berri gradually became one of its leading advocates. He stated that the Accord should be accepted as the framework for Lebanon’s unity and its Arab identity. Although with some displeasure, he agreed it should be the basis for supporting the reign.32 “I said bluntly that we have two choices, either to except it at face value, or to resort to an overturning of the table,” Berri explained a few years ago, “therefore I chose to adopt the first option.” His acceptance of the Accord was easier after Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din said that day that the Accord was essential. Berri explained that the Ta’if Accord was like a frame that the Lebanese people would fill with content. This frame already maintained the unity of Lebanon, its Arabism, the solidarity of the Lebanese people, the implementation of resolution 425 (which called for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon), and the resistance of the Lebanese people.33 One year later Berri declared that the Accord could not be partitioned, because a failure in implementing one article might only bring about the collapse of the entire Accord.34 Fighting the Palestinians Another expression of Berri’s oppositional role, in addition to the political one, was in the military arena. As the leader of Amal, Berri activated the movement’s militia against various militias in Lebanon, according to his political needs. This affected his political position and popularity within the Shi‘ite community and outside, as reflected in the Tripartite Agreement. During the 1980s Amal was involved in fighting against Palestinians, Druze, other leftist militias, and even Shi‘ites. For three years, beginning in 1985, the Palestinian wing that supported Yasser ‘Arafat, the PLO leader, became the major opponent of Nabih Berri and Amal in the military arena. Armed Palestinians, who left Lebanon in September 1982 because of the deal between Israel and the international community, slowly returned to their refugee camps in Beirut and Sidon in late 1984 and were organized as a military force.35 This threatened Amal’s control in western Beirut and its intention to take control of the southern territory the Israeli army was about to evacuate in 1985. The existence of a Palestinian militia in Beirut and in the South also contradicted Syrian interests, which were largely based on Amal’s military control there. The clashes between Amal and the Palestinians began on May 19, 1985, soon developing into a long war, known as “the War of the Camps” (Harb al-Mukhimat). Amal militiamen attacked, with the help of the Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army, the four Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. This

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brigade had already cooperated with Berri, who was involved, apparently, in the appointment of its commander, after Amal’s occupation of western Beirut in February 1984.36 The Palestinians were assisted by all the leftist organizations, including the Druze militia and other organizations who had previously opposed ‘Arafat and were Berri’s allies. The brutal battles took a heavy toll of about 500 dead and 2000 wounded.37Amal won the war with a clear military victory and took control over the Sabra refugee camp on June 2. Nabih Berri sought to prevent the reinstatement of Palestinian militias in Lebanon at any cost. He accused Yasser ‘Arafat of conspiracy to obstruct the Syrian plan for reunification of Lebanon. Berri may have acted on behalf of Syria, which supported the opponents of ‘Arafat, who were in the Syriancontrolled Palestinian National Salvation Front at that time.38 However, under Syrian pressure, Amal agreed to a ceasefire, called the “Damascus Agreement,” with one faction of the Palestinians, the National Salvation Front (Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Wattani) on June 17. This fragile agreement was based on a dozen points, including a halt to the fighting within the refugee camps, the release of war prisoners, the removal of heavy weapons, and the start of an implementation of a security plan in Beirut. The implementation of all points took place under Syrian patronage, while intensifying the relations of both sides with Syria.39 The agreement, however, was not maintained as most of the Palestinian fighters in the refugee camps were ‘Arafat supporters who did not obey the pro-Syrian “Salvation Front.” One week earlier, on June 11, a Royal Jordanian Airline plane was hijacked by Shi‘ite terrorists. One of the hijackers later stated that Nabih Berri had ordered the hijacking in order to press the Arab League meeting, which was convened the same week in Tunisia, to solve the Palestinian issue in Lebanon.40 In September 1985 the battles around the refugee camps resumed. Following another outbreak of clashes in March and May 1986, in which the PLO succeeded in taking over key posts in Beirut, a new agreement was reached in Damascus, the “Second Damascus Agreement.” It was based on the deployment of the mainly Shi‘ite Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army around the camps.41 In October 1986 the battles resumed once again, and the PLO succeeded in defeating Amal units in the refugee camps of MiyehMiyeh and ‘Ayn al-Hilwa near Sidon. This time Iran negotiated between the two sides until a ceasefire was reached on December 10.42 In early 1987 battles broke out again and the Palestinians occupied positions in the village of Maghdushah which controls the Lebanese coastal highway near Sidon and the roads to the refugee camps Miyeh-Miyeh and ‘Ayn al-Hilwa. In response, Berri laid a long siege on Palestinian camps in Beirut, Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajne, announcing he would hold the siege until the Maghdusha posts were returned to Amal. After his demands were fulfilled Berri set a new condition, a complete withdrawal of the Palestinians back to the refugee camps. The War of the Camps finally ended with the initiative of Nabih Berri. On January 17, 1988, he lifted the siege of the camps in Jabal-‘Amil unilaterally.

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According to Berri this step was a token of sympathy to the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) that had started in the West Bank and Gaza strip in December 1987.43It was a good opportunity for Berri to bring an end to this conflict, presenting himself as loyal to Arab nationalism and to the Palestinian cause, as he attested many times before and after the War of the Camps. There was, however, another reason for Berri to sign an agreement with the PLO in Jabal-‘Amil in January 1988. He obtained peace in the Palestinian arena just before Amal’s attack on Hizballah’s positions in al-Tufah area, east of Sidon. According to the agreement, Amal lifted the long siege of the Rashidiyeh refugee camp near Tyre and reopened the roads in the southern coastal area. Amal and the PLO began a mutual withdrawal from positions southeast of Sidon and agreed on the reconstruction of the refugee camps, which had suffered massive damage. Also agreed upon was the formation of a joint operations room for Amal and the PLO to coordinate actions against Israeli troops in Lebanon. In Berri’s view, this would enable Amal to prevent the PLO from operating behind the Lebanese–Israeli international borderline, and the Israelis from responding aggressively against the Shi‘ite population in the South.44 The War of the Camps created three political problems for Berri: (a) for the first time he was fighting against some of his long-time allies from the leftist camp in Lebanon, particularly Walid Junblat; (b) the large number of casualties harmed the determination and motivation of the Shi‘ites to fight, and raised strong accusations against Berri for his personal responsibility for an unnecessary war. (The impact of these accusations within Amal and the Shi‘ite community will be discussed later in this chapter.); (c) the war and the wide coalition of organizations that fought against Amal increased Berri’s dependency on Syria. Fights with the Druze Although Berri’s main ally in the Lebanese political arena during the 1980s was the Druze leader Walid Junblat, conflict between the two led to clashes of their militias. In the complicated Lebanese setting of the 1980s they could cooperate on political matters and at the same time have their soldiers fight each other. The Shi‘ite and Druze communities differed in many aspects. In spite of the fact that the Shi‘ite population was much larger than the Druze, the latter had traditionally played a much more important role than the Shi‘ites in the Lebanese political system. Kamal Junblat, Walid’s father, was very dominant in the political system and was regarded as the charismatic leader of the Lebanese political left. Another difference was geographic. The Shi‘ite population was divided among three geopolitical areas: the South, Beirut’s suburbs, and the Biqa‘. The Druze, on the other hand, were concentrated in one main geographical area, the Shuf in Mount Lebanon, an area that strategically overlooks the coastline between Beirut and the South and serves as a main passage from both Beirut and the South to the Lebanese Biqa‘.

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Further tension between the communities derived from the relationship between the Lebanese left and Amal. The first, previously headed by the Druze and supported by the Palestinians in Lebanon and many Shi‘ites, was a rival force to Amal. These relationships prevented Berri from officially joining the Lebanese left (the National Front) in the early 1980s. Following the joint victory of the Shi‘ites and the Druze in Beirut in February 1984, a new dividing element emerged: the question of who should control the streets of Beirut. The issue was complicated, among other reasons because of the existence of a small Druze population on the western slopes of the Shuf, in proximity to the southeast neighborhoods of the city, which were targeted from time to time by Amal. The above factors were brought to the surface in early July 1985 following the Druze support of ‘Arafat’s fighters against Amal.45 Berri accused the Druze of giving the Palestinians permission to fire artillery on Amal posts from positions under their control in the Shuf. The clashes between Amal and Junblat’s PSP ended with the formation of the National Unity Front in early August 1985. During September and October clashes resumed, apparently as a result of local commanders’ initiative, causing the injury of dozens.46 The battles divided western Beirut de facto into three areas: one under absolute Shi‘ite control; one under Druze absolute control; and one divided between the two militias.47 In February 1986 friction between Berri and Junblat was renewed after the latter and Syria accused Berri of having contacts with President Jumayil.48 The accusations were raised due to Berri’s support of Jumayil’s new “progressive plan” to solve the Lebanese crisis. This plan endangered the chance to implement the Tripartite Agreement, which had been signed by Berri, Junblat, and Hobeika, and sponsored by Syria. The friction continued and battles erupted once again in April 1986 in the southern Beirut neighborhood of Khalde. In early June, an Amal militiaman fired a missile at Junblat’s house. The Druze leader said sarcastically in reaction that Amal militiamen didn’t need to use force in order to get into his house because he had given a copy of the key to Nabih Berri.49 However, at the same time, Junblat threatened that any attempt by the Shi‘ites to insert militiamen into the Shuf Mountains would cause a bloodbath. Berri reacted by accusing him of cooperation with Hizballah against Amal.50 Berri, when referring to the question of his relationship with Junblat during those days, said they used to sit together in one car on their way to joint meetings, and listen to radio reports about their disagreements.51 In early 1987, Berri ordered his militia to attack Druze and other pro-PLO militias entrenched in West Beirut. Within five days, the headquarters of Amal in the Murr Tower were overrun, the PSP captured the Hamra district, and two detachments of Amal militiamen were cut off and surrounded. On February 22, 1987, Syrian forces entered West Beirut to prevent Amal’s complete defeat.52 The next conflict between the two broke out in February 1988 in the aftermath of the Libyan declaration of its intention to open an embassy in Ba‘aqlin, in the Druze area of the Shuf. This conflict reflected an additional

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tension between the two movements. The Druze held close contact with Mu‘ammar Qadhafi’s regime, who was their main financial supporter and weapons provider. Amal, on the other hand, had an “open account” with Libya, since Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the movement, had disappeared on Libyan soil. Nabih Berri had long accused the Libyan government of having responsibility for Sadr’s disappearance and objected to Qadhafi’s regime.53 In addition, the opening of the Libyan embassy in Ba‘aqlin symbolized a Libyan recognition of the Druze canton. Berri had long fought from inside the government against the idea of cantoning Lebanon, an idea that was put on the table several times since the civil war had broken out. The Shi‘ites, who were geographically scattered in three areas, objected to the idea. On the opening day a rally was held in which most speakers supported the program of civil administration for the Druze. The issue was further expressed in a propaganda struggle between the PSP and Amal.54 In April 1988 two new tensions emerged: Conflict erupted in the PSP between Junblat and his Shi‘ite deputy Muhsin Dallul. The latter felt deprived, like other non-Druze party members, and began establishing a new party, parallel to that of Junblat.55 The second problem was Berri’s assertive demand that Junblat call off the candidacy of his associate, Antoine Shaqir, for the Lebanese presidency. As a result of the tensions Berri and Junblat broke off contact for a while and even set preconditions for a future meeting.56 Fighting Other Leftist Organizations During the civil war, under Berri’s leadership, Amal collided with other leftist movements, in addition to the PSP and the Palestinians. In April 1985, Amal and the PSP joined hands in fighting against the Sunni Nasserite movement in Beirut, al-Murabitun. Berri hoped that in so doing he would wipe out the only opponent militia in western Beirut. After several weeks of fighting al-Murabitun was defeated.57 During 1986, reciprocal accusations of Amal and the LCP leaders ended in clashes. George Hawi, party secretary, accused Berri of taking over Jabal-‘Amil, and Berri, in response, accused the communists of supporting Hizballah.58 Toward the end of the year Amal also confronted the SSNP in the western Biqa‘, and later in Beirut.59 Both the LCP and SSNP were very popular among the Shi‘ite political activists in Jabal-‘Amil, and in fact they maintained some of their popularity even after the civil war. In July 1995 scholar William Harris visited Kafar Sir, near Nabatiyeh, and his impression was that one-third of the residents supported Amal, one-third supported Hizballah, and one-third were communists or hostile to all parties.60 The roots of their popularity go back to mid-1960s. By the early 1970s the Shi‘ites constituted one-third to a half of the members of leftist movements in Lebanon.61 This intense involvement reflected not only the desire for change, but also the unbridling of thousands of Shi‘ites from the traditional communal political framework. The LCP was the most significant political

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framework for the Shi‘ites in the period between 1972 and 75. In contrast to its activity in Lebanon in prior years, the party established its power in Muslim population centers, particularly among Shi‘ites. Most of its activity took place among peasants in Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘, in labor unions in the slums of Beirut, and in the student organizations of the Lebanese University. In 1975, 50 percent of party members were Shi‘ites, compared with 20 percent who were Sunnis and Druze, and about 30 percent were Christians.62 The seemingly problematic point in the political platform of the LCP during the 1980s for Nabih Berri was the support of Palestinian military activity in Lebanon. The SSNP, which was one of the most popular movements among the Shi‘ites in the 1950s, endured several difficult blows following a failed coup attempt by fellow members in Lebanon in December 1961. Party activity was banned for a decade and renewed only in 1970. Among the participants in the coup attempt were Fouad ‘Awad and Shuqi Khairallah, Shi‘ite party members who served as officers in the Lebanese army. Other Shi‘ites were also investigated under suspicion of collusion in the attempt, including Kazem al-Khalil and his brother ‘Abd al-Rahman. The secular social and anti-feudal ideology of the SSNP was the main attraction for the Shi‘ites in the 1970s. This ideology offered a solution for the youth who had directed most of their anger against the traditional communal leadership. The party supported resistance organizations and guerilla actions, and opposed communism and served as an alternative for the supporters of secularism who were opposed to communism.63 It is quite possible that Nabih Berri wanted to collide with both the LCP and the SSNP in order to reduce their popularity in Jabal-‘Amil and to score points among the Shi‘ite public, in addition to objecting to their support of Hizballah.

The Struggle within the Shi‘ite Community Berri’s most difficult struggle for survival after his political peak of February 1984 was conducted inside the Shi‘ite community. This struggle was conducted in two arenas. The first was between the moderate wing, represented by Amal under Berri’s leadership and the radical fundamentalist camp represented by Hizballah. This struggle revolved around both controlling the Shi‘ite population concentrations, and the orientation of the Shi‘ite community in the coming years. In the second arena, Berri had to deal with repeated attempts inside Amal to dismiss him from the leadership. These struggles were motivated by personal rivalries and ideological controversies involving power struggles between local leaders and the movement’s leadership. The Struggle against Hizballah The inner struggle of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon, between the moderate camp and the pro-Iranian radicals, witnessed a turning point during 1984. After the events of “Intifadat Shbat,” which symbolized the peak of

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Berri’s strength, two new factors were added to the struggle over the community’s orientation. One factor was that Berri joined the national reconciliation government led by Rashid Karami in May 1984. From that point on, until the parliamentary elections of 1992, Berri was a member in almost all governments in Lebanon. His position as minister changed the rules of the game against the radical Shi‘ite faction in three major aspects: (a) holding a ministerial position restricted his ability to use all means to accomplish the community’s goals, while the fundamentalists were free from any governmental or national obligations; (b) since Berri was appointed minister, he was identified by many Shi‘ites as a part of the Lebanese establishment, which was resented in the deprived areas. Hizballah, unlike the crumbling Lebanese regime, provided the common Shi‘ite with a spiritual, social, economic, and political response; and (c) when he became a minister, Berri decided to use the state budget for Shi‘ite needs, while the social activity by Hizballah was done with Iranian money. For this reason he insisted on establishing a new governmental portfolio for himself, the ministry of Reconstruction of South Lebanon. In addition, Amal took control over the Council of the South (Majlis al-Janub), placing Muhammad Baydun, a member of the movement’s political bureau, as its new head. The second factor which changed the nature of the inner Shi‘ite struggle was the withdrawal of the Israeli army from wide areas in Jabal-‘Amil. This unilateral Israeli step provoked a struggle between Hizballah and Amal to gain control over the evacuated territories. During the first half of 1985 Shi‘ite fundamentalists vigorously expanded their activities beyond the Biqa‘ valley, where they had previously operated. The attempt of Hizballah to expand to Jabal-‘Amil and to the southwestern suburbs of Beirut challenged Amal’s hegemony in these areas. The long resistance to Israel in the South increased the radicalism of many of that area’s residents. The struggle between the two Shi‘ite movements for control of the southern villages turned in the second half of 1980s into real battles and required the active involvement of Iran and Syria in the conflict. The position taken by Nabih Berri in Amal and that of the leaders of Hizballah in those years, Subhi Tufayli and ‘Abbas Mussawi, differed in some basic points. Berri led a clear pro-Syrian line while Hizballah adopted a clear pro-Iranian policy, with the help of volunteers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran); Amal supported the concept of a pluralistic society in Lebanon in which the Shi‘ites’ role would be determined according to their numerical proportion of the population, whereas Hizballah supported the formation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon, inspired by the Islamic Republic of Iran; liberating Palestine was not one of Amal’s ideological guidelines, while it was central in the platform of Hizballah; Amal opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, while Hizballah accepted them; Berri was ready “to calm” the South and to let UN forces be deployed temporarily, whereas Hizballah decisively supported a nonconciliatory armed resistance to Israel, including areas beyond the Lebanese–Israeli international border.

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Following the redeployment of the Israeli army, which left a security vacuum in some areas, the struggle spread to Beirut and Jabal-‘Amil. When it became clear that Berri’s takeover of western Beirut in February 1984 united different militias against the Shi‘ites, there was an attempt to unify all Shi‘ite militias: Amal, Hizballah, Islamic Amal, and the Islamic Organization of Moslem Students. In May 1985, the acting chairperson of the SSIC, Muhammad Mahadi Shams al-Din, tried to unify the militias under his own leadership but failed. For Shams al-Din it was a golden opportunity to improve his personal status at the expense of Nabih Berri, and to appear to be the Shi‘ite community’s leader. His failure reflected the ongoing decrease in the status of the SSIC, which started with the disappearance of Musa Sadr and continued with the radicalization in the Shi‘ite community, as a result of the struggle between the moderate and the fundamentalist wings. Nevertheless, during 1985 Berri tried to coordinate his moves by maintaining contacts with Shams al-Din and with Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Hizballah’s prominent religious scholar in Lebanon.64 The failure of the attempts to coordinate the two wings intensified the tension, but the struggle was still centered on comments and attempts to embarrass one another. In the summer of 1985 the radical wing succeeded in embarrassing Nabih Berri in the TWA affair, but eventually it was Berri who made political hay out of the events. The affair began on June 14, when Shi‘ite militants hijacked American TWA flight 847, travelling from Athens to Rome, with 153 passengers and crew on board, and held some of them hostage in the Beirut international airport. The violent takeover of the plane by the terrorists cost the life of American Navy diver Robert D. Stethem. As a condition for releasing the hostages, the kidnappers demanded the release of 700 Shi‘ite prisoners held by Israel. Israel stated it would consider such a demand only if an explicit request came from the United States. At this stage, when the crisis hit world awareness, Nabih Berri began functioning as a mediator between the kidnappers and the Americans. Berri, who served at the time as the minister of justice and of reconstruction of the South, found himself in a difficult position. On the one hand, he wanted to save the hostages from the kidnappers, which presented the Shi‘ites of Lebanon in a negative light in world media. On the other hand, Berri supported their demand to release the Shi‘ite prisoners. One of the hijackers, Fawaz Younis, a former Amal militiaman who was later caught by U.S. intelligence and was sentenced to 30 years in jail, told the Americans that Nabih Berri himself ordered the hijacking. “My orders were to get control of the situation . . . to buy time to allow Berri to get negotiations going,” Younis said. According to Younis, Berri ordered the hijacking to later impress the Americans by negotiating the safe release of the passengers, and at the same time to convince Hizballah that Amal was tough enough to share power.65 On June 30, the crisis ended when Syria became involved. The American hostages were freed and Israel promised to release the Shi‘ite prisoners in the near future. Nabih Berri, who was portrayed by the American media during the crisis as one of the kidnappers, succeeded in adding points in his favor in the struggle against the extreme

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Shi‘ite wing and won credit for the release of several hundred Shi‘ites from an Israeli prison.66 Years later, Berri referred only indirectly to the accusations, quoting President Ronald Reagan, who said when the released passengers were returned to the United States, that “We should thank Lebanese Minister Nabih Berri, who helped rescue the passengers and was the main cause for their release. All that was said about him was incorrect.”67 In the aftermath of the TWA affair, accusations between Berri and Hizballah were renewed. In response to Hizballah’s accusations regarding Amal’s secular nature, Berri pointedly declared in a speech on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the disappearance of Musa Sadr, that “it is about time to expose those who try to strike our [Amal’s] relevance to the [Islamic] revolution.” Berri called Imam Khomeini “our master,” and asked the Shi‘ites to distinguish between “those who worked on behalf of the revolution before its success,” including Musa Sadr and Amal, and those who “grabbed the opportunity after its success,” such as the various fundamentalist groups.68 In February 1986 the struggle between Amal and Hizballah in Beirut deviated from mere words, and armed clashes, although limited, broke out.69 The Shi‘ite Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army supported Amal, as it had during Amal’s takeover of western Beirut and during the War of the Camps against the Palestinians. In September of that year, the fighting in Beirut renewed, although later it was reported that the two sides agreed to a ceasefire.70 In the next two years, the two movements managed to avoid armed confrontations. In addition to verbal disputes, however, the struggle was characterized by attempts to eliminate Nabih Berri, whether politically, with the help of radicals from within the leadership of Amal, or physically, with Iranian support. The struggle between Amal and Hizballah became an actual war in 1988. In local terminology this war was known as “the War of Two Brothers” (Harb al-Shaqiqayn) or “the Brothers–Enemies War” (Harb al-Ikhwa–alA‘ada’). The cruel war, which left hundreds of Shi‘ite casualties, broke out in three waves: in April and May 1988, in January 1989, and between March and September 1990. Between and after these intensive waves, several limited clashes took place, continuing intermittently until late 1991. In Berri’s eyes, Hizballah had crossed a “red line” when it started to establish itself in Jabal-‘Amil. As long as the fundamentalists’ center of power was in the Biqa‘ they did not pose any danger to Amal’s status. However, when the struggle extended to the South, Amal had to react. The South’s importance did not sum up only with the fact that almost 80 percent of its population was Shi‘ite. It was always a source of pride for the Shi‘ites and the symbol of national resistance to Israel. Nabih Berri repeatedly declared that the South was the key for a solution in Lebanon and should be an example for good relations between Christians and Muslims.71 He praised the land of southern Lebanon, saying, “It is a land that links geography and history . . . the land of war and peace, the land of rights and faith, and the source of civilization and culture.”72

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After the establishment of Amal, Jabal-‘Amil was the movement’s main source of support. Following the Israeli invasion of June 1982, Amal became the strongest Lebanese military force in Jabal-‘Amil. By the mid-1980s, when an Israeli withdrawal from parts of this region appeared a possible option, Amal had a clear interest in proving its ability to take responsibility for the security of southern Lebanon in order to obtain hegemony there. As far as Amal was concerned, a fundamentalist foothold in the South could have undermined the region’s security and jeopardized the movement’s intent to take control of the area after the Israeli withdrawal. Hizballah’s ideology was to conduct its armed struggle with Israel in the occupied territory of the South and beyond the international border, until Palestine was released. Amal feared, however, that “heating up” the South would lead once again to the suffering of the residents as a result of Israeli reprisals. Amal therefore feared of cooperation in the South between Hizballah and Palestinian militias, which Amal had tried to prevent from re-organizing since 1985. The struggle between the two Shi‘ite movements was also a struggle between external forces. Amal was massively supported by Syria and Hizballah was a branch of the Iranian regime. In spite of the fact that Syria supported Iran in its ongoing war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, the two countries had different interests in Lebanon. The Syrians feared the creation of Islamic momentum in Lebanon, in particular in the Biqa‘ near their border. As long as the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the influence of Hizballah were limited, the Syrians were not threatened. In 1985, when extensive Lebanese territories from which the Israeli army withdrew became the center of struggle between the two Shi‘ite movements, the local interests of Syria and Iran collided. Previously, Amal’s control over southwestern Beirut (al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiyya) and the South gave the Syrians some influence there. A possible establishment of pro-Iranian Hizballah in these areas, at the expense of Amal, threatened to reduce Syrian influence and harm its cooperation with the largest religious community in Lebanon. In addition, the danger of possible cooperation between Hizballah and the PLO was a thorn in the Syrian flesh, since in the 1980s the pro-‘Arafat branch of the PLO was Syria’s main rival in Lebanon. The struggle over the capture of territories in the South in early April 1988, led to battles between the two Lebanese Shi‘ite movements. The battles took place in Iqlim al-Tufah (the area of apples), which is located in the hills east of the city of Sidon. This area dominates the western coastline near Sidon and the eastern heartland, mainly Nabatiyeh and Bint-Jbeil. During the period of late 1985 until April 1988, when Amal attacked Hizballah positions, the latter established a social services network in this area, which included schools, clinics, and cultural centers. The Iranians aided Hizballah with arms supplies and financing of about 100 million dollars a year.73 Shattering relations between the two movements led to deterioration in their relationship and eventually to the outbreak of armed conflict. In February 1988, two UNRWA workers were kidnapped by Hizballah near Sidon, in an area controlled by Amal. Nabih Berri, who wanted to prove he

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was in control of the area’s security, considered this action a breach of boundaries. The two workers were eventually released, but Hizballah acted once again later that month. On February 17, its people kidnapped the head of the UN Observers Group in south Lebanon, the American colonel William R. Higgins, while he drove on a coastal highway between Tyre and Naqura, returning from a meeting with a local Amal officer, ‘Abd al-Majid Salah. Berri couldn’t ignore this operation and ordered his people to conduct searches and detentions, to go from house to house in the villages of Iqlim al-Tufah, some of them under Hizballah control. In response, Hizballah killed Talal Qansu, a Lebanese army officer associated with Amal, and attacked Amal’s roadblock next to Haruf, a village in the eastern part of Jabal-‘Amil. Colonel Higgins was tortured and eventually murdered by his captors. He was declared dead on July 1990 after his body was displayed in a videotape released by his captors, although the body itself was found only in December 1991.74 In response, Amal militiamen attacked Hizballah positions in early April 1988. At the beginning of the attack, Hizballah seized the town of Nabatiyeh and the villages around it. However, within a few days, Amal regained control over Nabatiyeh and even attacked Hizballah’s fighters in the city of Tyre and its surroundings. An attempt made by the imam of the Nabatiyeh mosque, ‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq, to obtain a ceasefire, failed. On April 7, the conflict spread further to the area of Sidqin, south of Tyre. After a week of fighting Amal succeeded in removing Hizballah and regained control over the coastline, the area of Nabatiyeh and the towns that were considered Hizballah strongholds, Jibshit, Doueyr, and Zawtar.75 The next round of bloodshed between the two Shi‘ite movements started in early May 1988. As had happened before, a local event near one of Hizballah’s roadblocks in southwest Beirut ignited the fire. The people manning the roadblock murdered two Amal fighters from the Dabur extended family in cold blood.76 For Amal, this was an opportunity to use the momentum of its military victory in southern Lebanon in April and take control over Hizballah’s strongholds in Beirut as well. For Hizballah it was an opportunity to respond with a show of force in their Beirut strongholds, for example, the southwestern neighborhoods of Bir al-‘Abd, Ma‘adi, and alMa‘ud. Hizballah’s spiritual leader, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, resided in this area and it can be assumed that most of the Western hostages of the 1980s were kept in these neighborhoods. The fighting was especially cruel and destructive, even by Lebanese civil war standards. Hizballah took control over Amal positions in the neighborhoods of al-Shiyah and Ghobeiri, taking advantage of the defection of some Amal fighters to the other side. Syria and Iran attempted to mediate, but failed since Nabih Berri insisted his men regain control of positions seized by Hizballah.77 On May 5, Amal launched a new offensive, using tanks. The offensive caused tremendous damage to the dense houses of the Shi‘ite neighborhoods, and eventually failed. Amal’s fear of its destruction was real and only the invasion of Syrian troops saved Berri’s militia from a complete defeat.78 The Iranians were worried that the entry of Syrian soldiers into

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Shi‘ite neighborhoods would bring about the freeing of Western hostages, and they would lose their coercive power against the West, but there were no grounds for their worry. In January 1989 another round of battles occurred in Iqlim al-Tufah, after Amal attacked the villages of ‘Ayn-Safi, ‘Ayn-Baswar, and Jarju‘, which were under Hizballah’s control. Before the attack, Nabih Berri signed a ceasefire agreement with the PLO that enabled him to direct his militia to attack Hizballah without fear of opening an additional front against the PLO from the city of Sidon. At the same time, Berri tried to improve his relations with families and tribes in the Biqa‘ region, since he wanted to ensure they would not interfere with Amal’s concentration of efforts against Hizballah.79Although Berri succeeded in concentrating Amal’s efforts, Hizballah managed to take control over additional villages. Amal suffered the loss of senior military commanders in Jabal-‘Amil, such as Daud Daud, Mahmud Faqih, and Hassan Sibati, who were killed in October 1988. According to some reports, the January bloodshed reached new heights when Hizballah militiamen murdered Amal members together with their families as they slept. The resumption of fighting caused tension between Syria and Iran, after the latter accused the former of trying to expel Hizballah from Lebanon.80 The Iranian foreign minister, ‘Ali Akbar Velayati, arrived in Damascus in mid-January to promote a ceasefire. The main disagreements between Amal and Hizballah revolved around three points: (a) Hizballah’s refusal to hand over the murderers of Daud Daud, Muhammad Faqih, and Hassan Sibati; (b) Hizballah’s refusal to recognize Amal’s hegemony in Jabal-‘Amil; and (c) Amal’s objection to allowing Hizballah freedom of action against Israel in the South. The agreement to a ceasefire, reached on January 22, 1989, collapsed in just a few days and the Iranian foreign minister had to return to the region and renew his efforts. Finally, on January 30, following heavy Syrian pressure on Nabih Berri and similar Iranian pressure on Hussein Mussawi and Subhi Tufayli, the agreement was signed. It was based on six central points: (a) the establishment of a common operations room to coordinate military efforts against the Israeli troops in Lebanon; (b) Amal would be regarded as responsible for security in southern Lebanon until units of the Lebanese army were deployed, but the two movements would be allowed to carry out political, educational, and propagandist activities; (c) reinstatement of the “status quo” which existed in the South before the deportation of Hizballah on April 5, 1988; (d) an agreement not to allow the Palestinians a new takeover in the South; (e) subordinating Hizballah-controlled neighborhoods in Beirut to the national comprehensive security plan, with the presence of Syrian soldiers; and (f) an obligation not to conspire against UN forces and other international organizations in Lebanon.81 The agreement met the main demands of Berri: Amal was recognized as responsible for the security in the South, and it obtained partial control over Hizballah’s activities against Israel using the common operations room. In return, Berri enabled Hizballah to carry out political, propagandistic and

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educational activities in the South. The issue of the murderers of the three Amal top officials was solved by handing them over to Syria, followed by their immediate release.82 The agreement notwithstanding, fighting was renewed in March 1990, this time in the suburbs of Beirut. Daily clashes continued until September. During this period, it became apparent for the first time that the struggle between Amal and Hizballah caused a division in the Biqa‘ Shi‘ite tribes’ loyalty system. Shi‘ite tribes in the region of Ba‘albek were fighting among themselves, in the aftermath of the previous struggle in Iqlim al-Tufah.83 The Brothers–Enemies War between Amal and Hizballah ended on November 5, 1990, with the signing of an agreement in Damascus. Nabih Berri signed in Amal’s name and Subhi Tufayli in Hizballah’s, in the presence of the Syrian intelligence commander in Lebanon, Brigadier General (‘Amid) Ghazi Kan‘an, and the Iranian ambassador to Damascus, Hassan Akhtari. The agreement included six points, including the establishment of a committee, headed by the two officials Kan‘an and Akhtari, that would inspect the ceasefire, and the return of all residents who fled from the battlefield back to their homes.84 At this stage the struggle moved to civilian spheres. The 1990–1992 economic crisis in Lebanon did not allow governmental investments in the South. But Hizballah had used its huge budget from Iran to build schools, cultural centers, and clinics, easing its penetration into the southern Shi‘ite villages. The identification of Nabih Berri and Amal as an integral part of the regime, due to Berri’s membership in the government, reduced Amal’s support among Jabal-‘Amil inhabitants. Two reasons prevented Amal from dealing with the extent of Hizballah’s civilian activity: First, it did not want to establish a civilian mechanism that would replace the governmental systems, and by that to undermine the legitimacy of the Lebanese regime. The mechanisms Amal established were temporary and limited, and resulted from the desire to meet the needs of the residents in light of the collapse of governmental systems during the war. Second, Amal’s financial sources were limited. In the absence of an external financial supporter, the movement based its income on a tax levy in the harbors of Tyre and the southwest Beirut suburb of al-Uza‘i; a tax on the sale of fuel from the refineries of the Tapline company in Zaharani; and taxes on real estate deals. In addition, money was donated by Shi‘ite businessmen from abroad.85 The penetration of Hizballah into the Shi‘ite towns and villages in southern Lebanon at Amal’s expense became a fact in the early 1990s, and was later reflected in the general parliamentary elections of September 1992. A Fight for Survival inside Amal As previously shown in chapter 2, Nabih Berri strengthened his position as head of the Amal movement during the years 1982 and 1983, by removing his two main opponents, Hussein Mussawi and Muhammad Mahadi Shams

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al-Din. The disagreements with Mussawi revolved around the essence of relations with Iran and the nature of the future regime in Lebanon. The removal of Shams al-Din resulted mainly from personal motivations over the struggle for leadership of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon and the relations between the SSIC and Amal. Following February 1984, Berri encountered new domestic Amal rivals, mainly due to leadership and influence struggles. As far as primary ideological issues were concerned, Berri’s leadership usually received unanimous support. The process of undermining Berri’s position reached a peak between October 1986 and March 1987, while he was staying in Damascus in fear of an attempt on his life. During this period his inner movement rivals, Hassan Hashim, Daud Daud, Mahmud Faqih, and ‘Aql Hamiyeh, each carried out an independent policy within their own areas of responsibility. Amal was deployed in all three Shi‘ite centers in Lebanon: Jabal-‘Amil, the Biqa‘, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Amal headquarters in Beirut sent a man on its behalf to each area to be in charge of the district’s military commanders, who had their troops deployed in the area. The movement’s conference, which usually convened every two years, consisted of district delegates. These delegates elected the national leadership bodies, among others the central political chamber, the executive committee, the organizational committee, and the judicial committee. The elected bodies of Amal, therefore, had a strong presence of district’s military commanders who very often had more popularity in their districts than the national leadership, headed by Nabih Berri. This local support enabled some of them to run an independent policy, not coordinated with Berri, and at times even opposite to his. This was especially true regarding military commanders in Jabal-‘Amil who wanted to establish contact with Israel, in order to prevent clashes between Amal and the Israeli army and to prevent a Palestinian comeback, which was not desired, by either the Shi‘ites or Israel. For Berri and Amal’s national leadership, any revealed contact with Israel could have undermined his position against the leftist political organizations and Syria. The Syrians supported Berri in his intra-movement struggles, and he did not have to face any real outside opponent from the areas under direct Syrian military control. In Jabal-‘Amil, where he did not enjoy Syrian military backup, he was compelled to deal with local opposition undermining his leadership. In the course of time, Berri had controversies with most other senior Amal personalities. In October 1984 the former leader of the movement, Hussein al-Husseini, defeated the incumbent speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Kamil al-As‘ad in the elections for speakership with a majority of 41 votes against 28.86 Al-Husseini’s election expressed the support of Damascus and its discontent with the former speaker’s support of Bashir and Amin Jumayil for president and for the Lebanese–Israel agreement of May 17, 1983.87 Al-Husseini was considered among the associates of the vice chairman of the SSIC, Muhammad Mahadi Shams al-Din, who was dismissed from Amal in 1983, under Nabih Berri’s initiative. The disagreement between the two and Berri did not concern the key ideological issues of the Shi‘ite community but

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rather their different perception of the relations between Amal and the SSIC. While Berri saw Amal as being independent from the council, al-Husseini and Shams al-Din considered the two bodies connected to each other, as during the days of Musa Sadr. In addition, one has to remember that the influential role of speaker is the highest post open for Shi‘ites in the Lebanese political system. When al-Husseini was elected speaker, Berri feared the rise of a new moderate power center that would harm Amal’s support. Such a new power center could not only have jeopardized the street’s support for Berri, but was also perceived as a potential threat to the Syrian support for him, as alHusseini was considered at that time a close ally of the Syrians. After Nabih Berri was appointed minister in the Lebanese government in May 1984, and especially before the sixth Amal conference in April 1986, the attempts to remove him from the movement’s leadership intensified. In late June 1985, Akram Talis, an Amal militia officer from the Biqa‘ area who was previously dismissed from his position by Berri, conducted the first public attempt at mutiny against Berri.88 This was preceded by an unprecedented verbal attack on Berri from a group called “ ‘Ali Ibn Abu-Talib,” anonymous until then, presumably connected to Akram Talis.89 During 1985 Hassan Hashim stood out as Berri’s main opponent inside Amal. Hashim was a young teacher who was fascinated by Musa Sadr, joined Amal, and later became a prominent supporter of Hussein al-Husseini inside the movement. His official role in Amal was chairman of the executive committee, but his support from the movement’s members and the inhabitants of Jabal-‘Amil was based on his being a southerner, from the town of Marwahin in the region of Tyre, and for being in charge of the “national resistance” (al-Muqawama al-Wattaniyya), to the Israeli army in the South. Hashim’s rivalry with Berri began when the latter accused him of holding independent contacts with Yasser ‘Arafat during the war between Amal and the PLO in early 1985.90 These accusations provoked tension between Berri and the movement’s southern activists. Hashim sometimes acted independently, ignoring Berri’s authority. In September 1985 he traveled on his own behalf, without Berri’s permission, to the United States, a journey that raised much criticism against Hashim from many circles in Amal.91 On the eve of Amal’s sixth conference, the rivalry turned into an armed collision after supporters of the two were involved in a street battle which left four dead.92 Amal’s sixth conference, which took place in early April 1986, convened under the shadow of division for two camps: one camp was led by Nabih Berri, and based its support on Shi‘ites in the southern suburbs of Beirut and in the Biqa‘ region. His prominent supporters from among the movement’s leadership were his deputy ‘Akef Haydar, and some from Amal’s national leadership. Among the activists in the South, his most prominent supporter was Mahmud Faqih, the commander of Amal’s militia in the area of Nabatiyeh. The other camp was led by Hassan Hashim, who enjoyed the support of most prominent activists in the South and some of the activists in the capital’s suburbs. Among them was ‘Aql Hamiyeh, who held the sensitive position of being in charge of military matters (al-Mas’ul al-‘Askari) in

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Amal. As part of his position Hamiyeh controlled the regular army (al-Jaysh al-Nizami), which was the main organ of the militia. Another influential supporter of Hashim at that point was Daud Daud from the city of Tyre, who was the movement’s most popular local leader in Jabal-‘Amil.93 During the conference, Berri succeeded, with the help of heavy Syrian pressure on the 432 delegates, to repress Hassan Hashim and leave him with no senior position. After going to further extremes in his political positions, Berri was elected as the movement’s leader for two more years.94 ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan was elected head of the Islamic committee, Dr. Mustafa Hajj was nominated head of the Islamic court of Amal, ‘Aql Hamiyeh was reelected in charge of military matters, and Mustafa Dirani was elected head of the internal security system.95 Remaining without a position, Hassan Hashim announced he would create an alternative leadership to Berri’s. Hashim, who continued his criticism of Berri, survived an attack on his convoy and home in Marwahin, probably by Berri’s supporters.96 In early March 1987, Hashim failed in organizing a mutiny against Berri and the leadership of Amal. On March 1, his people took control of Amal military positions near Tyre and the village of Zifta. Hashim published a proclamation, accusing the leadership of the attack on his residence in Marwahin. A few hours later, he announced the establishment of a Movement of Reforms (Haraka Tashihiyya) which was to be a part of Amal and was to restore the movement to its original goals of the days of Musa Sadr.97 Nabih Berri urgently returned to Beirut from Damascus, where he had stayed since November 1986, and foiled the plot.98 One way to blemish Hashim inside the movement was to spread a rumor regarding Iranian involvement in the plot against Berri. On March 5, following the failure of his attempt, Hashim published a statement in which he denied the allegations, accusing Berri of corruption.99 The next day, Berri convened the organizational chamber of Amal, dismissing Hashim and his supporters from the movement.100 Another adversary of Berri’s inside Amal was the Tyre military commander of the movement, Daud Daud. The two had already disagreed during the Israeli invasion of 1982, when Daud conducted an independent policy in the zone under his command, not coordinated with and sometimes contrary to instructions from the movement’s leadership in Beirut. On the eve of the sixth conference in April 1986, Daud supported Hassan Hashim. Berri’s allies accused Daud of being too soft on the leftist organization around Tyre and of conducting an independent attempt to reach an understanding with them.101 When Hashim was dismissed from the role of chairman of the executive bureau during the conference, Daud was interested in obtaining the bureau’s leadership and becoming Berri’s deputy. Berri, however, refused to appoint him, asserting that he was interested in creating equilibrium between the activists of Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘ in the movement’s leadership.102 Following the dismissal of Hassan Hashim from Amal and the disagreements that emerged between Daud and Berri, the organizational bureau decided to dismiss Daud Daud from the movement.103 People close to Berri accused Daud of having contacts with Israel and derogatorily nicknamed

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him “David David.” Daud declared in response, attempting to portray himself as anti-Israeli, that he was not opposed to military operations within the state of Israel. He also expressed support for reforms in Amal, although not through violence, as the ones carried out by Hashim.104 The struggle between Berri and Daud ended, however, with cooperation and good relations. In September 1987, Berri went back on his word and appointed Daud head of Amal’s executive bureau.105 By that, he managed to gain support from wide circles in Jabal-‘Amil, over his dismissed opponents, ‘Aql Hamiyeh and Hassan Hashim. The cooperation between Daud and Berri came to an end when Daud was killed in September 1988, along with two other senior officials in the movement, Mahmud Faqih and Hassan Sibati. Nabih Berri proclaimed a mourning period and has since carried out yearly ceremonies in memory of the three. In his funeral oration for them, as well as in his book, feelings of grief and sorrow for their deaths are strongly felt.106 Many years later, another Amal senior official who was dismissed by Berri, Muhammad Baydun, insinuated Berri himself stood behind Daud’s assassination. It may be assumed that he said that out of anger and a desire for revenge.107 Mahmud Faqih, Daud’s main ally who was killed along with him, stood against Nabih Berri on several occasions. As the senior Amal official in the south, he gained great popularity among the inhabitants of Jabal-‘Amil and the fighters of “the Resistance.” Although he criticized Hassan Hashim’s mutiny attempt against Berri, Faqih resigned in the same week of the attempt in protest of Berri’s handling of the War of the Camps, and the situation in the South.108 He later went back on his resignation and was appointed head of Amal’s organizational committee by Berri. Another person with whom Berri managed to quarrel was ‘Aql Hamiyeh. In the conference of April 1986 Hamiyeh was elected to be in charge of military matters and commander of the militia, one of the most influential positions in the movement. Hamiyeh was known as being loyal to Berri, a loyalty that was important in light of all the movement’s rivalries and Hamiyeh’s sensitive position. During the War of the Camps against the Palestinians, Berri accused him of disobeying his instructions. As long as Amal defeated its enemies, the relationship between the two remained agreeable.109 However, relations deteriorated when Amal began losing to the PLO in the ‘Ayn alHilwa refugee camp, near Sidon. The southern activists, who were loyal to Berri, blamed Hamiyeh for the military defeat. The anti-Hamiyeh atmosphere was inflamed when Berri placed his own adherents in command of the Beirut area’s militia units at the expense of Hamiyeh’s supporters. The alienation toward Hamiyeh in the South also stemmed from another reason, related to the struggle between the movement’s activists in Jabal-‘Amil and those in the Biqa‘. As Hamiyeh originated from the Biqa‘, he was heavily criticized in Jabal-‘Amil.110 In June 1987 the geographic dispute between Amal activists in Jabal-‘Amil and the al-Miqdad tribe from the Biqa‘ turned into armed clashes. As a result, Berri was compelled to calm the dominant Shi‘ite tribes in the area of Ba‘albek-Hirmel.111 Hamiyeh’s resignation from Amal in

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November reinflamed the fighting. Immediately afterwards Berri convened the organizational committee and executive bureau, under the leadership of Mahmud Faqih and Daud Daud, both from the South, in order to officially expel ‘Aql Hamiyeh from the movement. This move enabled Berri to create a solid basis of support in the South as a counterbalance to the power of another expelled opponent, Hassan Hashim.112 Amal’s conflict with Hizballah contributed to the outbreak of an additional wave of resistance to Berri’s leadership inside Amal. A few Amal senior members, who had good relations with Hizballah and other pro-Iranian organizations, supported the abductions of Western citizens and soldiers by Hizballah in Lebanon. Berri, however, resented these actions. After fights between Amal and Hizballah broke out in April 1988, Berri dismissed most of these senior members. Among them was Mustafa Dirani, who justified the kidnapping of the UN chief observer in Lebanon, William R. Higgins. He served as head of Amal’s internal security and of the anti-Israeli operational body, al-Muqawama al-Mu’amina (the Believing Resistance). Other senior members were Dirani’s deputy, Ahmad Khalil Faqih; Adib Haydar, head of the cultural department; and ‘Ali Hussein and Zakaria Hamzah, both members of the political bureau. By these dismissals, Berri “purified” Amal from people with affinity to Hizballah.113 Toward the end of the 1980s, after a few years in which Berri’s ability to control Amal and to enforce his policy were challenged, he succeeded in removing all of his opponents from the movement. When trying to evaluate Berri’s position inside Amal in the 1980s, two basic factors need to be taken into account. The first is the manning of the movement, which from day one was not homogeneous. Amal was comprised of a wide variety of people, from different backgrounds, the uniting force being Musa Sadr’s charisma. Sadr’s personality brought together religious scholars, young, educated people, southerners, and even traditional politicians. After his disappearance, the movement remained without the unifying force who would bring the divided Lebanese Shi‘ite community together. His successor had to deal with new issues that were not on the agenda during Sadr’s reign. These issues, especially those of the relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran and security problems, intensified the divisions among the Shi‘ites in Lebanon. The second factor was that Nabih Berri had survived as the leader of Amal in spite of many attempts by senior members to undermine his leadership. During the period under discussion, he succeeded in enforcing his political plans in all possible movement forums, while all rebels were dismissed or accepted his authority.

Physical Survival Berri’s numerous struggles, inside and outside the Shi‘ite community, made him a potential target for assassination. When observing the Lebanese history of political assassinations before, during, and after the civil war, his

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physical survival is not obvious, taking into account Berri’s important role in leading the political and military line of Amal. In the eyes of many Palestinians, Druze, Maronites, and leftist movements, Berri was held responsible for the militant line that resulted in bloodshed. On the other hand, for Hizballah and other pro-Iranian Lebanese elements, and for some of Berri’s rivals within Amal, his positions were seen as too pragmatic and moderate. All this was enough for his many enemies to try to assassinate him. The first to openly threaten Berri were the Palestinians, against the background of the tension between Amal and PLO in Jabal-‘Amil during the early 1980s. Berri’s statements after his election as secretary general of Amal gave the impression that the Shi‘ites under his leadership would intensify their resistance to the Palestinian presence in the South. In June 1980, a rumor was spread that the PLO and the LCP had decided to eliminate Amal, due to the threat it posed to these organizations. In this context, “reliable sources” predicted assassination attempts against Amal leaders.114 In fact, the only attempt to assassinate Berri, ascribed to the Palestinians, occurred in August 1986, during the War of the Camps, when a booby-trapped car exploded in the al-Barbir neighborhood, 500 meters from Berri’s residence. According to the plan, the explosion was supposed to kill Berri on his way to participate in a Cabinet meeting. For unknown reasons, the car exploded nine minutes ahead of time.115 The Maronite Phalange’s militia, the LF (al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya), began regarding Berri as a possible target only after the Israeli invasion of 1982, due to his clear line against any cooperation with Israel. The tension between Berri and President Amin Jumayil, originally from the Phalange Party, and in light of Berri’s oppositional activity against him, also intensified the motivation to assassinate him. On August 9, 1983, three LF’s militiamen opened fire from a moving car at the guards of Berri’s residence in the Mazra‘a neighbourhood in Beirut. Two of the attackers were injured in the gunplay, but Berri was not hurt.116 Additional plans to assassinate Berri by the Maronite camp were discovered during the Geneva conference in March 1984, when three men were arrested on suspicion of conspiring to assassinate him and his political ally in the conference, the Druze, Walid Junblat.117 In April 1988, the internal security department of Amal exposed another assassination attempt which was presumably planned by the LF. According to the plan, a young woman, pretending to be a photographer, was sent to explode a demolition charge in proximity to Berri while ostensibly taking photos of him.118 Lebanese leftists also took part in the attempts to assassinate Berri. He escaped an attempt in April 1985, when Amal was fighting the Nasserite movement in Beirut, al-Murabitun. An 82mm missile was fired toward his house in the neighborhood of al-Barbir in the late evening, causing massive damage. Berri and his family members were not hurt, and were soon evacuated from the area by Shi‘ite soldiers from the Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army.119 In June 1986, during the fighting between Amal and the Druze militia of Junblat, a powerful demolition charge exploded near the same

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house, injuring passersby and burning a shop. Berri, however, escaped once again.120 The most severe threat to Berri’s life came from Iran and its main allies in Lebanon. According to an investigative report published in early 1985 in the London weekly journal al-Dustur, Nabih Berri served as a target for these elements. The report indicated that Iran’s senior representatives in Ba‘albek, Hamid Kna‘ani and Hussein Ma‘iri, had established suicide units comprised of young Amal activists. The two convinced the young activists to join these units, claiming that as a result of the Israeli siege on Beirut the connection between Amal’s leadership there and the Biqa‘ was lost, but the whole issue had been coordinated with Nabih Berri and the Iranian embassy in Beirut. When Berri heard about these false rumors he sent his close associate ‘Ali Ayub to Ba‘albek. On his return to Beirut Ayub said that he was held in a mosque by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who tried to convince him to rebel against Berri. Two days later Berri received an intimidating letter from Islamic Amal, a pro-Iranian organization established by Hussein Mussawi in 1982, saying that continuing the opposition to the Islamic revolution might risk his life. The letter caused a deep rift between Berri and Iran, and Berri even refused to meet the Iranian political attaché in Beirut, Mahmud Nuray. As a result of the rift, the Iranian ambassador to Damascus gathered Iran’s Lebanese supporters, including Hussein Mussawi and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and read them a letter from Khomeini. The letter stated it was time to “get rid of those who sold themselves to the devil in Beirut,” and for Iran’s supporters to behead those betraying leaders and unite the ranks of the Jihadists. In the following months Berri escaped at least five assassination attempts by Hizballah, Amal al-Islami, and al-Jihad al-Islami. In the first attempt three RPG missiles were fired at Berri’s office during a meeting of Amal’s leadership. In another attempt a cannonball was fired at his office building, killing one of his bodyguards. Berri protested to the Syrians on the attempts, and the latter banished Hamid Kna‘ani and Hussein Ma‘iri from Ba‘albek, along with about 300 Iranian Revolutionary Guard volunteers. In late December 1984 Amal’s internal security was informed of a plan to assassinate Berri during his planned visit to Damascus, and at the same time take control over Amal’s offices in Beirut. It was reported that Berri had ordered the execution of the main conspirators from Hizballah. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Hizballah’s most popular spiritual leader in Lebanon, was invited to Damascus and was blatantly told that unless he used his powerful influence to stop the plots against Berri, his own life would be in danger.121 An additional report of an Iranian plan to eliminate Berri revealed a comprehensive plan to kill Amal leaders, including ‘Akef Haydar, Sheikh Hassan al-Amin, and the Ja‘afari Mufti ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan. According to the report, the plot, which was planned by the Iranian government and coordinated with Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Berri’s deputy, Hassan Hashim, was supposed to replace him as Amal’s leader. The former Iranian ambassador to Beirut, Fakhr Rohani, explained that the Iranian motivation to

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“remove” Berri stemmed from the fact that he continued to oppose Iran even after heavy pressure. The relevant information was handed to Berri in early April 1985, probably by Syria. As a result he acted to eliminate ‘Ali Ayub.122 Ayub was put in charge of the military affairs in Amal after the fifth conference in April 1983. As mentioned, Berri sent him to Ba‘albek to examine the rumors concerning Iranian activity there. Following information received from the Syrians, Berri suspected Ayub himself of being part of the Iranian plan to assassinate him. In March 1985, Berri dismissed Ayub from Amal. One month later, Ayub and his supporters took control over a building in ‘Ashat-‘Akar for pro-Iranian needs. In reaction, Berri asked Druze Walid Junblat, whose militia controlled that area, to attack the building, an attack in which Ayub was killed.123 In the next months Berri was a target for a few more assassination attempts. During a visit to the Biqa‘ for the seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance, one of his bodyguards, ‘Ali ‘Isa, was injured from gunshots.124 In August, the previously mentioned plan to explode a vehicle near Berri’s car on his way to a Cabinet meeting also failed.125 Toward the end of the decade, following the outbreak of armed incidents between Amal and Hizballah, the Iranian desire to assassinate Nabih Berri was ordered in a religious Fatwa (religious verdict according to Islamic law).126 As a result, between October 1986 and March 1987, Berri moved to Damascus. When he returned to Beirut, the assassination attempts were renewed. In April 1988, during the heavy fighting between the two Shi‘ite movements in al-Tufah region, fire was directed toward Berri’s entourage, killing one of his assistants, Ahmad Harb.127 In May Berri had to leave the fast-breaking meal of Ramadan, after Amal’s internal security warned him of a plot. The two suspects were later handed over to the government’s internal security according to Berri’s request.128 In March 1990, once again during heavy fighting between Amal and Hizballah, a plan to assassinate him by using a remotely operated booby-trapped car, similar to the way President Rene Mu‘awad had been killed in November 1989, was exposed. It was later known that the Iranian minister of the interior, ‘Ali Akbar Mohtashami-pur, sent a special squad from Iran to perform the act.129 The Iranian attempts to assassinate Berri and his allies in Lebanon stopped after the ceasefire agreement between Amal and Hizballah was signed in November 1990. Further plots against Berri occasionally published in the media but their reliability is not clear. For example, Tehran Times ascribed Mahmoud Rafeh, a Lebanese police officer accused in 2010 of running a spy ring on behalf of Israel, with the planting bombs in Zahrani in 2005, perhaps in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Berri.130

Closing Circle—the Parliamentary Elections of 1992 The general elections for the Lebanese Parliament in 1992 were a major step in ending the civil war and beginning the process of restoration agreed upon

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in Ta’if. Twenty years after the last elections were held the people of Lebanon took to the polls in order to elect their representatives. This was a good opportunity to test the power of the political factions, after the changes which had occurred during the war. However, as most of the Maronites, as well as Sunni Muslim groups, boycotted the elections, it did not reflect the real situation. In the beginning of 1992, the Syrian–Lebanese contacts toward the elections started, inspired by the Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty of May 1991 between the two countries. The United States was also involved in the contacts before the elections, but as a result of the American need to gain Syria’s support for the Middle East peace process, it did not place too many obstacles to Syrian President al-Assad in the matter.131 In the absence of real opposition, Syria’s supporters in Lebanon managed to pass an election law, granting them an advantage. According to the law, three out of the five constituencies (Muhafazat Intihabiyya) were under the Syrian army’s control, and Lebanese citizens residing abroad, who had not renewed their citizenship during their years outside the country, were not allowed to vote in Lebanon’s consulates abroad. Most of these citizens were Maronite Christians who opposed Syria. After more than a dozen years of struggle over the image of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon and the path it was to take, the 1992 elections were a “power test” of its existing political factions. Although their demand for an immediate and permanent abolition of political confessionalism was not answered, the Shi‘ites saw the elections as a further step toward an improvement of their position in Lebanese society. A few factions of Shi‘ite candidates ran in the elections: a. The representatives of the new generation of Shi‘ite political activists, who represented a pragmatic modern line. Among these people like Nabih Berri, Muhammad Baydun, Muhammad Abu Hamdan, Ayub Hamid, and others stood out, especially representatives of Amal. These candidates gained strength during the civil war and they represented the Shi‘ites’ political change, in and outside the community: in the community, they represented the end of the era of ruling families (zu‘ama ), and outside they represented the increasing demographic and political strength of the Shi‘ite community after the civil war. b. Men of the old guard, among them representatives of zu‘ama families, who were pushed away from the heart of Shi‘ite politics and saw the elections as an opportunity to gain influence once again. The most prominent of them was Kamil al-As‘ad, who returned to Lebanon after a few years abroad and formed the “People’s Will” (Iradat al-Sha‘ab) electoral list before the elections in Jabal-‘Amil. Other men from the old guard were representatives of the Hamadeh and Dandash families from the Biqa‘, as well as ‘Abd al-Latif al-Zain and Muhammad Habib Sadeq from Jabal-‘Amil. c. Hizballah candidates, representing the pro-Iranian extremist line. The joining of Hizballah to the election campaign reflected the organization’s pragmatic line, as well as a policy of “openness” (infitah) toward the

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Lebanese state. The change in its policy derived, apparently, from the fear the movement would be politically isolated as the peace process, began in 1991, between Israel and the Arab states progressed. The change began in May 1991, when the movement’s secretary general Subhi Tufayli was replaced with ‘Abbas Mussawi. After Mussawi’s assassination by Israel in February 1992, he was replaced with Hassan Nasrallah, who continued the pragmatic line. Hizballah’s candidates were very young, some of them from a low socio-economic background, among them candidates such as ‘Ali ‘Ammar, Ahmad Madbuh and Muhammad Fneish.132 d. People who were not members of either of the large Shi‘ite movements, Amal or Hizballah, as well as independent candidates, among them Parliament members and former ministers. Prominent among these were Parliament Speaker Hussein al-Husseini, who headed the “National Consent” list (al-Mithaq al-Wattani), Muhsin Dallul, former deputy chairman of the PSP, who ran on the list of the “Popular Block” (al-Kutla al-Sha‘abiya), and ‘Abdallah al-Amin from the LCP. The election’s result indicated a great victory for Hizballah in the Biqa‘ area and for Amal in Jabal-‘Amil, the two major Shi‘ite constituencies. There were claims of fraud in the Biqa‘. Hussein Al-Husseini, the outgoing speaker, complained to President Elias Hrawi about the election’s illegitimacy and claimed Hizballah men threatened people near the polls and that there were forgeries. He also demanded that the results be voided and that new elections should take place. Al-Husseini resigned from the Parliament’s speakership on August 25, but was later persuaded to return.133 The results were a clear indication to the changing of the guard among the Shi‘ites and the defeat of the zu‘ama’s candidates, among them the representatives of the Hamadah and Dandash families in the Biqa‘ area and Kamil al-As‘ad in Jabal-‘Amil. Nabih Berri ran in the southern constituency, at the head of the “Liberation” list (al-Tahrir), which was a wide coalition of pro-Syrian supporters from Amal, Hizballah, and several independent candidates.134 With this list, the Syrians tried to create a framework to restrain Hizballah candidates and the Iranian influence in the South, since Jabal‘Amil was not under Syrian military control. Former Parliament Speaker Kamil al-As‘ad ran against the “Liberation” list with other candidates who were not considered pro-Syrian and who had collaborated with his family for decades.135 The eve of the campaign was accompanied by mutual accusations and defamations. In a ceremony on the inauguration of a bridge named after Nabih Berri, dozens of his supporters gathered, turning the event into an impressive demonstration of power. In his speech, Berri accused al-Assad’s campaign of receiving Israeli help.136 The elections in the south emphasized the advantage the election law gave the pro-Syrian candidates. In the previous elections of 1992, Jabal-‘Amil was divided into two constituencies: the South (al-Janub), and Nabatiyeh. The influence of the al-As‘ad family in the political system prior to the civil war enabled the isolation of the Nabatiyeh constituency, in which the

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family’s representatives enjoyed an absolute majority.137 When the two constituencies were united, according to the new 1992 election law, the al-As‘ad candidates and their supporters were “absorbed” in a larger constituency, where their relative weight was negligible. Other factors that played against al-As‘ad in the elections in the South were the Maronites’ low voting rate in this constituency and the closure Israel and the SLA placed on the Israeli security zone, which prevented those voters registered there who were away from the area from coming to vote. The Maronites comprised about 20 percent of the registered voters in the constituency of al-Janub, but only 5 percent of them participated in the elections.138 The affect of this was even greater, considering the high voting rate among the Shi‘ite voters, which reached over 60 percent.139 The Maronites’ low voting rate resulted from their boycott of the elections and the fact that most Maronites in the South lived in the Israeli security zone, which was closed during the election days. As the residents of the Israeli security zone were prevented from voting, Kamel al-As‘ad, who was identified as Israel’s favorite candidate, lost many votes. The elections were a big triumph for Berri’s “Liberation” list. Twentytwo out of the twenty-three delegates the southern constituency elected were from his list. The last delegate was Mustafa Sa’ad, from the Popular Nasserite Organization (al-Tanzim al-Sha‘abi an-Nassri), who was elected as an independent candidate.140 Berri won 118,827 votes, the highest number of votes a candidate received in the 1992 election campaign in all constituencies.141 Following the elections, Hizballah became the largest party in the Parliament with eight Shi‘ite seats (four elected in Ba‘albek-Hirmel, two in Jabal-‘Amil, one in Beirut, and one in Ba‘abdeh). Amal had four seats (three from the South and one from the western Biqa‘). Nabih Berri controlled the largest political bloc in the elected Parliament, which was based on the “Liberation” list. The results of the 1992 elections indicate two clear tendencies in the Lebanese Shi‘ite community: (a) the end of the age of the “old order” under the zu‘ama . young candidates from middle and low social classes entered Parliament; (b) the radicalization of the Shi‘ite street. Hizballah gained much success in the elections: eight of the twelve movement’s candidates entered Parliament, more than any other party. The fact that the Maronites boycotted the elections played in favor of the extreme candidates, but at the same time the results reflected more precisely the support rates in the Shi‘ite community. Berri’s Election as Speaker As the election campaign was over, the opening session of the new Parliament was scheduled for October 20, 1992. The meeting opened with the election of a new speaker. The Lebanese troika, which included the president, the speaker, and the prime minister, was now going to co-run the Lebanese state. The “second presidency” (al-Ri’asa al-Thaniya), as the Parliament

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speaker’s office is called, intended to play a great part in the restoration of Lebanon. Few candidates were mentioned from among the Shi‘ites, as the job is allocated to them according to political confessionalism. Among them were ‘Abdallah al-Amin, who was elected in the Bint-Jbeil district and was considered to be a favorite candidate of many young delegates, and Dr. ‘Ali al-Khalil, a delegate from Tyre, who had good relations with President Elias Hrawi.142 When it became clear that Berri was going to run, they saw no point in running against him. Eventually, two prominent candidates offered themselves for the position, Nabih Berri and the outgoing Speaker Hussein Al-Husseini, who had barely managed to be elected to the parliament in Zahle in the Biqa‘. In the ten days prior to the Parliament’s opening session, intensive contacts to choose the speaker were conducted. Berri and al-Husseini visited Damascus, since, due to the Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty between Damascus and Beirut, coordinating the election of the speaker with Syria was inevitable.143 The Syrians probably made it clear that they would support Berri for the job, as one can learn from statements and from the fact that al-Husseini had removed his candidacy.144In an article about the struggle for the election of Parliament speaker before Husseini had removed his candidacy, published in the al-Shira’ weekly, an unequivocal conclusion was presented, that Berri would get the job. The conclusion was based on the combination of Berri’s ideal data: he was elected as head of an authentic list, enjoyed the support of the largest parliamentary bloc, and the support of Syria. On the eve of the elections another Shi‘ite delegate offered his candidacy for speaker. It was Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, a veteran politician, elected on the “Salvation and Change” list, headed by Salim al-Hoss.145 Baydun, born in 1931, was one of the most prominent Shi‘ite politicians in Beirut. Like Berri, Baydun was a lawyer. In 1972, he was first elected to Parliament, and during 1991 and 1992 served as the minister in charge of water resources and electricity in the Omar Karami government. Baydun didn’t have a real chance against Berri, as the latter himself expressed content at running against him, so that he could be elected “democratically,” and not as a single candidate.146 In the vote, Berri won the votes of 105 of the 125 delegates who were present at the opening session. Baydun received 14 votes. The others abstained.147 As far as Berri’s personal status, his election to Parliament with the largest number of votes in Lebanon, and later his election as speaker, strengthened his political status and made him one of the three important politicians in Lebanon. A wide coalition that supported his speakership, which included candidates from Amal, Hizballah, independents, and Sunni and Maronite leaders, stressed his unique position: moderate enough for the moderate Shi‘ites and for other religious sects, and Shi‘ite enough for Hizballah. His status as a central political figure in Lebanon was reinforced in light of Syria’s dominance in the Lebanese politics. This chapter has presented Nabih Berri’s difficult struggles, until the early 1990s, to keep his position as the foremost political and military leader of

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the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon, a position he occupied since the uprising of February 1984. In spite of his many opponents, who came from all political and military factions in Lebanon and from within the Shi‘ite community, Berri succeeded in running in the parliamentary election campaign of 1992 as the leader of the Shi‘ite dominant faction. During years of struggle, Berri lost the support of many Shi‘ites, but in spite of all the difficulties he remained the leader of Amal. The explanation for Berri’s success, as inferred from the development of events, is based on three points: (a) Berri’s success in being regarded as the most important Lebanese ally of Syria, which became the “master” of Lebanon in the late 1980s. The Syrian backing of Berri included political support, arms supplies, military intervention for the sake of Amal, and the pressuring of activists inside Amal to assure their support of him; (b) lack of coordination between his many opponents inside the movement, who were troubled among themselves. People who were considered part of the same wing, such as Hassan Hashim, Daud Daud, Mahmud Faqih, and others, did not manage to coordinate their actions and exploit their great power in Jabal-‘Amil in order to take control over the movement; and (c) Berri’s success in taking advantage of the struggles between his opponents, to reinforce his own status. For example, he accepted the approach of his opponents Daud and Faqih, in order to use them as powerful tools against his rivals Hassan Hashim and Hussein al-Husseini. After surviving a dozen difficult years as Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri became a leading politician in post-war Lebanon. The 1992 elections started a new era for Nabih Berri, as the Lebanese speaker of the Parliament.

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Ch apter 4

Se rv i ng a s Spe a k e r : R e ac h i ng Nat iona l Stat us; L osi ng Sh i‘i t e H ege mon y

T

he election of Nabih Berri as speaker of the Lebanese Parliament in October 1992 gave him the opportunity, apparently, to establish himself as the omnipotent leader of the Lebanese Shi‘a. Two factors played in his favor: first, Lebanon after the Ta’if Accord was under the dominance of Syria, Berri’s main ally from the days of the civil war; and second, the power and authority of the Parliament speaker expanded under the Ta’if political rules. Despite these advantages, Berri gradually lost his dominance in the Shi‘ite community in favor of the rival organization, Hizballah, and the latter’s dominant leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Still, Berri became a central person in Lebanese politics during the post–civil war era, also known as “Ta’if’s Lebanon.” In some aspects, one can value him as the pillar of stability in the Lebanese political system during that period. This chapter will discuss the way Berri became so important in the Lebanese state and the reasons for losing his supremacy in the Shi‘ite community in spite of his top national status. The answers involve many factors, including the dynamics of Lebanese politics, Syrian inf luence in Lebanon, and regional processes and tendencies within the Lebanese Shi‘ite community.

Berri Becomes a Political Master in Lebanon Two decades after the Ta’if Accord, the role of the Lebanese Parliament’s speaker became synonymous with Nabih Berri, who has continuously held this position since the first parliamentary elections in the post–civil war era in 1992. Up until 2010, Berri was elected five times in a row to this position. During this period, Lebanon went through many events and great upheavals, in which he played a significant role.

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The Speaker’s Authority The position of Parliament speaker strengthened after the Ta’if Accord, in order to compensate the Shi‘ites for holding the junior position in Lebanon’s ruling “troika.” Although most of the power remained in the hands of the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister, the Ta’if Accord bestowed the Shi‘ite speaker with a new authority, which enabled him to have much more political influence than before. He is now elected for a four-year term instead of the two-year term prior to Ta’if, and it is almost impossible to dismiss him from his post since the chamber may vote to withdraw confidence from its speaker only once, and only after he has served two years of his term. Dismissing him also requires a majority of two-thirds of the deputies and a pre-submission of petition signed by at least ten of them. If the first vote fails, the Parliament cannot repeat such a move again until the end of the speaker’s term (part II, section A, clauses 1 and 2). The speaker is also involved in choosing the prime minister–designate. While the president is in charge of naming the prime minister–designate, he is obliged to consult the Parliament and bring their recommendations to the speaker’s attention and hear his opinion (part II, section B, clause 6). The speaker is also entitled to be a member of any future national council that would be formed to examine and propose means to abolishing sectarianism (part II, section G). The speaker has the right to appeal to the Council of the Constitution when he feels rules are not in accordance with the Lebanese constitution (part III, section A, clause 3b).1 He also has a tremendous influence over the timing of chamber meetings, the voting of rules, and the meetings of the parliamentary committees. All these privileges enabled Nabih Berri, as speaker, to play a central role in Lebanese politics for nearly two decades. Berri survived the political upheavals in Lebanon during this period mostly due to his use of his authority and various laws and regulations. While presidents and prime ministers have come and gone, he remains the only steady member of the ruling “troika.” By that, and in spite of harsh criticism, Berri has made a huge contribution to Lebanon’s ability to “contain” its fear of the Shi‘ites’ growing power after the civil war. Other religious sects feared the Shi‘ites because of their demographic growth to about 35 percent of the Lebanese population, and their close relations with Iran. The Iranian factor revived historical doubts regarding the Shi‘ites’ Arabism and a fear of Iran’s Islamic revolutionary nature, especially as its influence in the Middle East increased. The turning point of the attitude toward the Shi‘ites in Lebanon was the Shi‘ite uprising (Intifadat Shbat) of February 1984, in which they took control of West Beirut by military force. Following that uprising all the other major religious sects united in order to restrain the Shi‘ites. Later, Lebanon was divided into two new political camps, Sunnis and the Shi‘ites, instead of the Sunni–Maronite division which had existed before. After the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005, Lebanon’s main political alliances were formed on the basis of this division, the “March 14” alliance, mainly a Sunni alliance, and the March 8 alliance, mainly a Shi‘ite one. The next

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time the Shi‘ites used military force to take control over a part of Beirut was during the bloody clashes of May 2008. These events revived the fear of the Shi‘ites and in many aspects changed the existing political balance between March 14 and March 8 alliances, mainly in the latter’s favor. At the same time, Berri contributed to the process of integrating the Shi‘ite community into the Lebanese state. By introducing the moderate face of the Shi‘ites in Lebanon, without the incitement characterizing the leader of Hizballah, Berri is the hope for many Shi‘ites who wish to be an integral part of the state’s establishment and culture. As speaker, he preeminently set the pattern for the participation of Shi‘ites in politics under Ta’if’s Lebanon, and consequently he had prepotency on the attitude toward the Shi‘ites as a dominant factor in the Lebanese establishment. Although Hizballah has a huge influence on the attitude of the Shi‘ites toward the Lebanese state and the Lebanese attitude toward the Shi‘ites, it was Berri who enabled a more or less smooth entry of Hizballah into the political system by mediating between it and other factors in the system to diminish the fear which existed among many Lebanese. By that, Berri reduced the anti-Shi‘ite sentiments. In addition, he has played a large part in reducing the Shi‘ite under-representation in the civil service although the way he did it sometimes harmed the Shi‘ite image in the eyes of the non-Shi‘ite Lebanese public.

Berri and the Pax Syriana Nabih Berri played a central role in the Syrian control system of Ta’if’s Lebanon. First, as the prominent leader of the Shi‘ite secular public, he played a major role in convincing the Shi‘ites to accept the Ta’if rules of the game after the civil war. As the Shi‘ites were the largest religious group in Lebanon, their support of the Accord was crucial to Syria’s success in dominating Lebanon for 15 years, since 1990. Second, as speaker, Berri carried out Syrian “tasks” when requested. Third, the Syrians manipulated him occasionally, to restrict the growing power of Premier Rafiq al-Hariri. Fourth, through Berri, the Syrians succeeded in balancing Shi‘ite politics in Lebanon and preventing the excessive strengthening of the Shi‘ite radical religious wing, headed by Hizballah. Berri also gained political benefits from playing a central role within the Syrian alignment. First, it enabled him to sit in the speaker’s chair continually for almost 20 years. Second, the Syrians prevented Berri from being defeated in the parliamentary elections by forcing Hizballah to form a joint electoral list with him. This prevented Berri from being portrayed as weak when his popularity in the Shi‘ite street was particularly low. Trying to estimate whether the relations between Syria and Berri were only due to joint interests or more than that, one can say that Berri, for his part, remained almost completely loyal to his Syrian patrons and was ready to “swallow” humiliation. He understood the importance of keeping good relations with the Syrian regime and performed accordingly. The Syrians, for their part, found other allies in addition to Berri in Lebanon in the 1990s.

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Hence they did not hesitate to humiliate Berri if it served their more urgent interests. The clearest example of that was the case of extending Elias Hrawi’s presidential term in 1995, after Berri used his powerful influence to prevent the extension. The issue will be discussed later in this chapter. Until April 2005, Lebanon under the Ta’if rules was largely controlled by Syria. Lebanon was the greatest success of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s regional policy, during his nearly 30-year rule. Assad considered Lebanon to be historically and geographically part of Syria (Bilad al-Sham), separated from it by foreign powers in order to build an artificial political entity under Christian hegemony. Throughout his years in power, he often mentioned the common roots of both nations, stressing they were one country. Assad worked to materialize Syria’s many interests in Lebanon. As far as security was concerned, Syria wanted to keep an eye on its western neighbor, as the cosmopolitan and relatively free city of Beirut had a history of being a subversive center against the Syrian government, when Ba‘ath Party members organized the coup in Damascus in 1963 from there. Strategically, Lebanon was a potential platform for an Israeli military attack on Syria. Economically, Lebanon is the port for the Syrian transit trade and levies to Mesopotamia, and a source of employment for hundreds of thousands of Syrian workers. Politically, Lebanon was always a source for Western influence, compared with the anti-Western ideology the Syrian regimes had held. In terms of inter-Arab relationships, Assad’s desire to appear as a patron of the Palestinians in the 1970s, and later as the one who held the key to stability in the Lebanese state, led Syria to increase its involvement in the neighboring country. Hafez al-Assad had basic assumptions for his Lebanese policy. First, he assumed Syria must control Lebanon and had to play an active role there in order to keep its interests, and not to make do with indirect attempts to influence Lebanon. Second, a direct annexation of Lebanon into Syria was impractical because of international and inter-Arab constraints. Third, in order to implement Syrian policy, the Lebanese government should obey Syria. Fourth, the existence of a stable regime in Lebanon, which was necessary for Syria to fulfill the third assumption, was possible only by creating a new inter-communal agreement regarding the distribution of political power.2 The Ta’if Accord was to be that new agreement, and the Lebanese troika was Assad’s foremost tool to control Lebanese politics. The Syrians used the three-headed Lebanese regime to maneuver and balance between the Lebanese contradictory tendencies. A few Syrians were in charge of Lebanon during Ta’if’s Lebanon. ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who served as vice president, was in charge of the Lebanese file until 1998, when Bashar al-Assad, the intended president, replaced him. Khaddam, as did many of the “old guard” of the Syrian regime, gradually lost influence in the Ba‘ath Party following the death of Hafez al-Assad, and announced his resignation in June 2005. After resigning, he moved to Paris and became a critic of Bashar’s policy in Lebanon. In a TV interview Khaddam revealed some of Syria’s methods of controlling Lebanon, saying that former Lebanese

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Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri “received many threats” from Syria’s president.3 The relationship between Berri and Khaddam is very long and very good. They have met many times over the years. In the 1990s Berri was one of the few Lebanese leaders, and certainly among the troika, who shared many experiences with Khaddam since the days of the civil war. It is difficult to find direct quotes from Berri on their relationship, but his sympathy for the Syrian former vice president is quite clear from the way he describes their negotiations on political crises in 1990s Lebanon. Describing Khaddam’s involvement as a mediator between him and Premier Rafiq al-Hariri, Berri mentioned that they used to call each other nicknames, “Abu Mustafa” (for Berri), and “Abu Jamil” (for Khaddam), a custom that symbolizes closeness and respect. His story also emphasizes the integrity and mutual understanding between them.4 To some degree, after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005, Berri plays the role of Khaddam as an intermediary between the various factions in Lebanese politics. The Lebanese case was entrusted to Bashar al-Assad in the late 1990s, as part of his preparation for the role of Syrian president. In his first years Bashar failed to understand the importance of personal connection as a means to manage Syrian affairs in Lebanon and he did not interfere as often as his predecessor. Gradually, Bashar changed his policy and began to build connections with some Lebanese notables, such as Suleiman Tony Faranjiyeh, grandson of former President Suleiman Faranjiyeh; Talal Arslan, the Druze leader of the Arslan family which contested the Junblats; and the Sunni brothers from Tripoli, Taha and Najib Miqati. At the same time, Bashar developed hostility toward the prominent Lebanese premier, Rafiq al-Hariri, who was at the time in a political alignment with Nabih Berri. There were, however, other reasons for Berri’s weakening in the Syrian alignment in Lebanon after Bashar ascended the throne. Unlike his father, Hafez, Bashar has developed personal ties with Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah’s leader and Nabih Berri’s rival in the struggle for hegemony over the Shi‘ite public. While Hafez al-Assad never met Nasrallah, Bashar met him frequently, and maybe even saw him as a role model, following Nasrallah’s successful leadership in the resistance to Israel, which led to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese soil in May 2000.5 This was a meaningful change for Nabih Berri, who was used to being the only Shi‘ite connection to the Syrian regime. The direct connection between Bashar and Nasrallah reflected, of course, the strengthening of Hizballah in Shi‘ite and Lebanese public affairs, at the expense of Amal. Berri also suffered from the reshuffling in the Syrian regime following Bashar’s rise to power. Nevertheless, Bashar has a generally positive attitude toward him, saying “Berri is Syria’s friend. We respect and appreciate him.”6 The reshuffling was partly influenced by the Syrian president’s associates, most of them from the ‘Allawi sect and from Bashar’s family. The new circle around the Syrian president, which included Bashar’s brother Maher, his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, uncle ‘Adnan Makhluf and his cousin Rami Makhluf, became dominant in the Lebanese case. The “old guard”

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who were in charge of Lebanon, mainly Sunni personnel such as ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi, and even the ‘Allawi “High Commissioner” of Lebanon Ghazi Kan‘an, were removed from their positions. Kan‘an’s replacement was extremely influential since he was the executor of the daily Syrian policy in Lebanon between August 1983 and October 2002. As the long-time head of Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon, he gained status in Lebanon as the Syrian military proconsul and the uncrowned king of the country. Kan‘an was close to Hafez al-Assad, and one of his four sons married al-Assad’s niece. However, Bashar replaced Kan‘an in 2002 with Brigadier General Rustum Ghazali and appointed him first as head of Syrian internal security, and later, in October 2004, as minister of the interior. Trying to retain his status under the new “commissioner,” Berri attended the ceremony Rustum Ghazali held in honor of his predecessor in Shtura in December 2002. He toadied to the Syrians, saying that peace in Lebanon was the result of Syria’s sacrifices and watchful eyes, and that the relationship between Syria and Lebanon was the model that should be followed in the Arab arena.7 However, Kan‘an is believed to have either committed suicide or been assassinated in October 2005, possibly in connection with the Hariri probe. Some observers believed Berri himself feared for his own life after Kan‘an’s death because of their good relations.8 While Berri’s relations with Kan‘an were good, those with the latter’s successor, Rustum Ghazali, previously commander of Syrian military intelligence in Beirut, were not. Two reasons contributed to that: the fact that Ghazali was part of the Syrian reshuffle in Lebanon following the nomination of Bashar al-Assad, while Berri was well connected to the Syrian “old guard” in Lebanon; and the fact that Berri worked publicly against Ghazali’s candidates in the Biqa‘ in the municipal elections of 2004.9 However, before those elections in 2004 Syria signaled it still considered Berri a close ally. ‘Assem Qansu, the Shi‘ite head of the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, said during a visit to Nabih Berri that “Hizbullah and Amal . . . represented by our dear friend Berri, are our left eye and our right eye.” He also described Berri as a student of the school of Hafez al-Assad.10 Lebanon’s main contact to the Syrians on a daily level was Jamil al-Sayyed, the commander of the Lebanese General Security Service (al-Amn al-‘Am). Al-Sayyed is a Shi‘ite who was born in 1950 near Zahle, in the Lebanese Biqa‘. In the early 1990s he served as commander of the Lebanese presidential gourds, and later was nominated deputy commander of military intelligence. When Emile Lahoud was elected Lebanese president in 1998, al-Sayyed was appointed commander of the General Security Service. He used to be one of the prominent Shi‘ites in Lebanese public service, and due to his official duty he had had a great influence in Lebanese politics until 2005. Being a charismatic secular Shi‘ite, al-Sayyed is portrayed as a possible future alternative to Nabih Berri, and a possible successor as leader of the secular Shi‘ite faction in Lebanon. he was described as a smart and eloquent man with an extensive political knowledge which qualified him to be a future leader.11 His career was cut off when he was arrested along with three other generals of

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security organizations in Lebanon, in connection with the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, and served time without trial until his release in late April 2009. In a response to a blogger who raised questions regarding Amal’s absence from the celebrations of the March 8 alliance on the occasion of the four generals’ release, someone asked, “What does Nabih Berri possibly have to fear from another shrewd, well-spoken, charismatic, super-connected Shi‘ite who has the support of Hizballah and Damascus and who has dirt on every single civil servant and high-profile figure in Lebanon?”12 Very little is known about the relationship between Berri and al-Sayyed. Some rumors were spread in 2005 that Syria was grooming al-Sayyed to replace Berri as the speaker following the parliamentary elections.13 In an interview in alHayat that year, al-Sayyed responded to a question about whether Berri had tried to have him removed from his post by saying that Berri was one of the political leaders who used to think that state employees “belong” to them. Being sarcastic regarding Berri, al-Sayyed added that “each leader wants to make you his man, protect you and benefit from your services for the sake of his leadership. In Lebanon, you obtain immunity if you belong to a political leader, especially if you’re a state employee.”14 In September 2010, the spotlight turned to al-Sayyed after saying from Paris that Prime Minister Sa‘ad Hariri “should take a lie detector test to prove he did not support or fund false witnesses in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.” Since he was released from prison, al-Sayyed claimed “false witnesses” directed by the Hariri family, incriminated him for political reasons, meaning his personal rivalry with the deceased prime-minister and his good relations with Hariri’s opponents in the Syrian regime. In response, Lebanon’s top prosecutor, Judge Sa‘id Mirza, summoned him for questioning. Hizballah, which was suspected of being responsible for the assassination during the summer of 2010, called on the judiciary to revoke Mirza’s decision, claiming it was politicized. Following his return from France one week later, al-Sayyed was escorted out of the Beirut International Airport by Hizballah security officers. “I will not remain silent until justice is made,” al-Sayyed said while in the airport, accusing Prime Minister Hariri of paying for the testimony that sent him to jail. “False witnesses must be held accountable under the law, or we shall settle the score against them in the street,” he warned.15 By this behavior al-Sayyed held a different approach from Nabih Berri, who has never risen against the state’s institutions. His decision to prefer threatening with street violence rather than taking legal actions showed disrespect for the state, its institutions and its laws, particularly considering the fact that he himself was once a senior representative of the state. His strengthening relations with Hizballah calls a question on his future as a candidate to replace Nabih Berri as the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘ite secular faction. In any event, al-Sayyed is a potential opponent to Berri. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, after 30 years of military presence, threatened Berri’s status, as he was known for years as being Syria’s main ally in Lebanon’s political arena. A short time after the withdrawal Berri said that Syria would continue to constitute a strategic

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foundation of Lebanon. Fearing the impact of the withdrawal on the Shi‘ite influence in Lebanon, and of the nonexistence of a balancing factor between the two Shi‘ite movements, Berri declared the Ta’if Accord needed updating because the “turbulent developments in 2005 have disturbed many elements in the national reconciliation process.”16 Referring to those who criticized Lebanese–Syrian relations, he emphasized the full implementation of the Cooperation, Coordination, and Brotherhood Treaty of 1991 between the two countries as a general framework for bilateral relations and for all future agreements.17 Berri was among those who understood soon after the Syrian withdrawal that Lebanese–Syrian relations must undergo a fundamental change and that in order to continue the cooperation between the two countries formal diplomatic relations are needed. He said that all Lebanese support reciprocal relations between the two countries based on mutual trust and respect. “This will be embodied as soon as possible through the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Syrian and Lebanese governments at the ambassadorial level.”18 Official diplomatic ties between the two countries were indeed established for the first time in history, in October 2008.

The Lebanese Troik a Despite Syria’s domination from 1990 to 2005, Lebanon’s daily domestic politics were conducted mainly by a leading troika, which included the president, prime minister, and the speaker of the Parliament. Until 2004, the dominant member of the trio was Premier Rafiq al-Hariri, called by his supporters “Mr. Lebanon” and “the father of the new Lebanon,” for his dominant role in the restoration of Lebanon after the civil war. As of 1993, when Hariri began to be perceived as the “savior” of Lebanon, mainly for economic reasons, Berri and President Elias Hrawi served for long periods as Syrian tools to restrict him. Syria occasionally supported one side or another of the troika, in an attempt to make sure the Lebanese state regime leaders depended on Damascus, and to prevent them from acquiring too much power. Each member of the troika was interested in maintaining his political and personal interests within his own community. Nabih Berri struggled to retain his Shi‘ite public support from the days of the civil war, in face of the growing support of Hizballah; Elias Hrawi was ostracized by most of the Maronites, who opposed the Pax Syriana, due to his devotion to Syria and to the Muslim sector. His successor, Emile Lahoud, won the popularity of nearly half of the public when elected to office, but from among the Maronites he received the support of only about 40 percent.19 Lahoud was perceived as an ally of Syria and an opponent to the Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir. Rafiq al-Hariri was popular among most of the Sunnis, but wanted to gain support of the Christian public as well. In the dynamics of troika relationships, Berri enjoyed the strong position of being the balance breaker. Most of the time Hariri was involved in power struggles with the Lebanese presidents, Elias Hrawi, from 1993 to

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1998, and Emile Lahoud, from 2000 to 2004 (Hariri did not serve between 1998 and 2000). These struggles were partly a result of the Ta’if Accord, which gave both the prime minister and the president a leading position in Lebanese politics, unlike the exclusive dominance of the president in the past. Although in this situation the political position the Shi‘ites held was third in importance, it intensified Nabih Berri’s influence in the political arena as speaker, whose support was necessary to both the president and the prime minister, to gain dominance over the other. A few issues have repeatedly caused friction within the Lebanese troika before and after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. These included the government’s economic measures, election regulations, the government’s composition, public sector appointments, Lebanon’s foreign relations, and extending the term of the president. This friction had direct implications on the troika’s status within their own communities. Nabih Berri, aware of the damage of being involved in these struggles, said “the problems among top leaders were undermining Lebanon’s credibility,” but it did not stop him from playing an integral part in those disagreements.20 As long as Rafiq al-Hariri was in power, Berri tended to take his side in essential issues, including sharing of political alignments in election campaigns. This did not stop Berri’s conflicts with Hariri every now and then when their interests differed. One memorable confrontation was over the issue of civil marriage. This time, Berri aligned himself with President Elias Hrawi against Hariri, in an attempt to promote his long-time demand to abolish political confessionalism. The crisis broke out not only because Syria had encouraged the speaker and president to challenge Hariri, but also because of President Hrawi’s desire to ensure his own political future and his place in history before the end of his term in 1998. This gave Berri the opportunity to maneuver between his troika partners. Berri, who resented the stubbornness of Hariri as prime minister, made a deal with Hrawi, in which he committed to support the president’s proposal for civil marriage, in return for Hrawi’s support of Berri’s demand to establish a committee that would find ways to abolish political sectarianism, as required in the Ta’if Accord.21 Berri was to play a central role in the public debate over such a committee that broke out again in late 2009, this time with Sa‘ad Hariri as prime minister and Michel Suleiman as president. Hrawi’s bill of 1998, allowing civil marriage in Lebanon, received mixed reaction. Senior religious Muslims, such as head of the SSIC, Shams al-Din, and Sunni Mufti Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, vigorously opposed the idea. Hizballah also opposed the bill, as did many Muslims who considered civil marriage to be a threat to Muslim unity. The only Shi‘ite ‘alim (religious scholar) who supported Berri’s stand was Sheikh Hassan al-Amin, the Ja‘afari (Shi‘ite) Mufti of Tyre.22 Intellectuals in Beirut described the bill as “throwing a stone into the sectarian swamp.” However, Druze Walid Junblat supported it as a positive move toward the separation of religion and state.23 In the Shi‘ite southern town of Nabatiyeh, 26 lawyers also supported the bill, and stated that citizens should be granted the freedom to choose in

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accordance with the bill of human rights. They signed a petition demanding an optional civil marriage.24 Nabih Berri was quoted as saying that civil marriage is a positive step toward eliminating the “plague” of political confessionalism and sectarianism in Lebanon.25 Berri’s support of Hrawi’s bill was far beyond a political deal, as it reflected his consistent worldview regarding the abolishment of sectarianism.26 On March 18, Berri and Hrawi recruited a cabinet majority of two-thirds in favor of the bill allowing the option of civil marriage, and Hrawi formally proposed establishing a committee to examine the political system. Hariri, backed by the Muslim and Christian religious authorities, refused to sign the bill. The highlight of the debate on civil marriage occurred on March 29, with three thousand Islamists from Tripoli demonstrating near Dar al Iftaa’, the official residence of the Sunni Mufti in Beirut, against secularism and in favor of an Islamic state.27 In April, over 120,000 students signed a petition demanding the implementation of civil marriage.28 Eventually, the Syrians intervened, inviting the Lebanese troika to meet President Hafez al-Assad. Following the meeting Hrawi pulled his civil marriage bill and Berri’s push for abolishing confessionalism was off the agenda. Sharing Power in the Cabinet Ever since the first elections after the civil war, in which Rafiq al-Hariri’s government was established, Berri had hoped his political stands and the fact that he represented a large parliamentary bloc would contribute to his power in the troika. He was insulted by Hariri’s refusal to appoint a Shi‘ite finance minister in his first cabinet in 1993, an office which Berri wanted filled by his candidate. After he returned empty-handed in late 1993, the speaker threatened to stop backing the government.29 Berri had to publicly insist on this appointment in order to justify his position as the senior representative of the Shi‘ite community, to support the Ta’if Accord, and to prove that the Accord did not deprive the Shi‘ites, as many of them felt. Appointing ministers was one of Berri’s means to enhance his influence in the Lebanese regime and maintain his status among the Shi‘ites, especially vis-à-vis Hizballah, which did not participate in the government until 2005. Therefore, appointing ministers was a cause for confrontation between Berri and Hariri during the 1990s and 2000s. In May 1994, a political crisis broke out regarding the issue of reshuffling the government. Berri and President Hrawi wanted to restrict Hariri’s power, and the latter wanted to get rid of opponents from his own cabinet. Hariri proposed increasing the Christian representation in the cabinet but was blocked by Berri, who was insulted by the fact that he did not consult with him before publishing the plan. Instead, Berri renewed his demand to appoint a Shi‘ite finance minister, but this was once again rejected by Hariri. The political deadlock made Hariri suspend himself from duties, until his demand to change the government composition was completed. He returned to office the next day, after Syria had made clear its opposition to the move. The only change in government in 1994 was in September, when Hariri

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received permission from Syria to replace Interior Minister Bishara Mirhaj with his political partner, Michel Murr. The three senior portfolios of the cabinet, defense, foreign, and finance, are given to the three major religious communities as part of the political confessionalism. In Hariri’s government of May 1995, for instance, the foreign ministry was given to Mahmoud Hammoud, a Shi‘ite professional diplomat, as compensation for the replacement of the defense minister in the previous cabinet, Shi‘ite Ghazi Zu‘aytar, with a Maronite. Nabih Berri, as did Hrawi, Lahoud, and Suleiman in their tenures as presidents, used to control a bloc of ministers within the cabinet, by which they influenced decisions. Manning ministerial positions continued to be a cause for tension between Berri and Hariri later on. Berri, for example, opposed the appointment of Shi‘ite Bassem Saba‘ to the new government established following the 1996 parliamentary elections, and insisted on including SSNP leader, As‘ad Hardan, in the cabinet formed by Hariri in November.30 A replay of the crisis broke out in September and October 1997, when Hariri was trying to make personnel changes and remove some of Berri’s supporters in his cabinet, following the prime minister’s intention to raise the tax rate. The confrontation turned personal, and Syria, which opposed any changes in the cabinet, intervened and imposed reconciliation.31 Berri had controlled a bloc of ministers in other cabinets as well. He used the ministers under his political influence to score points in the Shi‘ite “street” against Hizballah. Since Hizballah was one of only a few parties that did not participate in the government, Berri was able to partly balance the success of Hizballah’s social network, funded by Iran, by controlling portfolios and budgets relevant to south Lebanon, such as energy and water, social affairs, environment, and agriculture. Appointments in Public Service Another means Berri adopted to influence economic and social policy, and to retain prestige within the Lebanese leading troika was integrating his people into high positions in the civil service and gaining control of trade unions. Appointments in the civil service became a cause for controversy among the ruling troika, which usually ended by distributing jobs to the clients of the three leaders. For Berri, the civil service was a means not only to gain political influence, but to perform “positive discrimination” in favor of the Shi‘ites. His high position as speaker gave him the opportunity to carry out one of most just claims of the Shi‘ites, of not playing a proportional role in the country’s civil service. The disproportion resulted from long-time discrimination and incompatibility because of the neglected educational system. This claim was raised as early as the 1970s by Musa Sadr and the al-Mahrumin movement, and was one of Nabih Berri’s motivations to join Sadr’s Shi‘ite movement as a young man. Berri wanted to use his position as Parliament speaker and troika member to promote the integration of the Shi‘ites to the Lebanese public system and the trade unions. Having his people in high positions served a few of Berri’s goals. It enabled him to gain influence against the other

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members of the Lebanese troika; strengthen his position with the Lebanese working class; and also strengthen his position in Shi‘ite areas by controlling local unions. As the matter was important for Berri, he was willing to take harsh public criticism for his public image of someone who was involved with “small accounting” as far as public appointments are concerned. In 1995 Berri stated he would continue to appoint Shi‘ites to positions within his reach as long as the confessionalist system had a firm hold in Lebanon and as long as Maronites, Sunnis, and other sects would comply with the system. He justified it with the hypocritical argument that by implementing this confessionalist policy he was interested in illustrating the dangers of confessionalism.32 The most memorable case of Berri’s maneuvering to place his clients in influential positions occurred at the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCLW), in 1997 and 1998. His actions illustrate political shrewdness and cunning, as well as eagerness to reinforce power within the leading troika. They also demonstrate the use of public bodies by the troika leaders against each other. In early 1997, Premier Hariri tried to prevent the promotion of several senior army officers, including Shi‘ite Jamil al-Sayyed, then deputy chief of military intelligence. Al-Sayyed was regarded as the most influential Syrian tool in Lebanon and as the closest person to Ghazi Kan‘an, Syria’s strongman in Lebanon. Hariri considered al-Sayyed to be the main executor of policies aimed personally against him, and thus tried to prevent his promotion. After Syria forbade Hariri from intervening in military appointments, the premier wanted to avenge al-Sayyed and military intelligence. The elections to the GCLW, conducted in April 1997, were a good opportunity for implementation. Hariri used the General Security Agency (al-Amn al-‘Am), an organization subordinated to his political ally, Interior Minister Michel Murr, to influence union leaders who opposed the serving union leader, Elias Abu Rizq. The latter was supported by military intelligence elements and by politicians, who were hostile to Hariri, among them Najah Wakim, Zuhir alKhatib, and Hizballah’s deputies.33 Hariri and his allies, Nabih Berri, Walid Junblat, and Labor Minister As‘ad Hardan, had planned to defeat Abu Rizq by integrating five new southern workers’ unions, associated with Amal, into the GCLW. The GCLW’s executive committee had opposed such integration the year before. By creating an electoral list headed by Anton Bishara, former head of the GCLW, they were able to compose a majority against Abu Rizq and win the first round of elections for the GCLW executive committee in southern associations, held in Sidon in April 1997. Each side accused the other of preventing voters from reaching the ballot, using the General Security on the one side, and military intelligence on the other. The results of the second round in Beirut were unequivocal. After the intervention of the Lebanese army commander, General Emile Lahoud, the General Security withdrew from some posts in Beirut, to allow the supporters of Abu Rizq to win a majority in the executive committee. As a response, supporters of Hariri and Berri elected their own separate executive

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committee. Each side claimed illegitimacy of the other, thus the GCLW was split into two leaderships. Ghanem al-Zughbi, who became the leader of the pro-Hariri and Berri wing, following Anton Bsharar’s failure to unite the organization, turned to the court against Abu Rizq on heading an illegal body, referring to the rival GCLW’s faction. On May 30, the latter was arrested for a false leadership claim of the GCLW, while on his way to an international workers union conference in Denmark.34 Fourteen months later Berri had an opportunity to increase his influence in the GCLW at the expense of Hariri. The desire to do so resulted from confrontations the two had had on various issues during the previous months. Berri decided to reach an agreement with Elias Abu Rizq, head of the rival confederation and his adversary the previous year, in which Abu Rizq received the support of Amal in the GCLW. Supported by Amal, Junblat’s PSP, and the Communists, Abu Rizq won the election of the united GCLW on July 29, 1998.35 The GCLW was unified under Berri’s control, but as William Harris wrote, a “unity on Berri’s terms meant that the union movement had become thoroughly politicized and compromised.”36 While Berri retained influential appointments in the civil service and protected his nominations, the two years from December 1998 to October 2000 were not easy as the Lebanese government tried to purify Lebanon from the corruption of Hariri’s term. When Emile Lahoud was elected president in November 1998, he put at the top of the public agenda, together with Premier Salim al-Hoss who replaced Rafiq al-Hariri in office after six years, the rule of law and “purification” of the civil service from Hariri’s people. Lahoud needed Berri’s cooperation, as Berri, the only remnant of the previous Lebanese leading troika, had good connections with the Syrian leaders. Therefore, the new government was not able to touch officials under his patronage and the dismissal of Hariri’s officials seemed a personal revenge and factional, damaging the efforts to implement successful reforms. On January 7, 1999, the government dismissed 19 top officials from financial boards of directors, including key supporters of Hariri.37 The following month the government declared a large number of appointments. In spite of al-Hoss’s efforts to perform a decent and impartial process, it was clear that the purification was purely of Hariri’s supporters. Berri’s people, even those with a dubious reputation, kept their jobs. An anonymous minister was quoted as saying about Berri, “We do not want to behave as intruders to his function. . . . Hariri and Junblat opened a front and we have only Berri on our side.”38 The “rule of law” campaign became a cause of disagreement in Lebanon’s politics. When al-Hoss, suspicious of fraud, initiated an investigation against the head of the Council of the South, Qabalan Qabalan of Amal, Berri abolished the initiative.39 The fact that fewer than expected appointments were carried out in the rotation of January 1999 indicates a disagreement between Berri, Lahoud, and al-Hoss. It might relate to al-Hoss’s refusal to appoint Berri’s nominees for director general of information, a speaker of the administrative council, and a director general of the National Pharmaceutical

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Council.40 Berri kept his distance from al-Hoss, claiming that showing dirty laundry in public threatened to deter foreign investors.41 However, Berri was careful not to tempt fate and continued to back the government. He took a stand as a mediator between the government and its opposition, which was useful to the Syrians as well. Berri and the other members of the troika continued the appointments in the public sector in the next decade. Economic Issues The main bones of contention which brought about repeated disputes between Nabih Berri and all acting prime ministers in Ta’if’s Lebanon were related to economics. His confrontations with Rafiq al-Hariri on these matters derived from contradictory interests. Hariri wanted Lebanon to follow modern Western economies, using a policy of a free market, privatization, and raising taxes in order to reduce the huge external debt from the days of the civil war. The implementation of Hariri’s vision contradicted Nabih Berri’s main interest of improving his wobbly position within the Shi‘ite community. As Berri feared the social implications of Hariri’s economic plan could harm his personal status among the Shi‘ites, he acted to restrain it. His economic perception was based on what his supporters call “a balanced development,” hand in hand with financial reforms, that should focus on achieving economic growth and improving living conditions across the country.42 Hariri’s economic measures threatened to harm most Shi‘ites because of the increased tax burden, reducing the share of state services due to privatization and expected mass dismissals. In most cases, Berri played the role of a loud opposition to Hariri’s economic steps. Nevertheless, Berri acknowledged the importance to Lebanon’s public and political life of properly managing the economics, and when it was necessary, he compromised on privatization, governmental budgets, and even on raising taxes. From the beginning of the troika’s rule Berri criticized Solidere, the Lebanese Company for Development and Reconstruction of Beirut, which was partly owned by Hariri. Berri opposed the privatization of Lebanon’s reconstruction after the civil war, claiming it was the government that should be responsible for the reconstruction. In Berri’s view, privatization was mainly another way for the Sunni and Christian elites to become rich at the expense of the ordinary citizens. He felt the antagonism among the Shi‘ite public, particularly after Shi‘ite religious scholars criticized Solidere for overpricing and looting the Lebanese people.43 Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah even issued a Fatwa prohibiting acquisition of Solidere’s shares in the Beirut stock exchange.44 In 1993 Hariri was able to calm the criticism in the Shi‘ite street, including that of Hizballah, with a proposal to establish a public authority for developing and improving the southern suburbs of Beirut (Elissar). The proposal substituted Hariri’s earlier plan to establish a private real estate company, a plan which was also opposed by the Shi‘ite movements.45 Raising taxes was a major bone of contention between Berri and Hariri. In September 1997, Berri and his allies in the government began to criticize

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Hariri for his intention to raise 800 million dollars by levying a new direct tax on fuel and vehicle licensing. The dispute reached a peak when Berri accused Hariri of “hegemony and monopoly,” and Hariri responded by saying Berri had no right to say so, asking him, “Do I have a monopoly of the administration, or do you have? . . . It is your pretense that caused the failure of the administration reforms.”46 Syria tried to reconcile the two on the next day. In early December a compromise was reached within Lebanon’s troika, amid rising concerns over impoverishment of the public purse. The new economic plan aimed at cutting administrative waste and raising two billion dollars on international capital markets in a partial restructuring of Lebanon’s debt. The political consensus had sent a reassuring message to the currency market.47 During Hariri’s second term, in 2003, Lebanon found itself in a severe economic crisis, which caused the prime minister and his finance minister, Fouad Siniora, to propose a budget which included the possibility of raising taxes and dismissals in the public sector. The Amal movement’s politburo stated that the majority of the population had fallen below the poverty line, and as the people would be the victims of any new tax, the solution was not to impose more taxes and fees.48 Berri criticized the budget for neglecting approved projects for the tobacco, weaving, and spinning industries, and the dam-building project in the Biqa‘, claiming the economic policy was not serious.49 “It is a budget of squabble and bickering,” Berri said, asserting that the Parliament would not allow tax increases under any circumstances.50 He understood the implication of raising taxes on his personal prestige among the Shi‘ite public, particularly because of the Shi‘ites’ tendency to see the Lebanese establishment, including the speaker, as a whole. The issue of raising taxes was a source of contention for Berri not only with Hariri. In 1999, during Salim al-Hoss’s term as prime minister, Berri confronted his associates in the troika on the annual budget. Economic depression and instability limited the government’s ability to maneuver socio-economic issues a great deal, and, eventually, al-Hoss’s technocratic government did not meet expectations. Berri was stunned by the additional budget increase to security, a step that reflected the main source of power within the regime. The regime was based on a group of military and security people around President Lahoud, and Interior Minister Michel Murr. Despite the high share for security and the raising of taxes, Berri voted in favor of the budget, which was approved in the parliament with a majority of 73 votes out of 128, with no opponents.51 Privatization was also a source for confrontation between Berri and serving prime ministers, particularly Rafiq al-Hariri. The struggle over the legislation regarding private television and radio stations in the mid-1990 was one of the most prominent ones. It was related to Hariri’s ambition to control satellite broadcasting and to take over much of the media market through government legislation. While newspapers required licenses, these stations thrived since the late 1980s without regulation. The government had an opportunity to control this open domain following an explosion in the church of Zouk-

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Mkayel, near Jounieh, on February 27, 1994. Several TV and radio news station threw unsubstantiated accusations on different factors of the blast, which caused great inter-sectarian tension in the public. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea was later arrested on charges of ordering the church bombing, but was acquitted. In March, the government adopted emergency regulations, which included a ban on private broadcasting of news and political programs, until legislation on media was completed.52 Two weeks later, the government turned to deal with the written press. It changed Regulation 104 from 1977, which prohibited the “purchase” of journalists, and raised the penalty for the offense of damaging Lebanon’s foreign relations.53 The press suspected that the government wanted to intimidate journalists so they would be “neutral” while reporting on the legislation struggle for electronic media. Loud public and newspaper opposition forced the government to reformulate the amendment of regulation, but the penalties remained high enough to threaten the journalists. The resistance to the ban on media included the whole breadth of the political spectrum, from supporters of Syria, including Suleiman Tony Franjiyeh and Elie Hobeika, to Hizballah and the Phalanges of the Jumayil family.54 Syria’s silence over the matter, as it did not want to provoke unrest in Lebanon, together with intra-government disagreements, allowed Berri to take advantage of this debate in the Parliament. On July 14, the Parliament abolished the government ban on news programs on private radio and TV stations. This was partly a populist initiative, as Berri wanted to please the public, and Hariri was forced to agree. On October 19, the Parliament approved a compromise: the government would have full licensing authority, including toll and financial requirements, which would allow five to seven TV stations to survive.55 However, the government’s control over political content was to be smaller than what Hariri had asked. The law forbade “all transmissions that may promote relations with the Zionist enemy,” perhaps due to Berri’s desire to please the Shi‘ite public who opposed the Middle East peace process, which started after the Madrid Conference of 1991. The law allowed continuing broadcasts of major stations, including the Lebanese Forces’ former station, LBC, and Hizballah’s al-Manar. Two and a half years later, in September 1996, Berri was pleased when Hariri decided to implement recommendations regarding the media, submitted by a special committee earlier that year. In addition to governmental stations, full license was given to four private television and three radio stations, all under the ownership of the regime’s senior politicians: Nabih Berri began ran NBN TV, which covered all local, regional, and international news on the hour;56 Interior Minister Michel Murr ran MTV; and deputies Suleiman Tony Frangiyeh and ‘Issam Fares were affiliated with the National Broadcasting Corporation, NBC. On September 18, the government announced it was forbidden for other stations to broadcast news, and that as of November 30 they would be dismantled. The following year, Berri paradoxically accused “senior politicians” of granting themselves licenses to operate television stations in Lebanon.57 The accusation derived from his

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desire to raise his own image within the Shi‘ite community against Hizballah, and to perform as a patron of Hariri. In a few cases, confrontations regarding economic policy reflected the tension between the legislative and executive bodies. In late July 1998, parliamentary committees under the influence of Berri updated the wage scale of the public sector. The update, which included raising wages, retroactive payments, and new pension arrangements, was to cost more than 500 million dollars over three years.58 Hariri and his finance minister, Fouad Siniora, rejected the update, since allocating these amounts required raising taxes, a step that could have hurt many citizens. Hariri received the support of the Syrian vice president, ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who was angry at Berri for his handling of the trade union elections a few weeks earlier.59 In mid-August, Elie Ferzli, who was Berri’s deputy speaker in Parliament, and a very close associate of Ghazi Kan‘an, caused a political storm when he accused Hariri of presenting false information to Khaddam. Berri called for a special parliamentary meeting to approve the new wage scale, arguing it could be financed by a turnover tax and payment for contracts of cellular telephone companies. Eventually, after Syria announced it would not interfere, this matter remained unsolved, thereby preventing Berri from trampling Hariri. Khaddam invited the speaker to his residence in Bludan, and advised him to defuse the tension.60 In 2002 Berri added the Israeli issue to the struggle against privatization. He vowed to oppose any move to privatize the water sector, because, he claimed, it would serve Israeli interests. “Israel has its eyes on Lebanon’s water resources and could get into the Lebanese water sector in a thousand and one ways,” he said.61 A year later Berri strongly opposed a government plan to privatize UNESCO Palace, saying Parliament would definitely not support such a plan if it was proposed. He argued that while sectors that should have been privatized were not, sectors which preserved Lebanon’s cultural heritage had been put up for sale. The palace was built in 1948 to host the Third International Congress of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). At the time it was described as the first appearance of the young, independent Lebanon on the international arena. During the Israeli invasion of 1982 the palace was the target of shelling, and in 1998 it was renovated and reopened on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the original UNESCO Congress. Since then it has become the primary government building in which national and international conferences and exhibitions are hosted. Berri was quoted as saying that he “advised” the government not to “even consider such a plan,” blaming the government for the “destruction” of Lebanon’s beauty and cultural image. “As long as such a privatization project requires the passage of a law,” he said, “then Parliament is serious and firm in rejecting it.”62 Despite criticizing and confronting the government’s economic policy, Berri well understood the importance of a stable economy to Lebanon in the post–civil war era. In many aspects economy is the key for nation–building similar to his vision for Lebanon, in which the Shi‘ites are integrated and play

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a central role. Following the defeat of al-Hoss’s government in the 2000 parliamentary elections, largely because of economic deterioration, Berri called for a national unity government which would face the economic crisis. He admitted it would have to take painful and unpopular measures to prevent the stagnating economy from collapsing.63 In 2001, Berri supported the oldnew Premier Rafiq al-Hariri’s reform plan, which he himself had rejected in 1997. The program envisaged the privatization of state enterprises as a tool to lighten the public debt. The speaker agreed to convene the Parliament in order to ratify laws that would enable the cabinet to move ahead with the privatization of certain sectors, notably electricity (Electrecite du Liban), telecommunications, and eventually, Middle East Airlines (MEA), the country’s flagship carrier. In 1998, unlike this position, Berri supported the unions’ struggle against the privatization of the electricity company and the national airline, and many employees considered him their patron. Trying to explain his new position, Berri stressed that no civil servant who would be considered “unnecessary” in a particular department would be “thrown into the street,” and that various state services could benefit from the competence and experience of such persons.64 Extension of the President’s Term Clearly the two lowest points in Berri’s tenure as parliamentary speaker were the episodes of extending (tamdid) the terms of Presidents Elias Hrawi and Emile Lahoud, both in extra three years. These cases did harm Berri’s reliability, and somewhat illuminate the nature of his relationship with Syria. The issue of electing a new president, which was discussed during the last year of Elias Hrawi’s six-year term, was a good opportunity for Berri to raise his status, particularly vis-à-vis Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The latter supported the extension of the president’s tenure in early 1995, as he was interested in reaching a compromise with Maronite leaders on promoting political and economic measures in exchange for a few changes in the Ta’if Accord, which the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir demanded. President Hrawi needed to improve his relations with the patriarch in order to increase his low public status within the Maronite community. The main reason for this low status was the feeling among the Maronites that Hrawi was a kind of “traitor” for joining hands with the Syrians against his community after the Ta’if Accord. The fact that many legislators objected to extending Hrawi’s term played in Berri’s favor, as did Syria’s silence over this matter, and the suggestion brought up was to elect Army Commander Emile Lahoud. An extension of Hrawi’s term demanded the amendment of the Lebanese constitution, which defines the term of the president as a period of six years. Electing Lahoud also required amending the constitution, because of Article 49, which requires a cooling-off period of two years for senior employees in the public service before they can be elected. Hrawi, confident Syria would back the extension of his term, said in April 1995 he was interested in an extension of three years, a move that was made through a petition of MPs calling for a change in the constitution.65

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About the same time, Muhammad Mahadi Shams al-Din, head of the SSIC, expressed support for Hrawi’s three-year extension.66 Shams al-Din was on good terms with Hariri, and his words, coming from a prominent Shi‘ite, were perceived by Nabih Berri as undermining his position. The speaker, who was visiting Morocco at the time, responded angrily to the efforts to obtain an extension in his absence. He interpreted this attempt to substitute consultation of the speaker with members of the Parliament illegal, because the former was required by the constitution.67 Berri conducted consultations in the second half of April, and was very pleased to discover that most of the legislators did not want to extend Hrawi’s term. Most of them said that if amending Article 49 was necessary, it would be better to allow the election of General Lahoud for president. Berri also visited the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir in his residence in Bkirki, and learned that he opposed any change in the constitution for the benefit of a specific person.68 Together with Walid Junblat, Berri led the opposition against the extension, claiming it was a breach of the Ta’if Accord, which the entire reconstruction of Lebanon in the post civil war era was based on.69 On May 14, Berri met President Hafez al-Assad in Damascus and got his permission to prevent any parliamentary decision on the presidential issue before the end of Parliament’s spring session in late May. This reflected the tendency of President Hafez al-Assad to make his decisions at the last moment. But Hrawi did not have to wait until the next opening session of the Parliament, in October. He learned about Syria’s decision to extend his term in a long meeting with President al-Assad, on August 24.70 The Syrians made intensive efforts to convince Berri and others to accept the extension. Hariri, who had changed his position earlier that year after understanding that Hrawi would not deliver the goods of a political deal with the Maronite sect, and now opposed the extension, was compensated by being given permission to reshuffle his cabinet. The changes in the cabinet caused tension between Hariri and Berri, which in late August developed into unbridled public attacks by the speaker. The two were summoned to Damascus by Syrian Vice President Khaddam, who urged them to settle the dispute. The same day Khaddam said in an interview to the Lebanese daily al-Safir that Hariri and Berri had agreed, under his auspices, on the extension of Hrawi’s term. Both Berri and Hariri were totally surprised and embarrassed by Khaddam’s declaration, and responded by ridiculously emphasizing the autonomy of the Lebanese Parliament.71 The Syrian president explained later that year that, “In general, they [the Lebanese] have agreed to three extensions: that of the state president, the speaker of Parliament and the prime minister.”72 Members of the pro-Syrian majority in the Lebanese Parliament speculated that President al-Assad couldn’t afford a leadership change in Beirut while his peace talks with Israel remained stalemated.73 However, Berri had announced that extending President Elias al-Hrawi’s term would not include an extension of the terms of the speaker and the prime minister. He noted that it would be a disaster and an act of treason for the Chamber of Deputies to extend its own term.74

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A few days before the official session regarding the amendment in the Parliament, Berri still protected his Syrian patrons while explaining his functioning as speaker, in spite of the great embarrassment they caused him. “I am acting in my capacity as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies,” he said. “I am not behaving emotionally but I am simply conveying everyone’s feelings. Those who call for extending the president’s term cite regional requirements, the stalemate in negotiations, and the lack of progress in liberating the South and the Golan.”75 The parliamentary session to amend Article 49 was held on October 19. Hrawi’s term was extended in three years, with a majority of 110 against 11. Syria’s blatant interference in the Lebanese constitutional procedure not only disregarded Lebanese public opinion, but evoked unusual responses from clerics. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah said one month after the extension that Lebanon was under a political occupation, and asked what kind of independence Lebanon had, and what kind of independence there could be in a state that was always looking abroad for its political direction.76 The Shi‘ite Ja‘afari Mufti, ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan, showed some understanding, saying, “No one is innocent of this accusation, even the accuser himself.”77 At the end of the day the efforts made by Berri since 1992, to impart dignity and credibility to the Parliament, were damaged by Syria’s most blatant interference heretofore in Lebanese politics. The extension of President Emile Lahoud’s term took place in September 2004, less than two months before his six-year tenure was to come to an end. While Nabih Berri welcomed any issue that bore the potential of commanding respect of the Parliament, such as election of a new president, he opposed in principle any amendment to the constitution, claiming it would breach the public’s trust in the Parliament. He already had expressed his view in 1997, in another context, saying, “In principle, I do not agree to the amendment of the constitution. I cannot envisage the strengthening of the executive power at the expense of the legislative power or vice versa.”78 This time, Berri played only a secondary role, as tensions between Lahoud and Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri had seriously undermined the government’s stability over the past year, and it seemed the two men were incapable of working together. The premier’s allies, Nabih Berri and Walid Junblat, objected to the extension although they did not say so publicly. In addition, the Maronite Patriarch, Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, was outspoken about the need for Lebanese sovereignty. Even the EU and the United States had indicated that they wanted to see the constitution respected and power handed over by the end of the year. Syria, this time led by President Bashar al-Assad, kept its cards close to the chest. On August 26, President al-Assad received Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and Nabih Berri, as the latter would have to be the one to bring any constitutional amendment required for extending President Lahoud’s term for the approval of the Parliament. Later that day, Elie Ferzli, Berri’s deputy and Syria’s closest Lebanese legislator, said that all options remained open.79 The next week, in a speech on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of Imam Musa Sadr’s disappearance, Berri called

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for a special session of the 128-member legislature to amend the constitution in order to extend Lahoud’s term. Freeing Syria from responsibility for the constitutional amendment, he said on this issue that, “the final say, first and last, is for the Parliament.”80 On September 3, 2004, the Lebanese Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment keeping pro-Damascus President Emile Lahoud in office for another three years. The amendment was approved by 96 votes to 29, with three absentees. With Berri’s position against the constitutional amendment known, it didn’t gain him respect. It was clear to everyone that he had led the Parliament to a humiliating step in accordance with Syria’s demand. Naming Prime Minister–Designate Berri’s behavior during the consultations which concerned electing a prime minister shows his tendency toward political pettiness and favoring shortterm interests. Once again his behavior damaged the speaker’s credibility in the long run. In early November 1998, a debate revolved around whether the president’s consultations with members of Parliament on selecting a designated prime minister are a legal duty or not. Berri believed it was not.81 The matter came up in the beginning of Emile Lahoud’s term as president, when, as according to the constitution, the inauguration of a new president requires the resignation of the government and the formation of a new one. After three days of consultations, immediately upon taking office on November 24, Lahoud found out that 83 legislators supported Rafiq Hariri and 31 gave him a free hand.82 Berri, considered at the time a political ally of Hariri, delayed the recommendation until the last moment, trying to strength his parliamentary bloc’s influence.83 His bloc at the time contained 19 legislators. Hariri was angry with Berri’s late support and with legislators whom he considered supporters, such as Junblat, Murr, Franjiyeh, and As‘ad Hardan of the SSNP, for adding their voices to the president’s decision. He considered it unconstitutional that 31 out of the 128 deputies did not vote for an actual person but rather left their vote to the head of state.84 Hariri rejected Lahoud’s offer to form a government, as he was concerned the president had the intention of limiting his authority. Berri then turned his support to the nomination of former Premier Salim al-Hoss, a staunch opponent of Hariri.85 In addition to Berri, all those who refused to support Hariri in the first round of consultations recommended Salim al-Hoss. He received 95 recommendations.86 The government formed by Hoss included only 16 ministers, compared with 30 in Hariri’s, including technocrats and non-party individuals, all associates or allies of the leading troika, Lahoud, Hoss, and Berri. Berri repeated the pattern of not keeping his word also during President Michel Suleiman’s consultations on designating a prime minister, following the 2009 elections. This time the results of the elections showed a clear victory in Lebanon for the March 14 bloc over March 8, of which Berri was a senior member. Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri, the head of the winning camp and son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq, became a natural candidate

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for premiership. The young Sunni leader well understood the difficulties he might face if a parliamentary majority trampled March 8. Just ten months earlier, in May 2008, Lebanon experienced a one-week civil war, which ended a political deadlock of 18 months. That is why Hariri sought to attain a deal with Berri, in which the latter would get the support of March 14 for speakership for Berri’s support of Hariri’s premiership. Hariri rejected an initiative within his camp to promote the election of ‘Uqab Saqr, a young Shi‘ite who was elected in the district of Zahle, for speakership. Hariri guaranteed the March 14 majority support for continuing Berri’s tenure as speaker and kept his word, despite his behavior during the 18-month crisis of 2006 to 2008. During that crisis, Berri’s actions as speaker were aimed at the interests of his political alliance, the March 8. He was criticized by the rival alliance and received threats that he would never be elected for speaker again. No other Parliament in the world would have agreed to choose the candidate of the losing bloc, but Lebanon being Lebanon, Berri has been reelected for a fifth term as speaker during the first parliamentary session on June 25, gaining 90 votes in the 128-seat Parliament, including those of Sa‘ad Hariri and many of the March 14 alliance. “I call on the Lebanese and on myself to benefit from favorable regional and international developments in order to consolidate peace and stability in Lebanon,” Berri said after the result was announced. He added, “This requires us to facilitate the establishment of a national government,” hinting at his intention to name Sa‘ad Hariri as prime minister–designate.87 Many of Berri’s supporters took to the streets of Beirut’s southern suburbs to celebrate his reelection, celebrations which ended with one man killed and several wounded.88 Hariri justified his voting for Amal’s leader as a decision that would “strengthen national unity and preserve civil peace.”89 Berri kept his commitment and 13 MPs from Amal recommended Sa‘ad Hariri for premiership. Hariri gained 86 out of 128 legislators, including the 71 MPs of March 14, and two from the Armenian Tashnaq Party.90 However, Hariri failed to form a government in his first try and returned his mandate to the president for new consultations on September 7.91 In the second round of the presidential consultations, Berri and Amal’s MPs did not name Hariri as their preferred candidate for premiership.92 Few days later, ‘Ali Hamdan, a senior adviser to Berri, hinted at the reason his boss had not kept his word, saying the timing in which Hariri returned the mandate to President Suleiman resulted from pressure from a foreign country. “This is not the first time outside powers have interfered in Lebanon . . . before the Doha agreement, the Americans and their allies in the region accused Syria of not allowing Lebanon to find a political solution. . . . What they accused Syria of, they are doing now. They want to pressure Syria, and this is good timing for their agenda,” he said.93 Hariri won the support of 73 MPs, and eventually established his government on November 9, 2009. At the end of the day, Nabih Berri played an important role in the troika, as tiebreaker between the acting president and prime minister. His importance has grown due to his authority as speaker of the legislature, which

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involves him in all political, economic, and legislative issues. Despite the sharp criticism regarding appointing his associates in the public service, and regarding his influence on Shi‘ite ministers in the cabinet, one might say Berri promoted the vision of Shi‘ite integration into the state, a vision already expressed in the days of Musa Sadr. In Lebanon, even at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it seems that these are the rules of the game and moral standards with which to promote the Shi‘ites. Berri, being a member of the troika for many years, knows how to do it well.

Divided Lebanon: Nationalism versus Sectarianism When Nabih Berri was elected speaker he had two major goals: one, to push forward the Shi‘ite integration into the Lebanese state; and two, to retain his political power against Hizballah. It thus was important for him to strengthen the Parliament, and particularly the role of the speaker, as a senior and respected factor in Lebanese politics. A rise in the status of Parliament meant a rise in the status of Berri. Generally, over the years, Berri had added dignity to the image of Parliament. However, once in a while, by performing a single action, he erased his achievements in this field and his behavior made him a laughingstock. The clearest example of this was the episode of extending the term of President Elias Hrawi in 1995. The most controversial case regarding Berri’s function as speaker is related to the severe political crisis that befell Lebanon from 2006 to 2008. Whatever one’s political preference, during this crisis Berri did not give the Parliament’s interests a top priority, but rather promoted the interests of his political camp and his Syrian patron. The answer to the question of whether this behavior was also for the benefit of Lebanon remains controversial. While the functioning of Berri as Parliament’s speaker in domestic issues is controversial, there is no doubt Berri was a central figure in issues related to Lebanon’s ties with Middle Eastern countries and with other countries in the world. No significant international politician who visited Lebanon skipped a meeting with Berri. The reason was not only the understanding of the world’s politicians that balance in the Lebanese leading troika must be kept. It also reflected an understanding that Berri’s unique position as the enduring member of the troika gives his stands an added value, as a result of both of his close relations with Damascus and of being the most senior representative of the Shi‘ite community, which has a growing influence in the Lebanese regime. Paradoxically, as Hizballah gained more power within the Shi‘ite community and the general Lebanese political arena, Berri’s importance grew, since he was able to mediate between the foreign governments and Hizballah. He succeeded in keeping his unique position after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in April 2005, when Lebanon was going through difficult times: a war with Israel, a severe political crisis, and a short civil war.

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Berri expressed his view of the Lebanese regime’s list of priorities clearly. “For Lebanon’s own interest,” he stressed, “[we need] a government that is committed, first, to the implementation of the constitution, the laws, and the Ta’if Accord, and second, to a five-year development plan.” 94 Once the civil war was ended and the Ta’if Accord had set the rules for the political game, Berri realized the importance of rules and regulations, not only for Lebanon’s reconstruction, but also for his own personal status. Being the senior Shi‘ite representative in the regime, its stability and adherence to law and to rules were necessary for keeping Berri’s status. This concept guided him in his functions as speaker for almost two decades. During most of his time as speaker, Berri “played” the role of a nationalist, who was concerned about the superiority of state sovereignty. In most cases, Berri sought not to harm the status of Parliament or other state authorities, even when his personal conflict with acting prime ministers or presidents reached new heights. In late 2003, for instance, he rejected allegations that the Parliament was not doing enough to make the government account for its actions. “Since when have Parliaments in Lebanon or any Arab or European state brought down a government?” he asked, adding that this did not mean that the Parliament does not warrant such accountability.95 In Berri’s favor as speaker, one might record a number of actions that improved the status of Parliament, alongside his own personal status, and emphasized his national activities. One was Berri’s influence in promoting Lebanon to modern governmental and civil standards. This attitude of openness to Western standards and reducing state control over individual life certainly reflects his worldview. The civil marriage debate aforementioned well demonstrates this point, as well as the wiretapping legislation he led in December 1999. The wiretapping issue came up after it became known that the security forces were involved in extensive telephone wiretaps, including against ministers and legislators. Berri demanded that wiretaps be supervised and led an amendment to the phone-tapping law in the Parliament. The new law stated that wiretapping officials is possible only with the approval of the interior minister.96 His consistent demands for the uniformity of history textbooks used in schools, for more transparency in the public service, and of course in abolishing political sectarianism, also contributed to Lebanon’s path toward modern standards.97 Rafiq al-Hariri’s Assassination The assassination of former Premier Rafiq al-Hariri brought about a dramatic change in Lebanon, when thousands of anti-Syrian demonstrators took to the streets, bringing about the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the country after almost 30 years. A series of pro- and anti-Syrian mass demonstrations, in March and April 2005, revived the anti-Shi‘ite sentiments in Lebanon and the political situation slowly simmered. Berri feared that the assassination would increase the tension which existed in Lebanon anyway and that Lebanon would deteriorate into violence.98 Shortly after the murder, he met with his associates in the troika and stressed the importance of

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a dialogue between the rival camps and holding the expected parliamentary elections on time.99 Eventually, Berri did go to the May–June Parliamentary elections with a joint alignment with Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri in some constituencies, including Bahia Hariri, Sa‘ad‘s aunt, to the constituency of Sidon and Zaharani, where he personally contended a seat. According to the Lebanese electoral system, each constituency should reflect the sectarian division and each list of candidates should include candidates from the relevant religious sects. In an act of loyalty to Syria, Berri rejected the accusations against his long-time patron of being involved in the assassination. “All of us want the truth about who killed Rafiq Hariri and his companions,” said Berri in a speech addressed to a Shi‘ite crowd that did not sympathize with Hariri, but immediately added, as if trying to appease his supporters, that “we also want to identify the offenders in other crimes who killed Samir Kassir, George Hawi, and almost killed Elias Murr.”100 Regarding the accusations raised by the former Syrian vice president, ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, of bad relations between Rafiq Hariri and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Berri swore to God he had heard from Hariri himself, after many meetings with Assad, that the relations were good.101 However, the heavy suspicions in Lebanon and the international community, in Syria’s direction, deepened the rift in Lebanese politics. “The Lebanese Parliament, and all the Lebanese people want to know who killed Rafiq Hariri,” stressed Berri after the assassination, “but we call on all parties not to make unfounded accusations which have the risk of dividing the Lebanese people and undermining Lebanon’s relations with its neighbors.”102 In mid-2010, rumours spread in Lebanon that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is to commit Hizballah activists to trial in suspicion of being involved in the assassination. The rumours caused public uproar and tension in Lebanon, in light of Hizballah’s explicit threat to demonstrate in the streets. March 8 camp demanded that Premier Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri announce in advance he would not accept the conclusions of a special tribunal, and that the whole tribunal is an American and Israeli tool against their enemies in the region. Hizballah, in response to the accusations, denied any involvement in the assassination and announced that it has evidence that Israel was the one responsible. Meanwhile, Shi‘ite Jamil Sayyed, former head of the General Security, who was suspected by the special tribunal’s investigators for being involved in the assassination and detained for four years on their instruction, assertively demanded to prosecute those who testified before the investigators and brought about his arrest, testimonies later proven false. Nabih Berri rarely expressed himself regarding the allegations against Hizballah, but demanded exercising the full rigor of the investigation on the matter of “false witnesses”, which was to be central on the Lebanese agenda in the autumn of 2010.103 Once again, He stepped into his familiar position as a middleman. When the Lebanese media reported that the French Ambassador to Lebanon, Denis Pietton, had stated that Saudi-Syrian contacts led to postponing the announcement of the indictment against

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Hizballah’s activists in order to calm everybody down, Berri said that what Pietton said “does not reassure Hizballah; rather, it confirms its fears as well as ours regarding the indictment.” Berri added he was in daily contact with Sa‘ad Hariri on this matter.104 Hariri’s memorial days have become a national event in Lebanon, including special anniversary sessions in the Parliament. Due to the enormous tension in Lebanon in the years after the assassination, the memorial days had a particular explosive potential. Berri was trying to walk between the raindrops, using his position as speaker to calm things down without upsetting his partners in the March 8 alliance. “Hariri’s day is for all Lebanese, not a specific sect or political faction,” Berri said, stressing that the anniversary should be a unifying occasion, not an additional element of division.105 Berri’s statement reflected a dilemma, which was shared by most Lebanese Shi‘ites in relation to the assassination. On the one hand, Hariri represented the man of means who had made his fortune at the expense of the Shi‘ites and other deprived populations; on the other hand, though, he represented the renewal of post-war Lebanon, a Lebanon in which they desired to be integrated. Nevertheless, the investigation of the assassination by the international community had become one of the bones of contention for the two rival camps in Lebanon. The March 14 looked out for Western support in order to carry out an independent investigation and conduct a fair trial for those responsible for the murder. The official stand of the March 8 was that the international community, including the UN, is under the dominance of the United States and Britain, whose perception of Syria and Hizballah is negative to begin with. Unlike others in the March 8 camp, Berri saw the desire of broad sections of the Lebanese public to establish an international tribunal to investigate the assassination, and was willing to accept it as long as the procedures and mechanisms of the International Commission of Inquiry’s work was agreed upon by the Lebanese authorities and received the consent of the Lebanese judiciary.106 He expected to gain political benefits from promoting the international tribunal by pressing the rival political camp in early 2007, linking the decision to establish such a tribunal with an agreement by the March 14 to the terms of the March 8 for forming a national unity government. He had even asked Saudi Arabia, patron of March 14, to influence its proxies to end the controversy by accepting a new composition of the government.107 Berri cynically threatened to “expose those who prevent the formation of the government” and by that, according to Berri, prevent a cabinet decision to establish the international tribunal, insinuating members of the March 14 bloc.108 He and his pro-Syrian camp continued to use the international tribunal issue as a bargaining chip in other political claims until the bickering Lebanese political leaders managed to reach an agreement over a variety of disputes in Doha, Qatar, in June 2008. In the years after the assassination Nabih Berri praised Rafiq al-Hariri’s contribution to Lebanon and their relationship over the years. Nevertheless, he had not tried to blur their harsh disagreements, especially on economic

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and social matters. Generally speaking, the picture he painted was real, since the two worked together for years on many issues, including on joint lists for parliamentary elections. “Rafiq Hariri is just my friend, and I cannot say more than the word ‘friend,’ ” Berri said of their ambiguous relationship in a TV interview. He described how when Hariri was once asked whether he had friends outside politics, the late premier replied that he had a friend, and his name was Nabih Berri, whom he cannot live with and cannot live without. Berri felt the same about Hariri.109 However, Berri considered Hariri to be a major contributor to postwar Lebanon. “The legacy of the martyr al-Hariri is the process of building peace in postwar Lebanon and rebuilding what was destroyed by the war,” he said to a Shi‘ite audience a few months after the assassination.110 On the other hand, it is difficult to find positive statements by Rafiq Hariri on Berri. In his book about Hariri, Nikolas Blanford quoted a close advisor to the late premier, saying that toward the end of his career “Rafiq had finished with Nabih Berri 100 percent.” It was said in regard to the UN Resolution 1559, adopted by the UN Security Council in September 2004. The resolution, among other things, called upon foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and called on all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to disband. Hariri had given up on Berri, according to Blanford, viewing him as “irredeemably corrupt and unreliable, opportunist and survivor, and not a risk-taker.”111 The corruption allegations could be related to claims, which cannot be confirmed or refuted here, regarding a bribe Hariri himself allegedly gave Berri as part of his efforts to gain cooperation from pro-Syrian senior politicians in Lebanon. The claims, which are widely quoted on the Internet, mention a contract that was awarded to the firm of Randa Berri, Nabih’s wife, to build a section of the coastal highway, at a price estimated to be at least 100 million dollars more than construction costs.112 Hariri’s disappointment in Berri can be understood given Berri’s tendency to compromise on any issue and not endanger his position among the Shi‘ite public by taking risks. The National Dialogue Berri’s initiative to establish a national dialogue forum, under his sponsorship as speaker, was one of the highlights of his term. The idea emphasized his special status in the harsh reality of a divided Lebanon. The change of personnel in the Syrian regime following Hafez al-Assad’s death, and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, both in the year 2000, caused instability in Lebanon. The tension rose following the Syrian decision in 2004 to extend the tenure of President Emile Lahoud another three years, and especially following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was a strong opponent to extending the president’s term. The political scene was in turmoil, following the parliamentary elections of 2005 in which the anti-Syrian camp won, and in light of the debate on the government’s decision to consign the UN the investigation of the assassination. The situation required a mechanism of dialogue in order to restrain the different factors

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from causing Lebanon to deteriorate into violence. Berri was the only one who was able to perform the task, since the other members of the Lebanese troika did not enjoy consensus. Premier Fouad Siniora was only a few months in office and President Lahoud himself was a bone of contention. In February 2006 Berri declared an initiative to form a national dialogue under his sponsorship in the Parliament, with the participation of all major factors in Lebanese politics. The first response to his proposal was a flurry of criticism as a number of officials expressed doubts regarding the benefit of the effort at that juncture, because just one week earlier the March 14 had launched a campaign to remove President Lahoud from office. Former Prime Minister Najib Miqati was quoted as saying that the timing of the dialogue was not appropriate in the face of the growing calls for the resignation of Lahoud. Lebanese Forces leader, Samir Geagea, also pointed to the presidential issue as an obstacle to the dialogue. On the other hand, President Lahoud himself said, “Participants should come to the negotiation table without setting preconditions.” Prime Minister Siniora supported the initiative, saying, “The solution lies in Parliament.”113 Regarding the demand to impeach Lahoud, Berri said he did not believe that Lahoud’s fate had been sealed by the anti-Syrian parliamentary majority, which did not hold the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to impeach him. “I have met with most of those who are involved in this [removal bid] but no one told me how [it will be done] constitutionally.”114 Berri should be given credit for conducting the first national dialogue meeting and presenting a national approach, despite being a senior leader in the March 8 alliance. He prepared himself thoroughly for the meeting, with the help of a preparatory committee comprised of his political advisors. Three major issues were put on the agenda during the talks: the UN investigation regarding Hariri’s murder; relations with Syria; and UN Resolution 1559 and its implications in disarming Hizballah. After the first meeting, on May 2, 2006, Berri described the session as positive, saying there was unanimous agreement on pursuing international inquiry into Hariri’s assassination and setting up an international tribunal.115 The agreement referred to UN Security Council Resolution 1644 of December 2005, which authorized the UN to help Lebanon investigate and establish a special tribunal for the murder.116 At the time, the appeal to the UN by the Siniora government had caused a debate between March 14 and March 8. In spite of this agreement on the Hariri inquiry, a new dispute over the issue arose later on, in which Berri himself was repeatedly accused by the March 14 ruling majority of blocking the creation of the tribunal under pressure from Syria. No agreement was reached on the other issues in the first round of the national dialogue. After several months of fruitless meetings, the dialogue stopped when Shi‘ite Hizballah launched an attack on Israel across the border, and dragged Lebanon into the 2006 July war with Israel. The national dialogue was renewed only after a severe political crisis and a short civil war in May 2008. Although the formation of a national dialogue forum gained Berri respect,

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it has not led to an agreement on most issues under debate. In spite of that, Berri’s national dialogue initiative strengthened his image as a central figure in Lebanese politics, and set a mechanism for dialogue between the two political blocs. The July 2006 War (Harb Tamuz) On July 12, 2006, Hizballah abducted two Israeli soldiers across the border in a deadly ambush, and by that initiated the first step of the war. Hizballah had not informed any governmental or military official about its intention to perform this military operation in advance. Although Hizballah didn’t anticipate the war would develop as it did, it was still able to successfully operate a wide range of military actions for 34 days.117 During the war the Shi‘ite areas were under heavy air strikes and shellings by Israel and hundreds of thousands of Shi‘ites left their homes in southern Lebanon and the southern suburb of Beirut (al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiya) to find shelter. Many of them lost their homes as the destruction was enormous in the Shi‘ite areas. After the war Israel claimed it had killed 600 Hizballah fighters, including Iranians and Sudanese.118 The official number of dead in Lebanon was 1,237, many of them civilians, and the damage assessment was 3.6 billion dollars.119 The war revealed fundamental controversy regarding the relations between the Shi‘ites and the Lebanese state as well as between the Shi‘ites and nonShi‘ite population. This controversy was blurred by Hizballah during the 15 years prior to the war by its downplaying of Islamic revolutionary dogma and emphasizing national Lebanese character. While many Shi‘ites felt that Hizballah was defending Lebanon in the war against Israel, many nonShi‘ite Lebanese wondered whether the Lebanese people paid a high price for Iranian or Syrian interests. Allegations against Hizballah of being an Iranian proxy and of causing Lebanon massive ruin made most non-Shi‘ite Lebanese perceive the Shi‘ites as an intimidating factor for a future Lebanon. Among the “sleeping djinn” which were perceived as threatening were issues of demography, Islamization, and military capability. In this context, the war revealed the failure of Hizballah to please both its external patron, Iran, on the one hand, and its Lebanese Shi‘ite supporters on the other, and to blunt the non-Shi‘ite population’s fears of the Shi‘ites. Its attempt to maneuver between the two, complicated enough in normal days, was all the more so in days of war. As far as Nabih Berri was concerned, the war was a proof of the openness of the Lebanese society toward the Shi‘ites, and he considered the criticism against them later as marginal. “One million people were displaced. Can you name one area that refused to take them in; can you name one party that didn’t take care of them?” Berri emphasized a week after the war ended. “I care that there was unity in the face of the Israeli aggression. . . . If after that there are expressions of recrimination and criticism, that is something not unacceptable.”120 One implication of the war was the rise in the popularity of Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in Lebanese politics for a short term. He became

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the person whose statements the entire international political world was waiting for. Most important, he had the last word in Lebanon concerning any ceasefire agreement, while Prime Minister Siniora and other Lebanese politicians, including Nabih Berri, served only as middlemen. Nasrallah’s personal popularity in Lebanon rose also because he was perceived as reliable, and because of the already existing hatred toward Israel. During the war, his popularity among all the Lebanese public was almost double that of Nabih Berri.121 When the war broke out the latter was surprised, as was everyone else outside Hizballah, but he quickly played the role he knows best, being a mediator between Hassan Nasrallah and the outside world, and acting as a Lebanese patriot by leading the verbal attacks against Israel. In the long run, as time went by and the daily difficulties caused by the war did not diminish, the popularity of Nasrallah among non-Shi‘ites decreased. As said before, while Hassan Nasrallah became Lebanon’s key figure during the war, Berri played a central role as the middleman between Nasrallah and the outside world. The war revealed the strong anti-Hizballah animosity of most Arab regimes, but also an anti-Shi‘ite one. This animosity provided Israel with an opportunity to defeat Hizballah during the war without real diplomatic pressure, and with Arab hope it would harm the pro-Iranian and anti-Western pivot in the Middle East. Hence the results of the war were very disappointing in the eyes of pro-Western Arab leaders. It was an irrevocable opportunity to deal a heavy blow on Iran and its allies in the Middle East. Such a blow could not only have hurt Iranian efforts to gain hegemony in the region, but also had the potential to harm the strengthening of Islamic movements in all Arab countries. What actually happened as a result of the war was that the pro-Iranian alliance continued to gain strength at the expense of the American hegemony. The Iraqi arena was probably also affected by the July 2006 war, and the general impression that the Americans were weakening in the region drove Iraqi Shi‘ite elements out of the U.S. bear hug and into the hands of the Iranian alternative. The war deepened the Sunni–Shi‘ite rift, within and outside Lebanon. Sunni religious scholars had to publicly deal with some Arab regimes’ support of Israel during the war. The issue became the focus of discourse in the Arab and Islamic world and revealed a dispute between different factions of Arab society. This was accompanied by growing concerns of Iran becoming a regional superpower. Lebanon became a front of the Sunni– Shi‘ite rift, as it was politically split between a Sunni camp (March 14) and a Shi‘ite camp (March 8). The two camps were a reflection of the regional struggle, backed by pro-Western regimes and Iran respectively. According to Lebanon’s religious leaders, however, the political split was not religious in nature, but rather derived from the political reasons of the national crisis and regional tension.122 Nabih Berri was very much troubled by the deepening of the Sunni–Shi‘ite rift in Lebanon following the crisis. He referred to it as an outside process which began in Iraq and was artificially imported to Lebanon in order to stir up strife between Sunnis and Shi‘ites.123 In the months following the war Berri held meetings with Sa‘ad Hariri, the

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Sunni leader of the March 14 alliance, to discuss ways to cool down the Sunni–Shi‘ite relations.124 One of Berri’s goals as a middleman was to calm the part of the Lebanese public that was angry at Hassan Nasrallah and the Shi‘ites. He tried to appear in public with Prime Minister Siniora to gain a national image and to express national feelings which increased among many Lebanese when the Israeli attacks caused growing damage and killing in Lebanon. The cumulative anger against Israel made his job easier, enabling him to divert the criticism from the Shi‘ites to Israel, Lebanon’s sworn enemy. Being in the broker’s position, Berri’s prestige rose in the eyes of all international elements who were involved in the attempts to reach a ceasefire. During the war, none of the foreign mediators who tried to promote a ceasefire with Israel had given up a meeting with Berri. It was known that he had the ear of Hizballah’s leader, and also that he was acceptable to the Siniora government and the anti-Syrian alliance.125 However, the war made all Lebanese factions much more extreme and split the country according to the political line between the March 14 and March 8 alliances. This catalyzed the outbreak of a severe political crisis in Lebanon, three months after the war ended. Challenging Berri’s Lebanese and Arab Nationalism: The Political Crisis of 2006 to 2008 The real ordeal that Nabih Berri faced as speaker was no doubt during the severe political crisis in Lebanon from 2006 to 2008.126 Was he acting as a national leader or a sectarian one during the crisis? The answer is not simple, but at the end of the day the arguments that support claims of his conducting a sectarian agenda are stronger. Yet, weighty arguments do support the Berri’s position. The tension in Lebanon between Shi‘ites and non-Shi‘ites, which began as early as February 1984 after the Shi‘ite military takeover of west Beirut, remained below the surface until the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. It had then met the tension with the pro-Syrian bloc, allied in the March 8, and the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance. Lebanon’s national unity government, established by Premier Fouad Siniora after the parliamentary elections of 2005, was divided on almost everything. This included the nature of relations with Syria, the economic policy, the issue of Hizballah’s disarmament, Lebanon’s relations with the West, and the Hariri probe. The division was not caused only by political disagreements, but rather reflected a fundamental dispute related to the essence of the future Lebanon. The historical debate over Lebanon’s character, between East and West, which was discussed time and again since the nineteenth century, was raised again. This time Lebanon faced a break between those who had bound their future with the Eastern rising power of Iran and its ally, Syria, and those who had bound their future, particularly economically, with the West. The March 14 anti-Syrian alliance based its support on “the Future” (al-Mustaqbal) parliamentary bloc headed by Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri and Fouad Siniora, the Druze bloc of Walid Junblat, the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea, Amin

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Jumayil’s Phalange Party, and others. The March 8 pro-Syrian camp based its support on the Shi‘ite movements Hizballah and Amal. A third parliamentary bloc that was not part of the parliamentary alliance was mainly Maronite Christian—the Free Patriotic Movement (al-Tiyar al-Wattani al-Hur)— headed by Michel ‘Aoun.127 The first signs of future political unrest within the new national unity government appeared in December 2005. Five Shi‘ite ministers from the March 8 alliance boycotted cabinet meetings for three months following a governmental decision to appeal to the UN and ask for the establishment an international tribunal to investigate the assassination of Hariri.128 The following year the Syrian withdrawal had put the issue of Hizballah’s disarmament at the center of the political arena. The parliamentary forums which discussed the issue had not reached a solution when the July war broke out. Hence, March 14 accused Hizballah of dragging Lebanon into an unnecessary war and of causing massive destruction. The accusations and tension increased Lebanon’s political polarization. The crisis, which broke out in November 2006, was to end in a short civil war in May 2008. Although controversies were on the table before the July war, neither side was willing to compromise. Hizballah’s disarmament was now a key issue for both sides. In addition, the anti-Syrian bloc urged international involvement in the Hariri probe. As both issues had a national character, any decision regarding them required a cabinet majority of two-thirds, according to the Lebanese constitution.129 After the Shi‘ites’ demand for a one-third veto right was rejected, the Shi‘ite ministers resigned from office on November 13, 2006. The resignation left the government without a Shi‘ite representation, which is necessary according to the constitution. Article 95, calls for the participation of all three major religious sects in the cabinet, hence Siniora’s cabinet became allegedly illegitimate.130 From that point on, until June 2008, Lebanon was in a state of political deadlock, divided into two camps. As time went by, other political issues came up. One major issue was the election of a new president, as President Emile Lahoud’s term was about to end in November 2007 and he had no successor. The first reason for that was a long disagreement on a candidate, and, second, even after the army commander Michel Suleiman was agreed upon, his election was postponed on other grounds. Nabih Berri, who had the authority, as speaker, to convene the assembly, postponed the presidential elections 19 times before finally convening it only after the bloody events of May 2008 and the following Doha Agreement in June.131 Despite harsh criticism, Berri insisted the assembly would not convene until they agree upon a package deal, which would include additional topics under discussion. These topics included, besides electing a new president, the weapons of Hizballah, the composition of the Lebanese government, the majority–minority balance, the Hariri assassination probe and the international tribunal, a new electoral law for the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2009, and Lebanon’s relations with Syria, Iran, and the West.

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Most of the allegations against Berri during the crisis concerned his conducting the Parliament in a sectarian manner, rather than national. Walid Junblat, for example, expressed these claims in an interview to al-Mustaqbal, saying that Berri, Hibzallah, and “all those under the Syrian regime” were guilty of “kidnapping the Parliament” and hindering the financial well-being of the Beirut’s downtown core, site of the opposition sit-in to overthrow the government.132 Parliament speakers in Lebanon have already been known to use authority for narrow interests in the past. The most prominent case was in 1964, when the Shi‘ite speaker Kamil al-As‘ad used political maneuvering to foil President Fouad Chehab’s election for a second term. In a similar way, the speaker refused to convene the assembly using different excuses, until Chehab himself, who was a strong opponent of the al-As‘ad family, withdrew his candidacy. Nabih Berri was accused of refusing to convene the Parliament only as an excuse to prevent March 14 from using their parliamentary majority until the requirements of his own political camp were accepted. Berri and his friends were afraid that the parliamentary majority would be able to confirm a new government that would be constitutional, and to oust President Emile Lahoud, who was considered a remnant of Syria’s domination. Such steps would completely cancel the political weight of the March 8 alliance. Prima facie, taking into account the political atmosphere in Lebanon, Berri’s refusal made sense. However, his approach was unbalanced, as it aimed at seeking a unity government that would cancel the parliamentary majority of the rival camp. Being familiar with Lebanese history, most Lebanese politicians from both camps regarded the concept of a national unity government as a necessity. It was wrong and impossible to “run over” a large political minority, since no government can function without receiving minimal legitimacy from its opponents. The focus of debate turned out to be the question of balance between the two rival camps within the cabinet. The debate continued for months. The March 14 camp demanded the cabinet reflect their parliamentary majority as was normally the case in Western democracies. Berri and his partners in the March 8 alliance considered the Lebanese democracy to be different from Western ones. According to their point of view, unlike the conventional method of the West, where the winner “takes all” and forms a majority government, the minority’s role here was to implement its relative power in Parliament. In this sense, March 8’s demand to have a “blocking third” in the government, to prevent the March 14’s majority from making its own decisions in matters of national importance, as the constitution requires, can be seen as fair. The formula Berri proposed, however, seemed more like an attorney bargaining for his client by presenting higher standards of proof. When it became clear that the government would be comprised of 30 ministers, Berri clamed the division of power in the government should be one-third for each of the two rival camps and an additional one-third for ministers who represent the president. In other words, a government devoid of a proportional representation of the people’s will, as reflected in the parliamentary composition. From a democratic point of view, Berri stressed, as long as the March 14 was the majority

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they had the right to refuse the formation of a national unity government, but not the right to force the March 8 alliance to join them in a coalition government. He believed the March 14 was afraid to form a majority government as they knew the March 8 would enjoy the majority’s support in the streets, a belief that was proved true in the 2009 parliamentary elections. In spite of the March 14 victory in these elections, March 8 gained more votes in total numbers.133 Using his bargaining skills and early experience as a lawyer, Berri explained: When you make a coalition, you must give me my rights. Let’s use business as an example. If you have 100 dollars and I have 50 dollars, we can form a business together but you must give me a third of the power. If you don’t want to do that, you can go into business by yourself and I will compete with you. The government wants Hizballah, Amal, and the Christian parties led by General ‘Aoun to be with them in the government, but it does not want to give us our rightful share of power. We have 57 deputies out of 128—that is more than a third, 44 percent. But they want us to have less than a third of the power.134

Berri was perceived as a flexible factor in March 8. When he launched a new initiative for a dialogue during the crisis it was welcomed by the politicians. “This fine string still linking the speaker to the majority forces (March 14) makes him the only internal party who can propose a consensual initiative that can lead to the resumption of dialogue,” said an anonymous source from March 14, and Future Movement MP ‘Atef Majdalani added that “[Berri’s] initiative is not clear yet, but the speaker is known for his moderate stance.”135 Various mediation missions from outside of Lebanon arrived to try to find a compromise formula to the government’s composition. The Arab League, headed by ‘Amru Moussa, was involved for a long time in these attempts, but no compromise was reached. The Arab League’s proposal disappointed Berri. He claimed he expected a formula of ten ministers from each of the rival camps and ten for the president, and that he was very surprised to discover that the league was offering ten to March 8, 13 to March 14, and seven to the president.136 For Berri, who saw himself as an Arab nationalist, confronting the Arab League was not easy, but he had no choice but to go against the official Arab approach. The dilemma was solved, as many times in Berri’s career, by blaming external factors. At one point, he accused the United States of being responsible for the failure of the Arab League’s initiative by influencing some changes in the plan, an allegation Moussa denied.137 As far as Berri was concerned, the Arab League was under Western influence, while Syria, isolated in the League, represented the “real” Arab stand. At some point he tried to make a linkage between the Lebanese crisis and the debate in the Arab League, as a reaction to threats by Arab countries to cancel the Arab summit expected to be held in Damascus. Berri threatened that if the Arab summit in Damascus was canceled the March 8 would adopt a series of measures, hinting at the

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escalation of riots and violence in Lebanon.138 Berri also intimidated his opponents by implicitly threatening the use of weapons. Each time he was interviewed on TV, his supporters went out to the streets shooting into the air, showing Berri’s military backing.139 After 18 months of political crisis, many political assassinations, no incumbent president in Lebanon, and massive international involvement, the rival factions took their hostilities to the streets. A short civil war broke out in early May 2008, in which Berri’s Amal activists, together with Hizballah and SSNP armed men, took control over strategic points in Beirut and other areas in the country, exerting military pressure to gain political objectives. Two governmental decisions triggered the escalation of the ongoing crisis in April 2008 and led to the outbreak of armed clashes in May. The first decision was to remove Hizballah’s communications network, deployed by Iranian specialists in Beirut and other parts of the country. Hizballah responded by using the old excuse it had already used in the early 1990s when justifying the holding of its weapons. It claimed that its communications network was the most important weapon in any resistance to Israel, and that the regular communications network could be tapped or bombed. The exposure of spy scandals in Lebanese telecom firms in 2009 and 2010, related to Israel, proved in retrospect this claim.140 Hizballah also rightly claimed that in the past the government had released a statement saying the network was part of the legitimate resistance to Israel.141 The second decision was to dismiss Beirut International Airport’s head of security, following the exposure of a Hizballah surveillance camera which was monitoring a runway used primarily for executive jets.142 This was a highly sensitive issue, in light of the political assassinations Lebanon had experienced since 2005, and the fact that some members of the March 14 alliance, who were using this runway, including the bloc’s leader, Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri, were under continuous threat.143 Hizbalah answered that it would not allow the airport to serve the CIA and Mossad, alluding to Western patronage of the ruling coalition.144 As a response to the governmental decisions, March 8 supporters organized riots, which broke out in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. Militants took control over key points in the capital, including the al-Mustaqbal television station owned by Hariri, the financial districts, the residential areas where foreign embassies are located, and key road junctions. The clashes of May 2008 resulted in more than 80 dead and 241 injured.145 In the eyes of most Lebanese and foreign observers, the events were the embodiment of a “breaking the rules” scenario. The nightmare of the March 14 ruling coalition, in which Hizballah would turn its weapons against other Lebanese, became a reality. Lebanon was only one step away from entering a new civil war. However, the bloody clashes were the catalyst needed to end the political deadlock. Under massive pressure from the Arab League and with the consent of Iran and Syria, the top rival Lebanese factions embarked on a national dialogue in Doha, Qatar, between June 16 and 21, 2008, and finally reached an agreement.

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The Doha Agreement shows that March 8, based on Hizballah’s decisive military superiority, compelled the March 14 to accept most of its demands. The debate over the government’s composition ended with a new cabinet, headed by Fouad Siniora, but with a one-third veto right to the March 8. Both sides agreed to the election of Michel Suleiman, the army commander, as president. The two governmental decisions that were the trigger to the short civil war were reexamined in the first stage and later cancelled. Hizballah’s autonomic communications network remained in place. An agreement was reached regarding the constituencies for the upcoming parliamentary elections, including a new division of electorates in Beirut. In addition, Hizballah’s weaponry was indirectly recognized as legitimate until the issue could be solved in a dialogue as part of a national defense strategy. The above analysis of Nabih Berri’s role as Parliament speaker indicates his centrality in Lebanese politics. Since he is the only one of the Lebanese troika to remain in office since 1992, it is not an exaggeration to estimate that he might be the most important political figure in Ta’if’s Lebanon, except perhaps Rafik al-Hariri. However, at the same time that his importance increased in the national arena, Berri lost his exclusive leading position in the Shi‘ite community.

Berri’s Loss of Hegemony within the Shi‘ite Community The Ta’if Accord has changed the nature of the struggle for hegemony between the Shi‘ite moderate current, represented mainly by the Amal movement and headed by Nabih Berri, and the radical current, represented by Hizballah and headed since March 1992 by Hassan Nasrallah. Berri was the first senior Shi‘ite leader who agreed to recognize the Ta’if Accord as a basis for the rehabilitation of Lebanon after the civil war. He had to justify his participation in the political game according to the new rules, but it was not easy because most Shi‘ites felt the Accord was unjust to them. They ended the civil war in Lebanon as the largest and most military powerful religious sect, so rightly they thought they would obtain, according to Ta’if, some power. The Shi‘ite representation was only that of the third most important role of the ruling troika, and only 27 seats in the Parliament, compared with 34 Maronites and 27 Sunnis, both smaller religious sects.146 The first Lebanese government after the 1992 elections, under Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, had a problem in the Shi‘ite “street,” although most Shi‘ites were willing to accept its legitimacy. Amal, under Nabih Berri, and the SSIC, headed by Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, were part of the Lebanese regime, and even Hizballah found a niche in the new Parliament, although it despised Hariri’s government. In the Shi‘ite stronghold of Jabal‘Amil, most inhabitants wanted a quiet life and welcomed the deployment of the Lebanese army in areas outside the Israeli occupation. However, most Shi‘ites did not feel that the government represented their will. First, the compensation for Muslims in Ta’if was mainly for Sunnis, as Prime Minister

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Hariri was a dominant figure in the country. Second, most Shi‘ites opposed the idea of a peace agreement with Israel, especially after the Israeli bombing in July 1993. The state was suspected by them of attempting to reach such agreement because it had participated in the Middle East peace process which started in Madrid in 1991, and because of Hariri’s economic policy, based on ties with the West. Third, the government seemed to continue the negligence of Shi‘ite areas, fearing Islamic radicalism. This caused disgust among the Shi‘ites against the Lebanese administration and enabled Hizballah to take control of social services instead of government. Socially and politically, 20 years after the Ta’if Accord, the Shi‘ites are isolated by the other religious sects in Lebanon, in spite of a political alliance they have with Maronite leader Michel ‘Aoun. This isolation has not brought about a love story between the Shi‘ite two main factions, represented by Amal and Hizballah, but has led to political cooperation. In the first 15 years post Ta’if, the cooperation was imposed by the Syrian master of Lebanon, and aspired to unite the Shi‘ite community as a supporting factor. After Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the Shi‘ites themselves realized that the different factions share the same interests in the short run, which requires cooperation. Despite the decline of Amal and Nabih Berri’s influence in favor of Hizballah, It would be a mistake to see the moderate secular Shi‘ite current as insignificant. Its strength is reflected, inter alia, in parliamentary and municipal elections, which indicates the support of powerful elements in Shi‘ite society. On the other hand, Amal’s electoral power is, in many aspects, a result of Nabih Berri’s sharp senses and political negotiating skills. The state of mind among the Shi‘ite public in the era of Ta’if’s Lebanon is reflected by a process in which the ideological differences between Hizballah and Amal were blurred. On the one hand, Hizballah was constantly biting at the status of Amal and establishing its own as representative of the majority of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. On the other hand, Hizballah is going through a clear process of “Lebanonization” since 1990, and in fact shows the Shi‘ite public a very similar political platform to that of Amal. Given the above, the remaining question is why Hizballah is gathering strength if, ideologically, or at least practically, it has adopted Amal’s stands? If Nabih Berri’s way is practically adopted by his opponents, we would expect the Shi‘ite public to give him the credit for persisting in his basic ideology and policy, but it did not happen. The answer to the question why, consists of a number of reasons, which are examined in this chapter on three levels: the internal Lebanese Shi‘ite scene; the Lebanese national scene; and the regional level.

The Lebanese Shi‘ite Scene Berri began his term as speaker of Parliament in the middle of the struggle between Amal and Hizballah over political hegemony in the Shi‘ite community. Only two years have passed since the end of their military confrontation, which took the lives of three thousand Shi‘ites, before the struggle

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shifted to two other arenas. One arena was dealing with the poverty and deprivation the Shi‘ites were experiencing. Both movements wished to gain support by providing social and communal services, Amal by using governmental budgets, and Hizballah with Iranian financial support. The second arena was the attempt to define the Shi‘ites’ Lebanese nationalism. Amal wished to do so by occupying key positions and offices in the country, and portraying itself as representative of the state. As was explained at the beginning of the chapter, Nabih Berri succeeded in placing his people in key positions in national office and on important employees’ committees. Hizballah wished to build the Shi‘ites’ national identity on the basis of the armed resistance to the Israeli occupation, and later to the state of Israel, while blurring its Islamic dogma. These two arenas, the social one and the one of defining Shi‘ite Lebanese nationalism, were in the background of the political struggle between the two movements in Lebanon after the civil war. Parliamentary Elections The political scene in the Shi‘ite community, as in the other Lebanese religious sects, climaxed during election times. The 1996 parliamentary elections were supposed to reflect the political balance between Amal and Hizballah after one tenure under the Ta’if game rules and put the two main approaches in the Shi‘ite community to the test. For Berri, it was to be a personal test, not only because of his tight control of Amal, but also because of the leading role he played in the Lebanese troika. However, Syria, who was the political patron of Lebanon after Ta’if, prevented the two movements from conducting an open contest and forced them to run in joint electoral lists in the Shi‘ite strongholds of Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘.147 In spite of the Syrian influence, the election campaign enabled Berri to do what he does better than most Lebanese politicians, namely use political maneuvering to strengthen his position. He decided to join hands with Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and run in a joint alignment. The reason for his decision was heavy pressure, applied by secular Shi‘ites, who in early 1996, during the Israeli military attack known as “Grapes of Wrath,” felt solidarity with Hizballah and now changed their position. He was also under pressure from Sunnis and Christians, who weren’t pleased with Hizballah’s aggressive tone and its constant dispute with the regime, and who also feared the strengthening of the Iranian Islamic influence.148 The alliance with Hariri allowed Berri to present himself and Amal as a national Lebanese factor, which could promote the interests of the Shi‘ites in the rehabilitating country, and Hizballah as an element which could harm Lebanon’s prosperity by clinging to the resistance to Israel and divide the country by striving to form an Islamic state. To some degree, he managed to portray himself as being Shi‘ite-Arab Lebanese, and Hizballah as being Shi‘ite-Iranian Lebanese.149 His ally Hariri presented the upcoming elections as a battle between moderation and extremism.150 While Amal was politically more solid, both locally and nationwide, Hizballah reached the elections at a difficult time. First, the movement’s

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leadership was frustrated by the fact that resistance to Israel in the South was not acknowledged at the national level and was even perceived to be an obstacle to the country’s rehabilitation, especially during “Grapes of Wrath,” which occurred during the year of the elections. Second, for the first time in Hizballah’s history, inner conflicts harmed the movement’s unanimity. Although preliminary reports of opposition in the movement to the leadership’s direction, by a group headed by former Secretary General Subhi Tufayli, were denied by Hizballah, they later came to be known as genuine, as the opposition turned out to be an open conflict in the “Revolt of the Hungry” in late 1997. The opponents, who were identified with the Islamist–Iranian line, attacked the movement’s incorporation into the Lebanese political system, an act which they claimed contradicted the movement’s platform of 1985 and blurred its Islamic goals. On the other side was the camp headed by Hassan Nasrallah, identified not only with Iran but also with Syria, who wished to see the movement integrate into Lebanon’s politics and society.151 Syria was troubled by Iran’s growing influence in Lebanon following “Grapes of Wrath,” as it expected Iran to acknowledge Syria’s own hegemony over Lebanon and Hizballah. Syria did not want interference with its free hand in managing relations with the United States, the Middle East peace process, Lebanon’s affairs, and its relations with the Shi‘ite community. With this background, and in order to maintain stability in Lebanon, Syria intervened to force the Shi‘ite movements to reach an understanding. In late July, Ghazi Kan‘an, Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon, had lunch with Berri and Nasrallah and discussed the composition of the joint lists in the Biqa‘ and Jabal-‘Amil.152 As different estimates at the time gave Hizballah 60 percent of the support in a case of a direct contest between the movements, Nasrallah refused to compromise. Berri, understanding that an agreement would prevent Hizballah from further strengthening at his expense, refused to accept Amal’s prior waiving of power, especially in Jabal‘Amil.153 Although Hizballah lost in the first three election rounds in the other electoral districts, it still refused the alliance with Amal in the South, under Syrian patronage. The failure in the constituencies of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and ‘Akar partly resulted from the fact that some inhabitants of the Israeli security zone, who were listed as voters in these areas, went to Beirut to vote against Hizballah and in favor of Amal and Hariri’s lists, after Berri promised to protect them.154 In an attempt to win more votes, Hizballah examined the option of forming a joint alignment with the former feudal Shi‘ite leader of the South, Kamil al-As‘ad. The implication of such an alignment was an open disobedience to Syria, as the latter was furious with al-As‘ad for his involvement, as Parliament speaker, in the election of Bashir Jumayil as president in 1982 and approving the Lebanese–Israeli agreement of May 1983. Berri was an old adversary of Kamil al-As‘ad, dating back to the days of the latter’s father, Ahmad, in the early 1960s. He mocked Hizballah’s link with political feudalism (bakawat), especially with al-As‘ad. “We claim that we are in favor of Lebanon and against the formation of an

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Islamic country . . . it is Israel’s goal to form small Israeli entities (Isra’ilyat) in the region,” said Berri, referring to al-As‘ad’s role as parliamentary speaker in promoting the 1983 Lebanese–Israeli agreement.155 Hizballah attempted to broaden its political alignment in the South and ally with the Shi‘ite leftist Habib Sadeq, who was also considered a political rival of Berri. Berri’s ally, Rafiq al-Hariri, claimed, in regard to the elections in the South and the Biqa‘, that it would be between “moderate people who listen to the country’s common-sense, and extremists, who reject the country’s common sense.”156 Hizballah, on the other hand, claimed Amal was denouncing Hizballah as being radical and at the same time seek to form a joint alignment with it.157 As Amal and Hizballah refused to compromise, Syria intervened during the last days before the elections in Jabal-‘Amil. Vice President Khaddam summoned Nasrallah to Damascus on September 3, and Berri and Hariri the next day, and together with Ghazi Kan‘an forced upon them a draft of an agreement.158 In a joint meeting held later in the Syrian intelligence headquarters in ‘Anjar, Lebanon, in the presence of Ghazi Kan‘an and Ibrahim Safi, commander of the Syrian Second Corps in Lebanon, Berri and Nasrallah agreed upon the details of the joint list and the names of the candidates.159 According to the agreement, Hizballah received what Kan‘an had already offered in late July, namely four candidates out of 21 in Berri’s list in Jabal-‘Amil and five candidates in the Biqa‘.160 The implication of the agreement was that Hizballah received only nine out of the 46 places allocated to the South and the Biqa‘. This time, unlike the 1992 elections, Israel encouraged the inhabitants of the security zone it had occupied to vote, and the voting percentage in Jabal‘Amil reached 48 percent. The joint list won 21 out of the 23 seats. The other two seats were won by Rafiq al-Hariri’s sister, Bahia, and Popular Nasserite Organization leader, Mustafa Sa‘ad. In the Biqa‘, the joint list imposed by Syria won 22 out of 23 seats. The voting percentage there, which stood at 37 percent before the ballots were closed, jumped to 52 percent following a two-hour extension, probably after pro-government clerks inserted progovernment notes into the ballot boxes.161 The results of the elections gave both Berri and Hariri control over nearly half of the Parliament, while only 17 out of the 128 deputies, including Hizballah and independent Christians, were considered a real opposition. Berri now ruled a parliamentary bloc of 19 delegates. The next parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 2000, only three months after Israel had withdrawn from Southern Lebanon, after 18 years of occupation. The withdrawal was justly credited to the Lebanese resistance (al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya), meaning Hizballah. The two Shi‘ite movements were once again compelled by Syria to run in joint lists in Jabal-‘Amil and the Biqa‘, although this time they allowed Nabih Berri and Hassan Nasrallah to reach understandings regarding the power distribution in the lists. The alliance between Amal and Hizballah harmed Berri’s ability to sign a pact with other candidates and emphasized the alienation

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toward the Shi‘ites by the remaining two-thirds of the population. In order to handle Hizballah’s reputation as movement which had successfully resisted Israel, Amal had to strengthen its position in the government. The fact that Syria forced it to run in a joint list with Hizballah harmed Amal’s efforts to isolate itself from Hizballah in order to attract non-Shi‘ite voters and facilitate the Shi‘ite incorporation in the state’s institutions. Each of the two movements wanted to sign an electoral pact with the Maronites, different from the Maronite–Sunni pact which was at the center of the Lebanese politics since the national covenant of 1943 and different from the Sunni–Shi‘ite pact of Hariri and Berri in the 1996 elections. Hizballah, which was not a part of Hariri’s government (from the 1992 elections until October 1998) and Salim al-Hoss’s (from October 1998 until the elections of 2000), maintained good relations with the Maronite President Emile Lahoud. The president favored Hizballah by paying a state visit to Iran in April 2000, by maintaining direct contacts with Hassan Nasrallah, and by openly praising the resistance. Nabih Berri, on the other hand, maintained good relations with Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, as he was a potential bridge between the Maronite hard-core establishment and Syria. However, in the Shi‘ite strongholds, the elections were not an indication of the power balance between Amal and Hizballah, as Syria, once again, forced them to joint electoral alignment. In the South, the joint list received all 23 seats. This time the Sunni candidates from Sidon, Bahia al-Hariri, and Mustafa Sa‘ad, were part of the joint list. The two were at odds with each other for a long time, and, with Berri’s mediation, had to reconcile in order to enter the pact between the Shi‘ite movements, a pact which ensured they would be elected.162 Other candidates did not stand a chance against this list, as 80 percent of the voters in the South were Shi‘ites. Berri, who headed the list as the representative of the al-Zaharani constituency, derogatorily called the participants in the rival list, which included representatives from the traditional families and leftist parties, “frogs around Amal and Hizballah’s lake.”163 In the Biqa‘, the alliance between Amal and Hizballah convinced others to join the Shi‘ite pact, among them Hariri’s candidates, who were at the time in the opposition, and local leaders including government supporters. The joint list of Amal, Hizballah, and the previous Parliamentary speaker Hussein al-Husseini, who had returned to the political arena after eight years, won all the seats in the constituency of Ba‘albek-Hirmel. The general voting percentage in the South and the Biqa‘ was 40 to 45 percent.164 In Beirut, Rafiq al-Hariri won a clean-sweep victory, with 18 out of the 19 seats allocated to the area. The remaining seat was won by a delegate of Hizballah. Eventually, the elections played in Hariri’s favor, who, together with his ally, Junblat, won almost 35 percent of Parliament. Nabih Berri lost some of his power, when the bloc he headed now consisted of 17 legislators, six of them from Amal, compared with 19 in the 1996 Parliament. Amal’s presence decreased even in comparison to its rival Hizballah, which had restored its 1992 power and was

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now represented by 12 delegates, compared with nine in 1996. Hizballah’s remaining three delegates were Christians. The 2005 parliamentary elections were conducted in the shadow of the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon after 30 years. The Syrians, who for the first time after the end of the civil war did not control Lebanon during the elections, this time did not have to force the Shi‘ite movements to join forces because both Amal and Hizballah well understood the importance of a Shi‘ite unity. This matter was particularly important, due to the fact that the elections were held in the shadow of the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri. Once again the joint list prevented the possibility of estimating the power balance between the two. The elections in the South, in which 14 out of the 27 allocated Shi‘ite Parliament seats were elected, were held on June 6. The joint pro-Syrian list was comprised of six representatives for each movement, plus Bahia Hariri and Osama Sa‘ad, the next generation of Nasserite leadership from Sidon. Both Amal and Hizballah claimed the elections were a referendum over the “resistance” to Israel (al-muqawama), in order to bind the inhabitants to their joint list. The only list that did run against the joint list was one headed by Riyad al-As‘ad, member of the al-As‘ad feudal family, who ruled the South until the civil war. This list was backed by Michel ‘Aoun and the Communist Party. ‘Aoun had returned to Lebanon after 15 years of exile just weeks before the elections and inspired great hopes in the anti-Syrian bloc, which wanted to create a united political bloc, comprised of Christians and Sunni Muslims. ‘Aoun’s involvement upset Berri quite a bit. The latter sarcastically said, “I believe the general is functioning in politics as he did in the army. He is against all people, which I think will lead him nowhere.” ‘Aoun fought back and said, “I don’t understand his policies . . . we speak two different languages.”165 Several months after the elections both found themselves in the same political alliance. No one was surprised by the results in Jabal-‘Amil. Nearly 80 percent cast their votes in favor of Amal and Hizballah.166 The average voting percentage stood at 45. On a personal level, Berri was surprised not to have received his usual highest number of votes, as Muhammad Fneish, MP from Hizballah, received several hundred more votes, which, apart from its symbolism, had no importance.167 When the results were published, Berri was able to announce, “The South has declared, clearly and before international observers, its backing of the resistance as a path for the past, present, and future . . . even the rival candidates are resistance fighters.”168 This was Berri’s way of using the unequivocal results of the elections against the demand to disarm Hizballah, a demand that was more intensely raised following Syria’s withdrawal in April that year. Similar statements were made by senior members of Hizballah, such as Nabil Qa‘uk, Hizbullah’s top official in the South and Na‘im Qasem, vice secretary general.169 In the Biqa‘ eight Shi‘ite deputies were elected, all of them from the joint list of Amal and Hizballah. This time, however, the joint list contained candidates from the full political spectrum, including the March 14 alliance of Sa‘ad al-Din Hariri.

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In general, the pro-Syrian camp, to which both Shi‘ite movements belonged, was defeated in the elections. The elected Parliament included three main blocs: a bloc based on the anti-Syrian March 14 with 72 seats; the bloc headed by Michel ‘Aoun with 21 seats; and the pro-Syrian bloc, which was based on Hizballah, Amal, and non-Shi‘ite candidates, with 35 seats. The representation of the Shi‘ite movements was balanced. Fifteen Shi‘ites were elected from Nabih Berri’s list, “the Development and Liberation” (alTanmiya wal-Tahrir), 11 of whom were Amal members and 4 independent candidates. Hizballah also won 14 seats, from which 11 were movement members and 3 others of independent candidates, who joined its “Loyalty to the Resistance” list (al-Wafa’ lil-Muqawama). Apart from Amal and Hizballah, the bloc included the SSNP, the Ba‘ath, the Popular Nasserite Organization, and a faction of the Maronite Phalanges, who left the bloc after a short time. After the elections were over, the Parliament convened its first session, electing Nabih Berri for the fourth time in a row as speaker. According to Subhi Tufayli, Hizbollah’s former secretary general, March 14 alliance approached Hassan Nasrallah with a proposal to replace Berri, a proposal Hizbollah’s chief turned down.170 Although the anti-Syrian camp won the elections, it had little choice but to back Berri, as his alliance with Hizballah had won over 80 percent of the Shi‘ite vote. Replacing him would seem like defying the will of the largest religious sect. Ninety members voted for Berri, but 37 cast blanks in what was seen as a protest against Berri and Syria. One vote went to Bassem Saba‘, an anti-Syrian Shi‘ite lawmaker who had previously confronted Berri. “I pledge to work tirelessly for the accomplishment of the people’s aspirations and for the consolidation of the citizens in their state, not in the regime,” Berri said in a speech upon his reelection. He vowed to shield Hizballah as an anti-occupation resistance movement, against international pressure to forcefully disarm it, and to conduct an uncompromising war against corruption. Many of Berri’s supporters drove around the city in cars carrying his picture in a show of force. Fireworks and gunfire outside the Parliament caused the wounding of two men.171 The 2009 elections confronted the two main political alliances in Lebanon, March 8 and March 14, less than one year after the short civil war of May 2008. Since those violent events and the following Doha Agreement, both of which represented a clear victory for the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance, the election results were a surprise. The anti-Syrian March 14 alliance won a parliamentary majority, quite similar to the previous elections of 2005, 72 seats against 59. In total numbers, the results presented a “popular majority” of the March 8, gaining an overall of 839,371 votes (55 percent) while the March 14 got an overall vote of only 693,931 (45 percent).172 Amal and Hizballah ran with joint lists and won all the Shi‘ite seats in the main Shi‘ite constituencies. Since these results were expected, the only noteworthy event was the running of an anti-Hizballah list in Jabal-‘Amil, The Lebanese Identity Union. This movement, which is also known as The Lebanese Option Gathering, was established in 2007 and headed by Ahmad

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al-As‘ad, the son of former Lebanese Parliament speaker Kamil al-As‘ad. The latter criticized Hizballah and Amal for silencing their opponents and for political and theological issues. With regard to the political aspect, al-As‘ad stated that while Hizballah emphasized ethnic Shi‘ism, his movement prioritized national Lebanese goals; he also criticized Hizballah’s subjugation to Iran. It should be noted that al-As‘ad himself was criticized for having the United States and Saudi Arabia fund his activity. As far as the struggle against Israel, al-As‘ad emphasized the need to build a Lebanese state that has the exclusive right to decide on matters of war and peace and does not allow various movements, such as Hizballah, to make decisions such as was the case in July 2006.173 However, the influence of the two major movements in the Shi‘ite public was so strong that even in his own constituency Ahmad al-As‘ad was defeated in large numbers. He gained only 10,694 votes, while the candidates of the joint list gained 48,064 votes (for ‘Ali Hassan Khalil) and 46,674 (for ‘Ali Rashid Fayad).174 At the end of the elections, both Amal and Hizballah won 13 seats each. In early June Berri was elected speaker for the fifth time in a row, gaining 90 votes. “I call on the Lebanese and on myself to benefit from favorable regional and international developments in order to consolidate peace and stability in Lebanon,” Berri said after the results were announced.175 All in all, Amal and Hizballah have not directly competed since the 1992 elections in the two major Shi‘ite areas. Running in a joint electoral list in 1996 and 2000, under orders from Syria, benefited Nabih Berri and prevented him from being defeated. Running in a joint list in 2005 and 2009 reflects the pragmatism of the two Shi‘ite movements, their recognition of the continuing isolation of the Shi‘ites in Lebanon, and the need to join hands to deal with it. Municipal Elections The Lebanese law empowers municipalities to decide upon the annual budget and taxation policy, to influence the realm of education and transportation rules, to name streets, and more. Ruling municipalities was hence a means for the Shi‘ite movements to strengthen their political and ideological grasp. Unlike the parliamentary elections, in which a direct contest between Amal and Hizballah was avoided, the municipal elections were a good indication of the political power balance within the Shi‘ite community. An exception was the election campaign of 2010, in which Amal and Hizballah reached a pre-agreement. The first municipal elections in Lebanon since 1963 were held in May and June 1998. Nabih Berri put Amal’s old mechanism to the test, by collaborating with independent candidates, Shi‘ites, and others, versus Hizballah’s organized disciplined mechanism. While Amal’s candidates were busy coming to terms with strong families and promoting themselves, Hizballah’s candidates offered a practical platform, emphasizing especially the movement’s experience in handling economic and social matters and in development. Hizballah offered no ideological platform, apart from the resistance

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to the Israeli occupation, and even blurred matters which could have hurt secular residents and tourism, such as the Islamic prohibition of drinking alcohol.176 In these elections, similar to the parliamentary ones two years later, Berri collaborated with Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in joint lists, while Hizballah collaborated with the former feudal (za’im) Kamil al-As‘ad. The results reflected, although to a lower-than-expected extent, the ongoing erosion in Amal’s position inside the Shi‘ite community and Hizballah’s growing influence, both ideological and material. The elections were conducted in four rounds between May 24 and June 14, each round in a different constituency. At the end of the day, 7,662 local council members and 2,041 heads of villages (mukhtarat) and city mayors were elected. The voter, who had registered in advance in order to vote, received a special ballot. Those registered were 60 percent nationwide, but 30 percent in Beirut.177 In the Israeli security zone and the villages in the Shuf area, which were abandoned since the days of the civil war, no elections were held. The Shi‘ite areas saw a hard struggle between the two poles represented by Amal and Hizballah. In Southern Lebanon, the elections were held on June 7 and were a measure of Amal and Hizballah’s strength and their organizational ability, although inter-family rivalries and old personal disputes were also involved.178 Hizballah felt confident enough to postpone Amal’s proposal to run in joint lists. The results were somewhat of a surprise, as Amal managed to win in Jabal-‘Amil. The extent of Amal’s triumph is a matter of dispute, as the two movements ascribed themselves the independent candidates who won the elections in a few municipalities. According to Nabih Berri, Amal won 51 out of 75 municipalities in which the movements confronted one another, while according to Hizballah, Amal won only 35 municipalities and Hizballah won 33 out of 68.179 In the municipalities where most of the population was not Shi‘ite, the two movements did not run in the elections. As far as village heads were concerned, Amal won 146 Mukhtarat compared with 50 for Hizballah.180 Although Amal had lost its stronghold of Nabatiyeh, it won the important city of Tyre. In the Biqa‘, elections were held on June 14. In Ba‘albek, a city where the majority of the population is Shi‘ite and which had been Hizballah’s stronghold in its first years, there was a big surprise. Hizballah was defeated as the Sunnis, who constitute 30 percent of the population, all voted in favor of the joint list of Amal, candidates from leftist parties, and important families. Hizballah, who was confident it would win the elections in the city, demanded on the eve of the elections that the mayoralty would be retained by one of its activists. The demand stirred up many Sunnis, who felt it might deter tourists from coming to the Biqa‘. Their claim was rejected by Hassan Nasrallah, who argued after the elections that the results were “a wave of confessionalism.”181 It is possible that Syria was involved in inflaming the resistance to Hizballah, as the Syrian interest was to prevent the movement from strengthening to the point where it would feel free to choose allies from within and outside of Lebanon.182 Hizballah won Hirmel, but lost the villages of Brital and Taraya to the supporters of former Hizballah Secretary

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General Subhi Tufayli, who rebelled a few months earlier against the government and Hizballah’s leadership. The rebellion, which was named “Revolt of the Hungry,” was suppressed in early 1998. In the southern Biqa‘, a variety of different lists won the polls, among them families and movements. At the end of the elections, Hizballah ruled 18 municipalities in the Biqa‘, where its men held 224 seats, compared with nine municipalities for Amal which held 158 seats. If not taking into account the 11 municipalities where the winners were under dispute were removed, then at the end of the elections in the two Shi‘ite strongholds Amal ruled 48 municipalities and Hizballah 40. Amal also received more seats in the local councils, 483 compared with 443 for Hizballah.183 In the neighborhoods of Bourj al-Barajneh and Ghobeiri in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which were technically part of the Mount Lebanon constituencies, Hizballah defeated Berri and Hariri’s joint list. It won 90 seats, while Amal won none.184 These large neighborhoods in southern Beirut were in Hizballah’s de facto control since the end of the fighting between the two movements in 1990. Generally speaking, the 1998 municipal elections have shown the increase in Hizballah’s power among the Shi‘ites at the expense of Amal, and that Nabih Berri was the most influential politician among the Shi‘ites. Although Berri was responsible for Amal’s loss of strength after the end of the civil war, he managed to limit the damage by using political alliances and to keep Amal, and himself, as the leading faction in the Shi‘ite municipalities, especially in the South. The next municipal elections, held in the summer of 2004, reflected the continuing increase in Hizballah’s strength and the dominance of the movement in the Shi‘ite street, at Amal’s expense. From the 171 Shi‘ite municipalities in southern Lebanon (the South and Nabatiyeh districts), the two movements entered a direct contest over the control of 142 municipalities. In 19 there was an understanding on candidates from strong local families, independent from the movements, and in 10 Amal and Hizballah ran in a joint list. In the rest of the municipalities, Hizballah won 87, while Amal won only 55. As far as seats in the local councils, Hizballah won 1,163 seats in the South compared with 613 for Amal. Among the municipalities Hizballah ruled were Nabatiyeh and Bint-Jbeil, while Amal managed to retain its control over the important city of Tyre. In the Biqa‘, Hizballah won a sweeping victory, with 36 municipalities compared with only 2 for Amal. Hizballah won 490 seats in the local councils there, compared with 30 for Amal. In the whole of Lebanon, Hizballah won 1,653 seats, while Amal won only 643, and Hizballah ruled 127 rural and urban councils, while Amal ruled only 57.185 Generally, Hizballah increased the number of municipalities it won in the entire country from 15 percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2004.186 In the next municipal elections held in May 2010, Amal and Hizballah for the first time cooperated in a joint slate of candidates. It may have been the result of Hizballah feeling that it had lost popularity in recent years due to its failure to reconstruct many of the ruined houses from the July 2006 war. However, this prevents measuring the balance of power between them after the 2006 war and the short civil war of May 2008.

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Summarizing the municipal election campaigns as a measure of the balance of power between Hizballah and Amal, it is clear that Hizballah increased its grasp among the Shi‘ite population at Amal’s expense. With regard to the personal level, the municipal campaigns indicate that Nabih Berri’s main areas of popularity are in the western part of the South, including the al-Zaharani, Bint-Jbeil, and Tyre. In Beirut’s southern suburb, Berri is popular in some of the areas, such as al-Shiyah and Bir Hassan, and somewhat in the western and central Biqa‘ towns. Inferiority in Supplying the Public Needs The gradual decline in Berri’s strength among the Shi‘ite public, as reflected in the election campaigns after the Ta’if Accord, resulted primarily from the Shi‘ites’ feeling of deprivation and anger against the Lebanese establishment and Berri’s identification with it. The fact that the Shi‘ites still feel deprived, and somewhat social outsiders, is credited largely to Berri, who serves a central role in the troika, which has led the country for the past 20 years. The Lebanese establishment has failed to correct the pre-Ta’if deprivation of the Shi‘ites, especially the supply of basic services to the poor Shi‘ite population of Beirut’s al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiyya, of Jabal-‘Amil, and of the Biqa‘. Not only is Nabih Berri identified with this failure, but his prominent rival in the Shi‘ite community, Hizballah, is perceived to have the answer to the population’s needs. Hizballah has gotten this reputation by using a wide social services network, and filling the country’s needs in matters of welfare, relief, medicine, and education. Nevertheless it should be explicitly said that Amal has not neglected this field. It runs a network very much like Hizballah’s, although on a smaller scale, due to the fact that it is financed mostly by the Lebanese government. Hizballah’s ability to provide large-scale services is due to the fact that it receives large sums of money from Iran. In 1995, for example, Amal’s Parliament member, Muhammad Baydun, estimated the Iranian support of Hizballah, for social and military activities, to be approximately 100 million dollars.187 Its social network of educational institutions, clinics, construction companies, and other services was established in the 1980s. Berri, who cannot compete with these sums, tries to use his position as speaker to gain public support among the Shi‘ites and to broaden their dependence on him to influence governmental budgets allocated for the Shi‘ites. One way Berri uses the state’s establishments, for the sake of the Shi‘ites and Amal, is to control those governmental ministries relevant to the South of Lebanon. Berri himself served in the 1980s as minister of the South, a job created especially for him. In Ta’if’s Lebanon, Amal’s ministers tended to serve in the ministries of public works, agriculture, energy, trade and health, sometimes even as economic ministers. Each one of these offices has a budget, which could be allocated to improve Shi‘ites’ conditions. In one case, in the 1990s, Berri appointed a relative, ‘Ali Harajili, whose daughter is married to Berri’s son, to be on behalf of Amal, minister of public works.188

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As speaker, Berri promotes Shi‘ite issues, including budgets for the Council of the South (majlis al-Janub), a governmental organization controlled by Amal. These budgets are a partial counterbalance to Hizballah’s huge Iranian support, which finances its welfare networks. The Council of the South, founded by the Lebanese government in 1970, was controlled by the za‘im Kamil al-As‘ad, who served as Parliament speaker during the 1970s. During the 1980s, when Amal became the dominant Shi‘ite political factor instead of al-As‘ad, the council was put under Berri’s personal control as a minister for the South. He appointed associates for top positions in it and was involved in listing priorities for the council. In the last decade the council has been headed by Amal’s Qabalan Qabalan, son of ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan, head of the SSIC. After the 2006 war with Israel, many parts of Jabal-‘Amil needed reconstruction. The war damage was estimated to be 13 thousand damaged buildings in the South alone, six thousand of them completely ruined. While the representatives of Hizballah’s construction company (Jihad al-Bina’) were able to come to the ruined villages on the day of the ceasefire, in August 2006, and offer the inhabitants cash, Amal had no monetary response and it had to depend on governmental favors. Berri’s good relations with Syria helped the Council of the South receive Syrian financial aid to restore some villages, but on a much smaller scale than Hizballah.189 The fact that the war itself caused a political crisis, including an argument over the government’s legitimacy, delayed the allocation of the budgets to the South, including those of the Council of the South. In fact, by refusing to assemble the Lebanese Parliament for months from 2006 to 2008, Berri prevented Amal from significantly contributing to the restoration of the Shi‘ite areas, using the Council’s budget. By doing so, he strengthened the dependence on Hizballah in all reconstruction matters. As speaker, Berri doesn’t hesitate to attack the government whenever the Council’s budgets are delayed. In the beginning of 2009, a political crisis erupted after Prime Minister Fouad Siniora objected to including 60 million Lebanese liras for the Council in the budget. Berri perceived the budget increase as an important means to improve his position versus that of Hizballah, especially as it was to be allocated in the year of parliamentary elections, and a year before the municipal elections. He threatened that unless the matter was resolved by allocating the budget to the Council, he would make sure the forthcoming parliamentary elections in the summer would be held in the five constituencies on sequential weekends, as was done in the past, and not in one day countrywide, as Siniora and the March 14 camp wanted.190 After almost six months of crisis, which prevented the allocation of the budget, the allocation was agreed upon as Berri wanted.191 Berri, as usual, presented his personal interest in the budgeting of the Council as a national patriotic matter, when asking, “Is it all about punishing the South and the southerners?” He further added that in addition to not supporting the southerners’ struggle against Israel by not releasing funds to the Council, the government had launched a premeditated

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media campaign designed to hide the fact that Iran and Syria, the patrons of the March 8 political alliance, offered to support the resistance and the liberation.192 Amal’s desire not to leave communal activities exclusively to Hizballah is not reflected only in the activities of the Council of the South. Amal’s institutions try to narrow the gap with the rival Shi‘ite movement as far as providing for the many years of deficiency in governmental investments. The activity operates under “The Association of Civil Activity” (Jam‘iyat al‘Amal al-Ahli), which has three main goals: (a) to improve the living conditions of the backward population in southern Lebanon, in rural areas and in poor suburbs; (b) to deal with the basic demands of the marginal population and its integration into the society; and (c) to prepare the proper conditions and climate for the existence of a culture of openness, reconciliation, and social justice. To do so, Amal had initiated numerous projects and established an educational network, titled “al-Zuhara,” named after the title of Fatima, daughter of Prophet Muhammad and the wife of ‘Ali, founder of the Shi‘a. The network provides for children as young as three years of age in its nursery (founded in 1988), for elementary school children (founded in 1981), and for children with special needs aged five to twelve (founded in 1997). The network also contains vocational training programs, such as the nursing school (founded in 1975) and other short training programs. One project, titled “The Green House” guides women in how to run an agricultural business, for example, growing flowers. Amal also occasionally organizes an open market for the products of these women, in which their businesses are promoted. In 1992 Amal established a culinary school, which included guidance in milk production.193 At the same time, Amal runs a wide services network as part of a mechanism called “The Family of Emissary” (Usrat al-Risala). This system has a more religious character, and it includes a scout’s movement called “Scout Association of the Islamic Mission” (Jam‘iyat Kashafat al-Risalah al-Islamiya). This movement was established in the days of Musa Sadr in 1977, and was recognized by the Lebanese education ministry, a recognition which wins it governmental aid. The movement is open for children age five and older and has 15 thousand listed pupils and 2,500 guides in four hundred scout divisions. Women are not deprived, as they participate in the “Association of Women Guides of the Islamic Mission,” which includes 2,100 guides and 13,000 pupils. The “Emissary family” also organizes religious activity, such as guidance on Islamic holidays and events, holding courses for reading the holy Qur’an, and visits to the sacred places of Islam and the Shi‘a.194 As does Hizballah, Amal provides the sick population with health support. In the realm of “The Association of Civil Activity,” Amal runs two clinics in Jabal-‘Amil, in the village of Taybe and near the Qouzah–Ita alSha‘ab junction, as well as mobile clinics in remote villages. In addition, the “Emissary family” also has a medical assistance body, Jam‘iyat al-Risala lilIs‘af wal-Sahi, which operates 2,300 paramedics and 75 ambulances.195

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After the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Amal operated a special program to reintegrate prisoners to society. The program, in cooperation with the Council for Development and Reconstruction, the Lebanese government, and the UN, enabled released prisoners to learn a trade and join the governmental development plans. The program was directed at prisoners who had served at least one year in either the Israeli prison or the South Lebanon Army’s prison of al-Hiyam.196 One of Amal’s important social institutions cares for the families of the movement’s fallen militiamen, called “Organization of the Fallen Lebanese Soldiers’ Oasis” (Mu’asasat Wahat al-Shahid al-Lubnani), established in 1990. This organization deals with adopting the children of Amal’s fallen militiamen and assists their families with education and employment, including vocational training.197 Unlike Hizballah’s parallel organization (Mu’asasat alShahid), the Lebanese connection is prominent in this body’s name. By doing so, Amal tried to distinguish itself from Hizballah and emphasize its Lebanese nationality and loyalty to the state. It is not the only organization Amal operates whose name emphasizes its national Lebanese character. In the Ghobeiri neighborhood of Beirut’s Dhahiyya, for example, the movement operates a body called “The Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care” (alJam‘iya al-Lubnaniya lil-Ri’ayat al-Saha wal-Ijtima‘iya), which deals with a variety of activities aimed at strengthening weak populations. Like Hizballah, Amal also runs its own media, called Amal’s Media Institution (Mu’asasat Amal al-I‘lamiya). Its television station, known as Nabih Berri’s N.B.N., is also called the “National Broadcasting Network” (al-Shabaka al-Wattaniya lil-Irsal). This name also implies Amal’s national perception. The movement also has a political magazine, al-‘Awasif (The Storms), published in the Barbir neighborhood in the southern Dahiyya of Beirut. The field of education demonstrates perhaps best the struggle between Amal and Hizballah over the future of Lebanon’s Shi‘a. In 2006, Amal published an encyclopedia which describes its activities and history. The first sentence in the chapter that deals with education belongs to Musa Sadr, who expressed well the importance of education to the movement: “There is no doubt that knowledge is the best revolution in the delicate situation of our [Arab] nation and [Lebanese] country.”198 Movements that wish to perpetuate their ideology for long periods form youth movements, sometimes even whole educational systems, to train the movement’s next generation, who will have to try to implement its world view. Hizballah’s work in this field was already studied in previous research. With Iranian financial assistance, the movement has formed, since the mid-1980s, a network of schools called “the Schools of the Mahdi” (Madaris al-Mahdi), named after the twelfth Shi‘ite Imam, who, according to the Shi‘ite tradition, disappeared as a child and is due to return some day as the “Mahdi.” Today, the educational network includes tens of thousands of Shi‘ite pupils, from kindergarten to high school. Hizballah’s educational institutions emphasize religious elements, including the connection to Iran and the idea of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (Wilayat al-Faqih). The pupils receive scholarships and

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assistance in buying textbooks, stationery, private lessons, and everything the pupils need to succeed. In the Shi‘ite neighborhoods of the southern Dhahiyya, one can find other schools, under the sponsorship of senior religious figures. Late Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah used to have his own educational network called “Islamic Religious Education Association” (Jam‘iyat al-Ta‘alim al-Dini al-Islami). Ibrahim Shams al-Din, son of the former SSIC head, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, also runs a network of vocational and religious schools in the Shi‘ite neighborhoods.199 Faced with the educational challenge, Nabih Berri had an ideological problem. As someone who sees the Lebanese nationality as a primary source of identification, Berri would rather have the Shi‘ite children attend school within a national educational framework. However, as Amal was losing support in favor of Hizballah, Berri didn’t just stand by. In the early 1990s, he ordered the formation of Amal’s educational network, called “The Amal Educational Centers” (Mu’assasat Amal al-Tarbawiyya). From 1990 to 2002, Amal established seven schools in this network, all named after the movement’s martyrs (Shuhada’), who died either in the battle against Israel or in the Lebanese civil war. One school in the Bir Hassan neighborhood in southern Dhahiyya is named after the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. The schools are located in the heart of the Shi‘ite areas, four in Jabal-‘Amil, two in the Biqa‘ and one in Beirut’s southern Dhahiyya. Most of them combine academic and vocational studies, such as electricity, accounting, architectural design, management, and hotelkeeping.200 One of the movement’s educational declarations is the support of moral and ideological values, emphasizing the principles of faith, and, different from Hizballah, the national integration and bond to the land of Lebanon, its unity and independence.201 Amal also runs cultural and research centers, “The Center of Imam Musa al-Sadr” being the most prominent. This nonprofit Beirut-based institute, established in 1995, organizes conventions regarding current issues in the Lebanese discourse. The center holds an annual convention to discuss a central issue, such as the Islamic–Christian dialogue (1996), human rights (1998), civil society resistance (2000), and the dialogue between civilizations (2001). The center also has an archive, containing documents and photos of Musa Sadr, and it also publishes the speeches and writings of Amal’s founder.202 A similar center, the Nabih Berri Cultural Complex (Mujama‘a Nabih Berri al-Thaqafi), is being built in south Lebanon. The center will hold conventions, and include a library of twenty thousands books and perhaps, in the future, contain Nabih Berri’s archive of speeches and photos.203 One has to remember that poverty and deprivation among the Lebanese Shi‘ites is still greater than in other communities. Hizballah also was not always able to fulfill all of the community member’s expectations, and Nabih Berri tries to use this in order to strengthen his position. A mutiny attempt inside Hizballah, led by Subhi Tufayli in the Biqa‘ as of mid-1997, is a good example of this. Tufayli, who led Hizballah in the mid-1980s, left the movement in 1992 in protest of Hizballah’s participation in the parliamentary elections and its “moderation” toward the Lebanese state, which

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contradicted the movement’s political platform of 1985. He claimed that Hizballah, under the leadership of Hassan Nasrallah, had deserted its basic Islamic social commitment, to become a regular political party and a resistance movement against Israel. The revolt he declared, called “The Revolution of the Hungry” (Thawrat al-Jiya‘), which expressed resentment for the continuing poverty of many Shi‘ites, reflected the inner argument regarding Hizballah’s path, which began in the early 1990s. In Ta’if’s Lebanon, Hizballah blurred its Islamic dogmas and chose, instead, to emphasize Lebanese nationalism, in a process usually referred to as “Lebanonization.” The principles of this process were previously explained in this chapter. Tufayli and his supporters revolted against the process of Lebanonization, which they claimed shifted the movement from its main purpose, that of being an all-Islamic movement. The argument inside Hizballah faced Iran with a dilemma, of whether to support the existing leadership, which leads a pragmatic national Lebanese line, or to support Tufayli’s group, which believes in the basic principles of the Islamic revolution. The Islamic republic favored Nasrallah and the existing leadership. In July 1997 Tufayli organized a protest against the governmental negligence of the Shi‘ites and their poverty in the Lebanese Biqa‘. His support base was largely in the villages of Brital and Tarayya in the Lebanese northern Biqa‘. Following repeated clashes between Tufayli’s supporters and the Lebanese security forces, the Lebanese army deployed three thousand soldiers in the northern Biqa‘. Following the arrests of 23 demonstrators in October, Tufayli’s men physically prevented Lebanese members of Parliament and ministers from visiting the northern Biqa‘. Nabih Berri, who sought to improve his low status in the Biqa‘ and to gain points at the expense of Hizballah and of Premier Rafiq Hariri, promised the rebels that the governmental aid of 100 million dollars pledged to them would be transferred before the end of the year. Following that promise, he was able to arrange for the members of Parliament a quick pass to the barred regions. Berri also distinguished himself from another prominent Shi‘ite personality, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, head of the SSIC. Shams al-Din, who stood unequivocally against Tufayli and supported the government, was criticized by Tufayli himself, who wondered in a radio broadcast what Shams al-Din had ever done to alleviate poverty in the Biqa‘.204 The “Revolution of the Hungry” ended on February 1, 1998, after Tufayli’s supporters besieged a Shi‘ite educational institution of Hizballah (hawza ‘ilmiya) two days earlier. The Lebanese government ordered the army, under pressure from Syria, to attack the compound of the hawza. The attack left eight dead, including Haydar Talis, a former MP who joined Tufayli, and two soldiers. Tufayli and about 100 of his fighters were allowed to escape to the hills near his hometown of Britel when the head of Syrian military intelligence in Ba‘albek, Colonel ‘Ali Safi, stepped in and forced the advancing Lebanese army units to halt.205 Although the issue was transferred from a military court to a civilian one and rumors were spread that Tufayli faced a

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death sentence, prominent Shi‘ites objected to the harsh steps which could have divided the Shi‘ites once and for all. As a result of their objection, at the end of the day the Lebanese government decided not to settle the score with Tufayli. An Iranian delegation which arrived in Lebanon emphasized keeping “minimal unity in Shi‘ite lines.”206 Eventually, Nabih Berri scored some points against Hizballah, being the driving force to financial aid for the Shi‘ites of the Biqa‘.207 In 2007 Western analyst Manuela Paraipan visited the southern towns of Bint-Jbeil, ‘Ayn-Ibel, and Tibnin, Berri’s village of origin. She heard people praising Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri for taking care of them. Each time she asked them, “What about the state?” the answer was “Which state?”208 This story reveals the extent to which the Shi‘ite movements took the job of the Lebanese state in providing the basic needs of the Shi‘ite population. Berri’s identification with the state establishment, being Parliament speaker for almost 20 consecutive years, harms his image among the Shi‘ite public, due to the establishment’s failure in the Shi‘ite areas. The gaps in the extent of the assistance to the population between Hizballah and Amal are a major reason for Berri’s weakening in the Shi‘ite arena over the last 20 years. Resistance to the Israeli Occupation Another reason for the weakening of Berri’s status with the Shi‘ite public was his removal from the heart of the resistance to the Israeli occupation of part of southern Lebanon, which the Israelis called the “security belt.” As the years went by and Israel continued to occupy parts of Lebanon, while harming the local population, the extremism of the Shi‘ite public and the willingness to fight Israel grew. As a result, the popularity of those fighting Israel, especially Hizballah, increased. The fact that Hizballah took the lead in the armed struggle to expel Israel from Lebanon made Amal lose some of its support in the South. Fighting the Israeli occupation not only made the public proud, but increased its feeling of being a part of Lebanon, by standing in the front of the struggle against Israel. The struggle took a heavy toll on human life and property, but Hizballah managed to handle the loss by using a wide system of support for the families of the victims and for the civilian infrastructure, with Iranian financing. When faced with the growing popularity of the resistance to Israel among the Shi‘ite public, and Hizballah’s identification with this resistance, Berri could only accelerate his verbal attacks against Israel and regarding the Palestinian problem, and extol Amal’s part in the resistance. Amal, unlike Hizballah, disarmed following the Ta’if Accord and gave up its right for an organized military force. Nevertheless, the supporters of the movement continue to hold small arms and often take to the streets to express joy and support for Berri. During the late 1990s, Amal supporters claimed to have taken part in actions against the Israeli occupation.209 Over the years, some events have become symbols for the Lebanese Shi‘ites’ resistance and sacrifice. The remembrance days for these occasions are used by Berri to emphasize his support of the resistance. In one of these

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events, known in Lebanon as the “Qana Massacre,” 106 Shi‘ite civilians were killed by an Israeli shell shot by accident while they were taking refuge in a UN shelter during the short war of April 1996, known as “Grapes of Wrath.” On the thirteenth anniversary of the occasion Berri delivered a speech to the village’s inhabitants and stated that the Qana Massacre “ended the turning of a blind eye to the war crimes and terrorist acts of Israel.” He stressed that the Lebanese know that their sole enemy is Israel which violated their borders, invaded their country, and committed massacres.210 Berri made similar speeches during other events, such as the memorial days of the Israeli “Operation Accountability” during July 1993 and the Israeli shelling of Kfar-Qana on July 30, 2006, which also took a heavy toll on human life. Another way in which Berri handles Hizballah’s success in the resistance to Israel is by commemorating Amal’s part in the struggle. During the late 1980s, for example, Berri published a book containing poems and funeral orations he wrote glorifying Amal’s fighters and the resistance. In his book, titled Pages from the Soil of the Resistance (Awraq fi Turab al-Muqawama), Berri praised the part Amal men and others took in the resistance.211 In Amal’s encyclopedia, published by the movement in 2006, one of the ten volumes is dedicated to Amal’s martyrs (shuhada’). The biographies of the martyrs who died while fighting the Israeli occupation received a special place in the book.212 Berri’s efforts to provide Amal with a central place in the resistance, thereby riding the wave of hate of Israel in the Shi‘ite street, and to appear as a Lebanese Arab nationalist, are faced with a similar effort carried out by Hassan Nasrallah. The leader of Hizballah, who takes credit for most of the resistance to Israel and its success, displays Hizballah’s accomplishments as Lebanon’s accomplishments in order to blur all suspicions that his movement might not be loyal to the state. At the end of the day, Nabih Berri manages to be identified with the resistance despite the small part Amal plays in this struggle. Most Shi‘ites realize, however, that Berri takes a secondary role to Nasrallah in this matter. Suffering from a Bad Image A further reason for the decrease in Berri’s popularity in the Shi‘ite community is the image that stuck with him, of being corrupt and unreliable. Much of the criticism he receives is related to zu‘ama-style conduct, traditionally seen as corrupt and morally deficient. The fact that Berri has headed Amal for about 30 years continuously, and has acted as speaker for almost 20 years, only adds to his association with the zu‘ama. Only a decade after Nabih Berri was portrayed as a symbol for the decline of Shi‘ite political feudalism and for the rise of a younger generation of politicians, skilled and lacking political ties, he was criticized for being a part of the new model of political lords. For most Lebanese, including many Shi‘ites, Berri acts in the same manner as the old Shi‘ite speakers acted during the days of zu‘ama. He has established a wide patron–client system in national and local politics, appointed his associates to positions in the public sector, changed his

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political positions to achieve personal and sectarian goals, and “folded” to satisfy his Syrian patrons’ will. The decrease of Berri’s image is also affected by the image of Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, perceived as Berri’s main rival for community leadership. Nasrallah has managed to create an image of a reliable, assertive leader who keeps his promises to the Shi‘ites. As the latter’s popularity increases, it is at the expense of Berri’s. In 2003 Berri displayed leadership and took a decisive stand in order to show his integrity and loyalty to the rule of law. Two Amal ministers, Energy and Water Minister Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hamid Baydun and Agriculture Minister ‘Ali ‘Abdallah, in addition to Western Biqa‘ MP (and former minister) Mahmud Abu Hamdan, were expelled from Amal along with three other members.213 ‘Abdallah was later charged with embezzling public funds and was even held in custody for six months, while Abu Hamdan is believed to have been expelled because of his close ties with security forces in the Biqa‘ region.214 Baydun had previously served in high positions in Amal, including head of Amal’s political bureau (1998 to 2003) and head of the Council of the South (1985 to 1991). It seemed that when his stands in the government became too independent, Berri wanted to replace him. Berri’s move was described as the biggest purge in Amal since the civil war. “The expulsions were decided upon within the context of an ongoing accountability drive, launched since the movement’s last congress in Beirut in the summer,” Amal’s statement read.215 In an attempt to try to win credit for his steps, Berri encouraged other Lebanese groups to do the same and deny politicians who had broken the law political cover. A few months later, in the annual speech on the occasion of Musa Sadr’s disappearance, in front of thousands in Ba‘albek, he called for bringing corrupt officials to justice. He quoted the Prophet Muhammad’s famous saying: “Even if Fatima [daughter of Mohammad] stole, I would have cut off her hand.”216 Although the expulsion allowed Berri to fulfill his desire and replace the Shi‘ite minister in order to assure loyalty, he did not win credit for his move and commentators still claim he most likely acted out of political motives.217 At the same time, as said before, Hassan Nasrallah was gradually acquiring the image of a reliable person. He was not involved in daily politics and put himself above petty politics, like his mentor, the Iranian supreme leader ‘Ali Khamenei. Nasrallah dealt with “serious issues” related to the future of Lebanon, its defense, the integration of the Shi‘ites into the future Lebanon, and the like. By leaving daily politics to Hizbollah’s members of the Parliament, Nasrallah was able to increase his popularity. Paradoxically, during the early days of the Shi‘ite faith and the 12 Imams, Shi‘ite leaders were accessible to the public as they usually were not the leaders of the state. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when spiritual leaders such as Khomeini and Khamenei took responsibility for governing, the supreme spiritual leader (al-Wali Faqih) who serves as a temporary stand-in for the Imam, isolated himself from the public, and became inaccessible to the ordinary people. This inaccessibility created an aura of holiness around the leader. Nasrallah, who in normal times barely appears in public for fear

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of assassination, went completely underground following the July 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel, and his public appearances became rare. Nabih Berri, however, is a very “open” politician, soiling his hands with daily intrigues, dealing with political constraints. He is usually interviewed on every issue on the public agenda. By serving as a mediator between Nasrallah and non-Shi‘ite sectors, he himself contributed to magnifying Nasrallah. On the one hand, this strengthened Berri’s irreplaceable position in Lebanese politics, but on the other, it wore out his leadership. In many aspects this dynamic was consistent with Berri’s personality and style of leadership. The criticism over Berri’s conduct and his dictatorship in Amal and the Shi‘ite secular-national faction in Lebanon reflects the public resentment and helps explain the deterioration in Berri’s position inside his own camp. The general feeling, ever since the end of the civil war, was that Berri had ruled Amal with an iron fist and didn’t hesitate to directly confront those who didn’t follow his path. Hussein al-Husseini, for example, who served as secretary general of Amal between 1978 and 1980 and as parliament speaker between 1983 and 1992, quarreled with Berri to a point where supporters of the two participated in a gunfight in February 1995. As a result, Husseini and Hizballah reconciled, after relations between the two had been cut off in 1992.218 The information regarding the opposition to Berri inside Amal is very limited and it seems that since the late 1980s no real opposition to Berri has existed in the movement. The relative stability in recent years among Amal’s leadership results from Berri’s success in manning the key positions with talented and educated people who share his outlook. Among them in recent years is Ayub Hamid, who serves as Berri’s deputy and therefore heads the political bureau, and Ya‘aqub Zahir, the executive committee chairman. The political bureau includes Haytham Jum‘a, Bassam Tleis (in charge of labor issues), Muhammad Nasrallah (in charge of cultural affairs), ‘Ali Qa‘afrani (in charge of education), Kheirallah al-Zein (in charge of financial affairs), and many others.219 In addition, Berri is assisted by very intelligent and talented political advisors. In recent years those have been ‘Ali Hassan Khalil and ‘Ali Hamdan, both of whom have extensive experience in national politics. The previously mentioned purge he conducted in 2003, in which six activists were expelled, three of them senior members, indicates the existence of other voices in the movement, different from Berri’s. On the other hand, the fact that the decision to expel them passed unanimously in the general council indicates that Berri’s control of Amal is very firm.220 In an article on Amal from 1997, published in the London-based Arabic-language news magazine al-Majallah, it was reported that the membership of 14,000 had been voided. This step was carried out in an effort to reinvigorate the movement, and recruit new members from different professional sectors and academia. The newly recruited 1,500 members joined, according to the article, the existing 10,000 movement members.221 A similar step had been taken by Amal following the failure in the 2004 municipal elections, which was perceived in the movement to be a result of its identification with the

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government. “Government bureaucracy had spoiled Amal’s rank and file, thus prompting the need for a comprehensive reform and correction drive,” al-Hayat Arabic daily wrote.222 Amal planned to take a series of reform steps in order to separate official government service from party and organizational activities by a sweeping reshuffle of personnel at all party levels. Berri was quoted saying he wanted to inject young and fresh blood into the movement.223 Some of the new recruits were drawn from the party’s “Cadres School”, directed by Hikmat Shahrour. The school was under the supervision of Ya‘aqub Dhahir, a member of Amal‘s executive committee, whose job is to make sure the organization follows the ideology and policy of its founder Musa al-Sadr.224 Eventually, many Shi‘ites who were disappointed with Berri’s personality and his conduct as the leader of the secular-national Shi‘ite faction withdrew their support for him. Some of them shifted their support to Hizballah and its Lebanonization process and some still seek a worthy leadership inside their community. Most of the Shi‘ites of this faction, however, given the lack of a real alternative, continue to support Berri. Musa Sadr’s Legacy Over the years, Musa Sadr has become a symbol under consensus among the Lebanese Shi‘a. They consider him to be the one who brought about changes which led to the improvement of their status in Lebanon. The loyalty to Sadr’s legacy has become a matter of rivalry between the two Shi‘ite movements. Each of them wished to be identified with Sadr and be regarded as his authentic successor. In this context, the process of Lebanonization in Hizballah canceled Amal’s exclusiveness as the representative of Musa Sadr’s political legacy. As long as Hizballah was an alternative to the Lebanese state, in the form of an Islamic state, Amal’s philosophy better reflected this legacy, as Sadr, who disappeared in 1978, wished to change the position of the Lebanese Shi‘ites inside the realm of the existing Lebanese state. Berri, being Amal’s leader, enjoyed the prestige of the role Sadr himself played in the 1970s during the first days of the movement. The fact that Sadr was a religious authority didn’t prevent Berri from stressing over the years the common side Amal had under Sadr’s leadership and under his, literally the political factor, while ignoring Sadr’s religious role. When Hizballah began portraying itself as a national Lebanese movement, in addition to an Islamic one, it dulled the criticism against it for undermining the foundations of the Lebanese state. This process allowed the movement to portray itself as Sadr’s successor. During the parliamentary elections of 2009 Muhammad Ra‘ad, head of Hizbullah’s “Loyalty to the Resistance” parliamentary bloc, specifically said that Hizballah’s electoral platform was based, inter alia, on a speech by Musa Sadr.225 Up to that point, the linkage between Hizballah and Sadr focused on the Shi‘ite activism which Sadr encouraged in order to persuade the Lebanese Shi‘ites to take their fate into their hands. In addition, the fact that Hizballah’s leaders

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were religious scholars, while Amal’s leadership was secular, put them in a closer position to Sadr’s personal world, as the latter was himself an ‘alim. The result of bridging the gap between Hizballah’s positions and the perception of Sadr was the increase in the movement’s legitimacy to compete against Amal for the title of Sadr’s authentic successor. The annual anniversary of Sadr’s disappearance, on August 31, had become a central arena for the rivalry between Amal and Hizballah. Both Nabih Berri and Hassan Nasrallah consider these events an opportunity to give meaningful speeches. In 2003 both of them accused the Libyan leader Mu‘ammar Qadhafi of being responsible for Sadr’s disappearance. Berri called Foreign Minister Jean ‘Obeid to send a memorandum against Libya to the UN Security Council and the Arab League, calling on them to “find out what happened to the Imam.”226 The accusations resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between Libya and Lebanon.227 After Berri applied pressure, Qadhafi was officially accused of Sadr’s disappearance in August 2008 by Lebanon, and he is wanted for interrogation on the matter.228 Berri has not let go of the matter and during March 2010 he led a campaign to pressure Lebanese President Michel Suleiman not to attend the Arab League summit, as it was to be held in Tripoli, Libya, and hosted by Qadhafi. The campaign ended with success.229 Another means for Berri to emphasize his being Sadr’s true successor is the stressing of personal ties between the two. On several occasions Berri spoke of these unique relations, since, unlike most of Hizballah’s leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, Berri was related to Sadr and the two had mutual respect for one another. In addition, Berri supervises the Sadr memorial. On Amal’s website, for instance, much room is dedicated to Sadr, his sayings, his sermons, and his connections with Berri. In the ten-volume series on the movement’s history which Amal published, Berri’s contribution is emphasized alongside Sadr’s. One has to remember that Sadr headed Amal for only four years before disappearing in Libya, while Berri has been leading the movement for 30 years. The question of whether Berri is genuinely Sadr’s successor is fully discussed in chapter 5. The lack of religious background has a further impact on Berri’s public status. When Sadr disappeared, Amal lost its highest religious authority, which was, at the time, the most senior one in Lebanon. Under Berri’s leadership, Amal became more secular, while Sadr’s religious leadership was represented by Muhamad Mahdi Shams al-Din in the SSIC. The relations between Berri and Shams al-Din deteriorated in the early 1980s, but were later stabilized to a point where Shams al-Din was not clearly identified with Amal, although he was connected to the movement’s religious system.230 Being chairman of the SSIC, Shams al-Din had to represent all Shi‘ites, including the faction led by Hizballah. After the fact, it seems that the image of Amal as a secular movement in a time of Islamization in the Arab world, and especially a decade after the Islamic Shi‘ite revolution in Iran, alienated many supporters with a religious world view. The fact that Amal is not identified with any senior Shi‘ite religious authority living in Lebanon deeply harmed

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its status with the Shi‘ite public, especially in light of the affinity between Hizballah and the Ayatollah al-‘Uzma (Great Ayatollah) Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. As an alternative, Amal points the believers from among its supporters to the religious guidance of the Iraqi Ayatollah al-‘Uzma Seyyid ‘Ali al-Sistani. Senior religious jurists (Mujtahidun) in Shi‘ite Islam have a great influence, and they also serve as role models (Maraj‘ lil-Taqlid). Their influence exceeds religious guidance in the strictest sense of the word, and relates to political issues as well. On the home page of Amal’s Internet website, in the links to “Holy Qur’an Network” (Shabakat al-Qur’an al-Karim) and “Amal’s Cultural Network” (Shabakat Amal al-Thaqafi), Sistani has a prominent place, and one can easily find references to his religious verdicts (Fatawa, singular Fatwa) in the section “Asking for Religious Verdicts of the Honorable Marja‘ ” (Istiftaat Quraniyya li-Samahat al-Marja‘).231 Berri has good connections with Sistani and it is known that he met him while the latter was on his way to London for medical treatment, and made a stopover in Beirut’s airport.232 It seems Berri sometimes consults Sistani on various issues, including political ones.233 However, as long as Amal is not identified with a religious authority on the scale of Fadlallah inside Lebanon, devout Shi‘ites prefer the rival movement. Perhaps following the death of Fadlallah in July 2010, this relative advantage of Hezbollah would be aborted.

National Factors The erosion of Nabih Berri’s status among the Shi‘ites was also the result of national developments in Lebanon. The most salient concern is the problem the Ta’if Accord brought about. Berri supported the Accord as a result of Syrian pressure, but his first tendency was to oppose it. He realized that in the circumstances created after the end of the civil war, the Accord deprived his religious sect. His main objection was to the continuation of political sectarianism (al-siyasa al-ta’ifiyya). Berri saw this tradition as the source for all of Lebanon’s violent outbreaks since the nineteenth century.234 The Shi‘ites have other reasons to oppose the Accord as well. At the end of the war, they were the strongest military element in Lebanon, and apparently the largest demographically. Based on these data, they deserved more than the Accord awarded them: the same number of Parliament members as the Sunnis, but less than the Maronites, and the third most important position in the governing troika. The insult was increased due to the fact that at the end of the war the military dominance in most of the country, as well as the political dominance, was in the hands of Syria, who had been an ally of the Shi‘ites, and especially of Berri, throughout the war. One can estimate that the Shi‘ites paid the price of Syria’s will to appease its enemies from the days of the civil war. At that stage, Berri chose to play according to the Ta’if rules, while his rival Hizballah chose to oppose to this arrangement. As time went by and the Shi‘ite public realized that no real improvement in the way they were being treated by the Lebanese state had occurred, they blamed Berri as the senior

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Shi‘ite representative in the government. Furthermore, during the 1990s, as Parliament speaker, Berri had become the protector of the Lebanese constitution, and thereby the protector of the Ta’if Accord. Although Hizballah later acknowledged the Accord as a basis for the reconstruction of post–civilwar Lebanon, it certainly never became identified with it. The split of political power in Lebanon into two main camps after Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination also affected Berri’s status among the Shi‘ite public, although in an ambivalent way. The attitude toward Syria and its position in Lebanon, which stood at the basis of this split into the pro-Syrian March 8 camp and the anti-Syrian March 14 camp had put both Shi‘ite movements in the same boat. Nabih Berri realized, much like his rival in the struggle over the leadership of the Shi‘ite community, Hassan Nasrallah, that in the existing political conditions the two have to work together in order to safeguard their futures. In this reality, Amal and Hizballah are forced to work tightly in order to lead one Shi‘ite line in Lebanese politics. The result, as aforesaid, is ambivalent for Berri. On the one hand, he is sometimes forced to take a stand which contradicts his principles, in order to keep the March 8 alliance united, and his credibility is thereby hurt. The clearest example for that was the change in his opinion regarding Hizballah’s arms. While he had previously declared that after the Israeli withdrawal Hizballah should disarm and integrate only as a political party, he later stated that Hizballah should keep its arms until the Arab–Israeli conflict is solved.235 On the other hand, the fact that Hizballah has become, following the political division, a central element in the political system contributes to Berri’s unique status as a mediator between it and the rest of the political elements in the country.

Regional Factors On the regional level, two main factors affected Berri’s loss of strength in the Shi‘ite street: the influence of Syria and Iran in Lebanon, and the increasing power of political Islam in the Middle East. Syria had controlled post-Ta’if Lebanon and run its politics by controlling the Lebanese troika. When the Syrian army left Lebanon in April 2005, its supporters in Lebanon needed political unity. Today, Amal depends on Syria to a much lesser extent than during the civil war, when the Syrians saved the movement’s militia while fighting leftist movements and Hizballah. However, Nabih Berri still personally needs Syrian backing in order to maintain his role as Parliament speaker. Hizballah itself needs Syria today in order to increase its arms arsenal, as a transition point for Iranian weapons, and as a source for the weapons themselves. Syria also uses the two movements in order to maintain influence in Lebanon. It needs Hizballah as a military threat inside Lebanon and as a strategic threat against Israel, and it needs Nabih Berri to act as a mediator and soften the antagonism against Hizballah and Syria. The outcome of this is that Berri is perceived by the Shi‘ite public as a weak element who obeys Syria, while Hizballah is perceived as an asset to Syria.

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Berri’s public status was also directly affected by the increasing regional power of Iran. The tightening of the Iranian–Syrian cooperation has increased the Iranian influence in Lebanon, especially due to Syria’s control of Lebanon until 2005. As a result, Iran’s proxies in the region strengthened, Hizballah being the most prominent one. Although Iran has improved its relations with Berri after the open rivalry during the days of the civil war in the 1980s, still one cannot compare Hassan Nasrallah and Hizballah’s importance to Iran to Berri and Amal’s. The struggles in the Iranian regime, which started in the mid 1990s, were reflected in the struggle between Amal and Hizballah in Lebanon, and enabled Berri to improve his relations with Iran. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989 and the condolence visit Berri paid in Tehran after the 40 mourning days opened the door for the improvement of relations gradually during the 1990s.236 Berri accepted the Iranian regime’s invitation and visited Tehran several times. He was met by the heads of the regime, including Supreme Leader Khamenei.237 In 1999 Berri was symbolically elected in Tehran as deputy chairman of the Islamic Parliaments’ Association. Two and a half months after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, in August 2000, Berri paid a visit to Iran, publicly praising the latter’s contribution to the victory over the “Zionist regime” and Khamenei’s support of the Lebanese people and their government. In his meeting with Khamenei he invited Iran to take part in the rehabilitation of South Lebanon.238 The issue of disarming Hizballah and its integration as a political party in Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal brought about struggles in the top ranks of the Iranian regime. It was known that the president of Iran at the time, Muhammad Khatami, tried to force Hizballah to accept Berri’s superiority in the Shi‘ite community and join the political sphere under his auspices, without a militia. The Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, on the other hand, publicly supported Hassan Nasrallah. When the latter visited Iran he took his hosts’ fancy by making a speech in Persian, a language Berri doesn’t speak, at Tehran University.239 Nasrallah objected to the Iranian president’s request that Hizballah turn to the intellectual and cultural fields, and claimed that the time to put down its arms had not yet arrived.240 In July 2001 Amal was allowed to re-open its office in Tehran, and Iran funded the building of one of Amal’s schools in South Lebanon. The good relations between Tehran and Berri during Khatami’s tenure can be largely credited to those between the Iranian president’s secretary, Muhammad ‘Ali Abtahi, and senior members of Amal.241 Later that decade, the increasing public pressure in Lebanon on Hizballah to disarm, and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, led to a further improvement in Berri’s relations with Iran, after both sides had reached the conclusion that this closeness is vital for the improvement of Berri’s relations with Hizballah, and to maintain Iran and Syria’s interest in Lebanon. Political Islam started to gain strength in the Middle East during the late 1960s, in an attempt to find an answer to the sense of inferiority to the West and Israel after the defeat in the 1967 war. The strengthening of political

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Islam and its success among poor social classes convinced more Lebanese Shi‘ites that they should support a religious Islamic movement such as Hizballah, at the expense of a more secular movement such as Amal. Berri is aware of the process, and therefore seeks, in many cases, to be portrayed as a devout Muslim. He is also interested in presenting Amal as a movement with an Islamic identity. Amal’s website, as previously mentioned, emphasizes Islamic religious content. Nabih Berri stresses his Islamic identity whenever he has a chance, in an attempt to narrow the gap with Hassan Nasrallah, a religiously educated ‘alim. As part of his efforts, Berri is photographed often while praying or in traditional Islamic costume, and emphasizes his early Qur’an studies as a child, and his ability to read the holy book at the age of five. This chapter has explained how Berri became a first-class national Lebanese leader. It also answers the question of why Berri lost his hegemony of the Shi‘ite community to Hizballah during Ta’if’s Lebanon, even at a time when his power in Lebanese politics grew. The conclusion is that his position in the two arenas, the national Lebanese and the intra-Shi‘ite, are related. As Berri became more and more identified with the Lebanese regime, his ability to blame that regime for the deprivation of the Shi‘ites became limited. Berri therefore became identified with the governmental deprivation, while his rivals in the Shi‘ite community, Hizballah and its leaders, who spent 15 years in the opposition, were free from that charge. As the community’s senior representative in the regime, Berri tried to reduce the discrimination by using governmental financing. His ability to do so, however, was much less than that of his rival, Hizballah. Two factors, Syria and Iran, were also part of a hegemony struggle in the Shi‘ite community. Berri, who had to bridge enormous gaps, decided that playing the role of mediator was the best way to maintain his status. This bridging harmed his personal image and caused his position to decline among the Lebanese Shi‘a.

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Ch apter 5

Berri’s Political Stands

E

xamining Nabih Berri’s political stands during 30 years as the leader of Amal and almost two decades as the Lebanese speaker is a relatively easy task. One reason for that is that Berri has expressed himself numerous times in the media regarding every issue on the agenda. Another reason is that Berri’s declarations and principles were usually consistent even though a gap between his statements and actions appeared from time to time. Several issues have come up on the Lebanese Shi‘ite agenda since Berri emerged as an important political figure. In the 1980s the ideological split among the Shi‘ites was at the center of the agenda, including the question of political identification. Part of the Lebanese Shi‘ites considered the Lebanese state as their primary source for political identification, while others considered the Islamic Shi‘ite Republic of Iran, and its high spiritual leader (al-Wali Faqih) as a primary political source, as well as a religious one. Since the 1990s, under the rules of Ta’if, the question of political identification was linked to additional changes in the Lebanese Shi‘ite political system. The civil war from 1975 to 1990 and the growing place of the Shi‘ites in the political system changed the balance between society, state, and governance. The result was a split within the Muslim camp in the post– civil war era, into a Sunni camp and a Shi‘ite one. Berri’s stands in regard to the role of Iran and the new balance became particularly important because of his key position as the Parliament speaker since 1992. During the years of the civil war the Shi‘ites were especially influenced by two Lebanese groups with whom they held relations. One group was the Lebanese political left, which was the closest political faction to the Shi‘ite main camp in the 1970s and 1980s. Issues related to leftist world views, such as economics and labor relations, nevertheless were and still are on the Lebanese agenda. After the war ended and the Lebanese political map had been changed as a result of the split in the Muslim camp, the unity of all leftist groups became impossible. The second group with whom the Shi‘ites held relations were the Palestinians, who were their main adversaries during the civil war. After the war ended, the Palestinian issue continued to be on the Lebanese agenda because of the Middle East peace process, which had implications in Lebanon, and because the Palestinian issue had great importance in the ideology of Hizballah, Amal’s adversary in the Shi‘ite community. In

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addition, the Palestinians had a major part in the rise of Sunni global jihad in Lebanon in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nabih Berri played an important role in these two relationships. Two foreign factors in addition to Iran—Israel and Syria—strongly influenced the Lebanese Shi‘ites in the period under discussion. The Israeli influence stems from its military invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its occupation of the Shi‘ite stronghold of Jabal-‘Amil, which evoked a Shi‘ite resistance and later the war of July 2006. The influence of Syria, Berri’s main ally during the civil war, became more complicated as time went by. Not only did Syria develop relations with Hizballah, but its role in Lebanon changed: from being the policeman on the beat during the war, through having political hegemony after Ta’if, to the military withdrawal from Lebanon, and the formation of an official political relationship between the two states for the first time in history. Berri’s stands during the years have two main characteristics. One, as previously stated, is consistency. Despite occasional tactical changes, which resulted from a shift in conditions and situations, Berri sticks to his principles. In the few times he deviated from these principles, Berri did not admit the deviation, but rather presented it as a part of the same principle. Any onlooker, however, could have easily seen how unreliable these claims sometimes were. The other characteristic is Berri’s pragmatism, both actually and theoretically. When discussing Berri’s political stands one cannot ignore the debate among the Lebanese Shi‘a during the last 30 years, regarding which Shi‘ite movement, Amal or Hizballah, is the authentic successor of Musa Sadr, who plays an important role in the Lebanese Shi‘ite historical memory. Both movements, it should be noted, have made use of Sadr’s image in their efforts to gain support from the Shi‘ite public. For this reason Berri’s stands should be compared not only with those of Sadr, but also with those of his major competitor for the leadership of the Shi‘ite community, the leaders of Hizballah.

Between Lebanonism, Arabism, and Shi‘a Since the early 1980s, the question of Lebanonism versus Shi‘ism has been the most important issue on the Shi‘ite agenda in Lebanon. The issue has split the Shi‘ite community into two groups, each with its own perspective. The first group is comprised of those who see the Lebanese state as a framework for their social and political integration as an Arab democratic secular state; the second group is comprised of those who see themselves as part of a revolutionary Shi‘ite Islamic system, inspired by Iran to establish a similar Islamic republic in Lebanon. Since the early 1980s, these two perceptions were represented by Amal and Hizballah, respectively. As the importance of this question grew on the agendas of Lebanon, the Lebanese Shi‘ites, and the Middle East, Nabih Berri had to maneuver between his basic position and political needs. His basic position is based on an idea expressed by Musa

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Sadr in 1977, which, according to Berri, was adopted in the Ta’if Accord with minor changes. The idea was that Lebanon is the final homeland for the Lebanese Shi‘ites and a sovereign, free, and independent country.1 One should bear in mind that in the days of Sadr, before the Islamic revolution in Iran, the subject of Shi‘ite political identity was not as complicated as later, and did not have a significant political role in Lebanon. It should also be remembered that Berri, as many other Shi‘ites in Lebanon in the past, considered the fact that he was a Shi‘ite a burden, which threatened to perpetuate them as the most deprived religious community in Lebanon, and Iran as a source of shame, because of its close relations with the United States and Israel. As time went by and the Lebanese Shi‘ites gained power during and after the civil war, alongside the strengthening of their Shi‘ite identity, Berri started emphasizing the Shi‘ite element of his political identity, mainly in order to keep public support. The matter is closely related to Iran’s role in Lebanon. Berri’s relations with Islamic Iran started with deep rivalry, but as the numbers of supporters of Iran in the Lebanese Shi‘a grew, and the Iranian involvement in Lebanon increased, the relations improved. This was made possible after the gaps between the two perceptions previously presented decreased. The door was opened to both sides for reconciliation, particularly due to the building of relations between Iran and Syria, Berri’s patron, and the political split between Sunnis and Shi‘ites in Lebanon. Soon after he was elected as the head of Amal, Nabih Berri presented a clear stand on the issue of political identity, declaring he was “a Lebanese and Arab before being an Iranian.”2 By this he expressed a clear political preference to Lebanese and Arab secular nationality over Shi‘ism or Islamism. In his world view, Lebanese nationalism is a part of Arab nationalism. Over the years Berri encountered a dilemma on this subject; on the one hand he had to intensify the Islamic side of his politics in order to minimize the drift of public support to Hizballah. This drift resulted from a wide process of Islamization in the Arab world and the increase of Iranian involvement in the daily life of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community. On the other hand, with Syrian and Iranian support, he joined hands with Hizballah, after years of rivalry, for Shi‘ite interests against the Sunni camp in Lebanon, supported by the Arab League. This situation compelled Berri to bridge the gap between the Arab political identity he had worn for years, and his actual support of the pro-Iranian camp in Lebanon, as the struggle between the Arab countries and Iran increased. As a solution to this dilemma, Berri decided to adopt the same line as Syria, the only Arab country that swam against the current, claiming it was the authentic Arab national line and that all the other Arab countries deviate from the original Arab nationalism, serving as a tool in the hands of the United States and the West. Berri’s stand in his first days as the leader of Amal led to confrontation with Iran. His decision to join the Lebanese President Elias Sarkis’ National Salvation Committee in the summer of 1982 was the turning point between verbal declarations and practical steps in the desire to draw away from the

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Islamic republic. With his decision to join the Front, Berri proved that safeguarding the Lebanese interest is more important to him than the exporting of the Iranian revolution into Lebanon. From that point on, during almost all the 1980s, the relations between Berri and Iran were characterized by detachment, excommunication, and attempts to eliminate Berri. For Iran, Berri and Amal no longer represented the ideas of the Islamic revolution. Hizballah was therefore founded as an alternative movement to promote Iranian interests in Lebanon. In spite of the bad relations, Berri was careful not to openly criticize Iran, as he understood the symbolic importance of the Iranian revolution to the Lebanese Shi‘ites. His criticism focused for the most part against specific elements within the Iranian government, such as the faction led by ‘Ali Akbar Mohtashami and the pro-Palestinian lobby in Teheran, but not against the revolutionary ideas or against Ayatollah Khomeini.3 Berri was also aware of the importance of the Shi‘ite religious authority (al-Wali Faqih) for many Lebanese. In interviews to the Western press in the mid-1980s, in which he tried to appear as a loyal Shi‘ite believer and at the same time to calm fears of an expansion of the Khomeinist revolution to Lebanon, Berri claimed that, “The West doesn’t understand that for us Khomeini is an admired person and one of the highest religious authorities, without any political obligation to him or to Iran.”4 Paradoxically, This perception was slowly adopted by Hizballah, as reflected in Hassan Nasrallah’s answer to a direct question on that subject while revealing Hizballah’s new political platform in November 2009. Nasrallah said, “The current manifesto is political, while we treat the authority of the Wali Faqih in relation to faith, ideology, culture, and intellect.”5 The awareness of Khomeini’s special status among the Shi‘a led Berri to emphasize the separation between conceptual and practical attitudes, saying “I am against the idea of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon now, but it doesn’t mean that I am not loyal to Khomeini.”6 He also emphasized what his ambitions as an Arab and a Lebanese nationalist had in common with the Islamic revolution, without forsaking the Lebanese framework or implementing the revolution in Lebanon: For us the Islamic republic of Iran is a source of pride . . . because it reflected our national aspirations and our national goals. . . . Its stand regarding the unity of Lebanon and the defense of the South, its belief in the Palestinian cause, its struggle against all forms of exploitation and colonialism, its struggle for the rights of the weak (mustaz‘afin) and even the use of the word “deprived” (mahrumin) more than once . . . all that causes us to long for the Iranian revolution like a lighthouse that lighted our Middle East.7

As the struggle over the support of the Shi‘ite public and over the legitimacy to represent the Shi‘ite community deteriorated, Berri needed to portray himself as a devoted Shi‘ite. During the 1980s, when this struggle was conducted against Hizballah’s religious leaders and figures such as Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din of the SSIC, Berri often used religious symbols. He was

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photographed in a prayer position and said he wished he had been educated in a religious school.8 In Amal’s conventions and conferences at that time, Khomeini’s picture was hung alongside a picture of Musa Sadr, even when the rivalry with Iran reached its highest.9 When Amal was accused of being secular, Berri introduced his movement as “Lebanese and Arab nationalist, with Islamic ideology” and also as a “faithful movement that follows the holy Qur’an.”10 The first principle of Amal’s platform, which is also presented on Amal’s official website home page, says, “the movement stems from the belief in God.”11 As the struggle between Amal and Hizballah deepened, Berri criticized the Iranian support of the rival organization. He claimed that this support weakened the Iranian influence in Lebanon and harmed the image of the Islamic revolution, saying that, “Iran paid an expensive price for deserting the Shi‘ites and Muslims of Lebanon only to be represented by a party in Lebanon, but it [this party] does not represent all the public that was deserted by Iran.”12 On another occasion he insinuated that Iran is responsible for the split within the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, saying the conciliation should not be between Amal and Hizballah, but between Iran and the Lebanese Shi‘ites.13 However, Berri understood that the public opinion and the Iranian massive support of Hizballah, particularly during the bloody war between the two Lebanese Shi‘ite movements in the late 1980s, forced him to seek conciliation with Iran. It was only after the death of Imam Khomeini in June 1989, that an opportunity was created for both sides to open a new page in their relationship.14 From that point on, Berri no longer faced a physical threat from Teheran, and slowly became a welcome guest in the Islamic republic. Some reports described a visit by Berri, together with his pro-Syrian Druze ally Walid Junblat to Teheran during the days of the Ta’if convention in October 1989, in which he strongly expressed opposition to the Arab League’s plan to end the civil war. It is not yet clear whether Berri visited Teheran in order to feel out the Iranian response to his accepting of the plan, or whether he was invited to Teheran by the Iranians who wanted to ensure that Berri would oppose the Accord.15 However, at the end of the day Berri agreed to the Accord, contrary to objections by Hizballah, the Lebanese proxy of Iran. Following the Ta’if Accord, Lebanon began a long rehabilitation and reconciliation process. Hizballah continued gain more support among the Shi‘ites at Amal’s expense, particularly in Jabal-‘Amil. The support was gained as a result of the armed resistance against the Israeli army in the South, which was performed now by Hizballah exclusively, and due to the services it supplied the public, standing in for the Lebanese government. The delivery of these services was possible thanks to massive financial support from Iran. Berri tried to counter the Iranian support by using the governmental budget, but it was too small. Both Berri and Iran recognized the importance of each other. Iran understood Berri is a key figure as a contact of the Shi‘ites to the Lebanese establishment. It was also aware of the political support Berri had gained among Shi‘ite middle and upper classes in Lebanon, and

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the great political influence he had as the Parliament’s speaker. Presumably, Berri’s close relations with Syria were also a factor in the improvement of Iran’s attitude toward him. Berri, from his side, understood the depth of the Iranian influence over the Shi‘ite public. Three regional processes brought him to the conclusion that keeping a good relationship with Iran was worthwhile. One process was the “Islamization” of Muslims all over the Arab world and the growing influence of Islamic ideologies and politics. The second process was the Shi‘iteSunni rift in the Islamic world. The third was the political split in the Middle East and the Arab world along two axes. One was under Iranian leadership, including Syria, Hizballah, and a few revolutionary Islamic movements such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The other was led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, included most Arab states, and was supported by the United States and the West. But the most important reason was Berri’s commitment to Syria, which became Iran’s most important ally in the Middle East. This regional reality forced Berri to confront the contradictions between his ideological stands and political needs, since inside Lebanon he is identified with the pro-Iranian axis. Berri managed to bridge the contradictions by playing with rhetoric, such as praising the Iranian assistance to Lebanon, and not to the Shi‘ite community only. For instance, he praised Iran and its supreme leader, ‘Ali Khamenei, for their “fundamental” role in the resistance against the “Zionist regime” and in the attainment of the great victory against the Israeli army in May 2000.16 During a visit to Teheran in 1993, Berri said he was carrying “a Lebanese” message that Iran was bound to help Lebanon come out of its political plight.17 The fact that during that visit he worked to promote relationships between the two countries and the two parliaments in particular, exemplifies Berri’s view of the ideal nature of the relationship between the Shi‘ites of Lebanon and Iran.18 The Shi‘ites, in his view, should be treated as Lebanese. Berri’s declarations regarding the relationships of the Lebanese Shi‘ites and Iran fell in line with his long-time stand that the loyalty of the Lebanese Shi‘ites is primarily to Lebanon. In that he differs from Hassan Nasrallah, who perceives himself preeminently as a follower of the Iranian supreme spiritual leader, ‘Ali Khamenei, a perception derived from his religious outlook. In modern Shi‘ite religious and political thought such loyalty means obeying the supreme leader’s instructions in all religious and political matters. In other words, it means to be first and foremost loyal to Iran. This perception is not accepted by all Shi‘ite scholars worldwide, perhaps not even by the majority. Some senior Shi‘ite scholars in Lebanon, such as the J‘afari Mufti ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan and Shaykh ‘Ali al-Amin, adopted similar stands to Berri’s on this matter.19 Berri and Iran cooperate on the Palestinian issue, which unites both the Arab and the Muslim worlds. While Berri’s motivation on this matter stems from an Arab nationalist vision, the Iranians are motivated by a religiousIslamic perception and also as a means to penetrate the Arabs’ hearts in the Middle East. The Palestinian issue, however, is a major factor in the

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Iranian–Berri equation. In the early stages of this relationship the rivalry between Amal and the Palestinians in Lebanon intensified the conflict between Iran and Berri. The latter accepted the Iranian mediation efforts in the mid-1980s to end the War of the Camps between Amal and the PLO.20 The ceasefire later broke off. After the improvement of the relationship Iran and Berri praised each other’s support for the Palestinians. As time went by and the recollection of the civil war dimmed, Berri softened his hard sentiments toward the Palestinians and went to extremes with his declarations in favor of the Palestinian case. Following the Israeli war on Hamas in January 2009, Berri said in a speech that, “Politically, the right and left in Israel are two sides of one coin; one of terrorism . . . murder is the law of the Israeli killing of third parties.”21 His incitement was shared by the Iranians. Iran organized a conference titled “Palestine, a Symbol of Resistance; Gaza, Exposure of Crimes.” A delegation from Lebanon participated in the conference, headed by Nabih Berri.22 The improvement of relations between Berri and Iran reflects the blurring of political differences with both Iran and Hizballah. Although their vision for the future of Lebanon was completely different, Berri decided to act according to his political needs and follow the sentiments of the Shi‘ite public in Lebanon. By that, he remained an authentic representative. The improvement of relations with Iran, it is important to say, shows the general trend of the Shi‘ites in recent years toward Islamism and political extremism.

Society, State, and Governance The abolishment of political confessionalism in Lebanon was and remains the main political demand of Nabih Berri. He has repeated the demand many times over the years in the media, and brought it up during the national dialogues in Geneva (1983), Lausanne (1984), and Ta’if (1989).23 In Berri’s eyes, confessionalism is the main reason for the illness of Lebanese politics and the sectarian deprivation. The abolishment of confessionalism, according to Berri, would enable the creation of a healthier society, with a secular national Lebanese and Arab identity. Such an identity might unite the Lebanese society and prevent further civil wars. “We need a modern and developed country, where justice and equality prevail,” he said, “[otherwise] the country will turn into one in which the citizens are ghosts.”24 Talking to students on another occasion he said that, “The process of abolishing sectarianism should start in schools . . . when we begin to learn from the same history book.”25 The demand to abolish confessionalism was also made by Musa Sadr in his time, and was one of the cornerstones of his Movement of the Deprived. In this issue Berri clearly follows Sadr’s line. In fact, the demand to abolish political confessionalism can be viewed as a part of a Lebanese national approach and patriotism, as for Berri “a deprived Shi‘ite is equal to a deprived Maronite.”26 This approach, however, can serve as an advantageous element for the Shi‘ites, who, as probably the largest religious community in Lebanon,

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might be the main beneficiaries of such abolishment. Under a democratic system, this could improve the chances of Shi‘ite politicians to win the top political positions.27 Both Sadr and Berri showed hypocrisy regarding this issue. The former, although declared when he established the Movement of the Deprived and Amal they are intended for all underprivileged in Lebanon, in practice these movements promoted purely Shi‘ite interests, and by that contributed to perpetuating sectarian confessionalism. The latter justified in 1995 his practice of appointing Shi‘ites to positions within his reach with the hypocritical argument that he wanted to illustrate by his confessionalist policy the dangers of confessionalism.28 On the other hand, confessionalism indeed brought about deprivation and injustice in regard to the Shi‘ites in the past and present. Another essential demand which was consistently raised by Berri was the Lebanese sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.29 The issue of territorial integrity was raised during the mid-1980s in the course of the civil war, as proposals to divide Lebanon into cantons according to geographical distribution of the religious sects were heard. Berri strongly opposed such a division for two reasons: (a) he truly wanted to see Lebanon rehabilitated as a united country comprised of all sectors and religious sects, Arabism being the unifying factor; (b) the Shi‘ite community, the most geographically scattered community, was expected to be the main sector harmed by the idea of cantoning. Separating Jabal-‘Amil (southern Lebanon), from the Biqa‘ (the Lebanese valley) and from al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiyya (the southern suburbs of Beirut) could have split the political power of the Shi‘ites and harmed Berri’s personal status.30 For years Berri referred to this issue in regard to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon but was “tolerant” of the Syrian occupation of other parts of the country. During the National Dialogue in Ta’if (1989), in which Berri did not participate, he said that “the [Syrian] withdrawal will start only 24 hours after the last Israeli soldier had left the South.”31 He reinforced this demand with UN Resolution 425 (1978), which called for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Lebanon, but only in regard to the Israeli army, not the Syrians. However, despite the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Berri defended the Syrian presence, saying it was a national necessity. In 2001, when the supporters and opponents of the Syrian presence in Lebanon took their battle to the street, he called to end the debate over Syria’s presence in Lebanon, saying the issue should not be a part of the domestic political game. He explicitly said that Syria’s presence was necessary as long as regional peace was not reached.32 The Syrian withdrawal in April 2005 caught Berri by surprise, but he quickly adjusted himself to the new reality. The last issue to remain on his territorial agenda regarding the violation of the Lebanese sovereignty, is the Lebanese claim for the Shab‘a Farms, an unpopulated area of 40 square kilometers on the slopes of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Shaykh). Israel claims, that as Shab‘a was conquered from Syria in 1967, it will be negotiated between Israel and Syria. Berri called for the liberation of the Shab‘a Farms from

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Israel, saying the Israeli claim that the Farms were previously Syrian derives only from Israeli attempts to provoke political unrest in Lebanon. Berri argues Israel knows the Lebanese claim for possession of Shab‘a was proven in the maps of the French Mandate of 1925 and the ceasefire maps of the 1973 war between Syria and Israel, and according to Berri, clearly show it to be outside the Syrian Border.33 While Hizballah uses the Shab‘a issue as an excuse to continue holding weapons, Berri uses this matter to demonstrate his patriotism. Berri once metaphorically compared Lebanon to a prisoner who is out of jail but his finger (Shab‘a) is still inside the cell.34 It would be interesting to see his stand if Syria, his patron, insists upon this area, after it established official political relations with Lebanon in October 2008. A key element in maintaining sovereignty and independence, according to Berri, was to build a strong army, subjected to the Lebanese government, which would include soldiers from all religious communities regardless of rank and positions: I’ll welcome the new army commander even if he is a Maronite, as long as he will be national and bring about the liberation of the South from the Israeli occupation. I’ll even accept a solely Maronite army if it would liberate the South. I will not accept a new army commander only because he is a Maronite. . . . I want to see one army for Lebanon which would liberate the South, with a leadership based on equality, cooperation and justice.35

A strong army, in Berri’s eyes, was essential during the civil war for securing sovereignty over the entire Lebanese territory. Such an effective tool in the hands of the government could have brought about the departure of all foreign military forces from Lebanon much sooner than had happened. Berri consistently demanded the deployment of the Lebanese army in areas of inter-communal conflicts.36 He supported the deployment of the army south of the Litani River as part of the Israeli–Lebanese agreement following the July 2006 war.37 The Lebanese army, it should be remembered, was absent from that area for 30 years, in 15 of which Hizballah was militarily present at the Israeli border fence. Apparently, Berri helped convince Hassan Nasrallah and Hizballah’s leadership to accept the agreement. In an interview with the press in the course of the war, he described himself as the only person in Lebanon, except Nasrallah, who could persuade Hizballah’s leadership to compromise for the common good of Lebanon, although Muhammad Fneish, the Lebanese energy minister from Hizballah at the time, claimed Nasrallah would listen to Berri just as he would listen to anybody else.38 Not only was this part of the agreement in line with Berri’s perception of the government’s sovereignty, but it also harmed the influence of Amal’s rival movement and its freedom of action among the Shi‘ite population near the border. Berri supported the disarmament of all civil war militias and their integration into the Lebanese army. He was the first to disarm his own Amal militia following the Ta’if Accord, calling on his people to join the Lebanese army.39

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When it came to Hizballah’s disarmament, a key issue in Lebanese politics in the post-Ta’if era, and particularly after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese soil in May 2000, Berri changed his mind according to the mood of his Syrian patrons. First he had to accept Hizballah’s armament because it was in the Syrian interest and apparently was a Syrian–Hizballah deal in order to change Hizballah’s opposition to the Ta’if Accord. Berri believed it might promote him in the renovated Lebanese political system as the Shi‘ite hope for being integrated into the Lebanese establishment and society. He claimed the weaponry was essential for the resistance against the Israeli occupation, saying that “following an agreement (of Israeli withdrawal), Hizballah will opt for political and social activity. . . . This is the nature of political parties, but it will be without weapons.”40 As the political split in Lebanon deepened and Berri found himself in the same boat with Hizballah, he fell into line with his former Shi‘ite adversaries. His weakness within the Shi‘ite community, as a result of the credit Hizballah gained for the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, prevented him from promoting his views. He had to fall into line with the positions of Hizballah, Iran, and particularly Syria, which opposed the disarmament.41 UN resolution 1559 of September 2004, which, among other things, called for all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to disarm, was another point in which Berri preferred political interests over principles. He opposed the disarmament of Hizballah, claiming the resolution was part of an effort to subject the United Nations to U.S. and Western foreign policy.42 Following the July 2006 war with Israel, the disarmament became a central topic in Lebanon’s political debate. The debate peaked after Hizballah was accused of dragging Lebanon into a war which left 1,300 dead and caused huge damage. Berri rejected the calls for disarmament, offering to solve this matter by a national dialogue. As the Parliament speaker, he claimed such a dialogue should be dealt with as part of all issues under dispute between the two major political alliances at that time, March 8 and March 14. His political rivals, however, objected to his claims, saying that since he belonged to one side in the dispute, he was biased.43 The war escalated the debate between both main political alliances, creating a severe political crisis. In May 2008, 18 months later, the crisis ended with a military takeover of western Beirut by Hizballah, Amal, and the SSNP. The short civil war once again raised the question of disarmament to the top of the Lebanese agenda, as arms were used against the Lebanese people. The events of May led to the Doha Agreement, in which disarmament was not directly mentioned. Instead, it called to “initiate a dialogue on promoting the Lebanese state’s authority over all Lebanese territory”; and that “the parties commit to abstain from having recourse to or resuming the use of weapons and violence in order to obtain political gains.”44 Hizballah’s weaponry is closely related to the matter of the state’s rule and sovereignty, which were among Berri’s primary issues. During the civil war he objected to the formation of a public administration in Jabal-‘Amil similar to the Druze administration in the Shuf Mountains, claiming it would

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harm the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Lebanese government. For this reason Amal, still the dominant Shi‘ite movement, handled only urgent daily needs and security matters, but did not attempt to replace the government. Hizballah, on the other hand, sought to further supply the community with services such as education, medicine, and construction, and as time went by, succeeded not only in standing in for the government, but also in gaining the sympathy and support of the majority of the Shi‘ites, at the expense of Amal. As Hizballah increased its activities as an alternative to the government, Berri, as speaker of Parliament, was supposed to represent an alternative, a sort of Lebanese national option for the Shi‘ites. He fulfilled this role only partially. In 2008 Hizballah was accused of building a “state within a state” and of undermining the state’s sovereignty after its independent communications network and its undercover control cameras in Beirut International Airport were exposed. Berri, once again, preferred political alliance over ideology. He presented the Lebanese government with the demand, which undermined its sovereignty, to abolish two previous decisions which defined the communications network as illegal and dismissed the general in charge of security at the airport.45 The government indeed went back on its decisions as the short civil war broke out in May 2008. Berri’s step in undermining the state’s sovereignty is a question of the eye of the beholder. In Berri’s eyes, the demand derived from national responsibility, since he did not consider the government of Lebanon at that time to be legal, as it contradicted the Lebanese constitution, by lacking Shi‘ite representation.46 Berri even vociferously defended a Fatwa issued by Shi‘ite cleric ‘Afif Nabulsi, prohibiting Shi‘ites outside Hizballah and Amal from joining the government, despite the fact that Nabulsi was not a member of the SSIC, thus having no right to issue the Fatwa. Berri, like Hassan Nasrallah of Hizballah, denounced any criticism of the Fatwa as an “attack on the scholars of Islam.”47 Berri’s political attitude well exemplifies his pragmatic approach. Although his demand to abolish confessionalism was brought up in every possible forum and emphasized in the political platforms of all political fronts he was associated with, Berri was aware of the difficulties in implementing this change at once; therefore he proposed gradual solutions. In the National Dialogue in Lausanne, he made do only with a declaration regarding the principle of abolishment of confessionalism and agreed to postpone its implementation.48 In the Tripartite Agreement of December 1985, he suggested equally dividing the number of Muslims and Christians in the Lebanese Parliament as a first stage of abolishment.49 In the late 1980s Berri accepted the Ta’if Accord as the basis for political solution in Lebanon, although it did not set a deadline for total abolishment of confessionalism.50 Berri’s pragmatism was also demonstrated in his demand for President Jumayil to resign from office. Even though the two were sworn enemies in 1983 and 1984, Berri suggested during the National Dialogue in Lausanne that Jumayil resign in six months, not immediately. During Jumayil’s term

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in office Berri declared he would oppose the president only by democratic means, although during those days of the civil war much more violent standards to get rid of a sitting President were a matter of course in Lebanon.51 In summary of Berri’s view regarding state and governance, one can see that he definitely perceives the Lebanese state as the political framework in which the Shi‘ites have to live together with other religious communities. Hence, the importance he attaches to the rule of law and the government’s control over all of its territories. Berri’s problem over the years was that the fight for survival in the Lebanese reality made insisting on ideologies almost impossible. Berri’s behavior was many times hypocritical. When ideology confronted political interests, he did not hesitate to act against his own ideology, but always presented the act as part of the same ideology. The most prominent example was his call in February 1984 to the Shi‘ite soldiers of the Lebanese army to desert their positions and join Amal, a step that enabled Berri to take control over western Beirut. Berri presented his call to the soldiers as an attempt to save the future of Lebanon52.

Relations with the Political Left Despite Berri’s attempts to portray Amal with a centrist political image, it is still identified with the Lebanese left. Musa Sadr was the first to lead a neutral political line in the 1970s in order to attract deprived people from all religious sects and to prevent Amal from getting involved in the civil war. Although Amal shared political and ideological views with the National Movement (al-Haraka al-Wattniyya), the parent alliance of the leftist movements, it did not join it. The primary reason for that was a personal prestige struggle with Kamal Junblat, who led the alliance, and Sadr’s desire to concentrate the Shi‘ites in a Shi‘ite movement. Four main reasons prevented from Berri maintain neutrality of Amal: (a) during his days as the movement’s leader, Amal was drawn into the civil war. As long as the war continued the Lebanese political arena was divided between right and left, lacking a political center. Amal was identified with the leftist side; (b) Berri’s main political demands were very similar to those of the National Movement. These demands included the abolishment of political confessionalism, doing social and economic “justice,” and maintaining Lebanon’s sovereignty and secularity; (c) Berri’s main ally in Lebanon was Walid Junblat, the son of Kamal, and leader of the National Movement; and (d) as the alliance between Berri and Syria deepened, he found himself allied with Syria’s other associates in Lebanon, the leftist movements. From the ideological point of view, Amal shared the same political and social goals with the other leftist movements. Both opposed the Maronite hegemony and sectarian discrimination. Politically, the Lebanese left was divided in the 1980s between pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions. Berri cooperated with the first, which included the PSP, a faction of the Ba‘ath Party, the SSNP, and others. The pro-Iraqi wing included, among others, the LCP, a faction of the Ba‘ath Party and the Nasserite movement al-Murabitun. In

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spite of the ideological similarity Berri never officially joined the leftist front. His cooperation with Junblat and the PSP never carried into the realm of the National Movement. Small details, Berri claimed, prevented him from officially joining the leftist front: (a) some National Movement’s activities contradicted Berri’s principle of supporting a central sovereign government; (b) the problematic relationship between Amal and the National Movement in the South; (c) the contradiction between the demand of the National Movement for inter-communal balance in the Lebanese army, and Amal’s demand for the abolishment of sectarianism in Lebanon.53 Berri perceived these reasons to represent a national approach. By officially joining the political left he would have harmed his efforts to portray Amal and himself with a Lebanese national image. The combination of Lebanese nationalism, as Berri perceived it, with Arab nationalism, shaped his positions in all political issues, including the disagreements with the National Movement. An additional reason that prevented him from officially joining was the belief that political centrality is the best option for the Shi‘ites. Like Musa Sadr before him, Berri aspired to maintain a neutral line, but as circumstances changed under his leadership he was compelled to maneuver between political needs and ideological desires. The National Movement, it should be noted, was disintegrated during the civil war. The leftist organizations’ inability to unite into one political bloc later on was caused by political developments which occurred after the civil war. Since the 1990s, the Sunnis and the Shi‘ites are on both sides of the political arena, a situation in which the unity of all leftist organizations is impossible. Leftist perceptions and interests are, however, represented by an alliance of Amal, Hizballah, the Free Patriotic Movement of Michel ‘Aoun, the SSNP, and some other small leftist groups, an alliance usually called March 8. However, as Hizballah carries the Shi‘ite Islamic banner and ‘Aoun represents the Christian Maronite faction, Amal is left with the social leftist banner. Berri always tried to raise the social banner and to appear as the protector of the lower classes and the deprived, as his mentor Sadr was. And indeed, at least until the mid 1990s when Hizballah’s popularity increased, he acted as the representative of most of them. In the 1990s, massive economic measures were taken by the government under the leadership of Rafiq al-Hariri in order to rehabilitate Lebanon from the long civil war. Hariri’s economic policy focused on the stability of the Lebanese currency, reducing inflation, and launching the reconstruction and development programs in order to boost the economy. Some of the measures taken, such as increasing taxes and privatizing governmental companies, harmed the lower classes. Berri, of course, strongly objected to these measures.54 At some stage, particularly from 1998 to 2000, when Hariri “was ousted” from office for political reasons, Lebanon encountered an economic crisis, resulting in recession, unemployment, interest rate increase and rising prices.55 Portraying himself as the defender of the lower classes, Berri confronted Hariri on his measures using the social agenda, and even “pushed” Hariri to resign from office in 1994, just to establish a new government.56 In August

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2003, following a new governmental plan to increase taxes, Berri criticized the governmental treatment of the economic crisis, emphasizing the failure to handle the projects in the Shi‘ite sector. He then was quoted as saying, “The government may resort to solutions on the basis of no new loans and no new taxes.”57 In October 2003 he criticized the budget draft for the following year, saying the Parliament will not allow tax increases under any circumstances.58 The economic struggle is important for Berri not only because of his socialist world view, but also because he represents “the Shi‘ite option” in the Lebanese establishment for the non-Shi‘ite public, and the Lebanese state for the Shi‘ite public, contrary to Hassan Nasrallah of Hizballah. His popularity is therefore directly affected by the government’s measures. To sum up Berri’s attitude toward the Lebanese political left, one can say that back in the 1980s he did not join forces with the leftist alliance as it included some of his adversaries and as he had minor ideological disagreements with it. He also wanted to keep as many open cards as possible for future developments in Lebanon. Today, Berri can be regarded as the most prominent secular leftist politician in Lebanon. With regard to ideology, Berri holds a leftist socialist world view, derived from both his early career in politics as a member of the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, and the Shi‘ite historical burden he carries. His personal conduct, residing in a huge house and the enjoying “good life,” contradicts this ideology. Nevertheless, his ideological motivation remains unchanged.

The Palestinian Presence in Lebanon Berri’s stand regarding the Palestinian issue should be examined in two aspects: the impact of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and the solution to the Palestinian problem. The latter’s by-product is Berri’s attitude toward the state of Israel. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon forced Berri to maneuver between contradicted constraints: his Arab national identity that refers to the Palestinian problem as the central issue on the one hand, and the Lebanese reality of rough confrontations between Shi‘ites and Palestinians on the other; disagreements with his political allies regarding the solution of the Palestinian problem; and the fact that the Palestinian matter comes up on the Lebanese agenda every now and then, compelling the Lebanese politicians to sharpen their attitude concerning the matter. The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon, which started with the defeat in the 1948 war with Israel, was one of the central causes for the general breakdown of the Lebanese state and the consolidation of the Shi‘ite community. This presence became a greater threat for Lebanese sovereignty and the political balance system. In the early 1970s, the Palestinians ran what was, for all intents and purposes, an independent system in Lebanon, in a region known as “Fatahland” near the Israeli border and in western Beirut. The Palestinians lived at the bottom of the Lebanese social ladder, lower even than the Shi‘ites, because they were prevented from attaining citizenship and their legal status remained that of temporary refugees. The

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idea of naturalizing them into Lebanon was consistently resisted by both Arab states and the Lebanese Christian camp. The Arab states rejected it as part of a policy to use the refugees as an argument against Israel, and as a coercive measure in the international community, to enable the return of the refugees to Palestine. The Christian camp rejected the naturalization because it feared to break the demographic balance in Lebanon, which facilitated Christian hegemony in the political system despite the statistics which indicated a Muslim majority in the Lebanese population since the 1970s. The debate regarding the Palestinian presence in Lebanon reached new heights in December 1968, following a raid by Israeli commandos on the international airport of Beirut, destroying airplanes of the Lebanese national aviation company, Middle East Airlines. The raid, which occurred as a response to a terrorist attack by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on an Israeli El-Al airplane in Athens, sought to insinuate that Israel held the state from which the terrorists had arrived responsible for the terrorism, and to demonstrate what Lebanon would have to pay for Palestinian terrorist activity. The debate regarding the measure to which Palestinians should be given a free hand in Lebanon, which rose within the Lebanese political system following the raid, turned to an armed clash between the Lebanese army and Palestinian militias. This led the Arab League to compel the Lebanese government to sign the Cairo Agreement (November 1969) with the PLO. The agreement gave the Palestinians a free hand.59 Toward the end of 1970, Palestinian activity decreased due to the weakening of the Palestinian organization after the expulsion from Jordan in September 1970 (known as “Black September”), and as a result of the election of the assertive and conservative Suleiman Franjiyeh as President of Lebanon. However, at the end of 1971, Palestinian activity was renewed more intensely and Lebanon became the only base for attacks against Israel. In May 1973, following an Israeli commando raid against Palestinian leaders and headquarters in the heart of Beirut (known in Israel as “The Spring of Youth Operation” and in Lebanon as “ ‘Amaliyat Fardan”), a political crisis was generated in Lebanon, which led the government to resign. Following the crisis, the Lebanese army tried to take control of the Palestinian organizations, but gained limited success. Any attempt to act against the Palestinians in Lebanon met with opposition from the Muslim camp and external Arab factors, particularly Syria. As a result of the Muslim leadership’s support of the Palestinian presence, the Palestinians became a direct threat to the Maronite elite’s ability to maintain stature within the political system. Clashes between the militia of the Maronite Phalanges Party (al-Kata’ib), the LF, and the Palestinian organizations were inevitable, and indeed, in April 1975 such clashes led to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. The contribution of the Palestinian presence to the political instability in Lebanon can be summarized by the following:(a) weakening the regime and the government’s sovereignty of the country, particularly near the Israeli border and in some parts of Beirut; (b) increasing the tension between Christians and Muslims; (c) strengthening the political left in Lebanon and

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weakening the parliamentary system; and (d) increasing the “problem of the South,” which already suffered from neglect and deprivation.60 The Palestinian presence in Lebanon also contributed to the crystallization of the Shi‘ite community. The interaction between Palestinian refugees and the Shi‘ite emigrants in the slums of Beirut strengthened the Shi‘ite feelings of disaffection toward the Lebanese establishment and inclined them to adopt political and social activism. This interaction drew the Shi‘ites away from the communal feudal institutions and directed some of them toward leftist movements and suburban institutions, controlled by violent neighborhood leaders. A second contribution to the Shi‘ite crystallization stemmed from the fact that the Palestinians became the primary concern of the Shi‘ite inhabitants in Jabal-‘Amil in the 1970s. There were two reasons. One was the repeated clashes between the Palestinian militiaman and local inhabitants. A senior PLO official, Abu-Yusuf, explained: The relatively small population density in the South emphasized the presence of the fadawiyya there, and created daily clashes between the inhabitants and caused many problems . . . because the people in the region saw them as an armed force like an army, and because these fadawiyya constituted a new phenomenon in the local scene.61

A second reason was the repeated attacks in Jabal-‘Amil carried out by Israel, in retaliation for the fadawiyya. In many villages, the residents were caught in the middle of the conflicts of the Palestinians and Israel. The mood among the Shi‘ites in the South in early 1971 was described by a resident of a village in Jabal-‘Amil as follows: The fadawiyya activity in the village of Yatar caused heavy damage. The people are scared for their homes and for their fate, and it is advisable that the fadawiyya leave the village. The Israeli commandos infiltrated the village, blew up houses, and caused casualties.62

With the escalation of clashes between the two sides, Musa Sadr expressed himself on the Shi‘ite position regarding the Palestinians, saying, “The Shi‘ites sympathize with the Palestinians, but our sympathy is no longer such that we are willing to expose our people to suffering and distress.” And on another occasion he said, “The PLO has caused anarchy in southern Lebanon, but now the Shi‘ites have overcome their inferiority complex toward the Palestinian organizations. They are fed up with it.”63 A third contribution to the Shi‘ite crystallization was the training of the first Amal militiamen in 1974 and 1975 in PLO training camps in Lebanon. The cooperation with the Palestinians in military training demonstrates the ambiguous character of the Shi‘ite leadership’s policy, in which rhetoric and actions were not in accordance. Sadr, for instance, denounced the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon and the high price Shi‘ites had to pay for it, but at the same time did not prevent the PLO from helping to build the military force of the Shi‘ite community. The military cooperation was kept secret

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in order not to hinder Sadr’s efforts to represent himself as a middleman in the Lebanese conflict. The unwitting exposure of this cooperation as a result of a training accident embarrassed Sadr and compelled his colleagues to take drastic steps to maintain his public image and to “minimize” his personal involvement in the military training. The Shi‘ite policy toward the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in the 1970s sheds light on several aspects of the leadership of Amal: (a) It was a pragmatic leadership which used all means for establishing a Shi‘ite military force, including assistance from the PLO, with which the Shi‘ite population in Jabal-‘Amil clashed during that period. (b) The leadership was not united, as part of it implicitly supported the Palestinian presence in the South (this stance was led by the Iranian Sadeq Qotbezadeh, Amal’s contact man with the PLO), while others opposed such activities due to the destructive implications it had for the Shi‘ite population. (c) The fact that senior members in the SSIC publicly denounced Palestinian military activity in Lebanon, while de facto cooperating with Palestinian militias, harmed the Shi‘ite leadership’s reliability. (d) The leadership’s orientation was on a national level, looking beyond the South. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why they would prefer the PLO to train Shi‘ite militiaman in a time of severe Shi‘ite-Palestinian clashes in the South. As an Arab nationalist, Nabih Berri adopted the old line of the Arab League, as expressed in his saying that “the Palestinian problem is a matter for all Arabs and Muslims; it is the origin for our consent and activity.”64 Just as did the Arab League, Berri primarily opposed their permanent settlement in Lebanon. The Palestinian struggle became one of the main symbols of Arab nationalism in the 1960s, and a central issue in the inter-Arab rivalry, because few Arab states wanted to lead this struggle. Loyal to this line, Berri emphasized his obligation to the Palestinian struggle many times. After the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in Palestine (the west bank and the Gaza strip) in December 1987, he emphasized the linkage between the Shi‘ite resistance to Israel in southern Lebanon and the Palestinian uprising in Palestine.65 On the other hand, as said before, the Palestinian military struggle against Israel, which was conducted from the territory of Jabal-‘Amil, turned the Palestinians in the mid-1970s into the main enemy of the Shi‘ites and Amal. The Shi‘ite residents of Jabal-‘Amil suffered the Israeli shellings for years as a result of the Palestinian military and terrorist activities. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Shi‘ites in the South openly showed content with the removal of the Palestinian factor from the area. Unlike his southern supporters, Nabih Berri, for political reasons, was not able to express empathy for the Israeli operation, and kept silent about it during the first weeks after the invasion.

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Berri’s aspiration to see the Palestinians re-settle in Palestine was derived not only from his “Arab commitment” to the Palestinian struggle, but also from the Lebanese aspect of the problem, meaning to prevent their permanent settlement in Lebanon.66 As a pragmatic politician, however, he accepted the reality of their temporary presence, even its military side, while opposing permanent settlement.67 He explained that the objection to any consolidation of the Palestinians in Lebanon is a common interest for both sides: the Palestinians would not give up their rights on Palestine, and the Lebanese people would not have to pay the political price for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The contradiction between pro-Palestinian and Arab nationalist declarations on the one hand, and the daily rivalry on the other hand, was solved by Berri with a simple formula: “The Palestinian struggle is one of the basic goals of the Arabs, but the road to the armed struggle should not go through Lebanese territory at the expense of the Shi‘ites.”68 Berri’s list of priorities on this matter was clear. The Shi‘ite and the Lebanese interests come before the Palestinian ones. It should be remembered that Berri initiated a three-year war against the Palestinians in the 1980s (the war of the camps, Harb al-Mukhimat), in which hundreds of Shi‘ites and Palestinians died and great suffering was caused to the residents of the refugees camps in Beirut and Jabal-‘Amil. With the change of the Lebanese political map following the end of the civil war and the split in the Muslim camp, the threat of the permanent settlement of the Palestinians, most of them Sunnis, became a bigger menace to the Shi‘ites. Moreover, a short time after the civil war ended, a peace process began in the Middle East, focusing on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. One of the ideas raised in the process was that of a permanent settlement of part of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Whenever such an idea was heard, Berri expressed total objection to the settlement of Palestinian refugees, not only in Lebanon, but in any Arab country.69 He even contacted European politicians and made sure they understood the Arab objection. Berri’s approach toward the Palestinian presence can be considered as continuing Musa Sadr’s attitude. Sadr, in his day, also emphasized the importance of the Palestinian struggle, but at the same time was the first to actually call on the Shi‘ites to equip themselves with arms against the danger of a Palestinian takeover of the South. This was the real reason Sadr established the Amal militia and not to fight Israel, as he publicly declared.70 Under Berri’s leadership in the 1980s, unlike Sadr’s time, Amal was the strongest local military force in the South, and held itself responsible for security matters there. Berri’s fear that Amal’s military control in the South would be threatened, led to his military initiative against the Palestinians in Lebanon, known as the War of the Camps, from 1985 to 1987. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Palestinian issue in Lebanon has risen again because of the penetration of fundamentalist Islamic organizations, linked to Sunni Salafi global jihad to the country through refugee camps. Among these organizations were Jund al-Sham and Fatah al-Islam. In mid-2007 the Lebanese Army fought against the latter for four

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months in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, at the government’s behest. Berri, as well as Hassan Nasrallah, unequivocally supported the army in spite of the political crisis in Lebanon, in which they did not recognize the government’s legality.71 While Nasrallah did it to maintain supremacy of his organization as the standard bearer of Islam in Lebanon and as the only armed militia, Berri supported the army for additional reasons: in principle, he supported the ability of Lebanon to implement its sovereignty, and he showed support for Shi‘ite army soldiers, which many of were his supporters.

The Attitude toward Israel Generally speaking, Berri’s position on this matter is pragmatic. He consistently supported the armed resistance in the South which was intended to expel the Israeli army from Lebanon, and after the Israeli withdrawal, to liberate the land of Shab‘a Farms on the slopes of Mount Hermon (Jabal alShaykh). However, Berri never denied Israel’s right to exist, nor called for its destruction. On the contrary, even during the peak of anti-Israeli sentiments among the Shi‘ites after the July 2006 war, he expressed himself in favor of the Saudi Arabian peace plan which was adopted by the Arab League in Beirut in 2002, calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in exchange for comprehensive peace and normalization. The Israeli issue is central on the agenda of every Arab leader, all the more so for a Lebanese Shi‘ite one. The Shi‘ites’ stronghold in Lebanon is Jabal‘Amil, bordering the state of Israel. In the past the relations between both sides had experienced ups and downs. From 1919 to 1920, during the Shi‘ite guerrilla war against the French mandate (Harb al-‘Isabat), the Shi‘ite za‘im of Jabal-‘Amil, Kamel Bey al-As‘ad, found shelter in the Jewish kibbutz of Kefar-Gil‘adi while he was wanted by the French.72 During the Arab–Israeli war of 1948 the Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh) under the command of Fawzi Qa‘uqji, withdrew from the Israeli Galilee region and set its headquarters in the Lebanese village of Tibnin, in the house of ‘Abdul Fatah Berri, from the Berri extended family.73 After the independence of both states in the 1940s, the Shi‘ite farmers of Jabal-‘Amil and the Israelis across the border held correct relations. The tension between Israel and the Shi‘ite inhabitants of the South increased after Israel started retaliating against the military and terrorist attacks of the Palestinian organizations who acted from Jabal-‘Amil, retaliations in which many Shi‘ites were hurt. When Lebanon was suffering in the civil war, Israel opened the “Good Fence” gate on the border, enabling Shi‘ite farmers of the South to sell their harvests in Israeli markets. As said before, the Israeli invasion of 1982 was welcomed by most Shi‘ites in Jabal-‘Amil, who were relieved when the Palestinians left. For several weeks following the Israeli invasion of June 1982 Berri avoided expressing a clear position regarding the events, as he did not want to become a target for the Israelis or go against the popular sentiments of the Shi‘ites in the south. Three month later, when he came to the conclusion that the Israeli presence in Jabal-‘Amil would not be short, Berri decided to

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stop sitting on the fence and stood against Israel. In a speech he delivered in Tyre in front of a huge crowd, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the disappearance of Musa Sadr, Berri declared that the Shi‘ites have to resist the Israeli conqueror and that any contact with the Israelis is forbidden.74 In spite of that, he ordered Amal’s military officers in Jabal-‘Amil to cooperate and coordinate with the IDF. For years since, Berri became the leading spokesperson of the National Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Wattaniyya) against the Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. The resistance to the Israeli occupation became in the 1980s the focus of Berri’s political and military activities. Feeling the sentiments of the Shi‘ite population in Jabal-‘Amail, he went to extremes, saying the National Resistance is the only way to liberate Lebanon.75 A salient expression for this belief was a book Berri published in 1989, called Pages from the Soil of the Resistance (Awraq fi Turab al-Muqawama). The book contains poems, speeches, and articles in which Berri praises the successful armed struggle of the Shi‘ites against the Israeli occupation and the martyrs (Shuhada‘) of all religious sects who died in action or contributed to the resistance in other ways. Among those eulogized by Berri in his book are Rashid Karami, Muhammad Sa‘ad, Bilal Fahas, Khalid Azraq, and Sheikh Halim Taqi al-Din.76 Berri used the resistance against Israel as an instrument to intensify his patriotic and Lebanese national image. He consistently pointed to Amal’s central role in the resistance and its achievements.77 Berri repeatedly emphasized the significance of liberating the South in reaching a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Lebanon.78 He even conditioned his joining the government on its creating a new portfolio for him, the Reconstruction of South Lebanon. Yet after the July 2006 war, which caused heavy damage in Jabal-‘Amil, Berri said, “Our right of resistance is always there.” 79 In all the political forums Berri participated in during the civil war and afterward, including the National Dialogue conventions in Geneva and Lausanne, as well as in all basic principles of the cabinets he shared, he demanded the inclusion of a paragraph that obliged the resistance to the Israeli occupation. Berri included such a paragraph in Amal’s political platform and in the platforms of some political blocs he took part in, such as the National Unity Front, the Unity and Liberty Front, and the Tripartite Agreement.80 In order to glorify the resistance, Berri makes use of Musa Sadr’s image. Sadr, according to Berri, gave the resistance to Israel first priority.81 As a matter of fact, during the time of Sadr, Israel did not yet occupy southern Lebanon and raided Lebanon only for short times. Sadr’s first priority was the social struggle of the deprived, for which he established the Movement of the Deprived and Amal. The resistance to the Israeli occupation was central in Berri’s demagogic rhetoric against accusations of being moderate. Each time different groups in Lebanon fought against each other, or when power struggles broke out within Amal, he blamed Israel and called for a ceasefire between the Lebanese factions in order to enable a joint front against Israel.82

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Despite the demagogic use of the Israeli issue, Berri can be regarded as very moderate compared to other leaders of the Lebanese Shi‘a. His pragmatism can be demonstrated in a few examples: 1. His objection to military operations against Israel across the international border during the Israeli occupation of 1982 to 2000. He knew that the consequences of such activity would cause a heavy blow to the Shi‘ites of Jabal-‘Amil.83 2. The ideas he brought up to solve the “Israeli issue” during the Israeli occupation were logical and practical. He called for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, with the integration of UN forces and international guarantees.84 3. His attempts to reach indirect agreements with Israel in order to ensure the control of Amal in the South and the common interest of preventing Palestinian presence in Jabal-‘Amil. In spite of these attempts Berri was careful not to be in any way personally identified with direct contact with Israel. He publicly denied any such contact and whenever he was accused of having them, he went to extremes with anti-Israeli public declarations and dismissals of Amal personnel who were suspected of having such contacts.85 4. When Amal captured the Israeli air force navigator Ron Arad in 1986, Berri enabled delivery of letters and pictures from the captive by the International Red Cross, and offered a relatively low price for a prisoner exchange deal.86 5. He supports pragmatic formulas for ending the Arab–Israeli conflict. Following the regional changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War of 1991 (“Desert Storm”), Berri continued using pragmatic and moderate declarations since for the first time a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict was on track, facing a possible reconciliation. Berri expressed the positions of the main Arab nationalist faction at that time, calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, according to UN resolutions 242, 425, and 338, in exchange for a comprehensive peace with the Arabs.87 He was sure that as soon as the Israelis withdrew, the resistance in southern Lebanon would stop.88 Later on, after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon (in May 2000), Berri focused his demand on the Shab‘a Farms, an area of 40 square kilometers in Mount Hermon. While Israel claims it to be on Syrian soil, the Lebanese claim it is to be Lebanese. Berri once metaphorically compared Lebanon to a prisoner who is out of jail but his finger (Shab‘a) is still inside the cell.89 Nabih Berri supports a Lebanese–Israeli peace agreement as long as it would not be a bilateral one. In an interview on al-Arabia TV two months after the end of the July 2006 war, he said Lebanon can liberate the rest of its territories by “the Resistance,” as before, but it can achieve it by peaceful measures, as long as it would be a comprehensive peace for the entire region.

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At that time, Berri felt an opportunity to revive the Arab peace initiative of 2002 which was based on Saudi Arabia’s peace plan.90 With regard to the Israelis, he said, “We offered them full peace and that is the door they can pass through when they are ready.” 91 Berri’s stands toward Israel are very similar to, and possibly coordinated with those of Syria.

The Relations with Syria In late 2008 Syria and Lebanon established a complete diplomatic relationship for the first time since their independence in the 1940s. This was a peak in a process that had begun almost four years earlier with the departure of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. It created new reality for Berri, in which his close patron and ally did not control Lebanon anymore. Nabih Berri, like the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, perceived Lebanon and Syria’s relations to be those of one nation that lives in two political entities and that holds special connections. He argued that: The relations between Syria and Lebanon are not just relations between one state and another and not only of two neighbors. This relationship, which is based on history and destiny, began in the past and goes toward the future. The relationship between the two countries is a kind of a blood relationship. In fact, many families are partly Syrian and partly Lebanese.92

Two reasons turned Berri into being the most important ally of the Syrians in Lebanon. First, he thought that peace in Lebanon would be impossible without a massive Syrian involvement and presence. For this reason he wanted Syria to be part of any national dialogue;93 and second, in the 1980s Berri needed a strong ally and patron in light of the close connections his enemies held—the Maronites with Israel, the Palestinians with Iraq, the Druze with Libya, and Hizballah with Iran. In addition, having political roots in the pro-Syrian circles of the Lebanese Ba‘ath Party, Berri shares the social, secular, and Arab nationalist ideology with the regime in Damascus. Therefore, he saw the alliance of the Lebanese Shi‘ites with Syria as being absolute: “Whether Assad wins the war or is defeated, we shall be on his side.” 94 Berri’s admiration for the late Syrian president was so great that he decided to name one of Amal’s schools after him, and one of his sons after al-Assad’s son, Basil, who was killed in a car accident in 1994. Berri’s close ties with Damascus and his tendency to fall into line with the Syrian regime regarding every subject raised accusations of his being a Syrian puppet. Although this accusation had a solid basis, Berri had a different perspective: “Many think I’m serving the Syrian interests, but not at all. I’m talking as a Lebanese and for the primary Lebanese economic, political, military, and security interests, much more than for the Syrian interests.”95 The most arrant accusation against Berri for being a Syrian puppet was raised following his behavior during the debate over the extension of the presidential term of Elias Hrawi in 1995. He opposed a constitutional amendment to

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extend this term, but when Syria decided otherwise, Berri suddenly changed his mind and led the efforts to extend Hrawi’s term for three more years.96 Loyal to his view, or lacking any other choice, for years Berri defended the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. According to him, this presence was officially called for by the Lebanese government and president. Therefore the continuation of the military presence was a kind of “favor” to Lebanon, aimed at the reconciliation of the rival factions. For years Berri claimed that the Syrian military presence would come to an end when security and stability are a reality in Lebanon.97 Sometimes he defended the Syrian presence by pointing to the Israeli occupation of the South. He argued that an Israeli withdrawal is a must before the Syrian troops leave. The Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, however, proved this claim to be baseless. Berri was surprised by the Syrian hasty departure in April 2005, but later started to promote the establishment of an official relationship between the two states, an initiative that became a reality for the first time in October 2008. The official relationship “will occur between two neighbors bound by brotherly relations and understanding,” Berri said. “Eventually, diplomatic relations will turn a new page between both countries, and we hope they will bring about cooperation for the interests of the Lebanese and Syrian people.”98 In a speech at the Festival of the Renewal of Allegiance (Tajdid al-Bay‘a) between Hafez al-Assad and his people in 1999, in the presence of high ranking Syrian officials, Berri expressed his attitude toward Syria and his admiration of to the Syrian president. The speech dealt with all issues treated in this chapter: Arabism and close relations with Iran, leftist social matters, resistance to Israel, political stability in Lebanon, and the legacy of Musa Sadr. This extract might explain his close relations with the neighboring country: While struggling for the rule of President Hafez al-Assad, today we renew our pride. . . . Here is Syria, the jewel of the East and the Arab castle . . . in Lebanon we [appreciate] the time our brother Colonel Bashar al-Assad and Syrian officials have spent, even at the expense of their internal affairs. They are devoted to us . . . we highly appreciate the burden on Syria to establish stability and public order in Lebanon. Syria gave thousands of martyrs in 1982, perhaps twelve thousand, and the lives of thousands of its citizens, to prevent Lebanon from becoming Zionist, to restore calm and peace to its land, and start the process of building the State. . . . Syria has allowed the Lebanese to expand their choices and has supported the promotion of freedom and participated in building the state and institutions of civil society. . . . [We have] every confidence in Mr. Bashar al-Assad, sponsored by the father of all of us, which makes us optimistic, today more than ever, because Lebanon is now a state of institutions and of law, transparency, fairness, and impartiality. [Lebanon is] on the threshold of the third millennium and able to face the future. . . . I remember Imam Musa Sadr’s appeal to President Hafez al-Assad on June 8, 1976, in which he said: ‘You are the great hope, my hero of the Golan Heights. You headed the fierce fighting for four months and led the battle of resistance with iron nerves.’ . . . The history of the

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Middle East will speak of President Assad’s successful development of relations between the Arab world and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and his ongoing work to mobilize the energies and possibilities of the Arab and Muslim worlds to serve our interests. The Palestinian people will not forget that al-Assad’s Syria is a center of resistance and uprising.99

Many people in Lebanon wonder whether Nabih Berri has any agenda except granting the wishes of Damascus, or does he have any ideology at all. In concluding this chapter one might answer, ultimately, yes. In spite of justified criticism regarding his political role, hypocrisy, and low moral standards, Berri has an agenda. For his supporters he is a Lebanese nationalist patriot and an Arab nationalist, who perceives Lebanon as the final homeland for the Shi‘ites who live there. The Lebanese state, according to Berri, has a clear Arab identity as declared in the Lebanese constitution, and an Arab socialist doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s. All its citizens are equal, not enjoying any sectarian privilege. The Lebanese state, according to Berri, should be sovereign and rule all its territories, using a strong multi-sectarian army. Hence all people and religious communities have to respect the state’s law and institutions and to not to act against it. Such a Lebanon should maintain close ties with its brother Syria. Berri started his political career with the above perspective but was compelled to compromise on his stands every now and then, because there was no other way for him to survive politically. A detailed examination shows that he did not change his basic positions on major issues on the Middle East agenda. Not coincidentally he was described by scholar Nizar Hamzeh as the most successful politician of the last three decades in terms of survival.100 Berri’s political career represents the Lebanese Shi‘a in the last 30 years, from supporting secular political leftist ideas to the increase of Islamic alignments. Some of Berri’s political perceptions occasionally raised wide criticism, but at the same time these perceptions allowed his acceptance by everyone. Berri is a Lebanese and Arab nationalist, and a moderate secular Shi‘ite. He is a close ally to Syria and Iran and at the same time acceptable to the West and Israel as a possible partner in the future. However, this is also his weakness because he blurred political principles in order to survive. In reality, Berri is a mirror of the image of Lebanon because there is no other way, presumably, for 18 religious communities to live in the same political entity.

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F

or the past 30 years, Nabih Berri has been leading the moderate faction of the Lebanese Shi‘a. During this time, the Lebanese Shi‘ites have undergone many changes. These changes were accelerated by a few major factors. 1. A change in the nature of the struggle over the leadership of the community following Musa Sadr’s disappearance in 1978. 2. The dilemma that the Shi‘ites faced following the Islamic revolution in Iran: whether to act in favor of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon, under the inspiration of Iran, or whether to look upon the secular multicultural Lebanese state as a primary source of identification, with Iran serving as a source of pride and inspiration alone. 3. The civil war, which transformed the Shi‘ites within a few years into a dominant force in the war and, consequently, had turned them from a minor element into a major political power in the country. 4. The reconstruction of Lebanon on the basis of the Tai’f Accord, which did not reflect the Shi‘ite military and demographic power at the end of the civil war, and even deprived the Shi‘ites. 5. The Syrian control over Lebanon from the end of the civil war in 1990 to 2005. 6. The fear, which existed in Lebanon, of the growing strength of the Shi‘ites, and, as a result, the change in the formation of the main political blocs from one based on the Maronite community and one based on the Sunni community, to a bloc based on the Shi‘ite community and one based on the Sunni community. 7. The struggle to end the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which was successfully led by the Shi‘ites, and the continuation of the struggle against Israel. 8. Lebanon’s becoming a central front in the regional struggle in the Middle East, between Iranian and Western influence. Since Berri had a great effect on many of these changes, it is important to examine the man and his activities in light of them. In exploring Berri’s influence over the path the Lebanese Shi‘ites took, one cannot ignore his autobiographical landmarks, as to a large extent they reflect the changes the Lebanese Shi‘ites have undergone since the 1930s. Born in Western Africa to an emigrant family that left Lebanon due to economic conditions, his odyssey reflects the Shi‘ites’ search for a new life, not as poor and deprived as

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the one they experienced in Lebanon. Returning to Lebanon at an early age without his biological parents, and growing up in his early years in an adoptive family influenced his ability to accept reality and suit his moves to it. It can also, however, be perceived as an analogy to the lack of a strong patron for the Shi‘ite community at the time, compared with the foreign patronage the other Lebanese communities enjoyed. Berri’s law studies and his attempt to join the Kamil al-As’ad’s slate for the 1964 parliamentary elections symbolizes the path young nonprivileged men had to follow in their attempt to pursue their ambitions for socioeconomic and political advancement. Nabih Berri’s public activity in student bodies reflected, beyond high personal ambition, the contemporaneous Shi‘ite desire to influence their own fate, and a strong political tendency in favor of Arab nationalism. The Arab nationalism appeal stemmed largely from the hope it gave young Shi‘ites like Barri to break out of the communal circle controlled by the zu‘ama . Berri’s joining Musa Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived, and the affinity between them, reflect the beginning of the change which brought about the participation of young men with no ancestral advantages into posts in intercommunal bodies. Berri’s election as Amal’s chairperson in 1980 marked the end of the era in which the Shi‘ites passively tolerated their conditions and their becoming an active element in Lebanon. It was also a time of a change of generations in the Shi‘ite community’s leadership. The peak of Berri’s power, following the occupation of western Beirut in February 1984, was actually an historic turning point in Lebanese Shi‘ite political status and their self-perception. From then on, the Lebanese Shi‘ites were no longer a marginal community but rather a dominant factor in the Lebanese sociopolitical system. Their military power and demographics were better reflected, although still not completely. The battle for survival Barri conducted after February 1984 reflected the other sects’ response to the Shi‘ite power breakthrough on the one hand, and the struggle over dominance within the community on the other. The decline in Berri’s political power as of the mid-1980s reflected the division in the Shi‘ite community as a result of the Amal–Hizballah conflict. Amal represented the faction which sought to take part in Lebanon’s reconstruction following the civil war, based on an intercommunal understanding, while Hizballah represented those who sought to implement the Islamic revolution ideal in Lebanon. Berri’s election in 1992 as the Lebanese Parliament speaker was in fact the closing of a circle, as the control of the zu‘ama over the community as it had existed since the Ottoman era ended. The rule of several feudal families over the public positions allocated to the Shi‘ites and over the community’s political leadership was at an end, supplementing their loss of control over the public two decades before. Ironically, Berri himself was to become a kind of a za‘im over time, although he himself was a product of the massive change the community underwent, a change that enabled a man of his background, previously prevented from climbing the sociopolitical ladder, to be elected to the most senior political position a Shi‘ite could hold. One

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can find justifications for the argument some Shi‘ites in Jabal-‘Amil made against Berri in this matter, which included him living in a luxurious palace, and his masterly attitude. However, it seems that at least one reason for his behavior is the Lebanese political system of confessionalism, which turns the communities’ leaders into a link between the state and the community. By that, the state bestows upon them the power to maintain the patron-client relations which have characterized the zu‘ama era. Berri’s characteristics and the fact that he has served as the Parliament speaker for the last 18 years only intensifies the basis for these arguments. Alongside closing the circle of the zu‘ama’s rule, Berri’s election as speaker opened a new circle of political rivalry among the Lebanese Shi‘a, a rivalry that grew out of processes different from those prior to the 1975 to 1990 civil war. While Berri consistently, during all his years of political activity, maintained his main political positions, as shown in this book, and has not changed Amal’s political platform, Hizballah blurred its Islamic dogma as of the mid-1980s, and gradually adopted some of Amal’s outlooks. This process of “Lebanonization,” which occurred in Hizballah, whether tactical or genuine in essence, reflects the understanding of Hizballah’s leadership that the Lebanese Shi‘ites are not ready for an Islamic theocracy according to the Iranian model, but rather consider their Lebanonism and Arabism a main source of identity. Correspondingly, many Lebanese Shi‘ites shifted their political support from Nabih Berri and Amal to Hassan Nasrallah and Hizballah, although the latter partly adapted itself to long-time Berri positions. Without the “Lebanonization,” Hizballah could not have become the leading Shi‘ite movement in Lebanon as of the mid-1990s. Although Berri lost hegemony over the Lebanese Shi‘ites, this process is actually a proof for the validation of his political positions, or at least a proof that his perceptions genuinely represent the Shi‘ite public. Berri’s loss of hegemony resulted mainly from Hizballah’s success at appearing to be the most capable factor in promoting the interests of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community and its successful fight against Israel. Antiestablishment feelings among many Shi‘ites, who justifiably blamed the Lebanese establishment for their deprivation, have also contributed to this process. Antiestablishmentism is a sort of political tradition among the Arab Shi‘a generally, going back to the early days of the Shi‘a in the seventh century. Berri’s identification, for many Shi‘ites in Lebanon, as a main element in the state establishment, exacted a heavy political price from him, because of his position as speaker. He also paid a price for the implementation of his political beliefs, especially his choice to play the political game according to the Ta’if Accord’s rules, in which the Shi‘ites were underprivileged. Unlike Berri, as of the 1990s, Hizballah managed to keep an oppositional approach, while diminishing its political differences with Amal. With Iranian financial support, Hizballah was also able to provide the population with basic services, which the government was unable to do. Despite Berri’s gradually declining status among the Lebanese public in general and in the Shi‘ite community in particular, and perhaps precisely

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due to the previously described processes, Berri plays a very important role in maintaining relative stability in Lebanon. He has become the mediator between the Lebanese state and the Shi‘ite community, and, in the last six years, between the anti-Syrian camp supported by the West (known as March 14), and the camp supported by Iran and Syria (known as March 8). Although Berri is an integral part of the pro-Syrian camp, his high office and Hizballah’s extreme stands make him an irreplaceable middleman. He is a Shi‘ite who enjoys massive public support, leading a strong political movement, moderate enough for Hizballah’s opponents, and, on the other hand, Hizballah’s leadership thinks of him as a convenient delegate of the Shi‘ites in the political system. Despite intra-communal rivalry, Hizballah understands that Berri represents a lesser threat from the Shi‘ites in Lebanon’s public arena, thereby enabling a dialogue between the Shi‘ites and the other communities. One of the issues under dispute in the Shi‘ite community since the late 1970s concerns the identity of Musa Sadr’s authentic successor. This book claims that as far as political perceptions are concerned, Berri is most suitable. In the main issues of the Shi‘ites’ future in the Lebanese state, the attitude toward the state–religion relationship, the future of the Lebanese state, the relationship with Syria, the Palestinian problem in Lebanon and in Palestine, and the position toward Israel, Berri has been consistent during his 30 years of political activity; that is, loyal to Musa Sadr’s positions. This loyalty is commendable, as Berri had to face the central question concerning the Shi‘ites’ identity and their relationship with the Lebanese state following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, while this question was only theoretical in Sadr’s time. It should further be remembered, that from the religious perspective, Sadr had more authentic successors than Berri in Lebanon, as the latter is not a religious scholar. Therefore, people such as Sheikhs Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din and ‛Abd al-Amir Qabalan, and even secular leaders such as Hussein al-Husseini, sometimes took a line similar to Sadr’s, as in the issue of the linkage between Amal and the SSIC. The two scholars favored this linkage, while Berri had broken off their ties and gave Amal a more secular nature than in Sadr’s day. It should be mentioned, in Berri’s defense, that separating the two bodies was a necessity for him, as the movement’s militia was needed for aggressive use, and due to the personal struggles over the community’s leadership. Two claims made against Berri are refuted in this book. The first is that during the years he has been forced to radicalize his positions in an attempt to maintain his popularity in the Shi‘ite “street.” A closer look at Berri’s main political views, from his nomination as head of Amal until his fifth term as Parliament speaker, shows that he has remained consistent. It is the rival faction in the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, represented by Hizballah, which has significantly altered its approach toward the Lebanese state and gradually integrated into the Lebanese establishment, previously perceived by them as illegitimate. The second claim to be refuted concerns Berri’s hesitancy when it comes to handling his intra-communal political rivals. A

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closer examination of the events shows that Berri usually acted firmly against his rivals. The fact is that most of them have left the scene, whether through assassination, retirement or simply leaving, while Nabih Berri remains head of Amal and the leader of the moderate Shi‘ite faction. Alongside Berri’s many successes, there is room for criticism of the man and his activities. Reviewing his public achievements in comparison to his goals indicates that Berri has not achieved many of them so far. Political confessionalism is far from being abolished, although this is one of the reforms agreed upon in the Tai’f Accord at the end of the civil war. According to the Accord, the relative number of Shi‘ites in Parliament was increased and the position of the Shi‘ite speaker upgraded, but the Shi‘ites still hold only about 21 percent of the seats in Parliament while their portion of the population is approximately 35 percent. Generally speaking, despite the changes the Lebanese Shi‘ites have undergone since the civil war, under Berri’s leadership they are still the third religious sect in terms of allocation of political power. Expelling the Israeli occupation can also not be credited to Berri but to his rival movement, Hizballah, despite his persistence in maintaining the issue on the public agenda. The success of the military campaign against Israel was identified by the public with Hizballah, and secured the pro-Iranian movement a better platform to gain public goals, on Berri’s expense. The claim concerning Berri’s hesitancy, regarding his handling of political rivals, is justified given his style of leadership. Countless consultations and fence-sittings often occurred instead of decisiveness and leadership. Richard Norton’s description of him from the mid-1980s, that “internal bargaining and negotiation are a necessary precondition to decisions, and as a result it is often easier to decide not to decide than to provide positive leadership,” is still valid 25 years later.1 The examination of several main issues allows us to evaluate Berri’s political career in broader terms, those of success or failure. The first issue concerns Berri’s ability to survive for so many years in the highest political office the Shi‘ites hold. Part of the answer to the question of how does he make it lies in his personal characteristics, such as ambition, high intelligence, and pragmatism. These personal qualities have made him take calculated steps in controlling political and communal power centers, labor unions, and commercial unions. Berri also knew how to gain the support of Syria, which controlled Lebanese politics in the decade and a half following the civil war and made sure her allies were placed in key positions. Indeed, the Syrian presence had left no choice to the Lebanese deputies but to vote for Berri several times. But the fact he was elected speaker for a fifth term in 2009, after Syria’s influence in Lebanon massively decreased following the departure of its army in 2005, indicates he is not dependent on them exclusively. In addition, Berri’s political positions correspond to those of most Shi‘ites in Lebanon, who favor a secular multicultural state with strong links to Arabism over linkage to Iran. Nevertheless, the main part of the answer regarding Berri’s ability to survive has to do with the political “square” he was sitting on and with general

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processes in Lebanon that took place in the relevant period. It was obvious to all elements in Lebanon that the Shi‘ite community had taken center stage in Lebanon following the civil war of 1975 to 1990, by their demographics and Iran’s rise as a regional power in the Middle East. The Shi‘ite takeover of western Beirut in 1984, under Berri’s leadership, was a landmark in the recognition of the growing power of the Shi‘ites by other religious communities and their patrons outside Lebanon, who understood that the process of the Shi‘ites becoming a dominant sect is irreversible. In this atmosphere of heavy fear of a Shi‘ite takeover of Lebanon, Nabih Berri represents the moderate “face” of the Shi‘ites, which accepts Lebanese nationalism and statehood as the main source of identity. The political stands Berri consistently represents in external and internal issues allow diverse elements to accept him. He is secular and moderate enough for the non-Shi‘ite Lebanese factors, and Shi‘ite enough for Islamist Shi‘ites. He is national enough for political rivals in Lebanon and perceived by Hizballah as a facstor blunting antagonism toward the Shi‘ites. He is seen as enjoying considerable support among the Shi‘ite public, which is the largest religious sect in the country, unlike other opponents to Hizballah from among the Shi‘ite community. He represents an anti-Western outlook on the one hand, but accepts the West and has even lived in the United States in the past. Some of his family, it should be mentioned, still lives there. Berri leads the moderate faction of Lebanon’s largest community; he has been an ally of Syria ever since the days of the civil war; he is accepted by the Saudis as a legitimate element, and even by the Iranians, after years of rivalry. Berri is accepted by both Europeans and Americans, who are involved in Lebanon and the Middle East, and even by Israel, as his outlook does not undermine Israel’s right to exist. All these award Berri the status of a main element in keeping political stability in Lebanon as a mediator, and of being an irreplaceable figure in Lebanese politics. Since Berri is well known for his stands on core issues, time after time he becomes, in the eyes of the anti-Shi‘ite factions, the lesser of two evils. As he allows bridging political rivalry, he is elected repeatedly as Parliament speaker. This is how, for example, he was appointed to the job for the fifth time in a row after the parliamentary elections of June 2009. Berri gained the support of the majority of the rival political camp (March 14 alliance), although in his previous tenure this camp harshly criticized him for using his office to promote the interests of his own camp (March 8). It should be mentioned that Berri stepped into the shoes of a mediator with his first election as a speaker in 1992. Previously, in the dozen years in which he led Amal during the time of the civil war, he assertively represented the Shi‘ite community, and his survival as the movement’s leader was based on rigidness and personal characteristics. At this point, one should ask why, despite being a main figure in Lebanese politics for 25 years, Nabih Berri has not delivered the goods or led the Lebanese Shi‘ites to a political hegemony. The answer to this question lies in his secret of survival. Berri’s need to maintain his status as a mediator, accepted on all sides, has prevented him from insisting on some of his stands.

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When one is accepted by almost all rival parties, more or less, it is clear that his stands are middle ones, which allow reconciliation and mediation. Taking an unequivocal side in crucial matters would probably pull the rug from under his mediating status, and by that jeopardize his ability to survive politically. Therefore, Berri has “folded” during his almost 20 years as Parliament speaker, from his initial objection to the Tai’f Accord of 1989, to the issue of Hizballah holding weapons without state authority. Reviewing his core stand regarding the future Lebanon, for example, shows that it is not as far from the stand of the March 14 alliance, as one might think. If Berri was not in need of Syria and Hizballah’s support, and he had the public courage to follow his basic Arab and Lebanese national views, Lebanon would have been in a very different situation. The attempt to see the extent to which Berri has so far succeeded or failed raises another question: Has his political survival prevented the Shi‘ites from political hegemony, or promoted it? There is no easy answer. On the one hand, 20 years after the Tai’f Accord, the Shi‘ites are still politically underrepresented and deprived compared to other religious sects. Their legitimacy as an integral part of Lebanese society and their loyalty to their state is questioned. This is partly the result of the Sunni–Shi‘ite rift in the Middle East and the growing Iranian involvement in Lebanon. As the most prominent Shi‘ite politician, Nabih Berri is very much responsible for this reality. On the other hand, taking into consideration the process of the Shi‘ites becoming the largest and military strongest religious sect in Lebanon, of Islamization in the Middle East in the last 40 years, and Iran’s turning into a regional superpower, it is possible that estrangement tendencies toward the Shi‘ites from other religious sects in Lebanese society were inevitable. In this reality, maybe Nabih Berri has prevented the Shi‘ites from a much larger estrangement which they could have encountered under Hizballah’s leadership, and kept them in the political game in Lebanon. The answer to this question lies somewhere in the middle, and alongside Berri’s personal responsibility for the failure, he can be credited with the fact that the Shi‘ites are still an integral part of the national discourse and not an isolated community. As to the question of whether someone else would have succeeded more than Berri, or, in other words, is he replaceable, it seems that the moderate Shi‘ite branch would find it difficult to find someone who is so experienced in Lebanese politics as Nabih Berri. Nevertheless, it is possible that someone tough, with leadership qualities, not bound to such an extensive survival system, would be able to bring new life into the moderate Shi‘ite branch and lead it in new directions. Prima facie, it seems that a possible man capable of doing so in 2010 is retired General Jamil Sayyed. His close ties in the Syrian regime, along with the gradual return of Syrian influence in Lebanon, put him in a good position. Another question is why, despite his senior position as Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri has lost his leading status in the Shi‘ite community. The answer includes personal reasons alongside general processes among the Lebanese Shi‘a. Berri’s de facto compromises on stands he basically has not changed,

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for short-term political reasons, is one reason. Although his compromises resulted from pragmatism, the political maneuvering has caused disappointment of Berri in the secular-moderate Shi‘ite faction. Dealing with niggling politics, alongside his occasional inability to insist on his stands, has damaged his public credibility. This has harmed Berri especially in comparison to Hassan Nasrallah’s rising credibility, which has resulted from his insisting on and accomplishing his goals and keeping distance from daily politics. The financial assistance that Hizballah received from Iran enabled it to allocate funds to the welfare of the Shi‘ite community. At the same time, Amal, under Berri’s leadership, using mainly the governmental budget, was not able to raise as much funding for this cause. As many of the Shi‘ites were poor and needed the social-welfare activity, Hizballah was able to gain the support of many of them. Another reason for Hizballah’s increasing power at Berri and Amal’s expense has to do with the process of Islamization the Lebanese Shi‘ites have witnessed since the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. In Lebanon, most of its supporters were affiliated with the religious authority of Marja‛ al-Taqlid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, one of the top religious authorities in the Shi‘ite world, until his death in July 2010. Amal, on the other hand, is not affiliated with any religious authority of this degree within Lebanon, and therefore finds it hard to recruit Islamic supporters. Nabih Berri’s close relations with Ayatollah ‛Uzma ‘Ali Sistani, can hardly be considered a counterpoint to this deficiency, since the latter resides in Najaf, Iraq, and not in Lebanon. Fadlallah’s demise might bring a change on this issue. As for the question of Berri himself, using the meaning of his name, whether he is a Nabih (meaning in Arabic clever, sharp, and alert) or a Berri (meaning wild), this book claims that Nabih Berri has combined both characteristics; otherwise he would not have survived for such a long period of time. In a historical perspective a few decades from now, Berri might be considered the real “Mr. Lebanon,” as his path symbolizes the tendency toward pluralism, compromise, political manipulation, and the blurring of principles in order to safeguard the Lebanese national framework. Although not necessarily a compliment, Berri certainly reflects Ta’if’s Lebanon and the essence of Lebanonization.

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No t es

Preface 1. Tom Sicking and Shereen Khirallah, “The Shi‘a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way,” CEMAN Reports, no. 2 (1975), pp. 97–130. 2. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986); Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a—Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987). 3. For example, see Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004); Hala Jaber, Hezbollah-Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Martin Kramer, Hezbollah’s Vision of the West (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989); Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballa (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1987); Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hezbollah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2001); Judith Palmer Harik, Hizbollah—The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); Marius Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly, 10, no. 2 (1988), pp. 683–698. There are many other publications on Hizballah and the Lebanese Shi‘a from 1990–2010. 4. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon—Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 5. Muhammad Jaber al-Safa, The History of Jabal-‘Amil (Taarikh Jabal-‘Amil), (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1981) (in Arabic); Tamara Chalabi, The Shi‘is of Jabal Amil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation State 1918–1943 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 6. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 264–272; Graham Fuller and Rend Francke, The Arab Shi‘a—The Forgotten Muslims (New York: Palgrave, 1999), pp. 203–238; Rodger Shanahan, The Shi‘a of Lebanon-Clans, Parties and Clerics (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 107–132; Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007); Itshak Nakash, Reaching for Power-The Shi‘a in the Modern Arab World (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 99–128.

Introduction 1. Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a-Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 15. 2. Salim Nasr, “Roots of the Shi‘i Movement,” Merip Reports 15, no. 5 (1985), p.13. 3. Shimon Shapira, Imam Musa al-Sadr: The Creator of the Shi‘ite Movement in Lebanon, Sqirot, the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies-the Shiloah Institute (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1986), pp. 23–24. (Hebrew)

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No t e s

4. Shapira, Imam Musa Sadr, p. 27; Martin Kramer, “Syrias Alawis and Shi ‘ism,” in Martin Kramer, Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 247. 5. Al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli, April 8, 1978. 6. Ibid. 7. Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a, p. 196 n. 23. 8. Tom Sicking and Shereen Khirallah, “The Shi‘a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way,” CEMAN Reports, no. 2 (1975), p.110. 9. The information on the ministers in al-Hoss’s government, established on July 16, 1979, is from Itamar Rabinovich and Hana Zamir, “Lebanon,” in Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon and Colin Legum (eds.), MECS 1978–1979, The Shiloh Center for Middle-East and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980), p. 644. 10. On Fadlallah see Martin Kramer, “Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,” Orient, 26, no. 2 (1985), pp. 147–149; Martin Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (Part 1),” in Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 11. Itamar Rabinovich and Hana Zamir, A War and Crisis in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: haKibutz ha-Meuhad, 1982), p. 137 (Hebrew), indicate a massive migration to Jabal‘Amil and the Biqa‘ from Shi‘ite quarters on August 18, 1976; on the fall of the quarter see Raphael Calis, “The Shi‘ite Pimpernel,” The Middle East (November 1978), p. 54; see also John Bulloch, Death of a Country, The Civil War in Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), p. 172. 12. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Islam and the Logic of Force, 3rd ed. (Beirut: alMu’asasa al-Jam‘iya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi‘, 1985). (Arabic) 13. Fuad Ajami, The Vanished Imam (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 216. 14. The details on Shirazi are from the announcement published by Jama‘at al-‘Ulama, following his assassination, quoted in al-Safir, May 5, 1980. 15. Shimon Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: ha-Qibuts haMe’uhad, Qav Adom, 2000), pp. 51–51. (Hebrew) 16. On the Itihad al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya, see al-Nahar, April 27, 1977. 17. Al-Safir, May 5, 1980. 18. Shapira, Imam Musa Sadr, pp. 18–19. 19. Richard Augustus Norton, “Political Violence and Shi‘a Factionalism in Lebanon,” Middle East Insight 3, no.2 (1983), p. 12. 20. Voice of Lebanon, for instance, announced on May 13, 1979, that Tibnin rejected Haddad’s ultimatum to join his militia and both sides were negotiating. See FBIS-DR, May 14, 1979, p. G2. 21. Such rumors were spread in September and November 1978, and in 1982 and 1988. The Shi‘ite Mufti ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan was quoted as saying that the Syrian President al-Assad and the PLO leader ‘Arafat gave him some information that Sadr was alive and was expected to arrive in Damascus; see AFP in English, November 19, 1978, in FBIS-DR, November 20, 1978, p. G3; see also a report by the Saudi newspaper al-Jazeera, published in London, in which Sadr was released by the Libyan authorities under pressure from Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria and al-Assad of Syria, and that Sadr was in Paris on his way to Damascus. The report was quoted in QNA Doha, November 18, 1978, in FBIS-DR, November 21, 1978, p. G3; a Kuwaiti newspaper announced that Sadr had arrived in Iran, through Addis-Ababa; see al-Watan, September 13, 1978; Shapira, Imam Musa Sadr, p. 32, wrote that such rumors were spread during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. 22. Norton, “Political Violence,” pp. 12–13. 23. Shapira, Imam Musa Sadr, p. 21. 24. Ajami, p. 213.

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25. Middle East News Agency (MENA), September 29, 1978, in NER, September 29, 1978. 26. On Shams al-Din’s meetings with the Lebanese heads of state, see Beirut Information Service, September 12, 1978, in SWB-ME, September 14, 1978, A/5/5916; on his meetings in Damascus, see BBC, September 20, 1978, in SWB-ME, September 20, 1978, A/5/5921. 27. On the special parliamentary session see MENA, September 17, 1978, in NER, September 19, 1978; on the special assembly to discuss parliamentary unity see MENA, September 22, 1978, in NER, September 22, 1978. 28. Beirut Information Service, October 16, 1979, in FBIS-DR, October 17, 1979, p. G1. 29. “Lebanon-After Iran: The Shi‘i Community,” Middle East Intelligence Survey, February 1–15, 1979, vol. 6, no. 21, p.168. (no author) 30. Amal’s political platform was published in al-Nahar, May 12, 1977; for the English version see Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a, pp. 144–166. 31. Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon, p. 61. 32. Hassan S., “Imam al-Sadr and Amal: The Explosion that Created Amal,” part five of a series of articles on the Islamic movements in Lebanon, al-Shira‘, no. 98, January 30, 1984, pp. 18–19. (Arabic) 33. The details on al-Husseini are from a series of interviews on his memoirs: Ghassan Charbel, “Hussein al-Husseini Remembers (1),” al-Wasat, November 28, 1994 (Arabic); and from Who’s Who in Lebanon 1990–1991 (Beirut: Publitec Publications, 1992), p. 141. (No author). 34. Shapira, Imam Musa al-Sadr, p. 17. 35. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, November 30, 1979. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid.

Chapter 1

Nabih Berri’s Early Years

1. Nabil Haytam, Nabih Berri-I Live in This Book (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 2004), p. 11. (Arabic). The book is a collection of personal experiences as told by Nabih Berri in a series of meetings with Nabil Haytam during 2001 and 2002. 2. The Michael Berry (Berri) Terminal is named after the former airport commissioner. For more on the Lebanese Shi‘ites from Tibnin in the United States, see Linda S. Walbridge, Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shiism in an American Community (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997), pp. 24–25. 3. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 103. 4. Haytam, p. 15. 5. Ibid., p. 12. 6. IDF Archive (Giv‘atayim), 922/1975, file 612, a report written by the intelligence officer of the Northern Command, November 13, 1948, quoted in Omri Nir, “Continuity and Change in the Shi‘ite Community of Lebanon,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, December 2001), p. 174. (Hebrew) 7. The story, as told by Nabih Berri, in Haytam, pp. 22–27. 8. Berri was interviewed for al-Jazeera’s series “A Special Visit,” by Sami Kalib, and was broadcast in two parts, on October 29 and November 5, 2005; the text and audio of the relevant part in the interview and the sound are also available in alJazeera’s Internet site, http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/72C296B9–288F4B67-B74D-2DB21E343914.htm’L1 (Arabic). 9. Haytam, p. 65. 10. Fawaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 169–70.

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11. Haytam, p. 39. 12. Ibid., p. 39. 13. Nassib Fawaz to Tom Hundley, in “Nabih Berri: The Man in the Middle,” The Spokesman-Review, June 18, 1985. 14. Al-Nagresko Caffe operated in Beirut’s Hamra Street until it was replaced by odka in January 1970. See: Nadia Barclay, “Café Culture in Beirut—a Center for Civil Society (Sixteenth Century to the Present”), (M.A. thesis submitted to the Growth and Structure of Cities Program, Bryn Mawr College, December 2007), p. 17. 15. Haytam, p. 79. 16. Haytam, pp. 80–81. The stories were told by Berri himself. 17. See in Berri’s official website, ; the distinction was also mentioned in Zahir ‛Abass, “Nabih Berri (al-Hamis) . . . Khasm la buda Minhu,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 26, 2009. 18. Ajami, p. 105. 19. Berri paid tribute to the memory of the late prominent lawyer Lahoud (1899–1988), in a memorial ceremony organized at the “Lawyer’s Home,” in March 2009. Berri said he considered Lahoud as the first active supporter for human rights and the first to call for dialogue based on respecting the other and allowing him his margin of human rights. Berri also credited Lahoud with being the first who to consider that democracy and confessionalism cannot coexist. See official publication by the Lebanese official news agency, the Ministry of Information, March 12, 2009. ; last viewed on December 11, 2009. 20. Ajami, p. 103. 21. Ibid., p. 105. 22. Tom Hundley, “Nabih Berri: The Man in the Middle,” The Spokesman-Review, June 18, 1985. 23. Haytam, pp. 63–64. 24. Ajami, p. 105. 25. “Lebanon: Present Status of Shi‘ites Discussed,” al-Majallah, August 30, 1997. 26. Al-Husseini’s explanation was published in a series of interviews presented in alWasat, November 28, 1994. The explanation of his associates and the political bureau is quoted in al-Liwa’, April 4, 1980. 27. Al-Husseini’s statement is in al-Safir, April 5, 1980; the report on the assassination attempt is in al-Nahar, March 14, 1980, and also the response of Prime Minister al-Hoss to the event, in Beirut Information Service in Arabic, March 13, 1980—in FBIS-DR, March 13, 1980, G1. 28. An interview with Nabih Berri, al-Shira‛, March 23, 1992. 29. The names of the leadership council are from al-Safir, April 5, 1980. 30. Al-Safir, April 26, 1980; al-Nahar, April 26, 1980. 31. Amal’s Encyclopedia, vol. 5—The Course of the Chairperson’s Political, Militant, and Philosophical History, p. 29. (Arabic) “Machiavellian,” in the political sense, usually means that all is fair in order to gain power.

Chapter 2

From a Marginal Militia Leader to a Key Man

1. Monday Morning, April 27, 1981. 2. Thomas Mayer, “Lebanon,” in: Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon, and Colin Legum (eds.), MECS-1980–1981, The Shiloh Center for Middle-East & African Studies, Tel Aviv University, (New-York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), p. 668.

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No t e s 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

189

Yosef Olmert, “Lebanon,” in: MECS 1981–82, p.706. Monday Morning, February 1, 1982. The Washington Post, April 18, 1982. An interview of Berri with Mark Kravitz, Le Matin, July 5, 1982, in FBIS-DR, July 14, 1982, p. G7; an interview of Berri in al-Itihad al-Usbu‘i, September 9, 1982. On the military aspect of the PLO’s evacuation from western Beirut, see: Reuven AviRan, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon 1975–1985 (Tel Aviv: Ma‘arahot-Defence Ministry, 1986), p. 168. (Hebrew) The Cairo Agreement set the rules of the game between the PLO and the Lebanese government following heavy clashes that broke out between them in the late 1960s. “Black September” is the name the Palestinians call September 1970, in which the Jordanian army’s attacked the Palestinian militias in Jordan, after a hijacking of four European airplanes by Palestinian militias landed on Jordanian soil, forcing the departure of their headquarters out of Jordan. On the Palestinians in Lebanon, see: John K. Cooley, “The Palestinians,” in: P. Edward & L.W Snider (eds.), Lebanon in Crisis (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), pp. 21–54; Rabinovich, The War For Lebanon, pp. 40–43; Michael Hudson, “Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story,” Journal of Refugee Studies 10 no. 3 (1997), pp. 243–260. Such an opinion on the importance of the Druze was expressed by the former president Elias Sarkis. See: Karim Pakradouni, The Lost Peace, translated from French to Hebrew by Avital ‘Inbar (Tel Aviv: Ma’arahot, Ministry of Defense, 1986), p. 193. (Hebrew) There are no official or exact statistics on the number of Shi‘ites in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Various estimations indicate 750 thousand to one million. See: William E. Shapiro, Lebanon, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), p. 21; Clinton Bailey, “Lebanon Shi‘is after the 1982 War,” in: Martin Kramer (ed.), Shi’sm, Resistance and Revolution, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 229; Fouad Ajami, “Lebanon and Its Inheritors,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 63/4, Spring 1985, p. 779; Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defined: Musa Al-Sadr and the Shi‘a Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 50; Yusuf Douwayhi, al-Nahar, November 13, 2006. Al-Hadaf, September 3, 1982. Beirut Information Service, June 20, 1982, FBIS-DR, June 21, 1982, p. G3; on the National Salvation Committee see: Joseph Alpher, “Untangling the Lebanese Labyrinth,” Newsview 3, no. 27 (1982), pp. 20–21. On Berri’s position just before the Geneva conference, see his interview with Lidia Georgi, Monday Morning, October 17, 1981. It is also called the “Constitutional Document.” The full text is in al-Nahar, February 14, 1976. Bailey, pp. 225, 228, mentions that Berri’s participation in the conference became possible only because of Syrian pressure on President Jumayil. On Berri’s participation at the expense of Speaker Kamil al-As’ad, see: Elie A. Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon, (London and New York: Tauris, 1995), p. 121. On the reconciliation conference in Geneva, see Olmert, “Lebanon,” MECS 1983–84, pp. 540–544. According to Reinich Jacques, based on American sources, the Americans finally convinced Berri and Hussein al-Husseini to support Bashir, and they considered their success a great achievement. Reinich Jacques, “Bashir Jumayil and his Era,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, September 1986), part two, p. 413. (Hebrew) Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, Unsafe at Any Altitude (Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2006), pp. 85–86. Ibid., p. 76. On Speaker ‘Osseyran during the 1958 crisis, see Omri Nir, “The Shi‘ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis,” MES 40, no. 6 (2004), p. 113.

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22. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (London: Fontana/Collins, 1990), p. 195. Ajami was speaking on the popular Face the Nation show, in October 1983. 23. Ze’ev Shiff and Ehud Ya‘ari, A Misled War (Jerusalem & Tel Aviv: Shoqen, 1984), pp. 197–200. (Hebrew) 24. The extent to which the Shi‘ites were out of the Israeli calculations can be demonstrated by reading the memoirs of Dave Kimche, who was in charge of the Lebanese case in the Israeli foreign intelligence agency (the Mossad) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Kimche later served as director of the Israeli Foreign Office and headed the Israeli delegation to the political talks between Israel and Lebanon that ended with the “May 17” Agreement (1983). In his book Kimche mentions the Shi‘ites and Berri only once, and only in general. David Kimche, The Last Option, part 2, “Israel and Lebanon,” (London: Weienfeld & Nicolson, 1991), pp. 125–185. (Hebrew) 25. Yosi Melman, “The Spy Shabtay Kalmanovich Was Murdered in Moscow,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2009 (Hebrew). Kalmanovich was an Israeli businessman who made the connection between the Israelis and Jamil Sa‘idi. 26. On Berri’s reference to the captured Israeli navigator, see Amal, November 7, 1986. 27. An interview of Berri with Salim Shihab, al-Yamama, February 2–8, 1983. 28. Al-Anba’, July 7, 1983, quoted by Bailey, p. 225. 29. Al-Sayyad, May 22, 1980. 30. On the arbitration see As‘ad Abu Khalil, “Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles,” MES 27, no. 3 (1991), p. 391. 31. On the Iraqi Da‘awa party and Mohammad Biqar al-Sadr, see: Chibli Mallat, “Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Biqar as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2, (1988), pp. 699–729. 32. Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: ha-Qibutz ha-Me’uhad, 2000), pp. 101–102. (Hebrew) 33. On the three persons see in Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballa, (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, The Shiloh Institute, Tel Aviv University, 1987), p. 7. 34. Berri said that in an interview, al-Shira‘, March 23, 1992. 35. Al-Sayyad, May 22, 1980. 36. Kramer, Moral Logic, pp. 6–7. 37. Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 88. 38. The Radio of Phalanges, September 7, 1982, NER, September 7, 1982; several other senior officials left Amal in addition to Mussawi: the chairman of the labor committee ‘Abdallah al-Zein; the chairman of the supervision committee ‘Ali ‘Akush; and the deputy for organizational matters Muhammad ‘Abd ‘Ili. The same day two other senior activists in Beirut, ‘Abdallah Mahmud and ‘Abdallah Qsir, also declared their resignation from Amal because of “the loss of principles for personal purposes.” They expressed support for Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. Mussawi’s declaration on the establishment of “Islamic Amal” in al-Nahar, December 29, 1982. 39. ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan, in al-Nahar, January 14, 1980. It was said before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in September 1980. 40. The Voice of Hope, December 2 and 3, 1979, in FBIS-DR, December 3, 1979, p. G1; Olmert indicates a few hundred volunteers. See Yosef Olmert, “The Shi‘ites in Lebanon: From Marginal Community to Central Factor,” in Martin Kramar (ed.), Protest and Revolution in Shi‘ite Islam (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center / ha-Kibuts haMeuhad, 1986), p. 131. (Hebrew) 41. Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 100. 42. Amal, November 14, 1980, quoted in Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon, pp. 90–91.

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43. Al-Safir, June 23 and 24, 1980. 44. Amal, May 23, 1980, quoted in Shapira, Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon, p. 91. 45. The support of Hizballah among the Shi‘ites at that time was estimated as 20 percent, see Bailey, p. 220; Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 101. 46. Al-Hawadith, August 20, 1982. 47. Al-Mustaqbal, July 31, 1982; Pakradouni, p. 216. 48. On the support of al-As’ad for speaker by the Phalanges, see al-Hawadith, November 27, 1981. 49. Olmert, “Lebanon,” MECS 1981–82, p. 740; Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 94, indicates that Berri, Qabalan, and Shams al-Din promised in private to support Bashir, but could not say this publicly. See also note 18 in this chapter. 50. Bailey, p. 221. 51. See, for example, comprehensive interviews with Berri in al-Hawadith, March 25, 1983; and with Shams al-Din in al-Mustaqbal, March 5, 1983. 52. Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 88. 53. On the support in Berri and Shams al-Din, see al-Tadhamun, November 3, 1984. 54. Bailey, p. 228. 55. The reports on Berri’s intention to resign are in al-Bayraq, April 26, 1982; The Middle East Information Agency, April 26, 1982, in NER, April 26, 1982; The Radio of Phalanges, April 24, 1982, in NER, April 25, 1982; the report that Berri went back on his word in al-Bayraq, April 27, 1982. 56. An interview with Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, in al-Mustaqbal, March 5, 1983. 57. Norton, Amal and Shi‘a, p. 89. 58. Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army—A National Institution in a Divided Society (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), p. 127. 59. On the “Black Saturday” see al-Nahar, February 5, 1984. This was the second “Black Saturday” in the Lebanese civil war, as the first was on December 6, 1975, when the militia of the Phalanges executed LNM people, and innocent Muslims and Palestinians, in a revenge action. 60. The Voice of the Mountain, February 4, 1984, in SWB-ME/7559/A/5, February 6, 1984. 61. Jaber’s announcement is in The Voice of the Mountain, February 7, 1984, in FBIS-DR, February 8, 1984, p. G7. 62. Damascus Information Service, February 7, 1984, in FBIS-DR, February 8, 1984, p. G7. 63. The Voice of the Mountain, February 7, 1984, in FBIS-DR, February 8, 1984, p. G7. 64. For example, the academic specialist Yossef Olmert’s article in Yedi‘ot Aharonot, February 17, 1984; The Economist, February 11, 1984; Le Monde, February 8, 1984; Ha’aretz, February 17, 1984 (an article that was translated from the German daily Der Spiegel).

Chapter 3 A Fight for Survival: Leading Amal and the Shi‘ites in the Jungle of the Civil War 1. Radio of Phalanges, September 24, 1982, in NER, September 24, 1982; on Berri’s response to Jumayil’s election see also al-Nahar, September 24, 1982. 2. Elie Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon (London and New York: Tauris Publishers, 1995), p. 158. 3. Ha’aretz, March 18, 1984. 4. Al-Nahar, March 15, 1984; Ha’aretz, March 14, 1984; Voice of the Mountain, March 13, 1984, in FBIS-DR, March 14, 1984.

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No t e s

5. Al-Nahar, March 14, 1984; Beirut Information Service, March 14, 1984, in FBIS-DR, March 14, 1984; Voice of the Mountain, March 14, 1984, in FBIS-DR, March 14, 1984. 6. For the final official announcement of the Lausanne convention, see al-Nahar, March 21, 1984. 7. Berri was quoted in Salem, p. 159; see also Berri’s answer to a direct question on this matter in an interview during the Lausanne convention in La Repubblica (Rome), March 15, 1984 in FBIS, March 21, 1984, p. G3. 8. Al-Safir, October 23, 1984. 9. An interview with Rashid Karami in al-Mustaqbal, July 28, 1984. 10. Salem, pp. 180–181. 11. Berri was praised Karami’s contribution to Lebanon, to the National Front, and to the struggle in the South in words he wrote in memory of Karami. See Nabih Berri, Papers of the Land of the Resistance (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus lil-Tiba‘a wal-Nashr waltawzi‘, 1989), pp. 17–27. (Arabic); After Karami’s assassination Berri appointed an inquirer to investigate the assassination, see in Beirut Information Service, June 22, 1987, in FBIS-DR, June 22, 1987, p. N5. 12. Al-Nahar, August 6, 1985; on the members of the “front” see Voice of the Mountain, August 6, 1985, in FBIS-DR, August 6, 1985, pp. G1–2. 13. On the political plan of the National Unity Front see al-Safir, July 31, 1985. 14. Salem, p. 162. 15. Ibid., p. 211; Salem was one of the draft writers of the “Tripartite Agreement.” 16. On the important points of the agreement according to Amal, see Amal, no. 416, January 10, 1986; the full text of the “Tripartite Agreement” in Tishrin, December 30, 1985. 17. On the Front see Syrian Television, July 23, 1987, in FBIS-DR, July 27, 1987, p. N3; on Berri’s accusations see Voice of Lebanon, August 3, 1987, in FBIS-DR, August 4, 1987, p. N3; al-Thaura, July 24, 1987, the editorial. 18. Al-Nahar, September 23, 1988; al-Bayraq, September 23, 1988. 19. Al-Hayat, October 14, 1990, pp. 1, 7. 20. Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizballah,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996), p. 52. 21. Daniel Nassif, “Nabih Berri—Lebanese Parliament Speaker,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 2, no. 11 (2000), http://www.meib.org/articles/0012_ld1.htm. 22. See an interview with Michel ‘Aoun, al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dauli, July 29, 1989, in HATZAV, August 29, 1989. 23. Nabil Haytam, Nabih Berri—I Live in This Book (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 2004), pp. 239–240. (Arabic) 24. The Daily Report 5, no. 10–11 (1994), p. 7. 25. Al-Safir, May 8, 2009, chronicled the relationship between Michel ‘Aoun and Nabih Berri in recent years. 26. Al-Qabas, May 14, 2010. 27. Haytam, 353–354. 28. “Beirut Parliament Summoned to Meet,” New York Times, Nov. 3, 1989. 29. The full text of the Ta’if Accord is in al-Nahar, October 23, 1989. 30. Voice of the National Resistance, October 17, 1989, in FBIS, October 18, 1989, p. 34. 31. Al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990. 32. Al-Diyar, May 20, 1990. 33. Berri’s quotation, including Shams al-Din’s, in Haytam, p. 356. 34. La Revue du Liban, July 20, 1991. 35. On the return of the Palestinian militiamen to the Lebanese refugee camps, see Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of the Israeli Invasion,” MEJ xxxviii, 1984, pp. 255–256, 258; al-Nahar quoted a Syrian report on this issue, October 28, 1984.

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36. Al-Safir, July 2, 1984. 37. Quarterly Economic Reviews, 3rd Quarter, Lebanon 1985, p. 9. (No author). 38. Joe Stork, “The War of the Camps, the War of the Hostages,” MERIP Reports, no. 133 (1985), p. 6. 39. On the agreement see al-Nahar, June 18, 1985; on key points in the agreement see Muhamad ‘Aql, “The Wars of the Brothers and Siblings, and the Profit is Equal to Loss,” al-Raya, September 5, 1991. This is one part of a series of articles on Amal. (Arabic) 40. Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, Unsafe at Any Altitude (Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2006), pp. 78–80. 41. Beirut Information Service, May 28, 1986, in FBIS-DR, May 28, 1986 p. G2. 42. Yosef Olmert, “Lebanon,” in: Itamar Rabinovich & Haim Shaked (eds.), MECS 1986 (London, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 484. 43. An interview with Berri, al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, February 19, 1988. 44. On the agreements see Berri’s reference in al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 2, 1989. 45. Al-Nahar, July 2, 1985; al-Ahrar, July 2, 1985; Voice of Lebanon, July 1, 1985, in FBIS-DR, July 2, 1985, p. G2; Quarterly Economic Reviews, 3rd Quarter, Lebanon 1985, p. 10. 46. Al-Nahar, November 25; New York Times, October 24, 1985. 47. Al-Anwar, December 1, 1985. 48. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, February 21, 1986. 49. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, June 20, 1986; Voice of Lebanon, June 8, 1986, in FBIS-DR, June 9, 1986, p. G5. 50. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, October 3, 1986. 51. Al-Majala, January 30, 1988. 52. Daniel Nassif, “Nabih Berri—Lebanese Parliament Speaker,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, December 2000, . 53. For example, see Berri’s accusations against Qadhafi during the 1980s in his speech on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance, in al-Nahar, September 1, 1986; the ninth anniversary in Berri, p. 130; and in al-Shira‘, October 5, 1987. 54. On the opening of the Libyan embassy in Ba‘aqlin, see al-Haqiqa, February 25, 1988; on deterioration of relations between Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party in al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, February 26, 1988. 55. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, April 1, 1988. 56. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, April 8, 1988. 57. Voice of Lebanon, April 17, 1985, in FBIS-DR, April 17, 1985, pp. G3–G4; Radio Monte Carlo, April 19, 1985, in NER, April 20, 1985. 58. Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘, February 24, 1986, quoted in Olmert, MECS 1986, p. 485. 59. Voice of Free Lebanon, November 2, 1986, in FBIS-DR, November 3, 1986, p. G2; Voice of Lebanon, December 11, 1986, in FBIS-DR, December 12, 1986, p. G1. 60. Harris, “Lebanon,” in MECS 1995, p. 456. 61. Salim Nasr claims that in 1974 the Shi‘ites were almost a half of the 20,000–30,000 active members of the leftist movements. See Salim Nasr, “Roots of the Shi‘i Movement,” MERIP Reports, June 1985, p. 13. 62. On the Lebanese Communist Party in Lebanon, see: Michel Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 57–90; on the Shi‘ites in the LCP see Rodger Shanahan, The Shi‘a of Lebanon—Clans, Parties and Clerics (London, New York: Tauris, 2005), pp. 101–103. 63. Al-Jarida, March 3, 1990; on the Shi‘ites in the SSNP see Shanahan, The Shi‘a of Lebanon, pp. 95–97. 64. Berri in an interview in Monday Morning, February 11, 1985. 65. Trento and Trento, pp. xvi, 83.

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66. A comprehensive investigative report on the TWA hijacking was published in Newsweek, July 8, 1985. 67. Haytam, p. 291. 68. Al-Nahar, September 1, 1985; Radio Beirut, August 31, 1985, in SWB-ME, August 31, 1985, 8045/A/4–6. 69. Voice of Free Lebanon, February 16, 1986, in FBIS-DR, February 18, 1986, p. G8. 70. Olmert, MECS 1986, p. 483. 71. Monday Morning, February 11, 1985, p. 21. 72. Berri’s speech at the Festival of the Renewal of Allegiance (Tajdid al-Bay‘a) to the fifth leader of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, 5 February, 1999, . This is the official site of the Lebanese Parliament. 73. The estimation of the amount was of Uri Lubrani, chief coordinator for Israeli operations in Lebanon, Ha’aretz, March 3, 1988. 74. On the deterioration of relationships between Amal and Hizballah until the outbreak of fighting see Amal’s reaction to the abduction of Colonel Higgins, Beirut Information Service, February 28, 1988, in FBIS-DR, February 28, 1988, p. 44; on local clashes in al-Nahar, February 26, 1988; on the attack on the roadblock near Harif in Voice of Free Lebanon, April 4, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 4, 1988, p. 37. 75. Voice of Free Lebanon, April 11, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 11, 1988, p. 47; on the expulsion of Hizballah militiamen and Pasdaran by Amal, see Jerusalem Information Service, April 12, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 13, 1988, p. 37. 76. On the outbreak of fighting see al-Nahar, May 9, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 6, 1988, in FBIS-DR, May 6, 1988, p. 42. 77. Al-Nahar, May 9, 1988; Beirut Information Service, May 7, 1988, in FBIS-DR, May 9, 1988, p. 42. 78. The Syrians “rescued” Berri when they entered the suburbs of Beirut in May 1988. See Voice of the Mountain, May 26, 1988, in FBIS-DR, May 26, 1988, p. 22. 79. On the improvement of Berri’s relations with the people of the Biqa‘, see al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli, January 1989. 80. Al-Abrar, January 11, 1989; Ayatollah Hussein ‘Ali Muntazari said that it was expected of Syria that it would try to stop the bloodshed in southern Lebanon more assertively, in IRANA, January 20, 1989, in FBIS-DR, January 23, 1989, p. 55. 81. Berri was quoted on the agreement in al-Nahar, February 1, 1989; and in Voice of Lebanon, January 30, 1989, in FBIS-DR, February 1, 1989, p. 26; Beirut Information Service, February 1, 1989, in FBIS-DR, February 1, 1989, p. 26. 82. Dan Avidan, “With Some Help from Friends,” Davar, February 8, 1989. (Hebrew). 83. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, January 12, 1990; Voice of Lebanon, September 1, 1990, in FBIS-DR, September 5, 1990, p. 44. 84. Full text of the agreement in al-Raya, September 5, 1991. 85. Al-Hayat, February 1, 1990. 86. Al-Safir, October 17, 1984; Beirut Information Service, October 16, 1984, in FBIS-DR, October 16, 1984, p. G1. 87. The first “punishment” of al-As‘ad by the Syrians was their objection to his participation in the Geneva National Reconciliation Convention in October 1983. See Salem, p. 121. 88. Al-Ahrar, July 4, 1985. 89. Al-Bayadar al-Siyassi, June 29, 1985. 90. Voice of Lebanon, February 1, 1985, in Olmert, “Lebanon,” MECS 1984–85, p. 542. 91. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, September 27, 1985. 92. Olmert , “Lebanon,” MECS 1986, p .481. 93. Al-Anwar, March 30, 1986.

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94. Deeb, p. 687; Radio of Phalanges, March 25, 1986, in NER, March 26, 1986. 95. Amal, April 25, 1986, p. 9; Radio Beirut, April 4, 1986, in FBIS-DR, April 7, 1986, p. G2. 96. Voice of Lebanon, April 4, 1986, in FBIS-DR, April 7, 1986, p. G2. 97. Al-Nahar, March 3, 1987; al-Quds, March 2, 1987; Voice of the Mountain, March 1, 1987, in FBIS-DR, March 3, 1987, p. G3. 98. Al-Nahar, March 4, 1987. 99. Voice of the People, March 5, 1987, in FBIS-DR, March 6, 1987, p. G1; contradictory reports were published on Iran’s attitude to Hassan Hashim. On the one hand, a report mentioned Hashim as a possible replacement for Berri, in al-Dustur, April 29, 1985; on the other hand, it was reported that Iran had stopped supporting Hashim, in al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, September 27, 1985. 100. ‘Aql, “The Wars of the Brothers and Siblings, and the Profit is Equal to Loss,” alRaya, September 5, 1991, p. 19. (Arabic); Voice of the National Resistance, March 6, 1987, in FBIS-DR, March 6, 1987, p. G1. 101. Al-Anwar, March 30, 1986. 102. Voice of Lebanon, April 4, 1986, in FBIS-DR, April 7, 1986, p. G2. 103. Beirut Information Service, March 12, 1987, in FBIS-DR, March 13, 1987, p. G2. 104. Al-Shira‘, April 27, 1987. 105. Voice of the National Resistance, September 18, 1987, in FBIS-DR, September 18, 1987, p. 27. 106. Berri, p. 14; Beirut Information Service, September 23, 1988, in FBIS-DR, September 23, 1988, p. 32. 107. Baydun, quoted in an interview with ‘Omar al-‘Issawi in relation to the al-Jazeera series on the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990. See: “ ‘Awdat Dimashq” (the Return of Damascus), Episode 13, January 10, 2005, 108. Al-Safir, March 8, 1987. 109. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, July 11, 1986. 110. Al-Masira, May 30, 1987. 111. Al-Liwa’, July 6, 1987. 112. Voice of Free Lebanon, September 18, 1987, in FBIS-DR, September 18, 1987, p. 27. 113. Al-Nahar, February 29, 1988. 114. Al-‘Amal, May 3, 1980. 115. Radio of Phalanges, August 2, 1986, in NER, August 3, 1983. 116. Kuwaiti Information Service, August 9, 1983, in NER, August 9, 1983. 117. Amal, March 1984, in FBIS-DR (Paris AFP), March 9, 1984, p. G1. 118. Beirut Information Service, April 20, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 20, 1988, p. 43–44. 119. Al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli, April 29, 1985; Voice of Lebanon, April 16, 1985, in FBIS-DR, April 17, 1985, p. G3. 120. Voice of Free Lebanon, June 8, 1986, in FBIS-DR, June 9, 1986, p. G5. 121. All the information is from a research report entitled “al-Khata al-Kamila liMuhawalat Aightiyal Nabih Berri (the Entire Plan of the Attempts to Assassinate Nabih Berri),” al-Dustur, February 25, 1985 (Arabic); also see Shefi Gabay, “ ‘Al ha-Kavenet: Manhig ha-Shi‘im Nabih Berri” (In the crosshairs: the Shi‘ite leader Nabih Berri), Ma‘ariv, March 19, 1985 (Hebrew); on the Iranian efforts to eliminate Berri see “ Khomeini’s Hitmen in Lebanon,” Early Warning 3, no. 6 (1985) (no author). 122. Al-Dustur, April 29, 1985. 123. Ibid. 124. Voice of Lebanon, August 31, 1985, in FBIS-DR, September 3, 1985, p. G1. 125. Radio of Phalanges, March 8, 1986, in NER, March 8, 1986.

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196 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133.

134.

135. 136. 137. 138.

139.

140. 141. 142. 143.

144.

145. 146. 147.

No t e s Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, September 25, 1987. Voice of Lebanon, April 14, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 14, 1988, p. 42. Beirut Information Service, April 20, 1988, in FBIS-DR, April 21, 1988, p. 43. ‘Awasif, quoted in Ha’aretz, March 25, 1990. Teheran Times, August 11, 2010, . Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1992, pp. 598–599. On Hizballah’s candidates in the elections, see al-‘Ahd, August 7, 1992. On al-Husseini’s resignation see al-Liwa’, August 25, 1992; Monday Morning, August 31, 1992; on his going back on his word, see Voice of Lebanon, August 29, 1992, in FBIS-DR, August 31, 1992, p. 40. The entire “Liberation” list is in: Ahmad Baydun, “The South: the Theater and the Novel,” in Farid al-Khazen and Paul Salem (eds.), Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, p. 399. (Arabic); and Voice of Lebanon, September 4, 1992, in FBIS-DR, September 4, 1992, p. 44. The entire “The People Will” list of al-As‘ad, in Baydun, Ibid, p. 400; and Voice of Lebanon, September 3, 1992, in FBIS-DR, September 3, 1992, p. 34. See “A Quarter of a Million Citizens have Answered the Call,” al-‘Awasif, August 14, 1992 (Arabic); Jerusalem Post, August 11, 1992. Malcolm H. Kerr, “The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections,” Middle Eastern Affairs 11, no. 9 (1960), p. 269. Monday Morning, September 14, 1992; al-Masira, September 14, 1992, indicates that that the voting rate among the 107,886 Christians who have the right to vote was less than 10 percent. According to the official list of registered voters, 57,937 were Maronites out of a total number of 504,982 voters in the entire Lebanese South. See al-Safir, June 19, 1992. Al-Masira, September 14, 1992, indicates that the voting rate among the Shi‘ites was above 60 percent; Ha’aretz, September 7, 1992, indicates more than 70 percent; according to al-Safir, June 19, 1992, in the South there were 328,162 Shi‘ites with the right to vote, out of 504,982 people with the right to vote; Iliya Harik, “Voting Participation and Political Integration in Lebanon,” MES 16, no. 1 (1980), p. 37, claims the voting rate in the South was always the highest in Lebanon, usually above 60 percent. Al-Khazen and Salem, Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, p. 437. The numbers of votes for Berri are in al-Masira, September 14, 1992. Al-Afkar, September 14, 1992. On Berri’s visit to Damascus see Voice of Free Lebanon, October 10, 1992, in FBRS-DR, October 16, 1992, p. 27; on al-Husseini’s visit to Damascus see Tishrin, October 12, 1992. Berri said in an interview in al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 24, 1992: “I met a few days ago with President al-Assad . . . we analyzed the picture of the near future, in other words, to examine what is going to happen after the opening session on October 15, and I forecast very good weather.” Voice of Lebanon, October 19, 1992, in FBRS-DR, October 19, 1992, p. 41. Voice of Lebanon, October 19, 1992, in FBRS-DR, October 20, 1992, p. 33. Al-Nahar, October 21, 1992.

Chapter 4 Serving as Speaker: Reaching National Status; Losing Shi‘ite Hegemony 1. “Text of the National Agreement—the Ta’if Accord,” on the official Internet website of the Lebanese Parliament, . (Arabic) 2. Eyal Zisser, Syria of Assad—at a Crossroads (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibutz ha-Me’uhad, 1999), p. 147. (Hebrew)

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3. Al-’Arabiya TV, December 30, 2005. 4. Nabil Haytam, Nabih Berri—I Live in This Book (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 2004), pp. 415, 417–419. (Arabic) 5. Nasrallah himself vouched for himself on the first commemoration day of Hafez alAssad that they had never met personally. See Radio Damascus, June 10, 2001. 6. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, February 8, 2001. 7. “Annual Gathering Hosted by the President of the Security Branch of the Syrian Forces Operating in Lebanon,” (Arabic), official website of the Lebanese Parliament, 8. Al-Shira‘, October 24, 2005. 9. Al-Shira‘, October 24, 2005. 10. “Visit to Home Signals Boost for Berri,” Daily Star, May 20, 2004. It is also discussed in Rodger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi‘a of Lebanon,” MERIA 9, no. 1 (2005), . 11. Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid, “Mr. Jamil Sayyed,” al-Sharq al-Awsat internet site (English edition), September 25, 2010, 12. Qifa Nabki, “The Speaker Falls Silent,” , (blog). 13. On the rumors about the Syrian plan, New TV ’s political commentator, May 3, 2009. 14. Al-Sayyed’s interview in al-Hayat was partly quoted by Qifa Nabki, “The Speaker Falls Silent,” , (blog). 15. al-Nahar, September 19, 2010. 16. Berri, from an interview by al-Jazeera, January 25, 2006, that was quoted in The Daily Star, January 26, 2006. 17. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2005. Berri, from his speech for the twenty-seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance. He referred mainly to the “Cooperation, Coordination, and Brotherhood” treaty signed by the two countries on May 22, 1991. 18. “Lebanon: National Dialogue Yields Results, but Sticking Points Remain,” IRIN Internet site, March 16, 2010, . The site is a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 19. Al-Wasat, October 5, 1998. 20. Berri’s quotation is from Morshed ‘Ali, “Berri Urges Action against Libya, Speaker Wants Legal Case Started over Missing Imam Sadr,” Daily Star, September 15, 2003. 21. William Harris, “Lebanon,” in Bruce Maddy-Weizman (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) 1998, Volume XXII (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), p. 412. 22. Al-Nahar March 11, 21, 1998. 23. Al-Hayat, February 11, 1998. 24. Al-Safir, March 31, 1998. 25. Al-Hayat, March 9, 1998. Berri said in the same sentence that standardization of history books in schools as well as civil marriage is a positive step toward eliminating the “plague” of political confessionalism and sectarianism in Lebanon. 26. On Berri’s support of abolishing of political confessionalism, see Maurus Reinkowsky and Sofia Saadeh, “A Nation Divided—Lebanese Confessionalism,” in Haldun Gülalp (ed.), Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict, Challenging the Nation-State, Series: Routledge Research in Comparative Politics (Oxon, U.K.: 2006), p. 110. 27. Al-Hayat, March 30, 1998. 28. Reinkowsky and Saadeh, p. 113. 29. Al-Safir, October 15, 1993.

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30. “News from Beirut, November 8, 1996,” Lebanon.com, . 31. Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1995, p. 452. 32. Al-Nahar, February 28, 1995. 33. Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1997, p. 517. 34. Ibid. 35. Al-Hayat, July 28, 1998; Abu Rizq won 34 out of the 56 representatives of 28 federations. 36. Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1998, p. 417. 37. For example: Nabil al-Jisr, head of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR); Yusuf al-Naqib, head of OGERO, the telephone company; Nichola Saba’, governor of Beirut; Muhamad Yamut, governor of Mount Lebanon. 38. Al-Hayat, April 26, 1999, quoting an unnamed minister. 39. “The Lebanese Report,” published by The Daily Star in collaboration with The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut, Spring 1999, p. 3. 40. Muhammad Shuqayr, al-Hayat, February 16, 1999. 41. Al-Hayat, May 1, 1999. 42. Eli Hurani, “Berri Declares Cabinet ‘Dead’; Speaker Presses Call for New Government,” Daily Star website, December 23, 2002. 43. Al-Safir, January 10, 1993. 44. Ibid. 45. Joseph Bahout, “Green Acres—The Turning of Land into Political Influence,” The Lebanese Report 5, no. 9 (1994), p. 3. 46. Al-Hayat, October 14, 1997. 47. Roula Khalaf, “Lebanon Weighs Plan to Cut Waste and Raise $2bn Abroad: But There Are Doubts Proposals to Sharpen Up Bureaucracy Will Ever Be Implemented,” Financial Times, December 4, 1997. 48. “Amal Movement Urges Parties to Cooperate,” Lebanon News in Brief, Daily Star, quoted in Lebanonwire.com, August 5, 2003, 49. Maurice Kaldawi, “Berri Queries Delays to Joint Projects,” Daily Star, August 13, 2003. 50. Karine Raad, Daily Star, October 6, 2003. 51. Berri’s astonishment is in al-Hayat, July 8, 1999. 52. Al-Nahar, April 7, 1994, column by Sarkis Na’um. 53. Al-Nahar, April 12, 1994. The full text of the amendment in al-Nahar, April 6, 11, 1994. 54. Al-Nahar, April 8, 1994, column by Sarkis Na’um. 55. Mazin H. S. Khalid, “Survival of the Richest—The New Media Law is Passed,” The Lebanon Report 5, nos. 10–11 (1994), p. 5; published by The Daily Star in collaboration with The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies 56. In the beginning Berri denied any ownership of the station; see al-Hayat, September 18 and 19, 1996. 57. The Lebanon Report 2 (Spring 1997), p. 50. 58. “The Sound and the Fury,” The Lebanon Report 3 (Fall 1998), p. 8. 59. On Khaddam’s support of Hariri, “The Sound and the Fury,” The Lebanon Report 3 (Fall 1998), p. 8; on Khaddam’s anger on Berri, Ibrahim al-Amin’s column in alSafir, August 14, 1998. 60. Al-Hayat, August 24, 1998. 61. Eli Hurani, “Berri Declares Cabinet ‘Dead’; Speaker Presses Call for New Government,” Daily Star website, December 23, 2002. 62. Sabine Darrous, “Berri Urges Cabinet to End Budget Review, Speaker Criticizes Delay in Getting Draft to Parliament,” Daily Star website, October 30, 2003.

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63. “Berri Urges National Unity Government,” BBC News Online: World: Middle East, September 6, 2000, . 64. “Action of a New ‘Style’ to Redress Socio-Economic Situation and Achieve Reform” Middle East News Online, Durham: March 13, 2001, in Proquest 100330678, . 65. Al-Nahar, April 7, 1995. 66. Shams al-Din, quoted from a dinner with Emir Haris Chehab, head of the ChristianMuslim Dialogue Committee, a project Shams al-Din established in the early 1990s. In al-Nahar, April 14, 1995, column by Sarkis Na’um. 67. Al-Nahar, April 11, 1995. 68. Al-Nahar, April 20, 1995. 69. Al-Hayat, September 1, 1995. 70. Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1995, p. 451. 71. Kaddam’s interview in al-Safir, September 11, 1995; Berri’s comment in al-Nahar, September 13, 1995. 72. Al-Aharam, October 11, 1995. 73. Globe and Mail (Toronto), October 12, 1995. 74. Voice of Lebanon, October 10, 1995, in BBC-SWB, EE/D2432/ME, October 12, 1995. 75. Ibid. 76. Al-Hayat, November 24, 1995. 77. Ibid. 78. Al-Hayat, January 3, 1997. 79. Nagib Khazzaka, “Controversy over Lebanese President Lahoud’s Reelection Deepens,” Agence France-Presse in English, August 26, 2004. 80. Sam F. Ghattas, “Lebanon Criticizes French-American Intervention; Hezbollah Backs Lahoud,” Associated Press Worldstream, Beirut, August 31, 2004. 81. Al-Hayat, November 13, 1998. 82. Al-Hayat, November 29, 1998. 83. Zeina Karam, “Reappointment of Hariri as Prime Minister Hits Snag,” Associated Press Worldstream, November 28, 1998, < http://www.lexisnexis.com/> (accessed February 9, 2010). 84. Agence France-Presse, November 30, 1998. 85. Ibid. 86. Al-Hayat, November 30, 1998. 87. Berri’s speech in al-Nahar, June 26, 2009. 88. Al-Nahar, June 26, 2009. 89. “Hariri: Future Movement Bloc Will Back Berri’s Reelection as Speaker,” Daily Star, June 25, 2009. 90. ‘Alia Ibrahim, “Hariri Begins Consultations to Form the Government and Warned of Difficult Task,” al-Arabia Net, June 27, 2009, . 91. Reuters, September 7, 2009. 92. “2nd LD: Lebanon’s Hariri Re—Designated as PM.” Xinhua News Agency-CEIS, September 16, 2009, . 93. Brooke Anderson, “Lebanon Held in ‘Boxing Ring’: Blames Neighbors for Inability to Form Government Since June,” Washington Times, September 24, 2009. 94. Eli Hurani, “Berri Declares Cabinet ‘Dead’; Speaker Presses Call for New Government,” Daily Star, December 23, 2002. Berri made these remarks while calling for the resignation of the serving government in late 2003. 95. Morshed Ali, Daily Star, September 15, 2003. 96. Al-Hayat, July 29, 1999. 97. For example, Berri mentioned that the main danger to Lebanon after sectarianism came from a widespread lack of transparency. See The Daily Star, September 15, 2003.

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No t e s

98. On the implications of the assassination see William Harris, “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride,” in Barry Rubin (ed.), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), pp. 64–70. 99. Al-Thawra, February 24, 2005. 100. All the other names were of persons assassinated between 2005 and 2008. See alSharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2005; Berri, from his speech for the twenty-seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance. 101. Berri’s interview with Sami Kalib, “Ziyara Khassa—Nabih Berri,” (“A Special Visit”), part 2, al-Jezeera, November 11, 2005. The text of the interview is also on al-Jezeera Net, 102. “Thousands Join Anti-Syria Rally in Lebanon as MPs Hold Stormy Debate,” Agence France-Presse, quoted in Khazen.org, . 103. al-Safir, September 24, 2010. 104. al-Safir, September 24, 2010. 105. YaLibnan.com Internet website, February 12, 2007, < http://YaLibnan.com/site/ archives/2007/02/lebanon_hariri_1.php> 106. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2005. Berri, from his speech for the twenty-seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance. 107. Naharnet.com, quoting Associated Press, April 7, 2007. 108. Al-Nahar, February 20, 2007. 109. An interview with Sami Kalib, “Ziyara Khassa—Nabih Berri,” (“A Special Visit”), part 2, al-Jezeera, November 11, 2005. The text of the interview is also in alJezeera Net, 110. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2005. Berri, from his speech for the twenty-seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance. 111. Nikolas Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon—The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East (I.B.Tauris, 2006), p. 118. 112. For example, Gary C. Gambill and Ziad K. Abdelnour, “Dossier: Rafiq Hariri,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, July 2001; Volker Perthes, “Myths and Money: Years of Hariri and Lebanon’s Preparation for a New Middle East,” MERIP Report Online, spring 1997, . 113. All quotes are in al-Balad, quoted by Hadi Khatib, “Support for Lebanon National Dialogue Dwindling,” Lebanonwire.com, February 23, 2006. 114. Reuters, February 26, 2006, quoted in Lebanonwire.com, 115. Nagib Khazzaka, “Lebanese Parties Meet to Resolve Crisis,” Agence France-Presse, in English, March 2, 2006. 116. Resolution 1644 (2005), UN Security Council, S/RES/1644 (2005), December 15, 2005, Official site of the UN Security Council resolutions, 117. Hassan Nasrallah said in an interview with Lebanon’s NEW TV: “If Hizballah had known how Israel was going to respond, the group would not have captured two Israeli soldiers. . . . If someone had said on July 11 that there was a 1 percent possibility Israel’s military response would be as extensive as it turned out to be, I would say no, I would not have entered this for many reasons,” quoted in CNN, , August 27, 2006; also see what Mahmud Qomati, the deputy head of Hizballah’s political bureau, has said to Associated Press, July 25, 2006.

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118. There are different estimations of the number of Hizballah’s casualties. On August 25, 2006, the Lebanese Higher Relief Council, an official government agency, estimated only 68 Hizballah fighters were killed; according to The British Telegraph, August 4, 2006, 500 casualties were estimated by Lebanese officials; Patrick Bishop of The Daily Telegraph, August 22, 2006, reported that UN officials estimated the number at 500; Abraham Rabinovich reported in the Washington Times, September 27, 2006, that the IDF had identified the names of 532 dead Hizballah fighters and estimated at least 200 others had been killed. 119. This is the official preliminary assessment by the Council for Development and Reconstruction, see no date; the number of dead includes 1,191 civilians and 46 military, and about 4,500 civilians and military were wounded. The numbers are from the official “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1,” United Nations General Assembly, November 23, 2006. 120. “Israel Waging Economic War On Lebanon,” APS Diplomat Recorder, August 25, 2006 . 121. Shortly after the war Nasrallah’s popularity among the Shi‘ites was 73 percent (in comparison to Nabih Berri’s 16.8 percent). See “Lebanese Divided behind Their Leaders over Critical Matters—August 2006,” Information international, no. 51, , September 2006; six month later Nasrallah’s popularity was 46.6 percent (in comparison to Berri’s 23 percent). See “Nasrallah and Aoun at the Top but with Fewer Supporters,” Information International, no. 58. See , April 2007; for other surveys that show Nasrallah’s popularity, see Mideast Monitor 1, no. 3 (2006), . 122. For instance, an interview with Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah with The Middle East Times, April 24, 2008; also an interview with the Associated Press, September 27, 2006. 123. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2005. Berri, from his speech for the twenty-seventh anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance. 124. Associated Press Diplomat News Service, October 16, 2006, . 125. On Berri’s position as a middleman to Hizballah during the war, see Jeffrey Stinson, “Hizballah’s Former Enemy Now Its Public Face,” USA Today, July 31, 2006, . 126. For more on the political crisis, see: William Harris, “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride,” in Barry Rubin (ed.), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), pp. 75–80. 127. ‘Aoun at that point was not part of the March 8 alliance, and anti-Syrian, but coordinated moves with the Shi‘ite movements. 128. The Shi‘ite boycott started on December 12, 2005, and ended on February 2, 2006. See al-Nahar, February 3, 2006; al-Sharq al-Awsat, , February 3, 2006. The Shi‘ite ministers included Energy Minister Mohammad Fneish and Labor Minister Trad Hamadeh of Hizballah; Health Minister Muhamad Jawad Khalifa and Agriculture Minister Talal al-Sah of Amal; and Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh. 129. According to Article 65 of the constitution. 130. The Lebanese constitution says that until the abolition of confessionalism “the confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet.” (Part F, Article 95, 3.a). 131. Al-Nahar, May 13, 2008.

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132. Al-Mustaqbal TV, March 2, 2007, quoted in The Daily Star Website, March 2, 2007. 133. Although the June 2009 parliamentary elections ended with very similar results to those of 2005, with a 71–57 win for “March 14” over “March 8,” the total number of voters for “March 8” was about 850,000 and only about 750,000 voted for “March 14.” The gap was the result of the distribution of constituencies and the electoral system. 134. Interview of Berri by Liam Stack, “Nabih Berri Speaks on Democracy, War, Peace, and Skiing,” Daily News Egypt, February 26, 2007. 135. Nada Bakri, “Berri Plans New Initiative to End Political Standoff,” Daily Star, December 29, 2006. Majdalani was speaking to the Voice of Lebanon. 136. YaLibnan.com, February 29, 2008, quoted an interview with Berri on NBN TV the same day. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. 139. For example, after an interview on NBN TV on February 29, 2008, as reported in YaLibnan.com, February 29, 2008; New TV has reported that more than 40 RPG 7 missiles were fired in addition to hundreds of rifles to celebrate Berri’s interview with ANB TV, resulting in several injuries and property damage. See YaLibnan. com, March 1, 2008. 140. On the spy scandals, see for example: Roee Nahmias and Reuters, “Lebanon: Retired commander suspected of spying for Israel,” YNET News, August 4, 2010, 141. Nasrallah’s speech, YaLibnan.com, May 8, 2008, . 142. On Hizballah’s response to the two cabinet decisions see: al-Hayat, , May 8, 2008; al-Sharq al-Awsat, no. 10752, , May 7, 2008. 143. Hariri claimed four alleged assassination plots against himself and Fouad Sinyora by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law and head of the Syrian intelligence Assef Shawqat. Agence France-Presse, quoted in Lebanonwire. com , October 30, 2007. 144. Nasrallah’s speech, YaLibnan.com, May 8, 2008, . 145. The press reported 65 to 84 dead and around 200 wounded. See: al-Nahar, May 14, 2008; or on the Internet: Nadim Ladki, “Lebanese Army Says Will intervene from Tuesday,” Reuters, May 12, 2008, < http://www.reuters.com/article/ newsOne/idUSL1250503820080512>. 146. The current allocation in the Lebanese Parliament was not part of the Ta’if Accord, but a change made in the electoral law before the first post–civil war parliamentary elections of 1992. 147. Al-Wasat, September 2, 9, 1996; al-‘Ahd, September 6, 1996; al-Hayat, September 11, 15, 1996. 148. Sarkis Na’um, al-Wasat, June 17, 1996. 149. See, for example, Sarkis Na’um, al-Wasat, June 17, 1996. 150. Al-‘Ahd, May 31, 1996. 151. Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, January 12, 1996; al-Shira‘, January 15, 1996. 152. Al-Hayat, June 30, 1996. 153. Middle East International, October 4, 1996. 154. Al-Hayat, August 22, 1996. 155. Al-Nahar, August, 21, 1996. 156. Al-Nahar, August 21, 1996.

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No t e s 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

168. 169.

170.

171.

172.

173.

174.

175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186.

203

Al-Hayat, August 23, 1996. Al-Safir, September 4, 1996; al-Hayat, September 5, 1996. Al-Hayat, September 5, 1996. Al-Safir, September 5, 1996. Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1996, p. 493. Muhammad Salih, al-Safir, August 29, 2000. Al-Hayat, September 4, 2000. Al-Hayat, September 4, 2000. YaLibnan.com, June 6, 2006, Al-Mustaqbal, June 6, 2005. Mohammad Fneish received 153,934 votes, and Berri got only 153,018. YaLibnan. com, June 6, 2005, ; also in Voice of Lebanon, June 6, 2005. YaLibnan.com, June 6, 2005, Nabil Qa’uq said, “The South has spoken: yes to the resistance and the resistance’s weapons, and no for foreign involvement,” in Radio al-Nur, June 6, 2005; Na’im Qasem said, “The vote is in fact a referendum on the resistance,” in al-Manar TV, June 6, 2005. Crisis Group interview, Subhi Tufayli, Ba‘albek, April 5, 2007, quoted in “Hizballah and the Lebanese Crisis, Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 7, October 10, 2007, note 61, p. 7, < http://www.nowlebanon.com/Library/Files/ EnglishDocumentation/Studies/hezbollah.pdf>. Naharnet.com, June 28, 2005, ; YaLibnan.com, June 6, 2005, . Hussein Assi, “ ‘Popular Majority’ Goes to . . . Opposition with 55% of Votes,” al-Manar TV website, June 9, 2009, < http://almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/ NewsDetails.aspx?id=89269&language=en> . For the allegations in regard to outside funding, see al-Akhbar, October 23, 2008; on al-As‘ad’s claims about Hizballah in 2006, see , May 3, 2009. The official results of the Marj’youn-Hasbaya constituency is on the website of the Lebanese Interior Ministry, at: < http://www.elections.gov.lb/Parliamentary/ Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/‫ﺝﻱﺍﺕﻥ‬-‫ﺕﺍﺏﺍﺥﺕﻥﺍﻝﺍ‬-‫ﺓﻑﺍﻙﻝ‬-‫ﺓﻱﺽﻕﺍﻝﺍ‬/ MarjyounHasbaya.aspx>. Al-Jazeera website in English, June 25, 2009, . Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 123. Reuters, May 24 and June 15, 1998. Ibrahim al-Amin, al-Safir, June 1, 2, 1998. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizballah, p. 128 n. 137; al-Hayat, June 9, 12, 1998 Al-Hayat, June 9, 1998. Al-Hayat, June 14, 1998. Al-Wasat, June 1, 1998. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizballah, pp. 127–130. The results from al-Shira‘, June 1, 1998. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizballah, p. 133; the results of the elections were published in al-Nahar, May 28, 2004. Helena Cobban, “Hizbullah’s New Face—In Search of a Muslim Democracy,” Boston Review, April-May 2005,

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187. The estimation is of Amal’s deputy Muhammad Baydun, in an interview with William Harris, January 1995. See Harris, “Lebanon,” MECS 1995, p. 455. 188. “Lebanon: Present Status of Shiites Discussed,” al-Majallah (London), August 30, 1997. 189. Al-Wehda, January 28, 2008, . 190. Al-Nahar, February 18, 2009. 191. The Lebanon National Budget Portal, . 192. Therese Sfeir, Daily Star, March 28, 2009. 193. Amal’s Encyclopedia, Part Nine: The Movement’s Institutions, p. 28–33. (Arabic) 194. Ibid., p. 104, 113, 122–123. 195. Ibid., p. 31, 115. 196. Ibid., p. 43. 197. Ibid., p. 83. 198. Ibid., p. 67. 199. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon—Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 52. 200. Amal’s Encyclopedia, Vol. 9, pp. 71–79 (Arabic); on Amal’s educational network see also Shaery-Eisenlohr, p. 77. 201. Ibid., p. 67. 202. Ibid., pp. 34–35. 203. On the complex, see Amal website, . 204. Al-Hayat, November 9, 1997. 205. Etienne Sakr (Abu arz), “Syria and the Islamist Movements in Lebanon,” February 23, 2003, in ; the author is the commander of the national Lebanese Movement “The Guardian of the Ciders” (Huras al-Arz). 206. Al-Hayat, February 10, 1998. 207. Al-Hayat, February 7, 1998. 208. Manuela Paraipan, “Looking Down the Precipice,” globalpolitician.com, November 26, 2007, . 209. Radio Lebanon, December 10, 1999, in FBIS-NES-1999–1210, December 10, 1999/WNC; Nicholas Blanford, “Victors Trash SLA’s Headquarters,” Daily Star, May 25, 2000, . 210. Al-Manar TV, April 18, 2009; and “Saturday News Briefs,” YaLibnan.com, April 18, 2009, . 211. Nabih Berri, Awraq fi Turab al-Muqawama (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1989). 212. Amal’s Encyclopedia, The stories of Amal’s martyrs Bilal Fahas (p. 102), Ahmad Qasir (p. 92), Daud Daud (p. 95) despite the fact that he was known for having military connections to the Israeli Army, Hassan Qasir (p. 120), Hassan Sibati (p. 151), and others. 213. The other three were lower ranking members in Amal: Riad Shaalan, Qassem Habhab and ‘Ali Zu‘aytar. 214. “Amal expels 2 cabinet ministers from party,” (no author) Lebanonwire.com, March 28, 2003, ; See also Rodger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi‘a of Lebanon,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 9, no. 1 (2005), . 215. Al-Nahar, March 31, 2003 216. Al-Nahar, September 1, 2003. 217. For instance, As‘ad Abu Khalil, in Answares.Com, ; Rodger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising,” .

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218. Al-Safir, March 7, 1995; al-Safir, June 16, 1995. 219. Amal’s Encyclopedia, Vol. 8, pp. 20–30, gives short biographies of some of the movement’s senior officials. (Arabic) 220. The unanimous decision of the central council was mentioned by Rodger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising,” . 221. Al-Majallah, August 30, 1997. 222. al-Hayat, July 26, 2004. 223. al-Nahar, July 17, 2004; a report on Amal’s plans was published also in al-Balad, July 8, 2004. 224. “Berri Reshuffles Amal Movement to Avert Downfall,” Lebanonwire, July 31, 2004, 225. Al-Akhbar, April 2, 2009. 226. Berri, from his speech for the anniversary of the disappearance of Musa Sadr, alNahar, September 1, 2003. He repeated his accusations of Qadhafi’s responsibility for the disappearance a few times. See al-Sarq al-Awsat, August 27, 2006. 227. Associated Press, September 3, 2003, quoted in Ha’aretz, < http://www.haaretz. com/news/libya-cuts-ties-with-lebanon-over-fate-of-missing-cleric-1.99055>. 228. Al-Akhbar, August 28, 2008. 229. Al-Siyassa, March 18, 2010. 230. Al-Majallah, August 30, 1997, indicates that in the middle of the 1980s Shams-alDin established an Islamic legal cover for Amal. 231. Amal’s official Internet site is at: . 232. Yamin Zakaria, “A Price for Treachery,” Media Monitor Networks, August 13, 2004, ; Berri also met the director of Sistani’s office; see al-Anwar, April 25, 2010. 233. This could be understood from a speech Berri gave at the opening of a library named after Sheykh Bahaa al-Din al-‘Amili. The speech is on the official website of the Lebanese Parliament’s speaker, see 234. Haytam, p. 354. 235. Three months before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Berri said to al-Ahram, February 14, 2000, that Hizballah would turn to political and social activity after the Israeli withdrawal, without weapons; in al-Safir, January 6, 2010, he said that they should retain their weapons as long as Israel is considered a threat. 236. David Rudge, “Amal Visit to Iran May Herald Better Ties,” Jerusalem Post, July 16, 1989. 237. Karim Pakradouni in al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 25, 1999. 238. IRNA, Tehran, in English, August 3, 2000, in BBC-SWB, August 05, 2000, Part 4, The Middle East, ME/D3911/MED. 239. Ibrahim Bayram, al-Wasat, October 23, 2000. 240. Al-Hayat, July 9, 2000. 241. Shaery-Eisenlohr, p. 116.

Chapter 5

Berri’s Political Stands

1. Nabil Haytam, Nabih Berri—I Live in This Book (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 2004), p. 355. The first section in Ta’if is: “Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.” 2. Al-Sayyad, May 22, 1980; Amal, May 29, 1987. 3. Berri’s criticism of Mohtashami is in al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990, and al-Sharq alAwsat, January 22, 1989; his criticism of the pro-Palestinian and pro-Libyan lobbies in Iran was in Amal, May 29, 1987. 4. The Guardian (weekly), February 26, 1984; Le Monde, February 11, 1984.

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5. The entire press conference, including Nasrallah’s reading of the new political manifesto, was broadcast live on many TV stations around the Arab world on November 30, 2009. A video of it is on YouTube. See: 6. Interview with Berri, Amal, May 29, 1987. 7. Al-Safir, May 5, 1980. 8. For example, see photographs of Berri in a prayer position during the sixth Amal caucus, in al-Safir, April 5, 1986; during the National Dialogue in Lausanne, in Ha’aretz, March 14, 1984; Berri’s quote on religious education in al-Shira‘, March 23, 1992. 9. For example, photos that were taken during Amal’s caucus, in al-Safir, May 5, 1980. 10. Amal, May 29, 1987. 11. Amal’s official site, < http://www.amal-movement.com/>. 12. Al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990. 13. Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Iran Sends Special Envoy to Beirut To Mediate Among Muslim Rivals,” New York Times, December 6, 1988, Late Edition (East Coast). 14. Berri visited Teheran heading a ten-member Amal delegation to participate in the memorial service marking the 40th day since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. During the visit, speculations that the new Iranian regime was about to confer more recognition on the “moderate” Shi‘ite movement at the expense of Hizballah were spread in Lebanon. See David Rudge, “Amal Visit to Iran May Herald Better Ties,” Jerusalem Post, July 16, 1989; Berri paid an additional visit to Tehran in October 1989; see Voice of the National Resistance, October 2, 1989, in FBIS-DR, October 2, 1989, p. 41. 15. ‘Ali Mahmud, “Lebanese Lawmakers Divided over Syrian Presence,” Associated Press, October 2, 1989. 16. IRNA, Tehran, in English, August 3, 2000, quoted in BBC-SWB, August 5, 2000, ME/D3911/MED. 17. Xinhua, “Lebanese Parliament Speaker in Tehran,” January 17, 1993, item no. 0117089. 18. Ibid. 19. Nasrallah said in a speech on May 25, 2008, that he is proud of being a member in the Wilayet al–Faqih party. See the English translation, Hizballah English TV, May 26, 2008, ; Qabalan, in response to the speech, quoted as saying “We do not want Wilayat al-Faqih, despite our respect for it”; Mufti ‘Ali al-Amin said: “Shi‘ites believe in the state and not in Wilayat al-Faqih.” Both quotes in al-Nahar, August 3, 2008. 20. On the Iranian efforts to end the “War of the Camps,” see “Amal Rejects Iran’s Proposal to End Camp War in Lebanon,” Xinhua, December 7, 1986; on the success of the Iranian efforts and the ultimatum, see “Amal Chairman Accepts Iranian Proposal on Camp War,” Xinhua, January 11, 1987. 21. Al-Nahar, April 19, 2009. 22. The conference took place in Teheran on March 4 and 5, 2009. See “Lebanese Politicians to Attend Conference on Gaza in Iran,” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, March 3, 2009, (accessed March 4, 2009). 23. Berri did not personally participate in the dialogue in Ta’if but his demands were represented by Shi‘ite MP Zuhir al-Khatib. 24. Daily Star, October 13, 2003. 25. Daily Star, February 12, 2009. 26. Berri in an interview, Monday Morning, August 20, 1984. 27. For more on demography in Lebanon, see Mark Farha “Demography and Democracy in Lebanon,” Mideast Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1, January–March 2008, <www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0801/0801_2.htm>.

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28. Al-Nahar, February 28, 1995. 29. For example, see al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 24, 2005; Berri’s speech on the twelfth anniversary of Amal, in al-Nahar, March 23, 1986. 30. On Berri’s objection to the idea of cantons see his interview in al-Shira‘, March 31, 1986; al-Hawadith, April 19, 1985. 31. Lee Stokes, “Berri: Israel Must Abandon Southern Lebanon,” United Press International, October 10, 1989. 32. Al-Ahram Weekly online, April 12–18, 2001, . 33. Al-Sharq al Awsat online, February 24, 2006, . 34. Liam Stack, “Nabih Berri Speaks on Democracy, War, Peace, and Skiing,” Daily News Egypt, February 26, 2007, 35. Berri’s speech on the occasion of “The Day of the Wounded and Dead,” in al-Nahar, May 20, 1984; Berri expressed a similar position in an interview with al-Diyar, May 20, 1990; and also in Beirut Information Service (English), May 26, 1984, in FBIS-DR, June 1, 1984, p. G3. 36. See, for example, al-Nahar, May 20, 1984; al-Shira‘, March 31, 1986; al-Diyar, May 20, 1990. 37. Berri in an interview with Syria-News, August 9, 2006, . 38. Berri’s description is in “I Can Persuade Hizballa” (interview), Spiegel Online International, July 31, 2006, ; Fneish was quoted by Jeffrey Stinson, “Hezbollah’s Former Enemy Now Its Public Face,” USA Today, July 31, 2006, . 39. Interviews with Berri in al-Khalij, August 21, 1986; al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990; see also Berri’s speech in 1988, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance, in which he said that the key to the solution of Lebanon’s problems is the disarming of all militias, in Nabih Berri, Pages from the Land of Resistance (Awraq fi Turab al-Muqawama) (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus lil-Tiba’a wal-Nashr walTawzi‘, 1989), p. 147. (Arabic) 40. Al-Aharam, February 14, 2000. 41. For example, Berri’s comment in May 2005: “Let’s not bury our heads in the sand and make the resistance and its weapons the topic of debate now, before a debate on the weapons of the aggression and the occupation. Lebanon must defend the South [both] officially and popularly . . . and taking into account Israel’s wars against [Lebanon’s] lands and the continuation of [Israel’s] occupation and aggression.” In al-Safir, May 23, 2005. 42. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 23, 2004. 43. For instance, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora has argued that Berri is a party to the conflict and cannot be the mediator of a national dialogue. See Paul Salem, “Hizbollah Attempts a Coup d’État,” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, May 2008, < http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/salem_coup_final.pdf> 44. Section four of the Doha Agreement; Daily Star, May 22, 2008, . (English) 45. Berri represented this demand to the delegation of the Arab league that mediated. See al-Manar TV Internet Site, May 14, 2008, < http://www.almanar.com.lb/ NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=43442>. 46. Berri expressed his view of the government’s illegality many times. For examples see al-Akhbar, April 3, 2007, ; and a TV interview that was quoted in YaLibnan.com on February 29, 2008,

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47. Mark Farha, “Demography and Democracy in Lebanon.” Nabulsi’s fatwa was published in Lebanese papers on December 21, 2005. 48. Amal’s demands at the National Dialogue in Lausanne are detailed in Monday Morning, October 17, 1983; the relevant issue was in section 5 of the final decisions of the dialogue, see al-Nahar, March 15, 1984. 49. The text of the Tripartite Agreement is in Tishrin, December 30, 1985; see also Berri’s remark in al-Jumhuriya (Egypt), December 28, 1985. 50. See section 2.B. in Ta’if Accord, in al-Nahar, October 23, 1989, and Berri’s explanations of the reasons he agreed to the final text, in al-Diyar, May 20, 1990; see also La Revue du Liban, July 20, 1991. 51. Interviews of Berri, in al-Khalij, August 21, 1986; al-Hawadith, March 16, 1984. 52. Rija Sari al-Din, ed. Watha’iq al-Harb al-lubnaniyya, 1984 (Documents of the Lebanese war, 1984) (Beirut, 1985), p.225, quoted in Oren Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multiethnic Identity and the Making of the Lebanese Army,” History and Memory, vol. 13, no. 1, Spring/Summer 2001. 53. Monday Morning, February 1, 1982. 54. For example, he was quoted as saying that, “As long as such a privatization project requires the passage of a law, then Parliament is serious and firm in rejecting it,” Daily Star, October 30, 2003. 55. For more on Hariri’s economic policy, see Ghazi Yussef, “The Economic Track of Rafiq Al Hariri: A Program For The Future Of Lebanon,” al-Hayat, April 30, 2005. The writer was the economic consultant of the late Prime Minister Hariri. 56. Nora Boustany, “Lebanese Premier Resigns Amid Conflicts,” Washington Post, December 3, 1994. 57. Maurice Kaldaw, “Berri Queries Delays to Joint Projects,” Daily Star, August 13, 2003. 58. Karine Raad, “Berri Slams Budget during Zahle Ceremony,” Daily Star, October 6, 2003. 59. The text of the agreement was published only in the spring of 1970. See al-Nahar, April 20, 1970. 60. Itamar Rabinovich and Hanna Zamir, “Lebanon,” in MECS 1977, p. 493. 61. Abu-Yusuf was a member of the central committee in the PLO and head of the supreme political committee. The quote is from al-Sayyad, January 7, 1971. AbuYusuf met his death in an Israeli raid to his apartment in April 1973. 62. Kul-Shay’, January 10, 1971. 63. Sadr said this to Karim Pakradouni, a former advisor to President Elias Sarkis and later leader of the Phalanges. See in Karim Pakradouni, The Lost Peace (Hebrew), pp. 103–104. 64. Berri’s speech in the 16th anniversary to the Movement of Reforms in Damascus, in Berri, p. 173. 65. On Berri’s commitment to the Palestinian issue, see his speech on Amal’s 12th anniversary, in al-Nahar, March 23, 1986; on the linkage between the Shi‘ite resistance and the Palestinian problem, see an interview with Berri in Sawt al-Sha‘ab, August 3, 1986; on the linkage to the Palestinian uprising, see in al-Wattan al-‘Arabi, February 19, 1988; and also in Berri, p. 79. 66. Monday Morning, February 1, 1982; Voice of Lebanon, September 21, 1992, in FBIS-DR, September 23, 1992; Ha’arets, November 4, 1986. 67. Monday Morning, February 1, 1982. 68. Monday Morning, May 10, 1982. 69. “Beirut to Take Part in Ministerial Meeting on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan,” Middle East News Online, January 3, 2001, . 70. Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a, p. 43; al-Itihad al-Usbu’i, September 9, 1982. 71. Berri congratulated the army for the victory, in al-Mustaqbal, September 3, 2007. 72. Reuven Erlich, Within the Lebanese Jungle (Tel Aviv: Ma‘arachot, 2000), p. 52.

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73. IDF Archive (Giv‘atayim), 922/1975, file 612, from: the Intelligence Officer of Northern Command, November 13, 1948. 74. The text of the speech is in al-Nahar, September 1, 1982; Berri expressed this position for the first time in an interview to al-Hawadith, August 20, 1982; he kept this position all through the 1980s. See also in al-Hawadith, April 19, 1985; and Sawt al-Sha‘ab, April 3, 1986. 75. Monday Morning, February 11, 1985; al-Anba’, June 9, 1986. 76. Berri, p. 17 (on Karami); p. 33 (on Sa‘ad); p. 43 (on Fahas); p. 51 (on Azraq); p. 83 (on Taqi al-Din). 77. al-Majalah, January 1, 1986; al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990; al-Shira‘, March 23, 1992. 78. For example: al-Hawadith, March 16, 1984; al-Shira‘, April 23, 1990; al-Diyar, May 20, 1990; Magazine, September 30, 1991. 79. Al-Safir, October 2, 2006. 80. For example, see section 1 in the Lausanne final paper, in al-Nahar, March 15, 1984; section “a” in the political platform of the National Unity Front, in al-Safir, July 31, 1985; section c in the Tripartite Agreement, in Tishrin, December 30, 1985. 81. Monday Morning, February 11, 1985; al-Shira‘, March 23, 1992. 82. For example, see Kayahan (Iran), June 2, 1987. 83. Al-Hawadith, April 15, 1987. 84. Al-Mustaqbal, October 27, 1984; Radio Beirut, October 20, 1984, in NER, October 21, 1984; Beirut Information Service, October 2, 1984, in FBIS-DR, October 2, 1984, p. G2; see also Berri’s quote on the importance of UNIFIL in Jabal-‘Amil in a speech in the occasion of the eighth anniversary of Musa Sadr’s disappearance, in al-Nahar, September 1, 1986. 85. Berri did not have direct contact with Israel during the Israeli first years of occupation. This was confirmed by Reuven Avi-Ran, deputy Israeli coordinator in Lebanon, in an interview with the author; this is also confirmed by Bayli, p. 229. Bayli served as a contact man for the IDF with Amal in the early 1980s; on Berri’s negation of any contact with Israel, see his interviews in Sawt al-Sha’ab, August 3, 1983; and in al-Shira‘, March 31, 1986; See also Berri’s explanation for the participation of Lebanese delegates in the Israeli–Lebanese military talks in Naqura during 1983, in his speech at the opening of the eighth convention of the Syrian Ba‘ath Party in Damascus, in Berri, p. 160. Later on Berri had direct contacts with Israeli officials in London, as part of prisoner exchange negotiations. See Yosi Melman, “The Spy Shabtay Kalmanovich Was Murdered in Moscow,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2009. (Hebrew) 86. Berri referred to the Israeli navigator in Amal, November 7, 1986; Haytam, pp. 342–345. 87. Al-Dawliya, August 3, 1992. 88. Al-Liwa’, March 16, 1991. 89. Liam Stack, “Nabih Berri Speaks on Democracy, War, Peace, and Skiing,” Daily News Egypt, February 26, 2007, . 90. Al-Arabiya, reported in Jerusalem Post, October 19, 2006. It was also quoted in alSharq al-Awsat, October 18, 2006. 91. Stack, ibid. 92. The quote is from a press conference; see Beirut Information Service, March 31, 1984, in FBIS-DE, April 2, 1984, p. G7; and also in SWE-ME, April 3, 1984, 7608/A/2; for a similar saying of Hafez al-Assad, see his speech on January 21, 1976, in Rabinovich and Zamir, pp. 198–224, and his speech during the signature ceremony of the agreement of “brotherhood, cooperation and coordination” between the two countries, in Tishrin, May 23, 1991. 93. Al-Liwa’, March 16, 1991; see also Berri’s speech on the tenth anniversary of the disappearance of Musa Sadr, in Berri, p. 149.

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94. An interview with Berri, Amal, May 29, 1987; see also Berri’s speech at the opening of the eighth convention of the Ba‘ath Party in Damascus, where he said, “We believe we should renew the promise of Musa Sadr (to President Assad),” in Berri, p. 163. 95. Interviews with Berri, in Tishrin, August 11, 1986; Kayhan (Teheran), June 2, 1987. 96. Daniel Nassif, “Dossier: Nabih Berri—Lebanese Parliament Speaker,” Middle East Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 11, December 2000, < http://www.meib.org/ articles/0012_ld1.htm>. 97. Al-Shira‘, March 30, 1992. 98. Berri claims to be the pioneer of the official relationship, and his story was confirmed by former Prime Minister Omar Karami. See al-Nahar, October 17, 2008. 99. Berri’s speech at the Festival of the Renewal of Allegiance (Tajdid al-Bay‘a) to the fifth commander of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, February 5, 1999, . This is the official Internet site of the Lebanese Parliament. 100. Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh is an expert on Lebanese politics and an associate professor of history at the American University of Kuwait. He wrote many articles and books on the Lebanese Shi‘ites. The quote is from Jeffrey Stinson, “Hezbollah’s Former Enemy Now Its Public Face,” USA Today, August 1, 2006, .

Conclusions 1. Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a—Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 89–90.

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Bi bl iogr a ph y

Primary Sources Books Berri, Nabih Mustafa. Pages from the Land of Resistance (Awraq fi Turab al-Muqawama). Beirut: Dar al-Andalus lil-Tiba’a wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi‘, 1989. (Arabic) Haytam, Nabil. Nabih Berri—I Live in This Book (Nabih Berri—Uskinu fi Hadha alKitab). Beirut: Mukhtarat, 2004. (Arabic) Kimche, David. The Last Option (ha-Optsya ha-Ahrona). Tel Aviv: ‘Idanim and Yedi‘ot Ahronot, 1992. (Hebrew) Pakradouni, Karim. The Lost Peace [Ha-Shalom he-Avud]. Translated from French to Hebrew by Avital ‘Inbar. Tel Aviv: Ma‘arahot, Ministry of Defense, 1986. (Hebrew) Salem, Elie A. Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon. London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995. The Encyclopedia of Amal under the Leadership of Chairman Nabih Berri (Mawsu‘at Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya bi-Qiyadat al-Ra’is Nabih Berri). Vol. 5. The Course of the Chairperson’s Political, Militant, and Ideological History. Beirut: al-Markaz alThaqafi al-Lubnani, 2006. (Arabic) The Encyclopedia of Amal under the Leadership of Chairman Nabih Berri (Mawsu‘at Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya bi-Qiyadat al-Ra’is Nabih Berri). Vol. 8. The Movement’s Casualties of War. Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Lubnani, 2006. (Arabic) The Encyclopedia of Amal under the Leadership of Chairman Nabih Berri (Mawsu‘at Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya bi-Qiyadat al-Ra’is Nabih Berri). Vol. 9. The Movement’s Institutions. Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Lubnani, 2006. (Arabic) The Encyclopedia of Amal under the Leadership of Chairman Nabih Berri (Mawsu‘at Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya bi-Qiyadat al-Ra’is Nabih Berri). Vol. 10. Amal’s History and Future. Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Lubnani, 2006. (Arabic)

Newspapers Magazines Al-Afkar (weekly, Beirut) Al-‘Ahd (weekly, Beirut) Amal (weekly, Beirut) Al-Anba’ (weekly, Beirut) Al-‘Awasif (weekly, Beirut) Al-Bayadar al-Siyassi (weekly, Jerusalem) Al-Dawliya (weekly, Paris) Al-Dustur (weekly, London) Early Warning Report (weekly, Washington) Al-Hawadith (weekly, Beirut and London) Al-Itihad al-Usbu‘i (weekly, Abu Dhabi) The Lebanese Report (bimonthly, Beirut)

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Magazin (weekly, Beirut) Al-Majalla (weekly, London) Al-Masira (weekly, Beirut) Middle East International (biweekly, London) Monday Morning (weekly, Beirut) Al-Mustaqbal (weekly, Paris) Al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli (weekly, Paris and Zurich) Newsweek (weekly, New York) Al-Raya (weekly, Beirut) La Revue du Liban (weekly, Beirut) Al-Sayyad (weekly, Beirut) Al-Shira‘ (weekly, Beirut) Al-Tadhaman (weekly, London) Al-Wasat (weekly, London) Al-Wattan al-‘Arabi (weekly, Paris) Al-Yamama (weekly, Riyadh) Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘ (weekly, —Paris)

Dailies Al-‘Amal (Beirut) Al-Ahrar (Beirut) Al-Anba’ (Kuwait) Al-Anwar (Beirut) Al-Bayraq (Beirut) The Daily Star (Beirut) Davar (Tel Aviv) Al-Diyar (Beirut) The Economist (London) The Guardian (London) Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) Al-Hadaf (Kuwait) Al-Hayat (London) The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem) Kayhan (Teheran) Al-Khalij (Abu Dhabi) Al-Liwa’ (Beirut) Le Monde (Paris) Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut) Al-Nahar (Beirut) Al-Qabas (Kuwait) Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Al-Safir (Beirut) Sawt al-Sh‘ab (‘Aman) Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London) Tishrin (Damascus) The Washington Post (Washington) Al-Watan (Kuwait) Yedi‘ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv)

Internet Sites Amal official website: http://www.amal-movement.com Lebanese elections blog: http://lebelections.blogspot.com/ Lebanese elections official website: http://www.elections.gov.lb/Default. aspx?lang=en-us

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Lebanese government: http://www.lp.gov.lb/ Nabih Berri’s website: http://www.nabihberry.com News: http://www.Lebanon.com News: http://www.Lebanonwire.com News: http://www.Naharnet.com News: http://www.YaLibnan.com

Summary of Radio Broadcasting and News Agencies FBIS-DR (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, daily report) NER, HATSAV (Summary of radio and newspapers, special reports, collected by the Israeli Defense Forces) SWB (BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcast, daily reports)

Radio Stations BBC Radio Beirut (Lebanese national station) Radio Monte Carlo (French station from Paris) Radio al-Nur (Hizballah’s radio station) Radio of Phalanges Voice of Free Lebanon (military station of the Phalanges) Voice of Hope (station of SLA from Marj‘ayoun) Voice of Lebanon (station of the Phalanges) Voice of the Mountain (station of the PSP) Voice of the National Resistance Voice of the People (underground station of the LCP) Voice of the South (station of the SLA)

TV Stations Al-‘Arabiya (satellite, Abu Dhabi) Al-Jazeera (satellite, Qatar) Al-Manar (Hizballah, Beirut) Al-Mustaqbal (Hariri, Beirut) NBN (Amal, Beirut)

News Agencies AFP (A Worldwide News Agency) Beirut Local News Service (Beirut) IR ANA (Iranian News Agency) Kuwaiti News Agency MENA (Middle East News Agency (Cairo)) Syria’s News Service (Damascus) Xinhua (the official press agency of the government of the People’s Republic of China)

Secondary Sources Sources in Arabic Al-Amin, Muhsin. Writings of Jabal-‘Amil (Khutut Jabal-‘Amil). Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilmiya lil-Tiba‘a wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi‘, 1983.

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Al-Safa, Muhammad Jaber. The History of Jabal-‘Amil (Ta’arikh Jabal-‘Amil). Beirut: Dar al-Nahar wal-Nashr, 1981. Al-Din, Raja Sari. Southern Lebanon Under the Shade of the Israeli Occupation (al-Janub al-Lubnani fi Zul al-Ihtilal al-Isra’ili). Beirut: Mukhtarat al-Akhbar al-‘Arabiya wal‘Alamiya, 1985. Al-Khazen, Farid and Paul Salem, eds. The First Elections in Lebanon after the War (alIntikhabat al-Ula fi Lubnan ma Ba‘d al-Harb). Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1993. Baydun, Ahmad. “The South: the Theater and the Play” (“al-Janub: al-Masrah wal-Riwaya”) in Farid al-Khazen and Paul Salem, eds. Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1993, pp. 357–416. Beily, Yizhak. “The Shi‘ites in Lebanon after the ‘Peace for Galilee’ War,” (“ahShi‘im be-Levanon Leahar Milhemet Sheleg”), Sqira-Hodshit, 22 (1), May 1985, pp. 12–20. Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein. Islam and the Logic of Strength (al-Islam wa-Mintaq alQuwah). Beirut: al-Mu’asasa al-Jam‘iya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi‘, al-Tiba‘a alThalitha, 1985. Text of the national agreement—the Ta’if Accord (Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani—Iitifaq al-Ta’if ). The official Internet site of the Lebanese parliament. .

Sources in Hebrew Avi-Ran, Reuven. The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon 1975–1985 (ha-Me‘oravut haSurit be-Levanon, 1975–1985). Tel Aviv: Ma‘arachot, Ministry of Defense, 1986. Erlich, Reuven. Within the Lebanese Jungle. Tel Aviv: Ma‘arachot, Ministry of Defense, 2000. Nir, Omri. “Continuity and Change in the Shi‘ite Community of Lebanon,” (“Hemshehiyut ve-Shinuy ba‘eda ah-Shi‘it be-Levanon”), Ph.D. diss., Tel Aviv University, December 2001. Pakradouni, Karim. The Lost Peace (ha-Shalom ha-Avud). Translated from French to Hebrew by Avital ‘Inbar. Tel Aviv: Ma‘arahot, Ministry of Defense, 1986. Rabinovich, Itamar and Hana Zamir. A War and Crisis in Lebanon (Milhama ve-Mashber be-Levanon). Tel Aviv: ha-Kibutz ha-Me’uhad, 1982. Reinich, Jacques. “Bashir Jumayil and His Era,” (“Bashir Jumayil ve-Tqufato”), Ph.D. diss., Tel Aviv University, September 1986. Shapira, Shimon. Hizballah between Iran and Lebanon (Hizballah Beyn Iran le-Levanon). Tel Aviv: ha-Qibutz ha-Me’uhad, 2000. ———. Imam Musa al-Sadr: the Generator of the Shi‘ite Movement in Lebanon (ha-Imam Musa al-Sadr: Meholela shel ha-Tnu’a ha-Shi‘it bi-Levanon). Sqirot, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1986. Shiff, Ze’ev and Ehud Ya‘ari. A Misled War (Milhemet Sholal). Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Shoqen, 1984. Zisser, Eyal. Syria of Assad—At a Crossroads (Syria shel Assad, ‘Al Parashat Drahim). Tel Aviv: ha-Kibutz ha-Me’uhad, 1999.

Sources in English and French Abu Khalil, As‘ad. “Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 27, issue 3, 1991, pp 390–403. Ajami, Fouad. “Lebanon and Its Inheritors,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 63/4, Spring 1985, pp. 778–799. ———. The Vanished Imam. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986.

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Alpher, Joseph. “Untangling the Lebanese Labyrinth,” Newsview, vol. 3, no. 27, July 6, 1982, pp. 20–21. Bailey, Clinton. “Lebanon’s Shi‘is After the 1982 War,” in Martin Kramer, ed. Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 219–236. Barak, Oren. “Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multiethnic Identity and the Making of the Lebanese Army,” History and Memory, vol. 13, no. 1, Spring/Summer 2001, pp. 60–84. ———. The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009. Barclay, Nadia. “Café Culture in Beirut: A Center for Civil Society (Sixteenth Century to the Present),” Master’s thesis, Growth and Structure of Cities Program, Bryn Mawr College, 2007. Bulloch, John. Death of a Country: Civil War in Lebanon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977. Calis, Raphael. “The Shi‘ite Pimpernel,” The Middle East, November 1978, pp. 52–54. Chalabi, Tamara. The Shi‘is of Jabal ‘Amil and the New Lebanon: community and nation sate 1918–1943. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Cobban, Helena. “Hizbullah’s New Face: In Search of a Muslim Democracy,” Boston Review, April-May 2005. . Cooley, John K. “The Palestinians,” in P. Edward and L. W. Snider, eds. Lebanon in Crisis. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979, pp. 21–54. Deeb, Marius. “Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly, 10 (2), April 1988, pp. 683–698. Farha, Mark. “Demography and Democracy in Lebanon,” Mideast Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1, January–March 2008. www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0801/0801_2. htm ———. “Demographic Dilemmas,” in Barry Rubin, ed. Lebanon–Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009, pp. 83-97. Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. London: Fontana/Collins, 1990. Haddad, William W. “Divided Lebanon,” Current History, vol. 81, no. 471, pp. 30–35. Halawi, Majed. A Lebanon Defined: Musa Al-Sadr and the Shi‘a Community. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004. Harik, Iliya. “Voting Participation and Political Integration in Lebanon,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 27–48. Harik, Judith Palmer. “Between Islam and the System: Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizballah,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 40, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 41–67. ———. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004. Harris, William. “Lebanon,” in Ami Ayalon, ed. MECS 1992, vol. XVI. The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Tel –Aviv University. Boulder, San –Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 587–625. ———. “Lebanon,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ed. Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) 1995, vol. XIX. The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Tel Aviv University. Boulder, San –Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 446–470. ———. “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride,” in Barry Rubin, ed. Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009, pp. 63–82. Hottinger, Arnold. “Zu‘ama in Historical Perspective,” in Leonard Binder, ed. Politics in Lebanon. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966, pp. 85–105. Hudson, Michael. “Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 10 (3), 1997, pp. 243–260.

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Ismail, Ismail. La Population Chiite De Borj-Hammoud Etude Humaine. Beirouth: Université Libanaise, 1973. Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Kerr, H. Malcolm. “The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections,” Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 11, no. 9, October 1960, pp. 266–275. Khalidi, Rashid. “The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of the Israeli Invasion,” MEJ, vol. xxxviii, 1984, pp. 255–266. “Khomeini’s Hitmen in Lebanon,” Early Warning, vol. 3, no. 6, July 1985. (no author) Kramer, Martin. Hezbollah’s Vision of the West. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989. ———. The Moral Logic of Hizballa. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Tel Aviv University, 1987. ———. “Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,” Orient: German Journal for Politics and Economics of the Middle East, 26, no. 2, June 1985, pp. 147–149. “Lebanon—After Iran: The Shi‘i Community,” Middle East Intelligence Survey, February 1–15, 1979, vol. 6, no. 21. (no author) Mallat, Chibli. “Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni–Shia Paradigm,” Third World Quarterly, 10 (2) April 1988, pp. 699–729. ———. Shi‘i Thought from South Lebanon. Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1988. Mayer, Thomas. “Lebanon,” in: Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon, and Colin Legum, eds. MECS 1980–1981, vol. V. The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982, pp. 663–686. Nasr, Salim. “Roots of the Shi‘i Movement,” MERIP Reports, vol. 15, no. 5, June 1985, pp. 10–16. Nassif, Daniel. “Nabih Berri—Lebanese Parliament Speaker,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 11, December 2000. . Nir, Omri. “The Lebanese Shi‘a as a Political Community,” in Barry Rubin, ed. Lebanon–Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis. New York: Palgrave—Macmillan, 2009, pp. 177—193. ———. “The Shi‘ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 6, November 2004, pp. 109–129. Norton, Augustus Richard. Amal and the Shi‘a—Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987. ———. “Harakat Amal,” in Edward Azar and Paul Jureidni, eds. The Emergence of a New Lebanon. New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 162–204. ———. Hizbollah: A Short History. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. ———. “Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon,” Middle East Insight, no. 3, January–February 1984, pp. 14–17. ———. “Political Violence and Shi‘a Factionalism in Lebanon,” Middle East Insight, 3, no. 2, 1983, pp. 9–16. Olmert, Joseph. “Lebanon,” in Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon, and Colin Legum, eds. MECS 1981–1982, vol. VI. The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983, pp. 702–732. ———. “Lebanon,” in MECS 1983–84. Ibid., pp. 536–77. ———. “The Shi‘is and the Lebanese State,” in Martin Kramer, ed. Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 189–201. Rabinovich, Itamar and Hana Zamir. “Lebanon,” in MECS 1979–1980. Ibid., pp. 596–627. ———. “Lebanon,” in MECS 1978–1979. Ibid., pp. 657–682.

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Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon, 1970–1983. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984. Randal, Jonathan. The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and American Bunglers. London: Chato and Windus, The Hogarth Press, 1984. Reinkowski, Maurus and Sofia Saadeh. “A Nation Divided: Lebanese Confessionalism,” in Haldun Gülalp, ed. Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the Nation— State. Oxon, U.K.: Routledge, 2006, pp. 99–117. Salem, Paul. “Hizbollah Attempts a Coup d’État,” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, May 2008, < http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/salem_coup_final.pdf> Salibi, Kamal. A House of Many Mansions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. ———. Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–76. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976. Shaery—Eisenlohr, Roschanack. Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Shanahan, Rodger. “Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi‘a of Lebanon,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 9, no. 1, March 2005. . ———. The Shi‘a of Lebanon—Clans, Parties and Clerics. London and New York: Tauris, 2005. Shapiro, William E. Lebanon. New York: Franklin Watts, 1984. Sicking, Thom and Shereen Khirallah. “The Shia Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way,” CEMAN Reports, no. 2, 1975, pp. 97–130. Stork, Joe. “The War of the Camps, the War of the Hostages,” MERIP Reports, no. 133, June 1985, p. 3–7, 22. Theroux, Peter. The Strange Disappearance of Imam Sadr. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987. Traboulsi, Fawaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto Press, 2007. Trento, Susan B. and Joseph J. Trento. Unsafe at Any Altitude. Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2006. Walbridge, Linda S. Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shiism in an American Community. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997. Who’s Who in Lebanon 1990–1991. Beirut: Publitec Publications, 1992. (No editor) Zamir, Meir. The Formation of Modern Lebanon. London: Croom Helm, 1985. Zisser, Eyal. “Syria,” in Ami Ayalon, ed. MECS –1992, vol. XVI. The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies Tel Aviv University. Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 723–749.

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I nde x

Abtahi, Muhammad ‘Ali, 151 Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoei, 8–9 Abu Hamdan tribe, 1 Abu Hamdan, Mahmud, 85, 145 Abu Rizq, Elias, 102–3, 198 note 35, Ajami, Fuad, 13, 17, 37, Akhtari, Hassan, 76 Amal al-Islami, 38, 44, 83 Amal’s Association of Civil Activity (Jam‘iyat al-‘Amal al-Ahli(, 139 Association of Women Guides of the Islamic Mission, 139 Educational Centers (Mu’assasat Amal al-Tarbawiyya), 141 Educational network al-Zuhara, 139 Family of Emissary (Usrat al-Risala), 139 Imam Musa al-Sadr Center, 141 Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care (al-Jam‘iya al-Lubnaniya lilRi’ayat al-Saha wal-Ijtima‘iya), 140 martyrs (shuhada’), 141, 144, 172, 204 note 212 Media Institution (Mu‘asasat Amal al-I‘lamiya), 140 Nabih Berri Cultural Complex (Mujama‘a Nabih Berri al-Thaqafi), 141 Organization of the Fallen Lebanese Soldiers’ Oasis” (Mu’asasat Wahat al-Shahid al-Lubnani, 140 Scout Association of the Islamic Mission (Jam‘iyat Kashafat al-Risalah al-Islamiya), 139 Amil, ‘Ali, 158, 206 note 19 Amin, ‘Abdallah, 86, 88, Amin, Ibrahim, 42 Amin, Shawqi, 9 Amin, Sheikh Hassan, 83, 99 Antoine Shaqir, 68 Anton Bishara, 102–3. Arab Deterrence Force, 31 Arab League, 65, 148, 157, 167 Berri’s Arab identity, 155, 169 Lebanese political crisis, 124–5, 207 note 45 peace plan with Israel, 171 Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh al-‘Arabi), 19, 171

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Arab Nationalists (al-Qawmiyun al-Arab), 19 Arad, Ron, 39, 173 Armenians, 8, 36 Tashnaq Party, 112 Arslan, Talal, 95 As‘ad, Ahmad Kamil, 133-4 As‘ad, Ahmad, 3 As‘ad, Family, 1 As‘ad, Kamel Bey, 171 As‘ad, Kamil, 4, 6-7, 13-15, 36, 46-8, 77, 123, 194, note 87 parliamentary National Unity, 6 council of the south, 7, 13, 138 Berri, 24, 30, 34, 40 elections 85–7, 129–30, 135 As‘ad, Riyad, 132 Assad, Bashar, 94–5, 110, 175 Berri, 96 connections with Nasrallah, 95 Hariri, 115, 202 note 43 Assad, Hafez, 5, 13, 40, 59, 85, 95, 96, 100, 109, 117, 141, 186 note 21, 196 note 144 perception of Lebanon 94, 174–6 Assad, Maher, 95 Association of the Clerics of Jabal-‘Amil (Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama Jabal-‘Amil), 9 Ayub, ‘Ali, 83–4 Azraq, Khalid, 172, 209 note 76 ‘Abd ‘Ili, Muhammad, 26, 190 note 38 ‘Abd al-Raziq, Na’if, 41, ‘Abdallah Mahmud, 190 note 38 ‘Abdallah, ‘Ali, 145 ‘Akar, 129 ‘Akush, ‘Ali, 26, 190 note 38, ‘Ali Ibn Abu-Talib, 78 ‘Alawites, 5, 9, 95–6 ‘Ammar, ‘Ali, 26, 86 ‘Anjar, 130 ‘Aoun, ‘Atef, 26 ‘Aoun, Michel, 60–2, 122, 124, 127, 132–3, 165, 192 note 22, 192 note 25, 201 note 127 ‘Arafat, Yasser, 31–2, 55, 64 war of the camps, 65, 67, 73, 78, 186 note 21, ‘Asaf, Tawfiq, 63

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I n de x

‘Ashat-‘Akar, 84 ‘Ashura’, 15 ‘Assem Qansu, 96 ‘Assi, Randa (Berri), 24, 117 ‘Awad, Fouad, 69 ‘Awad, Fouad, 69 ‘Ayn al-Hilwa, 65, 80, ‘Aynata, 8 ‘Ayn-Baswar, 75 ‘Ayn-Ibel, 143 ‘Ayn-Safi, 75 Ba‘albek, 1, 10, 14, 15, 76, 80, 142, 145 Elections, 87, 131, 135 establishment of Hizballah, 42–3 plot against Berri, 83–4 Ba‘aqlin, 67–8 Ba‘ath party, 96, 164, 209 note 85, 210 note 94 Berri’s membership, 21, 24, 61, 166, 174 election alignment, 133 in Iraq, 41 in Syria, 94 Lebanese Shi‘ites in, 4, 19 National Unity Front, 57 pro-Iraqi branch, 26, 30 Badr al-Din, ‘Abbas, 11, 26, Bakr, Ahmad Hassan, 41 Banisadr, Abulhassan, 43 Barbir neighborhood, 63, 82, 140 Baydun, ‘Abd al-Hamid, 145 Baydun, Muhammad Yusuf, 88 Baydun, Muhammad, 70, 80, 85, 137, 195 note 107 Bazargan, Mahdi, 43 Beirut, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50–51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64–80, 82–4, 87–8, 92–4, 96–7, 99, 100, 102, 104, 109, 112, 119, 121, 125–6, 129, 131, 135–7, 141, 145, 149, 160, 162–4, 166–8, 170–1, 178, 182 Berri, Layla, 21, 24 Berri, Mustafa, 17–18 Berri, ‘Abdul Fatah, 171 Beyt al-Talaba (the Students’ House), 20 Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria), 2, 94, Bint-Jbeil, 1, 88, 143 brothers–Enemies War, 73 constituency, 8, 19, 47, 136–7 Biqa‘, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 15, 19, 30, 39–40, 42, 43, 44, 51, 57, 66, 68, 69, 83–88, 96, 105, 145, 160, 186 note 11 Amal activities, 141 Amal-Hizballah Struggle, 70, 72–80 Berri’s popularity, 137, 194 note 79 elections, 128–132, 135–136

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revolution of the hungry, 141–43 Bir al-‘Abd neighborhood, 74 Bir Hassan neighborhood, 137, 141 Bishara, 102–3 Bkirki, 109 Black September, 33, 167, 189 note 8 Bourj al-Barajneh, 136 Boutrus, Fouad, 35 Brital, 42, 135, 142 Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty, 85, 88, 98, 197 note 17, 209 note 92 Brothers–Enemies War (Harb al-Ukhwa– al-A‘daa’), 54, 72–6 Buckley, F. William, 37 Cairo Agreement, 33, 167, 189 note 8 Chamoun, Camille, 36 1958 crisis, 2–3 Berri’s early meeting, 20 Chamoun, Dany, 35, 60 Chamran, Mustafa, 12, 14, 26, 43, 44 Chehab, Fouad, 3, 123 Chehabism, 21 Council of the South (Majlis al-Janub), 7, 13, 45, 56, 70, 103, 138–9, 45 Da‘awa Party, 41–2, 45 Dabur family, 74 Dahir, Mikhayil, 60 Dallul, Muhsin, 68, 86 Damascus Agreement, 65 Dandash, Tribe, 85, 86 Dar al-Iftaa’, 100 Daud, Daud, 25, 75, 77, 79–81, 89, 204 note 212 Dhahir, Ya’aqub, 147 al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiyya (Shi‘ite southern suburbs), 11, 45, 50, 61, 66, 70, 73, 76–8, 104, 112, 119, 136, 137, 139, 160, 194 note 78 Dirani, Mustafa, 79, 81 Doha Agreement, 112, 116, 122, 125–6, 133, 162, 207 note 44 Doueyr, 74 Edde, Raymond, 35, 36, 47 Elias Sarkis, 35, 155, 189 note 10, 208 note 63 European Union, 110 Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, 74, 104, 110, 141 and Berri, 71, 83 and Hizballah, 42, 149, 184 and Musa Sadr, 8–9 Islam and the Logic of Force (al-Islam wa-Mantiq al-Quwa), 8

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I n de x Fahas, Bilal, 172, 204 note 212, 209 note 76 Faqih, Ahmad Khalil, 81 Faqih, Mahmud, 26, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 89 Fares, ‘Issam, 106 Farhat, Riza, 8 Fatah al-Islam, 170 Fatahland, 11, 166 Fawaz, Nassib, 22 Fayad, ‘Ali Rashid, 134 Ferzli, Elie, 107, 110 Fneish, Muhammad, 86, 132, 161, 201 note 128, 203 note 167, 207 note 38 France, 1, 2, 20, 23, 38, 57, 61, 62, 99, 115, 161, 171, 189 note 10 Franjiyeh, Suleiman, 35, 36, 59, 60, 167 Franjiyeh, Suleiman Tony, 106, 111 Free Lebanon Army, 11 Free Patriotic Movement (al-Tiyar al-Wattani al-Hur), 62, 122, 165 Future Movement (al-Mustaqbal), 121–2, 124 Geagea, Samir, 59, 106, 118, 121 General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCLW), 102–3 General Security Service (al-Amn al-‘Am), 96, 102 Geneva, Reconciliation Conference, 35–6, 50, 54, 82, 159, 172, 189 note 14, 189 note 17, 194 note 87 Ghadar, Muhammad, 26, 32, 38 Ghazali, Rustum, 96 Ghobeiri neighborhood, 136, 140, 74 Good Fence gate, 171 Grapes of Wrath operation, 128, 129, 144 Greek Catholic, 35, 36 Greek Orthodox, 1, 35, 36, 38 Habib, Philip, 37 Haddad, Saad, 11, 38, 39, 186 note 20 Hajj, Mustafa, 79 Hamada, Marwan, 63 Hamadeh, Family, 1, 85 Hamadeh, Sabri, 3, 7 Hamadeh, Trad, 201 note 128 Hamas, 158–9 Hamdan, ‘Ali, 112, 146 Hamid, Ayub, 85, 146 Hamiyeh, ‘Aql, 77–80 Hammoud, Mahmoud, 101 Hamra neighborhood, 67, 188 note 14 Hamzah, Zakaria, 26, 49, 81 Hamzeh, Nizar, 176 Harajili, ‘Ali, 137 Harb al-‘Isabat, 171 Harb, Ahmad, 84 Hardan, As‘ad, 101, 102, 111 Haret Hreyk neighborhood, 61

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Hariri, Bahia, 115, 130–2 Hariri, Rafiq, 142, 165 assassination of, 95, 96, 97, 114–17, 120–2 elections, 126–8, 130–2, 135 troika, 93, 98–111, 117 Hariri, Sa‘ad al-Din, 97, 111–12, 115–16, 120–1, 125, 132, 202 note 143 Harris, William, 68, 103 Harub area, 55 Haruf, 74 Hashim, Hassan, 26, 49, 77–81, 83, 89, 195 note 99 Hawi, George, 68, 115 Hawt al-Wilaya junior high school, 19 Hawza al-Islamiya al-Zaynabiya school, 9 Haydar, ‘Akef, 26, 49, 56, 78, 83 Haydar, Adib, 81 Helou, Charles, 21 Higgins, R. William, 74, 81, 194 note 74 Higher Security Council, 31 Hijazi, Ahmad, 26 Hikma high school, 20 Hirmel, 1, 80, 87, 131, 135 Hiyam prison, 39, 140 Hizballah, 18, 29, 37, 40, 41–5, 53–4, 56, 62, 67, 68, 93, 95, 97, 106, 107, 113, 115, 116, 118, 122, 125–8, 162–3, 165–6, 174 internal opposition, 141–3 struggle against Amal, 69–76, 81– 4, 91, 98–101, 104, 137– 41, 143, 147–59, 178, 179–84 elections, 85–8, 128–37 lebanonization 7, 127, 142, 147, 179, 184 Mu’asasat al-Shahid, 140 schools of the Mahdi (Madaris al-Mahdi), 140–1 July 2006 war 119–20, 146, 147, 161 Hobeika, Elie, 59, 67, 106 Hoss, Salim, 7, 45, 49, 50, 56, 60, 88, 103, 104, 105, 108, 111, 131, 186 note 9, 188 note 27 Habhab, Qassem, 204 note 214 Hrawi, Elias, 86, 88, 94, 98–101, 108–10, 113, 174, 174–5 Hussein, ‘Ali, 81 Hussein, Ahmad, 26 Husseini, Hussein, 189 note 18 Amal secretary, 15–16, 25–6, 187 note 83, 188 note 26 elections, 86, 131 speaker, 46–8, 68, 77, 88 struggle after Sadr’s vanishing, 13, 180 struggles in Amal, 89, 146 Imam ‘Ali bin Abi Talib secondary high school, 20

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I n de x

al-Imam al-Mahdi (the Vanished Imam) religious seminar, 9 al-Inhiyaz al-Islami (Islamic Alignment), 13 Inter Arab deterrence force, 31 Intifadat Shbat (February Uprising), 51, 53, 69, 92 Iqlim al-Tufah (the area of apples), 66, 73–6, 84 Iran, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35, 40, 46, 53, 65, 69, 81, 92, 120–2, 125, 131, 134, 139, 145, 148, 150, 154–7, 162, 177, 180, 181 Berri, 37, 41, 72, 74, 83–4, 151–3, 157–9, 175–6 Hizballah, 41–5, 48, 49, 56, 70, 73, 75–7, 101, 119, 129, 137, 140, 142, 174, 184 Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), 12, 44–5, 70, 73 Iraq, 8, 9, 12, 22, 30, 41, 42, 44, 61, 73, 149, 190 notes 31 and 39 affection of July War, 120 connection to Amal, 184 Sunni-Shi‘ite rift, 120 support of the Palestinians, 174 Islamic Amal (Amal al-Islami), 44, 71, 83 Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da‘awa al-Islamiyya) in Iraq, 41 Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da‘awa al-Islamiyya) in Lebanon, 42, 45 Islamic Jihad, 158 Islamic Position Paper (al-Mawqif al-Islami), 49 Islamic Religious Education Association (Jam‘iyat al-Ta‘alim al-Dini al-Islami), 141 Isma‘il, Ahmad, 26 Israel, 4, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44, 55, 56, 57, 64, 70–3, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86–7, 95, 107, 109, 113, 115, 118, 125, 127–32, 134, 138, 141, 146, 150, 151, 154, 155, 159–62, 166–77, 179–82, 190 note 24, 200 note 117, 205 note 235, 209 note 85 July 2006 war, 119–21 resistance to, 143–4 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 39, 54 cooperation with Amal, 172, 201 note 118, 109 note 85 Israeli security zone, 87, 129, 130, 135 Ita al-Sha‘ab, 139 Itihad al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya (Union of Lebanese Forces), 9–10 ‘Isa, ‘Ali, 84 ‘Izz al-Din, Musa, 23 Jaber, Lutfi, 50

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al-Jabha al-Wataniyya li-Himayat al-Janub (National Front for the Protection of the South), 13 al-Jam‘iya al-Islamiyya al-huriyya al-Ja‘afariya (the Free Islamic Ja‘afari Association), 9 Jama‘at al-‘Ulama (the Association of Religious Scholars), 9 Jarju‘, 75 Jezzine, 62 Jibshit, 74 Jisr, Nabil, 198 note 37 Jounieh, 106 July 2006 War (Harb Tamuz), 118, 119–22, 134, 136, 146, 154, 161–2, 171–3 Jum‘a, Haytham, 49, 146 Jumayil, Amin, 34, 35, 36, 40, 45, 47, 67, 77 anti shi‘ite policy, 38 Berri as opposition to, 54–9, 82, 163, 189 note 16 Fabruary uprising, 50 Michel ‘Aoun, 60, 62 Jumayil, Bashir, 34, 35, 37, 41, 77 election for President, 37, 47, 129, 189 note 18, 191 note 49 Intention to nominate Berri, 34 National Salvation Committee, 35, 41 Jumayil, Pierre, 36 Junblat, Kamal, 66, 164 Junblat, Walid, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 40, 47, 54–60, 63, 66–8, 82, 84, 99, 102, 103, 109–11, 121, 123, 131, 157, 164, 165 Jund al-Sham, 170 Kafar Sir, 68 Kan‘an, Ghazi, 76, 96, 102, 107, 129, 130 Kan‘an, Hussein, 14 Karami, ‘Omar, 88, 210 note 98 Karami, Rashid, 35, 56–7, 70, 172, 192 note 11 Karbala, 9, 11 Kefar-Gil’adi, 171 Kfar-Qana, 144 Khaddam, ‘Abd al-Halim, 13, 94, 96, 130 Hariri’s assassination, 115 relations with Berri, 95, 107, 109 Khairallah, Shuqi, 69 Khalde, 50, 67 Khaled, Hassan, 47, 49 Khalifa, Muhammad Jawad, 201 note 228 Khalil, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 69 Khalil, ‘Ali, 7, 88 Khalil, ‘Ali Hassan, 134, 146 Khalil family, 1, 38, Khalil, Hussein, 26 Khalil, Kazem, 7, 47, 69

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I n de x Khamenei, ‘Ali, 43 and Berri, 151, 158 and Nasrallah, 145, 151 Khatami, Muhammad, 151 Khatib, Zuhir, 63, 102, 206 note 23 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhallah, 145, 157 and Berri, 64, 72, 83, 151, 156–7, 206 note 14 and Lebanese Shi‘a, 12 41–2, 44 and Musa Sadr, 10 Kimchi, David, 190 note 24 Kna‘ani, Hamid, 83 Khoei, Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi, 8–9 Kuwait, 9, 61, 62, 186 note 21, 210 note 100 Lahoud, Emile, 96, 98–9, 101, 103, 105, 111, 117–18, 131 and the GCLW elections, 102 extension of term, 108–11, 122–3 Lathqiyah, 9 Lausanne National Reconciliation Convention (Lausanne Conference), 20, 54–5, 56, 159, 163, 172, 192, note 6 and 7, 209 note 80 Lebanese Army, 49, 56–9, 60, 62, 69, 74, 102, 142, 161, 165, 167 Fath al-Islam, 170 defection to Amal, 30, 51–2, 164 deployment in the south, 31, 44, 75, 126, 161 February uprising, 50–3, 54–5 Shi‘ite Sixth Brigade, 64, 65, 72, 82 Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), 19, 26, 30, 57, 68–9, 82, 86, 103, 132, 164, 193 note 62 Lebanese Forces (LF), 32, 35, 36, 51, 59, 106, 118, 121 167 tripartite Agreement, 59 assassination plots against Berri, 82 Lebanese Identity Union (also The Lebanese Option Gathering), 133–4 Lebanese left (the National Front), 4–5, 7, 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 34, 36, 43, 44, 49, 54, 57–8, 64–7, 68–9, 77, 79, 82, 131, 135 153 Berri’s perception of, 164–8, 193 note 61 clashes with Amal, 30–3 Lebanese Muslim Student Association (al-Itihad al-Lubnani lil-Tilabah al-Muslimin), 42 Lebanese National Movement (LNM, al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya), 5, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 44 Lebanese Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya), 130 Lebanese University, 21, 23, 69

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Libya, 6, 11, 67–8, 148, 174, 186 note 21 Litani, 11, 161 Litani Operation, 6, 11, 14 Loyalty to the Resistance list (al-Wafa’ lil-Muqawama), 133, 147 Lubrani, Uri, 39, 194 note 73 Ma‘adi, 74 Ma‘aluf, Nasri, 35 Ma‘iri, Hussein, 83 al-Ma‘ud, 74 Madbuh, Ahmad, 86 Maghdushah, 65 Majdalani, ‘Atef, 124 Makhluf, ‘Adnan, 95 Makhluf, Rami, 95 Maki, ‘Abbas, 26 al-Manar, 106 Mansur, ‘Ali, 5 March 14 alliance, 61, 92, 93, 111, 112, 116, 118, 120–6, 132, 133, 138, 150, 162, 180, 182, 183 March 8 alliance, 62, 92, 93, 97, 111, 112, 115, 116, 118, 120–6, 133, 139, 150, 162, 165, 180, 182 Marj-‘Ayun, 1, 203 note 174 Maronite community, 1, 2, 3, 8, 34, 51, 57, 58, 102, 109, 164, 177, 196 note 138 anti-syrian sentiments, 85, 87, 131 Berri 82, 159, 161 French patronage, 38 Israeli ties, 38, 40, 174 leadership, 3, 36, 47, 60, 63, 88 98, 101, 108, 122, 126, 131, 165 167 lebanese Front, 29 militias, 5, 32, 35 patriarch, 98, 108, 109, 110, 131 troika, 92, 149 Marwahin, 78–9 Masri, Hassan, 26 May 17 (1983) Agreement, 35, 38, 40, 46, 47, 50, 56, 77, 190 note 24. Mazra‘a neighborhood, 82 Middle East Airlines, 108, 167 Middle East peace process, 85, 86, 106, 127, 129, 153, 170 Miqati, Najib, 95, 118 Miqati, Taha, 95 Miqdad (family), 80 Mirhaj, Bishara, 101 Mirza, Sa‘id, 97 Miyeh-Miyeh, 65 Mohtashami-pur, ‘Ali Akbar, 84, 156, 205 note 3 Montazari, Muhammad, 12 Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Shaykh), 160, 171, 173

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I n de x

Mount Lebanon, 1, 2, 10, 35, 55, 66, 129, 136, 198 note 37 Moussa, ‘Amru, 124 Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin), 4, 15, 22, 24, 101, 156 Mu‘awad, Rene, 84 Mujahedin Khalq, 12 Multinational Force, 50 Muntazari, Ayatollah Hussein ‘Ali, 194 note 80 al-Muqasid Islamic association, 20 al-Muqawama al-Mu’amina (the Believing Resistance), 81 Murabitun (Nasserite Movement), 19, 35, 38 fighting against Amal, 68, 82, 164 Murr, Elias, 115 Murr, Michel, 101, 102, 105, 106, 111 Mussawi, ‘Abbas, 42, 70, 75, 86 Mussawi, Hussein, 26, 30, 31, 38, 41, 43, 44–5, 48, 76–7, 83, 190 note 38 al-Mustaqbal political bloc, 121 al-Mustaqbal television station, 123, 125 Nab‘a quarter, 5 Nabatiyeh, 1, 68, 73, 74, 78, 86, 99, 135–6 Nabishit, 42 Nabulsi, ‘Afif, 163, 208 note 47 Nahr al-Bared, 171 Najaf, 8, 41–2, 184 Naqura, 74, 209 note 85, Nasrallah, Hassan, 62, 86, 144 Berri, 129–31, 133, 143, 145–6, 148, 150–1, 163, 166, 171 Hizballah’s leadership, 126, 129, 135, 142, 151 Iran, 151, 156, 158, 206, note 19 July 2006 war, 119–21, 161, 200 note 117 Popularity, 91, 184, 201 note 121 Syria, 95, 130–1, 197 note 5 Nasrallah, Muhammad, 146 al-Nasser, Jamal ‘Abd, 2, 22, 23 Nasserism 2, 19, 23 Nasserite Popular Organization, (al-Tanzim al-Sha‘abi an-Nassri), 87, 130, 132–3 National Broadcasting Networ, (NBN, al-Shabaka al-Wattaniya lil-Irsal), 106 National Covenant, 2, 36, 57, 63, 131 National Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya), 58, 78, 172 National Salvation Committee (Lajnat al-Inqaz al-Watani), 35, 37, 41, 44, 45, 155, 189 note 13 National Salvation Front (Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Wattani), 65

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National Union of University Students in Lebanon (al-Itihad al-Watani lil-Tulab al-Jam‘iyin fi Lubnan), 21–2 National Unity Front (Jabhat al-Itihad al-Wattani), 57 Nuray, Mahmud, 83 Operation Accountability, 144–5 Osseyran, ‘Adel, 7, 36, 37, 189 note 21 Osseyran Family, 1 ‘Obeid, Hussein, 26 ‘Obeid, Jean, 148 Palestinian Rescue Front, 65 Palestinian uprising (Intifada), 66, 169 Parliamentary National Unity (al-Tajama‘ al-Wattani al-Niyabi), 6–7 Phalanges (al-Kata’ib), Civil war, 8, 167, 191 note 59 Israeli alliance, 32, 38 Parliament, 106, 133 Pilgrim, Michael, 37 PLO, assassination plots, 82 civil war, 29, 31, 32, 33–4, 59, 67, 167, 189 notes 7 and 8, 208 note 61 relations with Shi‘ites, 5, 11, 30, 39, 44, 49, 73, 75, 168–9, 186 note 21 war of the camps, 64–6, 78–80, 159 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 167 Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 33 clashes with Amal, 54, 58, 67–8 collaborating with Amal, 59, 103, 164 February uprising, 33, 50 LNM, 32, 165 Qa‘afrani, ‘Ali, 146 Qa‘uk, Nabil, 132 Qa‘uqji, Fauzi, 19, 171 Qabalan, ‘Abd al-Amir, 31, 48, 49, 79, 83, 110, 158, 180, 186 note 21, 191 note 49, 206 note 19 Qabalan, Qabalan, 103, 138 Qabbani, Muhammad Rashid, 99 Qadhafi, Mu‘ammar, 11, 68, 148, 193 note 53, 205 note 226 Qana Massacre, 144 Qansu, ‘Assem, 96 Qansu, Talal, 74 Qasem, Na‘im, 132, 203 note 169 Qasir, Ahmad, 204 note 212, Qasir, Hassan, 204 note 214 Qom, 42 Qomati, Mahmud, 200 note 117 Qotbezadeh, Sadiq, 43, 44, 169 Qsir, ‘Abdallah, 190 note 38 Qubaysi, Ahmad, 204 n212

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I n de x Qulaylat, Ibrahim, 35 Ra‘ad, Muhammad, 147 Rashidiyeh, 66 Reagan, Ronald, 37, 72 Reconciliation Conference in Geneva, 35–6, 50, 54, 82, 159, 172, 189 note 14, 194 note 87 Red Cross, 39, 173 Reform Document (1976), 5, 36 Revolt of the Hungry, 129, 136 Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), 12, 44–5, 70, 73 Rohani, Fakhr, 83 Sa‘ad, Muhammad, 15, 172 Sa‘ad, Mustafa, 87, 130, 131 Sa‘ad, Osama, 132 Saba‘, Bassem, 101, 133 Saba‘, Nichola, 198 note 37 Sabbah, Anwar, 7, 63 Sabra, 65 Sadeq, Muhammad Habib, 85, 130 Sadiq, ‘Abd al-Hassan, 74 Sadr, Muhammad Baqir, 41–2 Sadr, Musa, 3–11, 13–15, 27, 34, 39, 43, 48, 68, 71, 72, 78, 79, 101, 113, 139, 140, 141, 154–7, 164, 168–70, 172, 175 Berri, 22–3, 24, 25, 147–8, 154, 159–60, 165, 180 Sadr, Rbab, 26, 49 Sadr, Sadri, 26 Safed, 18 Safi, ‘Ali, 142 Safi, Ibrahim, 130 Sah, Talal, 201 note 128 Salah, ‘Abd al-Majid, 74 Salam, Sa’ib, 35, 36, 47, 49 Saleh, Mahmud, 18 Salem, Elie, 54 Salim, Muhsin, 9 Salloukh, Fawzi, 201 note 128 Saqr, ‘Uqab, 112 Sarkis, Elias, 35, 155, 189 note 10, 208 note 63 Saudi Arabia, 36, 116, 134, 158, 171, 174 Sayyed, Jamil, 96–7, 102, 115, 183 Sfeir, Nasrallah Boutros, 98, 108, 110 Berri, 109, 131 Shaalan, Riad, 204 note 213 Shab‘a Farms, 160–1, 171, 173 Shahrour, Hikmat, 147 Shams al-Din, Ibrahim, 141 Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, 99, 129, 156, 180, 191 note 49 head of SSIC, 10, 42, 48 rivalry with Berri, 46–9, 71, 78, 109, 142, 148, 199 note 66

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struggle after Sadr’s vanishing, 13–15, 25, 187 note 26 strugles in Amal, 26, 30–1,77, 190 note 38, 205 note 230 Ta’if Accord, 64 Shariatmadari, Muhammad Kazem, 10 Shatila, 65 Shawkat, Assef, 95 Shihabi, Hikmat, 96 Shirazi, Hassan Mahdi, 9–10 Shirazi, Mirza Mahdi, 9 Shiyah neighborhood, 74, 137 Shiyah neighborhood, 74, 137, Shmistar, 15 Shtaura, 57 Shuf Mountains, 32, 34, 35, 66–7, 135, 162 Shuwabe, Akram, 63 Sibati, Hassan, 75, 80, 204 note 212 Siblani, Ghassan, 49 Sidon, 1, 19, 36, 64–6, 73, 75, 80, 102 Constituency of, 115, 131, 132 Sidqin, 74 Sierra Leone, 9, 17, 18, 20, 24, 39 Siniora, Fouad, 105, 107, 118, 120–2, 126, 138, 207 note 43 Sistani, ‘Ali, 149, 184, 205 note 232 Solh, Rashid, 56 Solidere, 104 South Lebanon Army (SLA, Jaysh al-Janub), 11, 38, 140 Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL), 97, 115–16, 118, 122 Supreme Spiritual Authority (al-Wali Faqih), 140–1, 145, 153, 156, 206 note 19 Suleiman, Michel, 99, 101, 111, 112, 122, 126, 148 Syria, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 36, 40, 48, 50, 71, 124, 128–33, 142, 149, 160–2, 167 Berri, 40, 44, 53, 56–7, 61, 65–6, 67, 76–7, 85, 88–9, 91, 93, 97, 115–16, 118, 128, 150, 158, 164, 174–6, 180–3 relations with Lebanon, 59–61, 63, 88, 94, 96, 97–102, 106–15, 121, 150 Iran, 70, 73–5, 121, 122, 124–5, 129, 152–5, 180 Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP, al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima‘i), 19, 101, 111 clashes with Amal, 68 cooperation with Amal, 30, 125, 133, 164–5 national unity front, 57 Shi‘ites in, 69

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I n de x

Ta’if Accord, 36, 60, 62–4, 85, 91–4, 98–100, 104, 108, 109, 114, 137, 142, 143, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 179, 184, 192 note 29, 202 note 146, 205 note 1 Berri, 159–63, 206 note 23 impact on the Shi‘ite community, 126–8 Talis, Akram, 78 Talis, Akram, 78 Talis, Haydar, 142 Taqi al-Din, Halim, 49, 172, 209 note 76, Taraya, 135 Taybe, 139 Development and Liberation list (al-Tanmiya wal-Tahrir), 133 Tibnin, 17–22, 143, 171, 186 note 20, 187 note 2 Tleis, Bassam, 146 Tripartite Agreement, 54, 59, 64, 67, 163, 172, 192 note 15 Tripoli, 5, 19, 35, 57, 95, 100 Tripoli in Libya, 11, 148 Tufah area, 66, 73–6, 84 Tufayli, Subhi, 133 formation of Hizballah, 42 leader of Hizballah, 70, 75, 76, 86 opposition to Hizballah’s leadership, 129, 141–2 revolt of the hungry, 136, 142–3 Tyre, 1, 17, 19, 23, 38, 66, 74, 76, 78–9, 88, 99, 135–7, 172 United Arab Republic (UAR), 2 United Nation (U.N), 57, 58, 63, 70, 74–5, 81, 107, 116–18, 122, 140, 144, 148, 160, 162, 173, 201 note 118 United States (U.S), 35, 54, 60–1, 78, 85, 110, 116, 120, 129, 134, 155, 158 162 Berri’s relations with, 24, 37, 41, 124, 182 CIA, 37, 125

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embassy, 38 emigration to, 17, 21 marines, 37–8 TWA hijack, 71–2 Unity and Liberation Front (Jabhat al-Itihad wal-Tahrir), 59 UNRWA, 73 Uza‘i, 76 ‘Ulama, 2, 3, 9, 12, 41, 42, 43, 45, 48 Velayati, ‘Ali Akbar, 75 Wakim, Najah, 102 War of the Camps (Harb al-Mukhimat), 54, 64–6, 72, 80, 82, 159, 170 War of the Two Brothers (Harb al-Shaqiqayn), 54, 72–6 Wazzan, Shafiq, 35, 50 Ya‘akub, Muhammad, 11 Yamut, Muhammad, 198 note 37 Yatar, 168 Yazdi, Ibrahim, 43 Younis, Fawaz, 71 Yahfufi, Suleiman, 9–10 Zabadani, 44 Zaharani, 1, 49, 76, 115, 131, 137 Zahir, Ya‘aqub, 146 Zahle, 1, 30, 42, 58, 88, 96, 208 note 112 Zamani, ‘Abbas, 12 Zawtar, 74 Zein, ‘Abd al-Latif, 48 Zein, ‘Abdallah, 190 note 38 Zein, Family, 1 Zein, Kheirallah, 146 Zifta, 79 Zouk-Mkayel, 105–6 Zu‘aytar, ‘Ali, 204 note 213 Zu‘aytar, Ghazi, 101 Zughbi, Ghanem, 103

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