Music Is Not a "Notational System" William E. Webster The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Summer, 1971), pp. 489-497. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8529%28197122%2929%3A4%3C489%3AMINA%22S%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism is currently published by The American Society for Aesthetics.
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W I L L I A M E. W E B S T E R
Music Is Not a ggNotationalSystem"
I. AUTOGRAPHIC/ALLOGRAPHIC DISTINCTION
A. Introduction
ture are examples of "autographic works of art"; music and literature are "allographic works of art."
B. Forgery book Languages of Art Goodman explicitly warns us that this is rich with ideas and provocative suggestions distinction of the autographic from the allofor the construction of a theory of musical graphic as a criterion of the forgeable and the notation. He categorizes the arts as being either "autographic" or "allographic." He unforgeable, is only preliminary to the acthen characterizes allographic arts in terms count of allographic arts in terms of notational of notational systems. In this paper I will es- schemes. (fn. p. 113) Yet, questions arise as tablish that Goodman did not sufficiently ex- to whether the forthcoming definition of plicate the notion of "forgery" to support the allographic works in terms of the concept of distinction between what he calls the "auto- "notational system" would coincide with the graphic" and "allographic" arts. I will pre- idea of allographic works that we receive sent counterexamples to show that Goodman's from his discussions of forgery. While forgery is not explicitly defined, from semantic requirements do not hold for musical Goodman's uses of the term3 we can construct notation in the way that he asserts they do; an approximate definition with which Goodfrom this it will follow that while music is a notational system, it is not the kind of nota- man might concur: P is a forgery of a work of tional system that Goodman asserts that it is. art W, if and only if P is a copy, reproduction, For Goodman no work of art is both or imitation of W and P is intended to deceive "autographic" and "allographic." He defines by falsely purporting to be genuine. A work "autographic work of art" in two ways: a of art W is a genuine work G, by Y, if and work of art is "autographic if and only if the only if W is a work of art and the historical distinction between original and forgery of it fact can be established that G was actually is significant; or better, if and only if even the created by Y, and that W = G. (p. 116) However, not all of his examples satisfy most exact duplication of it [the original work]' does not thereby count as genuine." the conditions of the autographic-allographic (p. 113)2X is an "allographic work of art," distinction. Goodman mentions at least the if and only if X is a work of art and X is not following examples of forgery: Lucretia and "a superlative imitation an "autographic work of art," or "in music . . there is no such thing as a forgery of a of it." (p. 100) This is the strongest sense of known work." (p. 112) Painting and sculp- the term forgery, i.e., the forgery is a copy or a reproduction of a specific work of art and it WILLIAM E. WEBSTER teaches philosophy at tht Phil- purports "to have the history of production requisite for the (or an) original of the work." adelphia College of Art,
NELSON GOODMAN'S
.
Music Is Not a "Notational System" i.e., stylistic imitation. The supposed lost works of various Masters which are discovered in someone's attic are often forgeries in this sense. In such a manner any Master's style could be forged. M2) The publication of the Flute Sonatas by Johann Joachim Quantz under the name of Frederick the Great could be regarded as forgery. Normally a person forges by claiming possession, or knowledge, of a work purported to have been done by an artist when it actually was not; it is a reversal of this situation when an artist gives the credit for the production of a work to another. I t was possibly out of respect and admiration for his patron and flute student that Quantz made this gracious tribute. M3) Is A's completing the unfinished work of B and purveying the work as having been completed by B a stylistic forgery? Surely it is at least that. This sense of "forgery" might lie between the sense used for (PI) and sense (P2) because the work forged is a space-time p a r t i c ~ l a rIf. ~this is true, it weakens the claim that the stronger sense of forgery is limited to (Pl), i.e., the plastic arts (or space-time particulars). If someone unadmittedly finished a CCzanne painting, it would be an instance of forgery in the same manner as it would have been had Deryck Cooke failed to admit the authorship of Mahler's Symphony no. 10. Since Goodman regards music as allographic and painting as autographic, and yet there can be in painting forgeries of exactly the sort described immediately above and there can also be in music that same kind of forgery, it follows either that the possibility of forgery does not distinguish the allographic from the autographic, or (as we have maintained at several earlier points) both terms are equivocal, or the only relevant sense of forgery is (PI), in which a space-time particular can be forged. M4) When Btla Bart6k went into the hills of Hungary, tape recorded folk songs, then published them unchanged under his own name, could he be said to have forged them? This also could be answered affirmatively or negatively: they are forgeries if he is publishing notational inscriptions of the same works the peasants are singing; they are not forgeries if the notational inscription of the published
score and the vocal sound events produced by the natives are different works. Either answer can be justified on Goodman's theory. This kind of forgery is different from the kinds considered heretofore. In this case, one is taking the credit himself for artistic creation of that which rightfully belongs to another. This may be more a case of plagiarism than forgery. M5) A composer's reproducing his own work is much more prevalent in music than in the plastic arts, i.e. (P6). This happens, on the one hand, with the admission of duplication and, on the other hand, deceptively. Bach often used identical works in different contexts or with slight changes in instrumentation, e.g., the Sinfonia for oboe and strings in Cantata no. 156 is precisely the same as the Air on a G String. This is not a case of "quoting." Composers may also publish a "new" edition of a composition, with little or no change, simply for additional royalties. These cases, if called "forgeries," could be forging in an extended sense. Thus, it is false that there are no forgeries of musical compositions. If Goodman's assertion about forgery is true, it is contrary to ordinary usage and based upon stipulation. Granted, he can hold that the only meaning of forgery that is of interest to him is the strongest sense ( P l ) : that there can be no forging of a work of music like a forgery of Lucretia. But, as was said above, this would be evidently true, because the forgery of Lucretia would be a physical object which is purported to be the physical object identical with the genuine Lucretia, whereas there is no physical object identical with any work of music. Perhaps there are deeper considerations: why can there be forgeries of Lucretia and none of the London Symphony? Goodman answers that it is because the latter is expressed in a notational system and, thus, can be said to have constitutive and contingent properties. For Lucretia, no pictorial property which it possesses can justifiably be said to be contingent in it because there is no comparable notational system with respect to which the distinction between constitutive and contingent properties can be made : (cf. p. 1 16) but for the London Symphony, its expression in a notational system is both sufficient and necessary for its identity: nothing is more
WILLIAM E.
the original than a correct copy. (p. 116) The point here is that a score which is not exactly equivalent, notationally, to the score of the London Symphony, cannot be a forgery of it since it is incorrect, and if it is correct it counts as the original. This argument of Goodman's depends upon the assumption that music really is expressed in a notational system as he defines that expression.
WEBSTER
objects which one deserves the pedigree in that all would be genuine.
D. Musical Performance
Goodman's position is that for the autographic arts there is no criterion for distinguishing constitutive properties from contingent properties; for the allographic arts there is. Both music and literature are allographic; and both are notational; it is the C. Duplication notation which provides the distinction beConsidering Goodman's "preferred" defi- tween autographic and allographic arts. His nition of autographic (cf. p. 113) in terms of point and its difficulty become clearer if we "duplication," I would argue against him as iurn to musical performance. follows: if every atom were duplicated in a Goodman claims that some arts are "onework of art, then the duplication would "count stage" (e.g., painting and writing) and others as genuine." Why is this the case? Because the are "two-stage" (e.g., music). He contrasts possibility of perceptible difference (which music to literature, "What the writer prowould be aesthetically relevant) is ruled out duces is ultimate; the text is not merely a by the exclusion of any perceptible difference means to oral readings as a score is a means at all. If this is true, it follows that painting to performances in music." (p. 114) The sug(Goodman's paradigm of the autographic gestion here is that "a score is merely a means arts) either is or could be allographic and that to performance in music." This is false for a this is a contingent matter dependent only score may be ultimate, i.e., read in a similar upon the excellence of one's replicative tech- manner to a work of literature. nology. Goodman treats performances as "instances Goodman attempts to escape the force of of a work," i.e., as comparable to a copy of a this argument by employing a technical work of literature. He says, "There may indefinition of genuine, i.e., "The only way of deed be forgeries of performances. Such forascertaining that the Lucretia before us is geries are performances that purport to be by genuine is thus to establish the historical fact a certain musician, etc.; but these, if in acthat it is the actual object made by Rem- cordance with the score, are nevertheless brandt." (p. 116) This, however, is at the cost genuine instances of the work." (fn. 113) of eliminating the distinction of meaning be- What is of primary interest to Goodman is tween the terms genuine and original. For "whether there can be forgeries of work, Goodman, "to be genuine" seems to be "to not. . . whether there can be forgeries of inhave a correct and authoritative pedigree." stances of works." (Ibid.) If he regards a However, given the conditions of reproduc- musical performance as an "instance of a tion proposed above, were the objects ran- work," analogously to a copy of a novel being domly interchanged, there would be no an "instance of a work," then this notion is physically possible way of determining to incorrect. Copies of novels and poems are which object the pedigree belongs. Thus, it tokens or instances of a work of art. Likewise, would seem to be better to regard any two copies of drama are instances of a work and works of art as genuine that satisfy the condi- co@es of scores are instances of compositional tion that it is physically impossible to deter- works of art in music. These senses seem to be mine to which of them the pedigree belongs. analogous to one another. However, it is false From which it would follow that being "au- that a performance of Hamlet by the Old Vic, or tographic" in sense (Pl) is a contingent the Eroica performed by the Philadelphia orproperty of painting, because it could happen chestra is an instance of these works of art in that there will be cases where it is physically any sense that is analogous to a copy of impossible to determine among competing Portnoy's Complaint, which is an instance of that
Music Is Not a "Notational System" work. The expression "instance of the work" cannot be univocally applied to copies of literature and to performances of drama and music because they are of different logical types. Goodman's unusual use of the term herformance may account for the following strange locution: there are "not performances that are forgeries of the London Symphony." (p. 118) This assertion seems to involve a category mistake: a performance cannot be said to be a forgery of (or denied to be a forgery of) anything except another performance; it could never be a "forgery of a compositional work." Inscriptions may be forgeries of inscriptions; performances, forgeries of performances. We can no more mix the categories of performance and composition, as Goodman does, then we can assert that a painting can be a forgery of a piece of scuplture. 11. MUSIC A S A N O T A T I O N A L SYSTEM
A. Syntactic Requirements for a Notational System In this section I will state those syntactic elements of Goodman's theory of music as a notational system. 1. CHARACTERS IN MUSICAL NOTATION. Goodman asserts, "A necessary condition for a notation, then, is character indzference among the instances of each character. Two marks are character indifferent if each is an inscription (i.e., belongs to some character) and neither one belongs to any character the other does not." (p. 132) And further, "marks correctly judged to be joint members of a character will always be true copies of one another." (p. 134) "The second requirement upon a notational scheme, then, is that the characters b e j n i t e l y dzferentiated, or articulate." ( P 135) 2. VIOLATION OF "DISJOINTNESS". There is an example which occurs in musical literature which violates the condition of disjointness (and character indifferen~e).~ Consider:
A problematic case can be found between
the fourth beat of the first measure and the first beat of the second measure. There is no assurance that these seemingly identical characters are indeed the same. The problem is created by the rule which states that the bar line dissolves all accidentals which have held through the previous measure. Assume for the present that the fourth beat of measure one is D natural. The identity of the following character will be determined bv whether the line above the note, which connects one to the other, is a "slur" or a "tie." There is no way of determining this from the score; the two score markings (tie and slur) are perceptually indistinguishable. If the line is a slur, then the second character will be different from the fourth beat D natural; if the line is a tie, the two inscriptions will be of the same character. Hence, if there are not clear harmonic indications of which alternative to choose, the exact identity of the character may be undecidable. Goodman's condition of character indifference is violated because there is no conclusive way of determining whether the inscription belongs to the character "tie" or the character "slur." I t seems to be the case that Goodman's syntactic requirements may be formulated so that they will hold for musical notation. However, given his syntactic requirements, I will show that his semantic requirements for musical notation do not hold.
B. Semantic Requirements for a Notational System 1. SEMANTIC UNAMBIGUITY. Goodman asserts: "the first semantic requirement upon notational systems is that they be unambiguous"; (p. 148) "a character is ambiguous if any inscription of it is; . . . the character is ambiguous unless all its inscriptions have the same compliance-class." (p. 147) This condition is often violated in musical scores by the