Murder and Politics in Mexico: Political Killings in the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica and its Consequences

STUDIES OF ORGANIZED CRIME Volume 10 Series Editor: Frank Bovenkerk, University of Utrecht, Willem Pompe Institute, The...

Author: Sara Schatz

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STUDIES OF ORGANIZED CRIME Volume 10 Series Editor: Frank Bovenkerk, University of Utrecht, Willem Pompe Institute, The Netherlands

For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/6564

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Sara Schatz

Murder and Politics in Mexico Political Killings in the Partido de la Revolución Democrática and its Consequences

Sara Schatz Department of International Studies Ohio State University 1885 Neil Avenue Columbus, OH 43210-1222 USA [email protected]

ISBN 978-1-4419-8067-0 e-ISBN 978-1-4419-8068-7 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8068-7 Springer New York Dordrecht London Heidelberg Library of Congress Control Number: 2011920810 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgments

Foundations that funded work which informs several of the empirical chapters of this book allowed me to explore this serious and longstanding human rights problem in the context of a developing rule of law. These include the National Science Foundation, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Fellowship for the Study of Political Violence and the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego. I would also like to thank the Instituto de Estudios de la Revolución Democrática and the Fundación Ovando y Gil in Mexico for allowing access to their archives. Special thanks go to Joel Solomon at Human Rights Watch. I am also grateful for the support of several scholars including Todd Eisenstadt, Daniel Wilkinson, David López, Guillermo Zepeda-Lecuona, Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach, as well as Byron Schatz for their helpful suggestions and encouragement in completing this project.

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Contents

1 Introduction................................................................................................

1

Political Killings as a Specific Form of Political Repression...................... The Political Killing of PRD Members in Mexico......................................

2 2

2 Mexico’s Liberalization–Democratization in Context............................

7

The Problem................................................................................................. Overview of the Mexican Political and Legal System................................. Origins..................................................................................................... 1988–2010: A Brief Overview of the Emergence and Electoral Vicissitudes of the PRD............................................................................... The 1977 Electoral Reforms................................................................... The Emergence of the FDN-PRD (1987–1988)...................................... After the 1988 Presidential Election....................................................... Impunity: A Consistent Theme Across Sexenios.................................... Impunity, Crime, and Drug-Related Assassinations............................... End Notes.....................................................................................................

7 10 10 12 12 13 14 16 17 21

3 Theoretical Dimensions of a Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings...................................................................................

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Democratization and Political Repression in Global Perspective................ How Much Violence?.............................................................................. Regime Change Toward Regimes with Deficits in Accountability......... The Mexican Case in Perspective........................................................... A Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings.............................. Democratization and Political Repression.............................................. Democratization, Political Protest, and Political Repression.................. Accountable Legal Institutions and Democratization.................................. Cause or Effect?...................................................................................... Accountability and the Rule of Law.......................................................

23 23 24 25 27 30 31 32 32 33

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Contents

Impunity....................................................................................................... Impunity as a Structured System............................................................ Political Assassination as a Calculated Strategy Embedded in Interparty Relations.................................................................................. Political Party Strategies: PAN, PRD, PRI.............................................. Social Origins and Political Activism..................................................... Puebla........................................................................................................... Social Origins.......................................................................................... Political Activism and PRD Victims in Puebla....................................... Political Assassination in Mexico: A Calculated Strategy...................... End Notes..................................................................................................... 4 Authorizing Political Killing in Mexico: The Importance of a Destructive Social Milieu...................................................................

34 34 35 35 37 37 38 42 43 45 47

Introduction.................................................................................................. 47 The Mexican Dynamic of Political–Electoral Homicide............................. 48 After 1988: A Difficult Time for the PRD.............................................. 48 Methods........................................................................................................ 49 Part I: The Activation of Historical Conditions for Destructive Behavior.............................................................................. 49 The Role of Leadership Authorization.................................................... 49 Selective Political Assassinations........................................................... 51 Engagement in Everyday Social Activities............................................. 54 Rationalization for Political Assassination............................................. 55 Authorization for Destruction Through Independent Social Mechanisms................................................................................. 57 Part II: Political Assassination: Victims and Perpetrators in Cross-sectional Analysis.......................................................................... 60 Political Assassinations as Deliberate Targeting..................................... 61 Cover-up/Authorization for Assassination.............................................. 62 Who Kills? Who Gains from These Murders?........................................ 65 Killings by Known PRI Members and Hired Guns Generally Linked to a PRI Leader(s)............................................................................ 65 PRI Members.......................................................................................... 65 Hired Guns.............................................................................................. 66 Killing Federal, State, and Local PRD Politicians.................................. 67 The Political Murder of Perredistas by “Unknowns”............................. 68 The Killings by Police............................................................................. 69 Are There Alternative Explanations for These Murders?....................... 72 Accidents or Revenge Homicides?......................................................... 72 Police Inefficiency?................................................................................. 73 Conclusion................................................................................................... 74 End Notes..................................................................................................... 109

Contents

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5 Disarming the Legal System: Impunity for the Political Murder of Dissidents in Mexico................................................................ 115 Introduction.................................................................................................. Political Killings in the Mexican Context.................................................... The Problem of Political Assassination.................................................. Crime Without Punishment..................................................................... The CNDH Case Reports: A Detailed Analysis.......................................... A Failure to Apprehend Suspects and to Adequately Investigate Crime......................................................................................... The Failure to Apprehend Convicted State Officials, Policemen, and “Hired Guns”...................................................................... The Failure to Apprehend Suspected and Convicted Criminals.................. The Failure to Adequately Investigate Crimes............................................. Impunity for High-Impact Crime................................................................. Perpetrators and the Paradox of Lawlessness......................................... End Notes.....................................................................................................

115 116 116 117 118 122 123 125 130 134 137 141

6 Impunity and Electoral Challenges from Below: The Killing Fields of Guerrero................................................................. 143 Introduction.................................................................................................. Regional Variations in the Patterning of the Political Killing of PRD Members Across Mexican States.................................................... A Broader Pattern of Social Conflict Between Authoritarian Incumbents and the Opposition............................................................... Violence in Guerrero: Postelectoral Violence and Political Assassination (1990–1994).......................................................................... Contested Municipal Elections, Elite Impunity and Political Killings (1988–1990).............................................................................. Continuing Political Violence and Political Repression (1991–1994)............................................................................................ Petatlán.................................................................................................... Michoacán and Guerrero Compared....................................................... Violence in Guerrero (1994–1997): The Intersection of Political–Electoral Conflicts with Violence Caused by Paramilitary Forces, White Guards, and Military Forces....................... Radicalization of Peasant Perredistas: The PRD and the 1995 Aguas Blancas Massacre (Costa Grande).......................... 1996–1997: A New Administration, More Politically Related Deaths (Various Regions).......................................................... State Violence and Mobilized Indigenous Peoples (1996–1997) (Costa Chica)..................................................................... After the EPR’s Appearance: More Perpetrators, Similar Political Murders (1997–1998) (Costa Grande)......................................

143 144 146 148 148 151 153 156 157 157 159 160 161

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Violence in Guerrero After 2000: Ayutla Municipality (Costa Chica and Beyond)........................................................................... The Multiple Dimensions of Impunity for Political Murder in Guerrero................................................................................................... The Failure of Prosecution...................................................................... How Criminal Elements Exploit Resource Deficits Within Criminal Justice System to Ensure Impunity for Political Assassination....................................................................... Conclusion................................................................................................... End Notes.....................................................................................................

165 169 170 171 173 174

7 Impunity for Political Killing in a Comparative Perspective................. 177 Introduction.................................................................................................. Political Competition and Degree of Electoral Threat in Mexican Municipalities.............................................................................................. The PRD’s Challenge to Rural and Urban Cacique Rule....................... Why Did Killings Occur in Some Municipalities But Not Others?...................................................................................... Description of Municipal Data and Statistical Model............................. Increased Electoral Competition as a Significant Risk Factor for Political Assassination............................................................ Impunity from Prosecution: Stable over Time............................................. A Comparative Pattern of Impunity........................................................ Impunity as an Intermediary Dimension................................................. Practices that Diminish the Likelihood of Political Killings During Liberalization–Democratization Processes...................................... The Extension of Political and Civil Rights: A Distinctive Time-Line..................................................................................................... Coda: Remembering and Forgetting the Dead............................................. Conclusion................................................................................................... End Notes.....................................................................................................

177 178 178 179 179 180 182 184 188 190 192 194 197 197

8 Conclusions................................................................................................. 201 Why Does Impunity Persist Despite a Transition to Electoral Democracy?.................................................................................. 203 Nonviolent Political Change and “Hard” Legal Systems............................ 205 End Notes..................................................................................................... 207 Appendix: Political Murders of PRD Members, 1994.................................. 209 Chiapas......................................................................................................... Guerrero....................................................................................................... Jalisco........................................................................................................... Michoacán....................................................................................................

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Contents

Morelos........................................................................................................ Nuevo Leon.................................................................................................. Oaxaca.......................................................................................................... Sinaloa.......................................................................................................... Veracruz....................................................................................................... Zacatecas...................................................................................................... A Few Revenge PRD Killings of PRI Members After 2000 (Chiapas).................................................................................... End Notes.....................................................................................................

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215 215 215 219 219 220 220 222

Bibliography..................................................................................................... 223 Name Index....................................................................................................... 239 Subject Index.................................................................................................... 243

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Comparative municipal size of opposition won municipalities, Puebla, 1989.............................................................

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Fig. 5.1 Standard criminal trial procedure...................................................... 120 Fig. 6.1 A scatter-plot of homicides and electoral support for opposition parties across Mexican states, 1988–1997................. 146 Fig. 6.2 State of Guerrero: municipalities and economic regions.................. 155

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List of Tables

Table 3.1

Social origins of PRD victims of political murder in Puebla.......................................................................................

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Table 4.1a An analysis of 250 PRD victims of political murder, 1988–1994....................................................................... Table 4.1b Justice – failure of federal/state officials to bring justice.............

80 96

Table 5.1

Summary of CNDH’s findings on PRD homicides...................... 120

Table 6.1

Regional location of PRD deaths before and after appearance of EPR (June 28, 1996)............................................. 162

Table 7.1

Comparing Mexican municipalities with PRD deaths with municipalities without deaths, 1989–2000................ 181

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Political violence occurs across all spectrums of nations, in all periods of history. Nevertheless, it is very important in transitions to electoral democracy because it can impair the full achievement of the consolidation of a multiparty system (Fein 1995; Gurr 1986; Muller 1985). In this regard, it is significant when the level of violence is extreme, when political killings are involved and these political killings are systematic and pervasive. This could indicate a real fracture or a problem on the road to democracy (Davenport 1998). In this respect, the case of Mexico is of significant interest because we have two elements. First, and on the one hand, the Mexican case represents a struggle to achieve full electoral democracy. And, on the other, it is characterized by targeted, systematic extreme violence, namely killings of the opposition party. This book analyzes several dimensions regarding impunity and political crime, more specifically, the political killings of Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) members in the post-1988 period in Mexico. The case of PRD homicides has not been studied so far in a comprehensive manner. Warner’s (CHR 1994) treatment of the subject is a single important monograph written by a PRD human-rights leader. Scholarly books, although providing excellent analyses of the organizational problems of origin and consolidation of the PRD, do not systematically study the origins and patterns of PRD-targeted homicides. Bruhn (1993) and Garrido (1993) trace the history of the elite currents and intraparty dynamics that gave rise to the PRD as a political party. Eyewitness and/or participants to the political–electoral violence of the 1990s well describe and detail the numerous violent episodes the PRD suffered at its inception but do not theorize the causes of this violence (Rojas Alba 1996; Ronquillo 1996). The deaths of so many PRD activists over the past decades also points to a more serious problem of continuing human rights abuses in Mexico. Even after the historic victory of opposition candidate Vicente Fox in 2000, human-rights groups still listed political repression as one of the country’s principal obstacles and documented 205 cases during 2001 in which political rights were violated. One report claimed that “repressive force is used by authorities to end social conflicts and is tolerated in all government branches (The News 2001).” By the end of the decade, both the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch and the US Department

S. Schatz, Murder and Politics in Mexico, Studies of Organized Crime 10, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8068-7_1, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

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1 Introduction

of State asserted that there were still serious problems of human rights abuses in the nation, including illegal assassinations carried out by members of the state security forces, kidnapping, physical violence, arbitrary arrests, and other abuses due to persistent problems of impunity and corruption (Proceso 3/11/08). By, 2010, impunity and the high incidence of another type of murder (drug-trade related assassinations) characterize the Mexican dynamic (TBI/Reforma 2009). The ideas for this book began to come together in response to the fact that the murder of PRD members continued after 2000, albeit at a reduced rate. Nine indigenous PRD members were assassinated in Ayutla, Guerrero after participating in protest rallies demanding the retreat of the army from their communities in 2001 (Reforma 11/6/01). The Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) confirmed that ecological activist and PRD member Omar Guerrero Solís was so severely beaten and tortured by members of the Guerrero state judicial police in 2002 that he suffered brain damage from near asphyxiation (La Jornada 9/24/02).

Political Killings as a Specific Form of Political Repression A road map to this book necessarily begins with the empirical fact that over 662 PRD members have died in politically related violence in Mexico since 1988. Typically, political killings have not been studied in-depth as a form of political repression alone. Instead, they are usually aggregated in the literature on human rights into a single empirical scale which also includes torture and the use of imprisonment (De Mesquita, Downs, Smith & Cherif 2005). Recently, some scholars have begun to argue that, in fact, political killings represent a very specific form of political repression which differs in type from torture and illegal imprisonment and carries different international and domestic costs for a government (McCromick and Mitchell 1997). A government’s decision, for example, to use killings over imprisonment carries the likelihood of higher external costs, and governments implicitly recognize this when they opt, for example, for “disappearing victims rather than killing them” (McCromick and Mitchell 1997:511). McCromick and Mitchell (1997) recommend that future studies which seek to understand why governments select one type of human rights abuse over another should disaggregate both “torture” and “killing” as two separate single dimensions for the dependent variable.

The Political Killing of PRD Members in Mexico In this spirit, this book is aimed at the analysis of political killings alone as a specific form of political repression. Its chapters are organized analytically into different themes and the appendix orders cases chronologically by state. This dual organization allows, on the one hand, for an in-depth exploration of distinctive variables that explain the political killings of PRD members. These include an examination of the

The Political Killing of PRD Members in Mexico

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role of leadership authorization in triggering a wave of political killings against the PRD, the role of the criminal justice system in perpetuating a state-sanctioned system of impunity for such political killings, and a regional study of how a series of violent interactions between political parties (the PRI [the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party] and the PRD) created an incentive for extrajudicial violence to continue despite national improvements in the electoral rule of law. At the same time, I also present in the appendix a robust chronological narrative of the individual political killings by states after 1994. This affords the reader interested in the individual case studies, the opportunity to learn more about the detailed historical narratives of the individual political killings of PRD members that occurred across time and across states in Mexico near the end of the Salinas sexenio (1988–1994) and beyond. Thus, the organization and presentation of the research findings is both analytic and chronological in form. The chapter outline of Part I of the book – Analytic Considerations – is as follows: In Chap. 2, I provide an overview of the Mexican political and legal system which includes a brief history of the advancement of electoral democracy alongside the persistence of impunity for murder within the criminal justice system. The difficult birth of the PRD occurred within this historical context. In Chap. 3, I discuss the Mexican case of the political killing of perredistas within the global context of liberalization–democratization, arguing that Mexico is not a sui-generis case of a particularly violent transition one but rather a more representative one where conflicts in the process of democratization can also result in significant political killings. I also explain the overall argument proposed in this book, which is that impunity for political killings is a structured system requiring one central precondition; namely the failure of the legal system to function as a system of restraint for killings. I clarify how this structured system of impunity for political killing consisted of political and institutional elements (law enforcement agencies, lawyers, public prosecutors, politicians). I also situate this argument within the context of the literature on democratization and political repression. In Chap. 4, I describe the specific constellation of historical conditions that came together to unleash a wave of political killings against the PRD after 1988. Frequently, when a state feels threatened, it has an incentive to supplant extralegal for legal controls (Turk 1982:116). However, political authorities do not necessarily employ extralegal control unless additional conditions are met because the overt violation of the rule of law by a state is harmful to domestic and international perceptions of its legitimacy (Campbell 2000). In addition, prior to the outbreak of political violence, there often develops a set of beliefs on the part of those who commit the violence that the other side is dangerous or bent on destruction and therefore can justifiably be destroyed (Baumeister 1997; Foucault 1995; Smelser 1998). While both of these precipitating conditions (real or perceived threats by the authorities and the development of a set of destructive beliefs) can bring people to the threshold of destructive behavior, alone they do not necessarily lead to deadly violence. Instead, as I argue in this chapter, an additional factor is required. Specifically, I argue that the leadership authorization of destructive behavior is a

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critical activating condition. It creates a permissive social milieu that allows for the utilization of political killings as a particular mode of social control against political dissenters during liberalization–democratization processes. Chapter 5 addresses the role of the criminal justice system in contributing to a state of impunity for political killings. Scholars of the rule and un(rule) of law have explained impunity in relationship to a series of “gaps” in the effectiveness of the rule of law with respect to various social categories. These can include flaws in the existing law, in the application of law (the politically connected are exempt from following the law), in the relations between bureaucracies and ordinary citizens (in access to the judiciary and to fair process), and in sheer lawlessness (a failure in the reach of the law, especially in rural areas) (O’Donnell 1999:311–313). Through an empirical case study of the political killings of the PRD members, using documents from the Mexican National Human Rights Commission, I argue in Chap. 5 that a state can also show acquiescence to political killings through the impunity that it provides the murderers. The empirical analysis shows that local and regional legal systems operated relatively systematically to perpetuate such a system of impunity. Impunity was manifest as a failure of the judicial system itself (adequately investigating crimes) and as a failure by the police and law enforcement (failing to serve arrest warrants after the crimes were investigated and suspects identified). This analysis suggests then that impunity for political killings is a particular type of “gap” in the implementation of the rule of law, in which there is a disarming of the legal coercive powers of the existing state to properly prosecute and punish murderers. Once a violent interaction begins between the government and the opposition, it can trigger the possibility of feedback loops, as is characteristic of “tit-for-tat” killings found in civil strife in Northern Ireland, Chad, and elsewhere (Sullivan 1998). The repeated localization of political violence can lead to further repetition over historical periods, as captured by the phrase “sustained violence sustains violence” (Poole 2001:10). At the same time, interactions associated with domestic unrest are complex and operate a series of nonlinear relationships over time (Lichbach 1987). In Chap. 6, I analyze the history of PRD–PRI relations after the 1988 Mexican presidential election, which in many states was one in which conflicts over local elections radicalized, with political violence and political repression erupting in a series of opposition–government interactions and involving political assassination (largely) against the PRD. I identify how a pattern of impunity developed after 1988 from these violent interactions between the political parties and was sustained in the Mexican state of Guerrero across three presidential sexenios (1988–1994, 1994–2000, 2000– 2006). In contrast, in states such as Michoacán, the political killings of PRD members and postelectoral violence fell precipitously by 1994. I argue that this pattern of impunity in Guerrero consisted of several dimensions – the direct employment of official violence against organized perredista peasants, the general failure of state or national authorities to bring justice when local authorities fail – a reality aggravated by lack of domestic and international press coverage of the murder of PRD members – and the partial penetration of the criminal justice system by criminals to thwart prosecution in some cases. This pattern of impunity created an

The Political Killing of PRD Members in Mexico

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incentive for extrajudicial violence to continue in Guerrero despite parallel national advances in electoral competition and improvements in the rule of law. One comparative implication that emerges from the analysis of the Mexican case is that impunity could be the missing link explaining why some countries have more violent liberalization–democratization processes than others. In Chap. 7, I examine the relationship between electoral competition in the 1990s and the (un) rule of law for political killings in Mexico and other democratizing nations in Central Asia and Africa. In this chapter, I identify a comparative pattern of impunity in violent global transitions to electoral democracy that includes: the unlawful use of the police to violate political rights through the suppression of peaceful protest, the political assassination of unarmed domestic opponents, the use of statesanctioned armed thugs to harass and/or assassinate political opponents of the regime, and an intensification of violent acts between legalized political parties. This comparative discussion suggests that, if certain institutional conditions remain in place within the state, political killings and impunity for such crimes is likely to continue despite varying degrees of electoral turn-over. One of these conditions is the continued discretion of political authorities to employ crime-preventing agencies to subvert or simply not implement the law. Conversely, I also identify which elements of accountability and participation coincide with nonviolent liberalization–democratization processes. These include the relative insulation of the state security forces from political manipulation and the political and criminal justice systems from penetration by criminal elements, as well as the creation of nonpartisan institutions for nonviolent conflict resolution. Political assassinations are calculated strategies of action aimed at eliminating political rivals caused by multiple, interacting factors that involve the political, legal, and criminal justice systems. As a form of interpersonal violence, political assassination involves direct or implied authorization from political leaders, the availability of assassins for hire and the willingness of some political leaders to utilize them against political opponents, and violent interactions between political parties combined with judicial system ineffectiveness. Judicial system ineffectiveness – a “soft” legal system – does not directly cause political assassination but it facilitates it and explains the persistence of impunity for political murder over time. Impunity is perpetuated for political killings during liberalization–democratization by a structured system consisting of a concatenation of political, judicial, and lawenforcement elements which combine to create a legal system which fails to function as a system of restraint for political murder. These elements include the failure of the judicial system to inadequately investigate assassination, the failure of law enforcement to serve arrest warrants in cases where the judicial system successfully investigates and identifies suspects of political murder, the ability of criminal elements to thwart prosecution and the failure of the political system to avoid the practice of contracting “hired” guns to eliminate political opponents. The appendix of this book in Part II provides the reader interested in details of individual political killings of PRD members not already discussed in previous chapters, a chronology of narratives of such crimes organized by state and by date after 1994.

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Chapter 2

Mexico’s Liberalization–Democratization in Context

The Problem This book studies the causes of political killings in Mexico’s liberalization– democratization1 during the post-1988 period within the larger context of political repression. Mexico’s democratization process has entailed a little known but highly significant cost of human lives in pre- and postelection violence: over 662 PRD members fell as victims of political killings in the post-1988 period (PRD – Partido de la Revolución Democrática–Commission on Human Rights 1994 – [herewith CHR 1994]; Global Exchange 2000; Tierra Noticias 10/27/01; Ofrenda en Memoria 2009).2 Many of these politically related homicides occurred while a party member was engaged in a legal activity such as organizing a political meeting, attending an electoral fraud protest, guarding the security offices of a political party, or conducting “get out the vote” preelection campaign propaganda (CHR 1994). Other homicides took place when a party militant was engaged in extralegal activities. These could include peasant-based land invasions, the possession of municipal offices, and the destruction of municipal property that occurred in the context of disputed election outcomes. The striking aspect of Mexico’s high level of political killings is that it was precisely a type of violence that is generally associated with a nonviolent, legal process, that is to say, with voting, the exercise of political rights of peaceful association and with alternation in power. This raises the interesting question as to why the act of voting and the transfer of power caused such a high fatality rate in Mexico, where semicompetitive turned competitive elections were permitted since 1939. It also raises a counter factual theoretical proposition – Why did one of the world’s most successful co-optive authoritarian regimes in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s (Cornelius et al. 1989:1) need to resort to the homicide of many members of its weakest political opponent in the 1990s? Furthermore, why did such political killing continue after the historical 2000 presidential election? This was an election that a majority of the public believed to have represented the attainment of fair electoral institutions (Domínguez and Lawson 2004; Eisenstadt 2004). Indeed, the number of political-electoral killings in Mexico’s liberalization– democratization in the post-1988 period was surpassed only in Latin America in the


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late twentieth century by the death tolls resulting from the civil wars in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador) and by the deaths from state-terrorism in Argentina and Chile during the period of the “dirty wars” (10,000 deaths estimated during the 1976–1983 period for Argentina and 4,000 deaths for Chile during the 1973–1977 period) (King 1989; Loveman 1999). Even in Uruguay, during the phase of the harshest military repression (1973–1984), the total number of deaths from state-led violence was estimated at 36 (King 1989). Ultimately, the problem of the political killing of PRD members was linked to the failure of the broader project of democratic accountability and to a thoroughgoing respect for law in democratization processes (Warner in CHR 1994:26). Previous research on Mexico’s democratization began to link the literature on the rise of the rule of law with the literature on democratization (Schatz 1998, 2000; Eisenstadt 2000, 2002, 2004; Aguilar and Trejo 2000; O’Donnell 1999; Stokes et al. 1998; Schedler 1999). Scholars of Mexico have more recently begun to study how state institutions transition from authoritarian impunity toward democratic accountability (Fox 2007). The study of the causes of the political killing of PRD members in Mexico’s liberalization–democratization raises the following paradox: On the one hand, the best way to lessen political-electoral violence is through the creation of a democratic state because democratic states are much less likely than authoritarian states to commit violence against their populations. In 1990, for example, authoritarian states committed approximately 35–50% more summary executions, disappearances, massacres, and torture than democratic states (Sorenson 1993:88). On the other hand, the act of creating a multiparty democratic system can also trigger greater short-term political violence as dominant political parties resist electoral challenges to their previously hegemonic authority. Liberalization–democratization and the attempt to consolidate electoral democracy in Latin America have also been accompanied by a significant rise of common crime and, in Mexico in the post2006 period, in organized crime-related homicides. This book explores the social, political, and legal dynamics of the paradox of democratization and the political killings of perredistas in post-1988 period. One case illustrates the complex relationship between political killing, liberalization– democratization processes, and a criminal justice system that often perpetuates impunity for such crimes. Sebastian Pérez Nuñez had previously been a peasant leader of Mexico’s ex-dominant party-state, the PRI [the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party] (CHR 1994:35). After switching political parties and becoming a member of the opposition left political party (the PRD) in the late 1980s and a leader of an independent peasant organization, he was jailed for participating in agrarian struggles. Although he was offered liberty to rejoin the PRI, Mr. Nuñez refused to do so and began to receive death threats. He was gunned down in a cold-blooded murder in front of his wife and two eyewitnesses at a gas station by a regional power broker (a cacique) in 1988. Although this regional power broker (an in-law of the governor) eventually turned himself in to the authorities and was condemned to a 30-year prison sentence, he was in jail for only 11 months and was then allowed liberty on the grounds of “insufficient proof ” (CHR 1994:35).

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Two other typical examples of PRD members who fell in political killings include, first, Carlos Ávila Luna. Ávila Luna died as the result of a beating he received from a member of the local PRI in a postelectoral fight over election results on July 21, 1989 in a small municipality in the Northern state of Durango. The fight broke out when Ávila Luna and other PRD members contested the PRI vote count at the municipal government office. Although some eyewitnesses did identify the men who beat Ávila Luna, no arrests, investigation, or prosecution of the crime was conducted (CHR 1994:71). In a second example, after very conflictive local elections, PRD members Valdemar Ambriz Nava and Nemisio Álvarez in Turicato, Michoacán died the day (March 1, 1993) that the new PRD mayor-elect was to take office (CHR 1994:182). Valdemar Ambriz Nava was shot in cold blood during a celebration breakfast for the incoming mayor as he opened the door after the assassins knocked on it. Nemesio Álvarez was shot by the same men later that day in the town square during the swearing-in ceremony. Both men were shot by hired guns of local cacique Adolfo Villaseñor. The local judicial police failed to apprehend the men, and the Special Prosecutor in charge of the case and the Mexican National Human Right Commission denounced such impunity in this case (CHR 1994:184). These examples illustrate not only how the rise of the PRD in 1987–1989 advanced electoral democracy in the form of increasing multiparty competition but also how impunity for political murder within the criminal justice system continued. Since 1989, the PRD has proceeded to compete in elections in Mexico despite the political killings and repression against its members as well as its own serious and continuing internal organizational consolidation problems (Bruhn 1997, 2008; El Universal 12/7/09). Yet, the majority of the political murders of PRD members remained unsolved in 2009 (CHR 1994, Appendix; CNDH 1994; Ofrenda en Memoria 2009), that is to say, in a state of impunity. To understand the roots of impunity for political murder in authoritarian institutions, this chapter now provides a brief historical overview of the origins of the Mexican political and legal systems, which for most of the twentieth century, were characterized by PRI dominance. Next, this chapter examines the electoral reforms (1977, 1996) and political events that gave rise to the emergence of the PRD in the 1988 presidential election, an election that represents an exception to PRI control within the larger 1929 to mid-1990s period. I also discuss the relative electoral fortunes of the PRD after 1988 in the context of the advancement of electoral democracy throughout the Zedillo (1994–2000) and Fox (2000–2006) sexenios. Beyond the political killings of perredistas, political assassinations, drugtrafficking-related deaths, and the need for a stronger rule of law are central themes that have continued into the early twenty-first century in Mexico. Thus, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the inherent institutional limitations including lack of resources and corruption within Mexico’s criminal justice system (Zepeda Lecuona 2002, 2010), which continue to give rise to impunity for the political murder of perredistas and to constrain the Calderón government’s (2006–2012) efforts to prosecute drug-trafficking-related homicides.

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Overview of the Mexican Political and Legal System Origins During 1519–1521, Mexico was conquered by Spain and remained a Spanish colony for nearly 300 years. Before the Spanish arrived, highly advanced cultures including those of the Olmecs, Mayas, Toltecs, and Aztecs ruled what is today Mexico and parts of Guatemala for more than a 1,000 years. During that time, a complex oral legal tradition emerged in Mexico whereby traditional authority (Aztec and Mayan authority in the south) resolved conflicts. After the Spanish conquest, Spanish law governed disputes exclusively in private law, commerce, property, family inheritance, and obligations among those of European ancestry in colonial Mexico. Nevertheless, the Spanish Crown also kept the customary indigenous law and legal institutions that did not go against established Spanish customs or church doctrine, under the concept of usos y costumbres (uses and customs). The movement toward Mexican independence started in 1810, when a war for independence was launched. Mexico achieved independence in 1821 and adopted its first constitution in 1824. The 1824 Constitution provided for a federal republic consisting of nineteen states, four territories, and a federal district. Mexico is therefore a federal system. Internal armed conflict ensued between the conservative and liberal elements of the newly independent Mexican state, and the 1824 Constitution was not implemented. In 1857, a new constitution was adopted by the liberal element that had ascended to power. The Mexican political system has since been a liberal constitutional regime based on such democratic rights as the separation of powers, the equality of all citizens before the law, the principle of innocence until proven guilty, freedom of political and other expressions and of the press, the protection of private property, the abolition of special privileges for the clergy and the military, and agrarian reform. The year 1857 also consolidated judicial review around the amparo (habeas corpus) suit, a limited but nonetheless initially effective form of individual rights protection. At the same time, however, the independence of the judiciary in practice remained limited in the area of electoral law. The principal of judicial abstention from electoral and political matters by the Mexican Supreme Court was well consolidated by the turn of the century and remained that way until judicial reforms in 1994. The use of deadly political violence as a means for conflict resolution violates all basic individual rights guaranteed under all of Mexico’s constitutions. Mexico’s severe social and economic problems erupted in a revolution that lasted from 1910 to 1920 and gave rise to the 1917 Constitution. The 1910 Revolution toppled the long-standing dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz (1877–1911). It is estimated that by 1910 almost 97% of the arable land in Mexico was in the hands of no more than one thousand families, while 2% belonged to small land holdings and 1% belonged to municipalities. In 1917, a constitution that replaced the 1857 Constitution (Hernández and Portes 1985) was promulgated with the intent of creating a liberal-democratic system

Overview of the Mexican Political and Legal System

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in Mexico. Nevertheless, the chaos of the revolution (diverse regional leaders competing for power, political assassination, economic crises) did not provide the social conditions for the consolidation of a democratic regime. The party that governed Mexico for most of the twentieth century originated from the National Revolutionary Party, founded in 1929 by President Plutarco Elías Calles in an effort to forge “a revolutionary family out of the disparate political and military elements that emerged victorious from the 1910–1917 conflict” (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2010:152). By 1937, the ruling party was reorganized by President Lázaro Cárdenas as a corporatist entity to include peasants, urban laborers, and middle-class professionals, promoting a nationalist agenda, and again in 1946 it was transformed into a civilian party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party. In 1939, a rightist political party called the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) was created by those who objected to the nationalization of the private property of the church, to the government’s expropriation of the holdings of foreign oil companies, and to its nationalization of such basic industries as fertilizers, telephones, electricity, airlines, steel, and copper. Thereafter, the Mexican political system was characterized by semicompetitive elections of the PRI with weak political opposition parties as an alternative to strict one-party hegemonic rule, which generally (with some exceptions) never won more than 10–15% of the vote share. The PRI won every presidential race until the July 2000 elections and most gubernatorial and mayoral races until the mid-1990s. Often, fraud and other extralegal tactics guaranteed large PRI electoral majorities. Between 1920 and the late 1980s, then the mid-1990s, Mexican presidents had enormous powers based on unwritten laws, including the ability to choose their own political successor, to act as a constituent power with the authority to make amendments to the constitution, and to act as a chief legislator, inasmuch as historically senators and legislators did not legislate. A Mexican president could also establish himself as the ultimate authority in electoral matters (since electoral material did not fall under the aegis of judicial review) and designate state governors, members of the PRI majorities in Congress, and most state representatives and mayor. He could also remove governors, mayors, and legislators at the federal and state levels, impose his viewpoint on one or both houses of Congresses, assume jurisdiction in judicial matters, impose his authority over state governors, and hold sway over municipal government (Weldon 2003). The executive branch also absorbed those segments of the administration of justice linked to criminal proceedings. Mexico’s authoritarianism also had some particular historical features of clientelism; specifically, Mexican presidentialism rested on the personalist logic of informal political groups (camarillas) which cut across institutional, ideological, social, and sectoral barriers (Pansters 1999:251) with the President at the apex of this network of informal relationships; many of which were hidden from the public eye. The presidential clique was the traditional group that chose the leaders of a wide range of subordinated camarrillas including party leaders, union leaders, local leaders, intellectuals, etc. The system of informal, personalistic executive power at the national level also had regional and local counterparts in the form of the “cacique” or strongman leader (De la Peña 1981). The cacique has functioned


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as a critical linchpin in the corporate system of Mexican authoritarianism. The informal, often arbitrary, rule of the cacique mediates and links the masses (rural peasants, the urban poor) to the state. As the central local powerholder with access to higher regional power brokers, the cacique acts as a broker through which ordinary people gain access to state resources. Some caciques also seek to monopolize and defend their positions, sometimes through the use of violence. Pansters (1999:254) notes: Studying the electoral process, Guillén López has observed that processes of corporate and caciquista mediation and negotiation pertain to a political culture that recognizes the existence of a separate established power with which people negotiate. Liberal political culture, in contrast, presupposes a direct political relationship between the citizenry and the state. Power is then not an established, external entity, but one that is determined and directed by the people through elections.

Elections then were then a critical mechanism by which caciques attempted to obtain, consolidate, and retain their rule. Within this authoritarian political culture (imposed upon a formally liberal constitutional system), the historical presidential authority to designate critical positions in these bodies (judges, parliamentary committee leaders, parliamentary leaders) meant that personal loyalty to the leader of a camarrilla or to the president himself rather than to impersonal bureaucratic performance was at the center of these posts. A competent administrator, judge, or parliamentarian under these circumstances was one who complied with personal loyalty, carrying out tasks given to him or her by his or her superiors with efficiency and without causing problems for them, even if it meant bending or ignoring the law (Pansters 1999:253). The occasional or even frequent disregard for the law can translate into the failure to punish crimes committed by local caciques, paid assassins, and/or contract killers when such action might adversely harm or disrupt the traditional social and political control of PRI local leaders. One result can be a state of impunity with respect to crimes against opposition leaders, as in the case of those PRD members studied in this book.

1988–2010: A Brief Overview of the Emergence and Electoral Vicissitudes of the PRD The 1977 Electoral Reforms The 1988 presidential election presented a brief exception of PRI control within the larger 1929 to mid-1990s period and frames the historical backdrop to this book, since the PRI temporarily lost its two thirds majority control in the Chamber of Deputies and therefore could no longer make constitutional reforms without a coalition partner, i.e., the PAN. A series of political pacts and electoral reforms took place in 1977, 1989, and 1996, resulting in the loss of PRI control from the federal administration of elections.

A Brief Overview of the Emergence and Electoral Vicissitudes

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The first, the 1977 electoral reforms, in response to democratizing pressures first crystallized in the 1968 student protests, which ended in the massacre of hundreds of students by police and military forces (Poniatowska 1971), maintained the PRI’s dominant position in the electoral system. Nevertheless, the 1977 reforms did result in a more open political environment and the more active electoral participation of opposition political parties, which had emerged on the left, including the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM 1972), Socialist Workers’ Party (PST 1972), Communist Left Group (UIC 1973), Movement for Socialist Action and Unity (MAUS 1973), Mexican Workers’ Party (PMT 1974), Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR 1975) and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT 1976), and the older Mexican Communist Party (PCM 1919) (Middlebrook 1981:59). One result of the additional party competition was the significant decline in the PRI’s share of the total vote in the 1979 elections (from 93.6% in 1976 to 74.0% in 1979), probably eliminating the “very large–and probably fraudulent–majorities that the PRI had traditionally won in a number of electoral districts (Middlebrook 1981:63).”

The Emergence of the FDN-PRD (1987–1988) By 1987, high inflation, a controversial privatization program, and austerity measures caused the ruling party to lose ground under the Presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988), leading up to the controversial 1988 presidential election. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, a clearly “technocratic” candidate, was nominated for the presidency by the PRI in 1987, but this disgruntled a number of prominent PRI statist politicians who claimed that the selection of Salinas de Gortari was “nothing but a disguised reelection which will perpetuate the rule by a counter-revolutionary clique...controlled by international financial interests” (Muñoz Ledo, quoted in Centeno 1994:2–13). These statist politicians were then expelled from the PRI after forming an independent current (the Democratic Current) within the party, which included high ranking, left-wing PRI politicians (Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, ex-PRI governor of the state of Michoacán, and Porfirio Muñoz-Ledo, ex-PRI party president). They went on to challenge the PRI in the highly contested 1988 presidential election by fielding a populist Leftist Front, which represented the convergence of different ideological strands on the Left into the FDN (Frente Democrático Nacional), including the smaller-left wing parties (PCM, PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico], PMS [Mexican Socialist Party], and PMT) (Bruhn 2008:214). The emergence of a populist leftist front in the 1988 preelectoral context threatened the PRI’s monopoly claim to a revolutionary heritage and brought it into direct electoral conflict with party in the 1988 presidential election. The FDN essentially drew on anti-PRI protest voters and where Cárdenas won in an electoral district, the PRI lost (Bruhn 1997:133; Domínguez and McCann 1995:41). When early electoral returns showed Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas leading in the race for the presidency (Barberán et al. 1988), the ruling party immediately shut down the computerized vote tabulation system at the Federal Electoral Institute in Mexico City

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on election day. This “computer crash” delayed the vote count for 5 days and ultimately produced an electoral victory for Salinas (50.3–31.06% for Cárdenas) that was highly contested by the FDN, which claimed widespread fraud. In mid-July 1988, the FDN engaged in a series of large-scale postelectoral protest rallies. Nevertheless, the FDN also won 139 congressional seats in the 1988 presidential election and, once the PRI majority in the new Congress ratified Salinas de Gortari as president by September, the transition to multiparty democracy had stalled. As Bruhn (1997:147) argues: The price of congressional seats [for the FDN parties] was implicit recognition of the electoral results. Once the FDN parties ratified the congressional election, they compromised their ability to claim that the PRI had not won the presidential election, both morally and practically. The FDN parties took what they could, but accepted that the PRI had won 52% of the congressional vote, giving the PRI majority control over the institution – the congress – with sole power to ratify the presidential election according to Mexican law. To some extent this outcome was implicit in the decision to participate in the legal process. Even the attempt to fight fraud through existing procedures put the FDN in an institutional environment that the PRI controlled: the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) and the Court of Electoral Disputes.

Party leaders went on to formally incorporate as a political party (the PRD) the following year (May 5, 1989 in Mexico City) with Cárdenas as the leader. It is the period after the 1988 presidential election, which was one of the acute conflicts between PRD militants and PRI caciques (local power brokers) and other PRI party members that forms the historical backdrop to this book.

After the 1988 Presidential Election Subsequently, during the period of liberalization–democratization (1988–2005) in which the majority of the political killings of PRD members occurred, the party’s electoral fortunes waxed and waned. Initially, at the national level, the PRD’s strength declined immediately after the 1988 presidential election, and by 1991, the party only won 8% of the vote share in the midterm elections (Shirk and EdmondsPoli 2010:163). The PRD’s initial decline at the federal level after 1988 can be explained by the external environment of repression and political assassination employed by certain priístas and others, as discussed in subsequent chapters of this book, as well as by the use of PRI control over the media to portray the PRD as a radical party likely to use violence (Bruhn 1997:280; Gledhill 1995:49). Other important factors also explain the PRD’s electoral decline in the early 1990s including the following: (1) the heterogeneity of the FDN’s initial goals and ideas, which often led to intraparty conflicts over candidate selection and (2) lack of institutionalized internal rules and procedures, which led to an overreliance on party leader Cárdenas as the ultimate arbiter and rule enforcer for the party (Bruhn 2008:215–217). In addition, as referred to in Chap. 6 of this book, the often spontaneous decisions of local perredista activists, rather than centralized party hierarchies (as in the case of the opposition right PAN), to engage in electoral protest and


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postelectoral mobilization during the post-1988 period (Eisenstadt 2004:153–158) also contributed to difficulties in its organizational consolidation. Nevertheless, PRD candidates did win more majority control over municipal governments than any other opposition party during the 1988–1991 period (Bruhn 1997:228–229). And there was also a strong regional basis to these gains–almost 60% of them were in the state of Michoacán – also the state with the initially highest level of political killings of PRD members during the 1988–1994 period (CHR 1994). Given that the 1981 victory of COCEI in Juchitán, Oaxaca was the first leftist win over any municipal government, PRD control over 89 municipalities during the 1998–1991 period did represent an importance advance for the left (Bruhn 1997:229), as well as a source of significant local electoral conflict with the PRI, as discussed in Chaps. 4 and 6 of this book. By 1994, Cárdenas won about 17% of the vote in the July 1994 presidential election. Bruhn (2008:216) argues that the January 1994 rise of the armed Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) and the increase of votes for the PAN in the early 1990s may have caused some of the national PRI leadership to view the PRD as a slightly lesser threat. Just as important, however, PRI’s “increased sense of electoral security after the victories in 1991 and 1994, contributed to its willingness to sponsor several critical reforms that transformed the electoral environment (Bruhn 2008:216).” Specifically, the 1996 electoral reforms ushered in, by 1997, a new generation of non-PRI affiliated intellectuals, professors, journalists, and citizens who administered elections under the autonomous Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) (Prud’homme 1998). Subsequently, the period from 1997 to 2000 was one characterized by the strengthening of the opposition parties. This included the first federal Congress with an opposition majority and various reforms aimed at reducing corruption and improving the administration of justice. The PRD won the regency of Mexico City in 1997 with 44% of the vote and gained a supermajority in the Mexico City legislature. The Party’s share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies also increased from 16.7% (1994) to 25.7% (1997). The July 2, 2000, election victory of Vicente Fox Quesada of the opposition Alliance for Change coalition (including the PAN and the Mexican Green Party, PVEM) was considered to have been the freest and fairest in Mexico’s history, ending the PRI’s 71-year hold on the presidency (Domínguez and Lawson 2004). By 2000, the PRD governed 7% of the nation’s population; winning 12% of municipal elections and controlling four state governorships (El País 6/3/03:62; Bruhn 2008:217). Under the Fox administration (2000–2006), Mexico’s electoral democracy saw further institutional changes from the late 1990s, not all of which occurred at the same speed or in the same way (Tulchin and Selee 2003:8). These included advances in the transparency of government information to the public (Cazares and Shirk 2007), antidiscrimination laws, the empowerment of the Supreme Court, the significant waning of executive dominance at the national level, a willingness of the legislature and judiciary to oppose the president even on high-profile policy initiatives, and more state and municipal independence than in the past, among other changes (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2010:114). Within this post-2000 political context, by 2003, the PRD was also able to double the number of federal deputy seats it had

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won in 2000, taking an absolute majority in the Mexico City legislature and winning in 14 of the 16 districts that make up the city. The Party also won in 25 more of the nation’s 300 electoral districts than in 2000 (a total of 55). More critically, by 2003, the party had strengthened itself regionally in the states Michoacán, Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Tlaxcala with some victories in Guerrero, Mexico State, and Guanajuato (La Jornada 7/18/03:3). In the states of Zacatecas and Baja California Sur, the PRD even won in all of the electoral districts. By 2004, the PRD gained power at the municipal level from the PRI in various states (Proceso 10/5/04). The more contested 2006 president election saw a fall in public confidence in Mexico’s electoral institutions (Galán 2006) when PRD presidential candidate Manuel Andrés López Obrador refuted his official 0.5% electoral loss to PAN candidate Felipe Calderón (35.31–35.89%) and mobilized half a million people in the center of Mexico City to call for a recount (Bruhn 2008:223). Rejecting the Federal Electoral Institute’s [IFE] subsequent partial recount, López Obrador went on to declare himself the “legitimate president of Mexico,” and the PRD gained 127 of 500 Congressional seats and 31 of 128 Senate seats in the 2006 presidential election (IFE 2006). By 2007, the party held 6 of the 31 governorships and 1 with the PAN. In 2008, perredistas won a majority of mayorships in the state of Baja California Sur and a substantial number in the state of Michoacán. By mid-2010, the PRD controlled eight governorships (Baja California Sur, Federal District, Guerrero, Chiapas, Michoacán, and Sinaloa, Oaxaca, and Puebla with the PAN) and governed in about 12% of the nation’s municipalities (PRD 2010). Thus, since 1988, despite the political killings and repression analyzed in this book, and the party’s continuing problems of organizational consolidation (sometimes violent),3 the PRD has emerged and gained an incrementally rising, often regionally based, electoral foothold in Mexico.

Impunity: A Consistent Theme Across Sexenios Despite these advances in electoral democratization, however, the idea of elite impunity associated with the flourishing of violence and cacique rule in the postrevolutionary period has been much slower to disappear (Knight 2005:40; Gruening 1928). Knight (2005:40) argues, on the basis of historical evidence of the postrevolutionary treatment of caciques, that the Mexican legal system takes a lenient view of crimes of violence. One important institutional aspect of Mexico’s political and judicial system relating to the failure to punish criminals, including murderers, which has remained stable over time, corresponds to inherent institutional limitations including lack of resources and corruption within the public prosecutor’s office (Procuraduría de Justicia [State Attorney Generals]; agents of the executive branch) (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). In fact, Mexico’s criminal justice system has been so lacking in resources and so inefficient in both investigating and prosecuting crimes that, by 2002, Zepeda Lecuona argued it could only try and apprehend approximately 150,000


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people per year no matter how many crimes were actually committed. The “Achilles” heel of the criminal justice system is the enormous demand for legal services placed on the public prosecutor’s office, which has created a workload that “swamps the system and diminishes the prosecutor’s ability to respond and the quality of services they can deliver” (Zepeda Lecuona 2002:75–82). Perhaps not surprisingly then, the Salinas (1988–1994), Zedillo (1994–2000), Fox (2000–2006) and the Calderón (2006–2012) sexenios have witnessed a continuation of impunity in response to the constant challenges to attend to the everincreasing rates of delinquency and violence in Mexico, along with the perennial failure of the credibility of the system of criminal justice (Schatz et al. 2007). In 2003, Elizondo (2003:44) wrote: “The most important problem with the incapacity to impose the rule of law [in Mexico] is the need to ensure society that impunity for criminal members of society will not be the norm... In the area of criminal law, the fashion in recent years have been to increase the punishment for serious offenses, but the problem is punishing serious criminals at all... (p. 43).” Advances in the rule of law at the federal level accompanying democratization since 1994, especially with respect to the judicial and criminal justice systems, have much less impact on citizen’s daily lives at the local and state levels; the latter is where 80% of the judicial case load is adjudicated (Haber et al. 2008:208). The lack of prosecution of the political killings of PRD members after 1988 has occurred largely within this deficient institutional context, as discussed in Chap. 5 of this book. During the Fox administration (2000–2006), attacks on human rights activists, including death threats, kidnapping, and intimidation, continued especially in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca (US State Department Human Rights Report 2001). PRI versus PRD electoral conflicts, which emerged within indigenous groups in municipal contests in Guanajuato and elsewhere in the 1990s (Hernández 2005:292–294), often intensified, and the PRI continued to maintain cacique political control over many indigenous communities in Chiapas (Rus 2005:200). While not all of these PRI-PRD political-electoral based conflicts turned violent, in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca, in municipalities where the PRD was electorally successful in challenging or winning political control from the PRI, the political killings of PRD members continued after 2000, as addressed in Chap. 6 and the appendix of this book. Similarly, after 2000, impunity for the prosecution of the political killings of perredistas, treated in Chap. 7 of this book, remains the norm.

Impunity, Crime, and Drug-Related Assassinations While liberalization–democratization has coincided with a falling birthrate in Mexico, it has also witnessed a rising crime rate. The nation’s proportion of the population aged 5–19 years has declined from 1970 (40%) to 22% in 2005 and is projected to fall even further to 22% by 2030 (Haber et al. 2008:163), largely due to increased urbanization. Yet, at the same time, crime rates have shown a significant

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upswing in the past two decades (United Nations Survey 2000, 2002; Magaloni and Zepeda 2004:177).4 And since many crimes go unreported, the crime rates may be much higher than reported by the government. Institutional limitations on investigating and prosecuting crime at the state level were so severe in 2000 that statelevel prosecutors failed to conduct effective investigations into 81.5% of reported crimes (Magaloni and Zepeda 2004:176, 182, 184–186). Thus, increasing urbanization during liberalization–democratization coincides with falling birthrates and rising rates of common crime. By mid-2005, in the largest reorganization since the 1980s, Mexican drug cartels leveraged the profits from their delivery routes to gain control from the Colombian producers as Colombian authorities successfully cracked down on Colombia’s drug kingpins (DEA 2005; Christian Science Monitor 8/16/05). Since 2006, the problems of violence and homicide have become increasingly acute with this escalation of drug trafficking in Mexico and the Calderón administration’s subsequent “war on drugs.” By mid-2010, there were an estimated 22,700 homicides resulting from intracartel, intercartel, and deadly violence between organized crime and state security forces, particularly the Mexican military (Los Angeles Times: Mexico Under Siege 2010). Hundreds of journalists demanded that the federal government guarantee proper security conditions for their work and investigate the assassination of more than 60 journalists and the disappearance of 12, all of whose cases remained in a state of impunity (La Jornada 8/8/10:2). Grayson (2010:270–271) noted that in early 2009, the government admitted the existence of 233 regional “zones of impunity” where crime was rampant. Although not specified by Mexican officials, such areas are believed to include the Tierra Caliente (a mountainous region contiguous to Michoacán, Guerrero, and Mexico State), the “Golden Triangle” (a drug-growing area in the mountains where the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango converge), metropolitan areas around Mexico City, areas along the southern Chiapas state border with Guatemala, and the US-Mexican border, where cartels are particularly violent (Grayson 2010:270–271). Some of these regions overlap with PRD-governed areas and the party, by 2009–2010, has also been affected by rising drug-related violence associated with organized crime as well as by possible political ties to the drug trade. For example, the Calderón government charged 12 perredista mayors in Michoacán in 2009 with protecting the La Familia cartel there. Next, the Quintana Roo PRD gubernatorial candidate Gregorio Sanchez (ex-mayor of Cancún) was arrested on charges of money laundering and conspiring to traffic drugs (Wall Street Journal 6/29/10).5 By mid-2010, the electoral climate deteriorated significantly, especially in states with significant organized crime presence. In Tamaulipas, local PRD (and PAN) candidates claim to have been threatened by drug lords and to have had difficulty persuading party members to run as candidates for mayor, deputy mayor, or legislators. Indeed, unknown assailants torched the home of Martha Porras, who had been seeking the PRD nomination for mayor of Nuevo Laredo (Tamaulipas), and she and several of her relatives disappeared, with the police not commenting if she was kidnapped or had fled (Associated Press 5/15/10). Sergio Campo Brito, the panista


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mayoral candidate in a Guerrero mountain community known for opium poppy crops, was dragged from his home by armed men, and his bullet-ridden body was found days later (Mexidata 7/2/10). Another panista mayoral candidate was murdered in the border town of Valle Hermoso (Tamaulipas) along with his son and another man (Mexidata 7/2/10). In Chihuahua, the PRD did not even postulate candidates in 18 rural municipalities plagued by drug-related violence. Priísta mayor of Guadalupe, Chihuahua near the US-Mexican border, who was known for his staunch opposition to drug lords and worked with other mayors in towns bordering the USA such as the Ciudad Juárez mayor, was murdered by unknown gunmen in front of his wife and child as he walked to his car (El Diario 6/20/10). Several killings of perredistas in the states of Zacatecas and Sinaloa in 2003 and in Guerrero in 2009 documented in the appendix of this book also appear to be directly linked to narcotrafficking. Impunity and drug-related assassinations have become such acute problems in Mexico that scholar Luis Rubio claimed in mid-2009 that there were “regions of the country where all vestiges of a functioning government have simply vanished,” while in the rest, “the climate of impunity, extortion, protection money, kidnapping and, in general, crime has become pervasive (Grayson 2010:271).” A series of binational (USA–Mexico) law enforcement efforts under the “Merida Initiative” to curb cartel influence and reduce corruption in Mexico were underway by 2010. These include intelligence sharing and coordination, the disbanding of municipal police departments, and approximately $396.6 millions of US dollars to improve Mexican counter-narcotics efforts, a portion of which went toward prosecution of drug traffickers (GAO 2007:12).6 Responding to the fact that a military-led fight against drug trafficking had failed to curb violence in Ciudad Júarez (Chihuahua) and along the border, the USA and Mexico have decided to shift the goals and funding in “Plan Merida” to “Merida 2” for 2011 and beyond to centrally include the goal of “reforming and enhancing the capacity of Mexico’s security and justice institutions” (Latin America 2010).7 The year 2010 also witnessed the high-profile political assassination of the Tamaulipas PRI gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Torres as well as the kidnapping and disappearance of the 1994 panista presidential candidate Diego de Cevallos (LA Times 7/27/10). Thus, the need to strengthen the rule of law and to curb assassination continues to be a central theme in Mexico. With respect to the state-level criminal justice system, domestic reform efforts to reduce impunity, increase prosecution, accelerate criminal procedure, and improve respect for due process rights resulted in the 2008 judicial reforms. To be implemented over an 8-year period, these reforms include the introduction of oral trials, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and mediation of legal disputes (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2010:318–319). By mid-2010, however, institutional limitations within the legal and criminal justice systems remain a serious cause of impunity for homicide (civil, political, and drug-trafficking related). The state of Chihuahua, for example, introduced oral trials in December 2006. By 2009, however, despite an estimated 2,082 drugrelated homicides in the state that year (TBI/Reforma 2009), state courts report only

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584 homicide cases reached the court docket with 100 reported homicides sentences from the oral trials courts in all of 2009 (Informe Año Judicial, Chihuahua 2009:90, 92). In other words, there is still insufficient court capacity to investigate, prosecute, and punish homicide despite the significant rise of murder associated with Calderón’s post-2006 “war on drugs.” Forty-three out of 63 federal penal judges (68%) receive protection and have increased their own security in the face of “veiled or direct” threats from jailed organized crime members or their families, according to the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) (La Jornada 2/10/10). Under such conditions, the legal system is not able to function systematically as a sufficient system of restraint for organized-crime-related killings. Indeed, Grayson (2010:278) argues that Calderón, to be successful, needs to complement his “anti-drug drive with an all-out battle against the impunity relished by public officials, including those in his own party.” And, in fact, the federal government reported that approximately 26% of those high-level figures detained on organized crime-related charges were public functionaries (PGR, 6E Informe 2006:5).8 Thus, despite the advancement of electoral democracy since 1988, impunity for murder, aggravated by institutional limitations and corruption, remains a serious problem in the Mexican early twenty-first century. The current climate of violence, killing, and impunity and the apparent failure of the Mexican government to reduce this violence9 should come as no surprise in the context of what happened before, as is discussed in this book. In this respect, the analysis of political killings and impunity during the 1988–2005 period, the main focus of this book, adds a new explanatory dimension to the widespread violence associated with the current drug war. By looking at the past, we can look into the present in a more insightful manner. Political killing is important because the failure of the police, judicial, and political institutions to stem the political assassination of perredistas meant that political elites could eliminate other elites for political reasons. This book demonstrates the institutional failures that gave rise to impunity at various levels of government, and then, in mid-2005, to intensification of the drug trade. After 2006, more political elites from a wider range of political parties are being assassinated (PRI, PAN), now largely by organized crime, and impunity for crime remains a serious problem (Zepeda Lecuona 2010:57). As such, the analysis in this book sets the stage for the present climate of violence and the difficulties of the political and judicial systems to curtail murder. For once a structured system of impunity has been created and it is understood that murder for political gain can go unpunished, this can structure the perception that the likelihood of impunity for murder will continue even when the motive for killings changes. In the next chapter, I situate the argument of this book within the distinctive scholarly efforts to understand political killings, often conceptualized in the context of the literature on political repression. This discussion is also linked to the broader scholarly themes treating the rise of the rule of law and the persistence of impunity, and to democratization and transitions to democratic accountability within the context of the central issue of the political killing of perredistas after 1988 in Mexico.

End Notes

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End Notes his book conceptualizes liberalization–democratization as a continuum of political change T toward the eight conditions that Dahl (1971:3) outlines as ideal-typical for the definition of a political democracy. The eight ideal-typical conditions of a political democracy involve the following: (1) Freedom to form and join organizations, (2) Freedom of expression, (3) Right to vote, (4) Eligibility for public office, (5) Right of political leaders to compete for support (5a). Right of political leaders to compete for votes, (6) Alternative sources of information, (7) Free and fair elections, and (8) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences. Because Dahl’s (1971:3) ideal type requires that these eight conditions be fully met, a goal that no country in the world has attained, this implies there can be a continuum of political change toward (or away from) these eight conditions. In general, the term “liberalization” refers to the extent to which rights and liberties are available to at least some members of the political system. However, attempts to precisely differentiate the area between liberalization and democratization along this continuum have been highly variable with “room for highly different types of semi-democracies and semi-authoritarian systems (Sorenson 1993:13)”; see also: (Sklar 1983; Remmer 1985; Markoff 1996:118; Whitehead 2002) and have not produced a clear, well-accepted distinction. 2 The total regional breakdown of 572 of these killings listed by the PRD as of 1997 was Guerrero, n = 189; Chiapas, n = 123; Oaxaca, n = 74; Michoacán, n = 70; Puebla, n = 38; Morelos, n = 15; Hidalgo, n = 13; Veracruz, n = 11; DF, n = 9; Mexico, n = 8; Sinaloa, n = 1; Durango, n = 4; Tabasco, n = 3; Campeche, n = 2; Coahuila, n = 2; Nuevo Leon, n = 2; San Luis Potosí, n = 2; Tamulipas, n = 2; Zacatecas, n = 2; Chihuahua, n = 1; Querétaro, n = 1 (Appendix: Crónica Guerrero 1998). On July 3, 2002, PRD leaders stated that 662 political murders had been recorded (La Jornada 7/3/02). By November 2, 2009, the PRD claimed that 723 members had been assassinated (Ofrenda en Memoria 2009). Many of the post-2005 PRD deaths, however, importantly overlap with the violence associated with the rise of organized crime. This book treats those political killings where there is sufficient substantiated, secondary material from PRD, journalistic sources, and/or the Mexican Commission on Human Rights sources. 3 Six perredistas working at the Party’s state office in the capital city were forcefully removed and beaten by other perredista militants in a January 2004 preelectoral dispute over candidate selection for the October 2004 local elections (El Universal 1/21/04). 4 Reported Total Crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000 (United Nations Survey 2000) were 1,433.81 and 1,503.71 by 2004 (United Nations Survey 2002) to provide one example. 5 All but 2 of the 12 Michoacán PRD mayors were released for lack of evidence (Associated Press 5/15/10) and Sánchez has vigorously denied the charges (BBC 6/1/10). 6 The number of extraditions of Mexican drug lords to the USA for prosecution has climbed steadily since 2002 (12 in 2002, 17 in 2001, 25 in 2002, 31 in 2003, 34 in 2004, 41 in 2005, 63 in 2006 to a record high of 107 in 2009) (GAO 2007:13; UPI 2010). 7 The three other stated goals of “Merida 2.0” include (1) Disrupting the capacity of DTO (drugtrafficking organizations), (2) Creating a twenty-first century border that advances commerce and security, and (3) Building strong, resilient communities that tackle the drivers of violence and defy the influence of the DTOs (Latin American 2010). 8 This figure is a measure of the role of public functionaries within the higher-ranking members of organized crime. It is calculated as a percentage of the leaders, financiers, lieutenants, hit men, and public functionaries detained by the PGR during the 2000–2006 period. This figure does not calculate the percentage of public functionaries within the much wider net of the drug-trafficking business. Thus, it omits “collaborators and retail distributors of drugs” who make up the largest proportion of criminals detained on organized-crime-related charges (n = 76,742) (PGR, 6E Informe 2006:5). 1

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y 2009, the Mexican federal government stated that it lacked sufficient resources to prosecute B organized crime and was both outgunned and outmanned (Milenio 7/27/09). Mexico’s Attorney General acknowledged in 2009 that organized crime groups are “one step ahead of the federal government in both weaponry and technological advances to engage in illicit activities”. The head of SIEDO (the Attorney General’s Special Investigative Division for Organized Crime) said, “although advanced technology is available to the government, organized crime groups acquire it first... [and] organized crime groups use more sophisticated communication methods, which permits the transmission of large volumes of information, while Mexican authorities use more traditional methods of communicating (Milenio 7/27/09).”

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Chapter 3

Theoretical Dimensions of a Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings

Democratization and Political Repression in Global Perspective How Much Violence? The question of political repression and violence in democratization is a general global problem because there is evidence that, as political competition and pluralism increase, reported political violence such as attacks on journalists, party activists, and human rights activists also increases (Ahnen 2003; Pereira 2000). Much of the early literature on democratization cited some important, mainly European, transitions to democracy as evidence of the peaceful nature of the post-1974 wave of democratization including the Portuguese “revolution of the carnations” (1975), the Czechoslovakian “velvet revolution” (1989–1990), and the Hungarian and Polish transitions to democracy, where no major state-led episodes of violence occurred (Maxwell 1986; Rosenfeld 1994). Also, frequently mentioned was Spain’s democratization (1975–1977) where, in the height of violence, only two students, five communist lawyers, and five policemen were murdered (Maravall and Santamaría 1986:84). Nevertheless, these transitions may have been the exception rather than the rule in the “third wave” of democratization.1 For example, in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, the rise of an opposition front unleashed a wave of political violence spearheaded by the authoritarian regime that included murder, torture, beating, rapes, house burnings, forced indoctrination, and farm invasions, largely aimed at intimidating voters into supporting the single party and dissuading them from voting for the opposition (African Affairs 2000; Johnson 2000:7). The main opposition movement in Zimbabwe in 2002 claimed that over 107 of its supporters were killed by hired guns of the dominant authoritarian regime in the 1 year alone (Newsweek 3/11/02:36). By 2008, a significant surge in political violence accompanied the presidential elections in the nation and included some 60 deaths (New York Times 06/26/08). Elections of the 1990–2000s in Kenya included attacks on and murder of opposition supporters, by private death squads hired by the authoritarian dominant party politicians and the state harassment of opposition leaders. Opposition Members of S. Schatz, Murder and Politics in Mexico, Studies of Organized Crime 10, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8068-7_3, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

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3 Theoretical Dimensions of a Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings

Parliament were denied permits for rallies, were blocked from entering certain districts, had their campaign meetings disrupted, and sometimes were even physically assaulted by the police (Barkan and Ng’ethe 1998:36). CNN televised one particularly bloody government repression of an opposition rally on July 7, 1997 in which pacific protestors were badly beaten. In Singapore in the late 1990s, opposition parties leaders were subject to severe fines and one opposition Worker’s Party leader who won 45% of the vote in a district felt the need to flee to Malaysia for his safety, since he received threatening phone calls (Economist 1/11/97:33). In South Africa, about 9,500–10,000 persons are estimated to have died in the struggle for democracy. The Tianamem Square massacre of between 400 and 1,000 people in Beijing, China in June 1989, the 746 people killed in political violence in Bucharest in December 1989, and the killing of as many as 3,000 people in the suppression of the democracy movement by the Burmese military in August– September 1980 (Huntington 1991:194) further illustrate the point. The collapse of communism not only brought partial democratization to most of the newly independent states and regimes in Bosnia, Croatia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Moldova but also coincided with a rise in nationalist conflicts in which 343,500 person were killed (Synder 2000:189). Even this brief comparative sketch reveals that harassment and death from political violence have not been absent from the third wave of global democratization.

Regime Change Toward Regimes with Deficits in Accountability A book that examines the political killing of PRD members in conjunction with liberalization–democratization processes provides the source for a more realistic picture of the travails and human cost of global democratization. Mexico represents an excellent case because its relatively high levels of political violence challenge the early notion in the literature that third-wave transitions to democracy were relatively peaceful. Since endemic political violence between legalized political parties was rare in the transitions in Western Europe and legal systems there were relatively strong (Huntington 1991:192; Di Palma 1990; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), the issue of political killings during liberalization–democratization processes was not at the forefront of this literature. By 2001, however, the further spread of electoral democracies to nations in Africa and Central Asia led to recognition of the centrality of the rule of law in curtailing political violence, repression, and arbitrary rule. Indeed, with respect to many Central Asia nations, some scholars began to reclassify regime change by the early twenty-first century. Despite initial discussions of transitions to democracy there, by 2001, however, Rose and Shin (2001:333) were characterizing regimes in Russia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere as “broken back” democracies with free elections but deficiencies in the rule of law, civil society, and in mechanisms of accountability. A shift in scholarly emphasis toward problems in the consolidation of third-wave democracies (O’Donnell 2002), rather than on transitions per se, also responded to

Democratization and Political Repression in Global Perspective

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a series of “democratic reversals” (Sudan 1989, Thailand 1991, Nigeria 1993, Pakistan 1999), “democratic breakdowns” in smaller African states (Congo, Gambia, Lesotho, Niger, and Sierra Leone) in the 1990s, and the “abortion of democratic openings” in Cambodia, Lebanon, Kenya, and several post-Soviet states (Diamond 2000). These events, in addition to serious problems of corruption in the post-thirdwave electoral democracies, also led scholars to focus on the development of state regulatory measures to reduce graft and increase the representation of citizens visà-vis the state, a process often called the development of “vertical and horizontal mechanisms of accountability” (O’Donnell 2004; Smulovitz and Peruzzottii 2000; Fox 2007). Issues that have come to the forefront in this literature also include institution building, a renewed interest in the rule of law, economic and state reform, equality, participation and the rooting and strengthening of civil society and political parties, and greater respect for human rights (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O’Donnell 2004:10). This is important because lack of accountability – impunity – is a continuing problem in the new electoral democracies. In the post third-wave democracies in Brazil, Argentina, and Jamaica, for example, Chevigny (1999) highlights the continuing existence of relatively high levels of impunity by the police. Scholars of democratic Guatemala (Ibarra 1991:81–82) and South Africa (Ellis 1999; Gordon 2006) also note that these regimes, despite competitive elections, have experienced difficulties in upholding the civil rights of those citizens (indigenous peoples, blacks) who had been excluded citizens under their respective dictatorships. In light of such deficits in the application of the rule of law, additional scholars have begun to (re)classify nations with semicompetitive elections such as Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, and Zambia as “electoral authoritarian regimes” (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006).

The Mexican Case in Perspective This book addresses the question of impunity (extrajudicial violence, political killings, lack of accountability for such crimes) in liberalization–democratization processes. Beyond noting that dictatorships have a significantly worse human rights record in terms of violations of life integrity than democracies (Huntington 1991:192–207), there is little extended qualitative treatment of the relationship between the development of the rule of law, liberalization, democratization, and political killings. Historically, it is well known that democratization has been accompanied by political violence. Several violent upheavals coincided with the first long wave of democratization in England, France, and America in which numerous people died including in the Enclosure Movement in England, the English Civil War, the French and American Revolutions, and the American Civil War. As Barrington Moore (1963:426–427) argues, “whether one believes these ...violent upheavals aided or hindered the development of liberal and bourgeois democracy, it remains necessary

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to recognize that they were an important part of the whole process.” The establishment of democracy in the “second wave” took place after the large-scale violence of World War II (Huntington 1991:18–19). Many argue that the democratic transformation of Mexico began in 1968, with one of its consequences being the 1977 electoral reforms, the loss of PRI control over the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and then the 2000 conquest of the Mexican presidency by the opposition (Meyer 2000; Aguayo 2003). If we include only that estimated political violence suffered by the political opposition in this same period – the students massacred in 1968, the subsequent disappearance and death of numerous leftist activists, the political killings of PRD members, panista deaths, Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) members killed since 1994 – over 1,500 people alone have died in the process (Middlebrook 1986:126–127; CNDH 2001; Tierra Noticias 2001). This figure does not include those journalists, human rights workers, reformist priístas, religious persons and laypersons, and other social actors directly or indirectly engaged in the struggle for expanded political rights. A focus on Mexico, where liberalization–democratization was not only a gradual process (Eisenstadt 2004) but also one characterized by a relatively high number of political killings, raises the interesting counterfactual possibility that the extension of political and civil rights do not necessarily progress in tandem fashion (Rose and Shin 2001). Rather, it is quite possible that an advance in political rights can cause some erosion in civil rights. If democratization actually does entail a loss of civil rights in the short run, we must be more sanguine about the human rights cost associated with its long-run benefits. This is not to say that liberalization–democratization is not a highly laudable goal.2 Rather, my point is that the comparative and historical evidence suggests that Mexico’s transition is not a sui generis case of a particularly violent one, but rather a more representative one where conflicts in the process of democratization can also result in significant political killings. A qualitative study of political killings also provides a case study useful for comparative studies in other countries undergoing liberalization–democratization with problems of political repression. It links an important topic – the protection of human rights – to an understanding of the practical difficulties in consolidating the electoral rule of law within democratization processes implemented by Mexico and other nations. Thus, the book addresses several interrelated literatures – democratization, legal sociology/the rule of law, theories of collective violence, and the study of victimology as it intersects with sociology and criminology. The data used in this book are also original in that they rely on governmental-human rights source documents published by the Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH – Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos) and by political party biographies not previously analyzed in scholarly publications. I now turn to an account of the main argument of this book, that impunity for political killings is a structured system requiring one central precondition, namely, the failure of the legal system to function as a sufficient system of restraint for killings.

A Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings

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A Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings Previous interdisciplinary attempts by legal scholars to understand the connection between state-sanctioned violence and human rights abuses examined variations in levels of impunity as a central variable causing political killings. Viñuales (2007:125–127) examined more than 3,000 Amnesty International Reports from all regions of the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Central-Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) from 1992 to 2005. From this global analysis, the author developed two main categories, which explained the causes of impunity as follows: (1) lack of capacity (institutional/legal deficiencies) making it difficult or impossible to provide some form of accountability for crimes committed by the state, state-endorsed actors, and nonstate actors and/or (2) lack of will (institutional/ legal structures are in place but they are not used), whether this inertia is legal or not. The idea “underlying the distinction is simply that institutional/legal measures are not enough to fight impunity. Cultural and political circumstances are as important as legal frameworks (Viñuales 2007:126).” The argument proposed in this book is that impunity for political killings is a structured system requiring one central precondition, namely, the failure of the legal system to function as a sufficient system of restraint for killings. As the Mexican case clearly illustrates, when the legal system does not function as a sufficient system of restraint, but rather one which creates a climate of ambiguity and uncertainty regarding political killings, impunity is rampant. Impunity, in turn, facilitates the choice of political assassination by political party leaders, members, and their affiliated “hired guns” against political opponents. This structured system of impunity for political killing consists of several elements (political and institutional) and includes law enforcement agencies, lawyers and social representatives within the public prosecutors’ office, and politicians. It involves various dimensions of action, and inaction, by these social actors. In the case of the failure of the judicial system, it can involve the inadequate investigation of many political killings. With respect to the failure of law enforcement, it can involve their inability and/or unwillingness to serve arrest warrants in cases where the judicial system successfully investigates and identifies suspects of political killings. Regarding the failure of the political system, it occurs when politicians contract “hired” guns to eliminate political opponents and may also politically manipulate law enforcement officers to carry out violent vendettas against their legal political opponents, including, but not limited to, their political assassination. The complexity of this structured system of impunity should not be underestimated. In such a system, some state actors may partially follow a strict set of rulebound procedures in processing political killings, while other state actors may fail to act in accord with the rule of law. For example, within the judicial system itself, forensics teams may strictly follow the law-determined procedures in processing political killings by adequately locating and identifying the corpse, and the approximate time and cause of death. At the same time, lawyers and social representatives

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in the public prosecutor’s office may act with arbitrary discretion and decide a political killing cannot be prosecuted for lack of evidence without even interviewing key eyewitnesses to the homicide.3 Judges, in multiple instances, may issue arrest warrants against suspects, but the police may simply decide not to execute them, be it for lack of resources, political will, and/or a combination of both aspects. In some instances, the police may execute their duties to protect the public from undue harm and may actively seek to capture murder suspects. Yet, in multiple other instances, the police may employ excessive force in removing political protestors from an area with, or without, nonuniformed armed men or even be authorized to assassinate political opponents. Police investigators following strict homicide investigative procedures may be assassinated by criminal elements associated with certain politicians who seek to thwart the prosecutorial workings of the criminal justice system. This concatenation of political, judicial, and law-enforcement elements creates a legal system that fails to function as a sufficient system of restraint, but rather creates a climate of ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to such murders. This state of affairs can allow crime-preventing agencies and criminal elements within civil society to potentially ignore and pervert the law with the end result as the lack of punishment for homicide. This system of impunity structures both the actions of the perpetrators and victims of political killings. Criminals take advantage of this climate of legal ambiguity and uncertainty because they know, for example, that if they forcefully abduct a PRD member from his home and subsequently “disappear” him, it is highly unlikely that the Judicial Police or the Public Ministry will find his body. The families of crime victims, for their part, clearly realize that pursuing the formal route of justice for prosecution of the political killing is costly, lengthy, and frequently futile. On a more general, theoretical level, I argue in this book, that such legal systems operate as “soft” ones that consist of an additional structural element important in understanding the genesis and prosecution of political assassination. This involves the question of the authorization of political killings by key members of the executive branch of government. Authorization also refers to the social context of the behavior (Milgram 1965, 1977). Which people or agencies authorize political killings (Kelman and Lawrence 1972)? Or, in the case of violent actions by nonstate actors, and/or quasi-state actors (contract killers working on behalf of politicians who engage in political killings), how do executive political elites respond? As is argued in this book, political assassinations are calculated strategies of action caused by multiple, interacting factors including direct or implied authorization from political leaders. Political assassination requires the willingness of some political leaders to utilize hired guns against political opponents and involves a pattern of violent interactions between political parties. Political assassination as a form of interpersonal violence is caused by the interaction of these factors (political leadership, the criminal justice system, political parties) in encouraging political murder. Judicial system’s ineffectiveness – a “soft” legal system – does not directly cause political assassination, but it facilitates it, and explains the persistence of impunity for political murder over time.


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The case of Hidalgo cacique José Guadarrama Márquez (PRI) also well demonstrates the interaction of these factors. Three PRD members were assassinated by openly identified assassins – Genaro, Ofelio, and Andres Juaréz Márquez – allegedly hired by José Guadarrama Márquez (CHR 1994:125). One victim had frequently publicly denounced cacique José Guadarrama Márquez as corrupt on various occasions. The PRD leader had received numerous death threats for his activism, culminating in his October 12, 1990 assassination. Five more perredistas were killed by the same hired guns (CNDH 1994:501). The CNDH found the entire juridical situation surrounding the assassinations “contrary to justice,” and the agency found evidence of the complicity of the law enforcement in this system of impunity. The CNDH recommended an internal investigation be conducted into both the Public Ministry and the “Jacala Group” of the Hidalgo State Police for negligence in failing to comply with proper required investigations into the crime (CNDH 1994:503–506). Yet, despite eyewitness testimony linking him to the political killings of multiple PRD members, Guadarrama Márquez was granted immunity from criminal prosecution by promotion to the Hidalgo state legislature by PRI congressional deputies. Indeed, in what can only be described as supreme irony, by the late 1990s, Jacala cacique José Guadarrama Márquez subsequently ran and lost to PRI primary candidate Manuel Angel Núñez Soto for the Hidalgo gubernatorial race. After losing this internal PRI race, Guadarrama Márquez decided after the historical 2,000 presidential election of panista Vicente Fox to break with the PRI and seek refuge with perredista Jesús Ortega, a major figure within the party and the losing candidate for the 2001 PRD party leader post (La Jornada 3/11/02) and, by 2008, the leader of the PRD (El Universal 12/7/09). A large number of perredistas were reported to have been gravely offended by Guadarrama joining the PRD given its accusation of murder against him in the incidents discussed above. Rumors even arose that Guadarrama spearheaded a fraudulent electoral operation to deliver the Hidalgo vote in favor of Ortega (La Jornada 3/11/02). By 2004, Guadarrama had even become the party’s joint coalition candidate (with the post-2000 “Convergence” [Convergencia] party) for governor in Hidalgo (La Jornada 12/04/04). As one journalist summarized it in December 2004: “Guadarrama and the PRD are [now] living an era of pragmatism when an electoral delinquent and assassin of perredistas becomes a PRD candidate; a decision that has been severely criticized. The scandal, nevertheless, has had no effect on Guadarrama’s career, who continues to maintain control in Jacala through local cacique Valente Salas Monter (La Jornada 12/04/04).” Civil homicides, in “soft” legal systems, may also go unpunished. To use another example from Mexico, in the case of the hundreds of murdered women of Ciudad Juárez, there is some evidence of the direct stifling of law enforcement’s ability to punish crime and/or the use of assassination against those who challenge the state’s prosecutorial claims.4 Liberalization–democratization processes impose additional pressures on such “soft” legal systems. This is because civil society’s demands for democratization and the increasingly competitive elections which often result from these “challenges

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from below” can increase the turnover of elected officials in office. In theory, greater electoral turnover increases legal accountability as newly elected officials respond to public opinion pressures to reduce violence by demanding greater punishment for crime from the legal system (Villareal 2002). In practice, however, impunity for crime may continue despite advances in electoral competition due to the uneven application of the rule of law across social categories and national territories (O’Donnell 1999). Legal systems are often slow to change due to a variety of factors, including corruption within the police, the continued bribery of state officials by organized crime in exchange for freedom from prosecution, inadequate funding, and/or their independent practices. In Chap. 7 of this book, I argue that liberalization–democratization may advance electoral competition for a period of time but that sociopolitical tensions, and/or internal political struggles within political parties may cause a resurgence of the use of political assassination against political opponents and impunity from prosecution by the legal system. This argument is advanced comparatively with reference to cases from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. Italy’s over 40-year-old democracy offers a pertinent, highly relevant example of an advanced electoral democracy in which a concatenation of institutionalized political, judicial, and law-enforcement elements – politicians, judges, and policemen who are bought and/or otherwise acquiesce to organized crime, activist judges who seek to fight against corruption and are assassinated – frequently results in a structured system of impunity for political killing (Pizzorno 1993:298–299; Donnatella and Vannucci 2000:157–158, 161, 170).

Democratization and Political Repression Theorists of political repression have acknowledged that the establishment of electoral democracy is not equivalent to establishing a rights-protective regime (Donnelly 1988). Although many studies of large numbers of countries find that overall democracies are less repressive than autocracies (Davenport 1995; Henderson 1991; Poe and Neal Tate 1994; Sorenson 1993), a variety of quantitative studies suggest that simple increases in a state’s level of democratization do not lead to commensurate reductions in human rights violations. As De Mesquita et al. (2005) note, “only those states with the highest levels of democracy, not simply those conventionally defined as democratic, are correlated with better human rights practices.” Thus, democratization per se does not bring about an immediate improvement in human rights behavior (Donnelly 1988; Fein 1995; Sikkink 2004), with some arguing that an improved human rights record is not attained until a certain “threshold” for a multiparty democracy is met. Indeed, the process of liberalization–democratization, at low-to-moderate levels, can have no impact on repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Or worse, the introduction of elections without full multiparty competition and constrained executives can actually lead to short-term increases in political repression (Davenport 1998). As states democratize and open up new political spaces, ruling


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political elites find themselves increasingly confronted by new challengers who are eager to detract legitimacy from the regime and create a new one. Out of fear of the redistribution of resources and the emergence of a new political order, governing elites often resort to more violence to contain potential challengers than is characteristically necessary under a stable despotism or autocracy. This is the so-called “More Murder in the Middle Thesis” (MMM) (Fein 1995; Gurr 1986; Muller 1985). Once democratization actually takes place, however, according to this thesis, violence declines again to a level that is even lower than it was originally. The result is a curvilinear relationship between democratization and political repression. Other scholarship, however, calls into question that there is a necessary decline in political repression once a democracy has been achieved. Gartner and Regan (1996:278) question the idea that in a political democracy, repression by political elites is rarely utilized, suggesting that real or perceived threat, more than regime type, is the most powerful predictor of the level of political repression. Democratic rulers, when faced with high levels of domestic real or perceived threats to their rule, will equally resort to extreme forms of political repression as autocrats (Regan and Henderson 2002:130). Similarly, Turk (1982) argues that where authorities (whether democratic or autocratic) perceive resistance to their rule as severe and/or when the resisters are of lower class, political repression will be more severe irrespective of regime type. Thus, when attempting to understand the relationship between democratization and political repression, there is essential agreement that political change in the form of democratization often causes a short-term increase in political violence and repression (Hegre et al. 2001). However, there remains some controversy as to whether the attainment of a specific regime type (a multiparty democracy) will result in a drastically improved human rights record. Some argue that democratic elites, when confronted with real or perceived threats to the legitimacy of their rule, will also resort to political repression and other human rights abuses (Turk 1982; Gartner and Regan 1996; Regan and Henderson 2002).

Democratization, Political Protest, and Political Repression The findings on the relationship between protest and repression bear a striking parallel to the findings on the relationship between real and perceived threat, political repression, and democratization. As Carey (2006:9) notes: Considering differences between democracies, semidemocracies, and autocracies, the results confirmed that democracies are more cooperative than other regime types. Governments in democracies were most likely to accommodate the opposition, and, at the same time, were least likely to display continuous repressive behavior. Also, the level of hostile state actions was lowest in democracies and highest in semi-democracies. However, if faced with popular dissent, democracies were just as likely to respond with negative sanctions as other regime types. Looking at the ability of negative sanctions to solicit dissident cooperation, democracies had a particularly bad record. In only one of six democracies repression led to dissident accommodation, compared to two out of four

32

3 Theoretical Dimensions of a Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings autocracies. In autocracies, hostile government behavior can sometimes successfully threaten the opposition into cooperation, but this approach is not particularly useful in democracies. Instead, democracies are more likely to respond with dissent to negative state sanctions and repression (2006:9).

Thus, (again) political repression against dissenters often increases as liberalization– democratization proceeds from autocracy with a peaking of political repression that is highest in the semidemocracies. Political repression then lessens in democracies where there is less continual repression against the opposition (Carey 2006; Henderson 1991; Poe and Neal Tate 1994; Rummel 1995). Nevertheless, democratic elites when confronted with popular dissident (perceived and/or real threats to legitimacy of their rule) will often respond, as in autocracies or semidemocracies, with equally negative state sanctions and repression.

Accountable Legal Institutions and Democratization Cause or Effect? To further understand the relationship between democratization and political repression, scholars have recently tried to disaggregate the various dimensions of political democracy. De Mesquita et al. (2005), in studying the relationship between democratization and political repression, for example, found a discontinuous step function in this relationship, that is to say, a sharp “threshold effect.” The authors, using the PTS scale,5 found in a quantitative study using multinational data from the Polity IV Project that there is only a dramatic improvement in the average human rights score after certain specific, complex, institutional conditions are reached. Specifically, a dramatic improvement in human rights occurs (1) only when a polity reaches a very high level of multiparty competition (defined as 5 years of continuous competition), (2) within a context of the [legal] regulation of this participation (defined with six steps), and (3) with restraints on the arbitrary exercise of executive power (containing seven steps) (De Mesquita et al. 2005:444, 453). The sequence and timing of these three dimensions were also found to be very important for the improvement of human rights. Whereas many polities can achieve open executive recruitment without maximal executive constraints, executive competition, or multiparty competition (4,089 instances), the authors found that multiparty competition in combination with the other dimensions (legal regulation of this participation and restraints on the arbitrary exercise of executive power) was only achieved in 66 cases (De Mesquita et al. 2005:455). It was much more common for a polity to achieve some level of competition in the selection of the executive. But the legal institutionalization of restraints on the abuse of human rights by the executive and/or by political parties in the course of electoral competition was much less likely.

Accountable Legal Institutions and Democratization

33

The finding that human rights abuses only decline significantly when legal institutions are robust adds an interesting dimension to the study of accountability. Unfortunately, however, the authors do not provide more detailed evidence of the nature of these steps regarding the legal regulation of participation or the restraints on the arbitrary exercise of executive power. This makes it very difficult to ascertain the plausible mechanism of change and the relationship between these complex variables that leads to accountable institutions.6 Furthermore, legal institutions seem to function simultaneously as both an independent variable (a cause) of accountability and a dependent variable (an effect of accountability) in this research. Accountable legal institutions appear to be almost an effect or dependent variable, since, by definition, it is only when a country is “already under a secure rule of law” that a nation at the highest levels of multiparty competition achieves a good human rights record (De Mesquita et al. 2005:445). Yet, legal institutions also are conceived of as a cause because a significant reduction in human rights abuses is only achieved when the institutions that support multiparty competition are supported by legal regulation on this participation and by restraints on the arbitrary exercise of executive power (De Mesquita et al. 2005:455). As Fox (2007:12) notes, it is difficult to clarify these relationships because not much is known about how innovations in accountability and participation which emerge “before democratic regime transitions” shape subsequent possibilities for state accountability-building.

Accountability and the Rule of Law One issue raised here for the study of political assassination relates to the meaning of the concept of a “secure rule of law.” The rule of law refers to a broad constellation of factors, which may or may not be empirically interrelated. Vallier (1971:223) has stressed the importance of “extricating the implied dimensions” of broad concepts if one is to make meaningful empirical statements about their effects. He describes the procedure as “disaggregating a concept or the exhausting of its analytical components.” This is helpful for ascertaining the combination of political, judicial, and law-enforcement elements that create a “soft” legal system. In trying to understand the rule of law concept, scholars frequently identify at least eight dimensions of it including the following: 1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2. Laws should be relatively stable; 3. The making of particular laws...must be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; 4. The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 5. The principles of natural justice must be observed (i.e., open and fair hearing and absence of bias); 6. The courts should have review powers...to ensure conformity to the rule of law; 7. The courts should be easily accessible; and 8. The discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law (Raz 1977:196).

Of these eight dimensions of the concept of the rule of law, only two dimensions purely address the issue of the development of institutional accountability. These


34

are: “the courts should have review powers...to ensure conformity to the rule of law” and, “the discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.” These are the dimensions that address the potential capacity for the rule of law to constrain and limit subjectively articulated power over individuals that do not conform to the strictures of law (Unger 1976:178–179; Thompson 1976:260) To be sure, the law may not be able to fulfill these hopes. As May (2005:11) notes: there are forms of social power that are articulated outside the purview of the law; the hoped for objectivity can never be achieved because the rule of law must by definition be the rule of lawyers and judges who interpret and deploy the law; and modern democratic states’ governments as legislators can never be separate from the interaction of conflicting social interests.

Nevertheless, one does not have to accept the rule of law as an unqualified human good to prefer it to other (autocratic) forms of rule (Fine 1984:175; Thompson 1976). If legal institutions that can curb arbitrary power are indeed one contributing cause of democratic accountability, then the timing of their development is critical. The relative robustness of such institutions to hold human rights abusers accountable prior to the achievement of multiparty competition in a given polity undergoing liberalization–democratization should matter a great deal from the standpoint of the violation of human rights (Fox 2007:11).

Impunity Impunity as a Structured System One way to empirically address the accountability dimension embedded in such a broad concept as the “rule of law” is to study its opposite – impunity. As Manaut (2000:153) argues at the global level, “the solution to the lack of global security... requires the elimination of impunity, thus making the full exercise of the rule of law indispensable....” Legal institutions that do not ensure punishment and/or accountability for political repression will guarantee a continuation of impunity for it, despite advances in the institutionalization of electoral competition. To make matters more complex even where parallel institutions of accountability such as electoral courts are being constructed during liberalization–democratization processes, there can be “lag-times” when social conflict (and political violence) actually increases before it decreases. This was the case in the construction of Mexico’s electoral institutions (Eisenstadt 2004, 2007) from 1988 to 2000; the same time period during which multiple political killings of PRD members took place. Since political repression (particularly the use of selective repression by political elites toward challengers) can actually increase under liberalization–democratization, ineffective legal institutions will ensure that it goes unpunished.

Political Assassination as a Calculated Strategy Embedded

35

Empirically, as noted above, there was a visible pattern of a short-term surge in political repression (the so-called Murder in the Middle) accompanied by very little prosecution of such violence in Mexico, and many African and Central Asian nations during the third wave of democratization. Electoral challenges from opposition political parties triggered short-term electoral-related violence as dominant party elites resorted to political repression and political killings to retain political power but with little legal punishment (Kirschke 2000:399–401). This political repression has taken a variety of forms: (a) in Mexico, in the 1990s, as argued in this book, as political assassination against political dissenters as urban and rural electoral clientelistic networks were challenged by opposition parties (Schatz 2001; Villareal 2002), (b) in Albania, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Nigeria, as shortterm bouts of electoral-related violence perpetrated by armed supporters of different candidates on their [legal] political opponents which have included physical attacks, harassment, mob violence, and the destruction of property, and (c) in Tanzania, and Kenya, as the use of government security forces to violently suppress political demonstrations (Human Rights Watch 1996a, b, 2002a, b, 2003). As Gurr (1993:165) notes, “communal groups in liberalizing autocracies have substantial opportunities for mobilization, but such states usually lack the institutional resources to reach the kinds of accommodation typical of established democracy.” Such opponent challenges to governing political elites in liberalizing autocracies and/or democratizing regimes take place within the context of legal systems that are “rule bound” but not necessarily “democratically rule-bound,” i.e., ensuring political rights, civil rights, and mechanisms of accountability (O’Donnell 2004:32). This distinction is important because impunity, to repeat a point made earlier in this chapter, can be understood as a structured system, i.e., one in which state actors partially comply with a set of established legal procedures in processing life-integrity violations and also one that produces the stability of impunity from prosecution over time. The rise of competitive elections between contending political parties at the local level within a liberalizing autocracy combines with judicial system ineffectiveness to facilitate political assassination as a form of interpersonal violence. I now turn to the interpolitical party dynamics that produced the wave of political assassination against the PRD with reference to Mexico after 1988.

Political Assassination as a Calculated Strategy Embedded in Interparty Relations Political Party Strategies: PAN, PRD, PRI The focus of this book is an in-depth examination of the political murder of PRD members in the years encompassing the birth of the party and its initial consolidation (1988–2005). The principal arena of interparty conflict during this period was between the FDN (Frente Democrático Nacional)/PRD and the PRI. The author

36


found no political-electoral homicides resulting from conflict between the FDN-PRD and the PAN (National Action Party). Neither the PAN nor the PT (Workers’ Party) has produced any similar type of document of the deaths of its militants, despite some cases of political repression against the militants of both parties (Rojas Alba 1996:24).7 The early period of the Salinas sexenio coincided with the breakdown of centralized presidential control, in terms of discipline in the ruling party and loyalty of government-aligned sectoral organizations (Cornelius 1999:5). PRI president Salinas de Gortari then was being challenged not only by a newly consolidating electoral left opposition but also by state-level PRI machines, especially in states where panista strength was increasing like Baja (1989), Guanajuato (1991), San Luis Potosí (1991) and where the PRI had suffered major setbacks in gubernatorial elections. The story of the political murder of PRD members suggests that Salinas dealt with these various challenges (from state-level PRI machines, from the panistas, and from the FDN-PRD) quite differently. With respect to the state-level priístas: “Salinas snuffed out these challenges through various tactics and, in doing so, won points in international media, financial, and governmental circles for his ‘democratizing’ actions (Cornelius 1999:5).” Panista gubernatorial victories in the states of Baja California, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí were recognized by Salinas and the national head of the PRI. The elected PRI governors in the latter two states were pressured to resign in the face of criticisms of electoral irregularities by opposition parties, independent electoral observers, and the international media. In other words, Salinas began a strategy of negotiating electoral victories with panistas, thereby quelling state-level rebellion within his own party. The FDN-PRD fared less well, however, in the Salinas calculus, and his attitude toward the perredista challenge was much more repressive, as the accounts in this book suggest. One top PRD official said, [then President] Salinas de Gortari, “saw us [in 1988] not as political rivals, but rather as enemies to be exterminated (La Jornada 10/11/00).” A strategy of “divide and rule the opposition” developed, which was quite effective for Salinas and clearly had implications for the political murder of PRD members over the sexenio. The PRI was willing to “horse-trade” electoral victories to the PAN in exchange for the party’s support of PRI initiatives, such as constitutional amendments on land reform and Church–state relations and for PAN certification of President Zedillo’s victory in 1994. In addition, often the PAN leadership would not allow panistas to engage in direct criticism of Salinas, despite their awareness of high levels of fraud in an election. Panista leader Javier Paz Zarza, in light of electoral fraud in the 1990 Mexico State election, decided to file a complaint to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights of the OEA against President Salinas de Gortari. Yet, this attempt was cut short when Javier Paz Zarza was removed from his position by the national PAN leadership, a removal some interpret as part of a deal between the PAN leadership and the PRI Interior Minister in exchange for recognizing a PAN victory in Mérida, Yucatán (Gómez-Tagle 1994). The PRD, on the other hand, was a weaker, very loosely organized political party that “lacked the discipline to ‘deliver’ on quid pro quo promises to the federal PRI government in exchange for local postelectoral concessions and had less to offer the

Puebla

37

PRI federal government (Eisenstadt 1999:272–273).8” The PRD often acted as an antiregime party, that is to say, a “hard-line opposition which refuses to even participate in authoritarian institutions and seeks instead to undermine them, usually via protest mobilizations (Eisenstadt 2000:8).” I argue that these differing political party strategies, a hard-line policy of political repression toward the PRD intertwined with the political activism of perredistas in small towns to explain why so many PRD political activists were assassinated as compared to panista activists.

Social Origins and Political Activism Contrary to popular perception, it is too simplistic to argue that PRD activists were killed because they were predominantly poor and rural or conversely that PAN activists were spared from political assassination mainly because they were from urban, wealthy families. Social origins alone do not explain the targeting of the PRD. There were, in fact, some well-to-do panistas who were either assassinated or died under suspicious circumstances during the 1988–1994 period. They included Judith Barrio, the daughter of Francisco Barrio, then PAN candidate for governor in the state of Chihuahua (June 27, 1992) and Manuel Clothier, PAN leader, activist and PAN presidential candidate who died in a mysterious auto accident (Rojas Alba 1996:487). Several other PAN members were killed in Mexico State, Oaxaca, Mexico City, and Zacatecas (US State Department 1999:4; PBI 2001:2; Reforma 9/7/02; La Jornada 3/28/03). Finally, several high-ranking panistas including the General Secretary of the PAN in Yucatán (8/18/91), Tatiana Clouthier, daughter of Manuel Clothier (Sinaloa 11/7/92) and a PAN mayoral candidate in Sinaloa (11/10/92) were victims of assassination attempts, and of beating, wounding, or torture (Rojas Alba 1996:451–489). Furthermore, when the PAN did join with the PRD in sponsoring a joint candidate for municipal president, their members were also injured. For example, during the October 1992 PAN-PRD municipal presidential campaign (Cuidad Madero, Tamaulipas), two panistas were beaten up on, on October 11. The joint PRD-PAN candidate, Alfredo Pliego Aldana (ex-Federal PRD Deputy) suffered an assassination attempt on his life on that day (Rojas Alba 1996:476). Thus, some urban, well-todo panistas and those interacting with perredistas in joint candidacies were also injured or died from political murder.

Puebla The case of Puebla provides a pertinent example of how social origins and political activism, combined with an existing hard-line policy of political repression toward the party, put perredistas at high-risk for political assassination. Over the next several sections, I examine the rural–urban origins, occupations, and histories of political activism of murdered PRD members as background to their political

38


assassination in Puebla. Ultimately, it was the intersection of the political strategies of both PRD rank and file, and PRI top leaders toward the PRD combined with their social and political origins that explains the targeting of perredistas for political assassination. Political assassination is, thus, a calculated strategy embedded in interparty relations. The example of Puebla discussed here also provides a brief preview of the larger, cross-sectional empirical analysis of victims and perpetrators considered in the next chapter.

Social Origins A close examination of some data on the social origins of PRD victims in the state of Puebla is found in Table 3.1. Social Origins of PRD Victims of Political Murder in Puebla shows how the social origins of perredistas intersected with political party activism to produce their political assassination. This information was taken from Luna (Crónica Puebla 1997) who conducted in-depth personal interviews with families of 71% of the 38 PRD victims of political murder in Puebla (1988–1997). Puebla was a politically complex state during the Salinas sexenio. The FDN/ PRD concentrated its forces in rural areas and small cities, whereas the PAN dominated in the capital city. The PRD won 6.3% of the vote in the November 1989 municipal elections and won in six municipalities in conjunction with the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Communista Mexicana – PCM) (Elections and Events 1992:4). The PAN won six municipalities, but the PRI won the overwhelming preponderance of Puebla’s municipalities (196 municipalities).9 The PAN won in the municipalities of Tehuacán, San Martín Texmelucan (Crónica de Gobierno 1994:449), Tezuitlán, Esperanza, Chapulco, and Yeyualtepec (El Sol de Puebla 10/16/07). Listed below are some comparative population figures that compare the level of urbanization in the state of Puebla (1990) with the population concentrations of the towns and cities where PRD members were killed in Puebla. The population data also compares the municipalities won by the PAN in the November 1989 local elections with the level of urbanization in Puebla State (1990). The population numbers are expressed in gradients of (a) towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, (b) towns and cities with population sizes between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, and (c) cities/metropolitan areas in which more than 50,000 persons reside. The data in Fig. 3.1 show that a high number of perredistas (70%) were killed in small towns and settlements (less than 10,000 inhabitants). Some 11% of all PRD members were killed in medium-sized cities and suburban areas, and 15% were assassinated in large cities and the capital city (Puebla). These data strongly suggest that the political murder of PRD members was much more likely to occur in less densely populated areas of the state of Puebla. After all, only 14% of the 1990 distribution of the Puebla population resided in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants. Yet, 70% of all perredistas were killed in such places (Borisovna and Velez 1991). In contrast, panista electoral victories in the November 1989 Puebla elections were

a

Place of death

San Juan Amecac

San Juan Amecaca San Juan Amecaca

San Juan Amecaca Puebla

Atilxcoa Acteopan Tepeojumaa Town

Amozoc

San Juan Amecac

Tehuacan

Chiautla de Tapia

Tepangoa

Cholula

Cuayuca

Coxcatlán suburba

Date (n = 27)

September 16, 1988

September 16, 1988 September 16, 1988

September 16, 1988 February 18, 1989

April 10, 1989 May 1, 1989 August 26, 1989

January 13, 1990

March 26, 1990

February 22, 1990

November 20, 1990

April 21, 1990

May 29, 1990

June 10, 1992

September 3, 1992

Highwaya

City

Atilxco

City

City

City Town

Capital

4,863

37,791

3,800

9,078

172,510

3,619

60,517

86,173 2,339 4,645

3,619 1,007,170

Politician

Student

Politicians

Politician

Politician

Peasant/bonesetter

Mechanic

Ex-Communists

Student

Son/above University

Son/above Peasant

Age 17

Father/son

Age 41

BA degree

Age 7

Age 25 Age 25

Peasant

3,619 3,619 3,619

Occupation/age/education

Population size in 1990

Table 3.1 Social origins of PRD victims of political murder in Puebla

(continued)

One owns home/all three killed after PRD meeting Killed painting electoral propaganda SJP assassinated him at municipal election Municipal president candidate shot by police at MP Leader killed by a drunken auxiliary policeman Both shot while buying fertilizer at a store Killed by stray police gunfire, antifraud rally Four assassinated near bus/names on a blacklist Seven bullets in face near bus returning from DF

First grade education; one-room adobe house All four killed in auto by roadside Student political and factory organizer Student activist

Small land-owner/sells cattle at market/owns car

Wealth/how killed

Puebla 39

Buenavista Coxcatlán suburb

Coxcatlán suburb

Tzintzingo

Huaquechula

Puebla Puebla

Venus.Carr. Town

Tehuitzingo Santiago Xalitzintla

Villa Lázaro Cárdenas

January 3, 1993 March 1, 1993

March 1, 1993

March 4, 1993

October 3, 1993

January 19, 1994 July 29, 1994

May 23, 1995

December 12, 1995 April 7, 1997

September 29, 1997

Chiautlaa

Capital Capital

Chiautla

Chietla

9,084

4,869 2,000

5,347

1,007,170 1,007,170

2,966

900

4,863

1,396 4,863

Population size in 1990

Age 46

Age 55

Age 70

Age 55

Age 70

Peasant

Age 63

Politician Owns car PRD Aux. policeman

Politician

Professor

Baker

Politician

Retired

Occupation/age/education

a

SJP State Judicial Police, Mun Pol municipal police, MP municipal palace, DF federal district, Ecol. Reg ecology regent Assassinated in auto, near bus or highway, in taxi Source: CHR (1994) and Crónica Puebla (1997)

Place of death

Date (n = 27)

Table 3.1 (continued)

FDN activist, union organizer for professors Ecol. Reg. opposed PRI MP and illegal logging History of political organizing Ambushed/assassinated by PRI hired guns Beaten to death by unknowns in fields

Shot, antifraud rally, PRI MP/PRI/ Mun Pol. Shot two times by the abovementioned assassins helping the abovementioned victim Six SJP abduct to car, beat him/ dies en route Killed in shoot-out with police at MP

Wealth/how killed

40 3 Theoretical Dimensions of a Structured System of Impunity for Political Killings

Puebla

41

Puebla State 1990 Urbanization Index

Puebla State,1989 Size of Locations of PRD deaths

Puebla State,1989 Size of PAN-won Municipalities

44% 10,000

15% 10,000

50% 10,000

Source: Borisovna & Velez 1991; Crónica de Gobierno 1994:449; El Sol de Puebl a, 10/16/07; CHR 1994; Enciclopedia de los Municipios de Mexico, 2000.

Fig. 3.1 Comparative municipal size of opposition won municipalities, Puebla, 1989

located in municipalities with population structures that more closely approximated the 1990 overall Puebla State population distribution. Yet, rural location per se cannot be simply understood to be a necessary factor leading to political assassination; nor is urban location a necessary constraint against political violence. Rojas Alba (1996:451–489) records a large total of 986 incidents of violence related to electoral processes (1988–1994) in all of Mexico’s states for all political parties and bystanders. This figure includes a range of human rights violations including political assassinations, attempted political assassinations, disappearances, suspicious or political accidents, death threats/criminal plans, illegal jailing, property damage, staged robberies, physical aggression, wounding, and/or torture.10 Many of these events took place in highly urbanized metropolitan areas and large cities such as Merida (Yucatán), San Andrés Tuxtla (Veracruz), Chilpancingo (Guerrero), Toluca (Mexico), Tepic (Nayarit), Campeche (Campeche), Federal District, Matamoros (Coahuila), among others. Furthermore, a small town does not necessarily mean an isolated rural hamlet. La Trinidad (Tepango) (pop. 3,800 – Table 3.1) is actually a settlement located only a 5-min drive down the highway from a medium-sized city. Coxcatlán (pop. 4,863), to give another example, is only an hour drive southeast of the city of Tehuacan (pop. 172,510). Atlixo (pop. 86,173) is a suburb to a city of 50,000 inhabitants, which is slowly extending over the core of a municipality, i.e., the definition of a Mexican “metropolitan area” (INEGI 1990). Amozoc (pop. 60,517) is the municipal seat of Amozoc de Mota municipality, and one perredista was assassinated near there as he got off a bus (Crónica Puebla 1997:54). Indeed, the access of many of these towns to a highway is very salient in interpreting these data since a full 37% of the victims were assassinated on a highway or in a bus during travel. As shown in Table 3.1, three perredistas and the 7-year-old son of one of them were assassinated in their car on a road between Atlixco (pop. 86,173) and San Juan Amecac (pop. 3,619) (Crónica Puebla 1997:16–17). A prominent PRD leader and electoral activist in the PRD 1994 presidential campaign (Praxedis Ramírez Guevara) was assassinated while filling up at a gas station on the highway returning from Oaxaca to Tehuitzingo (pop. 4,869) at 1:30 pm. A gray automobile without license plates pulled up at the gas station, and a hired PRI gun shot him with eight bullets from a 0.22 caliber firearm (Crónica Puebla 1997:36).

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Table 3.1 also details the occupational data, available on 20 adult PRD victims. The occupational data do not suggest that the PRD victims were predominantly peasants. Table 3.1 shows that the majority were politicians (40%), 25% peasants, 20% university-educated (students, professors), 10% engaged in skilled trades (baker, mechanic), and 5% retired (elderly). What this means is that a large percentage of the Puebla perredista victims were politicians. They held political offices such as Municipal President, PRD State Congressional Deputy, Supplemental State Congressional Deputy, Educational Regent, and PRD Municipal Organizing Secretary. Many of these victims were elected, town-dwelling politicians working in auxiliary municipal government posts. [Auxiliary positions are subordinate governmental offices to the head municipal government offices located in the municipal seat (usually largest town or city) within each of Puebla’s 216 municipalities]. Such auxiliary posts held by perredista victims included Auxiliary Policeman, members of the Auxiliary Municipal City Council, and electoral workers for the Auxiliary Municipal Presidential candidate (CHR 1994; Crónica Puebla 1997). Another important point revealed by Table 3.1 is that these victims were not the very poorest of Mexican society. Some owned cars and homes in towns. Others had enough bus money to travel to larger cities on business. While some PRD peasants did live in one-room adobe homes; others owned small landholdings or sold cattle at the market. These data, although based on a small sample size, reflect a social base typical of a small town (a mixed peasant base, skilled town craftsmen, and individuals with sufficient wealth to run for office). As Gledhill (1995:78) argues, the PRD was a Center-Left party built on a complex alliance of segments of different social classes, one reason why it has been difficult for the PRD to articulate a traditional class-based perspective.

Political Activism and PRD Victims in Puebla A close examination of Table 3.1 strongly suggests that the common feature of the PRD victims was less their social origins than their political activism. Most, if not all, victims were engaged in political activism of a type that irritated the established political order. This political activism, combined with an existing hard-line policy of political repression toward the party, put them at high-risk for political assassination. One of the university-educated victims had a long history of political activism that included student and professor union organizing, organizing university student houses, organization of urban poor neighborhoods, and organization of housewives, ejidatarios, and factory workers. His latter union organizing put him in direct opposition to the PRI CROC (worker’s union). Similarly, one peasant, the principal organizer of the FDN in 1988 in San Juan Amecac, ran into immediate conflict with caciques from the PRI CROM (labor federation) of Atlixco because he was taking away their political clientele. Although they attempted to take him back into the PRI fold, since he had previously been an organizer for the PRI’s peasant organization

Puebla

43

(the CNC), he refused (Crónica Puebla 1997:19). The CROM considered another victim (a politician) as “an obstacle” to regaining municipal power, according to PRD leaders in Atlixco, because he was successful in obtaining bank credit for local farmers in the suburb where the PRD won the Auxiliary Presidency in 1990 (CHR 1994:271; Crónica Puebla 1997:46). The PRD Education Regent assassinated in Coxcaltlán had put in a legal challenge to the land ownership claim of PRI paramilitary group Antorcha Campesina of a parcel of land currently occupied by a school (Crónica Puebla 1997:57). As a result, the director of PRI-affiliated Antorcha Campesina threatened all the PRD members of the San Juan Cuautla Auxiliary City Council that they would “suffer the consequences.” Many of the Puebla PRD victims were also founding members of the FDN/PRD (30%). One founding member of the PRD in his community served as local deputy from Acatlán (1989–1992), leader of the Puebla National Education Worker’s Union, an electoral activist in the 1994 PRD presidential bid and had a long history of political activism on the Left in the 1980s (leader, Mexican Communist Party, Mexican Socialist Party). The week before his assassination at a gas station, he had received death threats for filing legal claims against some of the PRI electoral victories in various municipalities in the November 1995 local elections (Crónica Puebla 1997:36). As the data in the next chapter from all the Mexican states where perredistas were killed also suggest, political activism, especially in small towns where perredista politicians confronted PRI municipal authorities, was a predominate risk factor for political assassination.

Political Assassination in Mexico: A Calculated Strategy The Salinas strategy of “divide and rule the opposition” – negotiating electoral victories with panistas in exchange for PAN support for PRI federal initiatives versus a strategy of political repression against the PRD – was reflected at the state level. In Puebla, panistas also engaged in irritating, disruptive protests against the PRI including public proclamations of PRI electoral fraud. Militant panistas burned about 1,000 voting cards and a coffin at the doors of the Puebla Federal Electoral Registry in an antifraud protest in Tehuacán (1992) (Rojas Alba 1996:213–215). PAN member Teodoro Ortega reported that violence had occurred in the process of voting when priístas threatened some citizens in the municipality of Tlaola, Puebla (Rojas Alba 1996:215). Yet, no panistas were killed in these events. Perredistas, in contrast, were both more heavily repressed and more actively militant in response to electoral fraud. While panistas called publicly for President Salinas to annul the November 1992 elections in Puebla, perredistas forced their way into offices of the Central State Electoral Commission when their access to legal means to submitting petitions was blocked (Rojas Alba 1996:213). And in other states, as Cornelius (1996:75) argued, “the behavior of the PRI-government apparatus in several key elections held during the Salinas sexenio [1988–1994

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(Michoacán 1989; Mexico 1990)] signaled that it would never allow a PRD government to come to power at the state level anywhere in the country.” This “behavior of the PRI-government apparatus,” however, requires further clarification. Few modern states, of course, will openly engage in the extrajudicial (illegal) murder of their own citizens. Therefore, there are few scholarly efforts to study the question of political leadership in authorization for extrajudicial murder, let alone its federal, state, or local authorization origins. It is known that historically states have both actively subcontracted out the extrajudicial murder of political opponents to quasi-state and/or private actors in some cases, maintaining “plausible deniability” for such acts. This allows a state to claim that such unlawful violence is not the work of the state or its security forces (Campbell 2000). States, in other cases, have merely tolerated death squad activity, often by private (nonstate) individuals. Politicians, in rural Nicaragua in 1926, played a central role where a gang associated with the Conservative political party engaged in the very public, and gruesome, tactical use of electorally related political assassination of 49 Liberal party members. The gangs would commonly announce their assaults with shouts and gun blasts. They often surprised their victims in their homes and wounded them with machete blows or gunshots. Gang members bound their victim’s hands with rope, raped the women, and beat their loved ones. They would often slash, bludgeon, or otherwise torture their bleeding victims as they paraded noisily through the adjacent village, to a selected nearby site of execution where they would perform various rituals of death and dismemberment – all to the raucous sounds of gunfire, shouts, music, songs, laughter, and drinking. Schroeder (2000) calls this “death squad” violence because “soft targets” (unarmed civilians) were largely killed and because the aim of the murder was to put fear into one’s political rivals, presumably to dissuade further political activism. Liberal gangs also existed in Nicaragua at the time, and they too killed their conservative opponents. The political assassination of PRD leaders and members in Mexico, as a form of political repression, displays some important similarities and differences with this case. As in Nicaragua, the killing of PRD members did often put fear in the population. In Puebla, three founding PRD members died on a Sunday, right after attending a founding meeting for the PRD in Teopejuma (8/26/89) while waiting on the highway for a bus. A Ford car, gold colored without license plates, traveling from the north to the south pulled up next to the victims, and a gun was put through the window. All three PRD members were shot to death. According to Don Hermilio Martínez, an ex-Communist leader who was present immediately after the assassination: When I arrived, party-member Eleuterio was still alive, he was the oldest, and I asked him who did it but he could not speak. All he managed to say was “Long-live Cárdenas!” and then he died in my arms. Later the priest arrived and the Public Ministry and who knows from where appeared the various patrol cars that had been hidden, watching the PRD organizational meeting. Back then I had a small car which is where they put the three dead ones. Nobody wanted to come with me. Everybody went home, they were scared, that was the point, to put fear in us and they had achieved that (emphasis added). Only one [PRD] party member came with me and that was because he had been drinking (1997:31).

End Notes

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Yet, unlike the Nicaraguan case, this political assassination was not a wide public event with random victims; nor was it necessarily intended to leave eyewitnesses, nor were there rival PAN or PRD political party gangs assassinating members of another political party (Schroeder 2000). In Puebla, the political assassination of PRD members did not look like indiscriminate “death squad” activity (Campbell 2000). Rather, the political murder of many Puebla perredistas was planned and executed ahead, often toward selected targets. As Don Hermilio Martínez put it of the triple assassination in Teopejuma: “I think that they were hunting them (Crónica Puebla 1997:31).”

End Notes or a detailed discussion of the historical and nation-specific countries involved in the three F waves and reverse waves of democratization, see Huntington (1991:16). Mexico had its first, fair competitive presidential election in 2000, which ended 71 years of single-party dictatorial rule and was, at that time, considered to have been part of this the wave of democratization. 2 As compared with the number of deaths from communal conflicts, civil wars, international wars, and dictatorships, the death toll from liberalization–democratization processes is quite limited (Huntington 1991:192–207). Nevertheless, this observation does not deny the impact of political killings associated with liberalization–democratization processes on the individual victims and their families. The impact of such political killings, in addition, is also social in nature insofar as it has intergenerational effects on multiple persons beyond the single victim. This intergenerational effect is discussed further in Chap. 6. 3 As Zepeda Lecuona (2002:83) notes the following of the Mexican legal system in general: “The agencies within the Attorney General Offices have long promoted objectives that parallel legal or de facto institutional goals: profiting from and illegal use of arbitrary powers by justice system functionaries and officials. These individuals abuse their authority with impunity. In a virtual “privatization” of civil service, deciding which cases will be processed has turned into auction, with court services going to the highest bidder.” 1

ee Washington Valdez (2006:140) regarding alleged high-level pacts between Mexican politiS cians, law enforcement officials, and drug lords. As with political killings, perpetrators of civil homicide in “soft” legal systems can take advantage of the knowledge that there is a structured system of impunity from prosecution to proceed with their crimes. Low-level drug dealers, for example, were reported to have engaged in the Juárez femicides “because they know they could get away with it” (Washington Valdez 2006:191). 5 The PTS scale measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index come from the yearly reports of Amnesty International and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. In the construction of an index for each year for each report, countries are scaled as if the reports are accurate and complete. Level 1 is as follows: “Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.” Level 2 is as follows: “There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.” Level 3 is as follows: “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with our without a trial, for political views is accepted.” Level 4 is as follows: “Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level, terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.” Level 5 is as follows: “Terror has expanded to the 4

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whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals (Terror Scale 2008).” 6 To further complicate matters, in practice, a regime may employ, in a historical sequence all types of political repression–imprisonment, then torture and then killings as occurred in the Argentine Dirty War (Lewis 2001) and in other cases of political repression. 7 There were, of course, priísta political activists killed in episodes of political violence; and some priístas were assassinated as the result of intraparty conflict within the PRI during these years. These include two high-level PRI members who were assassinated (Luis Donaldo Colosio and José Francisco Ruíz Massieu, the PRI presidential candidate and party leader) in March and September 1994. Rojas Alba (1996:25) also documents ten priísta deaths between 1988 and 1994. Supporters of the PRI in Chiapas after the January 1994 EZLN uprising, were ambushed, killed, and expelled from various communities (Implausible Deniability 1997:71–72, 80). PRI supporters, in interviews with Human Rights Watch, blamed the PRD, priests, and a PRDaffiliated group called “Night Ant” for armed confrontations in Venustiano Carranza and Chilón municipalities. In the wake of the July 2, 2000 election, which the PRI lost, confrontation within the PRI over a municipal government post in Cuatitlán, Mexico caused the death of 15 PRI members, the wounding of 98 with 5 critically wounded (La Jornada, 8/19/00:1). The outgoing PRI major of the town of Santa Catarina Yosunotuú, Oaxaca was also killed in postelectoral violence (Proceso 1/11/93:26). Deaths of priístas in postelectoral and shoot-outs with perredistas, allegations of anti-PRI deaths at the hands of perredistas, and the political assassinations of panistas that coincide in time and space with the political murder of PRD member in the states of Puebla, Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Michoacán (Proceso 6/5/89:10; Proceso 6/5/89:26) can be found in the appendix. 8 The PAN, in contrast, which acted largely as a “patronage seeking party”, was “an opposition willing to play by authoritarian rules, with the eventual but distant objective of liberalizing the electoral system, but obtaining office, public financing, and other resources in the meantime, in exchange for loyally ‘fronting’ opposition candidates to make the regime look competitive (Eisenstadt 2000:8).” 9 There were 217 mayorships in dispute (Crónica de Gobierno 1994:449). 10 This global list of 986 listed incidents include the 250 perredista deaths (1988–2004) discussed in this book as well as other human rights violations against PRD members, which make up the majority of the incidents on the list. In addition, there includes incidents of violence against other political actors such as those against panistas, priístas, parmistas, socialists, communists, other leftists, zapatistas, peasant and/or agrarian movement members, independents, policemen, journalists, photographers, lawyers, and members of civil society (urban leaders, indigenous persons, children, PRD office staff, PRD sympathizers, mothers/fathers of PRD members, and individuals engaged in petty commerce).

Chapter 4

Authorizing Political Killing in Mexico: The Importance of a Destructive Social Milieu

Introduction It is well known in the literature that state crimes frequently culminate in socially harmful behaviors that violate fundamental human rights (Ross 1995, 2000). Massacres, police brutality, torture, disappearances, and summary executions are among those practices committed by the state (the elected and appointed officials and the bureaucracy), which are frequently documented by civil liberties associations, human rights groups, and even official national human rights commissions (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, National Lawyers Guild, among others) worldwide. Other state crimes, according to research conducted largely in the advanced industrialized countries, involve other illegal and socially harmful practices such as cover-ups, corruption, bribery, tax evasion by politicians, and illegal domestic surveillance (Ross 2000:1). Interestingly, however, despite a body of emergent scholarship documenting state crimes, very little is actually known about individual level responses in group processes that culminate in such destructive behaviors. The majority of studies have emerged from the structural theoretical tradition, which views state crimes as a function of social class relations in which agents of state power (the police, the military, intelligence agencies) perpetuate domestic and international inequalities (Barak 2000; Ross 1995:6).While such work has been essential, Ross (2000:200) argues that even more studies are needed to examine those processes at the individual and group level that motivate individuals in groups, and by extension, states, to engage in crimes that include political killings. What, for example, is the role of political leaders in creating a social milieu that authorizes political killing as the systematic execution of domestic political opponents in cold blood? How do ideological similarities between contending political parties play a role in precipitating deadly violence? To what extent are hired guns, the police, or political party members more or less likely to be the perpetrators of political murder? In this chapter, I examine the interaction between several social and individuallevel determinants that led to the political killings of PRD members. Of the hundreds of leftist political party militants killed, the majority were found to have been gunned down by agents associated with the state (local politicians associated with


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4 Authorizing Political Killing in Mexico

the dominant-party state, police) or indirectly by hired guns on behalf of state leaders (Schatz 2001). Eisenstadt (2004:122) found that the conflict between the exruling party (the PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the leftist PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) resulted in a total of over a hundred deaths of leftist party activists in Mexico due directly to postelectoral conflicts during the 1989–1994 period. The political killing of PRD members is interesting because viewing it through the prism of PRI-PRD relations illustrates the role of leadership rationalization and authorization of destructive behavior. The social–psychological literature suggests that a precipitating condition to destructive violence is the development of a set of beliefs on the part of those who commit the violence that the other side is dangerous or bent on destruction and therefore can justifiably be destroyed (Smelser 1998; Goldberg 2002; Baumeister 1997). Yet, while this precipitating condition can bring people to the threshold of destructive behavior, it does not necessarily lead to deadly violence. Similarly, in the Mexican case, the political murder of leftist dissidents did not commence until it was ostensibly authorized by top political leaders. I argue that leadership authorization of destructive behavior was the critical historical condition activating political killing because it created a permissive social milieu that allowed for the utilization of more extreme forms of violence including the use of political assassination as a mode of social control.

The Mexican Dynamic of Political–Electoral Homicide After 1988: A Difficult Time for the PRD State violence in Mexico has a long history that reaches back well before the formal birth of the PRD.1 Yet, numerous analysts have noted that the rise of the PRD onto the national stage resulted in particularly bitter conflicts between PRD militants and PRI caciques (local power brokers). The history of the period of PRD–PRI (post-1988) relations is largely one in which conflicts over the 1988 presidential election results radicalized the PRD as did conflicts over subsequent municipal elections (1989, 1991) in various Mexican states. Aggrieved perredistas, believing their own candidates had been deprived of their rightful victories, escalated levels of protest from postelectoral rallies and marches to the actual takeover of municipal governments in some instances. Militant PRD peasant members also took over municipal palaces when they suspected official corruption and the poor management of resources in their districts. Violent police action often followed to recover them into government hands in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Mexico State. The political killing of PRD members occurred when state repression against PRD leaders and members including intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, death threats, the spreading of false rumors, defamation, and libel escalated to political assassination (Schatz 2001). Thus, collective violence occurred as a by-product of the resistance of the ruling coalition of elites to PRD demands for changes to the social order, including free and fair elections.

Part I: The Activation of Historical Conditions for Destructive Behavior

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Methods My aim in this chapter is to examine the interaction between some of the social and individual-level determinants of political assassination in the Mexican case of liberalization–democratization. Democratization implies change, and as Simmel (1971:205) argues, change is marked by social conflict. Conflict never takes a singular form but varies in intensity, duration, and context. Furthermore, in any given empirical case, several sets of social and psychological variables combine and interact with one another in very complicated ways (Smelser 1998:59). Toward this end, in Part I of this chapter, I rely on interviews,2 news accounts, government reports, and political party documents that document the flourishing of political assassination against the political opposition in Mexico. I also rely on the 1,000-page investigative governmental report by the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH – Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos 1994), which corroborates and verifies official state responsibility for the political homicides of PRD members. In condensed summary, the CNDH (1994) report found that various state officials failed to conform to proper legal procedures in over 90% of the processing of the PRD homicides. In Part II of this chapter, I construct and discuss a table of the perpetrators, victims, and judicial outcomes of the 250 murders of perredistas during the Salinas sexenio (1988–1994). This table is based on data published by the National PRD Parliamentary Group’s Secretariat and contains research on the political murders of the PRD members, and summaries of judicial action and CNDH findings (CHR 1994).

Part I: The Activation of Historical Conditions for Destructive Behavior The Role of Leadership Authorization The development of a cognitive framework that views the other side as malicious and one’s own social struggle as righteous may bring people to the threshold of destructive behavior, but such beliefs alone do not, of course, necessarily lead groups to erupt into destructive behavior. Deadly violence appears to also require the activation of certain additional historical conditions that “come into existence, moreover, when destructive behavior is authorized and rationalized (Smelser 1998:89).” The role of authorization in relation to destructive behavior can vary. In its most obvious form, it can involve either direct (official policy) such as when a totalitarian state authorizes mass destruction, concentration camps, or slave labor camps. Similarly, political authorization for destructive behavior can take the form of setting a climate in which “anything goes.” So, for example, while not ordering civilian massacres, the military policies in Vietnam of search and destroy, free-fire zones, and “using whatever means are necessary to destroy the enemy” can set the climate

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that encourages military units to exceed whatever limits on destructiveness may otherwise be observed (Smelser 1998:90). Another form of political authorization of destructive behavior appears to be more subtle. In this case, the political or military authority may simply remain silent, “thus establishing an atmosphere that does not oblige troops to destroy but does not oblige them not to either. Furthermore, if effective counter-authorizing agencies – for example, courts capable for handing down severe penalties for brutality – do not exist or are feeble, the probabilities are increased that evil may be authorized or quasi-authorized with impunity. A posture of permissiveness or ambiguity on the part of the authorities, while it does not openly or positively sanction murder, can be enough to guarantee the perpetuation of it (Smelser 1998:90).” Authorization can be distinguished from impunity where the latter means “exemption from punishment” and refers, as in international law, to the failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice (International Criminal Court 2009). Authorization implies endorsement, allowance, sanction, approbation or permission, and, in federal political systems, can originate from local, state and/ or federal officials. In the Mexican dynamic, a key element in the process of the initiating authorization of deadly violence by political party members appears to be the pivotal role of leaders. Top political leaders were central in initially creating a social milieu that appeared to tolerate the potential use of destructive behavior. Five months before the July 1988 presidential elections, for example, PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari warned that those who might resort to civil disobedience over electoral results would face unpleasant consequences (Horcasistas 1989:286). These unpleasant consequences seemed quite menacing and specifically aimed at leftist PRD dissidents. PRI leader Víctor Manzanilla Schaffer, for example, stood with the president and declared that “it was better to commit an injustice than to tolerate disorder.” Then candidate Salinas de Gortari added, “in politics, alliances are valid. Those that ally themselves with my party will earn a tangible political response. Those that form alliances against my party will have to suffer the consequences. That is the way politics works (Horcasistas 1989:286).” The rise of the PRD onto the national stage also coincided with Salinas’ selection of members for the top intelligence posts. Both the top secretary of domestic security and the head of the Mexico City police had been previously key leaders and/or members of the White Brigade, a clandestine paramilitary police unit that was responsible for the “disappearance” of thousands of leftist political opponents of the regime during the 1972–1980 period. As Reding (1989:23) notes, “Were there any lingering doubts about the meaning of these appointments, they were set aside by Rocha (the head of the Mexico City judicial police) who volunteered that ‘I was appointed to persuade the cardenista majority in this city not to insist on its political, social and constitutional rights’” (quoted from Proceso 12/26/89). Conversely, if a leader decides against the authorization of destructive behavior, this can stem the progression to deadly violence. One example from the Mexican dynamic was the ability of one PRD town leader to stop a mob lynching of a PRI policeman on the day the PRI mayor was to take office in a town whose election


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results had been challenged as fraudulent by PRD members. As the inauguration day of the PRI mayor proceeded, a group of perredistas sought to lash out in violent rage at the policeman guarding the PRI mayor. Said rank-and-file PRD member Catalán García, “If it hadn’t been for [the intervention of perredista leader] Dr. Raúl Morales, we would have lynched him… We won the election by 80% (Proceso 2/12/90:8).” In other words, the refusal of a political leader to authorize the use of deadly violence was sufficient to stop a mob lynching.

Selective Political Assassinations Interestingly, the first political assassination of the leftist opposition leader occurred a few months after the initial statements by top PRI Mexican political leaders. Four days before the most contested presidential election in Mexico’s history in Mexico City in 1988, the two high-ranking members of PRD president Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ opposition front – Francisco Xavier Ovando and his aide Román Gil Hernández – were assassinated in a blind alley in Mexico City (CHR 1994:57). Francisco Xavier Ovando, in charge of the creating the system of electoral oversight, had constructed a hierarchical oversight system in all 32 states (including the Federal District), with 300 leaders and 5,000 ballot box watchers, all of whom would communicate their observations of the voting process by private telephone lines known only by him (Rojas Alba 1996:38). Since the computer system was so strongly centralized, it was impossible for the FDN to rapidly substitute Francisco Xavier Ovando’s system3 and thus impossible to articulate an independent national electoral computer oversight system. Later, President Salinas privately stated to top PRD leaders that he was against those responsible for the assassination of Francisco Xavier Ovando (Proceso 6/30/96:18). The assassins of Francisco Xavier Ovando and Román Gil Hernández were apparently directed to broadcast the murders publicly on the day of the crime, since they called the police immediately afterward to report the assassinations and the exact whereabouts of the bodies. Subsequently, both a PRI state attorney general and a personal childhood friend of Salinas became credible suspects to the double assassination.4 Next, 2 months after the murder of Francisco Xavier Ovando and Román Gil Hernández, professional political assassins were also employed to murder leftist candidate for a Veracruz mayorship named Inocencio Romero Júarez, the second political assassination of the Salinas’ administration. Inocencio Romero Júarez was shot by an individual named Virgilio Ávila López who was posing as a representative from the Veracruz State Electoral Commission (CHR 1994:302; CNDH 1994:285–287). Virgilio Ávila López allegedly went to the front door of Inocencio Romero Júarez’s home on the evening of September 10, 1988 and told him that he had been sent by the State Electoral Commission with the papers that needed to be signed. As Inocenio Romero Júarez approached his front door to speak with him, the assassin said to him “come over here friend” and then took out

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his pistol and shot him four times in cold blood in front of his family. His wife tried to protect her family and to push the assassin away, grabbing at his shirt, but he managed to escape. Inocenio Romerio Júarez had previously received threats from local PRI cacique and PRI president of Tezonapa municipality Adán Lozano Meza that the latter would “stop his political activity” (CHR 1994:302).5 In the case of PRD municipal president from Vista Hermosa, Michoacán, Adrián Soria Lara, who was talking with friends at a park, the gunman approached him and asked “What party are you from?” to which Adrián Soria Lara responded that he was from the PRD. When the gunman said “Well, I am from the PRI,” Adrián Soria Lara responded that he was free to vote as he wanted and that had already happened. The gunman then shot and killed him before fleeing, and although found guilty of the crime of homicide, his apprehension order was not carried out (CHR 1994:164–165). The rise of the FDN also initiated the first of a series of political assassinations in the state of Puebla in September 1988 in the wake of the July 1988 presidential elections. As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of PRD militants were killed in the state alone, mainly local politicians, militants, professors, local party leaders, and PRD municipal presidents. Early in 1989, the assassination of several PRD leaders began in the state of Guerrero. For example, on March 8, 1989 in Acapulco, Guerrero, Amado Larumbe was assassinated. He was a PRD member who was engaged in petty commerce selling plastic articles and had seven children. According to his children, their father was always telling tales of the Mexican Revolution as legends and was a person who liked to help out other poor people (Crónica Guerrero 1998:42–43). He began a long career as a social organizer in the 1970s, helping the local poor organize for the regularization of their land titles into a large social movement in his neighborhood called the “Popular Council of Poor Neighborhoods of Acapulco.” Amado Larumbe, by 1981, led a large protest movement of urban squatters and peasants to the capital city of the state that even included contingents from El Salvador and Nicaragua. He gained fame as a social organizer and was often invited to the university to give speeches about his movement. As Amado Larumbe gained public recognition, the government began to send mounted troops into his neighborhood, and according to local accounts, fear spread among his neighbors who began to shut themselves inside their houses for fear of being shot. The local presence of the police did not dissuade Amado Larumbe who continued to go outside and urged his neighbors to do the same so as “to show them that we are not afraid… and that we are united in the defense of our area (Crónica Guerrero 1998:43).” This social organizer, a leftist by political persuasion, was a militant in the Mexican Socialist Party from which he joined Cárdenas’ FDN in 1988. Then, in 1989, Amado Larumbe became the local organizer of the PRD municipal chapter. He continued to press for the regularization of land titles for the poor, and the police continued to patrol the neighborhood. The situation became so extreme that even his wife asked him to stop his protest activities: “We have too many children to go around fighting with the government (Crónica Guerrero 1998:44).” She urged him to stop fighting “for nothing, to give it all up, that they go away to another area to live because the problem was too big and they were wasting away fighting and helping others.”


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His wife’s fears proved prophetic on March 8, 1989. State Judicial Police stormed the house while Amado Larumbe was watching TV with his brother-in-law and five nephews and accused him of having participated in the kidnapping of a local jeweler. The police ransacked the house looking for the ransom money that they alleged was there. They found nothing, and in the melee, Amado Larumbe was asphyxiated to death by the tear gas thrown into his home. The State Judicial Police took his son hostage and forced him to go through all of the drawers, cabinets, and closets of the house. They found neither money nor arms (Crónica Guerrero 1998:45). By the mid-1990s, several analysts of Mexico were already referring to the creation of a social milieu that tolerated the use of destructive behavior against the PRD. Gómez-Tagle (1994:8–9) wrote of the “barbarity” of priísta repression toward the PRD, which was “justified by oblique references to the PRD’s primitive, populist and personalistic tendencies.” Astorga argued that when the PRD first formed, president Carlos Salinas and the Mexican government “overtly persecuted its members. It was a very hostile time (quoted in Mauleón, 2000:2).” Postelectoral conflict was also punctuated by the selective assassination of other key PRD leaders in the state of Guerrero. Forty-five-year-old Iguala resident and PRD member Emiliano Gálvez Regino was killed by the Guzmán brothers (hired guns of the PRI mayor) in early March 1992 while tending his fields.6 Emiliano Gálvez Regino did not die immediately of his gunshot wounds but managed to crawl bleeding some 500 m to the house of the local PRD representative and to point out who his killers were before dying (Crónica Guerrero 1998:48; CNDH 1994). He had received various previous death threats in the form of notes left on the gate of the corral where he kept his animals. According to his surviving daughter who showed the notes to Luna (author of Crónica Guerrero 1998:86), one read that Gálvez Regino would be killed because of his involvement with the PRD “because it was a party that only tried to fool people.” A series of PRD leaders were also assassinated within the context of continuing electoral violence in 1992. The Tlapa de Comonfort local municipal delegate and promoter of social demands was hacked to death by unknown assassins in October 1992. The supplemental regent and general secretary of the PRD in Metlatonoc was shot in cold blood with a high-powered gun while buying goods at a store, by an unknown individual in Tlapa de Comonfort 15 days later (Crónica Guerrero 1998:48). PRD municipal delegate and social activist Aurelio Gálvez Maldonado was hacked to death by unknown killer(s) in Tlapa de Comonfort municipality in the same month. Another story of cold-blooded murder also illustrates the hostile political climate of the time. PRD member Pedro Chula Ponce was a 40-year-old peasant and militant activist. Pedro Chula Ponce participated as the opening speaker in favor of Guerrero PRD gubernatorial candidate Félix Salgado Macedonio on November 13 in Cuautepec in anticipation of the December 1992 elections. In his speech in favor of Salgado Macedonio, Pedro Chula Ponce denounced local caciques and PRI authorities. Three days later, he was assassinated on the basketball court in his community, La Dicha, in the middle of a game. The anonymous killer escaped without anyone stopping him (Crónica Guerrero 1998:62). Similarly, José Luis Pineda Duarte in the municipality of Atoyac de Álvarez had just been named as a functionary overseeing

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a polling station in Zacualpan for the upcoming state elections. He was assassinated in cold blood by Prisciliano Reyes González, the local PRI committee president of the area, who allegedly approached José Luis Pineda Duarte and shot him without uttering a single word (Crónica Guerrero 1998:49).

Engagement in Everyday Social Activities A combination of aspects – a posture of permissiveness on the part of the authorities toward the use of destructive behavior combined with the almost complete lack of penalties for such brutality as illustrated below – was sufficient then to generate a wave of homicidal action against the PRD throughout the 1988–2005 period. Some of the social activities in which the victims were engaged in at the time of the homicide include the following: driving home on the highway, attending a daughter’s wedding, walking down the street, walking to work, driving to work, boarding a bus, drinking a Coke on the street, laboring in the fields, using the bathroom, and sleeping at home. Victims were also killed while sitting in the patio of their home, sitting in an automobile, getting into an automobile, attending a party, having an argument while leaving a dance, driving a taxi, sitting in a park, and finishing a shift as a night watch guard at the PRD municipal offices (Schatz 2001). In addition, perredistas were killed while conducting a postcampaign celebration party, sitting in a PRD municipal office, leaving the PRD municipal offices, working at their shop, stepping off a fertilizer truck on the way to work, eating at a restaurant, collecting wood, entering a store, playing basketball, playing pool, walking in the public plaza, and going to church (CHR 1994). Often the bodies of those PRD victims engaged in everyday social activities were found with signs of torture and/or dumped in a common grave (CHR 1994:73–74; 96–97). In the cases of unknown assailants, especially those in which victims were stopped on the highway, PRD leaders would often be found tortured and shot but not robbed of their possessions. One PRD municipal presidential candidate in Veracruz was dragged from his house in the middle of the night by unknown, young armed assailants whose faces were masked with bandanas; he was tied to a tree and shot (CHR 1994:303). In some cases, dead bodies were mistreated, mutilated, and left in full public view (CHR 1994:73–74, 96–97, 270). In the cases of all three victims in Tlacloachistlahuaca, Guerrero, their respective tombs were subsequently raided, and the bullets extracted from the bodies by members of the Tlacloachistlahuaca municipal police, according to eyewitnesses (Proceso 4/29/91:30). The story of these three Tlacloachistlahuaca victims whose tombs were raided is illustrative of such extreme and brutal violence associated with these political murders. The first of these victims – Félix Octavio Ventura Ramos – was forcibly removed from his bed in Tlacoachistlahuaca, Guerrero in March 1991, taken from his home, and killed by strangling and savage beating. The assassins in each case were suspected to be hired guns of the local municipal president Daniel Onofre. The second victim – Tito Morales Santiago – was murdered in 1991 after being detained in Tlacachistlahuaca by the motorized police. According to his mother,


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both Tito and his brother Martín Santiago Martínez were tortured during their detention by near asphyxiation with a nylon bag (Proceso 4/29/91:29). She also claims that the interrogations centered around Tito’s political activities and that the commander of the motorized police told them that they were planning to “kill perredistas one by one” (Proceso 4/29/91:29). After being detained 8 h incommunicado in Ometepec, threatened with death, accused of robbery, and then released due to lack of proof, Tito Morales Santiago was redetained the next day for 2 days. The last that was seen of him was a neighbor’s report that he saw the perredista bloody and unconscious in a cave near the arroyo Tortolito. The next day his body was recovered by the Tlacloachistlahuaca municipal police (Crónica Guerrero 1998:83). Marino Antonio Martínez and Alejandro Montalván Santiago, the parents of Florentino Montalván de la Cruz and Genaro Martínez Montalván denounced the death of their sons in Tlacachistlahuaca to local authorities. Both victims were shot with high-powered rifles while working in the local fields in early 1991. Genaro died instantly, and Florentino Montalván de la Cruz was initially wounded. Two eyewitnesses to the murder identified the aggressors as members of the Tlacloachistlahuaca municipal police (Proceso 4/29/91:30). Both eyewitnesses were tortured. Days later, Florentino’s body was found on the outskirts of a nearby municipality.

Rationalization for Political Assassination The use of excessive police force, of course, requires justification or rationalization, as did the violent takeover of PRI-held municipal palaces by perredistas, since the dominant liberal constitutional schemata in Mexico condemns excess destructive behavior as illegitimate. Perredistas justified the illegal takeover of municipal town halls as legitimate, since, they argued, the PRI had won the local election by the use of fraudulent means. In other words, their own illegal behavior was justified with reference to the dominant liberal constitutional schemata – i.e., because the legitimacy and the legality of free and fair election had been violated, illegal behavior was then justified. In only a few instances was the PRD takeover of town halls justified by reference to revolutionary ideologies. This process of justification can take place on both an individual and collective level because individuals must “come to terms with their own consciences” with respect to the collective ideological systems that condemn violence as illegitimate (Smelser 1998:91). Similarly, it can be expected that individual members of the state security apparatus will also vary in this task of individual rationalization, even though they are all responding to a similar collective organizational demand (i.e., to follow orders) (Ross et al. 1999:278). This process is evident in the context of PRI–PRD relations in the post-1988 period. Rank-and-file perredistas, often responding to their perception of electoral fraud in local elections, engaged in the (largely unarmed) occupation of contested town halls. PRI-controlled state governments, for their part, in different states responded to the

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PRD strategy of taking over of municipal town halls by employing the police to dislodge them in a variety of different towns and villages. Often, these “re-take overs” of local government turned violent with deaths of perredistas resulting from beatings from police, and/or from being sprayed by police gunfire (sometimes stray gunfire). PRD members also died while engaged in antifraud protest rallies and marches after elections (CHR 1994:53, 81, 86, 137). In many instances of this conflict, a large number of police were dispatched to contain or dislodge perredistas. For example, a pacific protest march of some 400 PRD peasants along a public highway near Acapulco was violently broken up by some 100 regular police, 15 motorized police, nearly 50 state judicial police with bulletproof vests, 8 mounted police, agents of the federal Interior Ministry, and a group of firefighters with two tanks (Proceso, 3/5/90:8; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 1999). In some other of these protest instances, a few policemen also died from stray gunfire. At the individual level, reactions of the police in these various situations did indeed vary widely in situations where excessive violence was employed to dislodge PRD protestors from occupied town halls. At the one extreme, some of the police appeared to justify their own excesses by blaming the unarmed victim. For example, as two municipal police of Coayuca de Andrade, Puebla (Crónica Puebla 1997:39) began shooting into a crowd of PRD protesters, they allegedly shouted “Here is your father, mother-fkers” and shot perredista Lorenzo Santiago Torres to death (CNDH 1994:334). Similarly, the expression of contempt for the victim was evident in the reclaiming of the town hall of Ometepec, Guerrero by the government in “Operation Lighting.” During this special police operation, one of the some 300 Public Security Police who opened fire on the Ometepec municipal palace said: “Have your democracy by voice, mother-fkers” as he began shooting into the crowd (Proceso 3/12/90:6). One perredista died from stray gunfire as a result of this police operation. In this event, according to perredistas sleeping inside the town hall at dawn when the raid occurred, the surprise attack caused women and children to start screaming, some asphyxiating from the tear gas the police had thrown inside the palace. One PRD leader inside the occupied town hall tried to call for external help on his cell phone, but the effort was useless since the police had also thrown canisters of tear gas into all the streets surrounding the municipal hall (Proceso, 3/12/90:10). In the melee, perredista professor Eloy Cisneros shot back at the police in self-defense, reports Proceso, but was shot in turn outside the palace walls, fell to the ground, was handcuffed, and taken to a police truck to be removed from the area. Eyewitnesses claim that Eloy Cisneros was then deliberately run over by the truck tires before being dumped into the bed of the truck. The remaining PRD members were removed from the Ometepec town hall, put on buses, and driven down the highway. Eyewitnesses claim that every kilometer or so, someone was let off the bus and that those who had fainted or were wounded were sometimes left off without the bus even completely stopping (Proceso 3/12/90:10). Two perredistas including the brother of one of the dead (Andrés de la Cruz Zacapala) disappeared after being obliged to ride with the police to Acapulco (Crónica Guerrero 1998:79).


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At the other extreme,7 the Tejuplico City Public Security Police tried to protect the wife of a PRD member by warning her to remove herself from the town square before the police opened fire to control a PRD postelection protest rally in the state of Mexico. According to this PRD member’s wife, he said: “Señora, it would be better if you left, if you don’t go, you may repent your decision” (Rojas Alba 1996:193). In that incident, two police died as well as a PRD supporter and an undetermined number of civilians were injured (Rojas Alba 1996:195). The statements of the Commander of the Judicial Police Abraham Noriega Cantú in Cruz Grande, Guerrero express a position between the extremes of contempt for the victim on the one hand, and an attempt to express some protection for the protestors on the other. The municipality of Cruz Grande was the site of another violent dislodging of a popular PRD government in March, 1989. In this case, armed perredistas shot back at the police from three locations within the occupied municipal palace. Three policemen and one PRD militant – Leonel Felipe Dorantes – died in the gun battle (Proceso 3/12/90:10). According to Noriega Cantú, the PRD had better arms than their own because they possessed R-15 rifles and an AK-17. The commander, after 10 h of gun battle with perredistas, called for a truce. He had ten men wounded and wanted to pick up one of them who had been bleeding for hours. According to his testimony: “When I got close, they shot at me,” showing his bullet-proof vest with various bullet holes. As they saw that I was not armed, the people began to come out and collect the body of their fellow party-member. A woman embraced the body [of perredista – Leonel Felipe Dorantes] and said to me: “He is my brother, don’t do anything, let me take him away.” “At that moment, the perredistas took advantage of the situation to escape. They mixed in with the people, which helped them,” remembered the commander, and then he added, “We didn’t go after them. We didn’t even try to detain anyone. This was not our objective (Proceso 3/12/90:10).”

The PRI administration reclaimed the governmental offices in both Ometepec and in Cruz Grande the next day. A reporter asked the incoming PRI mayor in Ometepec on that day, “How do you feel taking office under these conditions and after having taken over the municipal palace?” “Nothing. I never saw the dislodging. And it is like when a person dies that one has never seen,” answered the new mayor of Ometepec, a prominent rancher and businessman, who affirmed that he was not a weak mayor and that he was loved by the community (Proceso 3/12/90:10).

Authorization for Destruction Through Independent Social Mechanisms In some cases, authorities may indirectly authorize political killings, but do not directly mobilize state personnel into a destructive apparatus. In such cases, mobilization can develop through independent social mechanisms such as paramilitaries or the hiring of paid professional assassins and/or off-duty police officers. Independent social mobilization for destructive behavior was also documented against perredistas. Direct eyewitness testimony to various political killings of

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PRD members makes reference to crime scenes in which both uniformed officers and off-duty policemen were recognized as perpetrators. Eyewitness testimony to several political killings of PRD members in the state of Puebla includes viewing murders committed by drunken and stoned security police, by a drunken auxiliary policeman, by various state judicial policemen, by the local municipal police, and by an assassin who was dressed in jeans, on a horse, who eyewitnesses said looked like the hired hand of a local rancher (Crónica Puebla 1997:24, 37, 39, 48, 59, 69). In the state of Guerrero, eyewitnesses recognized some off-duty policemen in several assassinations (Crónica Guerrero 1998:15, 60). In one case, witnesses claimed to have heard the cries of a victim being tortured by the police from the street (Crónica Guerrero 1998:24). In a parallel incident, the police in rural Chiapas were implicated in conjunction with armed ranch hands, paramilitaries, and other armed supporters of the PRI, as later discovered in 2001 by the State Attorney General under the Fox administration, in the murder of multiple indigenous citizens (La Jornada 11/03/01). The blurring of the lines, in some cases, between off-duty policemen and hired guns functioned, as in the case of death squads or independent hired assassins in Southern Cone Latin America (Faucher and Fitzgibbons 1989:166), to eliminate political opponents illegally without the official involvement or responsible of the state for the act. The use of paramilitaries then to assassinate political enemies can be instrumental insofar as the hired gun serves as a buffer between repression and government responsibility. They can perform illegal acts without directly engaging the official responsibility of the state, thus contributing to the conviction that repressive acts are covered by total impunity (Faucher and Fitzgibbons 1989:166). What is perhaps most interesting from a social–psychological perspective about the killings by paramilitary groups in the Mexican case was the calm acclimation to violence displayed by the perpetrators. In Chiapas, for example, paramilitaries did not bother to even cover their faces when they forced a busload of perredistas at gunpoint to stand quietly in the highway and listen to them give a speech. In this speech, paramilitaries said: “You are all PRD members and because of that, we are going to do away with all of you. Whether you want it or not: we are prepared and the government has authorized us to kill (Proceso 9/11/95:29).8” A similar episode occurred in Masojá Grande, Chiapas where another busload of PRD members was forced to leave the bus and listen quietly to a similar speech. This time, however, 1 of 30 teachers among the group – Héctor Pérez Torres – was singled out and told calmly: “This is the leader of the PRD and we are going to do away with him. For the moment, we are only going to kill him. The rest of you will escape but only on the condition that you return to being priístas. If you carry on with the PRD, we will kill all of you (Proceso 9/11/95:29).” At that point Héctor Pérez Torres replied that he was the nephew of the Municipal Council President and should not be killed: “I am with you all and if you believe that I have done something wrong then detain me but don’t kill me.” According to eyewitness Jiménez Jiménez, the paramilitaries paid no attention and replied: “We are tired of you because you lead the PRD. You die and the problem ends.” The teacher then tried to flee but was immediately shot in the back multiple times about 15–20 m away.


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There were nine eyewitnesses to the murder including Héctor Pérez Torres’ wife and child (Proceso 9/11/95:29). Similarly, this was the case of the overt public visibility of the five assassins who killed four perredista bus passengers in the state of Puebla in 1992. Four militants were assassinated in one event on June 10, 1992 in Coayuca de Andrade. PRD leaders Cupertino Lucero, Teodoro, and Eugenio Angulo and militant Anastacio Álvarez were intercepted on a public bus while traveling between Santa Cruz Organal and Tlacotepec del Calvario after returning from a shopping trip in Paixtla. Five visible assassins again did not bother to cover their faces, stopped the bus, and made all the passengers disembark. The assassins did not know their victims personally. Instead, they had a list of names written on a piece of paper and, before killing the perredistas, calmly asked each of them their names (CHR 1994:275). Several highschool students who were eyewitnesses to the crime said the assassins were strangers in the area except one who could be identified as a store clerk of the governmentsponsored Conasupo store controlled by the paramilitary group Antorcha Campesina. Another eyewitness said he recognized the voice of one assassin – Aurelio y Santos León – who lived in Amatillas. Such detail from eyewitnesses did not matter too much to the ultimate investigation of the crime, which the Mexican National Human Rights Commission found to be of “great negligence” (CNDH 1994:521). The murder of Sixto Chávez Maldonado in 1993 by off-duty judicial police in Petatlán, Guerrero suggests that at least some professional paid assassins may also have been members of the police, moonlighting in effect, as “guns-for hire” for disgruntled members of the ex-dominant party (Crónica Guerrero 1998). Finally, the assassination of Dr. Martha Morales Vázquez reveals the complex combination of political vendetta, both intraparty and interparty conflict, as well as the professional anonymity associated with such crimes. After the July 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre in Guerrero (discussed in detail in Chap. 6), the PRD in the region (Costa Grande) had sustained an active mobilization calling for the resignation of then PRI governor Rubén Figueroa Alcocer. This included the occupation of the Coyuca de Benítez municipal palace by perredistas since the day of the Aguas Blancas massacre. In September 1995, the government began to accuse a local PRD leader, David Molina Francisco, of involvement in homicides and assaults. It was in the context of rejecting this accusation that the assassination of perredista Dr. Martha Morales Vázquez occurred. Dr. Martha Morales Vázquez was a principal leader in the Costa Grande region and was the ex-PRD candidate for municipal president of Tecpan de Galeana. A month earlier, Martha Morales Vázquez led a blockade against the arrival of Figueroa at a support rally held by priístas in Tecpan de Galeana. On October 14, 1995, there was a public meeting at the PRD-occupied municipal palace of Coyuca de Benítez attended by the widows of the victims of the Aguas Blancas massacre to demand punishment for those responsible (Crónica Guerrero 1998:99). At the meeting, Martha Morales Vázquez qualified the government’s accusations against David Molina Francisco as “absurd” and asked ironically, “What was Figueroa thinking? (knocking on her head): Knock, knock, is anyone there?” (Gutiérrez 1998:202).

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That evening Martha Morales Vázquez drove to the front of her home with f ellow perredista Baldomero Galeno Lagunas. Upon arriving at the street outside her home, Martha’s husband came out to greet her while Baldomero Galeno Lagunas crossed the street to urinate. He saw two unknown young men walk toward the clinic, one with his hand covered with a beanie or rag (Crónica Guerrero 1998:103). The individual turned around and then returned again with something in his hand; Baldomero thought that he must be injured and was going to see the doctor. Instead, he walked up to the doctor asking her: “Are you Dr. Martha Morales Vázquez?” and then proceeded to shoot her in the neck, and then again in the spine after she fell to the ground. Martha’s husband escaped the attack with minor wounds, but Baldomero was gravely wounded, having been hit by a stray bullet. The two assassins fled the scene. At the clinic, Martha’s husband and fellow doctors were able to stabilize her and send her to Acapulco. Yet, despite 23 days of intensive care in which Martha Morales Vázquez was paralyzed and connected to an artificial lung and kidney, she died from her extensive gunshot wounds. The authorities detained Zaragoza Flores Bello for the crime on October 27, 1995 but then immediately released him (Gutiérrez 1998:203). Zaragoza Flores Bello was the brother of the ex-municipal president of Tecpan, Salvador Bello. Interestingly, Salvador Bello had been municipal president as a perredista from 1990 to 1992 when he was removed from the post, separated from the PRD, and aligned with the Figueroa government. Figueroa became Salvador Bello’s godfather. Gutiérrez (1998:203) notes that Salvador Bello tried previously to assassinate Martha Morales Vázquez and another perredista in 1993. Eyewitnesses to the murder claim that one of the two assassins was policeman Carlos Zamora, who lived in Salvador Bello’s house but disappeared from the town after the crime (Crónica Guerrero 1998:107). These case vignettes suggest then that paramilitaries (as well as professional assassins) are particularly acclimated to acting violently. The assassins in each of the cases conducted their crimes with minimal deliberation, attempting to correctly identify the victim9 before shooting him with relative calm, and, in multiple cases, letting the victims know that their destructive behavior had indeed been authorized by the government. The relative control and lack of chaos in these murderous situations strongly suggests that paramilitaries are indeed recidivists of destructiveness, apprenticed in violent expression and able to conduct their assassinations with relative quiescence (Goldberg 2002:226).

Part II: Political Assassination: Victims and Perpetrators in Cross-sectional Analysis To better understand how PRD politicians and members were targeted for political assassination and to more fully grasp the consistent linkage of perpetrators with the governing party, the analysis now turns to a cross-sectional examination of the 250 perredista deaths during the Salinas sexenio (1988–2004). Following the specific, individual victim in each case, Table 4.1a, “An Analysis of 250 PRD Victims of

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Political Murder, 1988–1994” – includes such data as the date and Mexican state where the crime occurred, the political position of the PRD victim within the political party and/or governmental office held, and all information available on the suspected perpetrators. I also delineate the legal outcome for each of the assassi nation victims in Table 4.1b, which is the second section of the table and is entitled “(Justice) – The Failure of Federal/State Officials to Bring Justice.” Thus, for brevity and readability, Table 4.1 is divided into two distinctive sections (Table 4.1a and 4.1b) and is located in the Appendix of this chapter. Furthermore, to substantiate the aspect of authorization (versus impunity) for the PRD victims, I also subdivided the two parts of Table 4.1 into four distinctive analytic categories. These four categories are – “Direct Evidence of Authorization or Cover-up” (n = 62 victims), “Impunity – Total and Partial” (n = 150 victims), “Contested Cases” (n = 31 victims), and “Clear Judicial Processing (n = 7 victims).” This allows the reader to follow and locate each political murder case by referring to the state and date of the victim’s death within each of the four analytic categories across the two subsections of Table 4.1. Within the text that follows, the two distinctive parts of Table 4.1 are referred to as, Table 4.1a “Analysis,” which refers to “An Analysis of 250 PRD Victims of Political Murder, 1988–1994,” and Table 4.1b “Justice,” which refers to “The Failure of Federal/State Officials to bring Justice.” Each analytic category is discussed within the context of the narrative below. Finally, due to the fact that multiple victims sometimes died in a single violent episode, there are a total of 189 distinct cases encompassing the 250 PRD victims. “The source for the entire table is CHR (1994), CNDH (1994), Crónica Puebla (1997) and Crónica Guerrero (1998).

Political Assassinations as Deliberate Targeting The objective is clearly assassination when the five visible, armed Puebla assassins do not cover their faces, stop a public bus, make all the passengers disembark, proceed to calmly ask all the passengers their names from a list of names written on a piece of paper, separate them from the group, and shoot them in front of eyewitness, as discussed above (Table 4.1b, Justice, 6/10/92; CHR 1994:275; Crónica Puebla 1997:40). Similarly, when a PRD candidate for a mayorship receives a knock on his home door from an individual posing as a representative from the Veracruz State Electoral Commission who allegedly needs “papers to be signed” and proceeds to shoot him four times in cold blood in front of his family, as happened to Inocencio Romero Júarez noted above, this is not a typical scenario for civil homicide, i.e., robbery and/or disputes over economic debts (Table 4.1b, Justice, 9/10/88; CHR 1994:302; CNDH 1994:285–287). There were only two contested cases of 250 political killings where either the government or the killers claim robbery as a motive in the crime (Michoacán, 6/28/90; 10/15/92) (Table 4.1b, Justice).10 Furthermore, the political murder is deliberate and planned when a band of known individuals associated with a local Hidalgo PRI cacique assassinates four perredistas

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and the son of one member over the course of 3 days – the first in an ambush on May 12, 1991, the second and third, the next day by shooting at them during the funeral procession, and the fourth and fifth victim (a 7-year-old) by forcibly entering their home and shooting them on May 15 (CHR 1994:129 – Table 4.1b, Justice). A full 11% of the 250 perredista victims received a death threat prior to their death. These included PRD members engaged in legal disputes investigating possible corruption schemes through the auditing of municipal funds, questioning of illegal municipal logging schemes, rural agrarian or urban land disputes, and factory-related disputes with PRI unions. PRD leaders and activists engaged on behalf of factory workers, peasants, and fishermen were also targeted and assassinated for their political and legal activism as political leaders (5%).11 A full 86.8% (n = 217 victims) of the PRD victims of political murder were not killed while engaged in direct-action protest activities. Nor were the majority of PRD victims of political murder hit by police gunfire (stray or deliberate) while at protest rallies, electoral-related dislodging, and/or protest marches after a contested election [only 11% (n = 27) victims12 and 1.6% of these13 were actually deliberately assassinated hours or days after (rather than during) participation in such protest events]. Nor were the majority shot while guarding PRD “occupied” municipal buildings and offices [0.8% (only 2 victims)]. And in only a few cases did policemen also die from stray gunfire resulting from police efforts to dislodge perredistas from contested municipal offices [Table 4.1b, Justice – Mexico State 12/12/90; Guerrero 3/6/90 (CHR 1994)]. Thus, the majority of political killings of PRD members did not follow the pattern found in extreme instances of protest situations in the USA (i.e., the Kent State incident), in which protest rallies end in violence when a severe, even extralegal reaction is adopted by the authorities (Turk 1982:108). Instead, as noted above and in data section on Puebla in Chap. 2, the majority of victims (86.8%) were hit in a variety of settings (at home, at the town entrance, after leaving a political meeting, in automobile, walking home), in unknown locations, and/or their bodies were later found left on the highway. Many victims were PRD politicians. Thus, several aspects combine (the murder of many PRD candidates, officials, and political leaders, the relatively low incidence of killings during direct-action protest, and the use of professional assassins) to reveal that the victims were targeted and the political killings were planned and deliberate.

Cover-up/Authorization for Assassination Scholars of political crimes understand that finding direct evidence of authorization from above and/or of cover-up of a political assassination by state agents is difficult. Typically, information regarding political assassinations related to governmental activities is “hidden, dark and discrediting information … [making it] … virtually impossible to gather inclusive … information about this particular form of killing” (Ben-Yehuda 1997:41). Were such information readily and publicly

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available, one hopes and assumes that these crimes would have already been properly prosecuted. Instead, however, the reality of investigation for political assassination is far more complex, often internally contradictory and frequently does not lead to clear prosecution, as the Mexican case shows. For example, the special Salinas-appointed prosecutor assigned to the case of the high-profile assassinations of FDN/PRD members Francisco Xavier Ovando and his aide Román Gil Hernández (see Endnote 4) contradicts the conclusions of the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) that high-level PRI members were involved in the assassinations. In fact, the special Salinas-appointed prosecutor was still unable to find the assassins despite a 2,000-page report on the case. Nor did the testimony of exPresident Salinas’ Federal Judicial Police Chief González Calderoni lead to further clarification of the political murders. González Calderoni claimed on US Public Television in 2000 (before his subsequent assassination in 2003) (La Jornada 2/6/03) that he investigated and found corroborating evidence that drug pin Juan García Abrego (Gulf Cartel) committed the assassinations of Francisco Xavier Ovando and Román Gil Hernández when asked by Salinas to do so. There is clear official evidence that top-level officials in the Morelos state government engaged in the direct authorization and cover-up of the political murder of PRD leader José Ramón García Gómez. The CNDH found that both the Director of the Morelos State Judicial Police Antonio Nogueda Caravajal and State Judicial Policeman Apolo Bernabé Ríos lied, engaged in “intentional cover-up” and the abuse of authority when they denied the existence of the Group of Political Investigations (Grupo de Investigaciones Políticas, GIP) within the Morelos Judicial State Police and its responsibility in the disappearance of perredista José Ramón García Gómez. Both officials were found to have lied to the Special Prosecuting Officer in charge of investigating the case of the disappearance of Ramón García Gómez (CNDH 1992:3, 5). [The GIP was an “anti-constitutional” group designed to illegally gather information on the political activities of the opposition in Morelos. It was officially dependent upon the head of the Morelos Judicial Police but in reality was managed by men within the Morelos Interior Ministry whose ultimate authority derived from the Morelos governor Rojas Alba (1996:96)]. The CNDH recommended that both Antonio Nogueda Caravajal and Apolo Bernabé Ríos be apprehended (CNDH 1992:7), but Antonio Nogueda Caravajal fled the nation.14 Despite inherent difficulties in directly investigating political assassination, Table 4.1b, Justice does show about 25% (n = 62 cases) where there is direct evidence of authorization/cover-up. This evidence includes the following: (1) finding of a “cover-up” by judges, (2) CNDH findings of a “cover-up,” “inexplicable negligence with sanctions,” “inexplicable omissions of investigation,” and/or a finding of “no investigation” with a recommendation of “sanctions for relevant state officials,” (3) the finding of a “cover-up,” and/or the “protection of suspected perpetrators to flee” and/or “total impunity” by the PRD Special Prosecutor (Fiscal) (Michoacán), (4) the confessions of assassins, and/or (5) suspicious circumstantial evidence (newspapers publishing death threats, blacklists with PRD names, the immediate release of a suspect by the police who eyewitnesses identify as a perpetrator) and the suspicious

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assassination of public prosecutors in charge of an investigation of the political killing of a PRD member. This 25% is a very conservative measure of authorization/cover-up, which does not take into account any of the 22.4% (n = 56) of those political killings that are in a state of “Total Impunity.” In Table 4.1a, Analysis, the majority of these “Total Impunity” cases involve the political assassination of PRD leaders (not PRD militants). [Table 4.1 combines cases of both “Total Impunity” (labeled by the CNDH (1994) as in a state of Total Impunity, impunity/severe negligence, or no trial/no investigation) and partial impunity cases (investigation begun, penal action in process, arrest warrant issued but not served) (60% (n = 150 victims))].15 Thus, the evidence for “authorization/cover-up” is also more stringent than for “Total Impunity” because it not only involves cover-up and/or multiple pieces of suspicious evidence but also involves a CNDH classification of “inexplicable negligence” (not just negligence per se).16 There is other circumstantial evidence revealed by Table 4.1a, Analysis which strongly points toward the authorization or direct cover-up of a number of these crimes. Professional assassins are clearly authorized by someone who pays for them to kill as in the cases of “blacklists” (Puebla, 6/10/92; Guerrero, 11/9/93) (Table 4.1b, Justice). In addition, why, for example, did the municipal police immediately release a suspect that eyewitnesses just saw commit a murder in a public place, as occurred in Tamaulipas (4/2/94)? Why did the PRI-dominated State Congress of Puebla vote against revoking the PRI municipal president’s office, even though 2 perredistas died, and four were wounded from gunfire coming from inside his home while PRD members were marching past it during a protest march (3/23/93)? Other evidence includes eyewitnesses who testified to hearing a police commander say “Shoot to kill, by orders of the President” (Puebla, 5/29/90; CHR 1994:491). A local newspaper, in two other cases, published public death threats against the two PRD victims (Durango, 6/11/93; 8/16/93) (Table 4.1b, Justice). The local newspaper, in another case, reported that the PRD victim was in the hospital when he was never admitted (Michoacán, 8/23/92) (Table 4.1b, Justice). In the context of disputed elections in Tixtla, Guerrero (1/13/90), eyewitnesses declared that PRI hired guns stated, after assassinating one perredista at 6:00 p.m., that they could kill as many PRD members as they wanted without problems because the PRI protected them (CHR 1994:83). The assassins did kill two more perredistas at 6:45 p.m. that same day. A Michoacán judge found evidence that prosecutors covered up evidence to protect hired guns of a local PRI cacique and the CNDH recommended that the governor discipline and sanction those responsible (8/24/91; CHR 1994:164). A different judge absolved the Coahuila State Judicial Police of the homicide of perredistas at a protest rally and closed the case. Yet, the CNDH recommended that the same judge be investigated and sanctioned for this act and the case be reopened (11/3/90; CHR 1994:53). The Special Appointed PRD Prosecutor in Michoacán claimed that the “total impunity” in one case was due to certain government authorities who had covered for the killers (1/16/93; CHR 1994:185). The Canadian government granted political asylum to PRD Federal Deputy from Morelos Mario Rojas-Alba after he suffered an assassination attempt at the

Killings by Known PRI Members and Hired Guns Generally Linked to a PRI Leader(s)

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hands of two off-duty policemen when attempting to investigate the disappearance of PRD member José Ramón García Gómez (1/24/92) (Dead or Alive 1999, Rojas Alba 1996:119). The family of assassinated Guerrero perredista Emiliano Gálvez Regino received a note, apparently signed by the son of the local PRI cacique José Hilario del la Cruz 4 days after his assassination by his hired guns. The note stated: “Now there are two (dead) of those who participated in the antifraud rally, and we will go on eliminating them one by one so that they understand we have power and there are those here who are supporting us… Leave that party, come with us or we will keep f-king you. We want you to apologize (CHR 1994:101).”

Who Kills? Who Gains from These Murders? It is also worthwhile to ask the simple question: who killed perredistas, and who stands to gain from the killings? The answer to this question is straightforward. The cases in all the categories in Table 4.1a, Analysis – (n = 170 cases) except “Contested Cases” show a breakdown of suspected perpetrators into the following categories – (1) actual known PRI members [20.5% (n = 35 cases)], (2) hired guns generally linked to a PRI leader [36.4% (n = 62 cases)], (3) unknown assailants [20.5% (n = 35 cases)], and (4) municipal, state judicial, and other police [20.5% (n = 35 cases)].17 I now examine each of these four categories of suspected perpetrators.

Killings by Known PRI Members and Hired Guns Generally Linked to a PRI Leader(s) There is a consistent linkage of perpetrators with the governing party. With actual known PRI members making up 20.5% of the murderers and hired guns generally linked to a PRI leader constituting 36.4% of the killers, this means that at least 57% of the total perpetrator sample is directly linked to a single political party in power against victims of a rising opposition party.

PRI Members Who gains from the murder when príistas are the killers? Two known priístas were found guilty of assassinating a PRD member and wounding two others who were painting political propaganda on a wall for the PRD mayoral candidate in Puebla (1/13/90). Suspected PRI perpetrators included national PRI leadership, state PRI leadership, local PRI-affiliated caciques, and local PRI members. Local rivals of the PRI for political power – PRD mayors, mayoral and ex-mayoral candidates, municipal trustees and PRD policemen and security guards – made up a full 18.5% (n = 18) of the victims of assassinations by known PRI members and/or their hired

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guns. Two PRD mayors were both even assassinated precisely on the day of their inauguration into office (Table 4.1b, Justice – Oaxaca, 10/22/89; 11/8/89). Electoral tensions, disputed local elections, and political–legal disputes over municipal finances and agrarian land led to assassination in the multiple cases where príistas were perpetrators (Durango, 6/21/90; Chiapas, 9/9/91; Michoacán, 11/16/93; Tabasco, 1/12/92; Oaxaca, 3/10/93; Chiapas, 10/2/92; Puebla, 8/26/89). One example was the political murder of a professor and prominent Tabasco PRD leader Sixto Hernández Alvarado who was shot to death as he left a dance hall on April 2, 1994 by PRI member Crescenio Reyna (CHR 1994:296). Sixto Hernández Alvarado along with PRD member and professor Gilberto Barrón and other citizens had filed a petition with the State Congress requesting an audit of their local PRI municipal president, accusing him of “nepotism.” Professor Gilberto Barrón had received a death threat a few days earlier (CHR 1994:296). A local PRI leader and two of his followers assassinated a perredista in the context of postelectoral tensions in Juquila, Oaxaca on 4/23/93 as he walked down the main street of the town at 11:00 p.m. (CHR 1994:247). The “occupation” of municipal offices by the PRD formed the backdrop to a few of these political murders by príistas (Oaxaca, 1/18/93; Michoacán, 1/7/90). In some chaotic dislodgings, some priístas also died, often from stray gunfire, as in Michoacán (Proceso 2/06/89:17, 1/29/90:17, 2/26/90:11). Yet, direct evidence of a political fight, confrontation, and/or verbal argument between perredistas and príistas which immediately preceded the political murder was not common (Morelos, 12/15/90; 1/15/90; Michoacán, 9/14/92).

Hired Guns With respect to the 36.4% of the perpetrators who were PRI hired guns, the motive for the assassin of a target (a perredista in this case) is likely money. But who reaps the political benefits of the elimination of the victim except the PRI member and/ or his associates who hire him? Hired guns largely killed political targets – PRD leaders and activists who disputed or won municipal elections or held municipal offices (Table 4.1a, Analysis – Hidalgo, 5/12-13/91; Michoacán 1/4/90; 1/19/90; 12/8/90; 3/30/91; 6/21/90; 12/9/92; 2/12/92, 1/1/93, Puebla 2/22/90, 3/5/92; 6/10/92, 3/23/93; Veracruz 9/10/88; 1/21/91; Oaxaca 4/10/89, 3/8/93, 4/17/93, 6/16/93, 7/11/93; Mexico 1/24/94; DF 12/11/92). A few agrarian leaders (Chihuahua 12/30/88; Chiapas 9/9/91; Durango 6/21/90; 6/11/93; Oaxaca 4/23/90) and PRD leaders disrupting municipal corruption schemes (Hidalgo 10/12/90; Oaxaca 11/9/93) were assassinated by PRI-hired guns. Hired guns associated with the Morelos Political Police killed several perredistas in Morelos (8/14/92, 10/6/89, 11/9/91). There is only one case of a perredista killed by a hired gun at an antifraud rally (Oaxaca 12/9/89). Hired guns killed four victims alone in the single town of Turicato, Michoacán where the PRD had challenged PRI rule in the 1988 presidential elections and in the municipal elections in December 1989. On December 26, 1989, a member of the


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local PRI cacique group shot and killed the PRD candidate for municipal councilman and his brother at a party (CHR 1994:153). The PRD Turicato mayor was next assassinated by hired guns associated with the “Cuámacuaro gavilla” on May 14, 1990 (CHR 1994:159). Next, the PRD Security Officer in Turicato was assassinated on November 9, 1990. The hired gun who participated in this case directly confessed that he worked for the ex-PRI mayoral candidate (CHR 1994:162). This political killing was followed the next month by the murder of the Second in Command of the Turicato Municipal Police (12/8/90). This final PRD victim in Turicato was also killed by hired guns of the “Cuámacuaro gavilla” in front of his wife and other eyewitnesses while milking cows on his ranch. Clearly, the act of running for and holding office as a perredista in Turicato, Michoacán in 1989–1990 was a risk factor for political assassination by the hired guns of local PRI caciques. Many PRD victims of PRI-affiliated “hired guns” received a death threat before being assassinated (41%, n = 11 of the total 27 death threats). Death threats make economic sense since hired guns kill for money and thus involve a fiscal cost to the person hiring them which could be avoided were the victim to cease his or her political activity. Yet, in the cases documented in Table 4.1a, Analysis, perredistas who received death threats did not halt their political activism. The example of the newly elected PRD mayor in Tezonapa, Veracruz who repeatedly received death threats from the ex-PRI municipal president (CHR 1994:302) is illustrative. This PRD mayor and the subsequent Tezonapa PRD mayoral candidate (9/10/88 and 1/21/91, respectively) were both assassinated by professionals who came to their doorsteps and shot them in front of their families. There was evidence of Federal Level Involvement in a “hired gun” political killing of a Guerrero PRD leader and lawyer who filed legal suits on behalf of 14 fishing cooperatives seeking restraints on multiple businesses from discharging toxic waste into the sea (CHR 1994:166–168). The PRD victim José Luis Valdovinos Rosales had allegedly also received death threats both from a business representative of ISPAT and the PRI Guerrero governor for his participation in auditing municipal funds allocation in the Ayuntamiento Popular de La Unión (CHR 1994:167). He was assassinated by the hired gun named Najid Saad Bernal (alias “el árabe”) who worked for the Federal Judicial Police on 6/23/92 in Michoacán. The night before his funeral, a naked, dead body smeared with excrement was left on the porch of the house where PRD Executive National Secretary Adriana Luna Parra was staying in anticipation of the funeral. The body was understood as an “intimidating message” (CHR 1994:168). The arrest warrant for federal hired gun Najid Saad Bernal had still not been executed by 1993, according to the CNDH, despite intervention by federal PRD deputies, the PRD fishermen involved in the cooperative, the PRD Federal Human Rights Commission, and PRD National Executive Secretary Adriana Luna Parra.

Killing Federal, State, and Local PRD Politicians Rojas Alba (1996:484–488) reports that PRD leaders formed a high number of victims (n = 142) of the 250 perredistas killed during the 1988–1994 period. According to his

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data on their political positions within the PRD (Rojas Alba 1996:484–488), 57% of these perredista leaders were federal, state, municipal presidents and candidates. This means the victims were politicians from all levels of government (local, state, municipal) and candidates for office who were assassinated. Rojas Alba (1996:484–488) also lists PRD victims of attempted assassination. Among the victims of attempted assassinations were several well-educated, well-to-do members of the Federal Congress and Senate. In a documentary filmed by the National Film Board of Canada, these federal level politicians recounted their experiences when asked by PRD Federal Deputy Mario Rojas Alba to describe their various assaults. Federal Congressmen from the state of Guerrero Felix Salgado said “They tried to firebomb my house. The government sent men to set it on fire while my family was inside. They loosened the bolts on my car wheels. They shot at my car. They lay in ambushed for me. And the police beat me up. They dragged me off. I’ve been beaten up over the years. We have undergone constant repression (Dead or Alive 1999).” PRD Senator Herberto Castillo from Veracruz stated that there were “four attempts on my life: attempts to assassinate me. The most recent attempt was 2 months ago. They shot at my van while I was driving. The shot hit the door at the level of my head. I was with my wife (Dead or Alive 1999).” PRD Senator Irme Serrano from the state of Chiapas stated of her attempted assassination: “There had never been an opposition candidate [in Chiapas]. Much less a woman! The governor was Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido…The man tried to have me killed three times – by running my car off the road. That is the standard method of killing politicians (Dead or Alive 1999).”

The Political Murder of Perredistas by “Unknowns”18 Returning to the data in Table 4.1a, Analysis, I now turn to those perpetrators who could not be identified (“unknown” assailants). Strikingly, all the perredistas except one who were killed by “unknown assailants” were elected PRD politicians [seated officials, local leaders, and/or candidates for office (20.5%)]. A Municipal Education Secretary, previously threatened with death by PRI-associated paramilitaries, was assassinated by seven bullets when getting off a bus by unknowns (Puebla, 9/6/92). A Municipal Human Rights Leader was shot at his doorstep by unknowns who fled (Veracruz, 2/23/91). A PRD Municipal President and Secretary were assassinated with more than 22 bullets when they entered a bar where the perpetrators were waiting for them (Oaxaca 5/14/94). A PRD State Deputy was assassinated on the street by one man who asked the victim for aid and then the other came over and assassinated him, after which both assassins fled (Puebla, 10/28/90). The overrepresentation of PRD leaders as victims of political assassination by “unknowns” suggests the systematic targeting of PRD politicians (PRD mayors, mayoral candidates, human rights leaders, municipal auditors, state PRD Congressional Deputies, and local leaders). Were these murders civil homicides, one would not


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expect a consistent pattern of victims who were only leaders with so few rank-and-file PRD members killed. Furthermore, these murders by “unknowns” do not fit a profile of unplanned acts of rage, anger, or frustration characteristic of expressive civil homicide (Miethe et al. 2005:102). There is no evidence that the PRD leaders were known personally by the perpetrators, no evidence of personal jealousy, and few eyewitnesses to these killings by unknowns. Dead bodies were found by the side of highways, near the edges of town, and were often severely beaten and/or mistreated. In some cases, the victims were killed in automobiles (Michoacán, 1/4/90), or perpetrators fled the town (Puebla 4/21/90). In part, these killings do look somewhat like “instrumental homicides” – attacks by strangers and multiple offenders in a variety of different situations and contexts with elements of planning (Miethe et al. 2005:125). Yet, they are not killings during robberies, the most prevalent type of instrumental civil homicide (UCR 2000 in Meithe et al. 2005:121). Instead, where sufficient information is available, unknowns killed these PRD leaders who were engaged in investigating municipal corruption schemes (Oaxaca, 4/17/92; 6/10/93; 3/21/94; 5/14/94), in the context of electoral displacements of the PRI (Michoacán, 5/15/91; Puebla 4/21/90; Oaxaca 11/22/92; Morelos 1/15/90; Puebla 2/18/89) and engaged in rural and urban land disputes (Chiapas 10/2/92; Mexico 9/20/92, DF 6/11/93).

The Killings by Police Finally, with respect to the police perpetrators (20.5%),19 there are cases showing direct evidence of the authorization or toleration of the police to engage in the unlawful use of force. One policeman, in Michoacán (12/25/92), confessed to being sent, along with eight other State Judicial Policemen, by a PRI member to kill PRD member Noé Alejo Moreno (CHR 1994:178). In another case, discussed above, the CNDH asked the Coahuila Superior Court that a judge be investigated and sanctioned for illegally absolving and releasing three Coahuila State Judicial Police (11/31/90) found guilty of shooting a perredista in the context of electoral fraud protests. An intelligence officer of the motorized police in Guerrero warned perredista Tito Morales Santiago after interrogating him about his political activities and nearly asphyxiating him with a plastic bag, with the following statement: “I am going to kill you damn perredistas little by little” and “next time I grab you, I kill you (CHR 1994:97).” Tito Morales Santiago was subsequently assassinated by the motorized police. The excessive use of force in the dislodging of PRD “occupied” municipal palaces also occurred on several occasions in Guerrero (2/27/90; 3/6/90; 3/6/90). Two perredistas, during a planned operation to remove PRD peasants squatting illegally on land in Tuxtepec, Oaxaca were shot by stray gunfire in front of multiple eyewitnesses when the State Judicial Police opened fire on them on 6/13/89 (CHR 1994:232–233). The bodies of the victims vanished, and they were declared “disappeared.” Yet, 2 years later, in November 1991, the clothed remains

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of the victims were found dumped in a clandestine grave near a highway, and it was possible to link the assassinations back to the State Judicial Police.20 Other evidence from Table 4.1b, Justice falls into the “gray area” between the use of excessive police force and direct evidence of illegal authorization to use force against political opponents of the regime (Guerrero 8/26/93; 9/21/93). The PRD claims a local PRI Deputy gave the police orders to assassinate the incoming PRD mayor on inauguration day in Tezoaltan, Oaxaca (11/8/89) but was himself never tried. The CNDH found four of five of the arrest warrants on the six municipal police were not executed until the agency’s intervention in that case (CHR 1994:236). Nonuniformed armed men were found working alongside municipal police to violently dislodge a PRD “occupied” municipal palace, killing 1 perredista in Michoacán and wounding 23 others (1/19/93). One issue is the question of who were the armed, nonuniformed men accompanying the police and who authorized them (CHR 1994:186)? One of the best publicized cases of high-level authorization involves the string of seven PRD victims listed in Table 4.1a Analysis and 4.1b Justice in the state of Morelos. These murders were tied to Apolo Bernabé Ríos. Bernabé Ríos was a PRI militant from Amilcingo, Morelos who served as the PRI governor Antonio Riva Palacio governor’s personal bodyguard (1988–1993), and then as director of the Group of Political Investigations (Grupo de Investigaciones Políticas, GIP) and the State Judicial Police, as discussed above. Estrada (1996:2) claims Apolo Bernabé Ríos openly assassinated at least 12 perredistas and other leftists, not counting those whose remains were too destroyed to identify and also jailed, tortured, and beat seven others. Apolo Bernabé Ríos’s methods were more brazen than those employed by the professional assassins described above, i.e., he openly admitted his crimes to friends and to the victim’s widows, and tortured and decapitated his victims (Proceso 2/03/92). One victim – perredista Timoteo Estudillo Peña – began to receive death threats from Apolo Bernabé Ríos and was found with his fingernails and toe nails pulled off, his head shot with three bullets, and his body thrown in a canyon (Rojas Alba 1996:103,119). Rojas Alba (1996:109–110; 121) interviewed several State Judicial Police directly involved in the assassination of José Ramón García Gómez, another PRD victim of Apolo Bernabé Ríos. These policemen reconstructed the details of that assassination including the place of death and the nature of the death (Dead or Alive 1999). One off-duty police, eyewitness to the death of José Ramón García Gómez, later testified that Apolo Bernabé Ríos forcibly abducted García and drove him to a remote location, called him a “squealing rat,” shot him, decapitated him with an ax and then put it in a black plastic bag in the backseat of his car (Proceso 2/3/92). This assassination occurred at about 3:30 a.m. in the morning after which the eyewitness, Apolo Bernabé Ríos, and two other men all went to a bar in Amilcingo and rapidly drank five beers. The eyewitness and coparticipant was then dropped off at his own home by Bernabé Ríos (Proceso 2/3/92). According to an informant interviewed by Rojas Alba (1996:96–97), Apolo Bernabé Ríos, as the head of the Political Police, reported to the Morelos governor (Antonio Riva Palacio) who, in turn, reported to President Salinas de Gortari.


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Under pressure from public opinion, the FDN/PRD and the victim’s family, a PRI appointed special prosecutor was assigned to the case of the death of Ramon García Gómez. The special prosecutor concluded, after interviewing multiple State Judicial policemen “moonlighting” as political assassins, that the intellectual author of the case was the ex-PRI Morelos governor Antonio Riva Palacio. Apolo Bernabé Ríos was condemned to 40 years in prison for the crime (Estrada 1996:2). Despite this, then PRI Attorney General of the State of Morelos stated that although many of Apolo Bernabé Ríos victims were PRD members, this was a “coincidence, and that they died for other reasons. He’s a dishonest police officer, charged with ill-gotten gains… As far as I know, there is no conclusive proof that these incident are political crimes even if some opposition parties here and abroad try to use them as a propaganda weapon (Dead or Alive 1999).” For his part, ex-Morelos PRI Attorney General Tomas Flores Allende added that Apolo Bernabé Ríos “wanted to carry out a mission of social peace,”… “His aim was to restore through standard police procedures order, peace and social tranquility (Dead or Alive 1999).” In stark contrast, ex-Chief Justice of the Morelos Supreme Court, Marcos Manuel Suarez stated the following about authorization for political assassination in the state of Morelos: “The PRI no longer represents the Mexican Revolution. It’s only an appendix – a rotten appendix of central power… I’ve been a PRI member for 42 years. I’ve held several key positions in the federal government. In the state of Morelos, I’ve been Chief Justice, president of the Supreme Court, secretary general of the government. In those days, under my orders, there were no assassinations. Now, there are assassinations (Dead or Alive 1999).” Rojas Alba (1996) claims that the federal government was aware of the political involvement of Apolo Bernabé Ríos and the Morelos governor (Antonio Riva Palacio) in the political assassination of perredista José Ramón García Gómez, but this was denied by the Federal Interior Minister. Rojas-Alba’s attempted assassination occurred on January 24, 1991; the day he was scheduled to give a press conference about the State Judicial Police testimony given to him regarding the circumstances of José Ramón García Gómez’s assassination (Rojas Alba 1996:119).21 As for Apolo Bernabé Ríos himself, newspapers quote him initially as admitting direct participation in the murder of perredista José Ramón García Gómez.22 In 2005, after serving 13 years of his prison sentence for the disappearance of Ramón García, Apolo Bernabé made a formal statement to the Morelos State Human Rights Commission declaring that ex-functionaries of the PRI governor Rivapalacio were the intellectual authors who gave him the order to carry out one of the disappearances of PRD members (La Jornada, 4/03/05). Apolo Bernabé Ríos, in an interview in 2008 with reporters after nearly 18 years in prison, blamed the federal government for the crime (Diario de Morelos 12/20/08:1). As he put it: “I am being screwed for, perhaps, the only thing I did not do. It should be clear: I did not disappear José Ramón. It was the federales, the ones from the DFS (Federal Direction of Security) and the CISEN (National Security and Investigation Center) in those days. It was necessary to generate political instability. Don’t forget that Morelos was one of the few states that lost the 1988 federal election. And it’s no accident that José Ramón was lost in December, and then in January of the next year, they began to watch

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various people, including myself and the Black Noguera Carvajal… (Diario de Morelos 12/20/08:1).” Later in the same 2008 interview, Apolo Bernabé Ríos also wanted to correct what he perceived as an “error” by a different reporter from the new magazine Contenido where he had been accredited with 99 assassinations during his time with the Morelos government. According to Diario de Morelos reporter Javier Jaramillo Frikas, Apolo Bernabé Ríos stated to him with respect to the Contenido story: “Don’t attribute miracles that I didn’t do… Which 99? There were only 88!” and then started to laugh (Diario de Morelos, 12/20/08:1).

Are There Alternative Explanations for These Murders? It is worthwhile to ask several alternative hypotheses regarding these murders. First, what if these deaths were not, in fact, as I have argued the political murder of politicians and political opponents because of their political activities but simply due to poor supervision of state agents (police, governing officials)? What then, were this alternative explanation plausible, would be the motivation for these nonrobbery crimes?

Accidents or Revenge Homicides? If this were not political murder, one would expect to see many more cases that could be related to drugs, alcohol, and/or personal or organizational vendettas. Yet, there is only one case of an off-duty drunken auxiliary policeman in Puebla who shot a PRD leader in Chiautla de Tapia (11/20/90), one case of a drunken PRI member who attacked and killed a PRD Security Officer and Auditor in Michoacán (3/19/92), and one case of drunken príistas spraying gunfire at an “occupied” PRD municipal palace where the 11-year-old son of a PRD member was killed (Oaxaca, 1/1/91). And there is only one case (a “contested” one) where the government claims that the planned ambush of two PRD municipal auditors and two PRD policemen was narcotrafficking related (Michoacán, 9/7/92). Still, it is possible, following alternative hypotheses, to argue that accidental homicide was a primary motive for these crimes. This is examined in the “contested cases” in Table 4.1b, Justice (n = 31). In three of these “contested cases,” the government makes this claim. One Mexico State PRD mayor (8/9/92) was actively investigating the potential corrupt use of public and municipal funds. His body subsequently appeared floating in the local river with blows to the neck and the head. The government argued that the crime was accidental and that the mayor was drunk and fell into the river causing blows to his head and neck (No trial). In another case, the government argued that it was anonymous hit-and-run vehicular homicide, which explained the death of a Michoacán PRD activist who was ambushed, severely beaten, and killed by unknowns. In fact, the victim was taken to a hospital where he testified about the attack before dying (12/21/92), and the Special PRD Prosecutor found severe impunity in the investigation of the case.


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Revenge on the family was the motive given by the government in one “contested case” (Oaxaca, 4/18/94) (CHR 1994:251–252). In another case, the Oaxaca Interior Minister said: “It was not a political crime” in a shooting death by three priístas in a village rent with postelectoral tensions. These priístas killed, by spray gunfire, the 10-year-old son of a PRD member playing on a basketball court with two PRD adult activists. The Interior Minister said despite electoral tensions in the town which were the result of the PRD electoral triumph, this “did not mean that priístas were responsible because sometimes groups with political differences try to capitalize on such events (CHR 1994:248).” Nevertheless, these cases do not possess the characteristics of personal revenge homicides described by Brookman (2003:1–2). There is little evidence of the personal involvement of friends and acquaintances, a history of personal conflict or an intention to attack to avenge some perceived wrongdoing other than a political difference with the victim. Only one case was found, in Oaxaca, where the government claimed that the killing of a PRD member was due to his nephew who allegedly killed a person known to the perpetrators. More to the point, even if one were to one assume that the government position is valid in all of these “contested cases” (Table 4.1a Analysis and 4.1b Justice), they would only account for 12% of the total 250 deaths reported.

Police Inefficiency? Finally, what about the hypothesis that the government wants to punish the killers of PRD members but simply lacks the capacity to impose order in some rural areas? Perhaps some of these deaths of PRD members are simply due to gross incompetence where the local police lacks the proper resources, infrastructure, is overloaded by cases, or is just too complacent to impose law in rural areas? In the poor (urban) neighborhood of Adjusco (Federal District, 12/11/92), the police indeed responded that they simply lacked enough officers to come and examine the crime scene (CHR 1994:61). This police response came after a PRD urban leader was murdered who had received repeated death threats for claiming that the violence in the area was due to one Reyes Rivera Domínguez (allegedly protected by the PRI Tlalpan Delegate). Perhaps it was simple local police negligence in Durango where the body of a PRD local leader who did not show up for his daughter’s wedding was found bathed in blood in his bed, but police said that there was no crime to investigate (12/7/90, CHR 1994:71)? (In this case, the Federal Judicial Police had come looking for the victim at his home 2 days earlier) (Table 4.1b, Justice). Maybe it is not that the local police fails to follow or comply with the laws (negligence) but simply that the local police was overwhelmed by the superior armed forces of hired guns. There was a case where the local police was present alongside nonuniformed armed gunmen, and the political murder of seven perredistas took place, but the armed gunmen were ultimately responsible for the killings not the police (Michoacán 2/12/93). In that case, there is insufficient evidence to determine if the police might have merely stood by (acquiesced), or been overwhelmed by the armed gunmen.

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Yet, despite these possible cases, there is also direct evidence to the contrary suggesting that in other cases, the police acted quite efficiently even in rural areas. When the government claimed an armed or suspected armed perredista was involved in the killing of a police or PRI member, the police and criminal justice system could be very swift in arresting, judging, and jailing suspects. For example, local law enforcement in Zicuapo (a small town in Turicato municipality, Michoacán) were able to arrest a PRD policemen (Tiburcio Hernández Villafaña) for the alleged murder of one member of the Los Elorza criminal band who died along with three PRD policemen on November 4, 1993 in a shooting. Other multiple examples of local police efficiency in arresting perredista suspects have also been documented.23 Furthermore, the State Judicial Police were quite effective in capturing, arresting, and executing arrest warrants on suspects when placed under the authority of PRD Special State Prosecutor in the state of Michoacán for the investigation of 14 perredista deaths. They tracked down and arrested suspects even in small, rural towns (Michoacán, 12/11/92; 12/18/92; 12/25/92; 1/1/93), and their actions account for 3 of the 7 successfully prosecuted cases in the 250 deaths illustrated in Table 4.1 (Analysis and Justice). Indeed, the data in Table 4.1a, Analysis show that a majority of the time when the police were the perpetrators, they were linked either to a PRI member or to a PRI governor issuing orders to dislodge a PRD-occupied municipal palace or a PRI hired gun. These linkages were established by a judge, and/or by the CNDH and/or by the confession of the assassins themselves. Such statistics do not look like police inefficiency in service of impunity, but rather like a pattern of political assassination in which the police are, on various occasions, employed by the governing party to remove and/or eliminate a political opponent.

Conclusion This chapter suggests that a sequence of several determinants combined to produce a wave of homicidal action against the PRD throughout the 1988–1994 period. The activation of historical conditions for destructive behavior began with the resistance of ruling political elites to the rise of a dissenting current within the dominant party. This process accelerated with the exit of prominent PRI dissidents Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porífiro Muñoz-Ledo from the dominant party; both of them went on to create an independent leftist party that successfully challenged the PRI in the 1988 presidential elections. This resistance by the top political elite to the electoral challenge of the left was followed by the political assassination of the top aide of Cárdenas in charge of the computation of election results on the eve of the election. This historical trigger, combined with a hard-line policy toward the PRD, created a social milieu in which destructive behavior, if not directly authorized or even quasi-authorized was, at least, activated. This permissive social milieu was, of course, aided by a passive legal system that generated the almost complete lack of

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penalties for state-sanctioned brutality. While none of these determinants alone may have been sufficient to produce a wave of political murder, when they all combine, it made such destructive behavior very likely to occur. This complex series of determinants can be understood theoretically in relationship to other works on the subject of political killing. Macrolevel structural theories of political crimes suggest that when a state (or collectivity, organization, and/or a group) feels threatened by a collective movement, it has an incentive to supplant extralegal for legal controls (Turk 1982). A state (as a collectivity) may facilitate such illegal/deviant behavior in various ways – as an organization that is structured in a way that provides incentives for illegality (Simon 2002:38). Or, it may “simply not have good controls over its members’ behavior (Simon 1982)” when situations present themselves to individuals in the form of opportunities to engage in illegal behavior. Particularly, when individuals are frustrated in achieving their goals, they may choose to take advantage of such opportunities to “selectively or randomly break (the law) (Ross 2003:26).” Various aspects of the Mexican political structure in 1988 provided both incentives and opportunities for the use of deviant means to control political opponents. Specifically, these included PRI-control over electoral law and the use of implicated criminals to contain and/or to eliminate dissent. By late June 1988, PRI elites perceived the upcoming challenge of the July presidential election as threatening to PRI hegemony over the state. An incentive for illegality arose within the state in the sense that the physical elimination of the electoral managers of Cárdenas’ information system was viewed as advantageous to facilitating a PRI victory at the election, and the Michoacán state attorney general was initially implicated in the assassination of Ovando and Gil by the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) (La Jornada 4/10/02). Several additional elements also point toward the use of political assassination as a means of eliminating political rivals. These include the “blacklisting” of victims, death threats, the consistent use of “hired guns” linked to the governing party (PRI), the systematic targeting of PRD politicians, especially by “unknown assailants” combined with the lack of robust evidence suggesting accidental death, homicide due to robbery or personal revenge. The question of authorization for political assassination was also substantiated in this chapter. Authorization was “multilayered”; by this, I mean that it could involve local, state, and/or federal levels of government, which may or may not, be internally coordinated. The investigation into the case of authorization for the political killing of a PRD leader in Morelos by the director of the Group of Political Investigations Apolo Bernabé Ríos reveals evidence of authorization from the Federal government (Estrada 1996; Rojas Alba 1996:119), authorization from the Morelos governor (Proceso 2/3/92; Estrada 1996; Rojas-Alba 1996:119), authorization from ex-functionaries Morelos PRI governor (La Jornada, 4/03/05), and/or authorization from the Morelos State Judicial Police (CNDH 1992). The direct finding of authorization or cover-up in 25% of the 250 political killings of perredistas, 1988–2004 (Table 4.1) by judges, the CNDH, the confessions of assassins, and/or suspicious circumstantial evidence also reveals the actions of governmental actors from varying levels of government (federal, state, and local).

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Writing from the theoretical orientation of the state crimes literature, Menzies (1995:143) argues that when a state such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia accepts the use of state terror against those it considers its domestic enemies, one must “change the whole socio-political structure to remove state terror, not simply change the police.” Nevertheless, the Mexican case was different than the political killings and impunity found in many authoritarian regimes because there was much more cover-up, less use of on-duty police, and the simulation of criminal investigation. The simulation of criminal investigation is evident in the extensive official trail of criminal leads in the political assassination of Ovando and Gil which, after a 2,000-page report, only served to exculpate some high-level PRI figures but still failed to find the ultimate perpetrator. Death threats to those investigating the political killings of their PRD spouses (Laura García Alonso), successful assassinations against policemen who rigorously investigated these crimes (Guillermo González Calderoni, ex-head of the Federal Judicial Police under Salinas, Rafael Ponce Miranda, Guerrero head State Judicial police officer), and failed assassination attempts (Mario Rojas-Alba) on potential whistle-blowers effectively close potential lines of criminal investigation (Crónica Guerrero 1998:30, 34; La Jornada, 2/6/03; Rojas Alba 1996:119). Theories of individual-level processes can also shed light on some of the microdeterminants of political killing. Cohen (2001) notes of other nations that policemen who commit homicide in the line of duty frequently justify their behavior with reference to such accounts as the “dirty work” theory, the “denial of the victim,” and “moral indifference.” Understanding these accounts can, in some cases, help us to illustrate the ways in which perpetrators of destructive behavior come to terms with their own consciences and with the cultural beliefs that condemn their behavior as illegitimate (Smelser 1998:91). In political crimes, for example, the police often argue that they must necessarily engage in unpleasant but necessary tasks because every society has “dirty work” that just has to be done. A mid-level Israeli security officer told an Israeli psychiatrist that he never took personally criticisms of the use of police torture against Palestinians because he was not a sadist or doing anything morally wrong. Instead, he argued that “ordinary Israelis including these same human rights critics can get on with their comfortable lives and know that their children are safe only because they can depend on the hidden, dirty work done by people like him (Cohen 2001:91).” The “dirty-work” theory also found some expression in police actions against the PRD. Mexican police commander Noriega Cantú explained the 10-h gun battle between the police and some armed perredistas in which three policemen and one PRD member died as a form of “dirty work.” He explained to reporters that he did not go after the protesting perredistas, nor did he try to detain anyone. Rather the police “objective” was merely to “dislodge the popular PRD municipal government to pave the way for the PRI mayor to take-over power (Proceso 3/12/90:10).” The director of the Preventive Police, Oliva Pérez was blunter when he told local reporters that his organized attack of some 175 policemen on unarmed PRD members in which at least five died during their protest march to the airport in Acapulco as “planned perfectly… In front, I had put the firemen. Next, the mounted police and then afterward everyone else. We went into disperse the protestors and send a message… (Proceso 3/5/90:8).”

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Another common justification stated by Mexican policemen who killed in responding to the organizational demand to follow orders and dislodge (largely unarmed) protesting perredistas was to deny the suffering of the victim. In spirals of political violence, this often takes the form of blaming the other, drawing on the refrain of “Look what they did/are doing to us.” Such narratives are often ideologically rooted in different cultures and can have quite different histories but often have the same ending: “History shows that the people whom you call victims are not really victims, ‘we, whom you condemn, have been the ‘real’ victims; they are, in the ‘ultimate sense,’ the true aggressors; therefore they deserve to be punished; justice is on our side’ (Cohen 2001:96).” The “denial of the victim” can be heard in the claim of the policemen in the Aguas Blancas massacre that the 17 unarmed peasants “Got what they deserved” (Gutiérrez 1998:120). Other policemen also negated the PRD’s ideological claim to be true democratizors, justifying their actions by stating – “Have your democracy by voice, mother-fkers” – before opening fire (Crónica Puebla 1997:39). Another version of denial of the victim was more direct and could be heard in the statement of the killer who felt it necessary to explain to the victims that their murders were somehow deserved, saying: “This is what is happening to you for being troublemakers” before shooting them (Proceso 3/12/90:6). On the other side, in some cases of near lynching of police or assassins by PRD militants (Proceso 2/12/90:8; Oaxaca 11/9/93) or where PRD militants defended their “occupied” town halls with arms and killed armed príistas (Junapeo, Michoacán), the “denial of the victim” was also heard in such PRD comments as “those people [the PRI]…saw how we got rid of their own little dead (sus muertitos) (Proceso 1/29/90:17).” “Moral indifference” is also a rationale employed by perpetrators, and there are many variants of it even within a single historical case. The idea of moral indifference refers to the notion that there is no need to be “innocent of a ‘troubling recognition’ (such as murder) because the recognition is not troubling (Cohen 2001:101).” For example, those perpetrators studied in Nazi Germany described their mass killings in banal, factual tones and, to the extent that justification for destructive behavior was expressed, it was rationalized in terms of “obedience,” “correct military behavior,” “professionalism,” “decency,” or even as the result of “stress” (Klee et al. 1991). In Mexico, the class of paramilitaries and hired guns who assassinated perredistas displayed a type of “moral indifference” in their calm acclimation to violence. In committing their murders, these assassins clearly stated their authorization to murder had been granted by the government, and then, they calmly attempted to properly identify their victims before killing them. Apparently, any type of social front could be employed in this process as illustrated by assassin Ávila López who said “come over here friend” to his victim and then took out his pistol and shot him four times in cold blood in front of his family (CHR 1994:302; CNDH 1994:285–287). Unlike those who appealed to the “dirty work” theory or even those who blamed the victim, these Mexican hired guns legitimized their actions by appeal to the fact of governmental authorization itself. As one assassin claimed: “You are all PRD members and because of that, we are going to do away with all of you. Whether you want it or not: we are prepared and the government has authorized us to kill (Proceso

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9/11/95:29).” As noted above, eyewitness Beatriz Romero Formacio heard one policeman order, as follows: “Shoot to kill, by orders of the President” before several others opened fire and killed a 17-year-old perredista Gonzalo Chantes Formacio who was participating in a postelectoral fraud rally at the town hall to stop priísta Primo Cuatle Rojas from assuming the office there (CNDH 1994:491). By justifying their murders with reference to governmental authorization, these perpetrators of destructive behavior referred to an alternative set of values that promoted or at least condoned murder as a legitimate act in certain circumstances. These overall findings on the microdeterminants of political killings then suggest that individual members of the state security apparatus did vary in the task of rationalization in responding to the similar organizational demand to follow orders (Ross et al. 1999:278), but they did so in patterned ways. In particular, the Mexican case of the professional assassin, apprenticed in routine violent expression, reflects a type of moral indifference characteristic of the repetitive use of political assassination. In the etiology of this type of crime, leaders are the linchpins. As Turk (1982:111) explains when authorities perceive a direct challenge to their authority, this can trigger a response of political repression and policing that can include political assassination. Turk adds: “Where they do not, the concepts of conventional politics and factionalism seem to be more appropriate. The ambiguities we encounter are a function of the complex structures of authority that characterize modern politics (1982:35).” The historic 2000 presidential election which transferred presidential power from the PRI to Vicente Fox (PAN) alone caused a 94% drop in the political murder of PRD members despite continued PRI control over a majority of Mexican governorships and municipal governments. This strongly suggests that the pre-2000 authorization, quasi-authorization, and/or cover-up by political leaders created a permissive social milieu toward the use of state-sanctioned destructive behavior. Any toleration of extrajudicial killings, facilitated by impunity within the criminal justice system, in turn, facilitates the further use of vigilantism and undermines any semblance of the rule of law. These narratives also have theoretical implications for future research on the relationship between dissent, democratization, and homicide. Specifically, in writing of the general topic of conflict in social interaction, Simmel (1971:70) noted that among the most dissociating factors of a group were hate, envy, need, and desire. Hatred, according to Simmel, can be much more intense in situations where people share or have shared a commonality than in situations where complete strangers confront each other. “People who have many common features often do one another worse or ‘wronger’ wrong than complete strangers do (Simmel 1971:91).” These causes of conflict can be particularly acute in groups where certain common qualities or common membership in a larger group characterize the situation. Specifically, Simmel (1971:95) suggested that conflict and the desire for vengeance is always worse in parties that have been previously similar because the “respect for the enemy” is absent where the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity. The historical and ideological specifics of the emergence of PRD dissent allow us to predict that ideological similarities between contending parties can lead to severe repression. The PRD developed from “an uncomfortable coalition of socialists,

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social democrats and PRI dissidents” (Gledhill 1995:75) in the context of a regime originally committed to a left-leaning revolutionary nationalist ideology. The decision of many on the Mexican Left to adopt the electoral path to democratizing change had the unintended consequence of leading to a large number of homicides of a specific character. For example, the demand by some Mexican caciques and policemen that the PRD victim “apologize” for participating in antifraud marches but, at the same time, the willingness of many to let bribed, and nonbribed, repentant PRD militants back into the folds of the PRI reflects a desire for vengeance tinged with ambivalence (CHR, 1994:30–31; 100–101, 270). This ambivalence is heard in the statement of a hired gun, quoted above, addressing a crowd of PRD members before killing their leader: “This is the leader of the PRD and we are going to do away with him. For the moment, we are only going to kill him. The rest of you will escape but only on the condition that you return to being priístas. If you carry on with the PRD, we will kill all of you (and then to the victim himself): ‘We are tired of you because you lead the PRD. You die and the problem ends’” (Proceso 9/11/95:29). Similarly, dying victims were reminded that their killer was actually the one with the power, and dead bodies were mistreated and, in some occasions, publicly left on display (CHR 1994:73–74, 96–97, 270). If the purpose was simply to eliminate the PRD militant in question, such practices would be pointless and redundant. Murder associated with the rise of the PRD suggests that this chilling form of political violence is meant to treat the victim as if he/she were somehow guilty of defection, a defector whose dead body, in some cases, must be made a public example to dissuade others. Foucault (1995:3) explains this type of enactment as state power, the atrocity of torture, the primitive and archaic use of decapitation as a method of verifying the completion of the murder and the public display of mutilated bodies as acts of revenge meant to send the political message that an attack on the regime has to be attacked in turn. Echoes of this message and the generalized, pervasive, climate of fear associated with PRD membership could be still heard in the voice of one widow of a murdered PRD leader who said in 2000: “It’s so much easier to be a part of the PRD in Mexico City. But once you step outside, you’re just marked (Mauleón 2000:2).”24 Political assassination against political dissenters in Mexico, as in political crimes in general, (Ross 2003:26) was a result of a sequence of interrelated individual and social level determinants. The defection of various reformist PRI leaders from the party and their formation as leaders of the FDN/PRD represented an ideological and organization schism perceived as (potentially or actually) politically threatening to ruling political elites. Death threats received by perredistas to cease their political activity often also entailed the request that the leader return to the PRI as an activist, a request that attempts to return the contending participants to a previous state of greater solidarity. Leadership authorization ultimately was the critical historical condition activating this wave of political killings by creating a permissive social milieu toward destructive behavior. Future research on conflict in democratization would do well to study further both what motivates political leaders to decide against the authorization of destructive behavior and what social conditions lead them to fear the consequences of vigilantism for themselves.

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Appendix Table 4.1a An analysis of 250 PRD victims of political murder, 1988–1994 PRD position in party Victims 250 Suspected State Date # = Victim/family death threat Total perpetrators Direct evidence of authorization or cover-up a Chiapas 12/29/1988 State/Local Leader (n = 1)# Hired Gun of Local PRI cacique at gas station Coahuila 11/3/1990 Local PRD Activist (n = 1) 3 State Judicial Police in context of antifraud protests DF 7/2/1988 National Electoral Leaders (n = 2) National/State PRI Leaders Durango 12/7/1990 Local Leader (n = 1) Unknowns leave body in bed; had denounced corruption Durango 6/11/1993 Local PRD/CIOAC Leader (n = 1)# 3 Hired Guns of PRI-affiliated agrarian union Durango 8/16/1993 State PRD/CIOAC Leaders (n = 3)# Unknown, suspected 1 hired gun of above case Guerrero 1/2/1990 Local PRD members (n = 4) Assassinated by 2 hired PRI guns who fled to USA Guerrero 2/4/1990 Local PRD Activist (n = 1) 3 PRI hired guns ambush and assassinated victim on his horse Guerrero 2/27/1990 Local PRD Activist (n = 1) Beaten to death by State Judicial Police during march Guerrero 2/27/1990 Local PRD Activist (n = 1) Assassinated during antifraud march; 2 others wounded Guerrero 3/17/1990 Local PRD Activist (n = 1) Beaten to death by PRI hired guns, taken from home Guerrero 5/28/1990 Local/State PRD Leader (n = 1) Abducted and beaten to death by 4 PRI hired guns Guerrero 1/19/1991 Local PRD member (n = 1)# Illegally detained, tortured, killed by motorized police (continued)

Appendix

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Table 4.1a (continued) PRD position in party State

Date

# = Victim/family death threat

Victims 250 Suspected Total perpetrators

Guerrero

3/2/1992

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Guerrero

10/29/1993 Local PRD member

Guerrero

11/9/1993

Local PRD Activist

Hidalgo

1/14/1990

Local PRD Activist

Hidalgo

7/27/1990

Local PRD Activist

Hidalgo

10/12/1990 Local PRD Leader

Hidalgo

5/12-13/91 Local PRD Activist

Hidalgo

10/27/1991 PRD Mun Trustee

Michoacán 3/27/1989

Local PRD Activist


Local PRD Policeman


Mun President


PRD Leader/Lawyer


PRD Mun Presidential Candidate

Assassinated in field by 2 PRI hired guns of local cacique (n = 1) Assassinated by 3 SJP near home of PRD’s Mun President (n = 1) Assassinated by 2 unknowns at his ranch at 7:30 a.m. (n = 1) Hired Guns of Local PRI cacique (n = 1) Hired Guns of Local PRI cacique of above case (n = 1) Hired Guns of Local PRI cacique of above case 4+child Paramilitary band associated with above case (n = 1) Beaten when 4 Mun Pol break up PRD meeting (n = 1) Dies after 2 police beat him at preelection meeting (n = 1) Ambushed by band armed men and local PRI cacique (n = 1) Assassinated by hired guns of PRI local cacique (n = 1)# Assassinated by hired gun of Federal Judicial Police (n = 1) Assassinated by rifle shots in his fields by unknowns (continued)

82



Date




Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Michoacán 12/24/1992 Local PRD member

Michoacán 12/25/1992 Local PRD member


Local PRD members

1 Wounded


PRD Officials – Mayor/Policemen

Morelos

12/15/1988 PRD Member and Policeman

Morelos

1/18/1989

PRD Policeman

Morelos

5/17/1989

Local PRD activist

Morelos

10/16/1991 Local PRD Leader/Urban Leader

Oaxaca

10/22/1989 PRD Mayor/Activists (1 woman)

Puebla

5/29/1990

Local PRD Activist

Puebla

6/10/1992

Local PRD Leader and Activists

Assassinated by known hired guns of PRI cacique (n = 1) Killed by 8 State Judicial Police/ many witnesses there (n = 1) Killed by 2 PRI policemen/ 1 confesses (n = 1) Shot by PRI member near public hall; died at hospital (n = 7) Killed by spray gunfire of hired PRI guns – officiating election (n = 1) Killed by ex-head of Pol. Invest. – State Judicial Police (n = 1) Killed by ex-head of Pol. Invest. – State Judicial Police (n = 1)# Kidnapped previously by above; assassinated/ dumped (n = 1)# Shot by State Judicial Police Commander (n = 3) 20 local priístas, assassinated 3 on inauguration day (n = 1) Shot by Mun Pol at PRD “occupied” MP (n = 4) Professional assassin with a list of PRD names; killed on highway (continued)

Appendix

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Date



Puebla

3/23/1993

Local PRD members

(n = 2)

Tabasco

1/12/1992

Local PRD member

Tamaulipas 4/2/1994

Local PRD Leader

Shot at antifraud march by hired guns of PRI Mun president (n = 1) Assassinated by 2 PRI at his ranch, postelectoral tensions (n = 1)# Assassinated by 1 PRI outside dance hall, eyewitnesses

n = 62 victims Impunity – total and partial DF 12/11/1992 PRD Leader/Urban Leader

DF

6/11/1993

Local PRD Leader

Durango

6/21/1990

Local PRD member

Campeche 12/25/1993 Local PRD Leader

Chiapas

9/9/1991

Local PRD Leader

Chiapas

10/2/1992

PRD Activist/Peasant Leader

Chiapas

1/24/1994

Local PRD Activists

Chihuahua 12/30/1988 Local PRD Leader

Guerrero

1/20/1989

PRD Mun Trustee

(n = 1)# Shot by hired gun of “shock group” of PRI delegate (n = 1) Body severely beaten, fingers/ toes fractured, unknowns (n = 1) Died after PRI supporters beat him at vote recount (n = 1)# 4 Hired Guns of Local PRI cacique (n = 1)# Hired Guns; Agrarian Struggle b/w CIAOC-CNC (n = 1) Ambushed/ Assassinated in land dispute with PRI CNC (n = 2) Bodies found shot/ Had been jailed by police 12/16 (n = 1) Known Hired Guns of local PRI cacique (n = 1)# Assassinated by 2 PRI hired guns; 1 found guilty but flees (continued)

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Table 4.1a (continued) PRD position in party # = Victim/family death threat


State

Date

Guerrero


(n = 1)

Guerrero

1/13/1990

Local PRD members

(n = 3)

Guerrero

1/20/1990

Local PRD Security Guard

(n = 1)

Guerrero

2/4/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

3/6/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

3/6/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

4/4/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

5/20/1990

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Guerrero

5/22/1990

Local PRD member

Guerrero

6/15/1990

Local PRD members

(n = 2)

Guerrero

8/9/1990

Local PRD members

(n = 2)

Young

(n = 1)

Assassinated a few days before federal elections by 4 PRI Assassinated by 3 hired PRI guns, 3 jailed for 2 1/2 years Dead in water tank/ coup de grace/ torture, unknown 3 PRI hired guns ambush and assassinate victim on his horse Gunfire – SJP dislodging/ CNDH finds negli/rec. invest/ sanc Dies from wounds by State Jud. Police at dislodging Assassinated by unknown(s); after activism in antifraud rally Ambushed/ Assassinated by PRI hired guns while walking Killed by State Judicial Police as he ran toward them Taken in by State Judicial and motorized police; killed Assassinated outside home by unknown(s) (continued)

Appendix

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Date



Guerrero

9/11/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

9/25/1990

PRD Activist at “Parallel Mun”

(n = 1)

Guerrero

11/9/1990

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

10/13/1991 Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Guerrero

11/25/1991 Local PRD Leaders

(n = 2)

Guerrero

4/1/1992

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

5/4/1992

PRD Mun Pol Commander

(n = 1)

Guerrero

10/1/1992

PRD Mun Delegate (Professor)

(n = 1)

Guerrero

10/15/1992 PRD Mayor and Party Secretary

(n = 1)

Guerrero

11/16/1992 Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Guerrero

12/4/1992

(n = 1)

Guerrero

12/23/1992 Local PRD Activists

Local PRD Activist

(n = 2)

Ambushed/ Assassinated with 21 bullets by 6 hired guns Beaten/axed by unknowns in his bed at home Assassinated by PRI Mun Pros and Police Chief at restaurant Assassinated by ax blow to neck near town; 2 PRI hired guns Killed by hired guns during dislodging of peasants Tortured, assassinated by motorized police Deliberately run over by a truck 2 times by unknowns Stoned to death by unknowns Assassinated entering a store by unknown who fled Assassinated playing basketball by unknown at close range Assassinated at 7:30 p.m. by drunk local PRI party pres. Assassinated in back by local police (continued)

86



Date



Guerrero

2/17/1993

PRD Activist and Mayor’s Brother

(n = 1)

Guerrero

2/24/1993

Local PRD Leader

(n = 1)

Guerrero

4/26/1993

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Guerrero

8/26/1993

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Guerrero

10/9/1993

Local PRD Leader

(n = 1)

Guerrero

9/21/1993

Local PRD members

(n = 2)

Guerrero

2/28/1994

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

Hidalgo


(n = 1)

Hidalgo

10/2/1992

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Mexico

2/10/1990

Local PRD Leader

(n = 1)

Mexico


(n = 1)

Mexico

9/20/1992

(n = 1)

PRD Mun Leader

Assassinated by 2 known PRI hired guns near taco stand Assassinated leaving hospital in a taxi by unknowns Killed during fight with PRI peasants in land dispute Killed by local police with his own machete Assassinated by 3 unknowns who were waiting for him Killed by local police at Mun park Tortured/tortured by unknowns after antifraud rally Commander of Mun Pol plus 1 Munpoliceman Assassinated by 3 hired guns of local PRI cacique in home 4 men associated with PRI peasant org. leader 1 PRD killed; 2 police killed during fraud protest rally Body found with beating wounds/2 gunshots, unknown (continued)

Appendix

87


Date



Mexico

12/8/1992

PRD Leader/Candidate

(n = 1)

Mexico

6/3/1993

Local PRD Leader

Mexico

1/24/1994

PRD Mayoral Candidate

Michoacán 12/26/1989 Local Mayoral Candidate

Michoacán 1/4/1990

Local PRD Activist

Michoacán 1/7/1990

Local Mayoral Candidate


Local PRD Activists


Local PRD Activist


PRD Security Officer


PRD Parallel Mayor


Local PRD Activist


PRD Mun Policeman


State PRD Leader

Assassinated by unknown at start of ejido election meeting (n = 1) Assassinated by unknowns in his vehicle with 6 bullets (n = 1) Professional assassination while at home by known hired gun (n = 2) Assassinated by drunken local cacique at a party (n = 1) Assassinated in auto by 3 hired guns (n = 1) Killed by PRI ex-mayor while guarding Mun building (n = 2) Assassination by hired guns of local PRI Mun President at MP (n = 1) Killed by local policeman while guarding PRD offices (n = 1) Assassinated at home by two hired guns (n = 1) Hired gun of local PRI cacique (n = 1)# Assassinated in auto by known hired gun (n = 1) Assassinated while milking cows by hired guns of PRI (n = 1)# Beaten to death by 3 hired guns (continued)

88



Date



PRD State Leader


PRD Mun Treasurer


Local PRD Activist


Local PRD Leader


Local PRD Activist


PRD Local Policeman


Local PRD Leader

Michoacán 1/1/1993

PRD Mayor’s Housemate

Michoacán 1/1/1993

Local PRD Activist

Michoacán 1/1/1993

Local PRD Activists


Local PRD Activist


1 PRD Activist at PRD “Occupied” Townhall


Local PRD/Peasant Leader

And wife

Woman

Victims 250 Suspected Total perpetrators (n = 1)# Ambushed on ranch by local PRI caciques (n = 2) Shot 17 times during ambush by unknowns (n = 1) Assassinated by unknown on way to highway (n = 1) Shot by known PRI member at PRD meeting (n = 1) Raped, tortured, slashed, shot by 6 men (n = 1) Shot after argument by off-duty State Judicial agent (n = 1) Assassinated at patio of his home by local PRI leader (n = 1) 12 Hired PRI guns, by coup de grace at own home (n = 1) 4 hired guns of above – in front of wife; then ate tacos (n = 2) Killed by spray gunfire at antifraud rally; 2 priístas also die (n = 1) Shot by brother of PRI local mayor Killed as local police and armed men spray gunfire (n = 1) Shot at wedding by known gunmen who flee crime (continued)

Appendix

89


Date


Michoacán 11/15/1993 2 PRD Policemen/2 Officials

Michoacán 12/27/1993 PRD Mayor/Police Inspector

Morelos

1/23/1989

Local PRD Activists

Morelos

10/6/1989

Local PRD Activist

Morelos

12/15/1990 Local PRD Members

Morelos

1/15/1990

Local PRD Activist

Morelos

11/9/1991

Local PRD Members

Morelos

8/14/1992

Local PRD Activist

Morelos

12/27/1992 Local PRD Activist/Urban Leader

Oaxaca

4/10/1989

Ex-PRD Mayoral Candidate

Oaxaca

6/13/1989

Local PRD/Peasant member

Oaxaca

8/13/1989

Father, Local PRD Leader

Victims 250 Suspected Total perpetrators (n = 4)

Ambushed/killed investigating PRD assassi nations by PRI hired guns (n = 2) Ambushed, shot in car by unknowns in car who fled (n = 2) Killed by spray gunfire at antifraud rally by Prev. Police (n = 1)# Assassinated in field by hired guns of Political Police (n = 2) Assassinated on a bus after confrontation with priístas (n = 1) Shot by PRI CTM leader in a confrontation with priístas (n = 1)# Chased, captured, tortured, hung by above perpetrators (n = 1) Assassinated by hired guns assoc, with Pol. Police (n = 1) Shot by unknown persons in neighborhood (n = 1)# Assassinated by hired guns of cacique; body left on highway (n = 2) 8 State Judicial Police removing squatting peasants (n = 1) Shot by known individual during antifraud rally (continued)

90



Date



Oaxaca

11/8/1989

PRD Elected Mayor

(n = 1)

Oaxaca

12/9/1989

Ex-PRD Mun President

Oaxaca

12/9/1989

PRD/COCEI Activists

Oaxaca

2/6/1990

Local PRD Activists

Oaxaca

4/23/1990


Oaxaca

1/1/1991

Child of PRD Member (age 11)

Oaxaca

3/26/1991

Local PRD Leader

Oaxaca

4/17/1992

Local PRD/Urban Leader

Oaxaca


Oaxaca

1/18/1993

Local PRD Members

1 Female

Oaxaca

3/8/1993

Local PRD Member

1 Wounded

Oaxaca

3/10/1993

Local PRD Member/Peasant

Oaxaca

4/17/1993

Local PRD/Urban Leader

Assassinated by Mun Pol on inauguration day (n = 1) Assassinated by PRI Mun President (local cacique) (n = 3) Shot by spray gunfire by PRI hired guns at an antifraud rally (n = 2) 2 assassinations w/ in 48 h by hired PRI guns (n = 1)# Assassinated at home by hired guns of local cacique (n = 1) Spray gunfire at MP party by drunk priístas (n = 1) Assassinated after meeting at MP by unknowns who fled (n = 1) Shot in vehicle; 2 unknowns who fled c/o eyewitness (n = 1)# Assassinated by unknown(s), body left on highway (n = 3) Spray gunfire by 10 priístas at PRD “occupied” MP (n = 1) Assassinated after political meeting by known hired guns (n = 1) Assassinated by PRI caciques (n = 1) Assassinated after wedding on street by 2 hired guns (continued)

Appendix

91


Date



Oaxaca

4/23/1993

Local PRD Member

(n = 1)

Oaxaca

6/10/1993

Local PRD Member

Oaxaca

6/16/1993

Local PRD Activist

Oaxaca

7/11/1993

Local PRD Activist

Oaxaca

11/9/1993

Local PRD Leader

Oaxaca

3/21/1994


Oaxaca

5/14/1994

PRD Pres and Sec. Public Works

Puebla Puebla

2/18/1989 4/10/1989

Local PRD/Urban Activist Local PRD Activist

Puebla

8/26/1989

Local PRD Activists

Puebla

1/13/1990

Local PRD Activist

Puebla

2/22/1990

PRD Mayoral Candidate

Puebla

4/21/1990

PRD Mun Counselors

Assassinated on street by PRI cacique and hired guns (n = 1) Assassinated by unknowns, body found dead (n = 1) Assassinated by 4 PRI hired guns while walking home (n = 1) Kidnapped into auto, assassinated by PRI hired guns (n = 1) Assassinated after protest by bodyguard of PRI fed. deputy (n = 1) Assassinated by 4 unknowns near edge of town (n = 2) Assassinated by unknowns waiting for them after political meeting (n = 1)# Shot by unknowns (n = 1) Assassinated by PRI CROM (worker’s union) (n = 3) Assassinated at bus stop by 4 PRI members; 1 confesses (n = 1) Assassinated while painting pol. propaganda, 2 known priístas (n = 1) Assassinated in front of MP by 5 swearing PRI hired guns (n = 2) Assassinated by 2 unknowns who were aided to flee town (continued)

92



Date


Puebla

10/28/1990 State PRD Deputy

Puebla

3/26/1990

Puebla


Puebla

3/5/1992

PRD Mayor

Puebla

9/6/1992

Mun Educational Secretary

Puebla

3/4/1993

Local PRD Leader

Sinaloa

1/18/1993

State/Local PRD Leader

Veracruz

9/10/1988

Newly Elected Mayor

Veracruz

1/21/1991

Mayoral Candidate

Veracruz

2/23/1991

Mun Human Rights Leader

Veracruz

6/20/1991

Mayoral Candidate

Local PRD Activist

Victims 250 Suspected Total perpetrators (n = 1)

Assassinated on street, 1 unknown asks aid, the other shoots (n = 1) Assassinated by 7 State Judicial Police at plebiscite vote (n = 1) Shot by drunk PRI auxiliary police (n = 1) Assassinated by 2 hired guns of local PRI caciques (n = 1)# Assassinated getting off bus by unknown with 7 bullets (n = 1) 6 State Jud. Police beat/pick up from home; dies en route (n = 1) Kidnapped, assassinated by unknowns after testifying (n = 1)# Professional assassination at doorstep by PRI hired gun (n = 1) Professional assassin, killed at his doorstep by 3 PRI hired guns (n = 1) Shot at 10:30 p.m. at doorstep by unknowns who fled (n = 1) Assassinated by unknown while walking with another PRD member (continued)

Appendix

93


Date



Veracruz

4/20/1994

Local PRD Party President

(n = 1)

Zacatecas

3/1/1992

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Zacatecas

2/21/1993

Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Contested cases Coahuila 1/2/1992

Local PRD member

(n = 1)

DF

8/20/1988

DF PRD Activists

(n = 4)

Mexico

8/9/1992

PRD Mayor

(n = 1)

Michoacán 2/2/1990

Local PRD Activists

(n = 3)


Wife of PRD Treasurer

(n = 1)



Michoacán 5/2/1992

PRD Mun Press Officer

(n = 1)

Michoacán 9/7/1992

2 Mun Auditors/2 Police-PRD

(n = 4)

Assassinated by 3 hired guns on a park bench in front of MP PRI Mun Delegate shoot him 5 times near ranch Stabbed/stoned/ beaten to death with a pistol by a hired gun

(n = 150 victims)

Michoacán 10/15/1992 PRD Mun Candidate

Auditor

(n = 2)

(n = 1)

Dies at violent dislodging of antifraud rally by State Police Assassinated in auto; victims distributing election material Body appeared in local river with blows to neck/ head Shot to death by Mun Pol while walking 3 hired guns of PRI deputy Drunken PRI member attacks PRD Security Officer Tortured, Assassinated by 2 hired guns in his taxi Planned ambush of official PRD Mun vehicle Shot in vehicle; other PRD members present (continued)

94



Date


# = Victim/family death threat PRD Mun Counselors

Michoacán 12/21/1992 Local PRD Activist

Oaxaca

10/27/1989 Local PRD Mayor/Co-op Leader

Oaxaca

9/9/1990

Local PRD Activist

Oaxaca

4/14/1992

Local PRD Leader

Oaxaca

6/5/1993

Son of PRD Member

Oaxaca

9/9/1993

PRD Leader/Mayoral Candidate

Oaxaca

4/18/1994

Local Founder/Leader PRD

Puebla

10/3/1993

Local PRD Activist

SL Potosi

11/18/1988 Local PRD Leaders

Tabasco

1/12/1992

Local PRD member

Age 10

Victims 250 Suspected Total perpetrators (n = 2)## Assassinated in auto by unknowns, tortured, coup de grace (n = 1) Ambushed (unknowns)/ beaten/ hospitalized/ testifies/dies (n = 1) Shot, presumed assassin from PRI co-op (n = 1) Shot, antifraud rally at PRD “occupied” MP (n = 1) Doctor says death from heart attack as a result of drowning (n = 1) Shot at basketball court by 3 priístas, 2 PRD present (n = 1) Ambushed on his donkey, shot by 3 known men (n = 1) Shot by four known men while walking with his son (n = 1) After beating victim’s son/ brother, drunk Mun Pol at MP shot him (n = 2) Shot by priístas during meeting of PRI Mun Presidential candidate (n = 1) Assassinated by 2 PRI at his ranch, postelectoral tensions

(n = 31 victims) (continued)

Appendix

95

Table 4.1a (continued) PRD position in party # = Victim/family death threat


Clear judicial outcome Guerrero 8/17/1990

PRD Mun Leader

(n = 1)

Guerrero

5/13/1993

Local PRD Member

(n = 1)

Morelos

12/6/1991

Local PRD Member

(n = 1)


Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)



(n = 1)

State

Date

Michoacán 12/11/1992 Brother of PRD Mayor

(n = 1)

Michoacán 12/18/1992 Local PRD Activist

(n = 1)

Killed by 6 Mun Pol in bar right after PRD meeting Assassinated by 2 hired guns by bathroom at anti-Gov’t rally Kidnapped, tortured, killed by hired guns of Pol. Police Shot to death by Mun Pol at marketplace Ambushed, hired guns of ex-PRI mayoral candidate Assassinated by local hired gun who flees Ambushed by hired gun of local PRI commissioner

(n = 7 victims) Source: CHR (1994), CNDH (1994), Crónica Puebla (1997), Crónica Guerrero (1998) MP Municipal Palace, OAS Organization of American States, Mun municipal, SJP State Judicial Police, St Pol State Police, Mun Pol municipal police, Prev. Police Preventative Police, Gov’t government, CIAOC Agricultural Workers and Peasant Independent Union, Negl. negligence, CNC National Peasant Confederation, rec recommends, CNDH National Human Rights Commission, pol. political, CROM Federation of Labor, Mun Pros mun prosecutor, CTM Mexican Workers’ Federation, Org organizational, CROC National Confederation of Workers and Peasants, COCEI Coalition of Workers, Peasants and Students of the Isthmus, PGR Attorney General’s Office (State), Solidarity social welfare program of Salinas’ Gov’t a Indicates evidence of cover-up/authorization

96


Table 4.1b Justice – failure of federal/state officials to bring justice Direct evidence of authorization or cover-up a Chiapas Perpetrator flees/returns/30-year sentence. aPerpetrator is godson of governor; judge releases after 11 months b/c “vanishing proof.” Jailed for agrarian activism under previous governor, offered liberty in exchange for returning to PRI Coahuila Judge Absolves Police/Closes Case. a CNDH recommends judge be investigated/ sanctioned/arrest warrants served DF Ovando and Gil Case – see Chap. 2 Durango a CNDH finds no investigation/severe negligence. Body found covered in blood/ Federal Judicial Police looking for him at home 2 days earlier Family waiting for victim to appear at daughter’s wedding in Ciudad Juárez Durango a Total impunity; aLocal Paper Publishes Death Threat by Assassins against CIOAC/PRD leaders PRD files complaint with authorities on crime; identifies the assassins Durango a Total Impunity; aLocal Paper Publishes Death Threat against CIOAC/PRD leaders Victims drawn out from home with assassin under false pretext of needing a ride to his house to help to him resolve agrarian conflict Guerrero Judge asks USA for extradition; USA rejects b/c request not properly formulated a CNDH finds Regional Fed. Jud. Police aided assassins to flee; finds negligence; lack of investigation Guerrero Investigation begun then closed; aCNDH finds inexplicable negligence; rec. investigation/sanctions of 1 prosecutor. 1 year after CNDH recommendation, 2 of 3 arrest warrants are executed Guerrero CNDH finds severe impunity; negligence; rec. new investigation; sanctions a PRD says police orders from governor. aOAS also finds total Gov’t impunity, fault for victim’s death Guerrero Gov’t closes case; aCNDH finds severe impunity, negligence, rec. new investigation/sanctions. 2 years after CNDH rec., Gov’t shows death certificate of alleged killer. PRD says no sanctions applied; motorized police present at protest march Guerrero Gov’t says victim drunk, killed by friends, closes case. aCNDH finds inexplicable omission of investigation by 1 prosecutor and State Judicial Police; rec. new investigation Guerrero a CNDH finds no arrest warrants executed/suspicious assassination of police prosecutor in charge of investigation. After CNDH rec., 2 of 4 arrest warrant executed; 2 perpetrators fled, including “intellectual author” Guerrero

12/29/88

11/3/90

7/2/88 12/7/90

6/11/93

8/16/93

1/2/90

2/4/90

2/27/90

2/27/90

3/17/90

5/28/90

1/19/91 (continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Direct evidence of authorization or cover-up a 7 jailed but let free on appeal. aNeighbor eyewitnesses saw bloody, unconscious victim held in a cave. Victim tortured and threatened 11/2/90; illegally detained by Mun Pol/motorized pol. on 1/16–1/19 Guerrero CNDH finds arrest warrant not executed; rec. investigation/sanctions. aFamily receives note 4 days after victim’s death stating intention and Gov’t authorization to kill more PRD members Guerrero Investigation begun. aEyewitnesses saw SJP in a car w/o plates shine light in victim’s eyes, shoot him. 4 other wounded in attack including the 9-year-old brother of PRD MP candidate Guerrero Total Impunity. aPRD gubernatorial candidate says victim was the first of 11 names on a death threat/blacklist of PRD members Hidalgo a CNDH finds severe irregularities/severe negligence/rec. sanctions. PRD says PRI’s loss of municipal elections causing extreme electoral tensions/violence in municipality (Jacala) Hidalgo a CNDH finds severe irregularities/severe negligence/rec. sanctions (same as above) (Jacala) Hidalgo a CNDH finds severe irregularities/severe negligence/rec. sanctions. Victim had publicly denounced local PRI cacique several times Hidalgo a CNDH finds delays, severe negligence. 1 victim is son of PRD activist (age 7). Victims killed sequentially: 5/12 1 ambush; 5/13 second ambush; 5/15 forced entry into home Hidalgo CNDH finds no arrest warrants executed. aPRD notes 3 perpetrators fled nation with aid including intellectual author who gave police orders Mich. a CNDH finds SJP fail to serve arrest warrants; recommends their execution, investigation of SJP. Victim is beaten to death entering portable bathroom in front of his little son Mich. a CNDH finds total impunity; negligence in investigation; rec. sanctions. aThe Judge released 1 perpetrator immediately even before hearing testimony against him Mich. a Judge finds cover-up. CNDH finds arrest warrants not served. CNDH recommends governor investigate/discipline Mich. Judge issues arrest warrant. CNDH recommends execution of arrest warrant. aPRD says victim received death threats from PRI Guerrero governor Mich. No trial. Gov’t claims death over land. Local press claims victim hovering between life/death in hospital on 8/22. aPRD notes victim never in hospital; shot on 8/23

97

3/2/92

10/29/93

11/9/93

1/14/90

7/27/90

10/12/90

5/12-13/91

10/27/91

3/27/89

1/25/90

8/24/91

6/23/92

8/23/92

(continued)

98


Table 4.1b (continued) Direct evidence of authorization or cover-up a Mich. Investigation yields no detainees/CNDH says case resolved. a Special PRD Fiscal says it is a political crime led by local PRI cacique; 1 of the hired guns is subsequently jailed for other crimes Mich. Attorney General claims victim had rifle; a Special PRD Fiscal disputes this; judge tries 1 policeman, jailed. Other police awaiting sentencing Mich. a 1 Mun Pol confesses to participating in crime; judge finds cover-up; issues arrest warrant; Special Fiscal arrests Mich. a Special PRD Fiscal claims total impunity in case stems from certain Gov’t authorities covering for assassins Mich. a CNDH finds delays in justice allow perpetrators to escape. Army and SJP do not show-up until next day to stop remaining gunfire Morelos Investigation frozen/a CNDH finds total impunity; recommends sanctions – see Chap. 2 (Jóse Ramon García Gómez case) Morelos a CNDH finds severe negligence Morelos a CNDH finds severe negligence Morelos a Judge finds Commander guilty but not jailed and promoted to Sub director of Prev. Police. PRD says victim heavily involved in mun. land title disputes; a father told by Nicolasa Ruíz Contreras about rumors his son would be assassinated that morning Oaxaca a CNDH finds severe negligence/clear delays of justice. Mayor killed at office; Women activist at home; other at town entrance in sequence Puebla a CNDH finds severe negligence – total impunity, no investigation at all, rec. sanctions Puebla a CNDH finds severe negligence – failure even to follow-up on eyewitness testimony, rec. sanctions. a Assassins boarded public bus, disembarked all passengers, read PRD names from list; shot them. PRD says perpetrators were PRI paramilitaries Puebla PRI-dominated State Congress votes against revoking PRI Mun president’s office. a Victims hit by gunfire from inside PRI Mun president’s house while marching past; 3 women and 2 others wounded; 1 victim dies in hospital Tabasco a CNDH finds no arrest warrants executed; rec. investigation/sanctions. a Eyewitness indicates 4 men but additional men also acted to cover-up crime but are not tried for the crime

12/9/92

12/24/92

12/25/92

1/16/93

2/12/93

12/15/88

1/18/89 5/17/89 10/16/91

10/22/89

5/29/90

6/10/92

3/23/93

1/12/92

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Direct evidence of authorization or cover-up a Tamaulipas a Mun Pol Commander immediately detained then immediately released; other perpetrator/detained by State Judicial Police fleeing town, tried, jailed. PRD says PRI Mun President tried to protect assassin w/local police. Victim and others sought State audit of PRI Mun President/Mun finances n = 62 victims Impunity – total and partial DF Total Impunity. PRD say sons denounce crime; 2 years later, locals claim perpetrator killed 2 more; police say not enough officers to investigate latter crime DF No trial. Victim opposed local urban development project. PRD notes body severely beaten Durango No trial Camp. CNDH finds 3 of 4 arrest warrant not served. Victim opposed local forestry project expansion Chiapas CNDH finds arrest warrant not served/negl. Victim’s son/other CIOAC activist wounded in attack Chiapas No trial. PRI CNC head led PRI peasants to invade land sought by PRD peasants, causing PRI vs. PRD peasant conflict Chiapas No trial. Army had removed them from jail shortly thereafter, then victims disappeared until found dead Chihuahua Penal sentencing initiated. Victim trying to get titles for ejido lands which were disputed by local PRI cacique Guerrero CNDH finds no arrest warrant served; recommend sanctions Guerrero CNDH asks state Gov’t for info but Gov’t says no complaint filed; case closed Guerrero 1 perpetrator subsequently assassinated; his wife blames PRD victims’ families, 2 PRD jailed but PRD disputes. CNDH finds original case frozen, contrary to law, negligence, and rec. sanctions Guerrero Investigation begun but victim’s sister stops it, saying maybe b/c of his age and ill health, he fell into the well. CNDH finds failure to properly investigate; rec. sanction. PRD says victim’s sister feared reprisals as victim’s death occurred in town of Aguas Blancas Guerrero Investigation begun then closed; CNDH finds negligence; rec. investigation/ sanctions of 1 prosecutor. 1 year after CNDH rec., 2 of 3 arrest warrants are executed

99

4/2/94

12/11/92

6/11/93

6/21/90 12/25/93

9/9/91

10/2/92

1/24/94

12/30/88

1/20/89 11/27/89 1/13/90

1/20/90

2/4/90

(continued)

100


Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Guerrero CNDH finds negligence, rec. new investigations/sanctions. PRD “occupied” MP; several police also die from stray gunfire Guerrero CNDH finds negligence, rec. new investigations/sanctions. PRD “occupied” MP; 2 other PRD members “disappear” at dislodging, never since been localized Guerrero No trial. CNDH asks state Gov’t for info but Gov’t says no complaint filed. PRD says local cacique very repressive; many PRD members moved away; this is second victim in Tlacoachistlahuaca Guerrero 1 perpetrator jailed but released on appeal. 3 other PRD members gravely wounded in attack. 3rd victim in Tlacoachistlahuaca Guerrero After CNDH intervention, 3 of 10 arrest warrants executed on State Judicial Policemen. Guerrero CNDH finds no investigation, rec. new investigation, sanctions. PRD says police violently detained 21 PRD peasants from their homes on that day Guerrero CNDH finds negligence, rec. new investigations/sanctions. PRD says this couple is sixth of 7 killings of PRD members in Ometepec in 5 months, suspect local PRI caciques Guerrero CNDH finds impunity, no investigation, rec. invest/sanctions. Victim threatened by PRI ejidal commissar (uncle of PRI Mun president) regarding use of ejido lands Guerrero CNDH finds extreme impunity and negligence by 3 in prosecutor’s office/rec. investigations/sanctions (Ometepec). Victim was also electoral activist Guerrero Mun Pol Chief jailed (11.6 years after appeal); Suspect PRI Municipal Prosecutor also acts as Public Prosecutor in the case and absolves himself of the crime. PRD says prosecutor drunk but shot victim immediately w/o discussion; victim active in antifraud activities Guerrero CNDH finds impunity, negligence in investigation, rec. new invest/sanctions. PRD says victim involved in antifraud protests; electoral tensions and disputes b/w dual PRI–PRD agrarian authorities Guerrero CNDH finds negligence, interference with investigation, recommends sanctions. Victim opposed local urban development project on ejido lands Guerrero Total Impunity. PRD claims victim very active in peasant struggles in area Guerrero No investigation. PRD claims victim pacific, well-respected w/o problems with anyone. Gov’t says motive unknown

3/6/90

3/6/90

4/4/90

5/20/90

5/22/90

6/15/90

8/9/90

9/11/90

9/25/90

11/9/90

10/13/91

11/25/91

4/1/92 5/4/92

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Guerrero No investigation. PRD claims victim active promoter of social demands of his constituency Guerrero No investigation. PRD says assassin not identified, shot in cold blood, electoral tensions in town Guerrero No investigation. PRD notes victim shot 3 days after his major speech endorsing PRD governor candidate. Victim had long history of political activism in Cuautepec Guerrero No investigation. PRD notes victim shot at pool hall in cold blood, had just been named poll worker Guerrero Complaint filed with authorities. No response, police killers continue working Guerrero Investigation begun, perpetrator identified, local police follow him but he flees. PRD says perpetrator had no personal fight with victim/it was a contract murder Guerrero Investigation begun, special congressional committee investigates case too. Victim + 1 PRD (female), 1 PRI wounded earlier that day at PRD antigovernor rally when PRI/State Judicial Police show up Guerrero No investigation. PRD and PRI members and SJP are all at dispute which lasts several hours. Victim shot, 2 PRD also wounded by bullets Guerrero No investigation. Police try to take victim’s machete, he refuses, they snatch it from him, kill him with it. Angry mob then destroys police car, multiple postelectoral tensions, police barricade in municipality Guerrero No investigation. PRD says enormous postelectoral tensions in the region. Eyewitnesses say victim shot 4 times in chest as he left a location Guerrero No investigation. Victims walking in park/police commander orders them to halt; fearing police, they flee but are shot and killed. PRD says multiple postelectoral tensions, anti-PRD reprisals in municipality Guerrero Total Impunity. PRD says death occurred after dislodging of PRD “occupied” MP/ Public Prosecutor refuses to investigate Hidalgo CNDH finds 1 of 2 arrest warrants not served. Commander fled; PRD claims he is protected by PRI Mun president/PRI state party president Hidalgo Total impunity (Jacala) Mexico CNDH finds 3 of 4 arrest warrant not served. Victim involved in opposition to local timber sale

101

10/1/92

10/15/92

11/16/92

12/4/92

12/23/92 2/17/93

2/24/93

4/26/93

8/26/93

10/9/93

9/21/93

2/28/94

10/13/90

10/2/92 2/10/90

(continued)

102


Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Mexico CNDH finds Mun Pol responsible. Shoot-out; Police claim police unarmed/some PRD armed Mexico No trial. Victim about to receive legal title for ejido lands also claimed by local PRI cacique known for violent methods. PRD notes climate of repression toward members in the municipality Mexico Total Impunity. Victim also running for president as ejido commissar. PRD local deputy demands full judicial investigation Mexico Partial investigation, no convictions. PRD requests CNDH investigate case Mexico Total Impunity. Perpetrator known to be a contract killer; goes to victim’s home asking for papers, shoots, intellectual authors unknown Mich. Penal Investigation suspended when perpetrator murdered. PRD candidate’s brother also a victim. Perpetrator arguing with victims over political differences right before murder Mich. CNDH finds total impunity by State Judicial Police/Public Min. Victim is brother of PRD leader. Postelectoral tensions in municipality Mich. CNDH finds 1 perpetrator evading justice. After CNDH recommendation, arrest warrant is executed. PRD had taken over municipal building, claiming PRI electoral fraud Mich. CNDH finds total impunity/no investigation, negligence, rec. sanction. PRD had established a “parallel” Mun Gov’t to protest fraud. Severe electoral tensions – that day, SJP detain PRD leaders/PRD retaliates by kidnapping some PRI Mich. CNDH finds arrest warrant not served. CNDH recommends sanctions. PRD had established a “parallel” Mun Gov’t to protest fraud Mich. CNDH finds arrest warrants not served. 2 years after CNDH recommendation, arrest warrants are executed. Victim was to be in charge of security at “parallel” PRD Mun Gov’t Mich. No investigation until CNDH intervenes – case then suspended. Eyewitness to crime not interviewed. Victim’s family not able or willing to vigorously pursue legal case Mich. CNDH finds arrest warrant not served. Public Min. says suspect fled to US. PRD notes no extradition request was made Mich. CNDH finds total impunity – not even a record of the case. Several eyewitnesses to the murder

12/12/90

9/20/92

12/8/92

6/3/93 . 1/24/94

12/26/89

1/4/90

1/7/90

1/19/90

1/21/90

3/31/90

5/14/90

6/21/90

12/8/90

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Mich. CNDH finds no arrest warrants served. PRD notes victim received several death threats from local PRI members Mich. CNDH says penal sentencing in process. Victim also agrarian leader/local police inspector. Killed in front of his own family; in PRD-governed municipality, received many death threats Mich. CNDH says penal sentencing in process. PRD Mun president/daughter gravely wounded. PRD says it was a failed assassinated attempt on Mun president with other victims caught in gunfire Mich. No trial – unknown assassin flees scene Mich. No trial. Victim, convoking a protest planning meeting for Morelia, provoked by priísta, argued with him and then was shot by him Mich. CNDH finds investigation started; instructs it send to judge. PRD notes that both victim and her father suffered assass. attempts/victim active in PRD governor and deputy races. PRD suspects hired guns Mich. CNDH finds arrest warrant not served, Special Fiscal assigned. Special Fiscal – PRD lawyer named by State Gov. to investigate 14 PRD cases; he is assigned some State Judicial Police Mich. Investigation begun but no one arrested. Special PRD Fiscal identifies perpetrator. PRD victim blocking access of local PRI leaders to local funds Mich. Total Impunity. Special PRD Fiscal denounces impunity; captures 1; tried by judges, sentenced, and jailed. CNDH recommends follow-up to judge on 3 others. 4 perpetrators later died in an attempt to collect on a kidnapping in a different case Mich. See above case Mich. Judge sentences 2 priístas – both out on bail. Special PRD Fiscal examining case Mich. Special PRD Fiscal takes case. Victim had filed complaint against perpetrator Mich. Special PRD Fiscal says judge finishing case-suspects out on bail. 23 others wounded in event, pacific citizens group asked PRD to leave town hall right before gunfire broke out Mich. Partial investigation. Victim was State Level Peasant Organizer; organizing against vehicle taxes; previously jailed, later released due to peasant protest Mich. No trial

103

3/30/91

4/13/91

5/15/91

9/13/92 9/14/92

9/28/92

11/3/92

12/5/92

1/1/93

1/1/93 1/1/93 1/17/93 1/19/93

11/6/93

11/15/93 (continued)

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Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Mich. PRD family members claim authorities obstructing investigation Morelos Only 8 of 38 police tried, jailed Morelos 1 suspect jailed; other not detained/CNDH finds delays, impunity Morelos No trial Morelos No trial. PRD says the conflict was between PRI/PRD transport workers Morelos Investigation begun but no one arrested Morelos Investigation begun but no one arrested Morelos No trial. Victim was second PRD leader of urban vendors shot in capital city Oaxaca CNDH finds grave omissions in investigation. Previous attempted assassination of victim by same perpetrators Oaxaca Tried, jailed, 3 suspects; arrest warrants not executed on 5 perpetrators. Four other (high-level) State Judicial Police in charge of operation have to resign over operation Oaxaca CNDH finds arrest warrant not executed. PRD says murder aimed to intimidate son who had received death threats by priístas Oaxaca CNDH finds arrest warrants not executed. After CNDH rec., 4 of 5 arrest warrants executed. PRD says local PRI Deputy gave the police orders but was himself never tried Oaxaca Jailed 1 year but State Prosecutor reverses sentence. Victim active in 1988 election, also professor Oaxaca Judge let suspects out on bail. CNDH requires more info. PRD says hired guns, led by PRI mayor, shot at outside PRD protestors from inside MP. La Jornada reporter testifies no bullet holes outside MP and that perredistas did not shoot from outside Oaxaca CNDH finds only 1 perpetrator identified but found innocent; other suspects evading justice in 1st assassination; grave omissions in investigation – total impunity in 2nd assassination Oaxaca CNDH find absolute inactivity, grave negligence. Wife eyewitness; PRD peasants claim judge protected assassin Oaxaca No arrest warrant executed. Occurred at “Popular” PRD Gov’t, 2 wounded including popular PRD president

2/27/93 1/23/89 10/6/89 12/15/90 1/15/90 11/9/91 8/14/92 12/27/92 4/10/89

6/13/89

8/13/89

11/8/89

12/9/89

12/9/89

2/6/90

4/23/90

1/1/91

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Oaxaca CNDH requests info. but the Gov’t says there is no record of case Oaxaca CNDH finds total impunity by State Judicial Police. Victim involved in neighborhood urban land dispute with local PRI authorities Oaxaca CNDH finds delays in justice by Pub. Ministry; negligence. Victim active in antifraud protests; son also told by priístas his father would be killed that day Oaxaca 1 guilty for killing PRD female victim but Pub Min appeals this sentence. 8 other PRD wounded, 1 PRI death. SJP, later that same day, try to kidnap 1 hospitalized PRD member for PRI death; Interior Min. aborts this attempted assassination Oaxaca Investigation begun. PRD says multiple postelectoral tensions in city Oaxaca No trial. PRD says victim had history of severe political differences with PRI caciques over agrarian issues Oaxaca Investigation begun. 1 assassin acts as friend and stops victim, 2nd shoots him in the back. PRD neighbor and eyewitness (age 17) sees victim hover b/w life/ death, runs home for help and then dies of heart attack Oaxaca Investigation begun. PRD says multiple postelectoral tensions in city Oaxaca No trial. PRD says victim started legal action against the PRI-CNC ejidal commissar (also his brother) over agrarian land title. PRD Mun Leader testifies to PRI-CNC involvement Oaxaca Investigation begun. PRD says perpetrators already killed various perredistas. Victim grabbed by 1 and then shot, died instantly. Significant postelectoral tensions in the town Oaxaca Investigation begun. PRD says victim had discussion over political differences with 1 of the perpetrators earlier that same day Oaxaca Investigation begun. Victim active in take-over of disputed MP and local tourist center. Perpetrator also fired for fraud as director of tourist center; pledges publicly to kill PRD. PRD mob nearly linch assassins but are then detained Oaxaca No trial. PRD says victim led movement to recover peasant lands in town Oaxaca No trial. PRD says both active in beach front legalization of land; suspect State Judicial Police. PRD Municipal President shot with 20 bullets Puebla Investigation begun. Victim active in factory dispute; threatened with death threats several times by PRI union (CROC) for activism

105

3/26/91 4/17/92

11/22/92

1/18/93

3/8/93 3/10/93

4/17/93

4/23/93 6/10/93

6/16/93

7/11/93

11/9/93

3/21/94 5/14/94

2/18/89

(continued)

106


Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Puebla CNDH finds severe negligence/possible cover-up by Pub. Min, rec. sanctions. No photos taken at crime scene, blood/chemical analysis found on murder weapon Puebla CNDH finds arrest warrants not served on 3. 1 confessed assassin said he killed them due to political differences – sentenced to 28 years. Local Police Commander is an eyewitness to crime Puebla CNDH finds no arrest warrants executed; omission by functionaries, rec. sanctions. 2 PRD members also wounded in attack that occurred in the context of the mayoral race Puebla CNDH finds severe negligence – total impunity, no investigation at all, rec. sanctions. PRD says PRI Mun President/paramilitaries behind attack Puebla CNDH finds severe negligence – total impunity, no investigation at all, rec. sanctions. PRD party locals say victim considered a “problem” by PRI CROM leaders who were displaced politically by PRD electoral victory in town. Shot while unloading a fertilizer truck Puebla CNDH finds inactivity on initial investigation by Pub. Min, negligence, rec. sanctions. His wife is an eyewitness to crime, but since the assassins flee, she is unable to identify them Puebla CNDH finds severe negligence – total impunity, no investigation at all, rec. sanctions. PRD says electoral tensions in town; PRI resists PRD victory; police arrive on election day, shot at some PRD, the victim ran but killed Puebla CNDH – arrest warrant not executed, recommends sanctions. After CNDH rec., arrest warrant executed but no sanctions applied Puebla CNDH – arrest warrant not executed, recommends sanctions. After CNDH rec., 1 arrest warrant executed, 1 not, no sanctions applied. Family eyewitnesses saw hired guns by body. CNDH blame SJP for not serving arrest warrants Puebla CNDH finds severe negligence – failure to examine eyewitness testimony, recommends sanctions. Victim legally challenges PRI paramilitary group’s claim to land occupied by a school. Paramilitary threatened all members of PRD Municipal Council Puebla Investigation begun after intervention of State PRD Human Right Commission. Victim’s wife and 2 children also beaten; the wife begs police to stop car at doctor but they refuse Sinaloa State PGR identifies some suspects. Victim also Mun Treasurer/Agrarian Land Co-op leader where a marijuana field found; he testifies that co-op not involved with drug. PRD Mayor requests Gov’t clarify the crime

4/10/89

8/26/89

1/13/90

2/22/90

4/21/90

10/28/90

3/26/90

11/20/90

3/5/92

9/6/92

3/4/93

1/18/93

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Veracruz CNDH finds no investigation – rec. investigations/sanctions. Victim repeatedly threatened to “stop his political activity” by former PRI president. Assassin pretends to be from State Elec. Commission; enters victim’s home, shots him in front of his family Veracruz No trial. Victim forcibly abducted from home, tied to tree in his yard, shot. PRD says perpetrators were Mun Pol. The Prev Pol says wounded victim dies enroute to hospital Veracruz No trial. Victim transported by family to hospital but dies there Veracruz No trial Veracruz Investigation begun, 3 perpetrators identified by young man sitting with victim. 1 assassin identified self as “a judicial policeman” before shooting victim 5 times Zacatecas Investigation begun but suspended when perpetrator files amparo. Victim argues with, and files legal claim against, perpetrator when his cattle denied access to ejido lands b/c he is a PRD member Zacatecas Complaint filed with authorities. PRD says victim active 2 days earlier in antifraud protests at MP against interim PRI Mun President; severe electoral conflicts in town. (n = 150 victims) Contested cases Coahuila Gov’t says death by heart attack. PRD says eyewitness and beat wounds on body indicate death by beating DF Judge sends 2 to prison for auto accident. 3 subsequent appeals.aPRD claims evidence of 6 Judicial Police involved and there was fabricated/contradictory testimony against setup suspects Mexico Gov’t says drunken victim fell in river. Victim actively investigating corrupt use of public and Mun funds. Victim’s family not convinced by accident theory Mich. Gov’t says police fired in self-defense/no trial. PRD claims 2 victims died immediately, 3rd victim shot then tortured into “confessing” to official version of the murder (that he was armed) before dying Mich. Killers claim it was attempted robbery; detained. PRD says it was a failed assassination of PRD Mun president; his wife caught in gunfire, 2 other PRD members wounded in attack Mich. CNDH closes case – murderer dies during murder when PRD security officer defends self. Female PRD auditor intervenes to aid PRD security officer and is also killed by murderer

107

9/10/88

1/21/91

2/23/91 6/20/91 4/20/94

3/1/92

2/21/93

1/2/92

8/20/88

8/9/92

2/2/90

6/28/90

3/19/92

(continued)

108


Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial Mich. CNDH closes case – claims family did not bring enough details forward. Killed by coup de grace; no eyewitnesses Mich. Partial investigation but no judicial action. Gov’t claim narcotrafficking revenge case. PRD says assassination aimed at PRD auditor, ally of PRD Mun pres; 4 PRD police also wounded Mbich. PGR/Special Fiscal say no political motive since it involved attempted robbery. PRD says robbery incidental, victim immediately killed by coup de grace; on way to political campaign Mich. Gov’t says assault case; PRD notes nothing robbed. Day before victims requested Mun administration conduct detailed audit of Solidarity funds; both victims received death threats for this work Mich. Despite victim’s testimony, Gov’t says his wounds are from hit-and-run homicide. Special PRD Fiscal says severe impunity in investigation – no suspect even identified Oaxaca Judge releases suspect for lack of evidence. State Superior Court upholds appeal. PRD says victim challenged PRI fishing co-op/active organizer of large antifraud protests Oaxaca No trial – Gov’t says victim died from rocket explosion. PRD says shot by police; doctor report says death by gunshot wound/video of police violence. CNDH request more info. that PRD can’t provide Oaxaca Family/witness says victim strangled, dumped in river. Judge holds case/CNDH remits case to State CNDH Oaxaca No trial – Oaxaca Interior Min. says despite electoral tensions, PRI members not guilty. PRD says child killed in “error” by gunfire aimed at 2 adult PRD members Oaxaca 3 men detained, taken to State prison; penal process initiated 1 later out on bail w/o arrest warrant executed Oaxaca Investigation begun – Gov’t says revenge (not political) crime b/c victim’s nephew killed someone 8 days earlier. PRD says victim was a key leader in elections and antideforestation movement Puebla Victim alerted at home to altercation involving his son/brother at MP; goes there armed; gets shot; then shots/kills 1 Mun Pol/people arrive, police get alarmed start spraying gunfire; victim shot again, others wounded. 3 PRD wounded and jailed; police off on bail; citizens file complaint that Pub. Min did not investigate the incident

5/2/92

9/7/92

10/15/92

11/4/93

12/21/92

10/27/89

9/9/90

4/14/92

6/5/93

9/9/93

4/18/94

10/3/93

(continued)

End Notes Table 4.1b (continued) Impunity – total and partial SL Potosi CNDH says negligent investigation, no arrest warrants executed but not political. Gov’t claims personal fight. PRD says victims were observing PRI meeting but only shot at meeting when recognized as PRD members Tabasco CNDH finds negligence, no arrest warrants executed. Eyewitness indicates 4 men acted to cover-up crime but judge does not issue warrant for cover-up (n = 31 victims)

109

11/18/88

1/12/92

Clear judicial outcome Guerrero 8/17/90 Perpetrators tried, all 6 jailed for 11.6 years. At PRD meeting, victim agreed to accuse PRI Mun president of nepotism; brother of PRI mun pres killed by friendly fire in attack. Guerrero 5/13/93 Killers flee, police immediately follow/trap them, killers fire at police, police return fire, kill both Morelos 12/6/91 Tried, jailed, suspected confessed to crimes and association with Political Police Mich. 1/23/90 Mun Policemen sentenced to prison for illegal use of firearms. PRD had established a parallel Mun Gov’t, tried to collect taxes at market when PRI Mun authorities showed up with police and killed victims Mich. 11/9/90 Killer confesses; imprisoned. Victim assassinated while traveling on highway with other PRD members who were also wounded in attack. Mich. 12/11/92 No judicial action until Special PRD Fiscal located perpetrator in another city, detains and jails him Mich. 12/18/92 No judicial action until Special PRD Fiscal locates perpetrator, detains and jails him. Local PRI commissioner had filed complaint of electoral disruption against PRD victim to State Electoral Tribunal (n = 7 victims) Source: CHR (1994), CNDH (1994), Crónica Puebla (1997), Crónica Guerrero (1998) a Indicates evidence of cover-up/authorization

End Notes Some other examples include the so-called dirty war of the 1970s where over 500 activists were “disappeared.” Armed parties battled with the local police and the army for state power after the 1994 Chiapas uprising resulted in violence and loss of life of non-PRD members too (Stephen 1997). Although the fact that each of these incidents relates to violence emerging from conflicts between dissidents and armed forces of the state is interesting in its own right, their overall treatment is beyond the scope of this book. For a discussion of other types of homicides and torture by local, state, federal police, and/or other citizens that are associated with drug-related crimes, with

1

110


freedom of the press issues, and with labor unions disputes, see Impunity (1990) and for violence associated with intra-PRI political assassinations, see Pansters (1999:253–259). 2 The author had primary access to primary interviews conducted Juan Hernández Luna of the Fundación Ovando y Gil, co-founded by Andres Manuel López Obrador. The results of these interviews are reported in this chapter for the first time for academic purposes. 3 Ovando was not only Cárdenas’ main campaign manager for electoral affairs for his 1988 candidacy as the opposition FDN presidential candidate but has also been his previous campaign manager for Cárdenas’ successful Michoacán gubernatorial bid in 1980 when Cárdenas was still a member of the PRI (Delgado 1989:44–45). Ovando also served as Michoacán’s attorney general during the Cárdenas PRI administration in that state. 4 The legal story of how the Ovando and Gil assassinations were handled by the judicial system is a long and complex one. Initially, the official government National Human Rights Commission argued this was a political assassination ordered by the Michoacán state attorney general (José Franco Villa) and the state Supreme Court president (CNDH 1994:5). Franco Villa had served as the Michoacán State Attorney General just after the Cárdenas (then still with the PRI) governorship (1980–1986). Villa was formally sentenced to 35 years prison as the intellectual author behind the assassination of Ovando and Gil (La Jornada 4/10/02). Franco Villa had already been previously prosecuted and sentenced to 11 years for the murder of the director of the State Judicial Police Gilberto Huerta Fuentes under the Cárdenas administration and had already served 10 years of that sentence. Given the high-profile nature of the Ovando and Gil murders, however, a special prosecutor was subsequently assigned to the case by the Salinas administration. After reviewing the 2,000page file on the case, the special prosecutor claimed that Michoacán State Attorney General Villa’s participation in the assassinations could not be fully proven. In 2002, after serving most of his previous sentence for the Huerta murder, Villa was subsequently cleared of the Ovando and Gil assassination charges (La Jornada 4/10/02). Meanwhile, in 2000, the ex-head of the Federal Judicial Police under Salinas Guillermo González Calderoni appeared on the US television program Frontline (War on Drugs). According to González Calderoni, Salinas’s “personal friend” from childhood, narcotrafficker Juan García Abrego of the Gulf Cartel told him that he [Abrego] killed Ovando and Gil at the personal request of Salinas. The context for this alleged conversation was the following: After US agents detected that elements of the Mexican Army were protecting a plane carrying a shipment of drugs from Columbia, a massacre ensued in which agents for narcotraffickers killed the military agents (La Jornada 10/14/00). The Salinas government was embarrassed by the incident and subsequently pressured the next year by Washington to take action against narcotraffickers to stem US critics of the upcoming NAFTA accord that Mexico was not a “narcostate.” In this context, Salinas allegedly sent his head of the Federal Judicial Police González Calderoni to drug pin García Abrego’s home to get him to turn himself in. At this meeting, García Abrego allegedly expressed his anger at Salinas because he felt betrayed after all he had done for him. According to Federal Judicial Police González Calderoni, Abrego said: “Why are they persecuting me if I served Salinas? It is not correct that he is looking for me…He asked me to kill Ovando and Gil, the great collaborators of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ campaign.” [González Calderoni to the TV interviewer]… “And what did he do. Kill them… He told me that he had done it, that he had killed them for Carlos Salinas. He wouldn’t lie to me. Besides, later I was able to corroborate it in the sense that I asked some of the other participants who confirmed his involvement. And then someone else told me the same. At that point, I concluded that it had occurred that way (La Jornada 10/14/00).” González Calderoni then told Frontline that he then informed his boss, the sub-Attorney General of the accusations but then he realized that he had become the one under investigation. An arrest warrant was put out on him and he fled to the USA in 1993, later becoming a DEA informant in exchange for avoiding prosecution in Mexico for illegal enrichment (for amassing an shady fortune of $400 US million dollars) and for crimes

End Notes

111

against health. González Calderoni himself was assassinated, in McAllen, TX where he lived, on February 6, 2003 (La Jornada 2/6/03). he CNDH issued a recommendation in 1992 saying that the crime had still not been clarified, T and the responsible party had not been apprehended. The Commission recommendation demanded an internal investigation take place as to why appropriate state agencies had not yet executed an arrest warrant on Ávila López, an inquiry that should also include appropriate sanctions (CNDH 1994:285–287). 6 In Igualapa, after the fraudulent December 3 elections of 1989, there were two ejidal commissars in Llando Grande de los Hilarios: one supported by the PRI mayor of Igualapa, and the other supported by the majority PRD community (Crónica Guerrero 1998:46; Proceso 4/29/91:29–30; 6/29/91:31). These two militants were killed within a 6-month period during a subsequent runoff election. Subsequently, another Igualapala PRD militant was killed by having his neck broken by PRI pistoleros Epigemnio Gorgua and the Guzmán brothers Nicolás and Ezequiel in October, 1991. Arrest warrants for probable homicide were issued by a judge against the Guzmán brothers. 7 A police action to control a PRD-led crowd trying to block the PRI mayor’s ascension to office in the town of Cholula, Puebla resulted in the shooting death of a 17-year-old perredista hit by police gunfire. Although the head of the judicial police in the operation blamed the death on violence starting from the crowd itself, a rank-and-file policeman declared that he failed to hear any shots being initially fired by any PRD members. Nevertheless, he added that he and nine other policemen stopped working after the episode because of the threats they received and for fear of what might happen given that “the people were really aggressive” (CNDH 1994:492). 8 This paramilitary group, estimated at over 800 persons, was called Socama (Solidaridad Campesina Magisterial). The group made its appearance in the village of Shucjá on July 14, 1995 where, according to the state Attorney General, five priístas had been killed (Proceso 9/11/95:29). 9 Although the alleged hired guns made an attempt to correctly identify the victim before shooting him (CHR 1994:275), they were not always successful. Three victims were reported to have been misidentified and shot inadvertently – one of the brothers of a PRD leader – and another the wife of the PRD treasurer caught in the gunfire (CHR 1994:103, 161–162, 248). 10 The contrast with civil homicide is dramatic. In only two cases was the victim robbed of any money or other property in the murder of over 660 perredistas. In contrast, Zurita (1999:35) found that 94.5% of all the civil homicides in Mexico’s 32 states and the Federal District in the 1990–1995 period were economically motivated. Robberies and disputes over economic debts also accounted for the majority of civil homicides in the Federal District in the 1990s (Banco Internacional 1999). Homicides due to assaults during a robbery also increased in the Federal District over the 1990s, and one survey of violent crimes there found that 80% were committed for economic reasons (Reforma Poll 1998). 11 The point is that these PRD leaders were engaged in political and/or legal actions as PRD leaders when assassinated, although their activities intersected with peasant, fishermen, and other primary producers’ interests. After all, PRD’s core support has consistently come from what Gledhill (1995:78) calls the “subaltern” classes, a category that can include a complex mix of indigenous Mexicans, peasants, and the urban poor. That some PRD leaders would be engaged in the defense of peasant interests, as part of their work as party leaders, has been documented by Bruhn (1997:213). That the dominant motive behind these murders was “political” does not require that economic considerations are not relevant to many of these deaths, or that the political activism in which many PRD members engaged did not carry significant economic consequences. The actions of some militants, if achieved, particularly those leaders engaged in the collective defense of peasant interests, as well as those perredistas in positions of power who sought to expose corruption, could have meant the loss of significant wealth (some illicit) for those whose business interests would be harmed by public exposure. My point is that the primary motive for the murder of a PRD leader or militant engaged in party activities was to eliminate 5

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the individual victim in his or her political capacities, although their actions in some cases carried significant economic implications. 12 These cases include: Coahuila 11/3/90; 1/2/92; Oaxaca 12/9/89; 9/9/90; Morelos 1/23/89; Michoacán 1/19/93; 12/12/93 7; 1/1/93; Mexico 12/12/90; Guerrero 3/6/90; 3/6/90, 817/90; Durango 6/21/90 ; Puebla 3/23/93; 5/29/90. 13 The following example of the political murder of PRD urban leader Martín Aceves González (Iguala, Guerrero, 1993) illustrates how a fight at an antifraud rally between PRD and PRI supporters later turns into an assassination. PRD activists planned a rally at the Iguala municipal palace to call for the removal of PRI governor Rubén Figueroa Alcocer when approximately 1,000 PRI supporters of the governor staged a rally there at the municipal palace at the same time (CHR 1994:104–105). One hundred PRD activists were kept at bay from the municipal plaza by the police, but after an older PRD activist was hit with a stone, the confrontation was generalized with both sides throwing stones, mangos, oranges, etc. Both PRI and PRD members were wounded and treated by the Red Cross. The police retreated to buses with the PRI activists (CHR 1994:105). Martín Aceves González, a PRD urban leader who attended and was wounded at the rally survived only to be assassinated three hours later by pistoleros upon leaving the hospital. The State Attorney General was investigating three suspects of the homicide (CHR 1994:107). Other examples include Guerrero (4/4/90, 2/28/94) and Zacatecas (2/21/93). 14 PRD Federal Deputy Mario Rojas-Alba, also investigating the disappearance of PRD member José Ramón García Gómez claims he was asked by the Mexican Federal Attorney General Ignacio Morales Lechuga to reach a “political compromise” in this case. Apolo Bernabé Ríos and other material participants would be jailed for the crime of the disappearance of José Ramón García Gómez, but the PRD still refused to discuss the issue, and efforts would be made to improve the relationship of the PRD with the Morelos Governor Antonio Riva Palacios (RojasAlba 1996:120). Rojas Alba (1996:120) says he refused and claims that Antonio Nogueda Caravajal was to aided to flee the nation. 15 Table 4.1 also demarcates a “Clear Judicial Outcome,” which shows only seven cases where the perpetrator was tried, arrested, and served jail time. In two of these three cases, these convictions were based on the confessions of the assassins [One was a hired gun working for the ex-PRI mayoral candidate and the other a State Judicial policeman working for the Morelos GIP (CHR 1994:162, 223)]. In two cases of a clear judicial outcome, it was the intervention of the PRD Special Prosecutor that led to the successful prosecution and arrest of the perpetrators. In one case, the police killed the suspected perpetrator before trial. 16 Assessing degrees of negligence is a standard in criminal law, especially with regard to intentionality in homicide (Williams 2010). 17 The data on 1.7% (n = 3) of the sample did not allow for a sufficiently clear identification of the perpetrators. 18 “Successful” assassinations, whether political or drug-trafficking related, importantly depend upon the victim being killed without the presence of live eyewitnesses to recount the circumstances of the crime (Don Bertletti, Mexico Under Siege, 2009). In this sense, then, the most successful assassinations are those committed by “unknown assailants.” 19 There were 15 cases involving the municipal police; 16 cases involving the State Judicial Police and 4 “other” cases (a Preventative Police case, two motorized police cases, and an Auxiliary Police case). Of the 15 State Judicial Police cases, 7 cases involved the single perpetrator Apolo Bernabé Ríos from the state of Morelos. 20 For this crime, three State Judicial Policemen received jail terms, arrest warrants on five more were pending and three top-level Oaxaca State Judicial Police officials were forced to resign over the incident (CHR 1994:232–233). Similarly, there was punishment of three of the ten Guerrero State Judicial officers tried for the excessive use of force and killing of a young PRD member who they shot as he ran toward them in Quechultengo (5/22/90). 21 Rojas Alba described his assassination attempt outside his house as follows: “One had a machete; one had a gun. The one with the pistol shouted, ‘Shoot or he’ll escape.’ I started to run

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in zigzags in case he started shooting. But I slipped and fell a few meters away. The guy with the machete ran up and began to strike me. I had a cut on my head. Later, I saw I was covered with blood.” Rojas Alba believes that this assassination attempt was committed to stop his investigation into a series of political murders committed by the local police. Later, he identified the two men who tried to attack him, but they were not prosecuted. They belonged to the Morelos Political Police (Dead or Alive 1999). 22 An acquaintance of Bernabé – Rufino Ríos Martínez – testified that about 3 months after the murder of José Ramón Garcia, he was talking to Bernabé at the house of a mutual friend. Ríos Martínez commented to him that people were returning from a protest march that they had in Cuautla. When Bernabé asked “why?” He said “because of the disappearance of José Ramón [Garcia] to which Apolo replied: ‘That one is already has already been liquidated’” (Rojas Alba 1996:117; Ríos Martínez 1992). When Ríos Martínez responded “Oh come on, that’s bull-sh…,” Bernabé replied “because it was a mission” and that they had thrown him in a well in Tehuixtla, next to a lake. According to the widow of another victim of Apolo Bernabe Rios – PRD member Estudillo Peña – she testified that Apolo went to her after killing her husband and said in a mocking tone: “You’ll never find the cabbage (as he was nicknamed) alive, never, because I left him very far away as I also did with José Ramón [Garcia] (Rojas Alba 1996:103).” 23 These include Telixtlahuaca, Oaxaca (1/18/93) (CHR 1994:245); the small town of Huaquchula, Puebla (10/3/93) (CHR 1994:279); Tixtla, Guerrero (1/13/90) (CHR 1994:83); and Tejupilco, Mexico (1/6/90) (Rojas Alba 1996:201; Ronquillo 1996:119–127) where the police swiftly found and arrested suspected perredistas. 24 Indirect evidence also suggests that many of these PRD leaders were likely to have been successful and possibly charismatic leaders. As one widow of a professor and PRD political activist murdered in 1994 noted: “I feel like I don’t have the power he had to organize people and to protest the atrocities of this government (Mauleón, 2000: 1).”

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Chapter 5

Disarming the Legal System: Impunity for the Political Murder of Dissidents in Mexico

Introduction Despite a body of emergent scholarship documenting state crimes (Ross 1995, 2000), and political terror (De Mesquita et al. 2005), much less is known about the specific use of political killings as a strategy of control of domestic political opponents. Nor is the role of the criminal justice system in perpetuating impunity for such crimes well understood. Most research on political killings are single case studies of the assassination of high-profile political leaders (e.g., Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy) or give very brief information about many cases from different cultures (Ford 1985; Kirkham et al. 1970). The few comparative approaches that exist conclude that political killings are largely the result of political vengeance against external enemies that occurs in the context of states with weak mechanisms of formal justice (Ben-Yehuda 1997). More recently, the moral and legal ramifications of political assassination (sometimes called targeted killings) reemerged in the context of the so-called War on Terrorism in which the Bush administration gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) permission to assassinate bin Laden and his followers around the world (Kretzmer 2005; McDonnell 2005; Statman 2004; Tinetti 2004). This literature raises the interesting issue of an open policy of state-sponsored assassination in transnational contexts in which a state publicly acknowledges a campaign of political killing. My objective in this chapter is to study the role of the criminal justice system in perpetuating impunity for political assassinations in Mexico. The Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH; Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos), an official governmental body, investigated the legal aspects of the political killing of PRD members. The commission found, in one illustrative case, that the state public ministry and the judicial state police were negligent for not serving the apprehension orders in the murder of incoming PRD municipal president Ignacio Murrillo Guzmán. Murrillo Guzmán was shot twice in cold blood, while leaving the party offices in Huandacareo, Michoacán, by the outgoing PRI former ruling party politician José María Campos Vargas in 1990 (CNDH 1994; Rojas Alba 1996). Although a district judge found the PRI municipal politician guilty of first-degree


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5 Disarming the Legal System: Impunity for the Political Murder of Dissidents

murder, sentenced him to prison, and issued a warrant for his (re)arrest on January 31, 1990, the state public ministry and the judicial state police responsible failed to serve the apprehension orders. Because a full 73% of the political murders of PRD members remained unsolved in 1994 (CHR 1994, appendix; CNDH 1994), the majority of these crimes remained in a state of impunity. In other words, no person had been charged with the crime and/or no investigation of it had occurred. Thus, the political killing of PRD members constitutes an interesting problem in which the criminal justice system fails to punish perpetrators of these crimes (Ross 2000; Smelser 1998). In this chapter, I contend that the criminal justice system showed its acquiescence in the killings through the impunity that was afforded the killers. Specifically, this acquiescence occurred through the further disarming of the legal coercive powers of the existing state to properly prosecute and punish murderers. Local and regional legal systems operated relatively systematically to perpetuate a system of impunity in two ways (a) by failing to adequately investigate crimes (a failure of the judicial system) and (b) by failing to serve arrest warrants after the crimes were investigated and suspects identified (a failure by the police and law enforcement). I show how the State Judicial Police and the Public Prosecutors were the state agents found responsible for human rights violations in the majority of these political murders. Such a pattern of impunity is especially damaging for the rule of law in Mexico because it further disables the judicial system of its power to punish political killings.

Political Killings in the Mexican Context The Problem of Political Assassination It is known that, though not widely documented, political assassination has been used as a political control strategy by the ex-dominant party (the PRI) in Mexico. Zepeda Lecuona (2005) wrote that Mexico has one of the highest rates of political assassination. Velasco Piña (2005) described a “secret society” made up of five top PRI leaders dedicated to preserving the state-party system by methods that included death threats to those presidents who might seek reelection (La Jornada 11/16/05). Recent documentation by the CNDH (2001) confirmed that at least 143 of those who disappeared in the war of the government against guerrillas in the 1970s (the so-called dirty war) were subsequently murdered, and their bodies were disposed into the sea by members of armed forces (CNDH 2001). The qualitative interviews with top opposition politicians discussed in Chap. 4 further revealed the frequency and the techniques of state-sponsored political assassination attempts in Mexico (Dead or Alive 1999). Although it is widely known that the use of political assassination to control domestic opponents is understood to occur, less well known are the specific institutions within the Mexican criminal justice system that perpetuate impunity for such crimes. The Mexican criminal justice system

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suffers severe problems of case overload (Bailey and Chabat 2001; Solomon 1999) and has difficulties enforcing punitive damages against human rights violators (Ruiz Harrell 1999). The historical weakness of the Mexican judiciary vis-à-vis the executive (Gonzalez Casanova 1965; Schatz 1998) has been a factor leading to the lack of law enforcement, although this is improving at the federal level. This becomes a more acute problem when the courts face difficulties in getting the police to serve arrest warrants on suspected criminals (Fix-Fierro 2003).

Crime Without Punishment Against the backdrop of the 1988 presidential election, widely seen as fraudulent, there were few institutional resources to process electoral–political conflict that arose at the local level. In general, electoral courts before 1994 were largely understood as “window dressing;” that is to say, institutions designed to present a benign face to authoritarianism, to placate international critics but with no powers to punish offenders (Eisenstadt 2004). In the specific states where the PRD most contested the elections, such as in Michoacán and where the most PRD militants (27%) were killed by 1994, post-electoral legal complaints during the period between 1989 and 1992 were handled by the Michoacán Electoral Commission, an arm of the PRI-controlled state executive. In the state, the lack of autonomy by electoral judges meant the following: Under extreme political pressures, the electoral court ruled erratically, but usually with a protective “cloak of legality” that gave the outward impression of conforming to state’s election laws…but frequently its decisions were blatantly biased against the PRD (Eisenstadt 2004, pp. 209–211).

This was also the pattern in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Puebla where a number of the political murders of PRD members also occurred and where state PRI-controlled executive electoral commissions were unable to quell electoralrelated violence. Nor were those institutions set up to curb state crime in general able to punish offenders. In 1991, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari allowed for the founding of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH – Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos). This institution was meant to improve Mexican justice and the treatment of human rights by state officials. It was also designed to represent that the Salinas’ and succeeding governments adhered to human rights. The CNDH was given the authority to investigate complaints of official state abuse and to make recommendations to the Mexican Government, and it did give citizens a new option for protecting individual rights within the criminal justice system. However, as in the case of electoral institutions of that period, the CNDH had the power to investigate possible state crimes in depth but had no prosecutorial powers to punish offenders. Hence, the institution did its job but was largely ignored by prosecutors and judges.1

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As noted in Chap. 2, the PRD also emerged within the context of a criminal justice system that suffers from inherent institutional limitations, corruption, and often fails to punish criminals. The institutional limitations on the public prosecutor’s office are evident in terms of the investigation and the prosecution of crime. The filing of a crime report initiates a preliminary investigation to gather facts and determine the crime’s legal status. On average, of every 100 cases reported, 70% result in an investigation, but in the majority of these cases (67%), preliminary findings fail to prove that a crime has occurred or do not uncover probable cause. Thus, in terms of investigation, a large number of cases are then filed, pending receipt of additional evidence or simply expire when the statute of limitations (the public prosecutor’s right to ask the court to try the case) lapses (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). Full investigations are concluded in only 23 of every 100 cases.2 Institutional inefficiencies in the area of the prosecution of crime are equally severe; of those 23 cases in which an investigation was concluded, only 11.6 were judged. And of those judged, 8.6 resulted in the convicted person fleeing justice and only three arrested and in custody. The overwhelming demand for the public prosecutor’s services, discussed in Chap. 2, has another deleterious effect: the creation of a set of incentives that has led to arbitrariness and corruption due to the office’s extensive discretionary powers. This can include the use of torture during investigations, irregularities in searches and detentions, and the taking of bribes in exchange for failing to execute arrest warrants, preventing a case from going to trial, closing an investigation, and even falsifying evidence (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). These inefficiencies and high levels of impunity are so severe that even high-impact violent crimes (29% of all crime are classified as high-impact and include murder, rape, kidnapping, home invasion, and car robbery) are frequently not prosecuted (Zepeda Lecuona 2007). Indeed, the estimated national average prosecution rate for civil homicide in 2001 was only 17.2% despite the severity of such a crime (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:278). With the general probability that a person who commits a crime in Mexico will be tried by a judge being only 3.3% (Zepeda Lecuona 2007), there is, in effect, a situation perpetuated by the criminal justice system of “crime without punishment” (Zepeda Lecuona 2004).

The CNDH Case Reports: A Detailed Analysis Research suggests that scholars must look further at victims’ or survivors’ methods of controlling state crime to understand which strategies are effective and which are not (Ross 1992). The efforts of the PRD to bring forward its homicide cases to the CNDH for further review as well as the investigatory efforts of the latter institution constituted small steps toward enhanced oversight of the state. Hurwitz (1995) argued that ombudsmen such as the Mexican CNDH do help improve government accountability if only because they force the legal system to examine a state crime, which is a behavior typically hidden from the public and the media (Barak 1990). As Turk (1982:147) notes “For official repression even to be subjected to legal

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review is an accomplishment; and for a regime to punish its own agents for using harsh tactics against its political enemies is unthinkable in many countries.” Thus, the CNDH’s recommendations in the case of its review of the political killing of PRD members represented a step toward the organizational control of state violence. The CNDH report, in addition, affords a rare opportunity to study an official review of the institutions of the criminal justice system responsible for the violation of human rights. In conformity with the laws that govern the CNDH, the agency adopts a broad definition of human rights violations which can occur in such crimes as homicide, torture, arbitrary detention, threats, presumed disappearances, wounds, false accusations, and abuse of authority (CNDH 1994:7, 49–50). A murder is a violation of human rights. The lack of state response to the murder is also a violation of human rights. The CNDH reviewed human rights violations in only those cases where it considered the PRD had supplied adequate proof that the murder victim was (1) a PRD member, and (2) was killed in a political context. So, the CNDH’s review of human rights violations refers to political murders (as a specific type of human rights violation) and to the lack of state response to the murder (another human rights violation). Toward this end, I analyzed the 1,000-page CNDH case reports on those documented perredista political killings submitted by the PRD to the Commission during the period between 1988 and 1994. The typical CNDH case report is, on average, between 5 and 6 single-line spaced text pages and contains detailed information regarding the time and place of the original crime, a short report on documents (autopsy reports, communications by letter) produced by Public Ministry, the State Judicial and/or Municipal Police, the Social Representative of the Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry, and lawyers with the State Attorney General’s Office. The case reports also contain details of the commission’s own formal requests for further information from state officials and a final summary of its conclusions and recommendations. Among those cases of PRD human rights violations submitted to the CNDH in 1994, there were 58 homicide cases with 73 victims. The subsample of cases selected for presentation in the results section of this chapter were those that provided the most detailed representation of the underlying patterns of administrative and legal treatment by the state and CNDH pattern of recommendations. However, Table 5.1 displays the data on all 73 PRD victims. [See endnote 3 for specific details on the CNDH’s case selection methodology and classification system.] The specific work of the CNDH was to review in detail how the Mexican criminal justice system processed the crimes against the PRD victims. After the human rights representative of the PRD filed an allegation with the CNDH claiming that the human rights of the (deceased) victim had been violated by the Mexican State, the CNDH’s review then consisted of examining all existing documentation in a given case to see whether the processing of the case conformed to the steps outlined in Fig. 5.1 (Source: Mexico Social 1998; Zepeda Lecuona 2005). These steps involve reviewing the various phases of a standard criminal trial procedure. Such steps include the investigative phase, the assignment phase, pretrial, the trial phase, and the final judgment.


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Table 5.1 Summary of CNDH’s findings on PRD homicides Major state agencies responsible State handling of Persons responsible for violations of human rights homicide cases for homicides Judicial action taken (67%)

No judicial action (33%)

Suspected and convicted criminals (48%) Suspected and convicted state officials (19%) Not investigated/unknown party responsible (33%)

State attorney general (10%) State judicial police (90%) Social representative for state attorney general (49%) State judicial police (51%) 100%

100% Source: CNDH (1994) CNDH Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática (n = 73 victims)

Standard Criminal Trial Procedure

PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION • With Detention •

ASSIGNMENT • Detention Must Conform to

Without Detention

Article16

PRETRIAL PHASE • Prison Sentence •

Liberty

•

Subject to Trial

•

Arrest Warrant

•

Court Appeal

•

Case Dismissed

TRIAL PHASE

•

SENTENCING

•

CONCLUSION

•

HEARING

JUDGEMENT

Fig. 5.1 Standard criminal trial procedure

The courts in Mexico dispense justice, whereas the public prosecutors are responsible for public safety, the pursuit of justice, and implementing and administering sentences. The State Judicial Police is the law enforcement body responsible for serving local arrests in cases of convictions by the judicial power.4 In the case

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of the failure to serve an arrest warrant, the State Judicial Police is the agency responsible for the violation of human rights in such cases. However, the Public Prosecutor supervises the police and technical experts involved in handling all investigations (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). To help clarify the complex relationships described in Fig. 5.1, the role of prior investigation within the Mexican justice system bears further spelling out in some detail. Both the federal and state-level attorney general’s offices contain what in Mexico is called the “public ministry” which is the office responsible for the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of those responsible, including those who violate human rights. Solomon (1999) provides a succinct summary of the initial phases of the criminal justice process through the public ministry: Through a process known as prior investigation, the prosecutor investigates crimes and identifies the suspect or suspects based on physical evidence and interviews with witnesses, victims and the accused. Once that is done, the case file is turned over to a judge, who may issue an arrest warrant. If the suspect is arrested in the act of committing a crime, the judge will simply certify that the arrest was legitimate. In either case, the suspect will then give a statement to the judge, known as a preparative statement (declaración preparatoria). Based on this information, the judge decides whether or not the prosecution should move forward. If the prosecution is to proceed, the prosecutor’s office continues to gather information. There are no jury trials in Mexico, and courts cannot conduct investigations on their own…Prosecutors are not responsible for investigating crimes alone; they work with judicial police, medical examiners, and other technical experts (p. 55).

The public prosecutors (the Social Representatives and lawyers who work within the public prosecutor’s office) are the ultimate authorities who decide which cases have sufficient or insufficient evidence to advance with an investigation.5 The CNDH, in conducting its review of PRD complaints of human rights violations, is authorized to request information from the appropriate government agencies, search for documentation, and/or follow up on a case through direct community research by agency personnel. The types of due process-oriented questions that the CNDH asks in its attempt to judge whether the state committed a violation of human rights in a homicide case include the following: (a) Was there a proper autopsy report carried out in the investigative phase? (b) Did the Social Representative of the Public Ministry within the Attorney General’s Office interview all the potential witnesses necessary to clarify the crime and/or put together sufficient elements to prosecute the crime as a homicide? (c) If a judge issues an arrest warrant on a criminal suspect, did the State Judicial Police execute it? (d) If a criminal is sentenced to prison, does he actually serve some/all of the sentence? These are the types of procedural steps the CNDH looks for in its review of each case. The final business of the CNDH after its review of a case is to issue a specific recommendation. The recommendations of the CNDH, of course, vary with the nature of its findings. Two alternative types of recommendations are possible. A first potential finding is one of “no responsibility.” In such cases, the CNDH finds that the various agencies of the state adhered to all of the proper legal procedures in investigating an incident, in making a decision whether to prosecute or to dismiss a case, and in executing proper judicial procedures in cases where prosecution occurred.

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A finding of no responsibility means then that no violations of the human rights of a citizen by the legal system were found. A second alternative potential finding is one of “state responsibility for human rights violations.” In this second type of finding, the CNDH finds a problem or inadequacy in the legal processing of a case by state officials. Typically, as shown in the case studies below, this involves a delay in processing the case, a failure of the State Attorney General’s Office to adequately investigate the case, and/or the failure by the police to execute an arrest warrant against suspected or convicted criminals.

A Failure to Apprehend Suspects and to Adequately Investigate Crime Table 5.1 identifies the CNDH’s conclusions about the political murders of PRD members. The first column of Table 5.1 refers to whether or not the criminal courts became involved in the prosecution of these homicides. I begin the analysis, from this point of departure, by dividing the homicide cases into two initial categories (a) ones in which some judicial action by criminal judges was taken and (b) cases in which no judicial action at all was taken. A brief summary of the findings in Table 5.1 demonstrate that in the majority of homicides (67%), judicial action by criminal courts was taken with two types of perpetrators (a) state officials (19%) and/or (b) criminals (48%) and the State Judicial Police was responsible for human rights violations in 90% of these cases. In the other 33% of the murders, no judicial action was taken against any suspected perpetrator of the crime. In these cases where no judicial action occurred, the State Judicial Police was responsible for human rights violations half of the time with the public prosecutors at fault for the other half. With respect to the first category noted in Table 5.1 – those in which judicial action by criminal courts was taken – it is clear that this constitutes the majority of homicides (67%). The criminal justice system, in the majority of such cases, fully processed the case by investigating the circumstances of the homicides, amassing sufficient data to identify and prosecute those presumed responsible for the murder, and then tried the parties in court, found someone guilty of homicide, and issued a penal sentence against the person(s). Given the gravity of homicide, the majority of cases that received some type of judicial action against an identified perpetrator of the crime should be a sign of a functioning legal system. As Table 5.1 (second column) reveals, there were two types of murderers (a) state officials (19%) and/or (b) criminals (48%).6 However, despite this initial investigation of the crime, identification, and prosecution of known perpetrators, as the case vignettes below demonstrate, a majority of these murders did not result in punitive action taken against the perpetrators. The frequent finding below – the failed execution of arrest warrants by the Public Ministry/State Judicial Police – refers to the majority of those cases in which the suspect was not arrested in the act of committing the crime. Rather, the failure

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to serve an arrest warrant and/or to rearrest a suspect could take place at various phases of the criminal trial procedure – the assignment phase, and/or after the judgment phase (if the suspect posted bail), and/or later on appeal of the case to a higher court. There have been significant difficulties, in general, in executing rearrests within the Mexican criminal justice system (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). Table 5.1 also refers to a second pattern of the legal processing of cases. In these remaining cases (33%), no judicial action was taken against any suspected perpetrator of the crime. This is because, in these incidents, the relevant state agents considered that the case lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute it as a crime. However, as the CNDH report often makes clear, this decision by representatives of the state attorney general’s offices not to prosecute these crimes almost uniformly constituted a violation of the human rights of the victim. The halting of further prosecution based on the reason of insufficient information continues the anonymity of the perpetrator of the crime. This is why over a third of the time the identity of the murderer remains unknown.

The Failure to Apprehend Convicted State Officials, Policemen, and “Hired Guns” The first pattern (67%) described (see Table 5.1) refers to those cases where judicial intervention occurred and a person was charged and convicted of homicide. The CNDH reports reveal repeatedly in these cases that often the state judicial police failed to carry out apprehension orders on those state officials convicted of homicide. Take, for example, one such case. PRD member José Durán López was murdered by the municipal ex-president of Metztitlán, Hidalgo and also by three members of the municipal police when they violently interrupted a political party meeting and shot him on October 27, 1991. All four men were suspected to be guilty of the crime of homicide and abuse of authority. Arrest warrants were issued on them by a penal judge in Pachuca, Hidalgo on November 4, 1991. A year later, however, none of the arrest warrants had been served. A second set of arrest warrants were issued on May 13, 1992, but these too had not been served by the time of the CNDH’s intervention into the case in August 1992. The CNDH placed the blame on the Hidalgo State Judicial Police for creating a situation with elements “contrary to law” (CNDH 1994:237). The CNDH recommended that, in the face of this “conduct guided by omission by the State Judicial Police leading to a situation of impunity,” the State Attorney General direct an investigation as to why the State Judicial Police had not served any of the outstanding arrest warrants. The first political murder in the state of Mexico was the fault of a PRI official and his associates on February 10, 1990. Silvino Rodríguez, a 56-year-old PRD leader in the town of Donato Guerra, was attending an assembly of ejitarios [collective peasants] on that day convened by the authorities of the same commission to try to sell local wood to PROTIMBO, a commercial concession. As the PRI president began the meeting, he read the list of those present but omitted Silvino

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Rodríguez’s first name, and then, in what PRD sources viewed as a provocative act, called him by the feminine name Silvia. Priísta Francisco García Munguía, along with his two sons and nephew after a discussion, approached Silvino Rodríguez in a menacing way and then immediately assassinated him, continuing to fire into his body even after he lay dead on the floor (CHR 1994). A legal investigation into the homicide (No. I/136/90 in Valle de Bravo) was initiated, and four arrest warrants were issued on the four suspects. The CNDH found, however, that only one of the four arrest warrants had actually been served (against Francisco García Munguía; CNDH 1994). The other three arrest warrants had not been served, and even Francisco García Munguía spent no time in prison because he had managed to appeal and reduce his sentence – a legal process that continued well into 1992. The CNDH, in its review of the case, found aspects of the situation contrary to law because numerous suspects were evading justice. In other cases, the State Judicial Police failed to serve arrest warrants against local policemen convicted of homicides against PRD members. In these cases, the “foot-dragging” by the State Judicial Police could be understood as part of the general reluctance within the police force to act against their own members (Menzies 1995). Let us examine the following examples where municipal police were either suspected or convicted of homicide but were not brought to justice by the State Judicial Police. The CNDH found the State Judicial Police of Puebla in the case of Jose Martínez Ruíz to be in a situation contrary to law for not carrying out the apprehension order against an auxiliary police officer found guilty, in a court of law, of killing a local PRD leader in Chiautla, Puebla on November 20, 1990 (CNDH 1994). In addition to its recommendation that the State Judicial Police execute the arrest warrant, a second recommendation for an internal investigation as to why the arrest warrant had not been carried out was issued by the CNDH. The case of PRD member Manuel Vázquez Saavedra, who was killed point blank by two municipal policemen in a restaurant in Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán on March 25, 1989, also appears to illustrate leniency in meting out punishment to the municipal police. Policeman José Luis Sevin Ruíz and Juan Rosales Roque were declared suspects in the homicide of Manuel Vázquez Saavedra and in the wounding of four other PRD members. Mateo Suateguí Chino was also charged with attempting to cover up the crime (CNDH 1994). Arrest warrants were issued on all three suspects. Yet 1 year later, the warrants had still not been served against policemen Sevin Ruíz and Rosales Roque. The only non-police party to the crime Suateguí Chino served 6 months of a year-long prison term for cover up. Suateguí Chino’s reduced sentence was the result of a judge’s commuting it after Chino paid a fine of 200 pesos. In its final summary on the Manuel Vázquez Saavedra case, the CNDH charged the State Judicial Police with causing a situation contrary to law by allowing murders to evade justice. It concluded that the case represented a “double violation of human rights: the homicide and the State Judicial Police’s lack of collaboration with the Judicial Power” (CNDH 1994:314). The CNDH also recommended an

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additional internal investigation as to why the State Judicial Police did not carry out these arrest warrants against homicide suspects. Another aspect of the problem of the State Judicial Police failing to serve arrest warrants is also illustrated by cases of homicides by the hired guns (paid assassins) of known PRI local officials. There is the case of Emiliano Gálvez Regino, a 45-year-old Iguala resident and PRD member (see Chap. 4) who was shot by hired guns (the Guzmán brothers) of local PRI Hidalgo state official Jacala José Guadarrama Márquez (CHR 1994) in early March 1992 in his field. The victim managed to crawl bleeding some 500 m to the house of the local PRD representative and to point out who his killers were before dying (Crónica Guerrero 1998:48). The Mexican Human Rights Commission found in 1993 that the state was responsible for failing to execute the March 23, 1992 arrest warrants for probable homicide against Epigemnio Gorgua and brothers Nicolás and Ezequiel Guzmán (CNDH 1994). Subsequently, in Jacala, Hidalgo later that year, Ramiro Márquez Salas, a 26-year-old peasant and PRD member, was ambushed and assassinated while working in his fields. Ramiro Márquez Salas had been an active PRD member in the local movement against caciques and had frequently publicly denounced PRI cacique José Guadarama Márquez as corrupt on various occasions. The PRD leader had received numerous death threats for his activism, culminating in his October 20, 1990, assassination. The CNDH found serious irregularities in the legal processing of the crime by local state authorities. Specifically, the commission found that the police failed to execute arrest warrants against the suspected assassins (CNDH 1994). The Hidalgo State Attorney General, in responding to a request from the Mexican National Human Rights Commission for clarification on these murders, informed the commission that the suspected assassins had fled the country. Yet several eyewitnesses in Jacala subsequently identified the same men as responsible for the five subsequent murders of PRD members in the next year.7

The Failure to Apprehend Suspected and Convicted Criminals The failure of the Public Ministry and the State Judicial Police to carry out arrest warrants did not only help those state officials and/or their associates suspected or convicted of homicides against PRD members but also helped suspected and/or convicted criminals (48%), who murdered perredistas, escape justice. The following case vignettes provide more detailed information on the CNDH’s assessments, judgments, and juridical conclusions of its role in these cases (see Table 5.1). Let us begin with the case of Ángel Mendoza Juarez, secretary of human rights for the PRD in Vista Hermosa, Michoacán. Ángel Mendoza Juarez was killed by two assailants at 11:00 pm on March 30, 1991. The case was sent to the district judge of Tanhuato, Michoacán on April 2, 1991, where arrest warrants were issued on two suspects for the crime of first-degree homicide but 1 year later neither of the suspects was arrested. This case is striking because shortly after the initial sentencing of the

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assailants, CNDH representatives had the opportunity to meet personally with the president of the Michoacán Supreme Tribunal and with the Michoacán Attorney General. At that time, they inquired about the legal processing of the Ángel Mendoza Juarez case and specifically about the processing of the arrest warrants (CNDH 1994). CNDH officials, in most cases, did not meet personally with state government representatives and/or rarely inquired about the legal processing of a case so close to the date of its original sentencing. This additional source of pressure, however, did not appear to have much effect on the case. CNDH officials did not hear back from the state’s attorney until a year later, at which time (on April 28, 1992) they were merely sent a copy of the judge’s original April 1991 orders without any additional information on the processing of the warrants against the two assailants. Another example of the police ignoring the judicial power is represented by the Ignacio Hernandez Barragán case. Here too the State Judicial Police simply let time pass without serving the arrest warrants. Nine months passed between a district judge’s ordering of an arrest warrant for the shooting death of PRD member Ignacio Hernandez Barragán on January 4, 1990, in Apatzingan, Michoacán and the CNDH’s inquiry into the case. The CNDH found this delay in violation of law and blamed the State Attorney General’s Office and the State Judicial Police. The commission issued its (now) standard recommendation that (a) the State Attorney General serve the arrest warrants, (b) it investigate why there has not been any action on these cases to date, and (c) the CNDH be notified of the results of such investigations by either the Public Ministry and/or the State Judicial Police within 15 days (CNDH 1994). An even longer delay (4 years) occurred between the issuing of the arrest warrant on Virgo Ávila López who killed PRD/Socialist Party candidate for municipal president, Inocencio Romero Juárez in Tezonapa, Vercaruz on December 12, 1988, and the involvement of the CNDH on August 31, 1992. As noted in Chap. 4, Ávila López, posed as a representative from the Veracruz State Electoral Commission, allegedly went to the door of Inocencio Romero Juarez on the evening of September 10, 1988 and told him that he had been sent by the State Electoral Commission with the articles that needed to be signed then assassinated him (CHR 1994; CNDH 1994). In its inquiry into the case, the CNDH again blamed the State Judicial Police for failing to arrest Ávila López and termed this state of affairs as “contrary to law.” Furthermore, the commission, in its formal inquiry into the case, discovered there was no information at all as to whether the State Judicial Police had even tried to apprehend the subject. Thus, the commission argued that the State Judicial Police had engaged in “conduct guided by omission [that] promotes impunity which is a grave act, as is that of taking someone’s life, an act that is clearly specified in the respective Penal Code” (CNDH 1994:286). The CNDH found, in some cases, that original investigative legal documents into a murder were later lost by the Public Ministry. For example, in a protest march near Acapulco, Guerrero one perredista – Donaciano Rojas de la Cruz – was beaten to death by the Motorized State Police. First, he was hit by a stone in the head thrown by a judicial policeman and fell down after fainting. The same policeman then


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beat Donaciano Rojas de la Cruz to death in front of his fellow policemen (Crónica Guerrero 1998:58). The Mexican Human Rights Commission released its report on the death of Donaciano Rojas de la Cruz in June 20, 1993 (CNDH 1994:193). The commission found that various members of the Guerrero Legal Director’s Office of the Guerrero Public Ministry acted contrary to law in failing to prosecute the case and recommended further investigation into the homicide of Donaciano Rojas de la Cruz. Along with the alleged “disappearance” of the Guerrero Public Ministry’s initial investigative report on the crime, no further investigation into the 1990 murder of the victim had been done by 1998. The Organization of American States looked into the case at the request of the PRD in 1999, and the organization concluded, “There has been full impunity both for the perpetrators of the murder and for those who obstructed the investigation of that murder…” (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 1999:18). In its institutional self-defense and in responding to various requests from the CNDH, the State Judicial Police reported on several occasions that it had tried to apprehend various criminals but could not fulfill the arrest warrants because the murderers had fled the town, or even the country. This was argued in the case of PRD militant Juan Sombrerero Nolasco. Juan Sombrerero Nolasco was shot by two men while putting up campaign posters for the Amozac, Puebla PRD municipal president candidate on January 13, 1990. Two other PRD members were also wounded in the shooting. After various investigations by the Public Ministry, a warrant for the arrest of two suspects on the grounds of presumed intentional homicide, assault, and property damage was issued on March 26, 1990 (CNDH 1994). No arrests of the suspects were made. The State Judicial Police responded, in response to the CNDH’s request for follow-up on the Juan Sombrerero Nolasco case 2 years later on October 30, 1992, that it could not execute the arrest warrants. The criminals, they argued, had fled to various parts of the state of Puebla, and perhaps even had left the nation and thus they were ignorant of their actual whereabouts. However, the CNDH did not accept the State Judicial Police’s explanation, arguing that they had not provided any evidence of having attempted to locate the suspects or to advance further investigation of the case. Thus, the CNDH concluded that not only had a clear violation of human rights occurred but also that the State Judicial Police’s failure to apprehend the suspects meant the failure to cooperate with, and their disrespect for, the Judicial Power (CNDH 1994). The State Judicial Police, in another case – that of perredista Leopoldo Bravo – also argued they could not execute the arrest warrants because the suspects had fled the country. Eyewitnesses to the crime, the police stated, had informed them that Bravo’s murderer had fled the country for Los Angeles. This, police sources argued, was the reason they had not served the June 25, 1990 arrest warrant (CNDH 1994). PRD member Leopoldo Bravo had been shot in broad daylight by Adrian Lázaro Marcado in front of a bake shop in Tanaquillo, Michoacán on June 21, 1990. Leopoldo Bravo’s wife was an eyewitness along with four others. All of the eyewitnesses said that the killer was a known acquaintance of Leopoldo Bravo who had

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driven his car up to the bakery, called out to the victim by his nickname, saying, “Wait for me Leopoldito, I am coming” and then proceeded to pull out his gun and shoot Bravo point-blank four times before fleeing in his car. The victim had opposed the assasin’s (a policeman under the previous PRI municipal administration) bid to be policeman under the new PRD administration. The PRD filed a claim with the CNDH 2 years later, alleging the violation of human rights of Leopoldo Bravo because of the failure of the State Judicial Police to arrest the convicted killer. As the result of its inquiry into the case, the CNDH found the situation to be contrary to law: It was contrary to law because of the suspension and presumed evasion of justice by the killer. It is the fault of the Public Ministry and the State Judicial Police for not executing the arrest warrant. Two years have passed since the arrest warrant was issued and the only response received by the CNDH in its inquiries was a copy of the original investigation. It is not valid to argue that the guilty party is out of the country because were this the case, then extradition orders would begin. Thus, [this case involves] the double violation of human rights: a state of impunity and the lack of the State Judicial Police’s respect for the Judicial Power (CNDH 1994:328–329).

Less dramatic, but more typical, is the case of PRD member Rubén Ríos Montero. Rubén Ríos Montero was killed in a post-electoral conflict in Macuspana, Tabasco, by priístas Pablo Damian Morales and Lucas Acosta Félix on January 12, 1992 (CHR 1994). The State Judicial Police made a partial attempt to execute the arrest warrants on the two suspects to his murder (Pablo Damian Morales and Lucas Acosta Félix) issued by district penal judge of Macupana, Tabasco, on January 20, 1992. The same judge also issued five other arrest warrants for presumed homicide as well as for presumed cover-up of the crime (CNDH 1994). Only one of the suspected murders (Lucas Acosta Félix) was brought before a judge by the State Judicial Police on March 20, 1992. Although he denied the charges against him, the judge sentenced Felix to prison for co-participation in the homicide of Rubén Ríos Montero on March 23, 1992. One and a half years later, the State Judicial Police informed the CNDH that they were continuing to look for the whereabouts of the second suspected assassin – Pablo Daiman Morales–but the information it received from the PRD victims’ family members was that it was likely that Morales fled his home on the day of the murder (CNDH 1994). None of the arrest warrants on the four suspects for the presumed cover-up of the homicide had been served. The CNDH found, in the face of this situation, “the presence of violations of human rights.” Specifically, the CNDH blamed the State Judicial Police for failing to adequately conduct the necessary investigation for executing the arrest warrant on the presumed assassin, Pablo Daiman Morales. According to the CNDH (1994), the information given by the family members of the PRD victim to the State Judicial Police on the suspected whereabouts of Morales: In no way justifies the police corp’s failure to conduct an on-going investigation into the whereabouts of the presumed assassin. On the contrary, it brings into clear light its inactivity in executing that arrest warrant and, as a consequence, causes the conduct imputed to Pablo Daiman Morales to not be judged by a competent authority (CNDH 1994:340).

The State Judicial Police also failed to execute arrest warrants on the assassins of PRD member Santos Cabrera Rosas of Guerrero which occurred on


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January 20, 1989, in Potrerillos. Santos Cabrera Rosas was shot in the back with seven bullets while walking home at night by Mónico Solís Escalante. Three years earlier, the 41-year-old PRD militant had been a supplemental candidate for the “Popular Unity of Guerrero.” At the time of his death, he was a member of the PRD promotional committee in Petatlán. The committee sought to challenge the PRI municipal president Hernández Valdovinos, whom the committee alleged was corrupt (Crónica Guerrero 1998). Santos Cabrera Rosas had received various death threats for his militancy. PRD sources alleged that the murderers were two brothers who were hired guns of the local cacique named Mónico and Gorgonio Solís Escalante (Crónica Guerrero 1998). Only Mónico Solís Escalante was arrested and presented before the Public Ministry, at which time he blamed his brother exclusively for the crime. This led the judge to absolve him completely and set him free. The CNDH found that despite a judicial order to arrest his brother Gorgonio Solís Escalante for presumable homicide in March 1989, the State Judicial Police had not served the arrest warrant by 1994 (CNDH 1994).8 The failure of the State Judicial Police to arrest criminal suspects was again the problem in the murder of peasant Silvino Rodríguez Reyes. Silvino Rodríguez Reyes was murdered in cold blood in public view by four men (Francisco García Cervantes, Agustín García Munguia, Fernando Cuero, and Simón García Munguia) after a heated discussion in an assembly of ejidatarios in Donato Guerra, Mexico, on February 10, 1990. There were multiple witnesses to the crime as is common in these cases of murders that occur in public forums. Arrest warrants against all four men for presumed homicide were issued but only one – Francisco García Cervantes – was apprehended by the State Judicial Police (CNDH 1994). And even here, Francisco García Cervantes had his sentence reduced on appeal to a higher court. In its review of the case, the CNDH found the juridical situation contrary to law and recommended that the Mexican State Attorney General’s Office instruct the State Judicial Police to (a) immediately execute the arrest warrants on the remaining homicide suspects, (b) order a corresponding internal administrative investigation with relevant legal sanctions as to the causes of the State Judicial Police’s failure to execute the arrest warrants, and (c) report the results of this investigation to the CNDH within 15 days. The analysis of the CNDH case reports so far has revealed that when judicial action on a case occurred such as the issuing of an arrest warrant on suspected or even convicted state officials and criminals, the State Judicial Police often failed to execute these warrants. This failure indicates a weakness in the judicial power to carry out its mandates, and points toward possible political interference in the processing of justice. It also implies that the legal system did function to sentence and convict murderers, but that the police merely fail to carry out its orders. Yet as noted (see Table 5.1), in 33% of these cases, no judicial action was taken against any suspected perpetrator of the crime because it was considered that the case lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute. Let us examine in greater detail the CNDH’s analysis of this conclusion, which is reached largely in reference to the State Judicial Police and by the Social Representative of the State Attorney General’s public ministry.

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The Failure to Adequately Investigate Crimes The second pattern that emerges from the case accounts (see Table 5.1) refers to the remaining 33% of the cases where no judicial action was taken against any suspected perpetrator of the crime. The following selected case vignettes illustrate the process by which state agents came to assume that a given case lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute it as a crime. The cases also demonstrate the CNDH’s finding of human rights violations for the failure of relevant state officials to adhere to proper investigative procedures in the processing of these cases. In the case of Timoteo Mardonio Estudillo Peña, a fair amount of confusion characterized the official investigation of his murder. Timoteo Estudillo Peña was tortured and then murdered in Amilcingo, Morelos on December 7, 1988. His body was found about 700 m from the highway 12 days later in a state of complete decomposition. An autopsy report was issued, which concluded that the death was the product of an armed assailant who both shot the victim and hacked up parts of his body with an ax (CNDH 1994). The Social Representative of the State Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry began an investigation into the homicide on January 11, 1989, but 3 years later, at the time of the CNDH’s involvement, no clear results had been obtained. This was because, in large part, various municipal officials kept passing jurisdiction for the crime to nearby municipalities. For example, the Morelos State Public Ministry agent said the body was found on December 19, 1989, but 7 days passed before the Social Representative of the State Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry told the head of the State Judicial Police to get involved in the case. The Cuatla Public Ministry, meanwhile, claimed the case was not in its jurisdiction and sent it to Ciudad Ayala on January 27, 1989. The latter did not receive a statement on the investigation from the State Judicial Police until 14 months later; a statement that was contradictory, according to the CNDH, because it “referred to events as if they had just happened; as if the statement had been written 14 months earlier” (CNDH 1994:251). In other words, it appeared that someone had just written a statement but tried to make it look like it had been written in the previous year. The voluntary testimony of the wife of the PRD homicide victim (Cirina Ramírez Ramírez) was taken by an agent of the Public Ministry on July 14, 1992, in Cuernavaca. Mrs. Ramírez stated that she suspected her husband’s killer was Apolo Bernabé Ríos (alias El Polvorón), a hired gun of a local cacique. Apolo Bernabé Ríos had stated in public that he had killed her husband and her husband had received previous death threats for his political activism, as noted in Chap. 4. Cirina Ramírez Ramírez also declared that she had not come forward to tell the authorities this before because she feared reprisals. The CNDH found “violations of human rights” because of the 3 years between the murder of Timoteo Estudillo Peña and the inadequacy of the investigation to determine who committed the crime. The CNDH also faulted the State Judicial Police for failing to investigate any details of the homicide despite an autopsy

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report on the gravity of the crime. Finally, the CNDH faulted the Social Representative of the Public Ministry for not undertaking any follow-up investigation on the claims of Mrs. Ramírez Ramírez regarding the suspected assassin and indeed for failing to further investigate any probable suspects in this case (CNDH 1994). Its recommendation was that (a) the State Attorney General further investigate the crime and, once sufficient evidence was collected, that it exercise penal action against the suspect; (b) after this was concluded, it order the State Judicial Police to execute an arrest warrant; (c) it commence an internal inquiry into why none of the relevant personnel engaged in the adequate discharge of their investigatory duties and that appropriate disciplinary measures be imposed; and (d) the CNDH be advised of the results of the above within 15 days. Similarly, the CNDH found that no investigation into the murder of Camilio García Cruz in Ejutla, Oaxaca, had occurred even though 3 years had passed since his demise on October 22, 1989. A November 20, 1989 autopsy report clearly identified Camilio García Cruz as the victim of an armed attack. There was also the testimony on March 1992 of one C. Antonio Santiago Cruz who declared that the persons responsible for the murder were a “group of 20 or 15 members of the PRI from San Juan Ocoateaces, Altal, Ejutla de Crespo, Oaxaca, living in neighborhoods, section three and four” (CNDH 1994:320). Despite these leads, no further official investigation of the case was conducted. The CNDH found the Public Ministry and State Judicial Police acting contrary to law for having let 2 years pass between the initial homicide and the taking of the testimony of C. Antonio Santiago Cruz. Nor did the CNDH accept the State Judicial Police’s statement that it was not possible to further clarify who committed the murder simply because certain persons refused to be interviewed. The CNDH argued, “It is not an impediment to justice if some people refuse to testify as long as the Attorney General exhausts all avenues possible to clarify the crime” (CNDH 1994:321). The CNDH, deeming the situation to be in violation of the human rights of the victim, blamed the State Attorney General of grave “conduct guided by omission.” It recommended further investigation of the crime, an internal inquiry into why the investigation had become so delayed, that appropriate disciplinary measures be imposed, and that the CNDH be advised of the results within 15 days. The conclusions of the CNDH were even stronger in the case of the murder of Reveriano Cruz Rojas, a PRD leader murdered in his home in Rio Grande, Oaxaca on April 23, 1990. Here, the CNDH accused the State of “absolute inactivity” with respect to clarifying the homicide. The PRD Secretary of Human Rights claimed that Reveriano Cruz Rojas had been killed by hired guns paid for by local PRI caciques; assassins who were being protected by the second mixed judge of Puerto Escondido, Oaxaca (CNDH 1994). The police gathered some initial evidence. An autopsy report dated April 24, 1990, concerning Reveriano Cruz Rojas, was conducted, and it was determined that the cause of death was from multiple gunshot wounds to the heart, abdomen, thorax, and pelvis. In addition, the State Judicial Police gathered the eyewitness testimony (dated April 26, 1990)

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of C. Blanca Estela López Ávila, who was present in the Cruz Rojas household at the time of the murder. C. Blanca Estela López Ávila declared to have witnessed the following: Suddenly at about dawn, I heard a bang on the back door and heard two shots. It seems that the bullets passed close by me and in the dim light I managed to see two persons dressed in dark clothing but I did not recognize them. I only remember that one of them of about medium height had on a sweater and a beanie cap and was slightly thin. At that moment we sat down and one of them walked behind the screen – this was the one that came closest. Reveriano said to him “WHAT DO YOU WANT FRIENDS, TAKE IT EASY” (QUE QUIEREN TRAQUILOS COMPAS), and one of them answered him: “WHATEVER” (QUE TRANQUILO NI QUE TRANQUILO) and at that moment both of them began to shoot and I did not move, hearing many shots and then both of these individuals ran off but I was not aware of the time that Carmen and Paula (the victim’s daughters) had left and then I saw them and did not hear any noise, so I wrapped myself in a sheet and left the house running… (CNDH 1994:332).

The CNDH, despite this initial evidence, accused the Oaxaca attorney general of absolute inactivity for not pursuing any further investigative action on the case from 1990 to 1992, for failing to undertake the proper actions necessary to clarify the crime, and for promoting a situation of impunity, the latter of which it considered “a crime as grave as is the taking of a life of a person” (CNDH 1994:333). In other words, the agency considered a state of impunity to be as bad as the murder itself. In addition, the CNDH noted in displeasure the State Judicial Police’s arbitrary detention of the eyewitness C. Blanca Estela López Ávila. López Ávila had voluntarily testified to the events described above but then was detained by the same State Judicial Police for coming forward to tell her story. Finally, the CNDH argued that the State had failed to confirm or refute the PRD’s claim that the suspected murderers were being protected by the second mixed judge of Puerto Escondido, Oaxaca, because the case had not yet been brought before the court. The CNDH also blamed the social representative of the Guerrero Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry and the State Judicial Police for failing to adequately investigate the circumstances surrounding the murder of another PRD activist (Felix Octavio Ventura Ramos, mentioned in Chap. 4) in Tlacoachisttahuaca on March 15, 1990. The autopsy report dated March 17, 1990, established that Félix Octavio Ventura Ramos had been beaten to death over all parts of his body with a stick, his face was destroyed, and a piece of wood was also found lodged in his right shoulder (CNDH 1994). Two eyewitnesses and the victim’s wife testified early on that Felix Octavio Ventura Ramos active in electoral fraud protests, had been conducting census business for the PRD in this village near his home on the day of his death. By the end of the day, he had begun to drink with a few locals who were unknown to the witnesses. Felix Octavio Ventura Ramos then went to bed but on the next morning when he was found dead in bed, the locals were nowhere to be found (CNDH 1994). The PRD human rights representative suggested a political motive for his death. Ventura Ramos had been very active in many antifraud protest rallies in and around the village of Tlacoachisttahuaca where he was killed. Tlacoachisttahuaca was a village in which a cacique-PRI municipal president named Daniel Onofre was well known for “his very heavy hand with people of the area and his violent repression of those who opposed his decisions” (CNDH 1994:279), according to the representative.

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The social representative argued on September 20, 1990, that there was insufficient evidence to carry out penal action in the case. Two neighbors at the crime scene who had been ordered by the State Judicial Police to render testimony about the events on March 23, 1990 refused to do so. As was typical in this pattern of cases where insufficient investigation occurred, the CNDH faulted the Guerrero State Judicial Police for never specifically detailing the type of inquiries they planned to conduct to clarify the case. They also noted that it was inexplicable that the social representative would not conduct the normal procedures used to get witnesses to testify. This was especially a problem when those witnesses in question could likely have helped to physically identify the local men drinking with the victim on the eve of his death (CNDH 1994). The CNDH, therefore, recommended the State Attorney General’s Office continue its investigation along the following lines, and specifically to (a) conduct an internal investigation into why the social representative had shelved the case and (b) ask why the head of the Guerrero judicial police, associated with Ometepec, had failed to further investigate. All of this further information was to be sent to the CNDH within 15 days. The CNDH also blamed the failure to investigate adequately the circumstances surrounding the homicide of PRD member, Felipe Santiago Matias, in Guerrero on October 31, 1991. An autopsy report revealed that 50-year-old Santiago Matías was axed to death, nearly decapitated, and left dead in a canyon near Llano Grande de los Hilarios, Guerrero (CNDH 1994). The PRD human rights representative claimed that Felipe Santiago Matias was killed by hired guns of the PRI and explained it as a revenge killing surrounding electoral fraud that had occurred in a previous municipal election. Both the PRD and the PRI had claimed victory in that election and had set up parallel collective peasant administrations. But in May of 1990, PRI authorities began to pressure the PRD ejidal commissary to renounce his position (CNDH 1994). It was in the context of this electoral conflict that Felipe Santiago Matias was killed, according to the PRD human rights representative. Again, the CNDH, found that the state had failed to do its job. In its review of the case, the CNDH blamed the lack of resolution of the crime on the following state officials responsible for conducting criminal investigations: (a) the social representative of the State Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry for failing to adequately interview the victim’s family about the crime and for merely authorizing them to bury the body, (b) the two lawyers in the Public Ministry’s Office who failed to conduct any type of investigation into the crime, (c) the State Judicial Police, and (d) the State Attorney General’s Office for not acting professionally in failing to conduct a proper police investigation (CNDH 1994). The CNDH issued its recommendation that the State Attorney General order the Public Ministry to investigate the crime and to undertake an internal inquiry with possible administrative or penal sanctions into the conduct guided by omission of the two Public Ministry lawyers who failed to properly investigate the case. It also recommended an internal inquiry with possible administrative or penal sanctions into the conduct of certain members of the State Judicial Police, especially the commanding officer for failing to respond to initial inquiries from the Public Ministry lawyers that they

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embark on a criminal investigation of the case. The agency also recommended that the results of such further investigations be given to the CNDH within 15 days. The CNDH found it inexplicable why the Public Ministry of Chilpancingo had shelved the case for lack of evidence when neither the State Judicial Police, the transit police, nor the social representative of the State Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry had conducted any inquiry into the case. Nor did the motorized police detain or interview any of the others who were with the victims at the time of the crime even though some were also eyewitnesses to the murders. Thus, the CNDH recommended the State Attorney General’s Office follow the standard procedures for homicide investigations. It recommended that the lawyer for the Public Ministry in Chilpancingo be investigated to determine whether and why he failed to conduct the investigation according to law. The CNDH also required that the results of such further investigations be given within 15 days. A final case demonstrates the failure of the state to adequately investigate the death of Lorenzo Santiago Torres, the previous candidate for municipal president, in the Coayuca de Andrade, Puebla, November 26, 1989 elections. According to two municipal police commanders who were on guard, along with four other policemen, at the municipal palace on the night of February 22, 1990, five individuals with M-2 rifles showed up (among whom was perredista Lorenzo Justiniano Santiago Torres mentioned in Chap. 4) and began to fire upon the municipal palace in the direction of the police (CNDH 1994). A subsequent shootout broke out between the two sides that lasted about a minute. Then, four of the men fled the scene with Lorenzo Justiniano Santiago Torres left dead with an M-2 rifle in his left hand. Lorenzo Justiniano Santiago Torres’ wife stated that when she learned the news of her husband’s death, she went to the municipal palace and found his body covered with a tarp in front of a kiosk. She asked several eyewitnesses what had happened to cause her husband’s death, but in the end, she said she did not know how her husband lost his life (CNDH 1994). The autopsy report does not specify whether the body had traces of gunpowder in the hands, an important detail missing in the report, given the PRD account of the same episode, which contends that Santiago Torres was a vendor and that he was sleeping in his kiosk while he got killed by a stray bullet when the police opened fire, attempting to dislodge PRD members from the municipal government building (CHR 1994). The CNDH blamed, in particular, two lawyers working within the Tepexi de Rodríguez public ministry for failing to adequately investigate the crime. No further investigation of the crime had occurred for 2 years since the death of Lorenzo Justiniano Santiago Torres, up until the time of the CNDH’s inquiry into the case.

Impunity for High-Impact Crime It has been said that repression “uses a great variety of techniques and strategies” (Faucher and Fitzgibbons 1989:166). In the Mexican case, the legal dimensions of the state’s response to the political murder of PRD members consisted primarily of

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two elements, that is, (a) failure to investigate crimes and (b) failure of the police to carry out the orders of judges. The certainty of the lack of punishment against those state actors responsible for human rights violations reflects the weakness of the judicial system to enforce punitive damages against human rights and other offenders, which is a problem in controlling state crime in general (Barak 2000). The case studies in this chapter also provide a window into how the Mexican criminal justice system failed to nab or punish the killers in the case of political assassinations, which indicates a judicial breakdown, and specifically, how the state demonstrated its acquiescence in the killings through the impunity it afforded the killers. Although only an average of 25% (1999) to 33.4% (2000) of all arrest warrants result in apprehension in Mexico (Zepeda Lecuona 2002, 2004:208–209), the CNDH 1994 report demonstrated that the various State Judicial Police units served arrest warrants ordered by judges in only 10.5% of the PRD homicides it reviewed (CNDH 1994). This means that suspected criminals are two to three times as likely to be arrested by the police as the murderer of a PRD member even in a criminal justice system already considered to be quite inefficient (Zepeda Lecuona 2002; Ruiz Harrell 1999). This represents a relatively high level of the failure to respond to the orders of penal judges. A second conclusion relates the state’s handling of the political murder of PRD members. The case studies in this chapter suggest that the public prosecutor’s office was quite similar in initiating an investigation to uncover probable cause as compared to previous findings on the criminal justice system in general [67% in the case of politically motivated murders of PRD members; 70% as indicated in the 1997 general study (Zepeda Lecuona 2002)]. Although the data were based on a limited subsample of the 662 crimes against perredistas, the data do suggest that the public prosecutor’s office was more effective in actually finding probable cause and in asking the court to try these cases. And in fact, the court did secure a judgment in the majority of them. Compare the 67% judgment rate in the cases of the political murder of PRD members with the much lower judgment rate (11.6%) found in studies of crime (Zepeda Lecuona 2002). This result is likely due to the fact that the cases filed with the CNDH reflected a situation in which human rights violations were very egregious (homicide). Unfortunately, this greater effectiveness on the part of the criminal justice system had very little impact on reducing impunity for murder. The CNDH found that successful prosecution in only 3.5% of all the homicides it reviewed (CNDH 1994).9 This high rate of impunity in failing to punish convicted murderers of PRD members can be compared to the overall estimated national average prosecution rate of 17% for civil homicide (2001) (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:278). Furthermore, with respect to many of the states where the CNDH reviewed the political murder of PRD members, this impunity rate for the conviction of the political murder of PRD members is even higher. [The estimated national prosecution rates for civil homicide in relevant Mexican states are as follows: Coahuila (47.1%), Michoacán (31.7%), Tabasco (31.4%), Federal District (28.1%), Veracruz (21.4%), Campeche (20.5%), Hidalgo (20.7%) (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:278; CNDH 1994:113)].10

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This result is somewhat paradoxical because homicide is a high-impact crime, constituting a severe social lesion, so the need for efficiency by the public prosecutor’s office in apprehending murderers is even more urgent. The State Judicial Police explained their negligence in terms of such institutional limitations as a lack of resources and limits on their jurisdiction.11 In responding to inquiries from the CNDH on the subject, the police often claimed that they were unable to serve such arrest warrants because the suspects had fled the state or even the nation (CNDH 1994). At the same time, the CNDH, the human rights agency, repeatedly found a consistent failure to execute arrest warrants on suspected homicide perpetrators by the state and municipal police and judicial officials in 89.5% of all the cases reviewed. Even as compared to the estimated 74% fugitive rate for all types of criminal cases (Zepeda Lecuona 2002), this represents an even higher rate of impunity than should be explained by the inherent institutional limitations of the public prosecutors in general. More statistical research is necessary to further differentiate the criminogenic role of the State Judicial Police from the public prosecutors in violating human rights. Previous research conducted by investigators working within the state human rights commissions have found both the state-level procuradurias (the public prosecutors) and the judicial police responsible for violations of human rights in roughly 50% of the time (Zepeda Lecuona 2002) when the criminal justice system breaks down. Similarly, the CNDH data presented in this chapter show that in those 33% of the cases when no judicial action took place, the State Judicial Police were responsible for human rights violations half of the time with the public prosecutors at fault for the other half (Table 5.1). Nevertheless, in the 67% of the cases where judicial action took place, the State Judicial Police were responsible for the violation of human rights, according to the CNDH, a full 90% of the time. This means that the State Judicial Police appeared to exercise even more discretion in failing to locate, arrest, and/or extradite suspects, and in failing to further investigate these crimes in the political murder of PRD members. Future studies that are able to pinpoint at which phase of the criminal trial procedure difficulties in executing arrest warrants are most likely to arise (the assignment phase and/or after the judgment phase, if the suspect posted bail, and/or later, on appeal of the case to a higher court) could shed more light on how the institutional limitations interact with the discretionary powers of the office to produce impunity (see Fig. 5.1). This would represent a welcome contribution toward understanding more precisely how and why the State Judicial Police consistently fail to comply with judicial orders.12 Solomon (1999) made an interesting point in this regard. He noted, “In theory, the judicial police take orders from prosecutors, although in practice judicial police often appear to work on their own” (p. 55). This chapter also found evidence of the arbitrary and perhaps autonomous powers of the State Judicial Police in deciding whether to serve an arrest warrant. For example, the relatives of the victims often brought up the issue of corruption within the police. According to the widow of peasant perredista homicide victim, Jose de la Cruz Navarrete, the Chilpancingo Guerrero police told her that she would have to pay a fee to have the arrest warrant


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served, which was money needed to help out the government. According to her testimony, she told the police that she was too poor to pay the fee and that subsequently the four murder suspects in the case continued to live in the town without punishment (Crónica Guerrero 1998:23). These results suggest then that in criminal justice systems where the power of the state to punish offenders is already weak, a strong political challenge to dominant cacique rule will likely further disarm the judiciary and promote even greater impunity for murder.

Perpetrators and the Paradox of Lawlessness These systematic human rights violations by state and criminal actors result in the lack of access to adequate legal justice by the families of those PRD members killed. As a form of repression, the denial of access to legal justice is a problem of the violation of the civil rights of the poor. As Marshall (1963) argued, lack of access to the legal system by the poor is a central obstacle to the extension and diffusion of civil rights within a society. Indirect evidence measuring the comparative socioeconomic status of PRD supporters suggests that they are among the poorer citizens (Magaloni 1998; Poiré 1998). In one sense then, the lack of access to legal justice by PRD family members repeats the general problem of violations of access to justice by the poor, which was what the CNDH was set up to alleviate; that is to say, it represents the continuation of civil rights violations of the poor (Oropeza 1996). On another level, the CNDH conclusions also have theoretical implications for research on impunity and the control of state crime. The failure of the state to do its job in a majority of the cases suggests that weak external oversight, inadequate supervision, and the powerlessness of victims are central factors causing state crime (Grabowsky 1989). Indeed, the very institutional weakness of the CNDH itself is highlighted in the fact that its recommendations to state officials to correct the violations of human rights committed by their agencies were followed in only a few of the cases. The inability of the CNDH to prosecute state crime combined with almost no jail punishment, even for the convicted offenders, only compounds the powerlessness of the PRD victim’s families. These case studies can also contribute to broader theoretical discussions of the role that criminal justice systems can play in controlling political dissent. The use of political killing as a control mechanism used systematically against the political opposition has not been extensively studied in recent theories of both the “rule” and the “(un)rule of law.” O’Donnell (1999) touched on the implications for democratic theory in his discussion of the sheer lawlessness of many local jurisdictions in Latin American nations. He described this lawlessness as a type of “gap” in the application of the rule of law: In most countries of Latin America…the legal state is absent: whatever formally sanctioned law there exists is applied, if at all, intermittently and differentially. More importantly, this

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segmented law is encompassed by the informal law enacted by the privatized powers that actually rule those places. This leads to complex situations, of which unfortunately we know too little, but which often entail a continuous renegotiation of the boundaries between these formal and informal legalities, in social processes in which it is (at times literally) vital to understand both kinds of law and the extremely uneven power relations they breed. The resulting dominant informal legal system, punctuated by arbitrary reintroductions of the formal one, supports a world of extreme violence, as abundant data, both from rural and urban regions show. These are sub-national systems of power that, oddly enough, for most extant theories of the state and democracy, have a territorial basis and an informal but quite effective legal system, and coexist with a regime that, at least at the center of national politics, is polyarchical (p. 15).

This chapter finds further that this state of lawlessness that lends itself to a situation of political violence and political killing is, somewhat paradoxically, one bounded by a relatively stable set of mechanisms, i.e., a structured system of impunity. The CNDH reviews of political killings suggest that a predictable set of social actors were repeatedly implicated as perpetrators of the systematic violation of human rights of the murdered PRD members. Indeed, the State Judicial and municipal police were directly implicated in about one-fourth of these political murders of PRD members. In some of the cases, local police participation, particularly in 1988–1989, was quite direct as exemplified by the point-blank killing of Manual Vazquez Saavedra by two municipal policemen in a public restaurant in Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, in 1989 (CNDH 1994). Typically, however, the direct and open participation of state and local police in the political murder of PRD members occurred only in the context of the use of excessive force to control post-electoral rallies and/or marches, that is, when state and/or municipal police fired on crowd (CHR 1994). In a few of these cases, the situation became so chaotic that policemen were sometimes also inadvertently killed by their own members. The CNDH review of those who killed PRD members in this chapter and the CHR (1994) data in Chap. 4 identified a stable set of perpetrators. These included known PRI officials and members; hired guns linked to a local PRI leader(s); unknown assailants and the police (State Judicial, municipal, and other police). In addition to some active on-duty policemen, most perpetrators were either criminals (hired guns) generally linked to a local PRI leader, known PRI members, and unknown assailants. Clearly in the area of the drug trade, many officers within the police force have been compromised and have participated in criminal activity (Alvarado and Davis 2001; Bailey and Godson 2000; Gledhill 1998; Lupsha 1996; Reames 2003). There exists, for example, a biographical study of a Mexican drugcartel assassin who had been a Chihuahua state policeman with US FBI training (Bowden 2009:46). Nevertheless, there is a severe need for research on the career origins of “hired guns” engaged in political assassination to precisely pinpoint any potential past or actual linkages with state security forces and/or any linkages to drug-trade-related assassins. The data on perpetrators in this chapter do also suggest, however, a blurring of the lines between criminals, and some priísta officials and party members in these crimes. For example, the CNDH (1994) identifies approximately 19% of those responsible for the political murder of PRD members to be suspected and/or convicted


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PRI state officials, including known PRI members such as the outgoing municipal secretary of Huandacareo, Michoacán (CNDH 1994). The CNDH review also attests to murders by openly identified priístas subsequently criminally charged with homicide. This included the case of convicted priístas Pablo Damian Morales and Lucas Acosta Félix who murdered perredista Rubén Ríos Montero in a postelectoral conflict in Macuspana, Tabasco, on January 12, 1992 (CHR 1994). The relatively regularized use of a set of state actors to ensure impunity for political killing raises a more subtle institutional question about the previous internal operations of the Mexican justice system. In raising the question theoretically, O’Donnell (1999) suggests that the Latin American legal state may, in fact, be absent in the subnational systems of state power and/or that the law may function there intermittently and differentially. In other words, there is a problem of lawlessness in many regions within Latin American nations. This raises a related paradox with respect to the Mexican legal system: On one hand, the legal state is present in the places where the political murder of PRD members took place. Yet on the other hand, rather than functioning as a system of sufficient restraint, it functioned instead rather systematically to create a climate of ambiguity and impunity surrounding these murders. By this, I mean that the main problem in the administration of justice in the political murder of PRD members did not appear to be the question of the physical absence of the legal state from these subnational systems of power. Indeed, there were few reported problems with either the physical presence or the relative competency of the technical experts of the police (Reames 2003), according to the CNDH’s evaluations. In fact, in two-thirds of the cases of the political murder of PRD members, the victim’s body was collected, an autopsy was conducted by the relevant police officer, and a file was opened into the homicide as following proper procedure. Sufficient data were even gathered to identify, prosecute, and to issue a penal sentence against the perpetrators in 67% of the cases. Thus, with some minor exceptions, the technical experts of the police were not a major factor of impunity in the case of the political murder of PRD members. This becomes less a question of the failure of the legal state to reach the population in the sense that the apparatus of justice is absent in the location.13 Rather, the CNDH reviews suggest that there is a further disarming of the legal coercive powers of the existing state to properly prosecute and punish murderers. The lynchpin of the system of impunity deepened an already existing pattern of institutional malfunction represented by the failure of the State Judicial Police to execute arrest warrants ordered by judges. This failure to punish criminals dilutes judicial power further of its powers of legal prosecution and worsens an already existing situation of crime without punishment.14 The 90% failure rate of the various state attorney generals’ offices to respond to the CNDH’s recommendations and to correct the legal problem in numerous cases of the political murder of PRD members also reflects a disarmed judicial system in which agencies designed to protect civil rights cannot enforce their own recommendations. The judicial overturning of criminal sentences against those perpetrators found guilty of murdering PRD peasants activists and leaders also sends the message that the legal system can be disarmed on appeal, even if one is initially convicted of homicide.

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In returning to the point about the frequent situation of sheer lawlessness in Latin America when there are gaps in the application of the rule of law, the case of the political murder of PRD members in Mexico raises a certain paradox of lawlessness: On one hand, the judicial apparatus of a lawful state was physically present, and a dense network of criminal laws and procedures partially operated to treat these killings according to established rules and norms. Yet on the other hand, this same legal system operated relatively systematically to perpetuate a system of impunity for these crimes. This was a situation reflecting then a very specific type of lawlessness, that is, a state whose laws were disarmed and in which crimes go unpunished. Ultimately, the rise of electoral institutions in Mexico helped to reduce the discretionary powers and resources incumbent authoritarian governing elites could employ to prolong their rule, including the toleration of violence and lawlessness to manipulate electoral outcomes. In the long run as electoral institutions grew in strength, a situation in which human rights institutions could fairly vigorously investigate state crime, but have very little impact on reducing it, did not continue, and human rights improved for the PRD by 2000.15 This was clearly a slow process: “Political assassination [under Salinas (1988–1994)],” wrote Rojas Alba in 1996, was “dosed out according to the electoral strength and the degree of autonomy of each political party” (p. 31). After 1994, the number of political murders of PRD members actually initially increased by 63% during the first half of the Zedillo sexenio (1994–1997) over the killings that occurred during the entire Salinas sexenio alone (Global Exchange 2000; U.S. Department of State 1997). This rise occurred despite Zedillo’s pledge in 1994 to uphold the rule of law during his administration. Political elites by 1997, however, were much less likely to encourage vigilantism for extrajudicial killings and the culture of lawlessness that such state crimes imply. This culminated in the 2000 presidential election of the first non-PRI president which brought a sharp (94%) decrease in the rate of the political murder of PRD members in Mexico. Thus, the rise of a strengthened electoral law did have a positive effect on diminishing the incidence of national electoral-related violence. Nevertheless, the political killing of PRD members has continued in Guerrero and other states. In addition, the Mexican criminal justice system has been slower to respond to the larger issue of the prosecution of political assassination and continues to guarantee legal impunity for these extrajudicial political killings even within the context of a more robust rule of electoral law. The legal documents on 90% of the more than 660 political killings of PRD members had been filed with the proper authorities by 2001, but these crimes still had not been clarified (La Jornada 10/27/01). In summary, this chapter details how the criminal justice system showed its acquiescence in the political killings of PRD members through the impunity that was afforded the killers. In only a few cases has the successful criminal prosecution of perpetrators occurred. I have shown how the failure to serve arrest warrants after the crimes were investigated and suspects identified (a failure by the police and law enforcement) and the failure of adequately investigate crimes (a failure of the judicial system) further disarms the legal coercive powers of the existing state to properly

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prosecute and punish murderers. Perhaps, then the story of the political murder of PRD members is a cautionary tale about how states can both promote democratization and electoral competition while acquiescing to extrajudicial killings through the impunity that they afford the killers.

End Notes he protection afforded by the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) is based on T an informal procedure and investigation of the facts (Oropeza 1996). The commission’s resolutions are merely “recommendations,” which are then submitted to the authority involved in the violation of human rights (Mayer-Serra 1996). In other words, the CNDH did not have the legal authority and/or control over police and administrative offices to prosecute or sanction abusers (U.S. Department of State 1999). 2 As Zepeda Lecuona (2002) noted, not all preliminary investigations should end in the bringing of formal charges such as in cases where the facts fail to indicate the commission of a crime or where a case lies outside the public prosecutor’s jurisdiction. The problem, however, is that justice is frequently not done in the sense that cases are frequently filed without concluding a proper or conclusive investigation. Zepeda Lecuona (2002) reported that a large 77% of investigations in Mexico are either pending or have been filed, awaiting new evidence that would determine the case’s legal status. 3 Of those 275 cases of potential violations of human rights of PRD members brought before the CNDH by the PRD in 1994, 51% were processed by the CNDH or 140. Of these 140, 90 were homicide cases. Of these 90 homicide cases, the CNDH claimed “No Responsibility” in 13 homicide cases. [The other six “No Responsibility” homicides included: one grave wounding, one arbitrary detention, two abuse of authority, one false accusation, and one torture.] Of these 13 rejected homicide cases, the main reason 69% (nine cases) given by the CNDH for a claim of “No Responsibility” was that the PRD did not adequately substantiate the victim’s membership in the political party (CNDH 1994:57–65). With respect to the remaining 31% (five cases) homicides, they were deemed “non-political” because they involved: (1 and 2) PRD policemen (one occurred in a PRD “occupied” municipality when the PRD night watchman was shot to death by policemen (1994:59) and in the second a PRD municipal policeman was shot to death at the outskirts of town by the State Judicial Police for “unknown” motives (1994:61), (3) the homicide occurred during an antifraud rally (1994:63), (4) the PRD members were ambushed by unknowns for unknown motives (1994:63), or (5) no reason was given (1994:65). The CNDH also found that 19 cases were either (1) not in its jurisdiction, resolved in the judicial process or accumulated in another CNDH finding (n = 16) or (2) it lacked information (n = 3). The final result was that the CNDH processed 58 cases of homicide, consisting of 73 victims. In the other 135 or 49% of the original 275 cases of potential human rights violations presented by the PRD but rejected by the agency, the CNDH determined that 18 had already been presented to the CNDH; eight cases were in the process of judicial sentencing and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the CNDH; three cases the CNDH had already declared to have had violations of human rights, and the penal route had been halted in one case. In another case, a special fiscal was in charge of processing the case. Another 16 cases had been resolved for various reasons. Ten cases were determined to belong outside the PRD to other non-governmental organizations that were in charge of their transmission. In 31 cases, the CNDH determined that the elements to process the case were too diluted, according to the laws governing the CNDH. And, finally, in 47 cases which were related to dislodging by public security forces, the affected parties had not been able and/or willing to present a formal complaint before the appropriate authorities and the PRD had not put together the CNDH’s required elements to review a potential human rights violation (CNDH 1994:7–8). 1

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he State Judicial Police are an auxiliary of the Public Ministry (Portillo Vargas 2002). There T are about 21,000 state-level judicial police who, by definition, must enforce a set of laws or codes, and in the case of states the relevant jurisdiction is the local state law. The State Judicial Police forces are organized under the offices of the Attorneys General (Reames 2003:5). 5 Although there are federal and local jurisdictions in Mexico, 80–95% of all crimes fall under local jurisdictions (Zepeda Lecuona 2002) including the political murders of PRD members. 6 As the previous chapter suggests, a “state official” could be simultaneously classified as a “criminal” if he is guilty of murder. This chapter, however, follows the CNDH distinction between public employees and private citizens and identifies state officials as those individuals who worked in some public capacity for the state: generally, ex or current PRI municipal presidents, regents, secretaries, and so on. The distinction is important because when the CNDH report identifies narrowly “state officials” as perpetrators of the political murders of PRD members, they generally directly tie the motive for the crime to some aspect of the individual’s job, that is, murder as a political vendetta of an outgoing PRI municipal president who lost his post to a PRD candidate, and so on. Since the PRD Human Rights Secretariat often claims that its militants are frequently murdered as the result of a political vendetta by disgruntled PRI members, this claim appears directly verified, at a minimum, by these cases from the CNDH findings. 7 Political turmoil continued in Jacala the following year during which time the murders took place. The official November 1990 municipal election results had PRI Artenio Estrada Olguin officially winning as local municipal president. Many perredistas, however, refused to accept Estrada Olguin as local president and a series of post-electoral rallies ensued. 8 The CNDH recommended the State Attorney General to instruct the State Judicial Police to immediately execute the arrest warrant against Gongorio Solís Escalante, conduct an internal investigation into why it had not already been served, institute disciplinary measures against guilty parties if necessary, and report its findings to the CNDH within 15 days (CNDH 1994). 9 This CNDH (1994) finding is also very close to the 2.6% rate of a “Clear Judicial Outcome” (n = 7) of the 250 CHR (1994) cases presented in Table 2.1. Any minor differences between the two rates can be ascribed to the fact that the standard of evidence for the CNDH effectively excludes cases of “unknown” perpetrators or 20.5% of the CHR (1994) cases. 10 Data is unavailable for the states of San Luis Potosí, Durango, and Puebla. It should be noted this data is not published in aggregated form in other sources or for other years (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:275). Furthermore, data is unavailable for the state of Baja California Norte (a PAN strong-hold in the 1990s). 11 In cases where judicial authorities have evidence of the whereabouts of those suspected or convicted criminals who have fled their state, they can issue orders to the relevant authorities in that jurisdiction to serve an arrest warrant (Personal communication with Zepeda Lecuona 2007). 12 This will be a difficult task, however, since there is very little written disaggregated data available on arrest warrant rates at the state level (Personal communication with Zepeda Lecuona 2007).

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his is a relative, not an absolute point. Clearly, the problem of the lack of physical access to T justice remains a real one, particularly in certain mountainous states like Oaxaca. 14 The disarming of the judicial power is also implied in the CNDH finding that the investigatory and prosecutorial powers at other levels of the judicial apparatus (the Social Representative of the Attorney General Office’s Public Ministry, the State Judicial Police, and to a lesser extent, lawyers with the State Attorney General’s Office) were partial or even halted at various stages in the course of a criminal investigation in those 33% of those political murders of PRD members where no judicial action was taken. 15 This exception to this rule was in certain municipalities within high-conflict states such as Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas in which a much lesser rate of the political murder of PRD members continued after 2000, as discussed in Chap. 5 and the appendix of this book. 13

Chapter 6

Impunity and Electoral Challenges from Below: The Killing Fields of Guerrero

Introduction Previous comparative cross-national empirical studies of political assassination have found that high rates of political assassination are not randomly distributed geographically but related directly to a host of variables. These include “systemic frustration, external aggression, minority tensions, and homicide rates, as well as political instability and violence (Kirkham et al. 1970:202).” While valuable, such research has only been able to correlate these various factors with higher political assassination rates. Scholars have not yet pinpointed the precise causal influence of each associated factor on predicting higher rates of political assassination. Another issue that has not been fully explored in the literature is the role that political structures such as political parties and legal institutions play in producing the conditions of interpersonal violence at regional and local levels (Villareal 2002). Political science studies, while directly concerned with the influence of political factors on violence, focus primarily on the relation between large-scale conflicts such as civil wars and the type of regime, using countries rather than on political parties and legal structures as the unit of analysis (Gurr 1993; Hegre et al. 2001; Hibbs 1973; Mueller and Weede 1990; Powell 1982). Sociological theories of crime focusing on political factors recognize that challenges from below in the form of social and political mobilization and protest by the poor, particularly in places where authoritarian cacique rule is strong, represent a threat to powerholders who traditionally maintain and reproduce their power structures through clients (Fox 1994). Because the recognition of the right to vote and to participate equally and to form associations modifies the power structure and poses a direct threat to the system of domination, greater electoral competition can disrupt patronage networks which rely on unequal exchange between actors at different levels in the social hierarchy (Faucher and Fitzgibbons 1989:142). It can also challenge the cacique’s ability to monopolize the representation of the interests of the community at higher levels of the political system (Cornelius 1977). Villareal (2002) argues the disruption of Mexico’s democratization–liberalization process resulted in a temporary loss of social control by caciques and a temporary increase in civil homicide over the 1990s.


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6 The Killing Fields of Guerrero

In this chapter, I argue that it is the interaction of political parties and legal institutions which centrally explains the continued political assassination of, and impunity for, PRD members in Guerrero. The case of Guerrero offers a unique angle from which to better understand trends in producing the conditions of interpersonal violence and impunity at regional and local levels because of the high and prolonged incidence of killing of perredistas in the state over time.

Regional Variations in the Patterning of the Political Killing of PRD Members Across Mexican States Across the nation, PRD members were initially killed largely in those Mexican states where PRI cacique strongholds were most challenged in the 1988 presidential election (Michoacán, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Mexico and Hidalgo) (Rojas Alba 1996:30–31) and where subsequent PRD protests in 1989–1990 against electoral fraud were also most strident. Yet, after these political events, the rate and regional patterning of the political killing of PRD members varied substantially across Mexican states despite the fact that electoral competition continued to disrupt patronage networks across the nation. Violence fell precipitously after 1994 in the state of Michoacán (home to some 80% of the Party’s National Executive Committee) where the majority of political killing occurred from 1988 to 1994, as the result of a rise in the party’s electoral strength and its acceptance of a strengthened electoral rule of law (Eisenstadt 2004). Nationally, however, the PRD continued to stage postelectoral mobilizations in many other states despite parallel institutional advances in electoral law (Eisenstadt 2004:153). In Guerrero, the number of political killings of PRD members actually initially increased by 63% after 1994 (U.S. State Department Human Rights Report 1997:5; Global Exchange 2000:6), despite a similar strengthening of the party as in the state of Michoacán. Armed peasant uprising in 1996 occurred not only in the state of Guerrero but also in the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas.1 The rise of armed peasants in these three states, however, had different consequences for the political murder of perredistas. In the state of Chiapas, the conflict between zapatistas and their PRD supporters and priístas and their paramilitary supporters in Northern Chiapas triggered a wave of political killing of PRD members in 1994 which did not drop until after 2000, with the electoral decline in the power of the PRI (see Appendix). In the state of Oaxaca, however, the rate of the political murder of perredistas, where the EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario) guerrilla movement made its first armed attack in August 1996, followed a similar pattern as under the previous sexenio (see Appendix). Indeed, the direct impact of the rise of an armed peasant movement in Oaxaca on the actual killing of PRD members was very minimal, at best, despite the build-up of an estimated 5,000 army troops posted in the state by 1997 (Stephen 1997:4).

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The rise of the armed EPR peasant movement in 1996 in the state of Guerrero neither triggered an initial wave of political killings of PRD members (as in Chiapas), nor coincided with the continuation of a previous pattern political killings (as in Oaxaca). The EPR did not even appear in the state of Guerrero until June 28, 1996, and by this time, 71% of the total PRD members killed in Guerrero between 1988 and 2006 (n = 160) had already died (Crónica Guerrero 1998:153). Nor can the state’s violent political history be claimed as the central factor explaining the political murder of PRD members during the intensification of democratization (1988–2005). There is an intensity of social polarization in Guerrero and a previous tradition of independent social organization on the left in the state (Crónica Guerrero 1998:35; Váldes-Vega 2000:99). Two guerrilla movements developed in Guerrero in the 1960s and 1970s led by Genaro Vázquez and Lucio Cabañas. And indeed, violence has been a traditional part of local politics in Guerrero where high degrees of poverty “contrast sharply with the opulence of the tourist resorts of Acapulco and Zihuatenejo (Gómez-Tagle 1994:80).” Yet, the state of Michoacán does not share such a history but was the bloodiest state in terms of the killing of PRD members from 1988 to 1994 (CHR 1994:318).2 The issue of legal institutions in Guerrero is important to explaining the political murder of PRD members. Guerrero’s legal institutions are among the poorest in the nation in terms of prosecution for homicide. Guerrero had the lowest estimated state prosecution rate for civil homicide in 2000 (8.7%) along with the states of Morelos (11.3%), Oaxaca (10.7%), and Mexico (6.2%) (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:278). This poor state-level performance correlates at the level of the legal processing of the political murders committed against PRD members. The CNDH issued 33% (n = 21 of 67) of its total recommendations of state responsibility for the violations of human rights of the 90 PRD homicide cases it reviewed to Guerrero’s state governor alone (1994:113).3 Thus, higher rates of political assassination of perredistas in Guerrero are positively associated with poorer state prosecution rates for the processing of civil homicide. Nevertheless, it is the interaction of political parties and legal institutions which centrally explains the continued political assassination of, and impunity for, PRD members in Guerrero. The actions of political parties after 1988 were critical. These include the radicalization of some local PRD leaders, the hardening of official authority by the PRI governor, and the failure of political parties and the legal system to establish new forms of social controls such as a functioning electoral court. These actions occurred during a period of intense democratization which included punctuated episodes of armed peasant uprising. These political events occurred within the context of already compromised legal institutions to produce and perpetuate impunity for political murder. The political killings in Guerrero then offer a good case study in which to identify how political parties and legal institutions interacted to encourage political murder and how impunity persisted there despite advances in electoral competition.

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A Broader Pattern of Social Conflict Between Authoritarian Incumbents and the Opposition Regional variations in the patterning of the political killing of PRD members across Mexican states over time suggest there is neither a linear nor curvilinear relationship between 1988 electoral support for the PRD and the number of political killings of PRD members in 1997. This relationship is shown in Fig. 6.1. The data in Fig. 6.1 demonstrate the intense regional concentration of the political killing of PRD members in the South-Southwestern region of Mexico; a region that includes the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas but which only captured about 20% of the presidential vote in 1988, according to official statistics (Nassif 1989:89). Thus, Fig. 6.1 does not show that a high percentage of vote share for the FDN in 1988 explains subsequent regional trends in the political killing of PRD members over time.4 Instead, the decisions and protest strategies of political party members mattered in the subsequent years. Eisenstadt (2004:153–158), in analyzing the decisionmaking process within the PRD to engage electoral protest and postelectoral mobilization during the post-1988 period, contends that local perredista activists, rather than centralized party hierarchies (as in the case of the opposition right PAN

Fig. 6.1 A scatter-plot of homicides and electoral support for opposition parties across Mexican states, 1988–1997. Source: CHR (1994), Crónica Guerrero (1998), and Rojas Alba (1996)

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[Partido Acción Nacional] party) often initiated such protests. Frequently, local activists made spontaneous decisions to pursue mobilization objectives that differed from leaders within the party. Such decisions included the illegal possession of contested municipal offices. PRD postelectoral mobilizations after 1988 involved an important expression of social discontent (agrarian conflicts, local citizen demand for social services, a reduction in political corruption, improved human rights) by other means (Eisenstadt 2004:158). Thus, PRD postelectoral protest and mobilization over the 1990s was based on not only which party got the most votes in 1988 but also on specific local social conditions; suggesting that challenges from below in situations of authoritarian clientelism can be multivalent in nature (Fox 1994). Within this pattern of social conflict between the authoritarian incumbents and the leftist opposition, impunity also contributed to the political killing of PRD members. Cornelius (1999:11) argue that regional variation in the PRD’s strength in the 1990s often led to the entrenchment of hard-line priísta leaders, who in some municipalities, continued to hold sway, leading to “high levels of authoritarian impunity and more rigid authoritarian control, including freer recourse to official violence.” Eisenstadt (2004:143) argues that such impunity continued even after the demise of the PRI-state’s national moderates in 2000 which left numerous “local cacique affiliates ‘on their own’ as a loose network of bosses able to perpetuate a monopoly on the use of coercion that they no longer possess, at least not according to national laws.” The degree of impunity within law enforcement also intersects to produce homicide. Villareal (2002:488) argues that impunity within law enforcement is an important mediating variable explaining the rise in civil homicide associated with greater electoral competition in Mexico’s rural municipalities in the 1987–1999 period. I argue, in this chapter, that a pattern of impunity which developed in 1988 between political parties and legal institutions best explains the comparative longevity of the political killing of PRD members in Guerrero, as opposed to other Mexican states. Both the legal system and the political system were implicated in this pattern of impunity. This pattern: (a) began with the use of official violence in response to opposition postelectoral mobilizations and also included the selective use of political assassinations of opponents (1988–1994); (b) it then shifted to a pattern of extrajudicial killings where political–electoral conflicts intersected with violence caused by paramilitary forces, White Guards, and, to a lesser extent, military forces (1994–1997); and (c) continued with the use of selected political assassination after 1997 and beyond 2000. Despite greater national electoral competition and improvements in the national rule of law, the high levels of impunity for the political killings of PRD members created an incentive for extrajudicial political killings to continue in the state. This points toward the importance of interactive effects between political structures and legal institutions in perpetuating continued interpersonal violence at regional and local levels.

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Violence in Guerrero: Postelectoral Violence and Political Assassination (1990–1994) Contested Municipal Elections, Elite Impunity and Political Killings (1988–1990) A narrative of the political killing of PRD members in the state of Guerrero begins within the context of numerous protest rallies by the PRD in the wake of the 1988 presidential elections, and the subsequent take-over of municipal governments (sometimes violent) by PRD members who claimed their victories were denied due to PRI election fraud. The presidential elections of July 1988 in Guerrero, as in the state of Michoacán, were marked by widespread fraud including the stealing of ballot boxes, the dumping and burning of ballots and the counting of votes by PRI officials rather than by the state’s electoral authorities. In Guerrero, however, PRI control over the electoral apparatus was even stronger than in Michoacán. The Guerrero Electoral Commission was dominated by three PRI-government appointees; an action that went against changes in federal law which had reduced direct PRI-government control on the electoral commission to two members. The legislative branch in Guerrero was dominated by the PRI and four owners of the major newspapers – Pueblo, El Sol de Chilpancingo, Jueves de Excélsior, Siempre – who were simultaneously PRI candidates to various electoral posts (Proceso 12/18/89:11). The opposition only triumphed in two of the ten electoral districts in the 1988 presidential election. Rojas Alba (1996:169) claims that the PRI actually lost eight of the ten federal deputy seats and refused to recognize the victory of Iguala deputy Félix Salgado Macedonio, until the latter presented to the state congress two large sacks of the missing ballots the PRI had not finished burning. It was within this contested electoral context that the first assassinations of PRD leaders began in early 1989 – Santos Cabrera Rosas on January 20, 1989 and Amado Larumbe (March 8, 1989) – referred to in chapter 4 – in the state of Guerrero (Crónica Guerrero 1998:45). Subsequently, the December 3, 1989 Guerrero municipal and local congressional elections were characterized by similar fraudulent methods used by the ex-ruling party as in the July 1988 presidential elections (Gómez-Tagle 1994:80). The PRD claimed to have proof and testimony of having won 51 of 75 municipalities (Rojas Alba 1996:169). The PRI recognized their victories in only nine, at least three of which were municipalities where the PRI itself was divided into rival factions (Cutzamala, Xochihuehueltán, Alcozauca, Metlatonoc, Tecpan de Galleana, Petatlán, Ajuchitlán, Coyuca de Catalán, and Zirándaro (Proceso 10/30/89:8). In pre-electoral violence, civic activist Ceclio Tacuba Cantarón was also killed on July 1, 1989 in Ometepec (Crónica Guerrero 1998:76) and PRD municipal committee member Guillermo García Tiledano of Tixtla fell on November 27, 1989 (CHR 1994:80–81). The CNDH, in its review of the Tiledano case, received the reply from the state government that it had no awareness of the event (CHR 1994:81).

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As also occurred after the December 1989 Michoacán municipal elections, local PRD militants began to occupy town halls by force. In both states, some of the “popular” PRD municipal governments were able to function successfully for a time. Ultimately, however, most ended in violent dislodgings a few months later by police forces. The forcible removal of PRD militants in both states often resulted in the wounding and sometimes in the death of local protestors who were killed either by stray gunfire, by direct killings, or in a few cases, as the result of a gun battle with the police. So, for example, on December 4, 1989 the town hall of Chichihualco was taken over by PRD members who were later evicted by riot police. Violence soon spread to other municipalities including Telolopan, Arcelia, Cutzamala, and Coyuca de Benítez. PRD members, by December 8, were engaged in 26 protest rallies held in front of municipal palaces (Proceso 12/11/89:6; 12/18/89:11). In 24 towns, the establishment popular municipal governments by perredistas worked well for several months until they were forcibly dislodged by the police (Gómez-Tagle 1994:80). Another key commonality between the political killing of PRD members in the state of Michoacán and Guerrero during the Salinas sexenio (1988–1994) relates to degree of disorganization within the party and the great discretion of local leaders from state party leaders. The PRD rank-and-file in both states was more radicalized than its leadership, as noted above, and often refused to accept elite-based negotiated solutions to postelectoral conflicts, especially when they involved giving up PRD-occupied popular municipal governments. By March 1990, however, the strategies of local perredista leaders within Guerrero began to vary in response to pressure and often political repression from authoritarian incumbents to release their hold on municipal governments in the wake of the dislodging of eight of the popular PRD governments that month. About 4,000 militant peasants in the town of Ometepec wanted to retake the municipal palace, but the local PRD leadership dissuaded them from the action. PRD member Secundino Martin Felícito had been killed with a high-caliber gun at 10:00 pm previously in Ometepec on December 29, 1989 within this context of postelectoral violence (Crónica Guerrero 1998:77). Local perredistas, in the town of Cruz Grande, hid themselves from public view but kept conducting secret meetings and sounding a siren at night. This later action prompted the judicial commander (in charge of the dislodging) Noriega Cantú to argue that perredistas were conducting psychological warfare (Proceso 3/12/90:11). The most radicalized popular PRD administrations were those such as Teleopan, Chichilualco, and Coyuca de Benítez associated with the Guerrero university and the current within the PRD called “The Revolutionary National Civic Association.” None of these had been dislodged by the police and all of them continued to function normally, although in Coyuca de Benítez, there was a nightly guard of 150 peasants armed with machetes and sticks. PRD leaders in these popular municipalities refused to accept any agreements with the PRI governor Ruíz Massieu. In the state of Michoacán, the breakdown of a series of federally assisted, postelectoral reconciliation pacts (1989–1992) and the effectiveness of state-wide PRD

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electoral protests ultimately brought the PRI governor down by 1992. A diminution of political repression and violence coincided with a rise in more effective electoral courts by 1994 in Michoacán. Guerrero governor Ruíz Massieu, in contrast, deliberately sought to circumvent the federal authority and proposals of the Interior minister in Mexico City for resolving postelectoral conflicts in Guerrero. Similar federal proposals had already been accepted by the governor in state of Michoacán. Ruíz Massieu did so by negotiating with local perredista leaders who were ex-members of the Mexican Socialist Party and the Coalition of Ejidos in those still-disputed municipalities such as in Atoyac and in Tecpan de Galeana. These local PRD leaders were more willing to accept the proposal of PRI governor Ruíz Massieu to substitute one PRI mayor for another one chosen in accordance with the local PRD (Proceso 3/12/90:11). The Federal Interior Minister’s Plan would have required the Guerrero governor to recognize the PRD in three other municipalities; an act Ruíz Massieu refused to do. The governor justified his “solution” to the problem of the still-disputed municipalities stemming from the December 1989 elections comparatively, arguing that “The solution in Guerrero is not the same as in Michoacán where they have been giving away political offices for more than a year and a half and there is still violence (Proceso 3/12/90:12).” Nevertheless, the capacity of the Guerrero governor to circumvent federal authority (a form of impunity) only triggered the intensification of political violence and political repression over time in the state of Guerrero. Fifteen other PRD members would be killed in political violence between February 1990 and June 1990 in the context of disputed elections (Crónica Guerrero 1998:147–148). In the town of Ometepec, the violent dislodging of the popular perredista government in March 1990 was followed by a string of murders in which six PRD militants would be killed (July to September 1990). All of those who died had previously participated in postelectoral struggles. Santos Rey Santiago and Aurelia de los Santos Salinas, to give an example, were assassinated just outside their house at 11 pm on August 9, 1990. In the latter case of Aurelia de los Santos Salinas, the material authors of the crime were suspected to be local-level priístas Romualdo Santiago and Tranquilian Reyes Salinas (Crónica Guerrero 1998:82). The Mexican National Human Rights Commission found the state failed to adequately investigate this crime, leaving the murders in a state of complete impunity (CNDH 1994:350).5 Other examples include the assassination of PRD member Senobio Angel Martín in Ometepec municipality whose body was left floating in the Xochistlahuaca river on August 11, 1990. José Jiménez Nájera, secretary of the “popular PRD administration” was attacked in his bed, beaten and hacked to death with an ax in a surprise attack on September 25, 1990 (Crónica Guerrero 1998:82). The CNDH found impunity by the state in handling the legal processing of this case (CHR 1994:96). Violence also erupted in a number of other Guerrero municipalities over the course of 1990; suggesting the further breakdown of Ruíz Massieu’s state-level plan to reduce postelectoral tensions in the state. PRD member Baltazar León Mateo in Tlalchapa was assassinated within this context in a restaurant by a drunken


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policeman (CNDH 1994:96). An additional five perredistas were killed between June and December 1990. In four of these cases which were reviewed by the CNDH, the agency found state responsibility for violations of human rights in the processing of the cases.6 In one of these cases, local perredista party leader José Laureano Valdovinos of Tecpan and the brother of the PRD municipal president were shot to death by police gun-spray fire in a bar by five local municipal policemen. All of the police were all later found guilty of the crime and sentenced to 11 years, 6 months in prison (CHR 1994:93–94). José Laureano Valdovinos had publicly accused the PRI municipal president of corruption and nepotism in the management of municipal finances.

Continuing Political Violence and Political Repression (1991–1994) The subsequent years (1991–1994) of the Salinas sexenio did not bring any greater peace to many of the municipalities of Guerrero but rather the intensification of electoral-related violence in many instances. Three militants in Tlacoachistlahuaca who had actively participated in postelection rallies after 1989 were subsequently murdered in January 1991. Five other PRD members were killed in 1991, a year which included the death of Felipe Santiago Matías who was hacked to death with a machete in the neck by hired guns. His corpse was found in a nearby ditch. The CNDH accused the State Attorney General’s Office of “lack of professionalism” and “impunity” in handling the Felipe Santiago Matías case (CHR 1994:98–99).7 A series of PRD leaders were also assassinated within the context of continuing electoral violence in 1992 in the municipality of Tlapa de Comonfort. These victims included the local municipal delegate and promoter of social demands, the supplemental regent and general secretary of the PRD in Metlatonoc, the PRD municipal delegate member, 40-year-old peasant, and PRD activists Pedro Chula Ponce and José Luis Pineda Duarte, discussed in chapter 3 (Crónica Guerrero 1998:48, 49, 62). Four more PRD members were also killed in 1992 (CHR 1994; Crónica Guerrero 1998:148). One of them, Juan Mercenario Moreno, local general secretary in Metlatónoc, was assassinated at 7:30 am by an unknown assassin who shot him in cold blood with a 0.38 super caliber pistol as the victim was entering a local store (CHR 1994:102). Another, PRD leader Aurelio Gálvez Maldonado, municipal delegate of the party in a large urban slum in Tlapa, was stoned to death by unknown assassins in October of that year (CHR 1994:102). Nor did the year of 1993 bring any political peace to the state of Guerrero as there were 20 more reported PRD killings (CHR 1994; Crónica Guerrero 1998:148). These deaths occurred in the context of the gubernatorial (February) and congressional deputy/municipal elections (October) of that year. The political context of these elections is important to understand how the act of creating a democratic multiparty system often triggers greater short-term political violence as the dominant party resists further electoral challenges to its previous hegemonic authority.

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According to scholars of Guerrero (Vidales 1992, Estrada Castañón 1993), the February 1993 election was characterized by many of the traditional methods used by the ex-dominant party to ensure its victory.8 Modernizing elements within the PRI who had promised to promote a more democratic approach to the February 1993 election were displaced by the postulation of Rubén Figueroa Alcocer as PRI candidate. Figueroa Alcocer was controversial even within his own party, given the cacique tradition that he embodied with its “stigma of blood and repression that he inherited from Rubén Figueroa – his father (1975–1981) – and the risk of anachronism that a return to that dynasty signified within a context of incipient modernization and high conflict (Vidales 1992:4–5).” The PRI, in its preelectoral campaign, employed ostentatious campaign spending and ensured ample coverage of Figueroa’s campaign by local radio and television (Estrada Castañón 1993:56). Despite such imbalances in the electoral playing field, however, the PRD managed to remain stable in its share of the vote in 1993 (29.6% in the 1993 election, 29.8% in the 1989 election) (Estrada Castañón 1993:57). The party also received a high vote count in various municipalities, especially in La Costa Grande region. Nevertheless, internal struggles within the PRD, an unequal campaign, manipulation of the vote in favor of the PRI and a new law that under-represented opposition parties in Congress left the leftist party with only eight municipalities. In other words, the PRD won 30% of the vote but received only eight municipalities and controlled only 17% of the state congressional seats. The PRI, in contrast, won only 58% of the vote but controlled 70% of the state congressional seats. The PAN controlled 6.5% of the seats with less than 4% of the vote. This seat distribution was due to the new law passed largely by the PRI-dominated Congress which granted a majority of seats to the party with over 50% of the vote while only giving 25% to the second political force, thereby guaranteeing the official party an overrepresentation in Congress (Estrada Castañón 1993:54). PRD leaders cried fraud in the wake of the congressional/mayoral October 3 elections. Mobilizations occurred in 35 municipalities where the party claimed to have won (Estrada Castañón 1993:59). Estrada Castañón (1993:56) summarizes the two 1993 elections (February, October) as: “A highly conflictive political context in which electoral competition arises, with structural conditions of marginality and backwardness and enormous social inequalities, to combine with the elements of the party in power which resist ceding territory even under the risk of political violence.” Within such a turbulent political context, a number of additional postelectoral conflicts erupted in various municipalities of Guerrero. Beginning early in the year, the municipality of Teleopan saw three perredistas killed. The brother of the PRD mayor was shot in cold blood after eating at a taco stand near the cathedral at 11:50 pm in February 1993. Witness claim PRI member Efraín Sotelo Trujillo was responsible. Six months later, a police cordon in the municipality had increased postelectoral tensions. PRD militant Julio Altamirano Valladares was hacked to death by his own ax by a policeman who had disarmed him of his machete and then killed him with it (Crónica Guerrero 1998:50). PRD member Ecliserío Saines Reyna was assassinated by PRI member Andrés Antúnez at the end of 1993.


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Ecliserío Saines Reyna had been a contender for the municipal president of the local PRD committee in Teleopan. This act, according to PRD sources, was understood among some priístas as an action meant to divide the municipality. Metlatóno PRD municipal policeman Margarito Chávez was killed in the line of duty while he was on patrol in the municipality on February 24, 1993 by three PRI pistoleros (Raúl Díaz Rojas, Daniel Guervara Cano, and Guervara Cano’s brother). Six months later in Metlatóno, PRD supplemental candidate for regent Francisco Moreno Gálvez disappeared on September 14, 1993 after leaving a work meeting in the municipal capital. He had intended to cross a nearby river and a few hours later, his clothes were found including a shirt soaked with blood and riddled with bullet holes. Later, his body was recovered in flood waters of the Metlatónoc River. Tlacoachistlahuaca in 1993 saw a repeat of its bloody conflicts of 1991. Two young perredistas were killed in September 1993 by the Police Commander of the area while walking in the park. The act was considered a repressive one aimed at intimidating other militants in the context of postelectoral conflicts. A postelectoral confrontation in Iguala in April 1993 between perredistas and priístas became violent as both sides started to throw oranges, stones, and mangos. The melee left two PRD members seriously wounded and the two were taken to the hospital by prominent PRD leader of the Colonia Plan de Ayala and the Popular Movement of Iguala Martín Aceves González. Martín Aceves González was accompanied by fellow female PRD member Reyna Araujo and perredista Marcos Martínez Mendoza. While in the hospital, Martín Aceves González saw various persons pointing to him and threatening him with their pistols (Crónica Guerrero 1998:38). Martín Aceves González said to fellow female perredista Reyna Araujo, “Don’t be afraid, they won’t do anything to us.” Nevertheless, Martín Aceves González asked the nurse if he could make a call to fellow party-members to come and rescue them but the nurse denied him use of the phone. The menacing men left the hospital and shortly thereafter the PRD members were released including the wounded. Upon their all leaving the hospital at about 11:20 pm, a taxi from the “Union of Authentic Taxi Drives of Iguala” pulled up next to their vehicle and turned off its lights. Reyna Araujo remembered that an individual from inside the vehicle shot Martín Aceves González six times. One bullet grazed perredista Marcos Martínez Mendoza, four missed their target and one mortally wounded Martín Aceves González. No prosecution for this assassination was reported. The state leader of the reformist PRI current called “Democracy 2001” said that the decision of priístas to hold their march at the same time and on the same day that the perredistas had announced their rally in Iguala was a provocation (Crónica Guerrero 1998:39).

Petatlán The social dimensions of mobilization by the poor can also be examined in the context of electoral challenges from below in Guerrero. As Piven and Cloward

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(1977:7) note, the poor will engage in behavior disruptive to established institutions as a form of social protest. Interestingly, Ornelas (1998:466) pinpoints the six deadliest municipalities in the Costa Grande where the majority of the political killings of PRD members would occur by 1997. These municipalities were also those with the most extreme levels of social inequalities in the state. The Costa Grande region includes the municipalities of La Unión, Tecpan de Galeana, Petatlán, Coyuca de Benítez, Atoyac de Álvarez, Benito Juarez, and Coahuayutla; all of which also suffer some of the worst forms of social polarization combined with growing urbanization. Petatlán, among these socially polarized municipalities showed the greatest deterioration according to the marginality index, from a medium high level of marginality in 1990 to a high level in 1999 (Ornelas 1998:466). It was the only municipality that did not present an increase in its level of welfare as compared with the other municipalities of the Costa Grande (Fig. 6.2). Petatlán was also the site of the first political killing of a PRD member in the state, Santos Cabrera Rosas in January 1989, as well as the place where Sixto Chávez Maldonado was killed in April 1992 – (both cases were referred in Chap. 3). The town was early on a PRD bastion. The PRD won a higher share of the vote there in both the 1989 election and again in the 1993 elections (Estrada Castañón 1993:59). The state congress recognized the PRD victory there in 1989 but later held a congressional inquiry against the PRD municipal president accusing him of stealing municipal money, of homicide, and of failure to govern (Proceso 6/29/91:31). The charges were later dropped (Rojas Alba 1996:170). By 1993, the strength of the PRD was such that Rúben Figueroa was unable to hold campaign meetings there in anticipation of the February gubernatorial elections. A political assassination occurred in Petatlán in late 1993. It illustrates the deliberate targeting of perredistas, the “moonlighting” of policemen for a PRI member and the collective rage of rank-and-file PRD members. Previously, PRD gubernatorial candidate Félix Salgado Macedonio denounced the existence of a “black list” that circulated in Petatlán in one of his gubernatorial campaign rallies leading up to the February 1993 gubernatorial elections. Death threats against ten perredistas – Rubén Aguirre, Jesús Mendoza, Alberto Cisneros, Victoria Peñaloza, Francisco Orozco Molina, Pedro Ropa, Isidoro Lambera, Manuel Olvera Nájera, Rómulo Elías, and Obdulio Barreto Martínez – appeared on that list (Crónica Guerrero 1998:97). Later that year, in October, 50-year-old PRD activist Obdulio Barreto Martínez denounced the presence of two judicial police agents that were armed and entered the hotel room where Petatlán PRD Presidential candidate Jesús Mendoza had been staying. As a result of Obdulio Barreto Martínez’s denunciation of the two judicial agents, an enraged group of PRD supporters captured them and were at the point of hanging them before handing them over the Public Ministry but were stopped by the police before the proposed hanging took place. One of the judicial policemen, in a declaration, said that he worked privately for the PRI candidate, Rogaciano Alba (CHR 1994:124). One month later, in November 1993, two armed individuals were waiting for Obdulio Barreto Martínez at the edge of his ranch. The armed men assassinated him by shooting him various times with highpowered arms when he arrived (Crónica Guerrero 1998:50).

Fig. 6.2 State of Guerrero: municipalities and economic regions. Source: Tlachinollan (2004)

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These Petatlán judicial policemen in many respects were lucky that they escaped hanging by an angry populace of perredista supporters. In civil strife elsewhere in the state, nine judicial policemen in the state of Guerrero in 1993 would die at the hands of a populace fed up and angry at the judicial system. Six of them died by hanging in various communities of the Northern region in the month of December 1993 alone (Proceso 1/3/94:26).

Michoacán and Guerrero Compared In the state of Michoacán, by 1994, the worst of the violence against perredistas dropped off markedly as only two members died in the state that year and in 1995, there were only three homicides; two in 1996 and but not a single death by 1997 (Crónica Puebla 1997:Appendix; Informe Anual 1997:12). In contrast, the political killing of PRD members in Guerrero continued just before and through the early transition from the Salinas sexenio to the Zedillo sexenio. During the brief Figueroa administration (1993–1996), 84 perredistas were killed (Proceso 3/18/96:29), with 63 more killed in the first 2 years of the Aguirre administration (1996–1998) (Gutiérrez 1998:201). Guerrero, with an additional 49 subsequently killed (1997– 2000), became the bloodiest state in the nation for the PRD during the Zedillo administration (1994–2000) (Hutchinson 2002). The answer to why this drop-off in the political killings of PRD members occurred in Michoacán relates centrally to a shift in the pattern of impunity between the political parties and legal institutions there. Eisenstadt (1998:328) views this shift both in terms of the moderation of the PRD’s stance, and through the establishment of functioning electoral courts in the state. Before 1995, postelectoral bargaining tables and the formal legal courts were both heavily biased against the PRD. This also changed after 1995 as the party began to moderate its stance. By the 1995 Michoacán elections, PRD president Antonio Soto declared that the party would accept the results of the election, whatever they were, “provided the electoral tribunal acted in conformity with the law (quoted in Eisenstadt 1998:328).” As Eisenstadt notes: The party’s [PRD] [early] advantages in Cárdenas’ home state seems to have been its overwhelming strength (despite internal division) and its desperate persistence. As it became clear to the PRI-state that the PRD in Michoacán would not be deterred, cooperation by the regime became more likely, especially with the emergence by 1992 of a moderate faction led by Arias and Solorzano, which the PRI-state could support as a wedge against the extreme left. So sheer numbers and their translation into credible threats to render the state ungovernable after fraudulent elections finally won maneuvering room for the PRD in Michoacán...9

In contrast, in the 1990 to 1994 period in Guerrero, as this chapter has examined so far, interactive effects between political structures and legal institutions were central in perpetuating continued interpersonal violence at regional and local levels. Unlike in Michoacán, in Guerrero, there was no shift in the pattern of impunity

Violence in Guerrero (1994–1997)

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between political parties and legal institutions. After 1994, at the level of political parties, there was a further hardening of official authority exemplified by the growing willingness of the governor to use security forces against the opposition. The case of the June 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre and the growth of paramilitary groups associated with the ruling party discussed below both illustrate the phenomenon. At the level of social protest, there was also a radicalization of peasant-based struggle illustrated by the birth of the OCSS in February 1993. At the level of legal institutions, unlike in the state of Michoacán, there was the failure to establish a functioning electoral court by the mid-1990s. Such factors form the backdrop for the continuation of the political killing of PRD members in the 1994–1997 period.

Violence in Guerrero (1994–1997): The Intersection of Political– Electoral Conflicts with Violence Caused by Paramilitary Forces, White Guards, and Military Forces Radicalization of Peasant Perredistas: The PRD and the 1995 Aguas Blancas Massacre (Costa Grande) There were 42 violent incidents reported against the PRD, four against the PRI and 17 against popular organizations including peasant organizations in 1995 (Proceso 3/18/96:24). A central event involved the Guerrero State Judicial Police, who, on June 28, 1995, massacred 17 peasant activists associated with the Southern Sierra Campesino Organization (OCSS) at Aguas Blancas (White Waters) near the town of Coyuca de Benítez. The peasants were on their way to a meeting to demand the return of peasant Gilberto Romero Vázquez, disappeared since May, 1995. The attack on the truck of peasants with automatic weapons was captured on videotape by the police. The original video was subsequently edited to remove the evidence which showed the police opening fire on largely unarmed peasants (see Ronquillo 1996:153–171 and Gutiérrez 1998:119–129 for multiple details on the events of the day of the massacre). The subsequent release of the original video generated great domestic and international protest that eventually led to the dismissal of Guerrero governor Rúben Figueroa in early 1996 and to the arrest of several state police officers. Figueroa’s removal from power was also a product of pressure exerted by the Mexican Supreme Court (in a historically unprecedented act) which investigated the massacre at the request of Zedillo. The Court found the Guerrero governor responsible for gross human rights’ violations, of covering up the truth found in previous investigations, of deceiving the public, and of obstructing justice by manipulating the Aguas Blancas investigation (Schatz 1998:230; Proceso 3/4/96:8). The PRD lists all 17 of the peasants massacred at Aguas Blancas as doublemembers of both the OCSS and the PRD (Crónica Guerrero 1998:56–57). The OCSS was officially born from the PRD in February 1993 in the mountains of

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Tepetixla. Many of its members, including its founder Beningo Guzmán Martínez, had been active perredistas who had participated in the party since the 1988 presidential campaign of Cárdenas but came to disagree with the leadership’s direction in 1993. Beningo Guzmán Martínez explained the ultimate rupture of the OCSS with the PRD in terms of political strategy: “We did not agree with [the PRD’s] form of struggle. We poor peasants were demanding a more defined type of struggle (Ronquillo 1996:154).” This meant, in effect, the OCSS demanded a less gradualist strategy than the PRD; a move that was mirrored by the “hardening” atmosphere of political repression by authoritarian incumbents. The OCSS’s demand included the immediate improvement of quality of life for the poor, including rural credits for farmers, the immediate cessation of repression by the motorized police, liberation of political prisoners, better popular education and respect for the popular will. In its platform of principles and programs, the organization expressed open support for a combative style of political struggle as the only way to “force the bourgeoisie and the State to recognize the rights of the people and to respect their conquests (Ronquillo 1996:155).” These differences in political strategy between the OCSS and the PRD led to some differences of opinions and even open conflicts before the June 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre. For example, on May 3, 1995 in Tepetixtla, the OCSS made its demands public in a meeting in which governor Figueroa and the general of the ninth military command both attended. At that meeting, peasant Gilberto Romero Vázquez (also a member of the Coalition of Ejidos of the Costa Grande) read aloud the general demands of the OCSS and personally handed the group’s petition to Figueroa. Gilberto Romero Vázquez disappeared 21 days later; the first of a series of politically motivated disappearances for the OCSS (Gutiérrez 1998:140). The OCSS blamed Figueroa and the local mayor of Atoyac de Álvarez, María de la Luz Núñez. Party militants then took over the municipal palace on May 18, 1995 to protest the disappearance of Gilberto Romero Vázquez who was also a resident of the municipality. Luz Núñez, although not a PRD member, had been supported as mayoral candidate by the PRD. Within 24 h of their occupation of the Atoyac de Álvarez town hall, the mayor, and PRD councilmen could not leave the building due to a police cordon outside it. OCSS members also asserted that María de la Luz Núñez had made statements blaming the OCSS for the violence against the Atoyac municipal government. Despite this, in the wake of the Aguas Blancas massacre, the Atoyac mayor publicly supported Guzmán Martínez and the OCSS. This allegedly prompted one general close to Figueroa to comment: “One cannot understand why the mayor of Atoyac is now supporting Benigno and his people when they kidnapped her (Gutiérrez 1998:141).” Perredistas who publicly supported the OCSS and condemned Figueroa for the Aguas Blancas massacre were less lucky. The perredista leader of the community in Las Mesas, Cristino Bibiano Nava was shot to death by local cacique Gustavo Rodríguez (7/14/95) in front of dozens of witnesses. Nava was shot while on his way back from a PRD protest movement demanding the fall of governor Rubén Figueroa Alcocer as responsible for the Aguas Blancas massacre (Gutiérrez 1998:201).


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Figueroa stepped down from power in March 1996 after the Supreme Court’s report finding him the intellectual author of the Aguas Blancas massacre (Proceso 3/4/96:6, 5/2/99:28).10 Angel Heladio Aguirre took office as substitute governor in early March 1996. Figueroa, in his self-defense, would later write a commentary on the events of Aguas Blancas in which he blamed the massacre on subordinates in his administration who failed to obey his orders to dialogue with peasant leaders (Proceso 5/2/99).

1996–1997: A New Administration, More Politically Related Deaths (Various Regions) Immediately after the Aguas Blancas massacre, Heladio Aguirre organized meetings in support of Figueroa in Ometepec as well as a march in Acapulco. Aguirre explained, upon taking office: “I did it because I was then president of my party and priístas asked me to support governor Figueroa, but now I have to governor for everybody (Proceso 3/18/96:27).” Several state perredista leaders including Octaviano Santiago Dionisio, Juan García Costilla, and Eloy Cisneros Guillén (all subsequently suspected and/or accused of connections with the EPR guerillas) did not receive Aguirre well. Some publicly accused him of being a “little cacique,” “always having been at the service of Figueroa,” and of heading the repression against perredistas in the October 1989 violent dislodging of the Ometepec municipal palace in which Román de la Cruz died, 63 persons were wounded and two perredistas disappeared (Proceso 3/18/96:26–27). In his natal city, sympathizers of the new governor organized two masses to give thanks for his ascendance to office. The religious ceremonies were presided over by Father Rafael Cortés. It appears that in his sermon, Cortés cited Spanish General Francisco Franco as a positive model for governing because “of his decision to rid Spain of communists” (Proceso 3/18/96:26–27). Thus, despite a change of governor, the political climate between the PRD and the PRI continued to reflect a climate of mutual hostility and disdain just as deadly hostility between priístas and non-PRD OCSS peasants continued to cause multiple deaths on both sides in other political strife in Guerrero. Specifically with respect to PRD/OCSS members, more were assassinated after Aguirre took office: Gildardo Dorantes Muñoz in Atoyac de Álvarez and Gonzalo Pastor Vinalay in Coyuca de Benítez both died in early 1996. OCSS and perredista Gildardo Dorantes Muñoz was assassinated on January 1, 1996 by the local PRI commissary of Mexcaltepec, Atoyac de Álvarez municipality Alberto Rangel Martínez. Local sources noted that Gildardo Dorantes Muñoz’s name was one of seven that had appeared on yet another “black list” of perredistas in Guerrero, many of whom had already received death threats from the PRI commissary for their political activity (Crónica Guerrero 1998:108). Thirty-three year old Pastor Vinalay, in the second murder, was ambushed with his wife on March 29, 1996 while on his way to work in the fields. The victim was shot six times with an M1 weapon and afterward smashed in the head

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(Gutiérrez 1998:200). His wife witnessed the assassination and was subsequently raped (La Violencia Política 1998:61). In what remained of 1996, 13 other perredistas were reported murdered, a number of them in Atoyac municipality, and in Coyuca de Benítez, the site of the June 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre (Costa Grande Region) (La Violencia Política 1998:61–62). PRD member Santos Añorve Jacildo was shot to death in Xochistlahuaca on March 3, 1996 by four members of a local paramilitary group (Crónica Guerrero 1998:61). PRD member Roberto Acosta Orrustieta was assassinated by 11 bullets from a 9-mm weapon by three young unknown men with military-type haircuts during a PRD party meeting in the community of Barrio Nuevo (Coyuca de Benítez municipality 6/6/96) (Crónica Guerrero 1998:62). On September 11, 1996, PRD member Natalio Gervacio Bello was brutally assassinated by suspected members of PRI-affiliated White Guards in Mexcaltepec. His body was found with his hands tied to his feet, and he had been shot four times, once in each eye and twice in the chest. He had also been stabbed in the heart and the right lung and had been slashed with a knife in the neck (Crónica Guerrero 1998:62).

State Violence and Mobilized Indigenous Peoples (1996–1997) (Costa Chica) In the wake of the Aguas Blancas massacre, Mixtec and Amizgo Indians (independent of the policy of the state-level PRD leaders) decided to create a rebel indigenous municipality in Tlacaochistlanhuaca on December 16, 1995 after holding the municipal palace for 7 months. These individuals, some of whom were perredistas, then set the municipal palace on fire after a postelectoral dispute in the La Montaña region. Indigenous militants demanded respect for the election of municipal commissary leaders, the stepping down of the municipal president and the development of a regional development plan (Liga Mexicana 1998:1; Gledhill 1998). This worsened relations with the local PRI, and with White Guards and other paramilitary groups in the municipality. There were subsequently 11 assassinations of members of the indigenous movement and a series of deaths of indigenous leaders in various parts of the state, particularly after the creation of the “New Ranch for Democracy” (the rebel municipality) with the support of some 30 indigenous groups (Liga Mexicana 1998:1). The “New Ranch for Democracy” involved the creation of authorities by uses and customs, an indigenous communal police, and the drafting of a regional development plan that included educational, health, and economic projects using municipal funds to support them. The military presence increased dramatically after the December 16 burning of the Tlacaochistlahuaca municipal palace (Proceso 1/1/96:16). Approximately 150 army elements, 40 motorized police, and a number of Federal Judicial Police entered the municipality at the request of the governor. According to perredista local deputy Eloy Cisneros Guillén, the excessive presence of the military was due to Figueroa’s tendency to resort to repressive acts to


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solve social problems. “The malevolent and bad intentioned rumor that there are armed groups in the Mountain region came from the same government that uses this to justify repression against our fellow party members (Proceso 1/1/96:16).” PRD deputy Eloy Cisneros Guillén had been accused of supporting guerrilla groups under the administration of the governor’s father Rubén Figueroa Figueroa and then let out of jail on political amnesty in 1978. The military’s explanation of the increase in personnel in the municipality was that its purpose was “to construct roads (Proceso 1/1/96:16).” The State Judicial Police arrested the Secretary of Human Rights of the PRD Bertoldo Martínez Cruz on charges of sedition for the December 16 burning of the Tlacaochistlahuaca municipal palace in February 1996 (Gutiérrez 1998:255). The conflict escalated to assassination when PRD municipal president of Tlacaochistlahuaca Rafael García Santiago was killed on September 12, 1996. He was ambushed by unknown armed men 2 km from the community of San Isidro, shot to death with a 16 caliber rifle and left in the river bed of the “El Tanque” River (Crónica Guerrero 1998:62). The political situation between members of the indigenous rebel municipality the New Ranch for Democracy and some local priístas worsened significantly by early 1997. The Guerrero Council of 500 Hundred Years of Resistance, an indigenous group, reported that 13 indigenous militants were assassinated in 1997 (Liga Mexicana 1998:1). On January 17, 1997 perredista Eusebio Sanchez Zeferino’s house in Yucucani was burned down. Zeferinio alleged PRI municipal commissary Antonio Tellez Lopez was responsible. Within this heated political context, the State Judicial Police and the Mexican Army illegally detained one Mixtec perredista leader who had actively participated in the creation of the rebel municipality. The PRD member was accused of robbery and sedition in February 1997 but released from jail and absolved of the crime for lack of proof in March (Informe Anual 1997:27). Subsequently, on November 4, 1997 at the rebel municipality, the New Ranch for Democracy, another perredista would also be assassinated. This PRD member and his wife were approaching a creek when a group of priístas were waiting for them. The victim was shot nine times with a 0.16 caliber weapon. Among the assassins was a contract killer well-known for having committed other assassinations including vehicular homicide in the area (Informe Anual 1997:98).

After the EPR’s Appearance: More Perpetrators, Similar Political Murders (1997–1998) (Costa Grande) A new armed guerrilla movement – the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario-EPR) appeared on June 28, 1996 in Aguas Blancas at the first annual commemoration ceremony for the victims of massacre.11 Subsequently, from June 28 to August 25, 1996, the EPR coordinated multistate attacks against the army, police, and other government targets in Guerrero that killed approximately 59 Mexican army soldiers in the state. The EPR attacks in Guerrero picked up again in May 1997 after some months of quiet with two firefights that left four


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guerrillas killed. In total, Gutiérrez (1998:229) argues that the EPR engaged in at least 13 armed actions in Guerrero from the date of its appearance on June 28, 1996 to May 1997.12 Yet, 71% of the total PRD members killed in Guerrero between 1988 and 2006 had already been murdered in the state by the time the EPR appeared in the state of Guerrero on June 28, 1996 (Crónica Guerrero 1998:153). Furthermore, the regional distribution of the political killings of PRD members that occurred after the appearance of the armed peasant movement EPR in June and the subsequent military build-up did not vary significantly (6/28/06–1/1/98, [n = 38 victims]) from their previous regional distribution within the state as Table 6.1 in Guerrero shows. In fact, the increased military presence in the Costa Grande region and the rise of paramilitary groups and White Guards only deepened already existing conflicts between perredistas and authoritarian caciques in many communities. It only added another layer of overlapping complexity (was the PRD member an EPR member or sympathizer?) for those already engaged in the political killing of PRD members. Subsequently, some PRD leaders began to be linked by the security forces to the EPR guerrillas and subject to illegal detention, harassment, torture and, there were a few cases of the disappearance of peasant perredistas suspected of being members of the EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario) (La Violencia Política 1998:10). Yet, on the whole, of the 38 killings of PRD members after the appearance of the EPR in June 1996, the deaths of only two victims can be definitively linked to the military policy of containing the EPR (October 29, 1997, November 1997, Atoyac) and one possibly linked (November 14, 1997, Cd. Altamirano) (Crónica Guerrero 1998:30–31). Instead, as PRD analysts note, the majority of political killings of PRD members in Guerrero throughout the 1989–1997 period were political–electoral in nature (Crónica Guerrero 1998:10). Even in municipalities like Atoyac, where the military presence intensified after the EPR’s appearance, these political murders were rooted in political conflict with the PRI. A pattern of impunity and the inability of politicians to prevent the political murders of the PRD continued to characterize the post-EPR situation in Guerrero despite the intensification of the military–EPR conflict in these same municipalities. Table 6.1 Regional location of PRD deaths before and after appearance of EPR (June 28, 1996) Before 6/89 After 6/89 Costa Grande 35.7% Costa Grande 42.1% Costa Chica 27.8% Costa Chica 15.7% Montaña 8.6% Montaña 7.8% Centro 13.2% Centro 7.8% Tierra Caliente 7.2% Tierra Caliente 7.8% Norte 3.3% Norte – Acapulco 3.9% Acapulco 10.5% n = 151 victims Source: Crónica Guerrero (1998)


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One example of how this complex intersection of political party strategies, deficiencies in the legal system, and the appearance of the EPR affected the political killing of PRD members is illustrated in El Cucuyachi (Atoyac municipality, Costa Grande Region). The Caballero Peñaloza family and other PRI members had maintained power for 18 years in El Cucuyachi before they lost to the PRD in the October 1996 elections. PRD leader Margarito Arreola Barrientos was elected Ejidal Commissar and perredista Cornelio Barrientos Cortés, Municipal Commissar. Some members of the Caballero Peñaloza family and ex-governing PRI members had served in the police and military and others formed part of paramilitary groups in the region (La Violencia Política 1998:30). Within this context, a relative of the ex-PRI cacique Caballero Peñaloza family – Leonardo Carmona Peñaloza – was murdered along with another individual. Several PRI members, after their electoral loss to the PRD in 1997, began to accuse perredistas of the murder of Leonardo Carmona Peñaloza, of being delinquents, of possessing high-powered guns and of being linked to the EPR. On May 23, 1997, governing perredistas in El Cucuyahci, some PRI members and the Municipal President of Atoyac requested a formal investigation strictly conforming to law into the homicide of Leonardo Carmona Peñaloza and others. Nevertheless, this effort to attain a clear judicial outcome for this homicide failed. Subsequently, on May 28, 1997, the body of 28-year-old PRD militant Agustín Blanco Baltazar was found at least 3 days after his death in a state of decomposition with signs of torture, one arm and a leg mutilated, and his tongue and genitals cut off (La Violencia Política 1998:64; Crónica Guerrero 1998:120). Eyewitnesses alleged that White Guards were responsible and also shot at the neighbor’s house as well as in all directions as they left the scene of the crime. Local townspeople blame the murder on four specific men – Felipe Carmona, Roberto Caballero, Francisco Balladares Peñaloza, and Moisés Peñaloza – armed priístas of the Cucuyachi PRI group who lost the local commissary elections. The locals also claim that the armed men stated that with the killing of Agustín Blanco Baltazar, they had avenged the death of Leonardo Carmona Peñaloza, the aforementioned relative of the local PRI cacique Caballero Peñaloza family. Thus, the political assassination of Agustín Blanco Baltazar appears to be a political revenge killing rooted in inter-political party conflict. Furthermore, on May 28, 1997 also in El Cucuyachi (Atoyac municipality), PRD member Martín Barrientos Cortés was detained 12 days by the military; taken while bathing in the river, accused of being a EPR collaborator, tortured, asked to collaborate in identifying other peasants allegedly involved with the EPR. Martín Barrientos Cortés was, however, unable to recognize anyone to presumed military intelligence operatives and, under threat, was released allegedly if he promised to assassinate one of his cousins. Fortunately, this did not come to pass and Martín Barrientos Cortés, in the company of his brother Cornelio Barrientos Cortés, recently elected PRD Municipal Commissar of El Cucuyachi (see above) and his PRD uncle Roberto López Baltazar went to the National Senate in Mexico City, and to the Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) to denounce the military torture (Crónica Guerrero 1998:30). The CNDH

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issued a recommendation that the Military Attorney General investigate the Martín Barrientos Cortés (and other) torture cases (October 20, 1997). Nine days later, on October 29, 1997 Roberto López Baltazar’s dead body was found a few meters from his house with 12 shotgun wounds in his neck. White Guards were prime suspects in the murder but army operatives had also allegedly searched his house in June and had the name of his son Leonel on their “black list” (La Violencia Política 1998:64). In this case, the evidence of authorization for this murder points toward a “multilayered” effort, potentially involving various state actors (military, paramilitary, local government) with various degrees of internal coordination. Nevertheless, the majority of political murders of PRD members after the June 1996 appearance of the EPR in Guerrero did not appear directly related to the Army–EPR conflicts. A full 92% (n = 35) of those perredistas killed after June 1996 were cases related to election-related conflicts with the PRI, conflicts with PRI interest groups, and political assassinations13 (Cuajinicuilapa 8/3/96; Tlapa 8/3/96; Azoyu 8/14/96, 8/21/96, 10/7/96, 5/1/97; Tlacoahistlahuaca 9/12/96, 11/4/97; Coyuca de Benítez 9/15/96, 4/21/97, 10/16/97; Chilapa 9/22/96; Alcozauca 10/16/96; Zirándaro 11/1/96; Xochistlahuaca 3/17/97; Malinaltepec 3/23/97 (n = 2); Tlapehuala 3/27/97; Chichihualco 5/1/97; Azoyú 10/16/97; Atlamajalcingo 11/1/97; Pungarabato 12/19/97, 12/21/97, 12/30/97; San Luis Acatlán 12/14/97; Quechultenango 1/7/98; and Cuautepec 1/31/98) (Crónica Guerrero 1998). Even in Atoyac, where the military presence particularly intensified after the appearance of the EPR, the political murder of PRD members continued to be rooted in conflict between the political parties (Atoyac 3/19/97; 4/22/97; 10/29/97 [n = 2]; 11/1/97 [n = 2]; 11/14/97; 11/27/97). One example from the Montaña region where the military was also present was perredista leader Guillermo Martínez Solano who was found axed to death and then left in a river in Altamajalcingo del Monte (November 1, 1997) (La Violencia Política 1998:64, 97). Guillermo Martínez Solano had previous conflicts with PRI militants and was threatened by the ex-municipal president. His father had also received death threats and was also finally assassinated on July 13, 1997. Five assassins were identified in the murder. The CNDH took the case in December 1997. The Costa Chica region, where indigenous perredistas created a rebel indigenous municipality in December 1995 (Tlacaochistlanhuaca, discussed above) is also the region where the municipality of Ayutla de los Libres is located. Ayutla municipality has the third highest concentration of monolingual indigenous Mexicans in the state (Tlachinollan 2004:20). It is also the headquarters of the Independent Organization of Mixteco and Tlapaneco People. The city of Ayutla is where PRD indigenous leader Marín Fidencia García was assassinated on October 12, 1997 as well as perredista Jesús S. Mendoza Guzmán on October 15, 1997 (Crónica Guerrero 1998:153). These political killings foreshadowed the intensification of political murder against the PRD after 2000 in Ayutla municipality.

Violence in Guerrero After 2000: Ayutla Municipality (Costa Chica and Beyond)

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Finally, there were several documented political assassinations in 1999 in Guerrero reflecting the electoral aspects of political conflicts between the parties in the state. Perredista Aurelio Peñaloza García, a former state attorney general and advisor to the PRD’s 1993 unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate Félix Salgado Macedonio was assassinated by three men dressed in Federal Judicial Police uniforms and armed with automatic weapons in March 1999 (U.S. Department of State 2001). Next, on October 4, 1999, the son of Acapulco PRD councilman-elect Marco Antonio López García (Marco Antonio López Hernández) was assassinated in the context of his father’s victory celebration. Thus, the 1994–1997 period witnessed a proliferation of violent actors (paramilitaries, White Guards, the military, the EPR) and an intensification of indigenous socio-political mobilization in Guerrero. These new violent actors and political developments intersected with the continued failure of political parties and legal institutions to contain continued interpersonal violence at regional and local levels and explain the continued political assassination of, and impunity for, PRD members in Guerrero. Finally, this trienio (3-year period) saw the beginning of the concentration of political killing of indigenous PRD leaders and members, a trend that continues after 2000 in Guerrero.

Violence in Guerrero After 2000: Ayutla Municipality (Costa Chica and Beyond) After 2000, many of the political killings of PRD members in Guerrero took place within a single municipality of the state: Ayutla de los Libres, in the Costa Chica region. The municipality of Ayutla is among the poorest in the state as measured by quality of life indicators such as housing conditions, education levels, income, and geographical location (Valdés Vega 2000:106–107). The inhabitants of Ayutla include mestizos, Mixtec, Amuzgo, and Nahuas indigenous groups. Politically, voters in the municipality were supporters of the PRI in the 1989 and 1993 municipal elections. The PRD won a seat in the municipality in the 1996 municipal election. Interestingly, during both the Salinas and Zedillo sexenios, there was not a single reported political killing of a PRD member in Ayutla de los Libres (CHR 1994, Crónica Guerrero 1998). By 1999, perredista candidate Fortino Caballero won the mayorship of Ayutla for the first time. Subsequently after 2000, a series of 13 different political assassinations of perredistas from the Mixtec and Tlapaneca region of the municipality occurred within a span of 2 years (La Jornada 2/09/04). Perredista militant Severiano Lucas Petra, the president of the committee of indigenous persons who were sterilized without their consent by the Health Department, was murdered in mid-2000 in Ayutla. Severiano Lucas Petra, before his death, had demanded along with others, compensation payment from the authorities. Lucas Petra claimed that the local PRI mayor of the community of Fátima had refused to release his payment despite a recommendation of the CNDH,

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supported by the Guerrero governor, that Petra receive the financial compensation (La Jornada 6/17/03 – CNDH Recommendation 4/1/99). The year 2001 was a relatively bloody one in Ayutla under the Fox administration. The killings began on January 8, 2001, in the town of Ocote Amarillo where Mixtec perredista leader Donaciano González Lorenzo was assassinated. On March 14, 2001, in Colotepec, PRD leader Román Rodríguez Navarrete was gunned down. A few months later, indigenous professor and PRD leader Miguel Mirando Macario was killed on May 20, 2001 in the town of San Antonio Abad. Miguel Mirando Macario had also been a leader of the State Teacher’s Union (Coordinadora Estatal de Trabajadores de la Educación en Guerrero – CETEG). The killing of indigenous PRD leaders continued in 2001. A Tlapanec indigenous leader and PRD militant was killed in the town of Ocotitlán on August 9, 2001. The victim’s name was “Eugenio” (the town mayor did not know his last name). Perredista indigenous leader of the “Independent Organization of Mixtec and Tlapanec Peoples” Andrés Marcelino Petrona was assassinated on August 26, 2001 in El Charco, the site of another massacre in Guerrero (June 1998). Andrés Marcelino Petrona was killed while on his way to a town meeting (PBI 2001:5). State PRD party leader René Lobato Ramírez by the end of 2001 strongly denounced these various murders of perredistas in indigenous communities of Ayutla municipality. He called on PRI governor René Juárez to stop the violence and repression against PRD militants (Reforma 11/6/01). René Lobato Ramírez noted that all the party members had been shot with AK-47s and AR-15s and that to date, the State Attorney General’s Office had not conducted a single investigation of any of these crimes. René Lobato Ramírez also suggested that the crimes were committed by paramilitary groups or “White Guards” (Reforma 11/6/01). The PRD mayor of Ayutla, Fortino Cabellero added, “All of them [the victims] were killed with great impunity by people who carefully planned the executions and one cannot discard the possibility that there was complicity with some judicial authorities in the region.” René Lobato Ramírez also added that the political killings of PRD members occurred in a more general context of aggression against human rights’ defenders. Both perredista leaders said they would go before the National Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to denounce the crimes and to try and get the federal government to investigate the assassinations. These efforts by PRD leaders, however, had little short-term effect. The assassinations of indigenous local perredista leaders continued in Ayutla municipality in 2002. The town of Barranca de Guadalupe was the site of a homicide in the summer of 2002 when perredista Galdino Sierra was shot to death in June. The next month PRD member Blanco Telléz died in San Francisco del Tibor in the municipality of Atoyac on July 5, 2002. Telléz was shot to death by two bullets at 11:30 by an unknown person with an AK-47. Blanco Telléz was assassinated while returning home from the municipal cemetery where he had been helping to build a grave site in order to bury a relative (La Jornada 7/06/02). Originally a PRT member, Blanco Telléz began working with the PRD, but most importantly with the Atoyac Democratic Unity (Unidad Democrática Atoyaquense [UDA]) as well as with the OCSS (Organization of Peasant of the South Sierra). Specifically, Blanco

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Telléz was a severe critic of heavy logging, and of the indiscriminate use of nets to catch fish in rivers and lagoons. He was also involved in several legal actions against the illegal capture of birds in the forests; actions directed through his work with the UDA. Blanco Telléz had also been one of the commemorative speakers at the seventh anniversary of the Aguas Blancas massacre. In addition, he was very active in promoting perredista candidate Elí Olea Urioste for municipal president. The day before his death, he participated in a political rally in favor of Olea Urioste’s candidacy for the upcoming October 6, 2002 elections. On the same day Blanco Telléz was murdered (July 5, 2002), assassins tried also to take the life of another perredista. In Iguala, PRD member and head of the Council of Popular Peasant and Indigenous Peoples (Consejo de Pueblos Populares Campesinos e Indígenas), Francisco Javier Salazar Torres, was severely wounded after being shot. The victim survived the attack but was gravely wounded. The aggressor, Jorge Pineda Vega, in this case, was detained by members of the State Judicial Police (La Jornada 7/06/02). The town of San Antonio Abad was the site of another political killing of a PRD member in the summer of 2002. Jésus Macario de los Santos was murdered there on August 26, 2002 (La Jornada 6/17/03). The last killing in 2002 took place in the Costa Chica region on October 28 in Ahuxutla when PRD member Ignacio Morales Ramírez, the son of a local policeman was murdered. State and local Guerrero perredista leaders by June 2003 were expressing further alarm and anger at the failure of authorities to stop the murders and to punish those responsible. PRD mayor of Ayutla, Fortino Caballero and state and federal party deputies demanded again that the PRI governor René Juárez Cisernos and PAN president Fox stop the violence and clarify the circumstances of the “selective” assassinations (La Jornada 6/17/03). Fortino Caballero did not blame the Mexican Army for the deaths, in contrast to his perredista colleagues. In a press conference on June 17, 2003, the Ayutla mayor said he considered the Mexican Army a partner in the development of the towns “because it combats narcotics trafficking and brings benefits like food handouts and medical services to the towns...” Fortino Caballero doubted the Mexican military was directly involved in the murders because the victims were killed with AK-47s and AR-15. In addition, it seemed odd to him the “selectivity with which the victims were chosen, in this case, Mixtec and Tlapanec regional leaders (La Jornada, 6/17/03).” PRD state leader René Lobato Ramírez blamed the assassinations on paramilitary groups supported by the state government and the Mexican Army. The persons representing the National Executive Committee of the PRD, its Parliamentary Committees and the State PRD parliamentary coordinator demanded that Fox clarify the assassinations by opening lines of investigation so that the deaths of the militants did not remain in a state of impunity. René Lobato Ramírez particularly criticized the State Attorney General’s Office for “‘pretending’ as it failed to even properly investigate these cases and for operating at a snail’s pace (La Jornada 6/17/03).” Guerrero State Parliamentary Coordinator Octaviano Santiago Dionicio argued that the assassinations in Ayutla “demonstrated the politics of inefficiency and complicity of governor René Juárez Cisernos which continues to generate

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worry and pain for Guerrero residents because he is incapable of even reigning in cacique groups that repress communities in the state.” Octaviano Santiago Dionicio concluded that all of this “adds up to the repressive environment in Guerrero in which there is an absence of punishment to those responsible for generating delinquency and impunity; by this reason, Guerrero should be given a first place prize for impunity (La Jornada 6/17/03).” The PRD’s gubernatorial candidate (Acapulco mayor Zeferino Torreblanca) won a solid victory (55–43%) over the PRI’s candidate Héctor Astudillo (El Universal 2/07/05) on Sunday February 6, 2005.14 The race was a very important one since the PRI had won a series of gubernatorial and local elections in late 2004 and some analysts were arguing at that time that the party was well positioned to reclaim the presidency in 2006. Although there was a marked preference in preelection polls for perredista candidate Torreblanca, the PRI began a very strong mobilization of its supporters (El Universal 2/03/05). Subsequently, the preelectoral climate became very tense in the state as both sides engaged in intense propaganda, and insulted each other in the streets. The head of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes reported that 34 complaints of the violation of election laws had been filed by both political sides including attempted vote buying. Political violence flared in the final days before the 2005 election. On the Wednesday prior to the Sunday election, teacher and perredista Luis Vivar Galindo was ambushed and wounded in Tlapa in the Mountain region of the state. Vivar Galindo, whose state of health was considered grave after the attack, had been commissioned to work with party militants to quell fraud in the upcoming election. PRD state leader Ricardo Monreal (a former prominent priísta) said it was a “provocation to dissuade voters” (El Universal 2/06/05). Days later on the Saturday night before the February 2005 election, unidentified gunmen with automatic weapons killed three policemen (all perredistas) and an innocent 15-year-old bystander in the Acapulco area during three separate attacks, one of them only a few blocks from the city’s wellknown beachfront. The assailants used AK-47 rifles and grenade launchers, according to state prosecutors (El Universal 2/09/05). Julio Ortega, the PRD’s campaign coordinator essentially accused the PRI of these murders, stating the attack was part of the PRI’s campaign to intimidate voters (El Universal 2/07/05). Victór Manuel Silva, the national PRI’s delegate to the state, blamed the Acapulco city administration’s failure to stem the violence that had killed its own police officers. Despite this, the Sunday election proceeded in calm on February 6, without any major disruptions in any of the state’s regions and with the absence of any serious complaints that would put the election results into question (La Jornada 2/07/05). The following week-end, however, perredista Efrain Varela, formerly the mayor of Apaxtla de Castrejon (Center Region), was shot to death on a Saturday night in a “hail of bullets” near the entrance of the town, according to the state Deputy Attorney General Antonio Nogueda (El Universal 2/14/05). Varela had just served as a witness in a hearing to certify the election victory of Guerrero governor-elect Torreblanca. Thus, after 2000, the political killing of perredistas was largely concentrated in Ayutla de los Libres, in the Costa Chica region, with indigenous PRD leaders as the prime assassination targets but with some continued political-electoral related assassinations.

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The Multiple Dimensions of Impunity for Political Murder in Guerrero This chapter suggests that a pattern of impunity arose in Guerrero in response to electoral challenges from below. A series of violent conflicts between authoritarian incumbents and the opposition in Guerrero created a pattern of impunity which persisted over time in the state. In Guerrero, a pattern of impunity continued after 1994 (unlike in Michoacán) despite initial similarities in the disorganization of the PRD and in the discretion local leaders to mobilize supporters. Political killings of PRD members continued in Guerrero even after the national rise of electoral law and the change of executive power in 2000 (unlike in Chiapas). As a “pattern” implies, this not only involved the power of individual caciques to recourse to official violence but rather a continued flow of impunity, which involved at times, the use of state violence (legal and extralegal) over time. Both the legal system and the political system were implicated in this pattern of impunity; intertwined with each other as both cause and effect. To take one extreme example, the use of state forces in the Aguas Blancas massacre represents a case of the direct employment of official violence against organized perredista peasants. This case was also a rare one in that it was studied in-depth by the Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) and the Mexican Supreme Court (Schatz 1998). Indeed, the CNDH, after investigating the massacre, recommended the investigation and dismissal of a large number of different governmental agents responsible for violations of human rights including the State Interior Ministry, the State and Assistant State Attorney Generals, the head of the State Judicial Police, the Director and Assistant Director of Security and Transportation, the ex-Special Investigator for the Massacre, the local delegate of the Interior Ministry, lawyers, and nine criminal investigators and other agents working within the Acapulco and Coyuca de Benítez Public Ministry (Crónica Guerrero 1998:104–105). Although the Aguas Blancas massacre was taken up by the Supreme Court, this effort coincided with several highly unusual events. First, there was a sustained international and domestic press and organizational effort to publicize the 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre outside of Mexico which placed the nation under further pressure to investigate and prosecute human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2008b:3). There were 62 stories on the PRD victims in the Aguas Blancas massacre alone in major English-speaking international newspapers in the 18-month period following the massacre (Lexis/Nexis Academic). In contrast, there were only three stories on the political assassination of any other PRD victims found the same index over a 10-year period.15 Second, a whistle-blower within the Guerrero state police released the unedited version of the police video which showed the police planting a gun in the hand of a dead peasant suspect who was then accused of firing first upon the police (Gutiérrez 1998:169). Third, the June 1995 massacre occurred after the promulgation of the December 1994 judicial reforms, a unified package of major constitutional and statutory changes which

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expanded the Court’s powers of judicial review and granted it the ability to declare acts of Congress and other federal actions unconstitutional (Schatz 1998:55). Capitalizing on the 1994 judicial reform, a coalition of 145 Mexican human rights organization tried to formally petition the Court act as an ombudsman to investigate violations of human rights by the state police in the Aguas Blancas case (La Jornada 6/26/95). However, this petition was denied on the basis that these groups lacked the “active legitimacy” to ask for the Court’s intervention. This was because Constitutional Article 97 states explicitly that such a petition must come directly from the president, state governors, or Congress (La Jornada 10/3/95). PRI President Zedillo subsequently took the historically unprecedented step of then requesting that the Court employ its extraordinary powers under Article 97 and act as an impartial ombudsman to investigate human rights violations in the Aguas Blancas massacre. Zedillo did so because he had pledged that he was serious about promoting the rule of law to the US government, businessmen and middle-class Mexican electors demanding greater juridical security and legal certainty (Schatz 1998:71–72). Last, but not least, in this case, Zedillo’s request can be understood as solidifying the political authority of the PRI president to “fire” a governor who in this case was flaunting his impunity (Cornelius 2000:124; Eisenstadt 2004:96). Thus, one dimension of impunity in the killing of PRD members included the direct employment of official violence against organized perredista peasants.

The Failure of Prosecution Another aspect of impunity was the general failure of state or national authorities to bring justice when local authorities fail; a reality aggravated by lack of domestic and international press coverage of the murder of PRD members. A measure of such impunity can be taken by the analysis of the legal processing of 50 cases of PRD killings which were followed over time in the state of Guerrero (1995– 1997) and reviewed by the CNDH. In the majority (82%) of these cases, the agency found, as in it national review of PRD political killings, impunity by the state either in failing to adequately investigate the circumstances of the crime, or by the failure of the police to execute arrest warrants on convicted criminals (Crónica Guerrero 1998:Appendix). However, there was no judicial action in 54% of cases (Crónica Guerrero 1998:Appendix). This is higher than the 33% of the national CNDH reviewed cases of the political murder of PRD members where no judicial action was taken against any suspected perpetrator of the crime (see Chap. 5). Furthermore, Guerrero judges were also more likely to absolve a suspected PRD murderer of the crime upon appeal, despite CNDH findings of delays in the administration of justice and negligence on the part of state authorities in complying with their obligations in multiple cases (Crónica Guerrero 1998:Appendix). Such greater judicial activism in overturning lower convictions upon appeal further reflects a

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higher level of impunity in Guerrero than in the other states. Only three individuals served any jail time for the political killing of PRD members in Guerrero. Impunity for political murder during this period was also illustrated in tensions between judges and agencies linked to PRI executive power. Such tension was evident in the case of perredista Flores Hernández who was murdered by four persons with high-powered rifles in the municipality of Tlacoachistlahuaca (site of the autonomous New Ranch for Democracy) on June 18, 1995. According to his father who was an eyewitness to the crime, four men entered the house and shot Flores Hernández to death (Crónica Guerrero 1998:56). Despite this eyewitness testimony, the Guerrero State Attorney Office’s investigation of the crime concluded the murder was of a personal nature (Investigation ABAS/03/170/95 in Crónica Guerrero 1998:102). Nevertheless, this conclusion was contradicted by the decision of a penal judge to sentence the four men for murder; two of whom included the PRI municipal commissar and secretary of the town of La Trinidad. Although the judge ordered an immediate arrest warrant on all four suspects to be executed by the State Judicial police, 2 years later, the arrest warrant was still outstanding (Crónica Guerrero 1998:102). In the meantime, the communal police of the (autonomous) indigenous New Ranch for Democracy detained the two PRI officials from La Trinidad and handed them over to the State Judicial Police. Despite their outstanding arrest warrants, both suspects were released; one immediately and one a few days later. PRD sources claim that the Assistant Attorney General later came to recognize the probable participation of the PRI municipal commissar of La Trinidad in the murder (Crónica Guerrero 1998:103). The Mexican National Human Rights Commission was more strident in its recommendation that the members of the State Attorney General’s Office (and the Public Ministry) be investigated and sanctioned for failing to serve the outstanding arrest warrants and for ignoring the mandates of judicial power (CNDH recommendation 11/6/97, 11/28/97). This example suggests that the State Attorney General’s Office was, at least in certain occasions, in direct contradiction with the legal actions of the judicial power. Thus, another dimension of impunity in the killing of PRD members involved the acute lack of sufficient legal prosecution of such cases.

How Criminal Elements Exploit Resource Deficits Within Criminal Justice System to Ensure Impunity for Political Assassination Criminal elements also appeared to take advantage of deficits within the criminal justice system to further thwart prosecution in some of the political killings of PRD members in Guerrero. This occurred within the shadows of the formal, official criminal justice system and is illustrated by the specific, and convoluted, details of the attempted prosecution of the political killing of PRD leader Romualdo García Alonso. Romualdo García Alonso was killed on May 28, 1990 in Amojileca and was acting president of a cooperative at the time of his death. He had received frequent

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death threats in the 1980s for his political and union activism but was not tortured and assassinated until 1990 for his participation in successfully organizing a local PRD chapter in Amojileca, Guerrero (Crónica Guerrero 1998:28–29). Justice and a sufficiently detailed investigation in this case occurred only after public outcry, eyewitness testimony to the murder, and the persistence of Romauldo García Alonso’s wife Laura that the crime be investigated (even in the face of numerous death threats to her life). One suspect for murder, Trinidad Nava Sales, was arrested but the other three suspects managed to escape; one of them was the hired gun of the ex-PRI municipal president candidate and a local cacique in Amojileca suspected to be trafficking in illegal timber (Crónica Guerrero 1998:25–34). In terms of resource deficits within the criminal justice system, in attempting to prosecute his death, PRD leader Romualdo García Alonso’s widow Laura was told by the Chilpancingo Public Ministry that (a) there was neither sufficient paper, nor a type-writer available for her to register her husband’s disappearance at the ministry and (b) that Romualdo García Alonso’s body was originally labeled as an “unknown person” by the official Forensic Authorities (Servicio Médico Forense – SEMEFO). Nevertheless, Laura was subsequently notified in her home by a group of men identifying themselves as SEMEFO officials of the existence of the dismembered body of her husband with precise details on his clothing. This visit was clearly “nonofficial,” however, since SEMEFO does not send visitors to homes and these men were never seen again. Yet, Laura apparently did not know this at the time because: (c) she was accompanied on the bus to the SEMEFO morgue by an individual posing as a SEMEFO representative. This “representative” would later be charged in court as an accomplice to her husband’s murder and was actually working as a hired gun of the PRI Chilpancingo municipal candidate. It appears then, in this case, that the perpetrators understood the actual workings of the Mexican Forensic system and took advantage of the general public’s ignorance of the system to track the victim’s wife’s movements in identifying her husband’s remains. Further prosecution of this case was ultimately also thwarted by criminal elements who assassinated Guerrero head State Judicial police officer, Rafael Ponce Miranda. Ponce Miranda was the State Judicial police officer in charge of the official investigation of Romualdo García Alonso. Rafael Ponce Miranda was assassinated on the very day he was to report to Romauldo’s widow Laura as to who was the likely intellectual author of the crime. The CNDH, in its recommendation, later highlighted the passivity and impunity perpetrated by the criminal justice system when it found that the State Judicial Police had not served the arrest warrants on those responsible for the original assassination of PRD leader Romualdo García Alonso (Crónica Guerrero 1998:90). Furthermore, in an admission of the distinction between actual killing and the authorization for killing, the CNDH report stated that the “intellectual author” of the killing of PRD leader Romualdo García Alonso was identified but remained uncaptured (CHR 1994:92). This case reflects the institutionalization of a pattern of impunity, evident in the fact that the attempt by a single individual, even a law enforcement officer, to reverse it (to successfully prosecute a political assassination) was met with further impunity and another assassination.

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Thus, a final dimension of impunity in the killing of perredistas in Guerrero involved the partial penetration of the criminal justice system by criminals to thwart prosecution in some cases.

Conclusion The continued use of political assassination over time points toward the importance of the interaction of political structures with legal institutions; which together can produce the conditions of interpersonal violence at regional and local levels. Turk (1982:141) points toward this interface between governing elites and the legal system when he argues that tactics such as political assassination and the use of paramilitary forces, instead of official repression, is a type of state terror that becomes employed by governing elites to control dissent when the authorities feel that more open and legal neutralization “cannot be achieved with sufficient certainty and dispatch, and/or without further raising an already dangerous level of political consciousness in the general population.” The centrality of political assassination in the political killing of PRD members was certainly more pronounced in the state of Guerrero than in the state of Michoacán. Several PRD victims were severely maimed by being run-over before they were dumped into a bed of a truck in Guerrero. Another victim was assaulted in his bed, beaten and hacked to death with an ax in a surprise attack. A PRD agrarian leader’s body was so mangled that his internal organs had burst out. In Tlacloachistlahuaca, Guerrero, two victims had their respective tombs raided and the bullets removed from their bodies. Schroeder (2000) suggests, as aforenoted in Ch. 3, in the Nicaragua case that the slashing, bludgeoning or otherwise torturing bound and bleeding victims before or after killing them by rival political parties was aimed at inducing a sense of terror in the population. In contrast, in the state of Michoacán, most political killings of PRD members occurred within the context of postelectoral conflict and most victims were killed by shooting deaths, largely without the accompanying bodily maiming and dismemberment (Rojas Alba 1996:148–149). Similarly, the level of brutality in the political killings of PRD members was distinctive after 1994 in Guerrero even as compared with the state of Oaxaca where the rise of paramilitary violence in response to armed conflict and the growth in the use of the military as a form of social control of popular dissidence were equally strong (Gledhill 1998:20–22). In the state of Oaxaca, there was only one reported case of the maiming of a PRD member after 1994. PRD member Hernández Mejía’s body was found among some rocks with a cord tied around his neck in 1997 (Informe Anual 1997:47). In addition, although PRD members in Oaxaca also died violent deaths as in Michoacán, there were much fewer reports of the maiming and mutilation of victim’s bodies and more reports of revenge killings by the PRD there. Furthermore, unlike in the state of Guerrero, there was comparatively more

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legal processing of the cases in Oaxaca on all levels – more judicial action regarding sentencing of convicted murderers, more CNDH review of human rights violations in the cases, and more convicted murderers serving time in jail (CHR 1994; CNDH 1994). Therefore, the interaction of political structures with legal institutions together produced the conditions of political assassination as a form of interpersonal violence at regional and local levels in Guerrero. The radicalization of some local PRD leaders in Guerrero after 1988, the hardening of official authority by the PRI governor, and the failure of political parties and the legal system to establish new forms of social controls such as a functioning electoral court encouraged political murder. At the same time, factors within the Guerrero criminal justice system including inefficiency and resource deficits further aggravated the level of impunity for political murder. While none of these factors alone explains the regional distribution of political assassination, taken together, they can predict its likelihood and persistence over time.16 Greater effectiveness of state-level law enforcement has been found to reduce the overall incidence of civil homicide in different Mexican states in the 1990s (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:88). Future studies are necessary to further clarify if, and how, the poor performance of state legal institutions in prosecuting civil homicide in certain states in Mexico (Guerrero, Oaxaca, Mexico, Morelos) also facilitates the choice of political assassination by political party leaders, members, and their affiliated “hired guns.” The case of Guerrero shows evidence of the interference of criminal elements with due process in the legal processing of political murder by the criminal justice system. Future studies are necessary to pinpoint precisely when political factors interfere (notification of authorities of the whereabouts of dead bodies, forensic identification, and examination of the corpse, influence in delaying or shelving investigation of the crime, intimidation, or murder of witnesses/investigators). Such studies would help further clarify how political parties and legal institutions facilitate political murder and how impunity for it persists.

End Notes imilarly, the EPR’s organizational strongholds were also found in Hidalgo, the state of Mexico, S and the Federal District but no cases of the political killing of PRD members were linked to this armed peasant movement in those states. 2 Furthermore, the state of Oaxaca shares a long-standing history of independent social and political organizations challenging local and state governments in contests for municipal power. There is also a history of the use of repressive tactics against the political opposition by some conservative elements of the local PRI along with hired guns, paramilitaries, local and state police and the military (Rubin 1997:139, 270–274). Yet, the state ranked third in the number of political murders of PRD members in the 1988–1994 period. 3 With an additional 23.8% of the total 67 recommendations sent to the governors of Oaxaca, Mexico and Morelos, these four states received 57% of the CNDH’s recommendations. The 1

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governors of Morelos and Chiapas each received 1 CNDH recommendation, the governor of Mexico state received 2 recommendations and the governor of Oaxaca received 12 CNDH recommendations regarding the CNDH’s review of the political murder of PRD members (CNDH 1994:113). 4 The South-Southwestern region also includes the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Yucatán where there were relatively few political killings of PRD members, see endnote 2, Chap. 2. In addition, while the poverty of a state can also increase its murder rate and the poor states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas are notable for their civil homicide rates (Magaloni and Zepeda Lecuona 2004:180), it is also true that factors other than poverty “influence the performance of judicial and law enforcement institutions, a topic that ranks high on the agenda for future research in this area (Magaloni and Zepeda Lecuona 2004:186).” 5 The Commission also recommended an internal investigation of the legal officer of the attorney general’s office of Ometepec and the Commander of the State Judicial Police as well as other public officials as to why they failed to conduct any proper investigation into the crime. These murderers left a family of five orphans, the youngest only a year and half old. 6 In only a single case did the CNDH declare the state “not responsible” for human rights violations. This was in the killing of PRD municipal policeman Eutimino González Flores where the police had executed the arrest warrant on the murder suspect who was a member of the Public Security Police (CHR 1994:92–96). 7 In addition, two PRD members died in the struggle of PRD-affiliated fishermen in Lomas de Chapultepec against the Acapulco-Papagayo business (October–November 1991, Eleazar Valentín and Amado Nieto Nolasco). In the Amado Nieto Nolasco case, the CNDH concluded that the State failed to adequately investigate (CHR 1994:100). 8 According to Vidales, “Formed in the autocratic cacique tradition of his stripe, pluralism, tolerance and democracy do not constitute central values in his political practice. On the contrary, he re-creates a political inheritance characterized by patrimonialism as a political culture, and by despotism as a form of government. In a turbulent context and given the electoral results in Guerrero in 1988, 1989 and 1991 (adverse to the PRI in terms of relative vote), the type of leadership that Rubén Figueroa Alcocer embodies could well catalyze political and social violence in the entity, even reaching levels of ungovernability.” 9 Perhaps there is no better testimony to the calming of anti-PRD related political violence in Michoacán than the 2001 example of Huancito where significant postelectoral violence had occurred in the early 1990s with several perredistas losing their lives. One town resident in a return to the village 12 years later on later on the eve of the November 2001 gubernatorial, legislative and municipal elections did not fear a repeat of the violence. “Nothing like that is going to happen here,” said Alfredo Joaquín Hernandez, a local resident of the Meseta town of Huancito. “Everything is calm now. Things have changed (The News, 11/14/01).” 10 For greater details on all of the events surrounding the investigation at Aguas Blancas, including the viewing of the video of the massacre, the testimony of PRI leaders in Atoyac and elsewhere, the text of the special prosecutor’s interview of Figueroa, and interviews with Supreme Court members on their investigation, see (Proceso 3/4/96, 5/2/99). 11 The initial appearance of the EPR at the Aguas Blancas memorial interrupted the ceremony and caused leaders Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Samuel del Villar and other state and national leaders to leave the podium before the guerrilla group presented itself. Later that evening, national and state PRD leaders emitted a communiqué stating that the appearance of the armed group at a commemoration for the victims of the Aguas Blancas massacre was a “grotesque pantomime” (Gutiérrez 1998:226). Three days later, the Guerrero state PRD leader changed his position, stating that the PRD “assumes that the EPR is a group demanding justice,” but still argued that it was unfortunate that the group decided to make its appearance at a solemn mass act because this was an act of manipulation. In its communiqué read at the ceremony, the stated goals of the EPR included the removal of the “illegitimate” Mexican government and the foreign forces sustaining it, the restoration of popular sovereignty, the implementation of economic, political

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and social change, the establishment of fair international relations and the punishment of those guilty of crimes against the people (Turbiville 1997:10). The EPR argued that the social conditions facing peasants in the Sierra Madre del Sur were similar to those in 1967 and 1968 that led Lucio Cabañas to take up arms against social injustice. The EPR guerrillas disappeared after firing AK-47 and AR-15 weapons into the air 17 times in memory of the peasants murdered at Aguas Blancas. The rise of the presence of the military in Atoyac de Álvarez increased significantly as did its operations (many in conjunction with the federal judicial police) in the context of combating the EPR. Unlike in the state of Chiapas, however, some analysts argue that there was no possibility of negotiation between armed groups and the military precisely because there was not open confrontation (Crónica Guerrero 1998:34). 12 The army reported nine dead soldiers, 43 wounded, and five dead from the EPR with one civilian killed and one wounded in collateral action. 13 Detailed information available on 19 of these 38 post-EPR cases indicates suspected perpetrators were unknowns (n = 9); PRI hired guns (n = 1), priístas (n = 3), military (n = 2), and White Guards (n = 4) (Crónica Guerrero 1998, Appendix:62–65). 14 Both parties ran as coalitions in the 2005 Guerrero elections – the PRI joined with the PT and PVEM to run as the coalition “Todos por Guerrero” and the PRD joined the PRS, Convergencia and the PAN to run as “Guerrero será Mejor.” 15 The first search was done using the search terms “Aguas Blancas Massacre Mexico.” The second search was done using the search terms “Political Assassination PRD Mexico.” With respect to the latter, one story mentioned the names of seven PRD political assassination victims in Guerrero (1990); a second noted two PRD victims had been killed in an election in Villahermosa (Tabasco). The third story notes that PRD Guerrero opposition candidate for Congress in the 2000 election had been detained and tortured by local police four years earlier, and shot in what he believed to be a politically motivated ambush leaving him blind in his left eye (Washington Post 6/28/90). 16 The predictors of higher rates of political assassination found by Kirkham et al. (1970:202) can loosely be translated to the context of Guerrero as “systemic frustration” (Petatlán, a socially polarized municipality with PRD killings which showed the greatest deterioration according to the marginality index), “minority tensions” (the intensification of political killings against indigenous perredistas), and “political instability and violence” (the undeclared war between the EPR and the military). However, such factors must be understood within the institutional context of the interaction between political and legal structures.

Chapter 7

Impunity for Political Killing in a Comparative Perspective

Introduction In this chapter, I examine the relationship between electoral competition in the 1990s and the (un)rule of law for political killings in Mexico and other democratizing nations. Electoral competition in Mexico in the 1990s between the PRI and the PRD occurred across multiple municipalities within different states in the 1989–2000 period but PRD leaders and members were not all killed equally in every municipality or in every state. To demonstrate it was the degree and level of threat posed by the PRD as a political party (not the rural origins of its members per se) which explains the targeting of perredistas for political assassination in the municipalities where they were killed, I begin the chapter with an analysis of quantitative data on Mexican municipalities. Next, I argue that despite advances in electoral competition across the nation, impunity for the political killings of PRD members remained stable across three sexenios in Mexico (1988–2006). I extend this argument comparatively to other transitions to competitive elections in Central Asia and Africa but with deficiencies in the rule of law to show how a similar pattern of structured impunity remains despite varying degrees of electoral turn-over in multiple nations. Impunity for political killings can be understood to occur in legal systems which are “rule bound” but not necessarily “democratically rule-bound” (O’Donnell 2004:32), i.e., ensuring political rights, civil rights, and mechanisms of accountability. As such, the extension of political and civil rights do not necessarily progress in tandem fashion. Such unevenness in the application of the rule of law and the inadequate protection of civil rights in a historical period of the extension of political rights is also illustrated with respect to the killing of perredistas in the final section of this chapter. This occurs through a discussion of the interactions of the State Judicial Police and the Public Ministry with female survivors of assassinated PRD members in Guerrero.


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7 Impunity for Political Killing in a Comparative Perspective

Political Competition and Degree of Electoral Threat in Mexican Municipalities The PRD’s Challenge to Rural and Urban Cacique Rule This chapter begins with a quantitative focus on the political assassination of PRD members; a phenomenon clearly related to disruptions in rural cacique power. Nevertheless, the small-scale qualitative data on such killings I presented in Chap. 2 – Table 2.1 Social Origins of PRD Victims of Political Murder in Puebla – did not find them to be an exclusively rural phenomenon. Scholars of civil homicide rates during the 1990–2000 period of increased electoral competition in Mexico have yielded mixed results. On the one hand, a rise in electoral competition was found to disrupt the patronage and power networks and monopoly on control of essential goods and services of local, rural caciques. Villareal (2002), as noted in the previous chapter, found an increase in electoral competition (1987–1999) resulted in higher rates of civil homicide at the municipal level, but only in very rural municipalities. He interprets this as local caciques tending to be largely rural. In contrast, other scholars found that neither political party alternation nor the political party in power were statistically significant causes of civil homicide in Mexican states (1996–2000) (Zepeda Lecuona 2004:88). In their work of organizing the PRD, leaders and militants were often mobile and went back-and-forth between rural and urban areas. This means that PRD leaders often challenged both urban and rural cacique’s access to a monopoly on control of essential goods and services. Murdered PRD leader Romualdo García Alonso, as discussed in the previous chapter, originally organized a large number of workers from poor urban areas in Lázaro Cardenas, Michoacán while working in a steel factory in 1984. He then moved to the small town of Amojileca (population less than 500) in 1986 and worked in a forestry company there before participating in the newly formed FDN in the capital city of Chilpancingo in 1988 (population 97,165). Although a central figure in organizing the FDN-PRD in rural Amojileca in 1989, García Alonso simultaneously commuted to urban Chilpancingo to attend law school at the Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero. García Alonso, at the same time, worked as a gardener for the university and organized a small urban work cooperative related to the construction of wooden utensils in the urban capital city (Crónica Guerrero 1998:29–31). Ultimately, García Alonso’s assassination was allegedly linked to his discovering, through his work with the Chilpancingo wood cooperative, that the PRI cacique in Amojileca was suspected to be trafficking in illegal timber. By the time of his actual death in May 1990, however, García Alonso had moved back into an urban slum on the outskirts of the capital city, and the actual operatives in his assassination were linked to an urban PRI cacique in Chilpancingo. Perredista García Alonso, in this case then, was killed because he posed a direct threat to cacique power that was tied to his economic and political organizing in both urban and rural areas.

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Why Did Killings Occur in Some Municipalities But Not Others? The complexity of the rural–urban dimensions of the PRD’s electoral challenge to cacique power requires further larger-scale, quantitative clarification. Why were PRD members killed in some municipalities and not others? To what extent did political competition with the PRI lead to PRD deaths in specific municipalities but not others? After all, the PRD competed in elections with the PRI across a range of municipalities and states in the post-1988 period but perredistas were not killed in every municipality, in every state at the same time. Even within a single state and during the same election, PRD members were only killed in some municipalities but not others. To try and answer these questions in quantitative terms, I hypothesize that the level of threat posed by the PRD, measured by the party’s electoral presence in municipal elections over the 1990s, can help explain its targeting. It can be assumed that the greater the degree of electoral threat to the PRI in a given municipality, the more likely a perredista was to die from political assassination there. To test this assumption, I constructed a “most similar systems” comparative research design which is pertinent for phenomena that share a large number of characteristics in common and differ in a small number of traits relevant to the phenomena under study (Przeworski and Henry 1970; Itzigsohn 2000). In the “most similar systems” model, the common characteristics are considered the “control” variables and the different traits are the “explanatory” variables. To test whether the degree of electoral threat to the PRI explains the targeting of perredistas in a given municipality, I assume the common characteristic or control variable is municipal participation in the same election. I then postulate that the different trait or outcome is the incidence of a PRD death in the municipality or not. Such a research design thereby compares municipalities where PRD deaths occurred to municipalities where no PRD deaths occurred in the same state during the same election. Differences in the dependent variable (municipalities with deaths versus municipalities without deaths) are attributed to differences in the explanatory variables.

Description of Municipal Data and Statistical Model The data is in the form of a random sample of 1,244 municipalities in 12 states where the PRD competed electorally with the PRI in the 1989–2000 period (Eisenstadt 2004). The 12 states and 21 elections covered by the data sample include Coahuila (1990), Chiapas (1991), Mexico (1990, 2000), Guerrero (1989, 1993), Hidalgo (1990), Michoacán (1989, 1992), Oaxaca (1989, 1992, 1995), Puebla (1989, 1992), Tabasco (1991, 1994), Tamaulipas (1992), Veracruz (1991, 1994, 2000), and Zacatecas (1992). The elections covered during this time include mayoral and legislative elections. I created a balanced panel data set by matching municipalities into those with deaths and those without deaths in the same Mexican states

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during the same election year. This data set yields 1,169 municipalities without deaths and 75 municipalities where PRD deaths occurred for a total of 176 deaths. I used all municipalities where the PRI competed with the PRD in a given state. However, most municipalities had no political murders of PRD members. Therefore, I used negative binomial analysis as the best statistical procedure for this analysis. This is because it creates a zero-inflated dependent variable (most municipalities had no murders) and allows for a test of whether or not there is a different process occurring in the observations with zero (municipalities with no deaths) and the numbered observations (municipalities with PRD deaths). The hypothesized independent explanatory variables used in the model include: the ratio of PRD vote to those votes officially obtained by the PRI, municipal population size, municipal social welfare level, a measure of agrarian conflict, and a rule of electoral law measurement (whether the electoral court overturned a complaint of fraud submitted by a political party). Endnote 1 provides a more detailed description of the data and all the variables used in this analysis. The results are reported in Table 7.1.

Increased Electoral Competition as a Significant Risk Factor for Political Assassination Consistent with my prediction, it was the degree and level of threat posed by the PRD as a political party (rather than the municipal population’s size or the overall welfare index of a municipality) which explained the targeting of perredistas for political assassination in the municipalities where they were killed. Municipalities without PRD deaths did not differ from municipalities with PRD deaths except along the dimension of degree and level of threat posed by the PRD. The degree of agrarian conflict, a measure of rural-based social conflicts, failed to reach statistical significance in all models. These results strongly suggest that an increase in electoral competition within a municipality did pose a significant risk factor for PRD members. This is consistent with the overall argument regarding the intrusiveness of electoral competition on cacique power and their willingness to resort to violence to contain such intrusions (Villareal 2002). Nevertheless, they also show how political assassination is not only limited to rural areas as population size failed to reach statistical significance. The results support the contention that PRD victims of political assassination were also urban and suburban political activists killed by urban caciques and their hired guns. Finally, the “rule of electoral law” variable did not reach statistical significance in the models. The PRD pursued political strategies in the early to mid-1990s “without regard for formal institutions,” as Eisenstadt (2004:153) argues. It was not until 2000, he contends, that the PRD began to pursue the judicial path to electoral fraud that relied heavily on electoral results and institutions (2004:232). Within the rubric of the construction of Mexico’s electoral institutions, the wave of political

1.63E−06 −5.019597 3,347,221 −5.814407 2.789393 16.27114

Inflate Population (natural log) Municipal income per capita Ratio of PRD-to-PRI votes Constant ln a a 3.09E−06 2.242801 1.986872 2.607723 1,883,143 3.064087

3.36E−06 1,882,501 2,123,592 2,123,592

Vuong test of zinb versus standard negative binominal: z = 1.64 P > z = 0.0501 Source: Data from Eisenstadt (2004) a Bold signifies variable which is statistically significant at 0.05 level

5.34E−06 2,275,387 9,811,846 −2.262097

Number of deaths Population (natural log) Municipal income per capita Ratio of PRD-to-PRI votes Constant 0.53 −2.24 17 −2.23 14.81

1.59 1.21 1.88 −10.65

z

0.597 0.025 0.866 0.026 0.000

0.112 0.227 0.060 a 0.000

P > [z]

−4.42E−06 −9.415406 −3.559475 −10.92545 2.420304 11.24927

−1.25E−06 −0.1414248 −0.0420744 −2.678313

7.68E−06 −0.6237874 4.228919 −0.703364 3.158482 23.53484

0.0000119 5,965,022 2.004444 −1.845881

[95% Confidence interval]

Inflation model = logit Log likelihood = −383.2454 Standard error

LR c2(3) = 11.62 Probability > c2 = 0.0088

Zero-inflated negative binomial regression model

Coefficient

Number of observations = 1,244 Nonzero observations = 75 Zero observations = 1,169

Table 7.1 Comparing Mexican municipalities with PRD deaths with municipalities without deaths, 1989–2000

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assassinations of perredistas then can be understood as occurring within that “lag-time” in Mexico when political killings of PRD members actually increased before they decreased by 2005 as electoral institutions strengthened. After 2006, and the intensification of the drug war, electoral institutions have once again to confront elections marred by political violence, including deaths, as discussed in Chap. 2. In fact, the 2010 firebombing of PRD, PAN and PRI political party offices in Sinaloa and other violent incidents, reports of vote-buying, systematic political spying, and other electoral violations were severe enough for Emilio Alvarez Icaza, president of the official human rights commission of Mexico City and a long-time member of the nonprofit political rights organization Civic Alliance to declare: “The alarming thing is that we are returning to those practices of the 1980s and before against which so much was fought” (Mexidata 2010:2). Thus, the ability of institutions of electoral law to diminish the likelihood of political killing is embedded within, and subject to the vicissitudes of, the larger judicial system and its relative capacity to limit political violence and homicide.

Impunity from Prosecution: Stable over Time What then was the effect of electoral turn-over at the presidential level in 2000 in terms of judicial accountability and did it thereby reduce the level of impunity for the political killing of PRD members? Villareal (2002:495) contends that transitions to democracy produce only temporary increases in violence that result from the disruption of patronage networks that competition implies. Advances in electoral competition should subsequently reduce political violence when the new political elite fears that violence will be used against them if they use it as a tactic, when there is a reduction in the old-style system of political bosses, and as policing methods improve. Villareal (2002:495) explains this configuration of inter-related changes as follows: With the routinization of electoral competition and the resulting alternation in the party in office will come a balance among the various factions in the community. There will be a disincentive for the group in office at any given time to use violence against opponents for fear that violence will be used against them when they are no longer in power. Moreover, with democratically elected officials at various levels of the political system, the benefits local bosses derive from membership in the old party will disappear, as will the relative impunity with which they used to operate.

If then sufficient advances in electoral competition are assumed to improve the institutional conditions for accountability (De Mesquita et al. 2005); was the pivotal 2000 Mexican presidential election such a threshold? Clearly there was a sharp (94%) decrease in the rate of the political murder of PRD members in Mexico after 2000 and thus the rise of a strengthened electoral law did have a positive effect in diminishing the incidence of electoral-related violence. Furthermore, in the arena of the investigation of the political killing of PRD members, there were some initial signs of improvements in some municipalities

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after 2000. The State Attorney General’s Office, in the northern state of Sinaloa, did investigate several political killings of three PRD members. In one political killing of a PRD member in San Luis Río Colorado, the State Judicial Police actually handed a suspect over to a criminal judge for sentencing after the suspect had a confrontation with the municipal police in that city (La Jornada 3/20/03). State authorities arrested Vicente Peña Zuniga and Nicasio Bernadino López for the murder of perredista Bautista Mejia in Oaxaca after 2000.2 Law-enforcement authorities also identified an additional suspect – the brother of a local PRI deputy candidate – alleged to have hired Zuniga and López to commit the murders (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report 2001:2–3). The Oaxacan state prosecutor’s office also arrested seven men within days of the January 2002 murder of perredista mayor Jaime Valencia of San Agustin Loxicha who was ambushed while walking to his house from the municipal palace. The state prosecutor’s office publicly acknowledged that the intellectual author of the murder of PRD mayor Jaime Valencia was the previous PRI mayor of San Agustín Loxicha Lucio Vazquez who hired “White Guards” to do the actual killing. In Chiapas, where non-PRI state prosecutors sought to pursue linkages between the PRI-apparatus and paramilitary groups, there was also greater aggressiveness on the part of law enforcement after 2000. State prosecutors, after the PRI lost the governorship in 2001 elections, searched the house of the Commander of the Security Police and made public his taped phone conversations with the State Attorney General3 which confirmed the murders of peasants by ranchers, the White Guards and the state police chief himself (La Jornada 11/3/01). The rapid terminationof the subcontracting of Chiapan paramilitaries/death squads as soon as the legal apparatus was decoupled from PRI political power suggests that increased electoral competition can indeed provide some incentive to improve policing methods. Yet, there was little evidence of rigorous investigation into the political killing of other PRD members after 2000. In the same state of Sinaloa, little action was taken in the case of the September 24, 2000 political killing of PRD member and journalist Miguel Ramírez Mendoza (PBI 2001:2). The investigation and prosecution of the post-2000 political killings of PRD members lagged significantly in Guerrero. By late 2001, the State Attorney General’s Office had failed to investigate any of the multiple murders after 2000 (Reforma 11/6/01). PRD leaders by mid2003, as noted in the previous chapter, were still criticizing the State Attorney General’s Office for the same failure to investigate and prosecute the (now) nine political killing of PRD members which PRD leaders linked to paramilitary groups or “White Guards” (La Jornada 6/17/03). Elsewhere in the state of Oaxaca in 2004, the outgoing PRI mayor in the Pinotepa region assassinated a leading PRD opposition candidate apparently because she threatened to audit his administration. He shot the perredista in the back while she was in the local medical clinic, stating “I am tired of you and I’m going to kill you” (La Jornada 9/28/04). State authorities did not “rush to apprehend the gunman” (Fox 2007:191; El Universal 9/29/04). More to the point, the actual arrest rate for the prosecution of the political killings of PRD members after 2000 was 13.3%. This is higher than the figure, 10.5%, given

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by the National Human Rights Commission’s report on the political killing of PRD members for the Salinas administration (1988–1994) (CNDH 1994:65–95). This suggests then that electoral turn-over did lead to improved investigation of the political killing of PRD members in those Mexican states (Sinaloa, Chiapas, and in some cases in Oaxaca) where the PRD and the PAN gained power and/or where the PRI which sought closer political linkages with the PAN. Nevertheless, overall low levels of prosecution (impunity) for these political killings across sexenios remained stable despite parallel advances in electoral competition. The causes of impunity are complex and multiple. As Viñuales (2007:126) notes, political, cultural, and institutional factors together explain impunity and it is the combination of institutional capacity (deficiencies) and a lack of political will (inertia) which cause and perpetuate impunity for crimes committed by the state or state-endorsed actors. Political will can partially explain improvements in policing methods that follow from advances in electoral competition. But political will can also explain a surge in revenge killings and there is evidence that the shift in electoral power in favor of the PRD after the 2001 elections in the state of Chiapas led to greater revenge killings of PRI members on the part of PRD members [See the section “A Few Revenge PRD Killings of PRI members after 2000 (Chiapas)” in Appendix].

A Comparative Pattern of Impunity The stability of impunity from prosecution over time, despite advances in electoral competition, is the striking dimension of the political killing of PRD members in Mexico. In comparative terms, a similar pattern of structured impunity can be generalized from the Mexican case across a series of cases of transitions to competitive elections but with deficiencies in the rule of law.4 This pattern can be characterized as consisting of several elements which may be present in part, or entirely, in distinctive cases but which all contribute to political violence and impunity from prosecution for such crimes. These elements include the unlawful use of the police to violate political rights through the suppression of peaceful protest, the political assassination of unarmed domestic opponents; the use of state-sanctioned armed thugs to harass and/or assassinate political opponents of the regime; and an intensification of violent acts between legalized political parties. This comparative discussion illustrates how, if certain structural conditions remain in place; specifically, the continued discretion of political authorities to employ crime-preventing agencies to subvert, or simply not implement, the law, as well as lack of punishment for the use of “hired guns” to carry out political assassination, impunity will remain despite varying degrees of electoral turn-over. In Albania, for example, continued clientelism and electoral violence coincide with liberalization–democratization. Despite a 15-year long, relatively competitive electoral process since Albania’s transition to electoral democracy, political assassinations and political violence resurfaced in local elections in the mid-1990s.


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Physical attacks, ballot stuffing and voter list manipulation, and acts of armed supporters of different candidates opening fire with automatic weapons on each other were reported throughout the country by the 1996 elections (Human Rights Watch 1996a). A pattern of impunity for these political crimes was perpetuated by clientelistic relations and the continued strength of local party bosses with political and business ties. In addition, this pattern of impunity included the lack of an independent commission to administer elections, to investigate the electoral violations, to prosecute violations of electoral law, and to investigate cases of police violence and abuse in detention (Freedom House 2006). A “truce” in the political killing in Albania was briefly achieved between the major political parties by 2002 only to fray again in 2003. It was not until the 2007 elections, when the human rights record of the police forces had improved significantly as had the Central Elections Commission’s willingness to concede to opposition demands that the political killings appeared to subside. The only sign of political violence in the 2007 elections was the wounding of one Democratic Party commissioner, who was fired on by a militant of the opposing political party. Significant reforms to the police by this time included the effort to shift the police toward a community service orientation and to reduce political intervention by the police (PAMECA 2007).5 In the Albanian case then, it was not until advances in the institutionalization of multiparty competition coincided with police reforms curtailing their use for political purposes that a significant toning down of the political violence occurred. A pattern of continued impunity for political killings can also take the form of an intensification of violence between legalized political parties which can, in some cases, lead to a reversal of electoral democracy. Four years after the 1997 peace agreement ended Tajikistan’s civil war, and a transition to democracy was claimed to have occurred; the political assassination of high-ranking political members of legalized political parties in 2001 reflected ongoing internal power struggles between and within the parties. The continuing distrust between the two sides led the government to consolidate its de facto single-party control by banning and denying registration to opposition parties. In subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections (2005, 2006), the ruling party and its president won by huge margins (79% in 2006), and the elections were boycotted by the major opposition parties as the electoral courts and electoral system were again under dominant party control (Regnum 2008). Interestingly, a return to autocratic government meant that although political repression against the major opposition parties surged in the form of police harassment and illegal detention, no political killings were reported in the 2005 or 2006 elections (Human Rights Watch 2006, Tajikistan). The major Tajikistan opposition parties (Democratic Party and Social Democratic Party) also boycotted the November 6, 2008 presidential elections on the grounds that the ruling party controlled electoral institutions (Regnum 2008). In the case of Nigeria, the lack of an independent electoral rule of law led to restarting of political violence and political assassination by political bosses in elections, political thugs, and members of political parties. Nigeria experienced an honest general election in June 1993 but the military annulled it (Chege 1995:354).

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Due to the lack of an independent electoral rule of law, the outcome in the 1990s was a continued pattern of political violence and political assassination leading Nigeria to be classified as a “blocked transition” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:120). In elections, political bosses provided arms to their supporters. Legal political parties on both sides (UNPP – United People’s Party of Nigeria and PDP – People’s Democratic Party) in the 2003 election resorted to armed attacks against the other in Bayelsa State in the Niger delta and political thugs shot at each other, killing 12 people. Both sides “claimed that their intent on that day was to make peace, that they were unarmed, and that the other side was the aggressor” (Human Rights Watch 2004). Impunity for these crimes was common. In Zimbabwe, despite initial liberalization in the 1990s, a pattern of extensive impunity persisted that included the political assassination of legal political opponents.6 Competitive elections were held in Zimbabwe before 1990 (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:7). Yet, by the mid-1990s, first-hand accounts from victims and witnesses implicated members of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), “youth militia” and supporters of the (then ex-)ruling party ZANU-PF in acts of harassment, intimidation, abduction and assault of opposition members and supporters, and civil society activists (Human Rights Watch 1996b). A pattern of impunity involving the use of deadly force by the police to suppress nonarmed protestors contesting election results was also evident. The state, in 1996, attempted to politically assassinate a legal domestic political opponent of the regime when armed police reportedly stormed the home of opposition member Philip Katsande and shot him three times in the arms and chest. Eleven years later, despite some continued liberalization, Zimbabwe’s opposition again complained of state repression spearheaded by the ZANU-PF and by 2008 political violence surged significantly around the June election when it appeared that the ruling party would lose to the opposition MDC. Opposition rallies were routinely blocked or canceled in early to mid-2008, there were assassination attempts on top opposition leaders, riot police raids on opposition headquarters, hundreds of opposition supporters were beaten, often by “foot soldiers” of the ruling party, and about 400 people displaced by political violence (New York Times 6/24/08, 6/26/08). A key actor in the campaign of terror was Constantine Chiwenga, the commander of Zimbabwe’s Defense Forces. The director of the Electoral Institution of Southern Africa, a nongovernmental organization promoting credible elections and democratic practices in Africa, alleged that approximately 60 people were killed by government militias (IRIN 2008).7 Indeed, the upsurge in political violence was so intense and opposition supporters were so desperate that the MDC presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the Queen of England stripped ruling party president Robert Mugabe of his honorary knighthood as a “mark of revulsion” at the human rights abuses and “abject disregard for democracy over which he is presiding (New York Times 6/26/08).” The case of Oyo State in Nigeria clearly illustrates a comparative case of the role of crime-preventing agencies during liberalization–democratization processes in failing to implement the law against armed thugs and even against armed legislators and thereby acquiescing to political violence. Human Rights Watch (2008a, b)


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characterized politics in some states of Nigeria by 2000 as still based on the so-called “godfather” system in which key old-style politicians employ political thugs recruited from key interest groups (transport workers in the Nigerian state of Oyo) to engage in violent clashes with supporters of rival political factions. In three separate violent incidents, the police did not make any arrests in connection with either incident (Human Rights Watch 2008a:3, 6). The first was an August 2005 armed melee between rival lawmakers in the state legislature; the second involved the later storming and looting of the Governor’s office by a rival political thug group and the third included a February 2007 pre-electoral incident where political gangs shot and wounded unarmed individuals from a rival political party. Two policemen associated with the latter 2007 violence complained that they were restrained by the police leadership from doing their job. One complained, “We have been put in a position to protect life and property. It’s not that we don’t know what to do, but if you try to do your job, you are playing with your life. When PDP people are arrested [during the election campaigns] we are told to let them go.” Another policeman also claimed he had been ordered by his direct superior not to intervene to stop violence on Election Day (Human Rights Watch 2008b:9). The Commissioner of the Police in Oyo responded to complaints from one political party about the diversion of voter registration machines to the personal home of a political rival for the purpose of creating lists of nonexistent voters by a so-called key “godfather” in Ibadan, Oyo. He noted: “If you hear a rumor and then you call the man and he says he doesn’t know anything about it, what more can you do about it?” (Human Rights Watch 2008b:9). The acquiescence of law enforcement to political manipulation is thus aptly expressed by this Nigerian police commissioner. Corrupted law-enforcement officers can be used to violently suppress legal political dissent. There is some evidence that ex-head of the Morelos State Judicial Police Apolo Bernabé Ríos – leader in the Group of Investigative Police [GIP]; a special unit of the police set up by then PRI Morelos governor to monitor and, if necessary, curtail the strength of the FDN-PRD opposition in Morelos – was also implicated in drug trafficking. Antólin Escobar, the PRI-government appointed special prosecutor to the Morelos State Attorney General to investigate the disappearance of perredista PRD leader José Ramón García Gómez discussed in Chap. 4 linked Apolo Bernabé Ríos with the drug trade in eastern Morelos. Concretely, the special prosecutor argued that Apolo Bernabé Ríos was also the head of one of the two criminal rackets in the area that were constantly fighting with each other (Proceso 5/30/94:39). According to Antólin Escobar: “This political police, in addition to spying on the opposition, was organized to participate in crime. Each of its elements could work with two hired assassins and, with complete freedom and police protection, was able to commit any crime, as long as they funneled (five million pesos) each week to Bernabé Ríos. The police, in charge of pursing delinquents, also participated in criminal acts (Proceso 5/30/94:39).” Antólin Escobar claimed that he himself received death threats from the GIP on March 11, 1993 and that there was a daily patrol car with license plates from the State Judicial Police watching his office (Rojas Alba 1996:138). In this case then, impunity for political killing was intertwined with corrupted law-enforcement elements.

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Impunity as an Intermediary Dimension To fully understand the significance of the comparative cases of political killings, it is necessary to return to the idea of impunity as a structured system requiring one central precondition; namely, the failure of the legal system to function as a sufficient system of restraint for killings. O’Donnell (1999:307), in theorizing legal systems in Latin America, has conceived of the rule of law as an “intermediary dimension,” influenced: both by regime and socioeconomic structure, so whatever this dimension is, it is – to resuscitate an admittedly ambiguous term – relatively autonomous from these two levels. This intermediary level consists of the extent to which the rule of law is effective across various kinds of issues, regions, and social actors. The rule of law as an intermediary variable mirrors the weakness of political and, especially, civil rights, deep inequalities and the social distances between social groups that they entail. After all, rights and guarantees are not “just there”; ...they must be exercised and defended against persistent authoritarian temptations, and for this the capacity that society furnishes to its members are crucial … [since] … the law in its contents and in its application, is largely (like the state of which it is a part) a dynamic condensation of power relations, not just a rationalized technique for the ordering of social relations (1999:322–323).

Thus, for O’Donnell (1999), the intermediary dimension refers to the effectiveness of the rule of law as it varies significantly across national territories, issues, and social categories. In my judgment, the level of impunity exercised within a polity can also be conceived of as an intermediary dimension that structures the relationship between liberalization–democratization and political repression. Impunity occurs in legal systems which are “rule bound” but not necessarily “democratically rule-bound” (O’Donnell 2004:32), i.e., ensuring political rights, civil rights, and mechanisms of accountability. Somewhat paradoxically, within legal systems which are bounded by a relatively stable set of legal mechanisms but where the rule of law is applied unevenly across various social and political categories, impunity for political killings is more likely. The “rule bound” but not “democratically rule-bound” nature of the Mexican criminal justice system has been revealed on several occasions in this book by way in which the legal processing of the political killings of PRD members has taken place. Strict rule-bound procedures including proper forensics, and the sufficient data gathering to identify, prosecute, and issue a criminal sentence in 67% of the cases was carried out both by the technical experts of the police and the State Attorney General’s Offices. Yet, only a handful of convicted actual perpetrators of the killing of over 660 PRD members actually served jail time for their crimes. Thus, formal rules were often fully and/or partially followed without the occurrence of punishment of perpetrators of political killings. In Chap. 2, I termed the operation of such a legal system as a “soft” one. A terminology of “soft” legal systems, of course, raises the issue of whether there exist “hard” legal systems and what kinds of processes make up a transition from a “soft” to a “hard” legal system. Scholars, in examining the development


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of “harder” public accountability within states, have conceived of the institutional obligations that accompany accountability as an issue of “answerability” – or “formal processes in which actions are held up to specific standards of behavior or performance (Fox 2007:28).” Accountability in this sense, as it refers to power relations between those charged with the public trust and the citizenry, is often discussed in terms of exposure of transgressions (Ross 2000) and punishment. “Unless there is some punishment for demonstrated abuses of authority, there is no rule of law and no accountability (Schedler 1999:17, Moreno et al. 2003).” The idea of exposure of transgression is also embedded in the literature on state crimes in advanced industrial democracies where there has been an emphasis on the importance of external and internal controls on state agents as ways of developing more accountable governmental and police institutions (Ross 2000). There is, however, another aspect of “answerability” as a dimension of institutional accountability which relates to power relations within the state; as between the police and the executive branch of government. The special unit of the State Judicial Police, such as the Morelos GIP, referred to in Chap. 4 and in this chapter, was explicitly set up by the Morelos PRI governor to monitor and, if necessary, curtail the strength of the political opposition upon direct orders from the governor himself (Proceso 5/30/94:39). Such practices render units of the police dependent upon the partisan calculations of a political leader rather than adhering to the rule of law. Similarly, the use of hired guns linked to the Federal Judicial Police [Najid Saad Bernal (alias “el árabe”-Michoacán 6/23/92), noted in Chap. 4] engages the police indirectly in extrajudicial activities (CHR 1994:166–168). Neither of such uses of the police is in conformity with the Mexican constitution. Furthermore, judicial system ineffectiveness encourages the further use of political murder as mode of interaction between political parties. In Nigerian politics, this took the form of using armed thugs to engage in violent clashes with supporters of rival political factions (the so-called “godfather” system in Nigeria) (Human Rights Watch 2008b). In Nicaragua in 1926, it was manifested as political party-affiliated gangsters conducting electoral-related political assassination against their political rivals (Schroeder 2000). Members of legalized political parties, in Albania in the 1990s, also engaged in acts of political violence against each other including physical attacks and political assassination (Human Rights Watch 1996a). Supporters and affiliates of the ex-ruling party ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe engaged in acts of harassment, intimidation, abduction, assault, and political murder of opponents (Human Rights Watch 1996b). In Mexico, the wave of political murders against PRD occurred during a time when deficiencies in the criminal justice system were “increasingly visible” and would only intensify with democratization to the point where one analyst claimed that by 2010 Mexico had reached an “exhausted model of law enforcement” (Zepeda Lecuona 2010:42). Clearly then deficiencies in legal systems which perpetuate impunity for homicide facilitate the use of political assassination as a political strategy to maintain power by certain party leaders and members.

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Practices that Diminish the Likelihood of Political Killings During Liberalization–Democratization Processes The question of answerability within a state and the issue of judicial system ineffectiveness bring the discussion back to whether there are specific dimensions of the rule of law that can constrain and limit subjectively articulated power over individuals who do not conform to the strictures of law. Unger (1976:178–179) refers to the “courts having review powers … to ensure conformity to the rule of law and to the discretion of crime-preventing agencies which should not be allowed to pervert the law” … as key dimensions of importance. In systems with “harder” legal systems, the following conditions can be assumed to be more likely to prevail, in relative terms: (a) crime-preventing agencies are better insulated from political manipulation, and/or (b) courts possess strong review powers, and/or (c) alternative institutionalized modes of nonviolent conflict resolution are present (elite pacts and local customary law), and/or (d) there is no tradition of using “hired guns” to violently resolve political conflicts. Several comparative examples illustrate how such conditions have diminished the likelihood of political killings in several liberalization–democratization processes. In Mali, following the March 22, 1991 massacre of several hundred democratizing demonstrators by troops upon orders from single-party president Moussa Traoré, the latter was arrested by a young army officer commanding a paratroop battalion which had joined forces with the pro-democracy movement. Since then and the holding of its first competitive election later in 1991, there have been virtually no reports of political killings by the government or its agents, and no reports of politically motivated disappearances or political prisoners despite opposition boycotts of subsequent elections as unconstitutional (U.S. Department of State 2006; Associated Press 4/30/07). Malian security forces (the army, air force, Gendarmerie, the National Guard, and the police) are generally under effective civilian control in Mali and not typically used for partisan purposes (Crime and Society, Mali 2008a:5). The police, in Mauritius, until an August 6, 2008 military coup toppled the democratically elected leadership, had largely been apolitical. From the competitive election in 1982 which ended the previous state of emergency, there were virtually no reports of political killings, politically motivated disappearances, or political prisoners (Crime and Society, Mauritius 2008:7–9). The armed forces and the police, in Senegal, in general, are under civilian control, professional, generally disciplined and traditionally remain aloof from politics (Crime and Society, Senegal 2008c:3) and do not commit major human rights offenses against political parties and their members. Despite protests of fraud after every election, some incidents of verbal violence and alleged scuffles between political partisans in 2007 (GlobalVoices 2007), there were virtually no reports of political killings, politically motivated disappearances, or torture by law enforcement after the 1988 presidential election where 30 students were killed in political violence (Young 2003; Sangmpam 2007; Crime and Society, Senegal 2008c; Association for Africanist Anthropology 2000). This restraint in employing law enforcement to violently suppress political opposition by politicians did not necessary mean, however, that the police did not

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engage in significant human rights abuses in these same cases. Examples of police and military alleged brutality, forced confessions, poor investigative techniques, and even extrajudicial killings were reported in relationship both to common crime and in wars with secessionist movements in these nations. The army, in Senegal, for example, is responsible for a significant number of extrajudicial killings, including some civilian deaths in its war with violent separatist rebels in the Casamance region (Senegal: Institutional Situation 2008:3). Senegalese police also shot and killed a student while forcibly dispersing a demonstration at the University of Dakar (Crime and Society, Senegal 2008c:4). In Mali, some members of the security forces have been implicated in extrajudicial killings in relation to common crime. The government, in 2000, following the killing of three tourists in Kidal, questioned at least 40 suspects and detained many in connection with the killings, three of whom reportedly died while being transported to jail (Crime and Society, Mali 2008a:5). The regular arrest of opposition members by the police and reports that the police arrested and abused student demonstrators were also reported in these nations. The very low levels of political killing of domestic opponents but continued human rights violations in other areas by these African state security forces and the police suggest that higher authorities view the specific political killing of domestic opponents as a practice that is “off-limits.” This suggests a low incidence of the use of “hired guns” by either the police or local politicians and the relative insulation of the state security forces from political manipulation. It also suggests a “harder” legal system in so far as law enforcement responds directly to the restraining orders of executive and judicial political elites with less room for inaction, inefficiency, and/ or directly ignoring judicial mandates. Such conditions can be predicted to lower the incidence of political killing in nations undergoing liberalization–democratization. Cultural factors which support judicial power can also contribute to the reduction of political killing during liberalization–democratization. These include the creation of nonpartisan institutions where national political elites approve a new constitution, face an economic crisis, and/or resolve regional problems. Referred to as “elite or party pacts” in the literature on Europe, these major efforts at compromise – the 1977 Pact of Moncloa in Spain; the 1974 AFM program in Portugal,8 and the Hungarian, Polish, and Czech “roundtables,” to name a few – all correlated with a low incidence of political killings in the European cases (Maravall and Santamaría 1986:86–89; Rosenfeld 1994). Similarly, in Mali, for example, since 1991, national political elites from all political parties (from the ruling majority and from the opposition) also engaged in the creation of nonpartisan bodies on several occasions (a National Conference in 1991, the Malian Centre for Interparty Dialogue and Democracy in 2008) which attempted to institutionalize nonviolent modes of conflict resolution in political life (Pringle 2006; NIMD 2008). This elite practice in Mali may build upon a cultural tradition of nonviolent conflict reduction in society which includes the use of customary law, and politically and socially neutral persons (griots, smiths, Muslim imams, and customary chiefs) as local courts to resolve legal disputes in rural areas. In addition, the practice of cousinage which forbids conflict between two ethnic groups or clans and encourages them to trade humorous insults with impunity also supports nonviolent conflict resolution.

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Gurr (1993:165) suggests, as referred to in the introduction of this book, that while communal groups in liberalizing autocracies in developing societies may typically allow for significant political mobilization, they usually lack the institutional resources to reach the kinds of accommodation typical of established democracy. However, the Mali example suggests that there may be important exceptions to this general rule. In addition, as Fox (2007:11–12) notes, historically, there have been several major accountability innovations including the Roman Tribune of the Plebs, China’s Imperial Censorate, Sweden’s ombudsman office, Islamic ombudsman, the Iroquois Federation’s system of checks and balances which can emerge “before democratic regime transitions, and their legacies also shape subsequent possibilities for accountability-building (p. 12).” In contrast, in “soft” legal systems, several innovations in accountable rural governance did not yield similar results. In Mexico – Guerrero’s Community Police and the Chiapas Good Governance Councils – developed precisely in those states where a number of the political killings of PRD members were also concentrated. While these local level innovations held the potential to diffuse political conflicts before they became violent, either they were not institutionalized until after 2000 (Chiapas) (Caracol II 2006 in Fox 2007), and/or faced significant hostility from state governments despite their ability to substantially reduce common crime (Guerrero) (Fox 2007:196; Rowland 2003:195–201).9 These initiatives as such did not or have not been institutionalized at the local levels. In addition, several eliteinitiated efforts to reduce political violence in Mexico over the 1990s10 were also not sufficiently institutionalized to halt the political killings of PRD members. One comparative implication of the Mexican case then is that the level of impunity could be the missing (intermediary) link that might explain why some countries have more violent transitions than others. As noted in previous chapters, in violent transitions, where the electoral rule of law and the judiciary are not sufficiently strong enough to prosecute and punish criminal offenders, a pattern of impunity can persist through time despite advances in electoral competition. Electoral challenges from below (even nonviolent ones) can lead to political killings in electoral-related protest, to political killings due to state-sanctioned political repression, and to the use of “hired guns” to eliminate political opposition under such institutional conditions. When courts (a counter-authorizing agency) are not capable of handing down severe penalties for such brutality, and there is an absence of local level institutions capable of mediating and diffusing political conflict, the probability that impunity and continued violence will continue is, of course, greatly increased.

The Extension of Political and Civil Rights: A Distinctive Time-Line The concatenation of political, judicial, and law-enforcement elements that combine to create a legal system which fails to function as a sufficient system of restraint but rather creates a climate of ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to political

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killing reflects the fact that in many contemporary Latin American states, the extension of civil rights and their legal guarantees is very incomplete, as compared to the formal political rights endowed to their citizens (O’Donnell 1999:10). The rule of law there can mirror the weakness of political and, especially, civil rights, and the deep inequalities and the social distances between social groups that they entail. The killing of so many perredistas seeking to exercise greater political rights during the intensification of liberalization–democratization points toward this weakness in civil rights and suggests that the extension of political and civil rights do not necessarily progress in tandem fashion (Rose and Shin 2001). The PRD’s struggle against electoral fraud was a manifestation of the struggle for juridical certainty for political rights. Perredistas were seeking to ensure legal certainty for voting rights from the late 1980s–1990s period; that is to say, the protest against electoral fraud sought to ensure the application of electoral laws equally. A majority of the population, in the Mexican dynamic, thought the attainment of fair electoral institutions had indeed been reached by the 2000 presidential elections but there was a subsequent fall in public confidence after the more contested 2006 presidential election (Galán 2006). In the arena of civil rights, however, the issue of political killings was, and remains, an issue of the right to life. Political killing, after all, represents the ultimate denial of citizenship: the right to life in the exercise of political opposition. The case of the political killing of PRD members suggests then that the struggle for the expansion of political rights can cause initial erosion in existing civil rights in states where the legal guarantees for those civil rights for all adults lack adequate protection. The issue, for the families of the victim, is also one of the civil rights and social rights with an inter-generational effect of the loss of life of a family member who is frequently the dominant breadwinner.11 After the death of a party member, the legal issue then becomes largely one of access to the judiciary and to fair process, i.e., protection for civil rights. The inadequate protection of civil rights in a historical period of the extension of political rights is clearly illustrated in the interactions of the State Judicial Police and the Public Ministry with female survivors of PRD members in Guerrero killed in political violence. Three perredista wives, after the disappearance of their husbands, tried to locate them and/or their bodies on their own. Three peasant PRD members (brothers Miguel Regino Benigno, aged 37, Florentino Regino Benigno, aged 32, and Pablo Rentería Liborio, aged 22) had disappeared on the same night of October 27, 1993. The victims came from the small towns of “Los Pelillos” and “San Isidro del Puente,” Guerrero, located in the municipality of Azoyú where a few dozen families live in small houses, many without electricity, or running water (Gutiérrez 1998:48). Six armed men dressed in civil clothes on the night of the 27th violently removed brothers Miguel and Florentino from their homes, striking Florentino’s 13-year-old boy and a crying 3-year-old girl with the back of a rifle butt. All three men were taken away, and, when Margarita, the wife of Florentino asked one of the men where they were taking her husband, he allegedly replied that they were the Judicial Police of Marquelia and that she should go there the next day to look for him (Gutiérrez 1998:48).

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Nevertheless, when Margarita, Cándida (the 21-year-old wife of Pablo Rentería and mother of three girls) and Quintila (the 30-year-old wife of Miguel Regino and mother of seven children) all went to the Marquelia Judicial Police station the following day, they were disappointed. Margarita said, “They told us that they had not detained them, that they did not have them, and that if they had them, they would not hide them from us.” Cándida also looked in the Azoyú jail and a sister of Pablo looked for her brother in the Ometepec and Cuajinicuilapa jails without any success. The three women continued their search for their husbands, asking for help from Azoyú perredistas. They filed a missing persons report with the Public Ministry in San Luis Acatlán, and three formal investigations were begun in November 1993. The women searched five city jails (Marquelia, Pinotepa, Cuajinicuilapa, Ometepec, and San Luis Acatlán) and went to the State Attorney General’s Office in the capital. They did not find their husbands. As the formal path of justice failed to help them locate their spouses, they asked local people in the small towns for help by word of mouth. Rumors of at least seven dead bodies came back to the women. A dead man had appeared in La Cuchilla. They went but found nothing. The neighbors said they had seen the body the day before but the next day it had disappeared without any formal complaint having been filed (Gutiérrez 1998:50). Two decapitated bodies had been found floating in the river in Juchitán. Yet, by the time the women arrived, the current had taken the bodies away. Two more bodies were sited on the beach at Barra de Tecoanapa but by the time the women arrived, the sea had washed them away. They actually identified several cadavers in Tierra Colorada and looked in various new graves in Agua Zarca. Twenty-one days after they began their search on November 17, 1993, a neighbor told them that he had seen three bodies, sprawled in a field, dressed only in shorts. Since at least one of the widow’s husbands had been wearing shorts when he was taken from his home, the women walked for hours in the sun but did not find any bodies. The next day, they asked locals in a nearby community if they had seen three cadavers in shorts and some told them the information was false but others said the three had been buried the day before. In the end, the widows failed to find their husbands. The Public Ministry had no information, nor had there been any complaints filed with the agency about any of the bodies.

Coda: Remembering and Forgetting the Dead Zur (1994:13), in analyzing the effects of political repression on female survivors in an extreme case of state violence (Guatemala), argues that impunity cannot be separated from repression when one examines the emotional impact of the latter since “the state’s purpose in creating such a situation [of impunity] is to maintain the regime’s dominance over people who are made silent and subservient. This is achieved by activating certain ideological and psychological mechanisms to prevent permanently the acknowledgment of the violence perpetrated by the state, and by evoking extreme fear through the threat of further violence.” Disappearances, carried

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out either by the police, the army, or hired guns, specifically can leave women survivors with “an awareness of their own powerlessness; the lack of power stems from the all-embracing might of the powerful which is stabilized in various social strata and supported by the situation of impunity in which they operate. One of the effects of this powerlessness is that people are left without a language to explain what happened (Zur 1994:15).” Zur (1994:13) also notes that responses to impunity will differ from one country to another according to the sociocultural and historical context, as well as the particular emotional make-up of the victim. The story of three widows of PRD members who sought to find the bodies of their missing husbands is interesting because impunity, in the form of missing bodies, prevents the victim (and the whole society) from elaborating the facts of what actually happened. This can inhibit reconciliation and result in distrust (Zur 1994:15). In November 2003, the National Parliament of Militants and Social Organizations of the PRD placed a wreath at the door of the national PRD headquarters for those assassinated calling them, “true martyrs and democratic promoters.” Andrés Cosetti, the head of the group called upon the Executive Committee of the PRD to continue to demand clarification of these assassinations, noting that it was “unpardonable, that PRD leaders, deputies, senators and governors, the current beneficiaries of the democratic life of the country, lose their historical memory and forget that the struggle to create the PRD cost lives (La Jornada 11/3/03).” Cosetti went on to acknowledge that the statute of limitation had already run out on many of the Party’s existing demands for justice in various assassinations. Nevertheless, he added, “We will permanently appeal to achieve recognition of the struggles of our fallen comrades and to pay homage to them. It is important the diverse governmental instances assume their responsibility and apply justice in these events (La Jornada 11/3/03).” Every November 3, the Party continues to remember its victims of political killings in a memorial service (Ofrenda en Memoria 2009). Yet, the broader issue of dealing with abuses committed under the old regime remains a problem in Mexico. As Chappell Lawson (2004:141) noted, unlike Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Poland, South Korea, South Africa, and in other relatively new electoral democracies, “Mexico has not moved in a comprehensive or coordinated way to deal with its authoritarian history.” At the opening of his sexenio, Fox promised to establish a truth commission in his inaugural speech in December 2000. After that time, however, his administration sent mixed signals. Some cabinet members supported the formation of such a commission but others argued against it on the grounds that its establishment might undermine the institutions that already exist in Mexico for administering justice (Wilkinson 2003:1). Fox ultimately dealt with past human rights abuses by appointing a Special Prosecutor for Political and Social Movements of the Past to investigate past abuses of those killed in the so-called “dirty war” and ordered the release of important classified documents. However, no truth commission was established, there have been no lustration laws punishing past human rights abusers passed and no right trials have been conducted (Chappell Lawson 2004:141). Human Rights Watch (Wilkinson 2003) reported that 1 year and half later, the military was not fully

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cooperative with the special prosecutor’s investigation and the federal government not supportive enough to move the investigation beyond the calling of witness to testify (La Jornada 10/31/03). As time passes, the cry for justice for more than 660 victims of the PRD continues but becomes harder and harder to sustain. The PRD, since 2000, has continued to call for the government to bring those responsible to justice. In July 2002, party leaders, the family members of Ovando and Gil, and others went to the Special Prosecutor for Political and Social Movements of the Past to ask for clarification of the political assassinations including the 1988 quadruple assassination of the four students in Mexico City (Ernesto del Arco Parra, Jose Luis García Juárez, Jorge Flores Vargas and Jesús Ramos Rivas). Cárdenas said that “he hoped that the law would be applied.” Party president Rosario Robles added that the Fox administration’s failure to create the Truth Commission that the PRD wanted was “one more broken promise (La Jornada 7/3/02).” This reflected, perhaps, the more generalized disappointment many academics, businessmen, civic activists, journalists, legislators, and even some governmental officials expressed about the first 3 years of the Fox’s presidency, and particularly, with the administration’s failure to move more vigorously against human rights abuses committed by the old regime (Chappell Lawson 2004:140). As Fox (2007:5) notes, even the 2006 release of the longawaited official report on the PRI governments involvement in the “dirty war” of the 1970s did not address the killings of many dissidents, including perredistas, during the Salinas presidency (1988–1994). The Morelos Independent Human Rights Commission in 2009 called on the state and federal governments to “present alive” disappeared PRD leader José Ramon García Gómez, abducted by the Morelos GIP in 1988, some 21 years earlier (La Jornada 12/17/09). The cry for justice expressed at the national level of the party is also reflected in the desire for justice of the sons and daughters of those fallen perredistas left behind. This wish is eloquently expressed in a handwritten letter from Carlos Manuel Ríos Félix, the son of a peasant militant killed in Guerrero. This chapter concludes with a transliterated copy of his letter written to the PRD Human Rights Coordinator in 1997 translated directly from the original Spanish, respecting the original spelling and syntax (Proceso 11/28/97:25). dear executive Director, My father was killed Because of political violence, the killers are from the PRI and work in the municipal presidency of macuspana, seven of them killed him in the night on Sunday, January 12, 1992. My father Rubén Ríos montero, went to rallies went to meetings went to demonstrations went to confrontations with the Government, because he wanted a democratic change because he supported the party of the democratic Revolution, and because of democracy he gave his life because their they saw him in the struggle, I want justice done against those assassins, because they left us orphaned, and because my father has been a peasant militant all his life. Sincerely, son Carlos Manuel Ríos Félix.

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Conclusion This chapter has shown that an increase in electoral competition with the PRI within a municipality posed a significant risk factor for PRD members. Municipalities without PRD deaths did not differ from municipalities with PRD deaths except along the dimension of degree and level of electoral threat posed by the PRD. PRD victims of political assassination were thus urban, suburban and rural political activists killed by both urban and rural caciques and their hired guns. Beyond Mexico, in such regions as Central Asia and Africa, the lack of prosecution for, and continued incidence of, political assassination across a series of transitions to competitive elections highlights how deficiencies in the rule of law reproduce a pattern of impunity for political killings despite varying degrees of electoral turnover. The continued unlawful use of the police to violate political rights through the suppression of peaceful protest, the political assassination of unarmed domestic opponents; the use of state-sanctioned armed thugs to harass and/or assassinate political opponents of the regime; and an intensification of violent acts between legalized political parties are all elements present to varying degrees in the nations examined in this chapter. This suggests that the intensification of electoral competition in legal systems which are “rule bound,” but not necessarily “democratically rule-bound,” can lead to unevenness in the application of the rule of law and the inadequate protection of civil rights in a historical period of the extension of political rights. Conversely, impunity and the likelihood of political killings in liberalization–democratization processes were found to be reduced in cases where crime-preventing agencies were insulated from political manipulation, courts possessed with strong review powers, alternative institutionalized modes of nonviolent conflict resolution (elite pacts, local customary law) were available, and/or elites were unwilling to use “hired guns” to violently resolve political conflicts. Thus, one comparative implication of the Mexican case highlighted in this chapter is that the level of impunity could be the missing (intermediary) link that might explain why some countries have more violent transitions than others.

End Notes 1

Data is from Eisenstadt (2004). The variables used include population (natural log) from official census data in 1990, 1995, and 2000, and author projections using the standard growth curve for intervening years in the early 1990s. The natural log of the population was taken to transform the variable into a range more consistent with other variables. The variable “welfare” measured the percentage of households in each municipality earning fewer than two minimum wages, taken from the National Population Council and National Water Commission’s (CONAPO) marginalization index. The variable “election won” is a ratio of the PRD’s vote to those officially obtained by the PRI. As Eisenstadt (2004:299) notes, “this is more informative than comparing the election winner (the PRI in over 80% of the races during the study) and first runner-up, because as a rule the PAN and the PRD did not contest elections won by other parties beside the PRI (and the overwhelming pattern of two-party competition meant that, for example, where the PAN won,

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there would be no real PRD organization to challenge them in any case).” It is assumed that the level of threat posed by the PRD explains the party’s targeting, understanding the ratio of PRD vote to those officially obtained by the PRI vote as a proxy for the degree of threat posed by the PRD (variable “election won”). Other variables tested included a measure of all agrarian conflicts in the municipality and a measure of whether the electoral court overturned a complaint of fraud submitted by a political party. This latter was measured by two indicators: the number of parties submitting electoral court complaints during the days after each election and the total number of complaints submitted (2004:305). 2 Although Oaxaca remained under PRI gubernatorial control, the PAN made significant inroads in urban areas in 2000 and the pro-PRD Committee in the Isthmus (COCEI) continued to control the Juchitán area. Furthermore, the PRI governor José Murat Casab was courteous toward President Fox and willing to cooperate on some issues (Grayson 2001:38). 3 Specifically, this participation included lending his ranch to hide bodies of those killed by the police as the following quote reveals. The context of del Valle’s quote is the following: after having his own 12-year-old son detained and tortured for the alleged murder of a police commander, the rancher became upset with the police and del Valle told the Chiapas State Attorney General (appointed in 1997 by then PRI governor): “Your greatest error was moving the dead bodies... Look, I am going to tell you something that you already know or that you don’t want to understand or else I just don’t know about these matters. Werclain (the federal chief of the Security Police) is a person who has his hand on the pulse of this place but at the cost of killing pure Indians (de matar puros indígenas). As you say, if we are going to kill people, then we are going to kill people. Why did you permit Nicolás Ruíz to kill Indians? Then we have a problem like that at Acteal... I don’t want more dead bodies because they will cause more problems for me... I did a good deed for the society of Chiapas (by hiding the bodies) because now nobody dares kidnap anyone around here. [Attorney General: So, all the dead men on your ranch were kidnappers and son-of-bitches... Why did they decide to bury them on your ranch?] Because the police asked me the favor–‘Hey, could you take these bodies for us’... There is no justice anymore. Here on the coast, one has to take justice into their own hands and then comes along a federal commander of the Security Police and asks us to participate in this type of operation.” [So the federal commander was completely informed of the matter?] “Completely.” Later on the tape, del Valle admits to killing the brother of one of the men who would bring the dead bodies to his ranch for the government security forces (La Jornada 11/3/01). 4 The comparative cases included in this chapter are those in which the legal opposition was not armed nor did they engage in violent acts against security officials. This is unlike the case of the 2007 Bas Congo event in which some members of the opposition party did engage in violent acts; thereby killing ten police officers and soldiers and two civilians. Human Rights Watch (2007: 9–10) concluded that the death toll then escalated with the Congolese police force employing excessive violence and killing 104 persons. I did not include these cases because, as noted in Chap. 2, this book examines a type of violence that is generally associated with a nonviolent, legal process; that is to say, with voting, the exercise of political rights of peaceful association and with alternation in power. 5 At the same time, the 2007 electoral system was not agreed upon by all parties as fair as many of the left-wing opposition parties withdrew their commissioners from the polling states and the counting centers (U.S. Department of State 2008, Albania). 6 Also, in Zanzibar, the police violently quelled the opposition also employed ruling party thugs to beat and abuse citizens in January 2001, when the Tanzanian government security forces violently suppressed political demonstrations that had been called to protest irregularities in the national elections of October 2000. At least 35 people were killed, and over 600 injured without the prosecution of those responsible for the killings as security forces – primarily the police, aided by the coastguard and the army – opened fire and assaulted thousands of unarmed demonstrators and others. In the following days, the security forces, joined by ruling party officials and militia, went on a rampage, indiscriminately arresting, beating, and sexually abusing island residents (Human Rights Watch 2002a, b).

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There are also some examples of the independence of the judiciary from ruling-party control. The chair of the University of Zimbabwe’s politics and administration department and rulingparty supporter noted that the judiciary acted independent of ruling-party control when it exonerated MDC opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai of a plot to assassinate Mugabe (IRIN 2008). Nevertheless, opposition parties are excluded from the Electoral Commission (Human Rights Watch 2008a, b:6). 8 In Portugal, it was the AFM (Armed Forces Movement) which was the liberalizing force within the military who deposed Caetano provided an institutional framework and timetable for the creation of a new political system within a year of the coup (Maxwell 1986:118). 9 Future comparative research that could link the emergence of innovations in accountable governance (O’Donnell 2006; Smulovitz and Peruzotti 2006) to the non-violent resolution of political disputes would be a welcome contribution toward understanding the question of how and when civil society can make a difference in terms of holding state actors publicly accountable. 10 In the early months of the transition to the Zedillo sexenio (December 1994–February 1995), the factors for a diminution of anti-PRD violence were being implemented, at least at the elite level. The EZLN uprising in January 1994 had the effect of stimulating a change of attitude by the top PRI leadership toward the legitimacy of the PRD. This change in attitude in the early months of the Zedillo presidency led to the official recognition of the PRD by PRI elites, and to negotiations for a liberalizing electoral pact in early 1994 between Zedillo and opposition leaders which promised to diminish political violence. Yet, this potential opposition-PRI pact fell through when opposition parties disagreed with the government over certain features of the new electoral rules, particularly over penalties for running coalition candidates (Prud’homme 1998). 11 Impunity for political killing can also cause a significant erosion of the social rights of the families of the victims as evident in the inter-generational effects of these political killings. In addition to the approximately 550–600 women who suddenly found themselves entirely economically responsible for the household, there are some 700 children under the age of ten left who lost a parent in these murders. This means that some 1,300 persons (women, children, and some elderly relatives) have been left to fend for themselves in an increasing difficult economic environment. For example, the wife of 41-year-old PRD Puebla homicide victim Juan Sombrerero Nolasco (CNDH 1994) was left to support three children aged 3, 8, and 10 without the carpenter’s salary that her husband had earned. After having to sell the house to pay the debt from the funeral costs, Doña Catalina had to take the children to live with the paternal grandfather of her husband (Crónica Puebla 1997:55). She has to wash and iron clothes for other people, to sell clothes, and to sell chalupas in front of her brother’s store 4 days a week. Despite the severity of the crime, Doña Catalina did not have money to pay for the trips back-and-forth to the city that would be necessary to pursue prosecution of the crime. Ultimately, apprehension orders against the murders were actually carried out after the intervention of the CNDH. The deterioration in the social rights of the surviving children is often quite drastic. Young boys are often required to become full-time laborers. Miguel, at age 14, had to leave school after his father PRD member Miguel Beningo Regino was killed. When he started working, his small size impeded him from picking up heavy feed bags. His mother would accompany him to help him with the harvest work after finishing her daily job as a maid. Miguel at 18 is now the primary income source for his four brothers and sisters. At the time of the interview, there was only a single can of corn for the family of six to eat (Crónica Puebla 1997:69). Twenty-three-year-old widow Lorena was left alone with three children to raise, all under the age of 10, when her husband perredista Ismael Mena was shot to death in Guerrero in 1995. She returned with her children to live with her parents after his death because her in-laws ran her out of their house when Ismael died. She has not told her children anything about their father’s death “because they are little. I don’t want my children to have a sorrowful heart (no quiero que mis hijos vayan con mal corazón). I prefer that they not know anything. The oldest boy does know that his father died but the young ones do not. I tell them that he is out, working (Crónica Puebla 1997:141).” 7

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Chapter 8

Conclusions

A main point of this study is that political assassinations are indeed rational, targeted actions but they do not occur within an institutional vacuum. Political assassinations are calculated strategies of action aimed at eliminating political rivals caused by multiple, interacting factors that involve the political, legal, and criminal justice systems. As a form of interpersonal violence, political assassination involves direct or implied authorization from political leaders, the availability of assassins for hire and the willingness of some political leaders to utilize them against political opponents, and violent interactions between political parties combined with judicial system ineffectiveness. This study found that in Mexico (1988–1994), 57% of perpetrators of political assassination were directly linked to a single political party in power (the PRI) against victims of a rising opposition party (the PRD). A high number of PRD politicians and leaders from all levels of government (local, state, and municipal) and candidates for office were either assassinated or victims of attempted assassination. Robbery, accidental and/or personal revenge homicide were not significant causes of these murders. Thus, the political gain from these political assassinations was clearly weighted in favor of some elements within the PRI. This represents a failure of the political system (some political parties) to accommodate to increasing electoral competition in a nonviolent way. Judicial system ineffectiveness – a “soft” legal system does not directly cause political assassination but it facilitates and explains the persistence of impunity for political murder over time. At the most general level then, impunity for political killings is a structured system requiring one central precondition, namely, the failure of the legal system to restrain political killings. Preexisting deficiencies (gaps) in a legal system facilitate the use of political assassination. As the comparative cases from Africa and Central Asia suggest, the existence of a ready “pool” of contract assassins for hire to eliminate political rivals (the “godfather” system in Nigeria) suggests a certain degree of confidence by perpetrators, and those who pay them, that impunity will likely be the outcome for political assassination. Mexican professional assassins and/or hired guns linked to a PRI leader alone constituted a full 36.4% of the killers of perredistas (1988–1994). In one sense then, the failure of the legal system to punish killers facilitates the use of contract killers for hire.


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The ability of criminal elements (be they certain politicians and/or l aw-enforcement agents) to “penetrate” the prosecutorial workings of the criminal justice system to authorize or intentionally cover-up political murder is a further example of the failure of the legal system to function as a sufficient system of restraint for political killing. Direct evidence of authorization or intentional coverup was found in at least 25% cases of these political assassinations as discussed in Chap. 4. Criminal elements in Guerrero took advantage of resource deficits within the criminal justice system to try and thwart prosecution in one political murder. The CNDH (1994) finding of “inexplicable” omissions of investigation in the prosecution of many of the political murders (CNDH 1994) also illustrates such criminal penetration of the justice system. A related aspect of this problem is the criminal penetration of the political system. Several instances were found in which hired guns, a policeman, a PRI member, and a cardenista politician were linked both to political murder and to criminal activity. Rojas Alba (1996:96) states that in his investigation of the disappearance of perredista leader Ramon García Gómez, his sources claim one cardenista was acting as a collaborator of the Morelos governor and was “dedicated to narcotics trafficking but tried to pass for a political leader (Proceso 2/03/92:26–28).” The federal judicial police hired gun who killed a prominent PRD lawyer was nicknamed “cocainómano” (cocaine addict) (CHR 1994:166). State Judicial Policeman and convicted head of the Morelos Political Police Apolo Bernabé Ríos was an alleged rapist (Estrada 1996:1). Circumstantial evidence associates the Salinas administration to drug-lord García Abrego.1 More research is needed on the criminal origins of hired guns, their recruitment by politicians of different levels (municipal, state, and federal) and the trajectory of their “career paths” as assassins linked to political figures to fully understand the nature and extent of leadership authorization of political assassination and its potential linkages to corrupt activities. Such research, however, is likely to be dangerous to the researcher. In several cases, individuals conducting in-depth investigations of the political assassinations of perredistas were either assassinated (Guerrero head State Judicial police officer, Rafael Ponce Miranda, Crónica Guerrero 1998:90), suffered an attempted assassination (PRD Morelos Federal Deputy Maria Rojas Alba 1996:119), and/or received death threats for their investigations (Crónica Guerrero 1998:25–34). PRD leaders and activists engaged in legal disputes investigating possible corruption schemes by local politicians (the auditing of municipal funds, illegal logging, agrarian and urban land disputes, and factory-related disputes) also often received death threats warning them to cease their efforts before their assassinations.2 Clearly, deficiencies in civil rights protection ideally afforded by a legal system were insufficient to prevent these human rights violations of investigators of political assassination. The rise of competitive elections between contending political parties at the local level also combines with judicial system ineffectiveness to produce political assassination as a form of interpersonal violence. In a “hard” legal system such as one in the UK, it is difficult to imagine that a group of armed men associated with a local opposing political leader, even under conditions of limited local police control, would authorize a group of armed men to open fire on the mayor, commander of the municipal police and five other political opponents in a town for 4 h, and then control the area

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for an additional 13 h without the intervention of higher-level law enforcement. In a “soft” legal system, however, such a scenario was not uncommon. The sequential assassination of seven perredistas including the mayor and the municipal police commander by heavily armed men over a period of 17 h began when a local priísta authorized it just after some of the local PRD police had left the area (CHR 1994:188, Turicato Michoacán, 2/12/93). [The Army and the State Judicial Police did not arrive to aid in calming the situation until the next morning.] This book has also shown, however, that the causes of political assassination are more complex than merely assuming the local police are incapable or impotent to impose order on local towns and villages. The police, since its post-2006 confrontation with better trained, informed and equipped organized crime groups, have often been “incapable and impotent” (Zepeda Lecuona 2010:50). Yet, the earlier evidence in this book (1988–2005) suggests a pattern of political assassination in which the police, including state-level police, were, on various occasions, employed by the governing party to forcefully remove and/or eliminate political opponents. Furthermore, in multiple cases, the police acted quite efficiently in arresting perredistas even in rural areas and, when placed under the authority of the PRD Special State Prosecutor (Michoacán), successfully arrested multiple PRI-associated murder suspects (Michoacán, 12/11/92; 12/18/92; 12/25/92; 1/1/93; 11/4/93; Oaxaca, 1/18/93; Puebla, 10/3/93; Guerrero, 1/13/90; Mexico, 1/6/90 [CHR 1994:83, 245, 279]). These “success” stories of police efficiency occurred even within the context of judicial ineffectiveness or a very low prosecution rate (3.5%) for the political murder of PRD members. On a theoretical level, impunity for political killings during liberalization– democratization can be understood as the product of a concatenation of political, judicial, and law-enforcement elements, which combine to create a legal system which fails to function as a sufficient system of restraint. The failures of various systems are multiple and interactive. They include the following dimensions: First, in the case of the failure of the judicial system, this involves inadequate investigation of murder. Second, in the case of the failure of law enforcement, this involves the inability, and/ or unwillingness, of the police to serve arrest warrants in cases where the judicial system successfully investigates and identifies suspects of the political murder of PRD members and/or its penetration by criminal elements to thwart prosecution. Finally, in the case of the failure of the political system, this involves the contracting of “hired” guns to eliminate political opponents and the political manipulation of some lawenforcement officers so that they assassinate legal and political opponents.

Why Does Impunity Persist Despite a Transition to Electoral Democracy? The political murder of over 600 perredistas (1988–2005) in Mexico illustrates how political change in the form of democratization can cause a short-term increase in political violence and repression (Hegre et al. 2001). By 2010, Mexico had made the transition, as in Southern and Central America decades earlier (Rodley 1999)

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from human rights concerns based on the killings of political opponents under liberalization–democratization to the escalation of civil homicides due to common and organized crime. Yet, levels of impunity for civil homicide remain alarmingly high in Mexico despite advances within the electoral system during this same period. Very high levels of public insecurity were reached by the mid-2000s (Shirk and Donnelly 2010:3; Zepeda Lecuona 2010). In a survey on public safety in Mexico City in 2005, 84% of those interviewed identified themselves as having been a victim of crime within the last 5 years and 96% said Mexico City was growing more dangerous (Reforma, 2/15/05). Assassinations have escalated in Mexico since 2006, largely over drug monies, mainly involving certain state actors (specific corrupt politicians and law- enforcement agents) and nonstate actors (drug lords and their hired guns) within the context of an “exhausted model” of law enforcement (Zepeda Lecuona 2010:42). By 2010, impunity still reigns in the battle against organized criminals whose “actions are the root of Mexicans’ perceptions of vulnerability and lack of security in an environment of escalating violence (Zepeda Lecuona 2010:57).” Some analysts have even begun to reclassify the Mexican government as a “failed” state (Grayson 2010). Despite the passage of time and the nature of the conflict, judicial system ineffectiveness continues to contribute to the problem of assassination. Clearly then, in Mexico, as elsewhere, the establishment of electoral democracy has not been equivalent to establishing a rights-protective regime (Donnelly 1988). Nevertheless, the political assassination of leftist political opponents begun in 1988 did drop significantly, especially by 2005. This drop speaks to a point made by US State Department Diplomat McCllellan (2009) who argues that, despite the uncertainties, rise in common crime and instability that a transition to electoral democracy brings, it is still preferable to a “benign authoritarian” state because the policies of the latter can shift immediately toward political repression, depending upon the actions of top leaders.3 Impunity can be understood to persist in legal systems which are “rule bound” but not necessarily “democratically rule-bound” (O’Donnell 2004:32), i.e., ensuring political rights, civil rights, and mechanisms of accountability. One aspect of this “unevenness” in ensuring political and civil rights is obvious in relation to press attention and prosecution of political murder. As noted earlier, McCromick and Mitchell (1997) contend that political murder differs in type from torture and illegal imprisonment because it carries the likelihood of higher external costs, and governments implicitly recognize this when they opt, for example, for “disappearing victims rather than killing them” (McCromick and Mitchell 1997:511). The political murder of 17 PRD/OCSS peasants in the Aguas Blancas massacre generated an intense level of domestic and international press; raising the external costs to the government were it not to rigorously prosecute the case (Human Rights Watch 2008b:3). Indeed, the Aguas Blancas massacre led to the intervention of the PRI president and Supreme Court and to the stepping down of a PRI governor. Other PRD victims whose cases had significant press coverage – PRD leaders Romualdo García Alonso and Ramon García Gómez – also received greater prosecutorial attention (Crónica Guerrero 1998:28–29; Rojas Alba 1996:113; Proceso 2/3/92).

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Thus, this book found that high levels of international and domestic press attention – a social dimension of accountability (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000) – can indeed serve to raise the external costs of political assassination to governments. McCromick and Mitchell (1997) also imply that less domestic and international press can reduce the external cost to a government of engaging in a political murder. This study found some indirect support for this proposition in so far as the poverty of a victim can contribute to the lack of media attention to the details of their specific killings. The poverty of many of the PRD victims (peasants, bakers, and students) was discussed in Table 2.1. A dearth of news press on the multiple deaths of these poor perredistas contributes to their improper investigation. Yet, social class effects are also heavily intertwined with political party strategies and urban, well-to-do perredistas, including many PRD politicians, also fell as victims of political assassination. Thus, upper class status alone is not necessarily a potential constraint on the ability of authoritarian politicians to assassinate political opponents. Rather, the external cost to a government of engaging in political murder is based on a complex calculus that includes social origins, rank-and-file and party leadership strategies, and the likelihood of press exposure/attention in any given case.

Nonviolent Political Change and “Hard” Legal Systems There is another aspect to the uneven application of the rule of law across various social and political categories as it relates to “soft” legal systems. The dynamic in Mexico of the political assassination of PRD members was not simply an example of “electoral gangsterism” such as that employed by caciques in Northern Nicaragua (1926–1934) where selective political assassination was employed to eliminate political rivals and to improve their own chances of winning an election (Schroeder 2000). Nor was it only that many PRD leaders were “seasoned políticos that made a career in the ruling party, the PRI… [and thus were] … not trained in the politics of resistance to overt repression by the government that other, now defunct, organizations like the Communist Party had to endure for decades (Ramirez 2010:2).” Contending political parties in Guerrero did directly contribute to continued interpersonal violence at regional and local levels where the hardening of official authority by the PRI governor, the taking over of municipal palaces by rank-andfile perredistas, and the failure of political parties and the legal system to establish new forms of social controls such as a functioning electoral court encouraged political murder. Yet, as important as these organizational dimensions were, impunity for political assassination also persists because, in legal systems with serious underlying institutional deficiencies in the ability to prosecute homicide, there is often a widespread belief that change will inevitably be “bloody and violent.” This speaks to the issue of conceptual sources of political change (Schatz and Gutierrez-Rexach 2002). Such beliefs are reflected in the statements of PRD and PRI leaders alike. PRD Federal Deputy Rojas Alba (1996) notes that in Mexico “there is a widespread

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[cultural] belief that politics is like a cockfight or a bullfight. Cocks must never step back, they must die in action (Rojas Alba in Dead or Alive 1996).” PRI analyst and politician Jorge Montufar Araujo stated of democratizing change in Mexico in 1999: [Political] change will take a tremendous toll. It will be bloody and violent. But that’s how people mature by facing their own realities. We now have 90 million Mexicans. If we have 70 million left after the change, we’ll have made it. We must pay a very high price, a cruel price for this inevitable change. Many people will lose their lives. Among them, many politicians. I am a politician and I know I am at risk (Dead or Alive 1999).

Konaté (2006), in contrast, argues that in Mali where there were few political k illings during liberalization–democratization, the Mandé cultural idea that “conflict can indeed be overcome by human agency” was a vital and invaluable concept for processing conflict nonviolently in a conflict-prone regional context. Ironically, the promotion of ideas of nonviolent political change within the context of “soft” legal systems can trigger a wave of political assassinations. This is not the intent of democratizing leaders. As Rojas Alba (1996) put it: “You lose hope. You act peacefully but they persecute your friends, they murder them. The State lies, deceives people uses all its resources. They corner you, you can’t even move. There is no room for democracy, for peaceful struggle. So you are always tempted to turn to violence [but]… I adopted peaceful struggle as the only viable method to really change the country.” This study suggests that nonviolent democratizing political change requires that multiple supports for a “harder” legal system must also be simultaneously present. These supports include (1) a law enforcement which responds directly and rapidly to the restraining orders of executive and judicial political elites with less room for inaction, inefficiency, and/or directly ignoring judicial mandates; (2) a broad sector of the public and politicians who support the idea of peaceful change; (3) a view by higher authorities that the political killing of domestic opponents is “off-limits” and therefore a low incidence of the use of “hired guns,” and (4) the relative insulation of the state security forces from political manipulation. If a transition to electoral democracy is to be nonviolent, these institutional and ideological changes must also occur during the introduction of competitive elections. Based on the analysis of a rise of murder during liberalization–democratization in 145 nations across the globe (the “MMM” – More Murder in the Middle Thesis) (Fein 1995; Gurr 1986; Muller 1985), such changes are neither easy nor necessarily widespread. The use of political assassination against the PRD in the transition to electoral democracy in Mexico involved a rational, calculated set of actions encouraged by certain political leaders and political parties within the context of judicial system ineffectiveness. “Soft” legal systems facilitate the use of political assassination and explain the persistence of impunity for political murder over time. To reduce political violence in the transition to electoral democracy, specific institutional conditions, namely a structured system of impunity for murder must be overcome. In the appendix of this book, the reader will find in all its details, the remaining cases of political killings of PRD members not covered already in the previous chapters of this book.

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End Notes upsha (1995) notes that leaked DEA (US) and PGR (Mexico) reports show calls from García L Abrego’s Gulf Cartel Office to the Office of President Salinas de Gortari. Astorga (2000:76–77) notes that Juan García Abrego’s drug group grew rapidly and was consolidated during the Salinas administration but weakened when his term ended. Indeed, García Abrego was captured in 1996 under the subsequent Zedillo administration. 2 On a parallel note, Yolanda Figueroa, author of a book on the organization of a central drug cartel in Mexico (the Gulf cartel) was assassinated along with her husband and three children after publishing her book (Washington Post, 12/16/96). 3 McClellan has worked with the US Information Agency, and then for 25 years with the US Department of State at embassies in Iraq, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, Russia, Kosovo, Germany, and Ireland. This comment was made in relationship as to why he still would advocate electoral democracy despite its association with rising common crime rates, and whether other regime forms (Communist party systems, authoritarian regimes with limited electoral competition, personal dictatorships, military dictatorships, and especially “benign” authoritarian regimes), might not be preferable regime alternatives. 1

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Appendix: Political Murders of PRD Members, 1994

This appendix1 contains additional data on the political killings of PRD members organized by Mexican state and then chronologically by date of the killing. The cases included in this appendix are those not already discussed within the previous chapters of this book. The majority of cases after 1994 from Guerrero are excluded from this appendix as these cases are discussed in detail in Chaps. 3, 5. At the end of the appendix, there follows a special section on Chiapas entitled “A Few Revenge PRD Killings of PRI members after 2000.” This section details four priísta deaths by PRD members; a reversal of the previous historical pattern discussed in this book where the PRD was usually in the opposition and the victim of, rather than the perpetrator of, political killings. The information sources for the appendix are from the following: CHR 1994; Rojas-Alba 1996; Implausible 1997; Skeels 2002; Proceso, Informe Anual 1997; IACHR 1998; Crónica Guerrero 1998; US Department of State Human Rights Reports, and several Mexican newspapers, La Jornada, Reforma, La Opinión Digital; Tierra Noticias; El Norte, El Universal, El Sol, El Sol de Puebla, El País and Uniceflac.

Chiapas January 24, 1994. Two PRD members died in the community of Las Margaritas, in the wake of the EZLN uprising. After being detained by the local police and put in the local jail on January 16, the military removed the two PRD members and took them toward the community of El Progreso. Their bodies were found shot up with numerous bullet holes fired at close range on the 24th (CHR 1994:37). July 25, 1994. Two perredistas – Agustín Rubio Montoya, and Jorge Fonseca García – were killed in Tapachula (Rojas-Alba 1996:453). In August 1994, there were state and federal elections in Chiapas. The PRD ran Amado Avendaño as its gubernatorial candidate against Eduardo Robledo of the PRI. The official results gave the PRD the fifth federal district with its seat in Tapachula but claimed that Robledo won the governorship with only 30% of the

S. Schatz, Murder and Politics in Mexico, Studies of Organized Crime 10, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8068-7, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

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Appendix: Political Murders of PRD Members

vote going to Avendaño (Rojas-Alba 1996:188). The PRD’s electoral strength had grown considerably from 1991. For example, in some municipalities of Chiapas (Chocomuselo, Chilón and Ocosingo), the PRD won more than 50% of the vote and in Tila, Sabanilla, Venustiano Carranza, the PRD gained between 30 and 40% of the vote (Implausible 1997:34). September 6, 1994. Roberto Hernández Paniagua was killed in Albino Corzo (Rojas-Alba 1996:453). September 27, 1994. Ángel Morales Gallegos was killed in Chilón (Rojas-Alba 1996:453). March 4, 1995. Jesus Artemio Decelis Guillén, the PRD municipal president was assassinated along with another peasant PRD member, Pascual Sánchez Solís, by an assailant with a R-15 high-powered gun (Proceso 9/11/95:29; Proceso 4/23/00:34) in Tila. [Tila is located in Northern Chiapas; a site where “Peace and Justice” had been active since the early 1990s (Implausible 1997:43)]. Although the PRD demanded the crime be clarified, the party alleges that the authorities did nothing and let the assassin escape. Shortly thereafter, over 4,000 indigenous persons from over 100 communities organized themselves and took over the municipal palace in Tila and demanded recognition as a political entity. The government proposed that a plebiscite be held between priístas and perredistas to see “who had more people on their side” (Proceso 9/11/95:29). PRD indigenous candidate for the mayorship of Tila, Francisco Jiménez, noted that news of the militarization of priístas began to spread with some arguing that a paramilitary training camp in El Crucero was set up by ex-military men. One estimate was that over 800 persons had joined a paramilitary group called Socama (Solidaridad Campesina Magisterial). The group made its appearance in the village of Shucjá on July 14, 1995 where, according to the state Attorney General, five priístas had been killed. September 1995. Paramilitaries assassinated PRD member and teacher Héctor Pérez Torres as he tried to flee after a busload of PRD members were forced to leave the bus, listen to a threatening speech telling them the government had given paramilitaries consent to kill them in Masojá Grande (Proceso 9/11/95:29). Pérez Torres’ wife and child along with seven others were eyewitnesses to the murder. PRD leader Jiménez Jiménez reports that the Attorney General’s Office was informed of the murder and asked to demilitarize the zone and disarm the paramilitary group but the only result was that the latter moved its operations to the town of Shecjá. Local elections took place in Chiapas on October 15, 1995. The Zapatistas, some of whom had previously been willing to support the PRD as their electoral agents (August 1994), decided in 1995 to boycott the elections altogether (Eisenstadt 1999:290). President Zedillo praised the elections as a “lesson in democracy, participation and legality (Proceso 1/1/96:18).” Yet, electoral justice in Chiapas in 1995 was, according to Eisenstadt “an oxymoron (1999:301).” Postelectoral turmoil followed in its wake. Government officials argued they were “surprised” at the take-over of the Soluschiapa municipal palace by indigenous groups and peasants on December 25th, naming it a “well planned strategy (Proceso 1/1/96:18).” The police dislodged the protestors and detained 45 persons but this

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action only led to more municipal take-overs the next day in San Andrés Larráinzar, Chenalhó, El Bosque, Soyaló, Simojovel and La Libertad, the latter was occupied by panistas. January 1996. The first PRD candidate of the town of Soyaló and the PRI winner Ausel Sánchez in the municipality of Angel Albino Corzo were assassinated (Proceso 1/1/96:19). March 18, 1996. There was an ambush death of two peasant perredistas in Simojovel. Non-governmental organizations disapproved of the violence and said it was “the result of negligence by the authorities” and attributed it to “probable acts of [political] revenge between groups in the region.” The Church also suggested that the assassinations, house-burnings and destruction of property were signs of a potential “fratricidal war with lamentable consequences...if the government did not stop the White Guards and paramilitary groups (Proceso 6/24/96:32).” June 1996. Two members of the PRD – José Jesús Gómez Guzmán and Arturo Cruz Pérez – were killed in a gun battle with PRI supporters during a PRD protest march in the community of Los Moyos. A PRI member, wounded in the armed encounter, died shortly thereafter and three other people were wounded. According to the Fray Bartolomé Human Rights Center, only PRI supporters received medical attention from the public security officers at the scene (Implausible 1997:57). Subsequently, 12 PRD-affiliated families and over 360 persons were internally displaced from Los Moyos. March 1997. Four PRD members died after a confrontation with PRI supporters in the remote hamlet of Lote Ocho. The PRD had promoted an earlier land occupation on a cattle ranch there (Implausible 1997:60–61). March 14, 1997. Four PRD members died in an ambush with public security forces in the community of San Pedro Nixtalucum. This incident involved a complex fight with PRI rural militants that evolved into an armed standoff involving the federal Security Police (Informe Anual 1997:32–35). March 18, 1997. A PRD militant was shot to death 14 times in the chest in Sabanilla: the PRD blamed the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice” (Informe Anual 1997:35). March 20, 1997. PRD militant and President of the Autonomous Indigenous Council Bernardo Alfredo Pérez (a Mixtec, age 40) was assassinated near his automobile by hired guns of the local PRI cacique in Santiago Tetepec. The victim was driving in his automobile with his wife and children, returned to his community at 11:00 p.m. when he saw armed men waiting for him a few meters ahead of his car. He got his family out of the car just before they began shooting. A few days before, he had received death threats from the PRI Municipal President. PRD sources blame hired guns of regional cacique Chano Lorenzo. Legal action was proceeding at that time (Informe Anual 1997:36). March 26, 1997. PRD peasant militant and member of the Tatamandones was assassinated. The victim began to have problems with other Tatamandones who

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were also PRI members and was killed by them around 5 a.m. after bathing near Santa María Huaxolotitlán. His body was found with six wounds from a beating where the perpetrators used a post as a weapon (Informe Anual 1997:37). May 1, 1997. PRD militant and ex-Municipal Treasurer was assassinated when he walked out into his patio to collect firewood to cook in Santiago Yaitepec Juquila. His assassin, PRI member Francisco Cruz Ramírez, shot him four times. A legal case was opened (Informe Anual 1997:45). May 28, 1997. PRD leader, electoral activist and local Agrarian commission member was assassinated after he bought, along with a fellow worker, a soft-drink at a store outside his work by PRI hired guns in Santiago Jamiltepec. Judicial action was in process on the case (Informe Anual 1997:58). June 22, 1997. Paramilitary leader of the “Peace and Justice” organization, Juan López Jiménez – was assassinated on June 15, 1997 in the community of Pasijá, presumably by perredistas. On June 22, 1997, a young boy 12 years old was shot to death, and seven perredistas were wounded in the community of Emiliano Zapata Municipio of Sabanilla in what PRD activists claim was a revenge killing for the murder of priísta Juan López Jiménez (Informe Anual 1997:64–65). June 22, 1997. PRD militant Mariano Pérez López was assassinated in an ambush on a highway near Shushupá in Sabanilla municipality (Informe Anual 1997:65). This case, with legal number SDH/0057, remained under review by the National Human Rights Commission, the President of the Republic, the Interior Ministry, the State Government and the Federal Attorney General’s Office; all instances where the PRD filed petitions of wrongdoing. June 24, 1997. PRD militant – Antonio Martínez Vázquez, age 38 and minor Rafeal Pérez Torres, aged 15 were assassinated and three others were wounded in the community of Pasijá de Morelos in Sabanilla municipality. Both were identified as PRD-EZLN members. Local PRD members claim their deaths were part of the string of killings by Peace and Justice Members in revenge for the death of one of their leaders. These assassinations were presented to the authorities under the same legal rubric as the above one of June 22 [Sabanilla] (Informe Anual 1997:65). August 2, 1997. A Chol Indian PRD member plus two minors were killed in Cruz Palenque, Tila municipality while fleeing to the mountains from armed men. PRD accounts allege that at 5 a.m., heavily armed men from Peace and Justice (some wearing the uniforms of Public Security officers) began to yell that they planned to gain justice against some zapatistas and catequitas. In the rush to flee to the mountains, two minors, 12 year old Miguel Gutiérrez Peñate and minor Nicolás Mayo Gutiérrez were assassinated along with 60 year old perredista Mateo Arcos Guzmán. Two women were also allegedly raped in the incident. All were Chol Indians (Informe Anual 1997:79). August 2, 1997. A PRD militant was shot to death by unknown assassins and his body left on the outskirts of Agua Fría, Tila municipality (Informe Anual 1997:80). October 13, 1997. PRD member and militant in the Peasant Organization “Night Ant” Rafael Guzmán Alvaro was axed to death in the head, back, lungs and arms

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in Chilón. Three assassins were identified – Juan Jiménez Sánchez, Manuel Méndez Sánchez and Sebastián Méndez Sánchez. The three men were detained by members of the Night Ant peasant organization and turned over to the Public Ministry. These peasants claimed the assassins had been paid 500 pesos by wellknown cattle rancher Adán Narváez of Chilón. The origin of the murder was a land dispute in which Narváez sought to remove the Night Ant organization from his property (Informe Anual 1997:94). July 30, 1998. A group of nearly 100 public Security and State Judicial Police, accompanied an even greater number of armed Paz y Justicia militants, attacked PRD and Zapatista supporters in the community of Shushupa (Sabanilla municipality). Four PRD/EZLN supporters died in the melee (IACHR 1998:3). July 2000. Four perredistas died in the town of Pintopea after the July 6, 2000 election day.

Guerrero October 29, 1993. In late autumn 1993, three young assassins were blamed for the shooting death of Tecpan de Galeana PRD neighborhood leader Juan Estrada Mora, according to eyewitnesses to the crime. Estrada Mora was shot four times in the chest as he left a meeting. Eight days later, state judicial police were named as the killers in the death of well-known PRD militant Adulfo Piedra Rivera also in Tecpan de Galeana. As he was walking toward the houses of the PRD president and union leader of the municipality, Piedra Rivera encountered a white pick-up without license plates. Within the vehicle were three judicial policemen who slowed down upon crossing Piedra Rivera’s path and shined a light into his face. Adulfo immediately turned around at which time the judicial policeman riding in the back of the pick-up shot him twice, causing an impact in the chest, the right hand and the left foot. Then the judicial policeman got down from the truck and shot the victim one more time (Crónica Guerrero 1998:50–51). November 10, 1997. The Army stopped the bus that perredista Higinio Castro Zeferino (age 49) was riding on in Atoyac de Álvarez. The soldiers made Higinio Castro Zeferino get off the bus and then questioned him about an armed person that they were pursuing (Informe Anual 1997:100). On November 10 in Atoyac de Álvarez, five army men also arrived in town asking about five perredista peasants who were qualified as “bad elements that were harming the town” (Informe Anual 1997:101). The men proceeded to the town hall to ask the ejidal commissary about their whereabouts. The next day, the same peasant perredista Higinio Castro Zeferino, who had been questioned on the bus the day before by the Army, was assassinated at his home about 3 p.m. while resting in the company of his family. Three assassins were captured and the Judicial Police took them to the Public Ministry of the local municipality. November 12, 1997. The General Secretary of the local PRD Municipal Committee was gunned down at 8 p.m. at the local sports hall in Atoyac de Álvarez. The two

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assassins presented themselves, and one killed him, firing at him multiple times. Then they fled in two vehicles (Informe Anual 1997:103). November 14, 1997. Perredista Silverio García was leaving a store near the PRD party offices with his daughter when a man with a military-type haircut shot him four times in the thorax in Atoyac. His daughter was wounded by a rickshaw bullet and ran to hide at the PRD office. From the windows, eyewitnesses were able to identify the man who remained in front of García’s body to make sure he was dead (La Violencia Política 1998:65). Silverio had been threatened by the local armed priísta group; one reason why he had left his town of El Cucuyachi to live in Atoyac, sleeping in the PRD offices. He also stated that he had been watched and followed. Silverio García, like Roberto López Baltazar (assassinated on October 29), had been involved in the complaint against the army for the illegal detention and torture of PRD member Martín Barrientos (see Chap. 5). July 5, 2009. A PRD town councilman and his family were shot to death on their way to vote in the election along with 11 other victims. The unidentified killers wore federal police uniforms and slashed the throats of five of the victims. PRD governor Zeferino Torreblanco claimed the assassinations were the work of drug cartels (Huffington Post 7/6/09). August 2009. PRD politician Armando Chavarría, a local deputy from Chilpancingo, Guerrero was assassinated outside his home. Astorga and Shirk (2009:21) link this assassination to the rise of organized crime and the general problem of lack of public security in Mexico.

Jalisco December 14, 1997. PRD President of the Municipal Party Executive Committee and Director of the newspaper El Nuevo Zitlán; which has a critical orientation toward regional caciques was assassinated. The victim (José Luis Facundo Guerrero) was murdered by unknowns while walking down the street. A child was an eyewitness to the crime and testified that a Suburban vehicle with polarized windows approached the perredista and one of the assassins got out of the vehicle, shot him ten times and then returned to the vehicle and fled. The victim had also been a witness on December 11, 1997 in a legal case against the ex-PRI municipal president of Cocula José Luis Facundo Guerrero. The municipality had embargoed the home of José Luis Facundo Guerrero because he had allegedly misused municipal funds in 1993 (Informe Anual 1997:103).

Michoacán August 6, 2004. PRD mayoral candidate Bernabé García Palma (age 40) was assassinated with four shots in an automobile by an unknown assailant who fled (Proceso 9/7/04).

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Morelos May 14, 1997. PRD municipal treasurer Gustavo Aguilar Caporal was assassinated by hired guns of the PRI municipal president in Huazulco. The victim had been previously threatened with damage by the PRI municipal president and took his family away from the municipality after the threat. At the time of his death, Gustavo Aguilar Caporal had been requesting an audit of potential corrupt usage of municipal funds. PRD sources claim that the homicide was celebrated on May 15 and that it was affirmed, without specific names given, that it had been done by “contract” and that two more were coming. A legal case was opened (Informe Anual 1997:49).

Nuevo Leon March 12, 1997. PRD General Secretary of the Municipality José Refugio Gallegos Moreno and Jovito Gallegos Moreno, Organizing Secretary of the PRD Municipal Committee (brothers) were assassinated in Zaragoza during the day, a few blocks from the municipal palace by the bodyguard of the PRI mayor Cristobal Torres. The victims were killed as they went to speak with the PRI mayor. The State Judicial Police detained the perpetrator, extracting him from a mob about to lynch him. Later, however, he was released (Informe Anual 1997:32).

Oaxaca April 28, 1995. A Oaxacan leader of the peasant group COCEI-PRD of Santo María Xadani, was assassinated by Mariano Guerra López, PRI municipal president in Guerra (Proceso 5/27/96:31). November 12, 1995. One PRD member (Asunción Ixaltepec) and one PRI member (Mazatlán Villa de Flores) died in post-electoral violence after the November elections (Proceso 5/27/96:32). March 28, 1996. One perredista died and six were wounded in a shoot out in the village of Ojo de Agua. May 1996. A shoot out between priístas and perredistas left one PRD dead and two wounded in the municipality of Yaitepec (Proceso 5/27/96:32). February 17, 1997. Aarón Torres Silva, a bricklayer and perredista was shot in cold blood at his work site in San Andrés Huaxpaltepec. Legal action was in initiated on the case with no reported results (Informe Anual 1997:30). March 26, 1997. Oaxacan PRD peasant Crisóforo Gómez de Luna aged 59 and leader of the local loggers union was assassinated at 5 a.m. when he returned from bathing in a lake in Santa Maria Huaxolotitlán. He was hit six times by large wooden posts. Gómez de Luna had begun to have problems with his membership

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in the social organization “Los Tatamandones” because of his militancy in the PRD (Informe Anual 1997:37). May 1997. The ex-councilman of Barrio Chico, Santiago Yaitepec, Juquila was assassinated in the patio of his own home (Informe Anual 1997). May 10, 1997. PRD ecology secretary Felipe Hernández Mejía was assassinated in the community of Santigo Jamiltepec. The death occurred in the context of local elections when the PRI refused to recognize the triumph of the PRD. Hernández Mejía’s body was found among some rocks with a cord tied around his neck. PRD sources blame local PRI cacique Chano Lorenzo for paying hired guns to commit the assassination and the Public Ministry for delays in processing the case (Informe Anual 1997:47). May 1997. Antonio López Hernández worked in the local agrarian ministry and had been an active PRD militant in Santiago Jamiltepec. He was assassinated by unknown men while drinking a soda and walking down the street with a friend. June 4, 1997. Two PRD members (a husband – Silvano Martinez Salinas [age 42], his wife Oliva Vargas Carro [age 32], their minor son [age 14] and the paternal grandmother [age 62]) were assassinated at point-blank range in their home in Emiliano Zapata de Rio Grande when two armed men with M-1 automatic rifles burst into their house and began shooting. Three other family members – children aged 4, 6, and 8 – witnessed the killings. The two perredistas adults had been threatened on previous occasions, allegedly by members of the State Judicial Police, for their political activism (Informe Anual 1997:60). The brother of the wife claimed that the family had been under siege from local caciques for some time (Legal case 119/997) (Informe Anual 1997:60). October 3, 1998. A group of men armed with AK-47 assault weapons opened fire on the PRD councilor-elect and his family who were on-route to a PRD election victory celebration. The councilor’s son was killed and the councilor was seriously wounded. State authorities charged a PRD activist with the crime and alleged that he was a member of the ERPI insurgent group. Nevertheless, the suspect later repudiated a confession which he alleged was coerced under torture (US Human Rights Report 1999:4). PRD leaders rejected the state investigation results as false and called for federal intervention. Human rights group advocates charge that both state and federal authorities used the investigation to control and repress the opposition and peasant groups by linking them to insurgent groups. As of 2000, the case remained unresolved and still open (US State Department Human Rights Report 2001:3). June 15, 2000. PRD supporter Artemio Antonio Pérez died in his cell at the Mixistlan de La Reforma, Oaxaca jail after being arrested at a PRI political rally for causing a public disturbance. Government authorities and the Oaxaca State Human Rights Commission claimed the death was a suicide (US State Department Human Rights Report 2002:4). Pérez’s family claims that PRI party members forced persons to attend the rally and that Artemio Antonio was arresting for voicing his

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disapproval. They also claim that he died as a result of torture in prison and began a hunger strike on June 21 to demand action against prison employees Alfredo Reyes, Wilfrido Hernandez Solano, and Luis Faustino Gonzalez for abuse of authority, illegal detention and torture (US State Department Human Rights Report 2001:2). Deadly political violence was again erupted in Juquila, Oaxaca after the July 2000 Fox victory. August 2000. PRD member Miguel Ramírez Mendosa along with several catholic priests was murdered in August and September of 2000 in Juquila “as a means to show that the power interests mean business (Barca 2001).” In the autumn of 2000, PAN Committee President Pablo Mijango Cortés was also murdered on August 24, 2000 in Juquila (PBI 2001:2). May 3, 2001. Fidel Bautista Mejía, a local PRD activist in Putla, was assassinated shortly after registering as a candidate for the state legislature. The PRD Human Rights Office reported that state authorities arrested Vicente Peña Zuniga and Nicasio Bernadino López for the crime. An additional suspect included the brother of a local PRI deputy candidate who was alleged to have hired Zuniga and López to murder Bautista Mejía (US State Department Human Rights Report 2002:2). January 12, 2002. PRD mayor Jaime Valencia was shot dead in a bloody ambush while walking to his house from the municipal palace in the town of San Agustín Loxicha. The town had previously been the home of one of the EPR guerrillas who died in the August 1996 attack in Huatulco that had killed several police officers (Skeels 2002:1). Jaime Valencia, the perredista killed there, was elected mayor in August 2001, and, according to his family, began to receive death threats in December and these threats continued in early January. State prosecutors blamed to murder on the ex-PRI Lucio Vásquez to prevent him from uncovering massive theft of public funds from CONASUPO; a government subsidized store that provides foodstuffs in poor rural areas. Two of the men arrested reportedly admitted involvement in the killing and in a scheme that skimmed money from the store’s proceedings (Skeels 2002:2). The state legislature suspended the municipal authority of San Agustín and installed its own interim administration in January. February 28, 2003. A confrontation between priístas and perredistas in the small town of San Pedro Amuzgos (5,500 residents) turned bloody. Two PRD militants were killed and three wounded when they tried to recuperate a public vehicle that sympathizers of the PRI mayor had decommissioned. Perredistas had been disputing PRI control of the municipal government claiming that local authorities were corrupt and had requested that the Oaxacan Congress decree a change of powers. In the week, angry PRD militants had actually jailed the PRI mayor, the councilman and three policemen in the local jail. The situation had gotten so tense that state authorities were not initially even able to enter the locality (Tierra Noticias 2/28/03). August 17, 2003. Carlos Sánchez López, local PRD congressional deputy, legal advisor to the Peasant, Indigenous CCU (Citizen’s Council Unihidalguense) and COCEI and brother of the ex-PRD gubernatorial candidate of Oaxaca was *

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assassinated with a cement block by two individuals in Juchitán. The victim had been drinking at a bar and was carried out by two individuals who beat him to death and then left his body on the street with his pants pockets removed and with no personal identification (Proceso 8/13/03). State PRD leaders demanded justice and Indigenous Peasant Commission representatives presumed the crime to be political since the victim was in conflict with municipal authorities, as a legal advisor, seeking the destitution of the PRI municipal president in Unión Hidalgo. June 2004. A PRD member died at hospital from beat wounds by five men during a confrontation between PRD and PRI members in Huautla. The incident occurred right before the gubernatorial elections in the state (La Opinión Digital 6/29/04). September 29, 2004. Guadalupe Ávila, PRD mayoral candidate for the local elections from the town of San José Estancia Grande, was killed at a doctor’s office by the town’s current PRI mayor Candido Palacios Noyola on September 29 (El Universal 9/29/04). Eyewitnesses to the murder recounted that Palacios Noyola entered the office and told Ávila, “I’m tired of you and I’m going to kill you,” before shooting her in the back. After the perredista fell to the floor, the assassin shot her again and wounded the physician attending Guadalupe at the time. The PRD, on the day of the assassination, vowed to find a replacement mayoral candidate in time for the upcoming Sunday elections. This involved the return of Ávila’s husband from Las Vegas where he was working as a bricklayer 5 days before the election. On the day of the assassination of Guadalupe Ávila, PRD mayoral candidate in San José Estancia Grande, state prosecutor Marcos Martínez launched an investigation into the case, ordered the arrest of Palacios Noyola and 30 police were sent to the town of Cuajinicuilapa, on the border with Oaxaca to ensure that the assassin could not escape (La Jornada 9/29/04). In Mexico City at the National Chamber of Deputies, all three political parties represented on the Chamber Political coordinating Committee unanimously passed an unexpected resolution exhorting Oaxacan judicial authorities to investigate and apply justice in this case. Panista legislator Juan José Rodríguez Prats brought up the assassination in the Chamber, saying it was a “tremendously worrisome act, and that there exists a grave process of decomposition [in Oaxaca].” Prats added that PAN deputy-elect Guillermo José Zavaleta “sent me a complaint because he is being threatened and had been whipped with a pistol, assaulted by the police, bribed and beaten” by elements of the Ministerial Police, who told him they were doing such acts on orders from the State Attorney General’s Office (La Jornada 9/29/04). Perredista senator Oscar Cruz López argued that the murder represented one more of a variety of diverse attempted murders and political crimes in the “agonizing sexenio [of PRI governor] José Murat Casab.” Cruz López also exhorted that the Senate require Oaxaca to eradicate its policies of impunity and alliance with cacique groups that “today enjoy a license to kill (La Jornada 9/29/04).” The October 2004 municipal elections in Oaxaca produced a spate of deadly post-electoral violence and conflicts persisted for months in five municipalities (San Blas Atempa, San Juan Lalana, Santiago Xanica, Santa Catarina Juquila and San Martín Itunyoso) (Proceso 2/07/05).

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January 2005. Two perredistas died in Mazatlán Villa de Flores (Proceso 2/7/05). [Also counted among the dead, according to official sources were one PRI member in Coicoyán and one in San Juan Lalana; one Preventative Policeman, and 15 others were also wounded in January]. January 30, 2005. Two perredistas were killed in post-electoral violence in San Martin Itunyoso – (Fausto Guzmán Rodríguez [age 24], and Pedro Guzmán Díaz [aged 42]). (Also counted among the dead, according to official sources were two PRI members in San Martin Itunyoso; and two from the Popular Unity Party) (Proceso 2/7/05). July 8, 2010. One perredista – Fructuoso Méndez Lucero was shot to death and another – Cruz Rangel Núñez was wounded by the PRI mayor of San Pedro Totlapan, Gerardo Jarquín Díaz. The perredistas were ridiculing the mayor for the electoral failure of the PRI in the July elections (La Jornada 7/8/10).

Sinaloa September 24, 2000. PRD member and journalist Miguel Ramírez Mendoza was killed (PBI 2001:2). May 12, 2003. The brother of the PRD Federal Deputy candidate from Sinaloa was assassinated in the city after being kidnapped from El Potrero de Sataya by armed men. The victim was found with his hands tied behind his back and his mouth tapped shut. State authorities said he had a criminal history of “crimes against health” (drug-related crimes) (Reforma 5/12/03). *

July 5, 2003. Everardo Obregon Sosa, a municipal PRD leader was killed in the city of Culiacán by three unknown assailants armed with AK-47s and pistols who tried to force him into a vehicle. The state Attorney General’s office was investigating by the end of the year. The media reporting linked the incident to narcotrafficking (US State Department Human Rights Report 2001:3). *

April 2009. PRD leader Beatriz Lopez Leyva, the victim of previous attacks, was killed. Lopez Leyva had requested protection and in June, the CNDH issued a recommendation to the governor of Oaxaca, the PGR, and the Oaxacan State Congress for further investigation into the killing (US Department of State Human Rights Report 2009:2).

Veracruz May 7, 1997. PRD militant and electoral activist Bernardo Calderon Jiménez (age 26) was assassinated with four bullets (two to the heart, one in the spine and one in the liver) by an unknown in Martínez de la Torre. The victim’s body was buried in

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the municipal graveyard without the Public Prosecutor’s Office conducting the proper investigation. The PRD requested an exhumation so that the proper investigation could proceed (Informe Anual 1997:47). July 24, 1997. The body of PRD militant Doroteo Cárdenas Salas (age 23) appeared on a highway by unknowns near Comalcaclo-Tlacotalpan with signs of torture (mutilated genitals and destroyed intestines); suggesting it was not a simple vehicular hit-and-run (Informe Anual 1997:78).

Zacatecas *March 28, 2003. PRD Subsecretary of Pacting and Citizen Attention, Manuel Ortega was assassinated when he arrived at home with his wife by two men who were waiting for him outside his house. Manuel Ortega was in charge of resolving a land dispute between indigenous peasants and ejidatarios in Bernalejo. Nevertheless, PRD officials stated that the motive for his assassination may not have been related to his political work with the agrarian conflict but related to family conflicts (El Norte 3/29/03).

A Few Revenge PRD Killings of PRI Members After 2000 (Chiapas)2 The coming of Vicente Fox to power with the July 2000 presidential elections was followed 1 month later by the August 2000 election of the first opposition governor in Chiapas government in Mexican history. Independent Senator Pablo Salazár united eight opposition parties, most importantly the PAN and PRD behind him to break the PRI hold on the governorship in the state. Opposition leaders claimed that the unity candidate represented a convergence for “peace and democracy with the aim of consolidating democracy in the country by the Chiapas process (The News 7/25/00).” Salazár’s Alliance for Chiapas won with 51.5% of the vote. Even this victory should not be overemphasized, however, since the PRI still carried the EZLN-controlled areas and continued to dominate the state legislature (Grayson 2001:47). As noted above, four perredistas died in the town of Pintopea after the July 6, 2000 election day. After this single bloody event, however, no more PRD members were reported killed in the state of Chiapas. Yet, four priístas and one EZLN member would lose their lives in post-electoral conflicts with the PRD in Chiapas after 2000. This suggests that in situations where there is a reversal in the balance of power but continued elements of impunity, previous victims can become aggressors and vice-versa; a variation on the pattern of “tit-for-tat” revenge killings as found in civil strife in Northern Ireland (Sullivan 1998).

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The municipality of Zincantán was site of the political killings. One Tzotil PRI indigenous man was killed and three more wounded in a confrontation between priístas and perredistas at the municipal palace in the village of Apaz, in the municipality of Zincantán (March 2002). The conflict arose over the distribution of local political power. PRD members did not accept the incorporation of three PRI councilmen on the local council (La Jornada 3/24/02:1). Priístas also burned down the rented house of the PRD mayor. The official version of events (now more sympathetic to the PRD) claimed that PRD members who were celebrating a festival were violently dislocated. One local version of events explained that the problem began when the musical group that was central to the festival stopped playing; an act which irritated the priístas. Subsequently, according to the local account, the aggrieved PRI members drew their guns and began to fire on PRD militants which then provoked a generalization of the problem. Priísta sympathizers after the confrontation went to the municipal palace where they allegedly burned down the mayor’s house and took his son and eight other persons hostage. The latter were released unharmed after a 17 h dialogue headed by state officials and backed up by dozens of state police. Meanwhile, in the community of Pasté, the state government established a pacification commission head up by the Secretary for Indian Affairs and the local mayor in order to negotiate the release of PRI members. PRD members in Pasté held about 20 priístas against their will as part of their protest against the integration of the PRI councilmen. The local PRI version of events blamed the violence on the state government and the local assemblies for failing to take into account the political existence of PRI members (La Jornada 3/24/02:1). As for the events in Apaz, the PRI spokesperson argued that it was the perredistas “who provoked us.” Chiapas government officials claimed for their part, that their mission was to ensure neutrality in the administration of justice. The state government, in an official press communiqué, claimed it would not “permit impunity in any cases...criminal acts will be combated with exemplary actions against those who threaten the rights of third parties and break the state of law, peace and harmonious co-existence of communities in Chiapas (La Jornada 3/24/02:1).” Almost 1 year after the violence in Apaz, political violence erupted again in the municipality of Zincantán. The PRD won the municipal presidency in the village of La Cruz Roja de San Cristobál (Zincantán municipality) for the first time in the October 2001 elections. Nevertheless, local priístas did not accept the election results. A pacted solution between party leaders placed three PRI members on the local city council. However, local perredistas rejected this pact in January 2002 and since that time, both groups sustained resentment and mutual accusations of aggression (El Sol 3/5/03; La Jornada 3/6/03). The conflict became deadly in March 2003. This time the post-electoral violence left three priístas dead, 12 wounded and 43 persons detained from both parties. In addition, five vehicles were burned and furniture and supplies were destroyed inside the municipal palace (El País 06/03/03). Among the homicide victims were PRI members Mariano Hernández Pérez, aged 60 and Rigoberto Pérez Montejo, aged 26. The deaths occurred in a gun battle when priístas showed up for a protest rally against PRD mayor Domingo de la Cruz.

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However, in a reversal of the previous historical pattern when the PRD was usually in the opposition, this time eyewitness claim that it was perredista supporters who showed up in a bus with rifles, AK-47s, pistols, machetes, shovels and stones and then some opened fire on the PRI supporters (El País 6/03/03). Local authorities claim that about 200 indigenous priístas had planned to take-over the municipal palace by force. One source reports that perredistas blocked the highway with stones and shovels with the result that ambulances could not remove the wounded PRI supporters from the town (El País 06/03/03). As distinctive from both the Salinas and Zedillo administrations, the violence in La Cruz Roja de San Cristobál was immediately responded to by the authorities. Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, the first non-PRI governor, showed up with officials from the National Attorney General’s Office later that same day of the killings to try and resolve the conflict (El Sol 3/5/03). A negotiation was set up between both parties at 2:30 p.m. that day and by 4 p.m., prisoners from both sides were released (La Jornada 3/6/03). The governor ordered additional police into the zone to prevent further incidents, arguing that the situation was “intolerable” and that the negotiation process had been set up to resolve the problem “once and for all.” Despite these pacification efforts, however, the spokesperson for indigenous militants of the PRD said that over 80 families (over 322 persons) had fled their homes to the town of Nachig, a principal PRD bastion, 3 days later. This was the day that priístas had given the state government to jail those presumably responsible for the confrontation (Uniceflac 3/8/03). The spokesman noted that the “non-aggression” pact signed by the leaders of both parties a few days earlier “does not guarantee peace in the zone.” The PRI spokesman for indigenous members recognized that the situation was “tense” and stated that his fellow party-members were demanding the mayor and the municipal judge step down as they viewed them as responsible for the confrontation (Uniceflac 3/8/03). The following year in Zincantán (2004), now governed by the PRD, another political conflict in erupted again in the municipality. This time, local governing perredista leaders found themselves in direct conflict with the EZLN. Indeed, EZLN members of tzotzil families in four communities in resistance denounced perredista campesinos with the tacit support of local PRD authorities for depriving them of water, and of threatening them with death for their refusal to recognize and work with local and state authorities (La Jornada 2/1/04). One of the zapatistas claimed ironically: “those from the PRI don’t bother with us, they are peaceful because they are not in power. The ones that attack us are from the PRD, they are now the government.” Thus, in Chiapas after 2000, the few deadly conflicts between the party and other political forces all resulted in PRI deaths, with perredistas often blamed as the instigators of such violence.

End Notes Indicates Indigenous-Related Cases or Possible Civil Homicides of PRD members after 2000. There was also an apparent political revenge killing by the PRD in Oaxaca. In one event, a priísta militant was killed in Santa María Xandani in early January 1993 by three PRD–COCEI sympathizers.

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Subject Index

A Ayutla municipality cacique group, 168 Fox administration, 166 massacre, 166 murder, 167 paramilitary group, 166 political killing, 165–168 political violence, 168 selective assassination, 167 White Guard, 166 C Coda ideological and psychological mechanism, 194 political repression, 194 quadruple assassination, 196 sociocultural and historical context, 195 true martyr and democratic promoter, 195 Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH), 49 government accountability, 118–119 human rights violations, 119 no responsibility, 121–122 PRD homicides, 119–120 prior investigation, 121 public ministry, 121 standard criminal trial procedure, 119–120 state responsibility for human rights violations, 122 Criminal elements, 202 Criminal justice system, 4, 202 CNDH government accountability, 118–119 human rights violations, 119 no responsibility, 121–122 PRD homicides, 119–120

prior investigation, 121 public ministry, 121 standard criminal trial procedure, 119–120 state responsibility for human rights violations, 122 failure to adequately investigate crimes Camilio García Cruz case, 131 criminal courts, 122 Felipe Santiago Matias case, 133 Felix Octavio Ventura Ramos case, 132–133 homicide cases, 123 legal processing, 124 Lorenzo Justiniano Santiago Torres case, 134 Reveriano Cruz Rojas case, 131–132 Timoteo Mardonio Estudillo Peña case, 130–131 high-impact crime, impunity civil rights violations, 137 electoral institutions, 138 hired guns, 138 priísta officials, 138–139 public prosecutor’s office, 135–136 rule of law, 137–138 state judicial police, 136–137 unknown assailants, 138 hired guns, 123–125 local and regional legal systems, 116 political killings crime without punishment, 117–118 judicial state police, 115–116 political assassination, problem of, 116–117 state public ministry, 115–116 war on terrorism, 115 state judicial police, 123–125 suspected and convicted criminals, 125–129 239

240 D Destructive behavior criminal investigation, 76 death threats, 76, 79 democratization, 49 destructive violence, 48 dirty-work theory, 76 illegal/deviant behavior, 75 individual-level processes, 76 leadership authorization deadly violence, 51 destructive behavior, 49 political/military authority, 50 moral indifference, 77 passive legal system, 74 political assassination electoral violence, 53 FDN, 52 hierarchical oversight system, 51 PRD leaders, 53 presidential elections, 52 vs. political dissenters, 79 political-electoral homicide, 48 political killings analysis of, 80–95 justice-failure of federal/state officials, 96–109 PRD militants, 77 PRI-PRD relations, 48 rationalization dominant liberal constitutional schemata, 55 eyewitnesses, 56 justification, 55, 56 revolutionary ideologies, 55 stray gunfire, 56 violent dislodging, 57 social activities eyewitnesses, 55, 56 high-powered rifles, 55 PRD victims, 54 theoretical implications, 78 vigilantism, 79 Drug-related assassinations binational law enforcement, 19 institutional limitations, 19–20 judicial reforms, 19 organized crime, 18 regional zones of impunity, 18–19 E Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) automatic weapons, 165 high-powered guns, 163

Subject Index indigenous municipality, 164 political assassination, 163, 165 political murder, 162 Popular Liberation Army, 161 regional location of PRD deaths, 162 White Guards, 164 F Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN), 13–14 G Grupo de Investigaciones Políticas (GIP), 63 H Human rights abuses, 1–2 I Impunity Coda ideological and psychological mechanism, 194 political repression, 194 quadruple assassination, 196 sociocultural and historical context, 195 true martyr and democratic promoter, 195 electoral competition, 177 high-impact crime civil rights violations, 137 electoral institutions, 138 hired guns, 138 priísta officials, 138–139 public prosecutor’s office, 135–136 rule of law, 137–138 state judicial police, 136–137 unknown assailants, 138 law enforcement, 204 liberalization–democratization process cultural factor, 191 extrajudicial killing, 191 judicial and criminal justice systems, 16–17 legal system, 190, 192 Malian security force, 190 political mobilization, 192 PRI-PRD electoral conflicts, 17 political and civil rights electoral fraud, 193 political killing, 192 political violence, 193 political competition and electoral threat killings, 179

Subject Index municipal data and statistical model, 179–181 political assassination, 180–182 rural and urban cacique rule, 178 political murder, 203–205 political party strategy, 205 political violence and repression, 203 prosecution ballot stuffing, 185 blocked transition, 186 clientelism, 184 crime-preventing agency, 186 drug trafficking, 187 electoral-related violence, 182 godfather system, 187 intermediary dimension, 188–189 law-enforcement authority, 183 patronage network, 182 police harassment and illegal detention, 185 policing method, 182–183 political violence, 184 White Guards, 183 rule bound legal system, 177, 204 structured system, 34–35 Impunity and electoral challenges, Guerrero Ayutla municipality cacique group, 168 Fox administration, 166 massacre, 166 murder, 167 paramilitary group, 166 political killing, 165–168 political violence, 168 selective assassination, 167 white guard, 166 brutality, 173 civil homicide reduction, 174 interpersonal violence, 173, 174 political-electoral conflict EPR (see Ejército Popular Revolucionario) politically related death, 159–160 PRD and Aguas Blancas Massacre, 157–159 state violence and mobilized indigenous people, 160–161 political murder criminal justice system, 171–173 failure of prosecution, 170–171 human rights violation, 169–170 juridical security and legal certainty, 170 violent conflict, 169 postelectoral violence and political assassination

241 Michoacán, 156–157 municipal election and political killing, 148–151 Petatlán, 153–156 political violence and repression, 151–153 regional variation armed peasant, 144–145 electoral competition, 144 guerrilla movement, 144–145 perredistas, 144 social conflict, 146–147 sociological theory, 143 state-level law enforcement, 174 Individual political killings, 3 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 56 Interpersonal violence, 28, 173, 174 J Judicial system, 201 L Leadership authorization deadly violence, 51 destructive behavior, 49 political/military authority, 50 Liberalization–democratization process accountability, 8 criminal justice system, 7–8 cultural factor, 191 emergence of PRD crime rates, 17–18 drug-related assassinations, 17–20 electoral decline, 14–15 electoral reforms, 12–13 FDN, 13–14 impunity, 16–17 municipal government, 15–16 2006 president election, 16 extrajudicial killing, 191 homicides, 7 legal system, 190, 192 Malian security force, 190 Mexican political and legal system authoritarianism, 11–12 constitution, 10 Partido Acción Nacional, 11 presidentialism, 11–12 1910 revolution, 10–11 Spanish law, 10 political-electoral killings, 7–8 political mobilization, 192

242 M More murder in the middle (MMM), 31 N Nonviolent political change and legal system, 205–206 P Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), 11 Political and civil rights electoral fraud, 193 political killing, 192 political violence, 193 Political assassination authorization, direct evidence of, 61 clear judicial processing, 61, 95 contested cases, 61 cover-up/authorization CNDH, 63 hired guns, 64, 65 total impunity, 64 impunity, 61 250 PRD victims, 60 problem of, 116–117 structured system of impunity political party strategies, 35–37 Puebla, 43–45 social origins and political activism, 37 targeting, 61–62 Political competition and electoral threat killings, 179 municipal data and statistical model, 179–181 political assassination, 180–182 rural and urban cacique rule, 178 Political-electoral conflict politically related death, 159–160 PRD and Aguas Blancas Massacre, 157–159 state violence and mobilized indigenous people, 160–161 Political murder criminal justice system, 171–173 failure of prosecution, 170–171 human rights violation, 169–170 juridical security and legal certainty, 170 violent conflict, 169 Political repression, 2 Postelectoral violence and political assassination Michoacán, 156–157 municipal election and political killing, 148–151

Subject Index Petatlán, 153–156 political violence and repression bloody conflict, 153 conflictive political context, 152 democratic multiparty system, 151 murder, 151 risk of anachronism, 152 Public ministry, 121 Puebla political activism and PRD victims, 42–43 political assassination, 43–45 PRD victims, social origins of highway, 41 occupational data, 42 population size, 38, 41 social classes, 42 urbanized metropolitan areas, 41 S Social milieu accidents/revenge homicides, 72–73 fundamental human rights, 47 hired guns, 66–67 independent social mechanisms destructive behavior, 57 eyewitness testimony, 57, 58 homicides and assaults, 59 illegal acts, 58 mobilization, 57 paramilitaries, 58 professional anonymity, 59 stray bullet, 60 members, 65–66 police inefficiency, 73–74 police killings electoral fraud protests, 69 illegal authorization, 70 political instability, 71 stray gunfire, 69 political leaders, 47 postelectoral conflicts, 48 PRD members, 47 rationalization electoral fraud, 55 eyewitnesses, 56 justification, 55, 56 revolutionary ideologies, 55 stray gunfire, 56 violent dislodging, 57 state crimes, 47 suspected perpetrators, 65 unknown assailants, 68–69 Sociological theory, 143 State-level law enforcement, 174

Subject Index Structured system of impunity accountable legal institutions cause/effect, 32–33 rule of law, 33–34 electoral-related violence, 35 global democratization and political repression accountability, 24–25 authoritarian regime, political violence, 23–24 civil rights, loss of, 26 Mexico, transformation of, 25–26 MMM, 31 opposition leaders, murder of, 23–24 political protest, 31–32 rule of law, 25 second wave, 26 third-wave transitions, 23 Tianamem Square massacre, 24 violent upheavals, 25–26

243 political assassination political party strategies, 35–37 social origins and political activism, 37 political killings authorization, 28 causes of, 27 civil homicides, 29 corruption, 30 interpersonal violence, 28 legal ambiguity and uncertainty, 28 legal system, failure of, 27 Puebla political activism and PRD victims, 42–43 political assassination, 43–45 social origins, PRD victims, 38–42 W War on terrorism, 115

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