Multiculturalism, Religion and Women: Doing Harm by Doing Good?

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Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Taiwan eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-03

Multiculturalism, Religion and Women

10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey

Also by Marie Macey


NEGOTIATING BOUNDARIES? Identities, Sexualities, Diversities (co-edited)


Doing Harm by Doing Good? Marie Macey University of Bradford, UK




© Marie Macey 2009

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identiﬁed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN-13: 978–0–230–20110–1

hardback

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All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.



This book is dedicated to my colleague, co-author and friend, Professor Sheila Allen, who taught me most of what I know and who died just before the book was completed. Many times as I was subsequently writing something, I could hear Sheila’s voice saying – as she did many times when we wrote together – ‘You can’t say that!’ But, as Sheila would have expected, I did – and carry full responsibility for doing so.



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Preface

viii

Acknowledgements

xvi

1

The What and Why of Multiculturalism(s)

1

2

Multiculturalism, God and Gender

35

3

Multiculturalism in Practice: Forced Marriage

63

4

Multiculturalism and Liberal Democracy

89

5

So, What’s Wrong with Multiculturalism?

123

6

Where Do We Go From Here?

158

Notes

167

References

170

Index

201

vii



Contents

Preface

It is now over a decade since the late Susan Moller Okin had the courage to put into writing the question that many women only dared to think about or discuss (quietly) with close friends and colleagues: Is multiculturalism bad for women? (Okin, 1997). Okin continues to be vilified for having raised a question that, on the surface, seems no more than a legitimate academic feminist concern, but which, on closer analysis, raises a whole raft of challenges to the conventional wisdom in academia, politics, social policy and practice, and, indeed, wider society. Perhaps it is for this reason that her work continues to attract such furious descriptions as colonialist, ethnocentric, imperialist and Orientalist from supporters of multiculturalism, both male and female. I have not seen the accusation of racism levelled at Okin, but, arguably, this is the subtext that runs through many of the criticisms levelled at her. For Okin committed the cardinal sin in multicultural terms of being critical of the way that some minority cultures treat women and suggesting, therefore, that affording rights to such groups/communities could be bad for women. What has changed since Okin voiced her concerns about the effects of multiculturalism on minority ethnic women? On the one hand, the answer is not a lot, other than the fact that multiculturalism has had another twelve years in which to become even more firmly institutionalised. On the other, for the first time in decades, concern is being expressed in Britain and elsewhere that multiculturalism might not be quite the complete solution that it was assumed to be to the issues raised by the reality of increasingly diverse societies. And there is little doubt that this shift, insofar as there is a shift, has been influenced by the shockwaves that reverberated around the world in the wake of the terrorist attacks and murders that have taken place this century and which were carried out, not by an external enemy, but by ‘home-grown’ perpetrators, that is, citizens of Western societies. In Britain, a major influence on the move towards ‘cohesion’, as compared to ‘multiculturalism’, pre-dates these events and consists of the violent public disorder and riots that took place in a number of northern towns and cities in 2001. But what these incidents share with the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the train bombings in Spain in 2004 and the bombings in England viii



The background to this book

ix

in 2005 is that the perpetrators were simultaneously ‘insiders’ – Western citizens – and ‘outsiders’ – members of minority ethnic/religious groups. This has raised questions about the previously assumed effectiveness of multiculturalism in promoting both equality and integration and has resulted in supporters of multiculturalism developing entrenched positions around the notion that not only is multiculturalism under attack, but that such attacks are, at root, racially motivated.

My reasons for writing this book This is not, then, the best of times to write a book that is critical of multiculturalism, though my motives for doing so have little to do with the violence noted above. For this book has been in my head for many years prior to those events, and a number of the concerns raised in it have also been expressed in various articles. Nor is my main reason for writing the book the fact that sociological contributions to the multicultural literature are – with notable exceptions – as thin on the ground as are references to women, though this is a factor. At root, my motivation stems from my direct experience with minority ethno-religious women, specifically those of Mirpuri heritage and Muslim faith living in Bradford, West Yorkshire. Many of these women are relatively privileged insofar as they are university students and therefore have a degree of freedom not afforded to the majority of their ‘sisters’ (and indeed ‘brothers’). Others are severely disadvantaged, the victims of forced marriage and domestic violence whom I met through my involvement with a domestic violence agency which worked particularly closely with Pakistani communities. And some are professional women who have succeeded in carving out careers for themselves – often against all the odds. What these women have reinforced for me is that there is considerable variety within ethnic and religious communities and that women have a central role to play in working for change within such communities – both of which are ignored by the vast majority of multiculturalists. But what these women have also reinforced for me is that Okin was absolutely correct when she suggested that minority ethnic women are generally more vulnerable to oppression and violence than are their Western counterparts and that the reasons for this are rooted in patriarchal cultures imported from the ‘homeland’ (Akpinar, 2003). Vulnerability to oppression and violence is particularly acute for women who enter the UK as brides and whose immigration status is uncertain – sometimes because men keep it this way as a means of exercising control over them (Dilday, 2007; Macey, 2008). Many of these



Preface

Preface

women do not speak English – again sometimes because men keep it this way as a means of controlling them. Many, therefore, have no knowledge of their rights. Need I repeat that this facilitates male control over women? Here, I do not refer to human rights in an abstract sense, but in such concrete situations as that of domestic violence. In all these examples, of course, British society plays a part. Women’s vulnerability due to their uncertain immigration status is linked to the immigration law that enables men to use this to their own ends. Lack of access to English is not due solely to the restrictions placed on women by their husbands and families, but the fact that there is inadequate provision for teaching English as a second language. And although women who enter the country as brides could be given basic information about their rights, they are not. I do not wish to pre-empt matters that are dealt with in some detail in various places in this book, particularly chapter 3. However, many minority ethnic and religious women have voiced their concerns about abuses within their communities that are being ignored by wider society. Some of these were powerfully highlighted in the 2006 reports of two government-funded consultations with Muslim women, one in England (Raz, Muslim Women’s Network), the other in Wales (Mahoney and Taj, The Saheli Project). The women who took part in these consultations raised such issues as: women as young as eleven and as old as 65 ‘disappearing’; forced marriage; domestic violence; ‘honour’-related violence, including murder; paedophilia in the community; sexual abuse in homes and mosques; incest; rape; attitudes and actions towards LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people); and the difficulty of obtaining a divorce. They also expressed concern about the role of professionals (police, social workers, teachers) and the government in enabling violence and oppression to continue by: treating culture as constituting a mitigating circumstance for violence; restricting so-called community consultation to male (often self-styled) ‘leaders’; failing to understand the concept of izzat (honour) and its impact on women; failing to investigate adequately incidents of abuse; and generally failing to intervene in communities because of fear of being accused of racism, or allowing ‘political correctness’ to take precedence over women’s, children’s and young people’s human rights. Mahoney and Taj comment: Whilst we extol the virtues of living in a global village where the advancement and promotion of equality, justice and the advocacy of human rights is a social norm, there are still those men and women subjected to complex and archaic customs such as the practice of



x

Preface

xi

honour related conditioned/cultivated behaviour, violence and abuse, living here in Wales. (2006: 17)

As readers will have noticed, I did not come to this book as a neutral commentator, but as a sociologist and a feminist critical of the role of multiculturalism in the oppression of minority ethnic women. This does not imply that I entered the debate with a totally closed mind or restricted my reading to material that supported my initial views. On the contrary – as the references should illustrate – I have tried to read as much of the large literature on multiculturalism as possible, most of which is written by its proponents. Far from changing my mind, this process has actually strengthened my conviction that Okin was correct in suggesting that multiculturalism is bad for women. Not only that, but I have found myself pushed in the unanticipated direction of now feeling that multiculturalism is not only bad for minority ethnic women, but for all of us – men as well as women, majorities as well as minorities, wider society as well as minority communities, and, indeed, liberal democracy itself. In other words, what started as a relatively narrow exercise focusing on minority ethnic/religious women has turned into a wide-ranging analysis of the implications and possible consequences of multiculturalism for British society as a whole.

What this book is … and isn’t This book is an attempt to counter the current neglect of women in the multicultural (and cohesion) literature (Okin, 1997, 1999; Mirza, 2003; Bhavnani et al., 2005). It is not, however, limited to women, largely because I found it impossible to avoid the implications of multiculturalism for other social actors and institutions. The book also examines the role of religion in relation to multiculturalism and women because: • this is a surprisingly neglected variable in both the multicultural and

race/ethnicity literature, given that while religion and culture are conceptually separable, in reality, religion is a central aspect of culture and identity for many minorities in contemporary Britain (Allen and Macey, 1994); • religion is frequently used to justify gender inequality and oppression;



The process of writing this book

xii

Preface

• there is currently a resurgence of religions across the world (Kepel,

1994, 2004; Furbey, 2008); the importance of religion and faith communities, particularly in education and the community and voluntary sector (CVS) (Farnell et al., 2003; Furbey, 2008; Macey et al., 2009); • the hard cultural conflicts tend to be religious (Gutmann, 2003; Joppke, 2004); • the mark of religious affiliation is to be exclusive (Zolberg and Long, 1999), which is in clear conflict with community cohesion; • recent legislation on religion and belief affords institutional religion and individual believers protection from discrimination and gives them particular rights (Macey et al., 2009). However, the focus of the book overall is on religion as culturally defined, rather than on its theological aspects, though these are discussed where relevant. This focus has led to considerable oversimplification of the distinctions within, as well as between, religions, and though this reflects the available literature, it is a limitation that needs to be borne in mind. Finally, the general neglect of a focus on the ability of individuals to interpret their religions differently should not be taken to imply my lack of awareness of this reality. In using a large quantity of empirical data, the book is an attempt to rectify the current imbalance between theory and research in a literature that is predominantly theoretical (Kelly, 2002; Flint and Robinson, 2008). Sociological and social psychological theory is used as appropriate and the multicultural theory that underpins various policy decisions is critically analysed, as is that which I believe has impacted directly on minority ethnic and religious individuals and communities. But theoretical development is not a key aim of this book. In adopting a sociological and feminist perspective on multiculturalism, the book also aims to fill a gap in a multicultural literature that is currently oriented towards philosophical and legal approaches. This is, of course, a particular brand of sociology and feminism and one that is critical of the influence of postmodernism and constructivism on sociology, feminism and multiculturalism. The book focuses mainly on Britain and is therefore limited to evaluating multiculturalism in relation to immigrant minorities, rather than the national/native ones which are the focus in countries of immigration (such as Australia, Canada, Israel and the US). Some reference is made to these insofar as multicultural theory and practice developed there have



• over recent years the British government has increasingly emphasised

been imported into British multicultural theory. Reference is also made to changes brought about by globalisation and migration, including challenges to the concept of the nation-state (Koenig and de Guchteneire, 2007). Using the term ‘multiculturalism’ in the title of this book may be open to challenge by the growing focus, both nationally and internationally, on ‘cohesion’ (Cantle, 2001, 2005; Sané, 2007; Singh, 2007). This is hopefully discussed in sufficient detail to answer critics. Finally, while this book lends cautious (and limited) support to some of the conclusions of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion (Singh, 2007), this does not imply acceptance of the multicultural, social cohesion or integration and cohesion agendas. Nor does my criticism of these concepts constitute a call to return to mono-culturalism, if, indeed, this ever existed in Britain in anything other than Anderson’s (1983) sense of an ‘imagined community’. Nor is it to support what Balibar describes as ‘social authoritarian arguments for the forcible assimilation of [ethnic] minorities into the national culture’ (1991: 5). It is, however, to propose that some level of integration and shared values is necessary to the maintenance of society and that this needs to be considered in responding to Grillo’s question: What kind of pluralism is possible or desirable in countries like Britain, France and the USA, where there is a commitment to universalistic, democratic ideals? What room should such societies allow for being French or British or American ‘differently’? (1998: 189)

Some final comments and caveats I have to confess that I have been shocked by the viciousness of some of the (profoundly anti-academic) comments on Okin’s writing on the topic of this book, particularly since I share Pollitt’s initial reaction: ‘I have to say I’ve had a hard time understanding how anyone could find these arguments controversial’ (1999: 27). Since then, I believe that there has been an increase, rather than a decrease, in the dominance of ‘political correctness’ in the discourse on minorities in general and multiculturalism in particular. I am therefore under no illusions that any caveats that I insert at this stage will protect me from criticism, but having found myself qualifying virtually everything that I wrote – to the point of nearparalysis – I decided to insert some brief notes in this preface rather than the book itself.



Preface xiii

Preface

First, the language used in the multicultural and race/ethnicity literature is contested and constantly changing in terms of what is acceptable and/or fashionable. I am conscious that I have already breached some contemporary ‘rules’ by using such terms as minorities’, race (without the required scare quotes), victims instead of survivors, and so on. There is also some variation in terminology in the book – for instance, South Asian, Pakistani, Mirpuri – and though I have tried to be as specific as possible, some inconsistency has inevitably resulted from my use of empirical research that uses such terms differently. Second, the question of generalisation is a difficult one and although, in the interests of brevity, I do not always specify the limitations on generalisation from particular pieces of research, I have tried to be as clear as possible. Third (and linked to the preceding point) the crucial question of correlation versus causation runs through this book, particularly in relation to my central thesis that multiculturalism has negative consequences for certain social categories and in relation to certain social processes and events. However, there are few – if any – cases in which multiculturalism can be said to have caused x, y or z. This is partly because the complexity of the social world – the subject matter of sociology – is such as to militate against the production of causal relationships. It is also because much of my discussion is centred on multiculturalism as an ideology, and it is notoriously difficult to prove a direct/causal relationship between ideas and action, behaviour or events. I am satisfied, therefore, to accept that my work is concerned with correlation rather than causation. Fourth, issues of agency and change necessarily arise from my adoption of a critical approach to the effects of multiculturalism on particular ethnic and religious communities. As with previous points, the insertion of caveats in the text became not only repetitive, but interfered with what I was trying to say. It is thus perhaps necessary to say at this point that nowhere do I intend to imply that minority communities – like majority ones – are static rather than dynamic, or that minority (or minoritised) women lack agency. Fifth, there is some concentration in this book on the Pakistani (Mirpuri) culture and Islam. This is a reflection of both my own research and the available literature, and this itself is connected to the fact that it is this category that has most frequently challenged British policy and practice and demanded that it be changed. Finally, a point that is more a reflection than a caveat per se is that at the end of the day, I am not entirely sure that it is multiculturalism itself, however defined, that I feel so uneasy about, or whether this concept has



xiv

come to represent a constellation of related ideological changes, many of which I actually regard as positive. These include a growing emphasis on human rights, particularly in relation to disadvantaged social categories such as ethnic, racial and/or religious minorities, women, non-heterosexuals and disabled people. Whatever the case, my problems are less to do with the underlying philosophy of what might be termed the equalities agenda, than they are with how this is operationalised – especially under the banner of multiculturalism.



Preface xv

Professor Susan Moller Okin, whose work on gender justice, particularly multiculturalism and women, was a major inspiration to me and whose death has been a great loss to the ongoing debates on feminism and multiculturalism. Dr Clare Beckett, who played a significant part in encouraging me to write this book in the first place and who gently harassed me when I showed signs of flagging. My younger son, Iain, who kept me going throughout with both practical and emotional support, and who continued to believe in me when I had difficulty believing in myself.

xvi



Acknowledgements

1

Introduction The logical way to start this chapter would seem to be with an analysis of the meaning of the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ as used in Britain and elsewhere. But multiculturalism was, and is, a response to cultural and religious diversity in society, so that to understand it we need to locate it within a wider socio-historical context. This chapter, then, first gives some information on diversity in contemporary Britain, then traces the origins and change over time of the policies developed in Britain to cope with these demographic changes. Finally, it moves towards trying to establish the key principles of multiculturalism as I use the concept in this book.

Diversity in Britain According to the 2001 census, 92.1 per cent (54,153,898) of the total population of the United Kingdom was ‘white’. Non-white minority ethnic groups constituted just 7.9 per cent, comprised of such diverse groups as: ‘mixed’, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, ‘other Asian’, black Caribbean, black African, black ‘other’ and Chinese (ONS, 2005a). In terms of religion, 70 per cent of people (40 million) identified themselves as ‘white Christian’; 71 per cent of black and 52 per cent of ‘mixed’ ethnicity also identified their religion as Christian. Other faiths included Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism. The largest minority ethno-religious group was Pakistani Muslims (686,000); other sizeable groups were Indian Hindus (471,000), Indian Sikhs (307,000), Bangladeshi Muslims (261,000) and white Jews (259,000) (ONS, 2005b). These facts raise two important points: first, the so-called white population – the vast majority – is far from homogeneous, but 1



The What and Why of Multiculturalism(s)


comprises people whose contemporary and historical origins span the globe; and second, the minority ethnic and religious categories – only some of which are seen to be in need of multiculturalism – are also highly diverse. Together, these points raise some fundamental issues about the multicultural project, not least why it should be considered necessary, how it is possible and on what basis its roots in racialisation are justified. These issues run throughout this book and are discussed in more detail in various places.

The making of multicultural Europe The historical context of multiculturalism is the need, following the Second World War, of most economies in Western Europe to draw on non-indigenous labour to boost their workforces. Some societies, notably Britain, France and the Netherlands, made use of labour from their former colonies, while others, such as Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany, drew on the southern peripheries of Europe, with Germany also going further afield to the Philippines and Korea. From the outset to the present day, patterns of recruitment and the conditions attached to migrant workers have varied among countries (European Commission, 1985) and are related to both historical and contemporary factors. The former include nationalism and deeply entrenched beliefs about who could – and could not – be a citizen (Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), 1989; Just, 1989). The latter include the effects of membership of the European Union, such as the co-ordination of increasingly restrictive immigration policies (Hammer, 1985; Cohen, 1988; Allen and Macey, 1990). The legal, political, social and industrial rights (or lack of rights) of non-EC nationals varied according to the domestic law and administrative regulations of the country in which they lived. These included no security of residence, no right to vote in or stand for election, no right to be joined by family members or visited by relatives, and children born in the country having no automatic right to citizenship. Switzerland, for example, had an ‘open door’ tradition with respect to tax and capital, along with a ‘closed door’ approach to outsiders, policing foreign workers vigorously via permits of abode or residence (Cohen, 1988: 164). Germany enforced a strict distinction between Gastarbeiter (guest workers) and the Volk (the people) whose citizenship was determined by inheritance (blood ties). Instructions on implementing



2

The What and Why of Multiculturalism(s) 3

Foreigners enjoy all basic rights, except the basic rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education and protection from extradition abroad. (Castles et al., 1984: 77) Sweden, which has long made use of labour from Finland and more recently from Yugoslavia and elsewhere, was one of the first countries to accept fully the consequences of this economic need and to take steps to treat immigrants as more than labour units. France has always operated an egalitarian policy in relation to immigrants and citizenship, on the condition that they accept total assimilation (Melotti, 1997), though some writers now dispute this, as discussed below. Under the 1948 British Nationality Act, Britain granted full citizenship to the Commonwealth workers it recruited and was, Melotti suggests, more tolerant of cultural differences and the formation of minority ethnic communities, while not being committed to equality of membership of the national community. According to Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), however, it was Britain and the Netherlands that made the first, and most ambitious, commitment to multiculturalism in Western Europe, earning them the title of the ‘standard-bearers’ of European multiculturalism (Joppke, 2004: 247).

The making of multicultural Britain Although black people have lived in Britain for over 500 years (Fryer, 1984), like most other Western European countries, Britain only became significantly multiracial/ethnic when post-war restructuring and expansion forced the reluctant recruitment of overseas labour. Despite being British citizens, the overwhelmingly male migrants were viewed as units of labour who, it was assumed, would return to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed. Migrants were discriminated against in the workplace, lived in appalling conditions and suffered ignorance, prejudice and outright racism in society. Because many South Asians subscribed to the ‘myth of return’ (Anwar, 1979), they tolerated this with little, or no, complaint, believing that they could save enough money to return to much improved living conditions in their homelands. The recruitment of overseas labour was, of course, linked to an earlier period of globalisation during which Britain and other Western European



the 1965 Foreigners Law in West Germany stated, with no apparent irony:


countries colonised much of the world (it was also linked to the fact that women who had been doing ‘men’s jobs’ during the war were expected to leave the labour market once the war was over). Thus, when confronted by serious gaps in the labour market, Britain turned to its colonies and former colonies to meet its needs. By the late 1940s, recruitment campaigns in the Caribbean had brought black people to Britain to do the work that white people were no longer willing to do. They were followed during the 1950s by migrant workers from the Indian subcontinent who generally took unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, significantly in industries that were in decline, such as textiles.

Britain’s response to ethnic, racial and religious diversity There are three levels at which Britain’s response to diversity can be analysed. First, what might be termed the grassroots, that is, how white British citizens reacted to their black and Asian counterparts; second, how the state dealt with diversity in terms of the law and social policy, and, third, the ideological level – the ideas, principles and beliefs that underpinned state-instigated policy and practice. While one might expect there to be a dialectical relationship between these spheres, there is also tension and contradiction within and between each, as well as a gap between rhetoric and reality.

The grassroots level (1): racism and discrimination in post-war Britain The Policy Studies Institute claimed that, in 1985, there had been no overall change in the geographical or economic position of black Britons since they first arrived as immigrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s (Brown and Gay, 1985). Others claimed that there was evidence of systematic discrimination against black and Asian people on every social dimension and in all spheres of policy and provision. In health, Gordon and Newnham (1986) pointed to widespread inequality in standards of health and the resources provided to combat these, while Burke (1988) reported differences in both the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. In housing, overcrowding and poor conditions were noted by Brown and Gay (1985), the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1985) and the Greater London Action for Race Equality (1987). In education, there was evidence of racism on the part of both staff and students (All Faiths for One Race, 1982; DES (Swann), 1983; All London Teachers Against Racism and Fascism, 1984; Troyna and Williams, 1986).



4

In employment, black and Asian people generally remained in manual jobs and/or suffered discrimination in relation to promotion prospects (Allen et al., 1977; Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1985; London Association of Community Relations Councils, 1985; Newnham, 1986; Brennan and McGeevor, 1987; Gifford and Bundy, 1989). In social services and social security, widespread racism was reported by Gordon and Newnham (1985), Connelly (1987) and Rooney (1988). A similar charge was made by Gilroy (1982) with respect to the criminal justice system. By 1981, the police admitted that racially motivated violence was common and increasing, with attacks on Asians running at 70 per 1,000 and on African-Caribbeans and Africans at 50 per 1,000 compared to 1.4 per 1,000 for whites (Home Office, 1981). In 1987, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) stated that racially motivated attacks, particularly on and around people’s homes, were extremely high and growing at an alarming rate. In 1988, Pilger claimed that racist attacks in London had reached a level reminiscent of those against Jews at the start of the twentieth century. Overall, then, after 30 years in England, and despite the implementation of three Race Relations Acts (in 1965, 1968 and 1976), there was little improvement in black and Asian people’s position on conventional measures of social wealth. Nor, as Allen and Macey observed in 1990, had the position of their children improved; indeed, for many it had actually worsened, partly due to the economic situation (Allen and Macey, 1990).

The grassroots level (2): racism and discrimination in contemporary Britain As illustrated above, when black and Asian people first came to Britain in significant numbers, they experienced racism and discrimination. Today, 60 years down the line, there is still evidence of systematic inequality across all the dimensions discussed above in relation to earlier periods, though there is also considerable variation between ethnic groups. It needs to be noted, however, that there are difficulties in comparing different periods of time, not least because the categories used for the collection of statistics varies. Today, for example, the breakdown of ethnic categories is more refined than in earlier periods, and the 2001 census collected information on religious affiliation for the first time. This shows that there is a correlation between religion and advantage/disadvantage, though it is extremely difficult to disaggregate religion and ethnicity (Macey et al., 2009).





As in the period of initial settlement following the Second World War, minority ethnic/religious groups have worse employment prospects than their white counterparts and are paid less. Pell (2007) shows that there is a discrepancy between the employment rates of minorities and majorities of between 60 and 76 per cent, with considerable variations between groups. Indian men have the same rates as whites and Indian women have almost as high rates as white women; Bangladeshi men have the lowest employment rates (57 per cent) and Pakistani and Bangladeshi women at 24 per cent have the lowest rate among women. In terms of religion, Muslim women have the highest economic inactivity rate of all faith groups – 68 per cent compared with 28 per cent for Christians and around 35 per cent for Hindus and Sikhs (Open Society Institute, 2005). In terms of earnings, Berthoud (2000) refers to an ‘ethnic deficit/penalty’ in male weekly pay, showing that when such factors as education and age are controlled for, there remains an ethnic penalty of 7 per cent for Indians, 24 per cent for Caribbeans, 36 per cent for Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, and 40 per cent for Africans. These differences are not restricted to majorities versus minorities, but are gendered. Platt (2007a) points to substantial pay gaps, not only between men and women, majorities and minorities, but between minority men and women with an average weekly pay gap for minority women of 20 per cent – over three times as high as that suffered by minority men, at 6 per cent. She also demonstrates that educational qualifications make little difference to the prospects of minority ethnic women, whereas they do for all men, other than Africans. However, some caution is needed in interpreting these statistics because there are fewer minority women in paid employment, more work part-time and their characteristics differ from those of men due to changes over the lifecycle related to childbearing/rearing and other caring responsibilities. On the other dimensions discussed above, gaps remain between members of majorities and those of minorities. These include health (Ahmad and Jones, 1998; Sproston and Mindell, 2006); mental health, where minorities are over-represented in the mental health system (Nazroo, 1997; Sproston and Nazroo, 2002); housing, with overcrowding, poor conditions and impoverished neighbourhoods (Sellick, 2004; Beckford et al., 2006); education, where again, while gaps remain between majority and minority ethnic groups, they vary by both gender and ethnicity/ religion, with some minorities (such as Indians and the Chinese) doing as well as, or better than, their white counterparts, while Pakistanis are underachieving, though girls are beginning to catch up (Abbas, 2002,



6

2003; EOC, 2007a; T. Phillips, 2007); the use of health and social services provision varies by ethnic, religious and racial group (Chambra et al., 1998; Ahmad et al., 2000; Atkin et al., 2002; Katbamna et al., 2002; Chahal and Ullah, 2004); black men have long been over-represented in the criminal justice system, including in prison, and young Muslim men are increasingly involved in crime (Macey, 2002). A different aspect of this is that these groups are significantly more likely to be stopped and searched by the police (Jones and Singer, 2008). And both black and Asian people are more likely than whites to be the victims of racially motivated violent crime, including homicide (Institute of Race Relations (IRR), 2008; Jones and Singer, 2008). In sum, it would appear that efforts to eliminate racially and ethnically based inequality in Britain have been less than fully successful, despite considerable strengthening of the race relations legislation in 2000 and amended regulations in 2002. This raises a number of questions about the reasons for disadvantage, which should, of course, inform the development of policy to tackle it. This is a particularly important point in relation to a book on multiculturalism, and one to which I return below.

The state, law and social policy One of the most striking aspects of British social policy with respect to immigration is the lack of preparation or provision for the black and South Asian workers who entered the country as a result of post-war recruitment drives in the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. This is clearly connected to the assumption that migrant workers would be a temporary feature of the British landscape. Indeed, it was not until the early 1960s when the families of such workers had begun to settle in the UK that it was realised that African-Caribbean and South Asian Britons were ‘here to stay’ (Gilroy, 1987). It was then acknowledged that ‘something had to be done’, at least about non-English-speaking children in British schools. So began a series of interventions, defined by Mullard (1982) as ‘assimilation’, ‘integration’ and ‘pluralism’ and corresponding to changing ideologies at government level, as discussed below. Suffice it to note at this point that these interventions are deeply revealing of attitudes and have had long-term consequences for racialised relations in Britain. The neglect that characterised the welfare policy arena did not extend to the sphere of immigration legislation, which, from the early 1960s, was characterised by increasingly restrictive laws directed primarily to




8


If we went on as we are, then by the end of the century there would be four million people of New Commonwealth or Pakistani origins here. Now that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture. And you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react, and be rather hostile to those coming in. (Thatcher, 1978) This and similar negative comments by other politicians, together with increasingly restrictive immigration legislation, provoked Ben-Tovin and Gabriel to suggest that: state racism has over-shadowed all subsequent discussion and action in the field. The official equation of blackness with second-class and undesirable immigrant – the principle that black people are in themselves a problem and the fewer we have of them the better – has dominated the public ideological discourse on race and has set the parameters for political action in this arena. (1982: 146) Whether or not changes in immigration legislation constitute ‘state racism’, there is no doubt that from 1962 such changes, and the political discourse that accompanied them, were characterised by a focus on visible minorities. Thus, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted immigration to citizens with passports issued in the UK or by a UK government representative overseas (such as the High Commissioner of a former colony) or who held a Ministry of Labour employment voucher. In 1965, the Home Secretary announced a tightening of immigration controls in a speech that was marked by open hostility towards African-Caribbean and Asian people. In the same year, Labour imposed a ceiling of 8,500 labour vouchers per year for the entire Commonwealth, as well as giving sweeping new powers to the Home Secretary. The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, passed by a Labour government, withdrew the right of British passport holders in East Africa to live in Britain. This was in response to the large numbers of East African Asians holding British passports who had been forced to leave their homes as a result of



limiting the entry of black and Asian people. The former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, justified this in an interview by saying:

Ugandan and Kenyan ‘Africanisation’ policies. The Act restricted entry to Britain to those whose citizenship had been acquired by birth, adoption, registration or naturalisation, or if they had a parent or grandparent who had been born or adopted in the UK, or who had obtained citizenship in the UK itself. This not only represents a highly novel interpretation of the meaning of citizenship, but one that emphasises ‘ancestral connections’ that are – almost by definition – white. The 1971 Immigration Act replaced all previously existing immigration laws and virtually ended immigration for settlement, restricting it to spouses and dependants of those already settled here and those who had a parent or grandparent born in the UK (though this has not been the case with respect to transcontinental marriage, as discussed in chapter 3). Notwithstanding the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, in 1972 the admission of 27,000 Asians expelled from Uganda resulted in a new ‘moral panic’ over immigration and led to the establishment of a Select Committee on Immigration and the introduction of further stringent immigration curbs. The 1981 British Nationality Act removed the ancient right of birth on British soil (jus soli) as the basis of citizenship and replaced it by that of descent (jus sanguinus). It created three classes of citizenship: British citizens; British dependent territories citizens, and British overseas citizens. Of these, only British citizens had unqualified right of entry to Britain – and British overseas citizens actually had no right of abide anywhere! It seems that the British government’s policy on black and Asian immigration was considerably more highly developed and consistent than was that on social welfare. It is not, then, surprising that many academics and activists levelled the accusation of racism against the government (Sivanandan, 1982; Macdonald, 1983; Layton-Henry, 1984; Miles and Phizacklea, 1984). However, in a more nuanced approach to an analysis of changing immigration law and its effect on racialised relations, Solomos (1989) points to the complexities and contradictions inherent in the situation – one of which was change over time in the ideas that underpinned government thinking about how to deal with diversity in Britain.

Diversity and ideology It is clear that the ideologies that have driven social policy and practice in the sphere of race and ethnicity in Britain have changed significantly over time. The rationale for such change includes the growing awareness of racialised difference and division in society and the role




of racism in this. In addition, there was pressure on the government to adopt a pluralist, or multicultural, approach to education and through this to society as a whole. This pressure came from a number of sources, including two official inquiries – one into the educational underachievement of black children in schools (the Swann Report); the other into the reasons for the urban disorders/riots in the 1980s (the Scarman Report). And over time, black and Asian people themselves organised to put pressure on the government, first in the name of equal opportunities/antiracism and subsequently through the development of identity politics, to claim the right to be different under the banner of multiculturalism. Assimilation (1950s–1965) The ignoring of post-war migrant workers noted above only began to change when these workers started to exercise their right as British citizens to bring their families to join them here. The immediate concern then was assimilation, that is, how to absorb immigrant children into ‘the British way of life’ as quickly as possible. This rested on the belief that a harmonious nation could only be created by minimising difference, and the best way of achieving this was by instilling both the English language and culture into Asian children. The focus on Asian, rather than black, children was for the simple reason that most black children came from the Caribbean where English was their first language and where they were educated within an English (and Christian) system. Asian children were sent to reception centres, language units or, in the 1960s and 1970s, dispersed via ‘bussing’. The official purpose of bussing was to try to avoid schools in areas of high Pakistani settlement being unable to cope with large numbers of children who had no access to English – a strategy that was condemned as racist and against which protest was mounted (see Troyna and Williams, 1986). The situation in cities such as Bradford is now one where some schools are close to 100 per cent Pakistani Muslim and there are areas where over 75 per cent of children start school with no access to English. In wider society antagonism to immigration was growing, fuelled by the overtly racist speeches of some politicians and, perhaps, by the introduction of increasingly draconian immigration laws directed particularly towards visible minorities. Integration (1965–early 1970s) The integration phase saw the government shifting from an ideology of assimilation to one that saw integration ‘not as a flattening process of assimilation, but equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins, 1970 [1966]: 267).



10 Multiculturalism, Religion and Women

This constituted an acknowledgement that ‘the problem’ did not rest entirely with minorities, but that white racism was also implicated. In schools, however, the approach was not to challenge racism, but to teach indigenous children to be tolerant of ‘other’ cultures. In 1971, Bernard Coard published a damning indictment of racism in education in his book How the West Indian Child is Made Educationally Subnormal in the British School System. However, at the same time as the government was publicly promoting integration, individual MPs were doing little to further the cause of good racialised relations. In the 1964 election, a virtually unknown Conservative used the slogan ‘If you want a Nigger for a Neighbour, Vote Labour’ to topple a leading Labour politician from a safe seat in the Midlands (Ballard, 2007). And in 1968, another Conservative politician warned of ‘rivers of blood’ flowing in the streets as a consequence of lax immigration laws (Powell, 1968). The government’s restrictive immigration controls also continued to target black and Asian people. Cultural pluralism (1970s–1980s) Cultural pluralism represented a significant shift from the assumption of a culturally and politically united society to acceptance of distinct cultural/ethnic groups in Britain. This was the beginning of what is today called ‘multiculturalism’, with the government stating that the school curriculum must take account of the multiracial nature of Britain. In 1979, it also launched an official inquiry into the educational underachievement of minority ethnic children. The outcome – the Swann Report – provided a semi-official legitimation for tackling prejudice in schools with the aim of promoting cultural pluralism in both the education system and wider society (Department of Education and Science, 1985). Meanwhile, public antagonism to visible minorities continued to be fuelled at the state level, including the distinction made in 1977 between British citizens and British overseas citizens. Racialised relations deteriorated and in 1980–1 there were a number of urban uprisings, termed ‘race riots’ by the media, despite the involvement of white as well as black people in them. These resulted in an official enquiry, the report of which called for an urgent response from the education system (Scarman, 1982). The development of multiculturalism From the 1960s to the 1980s, education engaged in a form of multiculturalism ‘ based on the premise that the key issue facing schools is how to create tolerance for black minorities and their cultures in a white nation




now characterised by cultural diversity or cultural pluralism’ (Rattansi, 1992: 13) This version of multiculturalism is a million miles removed from any of the ways that the term is used today, and was scathingly dismissed by such committed anti-racists as Mullard (1985) and Troyna (1993) as ‘the 3 Ss approach – Saris, Samosas and Steel Bands’. The focus was on prejudice (rather than racism) and the belief was that this could be eliminated by teaching white children about minority cultures. This was despite such evidence of racism in schools as that published by the CRE, Learning in Terror, which pointed to the widespread abuse of black and Asian students by white ones, including physical attacks that required hospital treatment (CRE, 1988). The change to anti-racism The situation in schools was, of course, a reflection of that in wider society, and by the 1980s an anti-racist movement had developed, partly as a result of anger at the failure of multiculturalism to eliminate racism in schools and society. This viewed racism as embedded in social structures and institutions and proposed that institutional ideologies and practices must be challenged and links made with other oppressions based on class and gender. However, in 1988, Murder in the Playground reported an inquiry into the murder on school premises of a thirteen-year old Asian boy by a white boy. This report, written by committed anti-racists, castigated the anti-racist policies of the school and local education authority as having contributed to the murder, labelling them ‘doctrinaire, divisive, ineffectual and counterproductive’ (McDonald et al., 1989). This raises questions about effective strategies for achieving racial equality and positive inter-ethnic relations that are directly relevant to the topic of this book, and which are discussed later. And back to multiculturalism It was not only such shocking events as a murder on school premises that gave anti-racist supporters pause for thought, but during the 1980s and 1990s a series of articles were published that were critical of both the theory and practice of anti-racism. These pointed to theoretical and conceptual inadequacies, including its essentialising of black people through its failure to deconstruct ethnic categories; its failure to locate anti-racism within an economic context or to properly consider the intersections and interactions of class and gender, its ignoring of Asian and religious identity, and its inability to include the growing number of people of ‘mixed parentage’/dual heritage (Modood, 1988; 1989; Miles, 1989; Mason, 1990; Gilroy, 1992; Hyder, 1993; Lindsey, 1994; Macey, 1995a; 1995b).




By the 1990s, anti-racism had ceded the ground to multiculturalism, albeit a multiculturalism claimed by its adherents to incorporate the best of anti-racism and – through its emphasis on access to power – to constitute a move towards real cultural pluralism (Modood and Werbner, 1997). This retreat from the potential radicalism of a Marxist-inspired and sociologically oriented anti-racism was undoubtedly welcomed by politicians who were more comfortable with the ‘psychological’ and less threatening approach of multiculturalism.

Minorities, anti-racism and multiculturalism Before bringing my account of the ideologies underpinning Britain’s response to becoming a multicultural society up to date, it is pertinent to ask what minority communities and individuals were doing while the government was changing its policy and practice in this sphere. At the risk of some oversimplification, the answer is that there was considerable divergence between black and Asian populations. For, though some Asian people, notably the young of Indian origin, were involved in various anti-racist struggles, it was generally young Caribbean people who were at their forefront, inspired first by the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, then the Black Power Movement in the US, and the anti-apartheid and Black is Beautiful campaigns in South Africa. But these movements were not only operating in a totally different context from that which applied in Britain in the 1970s (when their influence was felt most strongly here), but were underpinned by very different philosophies. Though all sought the advancement of black people, the civil rights era was fundamentally about achieving equality within society as it existed, an approach that some saw as assimilationist. The Black Power Movement, on the other hand, was about the politics of black self-identity and, indeed, in some cases separatism (Gaber, 1994). So it was to be in Britain. Short-circuiting the need to consider differences in the history, groups involved or philosophies that underpinned North American struggles for racial equality, Britain blindly followed where the US led. This resulted in the widespread adoption by anti-racist groups of the self-definition ‘black’, which was seen as a ‘political’ tool aimed at uniting all people who were subjected to racism, irrespective of their ethnicity, culture or religion. That this intention, laudable though it may have been, was fraught with both theoretical and pragmatic difficulties is highlighted by Dummett’s observation that: The term ‘black’ is de rigeur in some circles for all victims of discrimination: the use of this term can lead, on the one hand, to calling the





Notwithstanding the implications of Dummett’s statement, the overarching (and simultaneously inclusive and exclusive) term ‘black’ was subsequently adopted by academics, politicians and policy-makers. This resulted in considerable confusion in relation to both empirical research and the implementation of inappropriate and inadequate policies based on this, particularly in the spheres of education and social work. The acceptance of the right of self-definition in the academic, policy and practice spheres was indicative of the growing influence of minority pressure groups operating within an anti-racist and multicultural framework (see Gaber, 1994, for an analysis of this, particularly at the local state level). However, while there are clearly positive aspects of this, there are also serious negative ones. It led, for example, to accepting that black children underachieved educationally and therefore that the appropriate policy focus was on anti-racist education. However, using data that deconstructed the category ‘black’, Hymas and Thomas (1994) came to very different conclusions. They showed that black Africans, the Chinese and Indians from Africa and parts of the Asian subcontinent in fact achieved higher educational qualifications than whites and that a higher proportion held top professional jobs. Had Hymas and Thomas thought of gendering the categories that were said to be failing, e.g. African-Caribbeans, they would also have found that it was the boys who were underachieving, while the girls were succeeding educationally. (See Macey, 1995a, for a fuller discussion of the role of ideology in social science research; Mason, 1990, on the role of categorisation in research; Tomlinson, 1983, and Tanna, 1990, for critiques of educational research.) At this time, for a variety of reasons – some of which can only be described as racist – the majority of people of South Asian heritage rejected the term ‘black’. An important factor was that many people from the Indian subcontinent were less concerned with fighting racism than they were in establishing what Ballard (1994) terms ‘ethnic colonies’ and reasserting the norms and traditions of their homelands in British cities. This is linked to the perception that their stay here would be temporary – until they could improve their situation ‘back home’. Thus, unlike African-Caribbean settlers who regarded England as the ‘motherland’ (Green, 1990), South Asians were mainly concerned to ensure that neither they nor their culture was tainted by unnecessary contact with a



Chinese black, and, on the other, to denying that anyone who is not at least in part of African or Asian descent could be the victim of racial discrimination. (1991: 172)

society and a people whose morality they viewed with less than wholehearted admiration! (See Ballard, 1994; Shaw, 1994; Lewis, 2002; Macey, 2005a and Yip, 2004 for examples of negative evaluations of British morality, both historical and contemporary.) It is interesting to observe at this point that women were centrally implicated in the self-exclusion from wider society that would subsequently facilitate male control over them within self-contained communities. This ‘separatist’ orientation was encouraged by chain migration,1 which enabled the establishment of ethnic enclaves comprised of close-knit, often related, people (Ballard, 1994), and which facilitated the maintenance of the norms, values and traditions of the homeland. These differences in orientation between black Caribbean and South Asian settlers have had a significant influence on their subsequent trajectories which are highly relevant to the multicultural enterprise. Community/social cohesion (2001–) Community cohesion – later termed social cohesion – is (almost) the latest in a series of ideologies concerned with both racially based inequality and exclusion and – more broadly – with the social relationships (or lack of relationships) between ethnic groups. And though some see this as a retreat from multiculturalism and an over-reaction to ‘Islamic terrorism’, this is not correct. For by the late 1990s, concerns were being expressed in many Western European societies that multiculturalism had reached an ‘impasse’ and that a new, multicultural model of integration was needed (Melotti, 1997; Joppke, 2004). However, these were undoubtedly given a new urgency by the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 (9/11), the murders in the Netherlands of Pym Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, the train bombings in Madrid in 2004 and the bombings in London in 2005 (7/7) (see Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007, on the Netherlands; Abbas, 2005; 2007, on Britain). In the UK, though, it was local events in 2001 that precipitated the development of the concept of community cohesion. These consisted of a series of violent public disturbances and riots in a number of northern towns and cities, which were carried out almost entirely by young men of Pakistani heritage and Muslim faith (Carling et al., 2001; Macey, 2005b). In all the areas involved, the men’s families originated from Mirpur in the (Azad) Kashmir area of Pakistan, i.e. from a rural, rather than an urban area. And in all cases, the communities in which they lived in England were – and are – residentially and socially separated from others. This is particularly striking in cities like Bradford, West Yorkshire, which was the scene of the worst rioting for 20 years on mainland Britain




(Macey, 2005b). In a report written before the riots, Sir Herman Ouseley (2001) used the term ‘parallel lives’ to describe the extent of ethnic separation in Bradford, and official investigations highlighted this factor in relation to the other towns and cities involved, notably Burnley and Oldham (Cantle, 2001; Clarke, 2001; Denham, 2001; Ritchie, 2001). An earlier inquiry had also highlighted residential and social separation as one of a number of influences on public disorder (Allen and Barrett, 1996). Hence, community cohesion was born out of crisis (violent public disorder and riot) and the inquiries into this, which focused strongly on the lack of social interaction between ethnic individuals, groups and communities. It probably goes without saying that this approach was greeted by a storm of protest, as appears to be the case with every government initiative that is seen to impact on the apparently sacrosanct right of minority groups to live exactly as they choose. An example here is the introduction under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 of an English language requirement for settlement in the country. This was greeted by widespread accusations of ‘racism’, despite the obvious positive effects that access to English confers on individuals and communities. In particular, women who do not speak English are vulnerable to various kinds of abuse, including domestic violence and husbands who use their wives’ irregular immigration status to control them, and/or to take additional wives (Dilday, 2007; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HAC), 2008; Macey, 2008). However, leaving aside the knee-jerk – ‘it’s all racism, innit?’ – reactions epitomised by writers such as Back et al. (2002) to the suggestion that lack of interaction between ethnic groups was implicated in the riots, a number of more measured criticisms were made. These included questions about the reality of separation (Phillips et al., 2002; Simpson, 2004) and about its assumed effects (Amin, 2002; Robinson, 2005; Ballard, 2007). Others, however, had pointed out that segregation can turn into polarisation (Modood et al., 1997); that lack of interaction across ethnic boundaries can strengthen (already conservative) community traditions (Parekh, 2000a); and that lack of contact between ethnic groups can lead to defining outsiders as not sharing in the moral community, with potentially lethal results (Horowitz, 2002). Notwithstanding any of these responses – whether positive or negative, knee-jerk or nuanced – community cohesion became government policy with amazing speed or, some might suggest, unseemly haste. By 2002, the Local Government Association (LGA) had issued detailed guidance to local authorities and other public bodies on how they should promote (and measure) community cohesion (LGA, 2002). There has




been a broadening of the range of agencies assigned key roles in this process (Flint and Robinson, 2008), including education and housing (Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), 2006; 2007; Housing Corporation, 2007). In the CVS, projects applying for funding are now required to demonstrate a cohesion element, i.e. to show that they are working across ethnic boundaries (Community Development Foundation, 2007). All this is based on the ‘contact hypothesis’ – the notion that interaction between groups can reduce stereotyping and prejudice (Brown, 1995; Hewstone et al., 2006). This, in turn, is based on a range of psychological and social psychological theories about individuals, groups and identities (Adorno et al., 1950; Tajfel, 1970; Dozier, 2002). And though Amin observes that ‘Habitual contact in itself, is no guarantor of cultural exchange’ (2002: 14), it may be that the negative effects of racism, social exclusion and residential and social separation are such as to demand a radical rethink of multiculturalism. Whether ‘social cohesion’ represents this is a different question and will be discussed later. Integration and cohesion (2007–) Notwithstanding the fact that social cohesion policies had not been implemented long enough to assess their effectiveness, in 2006, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government announced the establishment of a Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Chaired by Darra Singh, Chief Executive of Ealing Borough Council, the Commission published its final report, entitled Our Shared Future, in June 2007. The upbeat title reflects the general tenor of the report in which much is made of surveys claiming to show that the vast majority (around 80 per cent) of UK citizens perceive people of different backgrounds as getting on well in their local areas (Attwood et al., 2004; Kitchen et al., 2006; MORI, 2007). This is an extremely odd finding that contradicts a large number of surveys and inquiries which consistently demonstrate the geographical and social separation of ethnic groups. These include the official inquiries following the ‘Northern Riots’ already referred to; Channel 4 Dispatches (2006); Peach (2006); Mirza et al. (2007); and Carling (2008). I can only assume that the explanation is the definition of ‘local areas’ used in the survey (on which no information is provided) together with the fact that inter-ethnic work-based contacts were counted as ‘mixing’. Whatever the case, the report states that ‘Cohesion rates in areas ranged from 38 per cent to 90 per cent – but in only ten out of 387 areas was it under 60 per cent’ (Singh, 2007: 21). This statement is made even





In Britain, we have learnt to celebrate the talents and contributions to our society of people from different backgrounds, races and faiths. We are becoming more comfortable in our differences and confident in our shared values. The latest data from the Citizenship Survey shows that 92 per cent of people feel that individuals from different backgrounds get on well in their area. (2009: 3) This raises the obvious question of why, if inter-ethnic relations are so positive, there is any need for multiculturalism, community cohesion, integration or the allocation of significant sums of money to improve cohesion – £50 million announced in 2008 under the cohesion banner, with a possible additional £8 million under ‘connecting communities’ in 2009 (Kitchin, 2008: 1–2). This question is of some significance in assessing whether multiculturalism has had positive or negative effects on social relations across ethnic and religious boundaries, to which I shall return. At this point, the question is whether the cohesion agenda differs significantly from the multicultural one. Perhaps not surprisingly, the answer is ‘yes’ and ‘no’. On the one hand, Cantle is at pains to reassure his readers that community cohesion involves no lessening of commitment to diversity, including the maintenance of minority languages and cultures. He states: ‘By actively seeking to maintain different traditions and views, we make it clear that one “value” that we hold in common is to respect what we do not have in common’ (2005: 148). He repeats this in a subsequent book when he refers to the need to maintain ‘genuine cultural distinctions’ and ‘linguistic differences within communities to underpin cultural differences’ (Cantle, 2007: 94). Thus, despite its title, it is difficult to see Cantle’s version of cohesion as anything other than remaining rooted in multicultural thinking. Arguably, in his addition of ‘integration’ to Cantle’s ‘cohesion’, Singh (2007) moves further from the multicultural paradigm, and in so doing has attracted accusations of promoting assimilation and retreating from multiculturalism (Baubock, 2002; Burnett, 2004, 2008; Rattansi, 2005; Bourne, 2007). What is certainly the case is that Singh raises a number of issues that can be seen to challenge ‘conventional’ multicultural thinking. First, he points to the changing nature of migration and settlement, linked to



more strongly by Hazel Blears, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in her foreword to the Cohesion Delivery Framework Overview, where she states:

globalisation, and to what he calls ‘super-diversity’ (2007: 34). By this he means that migrants now come from all over the world, rather than just countries with historical ties to the UK. Of course, in a sense this was always the case, though there is no doubt that the magnitude of diversity has grown, as has the variation in types of settlement, with many from the former Eastern Europe having no plans for permanent settlement here. Nevertheless, I think a criticism of multiculturalism is that from the outset its focus has been both essentialised and racialised, as discussed in chapter 5. Second, Singh takes on board the fact that identities are multiple, rather than singular, though I disagree with his suggestion that this is either new or that a single-identity orientation was adequate in the 1960s and 1970s (Singh, 2007: 34). On the contrary, I would argue that one of multiculturalism’s most basic flaws is its prioritisation of ethnic identities over all others and its failure, therefore, to deal adequately with the differences and divisions that accrue from such aspects of the person as, say, age and gender. Again, this is dealt with in more detail in chapter 5. Finally, Singh highlights trans-nationalism as a particular form of multiple identity, and while I agree with him that this is a very important aspect of the whole multicultural/cohesion/integration debate, it is hardly new. It is, and always has been, particularly relevant to my concerns about the potentially negative effects of multiculturalism on minority ethnic/religious women. Singh states that research suggests that trans-nationalism helps, rather than hinders, integration because ‘a trans-national identity may give people the confidence in their own identity to engage with wider society’ (2007: 35). Unfortunately, no information is provided about this research – which I am certainly not aware of – but the notion that maintaining (an ossified version of) the culture of the homeland somehow aids integration and participation in British society is pure multicultural theory. I would argue exactly the opposite for some of the reasons that Singh himself refers to: On the other hand, there are also those who are isolated from wider UK society, as they get all their information about the world from internet sites and satellite TV based in their home country. And transnational identities can be prioritised over national ones in narratives of war or extremism, as seen in the emphasis on global issues expressed by the 7/7 bombers. (2007: 35) While I would suggest that international, rather than trans-national, influences are probably more relevant to suicide bombing, of more




immediate concern to me is the influence of trans-national identities on the treatment of women. For encouraging the maintenance of the culture of the homeland can be extremely dysfunctional for women if this culture is rooted in highly restrictive definitions of their roles. This is particularly the case when such women do not have access to alternative views of the world, and therefore choices, because they do not speak English – a situation that was, and is, encouraged by multiculturalism and on which the government has only recently taken action. Multiculturalism’s encouragement of trans-national identities and orientations has both direct and indirect effects on women. An example of the former is forced marriage (discussed in chapter 3); an example of the latter concerns its potential impact on male attitudes to violence against women. There is evidence, for example, of how events on the Indian subcontinent impact on attitudes and actions here, as Samad (1998) notes in general terms and Allen and Barrett (1996) report with reference to the specific instance of voting in local elections. It is an open question whether this influence extends to so-called ‘honour’ crimes of the extreme type reported in newspapers and updated regularly in the Pakistan Journal of Women’s Studies (see Khan, 2008). In relation to gender issues, Our Shared Future is actually a considerable improvement on previous offerings in the arenas of multiculturalism and cohesion in that women actually receive some attention! And Singh’s emphasis on women as key agents in unlocking the potential of communities, the need to work with them and the need to encourage participation and leadership at the local state level are both long overdue and welcome. Whether this constitutes a retreat from, or a threat to, multiculturalism is another question. But it is certainly a ‘softer’ form of multiculturalism and one that seeks to balance the rights on which multiculturalism has focused with the responsibilities of citizenship. But women will only benefit from the integration and cohesion agenda if it can begin to undo some of the harm done by multicultural thinking. This is, of course, a very big if – and one that will need to be supported by central government through changes to social policy and by local government ceasing to interpret earlier cohesion policy in ways that impact negatively on women. Action so far does not leave me sanguine: in February 2008, the government formally accepted just two of the Commission’s recommendations, both concerned with definitions/typologies (Kitchin, 2008). In January 2009, it issued a new Cohesion Delivery Framework Overview (CLG, 2009), which mentions women just once, and that only to note research suggesting that ‘vulnerable people’, including women, have more negative perceptions of cohesion (CLG,




2009: 23, based on research by Laurence and Heath, 2008). Notwithstanding my scepticism about the reality, as against the rhetoric, of the difference between the integration and cohesion agenda, its predecessor social cohesion and multiculturalism, I accept that, theoretically at least, the latest version has the potential to challenge multiculturalism. I do not, therefore, include this when I refer to multiculturalism in the remainder of this book, but return to it in the final chapter. Despite my acknowledgement that the government’s newfound focus on integration and cohesion could be interpreted as a retreat from multiculturalism, this may be more apparent than real. Time will tell. However, multicultural thinking has become so institutionalised in Britain that few pause to challenge its underlying assumptions or to ask whether or not it is really a ‘good’ thing. This is partly because it is seen, at least by politicians, policy-makers, activists and academics, as part of the struggle against ethnic and racially based inequality and exclusion. That the public may not share this view is clearly of no concern to any of these people, despite its implications for the likely success of the multicultural/cohesion agendas. And it is worth noting here that surveys in Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands indicate that the general population is far from supportive of multiculturalism (see Betts, 1996, on Australia; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007, on the Netherlands; Poulter, 1998; Barry, 2001, on Canada, and Hjerm, 2000, for a comparison of Australia and Canada, and Austria and Germany). Perhaps in these countries – as in Britain – to question either the validity or utility of multiculturalism is to invite the accusation of being right wing, conservative or reactionary, if not out-and-out racist. It is pertinent, therefore, to ask whether multicultural (or anti-racist) approaches to tackling racism or racially based inequality have been effective, or, in the case of the newer integration and cohesion, are likely to be so. Certainly, the material presented above under the heading ‘Racism and Discrimination in Contemporary Britain’ would appear to leave no room for complacency. However, a more critical look at this is in order – for things may not be entirely as they seem!

Difference, disadvantage and discrimination – a cautionary note Throughout this chapter I have reported, rather than questioned, the research on racism and discrimination. And there is no doubt that various forms and expressions of racism exist in Britain that impact – sometimes fatally – on those British citizens who are recognisably




‘different’, whether on the basis of skin colour or such other signifiers as dress codes. Nor, as illustrated above, is there any doubt that some visible minorities are disadvantaged across many areas of social wealth and that some of this is the result of discrimination based on race, ethnicity and/or religion. Finally, there is no doubt that visible minorities are sometimes culturally and/or religiously different in terms of attitudes, values and lifestyles. In all these cases, the key word is ‘some’ and this is a matter for empirical investigation, not assumption. However, it is crucial to distinguish between difference, disadvantage and discrimination, particularly in carrying out, and interpreting, research that may be used to inform social policy. That this is not always the case in the arena of racialised relations is illustrated by research that starts by ruling out any consideration of the potential effects on disadvantage of ethno-religious differences. In most cases, this is so taken for granted that authors do not make it explicit. An exception is the Equal Opportunities Commission’s statutory investigation into Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women and work in England, Scotland and Wales. This states at the outset that the researchers were determined to ‘move away’ from cultural, ethnic or religious influences to focus on workplace discrimination (EOC, 2007a: 4). I believe that this illustrates the stranglehold that multicultural ideology has gained over our thinking and perceptions to the point that ‘disadvantage’ is used synonymously with ‘discrimination’. So convinced have we become that racism and Islamophobia are widespread, if not endemic, in Britain that the possibility of some disadvantage being a function of difference rather than discrimination is rendered as being ‘beyond the pale’. It is arguable, however, that the relative disadvantage suffered by some minority ethnic groups is not the result of discrimination, but of cultural and/or religious beliefs and the lifestyle choices that follow from these. A clear example of this is material inequality. We are repeatedly told that Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims are the poorest people in Britain. Berthoud (who does not ignore the contribution of cultural factors to poverty) comments: ‘Name any group whose poverty causes national concern – pensioners, disabled people, one-parent families, the unemployed – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were poorer’ (1997: 180). Leaving aside the fact that the operation of a cash economy2 makes it impossible to use conventional measures to assess their economic position, there are a number of aspects of Pakistani and Bangladeshi culture and religion that clearly contribute to poverty. These include: larger than average family size; the high incidence of children with disabilities; extended family living; women who do not work outside the home; unemployment or




low-paid male employment – largely, but not entirely – related to lack of educational qualifications and skills; the practice of sending remittances ‘home’ to Pakistan or Bangladesh, and undertaking regular visits there. Many of these factors are significantly exacerbated by transcontinental marriage, as discussed in chapter 3. An obvious point here is that lack of money has knock-on effects in other spheres, such as housing and health, which are then listed as if they were independent variables to produce a picture of widespread deprivation over which people have no control and that is widely assumed to be the result of racism and/or Islamophobia. None of this is to suggest that that racism and/or ethno-religious discrimination play no part in disadvantage and deprivation, though the extent of this is far less clear than is widely assumed. It is to suggest, however, that it is not the only factor and that to ignore cultural and religious influences is to present a very partial picture. Moreover, the danger of this is that it will influence the construction of social policy in ways that are unlikely to be effective in improving the situation of disadvantaged groups. This may well be one of the reasons why so little apparent progress has been made in closing the gaps between ethnic and/or religious groups – though it is crucial to remember here that there are major differences between minority as well as majority groups, as noted above. This, in itself, should make us cautious of too ready an acceptance of the blanket ‘explanation’ of racism, suggesting, rather, that it would be wise to consider differences within, as well as between, ethnic groups. This is particularly highlighted by those categories whose members are not easily distinguishable in terms of appearance but are in very different structural and material positions, such as Indians (Christians, Hindus and Sikhs) relative to Bangladeshis and Pakistanis (Muslims). Thus, if one takes a number of the areas in which equality has remained elusive, as noted above, one finds that there are, indeed, cultural differences that should be considered in arriving at an understanding of the reasons for disadvantage. For instance, an extended family of grandparents, parents and five children supported by a single, low-paid wage earner is unlikely to be financially well off. This will be exacerbated if that family also helps to maintain relatives in Bangladesh or Pakistan (Ballard, 2004) and if, as is the case in a significant percentage of South Asian families, a number of the children have disabilities (Health Education Authority, 2000; Mir et al., 2001; Overall et al., 2002; Christianson and Modell, 2004). The policy initiatives that might help to alleviate the difficulties faced by such a family will obviously depend on the reasons for their situation.




Thus, if the reason for there being only one member in the labour force is due to ethnic/racial/religious discrimination, then an appropriate response is through existing race relations and/or religion and belief legislation. If, however, it is due to a cultural and/or religious belief that a woman’s main role is centred on childbearing and rearing and the home, then such legislation is totally irrelevant. Similar points apply to this hypothetical family’s need for specialist disability services. If the wife’s inability to work outside the home is due to lack of such services, then a logical response is to improve the provision of these. If, however, such services are available but are rejected for religious or cultural reasons, as Shah (1995; 1999); Ahmad et al. (2000) and Atkin et al. (2002) suggest, it is difficult to see how this family can be helped – other than by setting up totally separate childcare and special needs provision for Muslims, as, in fact, has been proposed in relation to the health service itself (Sheikh, 2007). All this is so self-evident that it is utterly perverse to ignore it – as the literature does – and this raises some fundamental questions about the knowledge of reality, or the motivations, of multicultural theorists, which are discussed later.

Difference, disadvantage and multiculturalism My reason for including the above section is not to criticise the values and lifestyles of minority individuals and groups who suffer relative material deprivation. Nor is it to ignore the key structural influences that are arguably at the root of working-class and minority ethnic disadvantage (Flint and Robinson, 2008; Bottero, 2009; Sveinsson, 2009). It is, however, to question the validity of locating all the blame for inequality in racism or ethnic or religious discrimination. It is also to question the logic of, or justification for, multiculturalism – a movement based on assumptions of cultural differences – choosing to ignore these as and when convenient. The reasons for stressing the need for a broader approach to the analysis of potentially contributory factors is because of its implications for the development of social policy and service provision designed to ameliorate the situation. This is where multiculturalism comes into the equation as part of the struggle against inequality that is perceived to be linked to discrimination based on race, ethnicity and, increasingly, religion. What I have suggested so far is that minority ethnic disadvantage is not only the result of discrimination, but that there are some aspects of some minority cultures and religions which are centrally implicated in inequality. From this it follows that it is counterproductive to adopt a




policy (multiculturalism) that is geared to perpetuating these under the banner of working towards equality. This is not an entirely original thesis, and a number of multiculturalists themselves, such as Fraser (1997), have expressed concerns about the neglect of the material dimension. Critics, of course, have also done so. Barry, in particular, writing as an egalitarian liberal philosopher, provides an impressively detailed analysis of the tensions inherent in the struggle for equality being located within a multicultural framework. He concludes that ‘a politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution’ (2001: 8). However, I part company with Barry when he says: ‘But it remains true that ‘culture is not the problem, and culture is not the solution. Ill-conceived public policies can make culture into a problem …’ (2001: 317). For while I acknowledge the philosophical accuracy of his comment, I think it is sociologically questionable in relation to certain elements of inequality, as noted above. I think it is even more normatively questionable in the sphere of gender, where Okin (1999) proposes that ‘multiculturalism is bad for women’, and Patel states that multicultural policies ‘have had an enormous and devastating impact on women’s autonomy and rights’ (1998: 22). These arguments will be illustrated in chapter 3 with reference to the practice of forced marriage, but before going further in my criticisms of multiculturalism, some definitions of the concept are necessary.

So what do we mean by multiculturalism? When I first started writing this book I thought I knew what multiculturalism meant – at least in Britain. However, the more I became immersed in the literature, the more I realised how wrong I was. For trying to articulate a clear definition of the concept is like peeling an onion, where one layer is followed by another … and another … and another. Every time I thought I’d achieved at least an operational definition of the term, up popped another definition, or policy, or practice, or argument for or against the philosophical underpinnings of the term. The only consolation is that a number of renowned advocates of multiculturalism clearly share my problem. Kukathas (1986; 1992; 1996; 1997; 2001) suggests that ‘What exactly multiculturalism amounts to … is not so clear, since policies bearing that name vary, and principled defences of multiculturalism do not always defend the same thing’ (2001: 85); and Modood (1994; 1997; 2001; 2005; 2007) says: ‘multiculturalism is conceived differently in different countries and is given varied institutional expression depending upon the local and national political culture’ (1997: 4). The situation is positively encapsulated in Anthias’ comment that: ‘there are





‘Multiculturalism’ has been used to describe a wide range of circumstances and is understood and interpreted in a number of different ways. As a result, it no longer has any real meaning, other than at a very generalised level and in political terms. (2008: 68) Of course, it may be that it is the very breadth of definition that enabled Kymlicka to state in 1998 that there is no clear alternative position to multiculturalism, and in 2001a, that multiculturalism is now the dominant, and accepted, approach to diverse societies across the world. For if everybody is using the term differently, it is easy – though not necessarily true – to claim that multiculturalism is the agreed way of dealing with culturally and religiously diverse societies. This is not to suggest that the widespread acceptance of a theory, policy or practice necessarily makes it true or accurate, let alone the right, best or most effective way of dealing with a particular situation. In this case, ‘the situation’ is the increasing cultural diversity of European societies following the Second World War and ‘multiculturalism’ is the range of theory, policy and practice that has increasingly been implemented to deal with this. It is worth remembering here, however, that, prior to multiculturalism, the dominant approach to increasing diversity – in both numerical terms and in relation to the extent of cultural difference – was assimilation, which at the time also went largely unchallenged. It is also the case that much of the non-Western world that has become multicultural in normative terms expects settlers, whether permanent or temporary, to operate on the adage ‘When in Rome … ’. And this is not entirely unreasonable in relation to people who choose to migrate to other countries, presumably in full knowledge of differences in their social norms and values. In other words, we need to exercise caution in accepting that the latest thinking is necessarily the best – particularly in the sphere of inter-ethnic or religious relations which history shows are marked more by conflict than by goodwill. Notwithstanding this, as noted above, since the 1940s, increased migration has turned most industrial, or post-industrial, societies into multicultural ones – at least in terms of the ethnic and religious composition of their populations. And since the 1980s, more and more Western European states have implemented some variant of multiculturalism characterised by the accommodation, rather than assimilation, of minority



as many varieties [of multiculturalism] as Heinz or blossoms’ (2002: 279) and negatively in Cantle’s statement:

cultures and religions into liberal democratic societies. Notwithstanding this, the difficulty of defining what constitutes multiculturalism is illustrated by recent comments on France, a country widely viewed as a bastion of secular assimilation. Echchaibi (2007) points to the introduction of multicultural policies in France in the early 1980s, and Aitsiselmi suggests that France has ‘shifted from a centralized model of national identity, based on total assimilation, to a multicultural approach which recognizes cultural and religious differences’ (2006: 131). Schain (1999) argues that France is now de facto multicultural (which is not to say that it has embraced a multicultural ideology). Bertossi (2007) points to the influence of republicanism on French thinking about nationality and citizenship and how this has affected subsequent attitudes to immigration and settlement. Hamdan (2007) argues that multiculturalism is not compatible with French secularism. Whatever caveats apply to defining societies as multiculturalist, it is fair to say that there has been a general shift from assimilation to accommodation, not only in Europe but in many other countries, notably Australia, Canada and the US. This has come about for a number of reasons, some of which concern the desire to narrow the economic gaps between ethnic groups; some reflecting changes in philosophical, ethical and political thinking about equality and human rights, and some in response to grassroots struggles, first for racial equality and later for cultural and religious recognition. Though there is no single, agreed definition of multiculturalism, a number of references suggest at least some level of shared understanding. For example: 1. ‘in broad terms, multiculturalism advocates dealing with diversity not by assimilating, or expelling, cultural minorities, but by accommodating them’ (Kukathas, 2001). 2. ‘Multiculturalism … is underpinned by notions of respecting diversity and valuing cultural difference …’ (Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). 3. ‘Multiculturalism is a policy agenda designed to redress the unequal treatment of cultural groups and the “culture-racism” to which members of minority cultural groups are often exposed’ (A. Phillips, 2007). 4. ‘Multiculturalism as a political, social and cultural movement has aimed to respect a multiplicity of diverging perspectives outside of dominant traditions’ (Willett, 1998). 5. ‘Multiculturalism is a political and normative perspective on cultural diversity, where this is positively valued and worth securing and promoting’ (Parekh, 2000b).




6. ‘Multiculturalism involves a range of rights, different foci, including political representation, affirmative action, exemptions from laws, recognition of traditional legal codes, etc.’ (Kalev, 2004). 7. ‘Multiculturalism – the belief that all cultures are equal in value; every individual and every culture in which individuals participate, as being equally valuable’ (Minogue, 2005). 8. ‘Britain should develop both as a community of citizens (the liberal view) and as a community of communities (the pluralist view)’ (Parekh, 2000b). 9. ‘the political idea of multiculturalism – the recognition of group differences within the political sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship …’ (Modood, 2007). 10. ‘A shift to true multiculturalism … would involve the abandonment of cultural hegemony by the native Britons’ (Melotti, 1997). Put at its simplest, multiculturalism refers to the policies and practices developed by Western societies to cope with the non-Western cultural and religious diversity that now exists within their borders. But this is where there ceases to be anything ‘simple’ about it, for multiculturalism – like culture itself – is not static, but dynamic, so that theory, policy and practice change over both time and place. Cantle (2008) refers to ‘a spectrum from “assimilation” to “co-existence”’ (2008: 90). Anthias distinguishes between ‘liberal … and critical or reflexive multiculturalism’ and contrasts ‘hard and soft versions of this’ (2002: 279). On a ‘common-sense’ level one could, perhaps, place the definitions above on a continuum from soft, through liberal to hard, with critical or reflexive multiculturalism being seen as aspirational and concerned to remove the barriers to accepting the legitimacy of ‘different ways of being’ (May, 1999). At the soft/liberal end of the continuum, it could be argued that there is – on the surface at least – little that is particularly original, radical or objectionable about a multiculturalism that talks about not removing from the country people whose cultures or religions differ from the majority (Kukathas), trying to reduce their structural inequality (Phillips) or treating them with respect (Meetoo and Mirza). However, things start to look more problematic when demands are made that all cultures be regarded as equal (Minogue), that group differences should be recognised within the public arena (Modood) or that Britain should cease to define its own culture (Melotti). But even with the softer forms of multiculturalism the devil is in the detail, for it all depends on what happens to theory when it becomes enshrined in policy and operationalised in practice. This is not always easy to assess, partly




because few societies have adopted multiculturalism as an official policy in the way that Canada has, so that it is not clear what it means, for instance, to say that Britain, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands or France are multicultural societies. It is also because multicultural theory, policy and practice – like culture itself – change over time and place, and so, too, do the reasons for it, the ethnic and/or religious groups it targets and its focus, whether on government policy, activist and/or community groups or individuals. But multiculturalism is considerably more than a policy approach to coping with the cultural and religious diversity that now characterises Western societies. It is an ideology (in every sense of the term) that aims to influence both individual and societal attitudes towards different cultures and religions and their embodiment in individual and community lifestyles. Some would call this ‘social engineering’; Flint and Robinson, however, while apparently seeing no problems with multiculturalism on this dimension, refer to the more recent cohesion agenda as ‘the contemporary manifestation of a civilising offensive through which governments seek to inculcate particular values and to reshape the morals and behaviour of the population’ (2008: 259). This seems to suggest that multiculturalism is acceptable because it targets only the white majority for change, while adopting a laissez-faire attitude towards ethnic and religious minorities. Integration and cohesion, however, are not acceptable because they suggest that change is a two-way process, requiring adjustments by all members of society. This attitude seems to me to permeate a great deal of multicultural thinking and is deliciously illustrated by Modood’s criticism of ‘the “naïve” use of the term “Asian” by some white British people in ignorance of the cultural heterogeneity it encompasses’ (1997: 13). Modood is absolutely correct; however, he seems to be blissfully ignorant himself of the fact that exactly the same criticism applies to his own use of the term ‘white’! This is a rather amusing example of the tunnel vision that seems to dominate multiculturalism, but it is one that has potentially negative implications for the multicultural enterprise. It may, for instance, explain why many ‘ordinary’ (majority? white?) people feel that multiculturalism treats their culture with a serious lack of respect and that it is a threat to British culture as a whole. It is this kind of feeling that could engender support for far right political parties, such as the British National Party (BNP). Going where angels fear to tread, I would say that despite significant differences on a number of dimensions, most multiculturalism rests on a number of assumptions that have become so taken for granted that they have virtually ceased to be open to critical appraisal. Some of these




are discussed in more detail in chapter 5, but it is worth noting two foundational ones at this point. The first is the apparent belief that without active state intervention, minority cultures will become extinct. Watson refers to ‘coercive assimilation’ whereby mono-cultural state institutions act to suppress other cultures that thus ‘are persuaded to wither away’ (2000: 3). Cantle describes assimilation as entailing ‘the loss of minority languages, traditional dress and other outwardly identifiable characteristics, as well as the adoption of political economic and social norms that are determined by the majority’. He goes on to say: ‘with limited or no provision to support them, differences may nevertheless soon be expected to wither away’ (2008: 90). In addition to being patronising, I think this is one of a number of seriously erroneous assumptions that underpin multiculturalism. And in encouraging state intervention, it is one that flies in the face of the liberal democratic principles that gave birth to the multicultural movement. Leaving aside the question of why the ‘withering away’ of differences between people is felt to be a wrong that merits state intervention to prevent it, there are two elements to this assumption. First, the notion that without active (state) support cultures will wither away seems to rest on a very odd definition of culture. All cultures change over time, through interaction with other cultures, so in diverse societies, unless we propose banning all forms of inter-ethnic interaction, change is inevitable. It may even be that some aspects of cultures do, indeed, cease to exist over time, but anthropological and sociological intelligence suggests that this occurs over a very long period of time. The important points from this are first that cultures are inherently dynamic, and second that cultures develop in response to the challenges posed by their context/environment – and when that environment changes, so too do cultures, albeit sometimes rather slowly. In extreme conditions, such cultural adaptation is actually a requirement of human survival; in more benign ones, it is more a matter of cultures working for or against the interests of the group. What usually happens is that people retain certain aspects of their original cultures unchanged while modifying others to ‘fit’ better with the new environment. Generations of migrants to Britain have sustained strong and vibrant cultures without any help from multiculturalism, as is evidenced by such communities as Orthodox Jews and Catholic Poles. A major difference between such communities and the ones on which multiculturalism focuses is that outsiders have not tried to insist that individual members must conform to aspects of their culture that they might wish to reject or tried to lock them into




continuing membership of cultural communities that they might wish to leave. A further aspect of the argument that minority cultures need help to preserve themselves is highlighted by Cantle’s reference to political, economic and social norms being determined by the majority. The implication that it is somehow illiberal, unjust or wrong for the majority to define the norms of society runs through a great deal – though not all – of multicultural theory. But one of the key definitions of liberal democratic societies is that they represent the will of the majority, so that in criticising this, multiculturalism is challenging liberal democracy itself. And on a practical level, it is difficult to see how else liberal democratic governments could run the state. The second assumption that multiculturalism appears to share is that the communities and cultures they seek to protect and preserve are both unchanging and homogeneous up to, and including, being ungendered, which, as most women know, translates in practice to being male. Nor, apparently, are minority ethnic/religious communities troubled by other internal differences – and divisions – that are a feature of majority ones, such as age, class or sexual orientation. Thus, the prioritisation of ethnicity over all other aspects of the person is a common characteristic of multiculturalism, though rarely is an attempt made to justify this. Mirza (2003) notes that in the Commission on the Future of Multi Ethnic Britain (Parekh, 2000a) women get just a three-page mention out of 314 pages and Bhavnani et al. (2005) observe that Cantle’s Community Cohesion report (2001) fails to look at the specificity of gendered social action. Nor has this generally changed over time, despite key developments in feminist theory and Okin’s work on gender, culture and inequality, including her seminal critique of the effects of multiculturalism in these areas (1989; 1997; 1998; 1999). Even in Canada – the country that first introduced multiculturalism and is still seen as its leader in both theory and practice – the parliamentary briefing on Canadian Multiculturalism makes no mention of women (Dewing and Leman, 2006). And Canada’s guru on multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, has little more to say about women in his 2007 book than he did in 1995, with only six mentions in 374 pages. It remains more commonly the case that it is work that has moved towards ‘cohesion’ rather than multiculturalism that takes at least some account of women, though even here this is not always so. Thus, for example, Britain’s architect of community cohesion, Ted Cantle, mentions women briefly only five times over the 236 pages of his 2005 book, and has little more to say about them in his 2008 one, other than with




reference to (white women’s) enfranchisement, sexism and the authoritarian personality. In the proceedings of the Runnymede Conference on Community, Cohesion and Citizenship (2002) minority ethnic women are not mentioned at all. The Communitarian Network (2002) does better, mentioning women twice – once stressing women’s, and gay, rights and stating that discrimination against either group is unacceptable. The report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (Singh, 2007) also refers to women, including having a specific section and recommendations on ‘working with women’. Nevertheless, though this attention to women’s issues is a welcome improvement on most other writings, it remains a very small part of a lengthy (173 A4 pages) report. I would argue that the neglect of women is not a minor issue of concern only to feminists, but constitutes a crucial omission in most multicultural theory, policy and practice, an omission that has profound consequences, not only for women, but for all members of minority ethnic and religious communities. This argument is further developed in chapter 5, but before that I want to discuss what I believe is another central neglect of multiculturalism – that of religion.

Summary: the what and why of multiculturalism(s) In this chapter I have traced the historical development of multiculturalism in Britain and continental Europe to the large-scale recruitment of workers from non-European countries (frequently colonies or former colonies). This was to fill the gaps in the labour market following the Second World War when British workers who had served in the armed forces had been promised improved educational, health and working conditions. The result was that overseas workers were generally employed to do the jobs that indigenous workers were no longer prepared to do and this started a cycle of disadvantage that continues to impact on the children and grandchildren of these early migrants. The government made no preparations for such workers, largely because they were not expected to remain, even though they held British citizenship. South Asian migrants shared the government’s expectations, believing that their stay would be limited to such a time as they had amassed enough money to return home as relatively wealthy men. (This was in contrast to their counterparts from the Caribbean, who regarded the UK as the motherland and whose expectations were of permanent residence.) It was not until the 1960s, when the wives and families of migrant workers began to join them, that the government realised that the new British were here to stay, and that ‘something had to be done’ – at least




about non-English-speaking children in UK school system. This began a series of government interventions, particularly in education, which were based on ideologies of ‘assimilation’, ‘integration’ and ‘cultural pluralism’, and were expressed through various forms multiculturalism, anti-racism and a later form of multiculturalism that claimed to incorporate anti-racism. The current ideological position is ‘cohesion’ which, for the first time, has become the government’s official position. Both African-Caribbean and South Asian people were confronted by discrimination in the workplace and by rampant racism – including violence – in wider society. Their reactions to this differed significantly and this is connected to both the form of migration and the longer-term orientations of the two groups. At the risk of some over-simplification, Caribbean people were less tolerant of racial discrimination than were South Asians, because the latter saw their situation as temporary. Thus, it was mainly black people who were instrumental in developing the anti-racist movement and exerting pressure on the government to take action against racism, which it did through race relations legislation of varying strengths. The various multicultural, anti-racist and cohesion policies developed partly in response to perceived racial, ethnic and religious discrimination and to the reality of the continuing material disadvantage of minority ethnic/religious groups relative to majority ones. However, while stressing the reality of racism based on skin colour, culture and religion, I have also drawn attention to the fact that there are significant differences between ethnic groups. Some, in fact, are doing better than their indigenous (white) counterparts. This, I suggest, should alert us to the question that is generally ruled inadmissible within a multicultural discourse: what role might culture play in perpetuating disadvantage? The reason for the neglect of this question is that multiculturalism stresses the equality of cultures, which leads to an emphasis on only the positive aspects of diversity and a concomitant rejection of the possibility that minority cultures might also contain negative elements. Similar observations do not apply to multiculturalism’s references to white cultures which enter the multicultural debate only in terms of assumed racism! My discussion of the meaning of multiculturalism acknowledges that it is a contested concept that varies over time and place – hence my pluralising of the concept in the title of this chapter. Notwithstanding this, I note a number of shared characteristics that can be seen to constitute a continuum from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ versions of multiculturalism in terms of both theory and practice. These raise different levels of challenge to conventional ways of running liberal democratic societies, but all, to some




extent, involve governments in what might be termed social engineering in their aim to change the values, attitudes and behaviour of diverse citizens towards each other. And at a different level, all rest on some notion that minority cultures are fragile and therefore in need of protection, as well as that minority cultures are homogeneous and ungendered. Both assumptions have resulted in serious omissions in multicultural theory; both have had significant consequences for multicultural policy and practice; and in combination, both have had serious negative consequences in relation to the impact of multiculturalism on minority ethnic women. The neglect of religion, to which I now turn, has exacerbated these consequences.




2

Introduction In the first chapter, I discussed some of the reasons for the development of multiculturalism in Britain (and wider Europe). In this chapter I focus on two of the most striking omissions in this development – the almost total absence of both women and religion. I have linked the two in one chapter because I believe that secular multiculturalism intersects and interacts with religion in ways that can both exacerbate and legitimise the oppression of women in some minority ethnic communities.

Multiculturalism and religion Death … In an article in which we commented on the absence of women in the literature, Sheila Allen and I suggested that religion was ‘[another] neglected dimension in the study of race and ethnic relations’ (Allen and Macey, 1994: 120). Religion is also a major omission in multicultural theory, policy and practice, and a neglected variable in considering the impact of multiculturalism on women. For religion is a central component of identity for many minority ethnic individuals and communities (Wagley and Harris, 1958; Yinger, 1986; Rex, 1991). Indeed, though religion and ethnicity are conceptually separable, they are often considerably less so in reality, to the point that in some cases it is reasonable to talk of ethno-religious communities. However, caution needs to be exercised in this sphere and assumptions avoided, as Mahoney and Taj’s (2006) work with Welsh Muslim women demonstrates. For in making some extremely strong criticisms of their own communities and statutory service providers, the women were at pains to emphasise that their problems 35



Multiculturalism, God and Gender

were not a consequence of religion, but of culture. This highlights the difficulty of separating religion from culture, given that – by definition – religion originated and operates within cultural boundaries, albeit ones that are sometimes constructed trans-nationally or internationally, and always – again by definition – having a transcendental element. Early sociology accorded religion a central role in understanding society (Durkheim 1915; Weber, 1963), with religion being seen as a kind of social glue that bound individuals and groups into the social or cultural order (Durkheim, 1933; Parsons, 1965). Religion was also seen as providing a symbolic universe, or sacred canopy, that gave meaning to a world of otherwise potential chaos (Berger, 1969). The underlying assumption was of relatively homogeneous societies in which Christianity was the norm, so that interest in difference was generally limited to Catholicism versus Protestantism. In Western Europe and North America, this led over time to a focus on the processes of modernity and secularisation. This was influenced by the nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose proposition that ‘God is dead’ (Nietzsche, 1992) has been applied to the contemporary Western world by sociologists such as Bruce (1992). A further influence on sociological thinking on religion is the Marxist conception of it as a means of social control, oppression and maintenance of the unequal status quo. This view (or ideology) neglects the fact that – historically and internationally – religion has been centrally involved in revolutionary social change in North and South America and India, for example. Notwithstanding the general sociological orientation, debates on the reality of secularism in the West have continued unabated (see Davie, 1994; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2006; Bruce, 2002, 2006; Voas and Bruce, 2004; 2006; Voas and Crockett, 2005; Crockett and Voas, 2006). Arguments against secularisation are fuelled by such facts as that found in the 2001 census, which recorded that 72 per cent of the UK population defined themselves as Christian, though what this means is unclear and is not reflected in church attendance (Macey et al., 2009). And the growth in new religious movements (NRMs) also casts some doubt on the secularisation thesis, at least in terms of spirituality, if not institutionalised religion (see Barker, 2001; Heelas, 2001; Heelas et al., 2005). But it is in relation to diversity that the neglect of religion is most serious because of its link with ethnicity. It is also because religion is not only a source of stability and social cohesion, but is centrally implicated in conflict. Religion can provide individuals with strength and hope, but it can also be used to mobilise them to divide and kill (Afshar, 1989; Al Sadaawi, 1991; Lutz, 1991; Rath et al., 1991; Rex, 1991; Turner, 1991; Macey,




Multiculturalism, God and Gender 37

1992; Allen and Macey, 1994). And, on a day-to-day basis, religion is frequently used to justify discrimination against, and the oppression of, minorities within minorities – particularly women and young people.

Within this Eurocentric framework, it is probably fair to say that most of us had lost sight of the historic power of religion, which was in fact responsible for creating much of the world as we know it today (Allen and Macey, 1994). We had also lost track of the fact that both Islam and Judaism were major contributors to what is generally thought of as Christian European culture (Dummett, 1991; Turner, 1991; Modood, 1992). And despite our awareness of the role of religion in conflict, viewing the world through the lens of modernity and secularism led us to locate religion safely within the private sphere. It was into this millpond that The Satanic Verses (Rushdie, 1988) dropped, whose ripples of conflict and violence, death and destruction spread across the world. Even this, however, was not enough to serve as a wake-up call to most sociologists, who, with such notable exceptions as Modood (1992; 1998); Rex (1991; 1992; 1994), Macey (1992; 1999a; 1999b) and Samad (1992; 1998), continued to treat religion as of minor interest to the study of ethnicity. It took a series of incidents of violent public disorder and riot in Bradford (Macey, 1999b; 2005) and, eventually, acts of terrorism in the US and Europe before most sociologists fully realised that God is neither dead nor living in purdah, but very much alive and active in the public arena. Indeed, not only is God not dead – and never has been for a large percentage of the world’s people – but, as Kepel (1994) observes, since the mid-1970s, there has been a worldwide resurgence of the three Abrahamic faiths – Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Furbey suggests, following Sennett (1998) and Bauman (2004), that: ‘much of this global religious resurgence is associated with separation and conflict, reflecting a defensive reaction to the uncertainties and risks of a globalised and “liquid” world’ (2008: 120). This fits with earlier work, which suggests that in situations of rapid social change people have a tendency to turn to older certainties, such as those provided by religion; and that religion in these circumstances tends towards the fundamentalist, rather than more liberal variants (Neilsen, 1984; Robinson, 1988; Macey, 1991). This obviously has particular implications for women. Despite the growth in religiosity or religious self-identification generally, it is Islam that is the focus of most Western attention and, along with the US’s ‘war on terror’, there is a ‘war for Muslim minds’ (Kepel,



… and resurrection

2004; Ramadan, 2004). This is not surprising, since Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world, a growth that includes significant numbers of white, largely working-class, converts, some of whom have been involved in bombings or attempted bombings in Europe (Kepel, 2004). And it is the involvement in terrorist attacks by British Muslims that has played a major part in motivating the British government to afford Islam a new central role, particularly in the community and voluntary sector (CVS) – even though, as we have seen, Muslim women’s voices are often not heard (Macey et al., 2009). Thus, religion in contemporary Britain is now the subject of considerable attention, both positive and negative. The government has done an almost complete volte-face from the days when Prime Minister Thatcher responded to the Church of England’s publication of Faith in the City (ACUPA, 1985) by stating vehemently that religion had no place in politics, to one that actively promotes it. This approach is linked to New Labour’s ‘modernisation’ of social democracy (‘The Third Way’), a renewed emphasis on social integration and an interest in communitarianism (Farnell et al., 2003; Furbey and Macey, 2005). While the government’s interest in the faith sector actually pre-dates this government (Furbey, 2008), it is particularly evident in New Labour thinking. Tony Blair made explicit the government’s approach to religion in his comment: Our major faith traditions – all of them more historic and deeply rooted than any political party or ideology – play a fundamental role in supporting and propagating values which bind us together as a nation. (Blair, 2001) In the context of terrorism justified by religion, it is fascinating that Blair’s comment is so clearly rooted in a consensus approach whereby the conflict that is virtually inherent in religion due to its exclusivity is totally ignored. It also shows no awareness of the tension between the government’s privileging of religion on the one hand, its demand for community cohesion on the other, and, indeed, the relatively recent religion and belief legislation. All these impact differently on men and women, minorities and majorities, secularists and religious, but the government, like multiculturalism, appears blind to this reality. Thus, to give just one example, the negative consequences for women’s rights that can accrue from ceding more autonomy to ethno-religious leaders is ignored (see Shachar, 2001, for a detailed discussion of the impact of cultural




and religious differences on women’s rights; Southall Black Sisters (SBS), 2008, for an example of the negative effects of the cohesion agenda on ‘single-issue’ groups; the British Humanist Association (BHA), 2007, for concerns about the extension of policy and practice to religions in the public arena). Before moving on to a discussion of the impact on women of the interaction between religion and multiculturalism, I want to mention another element of the so-called ‘Rushdie Affair’, whose significance bypassed many people at the time. This is that the violent public disorder that accompanied protests against publication of The Satanic Verses in Britain signalled a very public consolidation of a change in (Pakistani) Muslim attitudes, which had begun in cities like Bradford, West Yorkshire, in the early 1970s (Macey, 2005b). This involved a shift away from demands for equality on the basis of race/ethnicity to demands for special treatment on the basis of religion (Macey, 2005b). The magnitude of this change cannot be overstated: it represents a turning-point in inter-ethnic relations, halting previous joint action against racism by Asian, black and white people, and heralding a new era of identity politics involving separatist Muslim action – and development – which remains to this day. Although a whole raft of both domestic and international factors played a part in this new prioritisation of religion as the aspect of identity around which mobilisation occurred, it could not, I believe, have taken place in anything other than a multicultural and liberal democratic context. Multiculturalism had paved the way for acceptance of demands for special treatment in terms of both exemptions from and extensions to the law, and the redefinition of equality as requiring different treatment. Liberal democracy had enabled freedom of speech, the right to make demands on government for change and the right of public protest (though not violence). Modern communications technology had brought the global to the local, as well as facilitating mobilisation. All this came together in ways that Muslims in Bradford and elsewhere made extremely effective use of in furthering their aims and gaining special privileges (Ansari, 2002). There are two important aspects of the above that are worth emphasising with respect to women. The first is that a brand of multiculturalism (or community cohesion) that involves ceding autonomy to communities through male ‘leaders’ does not generally operate to further women’s struggles for rights or autonomy. And in a context of residential, social and religious separation – as is the case for a number of Muslim communities in Britain (Peach, 2002; 2006; Carling, 2008; Macey et al., 2009) – the control and oppression of women is removed from public scrutiny





and its perpetuation thereby enhanced. All this needs to be read in the awareness that all religions discriminate against women in a number of ways and in a number of arenas; it is to these that I now turn.

Turner (1991) states that all the Abrahamic faiths are patriarchal and that this permeates their theologies and practices; de Ferrari points to the ‘persistence of an anthropology that assigns a “special nature” to women’ (2000: 25–6); and Lerner observes that a basic gender assumption of patriarchy is that: Men and women are essentially different creatures, not only in their biological equipment, but in their needs, capacities and functions. Men and women also differ in the way they were created and in the social function assigned to them by God. (1993: 4) All religions have clearly defined gender roles, usually based on that most telling of sayings ‘equal but different’, all of which carry prescriptions for behaviour. Brown observes that the concept of complementarity is central to an Islamic understanding of the relations between the sexes as operating in harmony with the skills and natural attributes of men and women. Complementarity asserts that biological differences determine how to be a good Muslim and that society should be ordered for the fulfilment of men’s ‘regency on earth’ (2006: 424). Brown notes that this leads to women’s roles and identities always being defined in relation to men, as daughters, sisters, wives and mothers. In other words, women – unlike men – are not seen as autonomous beings, but as existing only in relation to men! I have always held the view that it is not religion per se that leads to the oppression of women, but cultural interpretations and uses of it. However, Manji (2005) and Hirsi Ali (2006) write that discrimination against women is inherent inn Islam itself, and Moghissi (2000) states that: No amount of twisting and bending can reconcile the Qur’anic injunctions and instructions about women’s rights and obligations with the idea of gender equality. Regardless of the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Shari’a, if the Qur’anic instructions are taken literally, Islamic individuals or societies cannot favour equal rights for women in the family or in certain areas of social life … If the principles of the Shar’ia



Women and religion


Against this, some feminist scholars propose that international Islam can offer a way for Muslim women to attain their human rights: Dwyer (1999) says that the Qur’an can be used by women to invoke religious rights, although Philip Lewis (pers. comm.) points out that the Hadith – referred to in Islamic jurisprudence to interpret the Qur’an – can be used to override this; Brown (2006) suggests that global Islam could provide a platform from which women might extend their rights; and Afshar (2007) proposes that Islam can provide a framework to open pathways towards feminism. For these writers, Islam offers theological possibilities for women’s liberation. For others, it is the realistic analysis of the power of religion in some communities that leads them to adopt a pragmatic approach. Thus CIMEL/INTERIGHTS (2001) suggest the need to work through both religious and secular channels, and Woodhead (2008) observes that Muslim women are more likely to achieve equality by working within their religious culture than by rejecting this. Whatever the case, as with culture, all religions have a particular focus on women because of their intimate involvement in biological, cultural and religious reproduction. As the bearers and principal socialisers of children, women’s reproductive capacity and social location mean that men express concerns about women’s sexual purity. At a personal/individual level, this may be related to paternity – the simple fact that while a woman can never doubt that she is the mother of a particular child, a man can never be certain that he is the father unless he uses a DNA test. However, a different order of concern and control occurs in cultures that emphasise ‘purity’, and where this determines structured relationships and status. Thus, for instance, the concept of izzat (honour) has far-reaching consequences for women’s agency because loss of a woman’s honour also involves loss of male and family honour. Afshar observes that ‘any transgression denotes a failure, not only of the women, but also and particularly of their menfolk and hence the entire family’ (1994: 134). Since the consequences of this can extend across the economic as well the social dimension (Khanum, 1992; Bhatty, 1988; Moghissi, 2005; Bhatti, 2007), it is not surprising that young men in cities such as Bradford are obsessed with policing the appearance and behaviour of women (Afshar, 1989, 1994; Alibhai-Brown, 1998; Scott, 2003). This is not only to do with family honour, but is linked to



are to be maintained … women cannot enjoy equality before the law and in law. The Shar’ia is not compatible with the principles of equality of human beings. (2000: 140–1)

masculinities (Jacobsen, 1998; Dwyer, 1999, 2000; Macey, 1999a; Beckett and Macey, 2001; Archer, 2003) and – though arguably cultural, rather than religious – it is justified in the name of religion. Ultimately, however, such control can involve both mental and physical violence – up to and including murder (Afshar, 1994; Macey, 2007a; 2008). Efforts to control sexuality are not restricted to women or the Islamic faith, as is illustrated by religious attitudes to homosexuality (see Crockett and Voas, 2003; Yip and Keenan, 2004, on Anglicanism; Yip, 2004, on Islam), though I am not aware of any other religion that takes this to the extremes that Islam does. Nor, of course, is the control of women only a religious concern, though there is little doubt that this is enhanced if religion can be used to legitimate it. As one of the participants in the government-funded consultations with Muslim women in England observed: ‘Men in all societies may control women, however they don’t use religion as a justification, the way it is wrongly used by Muslim men within the community’ (cited in Raz, 2006). This comment is a profound illustration of why it is legitimate to suggest that multiculturalism contributes to the oppression of minority ethno-religious women, but also highlights some difficult questions around religious versus cultural requirements and the impact of these on women’s choices in a wide range of arenas – from style of dress, through educational opportunities, to choice of friends and even marriage partners. All of these raise complex questions: even the Muslim hijab (headscarf) is not, as Hoodfar (1993) points out, a neutral signifier. Rather: It has come to symbolize everything from Islamic fundamentalism and women’s subordination to freedom of religious expression and women’s empowerment and equality. (Hamdan, 2007: 2) This is illustrated by a number of high-profile cases in Britain, some of which have gone as far as the High Court for resolution. They mainly concern challenges to school uniform requirements, though one involved the dismissal of a teaching assistant who insisted on wearing the niqab (veil which covers the face) in class. The grounds for dismissal was that this interfered with her ability to do her job of helping non-Englishspeaking children to learn the language, though a common response was that it was motivated by racism or Islamophobia. Generally speaking, British schools have amended their uniform rules to allow Muslim girls to wear the hijab, but have drawn the line at the niqab, jilabaaba or burqa1 on the grounds of ‘health and safety’ because they prevent recognition, as well as interfering with




the teaching/learning process. France, on the other hand, provoked an international outcry in 2004 when it introduced legislation banning ‘conspicuous’ signs of religion in public schools. Alhough this included yarmulkes (skull caps worn by Orthodox Jewish males) and ‘excessively large’ crucifixes, the ban was widely interpreted as an attack on the Muslim hijab. Ezekiel points out that issues around religious symbols have arisen in the past, and analyses why the reaction to the ban was so strong – even involving hostage-taking in Iraq accompanied by demands to revoke the legislation (Ezekiel, 2005; 2006). But the diversity of views on the hijab by both wearers and others illustrate the complexity of the issue: some see it as a symbol of chastity or modesty (Bullock, 2002) or a purely religious symbol (El-Solh and Mabro, 1994; Engineer, 1994); others define it as a symbol of resistance to Western imperialism (Smith, 2004) or as an assertion of ethno-religious identity. Still others point to its role in affording women more freedom to move in public spaces free from male harassment and family disapproval (Moghadam, 1994; Ruby, 2004), though this itself raises some basic questions about Muslim women’s freedom which are generally ignored. In many parts of Britain, the hijab is so common that it attracts little attention; it is the niqab and burqa that cause discomfort to many people (including Muslim women who choose not to ‘cover’). The increase in the number of young women wearing burqas or jilbab in recent years is read by many as indicative of at least distancing from, if not rejection of, wider British society. For me, the question remains at root whether women who cover have done so from personal choice or have been pressured into doing so. My experience of university students suggests that this varies. Some parents make university attendance conditional on their daughters wearing the burqa – which probably explains the transformation as women enter toilets fully covered and emerge in Western dress! In other cases, students have had to struggle to persuade their parents to allow them to cover and lecturers and students are suddenly confronted with a transformed, and unrecognisable, person in the lecture room. Nevertheless, I think that there are legitimate health and safety issues around the burqa, as is illustrated by the fact that one of the men involved in the murder of PC Sharon Beshenivsky in Bradford escaped by donning this garment. I also think that the concept of choice is open to question, particularly when little girls as young as nine or ten are covered from head to foot while their brothers’ Western clothing allows them to run around freely (Macey, 2007a). As noted above, the question of choice is not limited to what women can wear, but affects their freedom of movement, health and physical




safety. For example, some women live in purdah, which was justified to me by one man as keeping them safe from the threat of rape in a corrupt society (in Farnell et al., 2003). Others are obliged to take circuitous routes to avoid walking in areas where large groups of young Muslim men cluster and subject them to verbal harassment. I have personally witnessed such young men stop their cars in the middle of the road to harangue (and even spit at) young women walking on the streets. Parents can also be harassed. I know of one young woman who changed from a full- to a part-time course to avoid her own and her parents’ harassment (Macey, 1999a). Note, too, that a third more than the national average of young Pakistani Muslim women have the highest rates of mental breakdown, self-harm and suicide in Britain (Husain et al.). It is, of course, questionable how much of this can fairly be blamed on religion in terms of theology rather than the cultural interpretations and cynical uses of it to further male control over women, but that certain men have found religion a valuable resource in this arena is indisputable (Macey, 1999a). Likewise, if multiculturalism has played a role in facilitating the control of women, as mediated by religion, it is indirectly rather than directly. It may be, for example, that in encouraging the maintenance of culture and religion as practised in the homeland, it has slowed down the process of change within certain communities. It may also be that its adoption of an essentialised and uncritical approach to ethno-religious communities renders women invisible and thus leaves the way open for gender-based oppression and even violence. Although it would seem to be Muslims who make the most overt use of religion to legitimise the control of women, other religions are not exempt. For example, some (white) Christian evangelical communities use discourses of purity to prescribe women’s dress and behaviour, instilling a deep sense of guilt in those who transgress religious norms (Aune and Sharma, 2007). Hunt and Lightly (2001) and Hunt (2002) show how a (black) Pentecostal church uses similar strategies around purity both to control women’s sexuality and to construct boundaries between itself and wider society in order to maintain the traditions of the ‘homeland’. This raises some uncomfortable questions for the government’s simultaneous emphasis on religion and on community cohesion. A further issue that has arisen as a consequence of both multiculturalism and the government’s prioritisation of funding for religious groups is that it has allowed some politically motivated projects to pass themselves off as religious ones. Mukta (2000) and Searle-Chatterjee (2000) point to so-called faith-based organisations (FBOs) that promote Hindu nationalism, and Samaroo (2005) found government-funded domestic violence




refuges being run by imams’ wives – with the predictable result that battered women were persuaded that it is a religious requirement for them to return to violent partners. There are numerous examples of how the world faiths discriminate against and, indeed, oppress women. Some of these are ‘formal’ in that they stem from religious doctrine; some are ‘informal’ and are rooted in the gender equivalent of ‘institutional racism’; and some constitute what Glick and Fiske (2001) term ‘benign sexism’. But there is a significant number of examples of discrimination against women that are clearly related to the autonomy that multicultural policies have afforded self-styled community and religious ‘leaders’ to govern their own communities. Some of the more extreme of these will be discussed in chapter 3. At this point, I shall mention only a few examples of how the religious construction of gender roles subjects women to inequality and disadvantage. I would flag up here the observation that most of these apply to the private sphere – that which affects women most profoundly and is covered by family law – the very arena that is frequently suggested as the most appropriate in which to allow religious freedom of self-governance (see Shachar, 1998, 1999, 2001; Nussbaum, 1999a; 2000; Deveaux, 2000; 2002, for discussions of this). I begin, however, with examples from the public sphere and/or which constitute points of intersection between the public and the private. First, there is the issue of gender roles in the clergy (or its equivalent). For example, the Catholic Church prohibits women from becoming priests and treats women religious (nuns) in a deeply unequal way to their male counterparts (Utti, 2006). Orthodox Judaism does not have female rabbis, though reform Judaism does, and Islam does not have women imams (at least not in the UK, though I understand that this is not the case elsewhere). The Anglican Church admits women to the priesthood, but only agreed in 2008 that they may become bishops, and the issue of women priests remains a source of major conflict within the wider Anglican communion, particularly outside Britain. Sani and Reicher talk of the danger of schism (2000: 95), and Crockett and Voas (2003) and Yip and Keenan (2004) make similar points with reference to homosexuality. I would note in passing that the discourse on women priests and bishops constitutes a striking illustration of the extent of overt sexism relative to overt racism. (A salutary exercise here is to reflect on what happens if one substitutes ‘black people’ for ‘women’ and to ask in the light of this: on what basis does multiculturalism prioritise race/ethnicity over gender?) Another area in which gender inequality is clear is that of women’s position in FBOs, where, despite being over-represented in voluntary




work, women are rarely found in positions of leadership or decisionmaking. In addition to this ‘glass ceiling’, a number of illustrations of gender inequality are provided by Farnell et al.’s research, summarised by the senior national community development professional who said: ‘The activity that is faith based is also in our view misogynist’ (2003: 34). In the same research, institutional or benevolent sexism is illustrated by the committee member of a Hindu temple whose response to a question about the (management) roles of women in the running of the temple was: ‘Every day women look after the kitchen very well, and wherever there is need, they are there. General maintenance, cleaning and hoovering …’ (Farnell et al., 2003: 34). Finally, an issue that raises serious questions about gender equality is the operation of religious courts in England – the Jewish Beth Din and Muslim Shar’ia courts (or tribunals). Beth Din have operated in England for over a hundred years and deal with civil disputes in a number of areas in both the private and public spheres – from divorce to partnerships in private companies. In all cases, both parties must be Jewish and have agreed to the Beth Din hearing the case. The fact that the decision, as with secular tribunals, is then binding, though not implemented by secular legal authorities, does not mitigate its effects on religious women. Shar’ia courts have existed in England since the early 1980s, but until recently have had no official standing in secular law. However, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) has (as they put it) exploited a loophole in the 1996 Arbitration Act which has enabled them to increase their powers significantly in a way never seen in England before. Apparently, these quasi-official courts have been operational in England since August 2007 and have already ruled on over 100 cases, though this only become public knowledge in 2008 (Taher, 2008). Given the furore that greeted the Archbishop of Canterbury’s suggestion that it was almost inevitable – and actually desirable – that elements of shar’ia law be implemented in Britain (Williams, 2008), this is likely to be deeply unpopular among the general public, and, I would suggest, with good reason, for there are farreaching implications of this, not only for Muslim women but for liberal democracy itself (a point to which I return to in chapter 4) for the use of arbitration tribunal legislation comes close to constituting a parallel legal system based on religion, though the government denies this. And it is true that such courts cannot, as yet, breach the law of the land. Nevertheless, in dealing with criminal offences, including physical assault, it is difficult to see them as anything other than alternatives to secular law. The same observation applies to the fact that they make rulings that would be out of the question in secular courts and that




are undoubtedly in breach of British (and European) equalities legislation. This means that the judicial system could find itself policing illegal decisions – which begs the question of what it would take to constitute a ‘parallel’ or ‘alternative’ system in the government’s eyes! Responding to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech on shar’ia law, Phillips drew attention to some of the wider implications of parallel or alternative law for both Muslim women and Western democracy: In order to protect our female Muslim citizens, we need to remove from them the yoke of sharia law, not institutionalise it with the seal of official approval. One law for all is the very basis of legal and social justice and is the glue that binds society together. Law is the expression of a society’s cultural identity. If there is no one law, there is no one national identity and therefore no society, but instead a set of warring fiefdoms with their own separate jurisdictions. (Phillips, 2008) One of the key justifications put forward for religious courts is that they are voluntary. But questions can be asked about the reality of the concept of choice in cultures where there are large disparities in the power of men and women and in which women are socialised into accepting a subordinate role (Okin, 1997; Bhatti, 2007; Macey, 2007a). And a number of shar’ia court rulings make it difficult to see any logical reason why women would choose to be judged under religious rather than secular law. For example, in the six cases of domestic violence heard by the courts in their first twelve months of operation, the ruling was that the abusers should undergo anger management classes! I would see the fact that all the women subsequently withdrew their complaints to the police as a matter of concern, whereas the MAT view it as a positive outcome because ‘marriages were saved and couples given a second chance’ (Siddiqui, cited in Taher, 2008). This needs to be read in the context of the fact that Muslim women are already deeply disturbed by the failure of the authorities to take action against violence in their communities (Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006). The operation of shar’ia courts is unlikely to improve this situation, particularly when the power of multicultural ideology makes people fearful of being accused of racism or Islamophobia. Another example is a disputed inheritance case between three women and two men in which the court awarded twice as much to the sons as to the daughters. Again, it is difficult to see why women would willingly agree to forfeit money that would certainly have been awarded to them under secular law. There are serious questions here about the reality of




women’s choices and the impact of shar’ia courts on women’s rights, to which I return later. In the interests of balance, however, it needs to be noted that a study carried out of the Muslim Law (Sharia) Council suggests that women using its mediation services had done so freely – without pressure from male family members – and partly because they felt disempowered by secular equivalents (Shah-Kazemi, 2001). Meanwhile, I conclude this section with some brief examples of the negative impact on women of religious law in the private sphere of marriage and family life, where religious doctrines are in tension, if not conflict, with contemporary civil law and wider social attitudes. A number of these illustrate Barry’s contention that when the state turns a blind eye to private coercion, this brings about much the same result as if it had formally delegated legal decision-making power, so that ‘Public tolerance is a formula for creating a lot of private hells’ (2001: 143). Perhaps the most fundamental of these relates to the decision as to whether or not to marry and the freedom to choose one’s partner. Yet all religions see heterosexual marriage as the only acceptable way of expressing one’s sexuality, and some, such as Islam and Judaism, go further in seeing it as the only ‘natural’ way of living. Indeed, in Islam, marriage is virtually a religious requirement and choice of marriage partner is severely limited, with parents sometimes arranging their offspring’s marriages at birth (MAT, 2008). ‘Mixed’ marriages (i.e. between members of different faiths and none) are also generally disapproved of by most religions, but the extent and expression of this varies widely. Orthodox Judaism refuses to accept the validity of marriage outside the faith, while Islam regards marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims as highly transgressive. It does, however allow men – but not women – to marry ‘people of the book’ (Christians and Jews) (Al-Yousuf, 2006). British law restricts marriage to adults and monogamy, and requires that people have exercised free will in their choice of marriage partners. In Islam, marriages are expected to take place early and are permissible from puberty. Child marriages have certainly taken place between British and Pakistani citizens and the Forced Marriage Unit has been involved in a number of rescues of such children from overseas (HAC, 2008). The ruling on free will also comes into play in relation to both age of consent and disability since to make a meaningful choice clearly requires a certain level of intellectual competence. This, too, has been breached in a number of cases of trans-continental Muslim marriages, and young British women have found themselves married to ‘husbands’ who are of an appropriate chronological age, but have the mental age of




children (Brandon and Hafez, 2008; Khanum, 2008). This is related to the extremely strong emphasis on marriage in Islam as well as the preference for arranging marriages between family members, and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. As far as the law on monogamy is concerned, not only are Muslim men allowed to practise polygamy, but the British welfare state pays full benefits to additional families (ignoring the Islamic rule that men are required to be able to provide adequately and equally for all wives). Secular law prohibiting bigamy is circumvented by the requirement that such marriages must be contracted outside England (Wynne-Jones, 2008). It probably goes without saying that women are not allowed more than one husband in either religious or secular law. Women (and men) are protected by law from violence within marriage, though statistics on domestic violence indicate that the law is extremely ineffective in this area. However, the fact that the Qur’an actually permits the ‘limited physical chastisement’ of women (Mather, 1998) introduces an entirely different dimension to the situation. A woman’s right to refuse sex within marriage is protected by the law against rape, though, shockingly, in some European countries, the ‘conjugal exemption’ (which basically permitted rape within marriage) was not repealed until the 1990s (Romito, 2008). However, since Muslim women are expected to be sexually available on demand, secular law is unlikely to protect them: ‘A wife may not deny herself to her husband’ (Kidwai and Huda, 2007: 35). Some research with a range of religious leaders in the US is illuminating on the issue. Asked: ‘What happens if a women doesn’t want sex?’ an imam suggested that it would be unwise for her to refuse sex to her husband, since he might then decide to remarry (Levitt and Ware, 2006: 35). Whether or not to have children, and how many, is generally assumed to be an individual decision, but both cultural and religious expectations play a major role here. Muslim women, for instance, have more children earlier and over a longer period of time than their white counterparts (EOC, 2006a). Religions that have strict rules on contraception, such as Judaism and Catholicism, obviously impact on family size, despite believers’ apparent ability to exercise personal choice. Catholicism is an example of the effects of migration, inter-group interaction and integration on personal choices – in this case, family size – that may be relevant to the current Muslim situation. For Irish Catholics who settled in England in the twentieth century had very large families relative to the English norm, but this changed over time due to a number of factors, not least being the availability of contraception, but also, presumably, economic/material considerations and attitudinal changes.




Different cultures and religions have varying attitudes towards divorce. In Britain, the right to divorce is institutionalised, but remains unacceptable within Catholicism, only allowed through men in Judaism and generally the prerogative of men in Islam, though women can sometimes instigate divorce. Decisions on the custody of children following divorce rest with the courts, but is generally awarded to the mother, though suitable arrangements for fathers’ access is required. In Islam, however, men have the right to custody of children who have been weaned, and while this is unlikely to impress secular courts, the development of shar’ia courts could impact negatively on women with respect to child custody. Negative attitudes towards divorce can place women who have custody of children in extreme financial hardship. For example, though secular law requires the payment of child maintenance, this is on divorce, rather than separation, which is not always available to religious women (Chantler, 2004). In addition, some interpretations of Islam deny alimony payments to women beyond three months following divorce (Nasir, 1990). This needs to be read in the context of Muslim women having a very low rate of labour market participation (EOC, 2006a; 2006b; Platt, 2007a). All this means that religious women, especially Muslims, are extremely vulnerable in relation to their ability to gain even minimal economic independence (Shachtar, 2001), let alone exercise the ‘right of exit’ so beloved of multiculturalists (Galston, 1995; Kukathas, 1997; Spinner-Halev, 2001). As with child custody, the new shar’ia courts are a matter of considerable concern in terms of their potential impact on Muslim women’s ability to leave abusive relationships.

Gender inequality, disadvantage and discrimination in secular society None of the above is to suggest that it is only religions and religious communities that discriminate against women and the latter needs to be assessed relative to the situation in secular society. In Britain, women are systematically disadvantaged relative to men in virtually all spheres of both the public and private arenas – the only exceptions of which I am aware are that young men’s experience of violent, stranger crime is 80 per cent higher than that of young women (Walker et al., 2006) and that women live longer than men, albeit in relative poverty since their retirement income is 40 per cent less than men’s (Women and Equality Unit (WEU), 2006). They are generally poorer, not least because much of their work is in the home, which is unpaid (Skinner, 2006; Moullin, 2007). They have less power because they are less likely to hold




decision-making roles – only 20 per cent of MPs are women (EOC, 2007b; UK Parliament, 2007); only 10 per cent of FTSE 100 directorships are held by women (EOC, 2007a; 2007b) and only 9 per cent of High Court and more senior judges are women (EOC, 2007b). They also suffer high levels of physical and mental violence, from forced marriage, through domestic violence, to murder (HAC, 2008). There is a vast literature on gender inequality in Britain, let alone the rest of the world, but this is not the subject of this book so will only be touched on here and in order to balance any impression that religion and multiculturalism are solely responsible for this. One of the most striking – and depressing – documents in this sphere is the EOC’s Gender Equality Index (2007c). This not only produces a raft of statistics on women’s inequality in contemporary Britain, but projects the (shocking) number of years that, on present progress, it will take women to ‘catch up’ with men. The EOC claims ‘considerable progress’ in some spheres, but acknowledges that: progress has often been painfully slow … [in some areas] the index suggests that the agenda has stalled, or worse yet we’re actually going backwards. Unless further action is taken, nothing will ever change. (EOC, 2007c: 1) Nearly 40 years after the Equal Pay Act 1970, and with a whole raft of equalities legislation in place, we have still not even managed to achieve equal pay for men and women doing the same jobs. And we are a million miles from seriously questioning why what are defined as ‘women’s jobs’ are so much worse paid than ‘men’s jobs’, or why women are not paid for their work in the home and with families. We live in a world in which girls are outperforming boys educationally (Df ES, 2006), but in which gendered subject choices (at ‘A’ level and in post-compulsory education/training) have long-term consequences for jobs and salaries. Boys’ choices prepare them for well-paid jobs in science and technology, while girls’ choices lead to low-paid ‘caring’ and administrative roles (HESA, 2005; Learning and Skills Council, 2005; Df ES, 2006). Partly as a consequence of this, 65 per cent of jobs are gender-segregated (ONS, 2006b; EOC, 2007c). As far as employment sectors and pay are concerned, there is an overall pay gap between men and women of 17 per cent (15 per cent in the EU) (EC, 2008). Women in full-time work are paid on average 17 per cent less per hour than men, and 38 per cent less when part-time pay is compared (ONS, 2006; EOC, 2007c). Women are still held largely responsible for the home and family and this means that they are more likely than men to be in part-time work.




The fact that domestic and childcare responsibilities are still perceived as almost entirely women’s responsibilities results in them moving in and out of the labour market over the lifecycle, and this has significant consequences for pay, promotion and pensions (Sigle-Rushton and Perrons, 2006). And though this section is not focused on the role of religion in women’s inequality, it is worth noting that women’s participation in the labour market varies considerably by religion. Thus, Muslim women have the highest economic inactivity rate of all faith groups – 68 per cent compared with 28 per cent for Christians and around 35 per cent for Hindus and Sikhs (Open Society Institute, 2005). Religion is also associated with labour market re-entry and there are particularly low rates of return to work for Muslims and Sikhs. Among the factors that impact on minority ethnic women’s participation in the labour market are lack of language skills, lack of English (as against overseas) qualifications and lack of support for childcare responsibilities (EOC, 2006a). The EOC’s statutory investigation into Bangladeshi, Pakistani and black Caribbean women and work in England, Scotland and Wales identified what it referred to as five ‘employment gaps’: low participation rates (Buckner et al., 2007; EOC, 2007a); unemployment (EOC, 2007a); lack of progression to senior levels (EOC, 2007a); the pay gap (Platt, 2007a); and occupational segregation (Buckner et al., 2007; EOC, 2007a; Platt, 2007a). Interestingly, while this investigation paints a clear picture of minority ethnic women’s location in the labour market, what it singularly fails to do is explain this, other than by reference to ‘barriers’ (i.e. discrimination). The reason for this is because of the researchers’ decision to focus solely on workplace discrimination (Buckner et al., 2007) and within this, on perceptions, rather than on concrete examples of discrimination. And while this is not to suggest that ethnic and/or racial discrimination do not occur most of the factors that disadvantage ethno-religious women in the labour market stem more from culture and religion than from discrimination. These include: large families; extended caring responsibilities; definitions of women’s roles as home-centred; the limitation of higher education to local universities (see Boliver, 2006, who highlights late and fewer applications by minority ethnic students and their intention to live at home while studying); constraints on participation in CV-enhancing activities; and an inability or unwillingness to travel for work (Macey et al., 2009).

Violence against women2 If some of the evidence of women’s inequality in various arenas is striking, nowhere is it more graphically illustrated than in the sphere of




violence, which is found across the world and affects women from before birth to death (UNFPA, 2000). While violence against women is universal, its extent and expression vary and are undoubtedly related to the rights and status that women have achieved in various societies. Gill (2003) suggests that where women have gained a level of independence and autonomy through the labour market, men’s attempts to control them usually take less overt and/or brutal forms than in cultures where women’s primary role is defined as reproductive and centred in the home. This, I would argue, supports Okin’s (1999) suggestion that not all cultures are good for women so that the implementation of multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies may not be in women’s interests. This is not to minimise the extent to which violence against women occurs in such societies; it is, however, to observe that a fundamental difference between postmodern societies and some others is that in the former this is not justified by religious or cultural traditions. Nor does it generally extend to such practices as sex-selective abortions, forced marriage or female genital mutilation (FGM). I believe that it is little short of bizarre to propose, as some ‘feminists of color’ do, that there is no difference between cosmetic surgery and FGM (cited in Kalev, 2004). Such an argument may well be sustainable at a certain level of abstraction and within a particular definition of the concept of ‘choice’, but the outcome – in the real world – is to legitimise the short- and long-term suffering of girls and women. And the response that the minors on whom FGM is inflicted would not be classed as such in other cultures is as unconvincing as suggesting that because British children used to be sent to work up chimneys and down mines, it is acceptable to do so now! It is one thing to propose that liberal universalism should be open to interrogation, but this is surely relativism gone mad. As Kalev observes: cultural relativism is in itself but another form of oppression. The implication of their arguments is that universal human rights that apply equally to women and to men are only to be pursued in Western societies, whereas non-Western societies should be left to pursue practices that the West would not put up with. This is equivalent to the abandonment of the pursuit of women’s struggle for equality. (2004: 347) This raises some fundamental questions about the role of multiculturalism in the oppression and suffering of minority ethnic women in Western liberal democracies, to which I return later. First, however, I note some examples of violence against women in both Western and non-Western contexts.




In Britain, the majority of the overt violence experienced by women is inflicted on them not by strangers, but by their partners or former partners. It is estimated that one in four women experience domestic violence3 at some stage in their lives (Mirrlees-Black, 1999; Summers and Hoffman, 2002; Home Office, 2007) and that one incident of domestic violence takes place every minute (Stanko, 2000). Domestic violence comprises 16 per cent of all violent incidents recorded by the police, constitutes 25 per cent of all reported crime and has the highest repeat rate of any crime (Kershaw et al., 2000; Walby and Allen, 2004; Home Office, 2007). Seventy per cent of incidents result in injury (Kershaw et al., 2000); a woman dies as a result of domestic violence approximately every three days (Home Office, 2007); 25 per cent of all murders in the UK are of women (Refuge Women’s Association (RWA), 2003), half of whom are killed by their partners or former partners (Flood-Page and Taylor, 2003). These statistics might give us pause for thought in assuming that ‘honour’ killings are restricted to minority ethnicities and religions. However, it is only within minorities that families and communities are involved in the murder of women and that culture/religion constitutes a justificatory ideology that is sometimes relied on as a defence in court (Okin, 1999; Phillips, 2003; Raz, 2006; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). In addition to physical injury and death, domestic violence causes severe emotional distress (Hague et al., 2003) and both psychological and psychiatric conditions, such as depression, anxiety disorders, dissociative disorders and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Warburton and Able, 2006; Pickup et al., 2001; Home Office, 2007). Warrington’s (2001) research shows that 50,000 abused women and their children are forced to flee their homes every year. The Women’s Aid Federation carries out an annual survey of refuges to provide a snapshot of various aspects of their use on one day in the year. The 2004–5 statistics indicated that 19,836 women and 24,347 children were living in refuges across England, with an additional 19,060 women and 23,445 children in emergency accommodation and 776 women and 902 children in second-stage properties (Williams, 2006). A particularly disturbing finding from this survey is that the number of disabled women using domestic violence safe housing is increasing yearly – between 2004 and 2005, numbers increased by 140 per cent (Williams, 2006: 5). All this represents the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of women who flee domestic violence, given the lack of refuge and other safe provision, and the fact that most women are not eligible for refuge places. The cost of domestic violence in both individual and societal terms is massive; in purely economic terms, Walby (2004) estimated the overall cost in England and Wales as £25.3 billion annually





• it is estimated that only one in ten incidents of domestic violence are

reported to the police; • recorded statistics refer only to severe, recognisable, reported abuse

(Mirrlees-Black, 1999, cited in HO, 2007); • British Crime Survey (BCS) data exclude sexual violence; • domestic violence applies only to ‘adults’, so that young people under

the age of 18 are not included in the statistics; • domestic violence is not a specific crime in Britain, which has obvi-

ous implications for the policing and prosecution of it, as well as the collection of statistics (Macey, 2008). In 1993, the World Bank stated that domestic violence against women of reproductive age caused as many deaths as cancer and more deaths than road traffic accidents and malaria combined. Heisse et al. (1999) suggest that, world-wide, at least one in three women have been beaten or coerced into sex or otherwise abused, and that one in four have been abused during pregnancy by their husbands or families. The World Health Organisation (WHO) views domestic violence as a significant public policy, health and human rights concern which ‘continues to be frighteningly common and to be accepted as “normal” within too many societies’. WHO also states that ‘international human rights law is clear: states have a duty to exercise due diligence to prevent, prosecute and punish violence against women’ (2005: vii). Kelly (2005) supports this, observing that the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action declared that culture, tradition and religion cannot be used by states to avoid their obligation to protect women. In this context, the fact that there is no specific law in the UK against domestic violence is particularly surprising, and McKerl comments: From my experience in the field of violence against women, I have found that it is not human rights that need to be upheld, but the rights of women as citizens to be protected from violence and abuse. (2007: 195; original emphasis) Rape is another example of violence against women and men’s assertion of power over them. The BCS showed that, in 1999, 61,000 women



(updated for 2005-6 to reflect population numbers and prices) (HAC, 2008). These shocking statistics have to be read in light of the fact that, as with other forms of violence against women, they are a significant underestimate of the actual incidence of crime, since:

in England and Wales were raped and that 754,000 women had been raped on at least one occasion since the age of 16. It is estimated that only 20 per cent of rapes (and 18 per cent of incidents of sexual victimisation) are reported to the police. Of those rapes that are recorded, 45 per cent were carried out by current partners with only 8 per cent constituting stranger rape (Myhill and Allen, 2002). Rape convictions have been decreasing over time and currently stand at only 5 per cent of the number of offences recorded (Walker et al., 2006; EOC, 2007c). This, together with the way that they are treated in court (Clarke, 2008), is unlikely to encourage women to report the crime. Some of the more negative changes brought about by the multicultural nature of British society are indicated by the fact that the Home Office definition and discussion of domestic violence now includes references to so-called ‘honour’-based violence, female genital mutilation and forced marriage. All of these now take place in certain ethnic communities in the UK (HO, 2005, 2008), though accurate statistics on their extent are in short supply. However, some indication of the potential extent of the problem is illustrated by the fact that one London-based minority women’s advice centre alone – SBS – deals with over 1,000 cases of violence against women every year. These include not only those named by the Home Office, but also assaults, the abduction of girls and women, acid attacks, violence related to dowry demands and murder (cited in Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (CIMEL/INTERIGHTS), 2001). There is growing awareness of ‘honour’ killings in Britain and wider Europe, though accurate statistics are limited, party because, as Mornington4 observes: people will not give evidence against perpetrators, sometimes because they support what they’re doing … and, even if they don’t support it, they feel it would be against the honour of their community to stand out against it. … The communities are extremely insular. (cited in Malik, 2005) In global terms, the UN (2002) estimates that around 5,000 women every year are murdered by family members – including their mothers – in the name of ‘honour’ (see also UNFPA, 2000; Thapar-Björkert, 2007, on the international dimension of ‘honour’ killings). The British police are only just beginning to pay close attention to the question of ‘honour’ killings and to ask questions about cases of missing women. The dominance of multicultural ideology is an issue here and how this might affect the police’s willingness to take seriously women’s fears of ‘honour’-related




violence or reports of women who have gone missing (Mahoney and Taj, 2006). Forced marriage is discussed as a detailed case study in the next chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the British government’s position to date has been that forced marriages involving British citizens are rare. A number of recent investigations, inquiries and other publications now provide grounds for challenging this assertion. A consequence of migration and settlement not mentioned by the Home Office is the growing demand for sex-selective abortions by people from countries and cultures in which there is a strong preference for boys. This demand to abort female foetuses is occurring in other Western countries (for the UK, see Walby, 2003; for Canada, see Solomon, 2007). It is also becoming more common in developing countries as access to medical technology increases (see Grewel and Kishore, 2004, on India; Shuzhuo et al., 2004, on China). Nowhere is the tension between violence against women and their right to control their own reproduction better summed up than in the UN’s comment: Around the world, women and girls continue to be victims of countless acts of violence. It is indeed a grim reality that the range of gender-based violence is devastating, occurring quite literally from womb to tomb. (UN General Assembly, 2001) This highlights a tension that runs throughout this book, because whatever the reasons, the reality is that, both directly and indirectly, women are centrally implicated in violence against women. For it is women who socialise the men who turn into oppressors of women; it is women who are often the prime movers in forced marriage; it is women in majority communities who frequently encourage their daughters to stay with men who abuse them, and who in minority communities actually carry out the abuse (up to, and including, murder); and it is women who generally carry out both virginity checks and FGM. As with the contradictions that permeate multiculturalism, this is a tension to which I have provided no answers – other than to suggest that the adoption of a multicultural paradigm does nothing to reduce it.

Multiculturalism and women In one sense, the invisibility of black and minority ethnic (BME) women in multicultural theory should come as no surprise, since mainstream




sociology had long ignored women in general and treated feminist theory as a sub- or specialist area, rather than as a core part of sociology itself. In this sense, the sphere of racialised relations simply followed the pattern established in sociology more generally; the same applies to multiculturalism. This means that most male writers either treat minority ethnic communities as undifferentiated on such dimensions as age, gender and generation, or make a passing (token) reference to women (and even, sometimes, to young people). The latter is not significantly different from some of the early responses by white feminists to the accusations by black feminists that they were marginalised or ignored in the developing literature. In many instances, white feminists ‘dealt with’ black women’s criticisms by ‘tacking on’ a paragraph about them! As far as multiculturalism is concerned, it is the prioritisation of race and ethnicity over gender and sexuality that has resulted in gender differences remaining unrecognised (Okin, 1999; Beckett and Macey, 2001; Samantrai, 2002; Mirza, 2003). This failure to recognise that minority ethnic communities – like majority ones – are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous is deeply revealing of the racialised nature of multiculturalism. This has a number of consequences, not least that it leads multiculturalists to focus on differences between, rather than within, communities (Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). Indeed, one of the most basic criticisms of multiculturalism is that it emphasises differences and ignores similarities, thereby ‘othering’ minorities and encouraging an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ attitude between ethnic groups (Mirza et al., 2007). It also, of course, leaves vulnerable categories – such as women and children – within minority communities exposed to, and unprotected from, forces within their own communities that are far from benign (Mahoney and Taj, 2006). For while all cultures can be a source of strength, comfort and stability for their members, they are also implicated in their oppression and control. This is particularly powerful when legitimised by reference to religion. In a direct criticism of multiculturalism, Halley comments: Culture constrains. Sure, it may liberate, too, but efforts to justify cultural rights are characteristically defective to the extent that they insist on the liberation story while suppressing the constraint story. (1999: 100) Some of these criticisms stem directly from aspects of multiculturalism that are inherent to the paradigm itself. For how could an argument for differential treatment be made without focusing at the group (rather than




the individual) level and without stressing differences between (rather than similarities across) ethnic categories, particularly minorities and majorities? For – postmodernism notwithstanding – multiculturalism in practice, and often in theory, is, by definition, founded on a static, essentialised and sometimes romanticised view of minority cultures that stresses homogeneity rather than heterogeneity. It is premised on the assumption that minority cultures differ from majority ones, and each other, to an extent that calls for differential treatment. Within this framework it is difficult to see how multiculturalism could even begin to be operationalised if one took cognisance of such realities as that women’s needs not only differ from men’s, but are sometimes in conflict with them. On a different level, since multiculturalism is about facilitating the maintenance and reproduction of minority cultures, one might expect women to occupy centre stage, and if not, at least to have a key role. The observation that women’s biological reproductive role forms the cornerstone of cultural, religious and social reproduction is not lost on most men in most societies and is intimately involved in efforts to control them. Patriarchy is universal (Walby, 1990), but its expression varies dramatically over time and place and between societies and cultures. It is undoubtedly both different and more overt in those societies that view women’s main, or only, role as located in the private sphere – centred on the home and family, caring for husbands and extended families, producing and rearing children. Differences in the treatment of women are thrown into sharp relief when diverse cultures coexist within one society, as is the case in Britain and other Western democracies as a result of migration and settlement. And it is these differences that have led a number of feminist scholars to question the role of multiculturalism in the oppression of women. For example, Nussbaum comments: ‘the current liberal interest in multiculturalism holds grave dangers for women’s equality’ (1999a: 105), while Okin observes that: ‘Establishing group rights to enable some minority cultures to preserve themselves may not be in the best interests of the girls and women of those cultures, even if it benefits the men’ (1999a: 23). In addition, cultural differences in the treatment of women are often exacerbated through the migration process itself because diasporic communities feel under pressure to maintain the culture of the homeland. This pressure is exerted particularly on, and through, women because of the symbolic role attributed to them as carriers and bearers of ethnic group identity (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Afshar, 1994). Akpinar




too notes the link between migration and the imposition of: ‘… patriarchal values which are remnants of a rural/feudal culture’ (2003: 428) and observes that this is sometimes expressed through increased violence against women. Afshar refers to the assertion by certain minority ethnic young men of their right to ‘police’ women – up to, and including, murder – commenting that: ‘there are many cases of daughters, wives or sisters being beaten to death, burned or grievously harmed by their kin for transgressing’ (1994: 133). Meetoo and Mira suggest that: the woman’s body is the site over which identity is asserted and culture is maintained. She, as the carrier and bearer of her ethnic group, has the obligation not to stray and disrupt the group’s identity by mixing with ‘others’. (2007: 191) These writers all raise a number of fundamental concerns about multiculturalism and women, particularly in the sphere of male control and violence against women in some of the diasporas that make up diverse Britain. In this, one of the most dangerous features of multiculturalism is that it implicitly assumes the existence of ethnic spokespersons able legitimately to speak for their communities (Yalçin-Heckmann, 1997). In reality, this has led to community consultation being largely restricted to self-styled, male community ‘leaders’ (Macey, 1999a; 1999b; 2005; 2006; 2007a; 2008; Puri, 2005; Baxter, 2006; Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006; McKerl, 2007). Even if we ignore the issue of violence, other implications of this for women cannot be overstated, as the numerous Muslim women cited in this book have long been telling the government, policy-makers and practitioners, though to little effect. Both multiculturalism and religion are centrally implicated in the deeply unequal – and sometimes dangerous – position of minority ethnic women (and girl children) and it is little short of astounding that they remain virtually invisible in the mainstream (male) literature.

Summary: multiculturalism, religion and women In this chapter, I have built on the process, begun in chapter 1, of tracing the development of multiculturalism in Britain, focusing in particular on what I believe are two key omissions that have had critical long-term consequences for the multicultural project and its impact on women. The first is the failure to consider the importance – indeed centrality – of religion in relation to the culture and identities of some minority groups and




how this can be used and abused in the control of women. The second is the failure to realise that women are key players in the maintenance and transmission of both culture and religion and carry responsibility for upholding the honour of men. Together, these have had fundamental and far-reaching consequences, not only for minority women, but for other vulnerable members of communities, such as children and young people. Neglecting the influence of religion in minority cultures was, and is, an error of startling proportions. For the power of religion is profound at all levels of human social existence, as even a moment’s historical reflection illustrates. That power can be harnessed to liberate or oppress, to unite or divide, to bring peace or conflict – with the latter more common where ethnic diversity exists (Wirsing, 1981). Multiculturalism’s secular approach is surprising for two further reasons: first, that over the last 30 or 40 years there has been a worldwide resurgence of Christianity, Islam and Judaism; and second, that for over a decade, the British government has placed a strong, and growing, emphasis on religion, particularly in the CVS. In 1989, the so-called Rushdie Affair was a clear demonstration of the power of religion as a mobilising force, yet it did not act as a wake-up call to multiculturalists. Nor, indeed, did 9/11 or 7/7. Multicultural thinking continues to stress only the positive aspects of cultural diversity, with little acknowledgement of its potential for conflict and even less acknowledgement of the role of religion in this. I have argued in this chapter that while religion impacts on women in both the public and the private arenas, its influence is particularly strong in the latter. This is because all religions are patriarchal and specify ‘appropriate’ roles for women in relation to sexuality, the home, family and childrearing. In diasporic communities, where cultural and religious traditions may be perceived as being under threat, this can lead to an extreme focus on controlling women in which their choices are severely curtailed – sometimes by violent, or even lethal, means. My argument, overall, is that multiculturalism facilitates male control over women, first, by ceding autonomy to community ‘leaders’ to define the needs of communities; second, by creating a context that can hide women’s suffering by ruling criticism of minority communities to be inadmissible; and third, by making professionals reluctant to interfere in so-called ‘community affairs’ for fear of being accused of racism or Islamophobia. This argument is further developed in subsequent chapters. However, given the content of this chapter, it is probably worth reiterating that I am not suggesting that multiculturalism is the cause of women’s oppression or violence against them, nor that this is restricted to minority




groups. Indeed, to do so would be ridiculous, given the extent of the phenomenon across the world, as reported in this chapter. However, it would be equally ridiculous to deny – as some writers do – that there are no real differences in both the expression and acceptance of violence against women in different cultural and religious groups and settings. And I find nothing in the literature to convince me that Okin (1997) was wrong to assert that Western women’s human and civil rights to protection from violence are better developed than those of their (originally) non-Western counterparts.




3

Introduction There are many examples of what can be termed ‘multiculturalism in practice’ that could be used to illustrate the actual impact of multicultural policies on people in the real world. Some of these are direct, such as the ban on trans-racial adoption which has resulted in thousands of ‘mixedrace’ (or ‘dual-heritage’) children in Britain and the US being condemned to a lifetime of institutional care (Simon, 1974; Simon and Alstein, 1987; Bartholet, 1991; 1993; 1994; Alstein and Melli, 1993; Aldridge, 1994; Gaber, 1994; Macey, 1995c; 1996; 1998). Some are indirect and involve the import through migration and settlement of practices that originate in different cultural contexts. These include sex-selective abortions, forced marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called ‘honour’-related violence, including murder. I use the term ‘indirect’ in these cases to indicate the fact that none of them is sanctioned by the state or, formally at least, by the cultural communities in which they are practised. On the contrary, FGM is illegal, as, of course, is murder – whether labelled ‘honour’ or otherwise. And that forced marriages are known to be wrong is, to some extent, indicated by the widespread denial of it by minority ethnic individuals (Samad and Eade, 2002; Phillips and Dustin, 2004; HAC, 2008; Khanum, 2008), though the belief that force only occurs when violence is involved needs to be noted here. Before moving on to forced marriage, it may be worth saying a little about some of the examples cited above. For example, North American policy on trans-racial adoption came straight from the multicultural/anti-racist movement in response to such fairly extreme statements by black social workers as that placing black children in white homes constituted ‘a blatant form of race and cultural genocide’ 63



Multiculturalism in Practice: Forced Marriage1

(Association of Black Social Workers and Allied Professionals, 1972, cited in Simon and Alstein, 1987: 143). Its relevance to this book is that it provides a good illustration of the consequences that can accrue from prioritising the rights of the group over those of the individual and the particular dangers involved when these group rights are based on ascribed characteristics, such as race. It is also relevant in that it is another example of the importation of policy and practice from another country to Britain where it has had equally disastrous consequences for children. Simon et al. (1993) present a striking example of this with respect to a Native American woman who left the reservation on which she lived to give birth to a child whom she placed for adoption with a non-Indian family. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently used the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act to rule the adoption void. This Act prohibits the trans-racial adoption of Indian children and gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. The court stated that tribal authority over children born to the reservation’s domiciliaries must be protected, even where a parent sought to avoid this. As multiculturalists in this country argue for minority ethnic rights in the public arena, including the law, it is not inconceivable that similar situations could occur here, whereby women’s (and children’s) rights are superseded by those of minority ethnic communities. In fact, this is arguably already the case, given the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal’s use of a loophole in the law to establish shar’ia law in Britain. It is important to note here that some multiculturalists, such as Parekh, are profoundly opposed to any move to allow different laws for ethnic and religious groups: ‘Britain cannot allow separate legal systems for different communities without violating the fundamental principles of common citizenship before the law’ (cited in Grillo, 1999: 204). An example of a totally different kind relates to FGM, which is known to be occurring in a number of European societies due to migration and settlement from parts of the world where the practice is common. Interestingly, though FGM is illegal in the UK and most other Western European societies, as recently as the 1990s there were demands in Britain for it to be carried out on the National Health Service (Stewart, 1998). Despite clear evidence that FGM is taking place in Britain (Dorkenoo et al., 2006), no prosecutions have been brought. The same is true in France (Hilsdon and Rozario, 2006) and Sweden (Ahlberg et al., 2004). It is interesting to relate in this context that some of my African students tell me that FGM is a routine, taken-for-granted practice in their communities, as, apparently, is virginity testing in black-led Christian churches.




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This kind of information is a salutary lesson to those of us who thought we had some sense of what is going on in minority ethno-religious communities. Two points arise from the issue of FGM in the context of a book on multiculturalism and women. The first is that the logic of multiculturalism can, and is, used to defend what I, along with many other individuals and organisations, regard as a totally unacceptable, extreme, dangerous and damaging form of violence against women and children (United Nations, 1993; UNFPA, 2000; Beckett and Macey, 2001; Kalev, 2004; UNICEF, 2005; 2006). Support for the practice of FGM comes from both the requirement to respect all cultures as equal and the principle of noninterference in minority cultures. While I suspect that few proponents of multiculturalism would openly support FGM, and some, such as Kymlicka, are utterly opposed to it, the writings of others, such as Kukathas, have been used to defend it (Margalit and Halbertal, 1994). As discussed elsewhere, ‘feminists of color’ have also raised questions that challenge Western assumptions about the distinction between such ritual practices as FGM and cosmetic surgery (see Chambers, 2004; Kalev, 2004, for a fuller discussion). The second point relates to the role of the law in relation to those cultural practices that have been defined as being sufficiently unacceptable as to be made illegal. This is discussed below, but the fact that there is evidence that FGM is being carried out on girls in Britain raises the obvious question of why no action is being taken against the perpetrators. I would lay some of the blame on the dominance of multicultural ideology and its effects on – in this case – medicine and the criminal justice system (as well as the difficulty of obtaining evidence). I would also suggest that FGM is another example of the suffering that can be caused to individual women and children when we allow the rights of the group to trump those of the basic human rights of its members. This brings me to the topic of this chapter – forced marriage. Here, as with other forms of violence against women discussed in chapter 2, my argument is not that multiculturalism causes forced marriage, but that it plays a significant role in encouraging the perpetuation of cultural practices that include forced marriage. It does so in a number of ways. First, because of its ideological influence on official and unofficial policy and practice – in this case, the government’s refusal to make forced marriage illegal and its acceptance of the legitimacy of ‘marriages’ that have taken place by telephone. Second, multiculturalism has encouraged the prioritisation of a (sometimes separatist) Muslim identity among particular groups, such as young men (Macey 1999a; 2007b; Dwyer, 2000; Archer,



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2001; Alam and Husband, 2006; Mirza et al., 2007) and – for the purpose of achieving particular ends – older men (Ansari, 2002; MAT, 2008). This impacts on both the public and the private spheres and is implicated in the continuation of trans-national marriages in which brides and grooms are brought from the homeland. Third, as noted in chapter 2, and clearly related to point two, multiculturalism has facilitated male control over women via the ceding of autonomy to religious and other self-styled community ‘leaders’. This again encourages trans-national marriages, as discussed below.

Forced, arranged and false marriages Concern in Britain that marriages between British and Pakistani citizens were not so much arranged as forced led to the establishment in 1999 of a Home Office Working Group to investigate the situation. This followed many years of questioning and pressure from the MP Ann Cryer, whose West Yorkshire constituency includes large Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities in which it is estimated that 80 per cent of marriages are with a partner from the Indian subcontinent (and which, according to MAT, 2008, are therefore likely to involve coercion). Cryer’s demands for action on forced marriage arose out of the many requests for help that she received from women who had been subjected to such marriages; despite this, she was treated to the same kind of vilification as was Okin, including from her colleagues in the Labour Party. At the local level, both she and her secretary received numerous threats, ranging from withdrawal of Muslim votes to physical violence (which actually occurred). The report of the Working Group, A Choice by Right, has largely defined the terms of subsequent research, policy and practice, particularly with respect to emphasising the distinction between ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriage: The Working Group is clear that the distinction [between forced and arranged marriage] lies in the right to choose. In the tradition of arranged marriages, the families of both spouses take a leading role in arranging the marriage, but the choice of whether to solemnise the arrangement remains with the spouses and can be exercised at any time. The spouses have the right to choose – to say no – at any time. In forced marriage, there is no choice. (Uddin and Ahmed, 2000: 10) Forgetting the multicultural edict not to make judgements about the cultural practices of others, the Working Group stated that forced marriage




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is ‘wrong’ (Uddin and Ahmed, 2000: 4). This constructed forced marriage somewhat simplistically as being diametrically opposed to arranged marriages, which were seen as constituting a ‘respectable cultural practice’ (Gupta, 2003: 69). This binary divide continues to underpin research, policy and practice, despite Samad and Eade’s (2002) suggestion that it is more accurate to think of it in terms of a continuum. The polarisation of the distinction between forced and arranged marriage may also be one of the factors that encourages the widespread belief that it is only when physical violence is involved that the marriage is forced. Other investigations into, and consultations on, forced marriages and such related abuses as domestic violence and so-called ‘honour’ crimes have followed. In 2002, Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage (Samad and Eade, 2002, funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) was published. In 2005, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) carried out a UK-wide consultation on criminalising the practice: Forced Marriage: A Wrong not a Right (FMU, 2006). Also in 2006, a series of government-funded consultations with Muslim women took place in England and Wales, apparently linked to concern about the political radicalisation of young men, but used by women to articulate other issues. Among these was the failure of the authorities to take effective action against violence perpetrated within minority communities, including forced marriage, paedophilia, sexual abuse in families and mosques, incest, rape in families and ‘honour’-related violence (Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006). Concern in Britain about forced marriage is matched in other countries of the EU where both governments and women’s rights groups see it as a growing problem; for example, Hamburg city council, supported by the EU, has recently initiated a series of meetings across Europe to discuss the issue (Jones, 2008). In Britain, 2008 saw a veritable spate of publications on forced marriage, including Crimes of the Community: Honour-Based Violence in the UK (Brandon and Hafez, 2008). Forced Marriage, Family Cohesion and Community Engagement (Khanum, 2008, (commissioned by the local MP Margaret Moran’s office, the Metropolitan Police Service and the Home Office), Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’-Based Violence, the report of a House of Commons Home Affairs Committee of Inquiry (HAC, 2008) and Liberation from Forced Marriages, by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT, 2008). The last two are highly significant: the HAC inquiry because it is the most comprehensive investigation undertaken in the UK into violence against women including in minority ethnic communities;2 the MAT publication because it is the first time, to my knowledge, that a national Muslim organisation has acknowledged



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that forced marriage is widespread in Muslim communities in the UK and that action needs to be taken to stop it. It is important to note here – and apply to other sections of this book – that the Qur’an specifically forbids forced marriage. However, the concept of ‘forced’ may be as meaningless in some interpretations of Islam as that of rape within marriage. For example, the Hanafi school of jurisprudence allows minors to be validly married on the basis of their guardians’ wishes without any requirement for the child’s consent (Poulter, 1998). And, in any case, the concept of consent is highly questionable here, given that the minors referred to are pre-pubescent – boys under twelve and girls under nine. There is no way of knowing whether such ‘marriages’ involve British citizens.

The extent of forced marriage in the UK The true extent of forced marriage will never be known, because so few cases are reported to and recorded by statutory agencies, but local community organisations [in Luton] receive several hundred enquiries about forced marriage each year. (Moran, in Khanum, 2008: ii) In 2000, Uddin and Ahmed lamented the lack of accurate information on forced marriage in the UK and in 2002, Samad and Eade reiterated this concern. However, the FMU reported that in 2006 they were dealing with around 5,000 enquiries and 300 cases of forced marriage each year, the majority concerning Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities (65 per cent and 15 per cent respectively) (HAC, 2008). In 2007 the FMU dealt with 400 cases of forced marriage, and in the first nine months of 2008, over 1,300 suspected cases reported (HM Government, 2008). The experience of CVS groups supports the suggestion that such statistics represent the tip of the iceberg. For example, in Luton,3 Khanum (2008) reports that there are over 300 approaches annually to various bodies for advice on forced marriage, suggesting that several thousand such marriages may be taking place every year. In Bradford4 the police, who are often the last port of call for women, recorded 191 cases of forced marriage in 2005 (155 of which involved Pakistanis). They report that the numbers are increasing every year and also note that cases are sometimes recorded as domestic violence (Bhatti, 2007). And Karma Nirvana, a small community-based project specialising in support for survivors of forced marriage, deals with over 15 new cases of forced marriage and ‘honour’-related violence every week (780 a year) (Karma Nirvana, in HAC, 2008, Ev.238). 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey



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It is widely accepted that forced marriage, like rape and domestic violence, is significantly under-reported and the latter is generally estimated to constitute only 10 per cent of actual instances. If this statistic is applied to the tiny minority of forced marriages dealt with only by the FMU, it would suggest an actual figure of 4,000 cases a year in the UK. If it were applied to the cases that come to the attention of numerous bodies in the statutory and CVS, we would almost certainly be talking of many more thousands every year. Some indication of the scale of the problem may be suggested by the fact that in 2007 in Pakistan, 11,022 spouse settlement applications were issued and 3,216 refused (HAC, 2008).5 More starkly, the UK Border Agency (the immigration service) reported that in the previous year, a total of 47,000 spouses entered the UK on settlement visas (UK Border Agency). I am not suggesting that all these entail forced marriages, but I am sure that a significant proportion of those between British and South Asian citizens are not freely undertaken. Written evidence from the FCO to the HAC raises another issue that is currently causing concern in the UK and was, in fact, the subject of an Early Day Motion in Parliament (UK Parliament, 2008). This relates to marriages involving a disabled partner. Among the 407 cases referred to the Consular Immigration Link team in Pakistan in 2007 were 193 cases of forced marriage and 86 of ‘vulnerable adults’, that is, people with a severe mental or physical disability (FCO, in HAC, 2008, Ev.439). I discuss the issue of forced marriage and disability – particularly mental disability – later in this chapter, though the relevance of Khanum’s (2008) suggestion that the category of ‘false’ should be added to that of forced marriages is relevant here. She uses the term ‘false’ to describe marriages that do not need to involve force because they are based on deception in relation to the partner’s attributes, such as educational qualifications, criminal background, drug addiction or disabilities. Khanum notes that such marriages impact particularly on brides from overseas where the marriage has taken place outside Britain without the groom being present. She cites one case in which the husband’s physical disabilities were such that ‘[the bride] was forced by the groom’s family to consummate the marriage in an unthinkable manner’ (2008: 47). In sum, material published in 2008 challenges the popular assumption (encouraged by a number of reports) that only a very small number of British citizens are affected by forced marriages. The reality would appear to be that many thousands of children and young women are being forced – or tricked – into marriages every year. I suspect, too, that if ‘false’ marriages were included, the total number of marriages in which abuse is involved would expand dramatically. 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey


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The reality is that in over 70 per cent of all marriages that take place, where the spouse is an English citizen and the other spouse is a foreign national from the Asian sub-continent, there is an element of force or coercion before the marriage takes place. These figures reflect the crisis that has loomed within the Muslim community without being noticed or dealt with for the past two decades. The figures that are reported to the authorities are only the tip of the iceberg. (MAT, 2008: 9)

The human face of forced marriage I am not of Pakistani heritage, I am not Muslim and I have no direct experience of forced marriage. For these reasons, much of the material in this section consists of the voices of women who do have such experience. I have, however, worked closely with a domestic violence agency with particular expertise in abuse in South Asian communities. And as a lecturer at a university in an area of high Mirpuri settlement, I have close contact with young women students being forced into trans-continental marriages (and occasionally men, for 15 per cent of the cases dealt with by the FMU are men). I have shared their sense of powerlessness and despair; I have witnessed threatened suicide, mental breakdowns, eating disorders and self-harm – the human reality behind the statistics. Notwithstanding these experiences, it was a specific incident that made me properly understand why Idrus and Bennett (2003) refer to forced marriage as ‘statutory rape’. This was when two unmarried sisters asked if I could help them to obtain the contraceptive pill. To condense a long and distressing conversation, these young women were being taken ‘on holiday’ to Mirpur, but knew that marriage to their cousins was planned and had overheard telephone conversations referring to rape as a means of ‘bringing them under’. Rape is, in fact, just one of the means by which young women are forced into unwanted marriages. Southall Black Sisters refer to: physical and sexual violence, threatening behaviour, imprisonment, abduction, mental and social pressures, including emotional



Bhopal says: ‘I feel that in practice there is very little difference between arranged and forced marriage’ (1997: 58). Bhatti’s (2007) research, as well as her own experience, leads her to conclude that almost all the marriages between a partner from Bradford and one from Mirpur are forced, not arranged. And the MAT states:

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Research and consultation illustrate some of the thinking behind forced marriage and the range of tactics that are used to coerce women into unwanted marriages: We are Pakistani. Marriages are arranged by the parents between two families of the same qaum [caste]. Get that through your thick head, bata [child]’, shouts Dad. What my father actually means is that he has chosen a man for me and I must marry him. (Bhatti, 2007: 38) Whenever I would ask my mother why do I have to marry someone in Pakistan? Her answer would be ‘the boys here are good and you’re giving someone from a poor background the opportunity to have a better life in the UK’. (Bhatti, 2007: 68) I was raped; I didn’t want to have sex with him. He was the opposite of what I was. He was twice the size of me. And anyway they would not have let me return until I got pregnant anyway. I didn’t know him or meet him before and he was not related to me, he was just from the right caste. (Brandon and Hafez, 2008: 20) My parents are so helpless in a situation where there are no right and wrong answers for them. I know they love me. I have seen the fear in their eyes at the thought of living as outcasts in a cruel and selfish community. I have to watch my parents cry and beg me daily not to kill them off among their family and in this society. (Khanum, 2008: 25) My Mum was saying – You’ve got to marry him or your Dad will divorce me. (HAC, 2000: 6) My cousin’s parents tricked her into going to Pakistan to see her dying Grandfather. But they forced her to marry this older man. So when



blackmail, restrictions on lifestyle such as limitations in movement, association, dress, education and career choices, oppressive financial controls, and other demeaning, humiliating and controlling actions. (SBS, 2001: 4)


Going outside the family is punished and you are torn between loyalty and survival. (HAC, 2008, e-consultation) There is a strong feeling of ‘acceptance’ of the tradition of arranged (and if necessary forced) marriage among young women. Some young women do not see any alternative. (HAC, 2008: e-consultation) I was forced into a marriage but my parents did not think it was wrong, they thought it was the right thing to do. So how are we going to educate people like my parents, how are we going to re-write rules which have been in place for hundreds of years? (HAC, 2008: e-consultation) My parents would never think what they did to me was ‘forced’. They genuinely thought they knew what was best for me. (HAC, 2008: e-consultation) We don’t want to leave our families, we just don’t want to be forced into a marriage. (Uddin and Ahmed, 2000: 5) Because I didn’t get married to him [cousin], they gave him my sister instead – that’s what it’s like. She’s in Pakistan now. She’s 16 and she’s pregnant. They had promised me verbally to him and his family when I was born. But now because I’ve run away they’ve given my sister to him instead. …My dad won’t bring her back ’til she’s had the baby. He’s afraid that she’ll have an abortion. It doesn’t matter to them what happens to her – they got the land that his family had. (Brandon and Hafez, 2008: 13) The above quotations highlight a number of aspects of forced marriage that are relevant to understanding the processes by which young women are ‘persuaded’ into marriages that they do not want. First, young Pakistani women are socialised into accepting their parents’ right to arrange marriages for them and sometimes find it difficult even to recognise this as constituting force. Second, to reject their parents’ wishes can involve 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey


she got back to England, she did a legger. Now no one knows where she is. (HAC, 2008: 6)

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rejection by the family and community, with all the material and emotional suffering that this involves. And third, young women love their families and do not want to hurt them. All these factors render women extremely vulnerable to forced marriage in ways that cannot easily be remedied by the law, social policy or professional practice, though these have a part to play. They also illustrate Shachar’s warning about ‘the perils of multicultural accommodation’ (2001: 17) and the inadequacy of the ‘right of exit’ as an ‘answer’ to such abuses as forced marriage. I will discuss these issues later in the book.

Forced marriage, human rights and the law I think there is a need for a specific criminal offence. In this country we have an offence against littering in the streets and yet we do not have a forced marriage criminal offence, and I say that because forced marriage leads to repeated rapes, et cetera, and horrific violence. (Sanghera [Karma Nirvana], HAC, 2008: Ev.35) As already noted, neither forced marriage nor domestic violence is a criminal offence in Britain. The report of the first Working Group on forced marriage stated – without explanation – that: ‘The Working Group does not support the creation of a specific offence of forcing a person to marry’ (Uddin and Ahmed, 2000: 9). When the FMU revisited the question of criminalisation in 2006, it reached the same decision, stressing that this was based on the views of the majority of participants in consultation on the issue. What it did not point out was that this was a very narrow majority – 37 per cent against criminalisation, 34 per cent for. A number of factors are relevant to this outcome: • it is based on only 157 responses, unevenly spread across England,

Wales and Scotland, and not always providing good coverage of areas where forced marriage is prevalent; • voting varied by category, so that while all the Crown Prosecution and Probation Service respondents were against criminalisation, the majority of Children’s and Young People’s Services were in favour; • 40 per cent of those with experience of forced marriage were in favour of criminalisation, and only 24 per cent against; • the consultation involved men as well as women, but no breakdown of voting by gender is provided. In contrast to the FMU consultation, that with 600 Welsh Muslim women in the same year, concluded: ‘It is necessary to raise a question regarding the need to criminalise it and make the act of Forced Marriage an illegal offence’ (Mahoney and Taj, 2006: 16). 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey


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Notwithstanding the fact that forced marriage is not a criminal offence, there is a considerable body of international and domestic legislation that either relates directly to it or can be used in relation to it. International law places forced marriage firmly within a human rights framework and, as Kelly (2005) notes, violence against women is now mainstreamed within both human rights discourse and practice. The UK is a signatory to a number of agreements, conventions and declarations specifically on marriage, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses’, and the United Nations: ‘A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her life and her dignity and equality as a human being’; ‘State parties shall ensure on a basis of equality of men and women … the same right to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their full and free consent’. In addition, UK law now has to be written and interpreted within a European framework, thereby increasing the power of European Human Rights legislation in the British context. However, neither the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 nor the UK Human Rights Act 1998 says anything about marriage other than that people of marriageable age have the right to marry and establish a family. Domestic law on marriage is laid down in the Marriage Act 1949 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The minimum age for marriage is 16 and marriage must be freely entered into: ‘[if] …either party to the marriage did not validly consent to it, whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise’, the marriage is voidable. A new Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 came into force in November 2008, and amends the Family Law Act 1996, rather than criminalising forced marriage. The Act adopts a very broad definition of ‘force’ to include psychological coercion and threats, and empowers courts to make protection orders to limit the conduct of anyone attempting to coerce someone into marriage. The new legislation is accompanied by multi-agency statutory guidelines which require public sector agencies to take action against forced marriage (Stobart, 2009). For some people this is a step too far; for others, it does not go far enough (HAC, 2008); and for yet others, it is not expected to work in practice (Khanum, 2008). HAC, for instance, states that while conflicting opinions had decided them not to recommend the criminalisation of forced marriage: If the implementation of the Forced Marriage Act [in conjunction with other measures being taken to combat forced marriage] cannot demonstrate concrete progress in reducing the prevalence of forced




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To some extent, these differences of opinion explain why the government has so far been reluctant to criminalise forced marriage. However, one might question the basis on which decisions are taken to ‘consult’ before introducing legal measures in some areas and not in others: for example, I am not aware of any consultations having taken place on whether or not to implement multiculturalism or community cohesion policies. Equally important is the question of the basis on which people are invited to take part in such consultations as the government deems fit to carry out, for there are clear indications that this was influential in the FMU decision not to make forced marriage a criminal offence. A number of sections of the Children Act 1989 provide powers that can be used to protect children (under the age of 17) who are being forced into marriage. Local authorities have a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need and this can be used to prevent children being removed from the UK. It can also, if necessary, require their removal from families into the care of local authorities. The Education Act 1996 can also be used to prevent forced marriage since it requires that all children must be in full-time education until the age of 16. In addition, both civil and criminal law in the UK include numerous offences under which people forcing others into marriage can be charged. Common law offences cover kidnapping, aiding and abetting a criminal offence, false imprisonment and murder. Specific laws that are directly applicable include: the Criminal Justice Act 1988; the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004; Children and Young Persons Act 1933; the Theft Act 1968; the Child Abduction Act 1984; the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2003; the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Vulnerable adults are protected under the Mental Health Act 1983, which can be used to prevent overseas travel and marriage itself. Of considerable significance is the frequently ignored fact that apparently unrelated law can play a major role in preventing forced marriage. A striking example here is the ‘primary purpose rule’ introduced by the Conservative government to curb abuses of immigration via marriage, but repealed when Labour came to power. The restriction of visas for marriage purposes had a strong and immediate impact on trans-continental marriages, as is indicated by Home Office statistics. In 1997, when the primary purpose rule was in force, there were 255 applications for visas



marriage and increasing the safety of victims, then the question of criminalisation should be revisited. (2008: 132)

for marriage; in 1998 when it was repealed, the number rose to 1,132 (Alibhai-Brown, 1998). This, along with statistics on the number of Pakistani Muslims in the UK, challenges Samad and Eade’s (2002) statement that trans-continental marriages are favoured due to lack of suitable partners in the UK. For when the option of such marriages was removed, Pakistani parents had no difficulty in arranging marriages for their children within the UK (Beckett and Macey, 2001). This is not to suggest that banning immigration for marriage purposes would completely solve the problem, for parents can and do take reluctant daughters to Pakistan and marry them there. Nor is it to imply that no marriages within the UK are forced; however, it seems likely that British citizens have a better chance of escaping an unwanted marriage in the UK than overseas (MAT, 2008). It would seem, then, that there is more than enough legislation in the UK to prevent forced marriage from taking place. So why are thousands of British children and young women still being forced into marriage every year? There are a number of different levels on which this question can be answered. These intersect and interact and raise questions of practice, as well as policy.

Forced marriage: policy versus practice, rhetoric versus reality The UN General Secretary powerfully highlights the gap between the law and its implementation in his comment that: Violence against women continues unabated in every continent, country and culture. It takes a devastating toll on women’s lives, on their families and on society as a whole. Most societies prohibit such violence – yet the reality is that too often, it is covered up or tacitly condoned. (Ban Ki-moon, 2008) This gap, which is sometimes of chasmic proportions, is indicated in the evidence presented to the HAC (2008). The reasons for this include lack of political will, fear of being accused of racism or Islamophobia, ‘political correctness’ and, perhaps most common, a level of ignorance that has actually resulted in women being murdered. There are a number of such cases in both Britain and wider Europe and the British police are currently reopening some cases of young Asian women’s disappearances and deaths, with ‘honour’ killings in mind. One particularly shocking example is that of Banaz Mahmod, whose murder in 2007 was arranged by her father and uncle after the police had ignored several appeals for help




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from her. This was despite the fact that she named those she thought would kill her and produced telephone footage of her fears (Marshall, 2007). The Mahmod case is a chilling reminder that the law in itself is not enough: there has to be the political will to implement it. This applies not only to front-line police officers, but to professionals in education, health and social/welfare services, where policy exists but is often not implemented by the very people who are in a position to instigate preventative measures. However, it is not only the implementation of policy that is inadequate; in some cases the policy itself is problematic. An example here (which sometimes involves poor practice) is the issue of loopholes in the law. The requirement for school attendance, for instance, allows for the provision of an ‘effective alternative to school’, and though there are guidelines on this, parents can deny inspectors access to the home and the child. The HAC inquiry (2008) discovered many children missing from school rolls who remain unaccounted for, including those who have failed to return to school after a holiday abroad (250 girls aged 13-16 in Bradford alone in 2006 (FMU, in HAC, 2008: 56). Although most education providers subsequently denied any link with forced marriages (Mornington, in HAC, 2008: Ev. 342-4), there is no doubt that children are removed from school for marriage purposes and that there is widespread failure to monitor and act on this. Another loophole with extremely far-reaching consequences is the fact that marriages conducted outside the UK are generally recognised here, provided that both parties have the legal capacity to marry. There is no doubt that this is exploited by parents whose children are resisting marriage and who are sometimes tricked into ‘holidays’ or visiting ‘ill’ grandparents, only to find their passports and return flight tickets taken away from them on their arrival (Samad and Eade, 2002). Sometimes, too, these women are not allowed to return home until they are pregnant or have actually given birth (Brandon and Hafez, 2008). Such marriages may fall into Khanum’s ‘false’ category, having been conducted with only one party present, or even by telephone: I have a young mother who came in to the office and said that she wanted to get her daughter married to her nephew in Pakistan. She said ‘I’d rather the marriage takes place on the phone.’ She asked is there a way to get the husband over by doing ‘Nikah’ [religious marriage] on the phone and is it a problem that her daughter is only 16? (Taj [Henna Foundation, Cardiff], in Brandon and Hafez, 2008: 14–15)



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The law and social policy in Britain are often gender-blind, resulting in bias against women. An example here is that men in polygamous marriages are entitled to full welfare benefits for all their wives and children, despite bigamy being illegal in this country (Wynne-Jones, 2008). In contrast, women brought into the country as brides, without indefinite right to remain, are denied access to public funding, and therefore to a range of services such as legal aid, housing, refuges (Chantler, 2004) and – ironically – the FMU (Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation, in HAC, 2008: Ev.291). One consequence of this is that many women (and their children) are forced to remain in abusive and violent relationships, particularly since some husbands and families refuse to regularise women’s citizenship status in order to maintain control over them (Burman and Chantler, 2004; Burman et al., 2004). At the practice level, a number of issues impact on forced marriage (and other forms of violence against women). One of these concerns breeches of confidentiality by the police, doctors, teachers and social workers; the other concerns ignorance. There is evidence of doctors reporting back to parents in cases of forced marriage (Allen,6 in Sawyer, 2008) and to husbands and community ‘leaders’ in cases of domestic violence (Puri, 2005). Police officers have sometimes treated women fleeing forced marriage as ‘teenage runaways’ and returned them to their families (Allen, in Sawyer, 2008; Khanum, 2008); teachers have been tricked by parents into making contact with escapees from forced marriage, and social workers have seen family mediation as an appropriate way of handling forced marriage (Khanum, 2008). All these actions quite literally put women’s lives at risk and, indeed, a number have been murdered as a consequence. The path to hell, as the saying goes, is, indeed, paved with good intentions! Ignorance is bad enough in its consequences for women; unfortunately, not all questionable practice stems from ignorance. In some cases, minority ethnic men choose to act in the interests of parents and the community rather than those of young women. Imams, community ‘leaders’ and local councillors are widely distrusted for this reason (Keighley Domestic Violence Forum (KDVF), 1998; Gores, 1999; Macey, 1999a; 1999b; Rehman-Sabba, 1999; Samaroo, 2005; Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006; Khanum, 2008), and there is evidence to suggest that this is well founded. For example, workers in benefit offices and Job Centres have revealed personal information to families and ‘bounty hunters’ which has enabled survivors of domestic violence and forced marriage to be traced (Macey, 1999b; Allen, in Sawyer, 2008); social workers have passed information to former husbands on the whereabouts of women




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and children (personal communication) and South Asian police officers have passed information back to communities. To some extent, all these examples can be argued to reflect problems related to multiculturalism at various levels, and the latter illustrates the tension that exists between British equality and human rights policies as they apply to different categories. The possible consequences for South Asian women of the setting of targets on minority ethnic representation in the police service were self-evident from the outset. That they were ignored is a blatant example of the prioritisation of race/ethnicity over gender issues which is fundamental to both anti-racism and multiculturalism. It is not, then, surprising that many people see little point in introducing specific legislation on forced marriage, though this is not the only reason to disagree with this. Opposition to criminalisation reflects a range of views on the reasons for forced marriage, the likelihood of it dying out ‘naturally’ over time, the adoption of a particular ideological stance and distrust of the British government.

Influences on forced marriage The meaning of marriage [Arranged marriage] helps maintain the social stratification system in the society (caste), it gives parents control over family members, it enhances the chances to preserve and continue the ancestral line, it provides opportunities to strengthen the kinship group, it allows the consolidation and extension of family property and enables the elders to preserve the principles of endogamy. (Bhopal, 1997: 58) There are some fundamental differences in attitudes to marriage between Pakistani Muslims and the native British that have to be considered in trying to understand forced marriage. Among non-Muslims, marriage is seen to be about personal happiness and love between two individuals. Among Pakistani Muslims it is a contractual agreement between two families and involves social structures and status, communal identity, culture and religion. The importance of this cannot be overstated and has far-reaching implications for our understanding of forced marriage and our estimation of the likelihood of it dying out naturally over time. Put simply, the individual’s desires, needs, interests and happiness are secondary to those of the family and community (Shaw, 2001; Zaidi and Shuraydi, 2002). However, this masks a more material reality that goes some way to explaining the preference not only for endogenous,



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The choices that are made have a far-reaching impact upon the parents, their siblings, and their siblings’ children, and a range of other relatives, affecting the futures and socio-economic positions of a much wider range of kin than just parents and children. For this reason, decisions about marriage are a matter of corporate, not individual concern. (2001: 325) It is important to reiterate that forced marriage is strictly forbidden in Islam. However, sexual relationships outside marriage are equally strictly prohibited, which is why, as noted previously, marriage is virtually a religious and cultural requirement for Muslims. In wider British society, sex outside marriage, cohabitation, single living and same-sex partnerships are widely accepted, which is related to marriage tending to take place at a later age than it does among Muslims. Pakistani parents consider it one of their principal responsibilities to arrange their children’s marriages and sometimes do so at birth or in early childhood. This emphasis on marriage seems to be close to a belief that it is a panacea for rebellion, ‘inappropriate’ relationships, alcohol and drug abuse and criminality – all of which are seen to result from ‘Western corruption’. Two obviously negative aspects of the centrality of marriage in Muslim communities relate to sexual orientation and disability. In relation to the former, there is evidence that young lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) Muslims are sometimes forced into marriage as a means of ‘curing’ them of their ‘deviance’: I know girls taken abroad, or forced into marriage because of their sexuality. There is constant pressure. I had come out [as a lesbian] to my family years before and the relatives in Pakistan said – bring her here, we’ll sort her out. I was forced into marriage. Although many people oppose forced marriage I find a lot of people say it’s OK for lesbians. (Anonymous contributor, in Raz, 2006) The appalling situation of LGBT people forced into heterosexual marriage gives a whole new meaning to Idrus and Bennett’s (2003) description of forced marriage as statutory rape. And just as forced heterosexual marriage impacts differentially on women and men, it is likely that



but consanguineous, marriage. Shaw observes that parents usually first consider the claims of close kin on their offspring as spouses for their children because:

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lesbians in such marriages will be in a far worse position than their male counterparts. For example, Yip (2004) reports that a strategy adopted by some South Asian gay men is to maintain the façade of marriage in public while engaging in homosexual relationships in secret. He does not comment on the fact that lesbians are unlikely to have the freedom to do this or on the potential effect on wives, who suffer the ‘collateral damage’ caused by false marriages (Khanum, 2008). This would count as an example of the ‘unavoidable costs’ of cultural autonomy noted – and defended – by multiculturalists such as Kukathas (1997; 2001). As far as disability is concerned, O’Hara (2003) found that some parents see marriage as a cure for learning disabilities, irrespective of either the severity of the disability or the socio-economic status of the family (Channabasavanna et al., 1985). Such marriages are more likely to be ‘false’ than those where disability is not involved, as evidenced by Bukhar’s example: I have one case when someone was brought over [from Pakistan to England] and her husband had mental health issues; he had the mental age of a five year old but the body of a 40 year old. It was a telephone nikah [religious marriage], so the girl only saw what he looked like on picture. (cited in Brandon and Hafez, 2008: 22) Rozario (2005) and Gilliat-Ray (2007) report that some Bangladeshi Muslim families prefer the risk of having disabled children to that of damaging the marriage prospects of other children. This illustrates the strength of the cultural and religious commitment to marriage, as well as the belief that it is a sort of ‘cure-all’. It is undoubtedly facilitated by the acceptance in Britain of the validity of marriages conducted overseas with only one of the partners present, or even by telephone. But false marriage involving a partner with an undeclared disability does not only constitute an abuse of the human rights of the people directly involved, but may have long-term consequences for the children of such marriages, and, indeed, for both the community and British society as a whole. For disability in South Asian communities in the UK is three times the rate of the general population’s (Overall et al., 2002; Christianson and Modell, 2004) and is linked to genetic disorders which are related to consanguineous marriages (this link is contested by some – mainly non-medical – researchers, such as Ahmad, 1995; Darr, 1997). Such marriages occur mainly between first cousins, especially the sons and daughters of brothers, and account for between 35 per cent and



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65 per cent of Pakistani marriages (Shaw, 2001; Hussain and Bittles, 2004; Rozario, 2005). It is also relevant to note here that consanguineous marriages in England, Japan and the US have fallen dramatically during the twentieth century in all communities, other than in British Pakistani ones, where the trend is actually reversed, with cousin marriages increasing over time. Shaw (2001) suggests that the principal reason for the reduction in the US is the integration of cultural and religious minorities and immigrants, which is exactly what one would anticipate occurring over time. It is reasonable, then, to speculate that the lack of change in Britain is connected to the lack of integration by Pakistanis relative to other ethnoreligious groups (Modood et al., 1997). The question is why this is the case. I believe that multiculturalism has played a significant part in this situation. Minority cultural influences Whatever the reasons for the relative isolation, or separation, of Pakistani Muslims in British society, there is little doubt that the current situation constitutes a vicious circle in the context of a discussion of forced marriage. For marriage between British and Mirpuri citizens facilitates the reproduction of Mirpuri rural social structure and organisation in urban Britain; this increases social and economic exclusion, which encourages trans-continental consanguineous marriage, and this in turn exacerbates both social and economic isolation and disadvantage. And so the cycle continues – over half a century after initial settlement. In one sense, this is testimony to the success of the multicultural emphasis on the maintenance of minority cultures. But this ‘success’ has to be weighed against the negative consequences that accrue to it, including, in this case, the misery of young people forced into unwanted marriages. Women are centrally involved in, and affected by, social exclusion and the struggle to reproduce the culture, language and religion of the homeland in an alien environment (Afshar, 1994; Macey, 1999b; 2005; 2007). Dwyer (1999; 2000) observes that diasporic identifications are always configured through gender, and Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) note that gender roles are often reinforced, rather than challenged, by migration and settlement. Notwithstanding this, change over time is generally considered inevitable, as minority and majority cultures interact and exert an influence over each other. It is the intense resistance to external influence that makes Pakistani communities unique in Britain in enabling them to avoid the level of change that might have been expected by this stage of settlement. This is not, of course, to suggest that no change is taking place in individuals and communities of Pakistani 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey



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heritage and Muslim faith, as I have already indicated both here and elsewhere (Macey, 2002; 2006; 2007a; 2007b). Recent publications focusing on positive change in young men include those by Alam (2006) and Lewis (2007). It is interesting that there appears to be no comparable work that deals with women, other than that which refers to improved educational attainment. Notwithstanding this, the rate of change remains extremely slow relative to comparable groups, and there is little doubt that inter-continental marriage, linked to other factors, plays a major role. Among these other factors is the creation of ethnic enclaves in some British cities, termed ‘comfort zones’ by Ouseley (2001) and Lewis (2002). These built on initial chain migration (Ballard, 1994) to produce a level of residential and social separatism whereby people in the same location live ‘parallel’ lives (Ouseley, 2001; Cantle, 2001, 2008). These comfort zones mean that Mirpuris do not need to move outside the immediate neighbourhood because all cultural and religious needs are met at the local level by fellow Mirpuris (Lewis, 2002; 2006). There are mosques and mosque schools run by imams brought from the homeland, community centres and solicitors, and shops that cater for all needs, from halal butchers, through travel agents and jewellers to undertakers (Lewis, 2004). High levels of unemployment and children attending local schools that have become dominated by the same ethnic group (Burgess and Wilson, 2003; Miller, 2004; Burgess et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2006a; 2006b; Osler, 2007) mean that in some cases there is very limited interaction beyond the boundaries of the ethnic group (Ouseley, 2001; Macey, 2006; 2007; Carling, 2008). In addition, modern communications systems and ease of travel have encouraged the production and consumption of culture, media, politics and religion via trans-national networks and associations (Samad, 1992; 1998). These, in conjunction with lack of access to English, can act to limit worldviews to those that accord with the traditional ones of the country of origin (see Harb and Bessaiso, 2006). Finally, there are a number of Islamist websites that can be seen as actively promoting racial hatred, violence and terrorism (Brandon, 2008) and a range of publications that not only discourage ethnic mixing but sometimes come close to inciting racial/religious hatred. Among the latter are those by Hizb ut-Tahrir (1995; 1997; 2000a; 2000b; 2002); the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, which refers to the difficulty for Muslims of leading a muttaqi (God-fearing, pious) life in a ‘corrupt’ environment and speaks of the need to ‘arrest the “integration” and “assimilation” of Muslims into the corrupt bogland of western culture and supposed civilization’ (cited in Newbiggin et al., 1998). The Islamic Party of Britain claims that ‘there is nothing in Western societies that remotely resembles good behaviour’, and Al-Hujjat states: ‘[the 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey


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US and Britain] speak honeyed words publicly, and sow corruption and injustice stealthily’ (cited by The London Bible College, 1999). All these factors exert strong pressure on Pakistani Muslim communities to maintain the culture and religion of the homeland and even to resist mixing with non-Muslims, let alone integrating into British society. And in encouraging a trans-national orientation, they are centrally implicated in forced marriage or, to put it another way, trans-national arranged marriages are essential to the maintenance of the Mirpuri way of life in Britain. However, no matter how apparently impermeable are the boundaries drawn by Pakistani Muslim communities around themselves, they are not immune from the influences of wider society. Majority cultural influences In addition to multicultural ideology, there is a range of factors that can be seen to stem from wider society, or the majority culture, that influence the extent to which full participation in British society by minorities is encouraged or discouraged. Poverty, for example, has long been recognised as resulting in social exclusion and the inability to exercise citizenship rights. As already noted, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are the most deprived groups in Britain (Modood et al., 1997; Berthoud, 2000; Platt, 2002, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; Beckford et al., 2006), which militates against their full participation in society. Further, a combination of legal requirements around citizenship and the manipulation of these by Pakistani Muslim men serves to exclude women who are brought into the country as brides (Burman and Chantler, 2004; Macey, 2007a; 2009; HAC, 2008). At a different level, British foreign policy is currently impacting on Muslim communities, particularly that which is linked to our ‘special relationship’ with the US. This has contributed to a sense of grievance by Muslims, particularly young men (Abbas, 2007; Mirza et al., 2007; Brandon, 2008), with the ‘war on terror’ being viewed by some as the Western powers leading a ‘new crusade’ against Islam (Hamid, 2007). It probably goes without saying that such young men are influenced more by emotion than knowledge (Mirza et al., 2007) and are encouraged in this by Islamist websites and, indeed, Islamic societies on university campuses (Thorne and Sharpe, 2008). It also goes without saying that this situation cannot explain the longer-term separatism of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain. However, the latter might logically be held to have played a part in the vulnerability of young men to political radicalisation. Racially based exclusion, racism and institutionalised racism also operate to exclude people, as noted in chapter 2. Although Britain does not




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have a history of support for far right political parties, the BNP has been active for some time and, more recently, has had some electoral success, particularly in, or close to, areas of high minority settlement. It has also turned its attention from a generalised racist/anti-immigrant stance towards a specifically anti-Muslim focus (Cesari, 2006; T. Phillips, 2007; Sveinsson, 2009). Ideological influences So far, in attempting to locate forced marriage within its broader context, I have focused on what might be termed material, or factual, influences. But this is, of course, a totally artificial divide, adopted simply for pragmatic purposes. I now turn to the ideological level which I regard as being of central importance to understanding the influences on forced marriage in order to understand forced marriage itself. First, it is important to apply the concept of ideology to an element of the material sphere discussed above – that of the relative disadvantage of South Asian Muslims in contemporary Britain. Since 1997 it has been almost impossible to read anything on this that does not cite a syndrome termed ‘Islamophobia’ by the Runnymede Trust (Conway, 1997) which is said to permeate British society. Since then, we have lived through a series of terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, a number of murders, the ‘Danish Cartoon Affair’ and the ‘Northern Riots’ in England – all perpetrated by extremists claiming to be acting in the name of Islam. And though the latter were influential in the development of ‘community cohesion’, the overall reaction to these incidents has been the generation of a large volume of publications that operate on the assumption that this – and just about everything else involving Muslims – is explicable, and indeed excusable, in terms of Islamophobia (see Phillips, 2006, for a passionately argued attack on this). This is not to suggest, as noted in chapter 2, that South Asian Muslims, along with other visible minority ethnic groups, do not suffer racially based exclusion and racism in Britain. But it does not follow from this that they experience either more than other groups, or that it is specifically based on religion. It actually seems highly unlikely that British racism is sufficiently sophisticated as to differentiate between Muslims and, say, Hindus or Sikhs, neither of whom are socially excluded. Certainly at the time that the concept of Islamophobia was popularised in Britain – and described as ‘a real and growing phenomenon’ (Conway, 1997: iii) – there was very little hard evidence to support its reality, as discussed in chapter 4. Notwithstanding this, the term ‘Islamophobia’ is now used with an abandon reminiscent of poetic licence – much as



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the concept of ‘institutional racism’ was, and is, (mis)used. This is particularly the case since the 1999 report of the MacPherson inquiry into the police’s handling of the murder of Stephen Lawrence referred to the Metropolitan Police as institutionally racist, then proceeded to destroy the real utility of the concept by inaccurately defining and operationalising it (see Williams, 1985, for a correct explication of the concept of institutional racism). The importance of this is not just that it is bad social science – though it is – but because: first, it has led to a neglect of other factors that contribute to Muslim disadvantage, and hence to the failure to develop policy that might improve the situation. Second, it has affected the attitudes and perceptions of both Muslims and non-Muslims in that perceived discrimination against Muslims far exceeds its established reality (Macey et al., 2009), or, as Mirza et al. suggest: ‘The authorities and some Muslim groups have exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has fuelled a sense of victimhood among some Muslims’ (2007: 6). Third, it is likely that the creation (I use the word advisedly) of a climate of victimhood has exacerbated the trend towards separatism encouraged by multiculturalism and has thus impacted negatively on inter-ethnic relationships. Finally, this is almost certainly implicated in the growing trend towards the prioritisation of a Muslim identity discussed previously and which is particularly evident in young people. Whether this is expressed through extreme religiosity (Rozario, 2005), rioting (Macey, 2005) or suicide bombing (Abbas, 2007), it is difficult to see much that is positive about it from a sociological point of view. I believe that all these factors are rooted in a brand of uncritical, illthought through multicultural ideology that has had serious negative consequences for Muslim women: What multi-culturalism does (in return for information and votes) is to concede some measure of autonomy to community leaders to govern their communities. In reality this means that community leaders have most control over the family, women and children. Together with the state, community leaders define the needs of the minority communities then limit and separate progressive voices on the grounds of these being inauthentic and westernised. More radical elements of our community are labelled as extremists. This is the result of multi-cultural policies. They have had an enormous and devastating impact on women’s autonomy and rights. (Patel, 1998: 22) There are undoubtedly several reasons for this, including demographic projections and concern about Muslim votes, the demonstrated ability of 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey



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Muslims to mobilise to achieve their ends, the fear of further public disorder and even bombings, and, of course, plain old-fashioned ignorance. Various people have commented on the latter: Bright, for example, warns of the dangers of the British government, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, working with groups that have radical Islamist agendas with origins in the sectarian politics of Pakistan (2006: 6); and there is an ongoing debate about whether the government and the police should work with radicals/extremists, as they currently do (Panorama, 2009). I believe that all this is linked to the influence of multicultural ideology across government, academia and everyday life. I also feel that this has contributed negatively to the current situation of Muslims in Britain in the material and other spheres. However, caution is necessary here for a number of reasons: • there is no way to prove the influence of ideas on thinking, let alone

action (though the advertising industry harbours no doubts on this dimension); • there is a fundamental distinction between correlation and causation – and we are dealing with the former, not the latter; • there is considerable danger of over-simplification in what is, in reality, a complex arena in which numerous diverse influences intersect and interact – from gender and generation to modern communications technology. This includes access to both the internet and such alternative media as Al-Jazeera, both of which can be used positively – to open up thinking to international perspectives - or negatively – to close thinking to anything other than that which accords with and perpetuates existing world views and prejudices. Harb and Bessaiso, for example, found that selective media viewing by Arab Muslims in Wales was related to the development of conspiracy theories on 9/11 and the death of Diana, Princess of Wales through its reinforcement of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism (2006: 1063).

Summary: multiculturalism, women and forced marriage We cannot sit and wait for this practice to die out with future generations. We have to be proactive in bringing the matter to the fore, making it totally unacceptable. (HAC, 2008: e-consultation) Although my main focus in this chapter has been on forced marriage, I have also touched on the ban on trans-racial adoption and the practice 10.1057/9780230245174 - Multiculturalism, Religion and Women, Marie Macey


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of female genital mutilation. My argument has not been that multiculturalism causes these, but that its widespread ideological influence has permeated government decision-making in a range of areas, including social policy and the law. This, in turn, impacts on professional practice by teachers, social workers and the police, so that women and children in minority communities are left vulnerable to physical and mental abuse. In different ways, the issues of FGM and forced marriage highlight the question of political will with respect to both the construction and implementation of the law. FGM is illegal; but there is clear evidence that the law is routinely being broken in that the practice is being carried out in Britain, yet the perpetrators are not being prosecuted. Why not? For surely there is no more barbaric example of violence against women and children than FGM – violence that leads to both immediate and long-term mental and physical suffering. Likewise, the example of forced marriage illustrates the influence of multiculturalism on political decision-making – in this case, the decision not to criminalise the practice. One of the justifications for this decision is that international and national laws are already in place to prevent young people being forced into unwanted marriages. Yet there is also increasing awareness that the numbers of British citizens affected by forced marriage in Britain are considerably higher than has hitherto been accepted. I am thus pushed to conclude that the failure to implement new, or to utilise existing, legislation indicates a lack of political will. Multiculturalism is implicated in all the cases discussed in this chapter, particularly in its emphasis on all cultures being equal and hence minority cultural traditions not being open to criticism. The reality, however, is that the vast majority of traditions are defined by men and benefit men – even those in which women are centrally implicated, as is the case with both FGM and forced marriage. I would argue, therefore, that multiculturalism carries considerable responsibility for the suffering of minority ethnic women, children and young people. However, the effects of multiculturalism are not restricted to vulnerable groups within minority ethnic and/or religious communities, but can be seen to affect wider society. In the next chapter, I examine the suggestion that multiculturalism poses a threat to liberal democracy.




4

Introduction My aim in this chapter is to explore some of the ways in which multiculturalism can be seen to pose a challenge – and possibly a threat – to liberal democracy and to do so by way of concrete examples. In line with the book’s overall focus, I concentrate mainly on Britain, despite my awareness of the central – and enormously far-reaching – effects of many aspects of globalisation on multiculturalism. This is particularly relevant to a chapter on liberal democracy, a concept that highlights citizenship, equality and human rights, because ongoing changes in international thinking in all these areas have a considerable effect on thinking at the national level. For instance, European and international laws and instruments are binding on Britain and have to be considered in creating domestic legislation.1 One of the most significant of these for this chapter is UNESCO’s Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity (2001), which lays down guiding principles for multicultural democratic societies. These are based on the idea that ‘only when cultural diversity is in balance with social cohesion, can we find ways of democratic participation and peaceful co-existence’ (Sané, 2007: xi).2 The UNESCO Declaration is significant in a number of ways. First – and contrary to multiculturalism – it stresses the need to balance the rights of cultural (and religious) minorities with those of society for social cohesion. Second – and in accord with multiculturalism – it stresses the right of minorities to maintain (and practise) their own cultures, religions and languages. This tension indicates that multicultural, democratic societies have not yet found the optimum way of dealing with diversity: ‘There is indeed a growing awareness, among politicians and academics alike, that the democratic management of multicultural societies needs rethinking 89



Multiculturalism and Liberal Democracy


The United Nations, founded to propagate the universalist ideals of Enlightened Europe, now speaks on behalf of every ethnic prejudice, believing that peoples, nations and cultures have rights which outweigh the rights of man [sic]. The ‘multicultural’ lobby dismisses the liberal values of Europe as ‘racist’, while championing the narrow chauvinism of every minority culture. (Finkielkraut, 1988, cited in Kymlicka, 2007: 6) The influence of international thinking on the British state is linked to the challenge of globalisation to the very concept of the nation-state (Koenig and de Guchteneire, 2007) and hence, in a sense, is also a challenge to my decision to focus on multiculturalism in Britain. This applies to the book as a whole, but is particularly pertinent to a chapter that questions the impact of multiculturalism at the state level. However, ideas are only translated into action through policies and laws that are designed and implemented at this level. Thus, whatever the validity of theoretical questions about the state, it remains a key locus for analysis and empirical investigation, particularly in relation to the increasing claims to recognition and rights made by minorities over recent years. In his discussion of social class and citizenship rights, Marshall (1950) recognised very clearly that if rights were to be meaningful, they had to be institutionalised: that is, there has to be some mechanism by which formal rights translate into substantive rights. The same principle applies to minorities, so we that we would do well not to deconstruct the state too readily! Notwithstanding this, the influence of the international on the national, particularly in relation to minority rights, is of considerable significance and highlights the question that I noted in the preface to this book. This is that it is not at all clear whether it is multiculturalism per se that I feel uneasy about, or whether this concept has come to represent a constellation of related ideological changes. Some of these reflect changes in thinking in the sphere of equal opportunities, including government-set targets aimed at making the labour market more representative of the ethnic composition of society. Of particular significance at both international and national levels is the shift from what might be termed ‘reactive’ to ‘proactive’ policy and practice. Many recent international developments relating to trans-national human rights law



and further development’ (Sané, 2007: xi). This recent revelation that multiculturalism is not the panacea it was assumed to be may be new to some people, but criticisms of it go back over 20 years:

strengthen the position of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities (Koenig and de Guchteneire. 2007), as do recent government initiatives. No longer is it sufficient for organisations to prove that they do not discriminate against minorities; they are now expected to take positive (concrete) steps to ensure equality and diversity. This applies particularly to racial and ethnic minorities in the public sector and has far-reaching implications for equal opportunities (these are discussed later in this chapter). Overall, much of this is positive and may be indicative of an increased commitment to tackling discrimination and increasing equality, which is seen to be essential to the flourishing of democratic societies. However, one has to question the potential gap between rhetoric and reality when we find ourselves defining 73 per cent of the population as being in need of protection through anti-discrimination laws in at least one area, while calculations that acknowledge the possibility of multiple discrimination would bring the figure to 109 per cent! (Green, 2006: 5–8). Relevant here is the fact that two-thirds of the cases brought under the religion and belief legislation cited race as a secondary jurisdiction (Savage, 2007). I would argue that there are elements of the current climate, particularly linked to multiculturalism, that have potentially negative implications for liberalism as the philosophy that underpins liberal democracy as a socio-political system. These include a tendency towards radical criticism of everything Western, particularly as this relates to ways of seeing the world that are informed by Enlightenment thinking. This is linked to the development and popularity of both feminism and postmodernism and has led to the rebuttal of ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ in favour of social construction (and deconstruction). Also implicated is the spread – particularly through public sector institutions – of what has become known as ‘political correctness’, which operates in a range of ways to silence not only dissent, but empirically established truths that are unacceptable within the dominant multicultural ideology. Before giving some examples, it is necessary to stipulate what I mean when I refer to liberal democracy. There is a large literature on liberalism, democracy and liberal democracy, some of which argues that there is a tension between liberalism and democracy (Wolin, 2004); some suggests that the two have a great deal in common (Song, 2007); and some proposes that they are mutually dependent: ‘liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and permanently married to democracy’ (Shklar, 1989: 37). Song says that liberal democracy combines the principles of individual liberty with those of collective selfgovernment and egalitarianism (2007: 69). As a sociologist, rather than



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a philosopher or political scientist, I use a working definition of liberal democracy as a socio-political system, described by Abraham Lincoln in his 1863 Gettysburg address as ‘government of the people by the people for the people’ (Basler, 1953). It is a system rooted in the liberal precept that governments should reflect the will of the people rather than dictate to them, and as such seeks to protect the individual from the state. Citizenship is central to democracy, for it is individual citizens who are entitled to both protection from, and by, the state and to the range of rights (and responsibilities) that citizenship bestows on them. Marshall classified these rights as ‘civil’, ‘political’ and ‘social’, and defined them as: • the right to individual freedom and liberty, including freedom of

thought, speech and faith; • the right to full political participation; • the right to share in full in the social heritage of a society and to live

the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society. The last point involves the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security (Marshall, 1950) and is probably linked to the post-war development of the welfare state. This conception of liberal democracy yields three principles that are particularly relevant to a chapter on multiculturalism and democracy, all of which I argue are challenged by multicultural theory and practice. The first is the requirement that governments reflect the will of the people and its most obvious implications are in relation to citizenship. The second concerns the primacy of the individual whose possession of citizenship carries both rights and responsibilities. The third concerns the concept of equality and rests on the belief that by virtue of their shared humanity, all individuals are of equal moral worth. These three core values are powerfully articulated in the French motto liberté, égalité, fraternité and it may be no coincidence that France is the least ideologically committed multicultural society in Western Europe. The fact that no liberal democracy has fully achieved these ideals does not detract from their profound importance, because simply holding them has far-reaching consequences for social organisation and human interaction. At the very least, liberal democracies provide a context within which struggles for equality can, and do, flourish, as evidenced by the trade union, anti-racist and women’s movements. On the other hand, the loss of all these movements – to varying degrees and for various reasons – is a salutary reminder of the fragility of grassroots movements




geared towards equality and human rights – a fragility that Barry suggests extends to liberal democracy itself, the conditions for maintaining which are ‘quite stringent’ (2001: 79). Marshall observed that the ideals of citizenship provide a yardstick against which the evolution of societies towards more developed democracy can be measured. These ideals illustrate the importance of the relationship between ideas (or ideologies) and material reality that is directly relevant to my discussion of the dominance of multiculturalism. They also draw attention to the importance to the democratic project of individual choice in that it is a liberal democratic principle that individuals should – as far as possible – have freedom of choice within the constraints of the law (and the requirement not to do harm to others). Although this is an ideal, it is a sociological truism that no one can choose an option that does not exist, either materially or in terms of consciousness/ideas. All societies restrict individual choices; but some restrict them more than others by placing even their consideration beyond the pale – at least in particular places at particular times. Thus, for example, if one lived in a Hindu theocracy, it would be extremely difficult to consider the possibility that all human beings are of equal moral worth, given that the Hindu belief in reincarnation can be, and is, used to justify extreme inequality. And it is arguable that introducing multiculturalism into Britain has acted to restrict further individuals’ already limited choices, for multicultural polices have ‘created a space for separatist and fundamentalist movements which seek to impose uniformity and homogeneity on all their adherents’ (Grillo, 1998: 212). All this highlights the tension that can exist between different worldviews and the challenges posed by de facto multiculturalism as a consequence of large-scale migration. This has presented liberal democracies with challenges on both the theoretical and pragmatic levels, and has led to the development of multiculturalism as both an ideology and a policy approach to dealing with diversity. Supporters of multiculturalism ask the eminently liberal question of whether liberal democracy is an adequate, or indeed appropriate, system for dealing with cultural and religious diversity. Some argue that there is no problem in reconciling liberalism and multiculturalism; indeed, Kymlicka (2001a) states that liberal multiculturalism is now the international norm. Others, however, adopt the stance that Western liberal democracy should not be forced on people from non-Western backgrounds (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994; Herr, 2004; Byrnes, 2005). It is important to remember here, however, that one element of this proposition relates to non-Western people now living in Western societies, another to indigenous peoples whose lands




have been colonised, and a third to the West’s attempts to impose its model of liberal democracy on the rest of the world. I would suggest that the arguments against imposing liberal democracy on immigrant minorities are considerably weaker than in the other two cases (see Kymlicka, 2007, on native people; Byrnes, 2005, on the international imposition of Western-style democracy). A further suggestion is that liberal democracy is incapable of dealing with the tensions and potential conflicts that accompany cultural and religious diversity (Tully, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Kelly, 2002). This is despite the fact, as pointed out by Barry (2001) and Joppke (2004), that the model of universal citizenship that underpins democracy did much to end the wars of religion in seventeenth-century Europe. Such concerns have led some to challenge the very bases of liberalism and democracy; Young, for instance, suggests that what is needed is a ‘cultural revolution’ (1990: 153). This stems from the multiculturalism argument that justice and equality require public recognition of minority ethnic cultures and religions (Tully, 1995). It also rests on Taylor’s (1994) assertion that failure to accord full recognition to minority cultural and religious groups causes harm to both individuals and groups, and is thus a key factor in explaining inequality between minority and majority groups. The demand that different – and sometimes conflicting – attitudes, values and beliefs be institutionalised in Britain constitutes a challenge to the hegemony of British culture, and one that I presume underpins Young’s call for a cultural revolution. I have to say, however, that the democratic basis of this is unclear to me, given that the last census showed that minorities in the UK comprised less than 8 per cent of the population and that these were highly diverse (ONS, 2002). It also needs to be noted that the terms of any debate on this would have to be based on liberal requirements for the rational assessment of factual information, rather than mere value judgements. This debate should surely include the question: What are the implications and possible consequences for liberal democracy of giving public recognition to cultures that are illiberal and undemocratic (in liberal democratic terms)? I think this question highlights a number of ways in which multiculturalism poses not only challenges to liberal democracy, but threats to it. Different strands of multiculturalism carry particular threats to different aspects of liberal democracy, but in the real world, influences in one arena spill over into another, whether these are ideas, policies or practices, so do not readily lend themselves to neat and tidy categorisation. Thus, my attempts below to organise my concerns about multiculturalism under





key features of liberalism and liberal democracy breaks down rather rapidly!

Reflecting the will of the people It is impossible to implement fully participatory democracy as a political system, so that all democracies are representative of varying kinds, e.g. ‘first past the post’ or proportional representation. All have faults, but there is widespread agreement that democracy is the best system so far developed in terms of curbing government power, extending individuals’ power and protecting human rights.3 This is not to suggest that all democracies are liberal, but the system is sufficiently persuasive as to explain why people in many countries continue to fight for the right to have a say in who governs them. This highlights the importance of citizenship, for participation in the electoral process is limited to those who hold citizenship. Two points arise out of this in relation to the multicultural agenda: first, that citizenship can never be neutral, nor at its inception did it attempt to be in relation to class, race or gender (see Lister, 2003, and Spierings, 2007, on gender); and second, it could be that liberalism and liberal democracies carry within them the seeds of their own destruction, particularly if they accede to the multicultural demand to afford virtually unconditional rights to illiberal individuals and groups. This is so important that it is worth again quoting Marshall on citizenship and democracy: Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed... societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed. (Marshall, 1950 [and Bottomore, 1997]: 18) Access to both formal and substantive citizenship (Brubacker, 1992) is, then, a central requirement of liberal democracies, as is the exercise of free choice. But sometimes individuals’ choices are restricted by abuses of the electoral system, and in recent years, a number of formal



Democracy, liberalism and liberal democracy

investigations have been conducted into these in minority communities. This may be because formal democracy is less well established in such communities, or where the politics of the Indian subcontinent influence voting here (Allen and Barrett, 1996; Samad, 1992). Caste and biraderi membership can also influence voting choices and sometimes involve pressure being put on community members to vote in particular ways, with powerful men issuing instructions on who to vote for. Needless to say, implementation of postal voting exacerbates such tendencies and it is a moot point why this was trialled in a number of areas in which electoral abuses were known to have taken place and where significant numbers of women had no access to the English language. All these are relatively obvious and straightforward requirements of the operation of a genuine democracy. Others are, perhaps, less selfevident, including those that refer to the collective or common good, and which entail acceptance of a number of features of the operation of liberal democracies. An example here might be policies and practices that are challenged by minorities, including exemptions from, or extensions to, laws that are binding on the rest of the population (see Barry, 2001; Phillips, 2003; Phillips and Dustin, 2004). The right to try to amend the law is part and parcel of liberal democratic principles, but this right is not absolute; rather, it is conditional on behaving in ways that do not impact negatively on other people’s rights. This carries expectations that proposals for change are reasonable and justified by rational argument, which Miller suggests highlights a central paradox of multiculturalism: The radical multiculturalist is relying on an appeal to the majority which makes sense only if a common identity is assumed, while at the same time arguing that minority groups should throw off an identity that is seen as ‘oppressive’ from the standpoint of group difference. (1995: 139) An established principle of liberal democracy is the right to public protest, provided that this is peaceful, not violent. This is necessary to ensure protection of the democratic rights of those who may be either ambivalent or actively opposed to change. But this highlights some very fundamental issues that multiculturalists are not generally keen to confront because of their focus on the positive aspects of diversity, and their dismissal of its potential for conflict. These include such questions as: Whose will is to prevail in situations of conflict? And even: Are there limits to diversity before society fragments, if not disintegrates? (Macey, 1995b; Beckett and Macey, 2001).





Democracy is more than a licence to celebrate (and exaggerate) difference. … It is a political system of mutual reliance and common moral obligations … If multiculturalism is not tempered by a stake in the commons, then centrifugal energy overwhelms any commitment to a larger good. This is where multiculturalism has proved a trap even – or especially – for people in the name of whom the partisans of identity politics purport to speak. (1995: 236) Multiculturalism and the valorisation of minority cultures Even leaving aside the theoretical and philosophical challenges raised above, there are a number of concrete examples of multiculturalism in practice breaching the basic principles of liberal democracy in relation to the will of the majority. These include the imposition of the multicultural and cohesion agendas on the British public, as noted in chapter 1 with reference to other countries. For there is certainly a large body of anecdotal evidence to suggest that multiculturalism is extremely unpopular in Britain, as is evidenced by the scathing reactions I have heard from white people to Trevor Phillips’4 unfortunately phrased comment that ‘[Britain is] by far the best place in Europe to live if you are not white’ (Casciani, 2009). More concrete examples range from access to information to demands for ‘special treatment’ by ethno-religious groups, which have been accompanied by violence. A number of instances of the former are given by Anthony Browne (2006) in his book The Retreat of Reason. Browne shows how what he terms ‘political correctness’ has led to the suppression and/or distortion of publicly available information. His first case is the shocking one of the rise in HIV among heterosexuals – shocking not because of the rise itself, but because of the reasons given by the government for it, which have largely centred on young people practising promiscuous, unsafe sex.5 In fact, says Browne, the increase is almost entirely due to African immigrants being diagnosed with HIV here, a statement that is supported by researchers at the Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections: ‘As the number of black and minority ethnic heterosexuals living with HIV (diagnosed and undiagnosed) in



These expectations of behaviour, as noted by Miller (above), rest on agreed principles, and this is particularly highlighted in relation to minority challenges to majority systems and processes. They also throw into sharp relief the frequently ignored areas of integration and cohesion – what Gitlin calls a ‘stake in the commons’:

the UK grows, the likelihood of heterosexual transmission within the UK will increase’ (Elam et al., 2006: 1). It is relevant to note that ‘official’ secrecy around HIV/AIDS is mirrored by some religions. Anderson and Doyal (2003) suggest that religions can inculcate such a sense of guilt or shame in sufferers that they feel unable to disclose their condition to friends or family – including partners – with clear consequences for the spread of the disease (61 per cent of their sample were African Christians; 1 per cent were Muslims). Adogame’s (2007) research found that African Pentecostal churches do not discuss HIV/AIDS and do not support sufferers. Perhaps even more shocking than the government’s failure to base its policy on empirical evidence is the fact that the most common reaction to Browne’s original statements was denial: There was a conspiracy not so much of silence but of denial that stretched across the media and the government from the lowest civil servants and reporters to the highest ministers and interviewers. (Browne, 2006: viii) Considerable support, however, came from doctors working in the field, with some reporting that their local health authorities refused even to discuss the situation. One of the government’s medical advisers in the Department of Health said that Britain was facing a massive explosion in HIV, but that ministers and civil servants simply refused to discuss the cause: ‘Ministers just won’t listen because they think it is racist’ (cited in Browne, 2006: x). This raises serious issues in relation to the development of policy designed to prevent the spread of HIV. Browne observes that nearly 1,000 people have contracted HIV from infected immigrants since Labour came to power: ‘That’s 1,000 lives blighted, ultimately, by political correctness. Those who defend political correctness must accept that it can come at a heavy price’ (2006: xi). It is not, of course, the only such case, though others are less immediately, or apparently, dramatic. For there is little doubt that multiculturalism has influenced other areas of research and publication (examples are given later in this chapter). The current requirement that both policy and practice be ‘evidence based’ makes ideologically motivated research even more potentially dangerous (though a counterargument might be the fact that research is often used to legitimise, rather than actually inform, the development of policy and practice). But it goes further than this, for the dominant discourse affects perceptions, and this impacts on decisions as to which areas to




research, whether or not to fund particular research and whether or not to publish the findings of such research. I know of many cases where funding bodies have refused to publish the results of research if these are not in accord with what they expected (or wanted?) the research to show, or because they view them as too politically sensitive. Indeed, I have directly experienced this on two occasions. In other cases, they have demanded that particular sections of research reports are removed or amended to a point that distorts the conclusions, or have even changed the reports themselves without the researchers’ permission. It is certainly becoming increasingly common for the issuing of research contracts to require researchers to sign over to funders their rights on all decisions about publication. This is usually accompanied by (verbal) assurances that this is just a ‘formality’, though in reality this is far from the case. This is exacerbated by the current fashion for postmodernism and constructivism and the rejection of ‘hard’ data in favour of multiple accounts and definitions of ‘truth’. We should hardly be surprised, then, when powerful decision-makers question the utility of the social sciences to policy-making, referring to ‘perversity’ and being ‘driven by ideology parading as intellectual inquiry’ (Blunkett, 2000). Some will dismiss this as right-wing politics, given that an unfortunate characteristic of some social movements and academics is to judge research and writing on the basis of who has written and/or published it, rather than on the quality of its content. However, it is (hopefully) more difficult to ignore the criticisms of no less an academic than Peter Berger, one of the greatest modern influences on phenomenological (or interpretative) sociology. In an article entitled: ‘Whatever happened to sociology?’ Berger refers to the ‘cultural revolution … that sought to transform sociology from a science into an instrument of ideological advocacy’. He is driven to conclude that ‘Perhaps [sociology’s] eventual demise should be seen as less than an intellectual catastrophe’ (2002). All this raises very serious questions about the control of knowledge and information in society and the role of academia – questions that are directly relevant to liberal democracy. Restricting access to information is a characteristic more commonly associated with authoritarian regimes than with democracies, and in any case, the World Wide Web has made it far more difficult to exercise this control than it used to be. However, a highly effective means of control is via minds, for if people can be persuaded to think within the constraints of a particular paradigm, the task of reducing awkward questions and gaining support for one’s views is greatly enhanced – particularly if these views appeal to the moral high ground. Here there is no better example than the multicultural ideology




that treats minority cultures, and by extension individuals, as beyond criticism, for this has influenced British discourse to an extent that comes close to constituting a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) – at least within the public sector. That many members of the general public are angry and frustrated by this is well illustrated in the report of the Commission established to investigate the 1995 violent disorder in Bradford: the present scale of antisocial behaviour is sufficiently large to make the consequences intolerable for a large number of people of all ages, and many people believe it to be increasing noticeably year by year. One particularly incensed Asian woman probably spoke for a lot of people in her scathing contempt for those Whites who excused, or failed to condemn, wrongdoing when the culprits were not White. It was, she rightly said, patronising, as well as stupid. (Allen and Barrett, 1996: 103) This has implications in a number of areas, which are discussed later. First, to return briefly to Browne’s HIV example: it is not a matter of the government restricting access to information, for Browne used published official statistics to reach his conclusion. It is indicative of public employees and organisations having internalised the dominant ideology of denying that minority groups and their members can be named as being implicated in anything that is not wholly positive. Nor does this case suggest that multiculturalism directly causes such attitudes, though it almost certainly encourages them through its treatment of minorities as beyond criticism. For even when there is unquestionable factual evidence of wrongdoing, there is pressure to deny this and/or to suppress research findings. An example here is the 2001 riot in Bradford, in which the vast majority (over 90 per cent) of perpetrators were young men of Mirpuri heritage and Muslim faith (Carling et al., 2001; Macey, 2005b). However, in writing about this, the majority of academics engaged in a series of terminological sleights of hand: first, the term ‘South Asian’ was substituted for the correct designation of either ‘Mirpuri’ or Pakistani; and second, the term ‘disturbance’ was substituted for the legally correct one ‘public disorder’ for the early stages of the incident and ‘riot’ for the later ones. This is undoubtedly misplaced political correctness, and in the case of the former, implicates totally innocent young men of Bangladeshi or Indian heritage in rioting – something that caused intense resentment on their part (Al-Ahram, 2001). There were probably a range of positive motivations for this approach, including concern to avoid negative




evaluation of a group defined as victims, though a problem here, of course, is that many multiculturalists seem to define all minority ethnic groups as oppressed and/or victims and to have an almost automatic reaction to champion their rights (Wolfe, 2002). I suspect, however, that a common reason was the now widespread fear of being accused of racism or Islamophobia. Sir Herman Ouseley’s investigation into inter-ethnic relations in Bradford – carried out before the riot took place – expresses this when he describes: a city ‘in the grip of fear’: fear of talking about problems openly; fear of challenging wrong-doing in case of being labelled ‘racist’; fear of confronting the gang culture, the illegal drugs trade and the growing racial intolerance, harassment and abuse that exists. (2001: 1) This illustrates the fact that the issue of access to information presupposes that the information is accurate (or that it is relatively straightforward for non-specialist people to establish that it is not). My suggestion above is that the dominance of multicultural thinking has had a profoundly negative effect on this and that this, in turn, has impacted adversely on the development of policy and practice. As more and more legislation is implemented with respect to equalities/human rights, it is worth looking at an example. Discrimination on the basis of religion or belief is one of the more recent additions to areas that are legally protected, with no fewer than six Acts making reference to it.6 However, other than the international influences noted above, the grounds for such legislation are far from clear, since there is little evidence to support the existence of religiously based discrimination in Britain, as noted in a recent ACAS report: a significant challenge for any literature review of religion or belief in the workplace is the lack of a strong research base [that shows] patterns of discrimination relating to religion or belief in isolation from race, ethnicity and culture. (Denvir et al., 2007: 26) It is relevant to suggest here that it is not the 71.6 per cent of people in the UK who defined themselves as Christian in the 2001 census (Weller, 2004) who are seen by legislators as being in need of protection against discrimination. And of the minority faiths, it is probably also safe to assume that it is Muslims (rather than, say, Buddhists) who are to the




forefront of their minds. For, while evidence of actual discrimination (or Islamophobia) is notable by its absence, the same does not apply to perceptions of discrimination that are widespread among both Muslims and non-Muslims in England and Wales (Allen and Nielsen, 2002; Ameli et al., 2004; Abrams and Houston, 2007). The parallel in Scotland relates to Catholics who are widely – and inaccurately – perceived as suffering discrimination (Bruce et al., 2005). It is the question of how this has come about that is of interest to the current discussion; and the answer points to the role of ideology in constructing ‘reality’ and how this impacts on the development of policy. Two publications have been particularly influential in creating the image which now dominates both government and public perceptions – that of Muslims as a beleaguered group. The first is the report of the Runnymede Trust Commission entitled: Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (Conway, 1997); the second is a report of research carried out for the Home Office by Weller et al. (2001) entitled: Religious Discrimination in England and Wales.7 The influence of the Conway report cannot be overstated and is illustrated by the fact that it was responsible for importing the hugely popular concept of Islamophobia from the US into Britain. The report begins with the statement that: ‘Islamophobia describes a real and growing phenomenon – an ugly word for an ugly reality’ (1997: iii). It goes on to say that the term Islamophobia refers to unfounded hostility towards Islam. It also refers to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs. (1997: 1) However, despite the strength of the statements that Islamophobia is both ‘real’ and ‘growing’, the Runnymede Commission provides only four specific examples of hostility or discrimination against Muslims in the entire report (1997: 38). It also acknowledged that the evidence for a specifically religious component in the data they used was ‘speculative’. What this means is that Islamophobia may – or may not – be widespread in Britain and that Muslims may – or may not – be discriminated against on the basis of their religion. The fact is that we simply do not know now, and the Runnymede Trust certainly did not know at the time of their publication. One of the reasons why we do not know is the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between discrimination on the grounds of religion and that on the grounds of ethnicity, though quantitative work by Khattab




(2009) considers the interaction of religion with other variables such as education, residential segregation and occupation in a promising way. The point I am making is that the Conway report has been extremely influential in encouraging the widespread belief that Islamophobia is a massive problem in Britain, yet it produces hardly any convincing evidence to support this claim. Similar comments apply to much of the subsequent literature on Islamophobia, including publications now regularly produced in Europe (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Islamophobia (EUMC), 2006a; 2006b). Even Allen, whose work over the last decade with both EUMC and the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) has done much to popularise the idea of Islamophobia, comments: ‘the reality remains that very little research [on religion] has actually been undertaken that offers any concretised or grounded evidence’ (2004: 11). The second example of an influential academic study in the sphere of religion is that by Weller et al. (2001), entitled Religious Discrimination in England and Wales, which is misleading because what it actually investigates is perceptions of religious discrimination by a number of religious people. The distinction is crucial. This research has not had the widespread impact across society of the Conway report, but it has certainly added significantly to the stockpile of data that can be used to inform – or justify – policy-making. The main finding of the Weller report is that religious discrimination is widely perceived by (representatives of) minority religious organisations as a serious problem. A majority of Muslim organisations reported very frequent occurrences of unfair treatment across every institutional domain, and both Hindu and Sikh organisations reported relatively high levels of unfair treatment (Weller et al., 2001: vii-viii).8 The brief given to Weller and his colleagues by the Home Office was ‘to assess the evidence of religious discrimination in England and Wales, both actual and perceived’ (2001: vi). The research team chose to approach this by asking representatives of a range of religious organisations: ‘Do your members experience unfair treatment because of their religion in any of the following areas?’ (2001: 136). Follow-up interviews were carried out with 29 individuals who answered this question in the affirmative. But there is a serious problem with this approach as it consists of third-party perceptions of religious discrimination by religious representatives. It thus cannot provide any independent evidence of the general extent of discrimination; it does not, in other words, fulfil the Home Office specification of evidence of actual discrimination. Despite this, it is cited as a source of significant evidence of religious




discrimination in England and Wales (see, for example, Purdam et al., 2007: 148, 160); and Denvir et al. in an ACAS review article describe the Weller report as: ‘the main study documenting religion or belief discrimination in the workplace, and wider society’ and ‘a comprehensive and detailed empirical study of the experience of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief’ (2007: 26–7, emphasis added). We are now in a situation where it is widely believed that in England and Wales there is a great deal of discrimination against Muslims, and that the same applies in Scotland with respect to Catholics. This is despite the fact that two significant pieces of research demonstrate very clearly that there is a major gap between perceptions of discrimination based on religion and its reality (the experience of discrimination). The first consists of a review of the research on sectarianism in Scotland by Bruce et al. (2005), which focuses on discrimination against Catholics (see Walls and Williams, 2003; Bradley, 2006). This shows that the widespread belief that Catholics are discriminated against is not supported by empirical evidence: ‘[there is a] gulf between perception and experience’ (Bruce et al., 2005: 165, emphasis added). One of the illustrations they give is the fact that ‘98.3 per cent of Catholics in [one] Glasgow survey declined the chance to claim to have been victims of discrimination’ (2005: 162). The second major piece of research is the 2005 Citizenship Survey of nearly 10,000 people in England and Wales (Kitchen et al., 2006). This found high levels of perceived unfairness, with almost two-thirds of respondents (64 per cent) believing that there was a considerable amount of religious prejudice. Of these (and without prompting) a remarkable 93 per cent felt that prejudice against Muslims had recently increased (2006: 48-53). However, when the survey separated perceptions of discrimination from direct experience of it, only 2 per cent reported the latter – rising to 7 per cent for Hindus, 12 per cent for Sikhs and 13 per cent for Muslims (Kitchen et al., 2006: 59). In sum, the vast majority of research into discrimination on the basis of religion or belief simply fails to make the crucial distinction between perception and actuality and thus paints a picture of extensive discrimination, particularly against Muslims, which is quite simply not substantiated. Of course, it is not only – or even mainly – information from government and academic research that influences ordinary people’s thinking. So, too, does that published by such ‘grassroots’ organisations as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). And, as with the Conway and Weller reports, a closer examination of these casts doubt on the validity of their claims. The IHRC, for example, bases much of its claims for aggression towards




Muslims on data culled from an online questionnaire, which includes incidents that people have heard about, rather than experienced. And in arriving at its calculations of the extent of Islamophobia, it defines ‘dirty looks’ as ‘religious harassment’ (IHRC, 2008), a bizarre exaggeration that is likely to produce seriously inflated statistics. Both the IHRC and the MCB are also guilty of misusing statistics from other sources to support their claims of discrimination against Muslims. In 2005, for example, they stated that the London Metropolitan Police were persecuting Muslims under the anti-terrorism laws. Yet Home Office statistics for London show that, out of a population of 1.6 million, 21,577 people were stopped and searched under these laws, of whom 14,429 were white and only 1,500 were Muslim. The proportion of Muslims among those who were stopped and searched (just below 7 per cent) is thus slightly lower than the proportion of Muslims in the population of London (just over 8 per cent). This is in stark contrast to the claim by the MCB that between 95 and 98 per cent of those targeted by the police were Muslim. The size of this discrepancy is difficult to understand, but even more worrying is that when Malik (2005) presented them with clear alternative evidence, they flatly refused to change their published figures. Now there is, in fact, statistical evidence to show that the police use their powers of stop and search disproportionately with respect to black and Asian people (Home Office, 2004) and that in London between 2001 and 2002 this increased by 30 per cent for black people, 41 per cent for Asian people and 8 per cent for white people (Metropolitan Police Authority Scrutiny Panel, 2004). Notwithstanding this, and more general evidence of racism in the police (MacPherson, 1999; Bland et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2000; BBC Television, 2003; Whitfield, 2004), it can be suggested that targeting Asian people following the London bombings is no less logical or reasonable than targeting Irish people at the time of the IRA bombings on the mainland! This section on discrimination against Muslims can be summed up by saying that there is a very large body of literature that has gained considerable exposure in the media and which proposes that Islamophobia is virtually endemic in British society. However, the fact is that this is not based on evidence of anti-Muslim racism or actual discrimination, but on people’s perceptions that this is the case. In reality, we do not know what the situation actually is: on the one hand, self-reporting could underestimate the extent of discrimination against Muslims, as suggested by Ameli et al. (2004: 23). On the other hand, it could over-estimate it, as proposed by Mirza et al. (2007). As Weller et al. suggest: ‘in [some] contexts, religious individuals can come close to claiming that others are




discriminating against them because they do not happen to share the same values’ (2001: 116). A caveat is in order here with respect to my emphasis on the need for hard evidence, which is that this should not be taken to imply that I regard the creation, collection and analysis of statistics as unproblematic. On the contrary, statistical evidence is only valid if the correct questions are addressed appropriately to representative samples of adequate size and interpreted correctly in the light of all the technical assumptions involved. Nor should it be assumed that I dismiss the importance of ‘perceptions’ – quite the reverse, for people’s perceptions create and define reality for them and thus influence both their attitudes and actions. My concern here is that inaccurate and/or misleading information can, if repeated often enough, assume an unwarranted facticity. In this way ‘what everybody knows’ becomes a self-fulfilling fallacy, or as Lenin put it: ‘A lie told often enough becomes the truth’ (cited in Browne, 2006: 29). This has potentially serious consequences for the development of policy and practice and for structuring people’s perceptions, both of which have implications for liberal democracy. Some of these ‘people’ are members of the groups that are the focus of multicultural attention, and defined by it as victims. One has to ask what the effects of this are, not only with respect to, say, self-esteem, but also in relation to potential alienation from British society, and what the implications of this are for liberal democracy, particularly commitment to the common good. The primacy of the individual The question of the common good has been discussed above, but is clearly related to the issue of the individual versus the group, and multiculturalism’s prioritisation of the latter over the former. This has far-reaching implications in a liberal democratic context in which the very basis of social structure and organisation is the individual rather than the group. In one sense, it can be argued that focusing on the ethnic collective is more in tune with the orientation of the groups at whom multiculturalism is targeted, many of whose cultures are communitarian rather than individualistic. And if we were allowed to make value judgements of minority cultures (which we are not within a multicultural framework), it could also be argued that in some ways this is considerably more attractive than the individualistic, competitive culture of wider society. There are, however, potential dangers to liberal democracy of prioritising the collective over the individual and these can be seen to operate at all levels – macro, mezzo and micro. Given the general orientation of this book, my concentration in this section is




mainly on the community and individual levels, but it is important to acknowledge, albeit briefly, some of the issues that relate to the societal level. A number of these are concerned with the contemporary resurgence of religion in many parts of the world, particularly Christianity, Islam and Judaism (Kepel, 1994) and within this, fundamentalist and communalreligious movements (Eisenstadt, 2000; 2007). While not subscribing to Fukuyama’s (1992) thesis that we are witnessing the ‘end of history’ or Huntington’s (1996) ‘clash of civilisations’, Eisenstadt suggests that these movements challenge the West’s claimed monopoly on modernity (2007: 240). He notes that this involves a shift away from the classic nation-state’s location of religion in the private sphere into the public, political and cultural arenas (2007: 241). In one sense, both Kepel and Eisenstadt point to an increase in the power of religion which reflects international pressure from ‘below’, but in Britain this is matched by pressure from ‘above’, illustrated by what Farnell et al. (2003) refer to as the government’s [re]turn to religion. This has been institutionalised through the law on religion and belief, as well as being linked to funding in the sphere of regeneration with a particular emphasis on the involvement of minority faith communities. And while some of this is part of the ‘inclusion’ agenda, the government would do well to remember that many local faith groups are informed by intensive international networks of communication that do not necessarily exert an influence in the direction of either integration or social cohesion. Nor, in prioritising the community over the individual, do they enhance the rights, choices or options of individuals, particularly women, as is graphically illustrated by the example of forced (or even arranged) marriage. This illustrates the magnitude of the shift from the individual and his/her rights to the group level at which what the individual wants is subordinate to the supposed needs of the collective: How could I, a young adult, allow my parents to pressure me into getting married? But the truth is I have never been raised to think about me as an individual with a unique set of rights. My identity as an individual is defined by roles and duties within the family and community. To understand the psychology of forced marriage is to know how the process of culture and socialisation operates on young people. As a child I was trained to suppress my own desires, wants and wishes and to fill the vacuum of desires with those of my family and the community. (Bhatti, 2007: 61)




A focus on the group, as against the individual, also tends to push communities in the direction of maintaining long-established traditions, rather than encouraging change, a tendency already present in the migration context and one that impacts particularly on women (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). In the case of diasporic communities, these traditions are those of the country of origin and may be in tension with the lifestyle of the ‘new’ society. This raises the question of the extent to which multiculturalism’s encouragement of cultural maintenance is dysfunctional for individuals, communities and, indeed, wider society. The latter raises the question of integration – or lack of integration – and is examined in more detail below. This is not to suggest that a focus on the group is inherently problematic, given that the basis of human social organisation and interaction is the group rather than the individual. This can be said to stem from our innately social nature, which is what distinguishes humans from other animals. Language, too, is a distinctly human attribute and one that rests on our ability to categorise, that is to say to think in group terms, and, of course, my own discipline of sociology is all about categories and generalisations, rather than the uniqueness of individuals. However, while these group/social features of human beings constitute major strengths, they also carry dangers. Our ability to categorise, for example, enables us to deal with the huge complexity of human social existence, but it has the potential to distort our perceptions and mislead us into stereotyping – especially of ‘others’ who are somehow not like ‘us’. This carries the requirement that in categorising sentient beings (as against inanimate objects) we examine the bases or assumptions that underpin our categories. And on this dimension I have serious reservations about multiculturalism’s prioritisation of ethnicity over all other aspects of the person. I have raised questions about this elsewhere, including as it relates to conceptions of culture and identity. However, I have to say that it is its essentalisation and racialisation features that leave me most uneasy and that I believe come close to constituting a kind of racism, as suggested by Stanfield (1993). This is a matter of opinion and one on which I profoundly disagree with Kelly’s proposal that failure to adopt a multicultural approach constitutes ‘an alternative form of racism or cultural discrimination’ (2002: 3). Nor do the lessons of historical and contemporary conflict – including murder and genocide – do anything to ease my concerns, given that most of them centre on racial, ethnic and/or religious differences (Baldwin et al., 2007, suggest a figure of over 70 per cent




across the world). Given that much of the world’s multiculturalism is the result of population movements stemming from inter-ethnic conflict, persecution and war (Cantle, 2008), it is difficult to understand how multiculturalism can neglect the issue of conflict. Here, the holocaust is a salutary reminder of the barbaric extremes to which the human propensity for ‘othering’ can lead (Gilbert, 1986; Wistrich, 1992), as is Horowitz’s (2002) comprehensive research into ‘deadly ethnic riots’. A different aspect of ‘groupthink’ worth noting here is sociological determinism, objections to which influenced the development of both feminism and postmodernism, both of which have had a major impact on multiculturalism. These criticisms contributed significantly to scholarship in raising awareness of what should have been the self-evident fact that women’s (or black people’s, or disabled people’s) experiences differ from men’s (or white or ‘able’-bodied people’s). However, despite these positive effects, this approach raises epistemological and ontological questions that, to put it bluntly, leave us in danger of deconstructing ourselves out of existence. Thus, for instance, black women’s objections to the ‘whiteness’ of first- and second-wave feminism (see Butler, 1990a) did much to enhance its theoretical validity (Carby, 1982; Amos and Parmar, 1984; Bhavnani and Coulson, 1986). However, contemporary criticisms, many of them made in the context of support for multiculturalism, have reached the point of challenging not only essentialism and over-generalisation, but the theoretical validity and practical utility of the very category of ‘woman’ (Flax, 1995; Bhabha, 1999; Herr, 2004). This throws into sharp focus the extent of conflict between the universalism that underpins liberalism and the cultural relativism that informs multiculturalism. What feminist and postmodern theory alerts us to is the need to interrogate taken-for-granted social categories in relation to their potential for ignoring the subdivisions within them (of, for example, gender, age, race and ethnicity). This is a valuable and necessary caution if we are not to fall into the trap of essentialism and, in so doing, harming the individuals who make up the groups concerned. However, one of my objections to multiculturalism’s prioritisation of the group over the individual is precisely that it has failed to learn the lessons of its own original criticisms. Furthermore, ignoring the unequal position and power of minorities within minorities has, arguably, exacerbated their vulnerability. This is discussed in some detail elsewhere, particularly in relation to women; the question in the context of this chapter is how this focus at the group level can be seen to pose a threat to liberal democracy.





There are a number of ways, and at a number of levels, that multiculturalism’s prioritisation of the (ethnic) group over the individual constitutes a threat to liberal democracy – all of which raise more questions. The first concerns the extent to which liberalism and liberal democracy can, or should, tolerate (indeed actively encourage) groups/communities whose cultures are intolerant and non-democratic. And while, as discussed elsewhere, some proponents of multiculturalism are aware of, and concerned about, this, it is difficult to see how the issue can be readily resolved within a multicultural framework. For a fundamental tenet of multiculturalism is that all cultures are equal, and a central requirement following from this is that cultures are not open to criticism (which is not the same thing as the liberal assertion of the moral equality of individuals). In concrete terms, valorising minority cultures has a number of consequences that have implications for liberal democracy, many of which are discussed above or elsewhere. In this section, I want to concentrate on the potential effects of multiculturalism’s encouragement of minority cultural maintenance – which sometimes reads more like an appeal from the World Wildlife Fund for the preservation of endangered species! This is, perhaps, understandable in relation to national minorities as compared to immigrant ones, though even here there are some troubling questions (see Barry, 2001). Sometimes, however, theorising from one context with reference to particular groups is uncritically transferred to unrelated contexts and groups – which is extremely surprising given the adoption of cultural relativism and its emphasis on the central importance of context to understanding cultural differences (see Raz, 1994; Flax, 1995; Gressgard and Jacobsen, 2003; McKerl, 2007). It might also be worth reminding ourselves that the origins of multiculturalism lie in Canadian public policy (Kukathas, 2001). None of this is to suggest that we have nothing to learn from other societies; simply that we need to exercise caution in assuming that what works in one context, with one group of people, will do so in another. My concern at this point is to explore the ways that encouraging a politics of difference may have contributed to the social separation and exclusion that characterises some communities in contemporary British society (Modood et al., 1997). The underlying question is whether constantly labelling people as ‘different’ (positively or negatively) may lead young people in particular to feel alienated from both their parents’ culture and that of wider British society. A follow-up question is whether this alienation might be one of the reasons that has left them vulnerable to



Multiculturalism and the primacy of the group

the appeal of religious extremism, whether expressed through violence and self-destruction, or the adoption of a highly traditional variant of Islam (Mirza et al., 2007). Any and all of these have implications for social cohesion/integration and therefore for liberal democracy at both local and national levels. Nowhere is this alienation demonstrated more starkly than in the case of terrorism expressed through suicide bombings, especially that of one’s own country and the murder of one’s fellow citizens. Kepel (2005) links this appeal to the lack of a national identity combined with access via the internet to a global identity and the dissemination of jihadi ideologies. Consider, for example, this chilling comment, made by a professional social worker before the London bombings: As far as I’m concerned, when they bomb London, the bigger the better … I know it’s going to happen because Sheikh bin Laden said so. Like Bali, like Turkey, like Madrid – I pray for it, I look forward to the day. (Abdul Haq, cited in Cohen, 2004) I do not intend to explore the issue of terrorism further in this chapter (see Pape, 2005, on suicide bombing; Abbas, 2007, on Islamic political radicalism in Europe) but shall concentrate instead on examples of public violence perpetrated over the last quarter of a century by men of Mirpuri heritage and Muslim faith in Bradford. This is not to suggest that such incidents are comparable to terrorism; it is to suggest that they are indicative of growing alienation from, and antagonism towards, non-Muslim individuals and groups and the prioritisation of a religious identity. This is not to be confused with religiosity, but may well reflect the use of religious terminology for political purposes, so that the term ‘Muslim’ may more accurately be seen as a form of religio-political identification (Macey, 2007).9 I have written this section in chronological order in an attempt to illustrate change over time and sone of the factors that might have influenced this. In 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran was created, which might have provided a boost to the development of an international Muslim identity. In 1982, ‘The Bradford 12’ (young Asian men who were caught manufacturing petrol bombs) convinced an all-white jury to acquit them on the grounds that they were ‘confronting fascists and defending my community’. With its connotations of heroic defence of country during war, the theme of ‘defending my community’ has tremendous popular appeal, and re-emerged at the appeal stage of the trials of the 2001 rioters




with the involvement of the London solicitor Imran Khan. In 1983, a campaign for the provision of halal meat in schools took place involving two large-scale demonstrations, both of which involved violent disorder. This campaign is significant for two reasons: it is the first assertion by Bradford Pakistanis of a religious, as against an ethnic, identity; and it demonstrates the power of a minority to overturn the established practices of the majority (humane slaughter regulations). In 1984 the ‘Honeyford Affair’ began, and lasted nearly two years. This was a campaign to dismiss a head teacher on the grounds of racism because he publicly criticised the failure to teach children English and their removal from school for extended visits to Pakistan. This campaign demonstrated Pakistanis’ ability to mobilise support from neighbouring areas to achieve their objectives. For the demand to have Honeyford dismissed was not unanimous at the local level; as one Asian school governor commented: ‘It’s very sad. They’ve rented mobs from all over Yorkshire to try and get him out. What can you do with people like that?’ (cited in Greenhalf, 2003: 64). In 1989, what became known as the ‘Rushdie Affair’ took place. This was the demand that the sale of Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, be banned on the grounds that it was blasphemous. Pakistani Muslim men in Bradford (and elsewhere) engaged in protest, including threatening arson and death to retailers who stocked the book, and proclaiming public support for the fatwa issued against Rushdie by the Ayatollah Khomeni. A ritual public burning of The Satanic Verses was followed by demonstrations that degenerated into public disorder. The significance of this event is its demonstration of the trans-national influence of Islam. In 1991, in response to the deployment of a multinational force against Iraq, Pakistani men in Bradford made publicly clear their opposition to the West and their support for an Islamic state in ways that aggravated racial tension. The 1995 local elections involved high levels of street activity by gangs of young Pakistani men who vented their anger and aggression at ‘the enemy’ in public (Allen and Barrett, 1996). Both Labour and Conservative candidates were Mirpuri Muslims – but from rival clans – and local Pakistani people were put under intense pressure to vote in particular ways. The harassment and violence around the 1995 elections demonstrated the influence of events on the Indian subcontinent on Bradford, a situation that still persists and has clear implications for more than just the democratic election process. Also in 1995, not long after the elections, Pakistani Muslim men instigated a campaign against the sex trade in which large numbers of youths engaged in harassment and violence. This started as




a peaceful, organised protest against the nuisance of prostitution in what had become a Muslim area, but which spiralled out of control as roving gangs of youths (many from surrounding areas) violently harassed prostitutes to drive them out of the area. This campaign is another illustration of young Pakistani Muslim men’s ability to mobilise support around religion from both inside outside Bradford, and their willingness to use violence, against women as well as men, to achieve their ends. As with the 1995 election, this has clear implications for liberal democracy. The 1995 public disorder (dubbed by the media the Bradford Riots) consisted of three days of violent public disorder. During this time, around 300 Pakistani young men rampaged on the streets, attacked the police station, threw missiles (including petrol bombs) at passing cars, smashed windows, looted shops, wrecked garages and burned cars, issued death threats at knife point and fire-bombed businesses, pubs, clubs and an hotel. As was to be the case in 2001, the people and property targeted for attack and destruction were non-Muslim. Despite the severity of the disturbance, no criminal charges were brought due to lack of evidence. The Commission set up to investigate the incident described the immediate reasons for it as: a failure to police by consent, and a widespread local misunderstanding of the accepted protocol for protest. The police showed their ignorance of the local population, and of its concerns; the protesters showed their ignorance of the means of acceptable protest; some representatives of the local population showed their ignorance of necessary and proper police procedures. (Allen and Barrett, 1996: 11) Following the 1995 disorder and before the 2001 riot there were regular, though small-scale, incidents of public violence, including attacks on police stations, following one of which, Jan-Khan (later to become spokesman for the Manningham10 Residents’ Association) commented: ‘A serious drugs and alcohol problem is growing, but the local Asian community is in denial … local politicians have a vested interest in playing it down. There’s a powder keg waiting to explode’ (cited in Goodwin, 1998). There were also widespread, routine incidents of aggression by young Pakistani men directed against members of all ethnic and religious groups of whatever age or gender. These received little, if any, publicity (Macey, 1999b), but were instrumental in curtailing women’s freedom – particularly that of young Pakistani Muslim women (Macey, 1999a; Scott, 2003).




The 2001 public disorder and riot in Bradford was part of a series of violent disturbances dubbed by the media the ‘Northern Riots’ that took place during spring and summer in a number of northern towns and cities. These started and ended in Bradford with the worst rioting on mainland Britain for 20 years, and it took over 1,000 police officers and support staff from nine police forces to bring the situation under control. Widely – and inaccurately – reported as a clash between the BNP and young Asian men, the incident involved around 400 Pakistani men violently attacking the police over 10–12 hours using a variety of missiles, including stones, rocks, roof tiles, fireworks and petrol bombs: 326 police officers were injured (some seriously) and attacks also took place on innocent people who had been unable to escape the city before it became, in places, an inferno. There is no doubt that the 2001 riot was perpetrated largely by Pakistani Muslims against non-Muslims (mainly white, but also Asian and black). Despite the mayhem that apparently characterises riots (and strikingly illustrated in this case by video footage), a number of aspects of the 2001 riot show clearly that it was an attack by an ethno-religious group on outsiders. Parekh (2003) labelled it ‘a Muslim riot’ and religion was certainly involved insofar as non-whites trying to flee the city were stopped and questioned about their religious affiliation: Muslims were allowed to pass; non-Muslims were beaten up and had their cars burned. An eye-witness commented: ‘Survival was down to pigment – black skin good; white skin bad. We witnessed the terror of drivers being battered with bricks’ (cited in Macey, 2005b). But the riot was also clearly racist in its restriction of damage mainly to white property (particularly pubs) and the fact that there is evidence of racist chanting. During the petrol bombing of the Manningham Labour Club, for instance, eye witnesses reported such shouts as: ‘There are some white bastards in here. Let’s kill the white trash’. This was prior to blocking all the club’s exits with burning cars before setting it alight. Taken as a whole, the 1995 public disorder falls most clearly into the category of an ‘ethnic riot’ (Horowitz, 2002) and as such is a striking illustration of inter-ethnic hatred of ‘the other’. Many reasons have been suggested for the riot, most of them rehearsing what Alibhai-Brown (2001) calls ‘the same tired old explanations’ – deprivation and racism, and the newer ones of Islamophobia and the far right (McGhee, 2005). A chapter on multiculturalism and liberal democracy is not the place to discuss these, though it is worth noting that the official inquiries that followed the ‘Northern Riots’ all highlighted the fact that they took place in areas of extreme residential and social segregation (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001; Richie, 2001), which is




relevant to the question of how multiculturalism might impact on liberal democracy. Multiculturalism cannot be held responsible for residential separation, which has a long history and is linked to chain migration. It may, however, play a role in its continuation so long after initial settlement through its focus on the maintenance of cultural traditions that could encourage people to remain within what Ouseley (2001) and Lewis (2002) have termed ‘comfort zones’. Extreme residential separation is likely to be related to social separation which – to varying degrees – characterises Britain. Peach (2006), for example, carried out a detailed analysis of ethno-religious residential separation in London and found very high levels of separation for Sikhs and Jews, but not, apparently, for Muslims. However, closer examination of this finding revealed that Muslims were, in fact, highly separated, but by ethnic origin rather than religion – a salutary reminder of the diversity encompassed by the term ‘Muslim’ that is so frequently ignored (Baksh et al., 2008). The issue, then, is not so much residential separation per se, but the dangers of this slipping into polarisation, as the events in Bradford might indicate is the case. This can then result in the ‘othering’ of outsiders that underpins inter-ethnic antagonism. It is interesting to note here that young white and Pakistani men in the residentially and socially separate situation in Bradford seem to have corresponding levels of ignorance about, and aggression towards, each other (Macey, 2005b). However, when this antagonism is expressed in physical violence, as noted above, it constitutes a very real threat to the principles of liberal democracy, which are about considerably more than the right to vote. Before discussing this further, I want to deal with the question of equality which looms large in the literature on liberalism and liberal democracy and that highlights some important questions about the potential impact of multiculturalism on liberal democracy.

The moral equality of individuals Equality is an inherent concern of liberal philosophy and one that is institutionalised in different ways in different societies in relation to civil, political and social rights. In Britain, the principle of equality of opportunity in, for example, education and the labour market has been an ideal for many years, and one that underpins anti-discrimination legislation. But equality of opportunity is not, of course, the same thing as equality of outcome, as Jewson and Mason (1986) discuss in their review of liberal versus radical approaches to the theory and practice of equal opportunities. And it is the reality of structured inequality (by




class, gender, race and ethnicity) that provides ammunition for multiculturalists, though they restrict their concerns to race and ethnicity. This is not unconnected to the displacement of the white working class from its central position in sociology, and its replacement by new categories of victims, particularly minorities. Nor, when the working class does receive attention, is the multicultural ethic of respect for difference applied – either because working-class people are not seen to have a culture or because it is denigrated. But it is the relative material disadvantage of some – but by no means all – minority ethnic groups that has been one of the driving forces behind multiculturalism, though whether it is a solution to ethnic inequality is a matter of considerable disagreement. Kymlicka (2001a) and Banting and Kymlicka (2004) argue that it is, while Miller (1995) argues the opposite, and Glazer (1997) and Barry (2001) suggest that multiculturalism not only does not reduce inequality, but exacerbates it. A key issue in coming to a conclusion on the likelihood of one approach versus another achieving equality (or at least reducing inequality) is the question I raised previously concerning the reasons for material inequality and the distinction between difference, disadvantage and discrimination. However, despite its critical importance to policy development, this question is virtually ruled out of court within a cultural relativist framework that – somewhat ironically – serves to draw attention away from cultural influences on relative deprivation. What is not ruled out by multiculturalists is a critique of the concept of equal opportunities as they operate in Britain. Those multiculturalists who can be seen as radical egalitarians (such as Young, 1990; Fraser, 1997) justify their attack on the liberal concept of individual equal opportunities through an assault on the social norms that constitute opportunities in the first place. At one level, this is undoubtedly correct insofar as having formal (or legal) equality is not the same thing as having substantive equality, as Brubaker (1992) points out in relation to citizenship. A simple example of the contrast between formal versus substantive rights is the limitations imposed on women’s access to job opportunities, not by the labour market itself, but by the social norms around caring responsibilities. It is this sort of situation, among other things, that led Young (1990) to call for a ‘cultural revolution’ and that underpins the multicultural belief that affording people genuine equality requires that they be treated differently. I have discussed a number of the theoretical and practical problems of such an approach elsewhere (see also Anthias, 2002); I would merely note here that fulfilling such a demand would require considerably more than a cultural revolution! The only point that I would wish to reiterate in the context of liberal democracy is the simple, but




central, one that is rarely raised in the multicultural debates around the right to be different. This is that the groups at which multiculturalism is targeted – or on whose behalf it claims to speak – are now living in a Western liberal democracy. So when multiculturalists state that the liberal democratic norms of, in this case, equality do not and/or should not apply to migrants from non-Western societies, they are actually implying that British citizens should be treated differently according to their race or ethnicity. This is, of course, the very philosophy that underpinned both the holocaust and apartheid and is one that comes very close to biological or socio-biological determinism (as, ironically, do some multicultural approaches to culture). Of course, multiculturalism – unlike either the holocaust or apartheid – is motivated by good intentions and respect for individuals and groups unlike one’s own; it aims to help, not hurt, minorities. However, a striking aspect of human social existence is that good intentions are not only not enough in themselves, but can sometimes cause harm. Conversely, positive results can accrue from negative, or bad, intentions. On a more prosaic level, it is legitimate to raise again the question of the extent to which liberal democracies can, or should, be expected to change their attitudes, expectations, values and general ways of doing things to include, accommodate or recognise those of a small (and internally diverse) minority of its citizens. At what point might British society become something entirely different from the one in which minorities have chosen to settle? At what stage might the integrity of British values be endangered? (Poulter, 1986). Writers such as Panniker (1996) and Steiner and Alston (1996) suggest that the very fact that minority cultures subscribe to different moral systems means that Western values are not applicable to them. But this does not provide solutions to some key questions around the challenges – if not threats – that multiculturalism can be seen to present to democratic principles and practices. Below, I shall examine some of the changes that have already – quietly – taken place in Britain in the equalities arena and raise some questions about the potential impact of these on liberal democracy. Multiculturalism and the right to be different In recent years, multicultural and human rights thinking has brought about some major changes to policy and practice in Britain through its impact on academia, the government and minority communities themselves. The most obvious example, as noted, is the expansion of anti-discrimination legislation, which has doubled and now affords legal protection from discrimination to six categories of people. While I




think that much of this is positive, I am not complacent about its likely effectiveness, given that, over thirty years after its inception, the EOC has not even achieved equal pay for women doing the same jobs as men (EOC, 2007b). Nor did the CRE succeed in equalising the job opportunities or pay of black and Asian men, as Berthoud (2000) demonstrates, though, as previously noted, the extent of differences between ethnic groups on this dimension suggests that factors other than discrimination are implicated (see, for instance, Adams and Carter, 2007, with respect to women). Nor am I sanguine that the establishment of an Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) will have more success, for despite it being tasked with bringing together the different equalities strands, I have reason to believe that it is operating within a multicultural framework that sees all minorities as victims and refuses to acknowledge the reality of conflict between both the legislation and groups themselves. On a different level, we are a long way from removing racism from Britain (CRE, 2007), as the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 clearly demonstrates (Macpherson, 1999). Nor was this murder unique – information collected by the IRR leads them to suggest that racially motivated murders are increasing (IRR, 2008) and their website lists over 50 such murders since 2000 (IRR, 2009). However, without detracting from the seriousness of racist violence, some caution has to be exercised in relation to IRR statistics since they include cases where those charged were not convicted. Nor is the alleged racist motivation always entirely convincing. This situation is not going to be improved by legislation that requires incidents of abuse against minorities to be classified according to the perceived motivation of the perpetrators. For while the criminal justice system has always taken account of motivation, it is now only necessary for someone (not necessarily the victim) to claim racial motivation for tougher penalties to be imposed on the perpetrators. Notwithstanding my general support for the extension of human rights to groups of people not previously covered by legislation (e.g. on the basis of sexual orientation), I do have some concerns. First, there is the issue that such a high percentage of the British population is now regarded as suffering discrimination on one or more dimensions (age, disability, gender, race) or lifestyles (ethnicity, religion, sexuality), as noted above. This paints a picture of contemporary Britons as being not only extensively prejudiced, but willing to express this in racist and/or discriminatory actions. I am far from convinced that empirical evidence supports this; what it does support, as also noted previously, is that perceptions of discrimination far exceed the experience of it (Bruce et al., 2005; Macey et al., 2009).




My second area of concern relates to the general change in thinking around equalities issues that has resulted in an increasing focus on proactive action. This can be seen in both international and national legislation, but has impacted on a number of areas outside the legislative framework. One example is the government’s imposition on such public bodies as the police, prison, probation and fire services of a duty to promote race equality. This includes setting targets for the recruitment, retention and progression of minority officers (Home Office, 1999) and follows publication of the Macpherson Report (1999) on the police’s handling of the investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. It rests on the belief that better representation of minorities leads to better service provision, an assumption that is open to question on a number of theoretical and pragmatic levels, and which, as previously noted, can have negative consequences for minority ethnic women. The CRE has always had the right to impose targets on organisations that were found to be in breach of race relations legislation, but the extension of this by the government itself is, I suggest, a move of considerable magnitude. It is one that goes against the British philosophy of equality of opportunity, because the imposition of targets almost inevitably results in positive discrimination in favour of minority ethnic or religious individuals. And since positive discrimination (as against positive action) is illegal in the UK, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the government is breaking the law and encouraging others to do so. In fact, because some sectors have difficulty in recruiting visible minorities, the setting of targets can in effect force them to break the law. It has long been known that the ideological pressure to favour minorities in certain sectors of the job market pushes employers towards discrimination against white people (the ‘how many boxes can we tick?’ approach). But to institutionalise discrimination against the majority by setting targets raises questions of a different order, questions that threaten liberal democracy, both directly and indirectly. The former concerns the central liberal belief in the moral equality of individuals and thus the requirement to treat them equally; the latter concerns the potentially negative impact on white people’s attitudes to visible minorities. I suspect that there will be many people, including government officials, who will argue that targets are not the same as positive discrimination and do not involve discrimination in practice, but are aimed at counteracting prejudice to achieve equality. I believe that this is both disingenuous and naïve and, in fact, a CRE formal investigation into the police service in England and Wales found evidence of unlawful




direct discrimination against white people in recruitment practices (CRE, 2005). The CRE investigation raises questions about approaches to furthering the equalities agenda, on which there are strong, and divergent, views – particularly in relation to positive discrimination. Khan (2006) argues that ‘preferential treatment’ is fair in relation to disadvantaged groups and O’Neill and Holdaway (2007) justify it on the basis of the need to change (racist) police culture. However, the chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales argues against positive discrimination on any grounds – gender, ethnicity, sexuality – saying that the way to increase the trust and confidence of all communities is by sustained nondiscriminatory action (Berry, 2004). Whatever one’s views, questions remain about the appropriateness of choosing to discriminate against the majority in order to improve the position of minorities within a liberal democracy that claims to afford everyone equality of opportunity. This is not to suggest that there are never grounds for special treatment, though I tend to agree with Barry’s (2001; 2002) reasoning as to why these are more difficult to justify than is commonly assumed. Over time Britain has granted the requests of minority groups for both exemptions from, and extensions to, the law. Examples of the former include the Sikh exemption from wearing safety helmets on building sites and when riding motorcycles in order to accommodate turbans. They have also been allowed to carry the kirpan (ceremonial dagger). The Muslim halal and Jewish kosher methods of slaughtering animals are also exempt from current law in relation to animal welfare, which is a far more contentious issue, since it indisputably involves an increase in animal suffering (Singer, 1991). The campaign for the provision of halal meals in Bradford schools was referred to above as an example of the use of violence to achieve desired ends. It was also accompanied by a public attempt to discredit those who objected by claiming that the Animal Rights Campaign had been infiltrated by racists. Other exemptions relate to rules rather than laws, and involve, for example, the Muslim demand that girls be exempt from school uniform requirements and be allowed to to wear traditional clothes, as noted in chapter 2. A number of such cases have had to be resolved by the courts when schools resisted demands to wear the niqab or burqa on the grounds that – unlike the hijab – these interfered with the teaching/learning process (Macey, 2007a; Macey et al., 2009). In most – though not all – cases, some generally acceptable compromise has been reached (Phillips, 2003). It is a matter of some concern that a number of minority demands to which the state has acceded impact disproportionately (and negatively)




on women. One of these is the decision to facilitate polygamy by paying full welfare benefits to bigamous families (discussed in chapter 3). Of even greater concern is allowing the MAT to use a legal loophole to establish shar’ia law by ‘the back door’ (also discussed in chapter 3). Finally, it is worrying that in a number of cases concessions have not been won through the democratic process, but through violent confrontation. This is clearly illustrated in Bradford, where violence has proved to be a highly effective means of getting one’s own way (Malik, 2001; Macey, 2005). I would argue that all these examples present serious threats to liberal democracy. Should we be allowing blatant breaches of the law – bigamy – and moreover paying for it? Should we be allowing minorities to exploit legal loopholes to introduce religious law into a democratic, secular society? Should we be acceding to violent demands for special privileges? For is this not, as Okin (2002: 230) suggests, ‘to let toleration for diversity run amok’? And is it not also to exacerbate women’s inequality and oppression?

Summary: multiculturalism and liberal democracy In this chapter I have analysed the challenges that multicultural theory and practice present to three of the core characteristics of liberal democracies: reflecting the will of the people; the primacy of the individual; and the moral equality of individuals. Within the context of globalisation, I have used a number of mini-case studies to provide concrete examples of areas in which multiculturalism can be seen to present a threat to both liberalism and liberal democracy and have linked these to the influence in academia (particularly sociology) of constructionism, feminism and postmodernism. My argument is that multicultural ideology, which owes much to these paradigm shifts, has become profoundly influential in a wide range of societal arenas, particularly the public sector. Here it has impacted on access to, and quality of, information – both of which are arguably essential to the effective operation of a liberal democracy. The two examples I have used to illustrate this are, first, the denial of accurate information on the reasons for the increase in the number of people who are HIV-positive, and second, the construction of the concept of Islamophobia. These two cases raise different questions in terms of the ideological influence of multiculturalism – one in relation to the creation of what constitutes knowledge; the other in relation to how such knowledge is interpreted and acted on in the policy arena. The issue of the domination of the discourse by what has become known as ‘political correctness’ is also touched on, not least because language plays a




major role in structuring perceptions and hence creating reality. A clear example of this is that empirical evidence shows that the perception of discrimination based on religion is significantly greater than its reality. Thus, a higher proportion of the population in England believe that Muslims experience discrimination than is demonstrated by the facts; the same applies to Scotland with respect to Catholics. This raises the question of the potential impact of multiculturalism on its recipients. For example, what is the effect on individuals of continually being told that they are not only ‘different’ from the rest of society, but are actively disliked by most people? For though social policy can make ‘victimhood’ economically attractive, the status itself is surely not conducive to either a positive individual self-concept or social cohesion. I explored this question through an analysis of the public disorder and riot that took place in a number of northern towns and cities in 2001, focusing particularly on Bradford, West Yorkshire. This highlights the position of young men who were born and/or brought up in Britain and who are faced with conflicting influences from both within and outside their communities, as well as via the internet. Is inter-generational conflict exacerbated by multiculturalism’s emphasis on the maintenance and reproduction of the culture of the homeland? Relevant here is the fact that community ‘needs’ are defined by self-styled leaders who exclude young men as well as women from the decision-making process. And what are the implications for the functioning of liberal democracy of populations who are so alienated from society that they see public violence directed against ‘the other’ as the right, or perhaps only, way to express their frustration and anger?




5

Introduction I stated in the preface that my reasons for writing this book stemmed from my concerns about the impact of multiculturalism on minority ethnic women. Serious immersion in the literature has not changed my mind; what it has done is to make me realise that my criticisms of multiculturalism are not restricted to its effects on women. Starting from the point of answering ‘yes’ to the question ‘Is multiculturalism bad for women?’ (Okin, 1997), I find myself increasingly aware that multiculturalism is not only bad for women, but for all of us – majorities as well as minorities; men as well as women; secularists as well as religious; society as well as the diverse communities of which it is comprised. The reasons for this vary by both area under discussion and ‘brand’ of multiculturalism, given that there is no single, unified multiculturalism, but several. However, there are a number of core concepts or assumptions that I think underpin all multiculturalisms and of which I am critical. Some have already been discussed at various points in this book, so will only be touched on here; others are examined in this chapter in relation to a number of the categories mentioned above – women, young people, minority communities and wider society. This chapter also picks up on some additional aspects of multiculturalism that I find highly problematic – its neglect of the white population, particularly the working class, the fact that it is a ‘top-down’ ideology that has been imposed on both minority and majority populations, and its tendency to be a ‘one-way’ street, whereby all the change is expected to be on the part of majorities, rather than minorities. First, however, it may be worth reiterating that I am a sociologist and a feminist, but that I am highly 123



So What’s Wrong with Multiculturalism?


critical of the particular aspects of each that have influenced a great deal of multicultural thinking.

if the sociologist has a highly important intellectual role as a critic of society … he [sic] is not simply a critic, but a sociological critic; and the quality of his criticism will depend upon the quality of his understanding of the institutions and movements in present day and past societies … he has a duty to resist being swept off his feet by every passing wind of ideology. (Bottomore, 1970: xii–xiii) As noted at the beginning of this book, sociologists feature surprisingly little in contemporary writing on multiculturalism, though work in the US and Britain from the 1970s on racialised relations has clearly influenced multicultural thinking. But much of this drew on politicised or ideologically inspired sociology and ignored a considerable body of theoretical and empirical work in the sociology of race relations (see, for instance, Miles, 1980; 1984; Mason, 1982; Rex and Mason, 1986; Husband, 1987; Solomos, 1989). This is related to Berger’s comment (cited in chapter 4) about the ‘cultural revolution’ that began in the 1960s and sought to turn sociology into an instrument of ideological advocacy (Berger, 2002). In a similar criticism of sociology in relation to race and ethnicity, Sheila Allen and I referred to this as the: politicising of the area around such questions as who could legitimately define the issues to be researched, what methods and concepts were appropriate to pursuing them and who was seen as having the right to undertake the work (Bourne, 1983; Cherns, 1987). At its most extreme, questions were (and are) raised about whether there is any value in academic work, that is, in theory building and research carried out by academics, particularly sociologists. (Allen and Macey, 1994: 110) One of the issues raised (and repeated in the literature on multiculturalism) concerned the ‘insider/outsider’ debate associated with Merton (1972) but discussed in relation to the black (African-American) experience by the Marxist historian of slave societies, Genovese, in 1971. At the time there was a growing school of thought that only ‘insiders’ can write about ‘their own’ groups and cultures – a view that prioritised



Sociology and multiculturalism

relevance and political engagement over scholarship and dismissed any aspirations in the direction of scientific objectivity (Allen and Macey, 1994). Genovese argued, however, that ‘ideologically motivated history is bad history and ultimately reactionary politics’, and that while pure scholarship and value-free social science are impossible, this does not free scholars from ‘the responsibility to struggle for maximum objectivity’ (1971: 4). Genovese also summed up the nonsense of the ‘only insiders’ position in both personal and social scientific terms in his conclusion that this meant that as a white American of Italian descent, he was qualified to write only about the history of Italian immigration, of which he knew nothing! Genovese did not deny that there are sound theoretical reasons for combining both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ research and analysis to produce more comprehensive, nuanced and sensitive accounts of social phenomena. But if the social sciences, particularly sociology, are to have any value over and above accounts of experience produced by everyday participants, it is difficult to see how (or why) work should be restricted to researchers from specific categories of age, class, gender or ethnicity. Yet the combination of multicultural and feminist positions has not only frequently resulted in exactly this, but has also at times led to research findings being suppressed, particularly those that do not toe the ‘it’s all racism, innit?’ line. The consequences of this for the development of effective social policy hardly need to be spelled out, for while assuming the high moral ground may be emotionally satisfying (Browne, 2006), it does not necessarily result in improving the life-chances of disadvantaged people, including minority ethnic ones. Indeed, I would argue that the opposite can, and often is, the case, as discussed below and summed up by Miles: As has been said on countless occasions concerning the unity of theory and practice, if the analysis is wrong, then it is likely that the political strategy will not achieve the intended objectives. (1989: 5)

Feminism and multiculturalism The observation that multiculturalism operated highly selectively with respect to scholarship in the sociology of race and ethnic relations applies equally to feminist contributions to this arena. Thus, work that attempted to theorise the relations of race and gender (and sometimes class) has been largely ignored (see, for instance, Rowbotham et al., 1979;



So, What’s Wrong with Multiculturalism? 125

Joseph and Lewis, 1981; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Bourne, 1983; hooks, 1984; Barrett and McIntosh, 1985; Bhavnani and Coulson, 1986; Allen, 1987; Ramazanoglu, 1989; Anthias, 1991). In the 1980s, feminist writing that prioritised descriptive accounts of personal experience led to questions similar to those noted above in the sphere of racialised relations. In particular, questions about the legitimacy of researching those who differ from oneself and a dismissal of the possibility of objectivity were raised that parallel those criticised by Genovese (1971). Similar answers apply: it is not that the authentic voices of those in particular categories do not enhance sociological and feminist analyses, but they do not replace them. For it is one thing to acknowledge that truth and objectivity are partial, but quite another to argue that aspirations towards them should be dismissed. Constructionism, postmodernism and feminism, like the interpretative paradigms that preceded them, have done much to guard against the over-ambitious claims and limitations of the deterministic, male-centred positivism that was the norm in the 1950s. But they have succumbed to that very British tendency towards pendular swings that entail throwing out the baby with the bathwater; multiculturalism has lost much in the process. I turn now to some criticisms of a number of the basic tenets of multiculturalism.

Multicultural paradoxes Cultural relativism It is difficult to see how multiculturalism could exist without an acceptance of the doctrine of cultural relativism, though theorists vary in the ‘purity’ of their emphasis on this. Central to cultural relativism is the belief that no culture is better than any other, since there are no transcendent criteria by which cultural differences can be evaluated (Watson, 2000). But if Kymlicka (2007) is correct in suggesting that most variants of multiculturalism in operation across the world today can be categorised as ‘liberal’, this poses a problem, given the inherent contradiction between liberalism and cultural relativism (Gellner, 1995), and between the growing emphasis on universal human rights and the simultaneous acceptance of the autonomy of cultures (Kalev, 2004). Leaving this aside for the moment, I have to say that the logical consequences of what I would call extreme relativism leave me with a sense of unreality – not with the humour attached to Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, but more akin to the horror evoked by Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis. For it is one thing to stress the need to take into account particular contexts (including of time and place) in trying to understand cultural




differences; it is surely quite another to suggest that, say, the Nazi or apartheid regimes are not open to criticism or that there is no difference between FGM and cosmetic surgery. Not only are there pragmatic difficulties (if not impossibilities) in trying to maintain the value-free stance that is a requirement of cultural relativism, but this approach also raises moral questions: such appraisals are arguably our shared philosophical and moral responsibilities – and we are all too familiar with the potential consequences, in a variety of historical and cultural contexts, of not saying anything. (Fisher, 2005: 118) Another difficulty is that most discussions of multiculturalism centre on Western liberal democracies which, as a consequence of migration, now include diverse ethnic and/or religious communities whose values and traditions may differ significantly from those of wider society. This means that it is not merely a matter of refraining from passing judgement on the cultural practices of other societies, but of what is going on within our own borders (i.e. being practised in relation to our own citizens). Even the former raises immensely difficult questions – is the implication, for instance, that we should have left the Nazis to continue their programme of genocide against the Jews and others? Or South Africa to continue to operate the apartheid regime? But the latter raises very immediate issues: Is the implication here that British citizens of minority ethnic or religious status are not entitled to the same rights and protection as members of the majority? Or, given that multiculturalism is supposedly all about ensuring that minorities are accorded equal rights, is it only men who have such rights? The answer would appear to be in the affirmative insofar as some multiculturalists judge women’s (and children’s) rights to be of subsidiary importance to those of (apparently non-gendered or age-differentiated) minority groups. Thus, Spinner-Halev states that: ‘avoiding the injustice of imposing reform on oppressed groups is often more important than avoiding the injustice of discrimination against women’ (2001: 86). And Kukathas extends to children his argument for the primary importance of minority cultures in ways that have been used to justify such practices as FGM: Perhaps toleration of the cultural practices of ethnic groups includes allowing ritual acts to be carried out upon children, because these can





Spinner-Halev’s and Kukathas’ reasons for adopting a stance that prioritises ethnic group traditions over women’s and children’s human rights are significantly different. Spinner-Halev’s argument is that women have the ‘right of exit’ in liberal democratic contexts, that is, they can choose to leave the group that is oppressing them. Kukathas, on the other hand, while also employing the ‘right of exit’ argument, focuses much more on the concept of toleration as being fundamental to liberalism. Both, however, raise issues that are of crucial importance to the multicultural enterprise and which are discussed further at various points in this chapter. Racialisation and essentialism It is interesting to note that criticisms such as racialisation (or ethnicisation) that I believe rightly apply to multiculturalism itself are levelled at those who dare to criticise it. For in a basic sense, racialisation was built into the historical development of multiculturalism, since the entire project grew out of the need for relatively mono-cultural societies such as Britain to find ways of coping with the divergent cultures and religions that migrants from outside Europe brought into the country after the Second World War. And because the people who were the focus of multiculturalism were recognisably different by their skin colour and/or dress codes, there was inevitably an element of racialisation involved, and one that frequently elided race and ethnicity. Critics of multiculturalism are also accused of essentialising minority cultures – stereotyping and failing to acknowledge that minority cultures, like majority ones, are internally differentiated, by, for instance, gender, age, generation, and so on. Yet it is surely multiculturalism itself that, in operating at the group level, is predicated on highly essentialised conceptions of both minorities (Butler, 1990a; 1990b; Haraway, 1990a; 1990b) and the majority. This is because it is based on assumptions of differences between (but not within) minorities and the majority so that, in practice, it can only be operationalised via an essentialised view of cultural diversity. This, in turn, is based on the belief that social justice within liberal democratic societies requires that we provide opportunities and services that recognise and respect these differences. And this, by definition, is rooted in essentialism and involves prioritising the group over the individual – an approach that is in direct opposition to liberalism.



be an essential part of the culture, and allow parents to educate and raise their children according to their cultural laws. (1986: 99)

Indeed, it is difficult to see how else multiculturalism could be put into practice, for if we stray too far from essentialism, we would be in danger of considering individual needs – something totally alien to the ‘groupthink’ required for multiculturalism to be multiculturalism. We might also be in danger of discovering that the differences that are the very raison d’être of multiculturalism are, in some cases, either nonexistent or of far less magnitude than is often assumed. But even accepting difference and limiting this discussion to, say, service provision, involves a high level of essentialism for purely pragmatic reasons. For example, once a multicultural approach is adopted to, say, the provision of meals on wheels, sheer logistics demands an essentialised approach, for how else does one calculate how many halal curries, rather than roast beef and Yorkshire puddings, need to be cooked and delivered and to whom? This is a banal example of what is actually an important and far-reaching feature of multiculturalism and one that is attracting increasing concern as policy and practice in the public arena is extended to the realm of religion (British Humanist Association, 2007).

Culture and identities The issue of essentialism raises other theoretical and practical problems with multiculturalism related to the concepts of both culture and identity. For – contrary to social science theory – multiculturalism is necessarily based (in practice, if not in theory) on a view of culture as static and bounded, and one of identity as singular and fixed. This is despite advocates of multiculturalism making such statements as: culture is a process of the constant adaptation of people to historical circumstances which require them, as a condition of their own survival, to engage sympathetically with new ways of understanding the world and responding to it. … any attempt to define, or worse, to legislate for a culture is doomed to failure … (Watson, 2000: 109) The problem is the mismatch between theory and practice, rhetoric and reality, for there are two aspects of multiculturalism in the real world that militate against Watson’s (accurate) statement of theory. First, in encouraging the continuous reproduction of the culture of the homeland, multiculturalism removes the onus from minority groups of ‘engaging sympathetically with new ways of understanding the world and responding to it’. In this, it acts against the natural dynamism of cultures and




pushes them into an even more fixed mould than is generally – but temporarily – the case in the early stages of the migration process. Second, multiculturalism does legislate for culture through both policy and practice and, increasingly, through all levels of education, as noted earlier with respect to the ‘cohesion’ agenda. I would argue that there is a sense in which multiculturalism locks people into rigid, reactionary cultural and religious categories, whether they desire this or not. And there is little doubt that many individuals and social categories, such as women and young people, do not want to be forced into a rigid and unchanging notion of their parents’ and grandparents’ culture. (This was well expressed some years ago by one of my Pakistani Muslim students who asked: ‘When do I get to stop being an ethnic?’) This throws into sharp focus the question of the limitations on, or boundaries of, choice, which will be discussed in more detail in the section of this chapter dealing with multiculturalism and women. Meanwhile, it is pertinent to note Barth’s caution, written with reference to ethnicity (culture) but which is equally relevant to identities: Ethnic categories are organisational vessels that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different sociocultural systems. They may be of great relevance to behaviour but they need not be; they may provide all social life, or they may be relevant only in limited sectors of activity. (1969: 14) This comment on ethnic categories alert us to the fact that identities – ethnic, religious or other – are not singular, static or all-encompassing, but multiple, dynamic and variable by situation/context (Burris and Jackson, 2000; Hopkins and Khani-Hopkins, 2004; Sellick, 2004; Sen, 2006; Modood, 2007). And in a globalised world, identities can also be hybrid and hyphenated as a consequence of national, trans-national and international influences, both real and virtual (Kymlicka, 1995; 2001b; Bhabha, 1999; Anthias, 2002; Macey, 2006; Modood, 2007). This is not to suggest that what might be termed ‘new ethnicities’ (Hall, 1992; Alibhai-Brown, 2000) have superseded the older, original ones of first-generation migrants, but it is to note that there is a variety of ways of being, say, Sikh or African-Caribbean (Modood, 2007: 106). However, no matter how often multiculturalists refer to diversity within cultural and/or identity groups, it remains the case that they continue to prioritise ethnic and/or religious identity over all other aspects of the person. This is said to be at the root of the clash between feminism and




multiculturalism, with Okin accused of prioritising gender over ethnicity and multiculturalists prioritising ethnicity over gender (see Kukathas, 2001). However, prioritisation of ethnicity is done with very little – if any – attempt to justify it, other than generalised references to discrimination, exclusion, inequality and oppression and suggests either that multiculturalists retain a static and essentialised view of the concept of identity – at least as it applies to minority groups – or that they are operating on a hierarchical model of oppressions within which racial or ethnic minorities are seen to be more oppressed than women, older people, disabled people, and so on. In fact, Modood states that ‘the most important cultural racism is Islamophobia’ (2004: 9, emphasis added). Whether this is actually the case is questionable, since the power of multicultural ideology is such that its assumptions generally go unchallenged to the point that it is not felt necessary to produce empirical evidence to support them. I would merely observe with reference to this assumed hierarchy of oppression that the evidence for violence against women in contemporary Britain (including murder) far exceeds that for racially motivated violence. From a different perspective, Green (citing Dennis, 2000) links the avoidance of producing empirical evidence to support claims of oppression and discrimination with the advent of postmodernism, suggesting that it is a means of rendering ‘elitist’ (or ‘authoritarian’) arguments impregnable (2006: 20). The concept of identity holds as central a place in multicultural theory as does that of culture; both are theoretically problematic, particularly in relation to the issue of essentialism and the question of change. Fisher uses the term ‘strategic essentialism’ to describe the fact that while multiculturalists accept that culture and identities are not singular, fixed or static, they then proceed as if they were (2005: 112). But, as noted above, it is difficult to see how else multiculturalism could be implemented. For to acknowledge diversity with respect to culture and identities in the groups that are the recipients of multicultural attention is to risk raising the question of what the point of multiculturalism is. Another problematic aspect of the use of the concepts of identity and culture (or cultural identities) in multiculturalism stems from the arguments used to justify the need for a multicultural approach to diverse societies. Herr argues that ‘exercising agency in a meaningful way requires that we tap into our own culture’ (2004: 76). Omi and Winant (1994) and Goldberg (1990; 1993; 1994) suggest that minorities are located in an alien web of cultural meanings, the complexity of which ‘def[ies] explicit learning or comprehensive articulation’ (Raz, 1994: 177). This is said to be exacerbated by the racist definition of




minority cultures as inferior, which deeply undermines people’s selfrespect (Margalit and Halbertal, 1994; Honneth, 1997) and it is precisely to mitigate these difficulties that multiculturalism is said to be necessary (Herr, 2004). In this context, group identities are a means of attaining justice and an important form of resistance to cultural imperialism (Young, 1990; 1995). Multiculturalism, then, is seen as essential to self-respect and agency, resistance to external threats to minority cultures and the struggle for racial/ethnic justice. One has to ask, however, what this implies about the individuals and groups who settled in Britain before multiculturalism existed to protect them. Were they bereft of agency? Did they experience loss of identity and cultural genocide? Did they suffer from lack of self-respect or self-esteem? This is not only contradicted by empirical evidence, but is deeply offensive to the people concerned, many of whom were, for instance, extremely active – and effective – in the anti-racist struggle. However, it reflects a long-standing tendency in the sociological literature to define minority identities as if they are constructed only in relation to majority ones and Western racism (Macey, 1999b). But if this were the case, the multicultural enterprise would be redundant, based as it is on the (accurate) assumption that people carry their cultures with them when they migrate – which is not, of course, the same thing as saying that these do not change over time. Finally, questions of a different order are raised by Stanfield in relation to identity and racialisation: the reproduction of a singular monolithic identity as objectified reality is a must if people of color are to remain oppressed second- and third-class citizens. To recognize that people of color have ranges of identities is to acknowledge their humanity in a way that is threatening to the status quo, in that it disturbs the social, political, and economic arrangements of the dominant group. (1993: 21) Though Stanfield’s comments refer to the US and are not addressed to multiculturalism as such, they highlight a fundamental question that can legitimately be asked with regard to the potentially racist assumptions and implications of multiculturalism in Britain. Bannerjee raises a similar question in the Canadian context, this time with direct reference to multiculturalism which, she says, rests on posing ‘Canadian culture’ against ‘multiculturalism, so that ‘An element of whiteness quietly enters into cultural definitions, marking the difference between a core cultural





there is a problem for liberal democracy in trying to reconcile equality and difference through the British approach to ‘multiculturalism’, which has made it much too easy for politicians to deal with selfappointed ‘community leaders’, and much too difficult for black and Asian Britons to have rich, multiple identities. (1999: 119)

Multiculturalism and women The theoretical and practical problems of multiculturalism discussed above obviously impact differently on people according to age and gender, and few would deny that women are less privileged – on any conventional measure and in any society – than males. This is exacerbated by the fact that in all diasporic situations there is a tendency towards the strengthening of traditions, at least in the early years of migration (Afshar, 1994). This leads to the exaggeration of elements of the original culture as groups struggle to retain their identities in a context in which these are seen to be threatened (Khanum, 1992; Shachar, 2001). And this results in a particular focus on women as the bearers of culture, identity and religion with the responsibility for their transmission to the next generation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Macey, 1999a; Abbas, 2004). Akpinar (2003) suggests that these traditions often stem from patriarchal values that are remnants of rural/feudal culture and that this explains the link between migration and violence against women whose behaviour is seen to threaten izzat. Thus, the type and extent of women’s disadvantage vary not only by society, but over time and place, and Western women are generally privileged relative to their counterparts in many other parts of the world. That this is the result of a wide range of factors is obvious, not least the long struggle for equality by the women’s movement, which is itself indicative of relative privilege. To put it starkly, if women are struggling for their own and their children’s survival, they are unlikely to have time, energy or inclination to devote to feminist issues! This is not to suggest that Western women have the monopoly on feminism, nor that they have achieved equality with men. It is to propose that, for both historical and contemporary reasons, they are frequently in a better position than



group and other groups who are represented as cultural fragments’ (2000: 10). With reference to Britain, Phillips talks of multiculturalism turning into ‘a dangerous form of benign neglect and exclusion’ (2004) and Alibhai-Brown comments:

their counterparts in, or from, less materially developed countries, which is essentially what Okin (1997) said and which brought down on her head accusations of Western imperialism! Indeed, economic improvement was the key reason for migration to Britain of the people at whom multiculturalism is directed. They thus come from societies in which gender equality was not a principal concern, so that it is not unreasonable to suggest that many minority ethnic women were – and are – disadvantaged on this dimension relative to their Western counterparts. I believe that the growth of multiculturalism, far from improving their position, has actually worsened it. For example, the excessive cultural relativism that characterises much British multiculturalism has had a profoundly negative impact on women because it has led to a widespread reluctance to ‘interfere’ in what are seen as ‘community affairs’. Yuval-Davis suggests that: [State actors] regard it as imperialist and racist for the West to intervene in ‘internal community matters’. Women are often the victims of such a perspective, which allows the so-called male representatives and leaders of ‘the community’ to determine policies that ultimately concern women, their well being, and their physical safety. (1997b: 206) That the self-styled community leaders who are consulted on community ‘needs’ do not always promote policies that are in the best interests of women (or young people) is self-evident, as has been articulated by numerous (academic and community) minority women. Particularly striking on the latter dimension are the voices of the 800 Muslim women who participated in the government-funded consultations in England and Wales reported in the preface. These women’s descriptions of oppression and violence within their communities raise concerns about the approach of politicians, policy-makers and professionals in terms of: consultation being restricted to faith or other community leaders so that the voices of women and young people are silenced; ‘political correctness’ trumping justice and individual human rights; and lack of understanding of such cultural factors as izzat and the way this can expose individuals to serious danger. This is not to suggest that multiculturalism is the cause of behaviour in minority communities that would be totally unacceptable within majority ones. However, the two consultations paint an ugly picture of some of the abuses that are being practised against women (and children) in twenty-first-century Britain. This should, at the very least, give pause for




thought to the cultural relativists who claim that no culture is better than any other, and that no criticism should be made of minority cultures. For such thinking encourages abusers to believe that ‘culture’ and/or cultural definitions of religion excuse their behaviour. This is thrown into sharp relief by the ‘cultural defence’ argument that has been used in courts of law to try to justify a range of illegal acts, including murder (see Okin, 1989; 1999, for North American examples; Phillips, 2003; 2007, for UK examples). It also creates a situation in which, as noted above, professionals (doctors, police officers, social workers, teachers) are reluctant to ‘interfere’ in so-called community affairs. This alerts us to the wider impact of multiculturalism in that it not only affects what goes on within minority communities, but also influences the way that outsiders treat individual members of such communities, as noted in chapter 3. Puri’s (2005) research in Britain and the US, for example, shows how multiculturalism, particularly cultural relativism, has influenced doctors’ thinking on essentialised cultural differences. She demonstrates how the notions of ‘cultural sensitivity’ and ‘cultural competence’ in medicine – designed to improve medical care for minority communities – actually operate to the detriment of abused (‘battered’) South Asian women. This, she suggests, is because, in practice, it replicates structures of oppression in these communities and results in unequal treatment. Puri’s research also leads her to raise one of the most fundamental problems inherent in multiculturalism noted above – who defines ‘the community’, its culture, traditions and needs: What goes unquestioned, however, are the politics of determining who is given the power to define a community, to name and define its ‘different needs’, as well as to guide physicians and other social service providers to the presumed ‘right course of action’. (1995: 417) This is critically important because it is not only a matter of who in communities has the right to define their needs, but also who outside does so. Who, for example, constructs the cultural-awareness criteria used to select police recruits, or the curricula used to train people for culturally appropriate/sensitive teaching, or cultural competences in social work? How accurate are the definitions of ‘community needs’ that (generally white) educators and trainers inculcate into the future professionals whose job it is to advise and help minority women and young people subjected to pressure and oppression from their own families and communities? And in cases of forced marriage or so-called ‘honour’-related




abuse, to pre-empt and prevent these? What I am suggesting is that the adoption of a multicultural, essentialist and relativist perspective in the training of professionals – often combined with the fear of being accused of racism or Islamophobia – has resulted in the near-paralysis of frontline workers. This leaves vulnerable members of minority communities isolated and unprotected and, in the real world, sometimes literally in danger of losing their lives (Afshar, 1994; Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006; Macey, 2007a; 2009; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). Young women have, in fact, already been murdered in the name of izzat in Britain and other European countries (Brandon and Hafez, 2008), though it is only recently that the British police seem to have become aware of this and begun to investigate disappearances and deaths more rigorously (HAC, 2008). Proponents of multiculturalism tend to respond to its critics by insisting on the need to differentiate between theory and practice, implying that the misunderstanding or misuse of multicultural philosophy does not negate its overall value. I would make two points here. First, that such reasoning rests on the luxury of detachment – a luxury that is not available to victims of violence in the real world. Second, if we include children and young people with women, a number of the features of both multicultural theory and practice mean that it has negative effects on the majority of members of minority communities. When this is the case, it is surely time to reconsider how theory is put into practice and the validity of any theory that so easily lends itself to abuse. This raises the classical liberal dilemma of toleration, or, as Deveaux puts it, ‘Are the intolerant to be tolerated?’ (2002: 503). The answer to this question is central to the thesis that multiculturalism is bad for women, in both theory and practice. Some supporters of multiculturalism are keenly aware of the dilemmas involved, though few go as far as Kymlicka (1989; 1995) in stating that rights should be denied to cultural or religious groups that overtly discriminate against women. Raz, too, is critical of cultures that repress categories of their own members or outsiders, stating that such cultures can only be supported if their oppressive aspects can be neutralised or compensated for (1994: 184). At the other extreme, Kukathas (though not a defender of group rights) holds strictly to the logic of liberalism in arguing that cultural and religious groups should be left to live by their own norms and values without intervention from the state (1992; 1997; 2001). However, he also emphasises – along with most advocates and critics of multiculturalism – that a fundamental requirement of liberal multiculturalism is for individuals to be free to leave the communities that are oppressing them. This ‘right of exit’ is so central to liberal





Any consistent defence of group rights or exemptions that is based on liberal premises has to ensure that at least one individual right – the right to exit one’s group of origin – trumps any group right. … Not to be able to leave the group in which one has been raised for an alternative mode of life is a serious violation of the kind of freedom that is basic to liberalism. (2002: 205/06) The right of exit It probably goes without saying that different theorists view the right of exit somewhat differently, with some, such as Spinner-Halev (2001), apparently assuming that its existence in liberal democracies is unproblematic. This is why he is able to argue that avoiding imposing reform on oppressed groups is more important than avoiding injustice to women. Galston is more circumspect in specifying the conditions in which the right of exit is a solution to the problem of oppressive groups: in circumstances of genuine pluralism, individual freedom is adequately protected by secure rights of exit coupled with the existence of a wider society open to individuals wishing to leave their groups of origin. (1995: 533) He also notes that a meaningful right of exit requires: • an awareness of alternatives; • the ability to assess these; • freedom from brainwashing or other forms of coercion; • the ability to participate effectively in at least some other ways of life

(1995: 534). It is doubtful that any of these conditions would be fulfilled by the minority ethnic women in Britain who might need to call on the right of exit! But perhaps none of this would be of concern to Galston, since he also says: ‘properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization of choice’ (1995: 523). Kukathas, too, having



multicultural thinking that it is essential to analyse whether or not it answers the main criticisms of multiculturalism in relation to women (and young people). Okin states:


If an individual continues to live in a community and according to ways that (in the judgement of wider society) treat her unjustly, even though she is free to leave, then our concern about the injustice diminishes. (1992: 133) Thus, despite the variations noted, these theorists’ position with respect to minority ethnic and/or religious women can be summed up as saying: oppressed women have the right to leave the groups/communities that are oppressing them. If they choose not to exercise this right that’s their problem, and in any case, protecting diversity is more important than protecting women’s right to choose. So, that’s all right then! Or is it? The categorical answer to this question is no and for a number of reasons, not least the sheer injustice of women being put in a position where the only way they can avoid sometimes intolerable oppression and abuse is by relinquishing everyone and everything they know. Okin says that the right of exit: ‘may well be such an unbearable choice as to be, in practice, no choice at all’ (2002: 224). Even supporters of multiculturalism share Okin’s concerns. Mookherjee refers to ‘the troubling demand that vulnerable people such as women bear the costs of cultural exit in order to preserve their rights’ (2005: 241) and Shachar notes: ‘the troubling fact that some categories of “at-risk” group members are being asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of multiculturalism’ (2000: 65). She adds: the right of exit ‘solution’ … throws on the already beleaguered individual the responsibility to either miraculously transform the legal-institutional conditions that keep her vulnerable or find the resources to leave her whole world behind. (2000: 80) It is not, however, simply a matter of justice and human rights, but of whether exit is a meaningful possibility in real – psychological, sociological and economic – terms. Nussbaum proposes that: ‘Without a cultural context that allows one to develop a sound sense of self, it is difficult to imagine a woman being able even to conceive of exit as an option’



stressed ‘the inalienable right to leave – to renounce membership of – the community’ (1992: 117), then spells out the consequences of this argument:

(2000: 268). This supports Okin’s (1997) emphasis on socialisation and her suggestion that some cultures raise girls in ways that do not facilitate their achieving autonomy or gender equality. This particular argument continues to attract much criticism and Okin is accused of treating minority ethnic women as victims without agency (Shachar, 2001; Herr, 2004; McKerl, 2007). It is an argument, however, that is supported by many of the women who have actually experienced forced marriage (see chapter 3) and also by the fact that such marriages continue to take place despite young women’s objections to them. But of immense significance are the material factors that keep women locked into the religious and cultural communities that oppress them, and which are surprisingly neglected by feminist writers who, like their male counterparts, tend to focus on the psychological or socialpsychological barriers to exit. They include the uncertain immigration status of brides brought from overseas, such as the ‘two year rule’ of residence. This renders immigrant women subject to deportation unless they can provide stringent legal evidence of, for instance, domestic violence (Meetoo and Mirza, 2007) and also prevents them from accessing such service provision as places in refuges (Burman and Chantler, 2004; HAC, 2008). There is also the suggestion that service providers are afraid of being accused of racism if they intervene in ‘community affairs’ (Johal, 2003; Burman et al., 2004; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). In some communities, too, the majority of ‘imported brides’ do not speak English, have no education or skills that would gain them employment and no job experience, so that their ability to support themselves and their children is almost nonexistent. And even if such women do overcome the immense barriers to escaping abusive relationships constructed by both their own communities and British society, we need to remember that there are men who are willing to track them down – from police officers to bounty hunters. This, then, is not about implying that minority women lack agency; it is about material reality preventing its exercise. In such a situation, it is difficult to see how the right of exit constitutes a viable option for them, let alone one that comes anywhere near negating the charge that multiculturalism can, indeed, be bad for women. Given this reality, it is difficult to disagree with Okin’s conclusion that liberal states should not give rights to groups that discriminate against, or oppress, women, but should enforce individual rights against such groups: ‘Not to do so, from the point of view of a liberal who takes women’s, children’s, and other potentially vulnerable persons’ rights seriously, is to let toleration for diversity run amok’ (Okin, 2002: 230).





A central question to be asked of multiculturalism, which has been touched on several times in this book, concerns cultural reproduction (or maintenance of the status quo) versus change. This is particularly relevant in relation to young people. For while multiculturalism is about facilitating minority cultural reproduction, young people who are born and/or brought up in this country are necessarily exposed to Western social norms through schooling, the media and the internet. Thus, no matter how residentially separated and tightly bounded such communities are, and no matter how much they – and multiculturalists – try to maintain cultural continuity in a ‘pure’ form, change over time can only be delayed, not prevented. No matter how strongly cultural boundaries are constructed and contact with other cultures prohibited, some level of interaction with these (and wider society) is inevitable. Thus (and despite parental choice), even if schools are in catchment areas that lead to the majority of students coming from a single ethnic group (Burgess and Wilson, 2003; Burgess et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2006a; 2006b; Osler, 2007), such schools are likely to be staffed by teachers from a different ethnicity, and learning content will be determined by the National Curriculum. In addition, in a world of global communications, young people are exposed to the media and internet and these exert influences that are sometimes in contradiction to the norms and values of their parents and the community. As noted previously, all migrant communities tend to ossify the culture of the homeland (Afshar, 1994). Multiculturalism actively encourages this tendency, which leads to the transmission via families, communities and mosques of the values and expectations of the homeland as they existed at the point of migration. Meanwhile, in the wider world, cultures are behaving as all cultures, left to their own devices, do – developing in response to the change that is an inherent feature of human social existence. And at this point in time, the processes of globalisation, international communications, ease of transportation and rapid technological development have resulted in very rapid change. This means that in ‘closed’ communities, young people – particularly young men – are confronted by an unprecedented level of inter-generational contradiction and conflict to which they are reacting in a range of ways, some of which, ironically, threaten the community cohesiveness that elders (and multiculturalists) are striving to sustain (Macey, 2002). The issue of ‘closed’ versus ‘open’ communities highlights the question of the permeability of boundaries and there is no doubt that some



Multiculturalism and young people

minority communities and religions strive for rigid boundary maintenance (Wallman, 1986; Macey, 2007a). But, despite their efforts, young people are influenced by the values and attitudes of a wider (globalised) world, some of which are in tension with the cherished beliefs and traditions of their parents (Samad and Eade, 2002; Macey, 2006; 2007a). This is exacerbated in areas characterised by high residential and social separation and results in young people being faced with difficult choices that sometimes put them in conflict with their families and the wider community. How they handle this varies: many are able to negotiate hybrid identities (Bhabha, 1997) or adopt contextually appropriate language and behaviour (Mac an Ghail and Popoviciu, 2004); others – particularly Muslims – opt to prioritise the ‘religious’ aspect of their identities (Modood et al., 1997; Dwyer, 1999; 2000; Macey, 2005b; 2007b; Alam and Husband, 2006; Hopkins, 2006; Abbas, 2007; Billings and Holden, 2007; Hamid, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Marranci, 2007; Mirza et al., 2007). Nor is it only young Muslims who are prioritising a Muslim identity: Mukta (2000), Searle-Chatterjee (2000) and Raj (2000) suggest that young Hindu men are increasingly adopting a nationalist version of religious identity which is connected to globalisation and communications technology. And in 1994 Sikhs mobilised to protest publicly against the Sikh writer Gurpreet Kuur Bhatti’s play Behzti (meaning dishonour, which included references to rape, abuse and murder in a Sikh temple) (Bassey, 2005). However, while these may indicate the importance of a religious identity, they are not of the same order as research suggests is the case for Muslims. They may even be a response to a sense of grievance that other communities, such as Muslim ones, have been given special treatment as a result of a strident forms of demand: This Government has no regard for the needs of communities that do not shout … If this had been some other community, the Government would have rushed to find a solution. Just because Hindus are quiet, we are ignored, isolated and sidelined. (Hindu Forum of Britain, 2008) The assertion of a religious identity is variously expressed – ranging from more young women opting to wear not only the hijab but the niqab or burqa, through the adoption of more ‘purist’ approaches to Islam (Rozario, 2005; Gilliat-Ray, 2007), to the involvement of young men in violent public disorder (Allen and Barrett, 1996; Macey, 1999b; 2005) and even terrorist attacks on their own country (Pape, 2005; Abbas, 2007). The latter examples are a reminder that the ‘alternative worldviews’




accessed by young people are not only – or even mainly – Western, but frequently Arab. The Arabic news channel Al-Jazeera is more regular viewing in some parts of Britain than the BBC, and the range of material available on the internet includes both extreme Islamist websites (Macey et al., 2009) and supposedly mainstream Islamic organisations which preach a strongly anti-Western message that comes close to incitement to hatred (as previously noted). Islamic societies at universities are also implicated in promoting at best separatist approaches and at worst hatred for all things ‘Western’ (Thorne and Sharpe, 2008). What I am suggesting is that many minority ethnic and/or religious young men in Britain today live in a world of tension and conflict in which parents, mosques and madrasas transmit sets of rules and expectations that can be in contradiction to each other and to those transmitted by both wider society and international sources. And the latter are also in conflict, as globalised materialism and American-style youth culture compete with the ummah, Islamic and Islamist groups to win the hearts and minds of the young. Nor, in some cases, do Muslim youth appear to have clear moral guidance to help them to negotiate these attractions and pressures (Bolognani, 2007a; Lewis, 2007). Lewis (2002; 2006) discusses how imams brought from the homeland frequently have no access to English, let alone any ability to relate to young men brought up in a modern urban context. Bolongnani reports young men’s criticism of their parents’ ‘obsolete or inappropriate principles for dealing with the problems of urban Britain’ (2007a: 359). One young man commented: Part of the problems the youth are facing [is that] the first generation, their parents, they are not moving, they are not willing to compromise, not willing to change, not willing to look at the same circumstances from a different reality, they are stuck. (cited in Bolognani, 2007a: 359-60) Another criticised mosques for being out of touch with the reality of young British men. He also observed that in recent years imams have increasingly focused their preaching on international rather than local issues: they don’t mention about drugs and what is going on in the community and everything … They will give a speech on what is happening in Israel, Palestine and places like that, but they don’t address the community, the problems facing the community. (cited in Bolognani, 2007a: 362)




Although this last comment might lend some credence to the government’s focus on the role of mosques in the radicalisation of young British Muslim men, it needs to be remembered that many such men have actually ceased to attend mosques (Macey, 2005; Channel 4 Dispatches, 2006; Billings and Holden, 2007; Mirza et al., 2007). This does not, however, detract from the importance of the fact that a major problem is that mosques are run by committees, not imams, who are sometimes appointed because of their links to particular biraderis (clans) and are poorly qualified, ill paid and have little or no job security (McLoughlin, 1998; Lewis, 2006). This makes them reluctant to address such sensitive local problems as crime, drugs or alcohol, though this varies widely. In Birmingham, for instance, one mosque successfully tackled the issue of genetic disorders (Walji, 2008), while in Tower Hamlets, Rozario found that none of the imams with whom she raised this issue had any knowledge of the problem one, commenting: ‘Islam says not to go near people with contagious diseases’ (2005b: 193). Yet it would appear that many parents delegate their sons’ moral education to mosques and madrasas in which the majority of teaching involves rote learning of the Qur’an: ‘Have you ever seen a parrot? They can talk … you can teach a parrot to talk and it will regurgitate whatever you taught it, but it doesn’t understand a word of it …’ (cited in Bolognani, 2007a: 364). Another potential influence on the growth of religious identity, particularly in young men, is the increased emphasis on funding religious projects in the CVS. Weller warns of the potential for competition and conflict in this situation: it is possible that religion, as one part of the contemporary ‘politics of identity’ might all too easily be transmuted into the service of an ‘identity politics’ that turns religious identities into absolutes within competitive, conflictual, and potentially destructive ‘communalist’ projects. (2004: 18) I would suggest that this is almost bound to be the case in a context that makes it financially profitable to stress the ethnic and religious base of various CVS projects. But the other side of this is the potential impact of political projects masquerading as religious ones geared to developing nationalist identities, as already noted. Mirza et al’s largescale survey of young Muslims aged 16–24, Living Apart Together: British





The emergence of a strong Muslim identity in Britain is, in part, a result of multicultural policies implemented since the 1980s, which have emphasised difference at the expense of a shared national identity and divided people along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. Islamist groups have gained influence at local and national level by playing the politics of identity and demanding for Muslims the ‘right to be different’. The authorities and some Muslim groups have exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has fuelled a sense of victimhood among some Muslims. (2007: 6) Mirza et al. also note that: there has been a significant rise in Islamic fundamentalism amongst the younger generation [of Muslims in Britain]. … the growth of Islamism in the UK is not solely a foreign problem, but something that must be understood in relation to political and social trends that have emerged in British society over the past two decades. … there is a growing religiosity amongst the younger generation of Muslims. They feel that they have less in common with non-Muslims than do their parents and they show a stronger preference for Islamic schools and sha’ria law. … their interest in religion is more politicised. (2007: 5) Mirza et al. have no doubts that multiculturalism is implicated in the shift towards separation rather than integration by young Muslims, and it needs to be remembered here that Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims are already the least integrated ethno-religious group in British society. Although multiculturalism is only one among a number of factors that have contributed to this, it must carry some responsibility for enabling the parents of the younger generation to resist change. This has placed young people in the invidious position of being confronted by competing claims and, perhaps, vulnerable to the attractions of anything or anyone offering them an apparently clear and uncompromising message – even the extreme one of suicide bombing. For, as noted above, parents, schools and mosques all seem to assume that it is someone else’s responsibility to deal with the moral education of the young (Bolognani, 2007a). Meanwhile, many parents’ continued orientation to Pakistan as



Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism, adds substance to these concerns:

the homeland means that not only are children socialised into an ossified version of Mirpuri culture, but are sometimes taken out of school for extended stays there. This is in order to maintain close family links (including arranged marriages) and to ensure the continuity of Mirpuri culture in Britain. But it leaves young people ill-equipped to cope with British culture and, arguably, has contributed to the ‘myth of return’ that characterised initial migration to Britain (Anwar, 1979) acquiring a new political significance among the current younger generation (Bolognani, 2007b). What multiculturalism also seems to have done with respect to young Pakistani Muslim men is to inculcate in them a sense of invulnerability and immunity from the law – the notion that they can do what they like and not be held to account. In his report on inter-ethnic relations in Bradford – published before the 2001 riot – Sir Herman Ouseley noted the feeling expressed by a number of these young men that ‘the police daren’t touch them for fear they’ll riot’ (Ouseley, 2001: 11). This stems from the fact that no one was prosecuted for the violent public disturbances in 1995 due to lack of evidence, which may have encouraged subsequent rioting, as Horowitz (2002) argues is a common pattern. Whatever the case, there is little doubt that multiculturalism’s aim of improving people’s self-respect or self-image has been extremely effective in this case, though not in a positive way! Ali describes young men as having adopted a brand of ethnic activism which is ‘aggressive and macho both in rhetoric and action … [and enables the conjoining of the] traditionalism of the old or lower middle class … with the quasi-ethnic nationalism of male youth’ (1992: 117–18). This aggression and, indeed, violence are frequently directed against both ‘the other’ and young Muslim women (Macey, 1999a; 1999b; 2002; 2005; Sturdy, 2001; Scott, 2003). It is not only aggression and violence that are of concern, but the growing involvement of Pakistani Muslim young men in crime (Macey, 2002; Bolognani, 2007a) and the increasing over-representation of Asians (Jones and Singer, 2008) and Muslims in prisons (Wilson, 1999; Beckford et al., 2005; Beckford, 2007).1 Whatever the reasons for this change over time, one of the most striking features of Muslim communities is the tendency to lay the blame for any ‘bad behaviour’ by young people in any and all spheres – from crime to sexual orientation – on white society (see Bolognani, 2007a, on crime; Heim et al., 2004, on alcohol consumption; Khan, 1997, on drug use; Yip, 2004, on homosexuality). At the very least, this has to be seen as an indicator of self-exclusion from British society and a continuation of the negative attitudes towards it that the first generation of settlers brought with them (Ballard, 1994)




and which are still expressed in such ways as discouraging children from socialising with non-Muslims (Farnell et al., 2003). I would argue that this has been facilitated by multiculturalism and constitutes a further source of tension, if not conflict, for young people. When one adds to this the tendency of both Islamic organisations (Malik, 2005) and the media in general to exaggerate the extent of Islamophobia (including hate crime) (Mirza et al., 2007; Macey et al., 2009), it is not surprising that many young Muslim men feel alienated from British society. This comes back to the fact that multiculturalism is predicated on difference, but if people are constantly told that they are not only different from others, but despised by them, it can surely come as no surprise to find minority groups holding less than positive views of the majority. This section has concentrated largely on young men, partly because many of the issues that impact on young women have been dealt with above or elsewhere. It is also because male behaviour is more visible than that of their female counterparts and thus has attracted more empirical research. This is connected with minority attitudes to gender and the influence of these on the socialisation of children, particularly in relation to the amount of freedom that boys are allowed relative to their sisters. It is obvious, however, that male attitudes and behaviour affect women, particularly in cultures where marriage and the family are central and revolve strongly around the notion of honour. The concept of izzat, as noted elsewhere, leads to an emphasis on women’s dress, behaviour and movements, and brothers, cousins and other male relatives are frequently involved in policing these. Male relatives are centrally implicated in various expressions of violence against women, from domestic abuse, through forcing women who have run away from home to return, to so-called honour crimes (HAC, 2008). And, of course, the changes that are being observed with respect to young men will impact on ‘their’ women. Thus, the growing numbers of Muslim men serving prison sentences will have serious implications for wives and families, as will any turn towards more ‘purist’ versions of religion. It is also possible that the use of aggression and violence in the public sphere could increase violence against women; Maitse (2004) found in the South African context that there was a correlation between ANC members’ use of violence in the struggle against apartheid and their perpetration of violence against women. Finally, recent changes in the policy arena can all be seen to have potential negative effects on women, including the extension of the reach of shar’ia law, the acceptance of bigamous marriages and the imposition of employment targets – all of which are expressions of gender-blind multiculturalism.





Okin suggests that: ‘Establishing group rights to enable some minority cultures to preserve themselves may not be in the best interests of the girls and women of those cultures, even if it benefits the men’ (1999: 23). I would argue, however, that any such benefit is strictly limited in that maintaining the status quo and controlling women are only positive in a narrow, short-term sense. It is negative in relation to increasing equality between ethnic groups in a number of arenas where differentials are clearly established (see Platt, 2002; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c, on poverty; ONS, 2002; and Beckford et al., 2006, on unemployment; the Health Education Authority, 2000, on health and disability; CRE, 2007, on education). And the reason why the multicultural emphasis on group rights will not enhance equality is quite simply because it completely ignores the role of women in bringing about change. For, as international development agencies learned a long time ago, improving women’s position is central to the social and economic transformation of the wider group (Brown, 1990; Afshar and Dennis, 1992). The right of exit as a ‘solution’ to oppression is also relevant to community development in that enabling critical voices to leave deprives their communities of potential change-makers, so adding to the tendency towards maintenance of a conservative status quo (Galston, 1995; Shachar, 2001; Okin, 2002). Finally, the fact that most women are not in a position to leave also makes it less likely that they will be able to influence group norms, especially in the direction of greater liberalism/equality. However, the sphere of ethnic and religious inequality presents multicultural theorists with some serious problems. For, based on the principle of cultural differences, the conventional view is that since ‘equality’ means different things in different cultures, to treat people equally requires treating them differently. Within this framework I find it difficult to see how the concept of inequality can be operationalised in relation to ethnic groups or, indeed, the basis on which inequality can be claimed to exist. I would make two points here: (a) that one would not logically expect migrants to Britain to catch up with indigenous citizens in less than several generations, particularly those who have come from uneducated, unskilled, rural backgrounds; and (b) on what basis are statistics on ethnic inequality accepted as a justification for multiculturalism when the entire notion of ‘truth’ or ‘fact’ has been relativised out of existence?



Multiculturalism and minority communities

Multiculturalists, however, appear to have no hesitation in stating that minority groups are disadvantaged, or in uncritically accepting statistics that support this thesis, while simultaneously ignoring (or rejecting) those that relate to the oppression of other categories. For both antiracists and multiculturalists collect and use statistical facts in a highly selective way that owes more to ideology than to adequate social science. A striking example of the former comes from the Islamic Human Rights Commission whose accusation of extensive Islamophobia is based on flawed methods of data collection (see chapter 4). An example of the latter comes from Kundnani, who cites police data on racially motivated violence perpetrated by white against black/Asian people, while dismissing figures from the same source on Asian violence against white people (Kundnani, 2001). A different order of question is why anyone would ever have expected multiculturalism to succeed in improving, let alone equalising, lifechances between minority and majority groups. And the only answer to this question appears to rest on the rather vague thinking around identities, respect, and so on (noted previously) and their supposed positive encouragement of integration (something that is itself somewhat contradictory to multicultural theory). Although Kymlicka (2007) cites Bloemraad’s (2002; 2005; 2006) research on Vietnamese and Portuguese settlers in Toronto and Boston to suggest that strong multicultural policies are a key factor in enhancing the speed and extent of integration into mainstream society, Barry (2001) argues that equality is far more likely to be achieved within the liberal conception of equal rights than the multicultural one of culturally differentiated ones. On a different level, if there are some aspects of particular cultures that militate against the achievement of, say, economic equality, then in promoting multiculturalism we can be accused of actively exacerbating inequality. There are serious issues here, issues that could possibly lend support to Stanfield’s comments cited above, that the process of essentialising minorities is a way of maintaining the (unequal) status quo and of denying the individuality and, therefore, the humanity of minority individuals. In this sense it is, of course, deeply racist. However, proponents of multiculturalism strongly resist any suggestion that cultural factors could be implicated in inequality, preferring instead to elide difference, disadvantage and discrimination to see racism as the only ‘explanation’ for any and all differences and disadvantages. However, the issue of the effects of multiculturalism on minority communities is not limited to the question of economic inequality and its impact in such spheres as education, health and housing. On the




contrary, I would argue that this is only one of a number of consequences that accrue from encouraging the preservation of the culture of the homelands that affect communities. Others are less tangible though nonetheless real, and apply particularly to those communities that are residentially and socially separated from wider society and are thus able to draw relatively closed boundaries between themselves and others (Macey, 2006; 2007a). Some of these have already been discussed elsewhere, but Parekh (2000) notes that such situations further reinforce (conservative) community traditions. Modood et al. (1997) and Carling (2008) suggest that this can result in polarisation between different ethnic groups. This can sow the seeds for politicisation and conflict, as has been demonstrated by the so-called ‘Northern Riots’ in 2001, which were largely perpetrated by young Mirpuri Muslim men (Carling et al., 2001; Macey, 2005b; Carling, 2008). As noted above and elsewhere, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the younger generation of Pakistani Muslims are confronted by such conflicting demands that the stability and cohesiveness of their own communities are threatened. More young women are engaging in self-harm, and suffering mental breakdown and threatened and actual suicide (Newham Asian Women’s Project, 1998a; 1998b), or are running away from home because of domestic violence, including forced marriage (Bhatty, 2007; HAC, 2008). More young men are engaging in a different kind of self-harm as they become increasingly involved in drugs (Khan, 1997) and other criminal activities for which they are receiving custodial sentences (Macey, 2002; Bolognani, 2007a). The generation gap seems to have taken on a whole new meaning in some minority ethnic communities – but it is a gap that I suggest can only be bridged by change on the part of the older, not the younger, generation. For the basic problem is the conflict that exists between the values of the community and those of wider society (and the Western world) of which young people are a part. The situation is powerfully summed up in an example given by Bolognani from her research in Bradford. A Pakistani male teacher reported the police contacting a mosque chairman following trouble with youths on the street. The police said: ‘You need to look after your lot’, to which the chairman replied: This is not our lot. This is your lot. It comes from your schooling system, from your society, it is not my lot, it is your lot. My lot is me, my age group. We came, we never went into crime, so don’t tell me this is my lot, this is your lot. You have done this. … It is not my lot, it is





These comments are surely indicative of a level of polarisation, rather than mere segregation, but polarisation between communities and with young people caught between conflicting forces. It may be, of course, that this community would have remained residentially and socially separated from the rest of society without any encouragement from multiculturalism. However, I think this is unlikely, for it is multicultural thinking that has enabled the older generation to maintain separatism to an extreme extent. It will be more than a little ironic if the outcome of such multicultural intervention is a community that fractures or even disintegrates due to inter-generational conflict.

Multiculturalism and wider society An analysis of the impact of multiculturalism on wider society raises a whole host of questions which range across the macro, mezzo and micro levels. • Does multiculturalism militate against the cultural reproduction of the

majority (or ‘host’) culture? • Does it have negative or positive effects on the liberal democratic organisa-

tion of society? • Does it encourage integration and cohesion or social separatism? • What are its implications and possible consequences for conflict versus

consensus? Some of these questions have been raised elsewhere, particularly in relation to liberal democracy, and to answer the others effectively would require a book in its own right, not the limited amount of space available to me in a chapter. As a sociologist, however, one of my most basic concerns about multiculturalism is illustrated by Mitchell and Russell’s comment that: the right to be different can never be unconditional. … No society can maintain a position in which ‘anything goes’ at the cultural level within its various communities. On the one hand, substantial sections of the population still appear to be unwilling to accept



your lot, because this is the problem of this system. I haven’t agreed to this system. (cited in Bolognani, 2007a: 365–6)

as citizens minorities that are culturally distinct and visibly different from themselves. On the other hand, some elements within the black and minority ethnic communities apparently wish to live apart, rejecting the view that the internalisation of some shared values and common commitments is the duty of every citizen. (1994: 153–4) This echoes Allen’s still unanswered question of nearly forty years ago: ‘What are the limits to autonomy and separateness and the degree of interdependence and integration considered necessary for the maintenance of the social system?’ (1971: 20). For one does not have to be a functionalist to accept the sociological truism that all societies, qua societies, depend on some level of shared values, without which it is difficult to see how they constitute societies. Yet I assume that few proponents of multiculturalism would see either their principles or practice as aligned with those of former Prime Minister Thatcher, who said: ‘And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families’ (Thatcher, 1987). Thus, one of the most fundamental evasions of the multicultural movement is the question of how much diversity any society can tolerate without fragmentation (Macey, 1995b; Beckett and Macey, 2001). This may even be the only basic question, for, arguably, it is from this that all the others stem. This is not simply a numerical issue of the kind more appropriately dealt with in discussions of immigration policies. It is, at root, a question of the degree of difference between majorities and minorities and whether this is of sufficient magnitude as to threaten the maintenance of British cultural traditions. And neither multiculturalists nor minority ethnic activists have any doubt about the extent of these differences, as is evidenced by the former’s call for a ‘cultural revolution’ (Young, 1990: 153) and the latter’s increasing demands for ‘the right to be different’. This is not a matter of toleration in the old-fashioned liberal sense of ‘live and let live’, for multiculturalism calls for radical change to British society by incorporating minority cultures into the public realm. Whether one views this as good, bad or indifferent is a value judgement, but the magnitude of the proposed change should not be underestimated. For institutionalising traditions that are in tension, or indeed in conflict, with British cultural norms can amount to the transformation of society. That this is not necessarily so in every case does not negate the danger of the slippery slope syndrome and the ultimate threat to, for example, hard-won, but fragile, human rights.




I believe that multiculturalism underestimates the potential threat to human rights of its own proposals and that this has far-reaching implications and possible consequences at all levels – individual, community and society. Many of these have been discussed elsewhere and will not be rehearsed here, but they include the potentially negative effects of multiculturalism on minority ethnic women and young people and on minority communities themselves. And since these are part of British society, what affects them also affects wider society. This is, perhaps, most obvious at the local level, particularly where minorities are sufficiently large (or even constitute the numerical majority) as to be able to exercise significant power through the electoral process. And, of course, there are also cases where the size of minority populations has enabled brute force (through public violence) to be used to gain particular ends. Multiculturalism did not foresee such possibilities because – like the government – it devotes all its energies to propagating a view of diversity that extols its virtues and denies its potential for conflict. But the perceived need by the government to focus so much time, energy and money on persuading the British people that diversity is a ‘good thing’ alerts us to another problem. Here, for ‘diversity’ read ‘multiculturalism’, because it is not the fact of diversity per se that is the issue; it is how this is dealt with in political, policy and practice terms. Britain has chosen multiculturalism as the way to cope with diversity, and has not only imposed this from the top down, but has frequently done so by stealth. This is strategically effective in avoiding conflict in the short term, for the simple reason that people cannot protest about something that they don’t know about! It is considerably less effective in the longer term, as people gradually begin to realise that something ‘isn’t quite right’: that, for instance, all the jobs for which they have been rejected have gone to black or Asian people; that their local election candidates do not include any white people; that the menu on offer at various events contains no meat that has not been halal slaughtered, and so on. People who live outside what are sometimes euphemistically called multicultural areas may regard this as an exaggeration. I can assure them that it is a statement of fact. One consequence of this is to inculcate in white people a sense of grievance that can result in them perceiving ethnic and/or religious minorities as receiving preferential treatment, whether this is true or not. The fact that this perception of what amounts to discrimination against white people is not restricted to grassroots workers, but is matched by public sector officials, carries the danger of self-fulfilling prophesies. For instance, in Farnell et al.’s (2003) research into the involvement of




faith communities in urban regeneration, the officials responsible for making decisions on grant applications perceived government policy as being directed towards minority faiths. Not only is this kind of situation unlikely to enhance inter-ethnic relations, but it could push some people into voting for far right political parties or even engaging in violent confrontation, including hate crime. That such consequences are unforeseen and unintended does not excuse multiculturalists for failing to consider these as logical possible outcomes of their theories, some of which openly call for positive discrimination, whether so labelled or not (see Khan, 2006, on ‘preferential policies’). To date, few questions have been asked about whether multiculturalism is the right or best way of organising societies such as Britain that have become culturally and religiously diverse over a relatively short period. I would argue, however, that there is an urgent need to reconsider the appropriateness of the multicultural project to a globalised world with high levels of movement across state borders and different kinds of settlement. The cohesion agenda is an acknowledgement that multiculturalism, as theorised and practised to date, is problematic in relation social stability and the maintenance of the social system, and will be discussed further in the final chapter. Before moving on to this, however, I think that it is important to note some other aspects of multiculturalism that are equally problematic and how these might impact on both the multicultural and cohesion agendas.

Some additional problems with multiculturalism Misrepresenting the white population Leaving aside the obvious point that ‘white’ is not an ethnicity, the homogenisation of the white population in government publications (including the census) and the multicultural literature presents an extremely distorted picture of British society. For there is probably far more diversity in the white category than in any of those that make up the minority populations which are treated separately. So why – at least until the publication of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion’s report – has multiculturalism been seen as relevant only to those groups whose members are visibly different, while the diversity of cultures and religions within the majority are ignored? It seems that the only time that whites are mentioned is with reference to their racism, ethnocentrism and power to exclude anyone who is not white – and, of course, their propensity to engage in ‘white flight’ when




neighbourhoods become ethnically mixed. It is worth noting in this context that so-called ‘white flight’ is not actually white, but includes, for instance, Hindus and Sikhs retreating from areas that have become predominantly Pakistani Muslim. Nor is such movement necessarily racist, but can be triggered by the loss of such neighbourhood resources as local shops, for example, which cease to cater for anything other than Muslim needs. Finally, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that in some areas, when the old majorities become the new minorities, they are made to feel extremely unwelcome (Sturdy, 2001)! Whatever happened to social class? One of the most significant omissions in the multicultural literature is social class – an omission that is arguably on a par with the neglect of women. An immediate result of this is that some behaviour that is probably more explicable by class is attributed to ethnicity, with serious consequences for stereotyping and ‘othering’ (Macey, 1999b). It also means that the people who are expected to carry responsibility for multiculturalism/cohesion are largely working class – Asian, black and white. For it is generally on working-class inner city residents that multiculturalism and cohesion are imposed – frequently by white, middle-class rural dwellers. In the context of this demographic reality, Singh’s insistence that integration and cohesion apply to everybody is less than wholly convincing, for it is undoubtedly the case that liberal toleration and enthusiasm for diversity are considerably easier at a distance. Two aspects of this situation are of significance. The first is that in situations of multiple deprivation, competition for scarce resources is a fact of life and one that is unlikely to enhance inter-ethnic relations if one party is seen to be privileged over another, as has happened within a multiculturalism framework. The second is that historical and comparative analysis tells us that change at the macro level is not generally brought about from the grassroots – revolutions tend, at least initially, to be led by the privileged. This casts more than a little doubt on the multicultural aim of bringing about societal level change. Multiculturalism as a top-down elite imposition Despite denials by proponents of both multiculturalism and cohesion, there can be no doubt that both are imposed from ‘the top’ on communities and individuals at ‘the bottom’. Both are aspirational, based on very different utopian dreams: one of a pluralist society composed of a ‘community of communities’ (Parekh, 2000a) in which consensus rather




than conflict is the norm; the other of a cohesive society where commonalities override ethnic differences (A. Phillips, 2007). This is a dream not borne out by comparative analysis, which shows that ethnic and religious conflict is more the norm than the exception (Wirsing, 1981). At a different level, it is also true that ‘political correctness’ is largely imposed by middle-class gatekeepers, though the backlash is not felt by them but by minorities. For example, local authority proposals to remove Christmas from the calendar by changing its name, banning carol services, Christmas trees, and so on, simply provoke anger in white communities and bemusement in minority ones, or, perhaps, wry amusement at such ironical ideas as Bradford Metropolitan Council’s ‘multicultural Christmas tree’! Multiculturalism as a one-way street One of the most striking aspects of the literature is that multiculturalism is very much a one-way street in which all change is expected to be on the part of majorities with few, if any, demands being made on minorities to accommodate to the norms of majority society. The cohesion agenda differs in that it moves more towards acknowledging that both majorities and minorities need to be open to change – to give and take. On the one hand, as far as ethnically based exclusion and racism are concerned, this is legitimate insofar as there can be no improvement in inter-ethnic relations, let alone social justice, while discrimination and racism occur. On the other hand, ethnic and religious minorities have freely chosen to come to this country, many not only for economic advantage, but because they appreciate the social and political values inherent in a liberal democracy. It is not unreasonable to expect migrants to conform to at least some British norms; indeed, it is essential that we all do so in order to preserve liberal democracy. Multiculturalists such as Kymlicka and Parekh acknowledge this, though many writers do not. Indeed, insofar as a central demand of multiculturalism is that Britain recognises cultural and religious differences in the public sphere, the call is most certainly for radical change by the majority population and society itself.

Summary: so what’s wrong with multiculturalism? In this chapter I have analysed what I see as some of the main theoretical and practical problems of multiculturalism from the perspective of a feminist sociologist. These include cultural relativism, racialisation, essentialism, culture and identities, and I have discussed these in relation to their impact on women, young people, minority ethnic communities




and society as a whole. In the case of women, I have also taken a hard look at the multicultural ‘answer’ to the situation of oppressed minorities within minorities and have found the ‘right of exit’ to be singularly unimpressive in the face of harsh reality. I have also highlighted some aspects of multiculturalism that cut across the areas discussed and which I believe impact negatively on both the aims of multiculturalism and ordinary people – Asian, black and white. In the process of these discussions, my criticisms have ranged between theory, policy and practice without always clearly delineating between these. Nor have I generally considered the significant differences that exist between multicultural theorists. I would justify this approach on the grounds that my concern in this chapter, as in the rest of the book, is to examine multiculturalism as it impacts on real people in the real world. Thus, my references to theory have been largely limited to those key elements of multiculturalism that I see as being centrally implicated in what is happening at the grassroots. One of the most ironical consequences of multiculturalism is illustrated in at least one of the communities – Bradford – which is characterised by high levels of residential and social separation. Such communities are, in a sense, the ‘success’ stories of the multicultural enterprise in that they have managed to maintain the culture of the homeland relatively unchanged for around a quarter of a century. I say relatively, because despite the best efforts of multiculturalism, and the communities’ attempts to draw closed boundaries between themselves and wider society, this can never be entirely successful. For the West enters even homes in which English is not spoken and television and newspapers are non-English, and it does so through children and young people. The immediate result of this is a widening generation gap as young people become more critical of, and alienated from, their parents. The longer-term result is a threat to the cohesiveness of the community itself, as increasing numbers of young men end up in prison, and increasing numbers of young women suffer mental breakdown, engage in various forms of self-harm, commit suicide or simply run away. In 2002, writing about young Mirpuri men’s increasing involvement in crime in Bradford, I suggested that there was an urgent need for Mirpuri parents to become more aware of, and open to, the world inhabited by their adult children. I also wrote, however, that I saw few signs of this happening. Bolognani’s (2007a) research with young men in the same city suggests that not only have the older generation not changed, but that young people are increasingly frustrated by this.




It may be, of course, that the older generation’s apparent refusal to change is less a refusal than an inability, insofar as they lack any real knowledge of alternatives. For multiculturalism has locked them into the world of a remote village in Mirpur, while the world in urban Pakistan as well as that in urban Britain has moved on. The question now is where do we go from here?




6

The development of multiculturalism and cohesion Before even attempting to answer the question of where we go from here, it would be wise to give a brief overview of the book so far and to try to articulate the current situation with respect to the multicultural, cohesion and integration and cohesion agendas. All of these, as noted at the beginning of the book, are part of a series of responses to the significant diversity that began to characterise this country in the late 1940s, when the British government actively recruited workers from its colonies and former colonies to fill gaps in the labour market after the Second World War. Most of these workers were viewed as units of labour who, despite holding British citizenship, were expected to return to their homelands when they were no longer needed. Migrant workers from the Indian subcontinent shared this expectation and this has had a long-term impact on their orientation to life in Britain, predisposing them to focus on maintaining close ties with their homelands and preserving their original cultural and religious traditions. Workers from the Caribbean, however, regarded Britain as their ‘motherland’ and correspondingly had a focus on integrating into society on a permanent basis. Whatever their attitudes to life in Britain, however, people of both South Asian and African Caribbean heritage were greeted by extensive ignorance and outright racism in all spheres of society. This, together with clear indications by the 1960s that Asian and black people were ‘here to stay’, pushed the British government into developing policies and practices aimed at managing cultural and religious diversity. Multiculturalism was – and is – one of these. What passes for multiculturalism has varied over time and according to its proponents and their underlying ideologies, which ranged 158




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from assimilation, through integration, to pluralism. Thus, the aims of multiculturalism differ – from enhancing integration, through reducing inequality, to achieving social justice and human rights via the public recognition of minority cultures. The empirical evidence cited in this book shows that multiculturalism has not achieved either integration or equality, and to the extent that the canons of human rights and justice have been fulfilled, it is at considerable cost to integration, equality and social cohesion.

Multiculturalism and cohesion today Since 2001, following the violent public disturbances and riot in a number of northern towns and cities in Britain, and the official inquiries that followed, there has been a shift towards ‘cohesion’ – variously labelled ‘community cohesion’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘integration and cohesion’ or just plain ‘cohesion’. Unlike multiculturalism, this has become official government policy and carries requirements in the public sector, including education and the CVS. This shift is widely perceived as a retreat from multiculturalism and in this, Britain is seen to be following a trend noted in such liberal democracies as Australia and the Netherlands (Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Joppke 2004) and linked to Islamist terrorism in the US, Europe and elsewhere. The basic difference between the multicultural and cohesion agendas is that the former can be seen to encourage social separation through its emphasis on protecting minority cultures, while the latter acknowledges that separatism can slip into polarisation which carries the potential for conflict. Community cohesion, as it was first called, aims to encourage inter-ethnic mixing in the belief that this will enhance relationships and ultimately result in more widespread social cohesion. However, as propounded by Cantle (2001, 2005), cohesion remains rooted in a brand of multiculturalism that stresses the importance of maintaining diversity through state protection of minority cultures. The integration and cohesion agenda (Singh, 2007) moves further from multiculturalism than the social cohesion one. However, Singh is at pains to stress that it is not about assimilation, and his defence of the maintenance of transnational identities as furthering social engagement (integration?) is pure multiculturalism. I would argue that to encourage such identities is to encourage trans-national marriages, the maintenance of the culture of the homeland in the British context – and hence separation, rather than integration.




In sum, and despite the vociferous accusations of multiculturalists that the cohesion agenda (of whatever ilk) constitutes an attack on multiculturalism, I am sorry to say that I think this is more apparent than real! Recent academic writing on multiculturalism has tended towards two – simultaneously defensive and aggressive – areas of focus. These involve laying the blame for terrorism on Western societies, particularly Britain and the US, whose foreign policies and internal practices are defined as anti-Islamic, and thus responsible for the creation of violent jihadist young men. Simultaneously, because the ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ is seen as linked to concerns about ‘home-grown’ terrorism, much of this writing constitutes a defence of Islam, Muslims and multiculturalism (and a condemnation of anything and anybody who is perceived as being critical of any aspect of these). Leaving aside the neglect of chronological accuracy in this approach, it has resulted in few writers acknowledging that – quite apart from terrorism – there might actually be a need to reconsider multiculturalism. Two recent publications, however, do attempt to take the multicultural argument further: Tariq Modood’s (2007) Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea; and Anne Phillips’ (2007) Multiculturalism without Culture. As one of the most prolific writers on, and proponents of, multiculturalism, it is no surprise that though Modood focuses on citizenship with particular reference to accommodating Muslims, this is a multicultural citizenship that is rooted in the familiar stance of maintaining difference and diversity. Indeed, Modood talks about the need to ‘keep alive the prospect of a dynamic, internally differentiated multiculturalism’ (2007: 154). Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the need for a national identity, albeit a ‘plural, changing, inclusive British identity’ (2007: 150) and the need for shared values, albeit ones that are not a definition of core values, and ‘are not simple and uniform’ (2007: 152). But this leaves me wondering what basic changes have really been made to the older multiculturalism, for it seems that anything that starts to touch on what might loosely be termed ‘integration’ – shared values, citizenship, national identity – is so hedged around with qualifications rooted in the multicultural discourse of diversity, difference, accommodation and recognition, as to take us little further. Phillips begins her book by stating that her object is ‘a multiculturalism without culture’; ‘A defensible multiculturalism will put human agency much more at its centre; it will dispense with strong notions of culture’ (2007: 8, 9). She stresses that her version of multiculturalism is grounded in the rights of individuals, not groups, which, as noted previously,





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The understanding of multiculturalism developed in this book rests, by contrast, on the rights and needs of individuals. It is grounded in the rights and needs of citizens, not of cultures or cultural groups, with culture entering as an attribute of the individual rather than the group. (2007: 164) She goes on to say that her version of multiculturalism ‘dispenses with reified notions of culture or homogenised conceptions of the cultural group yet retains enough robustness to address cultural inequalities’ (2007: 179). But – straight out of the multicultural stable – she adds that working out the precise implications of this ‘depends on addressing the democratic deficit’ (2007: 179). This is the need to elect a wider range and larger number of citizens from minority cultural groups to participate in the legislative process. As with Modood’s book, I am not sure where this takes us. On the one hand, perhaps, not much further than a less deterministic version of multiculturalism that takes more account of individuals; on the other, given that multiculturalism necessarily operates at the group level, it could be read as suggesting the need for a genuine retreat from multiculturalism!

Where do we go from here? We live in a rapidly changing, globalised world in which increased migration and a range of settlement patterns have made all Western societies multicultural and multi-faith in at least normative, if not ideological, terms. The globalised world is also one of economic and political interdependence in which nation-states are significantly influenced by international factors and much legislation cuts across national boundaries (including that which relates to human rights). Advanced information and communications technology is also a major influence on today’s world so that global cultures strongly influence national ones. In other words, the world as we know it is universal. Many argue that these aspects of globalisation suggest an increased need for debate on diversity, if not the actual strengthening of multicultural policy and practice (Berlant and Warner, 1994; Anthias, 2002; Nye, 2007). I would argue, however, that not only is this not the case, but that in such a context, multiculturalism is little short of an anachronism in both theoretical and practical terms. The criticisms of multiculturalism



has been the topic of considerable debate in the multicultural literature (Kukathas, 1992; Baker, 1994; Jones, 1999; Tamir, 1999). Phillips states:

put forward in this book have hopefully served to illustrate why, and how, I have reached this conclusion, but in purely pragmatic terms, I would highlight the lack of logic and practical impossibility of maintaining a local, culturally relativist, multicultural stance in a globalised world. And even if we could, I would argue that this would be doing a disservice to those minority ethnic and religious communities that are already – and increasingly – alienated from the mainstream. All this is thrown into sharp relief by a question that is rarely raised in the multicultural literature, which is – whose culture? For in highly diverse and mobile societies it is obviously impossible to protect every culture, language or religion, or to recognise all cultures in the public realm. So on what basis do we decide which ones to privilege and which to ignore, and who is to make this decision? These questions need to be located in the statistics cited in chapter 1 from the 2001 census which demonstrate that: • the people targeted by multiculturalism constitute less than 8 per cent

of the population; • they are highly diverse in ethnic and religious terms; • many of the so-called ethnic categories are extremely crude and mask

enormous diversity within them (similar points apply to the category of religion). The question also needs to be located in the context of empirical evidence which shows that those ethno-religious groups that have most resisted any form of integration into British society, and have held most closely to the cultural and religious traditions of the homeland, are also the most disadvantaged. Thus, I repeat: Whose culture? Whose religion? And why multiculturalism at all? However, the empirical evidence suggests that multiculturalism is so deeply institutionalised in British society that it has become ‘received wisdom’ and now permeates thinking, policy and practice to an extent that precludes critical analysis. This has had a range of unforeseen consequences – from the suppression and/or denial of research findings, through the reluctance of professionals to intervene in ‘community affairs’, to the development of contradictory and potentially highly damaging policies, such as setting employment targets that, almost by definition, lead to illegal discrimination against white people in favour of visible minorities and defining racially motivated crime in ways that




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rely on perceptions rather than proof. Time after time, we have acceded to the (sometimes violent) demands of ethno-religious minorities for special treatment, thereby encouraging such unacceptable behaviour as cruelty to animals and anti-democratic forms of protest. Simultaneously, we have refused to introduce legislation or to put into practice that which already exists when it comes to violence against women, such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation and domestic violence. And we have allowed organisations such as the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal to exploit legal loopholes to implement shar’ia law in Britain which has far-reaching, potentially negative consequences for women’s rights. All this is legitimated by the belief that multiculturalists occupy the high moral ground in their concern for the welfare of minorities. However, my argument in this book has been that as soon as one ceases to essentialise minority communities, one is forced to accept that multiculturalism is only good for older men, and that in the short term – in the longer term, it is bad for minorities as a whole. Throughout all this, proponents of multiculturalism and the government have maintained the stance that diversity is always and everywhere positive, a benefit to British society. But this position can only be maintained by ignoring the huge economic and social costs to the diverse people who make up the white majority. The economic costs alone include the payment of benefits that result from widespread unemployment among some minorities due to lack of education or skills (including those who continue to enter the country as ‘marriage’ partners); the payment of full benefits to polygamous families; the provision of interpreters and translators; the increasing number of Muslim men in prisons; the demands on the health service due to large families, disabled children and the long-term physical and mental health consequences suffered by women who experience domestic abuse, forced marriage and FGM, and, of course, the millions of pounds that are now being spent on consultations and special programmes directed at Muslims because of their involvement in terrorism. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lauding of diversity is an extreme example of ‘the emperor’s new clothes’ syndrome, and one that is unconvincing to those working-class members of the white majority who pay the economic and social price every day. In this, multiculturalism has had serious negative effects on inter-ethnic relations, particularly in places where minorities have become majorities and the neglect, if not displacement, of British culture is most profound. Thus, the argument developed in this book is that multiculturalism is not only bad for minorities, but for majorities and, indeed, for British society as a whole.





Multicultural theory is fraught with tensions and contradictions of an order that make it highly unlikely that it could ever have achieved its aims. But it is the empirical evidence on multiculturalism in practice that really highlights its inadequacies, for multiculturalism has failed the people it was meant to benefit. It has not enhanced equality and may actually have increased inequality by detracting from anti-racism (Bannerji, 2000) and by encouraging the maintenance of traditions that are dysfunctional in the modern (or postmodern) context. It has penalised both minorities and majorities because it is antithetical to genuine equality of opportunity (Barry, 2001). And in encouraging separation, if not separatism, it has had a negative impact on society as a whole, operating against social cohesion and posing a threat to liberal democracy. My argument in this book is that for all these reasons, multiculturalism has to go. But it also has to go because in the current globalised – universal – world, multiculturalism is an illogical, unachievable and anachronistic project. This raises the question of what can replace multiculturalism as a means of coping with highly diverse societies. My answer is nothing new; it is, rather, that we return to the days before we thought it necessary to ‘cope with’ or ‘manage’ diversity as a characteristic of visible ethnic or religious minorities only. For this rests on the assumption that having a brown skin or wearing the hijab indicates such significant difference as to require special treatment. This is both patronising and potentially racist, as well as sometimes plain wrong. My suggestion, then, is that we renew our efforts to achieve a genuine liberal democracy that would, by definition, include the promotion of equality of opportunity and the elimination of all forms of discrimination based on such criteria as age, class, ethnicity, gender, race, religion or sexuality. It would also involve the acceptance of liberal values that, arguably, are not narrowly British, but universal, as Gutmann argues: some basic human goods span the considerable diversity of modern cultures and support a set of ethical standards that are universal at least for the world as we know it and human beings as we know them. (1993: 193) Notwithstanding this, since universal values are implemented in a national context, there is a need for a shared national identity, sense of citizenship and commitment to the common good that transcends narrowly individual, ethnic, religious or local community concerns. This is



Back to the future?

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where liberalism must part company with multiculturalism, for it implies the (re)assertion of certain core values over the minority ethnic and religious ones imported into Britain. People choose to come to this country, and while the cultures and religions of their countries of origin of course continue to influence their lives here, they should simultaneously be free to adapt and change as they see fit. It is also reasonable that in cases of conflict, it is the established culture of the society in which migrants have opted to settle that should take precedence over those of other countries. But how are we move from the current situation in which multicultural ideology has resulted in some ethno-religious groups living ‘parallel lives’ (Ouseley, 2001) and some young people being alienated from both their own communities and British society? I would suggest that the first thing we need to do is reject the multicultural view of universalism as a dirty word and liberal values as either Eurocentric or racist: we need to revive a sense of direction, shared purpose and confidence in British society. One way to tackle this is to bring to an end the institutional attacks on national identity – the counterproductive cancellation of Christian festivities, the neurotic bans on displays of national symbols, and the sometimes crude anti-Western bias of history lessons – which can create feelings of defensiveness and resentment. We need to work together, as a society, to develop a renewed sense of collectivity that asserts our shared British identity and Western values … (Mirza et al., 2007: 7) A number of writers have pointed to the need for a clearer conception of shared citizenship, nationality, or sense of the common good. However, this may not be simple task: The problem is … that the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic politics. (Barry, 2001: 83) There are just two aspects of this enterprise of which I am convinced. The first is that it is urgent for everybody’s sake, for all the reasons given in this book. The second is that multiculturalism has nothing to contribute





Perhaps a growing sense that ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do’ has not been outlived as a maxim of immigrant integration, precisely because the contemporary ‘Romes’ are polyglot places in which the ties that bind are increasingly procedural and universalistic. (Joppke, 2004: 255)



to it – Britain is a European society, albeit one that is a member of the international community. And, who knows, it may not be such a difficult task as it first appears, for:

Notes

1. Chain migration was a system by which extended families (or biradaris – kin/close friendship groups) contributed towards paying for one member to travel to the UK to work. This man then sent money back home both to support the family and to enable other family members to join him. 2. In a number of areas where communities are close-knit, there is a practice of people working for relatives and being paid in cash, as well as an element of exchange whereby goods and services are traded. Neither of these is open to scrutiny, so that the imputation of widespread poverty may well be exaggerated.

Chapter 2 1. Considerable confusion is caused by a tendency in the literature to use the term hijab for vastly different types of Islamic dress. The hijab is a headscarf; the niqab is a veil that covers the face below the eyes; the jilbab is a full-length, loose garment like a coat that is worn over other clothes, and the burqa is a garment that covers the woman from head to foot with an opening that allows her to see, sometimes covered with mesh. 2. I am not aware of any publicly available statistics that disaggregate the various kinds of violence against women by ethnicity, though this is a significant omission. 3. There is no legal definition of domestic violence for the simple reason that it is not a separate crime in Britain. The government’s definition is: ‘Any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality’ (Home Office, 2008). 4. Marilyn Mornington is a district judge who chairs the Northern Circuit Domestic Violence Group.

Chapter 3 1. Some of the material in this chapter has previously been published in The Pakistan Journal of Women’s Studies, Alam-E-Niswan (Macey, 2008). 2. This inquiry involved 32 people giving oral evidence; 73 people providing written evidence; an e-consultation in which 86 stakeholders were involved; and 130 victims and professionals posting 245 messages, and visits to a range of centres, refuges and community projects to talk to victims. An impressively wide range of organisations and individuals were involved, though representation across the country was uneven and respondents were mainly concerned with domestic violence. 167



Chapter 1

3. According to the 2001 census, people of South Asian origin constitute 5.3 per cent of the population of the UK, with Muslims comprising 3 per cent (ONS, 2005b). Luton is a large town in the east of England, 51 km north of London, with a population of 184,390, 19.3 per cent of whom are of South Asian heritage and 14.7 per cent of whom are Muslim. 4. Bradford in West Yorkshire is a metropolitan district, covering rural as well as urban areas. The city itself has a population of 293,000, 20 per cent of whom are of South Asian heritage, and 16 per cent of whom are Muslim; 77 per cent originate in Pakistan, mainly the remote rural area of Mirpur. 5. Entry visas can be refused when it is suspected that sponsors are ‘reluctant’, as in forced marriage. However, around a third of those that go to appeal are won by appellants, largely because the sponsor is unwilling to make a public statement of her reluctance (Sedwell, Director of UK Visas, in HAC, 2008). 6. Commander Steve Allen is the spokesperson on forced marriages for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

Chapter 4 1. These include The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 2, 18, 20, 26, 27; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 2; The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 5; and The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 2, 14, 30 (Jahangir, 2008). 2. Pierre Sané is the Assistant Director-General of the Social and Human Sciences section of UNESCO. 3. There has been considerable debate about whether Islam and democracy are compatible and the implications of this for human rights (see Dalacoura, 1998; Cesari, 2004). I do not intend to pursue this question, but recent research in the UK and the US suggests that of around 350 grassroots Muslims questioned, none felt that Islam and democracy are incompatible, provided that the latter does not run contrary to the former (Turner, 2007). 4. Trevor Phillips is the Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). 5. In 2005, there were an estimated 63,000 adults living with HIV in the UK, with 7,450 new diagnoses that year – double the number in 2000 (ONS, 2006c). 6. The religion and belief legislation places all the major faith groups, secular belief systems (such as humanism and atheism), and non-belief on formally equal terms. This legislation includes The Human Rights Act 1998; The Terrorism Act 2000; The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003; The Equality Act 2006 (Part 2); and The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. In addition, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 has been extended to include offences aggravated by religious hostility, including assault, harassment and public order offences (Macey et al., 2009). 7. Some of the material on the Conway and Weller et al. reports has previously appeared in Macey et al. (2009), but particular credit goes to Alan Carling who did much of the work on these reports.




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8. Two other studies have recorded higher levels of self-reported discrimination by Muslims than other groups – Ameli et al. (2004) and Jayaweera and Choudhury (2008) – but both are limited by size or by type of sample. In a Europe-wide survey, Marsh (2002) found that less than 2 per cent self-reported religious discrimination. 9. Changes in terminology in this section reflect variation in systems of recording information. Only where I am certain of its accuracy have I used the term ‘Pakistani’ or ‘Mirpuri’; otherwise I have the more general term ‘Asian’. 10. Manningham is a largely Pakistani area of Bradford and the location of the 1995 and 2001 disorder and riot.

Chapter 5 1. For a number of reasons, care needs to be taken in interpreting prison statistics. These include the use of inadequate categories (Gressous et al., 2001); lack of statistics in some spheres (Jones and Singer, 2007); the effects of racism at various stages of the criminal justice system (Bowling and Phillips, 2002); and the danger of attributing to ethnicity (or religion) what may well be social class influences (Macey, 1999b).



Notes

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British National Party, 29, 85 British Nationality Act, 3, 9 Browne, A., 97–8, 100 burqa, as Muslim signifier, 42, 43, 141 see also school uniform dress code bussing, 10

abduction, of women, 56 abortion, sex-selective, 53, 57, 63 accommodation, 26–7 adoption, ban on trans-racial, 63, 64 age of consent, 48, 68 see also child marriage agency, 131, 132 inability to exercise, 139 Alibhai-Brown, Y., 133 alienation, 146 cultural, 110, 111 of youth, 110, 146 alimony, 50 see also divorce Al-Jazeera, as principal source of information, 142 anti-racism, 12–13, 33 criticism of, 12 see also Black Power Movement; Civil Rights Movement arranged marriage, 48, 66, 67, 79, 80 acceptance of, 72 non-acceptance see family, rejection by cf. false marriage; forced marriage; marriage, consanguineous; marriage, transcontinental assimilation, xiii, 7, 10, 27, 30, 159 coercive, 30 Australia, 21, 27, 29, 159

Canada, multiculturalism as government policy within, 21, 27, 29, 31 Caribbean recruitment of workers from, 4, 7, 33 youth, engagement in anti-racism, 13 categorisation, 108 Catholics, perceived discrimination against, 104 chain migration, 15, 83, 167n Child Abduction Act, 75 child custody, 50 child marriage, 48, 68, 75 see also arranged marriage children disabled, and consanguineous marriage, 81 socialisation of, 146 women’s primary responsibility for, 24, 52 see also education; madrasas; school absence Children Act, 75 Children and Young Person Act, 75 choice, 93, 95 challenges to, 93 see also right of exit Christianity control of women, 44 as norm, 36 citizenship, 78, 92, 93, 160 classes of, 9, 11 and democracy, 92 right to, 2, 9

Berger, P., 99, 124 Bhatti, G., 141 black, as ethnic category self-definition as, 13–14 Asian rejection of as identity, 14 Black Power Movement, 13 Bradford, 39, 156, 168n ethnic separatism within, 15, 16 minority ethnic women in, ix Bradford riots, 15, 37, 113 presented as public disturbance, 100 ‘Bradford 12’, 111 201



Index

citizenship – continued and right to vote, 95 and poverty, 84 shared, 165 see also marriage, transcontinental Civil Rights Movement, 13 clergy, male-only, 45 Cohesion Delivery Framework Overview, 20 cohesion, 159–61 effect on women, 20 as government policy, 19–20 moves towards, viii collective, community, prioritisation of, 106, 107 Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 17 Commonwealth Immigration Act, 8, 9 communications technology and cultural change, 140 and cultural reproduction, 83 and Muslim mobilisation, 39 see also Islamic websites communitarianism, 38, 106 community cohesion, 15–17, 89, 159 defence of, 111–12 community ethnic leaders, autonomy of, x, 38, 39, 45, 60, 86, 134 see also self-governance confidentiality, breaches of by statutory agencies, 78–9 conflict, intra-family and community, 140 conflict zones, see ethnic enclaves constructionism, 99, 121, 126 contact hypothesis, 17 contraception, 49 Conway Report see Islamophobia: A Challenge to Us All crime marriage as a panacea for, 80 among Muslim youth, 145, 149–50 perceived cause of, 145 racially motivated, 118 see also honour crime; honour killing Criminal Justice Act, 75 criminal justice system

discrimination in, 5 overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in, 7, 169n see also police; stop and search cultural autonomy, 65, 81, 126 cultural change, 30, 82, 140 resistance to, 82–3 state intervention to prevent, 30 cultural contamination, fear of, 14–15 cultural defence, 30, 135 cultural genocide, 63, 132 cultural imperialism, resistance to, 132 cultural pluralism, 11 cultural relativism, 65, 110, 126–7 impact on women, 134–5 and professional paralysis, 136; see also confidentiality breaches of by statutory authorities cultural reproduction, 108, 129, 140 see also homeland culture; women as culture bearers culture core, 132–3 dynamic, 30, 129 fixed, 129, 130 hegemonic, 94 maintenance of, 59, 108, 110, 133 majority, 84–5, 150 public recognition of, 94 reinforcement of, 133 democracy coerced voting within minorities, 96 participatory, 95 see also liberal democracy determinism, sociological, 109 difference degrees of, 151 determined by race, ethnicity, 117 right to, 117–21, 146 disability, genetic, 80 rates of, 81 see also marriage, consanguineous disadvantage, 24–5, 86 conflation with discrimination, 22 effect of religion on, 5 of women, 133



202 Index

discrimination, 4 against majority, 119 ethnic, 102 perception of, 86 religious, perception of, 101–2, 103–4; experience of, 104 workplace, 3, 22 diversity, 1–2, 9, 18 divorce, x, 50 domestic violence, ix, x, 47, 167n cost of, 54–5 incidence, 54, 55 mortality arising from, 55 religious court rulings, 47 see also honour crime; honour killing; marriage, physical chastisement permitted within; women, policing of; women, violence against Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, 75 dowry demands, 56 education discrimination in, 4, 6 multicultural, 11–12 pluralistic approach, 16 racism within, 12 underachievement, 6, 10, 11, 14 Education Act, 75 Eisenstadt, S. N., 107 employment rates, by ethnicity, 6 unskilled, 5, 51 see also English, use of and labour market participation; migrant workers; women, labour market participation; workplace discrimination English, use of, x, 10, 16 and labour market participation, 52 lack of, as a means to control women, x, 20 requirement as immigration criterion, 16 equal opportunities, 90–1, 116 Equal Pay Act, 51

203

equality, ix and difference, 147 of opportunity, 115 moral, 115 substantive, 116 essentialism, 12, 109, 128–9 ethnic activism, 145 see also Muslim mobilisation ethnic categories, 130 ethnic collective, 106 ethnic enclaves, colonies, 14, 83 ethnic minorities heterogeneity of, ix, 2 internally differentiated, 138 self-respect of undermined, 132 as ungendered, 127 ethnic mixing effect of, 83 opposition to, 84, 146 ethnic traditions, toleration of, x, 127–8, 136 see also cultural relativism; minority groups, exemption from law ethnicity, prioritisation of, 131 European Convention on Human Rights, 74 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Islamophobia, 103 exclusion, 20 see also residential separatism; social exclusion faith-based organisations, xii funding of, 44–5, 107, 153 women’s role in, 45–6 false marriage, 69, 77, 81 Family Law Act, 74 family rejection by, 72–3 female genital mutilation, 53, 56, 63, 64–5 see also ethnic traditions, toleration of feminism Black women’s objection to, 109 and criticism of Westernisation, 91 and Islam, 41 and multiculturalism, 125–6, 130–1 and sociological determinism, 109



Index

forced marriage, ix, x, 20, 56, 57, 63, 65–88, 135 as common law offence, 75 and cultural reproduction, 82 and human rights, 74 and immigration, 75, 168n incidence, 68–9 under international law, 74 and juveniles, 75 legal mean to prevent, 75 policy, failure to implement, 76 rejection of criminalisation of, 65, 73, 74–5, 79 cf. false marriage Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 74 Forced Marriage Unit, 48, 67, 73 Forum Against Islamophpbia and Racism, 103 France, 27, 29, 43 assimilation policy, 3 policy on use of hijab, 43 post-war migrant worker policy, 2 Fukuyama, F., end of history thesis, 107 Gender Inequality Index, 51 Genovese, E. D., 124–5 girls, socialisation of, 139, 146 globalisation, xiii, 3–4, 19, 90, 140, 161 challenge to nation-state, 90 group, prioritisation, primacy of, 110 group identity, women as bearers of, 59 group rights, 147 halal meat, campaign for, 112, 120 hate crime, 153 health service cultural sensitivity in, 135 discrimination within, 4 hijab, 167n as Muslim signifier, 42, 141 as symbol of resistance, 43 see also school uniform dress code Hindu nationalism, 44, 141

HIV, 168n suppression of data on, 97–8 shame associated with, 98 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 83 homeland culture, 19, 140 effect on women, 20 maintenance and reproduction, 59, 82, 129, 140 see also culture, fixed homosexuality, 42, 45, 81 and marriage, 80–1 Honeyford Affair, 112 see also Muslim mobilisation; school absence; English, use of honour, of family, 41 see also izzat honour crime, x, 20, 56–7, 60, 63, 67 135–6, 146 honour killing, 42, 54, 56, 76–7 housing discrimination, 3, 4, 6 human rights, xv and forced marriage, 74 knowledge of, x law, 90–1 threat to, 152 universal, 126 Human Rights Act, 74 Huntington, S., clash of civilisations thesis, 107 identity, 129 ethnic, prioritisation of, 19, 31, 65, 86 global, 111 hybrid, 130 monolithic, 132 multiple, 19, 130 Muslim, prioritisation of, 86 national, 160 perceived threat to, 133 religious, 111, 112, 141 trans-national identity, 19, 20 identity politics, 10, 39, 143 ideology, dominant, internalisation of, 100 imagined community, xiv imams, influence of, 142–3 see also madrasas, mosques



204 Index

Index

jilbab, as Muslim signifier, 42, 43, 167n see also school uniform dress code Karma Nirvana, 68 Khan, I., 112

Kukathas, C., 25, 65, 127, 128, 136, 137–8 Kymlicka, W., 26, 31, 65, 93, 126, 136

Lawrence, S., 86, 118 lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, ethnic attitudes towards, x, 80 liberal democracy, 39, 89–122 as detrimental to ethnic minorities, 31 and diversity, 94 top-down imposition, 94 threat to, xi, 89 liberalism, 91 liberty, individual, 91 Living Apart Together (Mirza et al.), 143–4

MacPherson Report, 86, 119 madrasas, education within, 143 Mahmod, B., 76–7 see also honour killing majority discrimination against, 120 oppression of, 152–3 marriage absent groom, 69 consanguineous, 49, 80 and disabled, disability, 48–9, 69, 81; see also false marriage of first cousins, 81–2 freedom of choice, 48, 74, 79 meaning of, 79 mixed, opposition to, 48 physical chastisement permitted within, 49 as religious requirement, 48, 80 by telephone, 65, 77, 81 transcontinental, 2, 66, 75–6; and citizenship, 78, 84, 139 see also arranged marriage, false marriage, forced marriage Marriage Act, 74 Matrimonial Causes Act, 74



immigration policy, 2, 7–9 primary purpose rule, 75–6 status and vulnerability, x; see also citizenship Immigration Act, 9 10 Indian subcontinent, postwar recruitment of workers, 7 individual, primacy of, 92, 106 inequality, 5, 20 cultural, 23, causes of, 24 gender inequality, 45–6, 50–2 inter-ethnic differences, 5 material, 22, 116 racial, 21 structured, 115 insider/outsider debate, 124–5 integration, ix, 7, 10, 11, 18, 108 as government policy, 19–20 Islam, xiv, 37, 38 conversion to, 38 discrimination against women within, 40–1 global, 41 Islamic Human Rights Commission, 104–5, 148 Islamic Party of Britain, 83 Islamic websites, and racial hatred, 83, 84, 142 Islamophobia fear of accusation of, 76, 85, 101, 102 perception of, 104, 105 Islamophobia: A Challenge to Us All, 102, 103 Italy, 29 izzat, x, 41, 133, 134, 136, 146 see also honour crime; honour killing

205

mental health discrimination in heath service, 4 of women, 6, 44, 54, 149 see also self-harm; suicide migrant workers, 2 discrimination against, 3, 158 postwar recruitment of, 2, 3–4 rights of, 2 see also myth of return migration effect on liberal democracy, 127 effect on women, 59 minorities assumed homogeneity of, 31, 58–9 visible, 8, 11, 21–2 minority cultures, non-interference in, 64, 110 see also cultural relativism; Islamophobia, fear of accusation of; racism, fear of accusation of minority groups, exemption from and extension to law, 120–2 achieved by violence, 121 see also halal meat, campaign for; polygamy and bigamy; school uniform dress code minority power, exercise of, 112 see also Muslim mobilisation minority women control of by men, 15 employment rates, 6, 52 oppression of, ix, 59; within own community, 134 policing of, 41 role of, 24 modernity, 36 Modood, T., 25, 29, 131, 160 moral community, 16 moral education, responsibility for, 144 moral guidance, 142 moral worth, equality of, 92 mosques education within, 143 influence of, 142 radicalisation of youth within, 143 sexual abuse in, x multiculturalism and agency, 131–2

argued need for, 132 criticism of, 21 definitions of, 25–6, 27–8 effect on youth, 140 as ideology, 29 imposed (top-down), 123, 154–5 institutionalised, 160 and justice, 132 marginalisation, absence of women within, 31–2, 57–8 as benign neglect, 133 neglect of white majority within, 123 plurality of, 123 policy, absence of women in, 31–2 problems of, viii public attitude to, 21, 96 as social engineering, 29 and youth, 140–6 murder, racial, 12, 118 see also Lawrence, S., MacPherson Report Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 46, 64, 67 Muslim Council of Britain, 104 Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, 83 Muslim Women’s Network, x Muslims demands for special treatment, 39 mobilisation, 87, 112 radicalisation of, 84 separatism, 39 vote, 86 myth of return, 3 see also migrant workers Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 16 Netherlands, 29, 159 commitment to multiculturalism, 3 postwar migration policy 2 public attitude to multiculturalism, 21 racist murders in, 15 New Labour, and religion, 38 new religious movements, 36 Nietzsche, F., 36



206 Index

niqab, as Muslim signifier, 42, 43, 141, 167n Northern Riots, viii, 15, 17, 85, 114 Okin, S., viii, ix, xi, 25, 59, 121, 123, 131, 137, 138, 139, 147 Ouseley, Sir, H., 16, 101, 145 paedophilia, x, 67 patriarchy, 59 Phillips, A., 160–1 Phillips, T., 97, 133, 168n pluralism, 7 cultural, 11, 12 polarisation, 16, 150 police, 5, 7 see also positive discrimination, stop and search; target setting political correctness, x, xiii, 76, 91, 100, 155 polygamy and bigamy, 49, 121, 146 right to welfare benefits within, 49, 78 see also minority groups, exemption from domestic law positive discrimination, 119, 120, 153 postmodernism, 91, 99, 109, 126 poverty, 50 and cash economy, 167n causes of, 22–3, 84 see also education underachievement; employment; unemployment preferential treatment, 120 perception of, 152 prostitutes, harassment of, 112–13 Protection from Harassment Act, 75 public disorder, viii, 15, 87 see also Bradford riot public protest, right to, 39, 96 public violence, 113 purdah, 44 Race Relations Acts, 5 race riots, see Bradford Riots racial equality, 119 racialisation, 128–9, 132 of difference, 9

207

racism, 9–10, 21–2, 84, 85 fear of accusation of, x, 76 heterogeneity of, 23 institutional, 85, 86 violent, 5, 12 radicalisation, 84, 86 rape, x, 55–6, 67 to effect forced marriage, 70 within marriage, 49 religion absence from multiculturalism, xi, 35, 61 associated with conflict, 36, 37 cultural role of, xi–xii, 36 as justification of oppression, xi patriarchal, 40, 61 power of, 61, 107 resurgence of, xii, 37, 61, 107 as social oppression, 36, 38 and societal understanding, 36 and women’s rights, 38–9 religiosity, 37, 86 religious courts, 46, 47–8 as disadvantageous to women, 47, 48 see also shari’ah law Religious Discrimination in England and Wales, 102, 103, 105–6 religious extremism, youth susceptibility to, 111 see also Islamic websites; mosques research, ideologically motivated, 98–9 residential polarisation, 115 residential separatism, 15, 16, 115, 141 right of exit, 50, 73, 128, 136, 137–9 opportunity for, 138 Runnymede Trust, 85,102 Rushdie, Salman (Rushdie Affair), 37, 39, 61, 112 Saheli project, x Satanic Verses, 37, 39, 112 Scarman Report, 10 school absence and forced marriage, 77 and homeland culture maintenance, 145



Index

school uniform dress code, 42–3, 120 sectarianism, Scottish, 104 secular society, 40–2 secularism, secularisation thesis, 27, 36 self-governance, by community leaders, 45, 91 self-harm, 44, 149 separatism, 13, 15, 86 and control of women, 39–40 residential, 39, 115 sex, extramarital, 80 see also honour crime sexes, complementarity of, 40 sexism, benign, 45 sexual abuse, x, 67 Sexual Offences against the Person Act, 75 sexual orientation, 80 see also homosexuality; lesbian, gay, transgender and bisexual people sexual purity, 41 shari’ah law, 46, 47, 64, 121, 146 Singh, D., 17, 18–19, 20 social class, 154 social construction, deconstruction, 91 social contact, absence of, 16 see also ethnic mixing, opposition to; residential separatism social exclusion, 82 and poverty, 84 self-imposed, see separatism social fragmentation, 151 sociology ideological, 123 as ideological advocacy, 99 Spain, Madrid bombing, viii, 15 Spinner-Halev, J., 127, 128, 137 state racism, 8 see also institutional racism; MacPherson Report stereotyping, 108, 128, 154 stop and search, police rates of, 7, 105 strategic essentialism, 131 suicide, 44, 149 suicide bombers, 19 super-diversity, 19, 86 Swan Report, 10, 11

Sweden, 3 postwar migration policy, 2 Switzerland, 2 target setting, 90, 119 in police service, 79 see also positive discrimination terrorism, viii–ix, 15, 37, 85, 111 homegrown, viii, ix, 38, 160 trans-nationalism, 19 truth, multiple, relative, 99 UK commitment to multiculturalism, 3 ethnicity and religions within, 1–2, 168n foreign policy viewed as crusade against Islam, 84, 112, 160 postwar migration policy, 2 unemployment, 83 UNESCO Declaration see Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity United States, 9/11 terror attack, viii, 15 see also war on terror Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity, 89 values, shared, 151, 160 victimhood, adoption of victim identity, 86 violence against women, 20, 52, 131, 146, 167n other women’s involvement in, 57 virginity testing, 57, 64 voting, coerced, 112 war on terror, 37, 84 Weller Report, see Religious Discrimination in England and Wales West Germany, 2–3, 21 white flight, 153–4 white grievance, 152 white population heterogeneity of, 1–2 misrepresentation of, 153–4 targeted for cultural change, 29 white racism, 11



208 Index

will of the people, 31, 92, 95–7 Williams, R., Archbishop of Canterbury, 46, 47 women as culture bearers, 41, 59, 133 domestic role, 51 economic disadvantage, 50, 51 economic inactivity, 52 economic independence, 50 harassment of by Muslim men, 44, 112, 113; see also prostitutes; women, policing of

209

identity defined in relation to men, 40–1 labour market participation, 6, 51, 52 lack of autonomy, 39 policing of, 60 oppression of under patriarchal culture, ix, 59 oppression of and religion, 45 reproductive role of, 41, 53, 59 women’s refuges, 54 run by imams’ wives, 44–5 workplace discrimination, 5, 22, 52



Index

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