Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

MR. CHURCHILLS TANK The British Infantry Tank Mark IV David Fletcher Contents Chapter 1

Introduction

6

The Wind s of Change

8

Chapt er 2

Vauxhall Motors and the New Tank

Chapte r 3

The Churchill Described

Chap ter 4

Early Trials

21 :

31 .,

47

Chapte rS

G~G~

~

Chapter 6

With the Canadians

73

Chapter 7

The Great Rework Scheme

Chapter 8

Church ills in North Africa

Chapter 9

The New Model Churchill

116

Chapter 10

Church ills in Normandy

142

82 102

Chapter 11

Campaigning in Italy

155

Chapter 12

The Last Battles

168

Chapter 13

A Hero Retire s

187

Chapter 14

Black Prince : the Big Gun Churchi ll ....................................... .

200

Abbreviations

211

Book Design by Robert Biondi. Copyright© 1999 by David Fletcher. Libraryof Congress Cataloq Number: 98-86735. ISBN : 0-7643-0679-0

Introduction

One of the enduring legends of B ritish histo ry concerns the set t-styled Lord Protect or, Oliv er C romwelt, from tha t sho rt period when Br itain sampled the delights of life as a republic . Old Noli, as he was kno wn , sat for his portrait altho ugh he was , as they say. no oil painti ng. Th e art ist did wh at he co uld 10 impr ove upon nature , only to be to ld by Cro mwe lllhat he wis hed to be portrayed "Warts an ' all". It may be true , but probabl y not, how ever thi s slory is typical of the ma n and the fact that it was told at all shows that it was regard ed as commendable and extreme ly unu sual . And therein lies the problem. We are all enjoi ned to promote a pos itive image in all aspects of life, sport and w ork . but it ill becomes the would-be historian . Indeed anyone who attemp ts to chronicle the development of Br itish tan ks in an ent irely positive way shou ld really mov e ove r to writing novels . Any rese arche r who se ts out to study the developm ent of British tanks in depth is liab le to devel op a jau nd iced view . Yet it is probabl y true to say that similar studies of othe r na tions. by fair minded historians. would revea l a similar tale . Even so the story of the Church ill tan k is exceptional. Uninspi red as it undoub tedly was , th e programme of tan k development devised by the British General Staff before Wo rld War 11 at least had so me so rt of log ic to it. So ho w was it that a ne w des ign , quite outside that programme. w as injec ted int o the system again st a good deal of professional adv ice? The answ er see ms to lie with the illustr ious person with whom it shared its name. Winston Chu rchi ll, like Preside nt Lincoln in 186 1, simply could not restrai n himselt from intertering in military matters. The difference is that whereas Lincoln man aged to co nfine himself 10 matters of pol icy. Chu rch ill also interv ene d in matters technical and he d id this la rge ly by instinct. Wh ethe r he w as right o r wrong it would be diffi cul t to say. even after reading thi s book . Yet the fact remai ns that a tank des igned and bu ilt in a hurry , in 1940 . was still consid -

ered fit to go to war ten years later and it acqu itted itself surprisingly well . This is Ihe fourth or fifth book to be pub lished on the histo ry of the C hurch ill tank. and undeniably the bigge st. It ha s been writt en by someo ne who has studied the subject for yea rs , has great admiration for the Chur chill and hopefull y a keen eye for its fault s. Even so it is only ha lf the story at best. The tempt ation to cov er every version wa s imm ense but co mmon sense , no t to mention publi shing limitati ons. indic ated otherwise and in the end we elec ted to confine ou r study to the gu n tank s. By elimina ting all the special purpose versio ns we have been able to study the deve lopme nt of the gun tank in full and give a reasonable amount of space to its servic e history . for afte r all Ihe two are inseparable . Much of what appea rs here is new, at leas t in the sense that it ha s not been publ ished fo r public co nsumptio n before, but the sour ces Irom wh ich it is drawn are exten sive . In the main these are found in the archive s at the Tan k Mu seum . which contain a wealth 01official docum ents. These range from user manu als through trials reports and Govern ment paper s to reg ime ntal war dia ries, co mba t reports and ind ivid ual remi niscences. These have been supplemented by material obtained elsew here . primarily with the assista nce of friends who se contributions are acknow ledged at the end of this piece . Whe re opinions are expre ssed it goes witho ut saying that th ese are the respon sibility of the aut hor alone . Eve n with this wealth of docu me ntary evidence certa in matte rs ha ve proved impossible to resol ve . Some might have been cleared up if the time for resea rch w as unlimited ; altho ugh the odds are that if a wr iter wait s until he knows everyt hin g then noth ing will eve r get done . and in any case. in fairnes s to one's publi sher. a time limit has to be set. At the time of writing the book has already over run by thre e month s and this can onl y be taken as a tribute to the pa tien ce of everyone at Atglen, Penn sylvan ia .

Introduc tion It cou ld neve r have been done alone and thanks are due to Peter Gudg in in Leamin gton , Ric hard Harley in Ed inburgh, Dems McCarth y in Dubl in , Pau l Handet in Sydney and pa rticular ly Tom Jen tz in Penn sylvania for getting the whole project started . And indeed to Peter Schiffer and Robert Biond i in Atg len for publishing a boo k by a Brit ish aut hor, on a British lan k in the United Sta tes . May I sa y 10American read e rs that I have not gone out of my way to exp lain our pecu liar.Br itish way of doing things lor their bene fit. I believe in this age of instant com mun icatio ns these thing s will be understood well enough and any attempt to adop t American termi nology would be patronising . It is dem onstrabl y fut ile to try and justify everything but by wa y of explana tion it should be sai d that in recounting the Chur chill's adv entures som e reg iment s ha ve fared better tha n oth ers . No favour itism is im plied. It is simp ly that one cann ot cov er everyt hing and the a im ha s be en to bring out fact ors pecul iar to the Chu rchi ll that are parti cularly rele vant. If supporters of 9'" and 48 '" Royal Tank Reg iments fee l hard done by it is on ly becau se bo th of them ha ve excellent historie s, currently in pr int , whic h do not need dup licating" . In the same way much of the wider backgr ound to this period has been cov ered in two of the a uthor's earlier titles wh ich, together, chronicl e the de velopm ent of British armo ur in the Second World War : The Great Tank Scand al (HMSO London 1989) and The Universal Tank (HMSO London 1993). Like the re mark able indiv idual for which it was name d the Churchill tank has a fascinating history . It lasted a lot longe r than its most optimisti c designers could have imag ined an d , as is often the ca se , perfor med a lot bette r un de r th e pres-

sure s of ac tive serv ice than anyone had a right to expec t. Especially in view of its poor beginni ngs . That this was due more to the devotio n and courage of those who served in it than any part icu lar vi rtue of the tan k itself is undeniable. Yet it managed to carve a repu tation for itself that has endured and even ea rned a great dea l of affection from those who fought in it and with it. Auth or Tom Jentz wa nted me to title this book 'The British Tiger ' but I couldn't do it. As to why, I can on ly fall back on a sto ry I hav e to ld el sewhere . In April 1944 , dur ing a sec ret deb ate in the Hou se of Comm ons. two members of par nament co nfronted Prime Min ister Winston Chur chill with the undenia ble infer iority of Briti sh tank s com par ed with the ir German co unterpa rts. At one sta ge Richard Stoke s MP requ ested that a C hurchill and Tiger tank shou ld be brought into New Palac e Ya rd , jus t by Parliament Sq uare . so that members of parliament co uld co mpare them . The arguments gre w so heated , and the co mments so per sonal that another MP stepped in to sugges t an alternative method of dec iding th e matte r. Perh aps M r C hurchill would care to take comma nd of a Chur ch ill tank wh ile Mr Stokes took over the Tiger in order to sel1le the argument as hon ourable me n shou ld? All things be ing equal such a due l wou ld ha ve depri ved Britain of an inspired leade r at a c ritical time . In truth the re is little to be gai ned by mak ing such compari sons and they will not be attempted in the follow ing pages. What you ha ve he re is the Ch urchill tank; Wa rts an ' al l. -aeere p.. Tank. Track.s. (Sutton Publishing ) Gudgm P., With Churcflill s to War. (Sutton Publishing).

The Winds of Change

In 1926 the 4'" Battali on , Royal Tank Co rps , mo ved from Bovington Camp in Dorset to Catterick in Yorksh ire . It must

have been quite a traumatic experience. Until that time all five tank battalions had been concentrated in the south of England, which enabled them 10train toget her, but now the Fourth was banished to the north, to a bleak cam p which the majority of soldie rs regard ed as one of the wor st in Brita in. Things did not change much beyond that. Ever since the end of the First World War the Royar Tank Co rps had been educat ing itsell in the art of mobile . armoured wa rfare and in doing so had rather become divorced from the rest of the Army. This was not intentio nal. It resulted from a kind of pe rsecution com plex which led the tank soldie rs to be lieve that they were outcasts, progressive ou tcasts perhap s, but misfits all the sa me. The mor e they pr eached the creed of armoured warfare the more they irritated the traditional arm s, so they wen t their own way and encour aged one another with talk of mobile division s in which tanks and armoured ca rs predominated. The inevi table reactio n to this isolatio nism was that other arms began to discuss tank s in relation to themselves and someti mes their thou ghts were adop ted by politicians par ticularly if, as a result, defence expenditure could be reduced . Thus when, in 1933, a senio r infantry officer remarke d that tanks would be more useful supporti ng the foot so ldie rs than chasing off across the countryside to outflank the enemy there were those who jumped at his words . It shoul d not be surprising when one realises that a year later the Sec retary of State for War was extolling the virtues of horsed cavalry! So , if tanks were not to replace cavalry they must support the infantry, primarily in direct assault operations against prepared defences. The format ions required to opera te tan ks in this way would be class ed as army tank battalions and the ir role would be little differen t from that originally devised for tanks in the First World War. Enthusiasts within the Royal Tank Corps could eithe r go along with this thi nking or ign ore it and expect even greater isolation; they chose the former co urse. Majo r-

General Percy Hoba rt, Inspec tor of the Royal Tank Corps , out lined the options in a pape r prepared for the Chief of the Imperial Gene ral Staff 's Research Committee in April 1934. Hob art, who base d his theories of armoured warfare on 5herman's ca mpaig n in Georgia , was happier promot ing the concep t of an independent tank brigade but he acknow ledged the purpose, if not the value of army tank batta lions wh ich were ' rorrnauv employed only after an opportunity for decisive action has bee n found and fixed by other arms". In other words infa ntry support tanks cou ld on ly go into action onc e artillery ha d softened up the target and infantry had secured the flank s. The q uestion then was · what kind of tank s should an army tank battalion employ? Hob art acknowledged the exis tence of two schools of thought. One advoc ated small, heavily a rmoured tanks to be used in la rge numbe rs. Small meant inconspicuou s; hard to locate and difficu lt to hit. Qu antity meant ove rwhelming numbers and thick armou r imp lied battl efield surv ival at a time when tight anti-tan k gun s we re regarded by many as the infantry 's co nvi ncing answer to the tank threat. Such ta nks would be armed only with mac hine -guns . Indeed they were in effect little more than mobi le, protected mach ine-gu n post s. As an alterna tive there were those who believed that a tank intended for infantry support should carry a cannon , and that by def inition meant a large machine, but what precise ly was its ro le? Some , who still viewed the infantry support tank in First Wand War te rms , considered that the gun should be used fo r neutralising enemy ma chine -quns and destroying fort ified structures such as pill boxes ; for them a gun capable of dealing out high explos ive wa s favoured . Othe rs saw the role of such tanks as protect ion of the infantry from enem y tanks so they preferred a high velocity , flat trajectory weapon . It is instructive to note that no one seems to have considered a d ual pu rpose gun at this stage . In both cases speed was considered unimpo rtant. It was sufficient that such tan ks could keep pac e with the foot soldiers as they advan ced and get across the sa me kind of coun-

Ch a p ter 1: The Winds Of C ha ng e

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A Med ium Tank Mark lA 0 14'"' Banalion . Ro yal Tank Corp s. on a bleak Yorks h ire moo r,

try. Of course In 1934 no such tank existed and 10 any case the theory of Infantry support by tanks had not been tested in Bntam since the end otthe First World War, It was therefore agreed that one tank battahcn should be singled out for this role and what more natural than to select the poor old Fourth, up there In the wilds of Yorkshire . To add insult to injUry Colonel George uncsav responding to Hobart wrote ; ':As obsolescent machines now with the ba ttalions of the Tank Brigade and the ba ttalions in Egypt are replaced by ne w ones , pass these to the 4'" Ba ttalion, Royal Tank Corps , Cettenc« and let It proceed with the work of experimenting In the close support of Infantry, In fact let it specialise in Divisional Tank Battalion wor k .,

And that is Just what did happen Of course ttus period of operati onal expenme ntmq with a serecuon of worn out tanks was only 10 last until the new Infantry support tanks were ready and It was now time to ce ooe what should be bunt. The duty of deciding fell to the Master-General of the Ordnance and at this time the post was held by General Su Hugh Elles a complex and contradictory character. On paper he was the ideal person to make such a decision. Enes had commanded the Tank Corps in France right throug h to the end of the Great War and in doing so had revealed himself to be a gIfted leader, personally brave and receptive to original ideas . But these are the quannes 01 youth. A career soldier. Elles had left the Tank Corps after the war and In those critical year s had altered rus views. Indeed

tor some time he became convinc ed that the tank was already obsolete: believing that power now lay With the mtantry, If properly equipped with ann-tank guns. Even the striking success of the 1SI Tank Brigade. during tactical exercises on Salisbury Plain in the thirties, did not convi nce him otherwise although he was now prepa red to accept that there was a place for the tan k as a supporting weap on for the infantry. He was reve rting to wha t he knew ; still seeing the tank in a First World War con text. As to what sort of tank, he would be guided in that choice by econom ic considerations and, that being so it was inev itable that he should decide in favour 01the smaller type, The result was the appearance, in 1936, of the tiny A11 Matitda. or Infantry Tank Mark I. It was followed , two years later, by the larger A 12 Matuoa. the Infantry Tank Mark 11 , which in tu rn was followed in 1939 by the Mark Ill . the lamou s Valentine . The next step , the subjec t of this study. was the Chu rchill. However the appearance of the Churchill was not the result of a logical , step by step developmen t. Indeed It evolved In a highly illogIcal way from something qurte different. Whatever else may be said abou t British tank design at the start of the Second World War nobody has ever suggested that II related in any way to the earlier con flict. Apart from a brief flutte r of indeci sion in 1922, which resulted in the unique independent machi ne, Bnnsn tank experts had resolutely ignored all the old concep ts of trench warfare and concentrated on destqns that SUiteda more mobile style of con flict. Indeed tacncaltrunkmq was already well ahead at what existing tanks

Mr. Churchill's Tank : The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

The pl"ototype Infant ry Tank Mark I, fir st of a new gener atio n of heav il y armo ured infan try sUppor1 tank s

Ci vili an engineers testing an earty Malil da . or Infa ntry Tank Mark 11 armed wi th the ub iqu it ou s 2·pounder gun .

could achieve and even the modest wo rk toward s the development of Infantry tanks could hardly be described as a complete return to old ideas But what If the expert s were wrong ? Once it had been agreed that the next conflict was bound to take place on mainland Europe , with the same old enem ies fighting it out once again over the same old ground , might It not be a return to the same old conditions? After all the French had constructed their impregnable Mag inot Line, which looked like the ultimate Western Front defen sive system and the Germans were known to be working on something called the Seiglreid Line which might well be similar. If that was the case might it not be wiser to design a tank to suit such condition s, even If It was not intended to repla ce the existing types? Betore we take a closer look at the results of this thinking perhaps it would be sensible to expla in the system by which new tanks were designed and built lor the British Army. It is quite complicated enough so there is no need to make com parisons with pre-war arra ngemen ts since they do not affect this study. Suffice it 10 say that a Ministry of Supply had been formed within the Govern ment in August 1939. It appears to have been a belated move , especially conside ring that Winston Churchill had been advocating such an organisation since 1936, but it is worth bearing in mind that it was not until April 1939 that the Chamberlain Government agreed to a sugge stion that Britain should raise a held force to participate in a continental war. The Ministry of Supply was responsible fer. among other things, the auocauon of essentia l metals and raw mater ials required for weapons production and for research, design and expe riment. prod uction and inspe ction of all military supplies. Coming down to specucs the first step in the development 01any new tank was a proposal by the General Staff of the Army_Within the Ge neral Staff the Director of Military Operati ons and Intelligence pronounced on the type 01 warfare and the sort of opposi tion to be anticipate d; the Director 01Staff Duties worked out the genera l specificat ions for new vehicles and advised on the quant ities require d to suit the current order 01 battle while the Director 01 Military Training dealt With troop training of course and the tactical doctrine.

This is all very elevated stuff but It does not suggest detailed technical knowledge . This was supplied by an Inspector, Royal Armoured Corps who brought his particular e xpenence to bear. Even so It soon became apparent that the Genera l Staff would need a wealth 01 technical knowledge . not just in term s 01weapo n - in this case tank - design but also on the manutactunnq side and It was here that the Ministry 01 Supply came in, acunq as a focal point . Although It takes us ahead a bit it is probably well to mention the Tank Board at this point. It was , in fact, crea ted in May 1940 to advise the Ministry 01 Supply on all aspects 01tank design, production and use. Tt us was recoqmnon 01the fact that , 01all land weapons with wh ich the Ministry had to deal the tank was. beyond doubt , the most complicate d. The tan k is an intimate association of matter s conc ern ing gunnery. turret s, armour, engine s, suspensions and , probab ly worst 01 all, the complex subject 01transmission as related to the climbing and steering capabi litie s 01tracked vehi cles. Knowledge 01these subjects generally, and 01the mobility element in particula r, was sadly lacking in both military and civilian engine ering circles , with results that we shall see. AI a meeting 01the General Staff, held at the War Office on 1 September 1939, two days before war was declared , the Director of Staff Duties anno unced that. altho ugh the Gener al Staff did not wish to interrupt production 01 Malilda and Valentine tanks they were concerned about the use 01 tank s in northern Europe. They antrcipated operations resembling siege warfare cono.nons where extensive shelling was likely 10 churn up the ground They the refore offered some very loose specmcanons which they wished the Director 01 Mecna r uzano n at the Ministry 01Supply to consider The tank they had in mind should be transportable by rail; It should be armoured to resist the German 37mm antitank gun firing solid shot but they did not msrst that the tracks should be pro tected . They believed a top speed of 10 miles per hour should be sufficient with a radius of action of 50 miles and in terms 01 armament they proposed a pair of 2 poun der (40mm) guns, three BESA 7.62mm machine-guns and a two inch smoke bomb projector . all opera ted by a crew 01seven men . The mental picture they had 01this lank was 10

e re c ter 1: The wmos of Cha nge based upon the Anqto-Amenc an Mark VIII type of 19 18, the so-called Internal/ana /t ank . The y realised that the proposed armour woul d prese nt a weight proble m but even so requ ired the ground pressure to be as low as possi ble, beari ng In mind the surfa ce such a tank migh t have to opera te upon . Clearly they were looking at a tank whic h had tracks running all aroun d the hull beca use they even sugges ted that an undrtctunq beam mig ht be carried. It proved to be a useful device for tanks d uring the Great War but no atte mpt had been made to revive it since , beca use it wou ld not wo rk on a turreted tank . Thus , for their new desi gn, the Gene ral Staff proposed a return to the old practice of moun llng the guns in spons ons on each side so that the hnal weapon layout wo uld be; a z-oouooer and co -axial BE SA in each sponso n with the othe r BE SA and a smoke bomb project or in the front of the hull, alongsi de the driver. They also specified a ce ntral command post Since it domina tes all matters concerning tank design in Brita in over this period this is probably a good time to orscuss the subject of rail transpo rt. Truck type road transpo rters hardly existed at this time and those being built we re intended for tank recovery on the battlefield , not for long distan ce road moveme nt. Th us all tank transporting, whe ther from the factory to the mili tary base , or from there to the docks , o r indeed anywhere . had to be done by ran. Now the British railway system is the oldest in the world The first public steam railway was opened in 1825 and Irom about 1830 the net work expanded in a rapid but diso rderly fashio n until It virtually covered the land . When the se earlier line s were built the majori ty were expe cting to use rolling stock wh ich was little different from exis ting horse-drawn road veh icles and in order to keep costs as low as possible , bridges across the lines and in particular tunnels , were designed around these wagons WIth but little clearance . Th is natu rally meant that all future locomo tives and wagons had 10 keep withi n these re stricted dimensions and the mea surements that governed their construction were referred to as the Loading Gau ge, This had nothing to do With the gauge 01the tracks. In Britain this was set at 4 feet 8.5 inches between running rails and this arbi trary figure was adopted by most other countries including those on the Contine nt and the Urnted States. Thus, in theory. loco motives and ro lling stoc k from all ove r the world co uld run on British rails but in practice the restricted British load ing gauge severely limited this possibi lity. Many US servicemen. stationed in Britain dur ing both worl d wa rs, remar ked on the small size of BritISh trains , often descnbmq them as miniature rauroads. Many probably never even realised that the track gauge was the same It the refore becomes obvio us that any tank built in Britain shoul d be designed withi n the limits of the British load ing gauge . La rger tanks would have to be dismantled In order to travel by rail and that was considered very inconvenient. Thus one may say that mos t British tanks buil t up to the end 01 World War 11 were limited in their size by civi l enginee ring restrictions ordained by the pionee r railway enginee r Geo rge Stephenson in the first hall of the Ninete enth Century' In ba-

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The Infa ntry Tank Mark Ill. o r Valentine. One of the most reliabl:!

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sic term s this meant a limit on width and height of aboutten feet . It did not affect length of course, at leas t not in a direct sense , but there were e xtenuating conside rations , Tank design is not rea lly a critical science . Get the design of an airc raft wrong and It will not fly : build a Ship which flau nts certa in ha rd and fast laws and It will probably turn over and sink. But you can do more or less what you like With a tank and it will still struggle along. 11 there is a limiting factor then It is ruled by someth ing called the L ove r C factor, wher e L is the L ength of track on the ground and C the distance between track Centres. In other wor ds the longer a tank gets the wide r it mus t be , otherwise it will be very difficul t to steer. 11 was something most designers learne d the hard way. So, It width was rest ricted by the railway loading gauge this indirectly limited length as well . Wh en the Gene ral Staff proposed a new tank design they gave it a number , prefi xed by the letter A. and the new 'shelled area tank' as one report called It, was designa ted A20. The Director of Mechanisation , General A E Davidson , show ed the General Staff's proposa l to two peop le. One was the president of the Mechanisation Board, Brigad ie r Houebone. the o the r wa s Le slie Little . c hi ef tank desi gn e r at Vic kersArm str on g since the death 01 Sir John Car oe n in 1935 Davidso n told Hollebone that he reckoned they would find it very difficult to meet the low ground pressure requirement Little's answer was predictable . He told David son that the Dep artment of Tank DeSign shou ld hand the whole project ov er to Vickers a nd let them do the desi gn work. Tt ns offer was not accepted but Little co ntinued to attend meeting s when the tank was disc ussed and presumably gave whateve r advice he could It seems that by the end of September 1939 the Departme nt of Tan k Design had produced qui te deta iled dra wings which Davidson ten we re too restricting . He favoured the idea of planning on a broad basis and had already reached the

Mr. Churc hill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

Then there was the engine and transmission. The Meadows Type DAV flat twelve was a 16204cc, overhead valve , liquid cooled, petrol unit rated at 300 horsepower . It could hardly be described as a tried and tested unit. At this stage in its design the Covenanter tank was intended to have a complicated double diffe rential, combined gearbox and steering system developed by Major W G Wilson , the transmission genius and famous designer of the first British tanks. This was also the intended transmission for A20 although Or Merritt was working along simila r lines and his triple differential Merritt·Brown system was shortly to appea r and would , for experimental purposes, be fitted into a Covenanter. One could hardly claim that either of these features was fully tested in October 1939. The first Covenanter would not appear until May 1940, and that proved to be an unmitigated disaster. Then again, what of the suspension? Nothing whatever is said about this aspect in contemporary documents concerning A20 but we do know that the system ultimately adopted was quite novel so it is difficult to see how either Holiebone or Merritt cou ld justify their opinion that no prototype was required. Of cou rse the truth was that they did not believe there would be time to build and test prototypes. It is a problem that has been covered in detail elsewhere: but no matter how often one conside rs it the idea of building new tanks for produc tion, straight off the drawing board , seems to be a terrible gamble, and it was one that the British lost every time they played. Expediency, under such circumstances is never justified yet there is little evidence , in the original minutes, of anyone protesting at this foolish practice. As the meeting drew to a close General Davidson said that he was unable to name a manufacturer, adding that he could see no chance of early production unless assistance could obtained from the United States and he added. rather cryptically , that in such a case the General Staff might have to accept shorter track life for the tank. Quite why this should be is not made clear and no obvious reason suggests itself. Davidson rounded off the meeting by saying that weight would still present problems. He pointed out that none of the floating bridges then in use with the British Army could handle 32 ton tanks. On 28 Octobe r 1929 General Davidson wrote to a Mr. Atholl Bla'r , of Hartand & Wolff in Belfast, Northern Ireland, soliciting his firm's interest in A20. He described it as being based on A12 but with a longer track base in order to cross wide trenches and explaine d that the General Staff was looking for something with a very low ground pressure which was also simple to build. Harland & Wolff was a general enqmeering company with branches in other parts of the United King· dom but they have always been closely associated with the City of Belfast and are best known as a shipbuilding concern. Many of the Light Fleet Aircraft Carriers of the Royal Navy were built by Harland & Wolff.

conclusion that the new tank would have to carry a turret. Indeed he had gone further than that. He specified the new Meadows, horizontally opposed, 12 cylinder petrol engine and combined Merritt-Brown gearbox and steering system then being designed for the new Cruiser tank A13 Mark Ill, or Covenanter. He also proposed a turret based on that of the A12 Matitda and was working on the basis of 60mm maximum armour thickness which would resist the German 37mm shell, but not the anti-tank round as specified by the General Staff. Even with 60mm armou r the use of side sponsons was going to create difficulties and it seems clear that by this time the idea of a turret was being generally accepted. A model of the proposed tank was shown at a Ministry of Supply meeting held on 25 September at which it was announced that the estimated weight was 32 tons. Someo ne then raised the question of mine clearing. AntH ank mines had not been a serious problem during the First World War but their potential was obvious and a good deal of work had already been done to create devices to counter them. The ruling theory at this time was that all infantry tanks , engaged in direct assault operations, shou ld be fitted with a mine plough. However the committee agreed that this was an extra complication that the designe rs of A20 cou ld do without. At a subsequent meeting it was suggeste d that the task of dealing with mines should devolve upon the little Al l , lntantry Tank Mark I which was now being eclipsed by newer designs. The Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff now asked if the new tank was merely an improved version of A12 but was told that it was in fact an entirely new design. He also suggested that, if there were problems finding a suitable petrol engine, he would much prefer a compr ession ignition, or Diesel type instead. This seems to have been greeted with very little enthusiasm but the committee was relieved to hear that, if the ground pressure problem was solved, the ACIGS would not press for the inclusion of an unditching beam. Finally the ACIGS asked, in all innocence. whethe r it would be necessary to build a pilot model. To anyone familiar with engineering practice or weapon development this would appear to be a ridiculous question, but the answer he got was even more astounding. Brigadier Hollebone assured him that they would not need one, that the new tank cou ld go straight into production. He was backed up in this by the Chief Superintendent of Design, Or. H E Merritt, who claimed that it was quite unnecessary since all the main design features had been tried and tested before; but had they? A number of tanks built during the First World War had weighed above 30 tons. Indeed the Mark VlIt weighed 37 tons, but none of those tanks had been filled with sprung suspension systems and they had not been expected to move at more than four or five miles per hour. The 1926 Vickers design, known as the Independent, weighed around 32 tons but it had not been successful and in any case it was very thinly armoured by 1939 standards while the A12 Matilda, which did have very thick frontal armour, only weighed about 27 tons in battle order. Therefore it seems quite clear that in many respects the A20 design would be breaking new ground.

• Fletcher . The Great Tank Scanda l, HMSO London 1989

12

Cho ote r 1: The Winds o f C ha nge

The company had also built some tanks, having accepted contracts for A9 Cruise r and A12 (Mati lda) Infantry Tanks shortly before the war. This was all part of a Government scheme by which many Brit ish engineer ing comp anies were given what were described as 'educational' contr acts to construct small batches of tanks in order to gain experience. It was a sensible move since there were very few firms with any such experience before 1935 and it was now obv ious that tanks would be needed in very large numbe rs, but as usual the authorities left it rather late. Whethe r the experience gained in building tanks to other peopl e's designs really titled the firm for design work is debatable. Here we have a new, untried design, which has to go straight into prod uction , built by a firm which had very little expe rience of making tanks at all. Nevertheless they were told that outline drawing s were nearly complete and the firm's task would be to finish the design and prepare working draw ings. Construction was to begin early in 1941 and they should be prepared to comp lete between 50 and 100 tanks with just the first two in mild steel since they would be needed to prove the drawin gs. Davidson sugges ted that if they were happy to accept the challenge, Hartand & Wolff should establish a design 01flee at Liverpool or Southampt on where they could liaise with the Mechanisat ion Board staff who would help with the design. He even offered a small incentive by suggesting that if Hartend & Wolff were able to complete a 300hp Diesel engine which they had designed it might prove suitable for A20 . The Belfast company responded by offering to send three or four draught smen to Woolwich and they stated that they also believed it would be wisest to build the mild steel pilot mode ls in England. Obviously they antic ipated probl ems during the design and construction stages with experts shuttling back wards and forwards across the Irish Sea . Th is, incident ally, is the first time that the tank is referred to by its alternative title of Infantry Tank Mark IV. The difficulties of bui lding tanks in Northern Ireland were also raised by Major Raikes in a report to Colonel Gardiner at the Ministry of Supply in March 1940 . Raikes believed that manufacture of the tank and all its components should be conce ntrated in one area, to avoid the time and expense involved in shipping parts all around the country. If A20 was to be built in qua ntity then he sugges ted looking at the industrial area of the Clyde valley around Glasgow , which was within easy reach of Belfast, and othe r locations in Scotland . "On the lace of it." he wrote, Mit would appear wrong in principle to transport all the component parts by sea to Belfast , to put them into the hull, and bring them back to th is country". However he al so appreciated that Harland & Wolff had taken a great deal of trouble in developing the hull construction and , since they had shop floor space to spare, it might make more sense to have them assemble the hull s which wou ld then be shipped across to the Clyde for completion. To be mo re specific he advised cutting back orders for A12 Matilda with Harland & Wolff, and the North British Locomotive Company in Glasgow and have them concentrate on A20.

By November 1939 it was confir med that the armour would be on a 60mm basis but by employi ng a new cons truction (their words ) the hull would be proof agai nst the British two pounder gun and that a test would be conducted at Woolwich to prove this. There is also , for the first time, a hint tha t the tank would carry a 3 inch close-su pport howitzer in the front of the hull. It comes in a report from Dr. Merritt who announced that design work on the fighting compartment was nearly complete but that he would like to know it it were possible to cu t 12 inches off the howi tzer's barrel. Otherwise he feared that it woul d stick in the ground and become damaged whe n the tank was crossing a trench. Late r that month it was agreed that Harland & Wolf! coul d build up to four mild steel prototypes if the y wished and we learn that the engine compartment was being designed around the H&W 300hp Diesel engine but that the Meadows unit should fit as an alterna tive. While uncerta inty remained over the engine the Chief Superi ntendent of Design , Merntt . sought to introduce a bit mo re by discussing alternative transmissions. He announced that he was investigating a Sinclair hydraulic system and David Brown gearbox which was simple r to opera te than the Wilson transm ission since it empl oyed dog clutches instead of braked epicyclics. Sinclair transmissions were designed to be used in self-contained railcars which required smooth acceleration. However they were not normally subjected to the rough and uncertain treatment that affected tank transmis sions and it is probably not surprising that none of the Sinclair sys tems were ever succ ess fully employed in tank s. It is equall y difficult to under stand why Merr itt was still not recommend ing his own transmis sion for A20. It had already been developed in 1938 and was probab ly more likely to work than Sinclair's untested equipme nt. All of which agai n throws into question why it was that Merritt advocat ed immediate production. The ear lier reference to a new construction for the A20 hull which improved protection is probably explained by a later com ment at a meeting on 17 November 1939. This mentions a box girder and is taken to refer to the form in which the hull was const ructed, which is pro bably best understood by refer ring to one of the Churchill hull diagrams further on in the book . What the report fails to explain is the method of construction. At this lime one would expect to find riveting emp loyed for most joints with bolting for certai n thicker components . Welding might be used for deta iled work but not when it came to joining armour plates . This was partly due to serious reservations about the effectiveness of welding armour but also because firms like Hartand & Wolff , traditi onal shipbuilder s primarily , would be experts at riveting with an experienced workforce of riveters . If there was some confusion over the method of construction it was echoed when the committee came to discuss the matter of wha t A20 was to be built of. The first mention of armour occurs in a brief note to the effect that CTA plate would be emp loye d upo n the outside . CTA, or Cem ented Tank Armour, had been develo ped by the English Steel Corporation in 1935. It was in fact a form of face hardened plate which 13

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The BritishInfant ry TankMark IV

was calculated to give about 20 per cent better ballistic protection than a similar thickness of the softer, mactuneabte homogeneous armour. Vickers-Armstrong had been using CTA on their light tanks from about 1936 and its good qualities are generally associated with thinner armour plate. This may explain why it is referred to as 'outside'. It suggests that Harland & Wolff was planning to build the tank with an inner structure of mild steel which would have a layer of CTA bolted to the external surfaces. This appears to be confirmed by a report issued in March 1940 which explains that some 14 tons of 0 .1. steel and 7 tons of CTA plate would be required for each tank. A similar system was certainly used on many subsequent designs. However the committee which governed the future of A20 was not coming down firmly on one side of the fence yet. They mention production problems with CTA and suggest that the design should be capable of being constructed with homogeneous hard plate on the outside as an alternative and round this off by saying that CTA plate could be used on the inside once production difficulties had been overcome. It was also agreed that firing tests should be conducted against sample sections of armour in the meantime. The hazards of wartime travel were brought out at a meeting held on 20 November. Brigadier Hotlebone. in his capacity as President of the Mechani sation Board had visited Harland & Wolff in Belfast. He had flown from Speke Airport at Liverpool in a single engined aircraft which he described as six years old and lacking radio, lire extinguish er and tools. The pilot lost his way and took two and a half hou rs for a journey that should normally take a fraction of that time . At one point they found themselves approaching Irish Free State territory where Houebone and his plane would have been interned for the rest of the war. The Brigadier found this all rather unpleasant and lelt that the Air Ministry should be told about it. In passing Hollebone also remarked that, while he was in Belfast, Mr. Blair of Harland & WolNhad shown him an eighth scale model of a tank which they were propos ing as a rival to A20. It was the same length with much wider tracks but it did not have the prominent front track horns of A20. Meanwhile new information had been elicited from the Director of Artillery at the War Office. 11 was learned that the General Staff had discussed the possibility of prod ucing a more powerfu l tank gun and the design department at Woolwich Arsenal was working on one which could fire a six pound projectile and that this had been going on since 1938. The first question was whether this gun could be fitted in the new tank, but they were told that the new weapon was not yet ready and probably would not be until 1941. Even so it seems hardly credible that the same General Staff should specify a gun which they already believed to be out of date for a tank they had not yet built. Accepting that for the present it was the 2-pounder or nothing, surely the specification should have included reference to the bigger weapon when it became available, and the tank designed to accept it? This sparked off further discussion on weaponry. The hull mounted three inch howitzer has already been mentioned . It was a low velocity. close suppo rt weapon intended mainly to

14

fire smoke rounds and it was designed to fit into the same mounting as the z-cooooer. The A20 team believed that their tank should do more than blow smoke rings and suggested that the gun should be capable of firing high explosive to destroy concrete obstacles. But they had learned that for the present only smoke rounds were being produced for the 3 inch gun. They therefore suggested that A20 should carry the older 3.7 inch close support weapon for which high explosive ammuni tion would soon be available, but they were told that even this gun lacked the muzzle velocity to do much damage to concrete and one member of the committee remarked gloo mily that neither of these weapons looked very promising for the front gun of A20. It is perhaps in the nature of committ ees that they should get carried away. Discussion generates discussion until they come to believ e that anythin g is possible , if only one talks about it for long enough. Thus it was that at a weekly meeting held on 24 November the chairman had to remind them that A20 was -a Ford, not a Rolls-Royce and therefore the 1941 production must be to simple designs and new ideas could only be worked out for 1942 production". He was able to show a new set of drawings supplied by the manufacturers and, the committee was told, the turret would not be the same as A12. They were now hoping to create a composite construction of flat plates which would save weight. The original A12 turret being, of course , mainly cast. It was also announced that a contract was being issued to Hartand & Wolff for a total of l oo A20 tanks, four of which would be mild steel pilots . A meetin g held on 1 December was something of a progress report. Blair, in Belfast, had agreed to build the four pilots and had already secured the steel plate. The committee also learned that the engine compartment would be able to take the Meadows flat 12 petrol engine or the Harland & Wolff Diesel while the choice of transmissions now lay between a flu id flyw hee l and clash gea rbox , (presumably Sinclair) , the Covenanter system (Wilson) and a controlled differential type which would appear to be Henry Merntt's new design . Trials with the armour had shown that A20 should be largely immune to British 2-pounder rounds and that the new turret would save about 80 per cent of the man hours required to make the existing A12 cast turret but that the two types would be intercha ngeable. A week later the Director of Mechanisation sounded a note of caution . He told the committee that he had held up the order for 100 tanks with Hanand & Wolff but retained the contract for the four pilot models. No explanation was given beyond the view that such an order was inadvisable but the position would be reviewed in the new year. This delay revived the gun issue and the 6-pounder was mentioned again but, after examining drawings of the gun early in 1940, it was considered too long. One statement claims that the muzzle would stick out two feet ahead of the front horns ot the tank although this would surely only apply if the gun were mounted at the front, and not in the turret as the committee wished? The statement goes on to say that "en these grounds the gun was ruled out for either turrel or hull". Of course the reason

Cho oter 1: The Winds o f Cha nge

why the gun could not go into the turret was that the turret was too small. There seems to have been no obvious reason at all why A20 should not have been designed with a larger turret beyond the tactt hat it appea rs to have been decided, more or less off the cu ff, to use the A 12 design when the original proposal for a turretless tank was rejected. This, of course is the problem. A20, as originally designed , was to be turrettess as we have seen , Once it was agreed that a turret was needed the entire des ign should have been reconsidered to accommoda te it, instead the designers appear simply to have sketched a turret onto the existing hull and left it at that. This is no way to design tanks Yet if anyone thou ght that the matter of armam ent wa s settled they would have been wro ng. A further meeting was arranged with the General Staff and they were offered three options for the main, or turret . weapons. These were ; a pair of mactune-quns . the 2-pou nder or a 75m m gun. The machine-guns would probably be a pair of BESAs; a heavy 15mm and 7,62mm as filt ed in some light tanks and armo ured cars The 2-pounde r we are familiar with but what about the 75mm? There was no such weapon in the British armoury at this time, assuming one rules out the 3 inch howitzer , and as we shall see . the chances are the Gene ral Staff were thinking of the current French weapon . The tank was also going to mount a machine-gun in each side of the hull and some thing larger at the front . The Gene ral Staff were still intereste d in the 6pounder and they ordered that the commi ttee should investigate a Royal Naval weapon . a 6-pounder anti-mo tor torpedo boat gun, which was shorter . II would be tedious to pursue the armamen t question very much further. It was neve r resolved and the end less discussion only serves to point up the utter futility of a system that permitted such commi ttees to go on chewi ng over a subject

ad infintum. espe cially whe n most of the weapons they proposed could not be fitted anyway , at least not without virtually redesigning the tank . Suffice it to say that among the weapons discussed and rejected were a 40mm v ickers piece . French 47mm and 75mm weapons and the naval 6-pounder. In any case there were othe r problem s. On 15 January 1940 Brigadier Hcltebone wrote to Hartand & WolH expre ssing doubt s about the suspension. He was becoming alarmed at the number of man-hou rs required to make it and for some reason that is not explained, had asked Vauxha ll Moto rs in England to investigate . This is the first mention of Vauxhall in connection with this tank but they will figu re much more prom inently soon. There is no reason why they should be expected to know anything of the subject because up to this time they had not had anything to do with tank design , but it seems that their sugges tions were well received and they were asked to complete detailed drawings and prod uce four experimenta l units for trial purposes. Since we do not know what the original suspension was like we can only assume that it had features in common with the improved Vauxhall system which will be dealt with shortly, The next day Harland & WolHreceived another letter. this t ime fr om Col on el Wat son , th e Vic e- pres ide nt of the Mechanisation Board . In it he told them that. since their 300hp Diesel engine was still in the development stage, and product ion of the A20 pilots was close, they should go firm on the Meadows engine , A few days later revised weight figures were released. showing that the tank was now expected to be ove r 40 tons fully laden. which cause d uproar amongst the Royal Engineers who pointed out that they had no bridges at all capable of supporting it. All through the development stage the committee had been considering how production might be expanded. The

The o nly example 01A20 to be fi ll ed with a turret. It was photographed at the Hart and & WolN la ctory in Belfast. The Matilda turr et retains its cu po la, whic h wo uld have place d the tank o utside the Briti sh railw ay loading gauge . Slot s in the sid e s how where th e !lank machine-guns .....ould fit .

15

Mr. Ch urchil l's Tank : The British Infa ntry Tank Ma rk IV

commitments for supp lying engines to the Mark V Cruiser , or Covenanter, wou ld not be able to meet the requirements for A20. A new Vauxhall powe r uni t is mentioned as an alternative. Assu ming that other cont racto rs cou ld meet thei r delivery dates Raikes bel ieved that Ha rland & Wolff would have five A20 tan ks ready by September 1940 with increas ing deliveries each subsequent month until the hund redth tank was fin ished in Feb ruary 1941 . In April the wooden mock-up was inspec ted by no less a personage than Sir Albert Stern . As secretary to the Landships Com mittee in the First Wo rld War Ste rn was always rega rded as the d riving force who . more or less single -handed , forced the origina l tanks into production against a lot of official resistance. A hard-headed business man and born organise r Stern was an individual of very strong charac ter but he neve r pre tended to tec hnical expert ise at that time and he failed to gain any specific awar ds when the invention of the tank was considered in 1919. Now, of course, he was an elde rly man who believed he had more to offer than was probably the case but he made the mistake of pretending that he was an authority on contemporary tank design and , for some reason, people were pre pared to listen to him . Even so it was mad e clear to him that A20 was neither an infantry tank , nor a c ruise r in the a ccepted se nse and the term Char de Forlresse was coined to make the point. Stern appears to have bee n quite impre ssed at this stage although he was already at work on a project of his own . In company with many of those he had worked with in 191 6 Stern pe rsuaded the Gove rnme nt to allow him to design a tank on even more impress ive lines than A20 , wh ich ultima tely appeared as TOG (for The Old Gang ) the nickname of Stern 's consortium. Although it had been agreed that the new Harland & Wojff tank wo uld be shipped by rail the re was still the problem of recovery to be consi dered . This was at a time when armoured recovery ve hic les were unknown and , as already explain ed , wheeled tank transporters were regarded as suitable only for recovering disabled tanks. The type of transporter then in production was equippe d to handle tanks up to 30 tons but this co uld not have cope d with A20 so the Director of Ordna nce Supp lies asked the Ministry to design a suitable trac tor and trailer uni t for the wor k. At the time this was regarded as too difficu lt and the suggestion was made that in the case of A20 the tank wou ld have to be repaire d in situ so that it could , in effect , recover itself. Later heavy recovery traile rs were deve loped and the hull of an A20 pilot was used as a test loa d. On 20 Ap ril the mock -up tank was insp ected by Monsieur Dupuy, the Frenc h Engineer-in-Chief, but his views are not recorded. In any case time was running out. Germ an troops, spear headed by tightly co ntrolle d regiments of tanks were soon pressing deep into French terr itory and, despit e some sho rt lived Allied successes, such as at Arras on 2 1 May, it would all be over in a few weeks. The war for which A20 had been designed was not going to happen . There would be no enemy fort ifications to attack, no shelle d area for the

order for 100 tank s from Belfa st had been re-estab lishe d in February and Mr. Btairhad anno unced that the first pilot should be ready by Jun e. If it was a success there was no doubt that more would be required and Vauxhall Motors was one of the firms that had been co nsidere d. The co mpany was told that if they agreed to take on the project the Ministry of Supp ly would build an d equi p a sha dow factory which Vauxhall wo uld organise and run. Shado w factories were origi na lly an Air Ministry co ncept, presumab ly since they were more aware than anyone els e of the threat from bo mbing. The idea was that key plants would have an alterna tive establishment, not too far away, which they co uld move to in the event that their original prem ises were destroyed by bombing . Vauxhall Motors accepted the offer and claime d that they would be able to deliver tan ks at the rate of about ten per week. In March Or. Merritt visited Be lfast and report ed back to the comm ittee his view that liaison between Ha rland & Wolff and the Mechani sation Board was not good enough and that standards were slippi ng. He also noted that the original A 12 turret took the tank outside the railway loadi ng gauge so it was agreed that the new tur ret wou ld be finished withou t a cupola to restore the situation . Having sorted that ou t someone came up with the suggest ion that the side mac hine -guns should be replace d by two small machine-gun turre ts, and this at a time when the first pilot model was under co nstr uction. Fortunately com mon sense prevai led and this sche me was d ropped. Not on ly wou ld it have exceeded the loading gauge aga in, it was estimated to add ano ther 2 tons to the weight. Major Haik es' repo rt, mentioned ea rlie r, has a number of more specific things to say abou t progress on the A20. or Mark IV has he terms it. These co mments raise some interesting points. Writt en on 25th March 1940 the report exp lains that the hull of the first pilot model shou ld be co mpleted by April. It goes on to say that the firm Automotive Ltd., wou ld be in a position to fit the co ntrols by early May, that the engines were nearly ready from Mead ows and the final d rives from Leyland . On the subjec t of gea rboxes both the MerriU-Brow n and Wilson type s are men tione d, suggesti ng that the first two tanks would have differen t systems for testing. Vauxha ll Motors is recorded as supplying the suspension while the Lon don & North Eastern Railway (LNER) company was pro ducing what are referre d to as the main tracks. Thi s is followed by a refer ence to 'Auxiliary Tracks and Trac k Susp ension ' . No contractor is named and the matte r is not exp laine d but it does raise the possibility thatA20, like the semi-mythical 'F lying Elephant' of 1916 , was to have auxiliary tracks mo unted between the main set, beneath the hull, to help reduce ground press ure and maintain traction if the tank sta rted to sink on soft grou nd. The term Main Tracks appears again when Raikes reviews progre ss on the production order for l OO mac hines. This report is mainly conce rned with the availability of stee l but it does confirm that no dec ision had yet bee n reac hed on the gearb oxes and further explains that Meadows, due to their 16

Chapter 1: The Winds of Change

The A20tank supplie d to Vaux hall Molor s. A bo x superstructur e is lilled in pla ce o l the tu rret and the tra c ks have been rever sed , Not ice also that the hull side door o pe ns th e opposit e way to th e ex amp le ph ot ographed in Belfa st.

tanks to wallow in and no concre te obstacles for it to red uce to dust: at least not yet . Howeve r the projec t was too fa r advanced to stop now. A mock-up hull had been built tor firing-at trials and it was sent to the gunnery range Shoeb uryness on the Thame s est uary where they wished to see how it would withs tand attac k from high explosive projec tiles. Ha rta nd & Wolff were informe d on 27 May that the MeadowslW ilson engine and transm issio n combination would defini tely be installed in the 2-po unde r version 01A20 and that a Lockhee d hyd raulic system would be used for throttle and clutch cont rol with compressed air assisted steering, This no doubt means that a 6-po under version was contemp lated afte r all. Colo nel Watson had stated on 20 May thatthe new turret bei ng des igned for A20 would take the 6-pounder but that any hope of insta lling a 75mm gun in the hull must be forgotten since it cou ld not be done without a co mplete redesign of the front of the tank . This is probably just as well unde r the circums tances since the imminent fall of France would have cut off the supply Another visitor to Belfas t on 1 June was Major John Oodd MP. Besides being a member of pa rliame nt Oodd was managing direct or of his family firm . S Oodd & So n Ltd., of the Lyon Works at Old ham in Lancash ire. He was ca lled back from his regiment at the outb reak of wa r and appoi nted Hon orary Adviser on Tank Prod uction to the Ministry of Supply, which appea rs to have been a freelance , troubleshooting role, Whether he knew much about tan ks is not clear but the impression given is that he was a prod uction expe rt. In Belfast Blarr told him that Ha rla nd & Wolff wou ld prefer to com plete their full order for A 12 Infant ry tank and then wo rk on A20,

but Oodd was able to tell him that , apart from the four pilot mo dels , the main orde r for A20 was now in abeya nce 'as the re was a probab ility of modifica tion of the A20 10 some thing diffe rent altho ugh simila r in const ruction ', On 7 June a mee ting of the Tank Board was told that the o rder for 100 A20 tan ks wou ld be cance lled but the pilots must be co mple ted. Indeed pilot number one was already virtua lly comp lete at Be lfast although ear ly trials had revealed faults in the hydraulic co ntrols , but a Mr. Ga tes of Harland & Wolff was wo rking on a plan to mo dify the system . Mean while the English Steel Co rpo ration was able to repo rt that it had solved the prob lem of casting thinne r sect ion turrets for A20 . which presumably refers to 6-pounde r turrets. The first p ilot mode l, now classified A20E 1, was photographed in Belfast with a Matilda turret and the same type was earmarked for the second pilot , A20E2 . These wou ld employ hydraulic traverse, like the Matil da itself . but the turrets then bui lding for pilots 3 and 4 would feature an electric trave rse system , In July Sir Albe rt Stern returned to Woolwich to look at the A20 mock- up again . He was now high ly critical of the limited internal space but admitted that the tank was a retatrverv small target. However when he exami ned Dr. Memtt's new trans mission , which presumab ly was show n indepe ndently of the proposed tan k, he was scathing , He poin ted out that with ordina ry clash gea rs it wou ld always mean the tank getting stuck in the mud · he was thinking in First World War te rms aga in - and he assumed that it would be expensive to produce and never avai lab le in sufficie nt quantities. It is indica tive of Stern's poor mec han ical ac ume n that he was criticisi ng one of the most effective tank transmissions ever

17

Mr. Chu rchill's Ta nk: The British Infa ntry Ta nk Mark IV

Scale plans of A20 .

~- _ . =-= ,

~

TANK, INFANTRY, MAR( SHEET

18

No,1

SCALE 1:16 (]f4 inch; , fo ot ) Rens

Chapter 1: TheWinds of Cha ng e

I

I .. ,, 1

(IV (PILOT MODEL, A20E1). 3'lst r uc t lo n Dra w ing by

©

s .c . HARLEY. 16 November 199 7.

19

~-1C~_"H~1

Mr. Churchill's Tank:The BritishInfantry Ta nk Mark IV

devised. It had its teething troubles , as we shall see, but once these were solved it proved to be ideal and remained in use with British tanks for many year s after the war. The pilot model A20E 1 was with Vauxhall Motor s by August 1940 becau se a letter from a Corporal Little at Luton to the officer commanding the Mechani sation Experimental Establishment (MEE) at Farnbor ough mentions that up to 5 August the tank had completed 110 miles. In that time it had consumed petrol at the rate of about half a mile to the gallon but, more alarmingly, was using oil at the rate of one gallon every twelve miles! Corporal Little explain s that the tank was loaded to its full combat weight and that, for some reason , its tracks were taken off and reversed. It is also reported to have taken part in a demonst ration at Westbury , in Wiltshire , on 13/14 August. It arrived at MEE from Vauxha lls on 17 April 194 1. It was issued with their number 1754 and it is intere sting to note that the very next entry in the MEE ledger is for a 40 ton capacity transpo rter trai ler by Crane s of Dereham , which probably expla ins how it got ther e. The tank 's log at MEE is brief. Eight week s after delivery it had registered a total distance travelled of just two miles and a month after

that it is recorde d as moving to the Experimental Bridging Estab lishment at Christch urch where it stays for just three weeks, no doubt serving as a make-weight for testing new bridges. In July 1942 it was passed to the Whee led Vehicle Experim ental Establi shment (WV EE), also at .Farnboro ugh, where it was used as a trial load for a new 70 ton transporter trailer, also by Cra nes. The Mechanisation Experimental Establishment had been created, under anothe r name , at Farnborough shortly after the First World War. It was the main testing centre for new military vehi cles and the late arrival of A20E 1 is a clear indication that it was never conside red as a serious contender for serv ice use . Indeed the first A22 pilot model arrived at Farnborough jus t a few days later and it is that tank which we must study now. Incidentall y there is a refe rence in the MEE ledger for this tank that some time in June 1941 it sustaine d damage to the rear towing eyes when it attempted to recover A20 by road , presumably followin g a breakdown . This may well be the only time the A20 and A22 tanks would have been seen tog ether.

I I I I I

I I I

I

I

20

2

Vauxhall Motors and the New Tank

Vauxhall is a dis trict of London , on the south ban k of the Thames . In 1857 a Scottish enginee r, Alexander Wilson , founded a bu siness there which he call ed the Vauxhall Iron Works : its main purpose being shipbui lding. The com pany gal into financia l difficu lties at the turn of the ce ntury but was recon stituted in 1903 10 man ufacture small , 6 ho rsepo wer , motor cars. This proved so successful that by 1905 new pre mises were requ ired so the com pa ny move d to Luton , in Bedfordshire, about 30 miles north of London. The co mpany underwent two changes of title. being fina lly est ablished as Vauxhall Motors limited in 1907. Throug ho ut the First Wor ld War it supplied staff ca rs to the British Army and after the war establis hed itself as a producer of quality sport and tour ing cars at the mo re expensive end of the market; and this at a time when smalle r, cheaper cars with mass appea l were starting to dominate the mar ket. By 1925 the compa ny was not do ing so we ll and it wa s taken ove r by Genera l Motors from the United State s. Its British comme rcial vehicle buildin g division , Bedfo rd, was created in 1931 with a factory at Dun stable , close to Luton . Both branches of the firm we re soo n doing ext remely well and Bedfords began building tru cks for the British Army. Th is side of the marke t expanded rapid ly up to the outbrea k of war and the compa ny even built a few armo ured lorries for the Ja panese Army. to be used in Manchu ria. This as ide they had no exper ience of constructing comba t vehicles and did not include any tracked machine s in their catalogue. Indeed none of their comme rcial lorrie s were intended for a paylo ad of more than 3 tons and all were litted with low powe red petro l engine s to comply with the strict requirements of British road haulage laws of the pre-war period . From 1939. of course , a rmy lorry product ion expanded dramat ically and one imag ines that production facilities at both plants were stretched to maximum . The comp any enjoyed such a high reputation that it was consulted by the Wa r Off ice about problem s with the coo ling of tank engines an d then came the reque st to improv e the ma nufacturing process for A20 suspe nsion . Having autho rised construction of a new

sha dow factory nea r Luton it was then asked to undertake the desig n 01 a new , petrol fuelled tank engine. This engine had to be of the horizontally oppos ed co nfiguratio n and ca pabl e 01 del iveri ng no less than 350 bhp . so it was clearly intend ed for A20 whic h, as its weig ht inc reased , was now regarde d as unde rpo wered . At that time the biggest engi ne Bedf ords produ ced was a straight six, rated at 72b hp . Vauxhall Motors had adopte d the over head va lve layo ut for all their engines back in the twen ties but it was soon evide nt that the new tank engine would have to reve rt to side-va lves in order to fit, so it is quite clear that the com pa ny was engaged upon a majo r engine design project . it was not just a que stion of sticking a pair of six cy linde r truck engines togeth er. It is a sad fact that in the decade before the outbr eak of World War 11 no se rious atte mpt had been made in Brit ain to produ ce a new eng ine for tank s. Many of the tanks in service in 1936 still empl oyed a 90hp VB deve loped in 1922 and effort s to improve it had failed. Lighte r tanks , first introdu ced around 1932, had used commer cial truck engine s or, in the case of the heavier Mati lda, a pair of six cylinder die sels similar to those used in Lond on buses. But the pair of them together did not produ ce more than 170hp. Vicker s-Arm strong had imported a 138hp GM diesel from the United States for their Valenti ne while the Nuffield Com pany in Birmingham adapted a tough old V12 aircraft engine, the USA Liberty originally designed in 1917 , for their new Cruiser tanks . It cou ld deve lop 300hp but was too big to fit the A20 , even if enough ot them coul d be produced . In an article about the new Vauxhall engine, published in the journa l Automobile Engineer of May 1945, an anonymous contributor exp lained some of the difficulties which faced the des ign sta ff at vaux hans. Size. as we have already seen , was of prime importance and dicta ted the hori zontally opposed cylinder configuratio n, Then the re was the shortage of quality materials, since hard wearing alloys were only being allocated to priority aircra ft prod uctio n. Enclosed in armour such an engine wa s difficult to cool and the designe rs also

21

Mr. C hu rc hill' s Tank : The Bnnsn Infa n try Tank.Mark. rv

His Majest y King Geor ge VI in the turr el 0 1Mark I T30971. The tria ngle , at the Ir o nt of the tur ret. car ries a warnin g thsllhis l an k is unarm ou red .

had to consider the layout of tueltanks and pumps which had to be kept cool to avoid the risks at vapour lock. Power output was an obvious consi deration - the writer believe d that 350hp was the minimum accepta ble for such a heavy tank and then there was the Question of torque . A tracked vehicle , by us very nature, sets up a conside rable amou nt of rolling resistance but when It attempts to turn the demand for extra power increases dramatic ally. In a vehicle wh ich was often expected to climb or descend steep slope s, dry sump lubrication was desirable and special arrangem ents had to be made to prevent oil leakage at either end of the crankc ase . Bearing these diffICultiesin mind . and accepting that the re were many others not recorded here, It is impressive to realise that it took less than three months from starting work on the drawing board until the first engine was running on the test bench. The company history gives it more preci sely as 89 days. The cylinder and crankcase block s of the new engine were made from pure cast iron. The crankcase was termed in two halves, each half including a bank 01six cyli nders . The cylinder heads, In high tensile molybdenum iron, were cre ated for sets of three cylind ers. Each cylinder was 5 inch bore by 5.5 inch stroke. giVing a total capacity 01 21300cc . The cranksnatt ran on seven main bearings and the pistons were aluminium alloy. Separate cam shafts, driven by roller chain, were provided for each bank of cylinder s and early eng ines employed hydraulic tappets , but these suffered from an ingress of dirt and plain tappet s were later substituted Dual ignition was employed . with dist ributors mounted on top ot the engine. along With four Sclex carbu rettors, while

twin fuel pump s we re located beneath the engine where they cou ld be kept relatively cool. The eng ine had a pair of ACSptunx. oil-bath air cleaners which were located in the crew com partmen t while the oil coolers, SItuated either side of the engi ne at the flywheel end . were fed by a large scavenge pump . Separa te water pumps served each cylinder block and an induced dra ugh t cooling fan was boile d to the rim of the flywhee l. A centrifugal governor limited the engine to 2.200 rpm which provided the required 350bhp. Compre ssion ratio was 5.5 to 1 and the torque was measured at 960 tt/tbs. The engine was fitted with a heavy duty, 18 inch Borg & Beck clutch . The belt driven dynamo was located on top of the engine With an a xial electric starter motor mounted beneath the left hand block eng aging an alloy steel gear nng on the flywheel. Apart from the valve problem s already mennoneo there was considerable trouble with cylinde r head gaskets , which had to be redesigned twice , and the big ends of the main connecting rods which had to be strengthened. All of this had to be resolved befo re production could beg in and it is worth noting that the com pany was even obliged to deSign and build ItSown dynamom eters and testing bays while they were working on the enqmes because none of their existmq equipment was capable ot handling it The Tank Board, menti oned in the previous chapter, was first suggested by the Minister of Supply, Mr Herbert Morrison. on 29 May 1940, while dramati c events were unfolding at Dunkirk. Morrison announced the new Board in the House 01 Commo ns on 11 June 1940. The next two weeks were so

22

Chapter 2: Vauxhall Mol ols and the New Tank

becuc that nothing was done so the first meeting did not take place until 24 June, lou r days after the French government surrendered . The situation had changed dra stically. Chair man of the Board was Sir Alexander Roger of BSA ; other members were drawn from British industry and the Trades Union Council, along with the Director Gene ral of Tanks and Transport, Geotfrey Burton. the Director 01Mechanisation and, from the War Otnce. MaJor·General Vyvyan Pope and Bnqacner Douglas Pratt : both 01 whom had just return ed from France . Item 1 on their agenda was : 'To consider (by 27 June 1940) the specificatio n for propose d new Tank A22'. Which did not give them very much time. These original specificatio ns have not survived but a revised set , resulting Irom this first meeting , were virtually a description 01the tank as built. At l he meeting Geoffrey Burton explained that they had been drawn up in order to meet a War Office requirement but bearing in mind most particularly the Prime Minister's wish lor a simpli fied heavy tank to be available in consid erable numbe rs by 31 March 1941. Gene ral Pope commented that he had never seen these cr aft specifications before they were handed 10 him shortly before the meeting bega n but at urst sight he thoughl they ten between two stools ; being neither an infantry tank , nor a mobile wartare tank. There is no point in recording the subsequent comments In detail since we do not know what the specifications were that Ihey commented upon , but me following points are of genera l interest . Clearly the armame nt was 10 include a hullmounted 3 inch howitzer because Gen eral Pope criticised ttus. He believed that two different weapons in one tank could crea te problems with amm unition stowage and it might slow up production . Pope also wanted more armour, if it could be added witho ut seriously increasi ng weight and he wanted a cruising speed 01 t o miles per hour. It seems that in the original specificat ions the turret was to be turned by hand and no rotating 1I0 0r was to be provided Jar the crew. This was considered a retrograde step and Brigadier Pratt agr eed to carry out tests on a Matilda before making further comme nts. There was a lot of discuss ion on methods oJtransporting the lank , which was quoted as being 12 inches wider than A20. Evidentty this was regarded as too wide for genera l rail travel without making special arrangements and the Board telt that this was unacceptable. The alternative , of designing a trailer tor road transpcrtanon . was rejected because It would be o.ttcuu to hnd proou cnon capacity and in any case the combination 01tank and trailer would be too heavy for most Bnnsh roads The Tank Board met again two days later (26 June) , which is when the revised spectcanons were issued . Dougl as Pratt reported on his experiments with the turret of an A 12. The gunner and comm ander, he said , would hav e to be slung This was not a comment on their usefulness but a suggestion that they be provided with sma ll slings, or seats, sus pended from the turret, so that they moved around as it ro-

The g real man him se-lf. Prime Mlni sl er Winslon Chur chill . cig.ar in mouth . is assisled aboar d a Chu rchill la n k. 11 sho uld be remembered th al he was in his tete s i xt ies al lhi s tim e . The la nk is a Mark I, bul lhe :J inch how itzer has nol yel been li ned inl o Ihe hu ll

tated. The loade r coul d manage by shuffling aroun d with the gun. He estimated that this would result in a loss of up to 25 per cent in fighting efficiency but thoug ht it would be acceptable if the alterna tive was a serious delay in production Colonel Blagden, on behalf of Geoffrey Button. explained that revised specificatio ns had brough t the width down to 9 It 3 ms., and that it would now be possible to move the tank by rail if the tracks were removed . This seems to be such a ridicu lous idea that one wonders why anyone should bother to propose It In the first place . Fortunately the Tank Board rejected 11. However the main subject under discuss ion was tha t 01production . No contract or had been appo inted at this stage but It was already clear that manufactu re would be by what was known as the parent system . This involved one company being appcmted prooucnon parents tor the tank but that mucn ot the assembly wou ld be undertaken by sub-contra ctors. These wou ld be respon sible for assembling parts 01 the tanks supervised by the parent . But the various component parts would be provided by a host of lesser sub-contrac tors. The parents would also be provided with what were known as 'free issue' items at government expense ; things such as weapons . radios . telescopes and so on. The Board was suggesllng that each sub-contractor should be made responsible for creating complete tanks so that 'free

23

Mr. Church ill's Tank: The British Infantry Tan k ~rk W

issue' items would be delivered direct to them. The chairman agreed to give this further consideration but since a similar arrangement already appears to have been operating in the case of the Matilda its discussion here is rather puzzling . A special meeting of the Tank Board was held on 28 June in order to consider Sir Albert Stern's suggestions for a super-heavy tank, but the A22 was not mentioned. However when they met again, on 6 July, a new problem had been introduced. A few days earlier the Prime Minister issued instructions to proceed. with a demand for a minimum of 500 tanks to be completed by the following March. This set things humming. Geoffrey Burton had already warned Churchill that it was not practicable to guarantee 500 new tanks in such a short time . The Board agreed and admitted that the minutes of their first meeting probably did not go far enough to stress the revolutionary nature of the design and the difficulties of transporting a 35 ton tank. This. they said, was unexplored territory. especially in matters such as weight and engine power. Vyvyan Pope, who probably did not much like the design anyway. was all for abandoning it. He pointed out that there were already lour approved types of tank in production and that was a good enough reason in itself for not adding a fifth. At least not until more experience had been gained. Clearly he preferred to buy more time in the hope of obtaining a better tank later. Geoffrey Burton argued for the longe r view, saying that he believed work should go ahead on A22 since economies in production might enable larger numbe rs to be available by the autumn of 1941. The Board agreed but felt it necessary to add that the military authorities should be advised not to make any plans based on having 500 new tanks ready by next March. Appreciating that, even as they were talking. huge air battles were raging all over southern England, they added that the risks from enemy bomb ing could easily upset the best laid plans. According to an official summary, issued in 1942, Vauxhall Motors was instructed to begin detailed design work and manufacture of the new tank on an unspecified date in July 1940. All one can say for sure is that it was some time between the 6'" and 22"". On that last date the Defence Committee met to consider Geoffrey Button's report on A22 . The difficulties of trying to produce 500 tanks by next March were pointed out and it was agreed to request a Priority 1A for them. The priority system was laid out in a printed document, issued by the Ministry of Supply on 14 June 1940. In basic terms it was an instruction to manufacturers on how to grade the work they had in hand. Priority 1A covered virtually any thing to dOllNith aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and small arms. Tanks. at this time. came in category 1B along with field and anti-tank artillery, machine-guns and ammunition . Writing to the Director General of Tanks and Transport in September 1940, John Dodd suggested that this system was a nonsense. He pointed out that any contractor with projects in category 1B found. whenever he made ready to start. that another category 1A job landed on his desk which immediately pushed

24

the 1B order further back. To make matters worse most firms, despite working shifts around the clock, always stopped production when an air raid warning sounded and as an example he cited Henry Meadows Ltd., who had only managed five hours of night shift work in one week owing to this interruption. By August 1940 most of the main design features had been settled but very few details had been resolved . Even so a wooden mock-up was well on the way to completion and the first Bedford 'Twin Six' engine was on the test bench. This is not concl usive but it points to a date sometime in the • middle of May when Vauxhall Motors was first ordered to work on the engine. In September the wooden mock-up was approved by the Gene ral Staff and design work was completed, except for the tracks and the gun mountings which had to be modified. Planning for production was said to be fifty per cent complete. At a meeting of the Tank Board. held at Ivybridge House, London. on 20 September 1940 General Pope sounded another warning about guns for tanks. Having reviewed the situation in detail he announc ed that all tank weapons . from machine-guns and smoke mortars to z-couooer guns and 3 inch howitzers, would fail to meet demand by that winter. He pointed out in particular that when orders were placed for the howitzer the A22 infantry tank was not considered, and this had upset all the calculations. With most tanks the 3 inch howitzer was filled as an alternative to the 2-pounder and only on a very limited scale. In an average regiment of fifty tanks no more than ten. but more likely eight, would require the close support weapon . Yet it had been agreed that every A22 should have one in addition to the z-coonoer. adding an extra 500 to the original order which it would be impossible to meet. By October Vauxhall had completed the pilot hull and started putt ing it together but numerous design details remained to be settled and there were problems finding suppliers for suspension units, final drive assemblies and armour castings, presumab ly turrets. Vauxhall Motors was expressing doubts about their ability to have even 200 tanks ready by March and in response to the shortage of 3 inch howitzers a change in armament was being consid ered. To aggravate matters further an instruction was received from the Prime Minister to the effect that tank production would go a lot more smoothly if peop le would simply go ahead and build them, rather than continue endlessly making changes to the design. It was the kind of comment calculated to drive engineers mad and in the case of A22 it was clearly unrealistic. Yet, as usual, Churchill had gone straight to the heart of the problem. Obviously, where something was wrong it would be crazy not to modify it. Yet it was equally foolish to continue making changes for their own sake. It is in the nature of committees to talk every subject to death and, in the process. lose sight of the principle objective . Since the Tank Board was no more than an advisory body its recommendations could be ignored, but they were bound to have some impact

erec te r 2: Vauxhall Motors and the Ne w Tank

and this only served to interfere with prooucuon while they were considered Most of the Information we have concerning Churc hill production comes straigh t from the original contract cards . recorded on a Hollerith type punch car d system specia lly design ed for detailing British military vehicle production. The cards are held in the Tank Museum archive . They are not easy documents to interpret, since many have been corrected more than once, but carefu l study reveal s some interestmq details. and since these are the tust Churchill contra cts 10be ISSUed they probab ly deserve closer examination . Recalling that the initial requ irement . author ised by the Pnme Minister. was for 500 tanks. the first group of contract cards adds up to 485 vehicles , All cards are dated 5 Octobe r 1940 and are mainly in batches of 70 or 75, Vauxhall Motors. as production pare nt. is not included in this first batch but the Master Card (Contract T301) lists 450 tanks not shown elsewhere so this was probably thei r initial contribu tion . Thus the first contract card for Churchill tanks . dated as above , is T747 for 75 Tank s A22t o be Assembled ' by the Austm Motor Com pany. However this order is then marked 'Cancelled', with the date given as 5 December 1940. Thi s appears to be the only one that IS cancelled , all the other s are increased considerably. BUI in their original stale they are as follows'

A Chu rch ill l ank unde r trial atlhe Vata hall Motor,tesling ground . II is li n ed wit h a s upe rst ructu re similar 10 tne t o n th e seco nd A20 and Ih is pi ct ur e shOw s how ea sy it was for m ud to gel all over the hul! and in lO th e o ri ginal patte rn ai r In lets

T752 for 50 tank s With Broo m & Wade Ltd . of High Wycombe T753 for 75 tanks With Newton Chambers Ltd .of Sheffield. The Vauxha ll Master Card , Contract T301 dated 9 December 1940 exists in two forms for 1.950 and 2,775 machine s but this only reflects the rapid expansion of produc tion and the next set. all dated 2 1 Decembe r 1940 . are as follows :

T748 for 70 tanks with the Birmingham Railway Ca rriage & Wagon Company . T749 for 70 tanks with Metro-CammeuCarr iage & Wagon Compan y. also of Birmingham . T750 tor 70 tanks with Leyland Motors of Lancashi re. T751 tor 75 tanks with Denr nsBrothe rs of Guildfo rd.

T754 for 70 tank s With Hattand & Wo1ffof Belfast. T755 for 70 tank s With the Glouces ter Railway Carriage & Wagon Company. T756 for 75 tanks With Beyer. Peacock & Company of Manc hester ,

A22 Mark I T32246 . asse m ble d by Leyland Mot or s. 11has the una r mo ured warning triangle o n the tur r et and the howit zer ca n ju sl be seen at the Ir onl

25

Mr. Churchi ll's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

ment rumb led on , mainly focusing on the respective priority of mechani cal trials at MEE and gunnery trials at Lulworth. The genera l view seems 10 have been that there was little point in check ing out the gunnery arrangements until the tank was seen to be working properly and , as Burton pointed out, none of those so far com pleted could be described as even reasonab ly fit in a mechanical sense. Following Churchill's comments on tank mod ifications, ment ioned earlier, the Tank Board met once more in Novem ber and then went into hibernation. Genera l Pope was scathing and wrote to Sir Andrew Duncan, the new Minister of • Supply, suggesting that he sorted it out. The result was that the Board wa s reconstituted and met again in Jan uary 1941 under its new chairman, Sir James Lithg ow. In its new guise the Tank Board was charged with tak ing dec isions on AFV design on behalf of the War Office , which in effect gave it execut ive powers , wh ile its adv isory role to the Ministry of Suppl y remained as a seco ndary function . Churchi ll, wearing his oth er hat as Minister of Defence , informed the Board that it should concentrate on expand ing production of existing type s for the present although wher e the A22 fitted in to this was not made clear. Not that this cha nged things very much. At their February meeti ng the Board spent a good deal of time discussing wider aspects of tank design and in particular the instruction that in future production of cruiser tank s shou ld have priority over infantry tanks. Which was an very well except that the entire production programme , laid down at the outbreak of war and only altered in the tight of events in France, was geared the other way. It might have been possible but for the joker in the pack , the A22, which had been wished upon the Army by an impetuous Prime Minister. In a letter to Sir James Lithgow, dated 10 February 1941, Comman der E A Micklem of Vickers-Armstronq said ; 'it is clear that the Infantry Tank Mark IV must remain an experimental machi ne for some time to come ... it seems to me quite clea r that unless some definite order of priority is given the re wilt be a serious risk of the Infantry Tank Mark IV Group [meaning the companies under the pare ntage of Vauxhall Motors) absorb ing capacity which could be more usefu lly used on the product ion of one of the establi shed machines', He got his answer two months later when Sir Andrew informe d the Board that the Prime Minister had been pressing for the produ ction of the Mark IV and that the Minister of Supp ly had promi sed to have 100 ready by the end of May and a further 400 comp leted by August. It had, therefore, been agreed that the manufa cturer s should complete 100 tanks to the existing (but flawed ) design as soon as possible and that improvement s incorporated in the later 400 would be carried out on the first batch later. In other words time, energy and mon ey would be expended on 100 useless tanks to keep the Prime Minister happy rather than hold ing up production to achieve a better product. Surprisingly General Pope supported this approach and members of another committee minuted the commen t that one hundred A22 tanks should be completed 'regardless of what they were like' and the final oeci-

It must be emphasise d agai n that wit h the exception of the cancelle d order with Austins all the other firms had their order increased subsequently and that , in every case the firm is contracted 10assemble the tanks, as distinct from manufacturing them . It is possibly a fine distinction but a signi ficant one where the Churchill tank is conce rned . An undated report . issued at the end of 1940, sounded a warning about weapon s. As alrea dy expla ined , the sudden development of A22 se ri ous ly upse t the product ion programme for guns and , altho ugh attempts we re made to meet the new demand s, it was now clear that arrea rs in delivery of the 3 inch howitzer would never catch up. Those tanks for wh ich no howitzer was availab le would be fitted with a hull mounted BESA machine-gun instead. The first pilot model (T 15129) was completed at Luton by Christmas , which by any standards was a remarkable achievement and a secand tank was ready by January 1941. Trials, conducted by Vauxhall Motors , began at once. In what will prove to be an impressive piece of under statement a Department of Tank Design monthly report mentioned'a numbe r of inevitable sma ll defects ... brought to light in the trials' and added that mod ifications would be introduced in prod uction mach ines as soon as possible. It went on to say that the 'behaviour of this vehicle under test had been most encourag ing'. But in its February report things did not sound so good . Bogie wheel failures were becom ing all too common as were bearing failures and problem s with the engine cylinder head gaskets . A War Cabinet Defence Committee meeting held on 26 February announced that two pilot models were being tested and a third was nearly ready. With that kind of optimism only politicians can generate it went on to say the results of these tests were sufficie ntly favourable to justify sta rting prod uction without waiting for the results of further trials and that materials for up to 1,500 Churchills were on order. The Prime Minister then said that production should be pushed forward because of the tank's 'superiority over all other model s'. The Committee therefore instructed the Ministry of Supply to treat the project as top priority. Four more pilot mode ls appeare d; T15 130 from MetroCammell , T15131 from Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wago n, T152 14 from Harland & Wolff and T65440 from Leyland. Deciding what to do with them cause d a slight stir. At a weekly meeting of the Director General of Tanks and Transport's (DGn ) department. on 4 March 1941, it was agreed to issue them as follows ; Pilots 1 and 2 should stay with Vauxhalls , number 3 should go to Ihe Mecha nisation Experimental Establishment, number 4 to the Gunnery School at Lulworth, 5 and 6 10 Bovington Camp wh ile 7 and 8 would be issued to units for user trials. The allocation of eight tanks indicates the use of at least three early production machi nes as. effect ively, pilots. The following week 's meet ing was told that Gene ral Pope did not place MEE high on the priority list. He wished to have the tanks redistributed so that more of them went to units . Geoffre y Burton said that in his view it was up to the DGn to allocate these tanks, not General Pope . and he wished the Genera l to be reminded of this. The argu-

26

Cha p ter 2: Va uxhall Moto rs and the New Tank

An o fficial phOlograp h 0 1a Mark I In whi c h I he hull g un ca n c learly be see n .

sion on their future postponed . Then , like the ghost at the banque t, Sir Albert Stern popped up to say that in his view produ cnon of the Mark IV should be halted in favour of the Mark II (Matilda ), presumably on the grounds that It was at least good enough . Stern was told firmly by Sir And rew that whether production 01 the Mark IV carried on or stopped it would have no ertect whatever on the number of Matildas produced . By March the first pilot A22 had com pleted 620 miles and there was some improvement in the bogie wheel situation , but there is an odd reference to improved cooling whe n none 01the earlier accounts had mentioned a problem . Yet the report goes on to say that the tank 's weight had now reached 38.45 tons , which exceeded the des ign figure so proposals for weight reduct ion were being considered . An altogether more bland report , issued to cover the second half of 1940 descnbes the new tank as we ighing 35 tons laden and hav ing a top speed of 15mph. It also explains that the original nve-soeec gearbox would be replaced by a lour-speed unit in due cou rse but It is mos t interes ting on the subject 01armament. To begin with it states that the new heav y tank has a 2pounder and co-a xiaI7 .92mm BESA in a three-man cast turret. with a 2 inch smoke mortar in the roof. and a 3 inch howrtzer or second BESA machi ne-gun in the hull. It then adds that a plate turret is being developed 10 take a new triple mountmq that is discus sed elsewhere in the report . The triple mounting would place a z- pounoer gun , 3 Inch howitzer and

BESA machine -gun on a common axis mounting In the turret. The scheme was initiated by the Department of Tank Design in September 1940 and a pilot model , expected to be ready by February 194 1, was being developed by vckersArmstrong in conjunction with the old established engineering firm, Stothert & PiU of Bath. The togic behind it was inescapable since it provided any tank that could accept the turret with the ability to lire armour-pie rcing, high explosive or smoke rounds at will. Yet the practical aspects of the project were equally daunting. General Pope had already pointed out the drtncuttres assoc iated with havin g two duterent guns in the same tank, never mind the same turret. The problems for the loade r and gunner, having to serve and operated two breech loading weapons and a machine -gun from within a cramped turret will be obvious enough but one must also consider the difficulties that would arise where three dlHerent types 01ammun ition must all be stowed within easy reach of the loader. Fortunately both main weapons could take the sam e telescopic sight. but that was one of the few positive aspects . In the event this complica ted arrangement never got beyond the prototype stage but it is referred to in a number of accounts on A22 develop ment aroun d this time . Interestingly the same report also ment ions that a suitable mounting for the new 6-pounder gun was also being considered Whatever plans were made concern ing armament they could be consi der ed somewha t academic while delivery of guns was falling behind. We have already seen that the BESA machine -gun was being seriously considered when deliver -

27

Mr. Ch urchill's Tank: The British Infan try Tank Mark IV

one way of keeping it in bounds; that was to we ld the tank's hull rath er than bolt it together . Thi s matte r will be examined in mo re detail later, when the Mark III version is discu ssed, but suffice it to say for the mome nt that by April 1941 a sample of the front end of an A22 hull had been assem bled by a welding process and subm itted for firing trials. The results had been sufficien tly promising for the firm Babcock & Wilcox of Renfrew had been contracted to produce a sample batch of 50 welded hulls ; but more of that later. For the present we are approaching the critical point in our story when the first production tanks were about to ap- • pear and we mus t e xamine the type in some deta il. But before we do it is worth noting some com ments which appeared in an ano nymous docu ment dated 18 May 1941 since it typifies the sort of thinking that bedevilled British tank development throughout the war. The writer is commenting on a paper on tank design submitted by Mr J Weir who had joined the Tank Board earlier in the year. The precise matters raised in his paper are not know n but they main ly concern ed gunnery and the ability of tanks to accept the 6-pounder gun . On the subject of infantry tanks our anonymous respondent explains that the Mark 11 (Matilda) could not accept the e-ooo-oer gun, that the Mark III (Valentine) might but was it worth it? And that the Mark IV (A22) could but it 'is a heavy tank largely owing to its obstacle and trench crossing capacity. Are the tracks vulnerable as they appear from the front, and can the idler be lowere d in future tanks, and the length reduced? If so A22 might become a better all -round infantry tank to carry the e-cocnc er '. Perhaps the question should have been; if A22 is not suitable wo uld it be better to mess the design aro und, or start again? The earliest completed produ ction Chu rchill for which we have any evidence is T3097 1, the first number on the original Vauxhall contract card. It arrived at the Mechanisation Experimental Estab lishment at Chertsey on 24 May 194 1 and took the ir number 1793. It is described as Tank, Infantry Mark IV but noted aga inst it is the single word unarmoured. This is slightly strange since it is not one of the five authorise d pilot model s, which migh t well be built from unarmoured plate, but in theory at least a produ ction machine . It was followed by T3 1347, anoth er of the Vauxhall batch, in July. The full report is not available but from what has survived it is quite clear that suspension and wheel problem s rema ined the most pre ssing yet the report also ment ions other detail de fects that have come to light . Given that the new tank would continue to cause trouble for at least another eighteen months this can be interp reted either as a lack of awareness of the seriousness of these problems or the traditional English habit of ignoring unwe lcome facts in the unjustified hope that they would go away . The final report for this period . that of June 194 1, shows that 14 produc tion tanks had now been completed and blames the delay on mod ificatio ns. Fourteen in June is certainly not 500 by the end of March no matter how much the Prime Minister may have insisted , and things were not des tined to get better for a long time . This same report

ies of the three inch howitzer were in doubt and it now appeared that supplies of BESAs were also in arrears. One school favoured acquiring the American Browning and discussions went ahead with a view to altering the mounting to accept either weapon, bearing in mind that it would also have to be used in the turret. Geoffrey Burton wondered if the Bren gun might not be used instead , but it was pointed out to him that the Bren was too long at the breech end to fit into a tank. As if all this were not enough another report, issued at the end of March, indicated a delay in the supply of gun mountings and it was agree d that tanks for which neither guns nor mounti ngs could be supplied , should be issued with a blan king plate of steel fitted over the opening . If one aspect domina tes all meetings conven ed to discuss the new tank it is the subject of suspensio n and tracks. Spring and bogie roller failures were becomin g endem ic. One solution proposed by vauxballs was to lit rubb er tyres to the road rollers although new tracks would be required as well and the company was working on a man ganese type, but it was not accepte d immedia tely, largely because the supply of rubber was restricted . Yet the rollers , which were of mild steel , seem to have been breaking up with monoton ous regu larity and a number of alterna tives we re suggest ed. One was to harden the original wheels, anothe r was to crea te wheels with mild steel cen tres and high tensile rims while cas t and forged types were also consi dered. Other producers came forward with various hardened steel formulations but none of them stood up to the punishment. Vauxhall Motors produced a bump test rig device which simulated the effect of continuous movement ov er hard ground and this proceeded to destroy virtually every type of wheel tested on it with in about two hour s. Trials carried out in the field were no less disappointing. One carried out by MEE noted that the roller beari ngs overheated so much that paint blistered and on one trip eleve n gallons of lubricant were used on the suspension in eleven miles, which was ridiculous. A Mr Dean of vaux hans came forward with his own modi fications, only to discove r that entire bogies started to fall off. Tracks were equa lly troublesome. The Ford Moto r Company at Dage nham produ ced thei r own steel tracks , and these are said to have been tttted to the first 1QQ mach ines. Vauxhalls believed that a shorter pitch track might be easier on the suspension and starte d to produce something. The OTD report for April gives an upbeat appraisal of the suspension problems but goes on to explain that the engine situation had not improved. A new type of cylinder head, of stronger constr uction , was under intensive testing but the problems had not yet been resolved . Indee d it become s clear in the ne xt report that Vauxhall Motors are having to consider redesigning the heads and block to a more robust sta ndard and that can only mean yet anothe r increase in weight. There is further mention of suspension problems and Vauxhalls are said to be investigating alternative materi als for the wheels. The problem of weight was clearly becoming critical too and. short of reducing the armou r pro tection , there was only

28

e rec ter 2: Va uxha ll Mot ors a nd TheNew Tank

makes the urst mention 0 1 another departure from the anginal prog ramme that we will deal with later, a self-propelled 3 lOch gun on the A22 chassis . Tnat reports were . by now, comi ng 10 thick and fast and they were uniformly negative. One noted that the side mounted air inlets sucked in mud by the gallon and it seems to have got in everywh ere. Mud in the gearbox . mud in the engine valves, mud even in the electrical tnnnqs. so a new design of inlet was devised wh ich drew in the air from above , along with fallen leaves In the autumn . Gearbox trouble was also promment . It had been agreed that the original live-speed box should only be fitted to the first 100 tank s Since complaints were received that It lumped out of top gear, and there was one Incident where two gears we re engaged at the same time. Unfortunately the habit of jumping out of top gear was also Identified in the tour -speed box and In time a commo n fault was oennteo . not In the gear selecto rs . which were different, but the drive dogs which were the same patte rn. Stranqelv . reports from users early in 1942 , suggeste d that the five-speed box gave less trouble but this was dismissed by the autnonnes . The Experimental WlOg at the Departm ent of Tank Design pointed out that since four -speed boxes were

mo re common In Bnusn service trus was a good enough reason to adopt them for A22 but 10any case there were more mmor faults repo rted with the five-speed type . Four-speed bo xes. It seems . did not produce so many faults, but those that were reported tended to be more senous Studying reports trom this penod one is struck by the lack of complaints about the Memtt -Brown transmission. Since it later became one of the chief sources of trouble this might seem surprising, but it may well be due to the limited mileage achieved in the early trials. One source claims thatthe origi· na! brake drums we re too sma ll but there are indications of more serious problems . A mee ting 01 the DGTT's committee suggested employi ng the Amencan Cretrac system Instead but this was rejected on two counts , In the first place It did not provide a neutral turn tacnrty which was believed . In Bntam. to be ioeat tor manoeuvenng tanks IOtatight places . such as the holds 01 smos . Also It could not easily be adapted to lIt into the A22's hull. Oddly , In view of tus earlier cnncrsm. Sir Albert Stern reappears In a DGTT repo rt of 16 July 1941. It seems that an A22 tan k had been supplied for exartunauon by tus Specia l Vehic le Development Cornrmttee. Now that his project for the superheavy tank TOG was coming to a

A Mark I Chu rc hill in M rvic e with the 43" Ro y a' Tank Regiment. The d ist in ct i ve m ark in g on tr o nt and aide is a red/Wh itek ed " ash whic h was adop ted l or ide nllficalion pu rpo ses on Br iti Sh ta nk s at th i s lime.

29

Mr. Churchill's Tonic The British Infantry Tank Mark

belated end Sir Albert was look ing for othe r ways to ma inta in his involvement with tan k des ign . Th e respon se to his offer to help improve the new infa ntry tank is not recor ded a lthough it seems clea r that nothin g ever came of it. Othe r report s, filteri ng back from regimen ts that had the tanks for trials spoke of a dust proble m, when it wasn 't muddy . Air, blown from the lower cooling outle t at the back, swept the dust kicked up by the tracks into a cloud whic h e merged at the front of the tan k and blinded the drive r, Com ments were also made about the tank 's ability as a gu n platfo rm. The suspension ga ve such a rough ride that it made firing on the move almost impossible, and firing on the move was rega rded as normal practi ce by the British . And then there was the noise. Another report des cribed it as terrific and fore cast that it wou ld damage the heari ng of crew memb ers. As it was mo st men were deaf for 48 hour s after a run in the tank and even after that crews were de scrib ed as loo king shak en and incapable of concentrati on. While work went on to remed y the problems it was agreed that trouble co uld be minimised if the tanks were restr icted to 10mph and this cou ld be ac hieved by blocking off top gear . Th is speed was the maxim um that cou ld be ac hieved without having the tank start to pitch uncomfortably. MEE repo rted

rv

that the tracks and suspension of A22 made it unsu itable for rocky or des ert ground and they also registered two gearbox failures . The DGTI, Geoffrey Burton , decla red 30 JUly 1941 as Decision Day for the A22 , but it was an empty dead line. The staff at Fa rnbo rough stated that their idea of a success ful test would be when the tank was able to trave l 1,000 miles at 12 mph , and they did not mean cove r 12 miles in an hour by vary ing the pace but maintai ning a steady 12 mph for long periods . Burten reminded them that unless A2.2could be made batt lewo rthy Britain would be without a 6-pou nder armed tank unt il the Ma rk VII Cruise r was ready , so me time in 1942. And Butt on had alrea dy promised that a tank with a e-oounoer gun would be read y for service by the end of 194 1. In Sep tember 1941 , at the suggestion of the Prime Minister, an order was print ed which gave all British tank s a name. Until now, with the exce ption of the Matiloa and Valentin e, most tank s were known eithe r by their Gene ral Staff A numbe r, suc h as A9 and A 10, or their official title such as Light Tank Mark VII or Cru ise r Tank Mark V, which beca me the Tetra rch and Covenanter respectively. The A22, or Infantry Tank Mark IV was to be know n as the Church ill. Whether this was intend ed as an honour or a rebu ke is not clea r, but it appears to have been taken in the former spirit.

.

30

~

3

The Churchill Described

ing of more co mplex shape wh ich oHered e xtra support to the track pin but presented a less aggressive surlace to the groun d. Thi s, no doubt , as a result 01subsequent exper ience in the desert These cas t steel links were shorter than the plate type so 144 links were required to encircle the tank rather tha n 140 . However they we re also a good dea l heav ier, by 11 Ibs per link . The tracks were not intercha ngeable . The diHerence in pitch demanded that the id ler and drive sprockets had to be cha nged with the track s. Again, based on ea rlier unl ortu nate experience, the track pms were not fubncateo Simp le as they look the suspensio n units were extremely com plica ted . The rollers. 01which there was a pair on each axle shah, were Ilanged like railway wheels and steel nmmed . which probabl y account s lor a lot of the noise transmitted 10

What follows is a reason ably co mprehensive oe scno uon

ot the Chur chill Mark I and it will serve in gen era l term s for all etthe main production models up 10 Mark VII , which in many respect s ca n be regarded as a new lank . Inte rim changes of mark will be dealt with as they occur . Two types of tra ck were provided tor the early Church ills, one 0 1 whi ch wa s 01Fir st World War style . Thi s con sisted of a shaped plate of pressed steel. riveted 10 interna l ba rs which held the track pins and acted as guides . Each lin k presented a heavy raised lip 10the ground which was suppose d 10 give better tracnon In mud ; designed as a result 01exper ience in France in 1940. il ls seen in som e of the ea rliest photogr aph s of Cnurctuntanks after which it rapid ly. an d me rcifully, disappears . The second type was formed from a single steel cast-

fI i

A Churchi ll Mark I phOl ogr aphed l or th e fr onti sp iec e of the o ri gi nal lnlan l ry Tank Mark IV hand book. Th is e.ample is fitted with t he ori ginal sty le 01 heavy . bui lt-u p trac ks .

31

MI. C hurc hill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

A new hull on tne ass em bly tme s how m g the fl anged rollers and sus pensIOn on fu ll stretCh. Nol l ce the l ive humps whiCh carried lhe l op run of l he trac ks . the se were laler replaced by lull lenglh sk id rai ts.

One bugbear 01 lhe Par enl sy stem of construct ion was th at parts of eaCh tank had to be moved around lhe c ou ntry from one factory to anot her . Her. a basic hull assembly is $eefl on the b3ck 01 a civi lian lo rry . a rigid eigh t-wheeled AE C Mammoth Maj or .

the Inside of tneta nk The shaft ran through white metal bear ings (whiCh replaced the onqmal bronze bushes) in a curved steel bracket known as the bogie frame , The axle shaft was hollow and served as a reservoir for lubricant. The bogie frame was pivoted near Its centre on a boss mounted on the boqte support bracke t. The upper end of the bogie frame pressed against a rebou nd pad which limited Its travel. At the lower end was the roller assemb ly which was crowned by a steel knife edge . ThIS pushed against a plate at the lower end at the spring assembly . Each bogie Included four coil springs fitted one inside the other. The outermos t spring. which was also the heaviest . was the main toad carrie r. assisted by the next inner. which was of lighter cons tructio n, Inside that was the bump er spring which only functi oned after the oute r springs had moved through most of their deflection. As its name implies the bumper spring helped to take the strain of the last three-quarters of an inch when the bogie took a heavy blow, The innermost spring. which was of very light construction, only served to restrain the bum per spring. Each bogie was capable of maximum 3 inch deflection and 2 inch rebound but rebound was restricted on certain bogies to im prove the ride, A single bogie unit weighe d 336 Ibs and there were eleven of them on each side of the tank. all ident ical except tor the thickness of their rebound pads . The leading bogie on each side norma lly ran clear of the ground and only came into play whe n the tank attacked a steep bank or other obstacle . The second bogie had limited rebound and was not load bearing either. On a hard, level surface It stayed clear to shorten the length 01track in contact WIth ground . Boqtes three through ten suppo rted the tank at all tunes . They were arranged . equally spaced , ertner side of the centre 01gra vity, The last bogie was regarded mainly as a track tensooer and had nnuted deflection. Indiv idual bogies were bolted direct to the hull and . apart from the rebound pads . were interchangeabte. The high track proule. inherited trcm A20 . was in keeping With perceived role 01 the Churchill as an assault tank that

might have to deal With scbstanuar trenches . which was another First World War concept. On ItS return run the track was supported on a series ot nve curved skids on each side instead of rollers but this feature must have introduced some roiling resistance . To enhance the Great War connection even further both the dnve sprocket at the back , and the idler whee l at the front (which was also the main track adjusting whee l) were toot hed . This technique had been employed on the very first tanks but pr o ved troublesome because the tracks stretched quickly and failed to mesh with both sproc kets . The fact that it could be employed successfully on the Churchill at least sugges ts that some progress had been made in track materials and design since 19 16. The reason for fitting teeth to the idler must have been to prevent the track from working its way off at the front. The Churchill employe d a twin drive system. meaning that the drive sproc ket had two toothed rims engag ing With the edges of the track. which is normal practice althoug h it could be more easily affected by stones or other fo reign bodies which were picked up by the tracks The armou red hull was arrange d in what tank desig ners called pannier fashion . That is the armoured portion of the hull extended sideways to the outer edges of the tracks . The difference being that in this case the pannie rs were within the compass of the tracks whereas on tanks such as the American Sherman or German Tiger the hull panniers extended above the tracks . Construction was descr ibed as double box girder since each pannier formed a rectangu lar structure on each side . creati ng a hull of immense streng th. All hull plate s were lIat and assembled by nvetmq on early models . the respecnve thickness 01the various plates can be seen from the diagram . Large. square doors were located in the panniers on each side . just behind the driver's seat. and further back were the air intakes . As already explained these were shaped to draw in air from below but. since the top run of the track was exposed they suffered greatl y from mud pour ing down from above and water picked up from below, working Its way in. Pt.

32

Cha pter 3: The Churc hill Described

CHURCHILL HULL BODY A d rawin g sho win g tM me tn h ull s truc ture.

CHURCHILL

EMERGENCY EXIT DOORS & ROOF PLATES

A dr awing showing the hu lf roof including the area aro und the turr et ring and overhead escape hatch es 'or the driver and hu ll machine-gun ner .

33

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infa ntry Tank Mark IV

CHUR CHILL ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOORS & ROOF PLATE A drawing showing the fea r hull roof and ha tc hes above the engine end transmission compartments.

~..-0-- - ~,~'" [!J i

,

.

.

e:F;?:: ?2b PANNIER DOORS AND REVO LVER PORTS DRIVER 'S LOOK · OUT DOO R

CHU RCH ILL

Draw ing s of the d river's look-out door and hull s ide door

34

Cha p ter 3: The Churc hill Desc ribed

light steel plate was added just above eac h intake to divert the mud but It did not work very well and in any case so much was thrown up by the track s that It went everywhere. Th is problem was on ly a llevia ted later when the tanks were filled with full leng th mudg uards , The inta kes exte nded the width of the tan k beyo nd the railway loading gauge so they were cesqoeo to unbolt and were earned on the engine decks when the tank was transpo rted by rail. The rearmos t vertical plate was spaced away from the mam hull struc ture to provide out lets. bOth above and below. for the warm air tha t had been drawn across the enqme . The uppe r hull . behind the turret , was formed from an arrangeme nt of hatches which provided access to the engine and transmission . This was also the location for the exhaust pipes and Silence rs. The turret ring Itself was Just 54 men diameter and ahe ad of It was a flat plate contanunq the overhead hatches for the driver and hull gunner . The former sat on the righ t. in a part of the hull which was stepped down to provide him with a forward facing doo r through which he could view the road . To t us left was the gunner . serving the 3 men howrtze r on the Mark I. The driver, like tus predecessor 10 the First World Wa r. had a very limit ed view. Even with the Iront VISiondoo r ope n his vie w to left or right was blocked entirely by the high tme of the track s a nd If he did wish to see to the sides his only means was a pa ir of rotating periscopes that ottered a very urmteo field of view . In fact he relied 10 a grea t extent on mstrucuons from his commander. The 3 Inch nowuzer mou nting . to the left of the dr ive r. was fitted In such a restricted spac e that ItS potentia l perf ormance was seve rely limited . The gun was controlled in bot h elevation and trave rse by gea rs and hancwheels but move men t was limi ted. Maxrmum elevation was 9 deg rees and depression 5 degrees whi le traver se was rest ricted by the width of the hull betwee n the ho rns. Nine degrees of elevation. for a howit zer type weap on , was a serious handicap , In idea l con ditions the weap on could fire a shot of around 131bs. at a mu zzle ve locity of 600 feel per second to a max imum range of 2,500 yards . In trials at the Lulwort h Gun nery Schoo l

A sce ne et tne Lond on Doc ks in July 1941. PrOl ot y pe Chu rchill T309 72 ha. jusl u sed a spec ial tamp wa gon 10 climb o nto a Aec l ank I rans po rte r wagon . Hig h ran king o fficers horn the War Office have arrived by mOl o r coach 10 walch l he demonslration

Th ing s do nol alwa ys go acco rd ing 10 pl an . Rail way statt and c iv ilians watc h as so ld iers pr epare 10 resc ue a Chu rchi ll l ank w hic h appea r s 10 have l all en o H a r ail way wa go n. The laea l ion c t ttu s embarr ass ing event has no l bee n esl abli sh ed

--

the maximu m ranges achieved were 2,400 yards firing high expl osive and' ,550 with a smo ke shell Fifty eight rounds of three inc h ammunition wer e stowed, 29 ro und s per side , In the hull pan nie rs ahea d of the side doo rs. The oHicial stow age diagram doe s not disting uish be tween high explosive and smo ke rou nds in the Church ill I, alt hough ttus is normal practice in othe r clos e support tanks In every other case smoke roun ds out number high exprostve by a co nsiderable amount but there is reason to believe that in the case 01 the Ch urchill hig h exprosrve shells form the main component . Tt us ISsuggested by a report from Lulworth which no ted that the range scale . attached to the gun . was only gradua ted tor high expjosrve rounds . It would fit Withthe tank's role as a direct assault weapon . Whether It proved possible in prac tice , since delivery of high explosive rounds qotmto serious arrears . ISano ther matter

The driv ers loc ati on in a Ms rk I Chur chill . The tnree 1001 peda ls and gear change leve r are obvious bu l one ca n also see lhe hand leba r steer ing con l rol and t he bar lh al li n ks Ih i s wi l h anOl he r lev er. o peral ed by lhe hull gunner on the le"

35

Mr. Churchill's Ta nk: The British Infantry Ta nk Mark IV

The driver 's controls are illustrated and the only feature to remark upon is the handlebar style stee ring lever in place of the normal floor mounted levers. Anot her unusua l feature is the half handlebar provided for the front gunne r and the ignition cut out switch. Both would be helpful in an eme rgency but the steering lever would also be useful to the gunner when laying the howitze r on a ta rget. The turret for Church ill I is of interest since it was the first attempt by British steel makers to create a complete cast turret, all in one piece. Infantry tanks Mark I and 11 had cas t turrets but in each case the roof section was made from rolled plate, bolted or welded into place . Infantry tank Mark 111, the Valentine, also had a turret combining both types of armour but that designed for the Churchill was ent irely cast , and one is justified in asking why? Inch for inch cas t armour is not as effective as rolled plate so, in orde r to achieve the same degree of protection, cast armo ur has to be app roximate ly five per cent thicker, and conseq uently heavier . We have already noted that in the case of A20 the designers we re planning to create a rolled plate versio n of the Matilda turret wh ich would not only be lighter, but easier and quicker to asse mble. Large castings presented the designer with two difficulties. In the first place it was not always easy to create a tu rret that was of varied thickness on diffe rent planes. Seco ndly there was a serious risk of distortio n whe n the casti ng was heated and cooled to achieve the hardening process. That these problems were success fully overco me is regarded as a remark-

able achievement fo r the British steel industry but it still does not expla in why it was done. There was no protective mantlet in the normal sense, just three slots in the front of the casting for the 40m m (2-pounder) gun in the centre , the 7.92mm BESA machine-g un on its right and the number 30 sighting telescope on the left . The tu rret was rotated by electric powe r and the controller gave two speeds. Fast had the turret all the way round in 15 seconds while the slow speed com pleted the 360 degrees in 24 seconds. The control could also be switched to manual so that the turret cou ld be turned by hand . During the design stage there had been talk of providing the tank with geared elevation for the co-a xial mounting but this had been abandoned in favour of free elevatio n, whic h was standard British practice at th is li me. This requirement evolved from the British obsession with tan ks firing on the move , where most other countries prefe rred the practice of halting to fire. Firing on the move requires that the gun is easily adjusted to compensate for movement s of the tank, and since this was before the days of automatic stabilise rs in tanks the Churchill had to rely on its gunner. In action he wo uld stand, or rather stoop, to the left of the gun, his right hand gripping the trigger and his eye pressed to the sight while his left hand grasped the traverse control. As the turret swung round he was carried with it by the rotating floor but in order to counter the pitching of the tank he bent his knees and used his body weight to cont rol the aim of the gun. To operate the gun accurate ly under these (text con tinues on page 42)

CHURC HILL i. u, Ill. SUS PENSION UN IT BOGIE Nos. 2,9 & 10. Detail s o f a typ ical suspension unit .

36

Cha pter 3: The Churchill Described

C~ '.()VFl. AG E ~ E1 J~ ~,~

J·p,£C£ WATE" Pll()()l' COV£ll 2H~TPOlES'8·

.. n,pllO"tl'O S'"'I'S IDoSCS GllOIJI' RTR, was 141 Regiment Royal Armoured Corps. or 141 RAC as it was known. The regimen t had been crea ted in Novemb er 1941 by converting an infantry battauon. in this case 711> Battalio n the Royal East Kent Regiment. popularly known as the Buffs. The need to expand the tank arm of the British Army had already been agreed but It could only be done as sufficien t tanks became available. Nothing could have been more soul oestroymq for

50

these proud regIments. whOprobably regarded tanks as nasty. dirty things at the best 01limes . than to take awa y their nues and give them noth ing in return . Even so the Buffs behaved true to lorm and did their level best to avoid menuonmq anything to do With machinery in their war diary. Indeed their pre occupation with trivia is almost breathtak ing On 15 January 1942 the war diary record s that a Court of Enquiry was convened, headed by a Major with two subalterns in support, to enq uire into how a certain Corporal had managed to wear out two pairs of boots to the exte nt that they were beyond repa ir in a mat ter 01weeks. Surely the good corporal could not hav e been march ing that much . now that his regiment had t anks? But the outcome is not recorded . On 24'" January they also had a vtsutrom GeoHrey Burton, presumably on the same mission as his VISl!to 10'" RTR, but they do not actually say so. On 6 February 1942 the war diary does mention Universal Carners and on the 18'" they go to Linney Head In South Wales tor gunnery trials. but they still do not mennon tan ks. Eight days later they are forced to revea l the truth. Secon d l ieut enant Neal and four men take a Churchi1lto the Royal Air Force station at Biggln Hill in Kent to take part in a demonstration to show how armoured formations should co-o perate with aircraft. The 43' Battalion the Northumberland Fusiliers from Newcasne-upon-Tyne. Ttus transmon took place in 1938 but on 19 Octobe r 1941 they had just moved from Brighton to Welbeck Abbey . They had three Churctnusat this

Ch a p ter 4: Early Trials

time , 18 by the end of the mo nth and 43 at the end of No vem ber. By the en d of the yea r the y were ab le to report tha t the ch angeover from Matildas to Churchills was almo st comp lete . O n 7 February nine Chu rcluus from th e 43'd, alon g w ith th ree from 144 RA C and three from 148 RA C , unde rtoo k a 32 mi le road march to Mrdhope Range s nea r Sh effield for a live firing exerc ise . They repo rted var ious minor trou bles on the way but only one tank broke do wn co mplete ly, and tha t was tak en back to the tank par k, Th ey cam e back on the 14"', and the war diary refers 10 'a number 0 1 mec ha nical breakdowns ' . Then. on the 25 '" comes their big test . For the hrst time since It was equ ipped with Cnurctuns. the entir e batta lion too k to the road for a 32 mile march with 36 tan ks . The w ar d iary is bnet bu t posmve . saymq tha t they had little mech anical troubl e but eight wireless se ts failed. which is no t bad going . On 3 April they record the amva! 01 their hrs t Churchill Ma rk 111.

At C row borough In Susse x 5 1" Royal Tank Reg iment (RTR) , a nother Mat ilda ur ut. record s the arr iva l of its first A22 on 10 Ju ly 1941 and its seco nd two day s later . Th is is on e regimen t that goes IOtO exphcrt deta il and shows that both tank s are of the Mark IVA, or Chur ch ill 11 type , altho ugh it ne ver menti on s the nam e at all. Further th e tank s are sho wn as T314 96 an d T 3 1497 w hich wou ld hav e bee n the hrst two pr od uction Cnurctuns co mpleted by Metr o-C amm eu. Mo re Mark IVA tan ks arrive in a steady tric kle fro m late Ju ly and on 29 Se ptember the regi me nt pa rticipat es in Exercise Bumper, 0 1 whic h mo re anon, In Novemb er a nd De cembe r the wa r diary reco rds the arrival of some Mark IV (clos e suppo rt) tanks which mus t mean Mark Is With the 3 inch howit zer. This reveals an interesunq de tail. As we have already seen the original plan was to equip every Churchill tank With the howitzer so that the close sup-

Fam ili ari sal io n ; young soldiers fro m an infanl ry reg imen t get to kn o w Churchill tank s of 43'" RlR during an exercise nea r Brockenhurst in the New For est in t942 .

51

Mr. C hurc hill's Tank: The British Inlantry Ta nk Mark IV

Two Churc hill . , the leadi ng o ne w ith th e u nl ik el y name 01 Cas/(et or Gas ket, are d irected oft a co un try lane int o woods du ring an el.e rci se

appea rs in the war diary and of all those inspected for this period none makes any co mme nt whate ver about the new tank s, good , bad or indifferent. Oune dmerent again was the case of the North Insh Horse This regimen t was a Yeomanry , or volunteer cavalry force raised be fore the First World War. It subsequently con verted to a rmoured ca rs but then Changed again to become an Infan try tank regiment , equipped With Valentines. Statronec at Ballyklnla r in Northern Ireland II suffered from be ing at the end of the supply line , and the delivery of tanks was painfully

port distinction would not exist, but tt us entry see ms 10 indicate that regiments were not aw are of this and, being used to the idea of havi ng a small proport ion of close support Mati ldas Withtheir regular gun tanks, they make the same assumption about the Churchills. Wha t they fail to explain is whether, by rtus lime , the Prio rity on smoke and high explosive ammunition has changed . On 16 Decembe r 194 1 a Lt Col Disney Barlow amves from the War Office 'to ca rry out speca! tes ts on the Mark IV' but the re is no explana tion . Presum ably the regimenl had been co mplaining but I1 so not a hint of this

A parti all y rew orked Churc hill Mark I swi ngs o ut ot a side road under th e dir ecti on of a military poli cem an . The turret cre w ha ve a Br en li ghl m achine-g un sta nd ing between th em .

52

Ch apter 4: Early tnos

slow. Yet one wonders why. being on the doo rstep of Harland & Wolff so to spea k, they did not receive Churctuus a lot earlier - unless the Belfast tmn was late with its deli veries . As It was the regiment moved to England in Oct ober 1941 and the war diary. which seems obsessed with disciplinary matters, only mentions the move ment of B vehicle s, the reg imental transport. Nothing is said abou t tanks at all . The North Irish Horse is now based at Westbury in Wiltshire but on 26 February 1942 the regiment goes briefly to the firing ranges at Casuemartm In South Wales where It does firing practice on Cnu rctuns. Nowhere else In the wa r diary around this time does one find tanks mentioned at all. It must be assu med tnattney took over Cburctuus on arrival in England . or shortly afterwards , but official confumaucn is lacking ThISsurvey ISby no means compre hensive . AI least five more British reqrments conve rted to Churchills over the penod up 10 Apnl 1942. and others would soon follo w. but It does serve to provide a flavour of how the tanks were distnbuted . the extent to which regiments repo rted on them and. 10 some extent . the ways in which they were used. There are no overt siqns of trouble . although the tour of Chu rchill regiments by Geoffrey Burton provides a hint. Apart from those 'Nlth a penchan t for concentratmq on the crimes of their per sonnel the war dianes give a consis tently up-beat impressron. The extent to wtnch this was all part of a positiv e, war winnmg outlook is unposstbte to judge, but there is another , less creditable exprananon. The war diary is normall y com piled by the regimental adjutant and then signed. on a day to day basis . by the commandmg office r. Now although it is by no means true of the entire Bnnsn Army; the Roya l Artillery and Royal Enqmeers being among the notable excep tion s. the average British officer was not really expected 10 know how things work. or even why. It was his job to command . and set an example for those that do. Again, with due allow ance for individual exceptions. it has '10 be said that this ten dency was honoured . almost to the point of becoming de rigueur . in the Royal Armoured Co rps. Perhaps , then , the attitude enshrined in some of these war diarie s was primari ly the result of studied indIfference, or ignorance . Quite possibly those that compiled the diary. who must have been aware that all was not well on the lank park . could not expla in why, and proba bly did not Wish to know, or display their ignorance This atntude cont rasts sharply with that of the man ufacturers . In May 194 1 Vauxha ll Motors printed a small leaflet on cheap , yellow wartime paper which they caused to be inserted into early editions of the vehicle handboo k. The six page document was headlined PO INTS TO WATCH and what followed was a list of known taults along with tips on how to muumise them and an explanation of what was being done to correct them . Tucked msrde the front cove r of each handbook It was available to be read by all who had anything to do Withthe Churchill tank and as such is probably unpara lleled. not Just In the tank world but in the defence industry gener ally. It must have had official sanction to appear there in the first place but It would have been exceptional in any army. never mmc the Bnusn

53

A Canad ian tr oo per cl utc hing an early panern Thomp son sub-ma chineg un . shelte rs al the back 0 1 his tank . Tank crews carried revol ver s as th eir per son al weapofl s bUI th e Tomm y Gun was also avai lable and ca n be seen o n th e stowa ge d iagram s

Ot cou rse there was an ulterior motive in such transparent hones ty. It was not simply a matter of laying their cards on the table. Vauxhall Motors manageme nt were recrurtmq the rank and tile to their side . They expla ined that these faults were not endem ic; they were the result 01hasty developmen t under urgent, wartim e conditions. but they would be put right. By treating the men as adults. and taking them into their confidence. the company deflected a lot of unhelp ful criticism This was further improved by sending teams of enginee rs from the factory to work with the men on their tanks and it wa s a refreshing appr oach . Othe r compa nies . which like Vauxhall Motors were household names , were respon sible for supplying equally dreadful tank s but nobody ever heard tnem admit it Because il was organised along British lines the Canadian Army was also persuaded to create one army tank brigade in additio n to its more conventional armoured brigades First Canadian Army Tank Brigad e wa s created at Camp Borden . Ontario. in Febru ary 1941. It comprised the Ontario Regiment , TrOIS RlVle res (Three Rivers) Regiment and the Calg ary Regiment which join ed in March. They were otnerwise know n more prosa ically as the 11"'. 12'" and 14""Army Tank Battalions respectively The Canadian Official History is a little confusing in lis treatment of them , claiming that most of the brigade had arrived in Britain by July and was virtually complete by September 1941 . At first the tank battalions appear to have been equipped WIth Meuioas althoug h Canadian industry was gearing up to build Valentines . A pho togra ph in the omcra!history shows an early Churchill . apparently belonging to the Calgary Regiment. driving through a bombed house on the Isle of Wigh l and ttns ISsaid 10 have taken place in June 1942. The

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61

Mr, Churchi ll's Tank: The British Infan try Tank Mark N

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Royal Tank Regiment. In February 1942 the regiment had sent each of its three

squadrons up to tnverary for combined operations training and in May B Squadr on, with one troop from A Squadron, went across to the Isle of Wightto practise landing techniques with the Royal Navy The location chosen for the trial was Thorness Bay, on the island's north coas t. The craft they emp loyed were Landing Craft. Tank Mark III or LeT (3); 640 ton vesse ls powered by two Davey Paxman diesel engines. Each LCT was capable of carrying five 40 ton tanks. Another problem which had to be considered was the movement of tank s from the deck of the landing craft to the beach . Most tank s could pass through still water betwee n eighteen inches and two feet deep without suffering any harm but when it got any deeper special arrangements had to be considered . At sea the problem was aggr avated by tide and waves . Early work on waterpro ofing was carried out by the Department of Tank Design, Special Devices Branch at Westwa rd Ho! in North Devon . When the Roya l Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) was formed in May 1942 it too k over respon sibility for applying the techniques.

Tank s and inf antry ashor e after land ing during the same or a sim ilar exe rcise . These tanks retain lull deep wading gear which wou ld nor m all y be d umped althis stage.

A Chur chi ll Mar k 11 01A Squ ad ron , 48'" RTR, abo ul to dr ive as hore from a landi n g craft . The ab sence .~; an air inle t, at leasl on th is side , suggest s tha t th ere was a ri sk of fouling th e nar row entrance .

76

Chapter 6: With the Cana d ia ns

Abo ",e: PhOlog rap hed fr om the sho re at Too rne as Bay 00 the Isle of Wigh tlh. sa me lank Is see n cl imb ing o nto dry land . TLC 316 was an LCT (3). Furt her o ft shore TLC 151 was an LCT (2) . Rlghl : The teue mea ning 0 1 Deep Wading . A Churchill at prel1y well maxi mum de pth but sllll go ing slro ng . The pe nnants o n Ih e wireless aeria ls may well have bee n inlended as mar ke rs in the even t of an accide nt, whic h is no doub l why the salely boa t is staying c lose by.

The waterproofing of all military vehicles was devised to cover two requirements; shallow wading, which protected the vehicles in water up to three feet deep and deep wading , which allowed it 10 operate in six feet 01water. Landing from the ocean , where waves would be enco untered and the level of a beach could vary. demande d the latter, so that was the method adopted tor the Churctnns at Dieppe . Preparation 01 the tank demanded a tremendous amoun t 01work. It involved III ling virtually every seam between hatches . doors and even panels 01 armour With specrat ptasuc compoun ds and then further covering vulnerable apertu res . such as gun moun tings and ventila tors , With waterproo f sheetmq made Irom balloon tabnc. Electrical components like the starter motors . dynamos, distributors and even the instrumen t pane l also had to be protected and , most impo rtant of all , somet hing had to be done to permit the tank to txeatne Without being swamped This was achieved on the Churc hill by filting three hollow, rectangula r ducts over the two side air inlet and single rear outlet louvres. These ducts were about turr et top level when

77

unec and open at the top, and in addition the exhaust pipes were extended and raised to about the same height 0 1 course all ttus treatmen t sever ely limited the tank's abilily to perform. Once it had all been applied it was unwise to dr ive the tank very tar since waterprooling integrity rapidly deg raded . And once the tank landed it was vital 10 get rid 01it as quickly as possible. As soon as the tank was clear 01the

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The BnnsriInfantry Tank Mark IV

Calgary Regiment. oesmneo the mat-laying apparatus to overcome this. However Ihe beach at Dieppe was cnert . nOI shingle. Chert is alarm 01rock found in chalk which appears as large boulders rathe r than small stones like shingle . 1Ianything It IS even worse than shingle , being Just as liable 10 break tracks but even more difficult to drive over. One curious change adopted for the actual operation was the decision to use Landing Cratt . Tank, Mark 11 or LCT (2) instea d of LCT (3) for the actual landing. The LCT (2) was a shorter version 01 LCT (3) displacing 453 Ions (laden) and capable of carrying juslthree Churchill tanks and one other small vehicle as required . Ten of these craft were allocated to land thirty Churchill tanks . Eighteen of them were Churchill Mark Ill . five Churchill 11 and seven Cnurctuut . three of which were flamethrowers . Three Mark Ills and two Mark Is carried carpet laying equipment and seven tanks were orqamsed to tow Daimler scoul cars ashore Operanon Butter . tne original name for the Dieppe raid was scheduled tor June . postponed until July and then cancelled . This caused dismay at Combined Operations headquarters and disappointment among the troops and there was continual pressure from British public opinion wtucn was demanding a 'Second Front Now!' to support the Soviet Union. Taking all these factors into consideration the scheme was revived as Operation Jubilee which , weather and uces permitting. would take place on 19 August 1942.

water, levers inside the crew compa rtment released the ducts, which fell aside , while small charges of Cordtex explosive were detonated to clear away sealant from weapon apertu res. ventilators and the turret ring Only then was the tank considered fit to fight. The decision to make the Dieppe Raid largely a Canadian operation was taken on 30 April 1942 and the Calgary Regiment slipped Into the role onqmauy allotted to 48'" RTR. They even took over some of that regiment's tanks ; special versions 01 the Churchill thal had been adapted as flamethrowers and carpet layers but these . coming under the headIng of specialised armour , fall outside the scope of this study Amphibious training was continued at "rnomess Bay and at Sealord in Sussex where a section 01sea wall similar to that at Dieppe could be lound . Another site was the tiny fishing harbour 01 West Bay, on tne coast near Bndport in Dorset. This last location was selected because , In a miniature way, it was a replica 01 Dieppe . A small harbour behind a typical shingle beach , overlooked by high cliffs on each side . Even so the choice of a shingle beach oocaies that those ptanning Ihe raid were by no means tncrouqh enough , and this may be due to the excessive degree of secrecy applied . Tests had already shown that Churchill tanks did not perterm well on shingle , It got Into the tracks and caused them to break , while on sleeper slopes , even quue short ones , the tanks would dig In untd they could not move either way. A member 01 the Royal Canadian Engineers , attached 10 the

Short ly before the Dieppe Raid 14- Canadian Ar m y Tank Regi men t (the Calgarya) para de dur ing e aererse Yuk on 11 . NOlice th e reg ime n!' s Daim ler Dingo sc out ca rs hned up away ove r o n the left .

78

Chapter 6 : With the Ca nad ia ns

Although the full ope ration involved land ings at various locations on a ten mile Iront the mam terce of tanks and mlantry would rut the town, square on , in successiv e waves Once across the beach and over the esplanade wall the attackers would cross the broad promenade and gardens , enter the town and make for the heig hts beyond where they would support a flank attack on the anuelc . Once a perimeter had been formed around the town various demonnon and cul ling out operenons would begin , follo wed by a withdrawal to the beach and embarkanon lo r England. In the event it did not work out anythi ng like that at all The enure regiment , that is 58 tanks, mobilised for the operation but 28 of them, that is all 0 1 A Squadron and elements 01C Squadron rememec aboa rd their landing craft as a ftcatmq. offshore reserve . Twenty nine of the othe r thirty tank s roll ed down the ramp s of thei r landing cra ft. Two drowned in deep water and 01the 27 that reached the beach 15 managed to climb the sea wall onlo the promenade . And this was no mean leat. The carpet laying devices had been designe d to assist this stage of the advance but the plan included a requirement that enginee rs should Iotlc w the first tanks ashore, carrying large baulks 01 timber which they would then use to build ramps for other tanks to cli mb over. Needless to say ttns Idea failed completely Enqmeers we re also deta iled 10 bnng exp losive charges ashore and destroy the huge concrete obstacles that had been construc ted by the Germans to prevent tank s moving further mto the town and , smce none of these men were able to complete their tasks none 01the tanks got further than the promenade. After light ing hard lor most of the mommq . ten tanks made thei r way back to the beach 10 cover the Infantry in their withd rawal but enemy fire was so heavy that relatively lew men actua lly got away. If the scheme had gone to plan the tanks would now have re-embarked , along with the troops, leavi ng the facilities devastated and the Germ ans, presum ably, bewildered . But with hindsight It is obvious that the plan was over optimi stic and British intelligence seriously faulty, Although they were not lorewa rned of the raid, except by a brief naval action a few minutes betcre the landing , Ge rman troop s on the Channel coast were gene rally alert to the threat 0 1 invasio n and well prepared to meet it. The first wave of troops met a Withering fire which they were never able to suppress and as mo re men and tanks arrived , casualties mounted . On the other hand the tanks stood up well to enemy lire and the main prob lems were caused by tracks breaking and turrets becoming Jammed. In all fourteen of the Calgarys were killed. but only two of those that got ashore made It back to England and , needless to say the only tanks that returned were those in the floating reserve and one from regimental headquarte rs which never managed to get ashore. The Allied lessons of Dieppe are beyon d the scope 0 1 this work but It gave the Germans a chance to evalua te the Churchill at their leisure . As the prisone rs were round ed up. wounded and dead removed and the tires died down , the tide crept in to swamp some of the tanks. Those that were

79

An unusual photograph 01 an earl y Churchill on a shingle beach . The cu cumsten ce s are not record ed butthe lank is in a sorry slat e . Shingle and Chur chilllanks never did mi. we ll .

stili running were used to drag others from the beach and they were examine d briefly in the Dieppe area . A copy of the German report came into Bnnsh hands In the Middle East and it was sent to London for transtauon. As a Colonel from the MIlitary Intelligence branch M.I.10 remarked "the comparisons made here are not uanennq". The Germans compared the Churchill not only to their own tanks but to the Russian machines they were now encoun tering in the east . And it did not compare favourably, 'The vehicle' says the repo rt 'offers nothing worthy of cons-oeranon by technical personnel , nor has It any new constructive features either m the metallu rgical held , or In the held of weapon technology', The 3 inch how itzer was 'bad and old Iastucned': the 2pounder 'left behind both in cons truction and eftecnveness ' while the e-pounoer's performance 'does not approach that 01 Russian guns of the same calibre'. Ammunition revealed no new or notew orthy features and. as for armour it was seen as very thick but of poor quality and did not compare well with German or Russian plate. They also cla imed that the track s were brittle and 01clumsy design which fractured ev-

A band oned tanks and a burnin g land ing craft. Typi cal sce ne s in the afterma th 01 the Diepp e Raid . Br Oken h ack s became SOmel hing of an epidem ic on thi s beach .

Mr. C h urChill' soTa nk.: The Brmsn Infantry Tank Ma rk rv

ery lime it rece ived a direct hit. Photogr aphs seem to indicate tnattne Cnurctnnsabandoned at Dieppe had the heavy, spudded cas t track made from a material described as B.T.S. 3. Discussing perf ormance the Germans noted that the tracks made so much noise that they believed it would be impossible for anyone to use the radio while the tank was moving. No similar comp laint is heard from British sources but the Germans made the point that when the la nk halted to use its radio it provided a good opportunity to knock it out . Not that this was regarded as a problem. As the repo rt sums up , The shape is also not mode rn. In conclusion it ma y be said that the English Churchill tank , in Its present torm, is easy to comb at' . The survey then went on to try and discover how the various tan ks were knocked out during the actio n. Only two out of the 29 tanks showed signs of having their armour pen etrated by ann-tank rounds, which were estimated at betwee n 3.7 and 5cm . Many tanks had been struck, but the limited number of penen auons might have given the Germans pause tor thought. The vulnerability of the tracks has already been Rlg hl : German so ldi ers examine Betty, aband oned In Ih e co llapse d bu nker on the es planad e al Dieppe . Clearly il was the nears ide tr ack whi c h bro ke. This angle gi ves a good v iew of the e etende d ex neus t pipes . Below : Blondiecaplur ed al Dieppe , re st ore(! to run n ing CH"de r and seen l'\ere with a German crew . Cert ainl y at th is stage Brit ai n's lalest hea vy tank did not strik e any lear Inlo Germa n hea rt s.

80

Chapter 6: With the Can ad ia ns

noted but this damage was not restricted to enemy fire. The inspection teams reported that tracks had been broken by stones which became jammed in the links and carried around the sprockets. They also noted that many of the tanks had become bogged down in the beach and decided to carry out a comparative test with one of their own tanks, although the type is not specified. This showed that on beaches with a slope of between 15 and 20 degrees the German tank could manage quite well but where the slope increased to between 30 and 40 degrees the tank started to Slip and then dug itself in until the tracks ceased to function. However they also noted that atter repeated attempts to tackle the same slope their tank gradually reduced the grad ient until it could get up. and that caused them to recommend that one should not rely on Sleep shingle beaches 10keep tanks at bay. Another interesting comment in this area concerns a tank which apparentl y fell into a hole on the promenade . The report refers to a tank 'falling into a large ditch , covered with a camouflage net at the rear entrance to the pill box' which sounds like a purpo se made trap. The closest one can find to this in Canadian accounts concerns the Mark III tank Betty which, atter roaming the promenade for some time plunged into what appears to have been a German dug-out. Attempts were then made, using other Cb urctuns. to tow Betty out but no sooner was this done than it broke a track and was driven back into the hole to give the crew more cover while they evacuated. The ultimate fate of the captured Churchlus is not entirely clear. Some must have been damaged beyond repair following immersion in the sea and the number of track breakages probably meant that it was impossible to refit all of them. Some were definitely sacrificed as hard targets and the German report gives basic figures from the results of firing a whole range of weapons at the tanks, in the .Dieppe area, shortly

81

alter the raid. Smallest of all, and least effective. was the armour piercing rifle grenade fired from a 98K carbine. The largest a 15cm medium howitzer which was described as having a destructive effect on both hull and turret. Between these extremes anything below 5cm calibre was relatively ineffective but the three most outstanding, all firing at 1.000 metres, were : The75mm PAK 40 tank gun firing APCBC which could penetr ate the turret and hull sides. The 88mm FLAK 18 anti-aircraft gun firing APCBC which penetra ted everywhe re. The 100mm medium gun K18 firing APCBC which effected penetrat ion of the turret and hull at front and sides. Unfortunately this report does not say whether the target lank (s) had the cast or welded turret. Further trials, carried out in Germany , added the Russian 76.2mm gun to the list of those that could penetrate the Churchill at 1,000 metres. The normal German practice with captu red enemy tanks was to give them an official designation and incorporate them into the Panzer force as Beu te (or Booty) Panzers but there is no firm evidence for this in surviving records. In all probability there were simply too few Churchills. and they of doubtful reliability, to justify it. German engineers. according to some sources . modified one tank by using extra bogie wheels to create return rollers, instead of having the tracks run back along skid rails. This, by all accounts, resulted in a useful improvement in performance . but it was one the British did not learn about until it was too late. There is no surviving evidence to suggest that it was ever considered by engineers in Britain independently of the German work.

7

The Great Rework Scheme

The idea 01o rganisi ng a majo r rewo rk scheme to rem edy some of th e more gla ring faults in Chu rchill tank s had bee n discu ssed al mos t as soon as produ ction began . Noth ing was agreed for some time bec ause the variou s autho rities could not decid e wh ether it would be wise r to ca nce l pr oduc tio n altogether and create a new infantry ta nk, or try to salvage someth ing from the existing des ign . The fina l deci sion seems to have been taken at a meeti ng , he ld in the office of the Co ntrolle r-General of Research & Development (CG RD) at the Ministry of Supply. The date of this meeting was 3 November 1941 , at 3 o'clock in the afternoon , if that makes any difference. Vauxhall Moto rs had pr epared a stateme nt for the meeting wh ich listed three ma jo r changes that they wished to introduce and posed five questions to which they wanted answers. The three changes were: To fit mudgu ard s ove r the top run of the track s . To alte r th e shape and flow of the air inlet s . To alter the air outlet at the rear of the hull. The original air inlets had certa inly crea ted problems and the lack of mudguards was a nuisance but no complaints about the air outlet can be traced in surviving doc um ents , beyond the fact that it generated a dus t clou d. Compared with the continual pro blems being posed by engines, gearboxes, suspension units and tracks they ha rdly appear to be sign ificant; yet none of these othe r matt ers we re disc usse d at this meet ing. T he mud gua rds , which wo uld be made from thin steel , we re probabl y time cons um ing to manu factur e but o ne imag ines that they co uld have been mad e anywhere, delivered to units and fitted by them witho ut too much difficu lty. The new air inlets, which drew air in from the top, wo uld also have to be manufactured but it is not cle ar if they co uld be bolted to the hull directly in place of the olde r type , or wh ethe r the hull might need to be altered in any way . Ce rtainly the hull woul d have to be modified if the air outlet was to be altered but

82

the re seems to be no good reason why the first two could not be introd uce d easi ly.

The nature of the proposed change to the air oullet is not clear but in any ca se it was ag reed to drop this from the rework progra mme and only introdu ce it wit h the next model of Chu rch ill which wou ld be produced. acco rding 10 this report , after the 100 111 Chu rchill ha d left the factory. So now the rewo rk pr og ramm e seems to have been reduced 10 the point where it only concemed two processes, neither 01 which appears 10 involve any major construction problems And it certainty did not include the kind of remedial work one might expect from the scale 01complaints. Yet the meeting agreed that two firms. Vauxhall Motors themselves , and Broom & Wade , wou ld turn their prod uctio n fines over to the rework prog ra mme fro m 1 Mar ch and 1 April 1942 respectively. This ra ised anot her ques tion. If tw o firms were take n out of producti on wo uld the supply of ne w tanks suffer? In other wo rds wo uld it be mor e se nsible to set all pr oduct ion lin es to wo rk on ne w tank s, incorpor atin g these modi fications, and leave th ose a lready bu ilt as they were? The gene ral view was that produ ct ion wo uld not suffe r. Those man ufacturing bottlenecks already ident ified did not occur on the production line itself and the loss of Vauxhall and Broo m & Wade would only reduce output by 30 tanks a month . Yet with both firms engaged on rebuilding they could guarantee to turn out 60 rewo rked tanks a month as good as new. Thus the gain in productio n of ba ttleworthy tan ks would be 30 a mo nth over existing del ive ries. On the othe r ha nd it was agreed that there was little poin t in trying to rewor k the first 300 Churc hills which , presumab ly, wer e rega rded as beyond redem ption. Units that had the se tank s would be fir st in line for repl acem ent since they were the most experienced Ch urchill equ ipped regiments. T he live q ues tions posed by th e tea m from Vauxh all Mot or s we re ma inly forme d to co nfirm the above decisions. but the first one is interesting . Vauxh all wanted to know if, once the rework programme began, production of new tanks shou ld be slowed down in order to incorporate these changes.

Chapter 7: The Great Rework Sche me

The pr ototype Chur chill T30971 , mod ified but not rew orked. The crude fr o nt mudguard s and r aised pan el s alo ng the sides of the lr ack s appear to be an earl y all emptto del eal the mud men ace.

inc redibly slow and vu lnerable to damage . long approa ch ma rches we re hardly ever co ns id e red. At th e Battle of Cambrai. in November 191 7, miles of extra railway track were laid , as close 10 the start poi nt as they could ge t. in order 10 deliver the tanks . But this cou ld only be done for large , setpiece batt les, In World War 11 fle xibility was a key factor for success and the task 01 de liveri ng tanks to the fro nt hne devo lved upon tank transpo rters whe n they wer e av ailable. Bu rto n 's stra nge statement mo re o r less relegates the Churc hill to First World Wa r status. which is clea rly ridicu lous.

The mee ting said no ; indeed they added , in answe r to an other question , thalthey planned to drive the other firms harder stili in order 10 increase producucn . When this programme was explained to the Tank Board at thei r next meeting on 25 November Genera l Bich ardson became rathe r optrmrstic. He sta ted that the War O ffice wou ld require 26 1 of the reworked tanks. fit to proceed ove rseas . by 1 January 1942, and 1.304 by 1 April. He was q uic kly told that newly built Churchnts . finished to the latest sta nda rd, would not start com ing off the prod uction line betore March and that the 700 scheduled tor rework. tan ks 301 10 1,000 . would not appear for at least twe lve months afte r that. The chairman . Geoffrey Burton . added helpfully that whe n it was designed Ihe Churc hill had not been regarded as the ulti mate infantry tank and that it had only been designed for short approach march es. This peculiar stateme nt. something of a non sequitur as It stands . appears to have been intended as a mean s of damping en thusiasm . but what did it mean? The approach march is. 0 1 course . the distance a tank has to trave l by road from its immediate base to the start line tor a battle. Obviously there is no point in SUbjecting any tank 10 a longer app roach march than necessary because it uses up a 101 ot tue! and wears out the tank and its crew . Furthe rmore II Ihe tank in que snon is slow mo ving , like an infa ntry tank. then there is a time tactor to conside r. Long columns 01 slow mo ving tanks. craw ling up to a battle . not only stretch preparation time but block tratnc route s and increase Ihe chances at detecnon Irom the air. warning the enem y of the Impending atta ck . In the First World War, when tanks were

A reworked Mark II with new sty le ai r intakes and full length mudguard s tryi ng it s lu ck in some ~rtjcula rly glu t inous mud . The man 411 the Ir ont does nOl lOOk ~rticul arty happy so maybe it is stuc k.

83

M r, C ruscrulrs Tank: The Bnnsn jn to nn v Tank Mark IV

The lull rewo rk scheme . when it was uttunately es tablished . Involved more. much mo re. than the three Items mennoned in the anginal discussion . This is made clear from a sixteen page boo klet Which. unfo rtunately . is undated, but since it does not mention Chu rchills beyo nd the Mark IV il can reasonably be associa ted wit h a period a round rate 1942 , early 1943. It is sub- titled 'Built to Major Re-work Specification' and goes on to explain :

On Vehicles bUilt to the Manufacturers ' ~Re· work " Specifica tion the W.O. Number is suffixed by the letter "R". 11 would require too much space to cove r every item In the bookl et but the lollowlng shoul d be men tioned bnefly. AIr the engme compa rtment was Improved . includ · 109the new inlets. Full length mu dgua rds were incorpo rated as were con tinuous trac k return skid rails . A baffle plate was added below the rear outle t to prevent dus t from being blow n forwards. Blast shields were fitted to the ends 01 the new mudg uard s and the side escape doors we re provided with catches that enab led them to be secured in the ope n posilion Some of Ihe suspension bog ie frames were strengthened and the rebou nd pads redesi gned to give a smoo ther ride Rubber tyres were removed from drive sprockets and the front idler axles made stronge r. Stowage was impr oved. especially lor ammuni tion . and the drive r was provided With a detach -

now through

able wind screen that lined into his visor aperture when the armou red door was open . In the engine compartmen t improvemen ts were made 10 the petrol pumps. radiator caps . exhaust system and the actu al engine mountings. New carburettors were supplied and the starter mo tor improved , Gearbox Improv ements were introdu ced in two stages and the boxes marked accordmqry and plans were announced to imp rove the steering brakes . In all 7 1 changes are listed - II all the stowage modifi cation s are take n as o ne ta sk . but to give so me idea 01 the sca le of wo rk involved these inclu de a waterproo fin g process ca rried o ut on all hull seams which are sealed with a mas tic co mpound called Bosnk . This suggests that every tank which went through the full rework programme had to be stripped right down 10 the bas ic hull assembly. And that would ce rtainly demand tha t they went right back to the produc tion line At a meennq of the Tank Design , Supp ly and Liais on Com mitt ee . whic h was he ld on 24 Apnl 1942 , the DIrect or of Tan k De sign put forwa rd a sugges tion . He said that. In addrlion to a pair 01 sel ected. rewor ked Chu rchills which were being tested at Chobham . others shou ld be tested by units in the field. The matter was appr ov ed and the object of the trial. cooenamed Trent, was defin ed as follows: It is required to carry out intensive mileage trials on 25 Church ill Tanks which have been comp leted to rework »oeoncet ion in order to satisfy ourselves that this rework makes the tank mechanically reliable and In every way balt/ew orthy.

A fi ne ellmple of a full y rewor ked Mark Ill . The eno rmous no tice o n l he s ide. al thoug h d iff ic u ll to re ad . appears to be an e..hortalion 10 faCIOry ,Iaff to I ry harder fOt the wa r effo rt . Presum ab ly th e fir m that bu ilt the tan k also ma nu facl ured ammuni tion fOt lhey have pla ced var IOUS samples upon Ihe lan k.

84

Chapter 7: The Great Rework Scheme

This plJge and lOP 01 plJge 86: Drawings showing ~"ised air Intakes , track guards and track skid rails .

CHURCHILL TRACK SKID RAILS

85

Mr. Church ill'sTank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

CHURCHI LL TRACK MUD PLOUGHS & STRIPPER PLATES Drawing of the mud p lough fitted to Churchill tanks.

86

C ha pte r 7: The Grea t Rework SCheme

Wh ich was a la udable aim . if nothing else . The first units to rece ive reworke d tanks. as it turned out, were the three regiments of 2 ' 11 Army Tank Brigade; that is , ~ ATA, 48'" ATA and 145 AAC . They were already in Scotland. having taken part in the landing exercise reco unted in the previou s chapter. so it was decided to ca rry out the exe rcise aro und the Scottish town 01Hawic k, in Teviotdale near to the English bo rder. In all 25 tanks were supplied for the tria l. eight eac h from 12th RTR and 145 RAC and nine Irom 48 th RTR. It was suppose d to extend ove r si x week s from 12 Ju ly un1i1 23Augu st 1942 and each regime nt appears to have ope rated independen tly over different routes which mixed road and crossco untry d riving . Although it wa s high summe r the British weather lived up 10 its reputation. The first two wee ks were wet and the g round beca me soaked . Then it dried up for two weeks and the c ross-country co urses became dusty . The fol lowing week it was showery and the final week was wet again . However as il to ensure that the trials co uld not be cond ucted in a proper man ne r. the War Off ice annou nce d half way through the trial that the tanks would be need ed for an exe rcise. Thus . after ten days the brigad e withdr ew Irom the trial in order to take part in Exercise Dryshod and when it came back. ten day s later, the tria l resumed . Two wee ks after that the War Office stepped in agai n to anno unce that the trial mu st be finished by a certai n da te, so the o rganisers decid ed to stop using the c ross-country co urses and co mplete the trial on the roads in order to bu ild up as much mileage as possible. Despite these unfortu nate attempt s to reduce the whole thing to the level of a farce the Depa rtment of Tan k Design appears to have taken the trial seriou sly and their report , which was issued in Oc tober 1942, wa s very thoro ugh . Each regiment filed its own report , every tank was identified by num ber and its performa nce welt doc um ente d. Twelft h ATA appea r to have scored best, although it was not a co ntes t. All of thei r tanks excee ded 1,000 miles du ring the trial, of which 500 miles (exactly, for every tank) was ac ross coun try. Howeve r they ran ov er good , wide roads with easy gradients. except arou nd Hawick itself, and their cros s-co untry co urse . which was on top of a hill, rema ined fairfy dry and firm . Things were not so good for 48'" AT A. The roads they had to use were narr ow lane s, which restricted the speed to about 10 mph, while their c ross-country co urse included some heavy going and long. boggy hills. This meant that more than half 01the driving was done in seco nd gea r and in fact they gave up after about 150 miles had been cove red by eac h tank and stuck to the road s for the re ma inde r of the ir trial. Only four of their ta nks e xceeded 1,000 miles . By comparison 145 RAC came off lightly. They had both lanes and wide roads to negotiate and the choic e of two cross-co untry areas, both of which stayed qu ite firm in the wet. Howeve r one of their tanks was invo lved in a n accident and had to be withdrawn whi le only one exceeded 1,000 miles (it did 1,001 ) three othe rs did 1,000 exac tly and the rest about 8DOmiles. As an as ide to these resu lts it is inte resti ng to see a comparison betw een the mileag e claimed for the tria l and the total 87

adomet er read ings after the trial was ov er (and one must assume that the mileage on Dryshod was included in the trial). Most tanks app ea r to have done abou t 80 or 90 miles before Trent began and one assume s that, as part of the rework program me, the clocks were reset to ze ro, thus providing inspi ratio n for gene rations 01 used ca r sa lesmen . Pic king throug h the repo rt on Trent , va rious factors stick out. After 250 mi les there were eight tank s which had not suffered any stoppages and the re we re no reports of suspension or gea rbox failures. Most of the trou bles seem to have bee n with the e ngine and tracks. By 500 miles only one tan k recorded no stoppage s. Of the rest eng ine and track failures had continued at the same rate while brake failures had caught up . Instances of gearbox or suspensio n failure we re still few. At 750 mile s every tank had suffered at least one stopp ag e and the failure rate rema ined constant except that there was a notable incr ease in linal drive and gea rbox failures . When the 1,000 mite mark was reached eight tanks had dropped out, plus the one invol ved in the accide nt, but gearbo x fa ilures did not increa se at the sa me pace and suspe nsion lailures we re neve r serious . Of course the fact that the seco nd part 01 the tria l was ca rried out entirely on roads was see n as having so mething to do with the low failure rate. Since so many prob lem s we re associa ted with the engine it is worth pointi ng out that the majo rity, by fa r, were due to the fuel pump drive which was only an accessory failure. All but three of the tan ks had the new mangan ese tracks and whe re the se failed it was due almost entirely to a massive loss 01retaining plate s, which held the track pins in place , so agai n it co uld not be regarded as a failure in the track itself. The bigg est prob lem of all , and the one which seems to have surprised the DTD mo st, conce med the Lock heed hydra ulic system. The log lo r every tank invo lved record s end less halts to d rain or bleed so me part of the system which, acco rding to the DTD , was due to the poo r fit of plugs and union s. Com ments on the suspension app ear to be far more ha rsh than the initial eviden ce see ms to merit. However the report poi nts o ut that the loss of one o r more track bogies did not necessa rily stop the tank o r disrupt the trial so it was not noted as serious . Even so the report refers to suspension troubles as inten se and claims that a lot of maintena nce and replacement was requi red to keep the tanks on the road. The stat istics , for what they are wo rth, reveal that ax les seizing or break ing, and bearings runn ing hot were the biggest problems , and it is worth noting that the mos t troub lesome bogie s were statio ns 6, 7 and 8 which , if nothing else , suggest where the ce ntre of gravity was . Finally it is worth noting that bogie brac ket fai lures beca me endem ic in 48'" RTR, which did most of the road running, and this too k the form of broken welds along the top of the brack et, which the OTD put down to poor workmanship . The report on Trent, well presented as it is, never does atte mpt to an swer the main question; whet her or not the rework sche me had succeeded. Beyond catalogui ng the va rious fa ults it expresses no views at all. The closest one comes to an y co nclusi on is in an appe nded letter, dated 12 Octo ber

Mr C hu rc hill's Tank: The British Infantry Tan k Ma rk N

1942, by a senio r instructor at the Driving & Maintenance Wing of the AFV School at Bovington . Having studied the Trent report he compared it with similar trials held at Bovington. He is obviously not happy with the way Trent was conducted He criticises the high road speeds, claims that the cross-country courses were too easy and is scathing about the standa rd of parade maintenance . He agrees that in the main , stop pages on the Hawick trial mirror those at Bovingt on but suggests that the hydraulic failures were due entirely to poor maintenance standards . Once again he is not prepared to say whether the reworked tanks are an improveme nt or not , but he does claim that slower running and good preventative maintenance will reduce the instances of failure , which is probably true of every machine . In an earlie r chapter it may be recalled that Vauxhall Motors suggested the use of rubber tyred road rollers but that this was treated as low priority due to the general shortage of rubber. Even so it is clear that something was done because by December 1941 Vauxhall is reporting to the Ministry of Supply that a Churchill with rubber tyred suspension is putting up a remarkab le show . They claim that tyres improve the behaviour and life of the tank along with the fighting efficiency of the tank and its crew . Even so they admit that it wou ld take some time to institute the new design . Pressed by the Tank Board in January they confi rm that it would involve a major redesign of tracks and suspension, which they expected to take nine months once the design had been released . Even so two member s of the Board , Lucas and Colonel Green , go so far as to state that A22 can never be really reliable unless it does get rubber tyres . One imagines that. faced with this sort of delay, the project would then be quietly dropped but there is evidence to suggest otherwise. In September 1942 the Department of Tank

A re wo rked Mark III at speed , c hurning up the du st. It is a pr obl em w hic h plagued the Chur chilll or i ts entir e serv ice lile

Design issued a report compiled by the Fighting Vehicle Proving Establishment on a proje ct known as Pussyfoot (but spelled Pusseytoot in the report) wh ich is descri bed as an Infantry Tank Mark IV filled with rubber tyred road rollers The tank in questi on is T32144 , a Mark 11 which comes from Vauxha ll Motor s. Whether it is the same tank as reported on in the prev ious Decembe r is not clear, but photographs Irom the September 1942 report show it with revised air inlets and track guard s, indicating a rework ed machine. Tyres were supplied by two firms, T B Andre Ltd and Firestone and the tank s is also fitted with special short pitch, cast mangane se steel tracks by Firth Brown. The final drive and sprocket s were also modified to suit the new tracks. For the initial trials the tank 's original roller s were fill ed with twin rubber tyres. 7 inches wide and about 2 inches thick, but these gave a lot of trouble during road runs. Subseq uently new rotl-

The reworked Mark 11 tank fitt ed w ith rubber tyred rollers and known by th e cod enam e Pus syfoot. It is interesting to o bse rve how the add ition 01 mudguards and larger air intake s suddenl y m akes the turre t look under si zed on the se tank s.

88

Chapter 7: The Great Rework SCheme

A c ross sec tio n dr awing 01a Mark IV. The hor seshoe sh ape d lilting in sid e th e turret i s the gunner' s s hou ld er piece . ind i cat in g a tank with Ieee eleva tion

Hill in north London. Using what is described as a noise meter micropho ne they tested the specia l Pussyfoot tank against a conventiona l one with steel rollers on a concre te road. Each tank went by Ihe microphone at a distance of six feet, doing 1Omph in top gear. The conventio nal tank registered 116 decibels yet the rubber tyred machi ne gave a reading of 98db The same appears 10 have been true of most other factors tested . Climbing ability and top speed were almost identical, while oil consump tion showed a modest improvement. It is also interesti ng to note that as the noise from the suspensio n diminished so the sound from the engine and ex-

ers 01larger diameter were fitted with thinner rubber tyres to match, and these appear to have wo rked a 101better. The report is quite comp rehensive but we only need concentrate on two factors here. First heat. This appears to have been the biggest problem . At speeds above 1Omph the tyres got quite warm and at 16mph became so hot that some of them broke up. Further it was noticed that it the tank slowed down , after a spell al 16mph , the tyres did not cool dow n loo quickly The other matter was noise . As expected this was reduced . bul not drama tically. Tests were carried out by specialists , in this case the Post Office Researc h Station at Dollis

A new Churc hi ll Mark IV eq uipped w ith th e o ri gi na l. sho rter (Mar k 3) vers ion 0 1 th e s- po unde e.

89

Mr. Churc hill's Tank: The Brmsn Infant ry Tank Ma rk.IV

A not her Mar k IV, ph o tographed al MEE Ch ert se y. Th l. one i. f ined w ith Ih e longer M.rk 5 gun.

haust increased . At speeds over 14mph an unpleasant high frequency noise was emitted which , accord ing 10 the report 'rendered intelligible conversation dIfficult' and Ihis was put down to the combined effect of shorter pitch track. and the spacing of suspension Units which meant that all bogies were passing over Joints in the track at the same li me. In their final summary the testing authorities praised the reduction in noise but explained that the tank was unsuitable for productio n in this form because the tyres could not withsta nd road speeds above 14mph or cross -country running above 10mph. They finished by recommending tnatt ne project be closed and the tank disposed 01. In the meantime a new version ott ne Churchill was be ing considered. Back in Oct ober 1941 firing trials were un dertaken against examples of the welded Mark III turret , and the results described as unsat isfactory. In the first place it was reported that supplies of plate SUitable for welding were in short supply and a War Office summary announced that up to that dale 389 turret had been delivered . Even so firing trials continued into November and in far too many instance s the armour plate was ces cnoeo as flaking . This meant that if the external face of the armour was struck by a projecti le , even it It did not penetrate . a sizeable chunk might come away on the inside and do a conside rable amoun t of dam age . The Bullet-P roof Plate Technical Committee stated that they were unable to guarantee supplies 01plate that we re entirely flake free. and the only solution Ihey could suggest was 10 employ

90

doub le skin constr uction . This would involve creannq an mner shell of mild stee l, which should cure the effect of flaking. but it would also require substantial alterati ons 10the design Given the repo rted shortage 01plate suitab le tor welding the only anemative was to inmate an entirely new design . A cast e-oo uncer turr et for A22 is first mentioned in a Tank Board report dated 23 January 1942 which reveals thattrials with 6pound er shot had proved success ful. showi ng that British tec hniques in producing cast turrets had improved . The report went on to note that It was now arguable that our castings were in any way inferi or to American practice. 11 was therefo re agreed that the obvious move was to return 10 a cast turret, but bearing in mi nd the greater size of a 6-pounder turret compared with the original pattern . it had 10be accepted that in order 10 produce a turret of the same weight some protect ion would have to be sacnuced. Yet, as the relevant Plate Thickne ss diagrams reveal, the cast turret was actua lly thicker on ItSupper surfaces than the welded version and no thinner on oth er surfaces. Nonc e also that the Izod .Test (I.T.) figure for the cast turret is higher in some place s, suggesting a more resilient structure . Ttus was one ot the principal prob lems with castings, that of con trolling the thickness of different surfaces . It required a good deal of shop floor skill and product ion time to grind excess material from large castings so it was probably no quicker to produce these cast turrets than the earlier welded type , It seems to have added something in the region of half a ton to the over-

Chapter 7: The Greet Re work SCheme

PIJ~S

9'·92 and top of fMge 93: StOWlJge, pllJte th icl m ess IJnd o ther dilJgrlJms re/lJted to the Churchill Mark I V.

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CHUR CHILL [V V 8. \71 PLA TE THICKNE SS

91

.--Tg:.~~ ~2. ~

Mr.Churchill's _ _ __ Ta nk_,._T..h"08 British Infa ntry To nk Mark IV

TURRET CHU RCH ILL IV & IV 75M M

CHURCHILL IV (TYPICAL ; OR V &'''' VI)

92

Chapter 7: The Great Rework SCheme

TANK

~IIlSEU~ 1

CHURC HILL V. & VI. TRANSPORT DIAGRAM

all weigh t of the new Mark IV Ch urchill but this wa s rapid ly swallowed up in a mor e ex tens ive up- armo uring proc ess which will be dealt with later. Mean while th e matter of Churchill produ ction wa s still ca using a lot of problem s . In May 1942 it was repo rted tha t 3,500 tanks we re on orde r and that they sho uld be finished by March 194 3. by wh ich time a repl aceme nt design mu st be ready . Within a few da ys the co mpletion date had been extended by a mon th and two othe r matt ers we re dealt with . It was reported that 30 per cen t of British tanks th en in produ ction we re Churchills and that the last 500 we re su ppos ed to be fitted with rubbe r tyres . It was al so explain ed that the replace ment assau lt, or infantry tank sho uld be based on the A27 design , that was the C romw ell c ruise r tank . Vauxhall Mot ors were informed that they would be expec ted to turn over to Cromwell produ cti on when the last Chu rchill was finished , and that brought a swi ft rea cti on . Under pressure from the Tank Board th e co m pany circulated a report in July 1942 which dw elt upon the recent success of trials on two Churctnns in an effort to stave off wha t app eared to be inevitable. Yet it seems cle ar that the authori ties were undecided . The Gener al Staff ask ed the War Office for a statement onA22, based on user ex perience but the Tank Board contin ued to ma ke it clear that 3.500 wo uld be the final fig-

ure. In the meantime it was announced tha t six Church ills wo uld be sent to the Midd le East for what was described as 'ope ratio nal experi ence'. In Oc tobe r 1942 the Tank Board agai n sla ted that the Chu rchill was ob sol escent and going out of produ ction . But now the y were faced with another problem . Th e only Briti sh weapon suitable for the close suppo rt role in tan ks up to 1941 was the 3 inch howitze r wh ich , as the Ge rma ns had reported on exam ples capt ured at Dieppe, was an inferior piece wh ich was al ready co mple tely out of date . Design work on a replacement be gan in January 1942 and it appears to ha ve bee n a very odd design . The plan seems to have been to use part 01 the ba rrel from the fam o us 3.7 inch an ti-airc raft gun, mat ed to the breec h ass embly of th e equally successful 25pounder gun , to pr odu ce a 95mm howitzer whi ch wo uld fire ammunition from th e old 3 .7 inch mountain howitze r. The gun would be produ ced in two form s. as an infant ry weapo n on a to wed ca rria ge an d as a close suppo rt tank gu n whic h cou ld repl ace the e-ooc nder. The towed version seems to ha ve been a total disaster , altho ugh it too k the authorities a long time to wake up to this , wh ile the tank weapon caused its own problems . In Nove mber 1942 a meet ing of the AF V Lia ison Comm ittee was told that produ cti o n of a-poun der tur ret s lo r A22 was almost com-

93

MI, Churchill's Tank: The Bnftsn Infantry Tank Ma rk IV

plete (and we must assume that they were referring to welded turrets) but that it was now revealed that the 95mm would not. after all. be interchangeable with the e-pou ooer in the Mark III turret. This was presented in such a way as to assume that the 95mm would not be used . since the scrapp ing 01new turrets appea red to be unthinkable. A week later the General Staff told that Comm ittee that they considered the 95mm essenuat. even I1it meant developing a speci al turret, and that the scrapping of some 6·poun der turrets might be inevitable . On the 24 November it was announced that the requirement for 95mm tank guns would be 250 . but whether this applied to the Churchill only, or included A27 versions is not clear. Surviving evidence is by no means complete but it does appear to reveal a state of confus ion which might not be unfamiliar to students of Bnnsn tank design . Since we know that in due course the 95mm nownzer fitted comfortably into the cast e-pouncer turret It must be assumed that the problems . whateve r they were , applied to the welded vers ion only. There is certainly no eviden ce that a 95mm version of the Chu rchill WIth welded turret ever existed but . If that is whe re the trouble lay. what was meant by the statement in November 1942 that turret production for A22 was almost comp lete ? Are we supposed to believe that all turre ts then being built for the balance of the 3,500 Churchills were of the welded type ? If so what were the cast ones for? The lai r answe r may be that those who made the statement were not awa re of the cast turret. but a cynic migh t suggest thalthis was just one

Abov e : A Mar k

Bel ow : An exam ple 0 1the Chu rch ill Mark V, li n ed with the 95mm ho willer.

ha s the Mark 5 gun li n ed with a counterweig ht at the muzzle end 0 1the ba rrel, wh ic h sug gests th at the weapon is on a free eleva tion rnourtt in g .

94

IV wit hou t trac k gua rds is an u nusual si ght. Thi s one

I

I

Ch apter 7: The Great Rework Scheme

prob lem too many. That the co mmittee membe rs thought they cou ld dispose 01 another co mplication by being a bit awk ward l ate in Decemb er 1942 It was an nounced that 95mm gun mountmqs would be ready by Ja nuary but that the re would be delays in the supply of guns and ammunition. Since it wa s intend ed for use in a tank, rather tha n a fie ld gun , a new fixed round was developed. The gun itse!t. known as the 95mm Mark I lank howi tzer , when mounted in the cas t A22 turret had a lull elevation of Just 37 degr ees . which limited the ettecnve range 10 6.800 ya rds . which was ad equate tor a tank . High explosive and smo ke ro und s were provi ded and the version 0 1 the Churchill mounting a 95mm how itzer in the cast turret was cassneo Mark V. The rework programme was co ntinuing to ma ke wav es . On 2 1 November 1942 the Director of Armo ured Fighting Vehicles at the Ministry of Supply told the AF V liaison Cornnuttee that moo.ucanons were continually bein g embod ied in new and reworked Churchill tanks , ma king a lot of extra work tor AEME personnel. He sugges ted that a rollin g program me should be irunated whereby ta nks now issued to un its shoul d return to manufac turers on a continual basis so that they co uld carry out cha nges . He wen t on to say that It seemed un likely that Cnu rctults cou ld ever be made re liable when travellin g long distances but fuusneo up by asking the Comm itte e to reconsider their intention to terminate produc tion at 3.500 machines . A pape r issued a tew days later reporte d on the resu lts 01 Trent I, which seeme d to sho w that p rob lems had , to use the report 's word , been 'Localised', Thi s, pres umably, meant that they were not rampant any more and might be rega rded as under con trol. It was furthe r announced that by this date - 24 Novemb e r 1942 . , ,205 Chu rchills had bee n rewor ked while the IIrst 24 7 tanks would on ly be used tor training . an d therefore might not have been reworked . The scheme was running smoo thly unde r the co ntrol of the Direc tor 0 1 Mechanical Eng ineering at the War Or nce who arranged . throu gh DAF V. tor tank s to be removed from units and delivered to vaux hatls. or Broom & Wad e for rew orking . On 3 Decemb er the Tank Boa rd announced that all reworked tanks sho uld be htted with the 6-pounder, which seem s to have been wish ful thinking although it migh t have been one way 01 using up a ll those extra turrets, Five day s afte r that the General StaHconfirmed that they would stick at 3,500 as the fma! hgure tor Ch urchill production but. whi le they were tal king statistics . wished Itto be know n that the re were now 16 9 ottrcra t modificatio ns inc or porated into the re work programme; which probab ly explai ns how it wa s that , in ao dinon to the origi nal rework sche me tor new tanks there was now a rework scheme tor reworked tanks . The Genera l StaH was agitati ng for prog ress .

Deta iled section d rawing 01tne 95mm howitzer tu rret 01 a Chur ch ill V In lh is eas.e l ne gea red elevation mechanism can cle arly be seen beneal h tne gu n .

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Rlghl and fNlges 96-98: Stowage di.lgrams and am mu nition de tails for thflo Ch u rc h ilf Mark V,

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96

Cha pte r 7: The Grea t Rework Scheme

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98

Chapter 7: The Great Rework Sc he me

Muc h of wha t happe ns in this per iod is tied up with yet anothe r change in a rmamen t which it will be more logi cal for us to study later. Suffice It 10 say at this poin t that on 20 Janu ary 1943 the War Cabi net approv ed production of an other 500 Church ill tanks . Such moves can only be attributed to expediency , fo r at this tune the Ch urch ill sti ll had to prove useu, and perhaps some Prime Ministeria l pressure. It cettalnly flies In the face of the declared mtenuons of the Tank Board . War Office and Gene ral Staff . Seek ing to qualify the present position the Tank Board report ed on 25 Ja nuary that of the 1,205 Churctuus reworked so tar. some 01 the first 289 would stili carry the 2-pounder but atleast 100 would be 6pounder . Out of the next 200 there would be 100 6-pounder and 100 equ ipped as Cana l Defence Ligh t (COL) tanks and all the remain ing tank s would be 6-pounder. In an effort to re-establish some semblance 01 authonty the Tank Boa rd produced a Statement of Policy wh ich announced that Church ill production would be limi ted to 4.000 mach ines and when they were completed Vauxhall Moto rs and its sub srdrary co mpa ni es would be turned over to Cromwell productio n. Little did they know Since nobody could claim that the Dieppe ooerauon was a representative examp le of the employment of Cnurcruatanxs there was stili plent y of scope for tactical evolu tion , Certai nly event s In the w estern Desert were not prov iding much evidence ; apart from the use of Mati ldas aga inst natian posi-

A factory photograph of the lurrellurnlable of a Mark V Chur c hill show , ing , from I he leh , l he Io4Ide r's , com m ande r', and gunner', seats . No-lic e Ihal lwo 0 1 lhem are adju slable tor he ight , The loader is actu all y seated on an .mmunllion bin .

-Man y hand s can ge t In the way. Women so ldiers of m e AUlCiliary Terr llo ria l Service appa renlly helping to mainla in a Mark IV Chu rc hill . One gel s I he imp re ssio n thal l he pho lographe r has rather ove rdo ne il in an effo rt 10 gel his m ess age ac ross . The veno us co mbi nation s 0 1 loo ls and poses seem h igh ly imp ro bable .

tions on the Libyan frontie r most subseq uent operation s by their successor . the vafenune . were almost mdistmqutsnable from cruise r tank action s. Indeed the pure infantry tank battle alway s seem s to have been someth ing of a myth . Howe ver this is not to say that it might not happen and contingency plan s had to be prepared . and II this was the case It clearly had to be done in c lose eo-operation With the infa ntry them selves . Thus by 1942 the School of Infantry , at warrtunsterm W iltshire , was engaged in trials to examine various options Left : A mor e plaUSIble sce nario in a Chur chill fac tory , moving a turr et. com plele wi th ~s kel and t urntab le. o nlo a waiting l an k.

99

Mi Ch urchill' s Ta nk: The Bnnsnmto nnv Tank

One resu lt of this was the discovery that In a combined infantry/tan k attack the crucial time came when the preliminary arnnery barr age lifted from the enemy pos ition to allow the infantry to move in. This gap , no matter how brief it was , gave the enemy lime to man his ann-tank guns and pic k off the tank s as they moved in at the spea r head of the assault . 11 was virtually impossible to locat e every hostile gu n before the attack began and indeed the tanks themsel ves wou ld not know where individu al g uns were until they unmas ked, which in effect mea ns when the gun in ques tion fired. by which time of course the tank was alrea dy vulnerable , if not des troyed . It was therefore sugges ted that infan try tanks cou ld advance within the barrage to ove rcome this problem. The question was. of course , what might happen to the tanks if they attempted to advance within a barrage . rather than beh ind it. An experiment was orgamsed and It took place at Larktnn on Salisbury Plain, on 5 June 1942. involving a squadr on of sixteen Chu rchills from an umdenuned regiment. Two trials were arranged . In the first. three field regiments of 25-po und ers. that is 72 guns , fired at the rate of 72 rounds pe r minute into an area 600 ya rds by 400 ya rds . firing air-b urst high explosive shells. The sixteen tanks concentrated within this area. in a box 300 yards by 400 ya rds , moving at just 5 mph . It must have taken a fair amoun t of courage . on the part of the tank crews . to drive in formation into this zone but in fact It proved perfec tly sale and there were no pe rsonne l casualties wha tever. The guns continued firing for eight minutes while the tanks wer e in the Impact a rea . The tank s disc ove red that they could not only move abou t within the lire swept zone but

~Ik

IV

they could still see clearly and deal with any ta rget easily. A number of tanks were hit . and one had its track broken. but the remaining fifteen kept moving . Ano ther tank lost one suspension bog ie and bro ke down shortly afterward s but even then , fourteen tanks survived and the other two were sWiftly repa ired, so the trial was regarded as a succes s. In the second tria l the barrage was stepped up to a more rea listic intensity. This time as the tanks moved up to the barrage zo ne the guns fired a concent rated burst to r two min. utes at the rate of 180 rounds per minu te . As the tanks moved into the danger zone this rate reduced to 108 rpm and contmued for live minutes. On this occasion there were no tank casual ties at all . Crews found that they were not affected by the detonations. nor did they report any difficulty In observetron so in a real acnon they would be ab le to hu nt down the enemy 's anti-tank guns with ease . Ttus would mean that many of the guns would be taken out while the ir crews we re sheltering Irom the barrage in slit trenches . Even" they oc emerge to man their gu ns under lire the chances of pick ing ott approac hing ta nks with shells exploding all over the pla ce were reduced co nsiderably. Ultimately the results of the trial were inconclusive. Some pointed o ut that the co nditio ns on Salisbu ry Plain were hardly typic a l since the soil was rich and dam p . In drier climates, they argued , huge clou ds 01 dust would be thrown up . obscur ing the ta rgets and making nav igation dllflcu ll. Subsequent exarrunanon 01 the tank s revea led more dama ge. In particular sttrapnettrom the she lls had found Its way Into the air inlets and It was suggested that the Chur ch ill was unsun-

Thi s may nol sho w the event descr ibed in I he l ed bUI atteas t it g ive s a lI avou r 0 1Chur c hill tank s operaling in an art illery bar rage .

100

Chapter 7: The Great Rework SCheme

able on this account. It is surprising to find no reports of dam age to vision equipment . Certainly it was possib le to change damaged prisms in periscopes but if this happ ened in the heat of action It might reduce comba t effectiveness and one wonders whether com munications might suffer if aerials were damaged . There is no evidence that the practice was ever employed In acuon. at least not deliberately. and it wou ld be Interesting to know If any considera tion was give n to the system used In the First World War where the bar rage was planned around shell-free lanes along which the tanks could move. As a footn ote to ttus period there is a complai nt by the AFV liaison Committee. dated 16 March 1943 . that up to that pence . no 95mm gun tanks . either A22 or A27. had arnved at the Lulworth Gunnery School for testing : and Lulworth was also interested In discussing the PLM moun ting. The PLM mount was a truly awful thing which must have been cursed by every tank crewman who had anything to do with It. The purpose of the PLM mount was to provide the tank with what was known as local ann-aircraft defence. Before it appeared tank crews relied on something called the Lakeman mount which. If anything. was even worse . Expene nce In France had convinced British tank crews that they needed some sort of weapon to deal with maraud ing enemy aircraft and Major Tom Lakeman had provided a soiunon - in haste as usual . It was simple enoug h. Just a portable arrangement of steel tubes and springs which. when filled to the turret. enabled the tank com man der to aim and fire a Bren light rnact une-qun at attacking enemy aircraft. In pract ice the chances of hltling an aircraft were slim ; the chances of being hit by the aircraf t somewhat greater since the gunne r had to expose a good deal of his upper body. The PLM mount probably did noth ing to improve the former but it did at least enable the gun ner to increase his chances since it was operated from inside the turret . The mounting consisted of a central pillar, bolted to the top of the turret. which carried a pair of Vicker s K light mactune-quns fitted with drum rnaqazmes. A down ward extension 01the pillar. passi ng through a hole in the turret. ter mi· nated in a pair of handleba rs. like those on a bicycle, with a tngger built into the handle . If an aircraft attacked, the gunner ducked down inside the turret so that he could just see out over the nm of the hatch . Inside . protected by armour. he gnpped the handlebars which traversed. elevated and fired the guns. Even if It did prove to be of some use in action the

A Churchill c rew I rom 43" Al A demonslrating the lakeman anti·ai rc raft mount with a 8r en gun litted with the d rum maga zine . Notice on the left the thr ee-pr onged vane si g ht used by lhe commander to align h is tank on a targ et.

mountmq was a dreadful nuisance at all other umes. Even with the handlebars folded away they occup ied space inside the turret and gave the gunne r and loader something else to snag their clothing and bang their heads on. Outside It obstructed the commander's view. Got in his way as he climbed in and out. and reportedly Interfered with radio reception. Unfortu nately It has proved impossible to discove r what the letters PLM stand for. Vauxhall Motors clearly did not like the thing but chose to complain about its weigh t. which cannot have been signifi· cant. However the Director, Royal Armour ed Corps (DRAC) told them that if weight was a problem they might delete the auxiliary fuel tank, titled on the back of the hull. It seemed that there was no gelling away from the PLM mount. It was certainly available for a range 01 British tanks and armoured ca rs but if photograp hs are any guide the only vehicle that ever carried it in action was the Humber Scout Car. If it was supplied for tanks going overseas the chances are that crews managed to lose it befo re they arrive d in the theatre 01 war. British tank crews have always had an ambiv alent attitude to externally mou nted machine -guns . especia lly for ann-aircra ft use . The general view seems to have been that il enemy aircraft were about the sensible thing to do was to stay inside the tank . close all the hatches . and wait until they flew away

101

8

Churchills in North Africa

Tanks had seen actio n in Palestine in 191 7 and they ha d been operating with Bri tish force s base d in Egypt since 1926 . It was a regi on fraught wit h probl ems wh ich rapidly thr eat -

ened to get worse as Mussolini 's aspirations becam e clear. Thu s, of all the tank prod uci ng nation s Brit ain, with France and Italy, had every reason to consider the use of tanks in dese rt con ditions . ve t there is very little evidence to suggest that this ha d any serious e ttect on the design of any armoured fighting vehicle built in the United Kingdom either before or during the Second World War. Of course, when the design of the Churchill was being rushed through the re were far more imme diate concerns and . as we have already seen . it was produced at first wit h the defence of the hom eland in m ind . So it is pro bably fair to say that of all British tanks produced since the end of the First World War the Churchill was the least prep ared fo r dese rt service . Yet wh en , after the Fall of France , the main focu s of Br itish attentio n shifted to the def ence of Egypt its deplo yment out ther e was only a matter of tim e . Indeed we have already noticed tha t the Prime Minister was advoc ating that very thing. We have also seen how , by late 1940 , two Chu rchills ha d been prepared for dese rt trials . Qui te what this pr eparation involved is not clea r. beyond the fact that both tanks were fitted with track covers which , in this context we re refe rred to as sand guards. We also know , from subsequent report s, that one of the tanks was fitted wit h full le ngth skid rai ls supporting the upper run of the tracks while the othe r had the do me sha pe d supports spread out along the top of each sponson which only suppo rted the tracks at intervals. The army in Egypt referred to these , appropriately enough , as ca mel back s . Th e two tank s were Vauxhall built ma chine s T30999 and T 3 1000 . Photograph ic evi dence reveals that they were of the Mark It type . The task of tes ting them woul d fall to the M idd le Ea st bra nch of the Mech anisat ion Expe riment al Establishment which was based in Cairo. With u -Boats waiting off the Stra its of Gib raltar and the threat from Axis aircra ft ove r the Mediterranean it was nor-

mal practice to route convoys bou nd for Egypt well out into the Altant ic , aro un d the southern Cape of Afr ica and up to Alexandria via the Red Sea and Sue z Can al. It was a long voyage , relati vely safe from enem y act ion but at the mercy of every kind of weat her th at na ture has to offer , espec ially in the Atl ant ic in win ter. Th e two tanks travelled as deck cargo , as we know from the first report filed on them by the authori ties in Egy pt. They are described as arriv ing in deplorable cond ition , without even the benefit of tarpaulin covers to keep out the worst of the rain and sea spray . which all played havoc with the two tanks . Su rface rust mus t have been sprouting up everywhere and it is claimed that many alloy castings had simply dissolv ed dur ing the voyage. Even be fore trials co uld begin cables ha d to be se nt to Br itain o rde ring rep lacement parts and th ey we re not de liver ed fo r th ree o r fo ur weeks . It was a period of rel ative stability in the West ern Desert. Th e British had fall en back to st ro ng posit ion s o n the Gaza la Line and eve n th e da ring Germans ha d to res ist the urge to attack while th ey recruited th eir streng th. Even so , as bot h sides kne w on ly too we ll, it was just a breathi ng space and in workshops on both sides engineers were wo rking flat out to return as many old tanks as possible to batttewcrthy condition, in addition to preparing new ones . It is quite surprising to find that anyone had time to conduct trials on experimental types , especially since the work involved a good deal of maintena nce . Read ing between the terse lines of the repo rt it would app ear tha t ins tructions had been received from Britai n that th e two tan ks should be limited to spe eds of 10mph and below. Yet the party in cha rge of dese rt tria ls for the Ch urchius only hon our ed this in part . Onl y one was adapte d, by blan king off fourth gea r. The ot her, ref erred to as the unres tric ted machi ne , began tria ls at once. Tho se concerned with the Ch urch ill's trials at home might have been surprised to read that gene ral pe rformance in the desert was good . and that steering was described as excellent. Of course . when it comes to steering, sand is much kinder to tanks than mud . although

102

Chapter 8:

Churcruns in No rth Africa

One of the pair ot Churchill Mark lllanks s hipped out 10 the Mid dle East ea rly in 1942. seen her e be ing p,'epared l o r tr ials at a wor kshop in lhe Nile ~tta , Thi s is T31000

T30999. the othe r Churc hi ll 11 sen t cu t to Egyp l . Noli ce th at o n both lan ks the air intakes appea r to have bee n m odified Irom th e o rig inal de sign

103

MI. C hu rc hill' s Tan k: The British Inf a ntry Tank Mark IV

It has other ways of harming them . Even so this would almost certainly have been the first tank operated in desert conditions with the Memtt -Brown transm ission , wh ich obviously performed well on a good surface . They certainty had suspension problems and the tracks were repo rted to be break Ing up. By February the unrestricted mach ine had been withdrawn to be fitted with a stronger suspens ion, designed locally. Which says something about the work shop resources available to British forces in Egypt. Unfortunatel y, short ly after the work on this modmcauon began, drawings arrived from Britain to show how Vauxhall Motors proposed to improve the suspension and It was feared that the local des ign would not prove strong enough. Meanwhile the second tank conunued with its trials. stili restricted to 10mph , It experie nced identical failures with the suspension and had soon worn out its gearbOx but in neither case. the report noted . had the track s yet taited entirely. They did complain that the two tank s were incapable of running straight, and continually tried to pull over to the left. And so the trials go on , until mid -June. There is an occa sional engine failure and the suspension is a continual source of trouble but noth ing terminal. Despite the sand guard s great clouds of the stuff are blown up in the driver 's face, just as had been the case with dust in Britain , bUI It is notable that the camel back track supports had all worn out within about 700 miles while the continuous skid rails showed no signs of failure,All thing s considered these trials must be regard ed as moderately successful. It is not clear whether the trials crew s were Churchill trained men who trave lled out with the tank s

One way to ke&p du st Irom blow ing up into the d rive r 's lace w.. 10 sl retch a canv as sc reen or dodger. ac ross the fr onl horn s. ASlh is shot l ho ws it see ms 10 work .

or local crews who more or less learned on the Job , but they seem to have kept both tank s running , after a lashion, lor aro und six months on a mode st stock 01 spares, There are no complaints of steering problem s or, perhaps more surprisingly, any adverse comment s on cooling, And all this, it should be noted, is before the Dieppe raid had taken place, Another matter recorded in the last chapt er was the decision 10 send six more C hurctuns out to the Middle East for what was described as 'operauonat experience'. This appears to have been agreed in July and once again it would be reasonable to suspect some influence being exerted by the Pnme

One 01 the Kinglorce Churchills be ing pre pared lor action. I1is parked w ilh ils turrel rever sed . The camoullage sche me has been desc ribe
104

Ch a p ter 8: Cnurchns in North Africa

A.Kl ng lo rce Church ill at the tim e ot th e Al amein battl e. Thi s tank is start ing to sport the acc u mu lati o n of unofficial stow age so belo ved 01th e Eigh th Arm y and it also has a canvas do d ge r slung at the fron t.

Ministe r. Whatever the impu lse the si x tank s, a ll reworked Mark Ills, arrived in Egypt o n 1 October 1942 , destined for the MEE at Cairo. Records reveal that the six machines were : T31665/ R T31950/R T3 1954/ R T68 186/R T68 189/R T687 14/R ... represen ting fou r of the firms build ing Churc t utlsunder the Vauxhall umbrella. Work bega n at once on prepa ring them for dese rt serv ice , whi ch included suspe nding a ca nvas scree n, or dodge r, between the front horn s to keep down the cloud of sand which blinded the driver . Whi le thi s was going on an operational unit, known as the Spec ial Tank Squadr on , was being formed under the com mand of Majo r Noms King MC. of the Royal Glouc estershire Hussars. His second -incommand was a Lieutenant A L Dean s of the Roya l Tank Regiment with four more office rs and 52 othe r ranks . The men who ope rated the tanks had all come o ut from Brita in and had Chu rchill experience, altho ugh none of them had ever seen the desert before. The officers and NCOs , by way of contrast, were all old desert hand s although the latter were described by the seco nd-in-com mand as being 'not very bright in mecha nical ma tte rs'. The Speci al Tank Squad ron was form ed on 14 October 1942 and Just four days later the men and tank s were loaded

onto a train and carried west into the de sert . Unloaded at the Burg er Arab railhead on the 20 th the tanks were then loaded onto tank tran sporters and driven forward to Te! er Eisa . All around them were sign s of great activity . With as much secrecv as could be main tained the British Eighth Army and its Allies , under the dire ct command of General Bernard Montgomery, was about to launch its greatest desert offen sive , Opera tion Liqtutoot . the opening pha se of the second battle of El Alamein . On the night of 23 October, as the Ch urch ill tank s prepared for thei r final move forward , the wes tern sky was alight with the fla shes from 1,000 guns. The kind of barrage which had not been seen since the dreadful day s of the First World War. The six tanks were directed along a route known as the Moon track, at the end of which , they were told , they should report to headquarters of 7'~ Motor Brigade , itself part of the l Sl Armoured Division . Beneath the barrage Montgomery's troops had opened two broad path s through the extensive German minefie lds and the task allotted to 1SI Armoured Division was to adva nce through the northernmost lane. But it was hard going . Strong ene my force s were waiting and , within the narrow confines of the cleared lane the attacking armour had no room to depl oy. By the even ing of 24 Octob er the leading British tank regiment , the Queen 's Bays, was down to a comp osite squadron of twe lve tanks , a mixtu re of British Crusaders and Amer ican Sherman s. British planners had named a feature on their map s as Kidney Ridge , due to the shape of its contour line. Butthere was no precise agreement as to whe re it was o r. indeed ,

105

Mr. C h urc hill's Tank: The British lnt c nrrv Tank Mark IV

whether it was a ridge at all. Nort h and south of Kidney Ridge were two enemy position s nicknamed (by the British) Woodcock and Snipe respect ively. Each one was well defended by Axis tanks , some of which were dug in, tha t had a clea r field of fire for some 2,000 ya rds . They had taken a baner ing , but some 88mm guns had been moved up in suppo rt. As the situatio n deteriorated the Ch urchills were ca lled up to deal with the dug in tank s The Special Tank Sq uad ron was by now being referred to as Kingforce afte r their comman ding officer and it was Noms King who led the way in T68 189/R , followed by 2 nd Lieuten ant Appleby in T316651R and Corporal Kelly in T681861R. Corpora l Kelly d id not last very long . When his 6-pounder gun reco iled after the first round had been fired it stuck , refusing to run out again . Unab le to contnbute mo re to the action Corporal Kelly ordered his d rive r to engage reverse and quietly withdrew from action . Nobody know s precisely what happen ed to 2JU Appleb y. His lank was seen to adva nce into the thick of the action . For a while it disappeared over the edge of the ridge bul a sho rt time later it was seen reversing slowly out 01action . Then it stopped, smoke appeare d and it finally burst into flames and co ntinued to burn for the rest of the night. Only one man , and he wou nded, is believed to have survived from the cre w of five. Whe n it was exami ned later it was seen that 38 round s of 50mm calibre had struck the front of the tank , one of which had penetrated. There was damage from one high exp losive round and si x str ikes from 75mm guns , one of which had penetrated . Th is was probably the shot that did the dam ag e. Howe ver on closer inspec tion eight strikes were found o n the back of the tank . one of wh ich had gone through the gearbox and three into the turret. They were of 57mm calibre and had obviou sly come from Bntrsh sixpounder guns . Putting the lacts together after the even t its seem s as if Lt Appleby had gone further into the Ge rma n position than was wise , and taken a lot of puni shm ent. As he reve rsed out his tank, wreath ed in smoke , was spotted by an Australian anti-tank battery . Being unfa miliar with the sha pe they too k the sensible preca ution and opened fire . 11 was an unfort unate turn at even ts but the re is no doubt that Appleby's tank absorbed a tremendous amount of punishment befo re it was destroyed . Major King himself , on the other hand , had an excellent day . He fired 45 rounds ot e-po cnc er. cla imed hit s on four enem y tank s and took eight enemy round s on his Church ill, none of which penetrated. He withdrew in good order , descr ibing his tank as fight ing fit. Kingfo rce spent seven days in reserve, gett ing the five remaining Ch urctutls back into wor king orde r. Meanwh ile with Rommel back from Europe Axis forces sta rted to draw back to a new defen sive line, but they did not go eas ily. The ir position at Tell er Aqqaqir proved very awkwa rd and Brit ish 2nd Armoured Brigade, supported by 7'" Motor Brigade , faile d to take it. Kingforce received instructions to move forward to take the pressu re off some Shermans whic h were in trouble . Moving forward along the Boo mera ng track they rolled into action , and into a storm of fire. Gun s and turrets caused most

Another popu lar feature of deser1lank l was th is sun shade art.ehment. intended to mak e the tank loo k lik e a heavy lo rry fr om a d isl ance. 11 is very rare to see It on a Churchill.

of the problem s. One tank suffered traver se failure wenour firing a shot while a nother received nine 50mm rou nds which jammed the turret . As imilar fate aw aited Corporal McCaffery's tank, T6871 4/R while Lt Howard, in T3 1950/ R too k over thirty hits and lost a trac k. Th e crew , so me of whom were injured. baled out and mad e their way back on foot. Major King was very lucky. A 50mm round came in through the open driver' s visor and pa ssed right through the crew area . Everyone quickly abandoned the tank but, once he could see that it was not going to bu m , Major King and Lie utenant Howard climbed back in and brought the tank home. Over the next five day s the c rew s go t the ir tanks back into shape and Howard's tan k was recovered . But the battle was moving away to the west and there was probab ly little poi nt in try ing to maintai n nve no n-standa rd tanks which cou ld not keep pace with the advance anyway. Kingforce was therefore o rdere d back to Alexandria, a jo urney that the tanks achieved on the ir own track s, whe re it was split up . A mont h afte r Montgomery la unch ed his El Alame in offensiv e Ge neral Eisenh ower commanded an Allied a rmy that landed in Tunisia. Th ere was no connec tion between the two events , the Tunisian land ing had been planned well in advance , but it did not resu lt in an immediate collapse of Axis forces . Granted Hemmers Alr ika Korp s was on the defensive and ret reating west but the Ger mans and Italia ns in Tunisia were well estab lished and the mou ntainous co untry conspired to assist them. The Allied offensive sho wed signs of bogg ing down and there was a call for reinforcemen ts. The enemy was establ ishing strong positions in the hills , which could only be ta ken by d irect assault , a nd this kind of work would suit the Church ills. It has to be recogn ised that some Chur ch ill reg iments had been training co ntinually in Britain for the best part of two years and , diff icult as it is to imagine , mos t of them would we lcome the chance to put it to the test in action. We have alrea dy establi shed that , in the British scheme of things. infantry tan ks were desig ned for a different role 10 tnat 01the cruise rs. Thus where c ruise rs tank reg iments were formed into armoured brigades , no rmally in armoured divisio ns, infantry tank regimen ts (o r battanons as they pre ferr ed to trunk

106

Chapter 8 : Cnurcnns In North Atnco

f ·....,r"

C

I

R~worked

I '

. l~

Ma rk lit tanks of 25" Arm y Tank

Brigad~

of tnemse fves) were grouped in independent army tank brigades with no otvrsiona t assocranons. A contemporary document oescnbed the role of a tank brigade as 'a suppomnq arm to assist infantry on to a position' . The brigade would consist of three regiments (or battalions) with the usual sprinkling of supportmq arms , which would be attached 10 infant ry brigades for specmc operations and Tunisia would be the first theatre in which this was prope rly put to the test with Churchill tanks The decision to send a tank brigade seems to hav e been taken in about Decembe r 1942 and the selected formation was 25'" Army Tank Brigade which would cons ist of three Churchill regiments; the Norm Irish Horse, 51 a Royal Tank Regiment and 142 Regiment Royal Armoured Corps . They saueo from Britain in sepa rate convoys during January and all were established at Bone in Tunisia by the second week in February. It would be Impossible to chronicle all their domqs over the next four months so the practice- which will be followed in every case from now on - wilt be to draw highlights from their various experiences which illustrate the nature of the work they had to do and record anyt hing parti cularly relevant to the perform ance of thei r tank s. They were all equipped with Cnurc tuus of course The North Irish Horse, raised in Northern Ireland as its name implies . was formed during the Firs t World War as a rmhua regiment . It spent the years between the wars in suspended ammanon and was reformed in 1939 as a consntu ent part of the Royal Armou red Corps . WIth its tanks and

lra in ing in Brilain be fore leav in g for North Al rica

men scatte red on various ship s which lelt the por ts of Brrkennead. Cardiff and Swansea between the 4'" and P' of January It passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on the 24'" and after touc hing at Algiers landed at Ptulhpevule on 10 February. A and B squa drons were at l e Kef on the 2 1st when news of the fight at Kasserine Pass came through and they received orders to create a defensive force, On the night of

A pa ir of Mark III Churchill s and a des palc h r ide r ', mot or cycle al a ra ilw ay cr o ss ing nea r Hun t ·s Gap in Tun i sia. l h~ un il ha, nol bee n identifi ed bl't is pr o bably th e North Iris h Hors~.

107

Mr, Cnurcbu's Tank: The British Infantry Tan k Ma rk IV

26/27 February they moved to Beia where they were soon in their first acnon . A Squadron only had eleven tanks while B Squad ron had just seven. One tank was knoc ked out by an 88mm round through the engine compa rtment while ano the r was rut by artillery fire and broke a track . On the other hand, later in the day, lieutena nt He rn took a snap shot at a German tank which suddenly appeared about SODya rds away and discove red afterwards that he had knoc ked out a Tiger . This defensive flghllng went on through most of March and there is more than on e ent ry in the regimental war diary to the effect that the tank s were being used as anti-tank pillboxe s. But the re are also referen ces to sq uad rons being sent out with infant ry on reconn a issance patrol s, which seems to be unusual work for Infantry tanks. By Apr il the Allies were well into their stride and on the offensive. But the Germans had turned some of the hill top loca uons into defensive postnon s 01immense strength which they believed to be tank proof . One such was known by the Bnnsh as Longstop Hill and the North Irish Horse were instructed to support the 36'" Infantry Brigade m their assa un. It pro ved to be a cost ly battle for the British infantry. The Germans had all the lower slopes well covered by mortars and there were snipe rs opera ting everywhere . The tanks d id their be st to he lp but they had mines to contend with and . being unab le to lire a respec tab le high explos ive round . they cou ld not ach ieve a great dea l. Fighting contmued around Longstop until the end of the month Gradually. as the tank crews ga ined in expe rience and the inlantry got used to working with them , their actions became more concerted . The tank s climbed higher up the slopes and soon they were supporting the infantry as they moved from ridge to ridge . Where ever possible they deve loped the prac-

lice 01work ing around the flank s of a hill and then advancing to the crest lrom both sides . The y de stroyed machine-gun posts tha t were holding up the infantry an d on more than one occasi on a tank would find itself on a high sp ur. looki ng down on an anti -tank gun that was cove ring a valley below . At such time s there wa s Iilll e ho pe for the en emy gu n. The ir first encou nter with en emy tank s at Longstop took place around midday on the 30"'. The German tanks were Panzer IVs. Three were engag ed and dr iven off but another. with a long 75mm gun . appeared around the side of a hill . knocki ng out one Chur chill a nd dama ging anothe r. The crew of the first baled out but the seco nd was taken out of acnon by the co-cnver. oper annq the rese rve stee ring mechanism tram his seat. They made It down the hill but there was a gUlly at the bottom which the Ch urch ill hit a nd rolled ov er. The seco nd reqmen tm 25'" Army Tank Brigade was 51. Royal Tank Reg iment. It sailed from Britain on 20 January and Its war diary give s a precise breakd own 01Its structure . wh ich may be taken as typical . It consis ted of 52 Churcruus Mark s III and IV, six Mark I and two Churchill armoured recov ery vehicles. For reconna issance It had nine Daimler scout cars, four While seout cars and ten Un ive rsal Ca rriers. 11 hac seven Loyd tracked per sonnel ca rriers and two Loyds ntted out with extra batteries for starting recalcitra nt tanks along with five Humber staff cars and 19 BSA M20 solo motorcycles Us tran sport ec helon consis ted of three Austin utlhty pick-up trucks, 253 ton Bedf ord lorries and 10 Ausnn 3 tan ner s: ten Be dford 15 cwt truck s, two Bedf ord wate r tankers and a Moms -Commercia t mobile office. The light Aid Detachme nt (LAD) whic h look care 01 maintena nce had a Scamme ll recovery tractor. an Austin stores lorry, two 15 cwt Bedtorcs

Chur ch ill s of th e North Irish Horse. led by a Mark I, atlhe lime of the baW e l or Lo ng stop Hill .

108

Cha p ter 8: C hurchills in North Africa

one Austin utility and two BSA motorcycles. The signa ls section had one Bedf ord 3 tonner, three 15 cwts , two signa ls truck s and another BSA . Manpower was 4 1 officers, nine warrant officers, five Staff Sergeants. 40 Sergeants , ten Lance Sergeants , 62 Corporals , 58 Lance Corpora ls and 533 troop ers. They arrived at Bone on 2 February having lost one ship with ninetee n tanks on the way. They we re part of the def ensive force at Le Kef but their first action, which took place on 28 Febr uary, is regarde d as a classic. 1t involved A Squadron at a site known as Steamroller Farm nea r El Aroussa. The farm stood at the head of a valley which was heavily defended by German troops that included two battalions of the Hermann Goer ing Regiment and elements of a Panzer Grenadier regiment well provided with anti-tank gun s. Thirteen Churctuns were involved. supporting two companie s of 2"" Battalion the Coldstream Guards, but the infant ry were soon pinned down by enemy lire. The tank s were tak ing punis hme nt as well. when orders cam e through to clear the pass at all cos ts. Two Churchills. commanded by Captain E 0 Holtands and Lieutenant J G Renton made a 1,500 yard dash across an exposed causeway which was cove red by an 88mm gun. Firing at a range of about 200 yards this gun got off two round s, and missed on both occasions, before it was cha rged by the tanks and the crew ran away. Now the tanks were faced with a difficult climb up a steep and winding track more suited to goat s. It was slow going With tight corn ers and a rocky surface but they finally arrived at the top to see. over the crest. the target of a lifetime. Firing down from their lofty position the two Churchills took out two more 88mm guns, two 75mms , two SOmms and many lesser weapons along with 25 assorted wheeled vehic les , two mo rtars and two Panzer III tanks. All this was achieved unsupported, because neither the infantry nor the remaining tank s could join them . and soon they had to withdraw. However they claim later to have inte rcepted a message from the German commander claiming that he had been attacked by a mad British tank battalion which had scaled impossible heights and for ced him to withdraw. Upon such ta les was the Churchill's reputati on made . Notes compiled shortly after the action recorded the damage sustained by ten Churchills at Steamroller Farm. It seems that 75mm rounds were penetrat ing on a regular basi s, especially through the turrets , and there is evidence of internal scabs of armour breaking off and injuring the crew . However one major problem highlighted by the battle was that 01close support . Since the new 95mm gun was not ready a number of Mark I tank s had been supplied to each regiment fo r this purpose. However at Stea mroller Farm the close support tanks were unable to help because they did not have the range. The 51$1 RTR also pointed out that with the howitzer low down at the front it was impossib le lor the tank to go into a hull down position since it masked the gun. They recommended that the guns were swapped over. the 3 inch howit zer being placed in the turret and the 2-pounder in the hull. This was certainly done. but just how many tanks were in-

volved is not clear. The regiment also put in a strong plea for high explo sive rounds for their 6-pounder guns, pointing out that the majority of their target s were ant i-tank guns or infantry which were difficult to hit with armour piercing rounds . Indeed a ques tion still hangs over the logic of fitting tanks that were intended to support infant ry with a gun only suited to comb ating tanks. Thei r wish was granted. A note in the war diary , dat ed t 3 April 1943, notes that two lorry loads of 6pounder HE had arrived so in future all tanks would carry 20 HE and just four High Velocity Armour Piercing in the turntable bins. B Squadron. meanwhile , had been attached to the French 19 Co rps while A and C Squadro ns remained in reserve at Djelida for most of March; A Squadron being involved with the recovery of damaged tanks from El Arrou ssa. At the end of the month A Squadron was involved in one of those events that can irritate lighting troop s out of all proportio n. They were at Bou Arada on the 29'" when a fleet of twenty tank transporte rs arrived with orders to carry eighteen of their tanks to Gatour. some twenty miles away. They loaded up and set out, but after live miles they came to a bridge which, upon investigation , proved too weak to take tanks. Thus they all unloaded, took the tanks on a route that avoided the bridge and the n ca rried on , still on their tracks, for the remainin g fifteen miles to Gafour. The tank transporters turned around and wen t home. The irritation is self evident from the war diary entry 'no doubt a satisfactory explana tion is forthcoming as to why 20 transporters had been despatched from Gua rdien son. a distance of 70 miles from Gat our. in order to transport 18 tank s a distan ce of five miles only'. One wonders if it wa s. That same mont h saw B Squadr on at Siliana with the French. It was not a happy time. The landscape was bare. virtually devo id of cover , and the best they could do was to scatte r the tanks across some farmland in what they christened Prickly Pear Plantat ion. While they waited for orders officers from the squadron began to reconnoitre the area. The grou nd gene rally seeme d to be impassa ble to tanks while the roads were mere tracks, in very poor condition. Liaison with the French appe ars to have been poor. On 4 March the squadron moved off from Sidi Marchett. followed by their transport with petrol. ammun ition and water. Mist was coming down which soon turned to hea vy rain and the track. which ran along the edge of the mount ain, was very poor. However they decided not to turn back and soon came to regret it. The scout cars found it hard going but the heavy tanks made it even worse . One tank broke a track, the tank behi nd it could not get pas t and the remaining sixteen kept going. The journey involved climbing to over 3,000 feet and the average speed was calc ulat ed at 3 mph . The transport soon became stuck. Yet the tanks got through in the end and the drive rs were congratulated . On the 9 m the tanks were ordered into action. The British officers regarded the French scheme as unworkable and protested . They were joined in this by Capta in Leenan of the US Army who was com manding a company of MS light tank s in

109

Mr. Ch urchill' s Tank: The British Infa n try Tank Ma rk IV

Chur ch ills 01 145 RA C in Tuni si a. They arr i ved in an overall coa t of green but th is reg iment broke up th e o ulli ne 01 th eir tank s w ith a pattern 01 sand pain t. Som e so urces c lai m that it was a coa ting of loc al mud bu t it seems too smoo th and eve n fo r t hat.

the same force . The squadron war diary paints a confused picture of the next few days . The French General Welvert seemed to be pushing for impossible results which the British and American tank men resis ted, along with some of the French officers. Protests were made to higher autho rity which enraged the General but in the end a plan was made which involved French infanlry riding on the Churchills. The action , described as a reconnaissance in force , took place on the 111n , despite a last minute signal from the British General Anderson telling B Squadro n not to get involved. All the tanks returned but many minor mechanical troubles were reported. as a result of all the heavy driving of the previous days . Even so on the very next day the squadro n was ordered on another trip of 50 miles . There were two options. Set off at once with the tanks running on their tracks or wait 24 hours for transporters. The British tanks men favoured the latter but General Welvert said he needed the tanks urgently so they got under way. Meanwhile the squadron commander, Major Dow, went on ahead by car to prepa re for the tanks . Reporting to General Welvert at Kesra they heard him say that the order to move the tanks was a mistake , and Dow promptly set off to try and turn the tanks back to Siliana . For the next ten days the weather got steadily worse , the rain got heavie r, turned 10 hail and made life a misery. Attempts to find routes for the tanks, or even better harbou ring sites , only went to prove that the whole area was quite unsuitable for tanks which would only make matters worse if they were used. From a report dated 21 March it is clear that B Squad ron was also blessed with Rota Trailers. They we re a diabolical invention. a two-wheeled unsprung trailer designed to be towed by a tank, The body was a stee l box intended to carry ammunition while the wheels were rotating , hollow tanks to carry fuel. On the march , along the wet and slippery track, Churchill drivers found that the heavy trailers would swing off the road, dragging round the back of the tank and forcing it off the road and into a ditch or agai nst a rock . One tank broke a track while doing this . Perhaps the soldiers would have put up with this inconvenience if the Rota Trailers

had proved their worth as carriers but they did not. Fuel leaked out from the wheel hubs and even after a short journey the stowed amm unition had been bounced around so much it was unfit for use and where the rain got in, as it did all the time , the rounds became soaked and ruined . The trouble was that even conventional transport could not be used easily to maintai n supplies . The war diary record s that tracked carriers were constan tly in demand to haul the lorries out of trouble On 29 March, alter yet another terrib le journey, the surviving tanks of B Squadron prepared for action in the area Sidi Saidou Said . The attack began in the afternoon but it was a strange one . The French infantry had suffered casualties in the morning and reported nine enemy tanks in the area. Captai n Leenan announce d that he was unwilling to have his M5 tanks forward in the reconnaissance role so Major Dow agreed to a change . Thirteen Chu rchill tanks were waiting on the start line with their engines running at 14.30 hours when it was announced that the French infantry were not ready. They finally moved off at 15.10. The Churchills leading the way as if they were light tanks , followed by the French intantry and American M5s in support . There was no opposition and they reached their objective in about ninety minutes . Ge rman forces were seen preparing to coun ter attack but they went away when the French artillery opened fire. B Squadron remained with the French for most of April, taking part in some vigorous actions , but they were back with the regiment by May and noted a change in enemy morale as more and more prisoners came in to give themselves up The third regiment in 25'n Tank Brigade was 142 RAC. This somewhat stark title was now borne by the men of 7"" Battalion the Suffolk Regiment. In 1941 the War Office had sanctioned the conve rsion of twenty Territorial Army infantry battalions to tank regiments , followed by a further fourteen in 1942. It was a drastic move , and not universally popular , but it was essential if the Royal Armoured Corps was to keep pace with the increased demand for armou r. Many. but by no means all, of these regiments were trained on infantry tanks and ended up with Churchrtls No doubt on the basis that

110

Cha pte r 8: Churchills in North Africa

these erstwh ile infant rymen would have greater empat hy with the troops they were suppo rting. The 142 ncl landed at Bone on 9 February. One of their first tasks was to replace another tank regiment at Sbiba , which raises an inte resting point. The regiment in question was the 1 6"'/5~ Lancer s which formed part of the 6'" Armoured Division . It had arrived in Tunisia with a mixed establishmen t of Crusade rs and Valent ines but was now due to convert to She rmans . As an armoure d regiment in an armou red division the 16"'/5'" had ntne in common with an infantry tank regiment but it says much about the natur e of tank warfa re in Tunisia that they could duplicate one another 's roles to some exten t. Either that or it proves that senior commanders in the theatre were not awa re of the differen ce. In late February the reqiment, which had been fighting in support of US 34 1~ Infantry Division, came under command of US II Corps. Later changes saw C Squadron move back under British command and five tanks from B Squadron go to join the French , but the remainder stayed with the Amer ican s. By the end of the month the entire regiment had reverted to British command and wa s involved in action near Medjez el Bab . Undoubted ly the fighting around Medjez el Bab, which began on 21 April and lasted until the end of the month, was some of the mos t intense to be recorded in any of the wa r diaries fo r this period . Seen from regimental level it was an endle ss cycle of confusion with tanks attacking ridges in support of infantry and the n retiring to leaguer for the night on one hour's notice. Often they got less than that. With German tanks around the infantry wer e very jumpy and tended to exa gge ra te ene my strengths. One entry in the regiment' s diary mention s a report concerning an incredible number of German tank s Which, inevitably. turned out to be a false alarm . But th is is only learned afte r the call for help had gone out and every tanks that could move was taking up a hull down position on some exposed ridge. As this action came to an end A Squadron was given a new task in the same area . The object was to take some high ground covering an enemy line of advance known as the Gab Gab gap and establish a defensive pos ition for infantry and anti-tank guns. Each tank was to carry rolls of barbe d wire and four of them wou ld be towing a-poun der anti-tank gun s. Zer o hour was 1700 hou rs on 5 May and the fo urt een Churchi1ls moved off in line ahead with the infantry marching alongside. At the entrance to the valley enemy fire came down and the infantry ducked into a dry wate r cou rse , or nullah, so that they could advance under cover. The anti-tank gunners, who had been riding on the tanks , jumped dow n and tried to walk close alongside the Churchills but they provided little protection and before long the gunners had taken fifty per cent casualties. Although a tank path up the hill had been discovered on the previous night it now proved impo ssible to find again so the tanks began to explore every likely route on a trial and error basis. As night began to fall eleven tanks and two anti-tank guns had struggled onto a plateau near the top of the hill whe re they formed a defended leaguer for the night.

The infantry were unable to follow, having taken too many casualties during the advance , so the tank men provided their own infantry protection during the dark hours . By dawn they were joined by infantry and the tanks moved up to the crest where they comma nded the enemy approach routes . All this took place unde r cons tant fire from machine guns , mo rtars and Nebefwerfers but the tan ks at least had the luxury of effect ive comm unicatio ns and whe n a column of 24 enemy tanks was reported to be approaching they called down artillery fire which drove them off. More tanks arrive d during the day and by a leapfrog process they carried the advance over two further ridges . The action ended at 1900 hours on 6 May when the tanks withdrew. For their final contribution to the campai gn 142ncl RAC became involved in the surrender negotiations. A pat rol of the Royal Sussex Regime n t ca pt ured a Ge rman head q uart er s and Colon el Robertson, the Comma nding Officer of the 142ncl , offered the communications facilities in his tank which was netted to British headquarters. In March 1943 the War Office decided to send a second tank brigade to Tunisia. This was the 2 1st Army Tank Brigade which sail ed as an entity from the Clyde and arrived at Bone on 25 March 1943 . The senior regiment in the brigade was 12'" RTR. Their first action was codena med Ope ration Vulcan which began on 24 April. It was a combi ned tank and infantry attack against German pos itions at Sid i Medienne, Sidi Satem and Sidi Abdalla h, all of which were known to be well protected by minef ields. Since Sappers could not be found to exam ine the exten t of the minefields in front of Sidi Medienne, which C Squadron was scheduled to attack , the commanding officer was instructed to use his Universal Carriers instead. They had already been loaded with ammun ition for the battle so their reconnaissa nce of the minefields was hastily done and not very well organi sed , but there was no time to do a more thorough job and the attack went in. The tanks and infantry advanced through a corn field until two leading Churctults blew up on mine s, the next pair moved off to the right to find a way through followed by two more working round to the left. All four tanks ran onto mines. Without tank support the infantry had a difficult time and by dusk had run out of ammunition , but the Germa ns still held their po sitions. As the infantry withdrew they passed the six wrecked tanks, all with broken tracks, but with their crews still in position and capable of fighting. Fearing a German counter attack a decision was made to withd raw the tank crews overnight but there was no attack . Instead the Germans moved into the minefield and thoroughly dest royed all the damaged tanks . On the next day six Scorpion flail tanks were brought up to deal with the minefield but, due to a mix up over signalling , a troop of Churchills from B Squadron also ran onto a mines with the inevitable result. This time, however, infantry went forward to cover the crews while they repaired their tanks, but the infantry pulled back before the work was completed and once they had gone the German s put in a counter at-

111

M . Chu rchill's Tan k: The British Infa ntry Tank Mark IV

tack. On this occasio n the Chu rchill crews stayed with their tanks and fough t back so they were able to comple te repairs in the morning and get away. On the third day A Squadro n took over and they man aged to avoid the minefields. Instead their infantry left them and the tanks were decimated by anti-tank gunfire, These were joined by mortars and dive bombers until nine of the squadron's tank s had been knocked out. On the final day B and C Squadrons took ove r again . They had more luck and managed to get the wea ry infantry onto Sidi Abdallah but it had been a hard fight marred by bad planning and poor cooperation between tanks. infantry and artillery. The 48'" Royal Tank Regiment was the second senio r requnent in 21 51 Army Tank Brigade. Its first major action involved A and B Squadrons on 21 April 1943 near a loca tion christened with the homely British name of Handley Cross . The objective was a hill feature with two peaks named Jebe l e! Mehirigar and Jebet Ja ffa. and 48'" RlR was 10 suppo rt a battalion of the East Surrey Regiment . The first stage was entirely success ful. A Squadro n wen t in with the East Sur reys while B Squadro n got itself into a hull down position behind a nearby ridge and gave fire support. Stage two involved B Squadron passing through and sending two troops ahead to the next ridge, which is where the excitement began . German tanks were encounte red at less than 200 yards range and a fierce battle ensued . Two Churctuus we re knocked out , one commanded by Lieutenan t Peter Gudg in taking an 88mm round through the hull mactune -qun posmon which ended up

Brit ish troop. 9athM around th e nger kn ocked out by 48" RTR on the Djebel Dja"a. Whether an y of th e Church ill s in the back gro und I re its victims Is unclear.

in the engine compartment. When one considers how crowded it is wit h five men inside a Churchill hull it is quite astoundmq to realise that all five men were able to evacuate the tank after it was hit. Anothe r Churchill was struck in the turret by a TIger at about 150 yard s range . where upon It caught fire The crew prudently baled out but two of them then went back and tried to fight the fire With exunqursners. Soon the fumes

Stili anracting the curious l he abandoned nger sit s on the hillside while a Churchill thunder. by in the baCkgr ound. accom panied by • Dlimler Dingo sc ou t car .

112

Ch ap ter 8: Churcnuls in North Afric a

got so bad that they had to give up but the officer, Lieuten ant Harvey, droppe d into the driver 's seat, released the hand brake and let the tank roll backw ards behind the ridge. They were fearful of sta rting the engine in case it aggravated the fire but a short time later the dr iver and gunner requested permission to go back to their tank, This being granted they climbed in, started up and drove it safely out of action, Inspecting the battle site the next day the tank men cou nted three Panzer Ill, one Panzer IV and a Tiger knocked out. Apart from one Panzer III wh ich was burned out the others showed very little sign of damage and the Tiger, which was little more than scratched, was later returned to Britain for evaluatio n and now resides in the Tank Museum . As an example of the strong construction of the Churchill the 48'" RTR war diary contains a brief summary of six damaged Church ills recovered on 26/27 April. following the action desc ribed above. All were apparently Ma rk IV variants and most had mine damage with broken tracks and suspen sion units. However two showed signs of being hit by enemy weapons and in one case the lower part of the hull was bulged inwards under the driver 's seal by a double mine explosion. However this and three of the other tanks were all driven away after their tracks were fixed . Armoured Recovery Vehicles being used only for the other two. Although it has nothing to do with Churc hill tanks it would be a pity to ignore a small action involving the regime nt's reconna issance troop in Universal Carr iers which took place as late as the 11 May. Reports had been received of an occupied farm from which a German soldier woul d emerge with a white flag, but from which fire was ope ned wheneve r British troops approached . The three Carriers got as far as the farm's driveway when the surrende ring soldier appeared, claiming to be alone . This did not convince anyone so two of the Carriers mounted an attack, Churchill tank style. This resulted in the surrender of nine Germa ns, including a General ; they attacked again and another 3 1 appeared. The next attack , delivered as the light was fading , netted a further 144 German troops along with the senior Germ an naval officer in Tuni sia . Still not satisfied the tank men kept the farm staked out until one o'clock next morning, by which time they had added anothe r 30 to their bag. Happy that the place was now unoccupied they withdrew along with their prisoner s. Eighth Battalion the Duke of Wellington's Regiment provided the personnel for 145 Regiment Royal Armoured Corps when they converted to tanks in Novem ber 1941. They formed the junior regiment of 2 1SI Army Tank Brigade. Their first taste of action was on the Jebet Jaffa alongside 48th RTR. They claim 10have engaged a Tiger and knocked out two Panzer IVs having lost two of their own tanks and one ARV in return. During further fighting on the 23"'. against what the war diary describe s as 'considerable oppo sition', they lost ten tanks with many wounded but just two men killed . They got their first Tiger on Guerriat Ridge on the afternoon of 24 April but the circum stance s are not described . In most respects their actions mirror those of the other regiments already mentioned . They were attached to the Guard s Brigade for most of the

time which can never be regarded as a sinecure , but much of their work seems to have been of a defensive nature. Early in May, with A Squadron 48th Royal Tanks under command they were part of the force cove ring the Gab Gab gap where a heavy German attack was ant icipated . It cam e late in the afternoon of the 4'" with abou t twenty enemy tanks supported by anti-tank fire, The regiment lost two tanks but in return, assiste d by its own ann-tank battery, managed to destroy two Tigers, nine other tanks wh ich might have been Panzer III or IV, and wha t they described as a mortar carrier. Two days later, wh ile suppo rting 5'" Indian Brigade , a tank from A Squadron ran onto an abandoned British mine dump and was blown to pieces. The debris damaged two other tanks and the regiment blamed the Royal Engineers for not marking the site . Even so the attack was a success , earning the regiment a specia l commendation from the divisional commande r. Attempts to reach any conclus ions about the Churchill follow ing its brief spell of action in Tunisia were limited by the amou nt of evidence available . As early as March 1943 the 25'" Army Tank Brigade issued a report, based one imagines on very little exper ience , which nevertheless makes interest ing reading. Amo ng the points noted is the comment that not all of the tanks shipped out to Tunisia had been given the full rework treatment. which suggests either that the programme at home was falling behind or those responsible for Shipping them were unable to identify all the modificatio ns. Another matter, repeated more than once in the brief report, concern s the protection of stowed ammunition . As early as 1942 trials in the dese rt had proved what most crews already knew ; that most fires in tanks were cause d by incoming projec tiles igniting the ammuni tion and not. as most theoris ts believed, by ignit ion of fuel tank s. The bri gade was now ca lling fo r armou red ammunition bins; 4mm thick if made from armour plate or 6mm if mild stee l was used . Another interesting remark concern s the visibility for both driver and front hull gunner. Their inability to see to the sides of the tan k left them feeling very isolated and there was an additional disadvantage for thos e of less than average stature. Short men had such difficulty looking through the periscopes at all that they preferred to drive with their front visors open and at least two tanks had been destroyed by rounds comi ng in this way. There appeared to be no easy way of curing this except by selecting talle r drivers, but the view to the sides could be improved by extending the upper sections of the periscope s. Genera lly, however , crews were said to have immense confidence in their tanks. When it came to mobi lity the brigade advised that in order to get the best results from Chu rchill tanks movement in daylight should not exceed 12 miles in two hours for eight hours, with one hour's maintenance every four hours. This gave a figure of 42 miles per day, but the report noted that on one occasion nine tanks had moved 100 miles in 24 hours and were still perfectly serviceable at the end of the run, although their total lives had been shortened . A study of all three regiments in the brigade, up to the date of the report , revea led that most of the tanks

113

Mr, Churc hill's Ta nk: The British Infa nt ry Tank Ma rk IV

had completed up to 400 miles, On average each tank had completed 340 miles and one belong ing to 51 st RTR had somehow managed to travel between 700 and 800 miles on its tracks On the gunnery side a case was made for more close support tanks . The argument was that , if an enemy tank was knocked out with an armour piercing shot it was nice to have a high explosive round ready to kill the crew when they baled out. It was recognised that the location of the 3 inch howitzer , in the front 01 the hull, was not ideal and the idea of exchanging it with the z-oouooer was mentioned again . However it was also suggested that the howitzer might be mounted in the hull 01some s-oounoer tanks, accepting a reductio n in 6pounder ammunition stowage in the process . Where the 6pounder was concerned crews agreed that geared elevation (or fixed elevation to use the contemporary term) was preferable to free elevation but it was noted that the elevating gear was badly located , It was also suggested that the turret BESA machine-gun should be transferred to the right side of the main gun . This would not only make the feed system easier to operate but relieved the gunner of any responsibility for attending to the machine -gun , which might distract him from his telescope . Of the telescope itself, the Number 39, it was agreed that magnification was insufficient for long range shoot-

ing and the cross wires were so thick that they totally obscured the target at 1.000 yards or above . The different types of track were discussed . suggesting that all three types were in use in Tunisia. The light cast type was least popular but of the other two . the heavy cast and manganese. the latter was said to give better running and resistance to enemy fire but it had the unpleasan t habit of breaking idler or sprocket teeth and jumping off altogether This was particular ly noted when the tanks were working over rocky ground . But mud was the biggest problem of all. and Tunisia was notoriously muddy. It worked its way under the track guards and . if left to harden , caused a lot of damage The brigade report included a sketch showing their solutions : extra slots above the side doors and a hinged section . three feet long. either side of the turret which could be swung open for cleaning Finally there were some interesting comments on armour Protection was required for the turret ring, something which British tanks we re notorious for, but the most interesting thing is that the fabricated turret (the welded version of the Mark Ill ) was rega rded as toughe r than the cast type. Most of the hatc hes were in need of a redesign to prevent small arms rounds from being deflec ted through the hinge s and there were problems with the side doors . These were tapered where

Although phot ogr aphed in Britai n thi s appear s to be an example 0 1the co nve rs io n fir st mentioned in Tuni sia . A Mark I in whic h the 2-poun der and 3 in ch howitzer have exc hanged places ; th e so-c all ed Chu rc hill Mark I Clo se Support.

114

Ch ap ter 8: Ch urctunsin North Africa

they filled rruo the hull but the brigade discovered that when a door was struck II was pushed in and wedged itself shut so that the crew could not open II to esca pe. They suggested an Internal rim, such as they had noted on Germ an tanks , which should prevent ttus In September 1943 the School 01Tank Technoloqy produced a summary based on a survey of battle damage . A total of 41 damaged tanks were consid ered. of which 20 were vrcums 01 mine damage . Basing their study on strikes Irom projectiles (he report recorded 8 1 hits in all, effective and ineffective _More than 25 per cen t of these came from 88mm weapons With 75mm the ne xt most common. Of the 21 tanks not mined . 10 were definite ly taken out by 88mm shots but whether from tanks or anti- tank weapo ns was obviously impossible to say. Part of the survey. which the report admitted was of dubious accuracy, claimed that of 20 strikes attributed to the 88mm . only 13 were effective while the 75mm scored 8 eftecnves from 16 strikes. They regarded this as encouraging. pomnnq out that it proved the Cnurctutrs armour was not yet outclassed by the lates t proiec tues. They calculated that an extra Inch 01armo ur would make a great deal of difference . buttnat would depe nd upon where it was placed The 25' Tank Bngades also record s the loss of one tank. T68384 of 51 ' ATA. which was attac ked by a dive bomber . One bomb broke the nearside track white the other tore off

sn

the engine cove r and shatte red it into three or four pieces be fore smashi ng in part of the engine . This in turn started a pe trol lire which burned the tank out. It would seem difficult enough for a dive bombe r to get one accurate hit upon a tank . Two would have to be quite remarkable . Looking ne xt at where the projectiles hit the report revealed that it was shared equally betw een the front, sides and all othe r areas . The area that concerned them most was the side . They estimated (why they coul d not be sure is unclear ) that the sides of a Churchill were about .75 inch (19mm) thinne r than the front and they believed that the additron of an extra 18mm 01 armour all round could have halved the casualtie s from shell fire. However the ratio of effective hits on the sides of tank s was far greater than those on the front and this gave rise to further specula tion . There is no mention of the fact that the side presents a much larger target but the report concludes that. since the sides were vulnerable, it would make little difference if they were a bit thinner. Weight saved here could then be applied as extra frontal armour . These were only tentati ve conclusions based on those tanks that been knocked out. The report recognised that other tanks must have been hit without being knocked out and withou t deta ils of them the sample was not truly balanced. Whether it would affect future designs remained to be seen .

115

9

The New Model Churchill

Whateve r rigours the Br itish Ar my and its Allies suffere d

duringthe Libyan and Tunisian campaigns they pale into relative insignifica nce when compared with wha t was going on in

Russia. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1940 the Red Army had something in the region of 24 ,000 tanks . Not all of them could be mobilised at once but even so they outnumbered those of the invaders on a prodigious scale . Despite these odds the Germans began 10decimate the So viet armour and , in a matter of months , had virtually annihilated it. By Dece m ber 1941 the Red Army was down to less than 5 ,000 tanks , nearly ha lf of which were on their eastern bor ders and unavai lable 10 meet the attack. Wor se still the rapid Ge rman advance threatened to over run a ll the mai n Soviet cen tres of produ ct ion so the government took the drastic step of evac uating the majority of their ma nu facturing plants well to the eas t, in the Ura ls. The hiatu s in produ cti on create d by th is ma ssive ind ustrial migr ation wa s made good . to a la rger extent th an the Russians were ever happ y to admit, by supplies of Lend -Lease tanks from Britai n, Cana da and th e Un ited Sta tes . Shipments of British tanks. Mat ildas and Valentines to begin with, starte d in Octobe r 1941, the majorit y travelling in th e gruelling Russian convoys. The arrangements made with Ru ssia under what was known as the Protocol Commitment called for the delivery of 250 tanks pe r mont h but this requi red convoys to continue through the summer months when perpetual cey light rendered them particularly vulnerable. Thus it was one thing to promise tanks but quite another to deliver them . Convoy PQ16 . which sailed from Britain at the end of May 1942 carried 468 tanks but . under constant attack from enemy aircraft and If -Boats seven me rchant ships were lost , taking with them to the bottom 147 tanks. Worse was to follow. coovoy P0 17 wh ich sai led on 27 J une, comp rise d 36 me rchant ships . ca rrying betw een the m 594 tanks and other essen tial items . Hound ed continu ally by airc raft and If -Boats the convoy and its esco rts put up a stout fig ht until, on the even ing of 4 July its esco rting crui sers we re withdr awn and the ships wer e orde red to scatter.

Nava l inte llige nce in Londo n, calculating from various reports . concluded that the battleship Tirpitz. and the so-called pocket battleship Admiraf Scheer were preparing to attack the convoy. The order to scatter was standard procedure in such circumstances but it immediately left the merchantmen easy prey to air and submarine attack. P0 17 was devastated. only eleven of its ship s finally made it to Russia where they delivered just 164 tanks . 11 is not clear how many of these were Churchills. Statistics merely show that up to and incluo ing PQ 17 127 Churchill tanks had been shipped from Britain . All of those sent are known to have been of the s-ooonostype so these would almost certai nty have been Mark Ills. Russian recor ds suggest that they received 30 1 Churchills, Ma rks III and IV. For ecasts issue d in Britain suggest that the total, up to Ju ne 1943 , should have been nea rly 500 Church ills in all, but mil ita ry for ecasts a re notor io usly optimis tic. It may be that some 200 Ohurc t nnsende d up on the bottom of the Barents Sea but it is mo re likely th at th e Russians simp ly stoppe d as king fo r them . They regarded the Churchill as a heavy ta nk like their own KV·l . bu t the two types could ha rdly be co m pared . The Soviet tan k outclassed its British co unterpart in almost every respect but above all else it was desig ned for Ru ssian co ndi tions. Soviet ma nned Chu rchills are know to have taken part in some of the great tank battles around Kursk in the summer of 1943 but details of their use are not readily available . There are good reasons to suppose that some of the Soviet Churchills fell into German hands but few to suggest that they were employed operationally by the We rmacht. Invariably, when a captured vehicle was adopted by the Germans it was issued with a new identification, and no such details are known for the Chu rchill . Gene rally it seems to have been Russia n policy to oper ate Wes tern tank s on their southe rn fronts whe re winter con dit ions were not so ha rsh . T he Chu rchi ll, hav ing been designe d for servic e in a tempe rate climate , late r proved itself in much warme r climes but, we ll before that , two Ch urch ills had bee n tes ted in ve ry cold cond itions. Betw een 2 March a nd 2 Apri l 1942 T311 0a . a Mark I and T31113 a Mark 11 , bo th

116

Chapter 9: The New Model Chu rchill

built by Vauxhall Motors, were tested in Kapuskasing. Ontario. Canada in very deep snow. The Mark I had the later pattern air cleaners and full track guar ds while the Ma rk II was in original condmon. For two days . up to 11 March. both tanks lay out on the prair ie while a blizzard raged and there was httreto show but their turrets when crew members skied out to Inspect them . Even so the report suggests that temperatures rarely dropped below freezing at this time so the greatest problem was snow . As with sand in the dese rt, snow seemed to get in everywhere. Both tanks suffered track breakages but the Mark I was further handicapped by the track guards . Snow packed in unde rneath and ended up bulging the tmwork which was later remo ved. Canadian built Ram and valen tme tanks also took part in the trials and if the photographs are any guide the Churchills seem 10 have spent much of their time dragging the other tan ks out of ditches and snow drifts. Yet the impression given is that the trials were inconclusive and it is worth noting that this all took place some months before the Cana dians took Cnurcruus into action at Diep pe. One result of these trials was a booklet entitled tnstrucuons to gUide the preparation of Church ill lff. IV, V. VI, VII and Vf/I for sub-zero opera tion (to minus 15 deg . F) the first editon of which appeared in February 1944. Most of the preca utions desc ribed involve the use of special covers and annfreeze grease but there are one or two particula r points to note . For instance the compressed air system had to be dis connected and certain parts removed . otherwise condensed moisture could freeze in the pipes and damage the equip-

Aft er a n igh t o n the Canadi an pr air ies m e l ir sllrick was 10 fi nd yo ur lank . then d ig it out and pr epar e fo r Ih e day 's lrials.

ment. Special batteries were provided and, of course. the engine cooling system had to be drained when the tank was not in use. At times. when a tank had to be left standing for long periods , special ca talytic heaters were provided. These would be place d inside and then the tank would be cove red completely by a huge sheet 01canvas material. draped loosely over the ent ire vehicle . This would main tain a tempe rature 01 at least zero deg rees but crews were advised not to climb inside unless it was essen tial because the lu mes could kill. Towards the end 01 1940. Babcock & Wilco x Ltd.. of Renfrew considered the construction of a welded hulllor the Churchill tank. This caused some inte rest at the Ministry of Supply and an orde r for one . placed with the Scornsn company in November 1940, was followed by a second in Janu-

Man y pic tures fr om th e co ld wealher I rials In Cana da ahow lh e Ch urc hill s rescuin g ct ner vehi c les. Th is is a case In po in t.

117

Mr. crorcnu's Tank: The BnnsnInfantry Tank Mark IV

ary 1941. Work on the hul ls co incided with the programme to produced welded turre ts for the e -pc unoer gun and this enabled the firm to solv e some of the antic ipated prob lems on a smaller structure . We lding armou r wa s rega rded with a good dea l 01susp icion in Britain . despite the fact that much exper imen tal work had bee n done at Wootwich Arsenal be lore the war. One fear was that heating armo ur to effect the weld could spoil the integ rity of the plate. Another sugges ted that the weld itself wou ld be vulnerable to direct hits from anti-tank rounds . Many British companies engaged in tank production emphasised thes e fears and also poi nted to the great short age of skilled weld ers since they empl oyed traditional rivet ing techniques in mo st 01 the ir plants. The attraction s of weld ing were many . It saved produ c non time and weight . It ensured a watertight hull and dId not require such accurate preparation of plate . But concern about the degradation of armour contmued so Babcock & Wilcox initiated a procedure known as postbeatmq . This involved gIving the assembled hull a second appli cation of the heat treatme nt afte r welding . but there were those who expressed doub ts abo utttus. In order to settle the matte r some turr ets were given Ihe postheating treatme nt and othe rs were net . Firing trials suggested that pos theatmq ma de no difference and there was even some evide nce to suggest that it did indeed cause more harm than good . The trials were there fore extended to the exper imental we lded hulls. The first one was given the treatment and the second was not. Both hull s wer e then co mpleted as tanks and subje ct to a 1.500 mile run ning test. When this was completed. in July 1942. the unpostheated tank was stripped down and the hull placed o ut on the range s to be shot at . It survived rema rkably well and took the pun ishment even better than a comparable riveted hull , so plan s were made to change over to welding entirely. The results were studied by the Welding an d Gas Cutting Branch of the Department of Tank Design who announced that weldi ng would save about 20 per ce nt in man -hours. 4 pe r cent in weigh t but require atleast 50 pe r cen t more Iloor space for assembly . This was bala nce d ou t to some extent by a reductio n in the demand for space where the pla te was cut. because It did not now have to be drilled to anyth ing like the same extent. Since I1 would create a good dea l 01 uphea val in proou cnon the re wa s no immediate attempt to Change over to welding and indeed . when It was introd uced man y other change s were incorporated On 6 April 1943 the Sec retary of State for War and the Minister of Supply issued a Jo int Memorandu m on the subject of Tank Supply Policy for conside ration by the Defence Committ ee of the War Cabinet. 11 containe d a tellin g sentence . "A substantial proport ion of the Briti sh 1943 tank requ irement will be met. prov ided shipping is avai lable. from assignm ents of American tanks ". Whatev er this imp lied for the future of British tank prod uction it did at least mean tnat . to some ex lent, the pressure was off. Since the majority of tanks on orde r from the United States wou ld be Snermans this would go a long way to correct ing the imbalance between infantry and crui ser tank produ ction which had proved impossible to rem -

While crew memb er s rep air a Ir ack on Ih eir Mark III one can study Ihe panels 01 ap p li que arm our utt ee 10 the sides 01 the hu ll and the side

eocr

edy since the prefe rence In favour of cruisers had urst been ann oun ced in 1940 . Things might have been ditrerent II Vauxhall Motors had shown more enthusiasm for the proposed changeover from Churchill to Cromweu production but they foug ht a long . ha rd rea rgua rd action In respect of the Churchill. a nd they were about to win Look ing at the current produc tion programme tor 1943 the Jo int Memorand um noted that 1.300 Cnurctutls remained to be builtlrom the agreed tmaltota! 01 4.000 and that these should all be completed by early 1944 . when producnon would cease . vet . the report noted . "as a result of con tinuous oevelopment . the Chur chill type has been great ly Improved In reliabili ty and fighting pert orm ence". 11 went on to say that in a rece nt telegram 10 the Prim e Minister. Gene ral Alexander had empha sised the va lue 01 the Churchill in the figh ting In Tunisia . "Its re lat ive ly heavy armour enables it to discharge tasks for wh ich no othe r B ritish tank at present seems equally fitted". The report went on to recommend that Churchill production shoul d con tinu e, at a reduced rate. throughout 1944 and that a furthe r 1.000 should be ordered . bnnglng the tota l up to 5.000 in a ll. A footn ote to the report includes a suggestion for the impr ovement of reliability and. If possible . armour protec tion for the Churchill and it conclu des: "The Wa r Defen ce Committee is invited 10 endo rse the policy as sta ted above ". It must have been mu sic to the Prim e Mlnister'Sears Despite the comforting assu rance of Sherma ns from the United Stale s the War Cabinet Defence Comrmttee made It clear that they were not prepared to rely enhrely on America for tank s. It was . to some exter n. a matter of nanona! pride . althoug h there were industrial unpncanons to consider as well Thu s the Defence Cornrmttee announced that Cromweu would

118

Chapter 9: The New MOdel ChurChill

contin ue to be developed, as wou ld the Chu rchill 'fo r the time being '. The implicatton was that some thing better shou ld be produced and the Defence Comm ittee made it clear that they would be sanshed wilh a much more heavi ly armoured tank . Indeed they said that speed might be sacntice d to increased protecnon and that they would not mind if the speed came down 10as low as 6 mph in such a case . Th is was only marginally better than British tanks of the First Wo rld War. In the meantime it was agreed that between 200 and 400 Ch urchill tanks should be up-armoured with as much extra plate as possmre and the MInistry of Supply was invited to comment on this. They responded on 14 May with the rather disheartening information that It would be impossible to increase the ~urret armour of exrstmq tanks , because the turret ring would not accept the weight. And they estimated that no more than half a Ion of extra armour should be applied to the hull because the suspension would not take it . This modest increase would bnng the top speed down to 11 mph . In June the Department of Tank Design produced a drawing to show how the extra armour should be fitted to a Churchill Mark 1II but went on to point Out that this extra modifica tion could not be done as part of the rework programme . lilt was done at all it would have to be done In the field .

We have already noted comments from Chu rchill users in Tunisia concern ing the need for high exp losive ammunition but it was not a new demand . Unfortunately the HE round sup plied for the 6-pounder gun was not capable of holding a significant explosive cha rge . lis destructive effect was hardly wort h the effort of firing It and it compa red unfavourab ly with the HE ro und fired by the American 75mm gun in the Grant or Sherman . This falling was felt strongly by Churchill crews in North Africa and one result of this need will be studied later , Meanwhile in Bntain others were thinking along the same lines . The general background to subsequent developments has nothing specifically to do with the Churchill . and It is covered elsewhere ". but the ultimate result affected the Churchill in a major way. A report . delivered 10the Tank Board in December 1942. revealed that Vickers-Armstrong was investigating the possibility of adapting the e-oounoer to fire 75mm ammunmon . This involved enlarging and relining the barrel and altering the breech end to accept American 75mm rounds The result could hardly be regarded as a major advance in the SCience of tank gunnery but It had two distinct advan- F!etChel , The Untversal Tank. HM SO LonOon 1993

Churc hi lls on exercise . probably with g-oRl R. A Loyd Carr ier ia br ing ing up th e rear .

119

M , C hurchill 's Tank : The British Infant ry Ta nk Ma rk IV

Bradrord . a well sl owed Mark IV laking part in a winler ex-erei se . Two local s have co me alo ng to see the me aa the l ank is mak ing of the roa-d aod tl\e i, fenc e.

tages. It put Bnusn tanks on a par with their American counterparts . especially with the ability to fire a respectable high explosive round, and it meant that any tank (or armou red car come to that) which could take the 6-pounde r could now be adapted to take the 75mm weap on; and this adapt ation could be achieved by doing little more than changing the gun. Of course there was more to it than that, the new gun would require new sights to match and the internal ammu nilion stowage would also have to be altered , but the main problem was elevation . The modified gun had a greater eftecnve range than the 6-pounder when it came to firing high explosive shells and It was no longer possible to trust to free elevation and the gunner's skill for accuracy . 11 was now rmperanve that some form of geared elevation should be mtroduced and. since vckers-Arms tronq deve loped the revised gun and ItSmounting this became their problem . However It also poses a problem for anyone attempting to produce an accurate history of the Chu rchill tank. The problem is this. Did the 6-pounder Churchill have geared elevation or not? It seems to be a simple enough queslion but one is now forced to rely, almos t enti rely. on written evidence and that is incredibly contra dictory. It wou ld be tediOUS to review the subject in detail . just to prove that the researcher had done his homework . bu t the follow ing might at least provide some insight into the problem . A diagram from the Illustrated Parts List tor Churchill tanks Mark III and

IV, pubtrsned In July 1942 (long before the 75mm weapon was considered) clearly show s what is oescnbed as the eleva ting and firing gear in which a handwheel oper ates a threaded shaft within a sleeve to activate the etevaucn while the handle of the wheel includes a fIring trigger . Next a handbook on e-oc unoer co-a xial mountings. published in January 1943 quotes the Ch urchill III and IV as having 'mounting 6-pr and SESA Med . M.G. No. 1 Mk I or Mkll' and states unequivocally these mountmgs are of the geared elevation type A report from Lufworth, dated 10 February 1942 . throws a bit more light on the SUbject. It concerns firing trials 01 a Mark III Churchill and refer s to elevating gear of Mark I and Mark 11 types . The former . which was designed originally for the s-ooorcer Crusader tank and AEC armoured car. is given a very poor report and even the improved Mark 11 does not seem much better. The pistol grip and trigger are so dllticutt to handle that It is impossible for the gunne r to fire accurately when the tank is moving or even when tracking a moving ta rget from a stationa ry tank. The lack 01a shoulde r piece is also said to make the gunn er's task more difficult. In January 1944 Vauxhall Molars published a heavyweight tome entitled Weight Analysis of the Church ilf Tank which covers all types of Churchill from Mark IV to Mark VII and illustrates each version with a beaut ifully executed side erevation sect ion drawing . That for the 6-pounder Mark IV shows , quite cnstmcuy. a horseshoe shaped shoulder piece

120

Chapter 9 : The New Model C hurc hill

which clearly indica tes free eleva tion . along with a foot firing pedal which again is typical 01this system . A Service Instruction Book for the Churchill III and IV. published in Oct ober 1944 refers to four moun tings for the 6-pou nder and 75m m gun which. It claim s. divide into two types: those that have cable firing gear and those with electrical firing gear with an auxiliary 1001 flnng pedal. but rt then goes on to state the mountings are of the 'tree : eleva tion type . that is they are elevated or depre ssed by the gunner exerting pressure on a snootaemece fitted to the mount ing. and again this appea rs to be quite unequivocal . Reference to the previou s chapter will reveal that reports Irom Tun isia alread y mentioned geared ele vat ion on 6pounder Cnurcmnsand the only logical conclus ion is that both types existed. but 11that were the case one would expect it to be mentioned in con temporary publications. especially service handbooks and parts lists. The closest one can find dates Irom September 1945 in the form of the First edition 01a handbook tor the Churchills Mark IX. X and XI. These will be treated in more deta il later but suffice It to say tor now that the Mark IX would carry a e-oouncer. the Mark X a 75mm and the Mark XI the 95mm howitzer . This handbook has nothing specmc to say concerning elevation systems at all. exce pt as an aside when discussing the construction ot the e-co uooer gun . In oescnbmq the muzzle counterweight the book notes that there are different styles tor those guns tha t have gea red elevation and those with free elevation . It is a small enou gh matter but a curious one. made the more so by the obvio us conf usion in contemporary publicatio ns and the almost total lack 01 an exprananon. Unlortunately one cannot quite leave it there . As already explained . when Vickers-Armstrong developed the new gun and mounting they introduced a geared elevat ion system ot

A cr ewman demonstrate s how one man can lift the engine out ot hi s tank with the aid 01 an Atl'ler1o n jack . l in ed to the turre t.

their own des ign. This was subsequently the subject of much criticism for its poor quality . It was cla imed that the only way to ensure accuracy was to wind the gun up to the desired angle and then turn the nandw neel backwa rds in order to take up the Iree play which wou ld otherwise cause the gun to jump . on firing. and miss the target. Yet we have seen Irom the above that a form of geared elevation already existed tor the 6- pounde r moun hng as early as July 1942 and one has to assume that this was a more reliable product than the vckers version . It so. why was it not adapted to the new gun instead?

Churchill tank s 01 an unidentified reg iment. supported by a platoon 01 Carrier s and . lor some reason some moforcycle despatch rider • . In the distance anofhe r reg iment tr om the brigade awails order. 10 move . h is very unu sual 10 see a c omp lete regimenl of Churchills in one photograph .

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Mr. C hu rchi ll's Tank : The British Infa ntry Tank Mar k IV

The history of the adopt ion of the British 75mm is another lengthy saga of muddle and misunde rstanding, some of which has al ready been noted . In February 1943 the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Liaison Committee announced that the priority order for conve rting tanks to the new gun was Chu rchill lirst , then Cromwe ll, then Centa ur. and finally Valentine , On the 23'dof that month the Cha irman of Armo ured Fighting Vehicles at the Ministry of Supply announce d that the 75mm mounting had passed endurance tests and the Liaison Committee stated that the 75mm Churchill with geared elevation would be ready to ente r production by August, subject to the number of e-counoertanks still required. The Committee also agreed to increase the number of Close Suppo rt (95mm) Churchills from 250 to 300 . I1was at this point that the Prime Minister elected to interfere once again in the fortunes of his namesake . On 14 May he decided to comment on the Join t Memorandum referred to earlier. He concurred with thei r views on up-armoutinq . even at the expense of speed , but had his own ideas on armament and in this instance he was commenting on tanks in genera l. Believin g, as he did, tha t a new, high velocity 75mm gun was still a possibili ty he questio ned the widespread adoption 01 the medium velocity weapon , the Vickers-Armstrong conversion. In his view, pending availabi lity of the HV 75mm , only 30 per cent 01 production tanks should have the MV 75mm ; the proportion of close support tank s with the 95mm howitzer should be increased from 10 to 20 per cent and the remain ing 50 per cent shou ld retain their 6pounder guns . The War Office bit back sharply . In a note destined to be read before the Defence Comm ittee on 15 June 1943 they state ; Tank armament policy cannot be decided on purely arbitrary percentages ... but must , in the end , be gov erned by an organisa tion , within the unit or formation , at once tactically sound and adm inistratively practicable. Tank policy, here and in America , is clearly directed to the produc tion - apart from a reteuvety small number of specialised equipments - of stan dard types of medium tanks moun ting. as main armament a developed high velocity 3 inch gun , effective both as an AP and HE weapon .. ... which was as good as telling the Prime Minister to shut up. The War Office was quite prepa red to adm it that percentage figures were necessary for production planning, with the unstateo proviso that it was up to them to produce such figures. They then wen t on to expand upon the subjec t. They noted that, during a recent visit to the Mediterranean thea tre of war, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial Gene ral Staff encountered a rema rkable deg ree of unanimity among tank users that what they required as an all-pu rpose tank with dual-purpose gun. Achieving this, they explained, was a long term policy which could not become fully effective before the second half of 1944. In the meantime they wou ld have to make the best use of what was available. Of Churctuns

A Churchill Mark Ill ' , fi lle d wi th th e 75mm gUll . poss ibly pho log r8phed in Fran ce .

all they said was that there should be sufficient to equip all Army Tank Brigades, which was probabl y just as well because they finally stated that its predec essor, the Valentine, was no longer acceptable in the field. On the subject of guns they explained that British tank crews were now so convinced of the super iority of the 75mm gun in the Sherman that they wou ld accep t not hing less for their own tanks, but the War Office experts had other ideas tor the Churchill. To this extent they appear to be agreeing with the Prime Minister when they say that, in tank battalions of army tank brigades equipped w ith Churchills , th e percentage of 6· pounde r tanks might be higher , up to 50 or even 66 per cent. The reason for this, as expla ined in their note, provi des a useful insight into the whole subject of infantry tank armament. Their reasoning is the old one, that infantry tanks work, primarily. with unarmoured troops who might be defenceless against enemy tank s. Thus it would be important for them to be supported by tank s which could drive enemy armour 011 until the infantry had their own anti-tank defence s consolidated . This goes right back to the reason for equ ipping the Matilda with a 2-pounder gun and one might have thought that there was enough cumulative experie nce from the last three years to show that what the infantry really needed was a tank with a good high explo sive firing capability. Yet on this point the War Office is quite firm ; There is no evidence at present that more than the normal prop ortion (about 10 per cent of unit equipment ) of 95mm howitzer armed close suppo rt tanks are required. In its final comments the War Office report states that from September 1943 all Church ill gun tanks will come off the prod uction line equipped with a mounting that wou ld take either the 6-pounder or 75mm gun, and with ammunition bins adju stable to take either type of round. In the case of the

122

C ha p te r 9 : The Ne w MOdel Chu rchill

A Churchill Mark IV wi th 7Smm g un or a Mark VI. Normalty one would e xpec t the la"er to c arry an All Round Vision Cupola . The marking on the turret side , a black canno n on a yellow and red d iamond, repre sent s the Gunnltry SChoo l at Lu lworth Camp. Dor set.

95mm It had been found Imposs ible to make the guns inter changeable so close suppo rt tan ks wou ld have to be bu ilt soecncauy as such . An y attempt to rework 6 -poundern5mm gun tanks to 95mm would have 10 be undertaken by the manu tactu rer. In April 1943 a pilot model Chu rchill Mark IV with the 95mm howitzer had been tested at Lulwo rth whe re problems had been idenlilied with the traver sing gea r, depression limits and sighllng arrangemen ts. Shortly alterwards the Defence Committee said that they would like to review the relative merits 01the 75 mm and 95 mm gun s as dua l purpose weapon s an d asked for a oemonstranon to be laid on at Lulw orth . Th ey were told Ihatthe 95 mm armed tan k was not in a fit state to take part in such a show but it is inte resting to see that the 95mm how itzer was even being considered as an ything but a high explosive firing gun at this stage . A high explosive anti-tan k (HEAT) round was certainly developed for the gun , although one a uthoritative source suggests that it was not very effective and proba bly never iss ued tor service . Never theless some official figur es claim that this could penetra te 110mm of armour at ranges up to 2,500 yards which was better than the Bnnsb or Ameri can 75mm guns cou ld do at any range. and even bette r than the 6-po unde r, firing APDS , at anyth ing ove r 1.000 ya rds . Returning to the war manes one can obse rve more regiments as they come to terms with their new tanks . The old 10'" Battal ion, the Kmq's Ow n Roya l Reg ime nt. now serving in Cnur chuts as 151 Reg iment. Roya l Arm oured Corps wa s stationed at Prudhoe on Tyne in Febr uary 1942 when Its first Churchill amved . But they did notlo llow in a rush. They had twelve tanks by the end 01March and just one more in Apri l. At the end 01 May they supplied two tank s for a trial on the

Rive r Tyne where they we re temed across on a raft composed 01 po ntoo ns supporting a length of Bailey Bridge, a syste m that wo uld be empl oyed late r on the mighty River Rhine The regim ent had 21 tank s by the end 01 that month but they make no mention 01 marks unt il the 21" tank is deliv ered . it being described as litted with a e-po unuer . as is the 22"Cl. Howeve r when their next lank arrives , on 28 June. it is described as a Mark 11 converted 10 Mark III which is an odd exp ression since it wou ld have been titted with an entirely differen t turret and internal stowag e. It is difficult to understand how a regime nt co uld know that a tank had changed ma rk unless it was one of thei r original stock, sent back for rework . Howeve r there is no evide nce at all of this practice Normally tank s se nt away for rewor k were simply replaced by new mach ines . By September 1942 15 1RAC had moved to Westgateon-Sea near Margate in Kent and by the end of that month it had 45 Chur cttius . The last delivery cons isted of two Mark I. six Mark JI and one Ma rk Ill. By Dece mbe r the regimen t had moved around the south coast to Worthing in Susse x where it too k part in an exercise cod e -named Advent Ill. It is tasci natlng to note how the War Office co njured up names for ItS many e xercises To call one Advent around Ch ristmas might reflect the spirit of the Ie snve seaso n but It hardly suggests a n attempt 10 maintain sec recy. In March the regiment took part in the massive , twelve day exer cise Sparta n which occupied a large porti on of the British Ar my in so uth east England that spring . It was all part of the long term bu ild-up for the forthcomi ng invasion of France . Further eviden ce of ttus is recorded at the end of May when the regiment's REME ofuce r. alon g With a regimental officer and seven men travel to

123

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry TankMark IV

Stowage diagrams for the Churchill Mark IV with 75mm gun .

124

Chapter 9: The New MOdel Churchill

A c ross secti o n dr awing of a Mark VI Churc hi ll s how ing the 75mm gun mounting

Burry Port in Carmarthenshire. Wales whe re they assist in expenmentat trials on the waterp roofmq of Chu rctuus. Their next exercise . codenamed Harlequin took them to Otterden Park. a large private estate near Charing in Kent and ended with a most unusual expedrnon . According to the war diary . the regiment was ordered to move from Otterden to Broome Park . another stately pile in the area which had once been the home of Lord Krtcnener . Measu red as the crow flies Broome Park is about ntteen miles from Otteroen and even a Churchill could have covered the distance comfortably in three hours . barring breakdowns. Yet li the war diary is to be believed the tanks were moved by sea . Unfortunately the war diary does not say where they were shippe d from . but common sense argues that it must have been somewhere on the north Kent coast. The neares t lo gical point being Whi tstable whic h. by the direct route. is also ab out fifteen miles from Ottero en. On e hopes their point of depa rture was not westqate-on-sea since the route the re from Otterden would take them via Can terbury, and Broome Pa rk is just outside Canterbury, on the Dove r Road. Any way. accor ding to the war diary parts of the regiment sailed in two stnpoaos . round to Dove r. The journey by sea must be abou t 50 miles and it would take the ships eastwards , a round the North Foreland and down into the English Cha nnel . It was a notonous stretch of water in both wars . threats from mines . U-Boats and German coastal forces are only part 01 It. The entire route is well Within the range of German aircraft ope rating from airfields in Holland . Belgium or France and for the last few miles into Dover they are also Within range of large guns on the French coast which regularly fired at Dove r. Just how much 01 the regiment travelled in this way is not recorded, but as suming the point 01 the exercise to be a practice in moving tanks then the vessels must have bee n large merchant ShiPS, rather than landi ng craft which could only carry live or six tanks each at bes t. By November the regime nt was bac k o n the coas t at Folkestone whe re the y partic ipated in Exercise Canute 11

which . one might suspect, had a mar ine theme. In fact it is desc ribed in the war diary as an advance and landmq upon an imag inary beach. Having survived this and their brie f coastal cruise in safety the regiment now comes under hre. On 4 December 1943 the war diary reports thal two Universal Carriers, six of the req.ment's trucks and two of the despised Hotatrauers were destroyed by long range gun ure. presumably from one of the big railway guns on the French coast which amused themselves by firing random shots into Kent aroun d this time . The year ends with the regiment involved in wading trials and then learni ng that it is to be drsbanded; its fate is now tied up with that of 107 Regiment RAC. In fact 107 RAC was anothe r batta lion of the King 's Own tha t had converted to tanks in 194 1. Its role changed in February 1942 when it was designated an Advanced Training Regiment for Chu rchill tanks. What this meant in practice was that it took men who had com pleted individual tra ining at a Royal Ar moured Corps training regime nt and form ed them into tank c rews with thei r own Churc hill to maintai n and ope rate. When this stage was comple te they woul d lea rn to operate with other tanks as a troop , and then the troo ps amalgamated to undergo squadron training, after which the men would be released to operational regiments. The 107'" was based at Leyburn in North Yorkshire , not tar from Cartenck where our story began . A typical weekly training programme . as published in the war diary . shows how the system worked There were four training areas around Leyburn : Rigton Moo r, Lindley Moor . Stambum Moor and Denton Moor . And on each weekday one of the three squadrons was on one of the areas doing a specific task . For instance on Thursdays A Squadron was on Denton Moor after a road march where they pracused harbouring for the night. Meanwhile B Squadron was on Rigton Moor train ing on minefield drill and C Squadron , on Stamb um a nd Rigton Moo rs learned 10 throw hand grenades Irom tanks , and at them . Satur days was set aside for mainte nance a nd inspec tion while Su nday was the inevitable day of rest. The re were diversion s. In June C Squ adron, work-

125

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

\llfI A'~ .I*.· OI~T ' NCUI \" 'N' - -I

-

_

(1~ ~~\~U~\:~~if;~,~ T;, ; ) '~OIo1IO{ -------'~~5

T025586 Stowage d iag rams fo r the Churchill Mar k VI.

ing with the local Home Guard, carried out a practice attack on what is described as a Slacker Bombard position. The Slacker Bombard was a crude, dangerous but effective form of spigot mortar supplied for use with the Home Guard. It was not much of a threat to a tank , and none at all to a Churchill, but no doubt it was useful experience for the Home Guard. In October 1943, after the regiment had moved to Otley in West Yorkshire, it found itself back on Denton Moor involved in what is described as a tank versus tank exercise with live ammunition, which sounds highly dangerous . Yet there are no recorded casualties, to tanks or men, and a month later the regiment moves down to Boston in Lincolnshire. During this period the war diary continually reports men and equipment being drafted away from the regiment, concluding on the 2 1't and 22nd of the month when all the tanks due for rework were loaded onto trains at Boston for despatch to Broom & Wade. Immediately afterwards the regiment is disbanded and amalgamated with 151RAC but retains its title. In Ja nu ary 1944 the am alga mate d reg ime nt is at Folkestone. It starts to receive M3A 1 Stuart light tanks which will form its reconnaissance troop. Its days as a training regiment are over, now it is girding up for war. Its first Churchill V arrives on 15 January, its second on the 19t~ . On 3 February the regiment is addressed by General Sir Bernard Montgom-

ery, a clea r sign that it is being prepared for something and in March it travels way up north to Warcop Range in Cumberland where Regimental Headquarters and A Squadron practices firing 95mm HE while B Squadron fires 6-pounder HE and C Squadron learns to control the fire of 25-pounder guns of the Royal Artillery from its tanks. In May it is involved in Exercise Quack , which had to do with medical matters, presumably evacuating casualties from tanks. On the 'l S" of that month it receives the significant one-word order "CONCENTRATE". This is not an injunction to pay attention but the instruction to start work on sealing and waterproofing its tanks. But we have got well ahead of ourselve s. Returning now to the north of England in 1941 we find the l ' VStn Battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers, converting to 108 Regiment RAC when the 125tn Infantry Brigade , of which they are a part. becomes 10,nArmoured Brigade virtually overnight. They are stationed at Bamard Castle in County Durham in November where they are visited by Genera l Martel and the senior NCOs spend a day at the Vic kers-Armstrong tank facto ry in Newcastle to see what they have let themselv es in for. It is a generalisation, and probably quite unfair, but anyone who understands British regimental loyalty will know that the task of changing the hearts and minds of the senior membe rs of the Sergeants' Mess is the key to any successful change Convince them that it is a wise move and everything else

126

Chapter 9 : The Ne w Model Churchill

follows smoothly . more or less . On 8 Decemb er the reg iment is told that It mus l adopt the Royal Armoured Corps beret and as if that is net bad eno ugh their first tank. which arr ive s just before Ctmstma s. is a Covena nter. By May 1942 the regiment has 25 Covenanter but at this poin t it learns that it is to become an Army Tank Battalion . Three Cnurctuus arrive within a few day s and the Co venanters are give n to the Poli sh Armoured Division . By June they have six teen Ch urch iUs, seven Valentine s and four Unive rsal Ca rriers. Th ey are also shown a film on the Chur chill tank . In August they move to Rufford Abbey in Lancashire where . amo ng othe r thing s, the y are treated to a demonstration of the Athert on tu rret hoist. This is a device wh ich can be mounted on a tan k's turret and used to htt comp onents on or off the ta nk. The so rt of thing which is ISSUed during trammq . practised with diligently for months . and probably never used again once the regimen t is on active service . From November tanks start goin g back for rework . the first three being despatched to VauxhalJs. In Ja nuary 1942 the regimenl supplie s a Churchill tank a nd c rew to the Mmistry of Supply to tour factories in the Midlands which are producing tank components , Unfo rtunat ely the office r commanding the lank is injured a few days later and ends up in hospital . Then, in Ma rch 1943 . they learn that they will be cnanqmq back 10 an armoured regiment once agai n. Their Chu rchills are sent away to be replaced by an ama z ing co llection of wo rn out cruiser tanks of very type from Mark I to Covenan ters . so they are right back where they started. Their first Shermans arr ive in April. They have 49 of them by Ju ne but are disba nded . as an armoured reg iment , in December. This story can be repeated . almos t word for word , in the case of thei r sister battalio n whic h became 109 RAC in No vembe r 1941 . The on ly curiosity, which has nothing direc tly to do with o ur subject. involve s their brigade comma nder who, on 4 Decemb er 194 1, informs the regiment that it shou ld ig nore the War Office dire ctive an d con tinue to ca ll itse lf 1st /6th Lancashire Fusiliers. It will con tinue to wea r regimental but Ions and bad ges instead of the bras h new RA C embelli shments and the soldie rs will be address as Fusilier. instead of the RAC rank of Troop er. It is a de lightfu l exa mple of that ingrained British habit of rejecting change by p retend ing that it has not happ ened and it contr asts particu larly with the t-v 5Th Battalion wh ich accepted the change so readi ly. This reactionary atti tude seems to infect the entire regiment if their war diary is any guid e. 11 hardl y mentio ns tanks at all beyon d admitting that it had some Covena nters . It co ntin ues in this idiosyncratic way through until May 1942, when it beco mes an Army Tank Batta lion , after wh ich tanks are never men tioned agai n and then right around to Augus t 1943 whe n the RAC Record Office inform s them that they are 109 RAC , like it or not. and must use that title. Howeve r in the end the War Office bow s to the inev itable and 109RAC is disbanded as of 1 January t 944 without. apparently, reverti ng to being an armou red reg iment. A few deta ils wilt suffice to bring out the flavour of some other Church ill regiment s in Brita in at Ihis time . The 110m Reg iment RAC, 5'" Batta lion the Border Regimenl as was ,

sta rts convert ing from Covena nters to ChurchiUsin May 1942 but then beco mes a Training, Holding and Draft ing regiment in 77 (Reserve ) Division at Ca tteric k and is subsequently disbanded . Mea nwhile 111 RAC , the e rstwhue 51h Battali on, the Manch ester Regime nt, conv erted to Ch urctuus in June 1942. Men from the regimen t attende d a lectur e on Ju ngle Warfare at Ca ttenc k in Septem be r but go no further than Wensley in North Yorkshire . From there . in January 1943. it sends ten Church ills by rail to Castlemartin in South Wales whe re, acco rding to the war diary . guns are fitted to their tan ks for tiring p rac tice . Two- pou nde r an d 6 -pounder g uns are fired on Cas tlemart in ranges butttus regiment is a lso disbanded early in 194 3. At the seasi de resort of Wort hing in Sussex 141RAC (7'" Batta lion The Buffs) ca rries out anti-aircraft practice on the sea fron t. firing machi ne-g uns at drogu e targets pulled by aircra ft, an d gas filled ba lloo ns, out 10 sea . It is a regiment with an ama zing p rope nsity tor losing things an d holding Courts of Enqu iry to find out whe re they have gone. First it is some morphi ne tablets from the first aid kit in a tank, then a sol dier's grea tcoa t. This is fo llowed by a spate of tools being lost from tanks which seems to become endem ic, and then a co mplete set of batteries van ish es from a Ch urchill tank . This woul d be remark able for weight alone. and might stand as some kind of reco rd if they had not managed to lose a complete Bedford truck in January 1943! They spent that winter at Asntoro in Kent a nd in Februa ry took part in an interesting exe rcise with number 184 Squadron , Royal Air Force, which is described as a Tank Bu ster squad ron . The mock atta ck by thes e aircraft , which are not identified by type, is repo rted as very effective but the regime nt then puts up a smoke screen with each tank firing its two inch smoke morta r and the regimental close support tank help ing out with its 3 inch howitze r. Th e war diary describes this smo ke expe riment as "sornething qu ite new" and it seems to wor k ve ry well. In Febru ary 1944 the regiment is told that it will be changi ng to become a Croco dile flamethrower unit. Fina lly 144 RAC , o the rwise B'" B att a lio n th e Ea st La nca s h ire Reg ime nt , fin ds itself at Ruff ord Abbe y in Nott inghamshire in Jan uary 1942, equipped with 24 Ch urchills Mark I and 11. In March one of its troops of Ch urchius goes 10 nearby Tho resby Park where they join up with Ch urchill troo ps from 148 RAC and 48 RTR and companies of infantry to take part in a de mons tra tion of tank , infantry and airc raft co-o peration with Tomahawk fighters of the RAF. They move to Be rkham stead in Hertfordshire and in Octo ber 1942 enjoy a spell of live firing on Stud land ranges in Dorset. This evo kes an inte resting comment from the war diary wh ich states that for the first time tank crews are provide d with a liberal amount of ammu nition . They fire 3 inch howitze r, 2-pounder and BESA ma ch ine-gu n and we are told that each gunner was allo wed to fire fifteen rounds of 2-pounder wh ich was obv ious ly some th ing quite spec ial . By January 1943 they a re at Shorn cliffe Camp near Folkestone, the place at which Sir John Moo re introdu ced his revolutionary method of training which proved SOuseful both to Moo re and hi s successor Welli ngton during

127

Mr. Churc hill's Tank: The BfltlshInfantry Tank Mark IV

the Pen insular campai gn of the Napo leonic War s. SUCh a re the shad ow s of history The regiment chan ged over to Shermans . for what was described as a special assault role, but a memorandum, com piled by their commanding officer while they were at Ashfo rd in November 1943, speak s for all tank regiment s in Brita in at this time . Lieutenant Colone l Wadd ell is cle a rly writi ng direct Irom the heart and his complaints probab ly tell us mor e abou t the ruling SItuation , an d the mudd le it c rea tes , than any official report . His first poi nt co ncerns the rework policy and there fore is highly relevant to Chur ch ill regiments :

There is no relation of any kind bet ween the tank policy (i.e . the withdrawal of tanks from the regiment for rework and the allocation of new tanks) and the requirement of the regiment for tank cre w training No tank regimen t shoul d be stationed in a county where the training groun ds are so fe w, so small and in such tremendous demand . Tanks require big trainmg areas and plenty of them.

To kill Germans we mus t be able to kill qwckly. ThiS requires plenty of shoo ting practICeon the mo ve with snap targets . We canno t ha ve too much. We get far too little; only twice in two year s. Most present gunners and tank commanders only once now. We are no w GHQ troops but have not got clear of an infantry division yet. The necessi ty for traming virtually untrained infan try is preventing us from genmg nearty enough tank training A bnet note dated 7 August 1943, claims that the Churchill Mark VI was about to beg in Its acc eptance trials . This was the de signation give n to a rewo rked version of the cast turreted Mark IV when fitted with the 75mm medium velocny gun ; the modified 6-pounde r. However a report , issued in July , 945, confuses as much as it c larifies this iss ue . It differentiates between a Mark IV Iitted with a 75mm gun and the Mark VI which has the same weapon with gea red elevation . Ttus repo rt cla ims that 242 Ma rk VI were issued while 820 Mark IV Ch urcmns were fitted with the 75mm gun . This tatter may well refer to the oth erwis e unknown Churchill Mark.IVB.

An overhead v iew 01a brand new Churchill Mark VII. Noti ce in particular tw o leatu res of the tu rret : the weld ed top panel and lh ickened li p arou nd the base,

128

Chapter 9: The New Model Churchil l

Accep tance trials tor the Mark VI were ca rried out at Lutworth in September 1943 and among other thing s they reveal a fault app arently common to the 6-pou nder and the bored out 75mm guns. Both were desc ribed as requir ing high firing effort and reference to this has already been noted with the Mark III trigger mechanism . On the Mark VI this had been replaced by a foot pedal . but one that still requ ired co nsider able physical effort to opera te . Colo nel O' Rorke. the officer com manding the Expe rimental Wing of the Gunnery Sch ool said that this problem would be cured once solenoid operated firing gear was introduce d but he sa id that he found it hard to unde rstand why it was taking so long to produce this equipment. He noted that a firm req uirement had bee n establis hed more than a year earlier The Mark HI. when it was fitted with the 75 mm, simply became the Mark lit' . Again the figure 01242 is given for the number 01 Ma rk III Ch urctuus converted to take the new weapon . When the first edition 01the Service Instruction Book was issued tor these tanks in Oc tobe r 1944 it simply refe rred to Churchill III (75m m) and Ch urchi ll IV (75mm) and presum ably precedes the appearance of the Mark VI. Th e new gun was known as the Ordnance , Quic k Firing, 75mm Mark V o r

Mark VA. The barrel was describ ed as externally similar to the Ordnance , Q . F. 6 pd r. 7 cwt., Mark V. that is the longer barr elled versio n of the 6-pou nder. It was also noted that with the exception of the extracto r leve rs and firing pin the co mponen ts of the bree c h assembl y were identical, and indeed inte rchange able with the 6-pound er. The difference between the 75mm Mark V and VAw as simply in the number of threads on the end 01the barr e l which were used to secu re the single baffle muzzle brak e. The Mark VA had twice as many. As already noted abov e it is this instruction book whic h claims that the 75mm mounting in these tanks is of the free ele vation type, and goes on to describe the sho ulder piece in some detai l It is wort h noting that the 1945 repo rt refers to the 75mm Ma rks III and IV as follows; 'A Field Conve rsion scheme was introduce d for replacin g the 6-po under in Ch urchi ll 111and IV by the 75 mm gun. This scheme affec ted sto wage . sighting arrange men ts etc., and was ca rried out by units in orde r to get sufficie nt 75mm gun tanks into the hands of the troo ps, pending the appearance of Chu rchill VI and VII'. The implication clearly be ing that the conversion 01a Mark IV to a Mark (text continues on page '34)

Thi s Mark VII. viewed I rom the rea r, has its air int ake s stow ed on the tr ack gu ard s. whi ch s ug ges ts th at it Is ready to tr avel by rail . The bolt s on the bac k 01 the hu ll show whe re the co u pling I or a I lame tuet traile r wou ld be allached

129

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Ta nk Mark N

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Chapter 9 : The New Model Churchill

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Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

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VI was something far more significant than simply swapping over the gun and a few othe r internal deta ils. Now that the rework programme was well under wa y and many of the existing tanks were also being fitted with 75mm guns there was lime to consider the design of the next batch. Clearly everything that could be done to the present design had been done , so if the Church ill was to be further improved it could on ly be achieved by a substant ial redesign . The new vers ion was orig inally desc ribed as the Heavy Chu rchill although , in the end , it on ly amounted to a difference of one ton . Th e spec ific designations were Mark VII for the 75 mm gun version while the close support model , with the 95mm how itzer , was class ified Mark VIII. When the much-quoted Joint Memo randum appeared in May 1943 it discussed the so-calle d Heavy Church ill but was rather vag ue about deta ils. A month later the Direc tor, Royal Armou red Corps offered some sugge stion s, including th e need for the floor of the tank to be proof against mine bla st, thicker armour for the hatch es over the driving compartment and a stronger turret ring to ta ke heavier turrets . Design work was aided by the fact that certain major aspect s of the new ve rsion had been anticipated . Back in August 1942, when Babcoc k & Wilcox issued their repo rt on the original welded hull, they put forwa rd the suggestion that in futu re hu lls the doors at the sides . and the driver 's front visor should be circular instead of square. It was a sen sible suggesti on because it reduced the risk of weak poin ts developi ng nea r the co rners on squa re door ape rture s. Th is was noted but not acted upon at the time , partly because it interfered with produ ction but mai nly since the future of the Churchill tank was then in doubt . The new turret desig n had also been anticipa ted but it is not entirely clear whether this wa s another idea generated by Babcock & Wilcox, or the Department of Tank Design o r indeed Vauxhall Motors the mselves. The p roblem had been to create a new and stronger design but it was genera lly agreed that neither welding nor casting would be idea l. altho ugh both had merits. A cast turret was integrally stronger but it was difficult to control the relative thickness of armour on all surface s of a one-piece casting , with the result that in most ca ses one ended up with a roof much thicker than it needed to be , and hence an unnecessary weigh t penalty. With welded structures, on the other hand, it was quite simple to have a different thickness of plate on each surface but the thicker suc h plate got the more difficult it was to prod uce a satisfactory joint by welding alone. The ultima te answer appeared to be a comp osite turret in wh ich the fou r vertical faces were created as a single casting while the thinner top and botto m plate s were welded in place . Th is arra ngement gave another advantage for it proved possible to recess the top plate onto a lip inside the turret shell so that no welded edge was exposed to enemy fire. There we re instance s on record where turrets that had an upper plate welded or bo lted would come away at the top when struck a glanci ng blow on the joint. The re are few things any tank crewman likes less than the sight of daylight shining in through an unauth orise d hole in his armour. It

imme dia tely crea tes a se nse of vulnera bility which is bound to affect the perf orm ance of the c rew unless it is remedied at once. The concept of a com posite tu rret was not entirely new, it already existed on the Malilda and the Valentine although in that case the top panel was bo lted on, but the new Churchill turr et was much heavier with an even thicker cast skirt around the base wh ich gave added protection to the tur ret ring. Vauxhall Motors had produced a very sim ilar turret earlier in 1943 for the new version of Cromwell tan k that they were expe cted to bu ild when the Chu rchill programme came to an end. A prototype had been produced and was undergoing firing- at trials at Shoe buryness by April 1943. Th ere we re clear ly those at the War Office who regarded the hea vy Churchill as a new tank and there is ev idence that at one stage it was alloca ted the General Staff number A42, rathe r than the more log ical A22F which became the accep ted de signati on . How ever at a mee ting of the Director, Royal Arm oured Co rps ' Advisory Com mittee meeting held at the Vauxhall plant on 2 Decembe r 1943 the Deputy DRAC, Brigadier C A L Dunphi e, stated that the Chu rchill VI I was rega rded as a new type of ex isting tan k. On that basis the com mittee member s, who woul d nor mally work through a lot of detail co nce rning the genera l fightability of the tank , confined themselves to matter s of stowage. A fully stowed tank was made avai lab le for them to study. In fact , to the untr ained eye it is difficult to identify the Mark VII from other Chu rchifls and o ne does best to rely on the turr et shape a nd va rious round ed ape rtures to be certain . There were othe r distinctive features, of co urse, but they are less o bvious . At the rear of the hull the air outlet was now deepe r, eight inches instead of five , as foreshadow ed in the or iginal rework progra mme . Pistol port s were also eliminated from the turret and the hull pa nnie r doo rs since they had proved almost co mp lete ly usel ess. In sid e was ano the r cha nge. The auxil iary stee ring bar for the hu ll machine-gunner was remo ved . probabl y becau se it got in the way and was never used. Mecha nically the re were no major diffe rences beyon d a cha nge in gear ratios to allow for the extra weight. the new gearbox being design ated type H41 . Other deve lopme nts that had taken pla ce in respect of engine and transmission design were across the board and co uld be applied to any marks, in theory. The vari ous changes were distingu ished by suffix de signati ons appl ied to the eng ine number. Suffix R, part of the o riginal rewor k programm e, signif ied improved oil feed to the dist ributor gear and the adoption of 37 mm ca rburettors. R1 marked the ado ption of an Amal. pos itive d rive fuel pump but included the original rew ork . R2 denoted the use of bolts on the co nnecting rod big ends instead of studs and naturally included modif ications Rand R1. And so it went on through to R6 , cover ing a chan ge to mechanica l, adjustable tappets, instead of hyd raulic tappet s. strengthening of the crankshaft centre main beari ng cap and va rious othe r detai ls along the way. Prec isely the same system app lied to the H4 gearbox. R, in this case, indicated strengthene d selec tor fo rks, among

134

Chapter 9 : The New MOdel Churchill

The hull 0 1an A22F, held in a rol ali ng Jig , whil e tw o workmen po siti on the I ro nt roo f sec ti o n. The Jig ca n be used to turn Ihe hull ri ght over 10 make Ih e welde r 's task eas ier.

Working on I he casling 01an A22F tu rr et . The wo rkma n appear s 10 be grinding olf excess melallrom th e In le rlor belore Ih e roo l plale Is lil -

other things . R2 recorded a change from double helical to spur gears in third and top along wllh improvements 10 the power lake-off while R4 showed that the gear change mechanism had been revised In ttus case moortceuons went through to RS which meant thatlhe sptmes on the taysbaft had been mod.tied along with all the foregoing changes . and others . The H41 gearbox , adopted for A22F was only issued as H4 tg. indicating the first production box and H4 1C which was the same mocrncauon as RS on the H4 box . The reason for this change In transmission had to do With the Increased weight, although this was theoretically restricted 10one ton. A Churchill Mark IV, V or VI, with all moomcauons . lully stowed and complete Withcrew weighed 39 Ions . A Mark VII or VIII Churchill in the same stale weighed 40 tons, Yet armour on the new model had increased lrom 4.5t o 6 inches atthe front, by an inch to 3.75 on the sides and even by a fraction on the hull floor and roof. Only the rear remained the same. The turret likewise was now 6 inches at the troruand 3.5 on sides and rea r while the top remained the same at one inch, Savings would have been made by welding of cou rse , in particular on the inne r faces of the hull pannie rs, but it is stili remarkab le that the designe rs were able to increase frontal protection to the point were I1exceeded that of the celebrated German Tiger tank Without adding more than one ton to the overall weight. However in order to allow for ttus Increase the gearbox ratios were modified . It was not a era mane change but It reduced the maximum speed from 155mph to 13.5mph ModifIcations to the suspension had also been on-going and there IS a bewildering list 01bogie units and their relevant distinguishing features in the Churchill Workshop Manual but lor the Marks VII and VIII a new type , with much stronger springs , was introduced. Since this was not interchangeab le Withthe earlier type an identification disc was applied to each bogie which the litter was supposed to check , This was easy enough on the right side of the tank, beca use the discs were

readily visibl e. bul on the left side they were on the Inner lace so in theory atleast tne individua l would have 10crawl underneath the tank to make sure. Anothe r major change which leatured on Marks VII and VIII but was applied retrospectively to earlie r marks concerned the commander 's cupola on top 01the turret. Most Bnnsh tanks produced early in the war carried huge , drum shaped cupolas but they Quickly went out 01 favour. The rumour went around that cupolas could be shot off, beheading the commander in the process . Throughout the middle years of the war most British tanks and the majority of American types dispensed wit h cupolas al together . Rat he r, as on the Churchills built at this li me, the commande r had a simple twopiece hatch with one or two perisco pes, set into a rotating colla r. The return to European conditions with the landings in Sicily, and the German habit of employing snipers to pick off Allied tank commanders, revived the practice 01closing the tank down in action and Immediately there was a cry for improved visibility. The result was a low profile device known as the All Round Vision (ARVI cupola . The ARV cupola featured the normal two- piece hatch surrounded by eight eptscopes . one of which could be eleva ted. The entire cupola could still be rotated but under normal circumstances It was set With a group of three episcopes at the front , and the tilling one at the back . I1came in two versions . On cupola No. 1 Mark tthe two hatches remained vertical In the open posmon while on the No. 1 Mk. 11 they could laid flat . Newe r tanks were also fitted wrtn the complicated Twin Blade Vane Sight No. 2 which tined up with the cupola and enabled the commander 10get an accura te lay on a tarqet even lrom the turre t down post-

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Firing trials of a new Churchill Mark VII took place at l ulworth early in 1944 although it would appear, from read· ing the report, that this was not the first such trial. A number of improvem ents are listed , from the elevating gear to Ihe

135

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The Bnnsn Infantry Tank Mark IV

Turr et mee ts hull on the A22 F pr odu cti on lin e li t Va..n :hall Mot o r 's Lut on p la nt . Noti ce the t wo lines of rails on the uoor, alo ng w hich the bogies run : also the way I he tan ks are c haine d to geth er .

Cro ss sect ion draw ing 01 a Ma rk VII s ho win g how th e redesign ed tur ret gave more room than the old Mark IV casting .

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Chapter 9: The New Model Churchill

padding on the comma nder's seat and the comment that the cupola still leaks is indica tive. The report refers to Mark III elevating gea r, which must be an improved version. It seems to work satisfactorily with just seven minutes backla sh but a more alarming fault is turret lift. Colo nel O' Rorke said that when turret rotation was reversed, on powe r traver se, the turret jumped and it was most disco ncerting. He suggeste d eithe r that the turret ring was oval, or that it dipped at the 6 and 12 o'c lock posit ions and he had be en promi sed by Vauxhall Motors that it would not occu r in later model s. However he felt that it should be watc hed in case the situation got so bad that it affecte d the accuracy of the gun. Trying to establish the precise numbe r of heavy Churchills built is complicate d, as usual, by the way in which the contract cards have been compiled. Two very vaguely dated contracts with Vauxhall Motors include Churchills Mark IV to VIII. Of these contract M570 1 fo r 550 tanks includes 58 type A22F which carried WO numbers T17 3142 to T17 3199. Contract M7454 covers 1.000tanks of which T25 1505 to T251647 are A22F, that is 143 tan ks. Cont racts specifically related toA22F are the undated M 14283 for 500 tanks (450 Mark VII and 50 Mark VIII) and M10577, dated 11 November 1943 forth e same quantity in the same proport ions . All of these contracts were placed with Vauxhall Motor as the parent com pany and it seems clear from photographi c evidenc e that they were now e Il A ~'HS . _OlL ! D I ' 11)J.O

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Draw ing of the all-round vtsson cupola.

back producing new tanks, which sugges ts that the rework programme was com ing to its end. However these last two contracts are complicated by the fact that no WO numbers are given for M10577 and those fo r M14283 are cont radictory. On the front of the card the numbers given are T341209 to T341708 but it is endorsed on the reverse with the informatio n th at T34 1409 to T 341 508 we re issued to the

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13 7

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The BritishInfantry Tank ~rk IV

Gloucester Railway Carriage Company wh ile below that entry il states that T347659 to T348 158 were also iss ued Whether these relate to M10577 is no t clea r. Two other contract cards appear to have comp leme ntary info rmatio n. M 1052 1. dated 9 Novembe r 1943, covers the supply 01 95 Mark IV Heavy Welded Hulls to Vauxh all Motors lid. specincanons - tt us with the Glouces ter Railway Carriage and Wagon Co. While M12574, dated 11 March 1944 with Charle s Rob erts and Co. refers to the assemb ly of 120 Churchill tank s with welded hulls. Clearly there is more 10 it than this. and the re may well be more contract s tor which no record s survive. A book let published by the Ministry 01 Suppl y in 1946 claims that in order to expand production the contract was extended to vanous other turns including Newton Chambe rs Lld .• of Sheffield, the Glouceste r Railway Ca rriage & Wagon Co.. and the Whessoe Foundry & Engineering Compa ny in Darllngton . It is interesting to note that when produ ction 01heavy Churchill hulls began Babcock & Wilcox. the pioneers. were employing a horizontal-vertical welding technique known as flat -bead welding while the Whessoe Foundry introduce d a gravity welding technique which was also taken up by GCR&W. Most other contractors adopted the Babcock & Wilcox syste m although, as they gained experience . some firms appear to have introduced variation s of their own which. pre sumabl y. should permit an expert in the science of welding 10identity the man ufacturer by inspectmg the tank . The technicalities 01welding. not to ment ion the broader subject of tank construc tion, could easily 1111 a book but it might be a very boring one. Most nrms appear to have ado pted the

practice 01asse mblin g tanks in SItu. bearing in mind that the majOrity were put toqether Irom compo nents which arrived from a variety 01 factories. However In their war history An Accou nt of our Stewardsh ip. wntten by W J Seymour. Vauxhall Motors give some specific details 01their own technique. Teking advantage of the double lIanged whee led bogies on the Churchi ll the pla nt at Luton was laid out with double, narrow gauge tracks like a pair of 1I1t1e railway s running the length of the production line . Once the new hull s were fill ed with suspension units they we re placed on these rails, one behind the other. The tanks were then moved down the production hne in sequence. At hrstthe company used a winch and then chain ed the line of tanks together. As each comp leted tank was winched forward onto its tracks it drew all the others one tank length behind It. Having practised this tor some time It occu rred to someone at the factory that the winch was superfluous. The next stage involved starting up the leading tank. once its tracks had been tilted . and having il pull all the others forward in its wake. Finally It should be noted that the new hull, whether it ended up as a Mark VII or VIII. was completed in such a way that the tank could be quickly adapted to receive all the flltings nece s sary to conv ert the ta nk int o a Croco dile uarnetnrower. Development work had been undertaken on an earl ier mod el but all production Crocodiles were of the Mark VII Iype with at least one Mark VIII. but whether this was true 01every heavy Chu rchill hull il is imoossibre 10say 11 not all then I1certainly applied to the majonty . Early in 1944 a new Mark VII Chu rchill was subjected to firing -at trials which revealed a number 01detauIauns . MocfJ-

Head on view 0 1a Mark VIII wi th the 95mm howitzer and All Ro und Vision Cupola . tf survivi ng ph otographic ev ide nce is any guide then the Marll VIII u w very Iinle eeuve service.

138

Ch ap ter 9 : The New Model Churchill

Prob ab ly training for D-Oay a col u mn of Churc hi ll s o n the mov e . The lead ing tank has the number of its appointed land ing c raft c halked on the trllck guard

ncanons were put In hand. bolh 10 remedy the se and incorporate other improvements suggested by Vauxhall Motors themselves and anothe r tank, altered to these standards , was despatched 10 Shoeburyness to serve as a tarqet . The trial took place ove r a period 01live day s starting on 31 May 1944 and the results were publ ished in July . Among the changes listed were improve ments to the hull side doors both to reduce the ingre ss of splash and strengthen the hinges ; to the driver 's vision port which was also letting in splash and proved weak around the locking handle and a stiffening girder running cross wise beneath the roof, just behin d the driver 's top hatch and another runnin g fore and aft between the two hatches. Other work was also carried out. mainly to strengthen internal flltlng s which, presumably, were being dislodged when the tank was struck by a projectile. The tank became a target for various weap ons including medium and heavy machine guns, a 17-pounder firing armour piercing ammun ition and a 25-po under firing high explosive . A 4.2 inch mortar was also used . The trial report is a substanna! document. far too detailed to review here, but som e of the more senous faults can be mentioned . Und er attack from armour piercing or high explosive rounds many welded joints appea r to have Irac tured and the air inletlouvres were bad ly damaged . The side doo rs still let in splas h and they tended to jam shut when struck by heavy rounds. Worse still the roof hatches above the drive r and hull machine-gun ner also jammed so that, under certain conditions . it would be difficult for all crew members 10 escape in a hurry. More modif ications were recommended but how many 01them actually were

done . and how success fut tnev were is not revea led. In any case many ot the tank s were already in serv ice and the invasion was imminent so these improvements would only appear on later versions and one could only hope Ihat crews survived long enough to appre ciate them , In lact the first two Churchill regiments ashore had a rough li me 01 it. Seventh Royal Tank Regiment, which had been recreated from the erstwhi le 1 01~ RTA , along with 91~ ATA formed the armoured element of 31s1Army Tank Brigade. They spent their last months in Englan d at locations around Kent and Sussex where the 7 1~ did some range practice at Lydd in March and then wen t to the South Downs training area in April. Later that month they moved to their concentration area, at Brackc own in Hampshire where they received a numbe r 01 new Churchills from 61'1 Guard s Tank Brigade. At the end 01 April they began to wate rproottheir tanks and strict mail censorship was impo sed . In effect what this mea nt was that they ceased to have a proper postal address; virtually ceased to exist because all mail had 10 be directed simply to 7"" ATA , Army Post Offic e, England which , as la r as the ir families were concerned. coul d have been anywh ere. Genera l Eisenhower came and spo ke 10 them on 25 May and th ree days later they were told that they were on six days notice for movement. On 11 June they mov ed to their assembly area . Fort Gomer at Gosport and on the 181'1 they moved down to the docks to emba rk. The next day their landing craft were hove-to off Coursetles-s ur-Mer in steadily worsening weather. Some elements came asho re in France on the 20'" but the rest remained afloat. no doubt in increasin g misery. until the 22"".

139

Mr. Churchill's Ta nk: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

Clearly a posed vie w but it embodie s the pe riod 0 1 waiting fo r em ba rkal ion , The partly camouflag ed l ank sits et tne roadside while ils c rew pr elend to be sponing l or hosllle air c ra ft

In realil v the re i s a 101 of ha rd wor k to do . Her e a c rew from 9"' Royal Tank s . assis ted by REME l in er s , prepare a l ank for wading in a IIreel at Gos port ne ar POrtsm oul h.

DUring that lime one LCT was rmned: they lost two men and six Cnu rctuns Ninth RTR were at Hove when postal censors hip was Imposed and they wen I to thei r concent rat io n area a t Farnborouqh on 8 Apnl. Sir Cha rles Broad . one of the great Royal Tank Corps pioneer s of the Inter-war years , vrsnec the reqimen t on 4 May and on the ' 3'" they took delivery of '4 US half-tracks. During the period 18 to 25 May they were busy convertmg 17 Mark III Churchills from e-pounoe r to 75mm. which seem s to have been done by their own REME personnel assistmq a team 01 travelling utters. On the 3' " they took delivery of SIX Crusader anti-aircraft tanks, htted with twm 20mm Oerhkon guns , which would form their AA Troop. On the 12 and 13 June they moved down to Gosport and sailed at 2300 hours on the 18'h. Their arrival off the French coas t coincided with Ihe height 01 the grea t storm, which ettecnvetv wreck ed a large proportion of the artificial Mulberry Harbours. It had been building up for days. blowing terce 6 or 7 from North North West, veering North East during the night 19/20 June and lurnmg the entire Bay of Seine 1010 a lee shore , Thick. low cloud was racing overhead and the seas building up, even within the pro tected are a created by the blockshrps. Many craft sta rted to drag their anchors and some were forced 10 beach in orde r to save themselves . The landing craft carrying regimental headquarte rs lost its anchor, followed by two kedge anch ors and then the barrage balloon that It was Ilylng , Then one engine failed and it was pure luck that It was not wrecked Most of the men were seasick but the regiment came ashore intact on the 22"". The 107 RAC. which has already bee n mentioned in tt us chapter. was also addre ssed by Monty. at Dover on 3 February but ItS war diary for the month s up to D-Day seems to be obsessed by the weather . On 28 May It transfers to ItS con centranon area where It rema ins at six hours notice to move It must have been a frustrating time. Nearly a month goes by D-Day comes and IS gone The regiment moves into its marshalling area on 2 1 June and then sus out ano ther long wait

Finally, on 3 July. they move dow n to Gosport for embarkalion. and war. They came ashore at Graye-sur-Mer on June Beach at 2 130 hours that same night Here they lamed With 147 RAC , which had landed at Coiombieres-sur-Seuues on the previous day and the third regiment of 34'" Army Tank Bnqace . 153 RAC . Their war diary chronicles many more details of the prepera nons tor ttus great event. They were at Broome Park near Canterbury m February 1944 and a mon th later were snu tmnq 6-pounder armour piercing rounds on Seatoro ranges In Sussex . On 14 April they returned 23 Rota Trailers to stores and no doubt heaved a sigh of rehett t tatthey did not have to take them to France. Theirs is the only war diary inspected for this book to me ntion Mark VII Ohurctnns at this time , of which they received three on 24 April, More came over the next few days but they also acquired a similar number of Mark Ill' Cnurctults. those mounti ng the 75mm guns. The men were issued wnh evasion kits on 25 May which, presumably, were intended 10 help them escape il they touno themse lves behind German lines and on 20 June they were issued with French currency They emba rked at Gosport on 2 July and came ashore the ne xt day in France. In our study of the Churchill tank and ItS gradual acceptance by the British Army we have , so far. not mentioned three impo rtant regiments . These are 4'h Battahon the Grenadie r Guards, 4'" Battalion the Coldstream Guards and 3'd Battalion the Scots Guard s which , together. formed 6'" Guard s Tank Brigade . A Guard s Armoured Division had been formed In 1941 but when the composition 01 armoured drvrsions was revised in , 942 an Independent armoured bngade was formed from the redundant regiment s and It was equrpped With Covenanter tank s. It converted la an army tank bnqaoe early In 1943 and was equipped With Chur ctuus but ItS future was never secure . TWice betw een then and the Invasion of Europe It was threatened With being broken up and the men sent as remtcrcem ent s 10 Guards mfantry battali ons m Italy But each time an appeal to the Pnme Ministe r saved the day

140

Cha pte r 9: The New Model C hurchill

The brigade spent most of 1943 and 1944 in the north , training with various inlantry divisions in the art of tank/in tan try co-ope ration. As we have alrea dy seen the brigade was obliged to hand over its new 75mm gun Mark VI Chu rctutls to 31"' Army Tank Brigade in April 1944 . This was a direct consequence of the second atte mpt by some author ities to retum the brigade to an infantry role and before the y finally embarked for France the e-eounoer tanks they had received instead had to be converted to 75mm by brigade wo rkshops. They moved to Kent in April and one gets the impression that the county was simply crawling with Churc hill tank s at this ume. However they were still there on Sunday, 24 June, when a Vl Flying Bomb , intercepted by an RAF fighter on its way to London , came down on the brigade workshops killing 5 1

men and injuring a further 40. The loss 01 so many skilled men just a few weeks before going to wa r was a serious blow Comcidentany the brigade held a Church Parade in Canterbury Cathed ral one Sunday in June when the service was taken by the Archbishop. One young tank commander in the Scots Guards , Lieutenant R A K Auncie. who may well have attended that serv ice . subseq uently became Archbishop 01 Canterbury in 1980. The brigade sailed from Southampton Water on 19 July and came ashore on Gold and Juno beaches the following day. According to their history the regiments found that the Military Police guides who had been instructed to meet them did not turn up and it took some time for the various tanks to find their way 10 the assembly area near Bayeux.

141

10

Churchills in Normandy

The Churchill lank played such a significant part in the battle to free Europe , and so many photographs can be found, that one is tempted to assume that there were doze ns of regi ments of them ove r there , supporting the Allied infantry in all their operation s. Yet if we disregard the va rious specialised units, and concentrate on conventional regimen ts it is perhaps surprising to discover that the re were neve r mo re than eight , and from Augus t 1944 , almost unlillhe end of the war

in Europe only seven. These were the three regiments , or battalions as they called themselves, of

gade. The two

(7'~

and

9'h

61~

Guards Tank Bri-

RlA) of 3 1s1 Army Tank Brigade

and the three ( 107, 147 & 153 RA C) of 34 tt1 Arm y Tank Brigade . It was 153 RAC which was disba nde d that August . T his means that for most of this per iod the re we re never mo re than 350 Ch urchill gun tanks wit h fighting reg iments at any one time . Their effect on the campaign , at ce rtain crucial times , wou ld appea r to be lie this figure. One reason fo r this was the degree of m utual confidence that grew up between infantry battalions and th e tanks they worked with; another is neatly summed up in a comment made by the war diarist of 9th RTR; the Churchill stands up well to anti-tank fire. If set on fire it burns slowly and the crews have

a good chance to bale out - Panthers , on the other hand, tend to blow up. The Churchill was a surv ivor and this was just as true of its resi lience to anti-tank m ines . Or look at it ano ther way ; 4'" G rena dier Guards , whic h saw as much ha rd fighting as any Chu rchill unit in nort h wes t Europe , only suf fered 54 taranues . five officers an d 49 other ranks, dur ing the enti re ca mpaign up to VE Da y. On 25 June the Chu rch ills of ? " and gtl1 RT R move d fro m thei r assembly area with in the beachead towa rds th e village of Cheux, west of Cae n . It was the start of an offe nsive codena med Epsom . Caen had been a prime Britis h objective for D-Day itse lf but for a va riety of reaso ns this prove d una ttainable . Fully aware of its key location , German troops quickly poured in to defe nd the city and befo re long th ere we re five Panze r divisions and one infantry divis ion in the area . Since

a head-on assau lt now appeared cos tly Montg om ery planned to enci rcle the city, going we st about , and Epsom was planned to that end with an initia l aim of crossi ng the Odon rive r and creati ng a bridgehead on the so uthe rn side . T he great sto rm delayed pla ns for the ope ration by four days but eve n this hardly gav e the two C hurchill reg im ent s time to get over the effec ts of sea sickness and c lea r the wat erproofing from their tanks before they w ere catapulte d into ac tion . Things had changed a good deal si nce the fightin g in Tunisia and it wa s now co m mo n pra ctice to alloca te one squadron of tank s to ea ch battali on of an inf antry br igade an d in this instance 7 th RTR w as suppo rting 46th Highland Brigade in 15tl1 (Scott ish) Divis ion. Mov ing o ut to cross the start line at 0730 on the morning of 26 Jun e B Sq uadro n was accompanying 2nd Battal ion the Glasgow Highlanders while C Squadron worked with 9Th Battal ion the Camer onians. A Squadron, with ]!h Battalion the Seaforth Highlander s acted as reserve. It is probably only fair at this stage to point out that there wa s a lot more to this , and mos t subseq uent battl es, than a couple of regiments of Chur ch ill tank s and thei r infantry. Epsom was a substantia l operatio n involvi ng one armoured division , an independent a rmo ured brigade and two other infantry divisions but it is clear why the two Church ill reg iments we re placed under command of 15th Divi sion (9 1h RTR was supporting thei r 44 th Brigade ) since this wa s the cent ral punch of th e entire attack. Their task was to break through the German defences and hold the bridges over the Odon river that wou ld enab le tt " Armoured Div ision to cros s. Th e historian Sir Basil Lidde ll Hart has des cr ibed Epsom as a st rategic failure but a ta ctica l success and there is no doubt that it was a hard fight. Not the idea l situat ion for me n in relat ivel y untried tan ks to begin the ir combat ca reer s. Both leading squ adrons of 7 th RTR ran onto minefields earl y on , C Squadron lost five tanks here and B Squadron four but they were in Cneu x by 1100 ho urs. The village o nly falli ng after some grim hand to hand fighting by the Glasgow Highlanders wh o too k over 200

142

Cha pter 10: cncctus in Normandy

An Instructive pic ture 0 1Churchill lanks of 141 RAC at res t. Most o llhe crews have acq ui red some spare track tor added pr otect ion bUllhey have . 11 fitted it in dIfferent way s. The Mark V, foreground left , has its t urret and nose covered while the tank closest to the camera has some covering the side door . more over the d river 's v isor and an un usual arrangemen t on th e Ir ont of the tur ret .

of the many invaluable support units which kept the front line battalions up to streng th. South of the Odon there is high ground which overlooks the next valley, that of the river Orne. This high ground is dominated by a leature known to the British as Hill 112 from its highest contour. British forces were established on its northern slopes by the 28'" but they got no further for the present All the while Caen and the high ground to the west was held by German forces they could pose a threat to the Ilanks and indeed counterat tacks continued on the north side of the Ooon for some lime . By the even ing 019 July British and Canadian troops had effect ively liberated Caen and attention was again turned to the range of hills south west of the city and in particular Hill 112. Once agai n 3 1"' Tank Brigade was called forward , this time With 349 Battery, Royal Arti llery unde r command , equipped with American bunt M 1Q tank destroyers. For this attack ?" RTR was to ope rate With A Squadron supporting 4'" Battalion the Wiltshire Regiment and C Squadron working with 4'" Battal ion the Somer set Light Infantry while B Squadron was held in reserve with "'" Battalion the Hampshire Regiment. Panthe r tank s, backed up by dug-in TIgers, presented formidable resistance and neither Churchill regiment made very much progress once they arrived on the southern slopes of the hill . 143

casualties during their very first action . A Squa dron, following up. was engaged by enemy tanks on the rightllank which resulted in the deat hs of one officer and ten other ranks. On the following day C Squadron, supporting the High land Light Infantry. assisted in an attac k la gain a river cro ssing at Gavrus. south of Grainviue-sur-Odon. during which they got into a fire fight with some Pant hers and Panzer IVs. They claim to have knocked out three enemy tanks. At 1800 hours on the 29'" the bridgehe ad was subjec ted to a pow erful counterattack by 1"' SS Panzer Divis ion which cost the British twelve Churcmns. C Squadron remained in a defensive position while B Squad ron pulled back la rally. Meanwhi le 9'" RTR was in action nearby. On 26 June C Squadron attacked the village of Cctlevitle . on the road from Cneu x to th e ot her river cros sing at Tourmanville . The Churctuus 019'" RTR claim one Panzer IV and a Panther for nine of their own but they were unable to hold the village in the face 01strong opposition. The Odon was crossed by the Shermans 0123..:1 Hussars on the 27'" but the bridgehead was attractmq Germa n armou r from a wide area , including TIger tanks of 101 SS Panzer Corps . The Ninth's war diary record s that on the evening of the 28'" they were strengt hened by the arrival 01 five new Church Ills and ten extra crewmen from 269 Field Delivery Squadron which is rare recognition for one

Mr. C hurchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Ma rk IV

A Churc hill o f 7'" RTR during th e Epsom operauon appro ach es the ed ge 01a fi eld with infanlry in c lose s upport

A Ch urchill IV. pr ob abl y of 4'" Battalion Gren adie r Guard s. pass es a ruined ch ur c h and the bett ered rem ain s of a Panzer IV dur ing ils advance

144

Ch ap ter 10: C herctuns in Norm an d y

In their war diary 9'n RTR remar k that "the close ness of the country around Maltot (a village on the sou the rn side of Hi1l112) made it almost impossib le to locate these tanks until too late" but they were lea rning, The re was little to be gaine d in trying to slog it out with Tige rs, or even Panthe rs so the new practice was to call down medium artillery fire upon them After a certain amount of this treatment the German tanks would withdraw into adja cent wood s o r orchards and the pro cess began all ove r again. The Seventh see m to have had a relatively ea sy time of it. They claim nine Panthe rs and Tlgers knocked out for eight of their own Ohurctnns with fou r officers and on e trooper killed. Ninth , on the othe r hand , suffered badly. They make no claims for enemy tan ks but lost sixteen of their own along with 1 officer and four other rank s killed but 29 other rank s are given as missing The German de fender s were told that Hill 112 was the pivotal point of the whole position a nd in no circumstance s may it be surrende red, but the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry held it lor mos t of the nigh t of 11/12 Ju ly and the Ge rmans were never able to recover it entirely. The fighting here would be resumed in a few day s. Having created a salient to the west of Cae n Montgomery launched Op eration Goodwood to achiev e the same thing in the east. It was the respon sibility of Britis h VII Cor ps and featur ed thre e a rmoured division s

but none of the regula r Chu rchi ll regiments. Goodwo od bega n on 18 July but three days ear lier the cnurcmns were operating again aro und Hill 112. British forces in this area now swung to face roughly south wes t and 31 s' Tank Brigade was joine d by the three Churchill regiment s of 34,nArmy Tank Brigade . They had come forwa rd from their assembly a rea earlier in the month in case they were required fo r the previous action but now it was time for the real thing For 107 RAC it started at once . At the forming up point. wher e they met up with thei r infantry on the 15,n, heavy artillery fire and morta rs mea nt that the tank s stayed closed dow n and there was little com muni cation with the infantry, Moving oH at H-Ho ur the ta nks found that they wer e virtually blind . Oper ating closed down. in a cloud of smoke and dus t kicked up by the barrage, they could do very little but . fort unately. the infantry atta ck was a success. Mea nwhi le 147 RAC . supporting 7'n Batta lion the Royal Welch Fusilie rs on 17 J uly. had a different exper ience . With A Squadron lead ing they sta rted to move forwa rd through waving co rnfields . The tanks found that every time they halted the infantry went to ground behind them and it was a problem to gel them started aga in. In due co urse the tanks were told to adv ance withou t halting and they soon got well ahead of the infantry. German troops soo n sta rted poppi ng up and surrendering in large number s

A long co lu mn 01Grenadi er Guard s ' Chur chill s in the Normandy country sid e . All of the tanks have local c amouflage appli ed to their turrets and the rearm o st tank has it s tu rret revers ed .

145

Mr. Churc hill's Tank : The Bnnsn lnton nv Ta nk Ma rk N

Proo l , if it were need ed . 0 1 the co ntus ed natur e of the fighti ng In Nor ma ndy . Chu rch ill s of Guard s Arm y Tank Brigade , goi ng one way, pass Sher mans 0 1 Guard s Arm ou red Di v is io n moving the other way. On th e Con li nent th ey o bserv e Frenc h rules of th e r oad . The loc ati on is near Vassy

but withou t Infantry the tanks were unable to handle them . Behind them Band C Squadrons were called up to keep com pany with the infantry while A Squad ron. now unsupported, took most of the punishment. They lost eleven tanks but suffered no casua lties and as darkne ss fell were pulled back On 16 July, while they were preparing to move 011 , 153 RAC was attacked by a dozen Focke-Wu lf 190 fighter-bombers which swept the area with machine-gun ure and bomb s. The regiment suffered no casuatnes but they claim 10 have got one of the aircraft. During the subseque nt action live tanks from A Squadron were seen to pass over the crest of a hill and lost to sight. A few days later all five tanks were found. burnt out north of Evercy. One of these tank s. named Egypt contameo the regimental Intelligence Officer who appe ars to have had the war diary with him so the surviving docum ent is a reconstruction, compiled from memory On the morning of 17July tank s of 9'hRTR carried out an indirect shoot using 75m m and 95mm guns agains t German POSitions which they claim to have produced mode st results Trying the same trick in the afterno on broug ht swift retanalion from a battery of Nebe fwerl er mortars . From then untrt the end of the month the regimen ts were In and out 01acnon almost on a dally baSIS On the 22'''' 7"" RTR took part in

Ope ration Expre ss with the Sherman Crab flail tanks 01 C Squadron . 1" Lothian & Border Horse under command and the next day the 7'h lost eight Churchills from C Squadron when operating west of Maltot. Pulling back into the Village they were able to claim one Tiger. On 29 July their Anti-Aircratt Troop 01six Crusade r AA tanks was disbanded. The flat whea tuetds north of the Odon had now given way to the pICturesque bocage . so typical of Normandy. From the air It looked like a random patchwork of tmy fields surrounding small farms . but on the ground it was a maze . The narrow country lanes ran between high banks and these would also be around all the fields . Each field was bordered by a high earth bank, strengthened by stones lifted from the fields and bound by shrubbery and sma ll trees in the top . Many of the fields contained orcha rds wh ich increased the availab le cove r tor defende rs and helped to fill the tanks with hundreds of small, hard apples II they drove through with turret hatches open. Indeed it was country designed lor the defender. Infantry had a very hard time moving Irom one field 10 anothe r and it was even worse for tanks. Atleast Shermans and Cromweus found It difficult and preferred to call in Royal Engmeer bulldozers to brea k the banks down. or use the improvise d blade developed by US Sergeant Curus Culln which the tank used

'46

Cn o o tcr 10

c rorcres In Norm a nd y

Founh 8a llallon Grenadier Guard s agam and a Churchill lead ing infanlr y l hro ugh stan ding co rn . The turr et crew are clearly not expecting Immed iate ac tion

to cui ItS own way through the bank . None 01this really bot h· erec the Church Ills very rnucn . They found It q uue easy to climb the banks . as we shall see . so instances of them futed With Cubns prong device are rare : tna only problem was what might be waiting for them on the other side . The Ge rma ns ",new the co untry well and Intended 10 tight fo r every field . bu t the Allies were learning fast Planning With their Infantry 9"" RTR wo rked out a routine tor handling bocage trelds. Infant ry wo uld lead th e way , crearIng the far Side of the ban k for the tank s which wou ld then come crash ing through. Her e they wou ld pause and tay down high exprostve and mac tune-q un tire on the next hedge lin e

while the Infant ry wo rked their way dow n the Sides of lhe field . They wo uld th en clear the defen der s from the lar Side . call the tanks through and start the proc ess again . One prootern they could not solve was the follow up , esoecranv the Infan try ba ttalion's anti-tank guns Th ese co uld not deal With the ban ks at all and by the lime they gOI thr oug h their Infan try co uld easily be un de r count er att ack . The tanks were unab le to leav e them If1 suc h s.tuano ns and there were tim es when they mi ght have to keep the Infantry compa ny all night Reports from 34 ·~ Arm y Tank Bngade contam very hltle thatr s new from ttus penoo . Dunng the move towards Ga vru s on th e 28 r~ , 14 7 RAC exptamtnatth ev made their tanks trave l

One 0 1a fam ou s se ries 0 1photographs l aken during the advance towa rd S Caumonl. Chu rchill s 016'" Gu ard s Tank Bri gade ca rrying Inl anl ry 0 1 lh e Roy al Sco ls Fu silier s along a taped rou te which has been sw ept c lear 0 1mines.

147

Mi Churchill's Tank.: The BritishInfantry Tank. Mark.IV

slowly and in small groups to keep dow n the great clouds 01 dust that might otherwise give their position away. At Gavrus each lank moved mto a special. bulldozed space where it would wait until summoned in the event 01a counter attack. On the 281h • at Matter. 153RAC has a lank hit on the qtacis plate. at which point the plate broke away and dropped into the driver and hull gunner 's laps . injuring both men . The same complaint can be found in other accounts of Chu rchill lig hling which suggests eithe r that it was endem ic or, like the old cupola horror story, one of those exagger ated tales that seem to entertain the morbid soldiery, It would be interesting to know whether this fault. If it was a serious one, applied to the Mark VII or earlier type s. If so then it suggests a problem with the weldmg, which mIght not be surprising . bearing in mind the thickness of plate being supported at this point. Considering the numbe r of Churchill regiments in France The horr or . ot Ihe boc:age . A Church ill rear . up to c-c• • a fie ld ban k dur ing thoeadva nce fro m Cau montlO HIll 309 . e _posi ng il S vulnerable their losses, in terms 01tanks and men, were not great. but it underside 10 the ene my . was snnnecessary 10 keep them up to strengt h. This duty fell 10 tne lor wa rd deli ver y squa dro ns (FDS) of th e Ro yal named SIarlight37 , sailed on the evening 0122 June. 11 conArmoured Corps and . since very little has ever been written sisted of 35 landing craft escorted by two motor torpedo boats about them a mention here might be appropriate . Numb er and a French destroyer. All arrived safely off the Normandy 269 FDS has already been mentioned and, from a study of coast despite an air attack in mid-Channel and landed near its war diary it would appear to have been dedicated more or Courseue s-sur-Me r about noon on the 2 3·~ . They arrived with less specifically to 31"1Army Tank Brigad e. Certainly from 26 Churchill tanks (some adapt ed to take Crocodile eqinpearly 1944 it appears to specialise in Churc hills and even ment for 141 RAC which formed part of the bngade at this Joins the Ilghhng regiments on e xercises. Even so It was not lime ) four Stuarts. a l oyd Slave Battery Carrier and sixteen just there to deliver tanks. lis tank crews were fully trained In B vehicles . Once oft the beach they followed the route to their the various comba t roles and ready to replace those lost from concen tration area which was marked with the green dlablo flghhng regiments as required. The FDS move to Farnborough sign of 3 10lArmy Tank Brigade. From their base at St Gabnet when the tank regiment s moved to their concentranon areas they sent seven tanks up to 7'.to RTR on the 25'" while the remainder, with their crews . were held at two hours notice 10 but cross ed ove r 10 France somewha t later. They board ed the landing craft at Gosport and l ee-an- Join wh ichever regiment might need them Solent on 19 June but spent a few days moored up in the Their war diary shows Ihat on the 28'" they suppued six Solent while the great storm blew itse!t out. The ir convo y. Churchill Mark VI, along With 3 ot ncers and 27 other ranks to

A plInoramic vi ew of whe atfoe ld s be t wee n CheU I. and Sa int Man vi eu on 26 June 1944 . Chu r ch ill s of"'" RlR in the d lSlance wi lh in fantry from 6Bana tio n. Ro ya l Sco ts Fu sili er .

148

Ch a p ter 10:

cncctus in Normandy

7'" RTR . Three Churchill Mark VI and one Mark V with 15 other rank s to 9'~ RTR and two Chur chill Observation Post (OP) tanks and eight other rank s to brigade headquarters. Their com mandin g otucer visited the Armou red Replacement Group from which they d rew their Ch urctuns and tra ined men on the 29"'. indica ting a further link in the chain that rep laced battle casuames in both machines and men . On 3 Jul y they were at a new base near Secqu evule-en- Bessm where they were joined by a battery of5 .5 inch gun s. Co nfident that what they were doing was useful, the men 01269 FOS came to the conclusion that the on ly thing the artille ry battery co uld make was norse . The Crocodil e regime nt. 141RA C. left 3 1'" Army Tank Brigade on 4 July and the Fie ld De live ry Squa d ron's war diary notes that all first line rents. p resu mably me aning Churchill Crocodiles whic h the FOS was ho ldmg were to be handed ove r to the regimen t, On 6 July eleven tan ks with lull crews were sent to 1'" AT A and ten went to 9'" ATR. How ever this regimen t sent most of ItS new crews back , which the Fo S interpreted as proof that many crews were survivmq . and rema ining fit. eve n though their tan ks were knoc ked out Indeed crews without tanks. which the war diary relers to as 'unho rsed', are soon tummq up at the Fo S to collec t new machi nes. On 10 Ju ly ten Mark VII Churctuus . With crews . arrive from 258 Corp s Delivery Squadron and these are lorwarded to 9,n ATA on the 11"'. It IS an ind ica tion of how close ly the FOS iden tified With ItS brigade that their wa r diary ca rries brief detai ls 01the acnons that their lig hting reg iment s were engaged in. They

Viewed I rom Ihe Olhe r side the Churc hill c ra shes down into l he ne . 1 field wh il e a fil e of in fantry pr epare s to l o ll ow

move to Putot-en-Bessm on the 12"', 10 a held lull 01hal l buried cattle which they hrst have to dispose of. On the 14'" they note tha t It had been deci de to lorm a troop 01OP tanks at brigade headq uarters, since casu alties to these tanks and their crews was so heavy . Apparently the o riginal sche me was 10 hold OP tanks at the FOS and send them out as req uired. They also suffered from a lair amou nt 01attention by ene my a irc raft. They see m 10 be visrted mo st nights and on the 16'" remark that strafing hedge s appears to be the enemy 's

In Seple mbe r 1944 B Squa dro n 14 1 RAC was ru shed 10 Bre sllo assisl Amer ican fOf"c es 10 reduce the fort re s s there. This was a Crocodile regimenl but I1 included conventional gun la nks o n it s stre ngth . Two of whic h are shown here pr eparing 10 mov e l orwa rd. The se cre ws have gone 10 some lengths 10 camouflage lhei r lurrets

149

Mr. Church ill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark N

latest tad. However on the 17'" they are told thal air attacks may not be dealt with by small arms because there have been instances of mistakes in aircraft identificatio n which 269 FDS blames on 'some othe r unit' . By 23 July they note that it is now trained men who are becoming scarce. On the 25'" they have to admit that scarcity of tank crew refits coming from 2 tld Armoured Replacement Group prevented lull reinforcing of brigade casualties in both tanks and men . Up to the 26'" they tearned that 43 officers .a ta other ranks and 94 tanks had been sent forward to the brigade but as far as more men were concerned 'reinforcement channels remain dry'. Two days later the OP Tank Troop is detached from Brigade HQ and sent back to the FDS so clearly that experiment did not work. On Sunday, 30 July, nine Churchill VIIs were removed from 9tn RTR who received nine Churchill lVs and Vis instead. The Mark VIIs, according 10 the war diary, needed modifications. Could this have anything to do with the damaged glacs plate referred to earlier? Is the modification an attempt to strengthen it? We last encountered 6'" Guards Tank Brigade ashore near Bayeux on 20 July. Most of them had an uncomfortable crossing and these three regiments also pay tribute to the U. S. Navy landing craft crews who offered to share their excelle nt rations with the Scots tank men . Unfortunately nobody was in a fit state to take advantage of the offer and , indeed , one battered old LCT carrying Churchills of the Scots Guards had 10 turn back when some of its tanks broke loose half way across the English Channe l. Once ashore . with time on their hands, the men of all three regiments started poking around the graveyard of wrecked tanks which was steadily building up behind the beaches. It rapidly became apparent that, well protected as the Churchill was, the Germans had weapons that could make holes in it. And it needed very little imagination, having peered inside some of these tanks, to appreciate what went on when a tank was hit. Thinking upon this the men wandered back to their tanks, and then back to the graveyard again where they started to collect up all the spare track plates they could find; Churchill, Cromwell, Sherrnan . it did not matter. These were dragged back to the tank park and welded all over the front and turret of the tanks until some of them were hardly recognisable. An experienced British tank officer, having observed this practice in Italy, reported on it to the War Office. In his view the covering of old track plates made absolutely no difference at all, apart from increasing the tank's weight and slowing it down , but he noted that crews had unbounded faith in the practice. Some were happy to expla in to him how the irregular surface of the track would deflect shot , when in fact it was just as likely to trap it, while others told him that they preferred to have the track hanging loose so that it swung with the incoming round and slowed it down. Nonsense it might have been but the crews believed that it helped them and as long as they were happy officialdom saw no reason to forbid it. The stubborn fighting that characterised the campaign on Normandy took a new turn on 25 July when American

forces launched Ope ration Cobra which broke through the German positions at St La and started a sweeping move designed to encircle the main enemy concentration facing the combined British, Canadian and Polish forces . Even so it was no joy ride and the advance down the valley of the Vire River, south east from St La, was hampered by German positions on the heights to the east, including the dominant Mont Pincon. The British were requested 10 neutralise this from the Caumont position which they had taken over from the Americans and the result was Operation Bluecoat. As usual it is not our intention to cover the entire battle but merely to deal with that part of it which involved Churchill tanks. and in this case it is a very particular one. This would be the battle debut of 61h Guards Tank Brigade. The three Churchill regiments would move out from the hilltop village of Caumont and drive due south to take the objective known as Hill 309, about five miles away. En route the Scots Guards would swing to the left and take a ridge above the village of Les Loges in order to cover the eastern flank. The Guards would be working, in the main, with 15'" Scottish Divisio n with whom they had trained for the past twelve months in Britain. The understanding between these two units, coupled with the combat experience already gained by the Scottish infantry and the exceptiona l professionalism of the Guards augured well for the battle. Churchills had been selected for this part of the operation because of the nature of the country between Caumont and Hill 309. Within a triangle of roads whose apex was Caumont was a maze of tiny streams, orchards , small farms and hills, crossed north west to south east by one narrow lane. Keeping direction would be quite difficult enough, and the opportun ities for ambush were extensive but to make matters worse the area had been sown with mines at various times by German, American and British troops when they were in the area and this had a serious effect on the progress of the infantry. The start of the action, on 28 July, saw 4tn Batlalion the Grenadier Guards descending the slopes from Caumont and taking two important objectives within the first hour. These were tuvain Wood, at the foot of the slope and the village of Sept Vents on the Caumont to Vire road which was the western side of the triangle. Down behind them came 3'd SCOlS Guards who soon found their infantry lagging behind . Within an hour orders came through that they should go on alone and the Coldstreams on their right got the same message. It was a choice between waiting for the infantry or taking advantage of the artillery barrage which could not change its timetable . So the tanks went on, rearing up over each of the bocage field bounda ries and then crashing down on the far side in what has been described as a sort of armoured steeplechase . In their regimental history the Scots Guards claim that no other Allied tank would have coped with the conditions but it meant a rough ride for all crews and a lot of punishment for the tanks. However they took their hilltop position and sat down to wait for the infantry. These were later reported to be in the village behind the ridge but their support weapons and transport were still miles back, snagged up in an enormous

150

Ch a n ter 10 Cncrctuns In Norman d y

A fme ill us tratio n 01 ju st how much d ust a Churc hill co u ld th row up when mov Ing la st along a d irt ro ad

trattrc jam and the Scot s G ua rds had to remain In front . Abo ut 6pm the Ge rmans put down an artillery ba rrage on th e ridge which fore warne d of a counte ra uack . This came sud den ly In the form of three new Jagdpant her 88mm self-pro pelled guns . the urst 01their type to be encountered by Bntrsf troops . They appe ar to have come onto the ridge from the north west. one remaining In support while the other two . making good use of natura l cover . raced throug h the Bnnstt req.m ent destroymq tanks as they went. The Sco ts Guards retamec an mtantrv style by retemnq to thei r thr ee Squadrons as Right Flank . S

a nd l elt Flank Sq uadr on s and I' w as S Squadr o n that bore the brunt of this atta ck . wrt t un secon ds eleven Ctturctulls were blaZing hul ks. at lea st one had Its ten et blown clear olf The remammq tank s fired as be st they could at the dep arting Germa ns but they all appea r to hav e had hig h expl osive round s loaded Even so . when the battlefield was exa mined a lew days later. two ot tnese big SP guns were found be low the rrdge with then track s broken and o ne of the se IS attnbuted to a 75mm HE ro und Iued by o ne of the Churct nns The Cotos trearn Guard s . navm q lettt netr Infantry beh ind . set ott down the Vue road and made qooo progress untrl tney arnvec outside the Village of la Moncbesse les Mares at about 3pm Her e the y lea rned tha t the village was Infested with Panth er s so the CO swung the regiment olf the road and w ent . bald head ed fo r HIli 309 by a cross-country rou te. The thre e sq uad rons (s im ply numb er ed 1. 2 and 3 as were the Grenadier s) sp read out ab reas t and crashe d throu gh the otchar ds wh ich ettectrvetv wiped on many Wireless aenals . They approa ched the hili at a pcmt where the Germans be lieved 11 to be qurte Im poss ible for tan ks 10 climb . but the Ger mans did not know their Cnurctuns Changing down the tanks dug their tracks In and worked steadily up the slope . One rolled over bu t the rest ma de It to tne top and deployed The Grenadier Guards moved out later In the day . carry Ing Infantry of the Glasg ow Highlanders on the tan ks They also got caught up In a major traftrc lam and navmq reached an orchard below HIli 309 decided 10 drop the Infantry of! there . Throug hout the 29'~ and 30" the Germans tneo every

ChurCh l ow er . pr o vided exce llen t ob serva tion platforms lo r German artillery o bservers so th ey were in variably des troyed . Two Chu rc hi lls ru mb le pasl l hi s one and m e leadi ng lank is very well covered wi l h ex lra traCk .

15 1

Mr. Chur chill's Tan k: The British Infan try Tank Mark IV

means they knew 10throw back the British armour. Unfortunately although the ChurchiUs and their infantry had done exceptionally well the armou red and infantry division working on each flank, which in fact represented the main theme of Btuecoat. were seriously delayed. The Grenadie r Guards were involved in fighting around the Bois du Hommes, a large wood to the east of Hill 309 whe re they reported finding some dum my Panther tanks made of wood . They regarded snipe rs as one of the worst threats to tanks in this close country and claim that the best antidote was a ten inch high armoured plate welded behind the cupola . The Coldstream Guard s caught up with some real Panthers a week later. On one occasi on at the village of Estry a Coldstream Churchill and a Panther met face to face and the British tank fired first. Unfortunately it was loaded with high explosive which did not hurt the Panther. The German tank then replied and dest royed the Chu rchill. It is worth noting that here we have seen two cases of infan try tanks having high explosive rounds 'up the spout' when encountering enemy tanks. This raises interes ting points . Clearly when working with infantry high explosi ve was essentia l to deal with enemy machine-gun and mortar positions, along with infantry. However it may be that the 75mm armou r piercing round was considered so ineffective thatthey did not bothe r to use

it very often . It is worth not ing, for exampl e, that when the Scots Guards approached the village of Chen edolle and were warned that it contained a Panther tan k, they blocked all the exits from the village and summon ed up some e-oocooer Cnurctuns to deal with it. When they arrived the Panther crew drove their tank into a barn and set it alight. Of course by this time there was a discarding sabot (APDS) round for the 6· pounder which had a far better penetration figure than any projectile supplied for the 75mm , at teast at medium range Not that the sabot round was very much use against a Tiger The comment by the Co'dstrearn s. that even sabot rounds bounced off Tigers like ping-pong balls, has been quoted by many writers and they claimed that the only way to deal with Tigers was to call down a medium artill ery barrage which . if it did not knock the German tank out, at least encouraged it to clear off. While Operation Bluecoat was going on the other Churchill regime nts were still fighti ng on the Om e but it is a repetitive story of attack , counterattack and wa iting , One or two incidents from this period will suffice to give a flavour of events Having crossed the Orne on 7 August 107 RAC covered their infantry (7th Bn North Stafford shire Regiment and 7'" Bn Royal Norfolk Regiment ) when a Germ an counterattack came in. The infantry withdrew , leaving the Churchills to face the on-

Crew and litters work on the tra ck of a Churchill Mark VI while another c rewm an keep s watch lrom the turr et. A Chu rchill Arm our ed Rec overy Vehicl e Mark I has arrived fa help and the mug s reve al that tea has been pr ovide d tor th e wo rke rs.

152

Chapter 10: Ch c rcruns in Normandy

slaught of Panther and Tiger tanks attac king their flanks, and many tanks were lost. Still they held on and next day B Squadron came up from reserve to relieve the remnants of A and C Squadrons for Ihe next night. The following day they were relieved in turn by 147RAC On the 12m this regiment , 147AA C, was involve d in an attack on the village of Thury-Harcourt . They lined the tank s up on a hill overlooki ng the village and pounded every door and window with high e xplos ive shells and concentrated machine-gun fire. This went on undisturbed for 45 minutes . Under this tan k generated barrage it was assumed that the infantry (2nd Battalion the Glcste rs) were doi ng well but when a signal came from the battalion CO for more help it reve aled a dillerent state of affairs. The Gloaters were so depleted that they would not be able to suppo rt the tanks with in the village, and in any case the route down from the hill was difficult to negotiate , so it was decided to withdraw . The tanks, still in their substitute artillery role , now laid down smoke shells to cover the infantry as they came out While on the SUbject of 34Th Army Tank Brigade this is probably the place 10 record that on 18 August, at a conference called to consider manpower problems. it was decided to disband 153 RAC. Their war diary records that the last tank left the regiment on the 2pt and the remaining personnel were posted away on the 28,n. Finally in this part a brief look at 7 th ATA, On 2 August they were ordered to take part in what was desc ribed as an Armoured Drive against the Vil1ers-Bocage to Caen road , following up an enemy withdrawa l. They moved oll at 16.30 hours with a squadron of uautanks and a troop of Churchill AVREs under command. They met very little enemy resistance but mines were a problem to the extent that they lost seven Church ills and two flails along the way. On 17 August

The ass ault on Le Havre. Chu rchills of has no trac k gua rd s al all .

r

the regiment was transferred to 34'hArmy Tank Brigade and made what the war diary descri bes as 'a remarkable run' of 54 miles by road to the Falais e area. What made it so remarkable was the high standard of reliability. They were on the road from 0900 hours until midnight but suffered very few mecha nica l bre akdown s. The regime nt was now in for a lengthy per iod 01 rest and maintenance when, amo ng other things. acco rding to the war diary, they were busy lifting the turrets off their Stuart reco nnaissance tanks. Operation Astcr ua. the attack on Le Havre, was scheduled for 10 Septe mber 1944. It was to be the first of a series of assaults on German held ports along the Channel coas t that had been by-passe d by the main Allied forces which, even now. we re swee ping forward into Belgium and Holland. The Churchill regimen ts that took part tend , in their histories and war diarie s, to make light of the ensuing action although it was hardly an easy battle. The 107 AAC got through their part of the proceedings without incurri ng any casualt ies at all, and the same appea red to have been true of 9'hRTA . The attack on Le Havre was co-ordinated by Canadian I Corps. It cou ld only come in from the north and east because of the location of the city port , on the north side of the Seine estuary, It was first necessary to break through a fortified outpost line and then reduce the defences of the city itself. The three Churchill regiments we re all unde r comman d of 49'h Infantry Division which took the eastern sector in the attack and their main tas k seems to have been tackling occupied enemy pill boxes . They had help of course, from the flails and AVREs of 79'h Armoured Division and the Churchill Crocod iles of the Bull s. These gave an exce llent example of their powers at one stage when 9th ATA was deal ing with a pill box , After a bout of shelling the ene my put up white flags, so an interpreter was sent forward to negotia te, He was told that a brief

Ro val Tank Reg im ent at th eir forming up poin t in the even ing . Noti c e th at the Mark VII In the lor egroun d

153

Mr, Churchill'S Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

Crew s Ir om 7'" Ro yal Tanks walc h as Lanc ast er s 01the Ro yal Air For c e batt er Le Hav re belo re Ih e atta c k go es in .

With Ih e lighting In Norm and y ove r it Is time to m ove east . Bugle r is gui ded c ote li s tran sp ort er. The appli q ue armo ur s ho ws up well and no tice Ih at th e cen tr e sec lion ot lh e track guar d has gon e 10 avoi d lh e ri sk 01 jammi ng the l urr et

respite was required in order to deal with casualties and afte r wailing for a while hosnnues were resu med . At this point a couple of Crocodiles came up and laid on a brief demonstration. at which pomt the white flags appeared again. and this lime the British infantry just walked in. Seventh Royal Tanks certainly had a tougher time 01 It. First they had a substantial minefield ahead of them and they had to wan while three lanes were clea red by flail tanks . Three of these were knocked out by ann-tank ure coming in Irom the right flank but when all was complete the Chu rctuus 01C Squadron started across . only to lose four 01their numbe r on mines. B Squadron. ope rannq on the left, came throug h unscathed. By 2 1.30 hours all positions were taken and A Squadron had come through to provide cove r for the night. B Squadron managed to rally but when C Squad ron tried to go back there was so much traffic conge stion that they got stuc k. This meant that at dawn the wrong squadrons were in the wrong place so AS quadron had to improvi se and when it ran low on supplies it was replenished from turretles s Stuarts which managed to get through the minefields. Most of their work seems to have been blasting away at pillbo xes with 75mm HE which usually appears to have had the desired effect. The battle lor Le Havre effecti vely ended on 12 Septembe r and when ,t is remembered that Bnnsh troops were in Brus-

sels on the 3'd.and Antwerp on the 4'" while First and Third U S. Arm ies were even further east It illustrates how quickly things we re moving Cnurctuus had no place In this kind of warfare . even If they could catch up. It is mterestmq 10note that such progress as they did make was almost entirely on their tracks . Transport and fuel was at a premium . Those tank transporters whICh were availabl e were rushing Sne rmans forward to the fight· ing trout so tne Churchills wou ld Just have to manage . As an example on 17 September . the day the airborne opereton to capture Arnhem was launched . 7"" RTR made a 50 mile road run to a place calle d Belmesmt whe re It went into a reserve area for maintena nce and training. Further eastward moves, starnnq on 29 Septem ber took them via Abbeville to a tccalion south of Dieppe where they found themselves resting close by 9 '~ RTR. At a dinner. given for Lieutenant Colonel A R Leakey, the comma nding officer of 7t11 RTR. by the officers of 9t~ ATA , the Colonel was presented with a model representing a Churchill tank disabled in a min efield . It was intended to honour his prowe ss and leader ship in discovering more minefields in France than any other unit commande r and is described as being received with 'grave and dubious laughter', as well it might be .

154

11

Campaigning in Italy

When the Allies landed in Sicily, in July 194 3. and subse-

quently on the Italian mainland in September they did not take any Br itish bunttanks wi th the m at all. T his was understandable in the case of the C rusa de r. and no t unreaso nab le when one considers the Vale ntine . but why not the Churchill ?

Two more or less official answers can be traced. One concerns the nature of the country. Southern Italy was largely rural and unde rdeveloped com pa red with the rest of the country so the roads we re simply incap ab le of handling heavy traf-

fic. Bridges. and even under-road culverts, could easily be damaged by heavy vehicles and the differen ce in weight , something close 10 10 tons, bet ween the She rman and Churchill, exclud ed the latter. However the men of the Churchill reg iments in Tun isia belie ved it wa s the gun . The high explosive rou nd supplied lo r the e-coonoer was a me re firecracker when co mpa red wi th that fired by the American 75mm gu n and since expe rience had show n that tanks sup po rti ng infantry need ed an effec tive high ex plo sive ca pabi lity this was anoth er po ssib le rea son lo r disca rding the C hurc hill. Oth er explanations have be en offered. One be ing General Mon tgom e ry's belief that the difference betw een c ruise r and infa ntry tank s was large ly academic and tha t an a il-p urpose tank was pref erab le . It wa s also clai med tha t the tw o Churchill br igades ha d tak en suc h a battering in Tunisia that they were in no fit state to tak e part in an othe r cam paig n. Howe ver the unde rlying reason co uld eas ily be that Br itish tank troo ps in the Med iterr an ean th eat re had si mply lost fa ith in British tanks and favour ed the reli abi lity of American ma ch ines . Th us it was that the 2 1"' and 25 1'> Tank Br igad es spen t a frustrati ng twelve mon ths in Algeria and Tuni sia be twee n th e Victory Parade in Tunis an d the time whe n they fina lly c ros sed ove r to Ita ly. Since it is obvious that it wo uld not have ta ke n a year to restore the two briga des to co mba t read ine ss on e has to assume that the authorities in Italy we re qu ite happy with their Shermans until they came up ag ains t the for midable German positions in the north of the cou ntry. The y had

a fo retas te 01 this at Monte Cassino . but for now we must observe the reg ime nts in North Africa . Se lected en tries from the vario us war d iarie s give a ltavcu r 01 thi s pe riod . Th e 2 1· Tan k Br igade was ba sed for mos t of this time at Pent hievre in Algeria. For 121'> RTR th is was a tim e lor moving ta nk s abo ut. Ten 01 the ir Ch urchill s went to 145 RAC in Au g ust and in o rder to make up numb er s they we re eq uipped wi th a variety 01other tan ks. For ins tance their brig ad e he adqu arte rs. in September 194 3. cons isted 01 one Churchill III and four cru iser tank s , wh ich we subseq uently lea m are Crusa de rs. l ater that mont h they initiated Exe rcise Gr ea ser , the purp ose of wh ich was to run in newly deli vered Un iversal Carriers and so lo motorcycles. In O ctober they give their strength as 48 Mark III and IV Chu rch ills plus four Mark I and on the 20 1h they begin Ope ration Kisme t wh ich ended on th e 22 nd • Two days late r a signal from brigade an nounced that . in orde r to conserve thei r tanks they wou ld be lim ite d to a tot al of 650 miles . This ca use d sixtee n tan ks to be Irozen imme diate ly w hile 24 more ha d only 100 mi les each in hand . T he remainin g tw elve were low mi leage ma chines, and the regim ent being six ta nks below wa r establi shment this seriously limited lu rther training . Early in November a troop of 17-pounder an ti-tank guns wa s attached to the regim ent and sh ortly afterwards they were visited by a Mr Jack. the Vauxhall Mo tors representative in North Afri ca . of who m more later. By the end of the month the ir stren gth is g iven as 43 Mark s III and IV. five Mark I, eight uniden tif ied tra ining tanks an d thr ee Stuarts : the Cr usade rs havin g be en handed in. At th e end of 194 3 four senior NCOs wer e sen t to El Gu errah on a co urse to learn th e 75mm gu n. Earl y in the new yea r they leamed that Hone ys (US M3A 1) wo uld repla ce the Univer sal Carriers in the ir recc e troop and eight mo re arriv ed . Th eir ne xt re port exp lained that 10 of their Chur chi lls we re at Brigad e Work sh op s 'as pe r progra mm e' which appea rs to incl ude modifications to the cupola and what are descr ibed as ' 12 ATA BE SA mod ifica tio ns to all ta nks' bu t these are no t explai ned. The regiment als o noted that all

155

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tan k Ma rk IV

new vehicles were painted in Europ ean camouflage colou rs In March the men attended a lecture on the Italian camp aign . The 48'" ATA were also at Pent hievre and their activities match those of the othe rs in the brigade . This long per iod 01 waiting provoked some people to exper iment. We shall encounter an important case shortly but for the pre sent we will look at the work of a Captain a lgin. the AEME officer in charge of 48'" ATA 's Light Aid Detachme nt. Having listene d to the complaints from membe rs of the regiment concernin g the limitations of the hull mounted three inch howitzer in the Church ill I. algin resolved to do somelhing about it. He took a sample tank and installed a second howitzer in the turret. replacing the regular z-cccnoer. His idea was to use the turret gun as the inlllal ranging weapon before bringing In the hull gun . With a bit 01 practice the turret crew discovered that they could drop a shell within a 50 yard SQuareon the third round . The intorrnanon was then pas sed to the hull gunner who could hit the same patch 01 ground with his first or second shot . The problem was that the turret gun , being still on a free-elevation mount, would occa sionally jump so tnat the range accidentally decreased or increased by as much as 100 yards. Work now concen trated on oevelopmq gea red erevanon for the turret gun butthe war diary taus to repo rt further develop ments . At the end of December 1943 retu rns show tha t the regiment had 49 Marks III and IV. three Mark I and what is described as a Churchill training tank which , presumably, had been rejected for combat service. In March 1944 two Sherman tanks, type M4A2, arrived, harbingers of another change . The third regiment in the brigade, 145 RAC , found themselves back in Bone alter the victory parad e in Tunis. The very place they had landed on arrival from Britain . Their war diary is one long catalogue of training and maintenan ce but it is interesting to note that their reports on exercises Trumpet and Kism et are writt en as if rep orting real act ion s. AI Penttuevere. in October 1943, a tank from C Squad ron gave a demonstration of towing a t z-pounoer gun belonging to 14'" Anti-Tank Regiment. This prac tice had first been used by Valentines of 23'd Armoured Brigade dur ing the advance into Tunisia and it is interesting to observ e that it had not been lorgonen. However at that time the anti-tank gun was the 6pounder which weig hed just ove r 1 ton whe reas the 17pounder was more than double that. Even so cross country towing trials by a Churchill were described as very satisfactory Since it was brigaded with two Royal Tank Regiments 145 AAC treated Cambra i Day (20 November and the ATA 's regimenta l day) as a holiday but at all other time s it was an endless cycle of maintenance and training . In February 194 4 tank crews begin training with the new rear smo ke emitters and in the middle of April they look over seven Snermans from 25'" Army Tank Brigade Meanwhile 25'" Tank Brigade was reco rding simila r events. The North Irish Horse. based at Ain Mokra near Bone , has nothing of note to report for this period , and neither does 51" ATA beyond announcing that the ir command ing officer,

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:~:I~~r;~~~~oh~;~lee~~~~~~I':,'~~;~~~:e~~~~eO~e:i~nl~~n~~il~.l:r:'s°uu~~

ably It belonged to 48'· RTR and was mined in Ilaly

Lieut enant Co lonel R B Holden, flew across to Italy in March 10 study conditions over there. In fact this became standard proced ure for all the Churc hill regimen t cas around this lime for obvious reason s. Later tha t same month some Stuarts and She rman s arr ived for training and the regiment prepared to move oversea s. The Junior regiment in this brigade , 142 RAC, has a similar story to tell . It went to Ain Mokra from Tunis and then to Nabeulm Tunisia in September 1943. By the end of the year they were at a place called Oued el Aneb On 20 March 1944 they receive a warning order for movement to Italy and early in April the comman dmg officer and second in command visited the Aoyal Arm ou red Corp s Schools In North Africa to exam ine a Churchill tank fitted With a Snerma n's 75mm gun . They were the n told that the regiment would rece ive 18 M4A 1 She rman tank s pending dehvery 01these up -gunned Cturrct uns. Mixed regiments of cruiser and infantry tank s seem, on the face of it. to be a curious comb ination, But expene nce in North Africa had blurred the distinction and since these were the people who had seen

156

Chapter 11: Campaigning in lta,¥

action their views had to coun t when placed against the dogm a being expou nded in Britain. That was the question . and we have alrea dy allu ded to it. Was there really any difference. apa rt from the gun. between the Churchill and Snerman tanks when it came to ope rational use? Granted they had their differences. and neither of them was in any way compa rable to the new generation of Ger man tanks . but was it really enough to justify ope rating the two types . never mind all the other tanks then being developed in Britain and the United States? Each type had its proponents , naturally. but these were invariably predicta ble . If one had trained and foug ht in Churchills the genera l view was that they were the best. But if your tank was the Sh erman then that was consi dered the better ma ch ine. Of co urse if one came dow n to spec ifics then there were d ifferen ce. and these could be tes ted. As we have see n, actions suc h as Steamrolle r Farm and Longs top Hill had convi nced a lot of peop le that the Chur chill had an ability to climb that was hardly infe rior to a fly on a window . How would the Sherman do under similar con ditio ns? The obvious answer was 10 find out. British 1 11 Armo ured Division agreed to spo nso r a trial. The site chosen was in hilly country south east of Bou Farik and the date for the trial was 6 December 1943 . A course was laid out about one mile long over which each tank would have to climb a scrub covered slope of average gradient. traverse the side of a hill which was cut up by small wedis and then tackle a very steep hilt. After that each tank had to demonstrate its ability to climb out of a wadi and finally cross some heavy plough lan d. It was a condition of the trial that the land sho uld be d ry. whic h it appears to have bee n on the day. The report does not ex plain how many tanks we re used . neithe r does it ide ntify the precise marks in eithe r case , but we do know that the ta nks ran in pairs. one Church ill and one She-man, ove r the co urse and we can assume that there were at least two of each type. This is clear from the fact that the first pair both managed to break a track ' for no accou ntable reaso n' as the report puts it. The results appea r to have been inconclusive, at lea st if one we re looking for a distinc t winner . and the most that the report was prepared to say was that the Churc hill was sligh tly faster than the Sherman ove r difficult co untry , otherwise ; "There was no obstacle which the Churchill surmounted that proved impossible to the Sherman on the day of the trial' . Both completed the course and both were defea ted by the climb out of the steep wadi at the end . They managed to get out a bit further along the wadi , where the bank was not so steep and . depending upon how one reads it. there is a suggestion that both tanks tackled the worst part of the bank successfully later on. Clearly the results depended to some extent on the skill of the drive rs and thei r expe rience . The second attempt at the wadi would appea r to bear that ou t, but it did nothing to justify the champ ions of either tank. Indeed a turrettess Honey was also put ove r the course and it got right through before failing at the last wadi when the tracks got wet and. being rubbe r padd ed, failed to grip on the ob-

stacle . Wet co nditions were another matter and. conveniently, it rained for 24 hours on 11 Decemb er so it was decided to repeat the trial. This time the going was much toug her yet again there was no real diffe rence to be noted . Nei ther the Churchill nor the Sherman managed to get more than one third of the way along the course and both broke tracks when mud got into the d rive sp rockets and unde r the tracks. A pair of turretless Honeys fa iled at the first ditch. Summing up the report agreed tha t there was little to choose betw een the British and America n tanks althou gh it was noted that on a side slope in the we t the Sherman was muc h more difficult to control. Yet the Churchill still had its supporte rs. The officer comman ding the Churchill troo p add ed some co mme nts of his own to the report. In his view the Chur chill was far bette r at cli mbing than the She rma n because of the higher set of its idlers and the long er le ngth of track on the ground . He poin ted out that the main reason why the Chu rchill failed on the wet plough land was becau se the right hand final drive spline stripped. He also explained that at one poin t the Chu rchill had to tow its co mpeting Sherman out of the wadi and then go on to comple te the course . So if the re was so little to choose betwee n the two tanks in terms of mobility , wha t about the gun? A REME officer, Writing after the war. explained that the e-coorcer, with a range of 800 yards firing armour piercing and no ability to fire high explosive was no match for the German 75mm and BBmm weapons. He also explained that the aperture in the front of the Ch urchill turret was vulnerable to machine-gun fire and , in brighllight , cast a dee p shadow for enemy gunne rs to aim at. Possib ly the office r was load ing his case , the anti-tank pe rfo rmance of the 6-pou nder was not that bad and the re is little evi dence for the belief that eve n Germ an gun ners could aim at a poi nt so small as the mantlet area of an Allied tank . This office r. Captai n P H Morrell. had good reason for playing down the va lue of the 6-po unde r Churchill. He was, in 1943 , co mman ding a deta ch ment of 665 Tank Troops Wo rkshop REME , attached to 2 1st Army Tank Brigade at Bone. Morr elrs deta chm ent was su bseque ntly absorbed back into its pa rent wo rksho p, statio ned at Le Khroub , and he was appo inted second in com man d. The task of this unit was the scra pping of tanks damaged in actio n and conside red beyond eco nomic repair. The workshop park was full of these wrecks , mostly Churchills. Valentines and Shermans. and Mor rell soon started to notice that in many cases the 75mm guns on the Shermans he was cuttmq up were virtually new. Morrell was convinced that the reason why the Churchills were not being sent to Italy was due entirely to the poor performance of thei r guns . He felt tha t the men of the two Churchill briga des we re becoming bored and frust rated by the long mont hs of inaction and he suggests that this feeling had also perme ated his unit. The war was going on without them. What they we re do ing might be useful but they were part of fighting un it and sho uld be in action. Whenever he had the time Morr ell used to wander among the wrecked tank s, study ing the different models. Then he

157

Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantr y Tank Mark IV

started measuri ng and soon came to the conclus ion, with a bit of work , he could fit Sherman guns into the cast turrets of Mark IV Church ill tanks and he started to prepare a letter 10 the Deputy Directo r of Mechan ical Engineering in North Africa, a Colonel Green , Now Morrell shared a large table with his CO, Major Chris Bevan , and before the letter was fm tsheo they were visited by the said Colonel Gree n, Since he was not required Morreu gave up his chair to Green and left the office, but while the Colonel was talking to Bevan his eye lit upon the letter. Morrell was recalled and told that Green liked the idea but it seems that his CO did not . He advised Morteu to keep quiet, and other officers in the unit pointed out that if such a thing we re po ssible someone would already have thought of it; ergo it was impossible. However Morrell perseve red and within two week s of sending the letter he was visited by Mr J C Jack, the Vauxhall Motors representative in North Africa . Morrell and Jack had known one another in Britain and the civilian engineer was impressed with his friend's scheme. As he pointed out, in a letter to Army Force Headquarters, the Sherman gun would physically fit into the ChurchiU'sturret and , if the many problems could be overcome it could be made to work . Furthermore Jack calculated that the tu rret ring assembl y of the Churchill was even stronger than that of the Sherman , so it should be able to handle the strain. On the basis of Jack 's recommendation Morre ll was ordered to report to the Director of Mechanical Engineering , Major-General W STope who, like Morrell was a civilian engineer in uniform for the duration of the war For two days Tape questio ned Morrell, probing for weak nesses in the idea and coming up with problem s that the young AEME Captain had not even thought of , It was an uncomf ortable time. Tope did not mince his words but he clear ly believed it could be done , Morrell was told that he could have a brand new Churchill Mark IV plus all the staff and facilities he might require to carry out the conversion. Tope told Morrell that he was sure it could be done but reminded the young officer that , so far, he had enjoyed a successfu l military career. However it hardly needed the General to point out that , if the project failed and the British taxpayer was deprived of a

The fini shed artic le, Churchill turre t and Sherman gun . The neighbouring turret has alread y had lis Ir ontal aperture enl arged to accept the Ameri can weapo n .

Fitting the Sherman 7Smm gun into a modi lied Chu rchi ll Mark IV turret by REME per sonnelln Tuni si a

new and expensive tank , Morrel! might consider that his career had gone about as far as it could go The proj ec t wa s decla red Top Sec ret and given the coc ename White hot. It would require too much space to detail every stage in the conversion but the first step was simply to prove thalthe gun could be made to lit. This being done Morrell said that all of his crew agreed that it looked right which, as many engineer s can testify, often indicates that a thing is right. There were problems of course, notably when it came to arranging for the 75m m gun to be fired from the right instead of the left. Then there was the sight which, in these early Sherman s. took the form of a combined telescopic periscope that had to be adapt ed to the British turret. It had also been agreed that the Sherman mount ing should retain its coaxia l Browning .30 calibr e machi ne -g un ins tead of the Chu rchill' s BESA . Morrell now discovered that with the gun on maximu m elevat ion the back end of the machine-gun knocked against the turret traverse gear so he adapted the mounting to over come this problem . During eleva tion the mach ine-gun kept in line wit h the 75m m until the last few degree s when it ceased to move , leaving the main gun to continue . In order to avoid confusion over ammuni tion stowage the hull mach ine-gun was also changed for a Browning

158

Chapter 11: Ca m pa ig ning In Italy

In his memo ir Morreu fails to give precise dates but it seems that the Initial work too k place aro und February or March 1944. The actua l conv ersion 01 the prototype is reported to have taken just ten days and It is known that a report on firing trials at the RAC Ranges was certainly issued on 21 March, followed by another early In April. In gene ral rtus was complimentary about the work , the only complaint be ing that the Cnurctun's turret fume extractor, which had been moved to accommodate the sight, did not clea r enough fumes Irom the turret. Once the matter 01the gun had been settled work began on the less glamorous task of sorting out am mu muon stowage and Morrell discovered that he was still able to fIt 8 1 rounds into the tank which matched the quan tity carried by the 6-pounder version. Once this had been sell led the workshop was trans ferred to Bone where a prod uction line was installed and in due course 210 Mark IV Churchills were converted to take the Sherman gun, They ente red service as the type NA75, the letters naturally standing fo r North Africa Of course, as we have already seen , e-cococer Churctuns in Britain had already been converted to accept a British 75mm gun but by this time the Italian theatre had beco me somev

thing 01a poor cousin , in terms of supply, to northern Europe so the NA75 Cburctuns provided a use ful stopgap . Bearing in mind comments made by some users on the Bnnsn weapon it migh t even be fair to cla im that the Churchill WIththe Amencan gun was the better version . One might specula te as to why this solution never occ urred to anyone in Bntam . Spare Sherman guns mus t have been available from tanks which the Bntish were happily conver nnq into armoured recovery vehicles and other roles, much to the irritation of the Amencans . or indeed those that were being adapte d to lit the Bntish 17-pounder Details of the serv ice use of the NA75 Church ill will be cons ide red later but it is pleasi ng to record here that Morrell was duly rewarded for his inventiveness and the moral courage he displayed in going ahead with it. He was promoted Major and taken onto General Tope's staff and was subsequently made a Memb er of the British Empire. The 25 tn Army Tank Brigade depa rted for Italy around the middle 01April 1944 , Most of the men sailed direct to Naples while the tanks and transpo rt were shipped to Taranto in the sout h and then brought up by rail and road transporters. They were iomed by 21sl Army Tank Brigade at the beginning 01 ~ '( - (

; ,; ,

-~"" " .

.. ~ . Q .

A phol ogr aph 01a co mp leted Ch urc hill Mark IV (NA75 ) s ig ned by man y ol l hos e who were invo lved , The sig nature 01 M J E Ja ck , the Vaux hall Motor s represenl ati ve , is v is ible bc ttc m rig ht.

159

Mr. Churchill's Ta nk: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

Chu rc hi lls and She r m an s al a l ank park in tla ly. The for mer are all Mar k IV, the laner all M4A 1.

May. Precise figures are not available for all six regime nts but to take 142 RAC as an example they now had 18 Sherman s (M4A 1) to replace a similar number of Churcmns It was said at the time that these tanks were provided tor their 75mm guns. pending the arrival of 75mm gun Church ills. Many of the commanding ortce rs had VISited the RAC Schools before they tett North Atnca. to inspect Mc rren's converted NA75. All 01the regiment s appe ar to have been organised on the basis o f two troop s of Ch urch ills and two troop s of Sherman s per squadron. However as we shall see there appear to have been many occas ions whe n these tanks operated independently In covering the ac tivities ot the tank brigades in the ital tan campaign one is faced by the problem of separating actions involving Churc hills or Sherman s. Where the war diaries identify particular ballle s in which cnurcnnstook part , or make any other relevant comment s, these have been recorded , but the wider aspects of the Italian cam paig n have been covered elsewher e so there is no point in going into loo much detail. When it arrived in Italy 12'" RTA immed iately handed over about half of ItS Churchill s to a tank delivery squadron and received, in us place, eleven Stuarts. ten Shermans two scout cars and six half-tracks. In July the regiment attended a dem onstration on the use of tascines and the Snake . explosive mine clearing apparatu s. They were also inspected by the King and enjoyed an audience With the Pope Twenty lilth Army Tank Brigade was selected to support the Canadians and spent the early part of its time in Italy training With ' SI Canadian Division at Lucer a. near Fogg ia The high standard 01teamwork creat ed there was soon put to the test during the attack on the Hitler Line in the sector between Aquino and Pontecorvo. The line was said to be thinly held, although it was not unusual for assau lt troops to be led this sort of mtormaucn but It inclu ded. among oth er things, Panther tank turrets dug into the ground which were sited to cover obvious approach routes. They combined potent tnepower With minimal target area and, when skillully

emplaced became difficult to detec t and harder stili to knock out. An accou nt of the attac k on the Hitler Line , prepared by Lieutenant G L Simcox . throws an interesting light on the real meaning of infan try support and how the Churchills and Sh ermans work ed toget he r, Simcox commanded the Snerman troop In C Squadro n 01 5 ' "' ATR and It IS worth noting that a summary 01 this ba ttle indicates that over the eight day per iod 17 to 25 May 1944 , following the reqiment's arrival at the front. tank crew members snatche d, on average , 24 hours 01sleep. Detailed ptannmq at troop level was entirely absent and , indeed. Simco x describes a bnetmq at which most 01 the troop leaders were asleep and that, on returning to his tanks he decided to let the men sleep for as long as possible rather than wake them up try to explain the plan , insofar as he understood it Thus the action was entirely a case ol lollo w your leader. The infantry set oH with an objective in mind . followed by the Chu rctunswhich in turn were supported by the Sherman troop. Startmq out in darkn ess and thick mist. under a perpetual barrage from both sides, the tank s simply followed the troops

Dam aged by All ied fi re and aba ndon ed by its crew an em placed Partl her tu rret no longer repr es.ent s a I hr eal on this Italian hillside

160

Chapter 11: Ca m pai g ning in Italy

Chu rchill. on the mo ve alo ng an Itali an r oad . Freed om of m ovemenllike fh i. was the exce ption rath er than the ru le in Italy.

and reacted to each problem as it occurred. Simcox record s that at one point he enco untered uncut ene my wire . which he knew the Church ills had been ordere d to flatten . He and his troop sergeant started 10deal with it when a troop of ChurchiUs appeared, from a totatly unexpected direction, trailing masses of barbed wire behind them and endangering their own troops. The Snerman s were used to tea r the wire off the Church ills and then followed them on 10 the enemy positions . The action resolved itself into a static fire fight , with Britis h and German tanks simply slogging It out. gun for gun , but a dug- in Panther turret was dOing most of the damage until It was taken out by the Comma nding Officer's Churchill. Dunng the action Sunc ox was called upon to deal With an enemy gun posmon wh ich was troubling the Can adians . He found difficulty In manoeu vnng his Sherman into a suitable posmon and remarks at one point that It wou ld have been easier with a Churchi ll, However in the end he is attacked by a hand held ann-tank weapon and decides to finish off the German posmon on foot, with his Tommy gun . After repeated visits to the German dug -out he killed or captured all of the occupants and was subsequently awarded the Military Cross

The 142 RAC took a particular hammering on the Hitler Line, They had actually taken part in preliminary opera tions on 16 May and B Squad ron reported that their Church ills worked well with the infantry. However one tank was lost when, bumping over a ridge , the commande r's head set fell off and , unable to communicate with his driver he was unable to stop him be fore the tank got bogged down . During operati ons on the 17'" C Squadron lost four tanks to German Faustpatr one ann-tank weap ons . On the Hitler Line , on the 22 ncl , C Squadron had seve n Cnu rctulls damaged by mines, three disabled with track troub le, lour Shermans mined and two more halted with electrical problem s. With Ihe Hrtter Line finally subdued and the two Churchill brigades bec om ing firmly establ ished as part of the army in Italy there was a distin ct swing in favour of the infantry tanks DUring their lime at Lucera in June 145 RAC personnel were told . "Fonowmq the recent operanons in which Churchill tanks have take n part . and the success gained , it is clear that the Chu rchill has made Its name. and higher authonty are now fully in favour of the tank and ItS capabihnes". QUItewho this meaningless message wa s mean t to impress is unclear but

161

Mr Churchill's Tank : The British Infantry Tank Mark IV

the ave rage Ch urchill crew man wou ld probabl y interpret it as sayi ng ' you are about to be sen t Into acno n in a selec tio n of obsol ete old tanks with inadeq uate guns but. never mind . your supenors have every faith in you r abili ty to ach ieve re sults anyway ". By rmd-June 142 RAC had formed a co mposite squa dron 01 Its Shermans whi le its Cnurctnus were kept out 01 action . This may hav e somethin g to do with mud . For e xample 51" RTR had reported roads so bad during that mont h that none of their tanks could be move d and a plan to send the Shermans up first had to be aband oned . But there were reports of mud causing ser ious dama ge to the Chur ch i1t s. It was heavy. glutinou s stuff which worked its way into the tracks and then got ca rried aro und beneath the track gua rds . Often bits of wood o r lump s of rock woul d get caug ht in it, an d there are instances on record of the mud sc raper, just ahead of the drive sprocket. being torn off . These foreign objec ts. lodged in the mud. co uld literally rip segments of the track s guards off or at least bulge them 10 the point where they jammed up aqamst the turret ring . Atte mpts were made to imp rove matters by altering the arrangement of the skid ra ils benea th the top run of the tracks but the preferr ed optron was to take off part of the trac k gua rd, especi a lly the bit either side of the turret. and operate the tank witho ut It.

The kind of interes ting deta il which can be gleaned by care ful study of the req.mentat war dia ries is typified by entries in the docum ent compiled by 145RA C at this lime . In July they announced thattheir headquarters squadron would compnse one Mark IV Churchill fined with two Number 19 (lank to tan k) and one Number 18 radio set s; a Ma rk V Churchill with one Numbe r 19. one Number 18 and a Number 38 (Infa ntry) set along with two Ma rk I close support tank s each with one Number 19 set. Dunng a long move by tank tran sport e rs in Aug ust one rig slipped off the road on a corner an d a Churchill rolled off, crushi ng two members of ItS crew. But it is a comme nt entered on 10A ugust that probably sums up the reality of good tank warfa re. The regimen t is to be ready for battle by the 12'hand wh ile making his notes the adju tant rema rks; "it's the ltttte thing s that count ... all hatches a nd pistol ports working efficiently , guns and WfT (radio) In perfect working orde r, all spares present and stowe d by the bo ok , a ll a mmuni tion c hec ke d a nd rechecke d fo r loose ro unds". On 11 Aug ust six of the reqmen t's Churctuus were filled wil h frame s to ca rry Iascmes Th e first action involving 12'" RTR was in support 01 the Canadians on the Argilla River. Th ings did not go according la plan and a composite squadron , which had made the crossmq. had to be supported as It withdrew by three troop s 01

A Mark IV Ch urch il l 0 1C Sq uad ro n, Nort h Irish Ho rse o n Ihe approac he s 10 th e Hitl er Li ne . The ins tructio n no t to be s to wed on dec k suggests Ih at it has o nly rec entl y arrived but the damag ed remain s 01 the tr ack gua rd s sug gests so me hard u sag e.

16 2

Cha pter 11: Campaigning in ttoiv

tanks. presumably Church Ills and Sne rmans. along with a troop of Ml 0 tank dest royers . Although basically Royal Artillery weapons . and therefore more properl y descr ibed as batteries rather than troops , the re is a lot of evidence of Ml 0s operating closely with tank regime nts on certai n occasio ns when their greater anti-tank hrepower would have been welcome . A cuneus entry in the 48'" RTR War Diary for about ttustime reters to tanks by code names ; She rmans are Spiders. Ml0s MOSQUItos and Cnurctuus are Beetles Early September 1944 found the Allies up agains t another tcr rmdabte German posmon known as the Gothic Line A subsequent acnon. involving A Squadron 142 RAC is well documented . The squadron comprised three troo ps 01 6pounder Chur ctuus. two troops 01She -mans and a Headquarters Troop of four NA75 Churctuus with 75mm Sherman guns . The Objective was a German posmon on Monte Colombo and the tanks were to support the 2/5'" Banabon. the Leicestershire Regiment of 46'" Infantry Division . As usual . in the Italian campaign. It was the Infantry that led the way. mov ing forwa rd at 0700 hou rs on 14 September, touoweo by two troops of Ct turctnus With the third troop and the two Sherman troops in support The leading troop s lost three Cbu rctuns almost at once : one bellied in soft ground . another rolled over in a ditch and a third lost a track . The three remaining tanks now com bined and. With the Snerman s firing in support , soon had their inlant ry onto a ridge about half way to the objective . Here they were seen by enemy observation pos ts on Monte Colo mbo and soon came under heavy fire. Further progress was made . but only With the greatest difficul ty. Only three tanks could manage to occupy hnng positions at anyone time and soon

they were virtually trapped . One . indeed . had its track broken by enemy li re and It took the crew two hours. working under intense shellfire, to replace ten track plates. The objective was taken after some htteen hours difficult lighting but It is interes tmq, in the summary , to learn that the squadron oftrcers believed "thatthe chances of success would have been considerably lessened If they had had Snermans only". Which at teast is a modes t complimen t to the Chu rchill. The same regiment repo rted that in the October fighting they encountered many more Panther turrets , which they left It to the artillery to deal With. They even repo rted an emplaced Tiger turret but were unable to conflrm it. Meanwhile 145 RAC report , in the wake of their Goth ic Line actions . that from 17 September to 9 October their tanks averaged 60 miles on their tracks and only reported one engine failure . but whethe r this was a Churchill or Sherman is not recorded . This regiment also operated a Panther tank , named Deserter , which was captu red by the Seatcrtn Highlanders of Canada who presented It to the regiment. It served With C Squadro n but they soon discovered tha t the tank was too wide to use British Bailey Bridges, which rather hampe red its usefulness. A trial mvolvmq Churchill tanks that was earned out at Riccione on 4/5 October 1944 revealed the range of ammunmon now available to British tank gunners . Two targets were provided . One was a 12 foot squa re canvas screen. the other a rather battered old Tiger tank that had been dragged down to the beach which became the trial range. This Tiger was without its gun or manttet and, having been burned out there was some doubt as to the hardness of its armour. At least three tanks were used . A Mark IV with a long (Mark V) 6pounder fitted with Iree elevatio n; anothe r Mark IV with the

Chu rc hills 0151· RTR forming up in line abreast du ring fighting on the Gothic Line . Noti ce how. as in north we st Europe. camouflage is part icu larly appli ed 10 the tur ret

163

Mc Churchill's Tank: The British Infantr y Tan k Mark IV

An oth er vie w 015 1" RTR o n the Gothic Lin e w ith a Daim ler Ding o sco ut car in th e imm edi ate for eground. The tank s are we lt di sper sed , sug gest · ing a thr eat 01air att ac k, but it alt look s peacetul enoug h .

Tank s as art ille ry. Fi ve Chur ch ill NA 75s and o ne wit h a Briti sh 75mm tirin g a co nc entrated barrag e 01 high explosi ve.

164

Ch apter 11: Ca mpaigning in Ita ly

shorter Mark III gun with geared elevation and a Mark IV NA75 with the American 75mm weapon . Ranges . on average , were about 650 yards. which would have been very dangero us if the Tiger still had its gun and an aggressive crew The only round that actually penetra ted the 102mm front plate was trom the long 6-pounder firing Sabot. The othe rs did little more than scratch the armo ur. The 75mm high e xplosive round chipped away chunks of armo ur where it hit. but the charge within the shell did no damage at all. A Sabo t round fired from the short 6-pounder also went through the frontal armour. Firing at the canvas screen revealed that Sabot ammunit ion was not as accurate as APCBC and tended to strike about two or three feet higher up the target . Among the rounds tried was e-counoer APCBC. APHV (Armour Piercing High Velocity), AP Discard ing Sabo t and for the 75mm just M61 High Explosive shells An interesting action carried out over the period 24 October to 9 November 1944 involved 51"' RTR supporting British 1O" Infantry Brigade . The object was to cross the river Bonco. establish a bridgehead on the other side and then cap ture the enemy airfield at Forti. Despite the fact that the infan try and tank men knew one another so well that they were all said to be on first name terms, the initial stage seems to have been a bit of a mess. The infantry waded the river and set up a defended perimeter but, when the tanks tried to find a crossing. the bank proved so high they reckoned a Sherman dozer tank would be needed to prepare a route . Why this had not been done before the infantry moved off is not explai ned However another young office r believed he had found a suitable cros smq place about 1.000 yards up river, It would not be ideal. It meant that . having crossed the river the tanks would still hav e to fight their way down the far bank to meet up With the infantry Even so It was decided to use this route and a troop from C Squadron moved off at first light. One tank was disabled on a mine before It reached the river and . whe n Lieutenant Neill's tank took the plunge it was immediately hit in the turret by an enemy anti-tank round . All of the turret crew died at once and the co-driver was wounded but. worse still, the crossing was now blocked . Then the river rose, no more tanks could get acros s and the infantry, under heavy counter attack. had to be pulled back . By watchi ng the aba ndoned Churchill in the river the troops were able to moni tor the water level. When it started to go down a new assault was planned. In an attempt to gauge the level of opposition it is said that the infantry brigade commander went down to the river bank and waved a wh ite handk erchief. Since the enemy took no notice they came to the conclusion that the oppos ite bank was not now well defended This natve piece of reconnaissance seemed to work since the tanks and infantry crossed the Ronco without opposition, although one tank got stuck . Meanw hile the Germans shelled another pote ntial crossing point further north . The next day, however, the infantry ran into oppositio n which the tanks sorted out and then plans were laid to hit the airfield . This was known to be well defended and each tanks was given an extra load

local s smil e and app laud as an unid entified Churchill Mark IV lead s a co n voy of Am erican tru ck s th roug h a liberated Ita lian tow n .

of stores , including ammunition , grenades and spare radio batte ries for the infantry . There was a lot of artillery fire about and the crews had to live inside their tanks . B Squadron was earmarked for the direct attack on the airfield and their crews were brewing break fast inside their tanks at 03 15 in the morning, Church ills from two troops moved forward while the third remained in reserve . Two of the tank s were towing 2-pounder anti-tank guns for the infantry They sat on the start line until signals from a flare pistol announced that the infan try were in possession of some buildings on the far side , Now the tanks rolled across the airfield . met up with the infantry and dropped off the anti-tank guns . The tanks now began systematically shelling the buildings and they had soon collected a good crowd of prisoners, The little anti -tank guns succumbed to artillery fire very early on. and one is left to wonder what anyone hoped to achieve with this pre-war weapon on a 1944 battlefield with Tigers and Panthers roaming about. By the end of the action nine enemy troops had been killed and 27 captu red . The attacking force suffered no casualties at all Meanwhile A Squadron advanced on the left of the airfield . They record one unusual incident when a troop sergea nt's Churchi ll was in action. The breec h block being opened to accept a new round a piece of shrapnel came down the barrel , into the turret and into the sergeant's arm. By 6 November A Squadron had been living in their tanks continu ously for thirteen days , The men were exhausted and it was essen tial to relieve them . However any attempt to move the tanks out was likely to attract enemy attention so it was decided that crews from C Squadron should go up on foot and change over with the A Squadron men . This caused a great deal of anguish . Despite their weariness the crews were very reluc tant indeed to hand over their tanks to strangers . even thoug h they were men from the same regiment The summary of this action reveals that over the fifteen day period five Church ills suffere d ignition problems from the rain . three were mined , seven suffered minor mechanical

165

Mr Churchill's Ionk: The Bn!lSh Infa ntry Tan k Mark. IV

Some Mar k VII Chu rchills arrived in ttaly towards the en d 01 th e war . This one demonstrates its abihly to climb ov er a 5herman Oc lo pus ARK

faults and three of the 75mm tank s were rendere d unse rvice ab le due to spla sh . We know that when Morrell modi fied the Chur chill IV turret he poi nted out the advantage of f," lOg an exte rnal mantle t. One is the relore su rpnsed to learn Ihat the turret could suffe r from bullet splash to the exte nt that it was Impossible to ope rate. Since no furthe r e xplan ation is give n , and since the same complaint is not report ed on conve ntiona l Ma rk IVs, one assu mes that splash affected the gun mo unting (but if so why not on the She rman'i) o r possibly the sights As 1944 came to an end there were changes in the air for the two tank brigades . The 25'~ was to be disbande d and there would be changes to the regiments . Both 142 and 145 RAC were due to be disbanded but, before they went , they ten a few usefu l details in their war diaries . Sta ring with 142 RAC they note that ea rly in November 1944 three 01 their clo se suppo rt tanks (presumably Mark Is) were sent to base workshops for conversio n toA RKs. The se were the turretless ramp tank s used for fllhng ditche s and fordmg fivers . The close support tank s were replaced by 95mm Mar k Vs and they a lso added lour Ch urchill AR Ks to then establi shment. It is inte resting to note that the regiment did not believe in the idea 01 Royal Engineer s ope rating these specialis ed tanks . In their view the Sapper s co uld never be tru sted to turn up where they were needed. when they were needed and preferred the idea 01 managi ng thei r own specialised armo ur. By De cemb er, in addi tion to M3A 3 and M5A 1 Stuart tanks, M4A 1 Snerman s and one rema ining Churchill Mark I. the regiment had nine Churchill fascine car riers, three Mark I and six Mark IV ARKs and thirteen NA 75 Churc hills . It had also been ptay-

Ing with Chur chi ll Crocodil e uame throwe rs but. all this useful expene nce notw ithstanding It was disb anded in Jan uary 1945 Much the same can be said tor 145 RAC . Early In Nove mber they ca rried out tests using Ch urctuns in the indirect hre ro le. On the 11'" the ir captur ed Pant her went Into acnon for the first time , shelling an enemy obse rvation post m an occup ied village. Un fortunately the Pan the r' s gun ner drsmoun ted at one poin t and trod on a Schu-mme. as a result of which he died . Du ring a shoot on 14 November two 95mm Cnurctutls. act ing in suppo rt of Infantry, managed to hit selected hous es at ranges up to 5,000 yards and they were firing an average 200 round s per day . During one patrol at this time an enem y telephone was found still mtact. but nobody an swered when they tried to make con tact . Tow ards the end of November there was a change to the squadron o rgan isation. It was now based upon two 95mm Churchill V. two Sherman . six Ch urch ill Ill /IV an d two troops (Sill tanks ) wh ich were either She-m an s. Churchill NA 75s or Ma rk VIIs Although disbandm e nt was announced on 1 Decembe r the regim ent continued to recei ve Mark VII Cnurctuttsto replace the Snerma ns and on the 22"" they carrie d out a tnatto cornpar e the perfo rmance 01a Ch urchill. Panthe r. and a Sherman With end co nnectors fitted 10 ItS tracks. ov er solt ground Unlortunately the resu lts of this tnal wer e not recorded DISbandment was complete by 17 Jan uary 1945 While this was going on 5 1" RTR was Withdrawn 10 emerge in an ent irely diffe rent te rm . Shortly after the action at Forf it starts testing Crocodil es and from December It was In the process of conv erting to an a rmoured engine er regi-

166

Chapter 11: Campaigning in Italy

ment with two squadrons of Crocodiles and one of Sherman Crab flail tanks. It remained active on the Italian front until the end of the war but now as part of a combined Royal Armoured Corps/Royal Engineers armoured engineer brigade. Meanwhile 2 1.1 Army Tank Brigade was reformed with 12111 RTR as the senior regiment, followed by North Irish Horse and 48th RTR. We shall concent rate on the senior regiment for this last phase. since it has no othe r published history. Going back to September 1944 it is interesting to note that the war diary lists six Mark I Churchills, 23 Marks Ill/IV, six Mark V and six NA75. These were suppo rted by twelve Shermans, eleven Stuarts and ten scout cars . In December there are references to a 75mm troop of A Squadron enjoying a shoot against a church tower west of the River Lamone, which was thought to be an enemy observation post. The tower was duly destroyed. On anothe r occasion a troop of 95mm equipped tanks carries out harassing fire against enemy positions with the aid of an airborne observation post, which is an unusual practice for tanks. In January 1945 there are many more references to indirect shoots as, for instance, during the attack out of Granarolo against enemy position on the east bank of the river Senio. Two 95mm Churc hills from Headqu arters Troop , supplemented by two troops of 95mm Churchills and one troop of 75mm Shermans act as artillery, in support of an infantry at-

tack. In February B Squadron try something even more exotic, indirect fire with BESA machine-guns firing tracerfess amm unition. In this case no comment can be found to explain whether it worked or not. At the end of March three Shermans of B Squadron are replaced by one Churchill NA75 and two Mark VIIs, the British 75mm version of A22 now starting to arrive in the Italian theatre. In April, as part of Operation Buckland C Squadron, now apparently equipped with Crocodile f1amethrowers, along with the Crocodiles of 51"1RTR and some Wasp flamethrowers based on Universal Carriers, set up a mass flame attack against the German bank of the river. The attack his highly successf ul and the infantry roll into action in Kangaroo personnel carriers of the 4111 Hussars. On 20 April the regiment takes part in a rapid advance that cuts through a mass of German armour. The war diary describes how Panzer IV tanks crossing a field 'ceased to exist as Panzer IVs after concentrated fire from three troops of Cnurctuus'. In all 20 enemy tanks were destroyed by the combined effects of tank gunfire, artillery and cabrank fighter bombers. On the following day one Churchill is hit three times by Faustpatrone rounds without recording any damage or casualties. Right up to the end the Churchill was maintaining its reputation as a tough fighter.

16 7

12

The Last Battles

Meanwh ile in northe rn Europ e great thi ngs were happ ening. Even before the atta ck on Le Havre began British troops had liberated Brussels (3'