Modern Psychotherapies: A Comprehensive Christian Appraisal

Acknowledgments

7

Introduction

9

I The

17

2 A Christian View of Pe r sons

19

TheDynamic Psychologies

63

3 Classic Psychoanalysis

65

4 Contemporary Psychodyna written with Mic/wel l-'! Mongis 5.1ungi

The Behavioral Psychologies

92 119 14J

6 Beba\�or Therapy

145

7 Rational Emotive Therapy

17J

8 Cognitive-Behavioral Ther",py

196

9 Adlerian and RealityTherapies

226

The Humanistic Psychologies

251

10 Person-Centered Therapy

255

II Existential Therapy

278

12 GestaJt Therapy

]0]

1STransactionaJ Anays l is

12 4

The Family S�mPsychologies

147

14 FamilyTherapy

149

Toward I:hrisl;an Psychologies

177

15 Responsible Eclecticism

179

1 6 Christian PsychotherAPY

401

Subject Index

419

AuthQr Index

422

Acknowledgments

Rcfonned Christian thinkers oftcn assert that in pursuing truth, we attempt to Mthink God's tJlOughts after him,�We cannot be so con6dent to claim that ....e. are presenting �God's LhoughlS� in this book, but it has been exciting to pursue thai goal in this project. Nt we wrOte. we were acutely aware of those who have been mentors to us in some fonn or another along the paths of our development. In somc sense, much of what might be good in all that follows is due to their influence-we have been thinking Mtheir thoughts� as ....'ell as God's thoughts. What is inadcquate in what follo.... s. is due to our own weaknesses. Our thanks go out in a special way to C. Stephen Evans and Alan Tjelt¥cit, who rcad thc firs! draft of this manuscript in its entirety, in very rough shape. TIlcir suggestions were al­ even though it .... as . W"dYS helpful, thoughtful and honest, and their insights have signifi­ can tly advanced our thinking and so made this a better book, We are dt..-eply thankful for the help offered by Michael Mangis of Wheaton College, who did the initial draft of chapter four (Contem­ poraJ1 ' Psychodynamic Psychotherapies) for us. We ....ere . out of our depths on many areas of current psychodynamic thinking, and hi! expertise in this arca is outstanding. Dennis Okhohn, Frances]. White, Siang Yang Tan, Robert Roberts, H. Ne...0 .-1 n Malon) Kirk FarnS\'.'Onh, Don Bosch, Drew Loi7.eaux, Brian Van Dragt and Jon Petel1lOn contribUled subscmtially to our work by olIering critiques of indi"Kluai chapten> at various stages of develop­ ment. We are indebted to many of our colleagues at Wheaton College who make wat in$tinllioll a rich place to think and \-.,!ork. We wish to thank Mid\ael Maudlin, our first editor at InterVarsit}' Press, ....hose . initial emhusiasm and encouragement meant a lot. Finally, we thank our pri.ncip...,J ilorophu.u _mp"""

We begin with the \·itally important taSk of looking carefully at the philosophical assumptions or presuppositions thal undergird an ap­ proach to counseling. Ideas about human character and personality do not arise in a philosophical vacuum. As Browning (1987, p. 95) has said, �the modem psychologies function within larger contexts of meaning about the WAy the world is." The approaches we will examine vary widely in terms of how explicitly the influence of philosophical 'aSSumptions arc acknowledged. Behavior modifica­ tion has been an easy target for Christian critique over the years because Skinner has been so transparent about his assumptions (see chapter six). The originators of some other approaches have not been so explicit, resulung in the need for careful work in unearthing their presuppositions.

'our colleague al Wheawn, Robert C. Robo:ru, ha$ d, 1987) ha'l

argued forwhalhe call, the "Vil'Ulel aPPTl)a(h 10 inu'gr.nion.-He Il:u'U me examination

of an approach to psychotherapy by looking al (he >irtu"el 10

(1IIti\...le. This it sintilar 10 our criterion of a mooers \ision of ideal humanfl� or

wholeness. Koheru argues in (Urn Ihat each vinue ;s emboedded ;n a 1lS)"" chology, ele.) from a Christian pcl'5ptttivc. Essential reading. Woltcrstorff, N.

(1984).

RtaJn, but went beyond, scriptural n!\'elation in order to develop guidelines for pastor­ al care. In doing lhis, Christian pastoral thinkers ha\'e frequently turned to contemporary nonreligious5(;holarship about dimensions of personhood to construct more completc models of ministry (Clebsch

1975; Oden, 1984). While some secm to regard this as heresy (e.g., Adams. 1979), as discussed in the previous chapter, we and Jaekle,

reg-Md this as a strength as long as the distinctives of the Christian faith are preserved and g1\'en prexminence.

But if we are not searching for a personality theory, what n i the Scriptures is it reasonable to expect to lind? In brief, we believe that our foray into theological and biblical anthropology will give us the essenUai foundation for a more true and more complete undentand­ ing of persons by giving

Wi

"control belief.s� (Woherstorff,

1984) or

presuppositions. These Control beliefs are the Mgivens,M the assump­ tions that conlrOl or shape all other thought. We can then use the� control beliefs to build a theory of personality ,,-jlh greater Christian distincth·eness.

Before embarking on this task, ....·e would endorse a number ofbasic

hermeneutical prinCiples (from Greidanus,

1982) that undergird or­

thodox biblical interpretation. First. since God is the Creator, !.here can be no ultimate conflict between knowledge from special revelation (what the Bible says) and creation (also known as Mgeneral revelation, � what nature sal's). There can and often ha! been, however, conflict bel\\'een interpretations of 5pecial re\'elation and interpretations about the

facts of the created

41

order. In such cases of conflict. !.he interpretation of either special or general !"e'.,elation can be wrong. or possibly both. Second, �the Bible is the Word of God addressed to the hean of man6 (Greidanus, 1982, p. 140). Hence a sincere submission to the Lord who speaks through the Scriptures and s i revealed n i them enables us to see reality, howC!\'er imperfectl)" from God's perspective, the ani)' proper perspective. Special revelation is sptcial. and that is why Calvin suggested that the Scriptures can function as spectacles that correct our vision of God's creation when sin has distorted our under­ standing. Third, the Bible is a historical book written first ofall to a panicular people in thcircuhure at a cenain time, answering their questions and meeting their needs. Thus the biblical message to us today cannot be understood properly without understanding lits historical and cultural context. With a proper app�ciation of these factors, we can conrl­ denlly expect that wc will hear God's voice speak to us !hrough his words to ancient peoples. Fourth, the Bible was written in nonscientific, cvcryday language that somctimes used (or assumed) commonly held �scienti£ic� con­ cept
ogy.

Similarly, many of !he verses often cited as teaching formal p!>)'cho­ logical conceptOttmia.llyambiguow.. At thc mosl relilrictive Ic>-.:I, they refer 10 a dassiotl ordilllinclivcly

f"reudioln approach to psychologlcal n:scarch, stlldy orU'calmcnc.Atasomewhatbroadcr Ic\"t';\. they ruer 10 specific modeb of �na.lity, psychopathology or psychothen.py. At the broadest \ael, they an refcr to a (omprehenJivl, and wel1-articulatl!d wurldview (el.

Van ucuwen, 19&)). Indeal, itls at this fimo! �I, ofu:n rcfcrred. 10 ...,a mel3P5}"t:hology, that "'-': "',lOt 10 focu5 much of 0Uf' allcnoon. We will telC'O'e the word ps,dIodJMrIIit. which isusuallyalso Iued in n:fc:rcnc:e to p5)'Choanal)�l, 10 ref"eronly to the post.Freudian approaches WI:will dhclU$ In (tapitt four.

67

Q...uSJCPSI·CJ/OA.'IlI!LYS/S

is to illuminate critical life events in the formati" e childhood years in order to resolve the �problems in li\;ng" that emerge throughout the remainder of the life span. Only through greater self-knowledge and self'elops as an individual interacts with the external ...."(ITld. The ego is largely conscious and serves a vital role in mediating the primitive urges afthe id with the constraints or opportunities of reality. Finally, the w.fJe"go places restrictive demands on both the id and lhe ego. It is generally understood as a split�(f from the ego and as the repository of the moralistic standards one has absorbed from "significant others," most often parents and society. Often seen

a5

a kind of �conscience.R the

superego s i assumed to be only partially com-cious. Finally. the

tt{m

omu: (U$umptitm asse rts that human personality can

best be understood as a closed or quasi-hydraulic S}'Slem. In other

i introduced imo the S}'stem in the words. a certain amount of energy s

i energy must be released, ways must form of the basic drives. Since ths

be found to disperse it in a direct or transformed manner, This s i "economic" in the sense that energy is neither gained nor lost; the bank account alwclYS balance�, The goal of psychoanalytic lteatmenl is to develop the capacity for the release of energy in SOCially acceptable and

i understood a.s disper­ appropriate ways. In contrast, psychopathology s sion of energy without regard to the constraints of reality or external

social norms (e.g., psychotic regression). For Freud. consciousnes..dge until he has previously contem­ plated the face of God and come down after such contemplation to look into himself. lives and moves.

.

.

.

,

A final fear relates to aUf concern about the ultimate direction of the maturation process in psychoanalysis. As Christians, we must continu­ ally remind ourselves that our ultimate salvation comes from without, not from within. There is the distinct danger in psychoanalysis of a kind of gnosticism where self-knowledge is seen as a means (0 self-sah�dtion (cf. Vitt, 1987, p. 73). Specifically, the cultivation and expression ohhe Christian virtues (Roberts, 1982. 1984) should be seen as the apex of sanCtification for the committed believer, not self-alo'!-areness and in­ sight. The search for psychological wholeness ought not to replace our desire

(0

know God or pursue authentic holiness.

A wonderfully helpful example of how concerned and committed Christian theoreticians can correct some of these inadequacies can be found in two articles by Vitz and Gartner ( J984a. 1984b). At r.he core of the Freudian clitique ofChristianity is the assertion that unresolved Oedipal issues are found.-uional in the formation of one's superego (e.g.. lhe son tries to lake over the role of lhe father) . In contrast, a more theologically infomled understanding of tbe sacrificial love of the Son for the Father and how the obedienl death of the Son brings ultimale redemption, can iUusU-dle how we life of Jesus becomes a needed corrective for the unresolved issues of the "unredeemed self'

8J

caught in unresolved Oedipal tensions. In short,Jesus sen'es as a kind of "anti-Oedipus" who finds life by obediently doing his Father's will rather than trying to destroy the Father. Part afme "good new!� afthe gospel, then, is the potential power thai comes when the perpetual fear and self-hatred of the Father due to the Oedipal crisis can be replaced by a thorough transformation of the mind through conversion and Christian commitment. The "un�deemed self" studied by Freud can be changed into a "redeemed self' in Christ through the mystery of belief in the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection ofJesus. Modd of A/momvJ ; ty The psychoanalytic approach speak.s deeply and meaningfully to the origins and functions of symptoms. It seems foolish to dislegard the impact ofcritical life events in the fonnative years or to neglect the role of the ego defense mechanisms in the etiology and maintenance of l y follow "problems in living. � On the other hand, it does nOt necessari that one must dwell exclwive1yon these matters in order to help clients make sense of the rOOL5 of their difficulties. Psychoanalysis contends that the root ofmuch of our psychopathol­ ogycan be found in aberrant psychosexual deveiopmenL In particular. aggressh'e or sexual impulses are major det�rminants of our neurotic tendencies. This is not consistent with the thrust of Scripture. where our own drive to be autonomous and godlike (i.e., pride) is seen as a more basic sotln.:e ofmaladjusunent and sin �Narramore, 1985. p. 9(0). Sexual impulses are troublesome but have become so because of our rebeliion ag-diost God. The Freudian tradition is prone to reductionistic interpretations of the etiolog)' and maintenance of symptoms. This is inconsistent with the thrust of contemporary thought in the human sciences, where etiology is more accurately seen as a function of multiple factors for almost all disorders. Despite iL5 strong emphasis on the biological and instinctual bases for beha\;ors, Freudian thought has \'ery little to say about more re
101 can bcrome distoned in many Wd)'S. One common example is an inability to �own· or experience as part of oursch-es those aspects that our parents found unacceptable, as when a parent rejects a child when she is needy. This may resull in a fragmented psychology wherein the Mbad" parts are "split off" ITom the acceptable parts, and the person's sense ora coherent identity is damaged. Freud essentially di\;ded psychopathology into two categories, neu­ rosis and psychosis. Psychosis, the inability orthe ego 10 interact with the reality of the external �'Orld. was seen as largely untreatable

through traditional psychoanalysis. Neurosis, however, reflected unre­ soh'cd conflicts from the Oians and psycho­ may providc fcrti dynamically oriented clin icians. Specifically, grcatcr awareness and understanding of the nature of sinful behavior may aid in more effective (albeit limited) interventions that address it. Obviously, human beings in and of themselves are pov.·erless LO ameliorate either the ultimate causes or efTens of sin. But thex can serve an impormnl and vital role a.� being agents of ..econciliatio� and renewal in human relationships. Discllssions conccrning moral accountability inevitably raise phi l {)o sophical questions as to the ex.istencc of free will. On first glance, contcmporary psychodynamic thought, in abandoning or altering the emphasis on biological instincts and dri\'cs, appears to ha\'C rejected the accompanying assumptions ofdctcnninism . In an apparent rejec­ tion of dcterminism, Cunu'ip

( 1 969, pp. 330-331) states that:

We havc non-dynamic behaviour theonesdescribing human beings asjust rcperLOircs of behaviour panems 10 be treated by techniques of reconditioning. . . O .. er and against this is the dynamic psychol­ .

ogy of the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic schools, standing for man's basic freedom and right not to be manipulated, bUlIO be supportcd till he can find his own proper mature sellhood. While proponents of the relational model may seem 10 have wholly accepted the concept of free will, it is more likely that most have, n i Evans's

( 1984, 1989) terms, rejected a �hard" detenninism. which

acknowledges the incompatibility of psychological causation and human freedom, for a "soft" dctenninistll. which simply redefines freedom lO make it secminglycompatible with psychological determin­ s i m. In both cases, imemal forces exert powerful influcnces on our thoughts, feelings and behaviors. But lhe relational models are much more amenable to a "libertar­ ian" perspective on personal responsibility than is classic analysis. Evans

(1984) has. ill fact, argued forcefully that contemporary psychody­ namic theory really has no need to retain the deterministic assumption of psychoanalysis. Eliminating thaI assumption would eradicate a stum­ bling block for Christian utilization of this approach. He argues that these approaches arc quite compatible \\1'CIIOTlIFJM.PI£S

ith a true relationship. It seems plausible, after all. religious impulses .... that our illlag� of God could be distorted by our el'periences \";th fallen people. l..'Spccially parents, in a fallen world. The slope can be quite slippery from that point. howe\'cr. Having �psychologizcd� our experience of God, it ilIay then .seem logical to conclude that what Chfistians often interpret as their experience of God is actually the work of the

unconsciOllS,

and

so,

perhaps, we should worship the

"God-image- in all of us. To counter this, more accurate conceplS of the Creator-God must be shaped in the context of Christiall worship. education, fellowship and service. We need the inpUl of these external sources for corrcctive feedback ag-dinst ollr subj«ti\·e and

projective

tendencies. TIle .seductiveness of these arguments does not invalidatc the possible helpfulness of the object-relations theories. Knowledge of early development may truly n i fonn us about distortions in our images of God; ths i knowledge could serve LO lead us

LO a

truer and more

intinrille relationship with God and others, JUSt as undemanding how our spouse is in reality quilC different from our internalized image of -r..lommy- or "Daddy- can aid the matur.uion of our marriages. It can take on an important role in therapy, especially .....hen .....e k. now that in

Christ ....e . have a current.

....o-\\o'ay t .. relationship with a li\ing, objectivc

God both through the Word in us and the written Word, �Iiving and active, [sJharper than any double-edged sword- (Heb 4: 12). The relational model ofcontempOl-ary psrchodynamic psychology may also provide helpful

insights into ho....' our image of God can gro.....

and become more healthy as our capacity for relationships goes through its necessary healing and maturing process. We ....ould . note in dosing thai this notion of the God-image being profoundly shaped by parental images has been subjected to careful empirical assessment. Spilka. Hood and Gorsuch

(1985, p. 81) summa­

rize the rcsulu of lhis research by slating thallhe complex.it)' and the subtlety of the hypothesis, and the difficult and challenging measure­ ment issues involved. make this a very complicated question indeed. The existing data provide some modest support for lhe projecli\'e hypothesis, suggesting mild simi l arity in concepts of God and concepts of the satne-sex or most-liked parent..

Theory ofHraltJr

According to psychodynamic thco,)"

the mature individual \'3.iues

relationships and can maint."lin a commiunenl to them. even when the

,

,

112 other person is nOt presem. Such malUrity requires a v.tluing of self since our perceptions of others arc highly dependent on our intemal representation of self. This notion is cenainly in accord with the commandment to �Io\'e your neighbor as yourselr"

eMt 22:39), It s i

• • ' of God, that this is the significant. in light of the object-relations vie'

second greatest commandment. Jesus said

tJlal it

....-as

like the greatest

commandment to �lo\'e the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul

and with all your mind�

(MI 22:37), Our greatest com­

mandment, to lo\'e God, places love of self and other second, an impossibility if self and other arc real while God is only an illl cmal representation. Perhaps lhe primary point should be, though. tbatlovc is central lO what God wants in

liS

when we are fully human. and it is

to their credit lhal these models pUl lhe kind ofinterpersonal bonding that might be called �at the very center of their model ofnonnalc)'. TIle psychodynamic S}'5tem. like all psychotherapy !o)'Slems, COntains an implicit ethical system embedded in its

understanding of normalcy.

Altruism and mUtual dependence arevalued within the contexts ofdose, especially famity, relationships, bm self-sacrifice, giving to the point of

allowing pain to be infliCled on the :self, would not be highlyvalued. The

hidden ethical vision of this tr,ldition �is that one has a moral obligation to do that which deep dO\\TI one wants to do. Or to say it differendy, it is morally justifiable to do what one is inclined to do because what one is inclined to do is also mOr".u� (Browning,

1987, p. 225).

Bec,lusc of our relational natures. we are n i clined to care for those

do:se to us because the)' care for US and nUr!ure us. This view direcuy parallels thaI of classic psychoanalysis. Thus a self-sacrificial act would generally be ulought of as a self-induced punishmcnI for irrational guih or the resuh of an inaccurate view thai others are more wonhy of lo\'e Ihan oneself. While this is probably often tnle (e.g., the self-sryled Christian �doormat"). this model has little place for the reality of Christ's unilateral sacrifice and our commandment to model ourselves after his example (CL Smedes,

1988). Since contemporary psychody­

namic psychology is agnostic regarding the existence of reality or truth outside of this temporal world. it cannot allow for choices or value� which caJl for lhe sacrifice of Lhe needs of the self. It cannot envision a relaLionship wilh a real God thalcould cmpoweronc to make a truly self-sacrificial aCl. In calling for the importance of equal and trusting relationships, and in highly prizing inter-relatedness. howe"\'cr, it farcs decidedly better lhan some theoretical S}'stem� which seem to actively embf"dce

.

,

UJ,'-/G"}.(PORAHI'PSI'C } /OOtNA.MfCPSI'CJ101'IfF.RM'IJ-:S

113

narcissism alone (Browning, 1987, chap, 8), Its ethic is still partial and incomplete, but it is an imponam improvement.

Model afPrydtotherapy Benner (1983), Workman ( 1 988) and others have suggcsLCd provoca­ tive parallels between the process of psychodynamic psychotherapy and God's work of salvation and sanctification. Salvation and sanctifi­ cation, it is argued. might be loosely understood as the process bywhich in intimate relationship with God we gro..... by the pmcc1i.'i of God himM!lf. through Christ, taking upon himself our �badness. �Through Christ's death, Mhe is open to receive all our sin, able to cont."Lin anything we can project OIllO him. In this relationship, we are offered the opportunity to become whole pcrsonsM (Workman, 1988. p. 21), TheM! authors suggest this is an analog to the psychotherapy relation­ ship wherein the therapist acts as a human mediator who accepts, on behalf of God, the �bad introjects, � the Mpsychic split-offs. ft that the client must be rid of to become whole. This conception dot."S parallel our call to be "Christ's ambassadorsft (2 Cor 5:20-21). reconciling sinners ....ith God. TheM! authors do not wish to stretch these analogies tOO far, and we would agree with this caution, The analogies are fascinating, but the dangers of rendering God's work into a purely psychological framework and ofelevating the redempti\'e work of the therapist to a grandiose le\-el are great. The psychodynamic methods of therap), may also be criticized for their seeming lack of appreciation for methods for change olnn- than baving a curative relationship. The pastoral instruction of the New Testament gives a great deal of attention to remo..ing the character­ ological barriers to good relationships, We are to lay aside jealousy, envy, malice and so forth. But there is also ample biblical attention paid 10 other functions such as correcting our thinking, disciplined prayer and st!cking restoration of shaucH..d rdationships. In the psychody­ namic camp. such inten'entions are often reg-drded as trivial or neces­ sarily ineffectual. Further, these models are subtly humanistic in assuming that all will be well if the cliem ha.� one really good relation­ ship. The person will. as it were, be able to function autollomollsly through the direction of the ego once tlle bad internalized objects are straightened out. What is missing is all understanding of health that includes a long-term relationship ....ith a living God and an appreciation for anchoring sclfin commitments to the church and God's revelation of himself in the Bible.

/1 4 from a Christian perspective, the faith afme therJ.pist is important. though nOllhe only factor, in dCLCrmining effccth'cness in p�1'chother. apr. The world view of a Christian will. presumably, � substantially difTercn! from that of a non-Christian lherapist. A non-Christian ther­ ith a healthy capacity for relationships may do far morc good apist .... LO\\'afd the healing of the personality than an inunalure Christian therapist, and a mawre Christian therapist CQuid possibly lead a patient away from true Christlikeness. On the whole, howcvt'r, the greaten capacity for healing must cenainly come from a Christian therdpisl directed by the Holy Spirit. As people, and in a profound and sobering way as thcrnpists. we are imagers of Cod. The more that the therapist can be an accurate imager of God and therefore direct the individual to a greater capacity for relationship with Cod, the more healing will take place, A Christian object-relations thempist would, therefore, realize the importance of a relationship between the patient and God in which God actively participates. and therapy may be While the intimate connection between heory t

considered the strength of contemporary psychodynamic modds. those who aspire to a morc objC)'Stem that does not present many of the problems to the committed Christian psychotherapist that

cl assical analysis did.

These models are rclat.ional in nature, balance a cautious optimism with a deep appreciat.ion of our capacity for self-deception and ha\"C a subslantial (though secondary in emphasis) understanding of our rational capacities as humans. 'nle values imbedded ill the model are •

broadly compatible widl Christian vahlCS, though ofcouP.)(' there is not

a perfect match. The obsen'anl reader ....ill note that our criticisms ofthis modcl were not MdevasL.1.ting.� Rather, they took the form of cautions. We Ulink il filting that this is onc or UIC models thai mall)' Christian therapislS arc

embmcing: il holds much promise as a possible foundation for futurc

elabordlion of a thoroughly Christian understanding of human per­ sonality.

116

MOD£//.V1'Sl"CIfOTllEl/APl£S

for Further Reading Browning, O. (1987). Rrligiqw though/lind 1M modem. pS}chologi4 Philadelphia: Foro-l"M. Browning"s 5}'I1lpaliletic analysis of the potential cOIlU'ibution� of Kohut i his chapler eight is and Erikwn to a Christian undc:nmnding of pcrwns n i the mainline denominational a model of5Cholarl)· lhoroughnes.s, though n rather than evangelical tradition. Crabb, L (1988). iruidi out. Colorado Springs, CO: NavPrcu. A recent work thai rcflfiLS Crabb'! mo\'cment toward �ychodyllamic thought. Gn�enberg, J.. and Mitchell. S. (1983). ObjIct.rt!ltitioru in p.rychoano1ytic IMIry. Cambridge. MA: Hal"'''ard University PrCSii Perhaps the definitivc work in object-relations psychology to dale. Gunuip. H. ( 1971 ), PSJdlOanaJylic IMrJry, Ihcuf'J, and 1M ulj. New York: Basic Boo,,_ A readable general introduction to all of the psychod}llamic lI1odels. Lake, F. (1986). Cliniro/ lhrology (Edited and abridged by M. Yeomans). New

York: Crossroad. i U"oduction to thc fasdnating thought ofa dedicated A readablt: abridged n Chri5tian cxpounding a thoroughly p5}'chod)namic \;ew of the counscling process. Miller, A. (1981). 1"ht! drama ojthe giftt:d child. New York: Basic Books. A book accessible to the lay reader, applying psychodynamic psychology to the understanding of childhood experience. SL Clair. M. (1986). Oljtd rtlatiQ,u and sdfPIJcholctJJ: ."" jPltrodudUm. Monterey. 0\: Broob/Colc. A readable gener..ll inu"Oductioll to all of the psychodynamic models. Stropp, Ii, 1-1., and Binder,]. L (1984). Prycholhmlp, i" a 1UW key: t\ gui(k la timNirniUti dyna"uc psyclwlMmpy. New York: Basic Books. A fascinatiug discussion of how psychod)11amic concepu can be adapte'}'chology that \'alues illl ro­ spccuon and examination of the unconscious as the most important ways of /mOlvi"II. This valuing of the "spiritual� also partially explains the positive reception of Jungian thought in religious circles. When Jungian acceptance of spirituality is conu-asted with the antagonism or antipathy against religion of most Iwentieth
10

h"mlon;z",

JIlNC/A.\· Tf/ER.\1')'

129

and service. He meant his psychology to fjll this breach. But this is precisely what is most disturbing about Jungian PSlcho!. ogy. Of all ule s}�tems. Jungian psychology (and perhaps existential p� .. ychology, chapter twelve) comes dosest to being a ri,"ai religion. It is comprehensive in its claim to explain the totality of human psycholog· ical and religious experience. In grounding his analysis of archetypes in the analysis of mythology and compa.rati,'e religions. Jung psychol. ,

ogized religious experience much as Freud did. He looked to explain the psychological realities behind the \�dgarie5 of different types of religious experience. It was thus inC\�table that his .....ould be a relati''" istic understanding of the functional value of different "religious mythologies. M Jung's w;e of religious terminology and concepts can lead the less discerning rellder to imagine him to be in closer allegiance \\-ith the fai th than is justified. Jung seemed to fmd Christianity useful in prJ> moting the larger quest for meaning. but he dearly did not emb.-..ce the cross and the resurrection as histOlical fuCIS. As Browning

( 1987)

observed,Jung supposed that overt material expression W'olS needed for coven psychic realities and thereby came to view important religious S)'TTlbols as having great significance and mcaningas "mystificd� psychic

projections. The notion of a God ....ho . loves and forgivcs or a Cod who

died for us and rose again to gi''e liS eternal life are the symbolic representations of deep archet)'Pal. and thus purely psychological. realities. TIlUs historic realities are n i terpreted as projections of psy­ chological needs. Jung reasoned from the recurrence across religions of cerrain motifs, such as death and rebirth or atonement, Utat UICse motifs represent or reflect underlying archet)'pes. This is a psychological explanation of religious commonalities. Bm it s i vital to realize that this is not the only po�ible explanation ofslIch commonalities. A dogmatic understanding could. for example. propose the enduring historic truthfulness of one religion. Christianity. and suggest thai commonal· iLies shared \\-iUl other religions represent the residual of shared trUth still left with us after the human fragmcmation and alienation of the Fall. This appears to ha,'e been C. S. Lewis's ....orking . model in 1M . listing ofwhat he callcd �thc Abolilion of Man, which doses with Le....is's

Tao.� the shared mo....tl foundation of all the world's great religions. In

other "'orels, commonalities between religions could either mean that "II religions are partially true and all represent projecLions ofps)'cho­ logical realities or needs. or thc}' could mean Ulal one religion is true

130 and others still share commonalities with the trlle faith to varying degrees. Jung's explanation works best if one has made an a priori commitment to some sort of psychological universalism in ex­ plaining religion.

This leads us (0 ask if there s i a Christian objection to the idea of a collective uncon§CiQ1I5. Fr.mkJy, we perceive mal many Christians react

negati"eI}' witb knee-jerk rapidity to the vcry idea of the unconscious,

bUi with no apparent rational basis. They of l en are concerned about determination or all psychological reality by the unconscious, but this

is an objection to determinism. Ilot to the idea or an unconscious per se. II may n i fact be true that the unconscious exists a� Jung asserts,

�. must know and funher that to know ourselves and hence be whole ....

more about what s i in our unconscious. But it isJung's profound trUSt of the unconscious that is questionable. We have no warrant as Chris. tians to regard any asp«t of our being as untouched by the Fall and hence an inerrant guide for life and growth toward wholeness. Further. .....e ha,·e no .... 'arrant from a Christian perspective to accept or deny the idea ofa collective unconscious. The Christian understand­ . are one human family, and hence ing of creation would assert that ....e the idea of a shared species repository of common experience is not incredible. Also, the doctrine of creation would male it possible to believe that God made us LO think about our lives in certain ways (i.e.,

archetypes).Just as Kant assened that causality .s i a structure that we

impose upon expericnce, similarly therc may indced be unh·crsal mental structures like .....hat Jung claimed to have discovered !bat undergird our most important psychological realities. If they do exist and if Christianity

is true, it

makes sense that those structures would

give us some access to religious truth. This is neither a point for or against Jungian psychology. It

is an

acknowledgment that he may be

right here. and that Christians cannot prematurely declare him wrong. Jungian thought is also popular in religious circles because it prizes

the mystical. Disenchantmem with the tyranny of propositional logic and purely dogmatic understandings of religious faith appears to be � increasing in many Christian cirdes. as is the desire to see our lives as .•

sLOries that are gradually unfolding (c.g Buechner,

1982, 1983). In an

age when sciemific understanding is prominent. �Jung was one of the

"'see Hunting (I9&>. pp. 33+S(0) lUran informed dUc;uwon ofil(lme dimensiomof!he mon: experiential dimensions of Christian faith and a ean:fui llna� of the PI"()5 and

cons ofJungian though! in uudemanding cach.

fl"SGlAN THERAPY

first in a long line of twentieth century intellectuals ",'ho championed a 'meliorative sense of m}th'-myth as a source of wisdom, vitality, .. (Browning, 1987, p. 164; cf. Taylor. 1987). As a leader in and rene....I" this movement, Jung is thus wannly received by many persons of faith. There is much to be said for the Jungian appreciation of our "u""ansrational" aesthetic, symbolic, mystical and slOry-telling natures. But we share Vin's (1987) concern that with too much emphasis on the mystical. the Jungian perspective can become a kind of intellec­ tuaJ gnosticism where the chief aim of life is to " know thyself' nlther than the workings of the CrealOr-God in the larger universe (see also Hurding, 1985). The self·awareness or self-knowledge so deeply prized in this tradition can too easily become a kind of substitute form of "self·salvation," with a limited (or nonexistent) understanding of the vital imponance of the incarnation and resulTection. or the cru­ cial need for the txtt:rnal manifestations of confession, redemption and reconciliation. TIle great cosmic mysteries of the faith are ren­ dered mere imrapsychic events that have their origill.5 n i the collec­ tive unconscious-not historical events anchored in lile larger march of salvation hislOry. There is a low view of authority and external validation within the Jungian tradition. Ultimately, the auLhentic. healthy person is the one who trustS the meaning of the symbols that emerge from Lhe collec­ tive unconscious. This highly subjective and experiential understand­ ing of ll"Uth can certainly lead to a low view of lhe authotity of the core teachings of the Christian Sctiptures and of the crucial impor­ L1.nCe of lhe disceming role of the larger community of faith. If .....e are to assume that we best undc:rstand external realiry from Lhe muhs thaI emerge from wilhin, ....hal . preventS us from lapsing into an ex­ treme tolerance of relativism? Is our theolpKY ultimately a personal "psycho-theology" only? Is the " henneneutic of self-understanding the authoritati\'e means for disco\"c:ring biblical truth? Knowing trutl, becomes a matter of individual discernment for lhe Jungian. The Jungian tradition seems (0 truSt completely the guid­ ance of Lhe unconscious. but doesn't address the limitations of this awareness, including our capacities for self-serving bias, self-decep­ tion and superficiality. Christians rightly hunger for an approach lhat prizes other ways of knowing and oLher aspects of human faith and experience beyond lhe rational and lhe dogmatic, but Jungian psy­ chology goes tOO far in its re\; . tiviSlic embrace of m}1h and its subjec­ tive epistemology.

IIIOf»:I/Nl'SI'CIIOTIlIillN'if:S

JJ2

We also share Vitz's fear that the Jungian perspective leads to an exaggerated indh'idualism. For the Jungian, growth toward health is an "inner jaurncyM (as Hurding has labeled it,

1985, pp. 334-360), a

journey within oneself to the exclusion of real horizontal or vcrtical contact outside of oneself. A more fully developed appreciation for the

t importance of the community. family and society s i needed in this vial

tradition, as well as our ultimate dependence on the Creator-God. ralher than an almost exclusive focus on the isolated, autonomous individual (\'itt,

1987). We are not faulting self-awareness per se-ill­

deed, that is often vitally needed in our Chri.!ilian communities (cf. Crabb, 1987). But when that is done al the expense of at least an equally strong desire to relate to God through the spiritual disciplines and worship, or to other persons through actS of charity, there is reason to be alanned. Christianity is ultimately an other-directed faith that is not

oriented exclusively LO .... 'a rd self-realization and indivi.duation.

MOOtl cfPtnonaJity Beyond those issues covered in the last section, we find the Jungian work on psychological classification useful in elucidating aspects of human nature. This typOlogy, as epitomized by the MBTI, issufficiently researched and validated to be responsibly adapted for clinical appli­ cation, assuming that it is sensitively and accurately interpreted. But

i church the reduction of persons to their "types," as is often done n

applications of the MBTI, s i inconsi.stent .... ith the broader Jungian

understanding of personality.Jung saw personality as much more fluid and multiply detennined than one would suppose from the lay litera­ ture or misapplications of the MBTI. The essentially unmeasurable nature of the linchpin of Jungian theorizing, the collective unconscious, is disturbing. As Macintyre

(1967, p. 296) has observed: That the existence of the collective unconscious is intended as a hypothesis is clear from the fact that it

s i a\'owedly introduced

to

explain why the same symbols keep recurring in dreams, mytholo­ gies, and works of art. However, there are no predictions that we can deduce from this hypothesis other than the vague generaliza­ tion that such symbols do and will recur-and this, after all, is what

the hypothesis was originally intended to explain.

MacIntyre mayhave been askingfora type of direct proof incompatible .... ith a concept like the collective unconsciow. But his criticism can at least serve to remind us that such a slippery concept should be held

jUNCIAN1'IWRAP'I'

133

with a good deal more tentativeness than the convincedJungians tend to manifest.

On the other hand, to state categorically that there is no reality beyond that which we can �see� seems equally foolish. As McLemore

(1982) has observed, all 100 many conservative Christians have devel­ oped -an irrational bias against the non rational.- Many Christians would benefit from a healthy expansion of their spiritual conscious­ ness, one perhaps that will foster understanding and awareness of the mystical and transcendent

.so

deeply V"dlued by Jungians. But such a

·spiritual consciollsnes,yraising- should protect alf.tinst the quagmires of an obsession with the mysterious and mystical as an end in and of il.SClf (McLemore,

1982, p. 128).

On a more positive note,Jungians have a high '1ew of the worlb of the indi\1dual. Theya.rc far less deterministic and mechanistic than the strict Freudians: they view human action as potentially more proactive

i the largcrcontext ofa quest than reactilie. Our behavior makes sense n i teleological. Although affect and for meaning and purpose in life; it s

feeling arc strongly emphasized, there is an appropriate respect for the imponance of cognition and beha\1or in Jungian thought.

Model ofHealth Jungian notions of health and \o\'eUness afe certainly in the spirit of the humanistic tradition in psychology. This is �roblematic, because it is an incomplete understanding of wholeness. Like Gestah and person­ centered therapies (chapters twelve and ten), analytic psychology asserts that we have an infallible guide in the pursuit of wholeness, which in thiss},"stem is the collenive unconscious. ForJung, affirmation and self-actualization are virtues, but accountability and obt'dience to authority are '1ewed with suspicion. Any focus on the content of religious beliefs and world views would be viewed as an obstacle in the process of authentic self-realization. Browning

(1987, pp. 1 77ff.) astutely points out a fundamental

ambiguity in Jungian thought. In some contexts,Jung speaks as ifone passively folio\.\-'5 the dictates of the unconscious in order to become whole. There appear to be no real choices to be made in this process other than to become what we were meant to become. In ot.her contexts, Jung speaks as

if we

must make responsible choices about

which archetypes to actualize at different paints in life. and that we thus choose who we arc becoming. This renders the growth process more of a reflective enterprise and underscores its fundamentally

,

"""

MOiJFRNPSYCJIOnlERllPfES

moral nature. The beliefs that shape our choic.:::s �'ould then beeome highly relevant, even determinative, of the direction of our growth.

Thus, Jung's theor),. like all personality theories, is in Bro\\ling's l analysis a m0T31 theory: �Il is a theory ofwhat humans want, quest after,

and need in order to be human. . . . It does indeed boil down to an ethics of self-actualization � (pp. 179-1SO). Browning argues (successfully, we think) that Jung·s ethic s i nOI wholly incompatible with Christian thought, but does need careful correction for it

10

be compatible with Christian ethics.

A related concern with reference to the Jungian understanding of

health and wholeness has to do with its obvious cgocem r ic tendencies, especially in conceiving of growth onl), as ajourne), inwArd, We do nOI want to disparage appropriate and responsible relf-realization. Indeed,

this can be conceived as a matter of good stewardship and integrity for the committed Christian. What we fear is a lack of vision of our need for a love relationship with our Creator-God, attainable ani), through thc forgivcness offered through the death and resurrection ofJesus Chrisl. A full understanding of Christian maturity is deeply informed by the confession of Jesus Christ as Lord of one's life. the cultiVAtion and expression of the Christian virtues, and the deep lovc for thc brOlhers and sisters. A biblically informed notion of costly discipleship is simply not partoflhe message ofhcaltll and wholcness in theJungian lT3dition. Jungian thought is ccrtainly to be commended for ilS �illingncss to addres.� the problem of pain. Indeed, forJung, neurosis is aIwa}'s based in the Ma\'oidance of Iq"ritimatc suffering.

M

Unlike the more naivcly

optimistic proponents in the humanistic lJ'adition who ad\'Qcate a Mculture ofjoy· (Browning, 1987, pp, 1 76-177), Jungians advocate a vision for life that suggests that there

be meaning to suffering. .... Individuation ill nOt thc inevitable result of self-a\.' reness alone; it may can

also require conscious and deliberAte effort sustained throughout the life span. The notion of a God that is absolutc and beyond all human experience would be alien toJung. For him, God had lO be experienced first and foremost in the soul . Logically, lhen, religious beliefs arc important only to the extent which they are expetienced as p&)'chic phenomena (Hcmpelmann, 1986), His "'theology" was based on a \�ew ofwholeness thai comes from the depths of our psychic nature. It Wd.'i not theocentric at any level, but anthropocentric (1'. 162), Wholeness does not have anything directly to do with a creed or membership in a

/35

JUNGIAN 1'H1ilIAPY

local church. We grow through our responses to the psychic symbols which point the ...."a}' toward greater personal integration. Reason and rationality, men, are viewed with suspicion byJungians. Through hstory, Jung asserted, the enduring truths of Christianity gradually lost some of their meaning as religious symbols deteriorated into mere signs or into dogmas. He felt that Chlistianit)' was too one..sided, .... ith reason enthroned and the emotional side of the faith impoverished. For Jung, symbolic language. not propositional truth, should be at the heart of the faith. TIle wellspring offuith can be found, for example, in the deeper meanings of the sacraments. Effective preaching and tcaching must bridge the gap between the world of the unconscious and the conscious, through symbols that relate the human to the infinite, uansccndcnt Cod. For many Christians, there is no more powerful l"econciling symbol than the cross. Consider the perceptive insights of Hempelmann ( 1986. p. 165), In the cross . . . .....e have a symbol that (through the story in which it participates) holds IOgcthcr the (wo o�posiLCs: sinful man, who has denied God. and lhe loving God ....ho . forgi\'es lhem and takes them back. This is ho..... 1 understand lhe symbol sYStem to function in helping the individual be healed. In Christ alone is there sah-a­ tion (and) healing. BUIJung would never go so far as to embrace the �a1one nature of Christianity. Further, in Christianity the symbols are not merely means of access into the realm of the collective unconscious. TIley also summarize historic extemal realities thaI are also at least partially understandable propositionally.Jung would seem to hold back from giving lhi.� sort of meaning to the symbols of failh. i

.

Model ofAbnormality

'ant to raise about theJungian Perhaps the most importaIH concem we .... understanding ofthe etiology and maintenance of"problems in living� has to do ....ith the understanding ofevil implicitwithin that perspective. No Hempehnann (1986, p. 162) has noted: Orthodox CI-nistians believe thaI sin and the devil are rea\. While it is true that many Christians ha\'e not given the devil his due, thinking and speaking as though sin was only a mistake or error, but not the essential evil thaI ·d....ells . in me,' as S1. Paul taught. Christianit}' has never gone so far as to deny the reality of evil. . In orthodox Christianity the problem of evil is central. It is lhe .

.

/36

l lhat cornell from the cross, the symbol thai points victory over evi directly to the reality of evi l . It also points to the power of love in God to conquer all evil-the resurrection. In contrast,Jung was ambivalent about evil (Bro.. , : ning, 1987). He did not fully appreciate the power of sin and evil at either the individual or insuflItiona1 1c\'cl. At times, he seemed LO trivialize evil by psychol­ ogizing it as the archetype afthe shadow, a kind of�culturally despised and suppressed side of unused human potentiality. Here e\i l is simply that part of human potentiality that the prejudices of particular histor­ ical epochs teach us to disparage� (Browning, 1987, p. 169). On the other hand,Jung sometimes assumes a quasi-Gnostic position of the simultaneous existence ofgood and evil in both the divine and human levels. There are problems with both options. In the former case, evil is psychologized and is primarily ....-ithin, and thus the po..... er to O\'t:rcome it must come from ",ithin by making �good choices� through the raised human consciousness. In this vein.Jungians often talk about �embrac­ ing the shadow,� that part of ourselves that we have cast off. There is . to O\�rcome no clearly articulated external force that has the po....er all evil; there is no conception of the importance of the hope of the resurrection. Indeed, the \"f�ry notion of evil has been sanitized or trivialized if it has been converted to something we can embrace; it is no longer Msubstantially evil� (Browning, 1987, p. 194). At a rather informal theological level, it could be said thatJung essentially posits a kind of�'Orlu righteousness� approach to personal redemption. We become our own redeemers. Certainly this is a major liability inJungian thoughL The latter case of conceiving of evil as substantial, coexistent and indeed coequal in God and humanity s i equally troubling. An intrigu­ ing exchange in the Journal ofPS)'clwlog), and TJuoJocj (Griffin, 198&, 1986b; Haule, 1986; Kelsey. 1986) addressed this theme. For Griffin (1 986a. p. 276), the accurate understanding of human evil should be at the heart of the integrath'e dialog. He pov,erfully asserted thatJung had inserted a "newM tradition, a psychology of modernity. to replace the essential and enduring truths of Chri.nian faith and experience, and that the new cosmology does not do justice to the understanding of the depths of our decepth'e and evil tendencies (d. Homans, 1978). Evident in this exchange is theJungian tendency to view evi l merely as an aspect of the good. a stance that is common in certain Eastern and "new age� religions but antithetical to orthodox Christian faith.Jung •

JUNGiAN TIIERItPf

J 37

actually suggested making the Trinity into a quaternity to allow for the inclusion of Satan in Ihe Godhead (Browning, 1987, p. 193). God is not, however, equal pans of good and evil, a melange of Star Wars' "good Force and bad rorce.� For Christians, c\i.1 is real and has no part in the Godhead. Evil ought nc\'er to be ui\ialized. Jungian thought needs fully to appreci· ate the power of sin and evil. It needs to acknowledge the reality of an external transcendcnt realm that can influence day-to-day humall functioning. And it mUSt honestly confront the "powers" and "princi­ palities" from without and nOtjusI from within. Jung had little patience with classification of abnormality beyond the differentiation between functional and organic conditions. He had little interest in the biological bases of behavior or what we un­ derstand today as some of the sociocultural variables involved in the etiology and maintenance of psychopathology. Six def Psymofqgy and T�, /4, 285-287. Hall. C.. and Lind7.'1', G. (1985). /nl1'Q(/udiqn W Ihtaries o/fJmorudiry. New York: Corey, G. (1982).

john WilL1' and Sons. Haule, j. ( 1986). Integrating psychology and theology "'ith bricolage: A � sponse to Griffin. Juurnaf 0'/PS)'choJogy and Thrology, 14, 278.28 1,

Hebon. R. (1982). Critics and thdr texts: An approach tojung's theory of cognition and personalily. joornal of Pn-sffl1ality and Social PsycJwWgy, 43,

40'J.4IB. Hempelmann, L ( 1 986). Is the jungian approach Christian? An analysis. Ctmawdil1jouml1l, 12, 161-166. HOI)!;u\$, P. (1978). j!mg ill am/at: Moonnily lind 1M making of psychoWcJ', Chicago: Uni\'crsity of Chicago Pre.ss. Hughs,J. (1987). iWJuIpingllupJYehoIogirol dQmain. Ikrkelt..1'. CA: Uni\'e rsity of Califomia Press.

Hurding, R. (1985). RoolJ and lMoo, London: Hodder and StoughtOn. johnson, P. (1985). \Vt: Umlmumding t� PJyclwlcgy ofT(Jl1I{lntil lovt. Nt..'W York: Harper & Row.

j ohnson P. (1989). He: Unwlanding rruurulinepsyc/wJog)' (rev, cd.). New York: Harper & Row. johnson, p, (1989). S1u: Ulldmlandillgfeminilu PSYCIwlofrl (re\', ed.), New York: Harper & Rm.'. jung. C. (19.$4) . A review of the complex theory. In TJu s/'TllctUIl! and dylUJmUJ �/htpryc1u, CoUected Works (Vol. 8). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960. (Fiut Gennan edition, 1934). jung. C. (1946). Two e5SayS 01'1 linal)·tic psydwlogy. N�w York: Meridian. jung, c. (1953-1978). Collected Yo'orks (20 Vots). U. Read. M. Fordham, and G, Adler, Ecb.), Princeton. Nj: Princeton UniversilY PreMo jUng, C. (1964). Ma'i and hiJ SJmboi.s. New York: Dell, jung, C. (1961), MhMTitS, drmm�, mId ll!j1«tions. New York: Random House. Kaplan. R.. andSaccuuo, O. (1989). PS'jchoiogicol ttSting (2d ed.). Pacific Grove, .

CA.: Brooks/Cole. Kaufmann. Y. (1984). Analytical ps},dlOlherapy, 1.11 R. Conini (Ed.). Curnnl fJ.ryclwlhtropitS (3d ed.) (pp. 10&.141). Iwca. IL F. E. Peacock. Kei�, D., and Bates, M. (1984). Pi«ul:unwland wu: Chan:uttl'alld ItI'Ilptmmenl Iypes. Delmar, CA: Prometheus Nemuis. Kd�, M. (1968). ChristojJsydt%gJ. New York.: Crtlssroads. Kelsey, M. (1977). TM OlMr side ofsilenct. London: SPCK. Kelsey, M. (1986). Repl}' to analytic psychology and human elil. }oomal of PsythokJgy and ThtrJ/DyJ·, 14, 282-284.

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MOllERNPSYCHOTIIUlAJ'lES

(19i6), " (Qmp�U guiM to tilml/1J, New York: Pantheon, Madnl}'l"e, A. (1967),Jung. earl GWtav, In P. Edwards (Ed,), Tlu tncyclCfHdia of philosoph, (Vols, 3-4) (pp. 294-296). New York: Macmillan , McLemore, C. (1982). Tlu J(nndal ofPSJc/wlhtraJrJ. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale. Moore, R. (Ed.) (1988). CarlJlmgand Chrn/ian spirituality. New York: Paulin Kovel,j.

Press, Munroe,

R.( 1955). Schools of p5Jchoonal),lic Ih()ll.glit. New York: Holt. Rinehart

and Winston, O'Connor, p,

(1985). Undmlanding jung, Ilndmlanding you�1f New York:

Pauli!t Pres". Rychlak, j.

(1973). 1nlroduction /0 fJn3{JT1ulil] and ps)'dwlhempy. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin. Ryckman, R.

(1985). Thtrmu oJ pmona/ity (3d cd.). Monterey, CA:

Brooks/Cole. Sanford,j.

(1980). Tlu invisible partlln:J.. New York: Paulist Press. Sallford, J. (1982), [k/1,IJHfI pttJp�: Comrn"" imling Ollt lo ont. New York: Pau1ist Press.

(1985). Jungian analysis. In O. C. Senller (Ed.). Bnki'rtncyrktpMia ofprydwlogy (pp, 615-618), Grand Rapids, MJ: Baker, Sanford . J, (1987). Tht lIil,grlo," withi,,: 7M inIW /IIl'ani"K oJjesw. ' MlJi"/f$. New

Sanford.j.

York: Harper & Row.

Sanford,j. (1989). Dmuru: God'j fOWJlIm langrla�. New \'ol'1e Harper & Row.

Stein, M.. (1985) .jungs trl'Vllmenl of Chm/jan;l], WilmClle. 11.: Chirion. Taylor, D. (198i). Tlu myth ofurtainl]. Waco, TX: Word. Van l...«u....el1. M, S. (1985). 1M pmml in PSYlholl>,:r " rontem/Jlmll} C hri$ti(m aptmJUal. Grand

Van Leeu....en, M.

Rl'

147

means. In this view, empirical sense data become the highest court of meaning and hence detennine trulh. ConlCmptWary philosophers of

science have convincingly documemed the problems

",;th

this out·

moded view of science and have begun to sketch the outlines for a better understanding of the process of human knowing (see Evans.

1977, 1989: and Van Leeuwen, 1982, for specifically Christian analyses; and Brown. 1977, for a more standard treatment of this issue from the perspecth'e of the phil osophy of science ) . If the material uni\'erse, understandable only as matter and energy operating according to uni\'ersallaws, is all that is, then human bdngs are material beings only and hence explainable by natural laws. Be­ cause mental phenomena were nOt accessible to empirical study. be­ haviorism

eschewed all �men talism . Philosophical behaviorism was -

first given clear articulation by the famousJohn B. Watson. In the

19205

he directlr challenged the nodon that mind or consciollsness rp�l"

) was the prOJX:r subject matter of psychology, because it could not be empirically examined. For Wal'iOll, the road to progress in psychol ogy was to follow after the natural sciences in dealing only with empirically verifiable constructs (i.e.. behavior): thus behavior was che

"

­

undersTood through its material and causal relationships to otJler behaviors and em�ronmelltal events. The specific formula for undel'� standing behavior was supplied later by the learning theories ofPa"lov,

Thorndike, Skinner and others. Beha\iorism's embrace of naturalism gave rise to what has been

called mturtionism, the principle of breaking down more complex phenomena inTo simpler more elemental ones. Thus human language ,

became understood as -verbal behavior, � olx:ratin g by the same prill'

dples as all oven beha\;or and reflexes. Thought in turn became

�subvocal verbal beha\'ior.� These complex phenomena were in turn believed to be understandable in tenns oflile most elemeOlal processes of learning. In this \iew, ,-'hat \\'e call Mmellal L e\'cnl.S� (such as thoughl.S and beliefs) become ctispositiol1s to engage in behavior and do nOt hold much interest apan from their direct ties to oven behavior.

Everything was reduced LO elemental processes. Another implicat ion ofnaltu-alism was mvirrmmtmlalism, not in the ecological sense but in lile sense that all behaviors arc caused by factOrs outside of or external to themsel\'esAiI human and animal beha\;or is

as caused by events in the environment. The typing behavior that created the word� on this page is seen by a beh aviorist as ha\ing

vewe d i

been generated by the stimuli of lilt' books and articles lyi ng duttered

/48 about the desk, by the contingencies of others expecting a promptly delivered book manusclipt and so forth. Authors write not because they want to, \,;11 to or because of SOllle iU·defined creative urges or libidinal impulses for procreation, hut because outside stimuli impinging on them compel the writing behavior.

compefabove signals that we must deal with the concept dl!termiuism as well. Gcnerdlly speaking, behaviorists accept the The word

of

notion that all behaviors are the inC\'itable results of the causally relcml\t conditions that preceded them (Erwin. 1978). Skinner (1976, p. 185) has said, MA person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a poim at which man)' genetic and environmental conditions come tOgether in ajoint effect.M If the beha\iors of human bcinb"S afC merely pan of the stream of natural material e\·ents occurring in a mechanistic cosmos. then it surely follows that all our anions, including even what we GIll our decisions and choices, are caused in such a way that, as Wolpe (1978, p. 444) put it. "We ah-"lys do \\'hat we must do." Human choice is ultimately illusory; our actions are the inevitable results of the causal forces impinging on us.

Mod�t ofPenmJatity Behaviorism is uniquc in that writers in this t.r..ldition typically make Slatemcnts about their vjew of persons onl)' indireClly. The real focus oft he model ison the principles ofbeha\10r that apply to all beh�l\ing

organisms, both animal and human. Since there s i really nothing spe­ cial about human beings, to understand persons you only ha\'e to understand the laws of leaming. Behavioral undcrst.:mdjngs of the

person arc generally that the person is a bundle of behavior pauems, reflexes, perceptions and impressions. The .selfis nothing more. in this view, than the aggregation of the person's empirical charaCteristics. In contemporary texts on behavioral assessment (e.g., Hersen and Bellack, 1981). it is not persons or their personalities that are assessed, but rather it is beha..iors and their controlling variables. Some take this position to its logical conclusion, such as BeUack and Hersen (197i, p.

12). who say bluntly that "personalil)' is not a real thing.M Behavioral views of the person are clearly atomistic; persons are best understood by looking at the Matoms� of their behavior patterns and how these atoms are arranged and related. These atoms are not seen as being held together by. or emanating from, any comprehensive. core of the person which \\'C might call a self.

8IJIII I7OH TIIHR,WI'

149

The committed beha\;orist asserts Ihal (uusicaland

opnalll kanJI'11K

processes explain all behavior, So it is 10 these processes ....e . now briefly turn, though the reader should be fore....'amed that these topics are immensely complex and have spawned an enormous liter-Hure; Ihus any briefsummary is bOlmd to be misleading due to o\'ersimplification and selecth>e attention. Operant iMming. Operant learning is also c.uled inslrumental learn­ ing. It refers to the modification of freely emitted behavior; that s i , behavior which is free n i the sense of being nonreflexi\'e and non­

cocro .. . d, not fret: in the philosophical sense, Operant learning is the process by which this emitted beha\ior is modified O\'er timc by the

colWl1Utmusthat follow conringenr.ly upon the responses and by the 5timuJi that form the context under which the behavior

occurs.

TIIC

classic

example i5, ofcourse, the rat in the Skinner box. Lever pressing or other fonns of emitted r.u behavior are modifiable by the consequences ar· ranged to follow the behavior. Responses followed by such events as prescnlation of food or drink, or by the removal of lmpleasalll noise or

shock are likely to increase the frequency of the behavior (rtinfi»ajj�II)

.

Responses followed by consequences such as a spray orice water or shock, l to decrease the frequency of or by the removal offood or drink are ikely the behavior (punishtMlt), Rats can attend to and learn to respond to stimuli such as light! which signal that reinforcement is available (lever pressing leads to food when the green light is on) or is unavailable (lever

pressing s i ineffective when the red light is on).

Whereas classical conditioning (below) does not create new behav­ ior, operant learning can lead to new and very complex beha,;or. First. new behaviors never before emitted by the organism can be taught through the process ofshaping. Shaping invoh'es reinforcing closer and closer approximations to a goal response. For example. a chicken can be taught to peck a piano key by reinforcing the behavior of being nearer and nCaTer the piano, then the behavior of touching the piano closer and closer to the keyboard, until a peck on the keys can be reinforced. New complex patterns of behavior can be created

chnining.

wherein more and more

�linksft

by

(specific beha,iors) are

required to occur together for reinforcement to be delivered. until an entire �chainft of behavior occurs before the final reinforcement (the chicken now raises a curtain. movcs a stool and then plays the piano). Those who practice beha,ior modification claim that human be-­ havior is largely the re!lulr ofthese operant processes. Human problems in living occur when: (I) people learn maladaptive or inappropriate

1'0 responses;

(2) people fail to tearn effective or appropriate responses due to their previous learning environments; or (3) people respond to the wrong environmental contingencies. Often the cause is described

as the combination of all three factors. The negative behavior of the hyperacti\'c child in the home and classroom may be the result of failure to learn proper skills of paying attention for swtained periods and appropriate ways of expressing boredom and anger. It may also inmlve having pre\;ous:Iy learned inappropriate responses of tantrum­ n i g, whining and manipulating. Finally. the hyperactive behavior may be reinforced by peers, parenlS and teachers who. perhaps unwittingly, pay anemian to the child when misbehavior is occurring and do not reinforce good behavior. The therapeutic techniques that emerge out of this model are powerful methods for teaching new behavioN and for arranging envi­ ronments to make desired behavior Rpay oft' and undesired behavior go unreinforced or punished. Several examples will iUuslTatc these principles. One of the dramatic successes of behavior modification has been in the rreatment of autistic children, whose bizarre behavior and unresponsiveness to norma] human inter.tction ha\'e puuled profes­ sionals for decades. While the causes of this problem are still obscure, the application of operant procedures has tielded the most effecti\'e (though not perf«t) treatment for this disorder (Lo\'aas,

1987). In

Lovaas's model, autistic children are given intensive u-d.ining for bours e\'Cry day. They are first rewarded with food for appropriate behavior at whatever elemental level they can begin with, and new forms of behavior are slowly developed through shaping and chaining. Ex­ tremely dangerous behavior such as self-injurious head-banging may have to be directly punished, but as Illuch negative behavior as pos.�ible is simply ignored in hopes that it will be displaced with positive responses as the child improves. Progressing from very fundamental behaviors such as language sounds and paying attention. the program reinforces increasingly more complex and socially important beha\'­ iors. As Lovaas

(1987) has reported, this treatment program produced

the asLOnishing outcome mal fully half of the autistic children in the program were indistinguishable from normal children by late elemen­ tary school age. and most of the others were improved. Another classic exanlple of operant behavior modification is the token economy in the classrom o . Skinner and othen have argued for

years that the best .... ay to manage bcha\ioris to usc positive reinforttment.

.

,

8Ei1Al'lOR TIII!RM'Y but this has proved difficult n i the dassToom, where misbehavior so of ten willS all inordinate amoulll of ,mcntion from the teacher as well as from pecB. Additionally. it ....'Quld be practically m i possible to imple­ mcnt a program of immediate food reinforcers for good behavior in elementary school children; after all. a teacher only has so many hands and kids can only eat so many M&Ms! The cr(.'3th-e solution to the problems of dire.'erdo other than what we do. As ZuriB' (1985, p. 199) says, behavioristic psychology �is not . . . compatible v.ith the notion of a free -.... illed �lf-initiating agent. .. In critiquing this view, we mUSt first nOte that not all psychologists who study even animal behavior use mechanistic forms of analysis that are characteristic of the strict behaviorist. Domjam (1987), for in­ stance, argues that theoretical perspectives that emphasize �choice� and that emphasize how patterns of reward and punishment restrict the "freedom of action� (p. 562) of animals are more fruitful than old-style stimulus-respon� models. But this view probably cannot be taken 3$ a belief n i animal freedom in the sense that Christians mean by thai term. We argued in chapter tv."O thaI Christian belief requires a rejection of determinism-the view that C\'ery human e\�nl is the inevitable outcome of preceding C\'ents--and requires beliefin limited freedom.

•

P'

,

157 Though some Christian ps}'chologists (e.g., Bufford,

1981) and some

Chrinian groups embrace such a strong view of Cod's sovereignty that they could be labeled theological delcmlinists. such a position has not been typical of historic. orthodox Christianity. John

Calvin

is com­ monly believed to ha\'c denied the freedom of persons, bUl along with Muller and Vande Kemp (1 985) . we would argue that hisbeliefin COO's sovereignty.

,

divine election predestination and lhe depravity of the

human will C'dllnOt be equated with philosophical determinism as accepted

by most behaviorists. Human freedom is even defended in

the Cahinistic tradition, as staled in the Wesuninster Confession of Faith (Leith,

19i3); MCod hath endued the will orman with that natural

liberty. that [it] is neither forced nor by any absolute necessity ofnature determined to good or evil.M

In most segments of the Christian rradition, human beings are regarded as

resp

onsible as morally culpable Responsibiity l ror our ,

.

actions seems to require the capacity to have acted other than we did in a given situation. ThU$. from a Christian perspective total determin­ ism is unacceptable and limited freedom s i an essential belier (Evans,

1977). PlantiDga (1983) nicely summarized the essence of a Christian position by defining the concept or "agent �ausation: the notion of a person as an ultimate source or action� (p. 23). The Christian must believe that a person 'schoices are sometimes the ultimate and deCiding factor in the occurrence of an action in order to believe that we are truly responsible beings who can be held accountable ror our actions before God. i But no te that causes do not have to be exclusive. To argue that n \\-'as

an ultimate cause does not rule out that other causes also affected the behavioral outcome. Even

a particular instance the person

though we make reaJ choices, we do so as persons with experiences and

constraints that exert an effect. Accepting the notion of agent causa­

tion does not mean denying the assertion that some or even much or our behavior is determined, or that the true choices ofa free agent are shaped by comtitU(ional or environ mental factors. The Christian concept of limited freedom is not the same as

freedom from regularit)·, freedom from influences on behavior or freedom from fini tude It simply means that the final choices that create behavior were not lhe result of impersonal rorces and the .

chooser was not merely a �IOCUSM ofinfluencescoming together. Rather,

the per50n decided among real options. influenced by his or her

history and constitution. This position has been excellently delineated

158 by Browning (1987, p. 113): The doctrine aflhe freedom. transcendence, and responsibility of humaru does not mean that

we

are totally free and completely

unconditioned by eithu internal impwse or external reinforce­ ments. In faCt. it meansjuSt the opposite. It means that in spite of our massive conditionedness by these forces, there is still asufficient modicum of transcendence over them to make it possible for us to alter, however slightly, the course of our lives. It would seem thai we are stuck with incompatible perspective! on this topic; detenninism and limited freedom do not in fact ap�ar to be reconcilable. Positively, we can learn from the behavior modifier that our behav­ ior s i influenced and shaped by many factors of which we are often unaware. In denying determinism, Christians are often in danger of embracing a prideful claim thai their choices and actions are toLa.lly free and unconditioned by their material existence. We are danger­ ously close to a self-denying view that denies the finilUde and depen­ dency in which we exisL It also seems true that human beings are a .... -er and higher capacities, and that again OUt of pride composite oflo we want to deny the real part conditioning influences play in our basic psychological make-up. Mockl ofl'mohality We introduced earlier the atomistic view of the person imbedded in behavioristic psychology. In mils view there are no necessary i nterrela­ tionships between discrete components of the person's behavior. If interrelationships exist between cJustersofbehavion;, as when a person tends to lie and to steal. they are there by the accident of conditioned assoc

iation or some such process. There is no necessary grounding of

any particular behavior or behavior pattern in a self. Thus a concept ofgeneral human responsibility is impo�ible, since each behavioral pattern has itS own specific controlling conditions which bears no necessary relationship to the person as a whole. There s i no �person � 10 hold responsible for the behavior e>:hibited. ntis ils why Skinner (1971) can call for the abolition of our criminal jurispru­ dence 5}'Slem as it exists today-there really are no perstniS to be punished but only response patterns to be modified. and thus behavior modification should replace judicial punishmenL For the behavior modifier, one negati\-e behavior pattern (such as repeated lying) doesn't make the person a bad person; rather. the lying is a behavior

BFJIAVTOR TlIE1IAP1'

JS9

pattern that needs to be modified. That pattern s i unrelated to the �pcrson,M as the person docs not exist. There is a certain clinical wisdom and utility to such an approach. in that the spurious O\'eridentification by a client (as a person) with a particular negative aspeCt of her or his behavior is genuinely problem­ atic. We have known sincere Christians who ignore many positive areas ofdiscipline and matlu;ty in their I.ives to focus on one negative pauern (�]'ve not 1x:cn able to kick my fingernail-biting habit; how dare I say that God is active in my life when I have no self-conu-oW). Thus this insight is of central value for the religious thinker: Not every behavior pattern i� a true index of the state of the self. One person's rudeness in a situation may be an accurate index of their arrogance, pride and self-deification. The exact same act by another person may be an anomaly related to being inattentive to social cues at that moment because of a deep inner struggle of some son. And perhaps

C\'eD

behavior patterns that are good indices of the condition of the hean

will ha\'e to be changed deliberately after the heart changes. Old, sinful habit patterns don't automatically change when the heart changes, as many a new convcn has disco\'Crcd. Ln chapter [\\.'0 we discussed the need for Christians to \;ew the person as a substantive agent or self. Christian thought requires the identification ofspecific behaviors in some significant manner with the unified person, because a person who commits specific behavioral acts which are sins must be capable of validly being labeled a sinner. In a powerful W"dY, a person's behavioral acts often are diagnostic of the inner condition of the �heart� or unified core of the person. As Christ said, �By their fruit you will recognize them� (Mt 7:16). So behaviors are not atoms unconnected with lhe heart; they are often (but not always) evidence of what lies in the hearL If we deny that persons are unified beings, then there s i no ant! to hold responsible for sin, no unified pef50n to be redeemed and �ncti6ed or punished. and sins arejuslbehaviorswhich occur in a person's b:odyorin his or her actions but are unconnected with the person per se.Atomism is thus unaccept­ able. though n i structive. to the Christian. Every theory ofpersonality has a \;CW ofhuman motivation, though we ha\'e dea1t only implicidy with it in behavior therapy so far. The behavioral \iew is actuallyvery simple and very complex. It is simple in i the driving, e\'OlutionariJy based proposing that hnman survival s motiva[ion behind our behavior.

As Browning (1987) and others ha\'e pointed out, there are remark-

"'DDffiNPSYCHOTHEIW'IES

160

able parallels between Skinner's environmental reinforcement and Darwin '5 concept of naLUral selection. For the Darwinian evolutionist, nature "selects" species that successfully adapt to their environmental niche. For the behaviorist, the environment "selects" behavion by reinforcing those responses that aid survival and adaptation to the organism's niche in life. Looking only at rat beha,,;or in Skinner boxes, we often mistakenly imagine reinforcement to be something that others intentionally do because they dcliberately want the behavior of the subject (rat or child) to change. But in the "real world," reinforcement and punishment occur naturally depending on how good of a match the organism's behavior is to the demands of the environment. For example. a partic­ ular type of hunting behavior may be reinforced by a greater kill at the end afme hunt because the hunting response meshed well with nature. To Skinner, individual adaptation to the environment, and hence greater chance of survival, is the motivation for human behavior. And one of the distinctives of behaviorism is that it proposes only a small list of inherent motivations or instincts that are themselves critical to survival, including such drives as for food, drink and sex (Herrnstein,

1977) . But the behavioral view of motivdtion is also exquisitely complex. because Skinner and others belie\'e that almost anything can become a reinforcer through its association .... 1th the limited number of more primary or basic reinforcers. Things like money or verbal praise come to be reinforcers through constant association with primary reinforcen such as food. warmth and sexual outleL In this way we can be led to \'3lue (and hence be motivated

by)

a diversity of stimuli, including

financial reward, the praise of our parents and peen, or by interper­ sonal recognition. Further, respome patterns like academic excel­ lence,

artistic

creativity,

physical

brutality

and

psychopathic

manipulation can become \'ehicles for obtaining primary reinforcen and hence Lhe response patterns can come to have a positive \�J.lue in

'T1 . right. So in the beha\ioristic analysis there is no one core their 0....

human motivation thaI is easily appealed to in order to underst.,nd

i idiosyncratically organ­ human behavior, Rather, human motivation s ized; each person's motivations may be different from those of his or her neighbors. Christians may applaud the motivational dh'ersity of behavior ther­ apy. but be righLly troubkd by its assumption thaI all effective moti\'a­ tions ultimately depend on basal drives shared with animals. Chrislians

BEllAVlOR 71fEJ«Y'I

161

must claim that human beings are capable of acting out of higher motives, such as the desire to serve God, and that such higher motives -ays reduce to the drive for tangible reinforcers. do not al.... A Christianjudgment that human motivations can and ought to be more noble and higher than they are may be valid; at the same time, i centives to change a appeals to Whigher moth'es� may be ineffective n person's behavior. For instance, Christians often object to token econ­ omies for their problem chi l dren on the grounds that the children Mought8 to obey their parents and do their chores because Mit is the right thing to do,� nOt to earn points to purchase video games. But ....hen . a disruptive child is moth-ated only by the a\'oidance of punish­ ment and the acquisition ofto),s. those appetites may be the best avenue for modification of the child's behavior, Such an initial change may establish the very possibility of the child being motivated by other things. Having children obey their parents. improve their school per­ formance and attend church to earn tokens to buy toys may be the beSt way to expose them to aclivities which they MoughtM to ,'3Iuc more, and

thus increase the likelihood that they will come to prefer them. Just

because Christianiry teaches that people ought to value more than material things does not mean they, in fact, do, and there is no psychotherapy system more humble and realistic about the depth to which human motivation can sink than behavior modification. The approach also suggests a technology for the alteration of human values and moti\'(:s through the acquisition of skills and associ­ ation ofevcnts. As Clouse

(1985, p. 94) pul it, �God created us as beings

who respond to reinforcer.; and punishers in our environment.M Per­ haps it is human pride more than aJl}1.hing that makes us prone to believe dlat we supersede all environmental influence. The deliberate �tructuring of onr environments to build up helpful and righteous beha\'ior seems a helpful le5S0u lo learn from behavior modification. The Nt.."W Tc�tament epistles often give instructions not for individual effort and growth but to the creation ofpo.....erful fellowship contexts, ....hich .

can

be effective mechanisms for the modification of individual

behavior. Sometimes the best path to person�change is the immcnion of the n i dividual into the community. with the person thus being subject to the contingencies of the personal consequences of that community. The behavioral analysis of this influence is, on an ultimate level. unsatisfactory, but it points us LO an aspeCt ofpersonal reality that we might notolher.... ise attend to. We can also mention in passing the behavioral view of good and

162

AlODF.RNPSYOIOTIfERAPIES

evil (see CosgrO\'e, 1982; or Bro....'Iling. 1987). For the behaviorist, good and evil as such do nOt exist because there are no values that exist outside of human conditioning pallerns. Moral codes, to Skinner, are believed to embody codified instructions about how 10 obtain rein­ forcement

(this is the -good�) and avoid punishment (the things to

avoid are the �bad"). A moral absolute such as "Thou shalt not steal� is behaviorally understood as expressing the normative pattern in a particular culture by which persons can generally expeCt rewards for honesty, diligence and thrift and punishment for theft and cheating. Browning (1 987) has convincingly argued that a dose examination of Skinner's worl, espe In other words. the informed

consumer of gestalt therapy services knows the values of the gestalt therapist with some accuracy before beginning therapy. but this is less true with the behavior therapies. Hence. its techniques can be pointed in many directions, as its abuses show. Without a built-in explicit model of healthy humanness, behavior modification becomes almOSt a collec­

(1987) has noted. The fact that behavior modification has developed a diversity of teChniques s i both a strength and a .....eakness. On the surface, students of beha\;or therapy often feci they are studying a loosely woven collage tion oftechniques in search of an application, as Tan

168

MODEJINPSYCi/(fTllERAPI£S

of intervention strategies. None of the other therapies rival behavior lherapy in the degree to which treaunent for different persons can be truly individualized because of the many techniques found in the model, and this s i a strength. Further. its supporters argue that it is not a set of techniques but a framework for analysis and modification. And ret the most frequent complaint against behavior therapy is its super­ ficiality, and the appearance of superficiality is certainly strengthened by the chaotic explosion of technologies available. This apparent superficiality is more than mere appearance; it may reflect the more profound lack of a central organizing understanding of personhood at the center of the model. ,\nother rea.\On that behavior modification isjudged superficial is that its view of persons is ahistorical; the important determinants of human action (and hence of personality) are almOSt exdllSively in the present. While operant psychologists use concepts such as learning history, their emphasis is on the current determinants ofbehavior. The origins of the self-defeating habit pattern are of little intrinsic interest to the therapist; the factors that cue the behavior and currently rein· force it are pre-eminent. The issue here is the cause of distress, and the behavior therapist! do have a point worth considering, that of how an event from the past can have any causal impact upon llS now. They argue that past events mllSt be made current in some form to affectllS in the present. So if a person is troubled by memories of a traumatic event from the past, it is the determinants of their current memories that must be examined rather than tht'! event in the past. Some Christians might see this present focus a mength, in that it facilitates accountability and action for growth. Olhers would see it as a negati,'e in that it trivializcs a person's sense of history and hence sense of self. Of all the models, the person of me therapist is least important in behavior modification and therapy (Tan.

1987), Bcha\�or therapists

have been forced by empirical research to admit of late that the quality of the rnerapislflht. cht.rcha: A rnukr in Chrisli" .. doctriru,jrom 1M

Bible w 1M preMfflt. Atlanla:john Kllox Press. 1...: .... ;s. C. S. (1980). The wright ofglory and oIht.ruddrmes. New York.: Macmillan. (Ed. by W. "Iooper: originally published 1949).

Lo\'aa.�. O. (1987). Beh�l\ior..1 treatment and nonnal educational and intellec­ tual functioning in young autistic children. Journal ofOm.sulti..gand Qir.ical P$ychoJOSO', .5.5( I ) 3-9. Marks, I. (1981). Ct'11! ami roTt of 'II'UTllI
&hatrior therapy:

(3d ed.). Orlando. FL: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich. Muller, R., and Vande Kemp. H. (1985). On ps)'chologisl$' u:s
to

create an

ethical code (for that can be done by clear thinking) " (Walen et al.,

1980, p. I I ) . According to Ellis himself, MPeoplc had belterdefine their

n . freedom, cultivate a good measure of individuality, live in dialogue o....

....ith . others . . . and learn to accept their own human limitalions and the fact that therwill (!\'entually dieM (Ellis,

1978, p. 47). Clearly, n i RET

people are the only real measure of people: God is irrelevant to the human outlook. As a part of his humanistic outlook, Ellis asscns that .....e have the freedom to pursue rational or irrntional ways of thinking. Though people seem to ba\'c innate tcndencies to behave and think irrationally. we ha\'e the freedom 10 choose rationality. Ellis

( 1978)

has denied that RET authoritatively or rigidly pre­

scribes a particular SCt of values for c\'cry client. Nevertheless, he enthusiastically concludes from his long-range hedonistic assumptions thm people hhad IL�uaUy bener strive to acquire and inlernali�e lhe follo",ing values, many ofwhich can be tbought ofas rntional attitudes� (Ellis and Bernard,

1985, p. 7); self-interest, social imerest.

self-direc­

lion, high fmsn..tion tolerance, flexibility, acceptance of uncertainty, commitment to creative pursuits, scientific thinking, self-acceptance, risk-taking, long-r.mge hedonism, non-utopianism and responsibility for our own emotional disturbance, Bya change of terminology from

values to r(ltjOlUli altitudes,

Ellis in many of his writings slips n i to a

value-prescription mode. contradicting his sC l lCd reluctance 10 pre-. scribe v,dues.

176

MODERNI'SYCHOTlfERAPtES

As accurately described by Sharkey (1981), Ellis vjell'S the self as merely a coll«tion of empirical characteristics, and in this way he s i very much like the traditional behavioristS. In other words, there really isn't a self (in the sense ofa responsible agent) that is at the core ofa person. Rather, our feeling of selfhood is what we sense from the coincidental co-occurrence of our behavior, traits, performances, thoughts, memories and so forth. Thus Ellis often ",Tites that while we mightjudge or evaluate a specific performance, action or trail, we can neverjudge or evaluate our .uivd, any more than one could judge the quality of the whole group of objects (the barrel of apples) by the quality of one element (the rotten apple). Why? Because those ele­ ments were gathered together by pure chance. Thus Ellis's ultimate answer to the self-esteem question is not to evaluate our selves at all. But recognizing the pernicious and irrational human tendency to evaluate their whole selves globally n'm a sinner; look at what I did"), Ellis concedes that at times it may be more efficient to globally and arbitrarily evaluate our whole selves, dedare ourselves acceptable and be done with it. He would rather that we not grade oursel\oes at all, but

if we are going to grade ourselvC! anyway, then let everyone assign themseh'e.5 A+'s and be happy.

Model ifP elsonality RET does not have a comprehensive theory of personality per se, but focuses more on a view of emotional disturbance and health. The core assertion ofRET is thata person's thoughts are central to understanding that person. Ellis formulates this relationship in an A-B-C format in all of his writings. People often come for therapy because ofa torIMqumce (C) , an emotional or behavioral consequence which is disturbing them (e.g., �rm horribly depressed�).

It

is common for people to auribute

their emotional or behavioral consequence to activatin.g experiences Qr I!VeJII.s (A). as if there were some necessary and invariant cawal relation­

ship between A and C (e.g.,

"I

keep having troubling thoughts about

immordl behavior; that's why I'm depressed-) . TIle

A can be an

external event (e.g.. death of a family member, a financial setback, a fight with a girlfriend) or it can be a person's own thought or behavior. But according to Ellis (and Epictetus before him), people are not l ft (B) they hold about dislUrbed by eventS themselves, but by the btu those events. So in order for immoral thoughu [Q result in depression,

Ellis would postulale that an inlermediate belief mUSI be broughl into play. For example,

) shullldn 't

..

have such thoughtS, and I'm a

,

,

IV.TION.4L EMOTlI'l-: TIII-:IIAJ'I'

177

horribl�, awful human being ""ho desc,,"cs to go to hell for having such t.houghts.� The A-B-Cs of RET are the core of its approach to personality. As mentioned earlier, a full-fledged theory of personality usually attempts to predict and

explain behavior in all or most areas oflife. Ellis's A-B-C

theory could be pressed to do

so,

but this would most Iikel)' result in

weak. ambiguous explanations or predictions such as Mher thinking and beliefs led her to act that way. M Such loose explanations are largely useless in the scientific study of personality, and so RET has spawned no serious scientific hypotheses or research regarding the broader aspects ofhuman personality. Butforclinical purposes, where the focus is less on predicting or explaining behavior generally and more on the focal explanation and modification of distress, the simplicity ofRET is regarded by its proponents as a \irme, in that that simplicity n i creases me utility of the theory.

Model t(Abrwnnality The RET theory of pathology is quite simple. Irrational beliefs result in undesirable emotional consequences, while rJ.tional beliefs result in appropriate emotional consequences. What is an irrational bcliefand how is it different from a rational belief? In large part, the twO are to be differentiated by their quite different emotional consequences. (Defining the rationality of a belief by its effect is a critical point in evaluating the theory, so further discussion of this .... ;11 be postpOned until later.) from time to time, Ellis has developed specific lists of commonly occurring r i rational beliefs, but such lists have tended to change over time. Elis l hasyel lo lake a stand on one finished lisl of major irrational beliefS. Table I contains his ('leven major irrntional beliefs as fonnu­ laled in an earlier work (Ellis, 1962). More recently, Ellis and Bernard (1985, pp. 1()'11) staled there were three main irmtionai beliefs ....· hich people hold: a. I must do well and win approval, or else I rate as a rotten person. b. Others must lreat me considerately and kindly in precisely the ....ay . I want them to treat me; if they don't, society and the Wliverse should severely blame, damn, and punish them for their inconsid­ erateness. c. Conditions under which J live must be arranged so that I get practically ali i W,lIlt comfortably. quickly and easily. and get \inu­ ally nothing that J don't want.

,

,

178

MODERN /'SYC.ifOT1f£1/API£;S

Deven Common Irrational lkliefs lRRATIONAL mEA NO. I: Th� idea that il is a dire necessity for an adult buman being 10 be loved or appnn'ed by virtually every signifICant penon in his community. nutATIONAL IDEA NO. t: The idea that one should be thoroughly competent. �qual" and ach�ng in :ill possible rape-cIS if one ;1 to consider onrselfworthwhile. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 3: The idea thai cerrain people an: bad, wick.ed or \;llainOlU and thal lhey should be 5C\' .. �ly blamed and punished for tbeir villainy. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 4, The idea mal il is awful and cataStrophic when things arc nOi the Wily one would ..ery much like them to be. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO. 5: The idea that human unhappincu il cXlemally aouoe-d and that pcple hil".. linlc or no ability \0 control tbeir 100 . iOW$ and disturbance$. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 6: The idea mal if something is or may be dangeroul or feanome One should be !el'Tibly concerned about ;1 and .!ohould k«p �Lling on the pouibiliry of iu ottlHring. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO, 7: Thr idea Ihat ;1 il euirr 10 avoid Ihan 10 face crnain life difficulties and ..elf. rrsponsibllitir$. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO, 8: Thr idea thai one should be t'

179

Model ofPrychothempy Therapy begins with the detection of irrational beliefs by the th�rapist and the client. If the theory ofpersonality proposes an A-B-Csequence. \\'e might not be surprised that the core of therapy is a Di that is

,

disputation

of irrational beliefs. There are many possible methods

available for disputing ilTluional beliefs. Ellis personally uses a great

deal of Socratic qucstioning and challenging of clients to p roduc� scientific clidence for their irrational belicfs (wilh the obl�ous supposi­ tion that the)· will come up empty-handed from such a 5earch) or to examine the practical emotional impact of IhoS(: beliefs ("'Why would you choose to bcliele something that causes rou pain?H), Some lhcra.­ pists who p'dclice RET use a 101 of didactic teaching aboUi the theory of RET with their clients. All RET pr.tclitioners uy 10 enable their '1 1 irrational beliefs. since clients 10 engage ill stlfdisputation oflheir 0.... therapy will presumably be maximally effective when clients are en­ '

ablcd to movc themselves toward health and wholeness. In addition to acti",ities focusing all changes in belief. the therapist also commonly

of the behavior and cogni­ as well as some techniques designed to be

uses many of the active change slr.negies ti\'e-beha\10r

ther.tpists

,

emotionally evocative such as imagery exercises and role-playing.

In Ellis and Harper (1975), the authors distinguished between twO forms of RE1� Ineleganl RET is focused on changing the particular irrational beliefs that aft"! causing the particular undesirable conse­ quences that broughl lhc client to therapy. Eleg(JtlI RET, on the other hand, has the much glOlnder goal of not only curing the person's focal

disturbance but also, for thc sake of the pre\'clilioll of future distur­

bance, Mconverting- the person 10 embrace :t rational life philosophy; that is, RET as a religion and wa)' of tife .

Christian Critique

We should notc that RET has replaced transactional anal) sis .\5 the secular therapy model most adapted for Christian consumption. Whether in the form of Cmbb's biblical counseling (in its early form, 1975, 1977), Backus's misbelief lherapy (Backus and Chapian 1980; Backus. 1985). Thurman's Lies lVe &iinle ( 1989) . or others (e.g., Sc hm idt 1983), RET ideas have been .....idely adapted for Christian '

.

,

consumption.

the importance of though! and belief in emOlional life, or lhe viability of direct change It seems unlikely that CIH'istians will dispute

180

ofmese aspects oflifc 10 produce helpful change. In a remarkably dear parallel 10 Epictctus, Martin Luther has said, "for the Holy Spirit knows ilia! a thing has only such meaning and value for a man as be a.ssign� to it in his thoughlS� (dtt.-d in Clebsch and Jackie. 1975, p. 213). Nevertheless, there are some rcal concerns to grapple with ill RET, as we will develop below.

PflilosophjooJ Assumptions The major presuppositions arRET about humanism and hedonism are incompatible with Christian assumptions. Human being5 are nOi the final aulhority in the universe, nor are they capable ohotal autonomy and self-perfection. Allhough human beings are certainly drawn to. ward pleasure and self-.gratification. especially in our unregenerate condition, we are motivated by more thanjusl the narrow gratification of our own desires. (The problems of hedonism as a motivational base are more thoroughly dealt with in chapters six and eighl..) Regarding valuing and values, we first note, a.� pointed out by Hauck (1985), that RET and Christianity share a perspective on human experience that says that what humans value is vital to their welfare and psychological functioning. RET contends to be a philosophically, and to some extent theologically, sensitive approach to psychotherapy that does not pretend to be value neutral. For the Christian reading in the field of psychotherapy. it is a breath of fresh air to encounter a major theoretician who fonhrighdy declares his presuppositions and values. According to Hauck (19S5. p. 238), �this emphasis on the profound beliefs and values held by clients makes it a comfortable medium for the pastoral counselor and religious client. � But while RET is an avo....·edly and openly philosophical and value-laden system, are its values and goals compatible with Christian values and goals? Ellis (1980) once wrote a response to Bergin, a Monnon and r.hus a theist, who espoused theistic values as a foundation for an approach to psychotherapy. Bergin (1980) asserted that "values are an inevitable and pervasive part of psychotherapy� (p. 97), and Ellis agreed with this. Ellis tOok issue ",ith Bergin's description of humanistic values, and -a1ues that Ellis proposed proposed his own list of atheistic values. The ... contrasted with theistic values in asserting thal there is no one supreme being in the universe, that personal identity is temporal and ephem­ eral, that self-acceptance docs not depend on the existence of a deity, thai self-satisfaction is cenual lO personal growth, that the structure of family life and sexual morality is a personal choice. lhal personaJ

/B/

1lA11ONAI.f:lofOTI\1: 1"IIERApt·

responsibility can exist without guill, and that we determine our 0\\-11 meanings in life basco on our personal desires and re:tllOll. Ellis himself dedared that there are Tllan�' points of conlraSt between his �clinical-hu­ manistic....theistic� values and those of the theist. The Christian readerwiU immediately see many points at which Ellis mml be judged wrong by Christian standards. Clearly, Hauck is \\"ong lhat value explicimess alone makes this approach suitable for pa5tOlal counseing! l Further. we can look at the respccti\'e goals of RET and Christianity. Ellis is clear about the goals of RET. which are to "'help people think more rationally: . . . to feel more appropriately; and to act more functionally . . . in order to achieve their goals ofliving longer and marc happily � (Ellis and Bernard, 1985, p. 5). Hauck declares that gthe welfare of each person. indeed, tJle good of society, arc the goals of both religion and REr (1985. p. 239). Lawrence and Huber (1982, p. 2 1 1 ) , after summarizing the goals afRET in much the fa.�hion which we ha\'e, declared �similar goals are found in the Bible. � Are the goals of Christianity equivalent to those of Ellis, as Hauck, i La"'Tence and Huber claim? The Wesuninster Confession of Faith, n answering the question "What is the chief end of man?� says, ;OMan's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever. � Glorifying God is not synonymous ....ith human happiness: a person whose human hal)­ pincss is fulfil1ed in sexual promiscuity is hardly contributing to God's glory. Indeed, human sacrifice in the fOI'm of costly obedience (Bonhoeffer, 1959) is what God most desires from us ("Does the LoRD delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as much as in obeying the \'Dice of the LORD?� 1 Sam 15:22). Kreeft (1986) has dt.'\·eloped this idea funJler. arguing that what God desires n i his people s i goodness, which is nOl synon)nlOUS with maximized lon�it}' or happiness. While goodness and happiness are surely not opposites nor incompatible, they are not equivalcnL The vision of God's goal ror Illunanity that pennea� the Scriptures is that of human beings bringing glory to the Father through their obedient manifestation of 01list's presence in their Ii\'es through ....·ol'd and dl'Cd (see also Tan, 1987; ;Uld Craigie and Tan, 1989a). Model r{Pt:r$onality

We have already criticized RET as nOl having a tnle, fully dC\'eloped theory of personality. We will further consider two principal aspectS of this incomplete approach to pcr!;(lnality: itS views of rationality and of emotion. Christianity is a religion that emphasizes belief. \Vhat we believe

,

MODERNI'SH:JIOTlfEJW'/ES

182

matters profoundly. People are urged to change their beliefs (�Come now, let us reason logether,� Is

1:18),

to think on certain things (Phil

to learn Scripture (2 Tim

3:15),

4:8), to �have the mind ofChrist� ( l

( l Tim 4:1..6). One afthe most often-citcd \'crses by Christians favorable to RET is Proverbs 23:7, Cor

2:16)

and to attend to sound doctrine

"as he thinketh in his heart. so is he� Rationality

(KJV).

s i so prized by Christians that it s i

described by some

theologians as one of the core human characteristics that comprise the image of Cod in humanil}' (e.g., Berkhor. 1939). On this point, as we have poinled Ollt in other chapters. Christians often detect real defi­ ciencies in other approaches to psychotherapy that de-emphasize rationality or expain l it n i such a way as to leave rationality an empty shell (e.g., gcsta1L, psychoanalysis). RET does nOt commit !.his error, placing human rationality in an appropriately prominent place among human capabilities. RET assumes !.hat people can ascertain tru!.h. This leads to the related point that this emphasis on rationality in therapy is possible precisely because human belief is concei\'ed of as directly changeable by argumentation. C\.-idence, logic and human deter­ mination. In a sense. RET looks at human beliefs as mental habits that can be influenced in the

same

way behavioral habits can be Changed. This is

an optimistic "iew of the human mind. and Christians can generally concurv.ith this portraiL Forinstance, Paul in Romans 12:2 and Ephesians

4:23 calls for a renewing of the mind which seems to be a process whereby

we actively participate in

a radical change ofunderstanding that results in

a revolution ofour spirirua1 li\'es. Such a call would be m i possible V.ithOUI

a presumpLion of r.ltionality similar to RET's. Though this valuing ofhuman rationality is avirtue orRET, we must note that it is lIle extremely high prizing and estimation of rationality that is the foundation for the arrogant humanistic atheism ofEllis, who seems lo ask, "Why do we need God when we have our brains?H Human reason is best understood not as the premier human characteristic of the image of God in us. but as one of quite an array of such wapi in which we "image� the Lord (see chapter two). Funher, it is \ital to note again that human reason is as prone to the influence of sin as any olher aspect of our being. For example. the fruilS of the flesh in Galatians

5: 19-20 contain as many sins of the mind as that of any other category. Ellis would agree that our rational capacities can cause

lIS

problems,

but views rationality as our means of -saJvation.H Christians, however, would not trust rationality to such an extent because il is as cont:uni­ nated by sin as the rest of us.

183 Further, we mUin inquire carefully about me RET understanding of the nature of belief as cognitive habit. If beliefs

3re

cognitive habits,

then simple diligence and skill \\;11 result in a change of belief. This

could undergird a bel e i f that human beings are ultimately perfectible by human effort alone. But while there

are

portion! of Scriplure that

seem to support such a view (as cited earlier), there are several very significant passages thaI do not. In Romans

1: 18-32, Paul caustically

describes the SOfry plight of those to whom God has re\'caled himself (v.

20), who respond

to this r�'e1ation

by not

humbling themselves

before the truth but rather refusing to honor God (\'. 2 1 ) . Proclaiming themselves wise (v. 22), they exchange the U'urn ofCod for a lie (v. 25). and refuse to �'en acknowledge God's existence (v. 28). Note thal lhis

response on t.he part of people whom Paul calls "fools� (and [lJis must

fall in this category) is

nM QuI of"� ig7l(mHl"j (a bad mental habit) ; it

s i rather a culpable and deliberate rejection of God in the face of the

truth. This type of response cannol be explained by a view of belief as mere mental habit. Qlristian supporters of RET often cile Mark. 7:20-23: 'What comes OUl ofa man is what makes him 'unclean: For from within . out ofmen's heans. come evil thoughts, sexual immorality. theft [m,my other sins i side and make a man 'unclean.' � are listedl. All lhese evils come from n BUlthis \'erse cannot be made to fil the RET fonnula. TIlis verse has

been interpreted (e.g.. Sterner, 1977) as &'lying that it is the c.'vil i not what Christ thoughts that lead to the sinful behaviors, but that s

said. Rather. he Slated that evil thoughts and the

specific

sins of

commission both proceed out of the heart; Ihus. the heart is surely nOt synonymous with a thought pallern, because the heart

f!rtCttks the

thought pattern. Thus a Christianized RET cannot simply look on ule heart as a belief �1'Stem; the heart must be more. This casts doubt on the most fundamental aspec::ts of the RETundefSlanding of rationality.

leI us turn to Ellis's view ofemOlion. Ellis contends that beliefs lead

to or cause emotions. Roberts (1982, 1988) has developed a more

fonnal and sophisticated view of emotion, which was fonnulated spe-­ cifically to be compatible with a Christian understanding of persons ith an RET and their emotions. Hisview has some broad compatibility .... \.-jew of emotions. In brief. Roberts argues that all emotions are

�founded upon concents� (1982, p. 14); that is. emotions are predi­

cated on the individual caring about or having some significant interest

in something. We do not have emotions in areas where we have no concerns (fOT inslance, one may have no emotional response at all to

/84

,1/Ol)ERNPSYCHOTHEJ«J'IES

hearing professional hockey scores on the radio if hockey was not an object of concern) ,

BUI

a concern is not

an

emotion; rather, �An

construal of one's circumstances in a manner relevant to concem� (1982, p. 15). In other words, an emotion is an

emotion is a some such

interpretation about a concern or object of value in light of one's

circumstances. For example. the emotion of jealousy is founded n i one's passionate love for anolher and that emotion occurs \\-;m me interpretation (accurate or not) that one's relationship .... ith . the loved one

is threatened.

It should be noted that among Roberts's concerns in formulating

was the fact that certain distincth'e1y Christian emotions are described in the Scriptures and Christians are commanded his theory of emotion

to exhibit or develop certain emotions (e.g., hope. gratitude, kind­ ness) . If emotions are reflexive involuntary phenomena. then the teachings of Scripture

are erroneous or misleading. "The fact that

emotions are construals goes a long way tOW'dfd explaining how we have control over them. . . . To succeed in bringing myself into a certain emotional state is to succeed in coming to see my situation in certain terms" (1982, pp. 21·22)-specifically to come to see the situation in Christian terms or from God's point of \lC\\.'. When we come to think and belie\'c deeply in a Christian \\'3.y. we will come to feel Christian

emotions. Note that for Roberts. this is not JUSt a matter of merely changing cognitions (as it is for Ellis) , as construals are more than beliefs and emotions are founded upon concerns. So to change an emotion, I may have to change my concerns. We can conclude posi­ tively that Ellis has a view of emotion that attributes some appropriate responsibility for what we experience emotionally and has some good beginning ideas about how we call change al least some emotions. The view of Roberts, though, s i more finely nuanced than that of Ellis. On the negative side. the complexity of what we call the human

Marl, as we haveJUSt discussed, raises questions about a monolimic \iew of emotions flowing from or being constituted of beliefs or consU'uals. Eschenroeder (1982). Zajonc (1980) and others have championed the cause of what we might call a "limited primacy of affect"; mat s i , mer espouse me view that while cognition might oflen shape and determine emotional experience, it is credible to suggest that the re\'erse is often the case; that as c1ient-cemered and dynamic models of personality propose, affect can come before and shape cognition. These highly complex mailers cannOl be resolved here, We raise the debate to suggest thai. Ellis and other cogniLively oriented theorists have not

185

It'"nONM. £.\fOT/Vf. THERAPY

totally carried the day in terms of understanding the nature ofhuman emotions.

Mrxhl rfHmlth Reflected in the values of RET (as in other psychotherapy systems) is a particular vision of what the optimally functioning or truly healthy human being looks like. Ellis's pieture of ideal humanity is transpar­ ently reflected in the list ofvalued characteristics we described earlier. It s i impossible in this limited space to critique every aspect of Ellis's vision, but let us briefly examine two aspeCLS. First, Hauck, a staunch devotee of Ellis and RET, S3.}'5 regarding

human destiny, �We were meant to live with dignity and pride in our awesome talents. To espouse a program [i.e., a religious doctrine] that

robs human giants of their Slamre is fooish l � (1985, p. 251). From our Christian perspective, Hauck has a point. in that human beings are created in God's image (Cen 1:27) and are amazing creamres (Ps 8). But the essence of sin is the aspiration to be gods ourselves, and inordinate pride is perhaps the quickest route to that OUlCome. We are not giants, rather. we are what",e are-human beings, created in God's image and fallen n i to sin and rebellion against our Creator, created of the dust (and thus part ofcreation) and yet made into living souls (Cen 2:7). We are the pinnacle of earthly creation, but we are not the pinnacle of existence; that rank belongs to God alone.

As a second example ofa rdated conception of ideal hUJrnmir}, we

can

look at the RET ,ireue of

�Ilanjmjly.

Roberts (1987) carefully

anal}"les a number of themes in RET and suggests that a fundamental characteristic Ellis is trying to develop in his client5 is equanimiry (a term which Ellis himself never uses). which Roberts describes as being �emotionally flexible and adaptable, relatively content regardlelis of what happens� (1987, p. 196). This is interesting in light ofElli§'s t)ing of RET to ancient Stoic philosophy. It is cJmmonly argued that Sto­ icilim was a �defealist� philosophy of life. The Creeks, experiencing a cultural decline and repeated brutal invasions and military defeats, developed a philosophy that sought to control the inner world of the

mind and $0 be unaffeioral therapy, such a thought is seen as an important contributor to writing beha\ior occurring; it is a causal force in its 0,",,'Il righL Thai is '""'ily cognitive- beha";orisLS

are often called "mentalists" by behavior

modifiers; this is perhaps the highest insult the behaVior modifier can inflict. Determinism is also modified substantially in this model, Remem­ ber that the classic beha\1orist believes that el,'enlS outside the person, operating through the laws of learning, totally determine all beha";or. We cannot do other than .....hat we do. Cognitive-bcha";orisLS sometimes

"

200

MODI-:R.VPSYCHO'('HERAPn:s

take similar stances, as when Marlatt (1982, p. 333), speaking 3bom responsibility in the development ofan addiction problem. states, "The faCI i s thaI an individual .....ho acquires a maladaptive habit pattern on the basis of past conditioning and the effects of reinforcement is no more 'responsible' for his behavior than one of Pavlov's dogs would be held responsible for salivating at the sound of a ringing bell. M Most cognitive-behaviorists. though, take a different ,�tance toward i on in-depth, and other detenninism. Randum has taken this ssue cognitive-behaviorists ha\'e IYpically endorsed his fannulation of this maner enthusiastically. He dC\'eloped the notion of reciprocal deter­ nl;nism (1978) (also the related concept of person-environment inLer­ actionism), which asserts that ""hile we are determined by our environments, ....'e are also the determiners of what our environments are (10 a limited degree). For example, we may be affected by what ....>e watch on lV. but \,'e choose what to watch, creating our "video envi­ ronment" when we turn the tube on and set the dial. We may be .m:i us at work. but we can choose affected by how others behave to....� (within limits) where we work, and we can be part of determining how others treat us by treating them in certain ways. We reciprocally deter­ mine and are determined by our environments. In Bandura's words (1978, p. 357), II is within the framework of reciprocal determinism that the concept of freedom assumes meaning. . . . Because people's con­ ceptions, their behavior, and their environments arc reciprocal determinants of each other, individuals are neither powerless oJ>. jects controlled by environmental forces nor entirely free agents who can do whatever they choose. People can be considered par­ tially free insofar as they shape future conditions by influencing their courses of action. Thus Bandura combines a belief in freedom with a recognition oflhe limitations and constraints on that freedom. Mood ofPencmoIity

In the cognitive-behavioral camp, only Mischel ( 1 973) has proposed anything approaching a grand theory of personality. He has suggested that rather than understanding personality from the perspective of unh'ersal dispositions or traits, people are bener suited to Midiographic analysisR where each person s i analyzed individually without reducing individual differences to measurements of universal {railS (Stich as dominance, eXlro\'er�ion. sensation-seeking, etc.). Each person 's per·

201

COGvrrM� /ll£HAI70RAJ. THf.RA.PY

$Qnality is unique and must be understood as such.

Mi.scMC.s Five Person Hzriabks.

Mischel organizes his idiographic

approach to understanding persons around fiveperron variablM. These are not traits or psychological structures (such as the id, ego, superego of psychoanalysis). but are categories of processes lhat can develop diiTerently in different persons. There is a strong similarity becv,een this approach and the behavioristic explanation of all personality according to the laws of learning. though here the list of processes is longer and more complex. These five person variables are:

1. Cognitivt encoding .strawgits. All persons SOrt the raw data of their sensations of the "'"arid in different ways. It is our encoding strategies that transform a perception of a mouth movement of another into either a warm, accepting smile or ajudgmental grimace of condescen­ sion; that categorize a three-sentence statement by a work supervisor into a \icious attack or a helpful exhortation. Some Christians might look at others in the church and categorize a small group as �real believers� and all others as �hypocrites,M while another person may son persons according to maturityjudged by how gracious and loving they

.. seem to be. AI a broad level, the way we sort the complex world v e

confront "channelsM OUI" personalities and can make us different peo­ ple. Persons with sophisticated, broad, adaptable ways of sorting or encoding their experiences will be more adjusted and adaptable than persons with simplistic, rigid and narrow encoding strategies.

2. OJgnitiVl'1 and bthavWml ron.slruction cmnpttmcies. ln response to the raw data we take in through our senses and our encoded perceptions,

we

must �figurc om� oW" world by constructing a cognitive model of it

and then go on to construct actions for responding to it. Once we have

i a way given a label to experience. we put bits of experience together n that seems to make sense. These models may vary from highly acc.urate and productive (such as the insightful understanding of the politically astute employee ill an organization) to highly inaccurate and destruc.­ tive (such as the paranoid delusions of the psychotic). On the basis of that model and utilizing me skills available, the person then

a(1.'.

People differ widely in the actions they are capable of exhibiting. For example, husbands differ �idely in their capacity to be emotionally sensiti\"t': and responsive to their .... ;ves. We all differ in terms of the ways we make sense of our world and the capacities we possess for acting in response tf) it.

3. Sul1tCtilH stimulus values. Another dimension on which persons differ is what they value and hence what motivales lhem. According to

202 Mischel, people build lip from the few basic motivations that Skinner allowed (need for food, v.rarmth. water, pleasure. elc.) to almost an infmite array of valued stimuli, which then become incentives for behavior or a focus for motivation. People can then differ immen5eiy on what are motivations for them because of their \"Cry different learning histories.

4.

Dpcunt and classical condilioning. Though he has mo\'ed beyond

tTaditionaJ behaviorism, Mischel believes that basic leaming processes arc still influential in human behavior. He does not understand these in the mechanistic manner of a Skinnerian, but believes them to be operative at a Cognilh'e leo.·el. For instance, operanl icarning (changes n i beha\i.or based on reinforcement paucms) is understood not as the mechanistic conditioning of operAnt behavior but as the influencing of choice behavior by the alteration of expectations of re. .. : ard.

5. &If-rIa rgu IOfJ sy,stnns alld plans. One of the major conuibutions of Bandura

(1978) and Kanfer (1979) in moving beyond traditional

behavioral conceptions of persons was the proposal that persons typi­ caUy internalize control of their behavior as they dew lop. Skinner may believe that our environment controls all, but these theorists argued that lhrough memory, expectancy and language we take our environ­ i side us, and thus the thoughts we engage in become as fX)werful ment n determinanlS of our actions as the external environment. \\,hi l e the study behavior of a student may be partially due to external contingen­ cies, such as social praise from dorm

assocates, i

availability of other

activities and so forth, the student can also create alternative forces that in fluence behavior through, for example, self-statements such as �I

must study now or I will flunk out of school," or -Imagine how my i age boyfriend will be impressed when I get an A in this course! � The m of the boyfriend conjured up at will can be as powerful a determinant of behavior as the real person. People then differ n i their capabilities

to regulate lheir own behavior. People differ according lO what beha''''

ior they pay attention to in themselves, how theyjudge that behavior (e.g., stringent versus generous sLandards ofjudgment) and how effec­ tively they give o,'crtconsequences ("No 1V for me lOnigh!; I didn't do my housc�'Ork!") orcovcn consequences (self-statemelll5 such as -I did a great job!- or �I'm a hopeless case !�) to lhemseJ\'es. Mischel's understanding of personality has not resulted in a formal therapy approach per se, bUl his model provides the best integrative framework for understanding all of cogniti\'e-behav­ ioral therapy, in thaI each intervention can be seen as targeting

COGXn1n:- BF.J/.4.\·/OIItL t TIIYJl.V1·

20;

oneor more of his person variables.

Bandura's Social-('..ognitiw Thl!tJ7). B'l.ndur.!. a prolific researcher n i this field, has contributed many important concepts to cognitive­ behavioral therapy, First. he focused 011 the phenomenon of model­ ing-the capacity of humans to learn notjust by direct experience but by watching the behavior or hearing the thoughlS or others. Modeling has becume an important component of cognitive-behavioral psycho­ therapy. Funher. Bandura developed the concepLS of self-regulation and reciprocal determinism, ,,·hich vo'c have already discussed. Finally. B;.Uldur.l developed the concept of ulf-effu:acy, which has become central in cognitive-behavioral practice laday. This is the concepl that it is notjust pastconsequences arall action that determine its occurrence (as Skinner might argue) or c\'en the expectation ofa future consequence (a cognitive event which Skinner would deny the importance of), but it is also OUI' roalualion of our

own

ro"'fNtellCY or

effectiveness in behaving iliat determines action. FoJ' example. a Skinnerian Vo'ould say a shy person's reluctance to interact with others is a function of having not been rewarded for such acti"itles in the past and of receiving ongoing rewarru for shy behavior. As Ireannenl, the Skinnerian would implement a learning so-.neg)' that

....·ould positively reinforce outgoing beha\ior. To this Sandura would add that the shy person must not only expect reinforcement for outgoing beha\�or. but shc must also manifest a sense of personal efficacy for those types of behaviors, a sense that she can effectively interact with OIhers. The point here is that people do not attempt things juSt bet:ausc therc are rewards; we also considcr our expectanc.y thaI we can be effecti\'e at the behavior it rakes to obtain the rewards. This s i important in cognitive-behavioral therapy where one is trying to establish new behavior. The therapist cannot simply create a reward. but must also create a sense of personal effcctivcncss to get the fearful person to act in courageous ways, or the lonely and depressed person to attempt new social interactions.

Mtichellbaum's Cognitive lkhuviar Theraf/)" vision

was

Meichenbaum's (1977)

to develop a method for understanding the impact of

cognitions (thoughts) on behavior and cmotion, and a method for changing the nature of thai impact. He proposed a three-stage process for effective change. First. a person mUSt become aware of thoughts relevant to the problem being experiencg'ltiW« i Mw",aI IMrapin. New York: Guilford.

informative professional handbook for this approach. Meichcnbaum, D. (1977). Ccgniliw«havior IMdiJkatirm. New York: Plenum. One of the original ground-breaking proposals for mO\ing beyond tradi­ tional behavior modification. Prop5t, R. (1988). �dwl'-apy in a rtligiolUftalMWOrlr.: Spirituality in l�tmQti(ltla1 Maling/Jtl1Ull New York: Human ScicnC('s Pr�5S. Perhaps the most fully developed religious approach to counseling based on cognith·e-bchavioral l.herapy. l.beha';or therapy A biblical approach and critique. Tan, S. (1987). Cognitiv... Journal o/Psy(holO1IJ lind T�. I'. 103-112. A helprul article. An

References Adam�,J. (1973). The Chri�tian cmm�{qr's 1111.11.1111. 11 Grand Rapids, MI: &.ker. Bandllra, A. (I978). The s.elf sy5lem in re.:iprocal determinism. Ameria:1'I

P5-jcluJkJgist, JJ, 34....358.

Bandura, A. (1986). $odal/()IJ.ndatioFIJ o/Ilwugllt and adjon. Englewood Ciffs, l NJ: Prentice-Hall. Ba.ndllTa, A. (1989). Human agenl.1' in social cognith'e lhrory.

rJwlogist, 44, 1 175-1184. Beck, A. (1988). J.uw is"rot>' a'()IJ.gh. New York: Harper & Row.

AlII(I"ican Pry­

Beck, A.. and Emery, G. (1985). "nxuty diJordm and phobillJ. New York: &uic 1\00,,_

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224 San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Cmbh, L ( 1 977). Ef« f ti1R. biblical wunst!ling. Grand Rapids, MI: Zonderv.l.Il. Craigie. F.. and Tan, S. (1989). Changing resislafI l assumptions n i Christian cognitive-behavioral ther.!P}'. Journal ojPrydwIogy and Dobson. K.. and Block,

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Chrisli4ni"

"JOday, pp. 2&-30. Evms, C. ( 1 989), Wisdom and ""manlUSs in p5)dwlog:y. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Foster, R. (1978). Ctltbration ofdiscipfi1ll. San Fmncisco: Harper & Row.

(1976). Toward a model of psychological man and his science. ChriJlum Sehofuts Rtvitw, 6, 3-19. Jacobson. N., and Margoln i G. (1979). Mariwl IMrt:lP'J. New York: Brun· Hodges, B.

.

ncr/Maze!. Jones. S. (1988). A religious critique of beh,1\10r therapy. In W. Miller and J. Martin (Eds.), lkhaviM IhmJpy and rtfigion (pp. 139-170) . Newhul)' Park, CA: Sage.

KAnfer, F. (1979). Penonal control, social control, and allTUism: Can society sumyt: the agt: of individualism? Amtriam J4, 231-239.

PJyChoiogUI,

Kendall, P., and Bemi$. K. (1983). Thought and action in psychotherapy: The cognitive-beha\ioral approache!;. In M. Hersen, A. K:udin, and A. Bellack

(Eds.),

11u clinical pSJr.hology h6ndboo/l; (pp. 565-592). New York: Pergamon.

Mailing serm oul ofsufftring. Ann Arbor. l\U: Servant. Ia ra ms , A. (1980). Treatment of dyspareunia. In S. Leiblum and L. Pe....
Sperry, R. (19BO). Mind·brain intcractionism: Mentalism. yes; dualism, no. NrufOSrit:nce, '. 195-206. Stuan, R. (1980). Htlping couples changt. New York: Guilford.

Cognitive-beha\;or therapy: A biblical approach and critique. Journal ofPsychology and TheoIcgj, lJ, 103-112.

Tan, S. (1987).

COCNfTl\E-BEIIA\'10RAL Tfl£RM't"

225

Van LceUWl;n. M. (1985). TMpnwn in PJ)'cllohJgy. Gral1d Rapids, MI: Ecrdmans. Woolfolk. R.. and Richardson, r. (1984). Behavior lherapy and thl!' idr:ology ofmodemity. American P3,dwwgis/, 39, 777-786. Wren. T. (1982). Social leaming lheory. self-l"I!'gulalion, and morality. £lilies,

92, 409-424.

.

,

9

ADLE AND REALITY THE IES .;.

he ....ork . of Alfred Adler has been \'cry influential in the secular counseling field. As we shall see below, it is in many

wa)'3 onc of the most adaptable �tems for religious coun­ selors. Despite

this, it has received little

aucntion. Adler's ideas are

widely used professionally but seldom attributed to the original lheo­ retician. The work of Adler is not easily categorized. It is sometimes listed among the psychodynamic psychologies, sometimes among the hu­ manistic, and sometimes among the cognith·e-bchavioml. We are fol­ lowing the Ialter approach because ofAdler's emphasis on cognition. choice and shorter-term directive counseling. Adler

was

a sickly child who overcame physical difficulties (indud­

ing rickets) and an unimpressive start in school (a teacher urged his father to place him ill lraining to become a cobbler) to attend medical

.wL£RlAN,t.,\TJR&.UTYTllJ;JIAPlf;S

227

school. Adler moved from ophthalmology to general pmctice, neurol­ ogy and finally to psychiatry. He was, for a time, a colleague and collaborator wiLh Freud. Conflict ensued when Adler began to advo­ cate \;ev.'5 or his 0\\11 which, in Freud's eyes, underestimated the importance or sexual drives and psychic determinism. Adler resigned as presidentorthe Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and a permanent split developed \\ith Freud, who openly expressed contempt for the work of his fonner colleague. In the remaining lWenty--six years or his ife, l Adler was a tireless speaker, author and innovator in America and Europe. He did nOl narrowly focus on therap)', but was also interested n i \\'hat are now called preventative community psychology interventions and indeed social change asa means or promoting human welfare. U)'tman (1967) characterized Adler as more ofa preacher than a scientist lOward the end of his career, in that he offered litt1e scientific proof ror his ideas or documentation or the effectiveness of his ",,-ark. He tended to use the .same case examples O\'er and over in his writings, and it is unclear how many clients he saw in a sustained fashion given his demanding tra"els and frequent relocations. Despite Adler's vigor, the decimation of v.'aT-torn Europe and the ascendency of behaviorism and psychoanalysis in America restricted the success of the Adlerian S)'stem, The model continued to be prom­ ulgated after his death by a few devoted followers, and it is saf"e to say that the S)'Stem is probably enjoying more popularity now than ever in its history. It is commonly suggested that the greatest sign of the influence ofAdlerian ideas is thatthey find theirwayinto othermodeb, whether explicitly noted or nol. For example, one or the first major disagreements between Freud and Adler was the lauer's early postula­ tion ofan aggression drive; Freud initially dismissed Adler's hypOlhesis, but over fifteen yean later incorporated such a drive into his theories (long after Adler had rejected his own hypothesi, ). It u commonly

noted that Adler has influenced the tllOught or the ego psychologies, rational-emotin� therapy, family therapy and many other systems (e.g., Corey, 1986, pp. 66-67). Descriptive SUJ"Vey

Philosophical Assumptions Brink (1985b) has described fi\"c major Ysource5� or inspir.nions for Adler's thought. From Janet, Adler took the generdl idea of the

MODERNPSYCJ/oTHEllAPIES

228

significance of inferiority feelings. From Nicl2SChe, he adapted lhe notion of striving for superiority. From V.uhinger, he lOOK the idea of the -gui ding fiction,- the Mas ir relativism of a subjective underst.anding oCthe person. From Marx, he absorbed the ideal ofservice to the social order which came to be expressed as the concern for -social interest. M And from Freud, he look ageneral dynamic orientmion. including the emphasis on early childhood experience ilnd the purposefulness of neurotic symptoms. h ,seems significant that Adler was an adult. com'en from Judaism to Mlibernl protestantismM (Brink. 1977) and was a socialist by political conviction (Brink. 1985a), The European Chlistian church v.�.lS in a period of decline during the first three decades of this century: Mclas..�ic liberalism" was at its zenith. and more purely social underslaI1dings of the gospe l were in ascendancy. We will further de\'elop this re lationship la ter. One of the most important influences on Adler '",as a \-ariam of idealism, Vaihinger's �as r i philosophy, Ule notion that the "guiding fi(tions� t hat persons lived by were lhe major determinants of choice and action. These ideas were to be judged by their functional impact rather than their truth per se. Vaihingcr actually described truth as �mercly the most expedient error� (in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 83), meaning that lI"uth is the myth that happens to work beSl. To understand persons, then. one need not understand the reality they live in but must underSL1.nd lhe world as !hey perceive it. lhe myths they live by. This is clearly a relativistic and subjective understanding of the person. For example. Mosak (1984, p. 60) has said, "Life has no intrinsic meaning. We give meaning to life, each of us in his own fashion." Guiding fictions are thus more imporL1.nt tllan reality, and there are doublS that reality can really be known at all. Adler believed that the ultimate causes 01" behavior wcre the final goals that a person embr.l.ct-d; these goals were considered m)'thr.. nle notion of ultimate causation is Aristotelian in origin. Adler dubbed his own position "fictional finalism." His view was a teleological one wherein a person chooses aClions in order to alL. 1. in the goals to which he or she is commiued. As Erikson (1 984, p. 131) stated. Adler saw �lhe person as holistically pursuing self-seleCted goals. � Thus for Adler the cause of a person s depression would be the person's goal of minimiz· ing risk, rather than the childhood e\'ents that shaped the goal. Adler rejected the hard determinism of Freud in favor ofa 1I0tion '

229

of human freedom bounded by the subjective world arthe person; we

make real choices, but do so in the context ora subjecth-e world that

channels or shapes the actions.

Adler also rejected the biological scientific approach to persons

that typified Freud in fa"'or ofwhat is todaytermed a "human science�

(Evans, 1977) approach that does nOl aucmpl lO reduce the distinc­

tively human to universal laws formulated in a narrowly scientific

fashion. Related

U)

this, Adler insisted on a holistic approach to

pef!KIns. To dissect a person into pans (such as Freud's id, ego and superego) ""'as to risk reducing the person to an impersonal system.

Thus persons were to be regarded as "indi.. ;siblc.� (This is why Adler's

system is also known as jndiuidualp�·cholof!J'. lIhis phrase is based on the

Latin word individium for indivisible or holistic.) Model ofPers01l41ity

Adler argued that the fundamental ground out of which persons grew

was a perception of infmonty. as he frequen;ttr said, "to Ijve is to feel

inferior: This was unquestionably true for Adler personally as he strug­ gled against the burdens of physical frailty and academic underachie\'e­

i childhood, All children, according to {--dler, by\li.nue of their size ment n

and lesser capabilities, feel inferior. It is out of experience that lhe drin!

to feel signijimnt emerges. We crave a sense of mastery, purposefulness

and meaning, and this becomes the prime mdtivator of adult life,

In me context of family, persons begin a baule 10 cope with their

feelings of inferiority. Family has a potent impact on growing children in shaping the fictions that they live b)'. Adler was a major ftgure in

�g attention 10 birth order and the ps),choWgirol position of the

d ra

III

the family as a prime detenninant of personality. Family interactions impart an understanding oflife and the child's place in iL child

Out of me raw material imparted by family, the de'l'eloping person fonns the lif�t)'h, a psychological map of self and world that becomes our guide for action as we suive to overcome feelings of inferiority.

Mom (1984) has understood the lifestyle to be composed of four

elements: the ulJ-cunapt, or view ofLhe self �as is�; the �lfidro' or self

as one ought to be; the pidu�ofthe 1J.1fn'ld, on� 's model or �myth � about

why things worK as they do outside of oneself; and one's tthical tmlUic­ IWns. This map determines who we each are, as it determines the

choices we make.

Adler also proposed that we each have common life tasks

10

be

worked out in the course of normal li\li.ng; these "'Cre the tasks of living

230

MOOF./lNPSI'CHOTHf:RAPf£S

in the society of others. the task of UI01'k or occupation, and the task of sex or marriage. To these three, Mosak and Dreikurs (see Masak, 1984) added the rtligious task of determining one's relationship to the ulti­ mate and the task of coping with 01U'S self. We approach meeting these tasks quite differently depending on the lifestyles we have de\·eloped. Modd ofHtallh Adler believed that it is normal w have problems to cope with; in fact, life tasks are ongoing problems thai every person must continuallycope with, as no problem is c\'cr soked perfectly. The healthy person is ikely l to ha\'c grown up in a family where the parents modeled how to choose attainable goals and effective and flex.ible .... 'en destnlctivc emotions are chosen behaviors. Thus, Glasser (1984a) never says someone is depressed (a passi"e description), but that they are depressing (as in "depressing thcmsclves as a way to control"). We can ncver control others. but we afe accounwble for our own actions of all kinds. .

MO MODERNPSYCJIOTIl£JW>lES GI:u.ser, W. (1981). SlotUnu oflhemind: NewdirtdiolUJ(}f'fwlity IMl'afrJ. New York: Harper &: Row. Glasser. W. (1984a) . Centro//heory: � new o:planalionJor /tow WI': CUlltroi our li�. New York: Harper &: Row. (A hardback \'erslon of this book appeared under the title Tuk, if/tc/iw rontroi of'jour life, also in 1984.) Glasser. w. ( 1984b) . RealiTy therapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.). CUrtmtprydwthaapin (3d cd.). (pp. 320-353). IWCl. IL: F. E. Peacock. Ha;n'ik, C. (1 986) . Adlerian psychotherapy; The neurotic 5ymptom. Unpub­ lished paper, Wheaton College Graduate School. Hester. R. (1987). Memory. myth, parable, and tJle therapeutic process. lmlividual PrydwWgy. 43. 444-150. Huber. R. (1986). Adler and the Trinity Rdl!;:clions on a residency ill pastoral counseling. Individual PrydlQlogJ, 42, 413-419. Huber. R. (Ed.). (1987). Individual Psychology, 43(4). Jones. S. (1986) . Community psycholog}" III S.Jonc:s (Ed.), Psychology and Ihll C/trutian f (lith (pp. 240-258). Gr:tnd Rapids. MI: Baker. Kahoc. R. (1985). Reality therapy. In D. Benner (Ed.). &Ju:r nlcycWpMi(l of prychoJog, (pp. 978-981). Grand Rapids, M1: Baker. LaJ»It:y. J. (I 972). Reality tJlerapy revisited. Pro/oral Psycholog)', 23. 3-4. McDonald, M. (1981). The Chri$/ian view of mall. Westchester, lL: Crossway. Mosak, H. (1984). Adlerian psychotherapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.), Curtml pryc/w. /Mmpit.J (3d cd.) (pp. 5&-107). Itasca, IL: F. E. Pe.u;:ock. Myers, D. (1981). 7'h.t infoikd Jtlf New York: Seabury. R01.snafs:l.ky,j. (1974). The impact of Alfred Adler on three "(ree-wiUW ther.t­ piC!l of the 1960's.JmmUlI t>fIndividllal P�, 30, 6!).8(). U),lman,j. (1967). Adler, Alfred. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Enc}'�lopedia of philoit' ophy (pp. 15--1 7). New York: Macmillan. Van Leeuwen, M. ( 1987) . Pcnonality thl."oril:ing within a Christian wodd \·;cw. In T. Burke (Ed.), Mall allff mimi: � Christiall theory of pmonality (pp. 171.198). Hillsdale, Ml: Hillsdale College PreM. \\lhitdlOUse, D. (1984). Adleriall antecedents to reality therapy and control theory. }lJUrnaJ ojReality Thmlpy, 3, 1()'14. Young,]. (1982). The morality of reality therapy. }OO"Ull of Rmliry Therapy, I, 8-11.

10 PERSON-CENTERED THE Y

t is

especially difficult

to get beyond mere intuiti�'e and emo­

tional appeal when evaluating pel'5On-centered therapy. A.!; Mclemore

(1982, p. 142) has nOled, when it s i thoroughly

described, person-centered therapy sounds Mmuch like the skillful administration of grace-not easy-to-roll-off-the-tongue grace, but dt.-eply meaningful interpersonal acceptance and communion.� In­ deed, a counselor in this tradition would strike many

as

a good

model ofwhat it meam to be a wi� and patient friend, a person ",,;th an enonnous capacity to isten l attenLively and respectfully. In a cuhure like ours where interpersonal contact and intimacy can be

IOSl IO absorption in the tasks ofeveryday living, few would find these qualities unattractive. Perhaps one reason why Carl Rogen's theory and technique has been so warmly embraced within significant portions of the religious community is that it appears to give us

256 "aluable dues and guidance on how to respond to those in misery and distress, or how to concretely �Iove the brothers and sisters. �

Descriptive Survey

PhilosophicalAmlmptioru Probably no theory of counseling and psychotherapy more fully mani­ fests the humanistic spirit in contemporary psychology than does person-cemered therapy, and perhaps no single individual belter em­ bodied its essence than its founder, Carl Rogers. An ever�'ohing approach since the early 19405, penon-centered therapy has experi­ enced a noticeable rene....-al of late (Boy and Pine, 1982). It boldly asserts that the client, not the therapist, should be at the hean of psychotherapy (and hence, it is person-centered) since only the dient has the reSOllTce5 by which to become more aware of and remove his or her obstacles to personal growth. It is significant that Rogers,

i a fundamentalist Christian home and recently deceased, grew up n rejected the faith of his parents during college in favor of "liberalistic humanism� (Van Belle, 1985b. p. 1016). He appeared not to deviate from this position for the rest of his life.

h is quite clear that person-centered therd.py s i a reaction against .....hat Rogers perceived as the dogmatism of �preK"riptive� religion and the elitist and rAtionalistic tendencies of classical psychoanalysis. In stark contrast to the strongly biological and deterministic assumptions of the early Freudian model (chapter three), Rogers stressed a highly personal, phenomenological and positive \iew of human experience. Person-centered therapy is often said to embody the permissive and pragmatic mindset of the contemporary North American milieu (Van Belle, 1980). Person-centered therapy emphasizes the primacy of the individual and is often criticized for contributing to modern narcissism and the erosion of any shared sense of meaning orv-.t1ue in Contempo­ rary !>OCiety (Viu, 1977). Consistent with other humanistic approaches to counseling and

psychotherapy, person-centercd therapy warmly embraces a number

of key values (adapted from Korchin, 1976, pp. 353fT.): (I) Persons should not be �atOmized� or broken down into their component parts. bUl rather should be studied as whole and unique beings; (2) What persons tell

us

through self-report of their experience is to be more

highly valued than what we can observe direclly or objec:th,eJy; (3)Since we are coparticipants in the process of self-actualization, we must be

,

2J7 willing to enter into the consciousness and experiential field ofothers (as well as OUf own); (4) Intuition and empathic understanding should be \1ewed as extremely important means of gaining insight and under­ standing; (5) Knowing something about the aspirations, dreams, goals and values of others tells us far more than does a comparable amount of knowledge about the biological. environmental or historical deter­ minants of their behavior;

l choice, (6) Distinctive human qualities ike

creativity, self-actualization and valuation should be emphasized in our study of persons,

a�

well as health and normalcy; and (7) Persons have

the potential (0 act .... ith . choice. freedom and responsibility. and not be merely reactive to events. The heritage of person
that is consistent with deeply internalized conditions of worth. The chief Rogerian virtues are to be fully alive to the moment, completely self-accepting and strongly committed to an ongoing proce5.'i ofperson­ al growth.

Mothl ofAImt1muJJity

Unfonunately, few of us get through childhood so unscathed. Most of us are subjected to conditions ofworth, are loyed conditionally; that is,

we are expected to act in accord with the expectations of parents or significant others rather than by our instincts in order to receh'e acceptance. Christian discipline and instruction would, for Rogers, be a prime example of disrespect for the child's sclf-directedness. The chi l d is confronted with the need to deny cenain aspects of his expe­ rience and act according to rules or judgments of authority figures

(�God wanL'! me to honor my parents; I guess I'm not really angry at Daddy�). He then develops an ideal .self, dictated by parental wishes, which does not fil who he really is (MGood boys love their parents and don't get angry with them�) and develops a selft:rsonal soil in which the client's hidden drive to grow and dc\'elop can finally be released. Only through lhe proper char.l.ctcristics and competencies of the therdpist can the client. i nate move IOward greater congruence and retease of his or her own n capacities. A� coparticipants in a process of change and discovery. the diem/ therdpist relationship s i egalitarian. informal and nonauthoritarian. Fonnal assessment oEthe presenting concerns or underlying dynamics n i the forms of psychological testing or psychiatric diagnosis are seen as inappropriatc and unnecessary. Techniques, of which !.here are few in person<entered lherapy, are secondary to the therapist 'S attitudes. sensitivities and skills. Active listening, clarification and reflection of feelings, personal presence and �coparlicipation" are seen as Ihe only necessary -tools" in the repertoire of the person<emered therapist, coupled \\�lh a profound respeci for process and inner-directcdness. 1t is assumed that thc client will freely choose to translate the changes experienced in the intimate con text of therapy to outside relationships with others. Christian Critique

Philosophical Assumptions Compared to some traditions, pcrson<entcred therdpy is explicit about its philosophical presuppositions. Many aspects ohhese a�sump­ clons can be appreciate-d. The insistence on seeing people hOlistically and as purposeful, the appreciation of olher vrd)'S of knowing beyond rationality, and the pl'ofound respect of....·hat it means to be a person

I'f.RSU."-CJ. �\'tHIEJ) 'fIIHHP)"

263

hUlTlaJl llaturt: through greater self-a....oareness and understanding, has

been more hesi al1lly t asserted (d. Roberts. 1985). Rogers takes the opposite position. He is opt imistic about one's

cxperiem :e as the basis of delCrmining ( ..mh. but rather pessimistic abom the \allic of culture, dOb'lna. traditions and systems of morality (Roberts. in press)

.

Per'SOn-untcred therapy is also implici dy a system of ethics. In person-ccmered therap),.

one is ultimately responsible only to oneself.

Personal wholeness assumes primacy: it hecOIll{.'S a moral imperative (Brown ing I 987) , oflen at die expense ofa propcrappredation of our .

responsibilities to others. Focllsing on ly on removing our 0....·0 barriers to our personal growth poten tial can lead to regarding ourselves too high ly or to a naive optimism about the human condit.ion. Certainly there is a sense in which we are troubled because we don"t

know ourscl,'cs, but it

\\'

ould hc inaccurate to state that ""e

.

Mgh·e birth to ourselves M In conversion, we become more of a tfltt:

self. bllt certainl), not a complete self. For lhe Chri5ti an it is God alone who gives us birth-not the therapist. nor the i ncrea5ingly ,

congruent person. And with thai profession of fai th . !lew oppOrtu­ ni lies and responsibililies must be assumed. includi ng a strong eomrniuncnl to becoming manifCSlaliolU of God's grace in this world in .....ord and deed. MSelf_ismM runs the risk of developing into �rne-ism� (Vitz, 1977). Christians can appreciate thc

emphasis in pcrson-centcred therapy

individual freedom and responsi bility. Individual choice and ule capacity to c hange is affirmed in the Rogerian trAdition. Initiall),. as on

Tisdale ( 1988) has noted, such an assessment of the human condition

in lhe therapeutic COOlext might seem harsh and inscnsiti�·e since it 011

the cliell t. It .isks blaming clients for all ulcir problems or regarding them as having more freedom Ih.m they actually possess B1I I lhis view has reassuring implications. People are seen as ha\'ing the potential to act and make decisious despite their situations,

Ct!nters responsibility .

histories or limitations. a.� the Scri ptures frequendy assert. On

the other hand. the Christian tradition describes certain

limit;lIinns on our freedom: ....e . arc portra),cd as in bondage 10 e\'jl, self-deception and sin. Person-celHcred

therapy recognizes nonc of these Iirnitations. Still. the cm phasis on rcsponsibi li ty in person-ccll­

tered therapy is a refreshing contrasl 10 th e more pessim istic It'll­ dencies of the deterministie models and

lhe current infatuation with

�addiclion� models for all human problcms There is far too much .

264 extcrnali1.alion and projection of responsibility going on in con­ temporary American society. Browning (1987) points om a major problem with the Rogerian COllcept offreedom, however. Person-ccnlcred therapy reduces human growth to the process of pursuing self-actualization by following the direction of one's instinctual organismic valuing process. Rogers thus renders the intricate and complex task of moral decision-making to the merely instinctual. Browning argues that this s i actually destructive of a robust view of human freedom, in that freedom "'Would descend to allenti,'!'! listening to our biology� (p. 134). A robust view of freedom requires thal we choose responsibly between real options. 8Ul in the Ragerian scheme, there is al....'a}'s only one real option, thaloffollowing our biologically rooted imlinets. Morality men runs the risk of beeom­ ing a matter of following the instinctual compass, rather man being a rigorous and demanding response of the whole person. Finally, person-centered merapy sees itself strongl}' in the human science ramer than natural science tradition (Van Leeuwen, 1985).

Although a number of me assertions about the philosophy of science endorsed by person-centered therapy and me broad humanislic�xis­ tenlial tradition have enormous appeal to many Christian students of psychology, there is reason to be concerned about some of the conse­ quences of such thinking. Relatively little high-quality empirical

re­

search has been generated by this approach to the study of persons,

although Rogers himself \\."as a noticeable exception (Prochaska, 1984,

pp. 1 16-120). The founder of person-centered therapy promoted an Munusual combination of phenomenological understanding of clients and empirical evaluation of psychotherapyM (p. 116). Serious proposals by Christians for more human-science strategies have been thought-prl> \'Oking (e.g.. Farns\"'·onh. 1985: Van Leeuwen, 1985), but ha\'e stimulated noticeably less research than more traditional research methodologies (d. Evans. 1989). Christian minkcrs must be cautious about endorsing "ei­ ther-or" options with reference to a philosophy of science. Few theore­ ticians or thenlpists ha\'e been able to emulate Rogers's exanlple of phenomenological and empirical sophistication.

Mod" C of experi, ence the c1ielll is urged to have? Persoll-ccntered therapy appears to focus 100 much on inner subjective experience and presem-centered·

ness. If " problems in living" are seen as rooted in aberralions in per·

ception, then it makes sense to focus on lhe client's awarencss of lhe here-and·now. Christian faith is not nec.essarily incompatible with a deep concern about individual inner experience. and there is a sense in which the Christian tradition \'3lues the immediac}' of the present

existential moment. After all. ....e . arc told to ask onl)' for our "daily

bread" and to live each moment fully "as untO the Lord."

But the Christian tradition values others as well. Even mystical

272

contemplation is �en largely as a means to emfJO"o-er oneself for more focused and concentrated ministry rather than as an end in iLSeIf. And Lhe Christian tradition is deeply rOOled in a strong sense of God's working throughout redemptive histOry. Becoming centered -fully n i the Tl\oment� rum the risk of leading to a limited sense of familial, historical. personal or spiritual identity. We need a personal and collective �story,� or we will eventually have to face an overwhelming sense of emptiness (cf. Lasch, 1979; OT Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan. Swindler and Tipton. 1985). There are risks for the pcrson-ccntered therapy lherapisl as well. It s i tempting for the Rogerian therapist to mask his or her own identily and uniqueness by being constrained to relate to clients in a �person· cenlered" manner. The therapeutic uiad ofcongruence. empath)' and unconditional positive regard can all too easily degenerate into a i effecrual way of relating to persons in general. bland, safe and n runher, these qualities should not be reduced to skllb or sensitivities that can be turned on or off as the occasion demands. Indeed, this would be the epitome of incongruity. There is a risk in perwn<entered therapy of the client developing an unhealthy dependency relationship with the therapisL McLemore (1982) reminds us of the almOSt inevitable tendency of a client to O\'eridentify with the therapist if the therapist does nOt set appropriate expectations, clarify hisor herrole, orestablish reasonable limits. Good therapy needs to help persons to learn how to deal with the reaJity of conditional love in the world (Strupp and Binder, 1986), but a poorly managed empathic relationship can eventua1ly increase unhealthy dependence and regression, rather than a greater degree ofaulonomy i particular, it is impera­ and maturation. For the Christian clinician n tive Lha! credit is given to the ultimate source of grace, since, in some m)'steriow and powerful way, we embody "Jesus Christ� for the client Person<entered the,dpy has probably been the most widely adapted approach to people-helping that has C\'er been developed. Applications for the business, educational, familial. group, individual, marit.'l.l and parental contextabound i.n the literature (cf. Corey, 1986). Person<entered thempy is also \\.idely appreciated for the \'o�dyS in which it has been adapted for the training of lay and paraprofessional coun.selof'$, It has helped mental heaJLh professionals to �give p�)'chol­ ogy awol}''' to the people. with all the ob\oloUS risks and benefits that entails, No doubt person-centered therapy is the dominant method used n i the initial phases of counselor training (c[ Meier, 1989)-per-

•

P'

,

274

miSlic. Rogers's unbridled optimism about the potential for growth from within can be less than helpfill LO those whose hun and pain rencel a greater variety of biological, psychosocial or socioculLural causal faclors than merely "blocks to their self-actualization. � No doubt, the therapeutic conditions of acceptance, empathy and honesty are powerful medicine. but they are nOl neccMarily sufficient La combat the diverse challenges of the human situation, Perhaps the approach is most helpful when the dientdoesn't need 10 go very deep or very far, or where. practically speaking, I.he e1ien! cannOI (cf. Kovc1, 19i6). And as Corcy (1986) has argued. are we really LO believe thai one particular relationship. no matler how powerful it is, can reverse the effecLS of years (or decades) of highly conditional Im'e? And how does an experience ofperson-cenlcred therapy prepare us for a world where so few persons evidence those qualities of health thaI arc -canonized- by Rogerian therapy (i.e., congruence, empathy and unconditional po5iti\"(� regard)? The greater the discrepancy be­ tween the dream and the realil)', the more potential there is for despair and frustration. Conclusion Few models of peapk'-helping han! been as widely discussed in Chris­ tian circles as has person<enlered therapy, We have already developed at length the most imponam criticisms of this model. N a ·purist­ humanistic theory, there are tOO many inadequacies in person<en­ terre therdpy for it e\'er to ser\'c as the foundation for a thoroughI)· Christian approach to personal healing. Perhal)S the enduring legacy of pcrson<entcred therapy for Chris­ tians will be the respect this tradition has for persons. Rogerians have taught us much about what it means to deeply care for (and be cared for by) others. Although we must be careful to realign certain concepts so that they conform more closely to the truth of the re\'ealed will of God, we can certainly be grateful that Rogers and his followers have deeply sensitized us to what it means 10 listen to someone (Jacobs. 1975). As Bonhoeffer (1954, p. 97) pcrcepti,·cly observed more than a half­ century before. 'The first service one o... :es to others in the fellowship consists in listening to them. Just as lo\"e to God begins with listening to His Word, so the beginning of love for the brethren is learning to listen to them. - All too often Christiam are talk.ing when we should be

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276

MODE.RSPStTJfaTHEMJ'iE.S

1 9+202. Ellens,]. (1982). God's grace and hUmlIl1 MaltA. Nashville: Abingdon. E\"Mls, C. (1989). n'Udom and hUlllan1U!U in psycJwloD. Grand Ibpids, MI: Baker. E\"anil, C. (1990), 5fflon Kinttgara d'j ChriJliaPl prycholofrl. Grand Rapids. MI: Zondel"'all, FamS'o'oX)rth, K. (1985). ltlluJU.hMrUd inkgrflticn. Grand Rapids. MI: Baker. Gaede. S. (1985). &longing. Grand Rapid!. t.U: Zonden-all. Garfield, S. (1980), Psyc/wthlrfJ(fJ: An tclectic approach. New Yorlr.:John Wiley. Hammond, D.; Hepworth. D.; and Smith, V. (1978), IWlfJrotring therapeutic (Ol1un'.!nirofiqn, San �'raJ:1CiJcO: josscy-&w. Jaco�J. (1975). A Christian client cousidcn Carl Roge�. Journal ofPrycilolOfD and ThtoIhgy, J, 25-30. Korchin, S. (1976). Mcxknl (linienl PSJ'IuJkJgJ. New York: Sa.sic Books. Ken'!':!']. (1976). !r. «mt/Jkk guitk 10 llina",. New York : Pamlieon. Lasch,J. (1979). 1M cui/un ofnarcis.si5111. New York; Warner Books. Lewis, C. S. (1968). A. mind au.oak: An anthology ol e s. Lewis. (e. Kilby, Ed.) New York: Harcourt. Brace ;Uld World. McLemore, C. (1982). 7M IUmdol ofP$J(.holhnofT1. \'rneaLOn, Il: Tyndale. Mclemore, C. (1984). Honet Chrutimlil]. J'hiladelphia: Wesuninster. Meador. B., and Rogers. C. (1984). PenolH;cntered theI';tpy. In R. Corsini (Ed.), CUm'PIt �holhmlpia (3d cd.) (pp. 142-195). lta!lCa.lL: F. E. Peacock. Meier, S. (1989). ThL �IS ofrot.lJu.c/i1lg. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Myers. D. (1981). The inflottd ulf. New York: Seabury. Oakland, j. (1974). Sclf-actuaJization and sanctification. j(JUrnol of PsydiobJgj mId Th.tobJgy. 2, 202·209. Oden, T. (1968). Klrygma and counseling. Philadelphia: Westminster. Ortberg.J. (1981). Accepting our acceptance: 50me limitatiom ofa Rogerian approach to the nature of grace. Joomat of PrjchologJ lind ChriJtilinity. I, 45-50.

Patterson. C. (1985). Th.c thmlp.cutic rtlntiomhip: Fmmdatimu for a/I «itdic fn'}ehol/u:mfT1. MOllterey, CA.: Brooks/CoOle. Peck. M. (1983). p. of thllit. New York: Simon and Schuster. Prochaska,j. (1984). SyjlD/f.! ofpsycholMrafrJ: A. tmruthtorrlical amllysis (2d ed.). Homewood, 11.: Oo�. Roberu, R. (1982). Spirituality and hU7IIO/1 tfMtions. Grand RapidS. MI: EerdmaJl$. Roberts. R. {I 985). Carl Rogers and the Christian \irtues.jfJUnwi of Pry c1wlo/l:] and tMrJJogy. 1J. 263-273. Roberts. R. (1988). Unpublished class notes. Wheaton College Cr.tduate School, Wheaton, IL Roberts. R. (in prc:ss) . Taking tA, ward to hMrl. Grand Rapids. MI: Eerdmans. RogCT$, C. (1961). On M.Offling a pm,,,,. Boston: Houghton Mimin. Rogers, C. (1980). A U1aJ oJbnng. BasIon: Houghton r-.liffiin. Rychlak. j. (1973). hllrodudion to /'nJlmaliI'J tJlld psycJwtht:m/YJ. Boston: Houghton Mimin. Smede5. L (1978). Low within limilS. Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmalls. Strupp, H., and Binder. G. (1986). PsydwlhnufT1 in d n.cw key. N"",' York: Basic

277 Boob.

Tall, S. (1987). Intr.l.penonal intcgration: The ser ... a nl'$ spirituaiity.JOtlmal of

Psycholot:! and Christanil], i 6, 34-39. Thielicke, H. (1964). TIIetthies ofSiX. U. Doberstein, Trans.)

New York.: Harper

&: Row.

TIsdaJe.J. (1988, October). Humanistic psycholherapyassumptions and Chri.... tian counseling. Paper presented al the International Conference on Christian Counseling, Atlanta, Georgia. Van Belle, H. (1980), &.ric inlml and IhmJ�ti, approach ol eAr! R. 1Wgm. Toronto: Wedge Pubti�hing. Van Belle, H. ( 1985a). PCI"$OII-centered therapy. In D. Bellner (t:d.), lJaMr Encycloptdia ofPsychology (pp. 822-825). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

Van Belle. H. (1985b) . Rogers. Carl Ransom. in D. Benner (Ed.), &Mr l ETlCJelcfJmia ofP.sytMJfJt{J. (pp. 1016-101 7). Grand R3pids, MI: Baker. Van Leeu....en. M. (1985). T� pmDn in psyduJlDg]: A amtnnporory Christian DpflroisaL Grand Rapids. Ml: Eerdmans. Viu:. P. (1977). PsycholofJ IlS rtligi01l: TM cult of�lfwonhip. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Wagner. M. (1975). TM SClsation of bting JOnubod,. Grand Ibpilh. MI: 7.on­ dCI''an. Wohl.J. (1982). Eclecticism and Asian counseling: Critique and application. 1111mu1tionnljofJ.T1Iaifor 1MAduanamtrll of Cou�Ujng. ,. 21�222.

11 EXISTENTIAl, THE Y +

xistential therapy has been defined as -" dynamic ap­ proach to therapy which focuses on concerns that are rOOled in the indi\idual's existenceM (Yalom, 1980, p. 5). Although only four per cent of the psychotherapists in America en­ dorse exiStentialism as their primary orientation (Prochaska and Norcross, 1983). this approach has had a far greater impact than this small figure would suggest. Indeed, one Christian existential psycho­ therapist, John Finch, had a major influence in the founding and development of the Graduate School of Psychology at Fuller Theolog­ ical Seminary (Malony, 1980). Perhaps most accurdtely described as a divc� group of attitudes and philosophical approaches to psychomcrapcutic practice. existen­ tial Iherdpy is generally not seen as a sepante school ofp�1'chotherapy like behaviorism or psychoanalysis. Nor does exislential lherapy seem

,

279

to lend itself to neatly defined models of personality, pSrChOpalhology or psychotherApy. Yet the attitudes and values that undergird existen­ tial therapy have been incorporated into many systems of counseling [ has become a Mstrange but and psychotherapy: so thal cxi.�tel1tiaism oddly familiar" orientation for therapists of all persuasions irrespective oflheir control beliefs and world views (Valom, 1980), At the 5.'lme lime, in the judgment of Norcross (1987. p. 4 1 ) . existential therapy "is a diffuse and declining approach plagued by a lack of consistency. coherency. and scrutiny. � D u oiplive Survey

l understanding of this dilfuse but important approach lO To faciit.ue understanding human difficulties and growth. we \g)'. Na.' York: Random House. The book that is widely credi tcd �il.h inu-oducing existential thought to the North Amerk:1n Kenc.

Mullen.j. (1981). Kitrletgtwrds phirosophy. New York: New American Library. Excellent illlrOOuctioll

lO

the general lhought of Kierkegaard.

Yalom. I. (1980). £xiIUnliolprych(Jlh«afT'j. New York: B...,ic BooklJ. The definitive reference in exislential psychotherapy.

References Benner. O. (1988). PsydlothtrafrJand Ihnpirilualqutjl. Grand Rapids MI; Baker. Bugental.j. (1978). PSJchothtrap>' and frroCts:s Tillfimdamental.s ofan exiJlt7Itial· h"mar,ishC afJIJrrKUh. Reading. M-\.: Addison·Wesley. Bugental J. (1981). Tlu mlrch for authC1licity: An triJtrntialofJnai)'lic approach kJ p!i)'chothtrapy (re\'. cd.). KewYork: Holt, Rinehan and Winston. Carter ] (1985). Healthy personality. In D. Benner (Ed.). Bam C1t:ycJqpdia of prydwlogy (pp. 498-504). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Corey. G. (1986). Throry and proaia of coun.sding and psychOlhtrallJ (&I cd.). ,

.

,

.

Mon terey. CA: BrooIu/Coh:.

(1984). ExisIC1halism: Tht phikwphy Of dtjptJir and tht qut$1 f()T h�. Grand Rapids MI: Zonder.-an. E\'3os. C. (1989). Wildo," and humtJnlU'll in psychology. Grand Rapids, Ml: Baker. E\'am, C. (1990). S.rrn �rr1's ChriJhali fJJ>·chckJgy. Grand Rapids. Ml: Zondervan. Finch.J. (1982). Nishkal1Ullwrma. Pasadena. CA: Integration Press. Finch,j., and Van Dragt, B. (1985). Existential psychology and pS)'chotherapy. In D. Benner (Ed.), BaktrrncydofHdia ofprychology (pp. 372 ·377) . Gr.md E\"allS. C.

,

Rapids, Ml: Baker.

(1978). Celtbralion ofdiJciplint. New York: Harper & Row. Frankl, V. (1959). Man$ �TCh Jar IIIfn fl ing: An inlTodl4ction to logothtrapy. New

Foster, R.

York: Pocket Books.

Fraokl, V. (1965).

Tlu dfKt()T and Ih� sIJ!lL' Fro", prychothtruP'J

10

il>gothuap>'. New

York: B:uHam. Frankl, V. (I 9i5).

Tlu IlnmllJciOU5 god. Nel,1 York: Simon and Schusler.

,\/OlJ£R,\'PSYCJIOTllElW'lES

302

"'riedman, M. (Ed.). (1973). TM wori.ds o/ecistmlialiJm: A crihwi rrodn. Chicago:

Uni\'crsiry of Chicago. Haden, N. (1987). Qoheleth and the problem ofalienatioll.

RnJiw, 17, 52-66.

Chrisli4n SdwkJrJ

Heidcgger, �.1. (1962).

Being (lnd timt. New York: Harper & Row. Hurding, R. (1985). RooI� and shoots. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Kaufman, W. (Ed.). (1975). Existnltinlism from DtJ5/orosky 10 Sartu. New York: Meridian.

Kierkegaard, S. ( 1 980). Thuicknes.5 unwMalh (H. Hong and E. Hong, Trans.) . Princeton: Princeton University Pre". Korchin. S. (1976).

MOIhm clinical PSJr1IO�. New Vork: Basic Books.

Ka.'e\.J. (1976). A tomph" guiik to (hl:ropy. New York: Pantheon, 1-.talon)'. H. (Ed.). (1980).

A ChriJtian mJkrlliaf /My,JUJwg:F

77Ii amlriim/ion

of

John G. Find!, Washington: Unh'er5iIY Press of America.

ExislmliaJ /»'jchologj. New York: Random Hou$(:. (1981). FTffl/am and ooliny. Ne",' York: Nonon.

May. R. (Ed,). (1961). May. R.

May. R., and Yalom. L (1984). Existential psychothempy. ln R. Corsilli (Ed.),

ClHT�t ps,CMtMropies (3d ed.) (pp. 354-391). Itasca, IL F'. E. Peacock. McLemore, C. (1983). Hrmt.'it ChriJtianity. Phi l adelphia: Westminster. Mullen,j. (1981). KUmgaard 's philasophy. New York: New American Library. NorcrOM.J. ( 198i). A rational and empirical analysis ofexistential ps),chotherap)'.Jmmml oj ffulfWniJtic Psychakgy,

27, 41-68.

7M critir4i ),fflJl. New York: Harper & Row. i (2d ed.). Chicago: Prochaska.J. (1984). PsJclwthC'apy: A translhmrfflcal analyss

Parks, S. (1986). Doney.

Prochaska,J., and Norcross,J. (1983). Colltcmporal'Y psychotherapistS: Char­ acteristics, pr.lctices, theories. and attitudes.

Ps)'daallwapy: Theary, Rt.0lrda

and Prattiu. 20, 620-627. RoberI.'!. R. (1986. Apri l ) . John Hneh on our IWO selves. Unpublished paper pre5ented at Wheaton College, Wheaton. IL. Rychlak, J. (1973).

Introoudian 10 /Jmanalit), and prydwtlumpy. BOSlon:

Houghton Mimin. Solomon, R. (Ed.). (1974). &isltlitiaLUm. New York: Modern Libr.uy. TiJljch. 1'. ( 1952). � mural?

Tillieh,

to be New Ha\-en, Cf: Yale Uni,'t:�jty Press.

P. (1960). ExL�lenlialism. p!!),chother·from a Christiall IIitu-opoint. Grand Rapids, ;\I1; Baker. Vande Kemp. H. (1986). The dangers or p�)'chologism: The place of God in psyc.hology.Joumal ofPrydwlolrJ and 1'1ita1ogy. 14, 97·109. Van Omgt. 8. (1985). A peace lhal passeth understanding: An existential view of the �dark night.'Journal rifp$)'cJwiogy Vall Leeuwen. M. (1985).

and C/lriJli(lnity, 4, 15-18. TM pmtm in P$)'chology; A (OIltmtfJorary C/lrtili(ln

(lppraisaL Gr.ll1d Rapids, Ml: £erdman,. Yalom. I. (1980). &isle1ltiaillJ)·dwtlu:mfr:j. NL'W York: Basic Book.$.

12 GESTALT THE

y

+

esmh therapy is perhaps the most phenomenological and pragmatic of the humanistic approaciles to people-help­

ing. The exciusi,'e focus in Gestalt therapy is all the here­

and-now ofimmediate experience and the integration offragmented parts of the penonality. Gestalt therapists agree mat emph�g the "why" of beha,ior (i.e.. insight and explanations) or analrz.ing past C\'("nts is far k'SS

therapeutically useful than sucs,ling the more CNen ".'hat� and "how" of present beha,ior. or the specific ways in which unfinished bus.iUCM from the

past intrudes on cum:nt functioning. GestaJt therapy appcals to those who are looking for g,eater depth and meaning in their intimate I'dacionships. Member.; of the religious community might find it especially attractive if they want something beyond the �unheallhy. sticky. manipulative, and symbiotic togetherness" that someLimes �haraclerizes our efforts to build and maintain community (McLemore.

1982, p. 162).

304 The founder of Gestalt therapy, "Fritz� Perls, u-ained as a psy. choanaly:;t in Germany between the wars (as he discusses in his

autobiography. I 969b) . Gestail lherapy reflects certain emphases of t.he psychoanalytic tradition, especially me role of the defense mech­ anisms in the development of symptoms. The academic Gestalt psychology tradition in Europe. which researched sensation and perception, also innuenced Perls. The major characteristics of per­ ception which these researchers stressed arc summarized in such maxims as "The whole is more than the sum of the parts.� The prevalell l existential philosophy of the time also had a substantial impact on Perls. He eventually forged Gestalt therapy as a creative merger of concepts from existential philosophy, psychoanalytic and GeStalt psychology, and techniques developed in the creative or expressive arts (e.g., psychodrama) . Before his death in

19;0, Perls made considerable use of ideas from

Zen Buddhism. Taoism and the human-potential movement. Foryears.

he \\-"a5 a resident "guru� in workshop and retreat centers across North

America. A strong and forceful personality, Perls had a devoted follow­ ing in both lay and professional circles. Although the influence of Gestalt therapy hlU waned considerably in the past decade, il was documented n i videotapes. audiotapes and therapy transcriptS when it l .... '35 at its apex of popularity. Although few clinicians today 'would describe themselves as Gestalt therapy "purists" philosophically or methodologically, many of the techniques of this approach have been widely adapted to the psychotherapeutic context.

Descriptive Survey

Philos&lJhcal i Assumptions aNd Model ofPtncmality The initial formulations ofCestalt therapy by Perls and his colleagues are difficult to evaluate becau!oe they are so decidedly antirational, openly disparaging intellectual precision and rigor. More recent "er­ sions of Gestalt therapy are more respectful of cognitive processes, but they share with earlier formulations a tremendous di5dain for "mind games" (irrational intellectualisms or rationalization!'), A5 such, its proponents lend not to delaiJ the philosophical assumplGood $umm.arie� of its therapc:ulk strategies can be found in F3ian and Shepherd 11970).JamenndJongeward (1971). Lamer (197') . Passon& ( 1975). Polsterand Po�ter (197'). Simkin and VanIer (1984). Van De Riel:and Korb (1980) and Zinker (l978).

305

(;JI �TM.TTNEJHI'I'

tions or v.dues on which the Gestalt therapy is based. making it more difficult

to perceive ils implicit con\1cuons aoom human nature.

C' ...cst..'lh therapy is an approach that stresses the unity of mind, body and feelings. It is a hybrid approach th:tt draws rdther freely on psychodynamic and phenomenological formulauons. Gestah places great emphasis on awareness, authenucity, confrontation. encounter. immediacy, personal responsibililyand ri5k taking. The keyassumpuon is that .....e are fully resfxmsible for our own behavior and experiencing. Perhaps this is nowhere more clearly evident than in the widely qUOled �Gestah pra}"er�: "I do my thing and you do your thing. I am nOt in this ....orld . to live up to your expectations and you are nOt in this ....orld . to live lip to mine. You are you and

I am I and ifb)' chance .....e find each other, i['s beautiful. IfnO{, it can't be helped� (Perls. 1969a, p. 4). Easily

n i terpreted only as a license for self-gratification or irresponsible hedonism, it more accurately reflects the extreme emphasis gestalt therapy places on personal autonomy as well as the need for individuals to more fully experience the present moment through n i creased awareness of what they are thinking, feeling and doing when they are interacting with others. Perls argued that persons are essentially biological organisms .... 'ith slTong needs. He generally limited these to breathing, hunger, thirst, sex, shelter and survival. A major task in a given day is to gel these organismic needs, or "end-goals,M meL The meeting of these needs in the present situational context i� the Gestalt-therapy version of a "self-actualization" drive (as opposed to the "optimization of personal potential" version of Rogenan psychology, chapter ten). Meeting one's o' .. .. n current organismic needs in a constructive. creative and healthy fashion is the ultimate goal ofGestah therapy. This could result in either greater self-integration or hedonism, depending on one's perspective. Whether this will translate into more responsible ethical and moral behavior in th(' larger societal context is a matter of n i tense debate in both lay and professional circles (e.g., Browning, 1987) . Gestalt therapy assumes that greater a....areness of organismic needs and situational requirements s i curative in and of itself. Persons are assumed to have the capacity

.....

within to support themselves in adaptive

a ys if the), are \\illing to examine and perhaps change the unique and

specific ways in which they see, feel, sense and interpret the realities of their personal needs and

of their situational context in the present

moment. In other words, accurate perception ofselfand surroundings

,I'ODFA\,I'SI'alanlF.RAPIr.5

306

will unk-ash the inherent capacity of the individual to rn/!(!t his or her own needs.

Fonner students of "introductory psychology should remember "

the example of the [amOlL' figurt/grmmd perceptual phenomenon,

most often exemplified by the ·fac�...ase� figure When olle focuses on .

the vase, the faces become mere background. but when onc focuses on the faces on either side of lhevase figure, the vase disappears to become mere background. Perls assened that ....e . nonnally form figure/ground perceptions of our needs, but experience these as discomfort or pain when they are disrupted (called "dis-imegratctr figure-glound differ­

entiation by Gestalt therapiSts). Perls argued that grtaU:r QUNlfflUSS of

our organismic needs and silUational requirements could pOlcntially result n i greater j1lt�gratum. We try out wlutions, discard those that do

not work for us and assimilate those I"hich do work for us. As we bring completion to these end-goals, we form wholes or

·GestaltsM which we can �Ict go or.M The assumption, consistent with

other humanistic approaches. is that there is an innate tendencywilhin all ofus to become more self-aware and thereby move toward a position

orgreater autonODl)' orwhoJem.-ss (the term Gestalt therapy practition­ er.! tcnd to use instead of aUlonomy).

GeStalt therapy places absolute confidence in our capacity to regu­ late ourselves from within. Authority resides exdusiw/y with that a....-are­ ness. External criteria apan from subjective experience are not to be tnlSted. "Mind g-.unes· (and often cognitive processes in general) are downplayed becauS(: Ihey lend to be the repository of rules, laws or regulations that have been assimilated from others withoU! personal integration. Thus these externally dcril'Cd rules almost inc\;tably result in unhealthy forms of dependence. usually in persons rdying on moralisms or Mshoulds- for guidance rather than on their own percep­ tions. Gestalt therapy has a rather low view of accountability to others since our wants and needs assume a position of absolute primacy. The i fully alive and aware, who fully functioning person is the one who s meets biological needs in an adult and responsible fashion. and who is not dependen t on others to meet these needs. lndh�duality tends to

be glorified and this can readily translate into a low view of relation­ ,

ships. In other words, we arc responsible to support ourselves fint and foremost and to stop depending on othen; to meet our needs for u�. Self-sufficiency, then, is a pre-eminent \;rtue in GeStalt therapy. In therapy Gestalt practitioners place great emphasis on our capac-

CESrALTTHERAI"l

307

it)' to take care of ourselves. The assumption is that in the long run il1 help us find continuous perceptual feedback and integlfES

Model
less need to be affirmed for who we

are (Rogers) and more need to stop pla)ing games, summon the courage to percei\'e ourselves and our ....,orld accurately. and stand on our 0....'1 twO feeL Grov.'th is thw not through affirmation (Rogers) as much as it is through confrontation and encounter. Immediacy and \�tality in experience are the ultimate virtues in Gestalt therapy. The ·shoulds· of collecti\'e morality are seen as vices, especially when they are used as a substitute for avoiding personal responsibility or risk-taking in the interpersonal context. As Korchin

(1976) has perceptively observed, Gestalt therapy's strongest appeal is perhaps to lhosc persons who feel o\'erburdened and oversocialized by the demands of contemporary Western societies btll feel relatively powerless in their drorts to become more aware of their own needs and wallL'1 (i.e., they are ·out of IOUch,. Gestalt therapy is certainly the most directive and confronti\'C approach to people-helping. If it follo\"'$ rrom the theory that clients must discover the fragmented parIS of their personality. then it follows that this can only be achieved by focusing exclusi\'eiy on the direct experience of the here-and-now. Working primarily through the ob­ ,orks tow-.m! the servable nonverbal and bodily clues. the therapisl .... goal of assisting the client in scelting fe....er environmental or external supports and (award greater intl.'grity and personal respons.ibility. B)'

]J2 whal CQnsu;clcd ill lheir abilil}' LO express either the depth orfull range of their feelings and who arc relatively free of �gross� psychopathology (e.g., psychosis. severe neurosis, org-<mic mental disorders, develop­ mental disabilities, ctc.). While judged by many to be effective in helping those who tcnd to overcontrol or repress their emotional expressiveness, serious concern should be raised about whether it should be used wilh persolls who are, comparatively speaking. un­ dercolltrOlled or impulsive (e.g., antisocial or oorderline). Both clients and therapists in Gestalt therapy are actively involved

n i encountering and confronting unfinished business--that is, unre­ solved figure/background Gestalts. Trea.�ured virtues in Gestalt ther­ apy. developed through greater organismic self-regulation, include full acceptance of personal responsibility, living fully n i the present mo­ ment and direCi experiencing as opposed to talking about things. \Vhen we are truly willing to confront our Mimpasse," greater energy is released as we �implode" and e\'Cnmally �explode � into the full recog­ nition of our biological needs. Until then, we will only wperfecl our nt'uroses� rather than conIron! them. Only when we are willing to confront lhe contradictions and polarities of our lives can we move toward reintegration of the -disowned� pans of our being.

Ouistian Critique

Pflilosophiool Assumptions and Model ofPersrmality GeStalt therapy smves to be a system that optimizes human freedom and autonomy while putting thinking in its proper place. We will discuss autonomy below, but will here focus all the understanding of freedom and cognition. First. \\-;th Browning

(1987)

we

\\-1)uld note thaI in making self-ac­

tualization a narrowly biologically based dri,'e for fulfillment, Gestalt thcr..lpy renders il� account of human nature one which actually makes it impossible for human beings LO transcend their physiological con­ straints. Gestalt therapy a.ssens thai

.... e .

are ultimately free only when

.....e do what our biological llrges push us to do, assuming that we act n i a nonmanipulativc manner. This runs the risk of being a profoundly impoverished view offreedom. By equating being human \\;th being physiological, humans are trapped. Perls's injunctions to follow one's biological urges rna)' create lhe illusion of choice, but Ih(..",), aClually dcplelc our greatest window of choice, thai being our capacity to transcend, lI.;th God's help, the

,

r .l :sT M .T TIIM/'"'1'1'

113

bounds or Ollr own sellishncss and physicalness to do what God calls U� to. To he human is to be a biological being (and to rejoice in that stale) . but we are not merely biological beings. The broader issue in Browning's (1987) analysis is that psychothcr­ apy systems often take somewhat legitimate descriptions of Mnonmoral goods,� such as feelings. needs, awareness and so forth, and then arrange them in conll''3.Teness'' being ad\'0C3.ted. The conformity pres­ sures within our Christian communities and subcultures run the risk or denying and distorting �rsol1a1 experience (d. McLemore. 1984). More underslanding about the way we manage the inevitable differ-

,

,

315 encesofopinion that occur in human relationships might do much to help our Christian communities achie\'c a grealcr sense of unity of purpose. Like.... ise. greater candor about our efforts to create intimacy i portant beginning point in establishing in relationships might be an m and enhancing rruly interdependent relationships. But we are concerned about the extreme emph;asis in Gestalt lherapy on self-awareness and self-fulfillment as critically important goals in themselves, especially when they arc not translated into a broader relational context. The balanced Christian is nOtjusl selfo(.ii­ reeled but other-directed as well. Self-sufficiency is ultimately an illu­ sion since we are created

to be

in relationship with God and others.

While we should take seriously the need 10 be fully alj\"c and aware, it is not a substitute for: concentrated and focllsed ministry that is primar· ily other-directed. Personal experience should indeed be valued, but its value is limited, especially .....hen compared to the importance of the authority of Scripture or the discerning role of the local community of belicvers. To Perls and other Gestalt therapists, the willingness to conform oneself to moral rules from the Scriptures and the guidance of others would

be seen as a form of dependent, ingenuine �other-regtllation. �

The pursuit of autonomy or wholeness rules a1l. Gestalt therapy at its best-when it is relatively free of its irresponsible hedonistic distor­ l l an incomplete education. The awareness that isso deeply tion�is sti \'3.lued in Gestalt therapy is only a partial and temporal understanding of ccrtain aspeCtS of selves, but when this assumes a position of absolutc primacy in our understanding of who we arc it is most certainly a pemicious \lc...... Finall)', we note the strong distrust of thinking in most \"Crsions of Gcstalt therapy (Benner,

1985). Though it would be fuir to say that we

all engage in '-mind games� in the course of evcryday existence, the fear of irrational intellectualism and rationalizations need not-and should not-generalize to the whole domain of cogniti\'e processes. The �go .....ith your gUl� instinct that lends lO emcrge from most forms of Gestalt therapy potentially leads to destructive pluralism and re\ati,·· ism where there is eventually little hope of achieving any clear consen­ sus on integrating theory or, more import.'lntiy. a cohercOI purpose or reason for li'lng. Pan of our difficulty in writing about Gestall thcnpy is Ihat a clearly

i the writings of Peds and articulatcd model of personality is lacking n others. Gestalt thenpy is almost deliberately antiscientific or at least

Jl6 prcscientific. Indeed, to be told that !.he only true WdY LO wunderstand�

GeSL1.Jt therapy s i to

cxpc rience

w

it� can iea\'c the "uninitiated" with a

strong sense of frustration (if not exasperation ) . To be fair though ,

,

this is not unlike the dilem ma that exi�ts when the nonbeliever uies to fully comprehend Scripture. A fair statement would probably be to

assert that Gestalt therapy requires a "leap offaith in which lhe novice ..

must be willing, al lea�t temporarily. to suspend certain critical faculties in order to morc fully appreciate its cUr.l.tive potemials.

Model ofHmlth Some aspects of Gestalt therapy's view of health are not incompatible with the Christian \iew ofwholeness. For example. Gestalt therapy has enriched our understandn i g ofwhat it means to be truLhful

.

ItS prim:uy

emphasis on nonverbal distortions has given us significant insights

aOOm the �larel'S of deccit� that all too oftcn charactel;ze our in terper­ sonal relationships (d. Mclemore.

1984). Gestalt therapy tcaches us

about the need to place greater stress on experiencing and doing rather dian merely talking about things. cenai nly a reasonable admon­

ishment to lilo8C ofus .....ho care deeply about facilitating a commitment

to lifelong learning and growing.

To a limited but significant degree. the emphases in Gestalt therapy on body awareness. direcmess, freedom. honesty. openness. responsi­ bility and spontaneity can be appreciated. Perls correctly says that our �problems in living� are often a function of our mjsuse of these capacities. of our deliberate decisions LO �play games� or of our 10slng

courage. But these �means, R these capacities. "'ere meant to serve far different �ends� for the Christian. They are not directionless, but ....ere .

meant to be targeted on a goal. We are told repeatedly to embrace

justice and mercy, walk humblr and show compa.\Sion not because of .

what they �do� for us, but because they are appropriate responses to Cod's grace. Clearly lacking in Gestall therapy is any concept of hol.iness or spiritual maturity, Self-fulfillment in proper alignment might be good temporal stewardship of our gifts and talents, but it needs to be directed tOward a much higher purpose worshiping God and serving others because "he first loved us."

A person may embody the characteristia. of health as developed in

the Gestalt therapy tradition, yet be living an impoverished life in a

spiritual sense. On the other hand, persons who appear (at least on the surface ) to have achieved some measure ofspri i mal holiness could be

living lh"cs that are personally or psychologically bankrupL To be fair,

317

however, it should be said thai it is possible for a person to embody aspects of the Gestalt therapy vicw of health and also be mature spiritually. Indeed, we have both inleraned with colleagues who em· braced certain clementS orthe Gestalt therapy vision ofhealth without visibly sacrificing their Christian commitment and witness. Authentic maturity implies a high degree of congruence between the inner and outer dimensions of our lives. We fear that GeStalt therapy all too often stresses the former ""iLhout seriously addressing the laller. The enduring question Ulat emerges is whether the more fully functioning person in the Gestalt therapy tradition is any more reccp­ li\'c to basic assertions of the Christian faith. Our fear is that this fulfilled penon in the Gestalt therapy understanding may be an indi­ vidual who is culturaJly, historically and personally dislocated. Indeed, the person may have an inflated .sense of self, or at least a seriously incomplete understanding of her or his fundamental humanity. Our identity as Christians is deeply rooted in a grO\\ing sense of our place in the march of redemptive history, nurtured in the context of Christian community. We feel strongly that it is a decided risk in Gestalt therapy that one can be so Wfully alive to the moment� that one loses all sense of a proper respect for the past or appropriate concern aboul the future. The potential distrusl of�righl thinking" (i.e., orthodoxy) can result in such extreme detachmelll from external reality and transcendent absolutes that there is little engagement in the demands of everyday living iJerond the personal realm. Although it may be argued thai we exaggenHe Ihe risk.� invoh'ed, from an eternal perspec" tive, we should nOt take these concerns liglllly. We fear that one of the main \inues of Gestalt therapy, self-understanding, might potentially lead to the pride inherent in a gro""ing sense of self- sufficiency rather than self-support.

Model ofAbrllJrmaJity There is much in the Gestalt therapy model of psychopathology that the Christian can find useful. The description of the levels of our deception, for example. can be painfully aCCU••He (cf. McLemore, 1984; Peck, 1983). In Christianity. these aberrations are ultimately consequences of the Fall, and more directly and immediately the result of our propensity toward sinning. In Gestalt therapy, they are first and foremost decisions to get others to take responsibility for us and meet our needs. Further, Gestalt therapy does not addreS!! the origins ohuch deceit in the larger societal context; psychopathology s i primarily a

MOI)fJtVl'Sl'CHOTHERAPD:S

318

�nalchoice to remain o\'erly dependent, inauthentic and irrespon

­

sible. In contraSt, a mOTe complete understanding of deception in the

Christian context v;c\\'5 sin as both personal and corporate. as well as

both phenomenological and historically determined. Ge5tah therapy focuses only on how the broader context s i individually manifested and/or experienced. Gestalt therapy manifests a om "-dimensional perspective on causa­ .. tion of abnormality, with little attention paid to broader physiological or sociocultural determinantS. As with other humanistic therapies. there is the decided risk in Gestalt therapy of placing too much emphasis on personal responsibility, thw mistakenly attributing too much responsibility to the self. a prodi\ity that social psychologists have convincingly demonstrated thai we are all prone 10. Still, radical personal responsibility. although initially overwhelm­ ing. carries with it the polential for change and Ihe hope for alleviation of S}mploms (i.e f i )'ou "cawed- your problems. you can v.ith greater .•

awareness �confront- them). Dt.'Spite this o,,",iou$ advantage. the one­ sided emphasis on personal atuibmion is simply misguided in ligtH of

the O\'Crwhclming evidence for the complcxiry ofcausation. Christian, would do well to be reminded that emotional and personal problems are nearly always more complex than they appear to be on the surface

(i.e., they are multiplely determined and multiplety maintained) . Un­ fortunately. our statements about the origins of these concerns are far too often naively simptistic, if not condescending and patronizing.

Mod" "hydooth=py

Responsible clinicians generally appreciate a number of emphases in GeStalt therapy. Exploring inconsistencies between what is said and

what is done is fertile material to pursut'- in any approach. Gestalt

therapy seems unusually insightful with reference to the games ,,'e play in our interpersonal relationship s. Its emphasis on �doing� rather than

just Msaying� introduces

nt.'W

dimensions of accountability into the

psychotherapeutic relationship. The methods of confronting and directly encountering "unfin­ ished business- have enormous intuitive appeal to many clinicians who

work wilh reasonably high-functioning diems. Focusing on the -how� .. :hal� of behavior and experience ce rtainly seems to mise clienl and '\

awareness. Although few therapists wilt go as far as the Gestalt therapist

does to MfrUSU-.Ht: the neurosis,� they generally agree ulat Mcontrol

issues� are cemrnl to the process of change and healing. Perls pereep-

,

,

('�:sr

"" .T 1'l1Jo;J1AM'

319

b"c!y observed that many of us \o'oould rather have Mconfirmation of our

neuroses" than confront our inevitable tendency to deny, diston or

diso\O,ll parts of ourselves, Most of us can recogniz e dimensions of

ounelves in the "Iarc� of deceit- in the model of psych opathology in Gestalt therapy. Gesrah therapy is decidedly critical of what it perceh"e5 to

be

distorted dC£ensive thinking, and often tends to be explicitly nonra­ ,

tiona!. Cognitive processes arc distrusted as a source of insigh t into

ourselves. This is simpl)' inconsistent with the more holistic emphases

of Scripture and the Christian tradition. The Scriptures emphasize the

rene\'ral of the mind as well as otller important aspects of our human­

ness (e .g. the body and feelings). Correctly understood, what \\'e really ,

need to do is to stop engaging n i SO many speculations rationalizations, ,

explanations or mani pulations (Perls's -lose your mind") and renew

our whole beings.

As

is increasingly being seen in the cognitivl.'-behavioral tradition

(cf. chapters seven and eigh t)

,

lhouglllS and beliefs appear to play a

significant role in the deve.lopment and main�enance ofpsychopathol­

ogy and the healing of these problems. Perhaps in part because it so

questions lhe value ofexcuses and explanations Gestalt therapy all too ,

easily translates into a more widespread distnJsI ofcogn itive processing

in general. Gestalt lherapy is obviously ill nec..-d of a cognitive theory that will balance its overemphasis on biological end-goals. It correctly

diagnoses the potential distortions of certain cognitive processes. but it is less than satisfying in what it proposes as a viable alte rnative.

Another concern often raised by some contemporary clinicians has

10 do with the Mg-allles� or �nJles" of Gesralt therapy. Few doubt that

these procedures and techniques are powerful tools, but the concerns

surround the possible misuse or abuse of these tools in a power game

perpetrated by the thcrapi.�t. It is certainly possible for the clinician to er wit h he enter into all unhealthy relationship of po.... l client, or lO

a\'oid dealing

\\-itll

his or her own countertnmsference problems.

As

with all approaches lhe issue appe-ars to be one or timing, tact and ,

sen:;itv i ity as well as the pc:rsonal and profess ional competencie5 and ,

qualities of Ule clinician (Guy.

1987). BUI until recently (Hedlin. 1987;

Simkin and Yomef. 1984) there ha.\ been little written about how best

to deal with some of the polential limitations or risks inherent in these

GeStalt therapy proced m-cs.

Gesctlt lhcrapycan be of use to us as we seek to more fully compre­ hend import:Ul t dimensions of the human condition. Gestalt therapy

)20 has taught ussomcthing aboUl Lht: importance ofbcing more fully alive to

the momenL It would certainly be fair to say thai for some of us, our

obsessive remembering of the past, OUf anxious anticipation of lhe future or QlIr drive to understand everything in a three-point sermon greatly interferes with our capacity to be present to onc another in our fcllo....-ship. A11 lOo often in our Christian communities, what passes

for ,;lovcP is more accurately an unhealthy dependence on others. masked under the guise of ·togcthcrness� Of MChriSlian unity" (d. Parks, 1986). What is truly needed in an age of cultural relativism and isolated individualism is examples of cohesi\'c and healthy communities where commilmenLS 10 one another are made, honored and maintained (cr. Smcdes, 1988), That sticky and manipulative symbiotic clo�ncs.� that

Gestalt therapy so accur.llCly exposes raises tough questions about the b."\ses on which �Christian fellowship" all too often forms. As 1\lillcrand Jackson (1985) have observed, perhaps this is because ...·.c rcally do not know how to be fully present to one another 01' how to really listen to

what the othcr person has to say. A'I a Gestalt therapist might respond, if \'i'e \'i'ere more �aware" and look greater �responsibility" for our thoughlS, feelings and actions, wc might be able \0 become mare sensitive and U'uly compassionate in our relationships. One can only wonder f i the atlCmpts at community in the Gestalt thentpy tradition during the past three dec-ddes have been any more successful than the Christian fellowships throughout U1C last IWO mil· lennia. Suffice it to say that it is our position that these communities will need a much deepe.· commitment to shared trllLhs. the Truth, if they are going

[0

sun;ve the less than attractive dimensions of our

fundamental humanity.

Although ule vk....'.. of persons in Gestalt therdpy is incomplete and

the suggested strategies for remediation are inadequate for fully con­ fronting the human condition, onc can hardly fault this tradition's blunt and frank assessment of the layers of deceit that all lOO oflen surround us. Awareness of the many subllc and diverse forms of .sclf­ deception we engage in is certainly a desirable goal for the committed . �the truth" has been more Christian, especially in those circles ....here . (Mclemore. 1984), or as a me-dns to bringing oflen used as a ....eapon about conformity to the expectations of others (Peck., 1987). The resulting enmeshment of identities, or the symbiosis of relationships. often makes it exceedingly difficult to separate our authentic ChriStian

beliefs and convictions from the cultural U'ends and values ....e . all 1.00

,

M()()f.RNPSt "C/ f(ftH£RIi I'ffS

)22 Mclemore:,

C. (1984). ffrmt'sl Chrislillnity. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Although not directly related w Gestah therapy. its powerful anai)-ms ofwhy it s i

50 diflicuh to be truthful in the (onu:.Kt of Christian conununitics s i

ccrtainly relevant. Perls, F. (1969). hi and oul OIIM gurlxlgt pwI Moab, lIT: Real People Press The rather entertaining autobiography of the founder of Ge1talt tberap)'. .

Polster. E., and Poister, M. (1973).

(Astall. Ihtrofry intwatm: Conl(ll.lr:J of IhnJry

and pmdia. New York: Bnltlncrjl>'Iazd. A major professional I'ourk gcared toward practicing clinicians ... 'ho walH to under:smnd and appreciate me contributions of Gestalt therapy. Van Dicrt V and Korb, M. (1980). .

.•

�1aiJ 1luran': An introduction. New York:

Pergamon Prm. A morc recent profc$Ilionai discussion of the therapy

U.5C'$

and benefitS of gt:lltah

.

Zinker, J. (1978).

CUaliw prrxtD

in Getalt

tMm/? New York: Random

House!Vintage.

Represents some of the more reccm adaptations of Gestah therapy for a

variety of clinical concerns and populations.

Rererences Bellah, R., MalfS

J40

God holds OUl to us, starling with repentance and forgh'cness leading to salV'.ltion, and induding the spiritual resources he offers such

as

liS

direclly

the fellowship of the community of faith. daily forgive ness

,

prayer, growth through knowing his Word and so forth.

Bm the failure to grasp these resources is morc complex than TA would propose. As \\'C mentioned earlier in discussing evil, ours is a fallen state where we

arc

both victims of natural and moral c\·il and

perpetrators of moral evil. We arc culpable rebels as well

as

victims.

In TA, pathology results from failing to appropriate that which is naturally and rightfully OUfS; in Christianity. our pa thology is a result of our faUenness, our ovm

c

ulpabil ity, our victimization by a fallen

world, and our failure to allow God to transform us into a �new

creature� (2 Cor 5:17). TA is a fulfillment model of personality, in thal all of the natural instinct's and moti"es of humans are regarded as fundamentally g ood

.

and thus the sources for all problems are regarded

as

external to the

person. At the mOSt profound level, persons are consistent, and conflict is an unnatural state for us. This conflicts with the Christian view of pencILS, wherein to be human is to be conflicted and torn by the internal and external conditions of our lives. i TA parents are consistently the �bad guys, � the As a result of this, n

source of all problems (the system hardly stands alone on this point) .

.... a ysJ the witch. devil, In the TA literature, �the parenting voice is [aI·

ogre, or pig� ( Oden 1974. p. 87). V.'hether the parenting voice is that .

of the biological parents or of one of the parent.ing institutions (teach­ ers. clergy, etc ) makes little difference. Recognition of Lhe positive .

influence of biologicaI parents is nire-of illstitutional parent figures,

nonexistent. This may be bc
1980). will determine the

course of development of individual family members as .... ·ell as the . family as a ...·hole. Family therapists usually speak less about nolions of persons and more about functional or dysfunctional family systems. There s i a sense in which the psychodynamics of any given individual disappear in lhe larger social context. While ulis may be a welcome change from the oppre!iSive individualism of much of contemponl.ry personality theory, it tends to blur or erode the m i portance of individuality (d. Van Leeuwen.

1984), A personality theory, lhen, is more implicit than

explicit in mOSt system therapies. because they frankly tcnd to be disinterested in the functioning of individual human beinb"S' And since SC'.'eral orLhe family approaches can be viewed as extensions or extrap­ olations from some of the major individual approaches to people-help­ ing. it is not possible LO summarize coherent or consistent notions of personhood.

Model ofHeolth Perhaps some of the most valuable contributions from the family therapy mO\'cment have to do with its characterizations of the qualities

353

of slffing families. Many of these qualities have lhcil' dear parallels in ScripUlre. Both popular (e.g., Stinnett. 1979; Curran. 1983) and pr� fessional (Beavers, 1982; Kantor and LehT, 1975; Lewis, Cosset! and Phillips, 1976: Olson, Sprenkle and Russell, 1979) treatments of the subject suggest a number of parallel themes. When coupled with a full appreciation of the nonnau\c Slnlctures and functions estabLished by God as part of the created order, we can gain grealer insight into our obligations and responsibilities as members of both biological and spiritual families from grappling with this literature. In the family therapies perspective, strong families: I. &sptmd positively /() challmges and crises. Rather than denying or distorting reality, they drdw on their individual and collecth'c resources to deveiop adaptive and healthy coping: strategi($. When these families arc unable to find the resources ",ithin. they readily admi t problems and seek help elsewhere. 2. Hmlt: (J ckarly arliculated world view, sometimes expressed in tcnns of a specific religious CQmmiunenL This undergirds their moral devel­ opmen t altruistic endea\'Ors and sense of history and heritage. 3. Commrmicali! w�IL They know how In actively listen. affirm and support express their LhoughLS and feelings, and manage the inevita­ ble differences of opinion that can occur in the family system. These fumiies l have a well-devcloped repertoire of conflict-management '

,

,

skills.

4. Owt)$e to spend tim" /Ogf.IJu.r in a V{J};�ty of tasks, including both

planned and spon tan eous activities. They can work hard together to\.\'ard a common goal and they know how to enjoy each other when they play or ",·orlt. 5. M((RePfOtrlises all(i h()7lorcommitmenls to()7!�anolhn: The marital and i a sense familial tasks and responsibilities are taken seriously. There s of belonging and respect for indhidual differences. The family is sc..."tu as the context for the developme nt ofa strong sense of self�steem and personal security so as lO encourdge an affiliativc and risk-taking attitude toward life. 6. Know !unv to ex{mSS tlldr lwe and ajJfrrecialiOIlfor one anolhr:r. Family members know and respect one another. They arc caring, compas.�ion­ ate, respectful, lOleranl and trusting. As m igh t be assumed from earlier comments, health and normalcy are viewed from the con text of the social system rath er than from a more personal perspective. Qualities that contribute to the well-bei ng of the family of origin may not necessarily .

•

P'

,

AlOO£RNPSI'OI(fTIIF.RAJ'IES

354 translate in to personal wholeness.

Modd ofAlnwmuJity

�Problems in living� are usually viewed as symptoms of a dysfunctional

family system by most family therapists. In particular, the unique and specific ways in which the family faces the stresses related to the inevitable changes, challenges and crises of liCe will detennine familial well-being. Pathological communkation patterns, enmeshment or dis­ engagement, scapegoating. family violence or substance abuse arejust some of the dysfunctional ways in which these events and transitions can be mishandled by the family system. The characteristic of homeo­ staSis, the tendency to maintain the $l:l.lUS quo mentioned earlier. is an asset to the healthy family. but is an enemy when maladapli\'c patterns are occurring, as it m i pedes change. Wynne. Jones and Al-Khayyal

(1982) argue thaI healthy communi­

cation ill essential if parents are going to develop adaptive behaviors n i their children.

Communitatioll deviance occurs when two or more per­

sons are unable to stay focused and share meaning in their interac­ tional efforts. In dysfunctional families, the verbal coment and/or nonverbal behaviors are often strikingly dissonant between family members. This is especially evident in the patterns of communication where overt content (what is said) is inconsistent with covert process (how it is said), as when a parent yells. �Of course I love youl Do yOll think I

....'Quld

put up with all yOllr crap if I didn'tr Indeed, such

dissonance and inconsistency s i the most common reason family mem­ bers seek professional help. Some examples of particularly pathological communication patterns include: (a) the

doub0bind, where two messages are logically n i consistent,

as when an ky, rejecting husband scolds his wife for nOl being more affectionate, thus communicating both �Iove mew and wdoll't love me"; (b) mJ$lijirotion, where family membel'5 befuddle. confuse or mask what

is really going on, as when people deal n i such generalities as "'the feeling just isn'( there"; (c)

sym1'flLt1i«d rtlalionships or ()t�pmd1/.Ship, where rigid

roles are the norm and power relationships emphasize rule gi\'ing and enforcing, exemplified by the rigidly authori tarian father who s i afraid LO relate to his children in a personal way; and (d) cmnpkmmtmy rtlationships. where penonal pa!hologies feed on each other,

as

when !he alcoholic

�Ioser" is married to !he "suffering martyr.� (Gurman and Kniskem [ 1981 ]

s i an especially helpful reference source for greal.er clarification oflhese destructive patterns.)

,

355

Ever), family system is seen as having Tules, some of which are explicit and many ofwhich arc implicit. When family systems have rules that allow for change, there is potential for constructive adaptations to life's challenges. BUI if the system is too rigid. due to incff«tual rules (e.g., "a 'real man' never asks for helpl�) or pathological communica­ tion, tension builds up and needs to be released in order for the system to maintain equilibrium or homeostaSis. Unhealthy !»'Stems lcnd to be static and resistant to change. They can project the tension between two members of the system (such as marital contlict) onto a third member of the system (such as the adolescenl daughter who lakes on an identity as the Mrcbellious onew or as Mthe bulimicM) rather than dealing mOTe directly \fES

380

the faith, as well as many insights, strengths. uses and points of aurae­ tivcness. Second, that each model

has both incompatibi l ities with

biblical faith and other flav.'S, inconsistencies, weaknesses and prob­ lems. None of the theories can be rejecu�d out of hand, but none can

be wholeheartedly endorsed by the Christian counselor. Some models hold more promise than others because they are more well elaborated, have more evidence supporting their effectiveness or have more per­ vash'c commonalities with Christian belief and practice. We do not have lhedefinith'e model 10 propose in place oflhe many theories we have examined. In fact. we do not believe that a definitive model exists and think it unlikely that it will ever exisL If after twO millennia Christians cannot agree aboulsome oflhe most fundamental points of theology (as documented by the din�rsiry of denominations

and theological "schools"), how can we expect congruence on a �Chris­ tian" psychology? So how can the field be put together? How can counselors achieve some order in their understanding of people so as not to be paralyzed \.\'ith indecision and confusion when confronted with a hurting person? We would argue that it is reasonable at this point ill history for Christian counselors to be tCkctieor pluralistic in their approach, dra\.\ing flrst all

the faith for the foundations of a view ofpersons and then elaborating on that view with conceptions taken from secular psychology or the writings of the Christian counselors of the past and the present. And lest the result of this be a sloppy, unsystematic hodgepodge of ideas, we will sUryey wdYs in which this eclecticism might be conducted.

As we stan out, we would argue again, as we did in chapter two, that the Bible does not teach a personality theory, though it does teach us much about persons. Van Leeuwen ( 1987), working within the frame­ i vital to work of personality theorist Salvatore Maddi, suggests that it s

distinguish bet ... ..een suppositions of

COrt

personality tendencies and

characteristics (about which the Bible and the faith has much, though not (:\'erything, to �y) and more the pmphLrol statements about per­ sonality types, modes of human development and the like. For example, the concept of sin

is

central to the faith, but that

concept, with all its meaning. does not tell

us

why one person sins by

committing adultery while another sins with a prideful.

arrogant atti­

rud� or by a lack of compassion for the poor, The faith tells US that God

did not intend for US to

be riddled ",ith anxiety, but it does not tell us

how to d�al with a person who is phobicly afraid of social siruations,

nor does it tell us why some avoid feared objects while others o"ercom-

.

,

381 pensate for their fear with an exaggerated bravado. OUf faith tells u.s the ultimate meaning of life, but it does not tell

w

why so many

conversions to saving faith occur in adolescence rather than in late aduhhood. Only our psychologies address lhesecomplex and intricate

ISSUes. Several authors ha\'e notoo that the theoretical allegiances ofcoun­ selors to different counseling approaches tend to change over time. While there is no solid empirical research 10 back up these claims, they are intuitively appealing. Halgin

(1985) suggested that there are a

number of pressures that encourdge students of counseling ap­ proaches to make identificalioll5 with particular approaches even before they have received substantive training in these approaches. This may be due

to student

perceived congruences between a model

and that student's pel"5OnaJ life philosophy, identification with a pro­ fessor or teacher who emulated a certain approach, or pressure exerted by graduate admission processes which encourage early identification of a preferred model. In the graduate training envi­ ronment, student allegiances to a model are drAmatically affected by training opportunities available, both in tcnllS of courses and practicum experiences and personal experiences willl therapy. Training programs often are strong in one approach 10 the delri­ men 1 ofothers. Also, those educating students in Iherapy seem more likely to be theoretical purists than community practitioners be­ cause such theoretical purity makes classroom communication eas­ ier and may facilitate research productivi ty.

In practicing therapy (following J-Ialgin, 1985; and Norcross, 1985) the clinician inevitably confronts lhe limits of his or her model. This may be minimized for those who work

n i

settings where they are

exposed only to a homogeneous population needing help, as in the case of the behavior modifier working only with the mildly develop­ mentally disabled (retarded), or the existential therapist only working with high-functioning, \'erbal and intelligent persons experiencing milder dissatisfactions with life. For m05l, though, confrontations with the limits of one's model occur quite soon in practice; we run into counseling problems that either stretch our working model to the limits or clearly fall beyond the bounds of our model. We also encounter cases where our model should MW worked if the approach is true, and .....e musl confront the fact thal it did not work.. These experiences are akin to the psychological challenges we race in personal development when our status quo is shaken and the resulting

382 disequilibrium forces us to gro..... a bit morc. Without such crises, we would be unlikel)' to ever grow. Our reaction to such challenges may be rigidly to claim the exclu­ sive correctness of our model and to deny its limitations (a response nOt in the beSt interest of therapist or dient). Some will acknowledge the limitations but confidently believe that it is only a matter of time until the essential correctness of their approach is borne out. Some rna)' lapse into a relativism mal results in the kind of MsupermarkclM

(Nelson:Jones, 1985) or chaotic eclecticism we \\;11 describe below. But £he healthiest response is to make a commitment to growing in effec­

tiveness through knowing the limits of our approach and understand­ ing how other models might complement and make lip for the weaknesses of our own. The options for responsible eclecticism \\l'

415

therdpy, but are perhaps more skeptical about psychotherapy than they have been in past years. They are bombarded with "Christian Psychology Is Apostasy" literature on the one hand and "99 Reasons to Refer Your Parishioners (0 Us" literarure 011 the other. Pastors are more aware than ever lhat it cannot be taken for granted that psycho­ therapy is ad"ancing the cause of the churcb, because there is often too much slippage between herapy t goals and the church's needs.

What are we advocating? Obviously, we must start with urging a

re­

newed commimlent to sclving Cod and his church, a commiunem to imaging the Father through our professional work. If this isn't a fore· most commitment, than the rest hardly makes sense. Second, we would advocate the need to think with Christian darity about the theoretical approaches to understanding and changing pe­ pie. which pro,,;de the backb'l"Ound for all counseling practice. It is our prayer that this book represenlS an advancement of that enterprise. Funher, it is essential LO be infonncd biblically and theologically about God's caring for his people and about the inSU1.lctiOIl he has gi\'en tiS for the care of souls in the church. Too much of what passes for integration today is anemic theologically or biblically, and tends to be little more than a spiritualized rehashing of mainstream mental health thought. TIle church has a rich corponlte history in the field of pastoral care which

.... -e

need to know about if we are to be Chri5-

tian psychotherapists. Psychology was a division of practical theology long before it became a separate field and the pastoral care tradition has rich resources to digest. Pastoral ministers were far from ineffective and uninsigluful be­

fore the advent of Freud. The mental health professions oflen un....;I­ tingly believe and promulgate lhe fable that nothing significant oc· curred in the psychological care of persons before modem times­ just look at (he coverage in a typical introductory psychology text, where discussion of religion is typically paired with picture!! of spin· ning chairs, su-digackelS and inhumane insane asylums (Kirkpatrick and Spilka, (989).

BUI premodern pastoral care was not ineffective.

Thomas Oden ( 1984), well·known pastoral theologian and fonner en· thusiastic advocate of several psychotherapeutic methods, now calls himself a "classicist" and devotes his time to the study of the pastoral care techniques of Pope Gregory the Great (from the early sa'oc:uion of coun56-'"

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