Modern Latin American Revolutions: Second Edition

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MODERN LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS m

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MODERN N AMER REVOLUT -llSECOND EDITION

E A M e m k r o f the krscus Books Croup

AI1 rights reserved, Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publicatio~zInay be reprod ~ ~ c eord transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanicdl, including photocopy,

recording, or any i~tformiltiollstorage and retrieval system, without pern~issio~l in writing from the publisher. Copyright 8 L 993,1999 by Wswiew Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group PublisI~edin 1999 in the United Stales of America by Biestview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80.301-2877, and in the United Kirlgrlom by Westview Press, 12 Hid" Copse Road, Cumnor Hilt, Oxford OX2 9ff

Library of Congress Gatc~ltioging-i~~-Publication Ddta Seibin, Eric. Modern Latin America11rewlutions I Eric Sefbin, -2nd ed. p, cm, Includes ilzclex. ISBM 0-8133-3543-9 (pbk.) 1. Latin America-Politics and government-19482. Revulutio~lsLatin America-History-20th century. 3. Leadership, I. Xde. F1 414,2,S39 1999 303.4'3'~1980804-d~2 1

98-44127 GIP

The paper used in this prxblication nleets the r e q u i ~ m e n t of s the American National Standard for Perrnanence of Paper for Prir~redLibrdry Materials 239.48- 1984.

Contents Acknczwfedgmen&to the Semnd Edition A~knowleclgtr~ents to the First Edieiarz 1 Social Revolution and the Role of the IxzdividuaI

The Literature on ltevofuticzn, 4 Social Revolrttion: A flefinition, 1 0 Paths to Success: The Institutionalizatim and Clctnst-tlidationof SoclaX Revolution, 12 Revolrttion and the Rofc of the Individual, 25 2 Social Revott~tionrtryPaths: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada

h y u l a r Support and Consolidation, 32 Bolivia, 1952-.-1956:Instituticznalization Without Consotidation, 33 Cuba, 1959-1 969: G~nsolidationWithout Institutionafizatim, 39 Nicaragua, 1979-1 990: Institutionalization and Consolidation, 46 Grenada, 1979-1 983: The Revolution That Never Was, 54 Goaclusion: The Importance of:C=ansolidation,64 3 Social Revott~tionrtryLeadership: Ideolov and Strategy

Visionary and Organizational Leadership, 69 Antipathy for the Revt3l~ticzn:The International Situation, 87 Leadership and the Transformation of Society, 89 4 Making the Revolution R e d i ~The : Nicaraguan Revolution, f979-f990

Goasofidat ion in the Nicaraguan Revolrttion, 93 Institutionalization &dux: The International and Domestic Clctntetxt of the f 990 Election, f 04

CONTENTS

vi

The Nexus of Institutionalization and Consolidation: The 1990 Election krticiy ants and Strategies, 1 1 I 5 Bringing People Back In: A New Vacabutary for Exploring

Revaiutianar)l Processes The Theoreticaf Themes, 126 The Practical Utility, 130 The Consolidation of Sociaf IPev~>lution,139 Epilope: The Future of Revolution in Latin America: and the Caribbean-Canon and Revision

No tf?s List ofAcrorzyms Ittdex

Acknowledgments to the Second Edition It is extremely gratifrying tcr have been invited to dcr a second edition of this book, and X am once again struck by the many debts I clwe. I have benefited from the consideration of and conversations with a number of people-none of whom, obviously, is responsible for any of: the Raws herein, some of wham disagl-ee with its ccrntentions, and all c->Ewhomare the kind of magnanimr>usscholars who make this professictn fun. Thus, my enormous thanks to Michael I-licXcey; Carrnenza Gallo, Misagh Parsa, Sidney Firrow, and tlze other members of the X 996 National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar New I%"erpectives in the Comparative Study of Revolutions; Jack Goldstone, Wally Goldfrank, Meredith McKittrick, Florence Gould, Stew flavidson, Jan Dawson, Shannon Winnubst, Rabert Snyder, Daniel Castro, Margaret Dorsey, Jennifer Mathews, Amy McKee, and Iennifer Suchtand. Thanlcs as well to Torn Walker, who kindly continues to go out of his way for me, and to the redoubtable Karen Kampwirtlz. For the past several years my work has been inspired, challenged, and informed by that of John Foran, Jeff Goctdwin, and Timothy Wiclcharn-Grodey; X deeply appreciate their cotlegiality My research in Grenada was greatly enhanced by Ruth Johns of the Grenada National Library, Beverty Steele of the University of the West fndies Ccrntinuing Education Program, Dr. Terrence Marryshow of the Mat~riceBislzap Patriotic Front, Judy Ellen Witliams of the Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA), and the ever pa"Eent Yarnell DeRochC of the Grenada National Archives, This research was supported by a Samuel Taylor Fellowship and Southwstern University" Sullen Faculty Dexloyment Fund. Mirzs~iewPress has continued to be everything an author could hope for in a yublislzel: I am extremely grateful that Kad Yambert invited tlzis edition and that Jennifer Chen has been such a helpful editor along the way, Thank, tot->,to project editor Elizabeth Lawrence and to Cheryl Carnahan for a wc?nQerfutjob of copyeciiting. Besides being the m r l d k two most nearly perfect children, my daughters, Jesse and Zoe, are wnderful people who make being a parent a joy; bctth of them have discussed parts of what p u will read here with me anci have greatly inauenced my tznderstanding of the ways in which people learn and share knowledge, Beyond providing me with invaluable insights abctut these matters, Jesse and Zoe are

...

v111

ACKNOhXEUGMENTS TO THE SECOND EDITION

constant anci delightful remit-tders tlzat there is a real world out tlzere tl-tat matters a great deal. As for Helen Cordes, W ~ CisI now severaf bor>ksahead of me, I can add little to what I said in the first edition-1 remain in awe of her love and devotion, This eciition is dedicated to these three amazing women who SO generously share their lives with me.

Eric Selbin

Acknowledgments to the First Edition An undertaking such as this relies heavily on the assistance, support, and good graces of a wide array of yet>ple. Recognizing them here hardly repays the debt I owe them. (Nor dctes it implicate them in any way in any errrrrs of omission or commission, which remain sofcly my responsibility,) K a t h i y S i u n k inspired me throughtrut the process of writing this book. Her thoughtful and challenging questicrns and repeaktl close, critical, and insigl~tful readings served to make tlzis book you hofd in your hand Ear better. I can think of no way to adequately express my appreciation for what she has done, Brian Job offered consistently helpfuf criticisms and enwuragement, Etcm Aminzade, Henry llietz, Mary Dietz, Raymand Duvall, Gecif. Embanks, ftslzn Freeman, Cal Tillson, August Wi~ntz,Stuart Schwartz, and Gary m i a have all aided and abetted my interests in revolution and Latin America over the Far$; each of them has inauenced what you will read here. Kris Thalhammer read the entire manuscript closely and pushed me to be clear and accessibfe; her optimism and enert;y were inspirational. Timohy WickhamGrowlcy revicweci tlze manuscript for Westview Press and offered everytlzing one could hope for: a close, caref~~f reading, challenging questions, and compelling arguments. Leslie Anderson encouragecl this project from the start and took the time to read parts; her stzpport and insights were invaluabte. Cynthia Kite and Greg McAvoy read bits and pieces, asked tough questions, and provided valuable insiglzts. Kathy Hochstettcr slzared her knobvledge of Latin America with me ancl, along with Jim Mahoney, W n d y Rahn, and Cynthia Weber, provided thc~ughtful comments, critical support, and timely enthusiasm. At various stages, Gary Prevost, Harry Vanden, and Thomas Walker all encouraged my work and made Izelpful suggestions, In Nicaragua, Ivan Aguilar, Jr., Martha Clalderbn, Rimer Khordero, and Manin Ortega all went out of their way for me. Barbara Spencer, coordinator of Project Minnescrta-LeQn (I3ML) during both of my stays in LeQn, was extremely helpful and a great friend, Etc3sanne Fischex; another PML coordinator, was also a great help. I remain staggered by the warmtlz and generosity show11 me by so many Nicaraguans, particularly the Lecinese, who were always willing to take the time to

X

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS TO THE FIRST EDITION

explain the subtle intricacies of daily lik in Nicaragua to a. less-than-subtle North American, One of the reasons X chose to work with Westview Press was the opportuniy to work with Barbara Ellingtan; as many people had predicted, it has been a. gEat experience. I alst:, appreciate the efft~rtson my behalf by others at Westview including Kathleen McClung, Michefle Murphy, Martha liobbtrrs, Connie Oehring, and Marian Safran, who did a wonderful job copyediting the manuscript. The research in Nicaragua was funded by grants from the McMifIan Travel Fund at the University of Minnesota and a generous ixesearch Abroad Grant from the G r a d ~ ~ aSchool te at the University of- Minnesota. I greatly aypl-eciate their support. A special thank-yt~tzis c:,wed to my parents, Marion Selbin and Tcref Selbin, whcr instilled in me a commitment to justice, a love of learning, and a fascination with politics large anci small and who have always encouraged me to do the things that I wanted to do. Jesse Ccrrdes Sefhin, a trufy wcjnderfuf child, frequently offered to hefp with this book anci did so far more than she realizes, Besides helping me keep tlzis project in perspective, she proved to have a defightfuf sense of timing about hugs, smiles, and larrghter, Zoe Ccrrdes Selbin cleverly waited until the very last stage of the project to grace us wit11 her deliglztful presence. This book is dedicated to the lovely and talented Helen Ctrrdes, an amazing person day in and day out. During the time X was w r k l n g on what she came to refer to as ""our long national nightmare," she did far more than lzer share of housework, yardwork, and, most important, parenting, all while w r k i n g more than full time as an editor of the fltt-ze: Reader, I stand in awe of her love and devotion, E, S.

CHAPTER ONE

ution and the of the Individua Revolution remains endlessly fascinating to scholars and activists atike; it is, W. L. Mencken once suggested, the ""sx of pofif csF1 However, the concept of revolrttion has lost much of its utility, rendered by excessive anci careless usage into little more than a synonym for "watershed" or ""turning pclint" and invoked as a rhetorical device trt lend drama or import trt far less dramatic, even mundane, occasions, In addition, the use of: the term to connote funciarnental societal transform mation has recently been challenged by the claim that the triumph of capitalism is contemporaneous with the demise of revolution. Nonetheless, social scientists who continue to debate exact meanings of revolution remain cctmmitted to the importance of the concept and the need to finetune it. Revctlutions offer us a rare opportunity to gtimpse politkaaX life in its rwest, most open, anci perlzaps most revealing fr>rm.The drama of revolrttion lays society bare, prc>vidingthe opportunity to see the hopes and fears of great numbers of people wl~osedaily struggle is bczund up in the mundane questions of where tlzeir next meal wifI came from, how to clothe their children, or how to care for their sick Suddenly-although in some cases only after an agonizingly long struggle that can last beyond the life of many participants-possibiiities seem to abound. Revolutians thus appear as the most profoundly political moments that occur in any st-tciet-ye2Sociologist Michael Kimmel goes as far as to position the concept of: revolution as the ""eentelryiece of all thearies about society.'" Under any set of circumstances, revc~lutionprc3vides an important and critical lens throtzgh which to view the world, The human belief in boundless possibilities and the intrillsic ability af people to reslzape both the world and themselves present the peaple invtdved in the revolutionary process a tznique treasure. It is in the revrtlutionary k i us, moment that those people become most accressibie to outsiders X There is a rich and lengthy tradition of: social science researcl1 on revolution." Most of this research has been and mntinues to be based on what are commonly referred to as the ""great revotutionsn":he French, ltussian, Chinese, and, occasiczn-

2

SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

ally Mexican. These revolutionary processes were characterized by the societal tensions surrorznding the transition from feudalism ttr capitalism, particularly class struggle; they marked the demise of ""ancient, traditional royal, or imperial regimes."Us a result? research on these revolutions fcjcused on their catlses. Commonly these revc3lutions were portrayed as evidence of the ""grand sweep of history" and the importance of instiltutictns and structures. The revolrttions in France, Rt~ssia,China, and Mekco thus may be seen as the ""fst generation" of social revc3lutions. These revolutions have served to hetp social scientists and others define the term revslution, and they have fueled research on a ""sconci generation" of revolrxtions, those in tlze Third World since W r l d War II,Were again, the focus has largely been on the causes of revc~luticrn,particularly the role played by the peasantry.' Yet the reference point uftima~lyseems to remain the first-generation revctiutictns. The modern Latin American revolutions are related-btlt distinct from their predecessors,K The importance of these differences should not be ignored. The links between the two generations are nodifficult to discern, In bctth, the social revolutionary process broadly t~nfc~lds in tlze same pattern: insurrection, pc~liticalvictory, and the effort to transform s o ~ i e t yRecognition .~ of this cttnnection is important, among other reasons, because i~allowsus to take advantage of and build on the outstanding work done by several generations of social science theorists of revc3tution. It also reminds us of the extent tc:, which revolutionaries look to past revolutions h r both negative and positive examples, Att four rev(~lutions considered Izere-the Bolivian, Cuban, Nicaraguan, anci Grenadian-drew to varying degrees on the experience of the Mexican revc~latic>n,~~ There are, howevel-, important and meaningful differences between the first and second generation of revolutions, At least two of these differences relate to the changes that have occurred in the internaticrnal system, The modern Latin American revotutions have come of age in a time of economic dependency that contrasts rather slzaryly with that of tlze essentially preindustrial first generation." Furthermore, these revotutions have not occurred in ""Xarge and predominantty rurat, nations with long-standing traditional governments,""but rather in neocolonial s e ~ i t ~ that g s featured relatively modern government institutions.12 Although these differences are important, it is also the case that they can be readily captured by a structural perspective. Same differences cannot be easily captured by such a perspective. The conscious choices and intentional actions of peoylte have played clearly critical roles in the revofutictnary processes, The modern Latin American revofutions in particular have been cl~aractetrizedby prafc~undlymulticlass alliances and lzigh degrees ofvt3luntarism, Structural theories are pc~orlyequipped to explain the even minor cross-class alliances present in these cases and largely deny the importance of leaderslzip in the first-generation revolutions. Such tl-teoriesare eeven less useful in helping to understand cases such as Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada,


3

Revolrttion clearly denotes more t l ~ a na simple transition. The term implies that in the period after revoltztionaries acquire ccrntsol of the state structures, they will seek to transform fundamentally at feast some facet of society, Social revcdtution describes those relatively rare cases where the revolutionaries seek the profound transformatic~nof the entire society. The failure of most theories to account for these attempts at societal transforma"eon seems problematic. This 6ailure is exacerbated by the predominance of:deterministic or structuralist approaches. Macrolevel structural forces (such as the state, class relations, or the international economic and poIitica1 arena) are of great use in sketching the conclitions present and to be encountered. They are of: Xittte use, however, in expltoring the essence of the social revultztic~naryprocess." Nowhere is this more c~bvic~us than the inability of such approaches to explain (or even explore) the often remarkable verve and creativity with which revofutionaries create new societies. Xt seems clear that what is missing from these conceptualizations is recognition of the central and critical role played by people in the comptex process of revc~Iution.l 4 To date, social science researchers have ccrmmonly focused on the structural determinants of the breakdown of regimes or the formation of revoltztionary vanguards and their ability to cobble trrgether coatiticzns that succeed in taking power. Given the magnitude implicit in the revolutionary process, this b c u s is understandable." Hc~wevet;researchers have paid rrlatixfy little attention to the revolutionary process as it continues rafter political victory*What attention there has been has focused almost exclr~sivefyon institutions and structures, The very aspect that defines the social revcrlutionary process-the effort at fundamental transformation of society and the people in it-has largely been ignored, The attention of those sclzofars who have considered the period tlzat fc~ilows pcrliticaf victory has remained focused on variorzs political, economic, or social variables, As a result, social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, have done an excellent job of understanding and explaining the ""institutionalization" of revcrlutions, that is, the reestablishment and reorganization of state structures, including the creaticzn of new institutionseEh Aftlzough tlze establishment ancl maintenance of state power is a mit~imumconclitian for the success of revc>lutions,it is only part of the story, The term revalutiorr, as 1 mentioned, evokes images that include conscious efforts by some of the participants to effect hnclamen?al changes." What defines any fist of ""great revc>tutions," as Hobsbawm pcrinted out, is not acqtzisition of state p o w r but devotion to the creaticzn of a "new framewcrrk," m e w orientation for society. l, revolution that lzas not at least attempted to establislz srrclz a framewcrrk is tznlikEhy to be on the fist." Thus revofutions have historically been judged by the people" relaticznsfiips with the new government and with each other and by how mucl1 or how little they embraced tlze revolutionary process itself-,forged in the complex relatic~nshipbetwen the revt3lutionaries and the prryulation in whose name they purport to act.

4


The quintessence of the social ~volrttionaryprocess is tlze transformation of society, more specifically, of citizens. krhaps the most eloquent and certainly the most cornpefXing explanation of what this means was suggested to me by an older woman in Nicaragua who related with a mix of amusement, disbelief, and disgust hrrw the wealthy in Nicaragua had treated the rest of the popuiatic-tn as if it were ""cfile:3She hastened to assure me: ""This could never happen again. We wczuld never allow this. We know now that we are not cattle. . .ancl we will never be their cattle again:""4his change in the way citizens view their society and their own rc-tIes within it has largely been ignored by politicai scientists, X will attempt to capture tlzis change by introducing the concept of the consolidatirarz of a revolrttion, as distinct from its institutionalization. The difkrence betwen institutionalization and consolidation is more than a matter of semantics, Although subtle, it is an important, even essential, distinction, Consolidation occurs when a significant majority of the population embraces the core of the social revc3tutionary project-centered on the creation of a more just and equitable society-and is therefore willing to resist efforts to roll back the gains made tlzrough the social revolutionary process.lR The focus is on people, not structures; choices, not determinism; and transformation, not simplfy transition, Xtevotutions are human creations-with all the complexity illherent in srrcll a claim-ratlzer than inevitable ""natural" processes. The failure of most social science researchers to adequately incorporate the role played by individuals has rendered their analyses Rat, incomplete, and unpersuasive; tl-re omission of human it~teationsancl actions hinders efforts to explain revol~tticznaryprocesses,. This chapter continues with a brief review of the relevant literature on revc3lution; I then propose a wczrking definition of revolution. Xn rlze next secticzn I introduce the concept of consolidation as a process distinct from institutionalization and as an analytically useful toell in the effort to understand social revoluticznary processes as well as other forms of societal change, In a finat section, which presages the discussion in Chapter 3, I consider the role of individrtals in the social revolutionary process and suggest that they are responsible for the directiczn the revolutionary process takes after potitlcal victory

THE LTTEMTURE ON EVOLUTION Re-volutiarz, as Finley pointed out, is a term that is used commonly and ttznderstood weif by academics and nonacademics atike despite a variety of contradictory meanixzgs.2This is not to imply that revolrttion can mean anything at all that one proposes. Indeed, revolution carries with it a common set of implications that distinguish it from other phenomena, StiH, there remains a great deal of debate over the meaning and import of revaZutiiorz as a term.2" Definitions do not solve problems; the question is whether the chrrsen definition advances one's stznderstanding of the term.2Qt the same time, as Aya pointed out, cttnfixsion arising from the lack of "&equate dlstincticzns may slow solving


5

problems of explanation. Hence, though we need not define, we must ofien distinguish,""" Rather than offer yet another ""precise" definition of revs>lution,what f propose here is a wctrking definition that builds directly on preexisting conceptualizations. Other explanations, relying on classic definitions, lack suitabtc attention tcr the final, transformative phase of the social revt3lutionary process and the role of people in that process, Social scientists, plziftlsoyhers, and ~volrttionarieshave constructed a wide variety of models of revcjlution. In the sociaf sciences the current reference pcjints are the people whom Goldstone has designated the "third generation" of:revcdtutionary theorists.2The third generation drew in part on the ""natural lzistory" of revs>lutians,catafoged by the first generation of theorists in the 1920s and 1930s.26 The third generation also built on and reacted agaillst the work of the second generation of theorists, who in the 1960s used social science methodotogies to explain revofutions.27 Most of those social sciena theories have proven to be poorly conceived, generating analyses based on what Hobsbawm fabefed ""static dichotomiesn":2 simplistic distinctions such as vioXencelnonviolence29 or tlze fttnctionldysfttnction of society'l" The "third-generation"" theorists promised mare-detailed examinations of a greater variety of revotutictns and i'hofistic" understandings of the revolutianary process." There is little question that these theorists considered a wider array of revs>lutionsthan had their predecessors, and they sought broader understandings of the revolutionary prctcess, Their w r k was marked by important insights as well as Skocyol's paradigmatic definition of revof~tinn,~2 Yet three things that cut across the work of these theorists have remained troubling: Their theories are rooted in the ""great revolutions"";heir focus is almost solely on causes of revcdtution; anci structural perspectives would appear to be their deeault position. To the degree that there has been any consideration of the period after the revcrlutionaries came to power, these scholars continued their predecessorsYncfination for positing reestablislzment of the state-defined here as institutionalization-as the ultimate goal. None of the third-generation works has held up weft as a general theory of revolutian, Altl~oughthis third generation of tl~eoristsholds sway, there is arguably an emergent fourth generation of theorists who have deepened and expanded conceytictns of matters revolzxtionary,"Vorrest Cotburn and I have caIlecZ far the return of people anci their ideas to a place of:prominence in understanding and exploring revc>ltztionary proce~ses.~"~ame of the leading yc3ung figures in the field-such as John Foran, Jack Goldstone, jeff Gactdwin, and Timothy Wickham-Crowtey-have cast their nets somewhat wider, calling for increased atteation to the role of culture as at feast a variable in the mix of factors.". All of us have sought to varying degrees to wrestle with the paradox of agents and structures ancl tlzeir rote and utility in theorizing about revolutions, Nonetlzefcss, there remain today in the sociaf sciences three predominant models of revolutic1n.36 Perlzaps tlze greatest influence on all it~vestigationsof revolution continues to be

6


KarZ Marx's theory of self-conscious movements rooted in class canfiict. A principal alternative to Marx can be found in the ""political confiict" approach of Charles Tilly, Finally, the structrrralist models of Samuef Wuntington and, more recently, TIlecZa Skocpol have been paradigmatic in tlze social sciences." The canceptualization of social revcrlution offered here is infltzenced by and rooted in these perspectives.

Kari Marx The massive body of work Karf Marx produced has shaped modern trnderstandings and expianations of revc>lutionmrrre profoundly than any of the other works that undergird social science theorizing.". It is nczt possible in this brief discussiczn to do justice to Marx" view on rev~)luticzn,for they permeate virtrrally everything that Marx wrote. "Marxian lzistorical materialism:" Dunn argued, "is above alf else a theory of rev~>lution."~Tven though during the past 140 years Marxk intetIectual legacy has been sul3ject trr various interpretations, the key components of Marx's views on revolrttion remain discernible. Revt)lutions, for Marx, were not events but processes: class-based mowments driven by the inherent contradictions-objective contradictions-in society, Conflict was it~evitablegiven that the relatively small number who owned the means of production extended pervasive control trver the lives of those who produced. Socialist revolution was likely to occur when the urban working class, the proletariat, recognized its exploitation at the hands of the wealthy, the botrrgeoisie. Marx" perspective was summarized cogently by Sleocpol: "Marx understood revotution not as an isolated episode of violence or cttnfiict but as classbased movement growing otrt of objective structural contradictions within historically dexloping and inherentk ccrnf'lict-riddensociety.'"O This view of revolution was manifested in several concrete ways througho~tt Marx's work. The ciearest was Marx? fcfcus on economics: Sodety's divisions are class based and classes are determined by one" e a ~ n o m i cstatus, Morerrver, the ""objective structural contradictions," which make cttnfiict inherent in societ-y, are rooted in questions about the ownerslzip of tlze means of production and the expltoitation of the urban mrking class, IPelated to this-and at odds with the argument of this book-was his attenticzn to '2zl3jective structural conditions" "her than people. Finally, Marx cansidered the urban workers the revolutionary class. In fact, for Marx: "Tl~elcrwer middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant . . . are . . . no~revofutionary,but conservative, Nay more, they are reactionary,'"Tet, as will be seen in the cases considered here-Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada-many of these ""classes" "ayed important, even leading, roles in revoluticznary processes, establishing for thernsetvcs ixnpeccable revolutionary credentials. Most important for our purycrses is Marx" recogni"tion (or contention) that revolution is fundamentally a process, not simply an event. The idea of revotuticzn


7

as a process seems to have gone in and out of Fdshion over the years among students of revctlution; f wiU stress it here, Another significant pctint for my w r k i n g definition is that Marxk cconcegtualizatlon of revolution, although definitely structuralist, does not totally preclude human agency. Across Marx's copious body of work one finds any number of recctgnitions of the role of individuals in the construction of their world. This is perhaps most apparent in the famous dictum &-roxnl"he Eighteel.rr-faBrumuire ofLouk Bonaparte: "Men make their own history, btzt they do ncrt make it just as they please"'44 C~onsequentt_y,Marx argued, people can act upon their environment and ""objective" mndirions, albeit not under conciitions of their own chnasing. At the risk of sounciing trite, one can say that there can be no revctlution without the revolutionaries, The work of Marx is thus an important and influential jumping-off point.

Charles Tiffy Charles Tilly's work on revolution is fttndamentally structural. The role for peaple to play in "filly's conceptuatization is canfined well within existing strucdefined one end of a continuum of the daily struggle h r ret u r e ~ . ~Revolutictns ' sources, People" actions were clearly relevant for Tilly at several points. This is most apparent in his notion of:""coective action" anci his description of tlze revolutionary process, which he elucidated as a seven-stage sequence. "Collective action," for Tilly, rekrred to peopie acting together with thought and purpose: "joint action in pursuit of common ends.'"4 '3ptntanecrus, disorganized, random" kbehaviar was excluded4j Colfective actiitn thus signified consciot~sand inkentional behavior in which peopie engaged," This behavior in pursuit of clzange and the subsequent interactions are best understood as a point where the interaction of agency and structure, that is, the relationship between people and institutions, is discernible. People and institutions interact. According to Tilly, revolution was the mobilization of that discontent into a situastruggle for political prtwer with those already in power; "revc~ltzti~nary tions" xferred to periods when multiple contenders vied fbr power," T k displacement of tlzose in power by those out of:power-the triumph of a single contender-signaled what Tilly referred to as a ""rvcrlutionary outcome.""" TTilly echoed Lenin" maxim that revolutionary situations were no guarantee of revcdfutionary outcomes." krhaps as a result, Tilly's points of emphasis generated a theory that lends itsetf better to inwstigations of the period prior to pctlitical victory than trr the prctcess considered here, which unfolds after the transfer of sovereignty from the old regime to the victorious revolutionaries. A place fbr peoylte is also evident in Tily's expticatirrtn of the rewlutionary sequence. He saw the first three stages as f l ) the ""gaduat mabilization of contenders xnaKng exclusive claims to governmental contml"; (2) a ""rayid increase in the number of peoylte accepting those claims"; and (3) "unsuccessful efhrts by the government . . . to suppress the alternative coalition." In each stage it is possi-

8


ble to discern people; they are called upon to make conscious cl~oices,perhaps most obviously about whether to accept the claims of the power contenders. Rople effectively disappear from the next two stages: ( 4 )the ""etabtishment by the atternative coalition of effective control over some part of:the government"";ncZ (5) ""struggles of the alternatiw coalition to maintain or expand that control.'' In the culmination of the revolutionary process, however, people may once again be part of: tlze process. The final two stages are ( 6 ) the ""reconstruction of: a single polity throtzgh the victory of the alternatix coalition, throtzgh its defeat, or through the establishment of a modus vivendi b e ~ e e nthe alternative coalition and some or all of the ofd members; fragmentation of the revofutinnary coafitionm";nd ( 7 ) the imposition of rarztine governmental control throtzghout the subject poputation."% Each of those stages incorporates a human element. In these stages the revoiuticznary leadership is, first, engaged in negotiations and, second, seeking the support of:the population. Of the many implications inherent in the seven-stage progression that "filly formufated, two merit mention here, The first is that the sequence is overwhelxningly slanted toward the period prior to political victory Only the final stagereimposition of routine gc~xrnmentalcontrol-deals with what transpires after the revotutionaries have achieved pofiticaf victory, Moreover, the reimpctsltion of routine governmental control focuses explicitly on the institr~tianalizalisn process, Structures, in particular the state, remain the key, Atthough l'illy rnay have been guilty of cttXtapsing the political into the social and tlze social into tlze pofiticaf," k heernetheless provided some space for pesrple's motivations within the structures. The revcrlutionary moment arrives "when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted witlz strictly incompatible dem ands from the government and from the alternative body claiming control elver the government or . . . tc>be the gtrvernment."sz This crisis of muftiple sovereignty in TiIly's model is resolved by the populaticzn, or at least a significant segment of it, makng a cl~oice.~Vtioluntary ccrmmitment tc>the new regime wcruld seem to be human agency in action.

Samuel Huntingan and Theda fkocpol Although influenced by Marx and Tilly, the c.oaceytualization of revofution presented lzere is rooted in and is a direct reaction to the definitions of: revolution and social revt3lution proposed by, resyectixly, Samuel Huntingtan and Theda Skocpol, Their perspective, like that of Marx and Tilly, rnay be referred to as structuralist, that is, the focus remains primarify on the "objective" "dynamic of: strucis little or no place accorded to agents-people are, quire simply, tures.?"There nett relevant to their theories of revolution, Huntingtoa's PoFz'tz'cc~lOrfler i~ Ctrur~gz'xzgSocieties has, at least in the study of revc>lution,been subsumed to some degree by Skocpol's scjrk. It nonetheless remains an important starting point. From Huntlngton's perspecdve, moderniza-


9

tion is the cause of revolution. Therefore, the focus is on political institutions and their ability to meet rising demands. IPevctlution is brought on by the failure of political institutictns to accommodate new demands and absctrb potential chatlengers that emerge during tlze modernization process,-"S There are two aspects of Huntington" wctrk that are of particular refevance for my cttnceptuatization of revolution. The first is his definition of revolution as ""a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its pctliticat institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activiy and policies:"TTlne second is his distinction bet.sueen revofution and relatecl plzenomena such as insurrections, rebellions, coups d%tat, or wars of independence, Huntingtonk definition is cogent and compelling. Particularly persuasive is his framing of revolution as an utctcome. At the same "erne, he construed revofution as little more than an outcome. Altl~otlghhe conceptualized revolrxtion as both "rapid" and "viotent," there is little evidence in his work to suggest that revc3lution is, in fact, a process rather than an event limited in scope and duration." This renclering is partly a result of the model that Huntit~gtonand other structuralists have visualized, according to Kimmel, that of volcanic activity: "Discontent srnolders for years, while the pressure below builds and builds, until, unable to contain, it any longer, the volcano erupts, destroying the stable mountain underneatlz and sweeping away all that was beatztiful in the traditional landscape."^ What matters i s the outccjme; the process is essentially absent.59 Skocpol%States and SuciaE Revolution, published eleven years after Huntington" PPOtical Order in Changing Societies, supplanted the latter and emerged as the paradigmatic statement on revcdfution, the reference point for theorizing on the topic.siJAs we have seen, the essential centerpiece of Huntington" wcjrork is modernization, but for Slocpol the state and its relationship with domestic social classes and the internationat political economy occupy center stage. Revolution, for Skacyol, is basically keyed to the weakening or collapse of the existing state structure, Most important for the definition of revolution presented here is Skocpc~l's conceptualizlstian of social revolrttion as the "rapid, basic transfc~rmationsof a society" state and class structures; . . . accompanied and in part carried throtzgh by class-based revolts from betow.'"?l There are two critical aspects inlze~rentin this understanding of:revolution. First, these ""transfc~rmations'"must be not just political, social, or ecctnomic, but all three, in a ""mutually reinforcing fashion:'b2 In this way Skocyol, having built on Huntington, further distinguished social revofutictn from related phenomena. Secand, sociat revolrttions must it~cludea popular uprising, since they are driven by the presumably disaffected class from betow, Although not directly intrctducing a rote fbr people, Skctcpol nonetheless reintroduced the element of:process, which is missing from tlze definition proposed by Huntington; consequently rewlution was understood as both an outcome and a process."'

11 0


Consistent with her structural approach, Skocpol explaitled the social revafutionary process by placing the state in the center of her analysis and avt3ided vc;\luntarist factors by rekrence to class relations." TTfi prctduced plarrsibie (and useful) assessments of the so-calleci great revolrxtions (those of France, Russia, and China) that she undertook. Skocpol" approach proves much more limited when the cases under investigation are modern soclat revolutions (Cuba or Nicaragua, for examyte). Skocpal" cconceytualizariontirn is ill equippeci to deal with processes, which have been fundamentally, in some cases deeply, rntztticlass in character and have also been characterized by voluntarism.65 Shcyol itltroduces process in her definition, but she devotes little attention to it. Most notably, she fails to consider the c~bviousimplication: She does not allow a role for people in the rewlutionary process," As with Wuntington, those who make the revctlution are conspicuous by their absence. The failure to include the efforts and intentions of people indicates tlze belief that structural conciitions dictate absolutely what peoylte can do. Skocpol? working assumption, as Kirnmef suggested, w u f d appear to be that appropriate and mindless actors are perpetually in place, ready to perform tlze actions required of them by the structural conditions-" This persyectiw cttnstrues people" responses to structural cttnditions as irrelevant. Ccznsequently, the most basic and mast human elements of the social revolutionary process, such as ideology>leaderslzip, anci lzuman agency, are ignored." Although Skocpol" consignment to the whipping post as an unrepentant, unapologetic structuralist is unfair,"g lzer memorable invocation of Wenciell Phillips's declaration that ""revolutions are not made; they come" nnoetheless stands as the sine qua non structuralist position.7o Skocyal has provided the paradigmatic definition of sociaf revafmtion. Moreover, she has presented convincing evidence of the relationship between strrtctrxral conditions and revolutionary transformations. Yet her analysis is flawd, for it feaves ncr meaningful role for people to play; People" consciousness and actions are critical variables that cannot be ignored; they are '""always part of the story,'hs Kimmel noted ""and sometimes cruciat to it.'"! I contend that people are m2w~yscrucial to the story The question is where and haw people enter the revalufc;\nary procless.

SOCIAL MVOLUTION: A DEFINITION By now it should be apparmt that the central tenet of my workng definition of revc>lutionis that revt3lutions are in large measure the product of and characterized by human action, Although the fourth-generation scholars of revctluition mentioned earlier have moved beyond the smatlzering structuralism of the tlzird generation-meaningful places for agents and the impact of culture have crept into the Qiscussiczn and been treated largely as fegitimate-mast of these scholars remain profoundly. in the thrall of snucturalist perspectives; the small place made for agents and culture needs to be expanded. Ropfe create their wc~rld,and I believe it is possible to construct sophisticated and substantivety grounded theories


li li

that recognize the power anci importance of people and structures; the utility gained by balding the two analytically distinct pales next to the viofence done to reality The conscious choices and intenttonaf actions of people have clearly played critical roles tlzrouglzout revoltttinnary processes,. Here, I have sought to ccrmpensate for the failure to include people's cccrnscious actions in conceytualtzations of the social revolutionary process by introdudng the concept of goal into tlze uncierstanding of social revolutton.7Woul itnplies conscious aspiration and intentional action in pursuit of a final aim. I define social revolutian, then, as the successful overtlzrow of a rufing elite by a revcrluticrnary vangrtard that has mobilized broad popular support and ttndertaken the transformation of a society" political, eatnomic, and social structures in a contemporaneous and mtztually reinft3rcing fashion. As F-Iuntington did, I distinguish social revolutions from related phenomena by virtue of their outcome. As Skocpal did, X incorporate process because sociat revolutions are carried E o m r d by popular revcrlutionary movements. W ~ a ist now present is the notion of goaX; social revoiution is understocrd as an outcome, process, and goal. The range of cases is relatively narrow It includes only situaticjns where there is an attempt to fundamentally transfc~rmsociety. My deffnition stresses the importance of the revotutionary leadership" effort to mobilize broad popular ~upport.7~ Finally, the inclusion of transformation as a goal sharpens the distinction betwen social rewlutions and related yhentrmena that fail tcr bring about such transhrmatian. This distinction does not deny the significance af those related plzenomena: coups d'ktat, rebellions, and ycllitical rewlutions. Trimberger shctwd that coups d%tat in Japan (f 8681, Turkey f 1914), Egypt f 19521, and Peru (f 968)-which she construed as ""revolutions from above3'-sought radical transformations,'" Walton demonstrated that rebellions in the Pbiiippines (1946-19531, Kenya C X 952-1 956), and Ccrlombia (1946-1 958) resufted in signihcant, if limited, emnomic and political refnrms.7UPoliticat revcrlutions in England (1640-1650, 1688-1689) and the United States ( 1765-1 776) profoundly reorganized the state and politics of those countries. The goals of a coup d'ktat, rebellion, a r political revolrttion, however, rarely incfude changing the entire system but rather striking at specific locations within the estabtished system of government or reorganizing the government to address specific grievances, Coups d'krat are restrictecl in both nature and objectives: Power is transferred either within the ruling elite or from one ruling etite to another, but the state, economic, and social structures and relations remain the same.7Webetlians are often spclntaneous uprisings aimed at changing the leaders, pcllicies, or perhaps even political institutions of the state, but only rarely do they They are driven by involve efforts to directly a&ct social structures and value~.~7 the desire to redress particular grievances a r alter specific situations, Political revolutions transform state, but not economic or social, structures. Such government reorganizations may even include ciass cttnRict.78

11 2


m e r e a s such refc~rmsand politicaj reorganizations may be an antecedent to liberation), these social revt~fution(or part of a war of independencelnati~~nal phenomena may be best construed as events because they are limited in time, target, and objective. In otl~erwords, tlzey lack the necessary constructive transfermative consequences and the fundamental and contemporanes>uschanges in social and poiieicai structure occurring in a ""mutually reinforcing fashion" "at is the special feature of social revolution.79 Social revolution is a dynamic process that encompasses both the destruction of the oXd regime and the construction of a new societyemAs a result, the social revolutionary process i s most t~suaflythought of as having three phases. The first of these is the insurrectz'orz, during which prrlitical sovereignty is challenged, in some cases by multiple contenders, and may be in doubt." This period is faflowed by the political victor3 whicl-x is marked by the transition of sovereignty from tlze old regime to tlze revolrttionary government, This is tlze most readily discernible phase and the most easily dated-those dates commonly associated with revofutions refer to this phase of the process, The third anci final plzase of the social revol~ttionaryprocess is the rmnsfirmution of society and the pes>ple,that is, the institutionalization and consolidation of the revcdfution: the redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of Xife, industrialization and urbanization, and moral reconstruction, This last phase, during which the revc>lutionaryleadership tzndertakes to transfcjrm popular attitudes and create a new people and society and the ""old" people and society react, is the defining characteristic of social revolution and the focus of:this project.82 The distinctions b e ~ e e nthe processes of consofidation and i~zstitutionatization, central to the project presented here, are aixrther developed and explored in the next section. Although there is a large literature on institutionalizatian, few scholars have dealt with the consolidation phase of the social revcrlutic>nary process, and little literature exis& upon wl~ichto base my obsemations. Ccrnsequentfy, at this point we must explore the differences between institutionalization and consolidation and consider the vc>luntaristic nature of the consolidation process itself-,

PATHS TO SUCCESS: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF SOCIAL REVBLWIQN During the insurrection the revotutir;7naries must act to mobilize broad pcrpular support and topple the old regime. In the pcrlitical victory period the leadership's strateu for acquiring power and transferring sovereign~is prominent. As leaders undertake the third anci final phase of the social revolutionary process, tlze transformation of sctciety and the individuats in it-which they inevitably dcr after taking powr-the focus shifts to their strategy for the consotidation of the revofu-


11 3

tion, In other words, social revolutions are neither haphazard nor spontaneous; rather, ""they are led by men, even when they seem most sgcontaneous, Revc3lutions occur because men want them to occur;""qhe sociat revolutionary prctcess requires the conscious effort of peaple-intentionality is as necessary to the process as are extant structural conditictns, The onset of the final phase of the social revctluticznary prcocess represents the moment that Rabert Darnton, in seekng to explait1 what was so revolutionary about the French rewlution, referred to as ""possibilism."@ Peoplte suddenly find themselves presented with boundless opportunities to reshape themselves and by extension their world. The course of history, Arendt argued, ""suddenly begit~s anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or tcrld before, is about to unfctld."g5 kople, she asserted, believe ""tat they are agents in a process which spells the end of the old order and brings the birth of the new wrId."% In tlze estimation of: Kandall Callins, "The rare elation that accompanies a revolrttionary uprising is prcobably due to there being no apparent boundary betwen one's sown micro-situation and that prevailhg anwhere else,""" As nineteenth-century French lzistoorian Jules Michelet said of France in 1789, ""On that day everything was ycossible . . . the future was present . . . that is to say time was no more, all a lightening Aash of eternity."ag Revolutions are, if not rare and mromentc>us,certainly dramatic attempts to reshape society and recreate the material and ideological conditions of its daily life. The French revctluticzn remains the primary reference point and the archetypethe leaders sougl-tt,after all, to reconceptualize time, measurement, interpersonal refations, Every case of social revc>lutionbegins the period of transformation with dramatic visions, which often run headlong into the societaf conditions that survived the first two plzases of:tlze social revolrttionary process. This final phase is ccomyltex and fraught with cttntradictions, Most immediately, the kaders are faced with two essential tasks, The first is establishment of some sort of at least minimal government that can gain international ancl domestic acceptance. This is the yrt>ject of institutionalization; it entails the simuttaneous dismantling of whatever institutions remain from the old regime and their replacement or reconfiguration. Central to this project are questions about succession and limitations on perscrnal pt>wer.sg The seconcl task, aclzieving consolidation, involves convincing the people that political victory in itself does not signify the success of the revolrttion, They must embrace the social revolutionary project, its essence or core, which has historicafly been the promise of health care, educaticzn, justice, the rights of the disenfrancl~ised,With political victory, the peapfc win tlze opportunity to make a better life for themselves and their children. The succress or failure of any particular sociat revolution lies largely in the paths that the revolutionary process takes, X argue lzere that the discrete but interrelated tasks of consolidation and institutionalization, which tzndergird the final phase of the social revoluticznary project, represent the primary paths availabfe after the

11 4


political victory. Whereas the processes of: institutionafization ancl consolidation can be combined in a variety of ways, only when there is attention to both processes is the resuft a successfuf social revotution. Xn other words, when there is a 6~ilureeither to institutionalize or to consolidate, a social revolution lzas not occurred. Olzly those cases where there has been a significant degree of institutionalization and consolidation are successful social revolutions,

XnstitutionaXization:The Structure s f the SociaI Revolutionary Process Institutionalization is a critical step in rebuilding a state vacated by the old regime or destrc>yedby the revc>tutic~naries.. hfitical institutions, which fc3rm part of a state apparatus, include government bureaucracies, the military, the executive, the jucliciary, and the legislature." A state" claim to prrlitical scjvereignty must be substantiated via a combination of administrative, fegal, pcrlicing, and mifitary organizations under the ctbntrof of an executive authority, As a ruie, during the first two phases of the social revolrttionary process, the leaders argue that the instimtions that constitute the regime in power are ccrrrupt, fundamentally tlnjust, immoral, and unequal to the task of national development. Presented with the opportunity to create a new society the revolutionary leaderslzip must either dismantle or reorganize the political, economic, and scjcial institutions inherited from the old regime, New state it~stitutionsare created for a variety of:reasons; these institutions can be crudely lumped into two broad categories, Tlie first semes the immediate instituticrnal. needs of the nasclent government. Attention here, then, is on those institutions refated to the state's ability both to defencl itself (ta maitltain its existence) and to require its citizens to obey the laws (to reestablish order in the aftermath of the political victory). This plays itself out in a variety of ways with respect to the components of the government apparatus, but tlzere are certain patterns that have been readily ictentiffzible throtzghout history. The second category is designed to provide assistance in the drive for ctbnsolidation, The focus of these institutions, therefore, is on social services and equipable treatment for the population. One of the key components in the first category is the justice system. The mifitary and police, or what remains of them, are usually dismantled; the victorious revolutionary army andlor former members of the mifitary or police who were sympathetic to the revc>lutionaryprocess replace them. The judiciary-~ften after having served as the legal bulwark in the old regime" repression of the population-must dispense justice in a society in transition, where tlze very notion of what is just and legal is being hotly contested, sometimes formulated and reformufated on the spot. Therefore, in the early d a p after political victory, there is usually an abundance of ad hoc trib~tnalsand juries to mete out ""revolutionary justice" tcto thrrse who opposed the social re\rcrfutionaryprocess,


11 5

The legislative and administrative branches of the government are also key components in the first category, and another set of important changes is effected in them. The legislature, previously a ltargeiy irrelevant, privileged arena of the powerf~tl,reflects the whole population, and a large number of laws are passed. Carnmr>nbthese statutes are aimed at dismantling vestiges of the old regime and legalizing the new. AS a rule, wide-ranging guarantees of the new society are passed and provisions made to oudaw the type of excesses that in part served to define the old regime. Perhaps the most important issues to be resr-,lved in terms of institutianafization of the new government are tlzose of succession and limits on personal power. These matters have often play;.ed a role in creating the insurrection, and revolutionaries are quick to try to remedy them. Historically, hcowe~r,that has prcmed difficuit: The institutianafizat-ion process has rarely succeeded in resolving these problems, and often they have come back to haunt the revolutionary process. The modern Latin American revt3lutions have been no exception. Despite trccasional forays into electoral democracy>succession in both Bolivia and Cuba had traditionally been via pZpes Je esttado (coups d'ktat). Personal power in both countries had traditionally been limited only by the strictures of the etite and the views of the military, The Botivian revotutionaries sought to introduce democracy in combination with a system of cogoverament to solve tlzese traditional yroblems-but for reasc>ns elabcjrated in the next two chapters, neither worked. The revolutionaries in Cuba took a different tack-no provisions were for realiy have been) made for succession, anci the limit on personal power was anci is cansidered to be "the yeoylte." It is likely that the Cuban populatic>nwill have to confront the issue of succession within the next decade. The success of the Cuban people in limiting personal power since political victory seems mixed, at best, but bogs down in what may be thought of as definitional questions. It is, however, clear that the personat p o w r of Fldel Castro within Cuba is reta"eve1y limitless, Though Grenada had been indepencient for only five years at the time of the 1979 revcrlution, it, lilte the other Eastern Caribbean states, already had traditions concerning both succession and the limits of personal power. In fact, there were two discardant traditions, These countries have largely ~ t a i n e dtheir colonial legacy of Westminster-style parliamentary democraq, featuring regular, essentially free elections with mult-iparv participation." In practice, however, some leaders have taken advantage of tlie ""wide latitude allowed to tlze executive by the Wstminster system" and their stature as their country" 'Younding father.""" One result of th i s has been few meaningful restrictions on personal p o w r and in some cases intrapamily succession. As Heine pointed out, in societies where democratic institutions have been imposed by colonial powers, there are rarely ""countervailing forces to the unbridled exercise of authority of an all-yowerfuf executive."g3 By 1979, Grenada had been run by Eric Cairy, under the guise of demcrcracy, for t-tventy-eight years. Rather than a stereotypical Caribbean dictator, Gairy "was

li 6


simply tlze most extreme expression of: the peculiar mix of democracy ancl authoritarianism" endemic to the Eastern Caribbean." Grenadian revcrlutionaries essentially emulated the Cubans on questicrns of personat power. Ltn~itson personal power under the revolutionary government appear to have existed as a combination of "the people" "a Cuba and intraparty self-criticism. Also reminiscent of Cuba was the Grenadianshpparent lack of attention to the issue of succession. These issues played a role in the ill-Pdted 1983 coup, which sealed the fate of the Grenadian revt3luticrn. Both are addressed in greater detail in the next two chapters, Personal power lzad been unlimited in prerevofutionary Nicaragua; the dic~atorship there was a dynastic one in which succession passed from father to son to brother. The Nicaraguan revcrlutionaries were extremety sensitive to limitations on persona1 power, As a result they carefully divided up responsibility within the new government and, as is explored more fully in Chapter 3, sought to avoid charismatic leaders. The policy seems to have been successful. In ccrntrast to the other modern Latin American revolutions, personal power in Nicaragua remained timited-some have suggested to the detriment of the revofution-and none of the revcrluticrnary leaders was accused crf the sorts of abuses that seemed to occur in the other cases considered here, The mecl~anismthe Nicaraguan revolrttionaries chose to resofve the succession issue was electoral demrrcracy, That was a somewhat contrcrversial chrrice, in part because it carried with it huge uncertainty: No revolutionary government had ever placed itself before the voting pubtic in free and open elections, The two efections since the Nicaraguan revcrlution occurred in the midst of a brutal military and eccrnomic war. The Sandinista Nadonal Liberation Front (FSLN) wctn the 1984 election, bat it lust the one in 1990. The peaceful transfer of power after the 1990 election suggests that alone amrrng the mrrdern Latin American revcrlutionaries, the Nicaraguans successfully resolved the succession issue. The first institutions tlzat a revolutionary government must create, as we have seen, are related tc:, the immediate control of state power and its practice, Equally important are those that support and enctturage the social revoXutlonary process, The seconcl category of institutions therebre generates the mechanisms of: the consolidation process. Such institutions are supposed to provide at feast basic social services and the appearance of just and equitable treatment of the entire population. Social revolutionary governments have typically established institutions concerned with agrarian reform, women" rights, workers\ights, the rights of ethnic or indigenous groups, education, health, children, and employment. The government also encouraged the creation of: counterparts to tlze new institutions among the population, In all modern Latin American revt3lutions there has been a profusion of such institutictns, which enable the government after political victory to shift the focus of: society from its elitist exclusionary past to a populist incfusicrnary present and hture.


11 7

The creation of government and government-sponsored it~stitrrttonsis intended both to reinft~rceand to strengthen the break with the past. There seems little questicrn that the Cubans and Nicaraguans were able to use their new institutions in this mannex=The Grenadian case is Far less clear, alr1zougl-tthe appropriate institutions w r e certainly in place. Such institutions were also created in Blivia; however, the desire of a significant part of the revolutionary leadership nett to effect a break with the past-a matter explored furtlzer in Chapter 2-came back to haunt them and prevent the success of the revc3lution. ""Xstitutionalization" and ""rvolution" do not always coexist on easy terms, in large measure, because of:tlze association of institutionatiization with bureaucracy and bureaucratization and, by extension, with a grc~winginertia and conservatism," The Mexican, Russian, and Chinese revolutions may alf be accurately described as instituticrnalized, What is more, in each case such institutianatization is assodated with negative results: oppression, conservatism, bureaucracy, inertia, and inefficiency: The Mexican and Bolivian revolutions in particular came to be seen by later Latin American revolutionaries as proof of rile dangers inherent in institutionalization, Some revcrlutionaries have argued that no revcrlution shorzld ever be institutionatized lest it cease to be a creative or prctgressiw force. Among the modern Latin American revolrttions, only the Bofivians enshrined ancl sought to emulate the Mexican type of institutionalization. In Grenada, there w r e sharp divisions among the leadership on this as on most issues. The leaders in Nicaragua remained leery of institrttionalizatian even as they sought it; they feared that institutionalization worzld stuftit;r.the social revc>lutionaryprocess, The Cuban revolutionaries were the most virulently opposed to ix~stitutionalization,often rekrring to Mexico and Bolivia as ""warnings" of what institutionalization would lead to. Although the Cubans eventually did begin tc>institutionalize the revc>lution,the ""rectification" ampaign, which opened in 1986, was in part an attempt to de-institutionafizc the social revolution and regait1 tlze vibrancy, creativity, egalitarianism, and nonexclusivity that were once distinguishing characteristics of the revoluticrn, Afthough Cuba's rectification process has met with some success, it has become difficult to discern its status, as the Cubans confront their foss of support from their former Eastern European allies and particularly the former Soviet Union. Matters have become even hazier as the Cubans have successfufly courted European ancl Canadian investors while still plagued by increasing ecanomic and diytomatic pressure from the United States. It fails to the social revc~lutionaryleadership, having seized the institutional structures, to utilize its full resources to reorganize them from the ground up, based on principles different from and antithetical to those of the preceding regime. It is this reestabfishment of state power, based in the executive, coercive, ancl administrative organs, that denotes the successfttl instituttonaltzatian of a revc>tutirrtn.Two of the revolutions tznder ccrnsideration here-the Bolivian and

11 8


the Nicaraguan-were successfully institutionalized. One migl~tsay that the Cubans have Airted with institutit>nalizati~>n,~h Institutionalizati~jn~ hc>we.rer,provides relatively little evidence about consoltdaticrn. Societies require institutions to deal with the issues inherent to cc.otlectiveexistence, but those institutions function onty if the prrputation breathes life inttr them. As we shaZl see, the government can create and refurbish institutions and encourage people's participation, bat it cannot make tl-tem work. It is in this wdy that the gc>vernment'sreorganization of the institutions and structures of scrciety is deftly and proforrndly i n t e r ~ i n e dwith the project of cttnsotidation. Reorganized state structures, particularly the institutions newly created to meet the needs of the population, often provide a basis for consolidating the revolution. Examples incfude the institutions focused on health, literacy, and agrarian reCrm in all four of the madern Latin American revolutions, Another tactic, employed in both Cuba ancl Nicaragua, was the creation of ""dknse committees," which were organized by neighborhood. In theory, these institutions were charged with the dual responsibilities of prornodng and channeling the popufation" energy anci involvement in the transformation of society.97 New instituticrns that are succressful in engendering greater participation, furnishing health care, improving the economic lot of the people, providing access to government services, and so an, not onty strengthen their awn legitimacy but also lay the groundwork for a healthy relationship between the leadership and the population, When such institutions fail, hcdvvever, they became an obstacle, a barrier, between the government and the population for whiclz the population carrectfy holds the government resyc~nsiblte.The aforementioned neighborhood defense committees in Cuba and Nicaragua (the Ccjrnmittees for the Defense of the Revolrttion [CUKs] and the Sandinista Defense Committees [CUSS],respectively) provide instructive examples. During the first ten years of the Cuban revoluticrn, the CLlRs served as the primary revolutionary institution." The CDRs provided contact with and access to gclvernment, transmitted propaganda messages, and supported the revc>tution's cammitment to health care, including nutrition, and education. The CLlRs also frtndioned effectively as tlze eyes and ears of the government in the neigl-tborhoods, which inevitably restzlted in some abu~es.~W~onetheXess, from f 960 fa 1970, the CDRs were effectively tl-re heart of the revolution, increasing people's commitment to the revolutionary process. In short, the largely popular Cl>Rs served as the integrative and mobilizing arms of the sociaf revcrlutionary process, driving institutionalization and promating consotidation at the same time.100 Although the CDSs in Nicaragua sought to dupficate the dpamic, pclsitive role pfayed by the CURS in the first ten years of the Cuban rcvt)ltztion, the ccrntrast between the two was striking. The CDSs had begun as neighborhood support groups during tlze insurrection; this legacy anci people's initial enthusiasm after political victory got them off to a strong start. Yet the CDSs failed to fulfil] either the role envisioned for thern by the leaders or the concomirant expecQtions of the


11 3

population. Rather than being an important component of:the social revolutionary process, the CDSs degenerated into what might charitably be described as a conduit for government policy and resources; a more common characterization migl~tbe a mechanism of bureaucratic control, mired in petty neighborhood squabbles. This faittzre led tc>the CLISs7oss of legitimacy and eventual collapse."I The largefy unpopular CDSs may have played a role in the process of instituticznalization; they apyear to have done little to promote consolidation. The close relationship b e m e n institutionalizatic>n and consolidation is a recurrent theme thrcsughout this b o o l ~Vet these two critical dimensions of the social ~volrttionarytransformation process are most ~tsehllytreated as analytically distinct. In practice, as f shalt iltustrate in Chapter 2, the relationship betwen the two prc)cesses may be characterizd as praft2undly dialectical in nature-^^^^

Gonsofidation:The Heart af the SociaI Revolutionary Process lPJhat littte discussion there is about curzsol'idatiarz as a term has ccsme largely from those investigating the breakdcswn of democratic regimes and the transitions to demacraq and socialism. Much like their ccrfleagues whet study revolution, howeve& tl-tese scl-tolars have largely Fdifed to recognize that consofidation is distinct from the institutironalizatim process, On other occasions consolidation has been confiated with legitimacy or hegemony.1~~ In all tlzese cases, as a rule, institutionalization is considered the ultimate goal, signifying reestablishment of: the state, presumably, with democratic or social democratic structures. The result has been a perhaps excessive amount of time and attention paid to the drawing up of new constitutions, enactment of new laws, and the development, construction, and redirection of new and old institutions, Relatively fittle attention has been paid to questions of deepening democracy, which is where the concept of consolidation articulated lzere would come into play Consolidation is often ena3untered as synonymous tc>institutionalization, that is, ""cctnsolidadon" of the state apparatus and state power. This idendfication is most readily found in tlzree areas of investigation: ( l ) the study of:emergent Third W r l d states,fO4(2) the exploration of the breakdown of authoritarianism and transition to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America,io%nd (3) the focus on transitions to socialism in the Tllird Wc>rld."R On the csccasions when ""conscslidation" k discussed, it is usually in terms of the status of the state apparatus andlor powr, Even recent works that appear to offer some distincdon by, h r example, focusing on the (re) creation of civil society remain predicated on instituticsns as the prect~nditionfor consolidation.f07 My contention is that concerns such as the latter are most usefully understood under the designation "innstutionaf?~ation."l~6 In fairness, W should note that the authors of those sttrdies dcs not purport to be talking about social revotution, much less the consalidation of social revolu-

20


tion. Social revolrttion, after all, denotes fundamental transformations, and the focus of much of the work cited above is on transitions. Those interested in the struggles of Third Miortd states have historicalXy focused on their construction; if there is no state, tlzere presumably is nothing to consolidate. For tlze others, the r-~ansz'tionto either democracy or socialism, as they understand it, has relatively little in common with the tmnsformatian that is the hall~narkof the social revcdtutionary process. Nonetheless, this is how consofidation is commonty ~tnderstood and i n v ~ ~ k e d . ~ ~ ~ ~ One of the few specific definitions of consolidation was offered by Maravefl and Santamaria. Consolidation, they contended, i~lcluciesthe processes by which the emergent regime eliminates, reduces to a minimurrr, or incorporates its initial ideological and institutional inctlnsistencies; esrablishes alltonomy in the face of preexisting established powers withi11the country, especially the armed forces; mobilizes civil society into political forms of expression; and deveiops and mai~rtai~rs a structured and relatively stable party systefn, capabie of guaranteeing popularly accountable government."""

In practice, consotidation is fundamentally, if not completely, tied to the function, autonomy, and reproduction of the new regime, These are based on ""istituticrnalization of the regime" norms ancl structures, the expansion of its legitimacy, and the remtwal of obstacfes.'"iH Additionalfy, consolidaticrn" primary value lies in i t s being "the prcrcess that, eventualfjly, leads to pofitical material institutianafization."~UIthougEzpresented as a distinct process, ccrnsolidation and its ccrmycrnents are rendered suspiciously like those of institutionalization, Consc~lidation, even in these definitions, remains clearly captive to instituticrnaXlzatijon,"" Some schrrlars, particularly those interested in questions about more profound change, have left open the prospect that consolidation denotes possibilities beyond institutionaZisc,at-ic>n, Fagen" focus on the consolidation of state power acknowledged that much more is at stake tlzan institutons: What is up for debate is nclthing less than the ""real meaning" of things in the new society.fl4 4E.l contention that the ""politics of transiConWmust be integrative and patriotic hints at the process of consolidation as definecl here.IlToraggio, having recognized the limitations of top-down approaches, echoed this noticsn of consolidation by fbcusing attention on the populfatictn: ""Popular power and hegemony are constituent components'9fhat not onfy compete with but also strengthen "state power within the joint project of rewllmtionary ccrnsolidationP1 l q ~ o transitions r to occur, the ""ceative energy" of the poyvrlaticrn must be utilized, Both these arrthors touclzecl on elements of what is unclerstood here as consofidation.

Defining Consolidation Consotidation i s the struggle during which the revotutionaries seek to win what Marchetti described as the people" soul, and the people seek to reaiize the visions


21

that brouglzt many of tlzem to tl-te struggle.1i7 S~ucessis measured by tlze degree to which the population adopts the core of the social rewlutionary project not simply in words but in deeds. Consolidation, then, is related to people" percreptions of:the conditions of their everyday fives and of their relationships with each other, with the new government, even with the revcrlutionary process itself, At this stage, the factors central to consolidation are trust, opportunity, and vision of the fttture, wl-tich are bounci together by an underlying sense of empowerment. Taken together, these four represent what is referred to here as ""popular attitudes.'' Trust refers to people" reliance on the character, truth, abttity, and strength of the government. Xt is manifested, in part, by a general acceptance of:tlze new institutions and of the ""rules of the game.'" Presumably; a centraf reason for this trust, once the initial elation has passed, is the ncztion of oyyorttznity, Oyporttznity refers to people" sense of access to what had been the exclusive province of the powerful-education, housing, and the ability to get tlzings done-in otlzer words, efficacy and efficiencry, Rrhaps opportunity" greatest appeal lies in people's sisiczns of the future, A vision of the future is often rcrated in, intergenerationaf justice, that is, the belief that things may be bad now, but with greater opportunity, they will be better for one's children. This notic~nis critical; people accept present suffering in exchange fczr a better future, What holds these factors together is the sense of empowerment, that is, people's befief that they can make a difirence. As a component of trust in the government, character relates to perceptions of whether tlzose in government are decent, honorable, and work hard. Truth, quite simplty, refers to whether peoylte feel that they are being dealt with hrrnestly and openly*Ability refers to perceptions that those in power possess the skills necessary to run tlze government, Finally, strength refers to people" sense of wl-tetlzer the gc>vernmentleaders can hold up to the rigors of managing the country-can they continue to function in the face of adversity?-and whether they need outside lzefy, suclz as foreign support, to do so. These are tlze core elements in assessing the degree to which people trust the gc>vernment. Opportunity is fundamentally about access to goads and services, both public and private, which previously were available only to the elite. Because these goods and semias had been tzncrbtainable by most, the notion of equality underlies this concept, Education refers not simply to basic Iiteracy, although that is critical both syxnbolically and practically-for the creation of a more inhrmeci poyufation-but also tcr l~ighereducation, such as training in medicine, agriculture, engineering and electronics, and the Xaw, Housing means access to affordable, adequate housing. The ability to get things done refers to the sense that it is not only pcrssible but atso plausibte to think that gc>vernment bureaucrats are accessible and will be honest and able to help. Tl-researe the criteria for assessing the degree to whiclz people believe that the government affords tlzem opportunity* Most people desire a better tife for their children or the children of others, A vision of a better fixture explains people" willingness to suffer and struggle now.

22


This entails tlze ability to see beyoncl one's present circumstances ancl even tlze immediate future to the long term, a not-tc>o-common trait, I3eople will almost always profess a commitment to their children" hatsing better lives than they do, but most nonetl~elesslead their own lives with a great deal of: irnmecliacy. Since the immediate questions often relate ttr providing food, clothes, medicine, or shelter to these same children, this is not surprising. Vet the social revolutianary process often demancls tlzat the people set aside their more itnmediate hopes in exchange for a vision of the future. Exnpowerment, in this case, refers to efficacy and staying poweq that is, giving individuals the sense that their actions will have an effect on tlze process and that they can defend the gains that they make, This may be seen in a variety of ways: kople" invc~lvementin mass organizations and pc~liticalparties as well as in popular protest and demonstrations are obvious indicators, Empowerment binds these elements tagether because people d o not participate without trust, apportunity increases empcIwrment, and emp(>wermentis engendered by a vision of the future, Popular attitudes are like a belief system, albeit one tlzat is less formal ancl less rigid than that denoted by the term ideology Neither whc~llyindependent sets of ideas nor sets of justifications dependent on the exigencies of political power, popular attitudes form a loose-knit worldview that people bring to bear a n the events around them. This ""tool kit'"lrs with which peopluconfr'ront the exigencies of their daily lives is composed of myriad factors and is best determined by questioning people to reveal their practical political ideofogy,"g with which they judge events, and their practical knowledge'zo about dq-to-day life, A fcrrmer political cadre in the Nicaraguan army explained that people approached the vagaries of life in Nicaragua simply: ""Listen, capitalism, communism, sociatism are all just bullshit-people here just live, they don" care about those things."""" X am not suggesting that tlzere is no place for more traditional social science variables, People's economic situation-as tlzey perceive it-and geographic Xocation are other factors that are useful in explaining the status of consolidation. The key2hcrwever, is popular attitudes; the process of consolidation is nctt best understood solely by attention to and a reliance on srrcl~structural Fdctors as ecant~micsand geography, In Fact, in the sc~cialrewltztionary process, ideas can countemail structural factors or at the very least profoundly shape and alter them. As a result, voluntaristic Factors, such as popular attitudes, allow us to begin to uncover the process of consolidation. Moreover, economics and geography may be construed as primarily influenced by the institutianalizaticzn process; popufar attitudes, lzowever; reflect the population's view of: its status and are tlzelrefore at the center of the gotrernment" rrevtotutionary strategfr ft9r ct~nsolidation. Given its elusive nature, consolidation is best assessed atong a continuum. At one end there is the ideal of consolidation; the complete adoption and incorporation of the social revctlutionary process into society so that that process is a seamless, mutually reinfcrrcing, coherent whole. At the other end is breakdown: the


23

complete failure of the government to engender tlze population's support, much less its commi"tent to the social revolutionary process. The scale thus runs from support through validation, undermining, and, eventually, breakdcrwn, Practical indicators of consofidation range from enthusiastic support for tlze core of the social revolutionary proirect to the grudging, tacit acceptance of the ""new societye3Thehrmer is enhanced by literacy campaigns, health care and nutrition projects, land redistribt~tinnand agrarian refc~rm,income redistribution, and the participation of the population. The latter is demrrnstrated by the tolerance of unpopular government dedsions, for example, not rioting at fcmd price increases, or an unwillingness to take part in behavior that undermines tlze social revolutionary project. The dividing line betwen supporting behavior and validating behavior is permeable, Validation denotes the willingness of people wary or even hostile to the government, such as tlze ""loyal" opposition, to work inside the new structures. Thus a demonstration aimed at specific grievances within the gc>vernment may serve to strengthen the government both by recognizing its legitimacy and by addlressing the new institutions that have been created. This kind of participation indicates at least a tacit acceptance of the rules of the game, further proof of institutionalization, which in turn may be reatisticatly construed as assisting the process of consolidation. However, if tlze same demonstration were to challenge or deny the legitimacy of the gotrernment, it could be ccrnstrued as undermining behavior, The fine between vaiidating bel-ravicrrand undermining bel-ravicrr is atso permeable. The range of tinclermining behavior includes tlze refusal to vote or participate, setling to the black market, trading money on the black market, efforts to create internal. disruptions, emigrating, or? uftimately, a declsicrn to join counterrevolutionary forces, If institutionalization is a Eamiliar concept, consolidation is an elusive one, Instituticrnalization is a prctcess that may be readily measured by such factors as the status or fundion of key government structures. Consofidation, wf7tich is related to peoylte" perceptions of the material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives and their reiaticrnshiys with each other, with the new government, even with the revolutionary process itself, is not so easily measured. Then how can one identify when the ccrnsolidation process is a success, that is, when it is "t>vern""ltis nctt clear to me tfia~lhereis a good answer to this question. 1X":evcrluticrnsare cornmonly assigned dates by political victory, for example, October 1917 in R~issiaor Jantzary 1959 in Cuba, Discerning the end of the consolidation process, the conclusion of the revolution, is a much trickier business.122 Rrhaps the most useful tools for assessing the end of consolidation have been proposed by Hobsbawm, In the period after political victory, he pointed out, there is genuine, if not always universaf, ""enf~tsiasm for the cttnstruction of a new and better socieryY'"z3i t the same time, ""the most prohund effects of the revolutionary expectation on human personality" "rely occur on a grand scale and generally, he argued, tend to be short-lived.u2 None of this is meant to dis-

24


parage the real and meaningrful clzanges that occur but rather to remind the reader that transfc3rmation is a cornpiex, profound, and difficult process in which to engage, Reality takes its toll on popular support and tlze willingness of the peayte to make sacrifices and continue the struggle. Shortly before the 1990 Nicaraguan elecdons, a Nicaraguan confided to me that some people were wondering aloud if they slzould support the FSLN in the ~~pcoming elections and continue the struggle or vote for the National Oppcrsition Union (UPi30) and enjoy the roughly one month of luxury they believed the United States would ""reward" them with before it turned its traditionally short attention span else where.^^^ fnstituitionalizatic3n rnay be measured by the stability and functioning of the state structures or assessed when the major social and eccrnomic disruptions that commonfy accompany the political victory have been In Pact, tlze reason ""over" w~rasplaced in quotes in the question, W ~ e nis a revolution "over"? was to denote that there is a sense in which the consolidation process rnay in fact never end but, rather, if successful, be silnply subsumed into the soclaIizatlon process that all societies rely on to replicate themselves. So the revolution, in some sense, simply beccrmes the new framework within which the ccruntryS historical evc~luticznhenceforth takes place. Inevitably, inspiration wanes as the disfance from political victory grows. Even when the rewlutionary spirit holds up in the face of the exigencies of everyday life, Hobsbawm pointed out, its institutionafizafton inevitably results in routinization and eventually in the rhetoric of: anniversaries,~z~ The ultimate test of the ccrnsolidation prc~jectis to determine hcrw far, and tcr what extent, the changes of values and the capacity of people to mobilize are maintained, especially when many of the revolution" ppt-omises-utopian and otherwise-are revealed as imy ractical. The question that Hobsbawm posed is this: h%at remains of the original saciat revolrxtions when the transformation t l ~ a they t lzave brought about lhas Faded from memory or is taken far granted, has become simply an era in a country's histary?QSThe range of possibilities is relatively wide, stretching from revolutions that lzave slipped from public memory, such as tlzose in England or Bolivia, to revc>lutionsthat remain either permanent points of reference, as with the Russian, or important elements in current political and ideofogical debate, as with the French or the Cuban, IzLY Stilf, Hobsbawm suggested that there are at least two identifiable reference points. One is when the first adult generation of ""children of the revolutic~n" emerges on the public scene."Yhese are the people whcrse education and careers are based in and therefore entirely betong to the new era. Of course, generational change is an important element in any society, yet revolutions accentuate and depend on it to continue and perhaps expand the social revolrttionary project. The new generation often plays an unusually impcrrtant role in the drive to transform individuats and society. At its earliest, hcjwever, this change can only be ascer-


25

tained after the rouglzly twenty-five years that conventionally demarcate generations, The second reference point may take even longer to invoke and, at root, relies largely on hindsight. This point is reachecl when the social revolutionary government has demonstrated the capacity tcr resist internal challenges and has not been overthrctwn for a sufficient period of time, Hobsbawm suggested that we knctw revolutions are over ""when the general pattern or Yramework" set up at one point in history has not been fundamentally altered for a sufficiently long time, though this need not exclude quite significant change within ir."ME Said another way>consolidation is linked to people" long-term ancl tlzel-efore presumabfy profound embrace of the new society. Consolidation as it has been ccrnceptualized here is clearly a step beyond any of the ways it is commonly encountered. Is such a new definition justified? To put it more coffoquially, what does it buy us? The answer is that it allows us to sketch a more accurate picture of the most irnpcrrtant phase of the social revctlutionary prctcess, the period that defines the entire process, The task of creating a new world is not one that can be understaorl solely irz terms of structures and institutions, economic statistics and potiticat norms. It requires access to the ways in which people seek to recreate themselves and the material and ideotogical conditions of their everyday lives, This is the "haandfe" povided by consalidation.

REVOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL The study of social revolution has been dominated by structurafist conceptualkations that fail tcr reccrgnize that sociat revcrfutions are creative acts, wncrete episodes in which people pursue goals,132 The contention lzere is that structural tlzeories alone wilI never altnw us to ascertain the manner in which any given social revolutionary process unfolded, We mtzst, to echo George f-fomansk plea, bring people back tn."Vt is time to turn around Wenclell PlzilXiys's mnzel5lorablc statement so compellingly invoked by Skocpol: Revolutions do not come, they are made. This is not to deny the general character of sctcial revc3lutions as macrohistoricaf phenomena or the cttnditians that impinge on the prctcess. Vet scl-rolarshave largely ignored the strongly valxtn~aristaspect of social revofutions: People make revc>lutions,Further, most studies of revolution focus on the catzses of rewlution and pay virtually no attention to the complex processes that unfold during the transformation of society after the insurrection. Even those few scholars whcr dcr consider separately this final phase of the social revolutionary process do not treat consoXidatiams as distinct from the institxrtictnalization pro~ess.13~ They present consolidation as an ""o~ltcome"&&eterminedby a variety of factors, particularly, structural ccrnditions and events that promote the political victory, The period of transformation they describe, ctxptain, and predict

26


by cataloging and considering structural antecedents, but the tatter often ultimately prcme to have tenuous relationships to what unfolds. Xtevcdlutionaries have chosen to pursue (or nctt) the two processes in different ways. As we explore at lengtll in Chapter 3, there are two primary types of social revc>lutionaryleadership: visionary and organizrttianaf, Each type deals with consolidatictn and institutictnalization according to its naQure, X contend that excessive fbcus on one comes at the expense of the otl1er.~35 Let us consider social rewlutions with very strctng visionary leadership, as in Cuba, which tend toward consolidation, and cases such as Bolivia, with strctng organizational leadership, which are prone to instittxtionali~ation.In those cotxatries the lack of both types calls into question the success of their social revolutions. Although Grenada appears to have both types of leadership, a disastrous split among the feaders seated the fate of the revotution. It is only in cases such as ~ social revolutionary leadership achieves some semblance of Nicaragua, w h e the balance betwen the two processes and remains united, that the success of the social revotutionary process seems assured. The debate over tlze relative wei&t and diatecticaf relationslzip between itldividual and cctllective will as opposed to historical circumstances in determining the outcome of a given event or process is one of the central issues in modern social theory anci is important to the argument presented lzere.fi6 Action occurs within a given and defined set of circumstances, and it is the interpiay of circumstance and actionneither of which can exist Mrithout the other-that creates human history. The importance of voiuntarism in tlze social revolutionary process and the resulting dynamic relationship betwen structure and agency during the consolidation process fuel the debak over the specific relatictnship.li7 Resofution ofthis debate lies in tlze remgnition tlzat tlze parameters in which human action is pclssible depend on historically syeciffc cctnditians-~"tructuralism and ""hmanism" (agency) may each, in particufar circumstances, be significant.139 Few today subscrik wholeheartedfy to one extreme or another in this ""agentstructure" "debate; meaninghl explorations and satisfactory answers lie with those theories that can take agents and structures, both rof which have cttnsequentiaf roles, into account. The argument lzere demands a focus on people's consciotzs choices and actions and how they shape the world. Structural perspectives provide a framework that may be utilized trt evaluate events and processes across time. But it is imperathe to recognize that this framework is merely a shell, ""dtermined" by the structure. Predetermination results in a disinclination or inability to estimate the critical vofuntarist events and processes that shape reality. m e r e a s the relationship between objective conciitions anci human actors in social history is discernible on a common-sense level, theoretically, matters are less clear, Social revolutions are neither automatic nor inevttabie. There is little question tlzat "objective conditions" may set the stage; however, they do not move societies into or through the revc>lutionaryprocess, I proyclse that we can understand the transformative period by relating the social, economic, and politic21


27

structures at the domestic and international levels to purposive, voluntaristic political action. Part of the focus here, then, is on the efftjrt of the revcrtutionary leadership to consolidate the revolution and the reactions of people in the society in transition. Vcltluntaristic events abound during the social revolutionary process, and several scholars have demonstrated the central role people play during both the insurrection anci the battle for political power.I@Bet it is in tlze incredibly camytex and lengthy transformation process after political victory that the efforts and macbinatic~nsof groups and individuals have their most obvious and dramatic impact. The final phase of the social revolutionary process should be construed as a p eriod of ptzrposeful adaptations to a ccrnglomeration of political circumstances as the social revolutionaries seek to transform the ycrlitical, economic, and social structures of their society. To omit the element of cctnscitzus actictn and decision from tlze analysis is a mistake. Options are considered and choices are made: This phenomenon has not been, and cannot be, captured by a structural perspective. The inadequaq of that perspective can be iitustrated by considering two cases where the structural conditions identified by Skocyol do exist but where the results of the revcrlutions are different. If, as Skc3cpcrl argued, only structural conditions are relevant to the social revolutionary process and if they are the same in two cases, the outcomes should be roughly similar. If tlzey are not the same, the question is, what was different abcltut the two cases? My contention is that the difference lies in the rctle played by individuals-both the revolutionary leadersizip and the population. The 1959 Cuban revc~lutionis one of the few cases universally accepted as a successful social revolution, The 1952 revotution in Bolivia, in stark contrast, has been relegated to little more than a historical. footnote, a rarely invoked reference pcrint. Therefc~re,two processes that look remarkably analogous when considered in structural terms result in dramatically different outcomes, outcomes that are not, in &ct, persuasively explained by reference to structural factors. The "missing link"" is instructive. For Skocpol, as noted earlier, the state and its refatitznship with the international political economy ancl domestic social classes occupy center stage in tlze social revt3lutionary process. ""Kevc~lutit~nary crises" occur via "inter- and intranational structural contradictions and canjunctural occurrences beyond the deliberate control of avowed revol~~tionaries,"m As a result, inlrestiglttors require a structural perspective that emphasizes ""objecti-\.e relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups and nafons, rather than the interests, outfooks or ideologies of particular actors in revolutionsPW2 Specifically, for Skocpol, social revolutions occur in essentially agrarian societies and happen only with the cotlapse of the administrative-military structure, Critical to the unhlding prctcess is the role played by the peasants as a cirtss either in revolt or mobilized for guerrilla ~ a r f a r e . 1 4Tl-rerefore, ~ the rewlutions in Bolivia and Cuba are casually lumped together by Skocpol as examples of social revc1luticzn.1~~

28


A perspective that equates the Bolivian and Cuban revolutions is missing something, that which would exytain the radically difkrent trajectories of the revolution^.^^^ What: is missing from Skczcyof's fctrmulaf on is a meaningful role for individuals in the social revolutionary process. It is the inclusion of: individuals-both in the social relrotuticznary leadership and in the population generally-that prctduces a useful explanation of the dramatic contrast between the two revolrttionary processes, In Bolivia the revolutionary leadership failed to cczmpltete the social rewlutionary process. There was no real visionary leader, no one to articuiate the hopes and dlreams of the population anci energize them to continue to struggle and participate in the revc~luticznaryprocess, Moreover, the organizational leaders-those who sought to implement the social revolutionary program-were at odds with each other over the directiczn of the social revoluticzn. The Bolivian leaders reached a rough, at times very rough, consensus on the institutionalization of the revt3lution. Appropriate laws were passed and institutions created and reconfigured. The failure to agree on a strategy for consoJidation kept the leaders, lzowevex; in contention; tlze Bolivian revolutionary process unfolded in the ""czntext of bitter idectlogical conflict and intense factional struggle.""" As a result, the Bolivian revolution degenerated intcz a struggle among the leaders, which lasted until tlzose who apposed the core of:the social revolutionary project won, The Bolivian peoylte" response tct the conflicting signals and messages was to ioofc out fafor their own, narrrtwer, interests rather than the broader social revolutionary process (see Chapter 2). Thus, Bolivia may be most usehlly understood as an ina3mplete social revczlution in which there was a failure of the rewfutionarks to consofidate the social revolutionary process, Xn Cuba there was an aggressive program of cansolidation led by visionary leaders and caref~llfyundergirded by organizational leaders. Eschewing any program of instituticznalizat-ion, the social revolutionary leadership committed itself to funciamentafly transforming the material and ideological conditions af everyday life. The people were mobilized and energized through health and literacy campaigns and empowered to take charge of their lives and "their" ~vctluticzn. The success of the consalidation project can be seen in the degree to whicl~tlze Cuban yczyulation, particularly from 1959 to 1969, embraced the core of the sociaX revolutionary project and participated actively in the process. In fact, it is the role of the Cuban people in the process that has led so many to label the revolution a success. Yet the absence of institutionalization during the first decade and its subsequent uneven introducticzn has created problems for Cuba, In particuiar, the question of succession and the population's relationship with a popular but aging leadership-both visionary and organizational-may well provide the real test of whether the Cuban revofution has been a success. The final transformative phase of revolution has cammanly been treated by scholars as highly structured, with the primary focus on the structures the nascent governments inherit and the reorganization or creatictn of institutions. These


29

sc11olars"remise remains that people are either ineffectual or inconsequential in the face of structures, I contend that although social revs>lutionswill face confining conditions, they are guided by the conscious plans and significant choices made by revolutionaries across the three phases of the social revolutionary process. Clctnsideration of the prcrcesses of institutionalizatic~nand consolidation and their possible combinations provides a powerful and useful way to distinguish bet w e n and among social revs>lutions,The Eailure of social scientists to adequately account for the roIe of the individual. and people" interactions with the structures that surround them lzas proven limiting. Atrhougl~from a structuralist perspective, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada may all be cases of social revolution, the perspective introduced here helps draw some meaningful distinctions amsrng them. These dlstlncticrns produce both a useful general understanding of the social revolutionary process and wortlzwl~iteinsiglzts into tlze respective cases, In Chapter 2 we will consider the most obvious of the variety trf options pursued in the period after politicat,victory: f l ) institutionatization without consolidation (Bolivia, 1952-1956); (2) consolidation withatlt institutionalization (Cuba, 1959-1969); (3) institutionalization and consolidation (Nicaragua, 19791940); and (4) the absence of institutionatization or consolidation (Grenada, 1979-1983). In Chapter 3 X explore tlze way in which such paths are cl~osen-a combination of the nature trf the political leadership, the social revs>lutionaryideology, and the social revolutionary strategy, In Chapter 4 we will return to the Nicaraguan case and consider it in greater degree. Chapter 5 will revisit the themes of the book. The future of revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean is considered in the Epilogue.

CHAPTER TWO

utionary Paths: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada This chapter seeks to demonstrate the utility of ccrnsolidation as an independent analytic concept, fnstitutionalization and consolidation are the lenses that f use in this section to investigate social revolutionary processes. My approach picks up aspects of the social revolrttionary process tlzat previous students of revolrttion have treated as peripheral, and thus it provides new insights. Specifically, in this section X consider the social revoXutionary processes that unfolded in the four modern Latin American revolrxtions: Bolivia, 1952-1956; Cuba, 1959-1969; Nicaragua, 1979-1 990; and Grenada, 1979-1983. These cases are not ideal types; rather, they serve to demonstrate what we might learn by using institutionalization and consalidation as instruments of analysis, Consolidation and institutionalizatim are most usehlly tznderstood as paths that revotutionaries choose to fcjllow (or not to fc~clll~w) in the period after political victory As such, institutionalization and consolidation should be discernible within the social revc3lutionary process. W ~ e nW use these processes as analytic tools, we can gain insight into previously murky areas of the social revolutionary process; we can also observe 6~ctorsand issues that have been marginalized by misunderstanding, inattention, or ot~erlynarrow ccrnceptualizatiom Let us briefly consider the four most otlvious patterns of institutionalizath and consolidation in the context of four specific social revolutionary processes (see Figure 2.1). Bolivia, an example of institutionalization without consolidation, hiled as a social revofutic~n,and remains little noted. Because of the failure to conscrlidate,the revolution offered little protection for the gains achieved under the auspices of the revc>lutionaries,Cuba, the fate twentieth-century archetype of social revt)lution, here serves to illustrate consolidation without institutionalization, Fidef Castro's continued arlsility to step outside of ancl alter state institutions as he chooses leaves institutionalization suspect. This phenomencrn also means that the ultimate success

SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARY PATHS

FIGURE 2.1 Xnslitrrtionalkzationand consoiidation of social rcvtlitrtion in Roiivia, Cu ha, Nicaragua, and Grenah

of the Cuban revolution, its staying power, remains conjecture-mat will happen when the immense figure of Fidel Castra departs the scene? The Grenadian revczlution exhibits neither institutionalization nor consotidation, Although Grenada serves as a useful example of this lack, that is not necessarily the best wdy to understanci the Greaadian revolutionary process,. Plausible arguments can be made for comparing the Grenadian case to Bolivia, even interpreting it as akin to either Cuba or Nicaragua. Nonetl-retess,as will be explored below Grenada is clearly the case in Latin America that most cfosefy fits this categclry Nicaragua, in which there w s both institutionalizatim and consotidation, seems to have proved the success of bctth processes. The successfuful institutionalization in Nicaragua made it difficult for tlze FSLN to step outside state institutions to after the ejection results, as Castro could in Cuba, where institutions have remained susceptible to his charismatic authority. Tlze strength of consoiidation in Nicaragua not only protected the care of the social revaf~ltionaryproject-in contrast to Bolivia or Crenada-but also forestalled any serious discussion of the rollback of the saciat revotution, even by a victorious aliiance that includes ctdunterrevofutinnary factions," My argument is that in cases where there was a failure either to institut'ranafize or consolidate, a social revoluticzn has not occurred, Such failure, as in Grenada, 1979-1 983, results in a failed social revolution. Institutionafization without consolidation, as in Bolivia, 1952-1956, most likely will also result in an ina3mplete and therefore failed social revolution, Ccznsafidation without institutionalization, as in Cuba, 1959-1969, is somewhat more difficult-the revofutinn remains incomplete and therefore both vulnerable and suspect tzntit it has demonstrated the ability to transkr powr, Even with the relatively higher degree of institutionalization present in Cuba rod% the remarkable stqing power of the revolrttion lzas yet to face its ultimate test, the loss of the jefe ~zdxirno,Fidet Gastrcz.

32


Only when there is both institutionalization anci consolidation, as was arguiibly the case in Nicaragua, is the success of the social rewlution likety. Success is most clearty identified when it is clear that the saciat revofution has not been ctverthrown and tlzat the tenets of the social revolution have become central to society. Even though under these terms the social revczlution in Nicaragua appears to be a success, it merits repeating here that it is dimcult to gauge the success of the consolidation process until sufficient time lzas passed. It is too early to declare tlze process of consolidation cczmpltete in Nicaragua, If consolidation, institutionalizaticzn, or a mix of the two represent the paths wailable in the post-political victory period, one can ask how a particular path is chosen in a specific case, This question is explored at length in Chapter 3. Fcrr the purpczses of this chapter, I argue simply that choices are made by the leaders as they appraise the interplay of the population" needs and demands and the domestic anci international Factors tlzat impinge on their ability to realize the social revs>lutionaryproject, The social revs>lutionaryleadership, a small cadre of rev this end, social revolutionaries seek to btlild and mait~tait~ popular support across all the phases of the social revolutionary process. Given that supyczrt prior to political victory is atmost always granted at great rislc-usually of one's life-the initial relationship between the revolutionaries and the population necessarily involves the murkry areas of belief, hopes, dreams, fear, anger, and commitment on the part of the latter. It is often hen: that revolutionaries first recognize the cttmplexit-y of their relationship with the people in whose name tlzey purport to be fighting fc~rstate control and for the right to lead in the creation of a new society. When the revotutionaries do realize that it is the poptzfation that is at greatest risk and that is actually bearing the brunt of the fight for political victory, the impact can be both impressive and inspiring, Humberto Ortega, a leader of the Nicaraguan revoluttczn and the country" minister of defense under both the FSLN and subsequent UNO governments, noted that during the struggle, "we always took the masses into account, but more in terms of them supporting the guerrillas so that the guerrillas could defeat the Naticznal Grrard, Tl~isisn? what


33

actually happened. What actually happened was that it was tlze guerrillas who provided support fbr the masses so that they ccruld defeat the enemy by means of insurrection."4 Such sentiments, faken to heart, can be inspiring; they are doubtless sobering as well. hlitical victory; as ccruntfess revotutionaries have disct)vered, does not guarantee people" continued support, much less their commitment to the social revolutionary project: Revalrttionary situations do not always beget revolrttionary outcomes.' Thus, at this critical juncture, the nascent social revcrluticlnary government" primary concern must become the battfe for the support of the population. Even though they are confronted with a wide array of canfining conditions and threats both internal and external, the revotutionaries must focus on the process of consolidation. Many revoluticrnaries have made the mistake of being overly idealistic about the peaplc, presumit~gthat tlzey "unc2erstood79heexigencies of the situation; they thought that the pec~plesaw the world as the revcrlutionaries did, Ta some extent this coincidence of views is certainly the case: Rc3pXe have demonstrated time and time again that they are prepared to make compromises with a new government just as they did with the old. But the people know their vants and needs..To win them to the side of the revolution, to engage them in the revolutionary spirit, it is necessary to involve them in the step beyond the battle for political power; engaging them in the struggle for a new society and for their future and that of their children. Popular support remains the essential condition for tlze survival of the social revc>lutionaryyrcrcess, Only the peoylte can supply the energy, power, and time to create the new society. Persuasion, organization, or coercive measures aXctne have not been able to create this support, Rather, obfaining popular support is dependent on the package presented by the revc)lutionaries, This support may be manifested in active participation in the social revolutionary process or in grudging, tacit cansent to it, but such support cannot be coerced; it must be voluntary. 1PJhatexr its forms, without popular supycrrt the revcrlution cannot be and will ncrt be consotidated. Without popular support the social revoluticrn is unable to transform society and degenerates into simply another in what may be a long line of gclvernments. This can be seen clearly in the case of Bolivia.

BOLIVIA, 1952-1 956: 1NST1TUT1BNAL1ZATlBN WITHOUT CONSOLIDATION Bolivia" 1952 revctlution is often overlooked when social revctlutions are discussed,Wevertlzefcss, at one time the 1952 revolution in Bolivia was considered Latin America's seconcl great revalrttion of the twentieth century, ceding only to Mexico.TThe most common adjecdve aetached to the Bolivian revctlutioms. is "incomplete:halthough scholars have atso used terms such as ""unfi~~ished" and "un-

34


completed'khen discussing the Bolivian revolutionary experience. There is tinquestionably a consensus that a revcrlutionary process began to tznfotd in Bolivia in 1952; there is iess agreement abcrut where that process w n t , Clearly, however, the Bolivian revolution of 1952 has become little more tl-tan.a historical. aside, referenced tzsually as some sort of revcrlutic~n-pc->litical or social-but mrrst ccrmmonly invoked as the modern archetgvpe of an incomplete social revoIuticzn.8 As I have made clear, I argue tlzat for a revolution to achieve success, the revolrttionaries must be able both to institutionalize and to consolidate the social revcllutionary process, Institutionalization afone is not encrugh to ensure success; the "incompleteness" oaf tbe Bolivian revolrttion stemmed from tlze Failure of the revolutionaries to consolidate the revc>ltztion,I shall focus on that failure and the unique configuration of Bolivids revc3lutionary leadership as Factors responsible for the revolution's ixn~ounpleteness.~ As will be explored betr>w% Bolivia" revc>lutionaryleaders were divided prior to achieving political victory; they were never able to cjvercome this problem. The leaders were able to agree on and impose from abcrve the reforms of many state structures and create new ones to meet the demands anci desires of: tlze popufation, In other words, they institutionalized the revc>lution. They were tznable, howver, to convince the majority of the population to embrace the social revolutionary project; tlze~refore,they Failed to consolidate the revolrttion, f n contrast to parties in the other modern Latin American revcrlutions, the vanguard party in Bcrlivla was largely moderate, middle-ciass, and rehrmist, The National Revolutionary Movement (MNK) was founded in 1941 as a neo-Nazi political party." ots Ieaders cultivated a popufi" image while maintaining their essential.commitment to a narrow grcrup w-itl~in,Bolivian societry, the middle- and upper-middle-class ""dvelopmentalists."~ Just two years later, the MNR was y art of the civil-military c ~ u that p installed a reformist regime based on ""military socialism."Q When this government collapsed in 1946, the MNR began s i x years of exile, clanciestlne activity, and the search for its fttture in Bolivian politics. Casting about far a new direction that would return them to power, the MNR leaders lit upon more or less pure nationalism. The party would prcrvide a meef ng place of: sorts, a pragmatic centex; for those shut out and marginalized by the new gc>vernment.The MNRk premature attempt at a civil ccrtzp in 1949 convinced the leadership that the party needed to broaden its base even further before it could return to power. The solt~tion,the leaderslzip decided, was the creation of: a broad, mtzlticlass, populist party, which mtzld serve to integrate all the principal elements of st-tciefy;.1. Xa Mexicds Instituticznalized Revolutianary party (PRX), By 195l tlzere were three Factions within the MNR. A traditionalist faction remained true to the MNR%rightist roots, ofkring a rather vague protofascist program built around national digniv, harmony, and anti-Semitism. Another faction, which coalesced around MNK labor leader fuan Leclzin Oquendo, proposed a specific labor- or left-oriented program of political, sc~cial,and economic change, including universal suffrage, nationalization of the tin industry, and


35

widespread agrarian rehrm. The third faction was tlze Centrists, pragmatic nationalists such as Victor IJaz Estenssoro and HernAn Siles Suazo, who articulated "national-devefopmentatist" values that were "more an attitude than a clear program,""' These pragmatic nationalists formed the core MNK Zeaderslzip, playing off the other two factions and manipulating them in their drive for state power. Seelcing to broaden their base with the population, the more pragmatic among the MNK teaders reached out to Bolivia's Left, specifically Bolivian workers. The result was an tzneasy and a w h a r d alliance between the traditionalists, the upyermiddle-class core MNR leadership, and the more radical wrking-class leadership of:o r g a n i ~ labor d in Bolivia, Ait11ougl-t this fragile alliance was ""Ei-aughtwith mutual distrust and hostility," it enabled the MNIZ to contest the 1951 elections successfulfy with a broad-based platform, long on promises and short on specifics. The centerpiece of the platform, in the popufar perception, was the adoption of labor/left's call for universal suffrage, nationalization of the tin industry, and widespread agrarian reform. f 4 Xn the 1951 election, tlze MNR ticket of Vaz and Sites won a plurality of: the votes, falling just slzort of:tlze absolute majority necessary to win tlze election outright. The MNIi leadership looked fc~mardto their confirmation in the ccrngress, as dictated by the constitution, Before that coufd happen, however, the military and tlze elite persuaded Bolivia's president to declare the election results a thl-eat to democracy, coutlaw the MNM as commtznist, and turn the gc>vernmentover to the military for safekeeping until new elections coufd be held. Thus, in May 1951 the MNR was prevented from taking office. The MNIZ began to consider other avenues to power. Despite its efection rhetoric, a description of the early MI";IXX remained apt: "an electoral and parliamentary cabal seeking quick access to governmental office througl~which it intended to impose refc1rm.u Not surprisingly, the MNR leadership laid the grczundwcjrk for a civil-military coup that wcjuld place them in the offices they had won in the election. There is every indication that such a coup lzad been developed and put in motion, but the MNM? military allies were tznable to bring over their colleagues." Wlzen the military remained loyal to the government, an armed urban population-quickly joined by tlze tin miners-stepped into their piace, k%at had begun as a relatively narrow civjll-military coup metarnrorphosed into a broad-based insurrection replete with revoluticznary rhetoric;, The lzistory of the MNK and its teadership leaves little doubt that it had neither anticipated nor particularly desired a broad-based revc>lution from below- Regardless of the MMR" original vision of the process, in April 1952 the country was in tlze hands, not of the MNK's military copfotters, but of hastily cobbled together militias of wrkers, party activists, tc>wnspeople,and miners. Armed and radicalized, these people demanded mctre than another coup or rebellion-"eq wanted a revolution. After the revc3lution" tzntzsually brief and refatixly bloodless three-day struggle for potitical power (9-t I April f 952), the MNR was nominally in control and cer-

36


tainly holding tlze reins of power By virtue of: its role in the 1945-1946 rehrmist gcltrernment, its somewhat romanticized history of opposition, its clear victary in the 1951 election, and its initiation of the insurrection, the MNR had immense popular support. %ding the crest of tlze revolutionary process, the MNR leaders found themselves in what they perceived as their rightful position. Under the aegis of the constitution and Bolivian history, they toolc office, The MNK was clearly in control politically. The elite was discredited and the military s o m e d e r e betwen disarray and nonexistence. Neither group was in any position to oppose the changes prctyosed by the MNR.The changes to be instituted, lzowever, were not immediately clear, The new regime moved cautiousty, careful to stress its ties to its predecessors. Its vision and promise were of nationalism and unity; its right to gcltrern was based on curzstitt~tionalgrounds," kgitimacy was rooted not in a radical future but in a solid past. The care MNK leaderslzip thus begin its tenure looking backwards-to tlze Balivian constitution and the institutionalization of the Mexican revolution, As a result, the leaders were iZI prepared for the strctng and radical demands of their partners in revolution, tlze armed and organized workers, whose expectations and vision went considerably beyond the vague specifics of the MNM? 1951 etectrrral plathrm. Having been the driving force, indeed, the fighting hrce, of the revcdlution, the workers demanded radical institutional clzange: nationalization of: Bolivia" primary industry, tin minhg; a broad program of agrarian reform; the introduction of universal suffrage; and a dramatic curtailment of the army" p a w . At1 these demands except the reduction of the mili~arylzad been in the MNIl's 1951 platform; thrrse whom some have dubbed the ""reluctant revc~lutionaries"acquiesced to demands both trt transform the old structures and to create new ones." This also marked the renewal of what would beccrme increasingly bitter internal struggle among the leadership of the revc~luticon.Most dramatically, the MNKs IaborlLeft and its new rural allies formed the Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB), a powerhi, unified tabor union, led by Leclzin, which successf~tlfy demanded a system of ccrgotrernment. In practice, ccrgovernment meant that COB had veto p o w r over policy decisions, shared in management of the new Bolivian Minitlg Corporation (COMXUOL), and controlled tlze Ministries of Mines, Labor, Public Works, and i3easant Affairs. From such a position, COB ccruld maintain ""prmanent vigilance lest the bourgeois MNXX seek to hoJd back the revcdluti~n."~~ The right wing of the MNR responded with accusations that COB was trying to ""communize" "~olivia, In this context, the MMR began to decree changes in structure that were promised in its 1951 platform and that were central to the vision of: the populaticm that made the revc~lution.What is important to recognize here is that these effcjrts a"etnstitut'ranaXization were n o w a r t of a broadly based, previously delineated program bat instead signified a series of: campacts negotiatecl among tlze conflictkg MNR factions. These compromise agreements were essentially accommodatictns between the pragmatic nationalists around Paz and between Lechin


37

and lzis allies from the tabor/left, tmiversal suffi-age was a relatively easy issue to resolve, btzt nationalization of the tin mines, the dismantling of the military, and agrarian reform-where the MNR and COB eventually accepted whamas essentially a hit accampli in the countryside-were trickier. The implementation of agrarian refc~rmprovides an interesting window into the difficulties of the institutionalizatlan process. Bolivia's rural order was firmly rooted in the era of the Spanish Conquest, A relatively small number of people of European descent lived quite well on their haciendas (landed estates), whereas most of the indigenous rural poyvrtatian-a majority of Bolivians-lived lives of abject poverty in near-slavery. In the fall of 1952, emboldened by tlze revolutionary process, Bolivia" indigenous population-the ccruntry" newly enfranchised majority-began to move. In an atmosphere most commont-ydescribed as ""rural vtoXence:9olivia% rural inhabitants began to seize the land that they believed rightfully belonged to them, A hesitant MNR, committed at least in theory to some sort of agrarian reform, debated what to do.20 The COB, in control of the newly created Ministry of Peasant Affairs, encouraged the radicalization of the rural population. The MNK right wing demanded the suppression of the seizures, lest the indigenous population upset all of Bolivian society, Paz and the centrists initially condemned the land seizures and the violence, then began to lzeclge on the issue, ancl finally, grudgingly, gc~ton the bandwagon when the orztcome seemed clear, In response, the MMR Xtight attempted a coup. The failure of the coup strengthened the hand of the Left. A commission was created to study the matter of agrarian rehrm, wf~ich, already a fact in the corzntryside, was shortly thereafter accepted in theory by those in the capital, La Paz.2" As a result, landed campesinos organized themselves into sz'ndimtos-essentially rural unic.tns-with attendant armed militias. Despite the best efforts of the GOBistas to manage and direct the rural gopulafon, regional and locaf leaders quickly emerged ancl proved itnperviaus to national leaders' efforts to control them. In fact, once their land was assured, most of the campesinos turned inward, seeming no longer to have the inkrest or ability to act as a natianaf force,22 The sindicatos7focus, rathex; became defense of the lancl they had won. Bolivia's indigent->~$ population became extremely conservative, a conservatism that Paz wc?uXd later draw on to build the p o w r base he had lacked in the early period following political victory13Most important, hc~wever,w s that agrarian reform w s established; it became an enshrined institutic->n.z4 In slzort ordel; tlzen, the various poliGcal institutions were eestablislzed, Moreover, they appeared to be functioning. The question that remained open was whether, having successfufly and rapidly institutic~natized,this disparate, mtzfticlass coaiition of the urban middle class, the wctrkers, and the peasants could create a new society: Could they consolidate tlze revolution that was r;znfc~;tlding? The core MNK leadership took the lesscsns of the Mexican revolution seriously and was convinced that the strong one-party state that had emerged there would

38


guarantee the success of that process.2Therefore, the new government roughly based its political structure on the Mexican model of a formal democratic framework within which the official party cttntrcrlled ail the meaningful levers of power. The MNR, seeking to emulate Mexim's PRI, envisioned itself as the place where all the Ieey grotzps were to be integrated: mrkers, peasants, the middle class, and eventually a new civilian-contrafied military Theoretically, then, this inclusive: party structure would undergird a strong and autonomous state structure, which wcruld then undertake the creation of the new Bolivian society. In practice, of course, each faction sought to control the process. The traditionalists resisted most notions of social and political change. The pragmatists recognized that relatively moderate social and political changes might be necessary to achieve the eccrnomic development they sought via state capitalism. Iilegardless of the structural changes that it was overseeing, the core MNR leadership retained its fttnclarnentally refc~rmistcharacter. In the Pice of rightist ancl centrist allies, tlze COB pushed ftrr a quasi-state-socialist system and for further societal changes that would lead to the creation of a new Bolivian society To this end, the COB became tl-te only Faction that sought to mobilize tlze popuiace in a systematic fashion. Tension between the reformists and the COBlLeft atfiance, howver, prexnted any coherent effort at creating a new society.2Vn Pact tl-tere was increasingly little pretense of such an effort, as each group sought to sway the population. The previously mentioned ccrup attempt from the MNM Right ont-y further exacerbated matters, temporarity strengthening the Left but laying the groundwork for a subsequent rupture between the Left ancl tlze Center prior to tlze 1956 elections, At that time the internal squabbling reached new levels; all sides seem to have surrendered to the notion that they could not fundamentally transform Bolivian society. The watclzword of the new Siles adzninistration was the institrttionalization of the revcrltztion. '50 this end, the MNM called on outside help, specifically the United States and the International Monetary Fund, The Failure of the Bolivian revolution to consolidate can be explained Piirly simplty by considering the main factors of consolidation, Atthough the revc3lution clearly created a greater sense of opportunity, it failed to develop trust, build a vision of the future, or ultimately empower the population. The inability of: the revolutionary ccralirion tcr speak with one vcrice-in fact its very public squa-bblingprevented any coordinated effort to develop trust, The MNR core leadership remaineel a small group that manipulated tlze larger Factions on tlze party wings. Such leadership did not inspire trust among the people, and many grew apathetic about the process, The fact that there were three competing factions with different visions of the future was further complicated by the lack of trust in tlze leadership: It was unclear who was making decisions, how they wrzld be made, and whether they could or w u l d be implemented, Finatfy, there was little sense of ~ seemed to rest at long-term popular empowerment in a situation w h e control the tcrp-with those manipulating the ccrmpeting factions-rather than with the people, who had little input into the soclat revoluticrnary process.


39

Perhaps it is not surprising that tlze Bolivian revolution remains little more than a fc~otnotein history. ""Et c~wninstitutionalizati~3n~" Uominguez and Mitchell argued, ""proved to be a hollow accomylishment,))27Uniquely positioned to aid and abet the consalidation process, the MNR did n e i t h e ~Lacking a cohelrent program or accord on an objective, the MNR remained a divided and divisive organization. Ultimately, Matlc-tysuggested, ""the MNR became stalemated, with no wing of' the party able to ixnpose its concepts on the party organization, let alone the country at large."" The legacy of the MNK is toy-directed, manipulative intraparty politics, which consequently deteriorated into politics as usual in Bolivia. The heritage that remairzs is one of an incomplete revolution, a process b e g ~ ~ n but never finished. Institutir;7nalizationalone is not enough; it lacks the necessary commitment rrf the pc->yufation.The Bolivians emulated the Mexicans perhaps far more than they intended to. The failure to consolidate, the inability to protect and extencl tlze gains made by tlze revolution, is not the only reason that the Bolivian revc>lutionhas slipped into cjbscurity, but it is certainly irne of them. The failure trf the more radicaf elements, which constituted a significant portion of the popufation, to move beyond institutionalizatinn anci legitimation so as to consalidate the revcrlution and create a new Bolivian society was not lost on others seeking to radically alter their societies and create new wrXds.

CUBA, 1959-1 969: CONSOLIIDATION WITHOUT f NSTITUTIQNALIIZAT10N If the puzzle of Bolivia is it1 part its obscurity and marginalization, Cuba is intriguing for tlze position it has come to occupy as the prototype of modern social revc>lution.Distinguishing characteristics have incfuded the relative lack of internal opposition, the incredible staying p o w r and popufarity of Fidel Castro, and, f t ~ the r first ten years of the revolution, an almost pathologicaj aversion on the part of the leadership to institutionalization; beginning in the mid-1980s the remaining ones of those leaders again evinced that attitude in what is calfed the ""rctification"" process. But can a revolution that lzas yet to prove its ability to transfer power be ccrnsidered a success? With respect to Cuba, we must ask, What happens when consolidation occurs, but there is no meaningf~~l effort to itlstitrttionalize the social revolutionary process? The contention here is that the absence of institutionalizaticrn renders the Cuban saciat revolutionary process suspect, at least until it i s clear whether the process can survive the passing of those who have led the revolution since its inception. In other words, in the absence of institutionalization, can the revofutionary process continue without the consolidators? By most stanciards there seems little question that the Cuban revolrttion is the archetype f'br social revc3lutionary success. Cuba has handled the social and eccrnctmic scourges ofthe Xess developed world far better than most other countries.2"

40


Cuba's prodigious successes in the areas of lzealth care, literacy, edrtcation, child care, and combating hunger are recognized even by most critics of the revofurights have been another matter, Despite the intrczduction of "dit i ~ n , blitical ~" rect democracy" hmediately after political victory and the advent of poder popufar (people" ppwer)in the mid-1970~~ few of the rights and privileges associated with the Western democratic legacy exist: in Cuba, and there are no clear fines of succession. These factors imperil tlze future of:the revolution. The fbcus in this section is on the decision of the revc3lutionary leadership not to institutionalize the revolution and the continuing presence-one might say omnipresence-af Cuba's jefe mhimo, Fidet Castro. As we will see, Cuba's ~ v o l r t tionary leaders were committed from the start to amid the sort of institutionalizaticrn that they beliet~edbad derailed the revczlutions in Mexico, Russia, China, were able to convince a majority and, most recently Bolivia. These revc~luticznaries of: tlze population to embrace the core of the social revolutionary pmject-tlze Cuban revt3lution clearly has been consolidated. The failure to institutionalize, howver, has left the revc~lutionvulnerable, Xn contrast to tlze Bolivians, on l January 1959 the Cubans stepped into a vacuum, an institrztional ccrllapse created by the flight of the elite, During the insurrection the revoluticznary 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) focused on the creation of a new society rather than on the destruction of the ofd one, which seemed to be destrc>yingitself. At the time of the revc>lution,according to IJkrez: ""Sciaf structures were in disarray? the potiticaf system was in crisis, the economy was in distress. National institutions were in varying degrees of disintegration and disrepute, and becatzse they had not served Cuba well, if at all, they were winerablef'When the revolutionaries defeated the repressive regime built on tlze foundations of the old society, tlzose foundations simply crumbled. The institutions and people that did remain were stained, stigmatized by their complicity in the events that had brcjught Cuba to this point. Not only the branches of tlze government but also, by virtue of their association with the discredited regime, Cuba" sother important institutions, the old yczlitical parties, the press, and the Church, were fainted.32 Tl-tere was no institution, for that matter, no individual, in a position to challenge the revofutionaries, From the time of the political victory and the attendant institutional disintegration, the Cuban revolution has been characterized by ineffectual institutions and the personal leadership of:Fidel Castro ancl a coterie of M-26-7 veterans from the mountains. These were people not inclined to the details of government. The revoluticzn had been wcjn in part by the flexibility with which the revolutianaries confronted specific problems as tlzey arose, according to tlze demands of: the immediate cczntext, and then leading by example. Despite Castrds appointment of Manuel Urrutia to the presidency and Task Mirb Cardona to the office of prime minister and his own decision to forgo fcirmal office, it was clear by the end of the first month that there were two governments in Cuba: one at the presidential palace, another at the Havana Hitton, where Castro and his iieutenants were en-


41

sconced. Two weeks later, six weeks into the post-political victory period, tlzis system of unofficial cogovernment ended: Castro tc>& the recently vacated office of prime minister, The period afrer pofiticaf victory was marked by Castro's adoption of a highly egalitarian, populist style of go.l.ernment that was in effect an extension of the M-26-fieadership style. An tnfainirmaf band of revotutionaries, Xed principally by Castro and his chief lieutenant, Emesro "Che" G~uevara,reasoned that the methods that had brought them ttr ycrwer should work tc> transform Cuban society. One result of this, according to Fagen, was immense disdain of and disinterest in ""tze routine processes of-pubtic adlninistration."33 In fact, the revcrluticznaries had decided that no institutional framewrk could ycrssibly provide the flexibility they wanted tc>move quickty in changing society. Drawing on their experience in the mountains, they desired a fczrm that wctuld provide the arrangements and procedrtres that would allow for discussion, chnice, and flexibility in an extremely dynamic and fluid situation. The population, emboldened by the depth and breadth of the potiticat victory, responded, ""Pressure for immediate, deep, sweeping change was buildi~lg:)Pkrez argued, ancl the canstituency for radical change was ""vast."""" W ~ a had t to be avoided, tlze revolutionary leadership klt, were the stifling effects of' institutionalization, Castro repeatedly denounced bureaucracy as a source of great evil, a scourge that the revc~ltztionarieswere determined to eradicate, along with the physical diseases that beset the popufation." Guevara sitnilarly warned against tlze spread of ""bulaucratism" ancl called for a ""war" against this affIiction,w True revolutionaries, the leadership stressed, gloried in labor and struggle, not desk wctrk. To prove their poixit, Castro, Guevara, and the others set the tone by fogging long hours not jttst in their governmental duties but also in vt3luntary labor: cutting sugarcane, building houses, working in factories. The absence of strictures and bureaucracy-ctf even a blueprint beyctnd the vague promises of the 1956 M-26-7 manifesto"-allc~wed the leaders tc>continue with the improvisaticzn, flexibility, and sheer will, sacrifice, and determinaticzn that had been the hallmarks of the successful insurrection, The revolution was constantly being "innvented."~~Institutions and the attendant bureaucracy could oniy interfere in the relationship between the rewlutionaries and the pcryulation. If any institutionatizat-ion was taking place, it was the instituticrnaXizalion of the myth of the Sierra Maestra, the heroic guerrilla fighters and the population who cared fbr them and on whcrse behalf they purportedly fought.49 Although the new government avoided formal institutionalization, it moved quickfy to transform the country" social and political systems anci alter patterns of economic dexlopment. Clearly such a task could not be tzndertaken without some kind of structure, Pricrr to the poIi"cca1victory, the M-26-7 high command had created ""deyartmentsP wl~ichwere charged with administering the ""lberated" areas of the Sierra Maestra. These departments of justice, health, social security, agriculture and peasant affairs, ctdnstruction, industry, sociaX construction,

42


services, education, and finances were, in effect, ""ebryos of the future ministries;""o In the period after pc~liticalvictory, these departments quietly became the instituticzns, the structrrre that, regardless of its official status, undergirded the revolutionaries' drive for cansolidation, The formal institutions, rather than being revamped, were to be supyltanted by a mix of ""direct democracy" and massive mohitizaticzn campaigns.4E Direct democracy was built on face-to-Face meetit~gs:Castro, G~xevara,and the other leaders traveted throughout the country, tallting with people enmeshed in the revolutionary process about their problems, large and small, and trying to solve them, An a&-told tale comes horn the experiences of tlze Frenclz philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who accompanied Castro on one of his excursions into the countryside in 1960, On this trip Sartre witnessed "&rect democracy" "firsthand, as he watched Castro taclcle problems such as a matf~xnctictntngreftrigerator in a bar at a ""yople's beach? the design of housing being built by rural workers, and deciding which member of an agricultural cooperative should repair the tractors," Whether such questions merited the immecliate attention of the country's top leadership is moat: The proceciure strengtlzened a perceived bond bet w e n the revolutionaries and the population, Instituticzns were thus to be replaced by tile deep and abiding persanaf relaticznship between tlze revolutionary leaderslzip and the population, a relationslziiy that the revc~lutionariesbelieved wc~ufdflower, But the leaders corzld nczt be everywhere at once, and few created the drama, intensity, and sense of commitment brouglzt by Castro, Grxevara, or Camilo Cienfxregos, Beyond the impetus of ""dinrct democracy," then, the people were to be kept energized and involved "through allinclusive mohtiizaticzn.'""" fnstitutionafization was not a priority and to the degree that it existed or emerged, it was perceived as an obstacle ta be overcome and perhapxven counterrewlutionary; Consequently, the first decade of the revolution was in part characterized by weak and ineffectual it~stitutians," Those institutions that did exist had little pc~werand served only to increase Castrds power rather than detract from it; Castro seemed uninterested in the creation of institutions that could stand on their own. The social landscape in tlze aftermath of political victory '%ad the masses as its foundations, new p~~yulists as its leaders, and a charismatic authority as jefe ml.ixima,""" Unfettered by ""istitutionaf demands, popular pressures, or dissident cliques, Castro's power was nearly absolute.""" The key terms here are authority and power: Both were unquestionably wielded by CastrcI, Xn theory and practice, the Cuban government of this period operated on the vanguard theory: the assumption that a self--selected core of intellectually and moraffy superior and proven revc>lutionarieshad to lead the peoylte. Basic policies, even the most mundane and picapne ones, were set from abctve by Fidel and his small circle of advisers, predominantly tlzose who had fought with him in the Sierra Maestra-4VThese decisions were then communicated to the population, which was mobilized by the regime" revoluticznary organizaticzns. Impitementa-


43

tion of:government-planned and -initiated programs maximized support; probably the most important of these programs were the literacy campaigns, the health campaigns, the vctluntary labor projects, and the neighborhood committees. These crusades energized anci itlvolvcd the population, but tlzey did notlzitlg to create or strengthen institutionalization. There were experiments with institutionalization and institution building. Probably tlze most important-and revealing-incident related to nascent institutionalization was the 1962 ORX/Escalante affair. That was the attempt of oldline Cuban Ccjmmunists to fake advantage of the decision to integrate the various revolutionary organizations into a singfe, unified vanguard party anci to centralize and bureaucratize the revolutionary process, Although this efhrt began with the blessings of Castro, it was perceived by others in the revolutionary leadership as an attempt to limit creativity3Aexibiiity3and participaticzn. The OKIlEscalante afcair was complex and multifaceted, Xn theory, it was an effort t~ provide the ccruntry with a political apparatus, a set of functional political institutions, In practice, it served to highlight the tension b e ~ e e nprocesses of institutionalization and consolidation. In 1962 a new party was created, a party that was to be the political apparatudczr the ccruntry. The Integrated Revt3futionary Organization (ORX) combined the M-26-7, the targely student-based Revctlutionary Directorate, and Cuba's old-line, Moscow-orientetl, prerevolutionary Cammtznist party, the h y u l a r Sociafist Party (PSI)). Because the I3P cadres had extensive organizational experience, construction of the OR1 was en~rustedto former PSIP executive secretary Anibaf Escalante.48 Escafante moved rapidly and effectiivefy to place PSP members in the country's emergent institutions, and he began to have tremendous influence over the mast fttndamental policies anci programs of the revolution. flrllvuing on Stalin's tactics, Escalante m r k e d to build the institutions into a bulwark against those who had led the revctluticzn and the population in general, He used bureaucratic methods to try to split the revolution's leadership; particularly effective was a purge of army commanders who had led the guerrilla struggle and the defense of the country during the U,S,-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. Escalante" heavyhancled tactics, aimed to speed up the agrarian reform process, resulted in the alienation of farmers; that, in turn, created Ebczd shortages that began to undermine support fcrr the revolutianary process, In addition, blatant bureaucratic excesses-prkilege and corruption reminiscent of the old regime-angered more and more of the population. Construction of the OR1 was "the first major attempt at institutionalization undertaken by the re~ofution,'~Xastrt> had apparently envisioned the OR1 as a transitional institution that wrzfd build a new pclliticaf apparatus for Cuba. In fact, the OR1 simply became the PSP under a new name, As the sttua"e-iondegenerated, Castra first criticized the OK1 and removed Escalante and tlzen dismantted the ORf, In effect, Castro stepped outside the embryonic institutional framework to condemn it. The ease with which Escalante was deposed and the OR1 "xeorga-

44


nizedm-as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (I3tJRS)-proved the strength of Gastrds charismatic authority. Clastrds attack on the OR1 and his distandng from the attempt at instituticznalization further discredited tlzat process in Cuba. As Castro explaineci it, the OR1 and by extension institutlonalizaticrn were ""atraitjacket, a yoke," binding and limiting the revolution rather than advancing it." The role played by Castro in stepping in, destroyhg the ORf's influence, ancl shutting it down, made clear his dc~minanceof the yc~liticstlprocess; it was clear from his action that any institutionalization that occurred would be of his design and at his discretion." Apparentiy Castro feared that the institutionalization and thereby bureaucratization of the revc3lution would limit his sgclntaneity of action and power and lay the groundwc~rkfor the emergence of a new class gc>verningin its own interests rather than the interests of att Cubans. Castro explained that there had been na ruslz to set up new institutions because ""we would like tlzem to conform to [social] reality and not the other way arotznd."% In other words, Castro opted for charisma over bureaucracy in fashioning the daily operation of the government: Personulismo was chosen over institution b~~ifding.'~ The revofutitznary leaders retied on the intense mobilization campaigns to define their sacioeconomic and poXitlcal policies-----butthe campaigns were not by themselves sufficient to create institutions as long as Castro" charismatic leadership, which could alter any yc~licy,any decisic>n,at any time, existed. Thus, the government" earfy politics was oriented toward creating new attitudes to meet the dual cl~aflengeof ensurit~ggovernment stability and survival and inaugurating the strategy for creati~lgthe new revc~lutionarysociety; in the felicitous description of Pdrez-Stabte, ""Charismatic authority and popular mobilization~ crystallized the politics of the new Cuba: Fidel Castra was hlcrum; el prdeblo ctlbano, sustenance.'"" The leadership did not ignore the potitical aspects of the country's development; the erosion of the old political culture and the develoyn , a central ment of a new one, based on tlze values of the social ~ v o l t ~ t i owere concern. The success of Clubs" consotidation project is readily apparent in terms of the main 6~ctorsof consalidation. The process of "direct democracy" served to build a high degree of trust and opportunity. The prevalent notion, the perception, if not the reality, was that the leadership was wifXl~~g to submit itself to the people on a regular basis and live anci work among them anci like them. This also facilitated the development of a widespread sense of opportunity among the yc~yulationclearly, those spheres of Cuban life that had been the purview of society" elite were now accessible to the population, including access to tlze very top leaders, The mass mobilization campaigns also contributed to the development of a sense of opportunity, The population was being educated and receiving health care, wealth was being redistributed, anci so on. It was clear to tlze people that they w r e being affinrded opyc->rtunitiesthat once were largely beyond their imagination, This, in turn, heled people" vision of the future, Suddenfy the possibilities


45

seernecl limitless, ancl for many there wwas little question that their clzildren would have greater opycrrtunides and a better future than they had. Underlying all this was a pervasive sense of emyowrment-Cubans beiieved that they had a role to play and that the gains were theirs. What could be more empowering than the belief that an individual ccruld confront the leaders of the government and expect them to respond? By 1969 government by consolidation-exhortation and mobilization-had beccrme exhausting for both the prryulation and the leadership. There w r e no permanent, stable institutians of any significance.5W~oreover,exhortation and mobilization were not provit~gto be means by which long-term economic and social demands could be met." Faced with a crumbling economy and a revt3lutionary process that was starting to wear thin, in 19'70 the government mt>-vedto institutionalize Cuba's governmental processes. For some the move toward institutionalizatioa marked tlze end of the revolution ancl the beginning of: ""tze pcrstrevc>lutionaryera.""' If the goals were depersonalizaticzn, diffusion, and democratization or the subordination of individuals to institutians, institutionatizatic2n may be adjudged a Failure.'" The argument that tnstitutianalization has totally failed ignores the fact that since 1970, and especially since the first Communist party conference in 1975, there have been more clearly delineated lines of autl~orityand formalized procedures, Mechanisms were introduced to include more peoylte in decision-making processes, attow at least local leadership to be held accountable, and oversee the day-to-dq running of the country." It is probably accurate to suggest that after 1970 the leadership sought to institutionalize a preexisting set of structures and move away from the highly personatistic; character of the revolution, The result of this ""neainstitutionalism" is tlzat Cuba's institutions have been rescued from the periphery of Cuban politics and made part rrf the dynamic.60 Such changes were real enough and created more robust institutions, institutions that at least one particularly knowledgeable sclzolar believed were viable enough to outlast Castro;" manother expert supports this view, nodng that ""Fdel might wish that he coufd say Efdtat cfest moz" f"f3wevet; the Cuban state is much more than his institutional yersonification.'"""t is less clear hrrw meaningful these changes were. The late arrival of insdtutionalizatir3n prevented a ready acu3mmodatlon with consolidation. This may be most directly mirrrrred in the rectification program undertaken in the mid-1980s (in part as a return to tlze glories of the first ten years), The focus of the rectification campaign coufd not be much clearer." The policies tlzat dominated from 1970 to 1986, whiclz themselves were intended to be a rectification of what Castrcr considered his C W ~ errors I of the first decade, were determined to have been a mistake, a deviation from the policies that had begun the revolutionary process. In particular, Castro excoriated the evils of "mecl~anisms" and ""administrators,"twcr of the pitfalls, presumably; of institutionalization,"4 The argument, at feast as presented by some refczrmist politicians, was that the Cuban

44


revolution ""coyied institutions anci norms that did not corresponci with our idiosyncrasy, traditirrns, and style:' clearly implying that Cuba had drifted too far tznder the influence of its Soviet afliesV65The emotional heart of the rectification process, tlze attempt to redress this imbalance, was the reintmduction of the Guevarist "moral economy" of the 1960s; the practical centerpiece of the rectification project was the reorganization of the party. Together they also reinforced the prominence of the unique role of Fidel Castro. Forty years after political victory, the Cuban revcrlution remains overwhetmingly dominated and transfixed by the figure of Fidet Castro, Domlnguez and Mitchell were undotlbtedly right to warn against tlze temptatinn to read the Cuban political system as mere ""one-man rule," instead likening Castro to a ""laser device, which concentrates focused light waves and emits them in a narrclw, very intense beam.66 Any analysis of Cuba today, however, reveals the extent to which-for better and for worse-tlze country has been marked by tlze vision and choices of Fidef Castrcr. The rectificaticrn campaign designed to remedy the revolutictnk past errors was inaugurated by Castrct, defined by Castrct, and directed by Castro," The 1998 visit of the pc->yeto Cuba wcruld appear to be another masterful ploy by the aging leader, putting pressure on the United States to change its increasingly outdated galices vis-B-vis the island, Castro continues to loom larger tlzan life>crisscrossing the islanci on trips, the primary source of legitimacy of the gcltPernment and perhaps of the revc3lution. We remains the "leader towering above all IndivlduaIs and institutions:'(" h Inact, it may be that what lzas been institutionalizeci at this point is Fidel Castro." As such, his mrrnopoly on power may well be an obstacle to any further development of Cuba's soclat, potitical, or economic processes. At the same time, the cttnsalidation of the revofution has forever changed the people of Cuba; it is hard to imagine that they would ever return tcr the way things w r e befbre. The true test of the revolution will be when Fldel Clastro has left the scene,

NICAMGUA, 1979-1 990: f NSTITUTIONALIZATIQN AND CONSOLIDATION The Nicaraguan revofution has similarities to both the Bafivian anci Cuban experiences, As in Bolivia, competing factions existed witlzin the revolrttionary leadership; therefore there was apprehension about the consolidation of the revcrlution. As in Cuba, the nascent government faced immense pressures, although in Nicaragua these emanated from internal as well as external actors. As a result, there were ccrnarns about institutionalizing the revcrlution. Yet important differences also exisred. Nicaragua" revctluticrnaries, the Sandtnista Nationat Liberation Front (FSLN or Sandinistas), came to power wit11 a commitment to the creation of an incltzsive community in Nicaragua predicated on both a mixed economy and a mixed political system. This was indicatim of the FSLN's desire to put to use


47

the lessons the leaders believed that tlzey had learned, in part from their interpretations of the Bolivian and Cuban experiences. The Sandinista revcdlutianaries, who dominated the new Nicaraguan government, consciously set out to pursue a drtal revol~xtionaryproject: institutionalization and consolidation. Thus they are tznique among the ft~urcases being ccrnsidered here, Altering the social, political, and econcrmic instituticzns of the country, the leaders realized, would not be enough to fundamentally transform society: Witness Bolivia. Nor did they want to replicate the Cuban pattern of engaging the popufation while hiling to empower them. The FSLNk commitment was to enable the population: It sought to provide the population with the tools that would ""convert thern into the active subjects [agents] trf their own history."7R Nicaragua serves as a useful model for the successful social revolutian because of the amount of institutionalization and consotidatictn there, Vet Nicaragua atso serves as a powerhi reminder that a critical international context can shape events and affect processes as they unfold. Scrcial revolutions do not happen in isotation: They are probundly embedded in the complexities of the internaticznal system. Nonetheless, it is the hility to institutionalize and consolidate the revolutionary process internally that denotes success: Consolidation, once achieved, is extremely difficult to destroy, Chapter 4 is specifically addressed to consolidation in Nicaragua and inclucies consideration of the 1990 and 1996 elections. Therefore, in this section I will focus on the 1984 eXectoraX process as an exemplar of institutionalization, X make the argument lzere that the mechanics of the electoral process intmduced by t l ~ eFSLN and its successful implementation on two occasions under adverse conditions indicate that the revcdludonary projea has been institufonalizect. in Nicaragua, A brief discussion of consolidation will presage the lengthier discussion in Clzapter 4, On 19 July 19'79the victorious Nicaraguan revcolutionaries found themselves in a situation strikingly similar to that of their Cuban predecessors. Although many members of the elite stayed in Nicaragua, in contrast to their Cuban counterparts, the state apparatus, such as it had been tznder Scrmrxa, departed. Although the FSLN and its allies successfully removed a long-lived dynastic dictatorship, the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGKN) confronted the collapse of the entire gcItPernment apparatus, including the army, the congress, the burearrcracy, the courts, and the civii in~titutians,~" The legacy beqtzeatbed to the Nicaraguan revolutionaries was one of antidemocratic, neomilitary, patrirnonial politics characterized by massive corruption and pervasiw human rights violations, The failure of the previous regime to have made any efforts to build a meantnghl state simplified tlze process. The enactment of new laws, the dextopment and cc~nstructionof new instittltions, and the rehabilitation of some otd institutions went relatively smoothfyaY2 The revtJfutionaries seem to have been ccrnscious of the need to ensure limits on personal power and provide a mechanism for succession. Thus they decided to maintain the collective leadership that had brought: them to pofiticaf victory, In a

48


Nicaraguan variation of Cuba's '"irect dernocracy>'>ublic assemblies such as ""Face the kople," "encounter and dialogue sessicrns between toy officials and the population, which served (in theory) to help hold the leadership accountable, were televised.73 Succession would be handled via the traditional mecl~anismof the Wstern democratic: systems-elections, The JGRN quickly installed a legal system, partly as a measure of instituticznalization, but also to deal with the crimes of:the previous regime, in particular tlzose of the despised National Guard, whose rights were relatively wet1 pr0tected.7~A comprehensive agrarian refcjrm program, which included nationalization and distribt~tionof the substantial lancl-holdings of the former dictatol; the formation of thrrusands of coc~perativeagricultural enterprises, and the redistribution of hundreds of thc~usandsof acres of other lands to individuals and cooperatives, was enacted, Highly successful and popular mobilization campaigns dramatically reduced adult illiteracy and expanded health services in both curative and preventive medicine. A massive campaign was undertaken to eliminate epidemic diseases and improve public health, inciuding a highly successful effort to combat diarrhtea, the major killer of infants in Latin America. As in Cuba, tlze implementation of these programs demonstrated t~ the people the FSLN" commitment to transform their lives and the hbric of societ-y, The resultant underlying base of support and goodwill was a critical component of tlze government's project to consolidate the revcrlution. As a way to assess institutionalization in Nicaragua we shall clcrnsider the establislzment ancl functioning of t l ~ eelectoral process there. The 1984 election was the FSLN's most impcrrtant effort to institutionalize the Nicaraguan revsIlution. The ratification of the constitution in 1987 and the 1990 election served to codifY that institutionafization process. Since Nicaragua declared its independence in 1821, there have been only three openly contested elections: the first in f 484, the second in f 990, and the third in 1996.75 In these cases, the ejections were ascertained to be free, open, and fair by significant numbers of international c1bserwrs.7TThe eEections and the peaceful r opposition after the 1990 election-a unique event in transfer of p ~ ~ toe the NicaraguiZs history-stand as irreft~tableevidence of the success of the social revolutionary institutionalization project." 'ithough the f 996 election may raise questions about claims for consolidation-a topic addressed in Chapter &it too seems to confirm the success of Nicaragua's institutionalization. There is more democracy. in Nicaragua today than there was either under the Somoxa dictatrrrship or in the century of independence that preceded The elections of: tlze final member of the Somoza "+nnastyP Anastasin Somoza Debayle, "featured translucent ballots the buying of votes, intimidation, and, when all else failed, stuffed ballot boxes'"79 As a result, tlze promise of: elections or electoral democracy seemed of:little importance to the majority of Nicaraguans prior ttr or during the struggle for power." Nonetheless, electicrns were part of the FSLN plathrm wll before the defeat of the Somo.r,a regime.81


49

The FSLN" three Pactions (detailed in Chapter 3) had different ideas on a wide range of topics, not the least of which were elections, The "keep commitment to social justice" "shared by all the factions did not mitigate the concern of some ""about wl~etlzeror not that vision was compatible with plurafist democracy.'*"'n particular there was concern that immediate ejections risfied degenerating "into a sort of dlrectictnless populism (B Xa Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s and BoXlvia in the 1950s)."RW1\j'onethefess,tile FSLN was the only leftist party in the struggle against Somrxa that n e x r called fbr a ""ctctatorship of the proletariat" and that defended the notion of a multiparty political system." By the time of the political victory, the FSLN had dctermitled tlzat elections were "nat a concession bat ratlzer a way to strengthen the revcrlution.X" The revolutionary leadersk~ommitrnentto electicrns was included in the laws presented the day after they achieved political victory-g6Although various members of the leadership repeated this promise, they often tempered it with the admonition that democracy was more than simplty elections.87 At the huge rally celebrating the end of the successful National Literaq Campaign on 23 August 1980, for example, Humberta Ortega pledged that the electoral law would be in place by 1983 and elections wcruld follow by 1985. In the same speech, hc~wexr,he warned against equating elections with dernocracly: ""Fr the Sandinista Front, dernocraq is not measured only in political terms, nor is it confined merely ta participation in elections, It is more, much more, . . . And it must be said once and for ail, demacraq does not begin and end with electicrns. It is a myth to want to reduce democracy to that.""" Still, the rewtutionary leaders clearly saw elections as part of the overall democratic package tbat they were seeking ttr implement in Nicarag11a.89 The commitment to elections and to the creation of an eqtzitable electoral process was renewed regularly by the FSLN leadership over the next several years," Delegations were sent to European and Latin American countries as well as the United States to study their political systems. The conclrxsion was tbat Nicaragua should marry the best of Western participatory dernocracy-including regular elections, a parliament, a multiparty system, ftreed~mof the press, separation of- powers-with the best of a distributive justice system suclz as Cuba's in which medical care, housing, food, and edtzcation are assured ttr a1lE91 Although the oppc~itionand the United States ccrmplained about the length of time until the first election, the FSLN argued that under the circumstances, it had to give priority to improving social ccrnditians. There was another factor, however Nicaragua lacked the technical ability to hold an election. Simply conclucting an ejection in a ccruntry that has no meaningful electcrral history and no real civil society is a problematic enterprise. How are such things yuickfy arranged? Afthough this is what the U.S. government wanted-indeed, demanded-in Nicaragua, the U.S. State Department reccrgnized that a quick election w u l d be at best extremely QifficuXtand mare likely impossible to ctrganize.92 Such an elec-

50


tion, tl~eyconcluded, would sitnply represent ""an absurd projection of North American political culture-"93 The Council of State-the legislative body that had been established fcrr the period prior to electionsdirew up legislation a n the elections anci a n the status of pcrlitical parties." h September 1983, with considerable opposition input, a pcrliticat pa"ies law was enacted, Three months later, the government, anxious to capitalize a n its popularity and gain the sympathy of the Western democracies in the ccrnfrontation with the United States, announced that the ejections wcruld be moved up to 1984. Xn February f 984 an electiczn date of 4 November 1984 was announced. A month later tlze Electoral Law3modeled on those of the Western European parliamentary democracies, was enacted.'" The 1984 Electoral Law estabtished a system ""raoted in the classical liberafdemocratic concepts of territorial representation and 'one citizen, one vote.'"^^ The law provided for the ejection of a president, vice president, and a National Assembly of ninety people; all terms wotzld be for six years. There wotzld be a separation of pouvcrrs b e ~ e e nthe executive and legislative branches.97 The voting itself would be direct, popular, and secret, with the electorate camposed of all Nicaraguan citizens atper the age trf sixteen. The presidency wotzld be decided by a simple piuralityei"li Well before the elections, Ronald Reagan articulated the U.S. view that the elections would be nothing more than a ""S3viet-style sham.""' The United States then began a massive and systematic campaign to discredit the elections, including a program of disinformation and political ""dirty tricks" in both Nicaragua and the t-mited States.'"" The center of the U.S. effort to undermine the elections was the candiday of Arturo Cruz and the coalition that nominated him, the Democratic Coordinating Committee (CD). Cruz, a businessman ancl former member of r l ~ e JGRN living in Mrjshington, D.C., was presented by the United States as a moderate who was the only viable opposition candidate, As a result, the United States publicly staked its interpretation of the elections a n hixn.~~I Accrctrding to Cruz, he was from the start simply an ""eectoral teaser," who was never meant to stay in the Prior to his return to Nicaragua, Cruz even told a U.S. reporter: ""Xm not really going to run. You know that."")? Mario Rapyaccioli, one of the leaders of the CD and a friend of Gruzk, explained to reporters that "Crux does not intend to run and is interested only in discrediting the election.'"W The FFSLN remained overwhetmingfy pcrpular with the majority of the people; after atf, it had defeated Somoza and introduced extremely pcrpular social programs. The U.S,/C=D supporters were well aware that they could not defeat the FSLN at the ballot box. The best tlzey could Izope fur was to use Cruz and the CD itself to Belegitimize the elections-"" This charade, lamented Rnezuelan President Cartos AndrCs Pdrez, atfowd the United States to proclaim that there had not been free elections in N i c a r a g t ~ a ~ ~ ( ~ ~ On 4 November 1984, h r the first time in its history, Nicaragua held electiczns that were hailed as free, open, fair, and honest by the six opposition parties that


53

participated and virtually all the international observers not affiliated with tlze U.S. administration.107 Of those registered to vote (93.7 percent of etigible vcrters), 75 percent cast ballots,f"The FSLN presidential ticket of JGRN members flanief Ortega anci Sergio Ramirez polleci 66-7 percent of: tlze vote; the FSLN National Assembly state received 62-9 percent of the vote (sixty-one seats).W9 The opposition received 33 percent of the vote, mosdy split among the three parties that represented the Kight and Center, and were awarded thirty-five (36.5 percent) of the ninety-six seats (including seats for the six losing presidential candidates) in the NaticrnaI AssernblyeH0 The 1984 Nicaraguan elections were honestly run and reflected reasonably well the preferences of the Nicaraguan ycrlity. Their primary importance, ht)wever, was not technical virtue. The elections yrc3vided the country" sopycrsition parties the opportunity to present themselves and their platfc)rms to tl-re public and win places in a legislature where they could seek to implement their program and criticize the gotrernment.11' Thus the elections served to institute these parties as "htegraf, if subordinate, parts of the poliym"he result was institutianaIizaticrn of a significant measure of political. pluralism,""l"fh FFSLW became the first revolutionary goxrnment to include meaningful, ccrmpetitive elections in its political repertoire. In so doing, the FSLN became the first ""vanguard" p r t p to achieve power through armed struggle anci then submit itself to an open electorat contest against as wide a range of opposition parties as chrrse to compete, The institutionalization process in Nicaragua has been a success-one all the more significant in view of the legacy of:oligarchy anci dictatorship that tlze revolutionaries inherited."'" The Sandinistas heXped the country to overcome that legacy. Although the victory has been uneven, the Sandinistas i n s t i t u t i c a e d a system that permits debate and criticism at a level "unprecedenteci in Central American history.'"" That their system atlowed the defeat of the social revotutionary fbrces at the batlot box is unprecedented in the wctrld, The FSLN built the electoral system on a democratic framework that lzas been widely praised and even proposed as a precedent "brfuture elections wortdwideP1 "deed, it wctuld be hard to imagine a stronger claim to the relative success of the institutionalization process in Nicaragua than the successft~land peaceful transfer of power that occurred after the 1990 election. That proof of succressful instituticrnalizatiion woufd seem to call into questicrn the process of consolidation. After all, this line of argument runs, if the revolution had been ccrnsolidated, the FSLN wotzfd have won the etecticon. This argument, howver, misses the essence of consolidation. Because consolidation is abctut peoplc's attitudes towad tlze revolution-it represents tlze degree to which a significant majority of the poytzlation embraces the core of the social rewtutionary project-it is not necessarily linked to an exact set of institutions or particular programs or even spedfic people or parties, The FSLW quickfy moved after political victory to develop and enlarge popular support for the social revolutionary process, that is, to begin the social revolution-

52


ary project of cansolidation. The project ~~nfolded in two discrete bat interrelated parts, One part was the denigration and destruction of privilege, based on the implementation of an array of broadly accessible and poyuIar social programs, Buildi~lgon this, the seconci part was the effort to make sure that the population had a pemived stake in the process, with the intrc>duction of bwadly accessible political structures as well as the aforementioned popuIar social programs.f16 Throughout, the social revofutionary leadership "championed'9the people to bind them to the social revc3lutionary preject, It required little effort for the new government to denigrate and attack privilege. Nicaragua, at the time of tlze 1979 revolution, was characterized by the ""rncid Aavor of the Somoza regime," which had redtzced it "even by regional standards, [to] a wretched ptace."~l~ Somoza and his cronies had so alienated the popufation that even many of those who enjoyed privileges in Nicaraguan sociefy had turneci against him. Xn contrast to Cuba, however, where mucll of the elite fled with Ftlfgencio Batista, the FSLN confronted an elite that was not only established but also in fact part of the broad revolutionary coalition that achieve"t,olitical victory in 1979, As a result, the FSLN leaders had to move carehlly. The attack on privilege could not be fczcused on the walthy, but rather on the basis of the populaticzn" incredible despair and the failure of the Somoza regime to see to minimal standarcis in areas such as eciucation and lzealtl~care. The revczlutionary leaders recognized that they had to involve the people and create in them a sense of stake in the prczjecr. Praxis was regarded as crucial to the consalidation process; the creative, corrective, and salutary elFCects of immersion in rewlutionary activity in mass organizations, the armed forces, the schools, and this sense, above all, tlze illusion for some, the political party were ~tressed.1~qfn or perception of participation has been one of the primary velzicles for the social revolutionary transformation of society. f do not say this cynically. Xtlusion and peraption are cri"ccal for any government, particularly h r those that base their claim to legitimacy on responsiveness to public concerns anci demands. l 9 To this end, the FSLN immediately backed the creation of a n e ~ c t r kof affiliated mass organizations that w u l d debate and vote on issues as weit as work c ~ f lectively to carry out pmjects important to building the new society. These organizations incltzded labor unions, peasant groups, and associations of women, youth, and small farmers. The effort built on the immense popular support that had been generated during the first two plzases of the social revolutionary process. Membership in the mass organizations was actively encouraged among all Nicaraguans, and hundreds of thousands joined.120 Thmugh such organizations the FStN was able to camplcte practical pmjects, mobilize support, and begin the consc->lidationprocess rapidly, As Chapter 4 is largely devoted to the assessment of consolidation in Nicaragua, I shall not dwell on it Liere. Suffice it to say that Nicaragua is a society well into the third phase of the sociaf revc3lutionary process, ft might even be argued, as we will consider in Chapter 4, that the 1996 electiczn focused largely on


53

that very issue. Institutionalization can lzardfy seem in doubt after the r990 efection, The FSLN created a mixed economy and a ycllitical system that is judged open by any standard. The f 990 electiczn marked not only the first time an opposition party in Nicaragua lzas ever won an election but also the only case in which a rewlutionary goxrnment has created an etectoral process that it atfrjwed itsetf to lose. The status of the effort to ccrnsoXidate tlze revoluticzn is less clear. FSLN success at creatit~gopportunity and a vision of tlze &tare did not necessarily translate into trust, The failure to build trust or, perhaps more accurately, the loss of trust, is attribrrtable to many ftactors, Chief among these were serious FSLN mistakes and the massivct anci systematic efforts of: the United States to undermine the government. One of the FSLN's greatest-if perhaps most bitterswet-successes has been the empowerment of the populaticzn since empowerment turned out to be a double-eciged sword for tlze revolutionary leaderslzip, Empowerment lzas resulted in a commitment to the revc>futic>nbut not to the revt3lutionaries. The people were convinced that they could realize their revoiuticznary promise and vision witlIout the social revolutionary leadership. Pc~werfufelucidation of this point came from an older w m a n who had raised a large family in Lelin, Nicaragua's secttnd-largest city. In a tone that shifted from amusement to disbelief to disgust, she related: For many years here in Lecin the wealthy wc>uIdhold parties in the park in front of the cathedral. When they had these parties they would rope off the area in front of the cathedral with gold ropes, We wc>ukiall crowed around to watch them as they were driven up and got out of their cars and had their party and acted as if we were not even there. They danced and ate and drank and it was as if we were their cattle in the field, Cattle. Can you believe that? Is it hard for you to imagine?It never even occurred to us that we corrld cross the ropes. They would take over this public place for a party and we would just stand there like brutes with our rnourhs oyerl and stare in awe. Like cattle. We11, this corxid never hagl~enagai~r.We wauld never allow this, We know now that we are not cattle . . . and we will never be their cattfe agairl,""' The message is dear: Roplte in Nicaragua have been transformed, and it is impelssible to take that away; by extension, society has been transformed, and the clock cannczt be turned back, The Nicaraguan revolutionaries were barely able to implement their revolutionary program and vision or successfufly to integrate popular visions; beset by economic problems, only some of which were of their malcing, and internaticznal pressures, not least the armed intervention supported anci directed largely by tlze b i t e & States and involving all c>fNicaragua" neighbors, it is surprising the revolution survived at all, Nonetl~efess,the Nicaraguan revolution did survive, and the revolutionaries, by becoming tlze first ever to transfer power peacefttlly at the ballot bcx, proved that the more broadly yclyufist, more democratic: heart of the revoluticzn could survive. An understanding of how and why the revolution contin-

54


ues in the lzearts and minds of:so many Nicaraguans-an appreciation of the attitude articulated by the w m a n qucrted earlier-is what consolidation brings us that is missing from sttldies focused on institutionafization: access to the people's attitudes towarc2 the material and ideological conditions of their everydw lives, Only in this way can we reliabfy assess the meaning and impact of social revolutionary processes,

GRENADA, 1979-1 883: THE mVOLm1[8N THAT NEVER WAS The Grenadian revolution represents an anomaly. One scholar likened it in stature to the revoft that culminated in the creation of the Haitian Republic in 1804 and to tlze 1959 revolution in Cuba.QUncrther important Caribbean scholar tbcrrzght that the Crenadian revr>lution represented, in some sense, the "intrusion" of Latin American revolutionary processes into the largely conservative, Englislz-speaking, Anglophile Eastern Caribbean."+ C~astrcrhailed it as ""aig rewlution in a small country."aThe United States was so concerned that it wcjrked almost from the start to destabtiize the revolution and developed miilleary plans to overthrow it, one of which was implemented in 1983.i2W~rtainly the process in Grenada was dramatically new to the Eastern Caribbean. Vet when the topic is revoludon, Grenada does not even rate the footnote customarily accorded Bolivia: Most recent work on revolution in general or on revolution in the Third rAJ'>rldsimylty omits mention of Grenada.U"6Aftl-xougt.r the U.S. invasion of Grenada seems to have assured the country a measure of fame-at least in discussions of: the numerous U.S. interventions in the Third World-esyecially in Latin America and the Caribbean, Grenada dcres not even appear on most Xists of failed revotutions, Given the scholarly attention commanty visited upon most revolrttionary processes, this omission is rather striking. The question is, lPJhat happenedM~ccordingto the mrrdet presented here, a successful revolution is one in which both ix~stitutionalizationand consofidation are attainec2. The Grenadian revolrttion's faittlre either to institutionalize or to consalidate has apparently served to relegate it beyond the margins of ccrnsideration as a revolution-particularly as a social revoluticrn. Xf the Bofivian revofution was ""icomplete" ancl the Cuban revolution remains in some sense wlnerable, the Crenadian rewlution has been aptly described by one of its leading students as ""aortedPQ7 The question, however, is whether the termination of: tlze revolution was a result of the t7.S. invasion or of the inability of the revccolutionary leadership to find common grotznd on which to pursue the social revolutionary prctcess, The U.S. effort to destabilize the revolution should not be discounted, but the consensus among schofars of the Grenadian revofution is that by the time of the U.S. invasion, the revr>lutionhad setf-destructed. No less an authority than Fidel Castro declared the Grenadian revofution a


55

Of the explanations that have been proffered for the coflapse of: the Grenadian revc>lution,most are based on one of tcvo theories. The first, and by Ear most ccrmmon, hcuses on the disintegration of the retationship b e ~ e e nthe primary leaders of the revolrttion, Maurice Bishop ancl Bernard Coard,'" A second explanation concerns internal party divisions over questions of socialism versus democraq, the pace of the revoluticrnary process, pofltics versus cuftrrre, and political legitimacy.'" These explanations nonetl~elessoften devolve to questions surrounding the Bishop-Coard split. A third set of scholars effectiwfy merges these two perspectives,""" We may analy~ethe Fdifttre of tlze revofutian by looking at the attempts of: the Grenadian leaders to institutionalize and consolidate the rewtutionary process. One intriguing aspect of the Grenadian case is that there were clearly conscious efforts at insti~tionalizationand consolidation-efforts that mirrored to varying degrees the processes in BaXivia, Cuba, anci Nicaragua, Although the Grenadian revc>lutionaryleaders pursued more or less the same setf-conscious processes as the Nicaraguans, the Grenadian leaders w r e unable to stay unified and became dramatically-and for Bishop and some of Izis close assaciates, Fatally-split, Maurice Bishop was clearly Grenada" visionary feader-often likened ttr Cuba's Castro in terms of charisma and stylee13"anard Coard is best ~tnderstood as an organizational leader-oftea described as a classic bttreaucrat, born to organize. In Nicaragua, as we shaft see in Chapter 3, the revt3lutitrnary leaders were careful to make sure that those with different leadership styles could wctrk togetlzer. Xn Grenada the consalidation process seems to have been largely in tlze hands of Bishop and the institutionalization project guided primarily by Coard; although shortly before the end, they h u n d these positions ironically somewhat reversed. Their differit~gleadership styles fed them to act at cross-purposes, so that neither process got the necessary attention.l.33 The former ""Commonwealth Caribbean'hations that make up the Eastern Caribbean began to gain their independence from Britain in the early 1960s. The British had left superficial democratic institutic~nsbehind, but the people actuatfy had relatively little meaningful experience with democracy;'" The Eastern Caribbean states were all led to indepencience by powerf-ttl, charismatic figures such as Vere Bird, Sr., in Antigua, Grantley Adams in Barbados, Norman Manley in Jamaica, and Eric Wiiliarns in Trinidad. Whereas the Mirzstrninster system remained intact throughout most of: the Eastern Caribbean, some of these leaders discc~veredthat it was ycrssible to adhere to the letter of the system while enjoying near-dictatorial powers.'JWo one more nearly approached tlze dictatorial status than Grenada's Eric Gairy. Sir Eric Gairy may not have been a Latin American dictator in the classic mold; however, ""Gairyism,'5xn the view of noted Caribbean scholar Gordon Lewis, "marked the intrusion into the region of- the habits of Latin American caudilf i s r r ~ o . "As ~ ~ leader on Grenada" long trek to independence, Galry attained greater and greater stature; he was Grenada" '%hero"--in the wctrds of one Grena-

56


dian, ""h jtust got to be too mudz, he was a hem who got too much."!S7 Corresgcrndingly; he became more corrupt and less interested in democraq and the complexities and complications it entailed. During the five years after Grenada received its fc~rmalindependence from Britaitz, (>airy's delusions of grandeur and international significance increased. He not only monopolized power but also manipujated the parliamentary system to Iegislate abuses, In a further parallel with Latin American traditions, Gairy reached new heiglzts of brutality in atlacks on his perceived enemies. Gairy moreover, courted notorious dictators such as South Korea" General Pal< Chung Hee, tlze t>uvaliers in Haiti, ancZ Somoza in Nicaragua.'" Perhaps most chilling, hc>we.r.er,w s his increasingly close tie with the new dictator of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet.f3Wairy%personat bodyguard, tlze nefarious Mongoose Gang, and its Night Ambush Squad auxiliary operated as instruments of terroreEil0 Their primary targets were opycrnents of GaIry and those who disylteased him, particularly any wc3men who spurned his advances. There may be no greater indication of the inAuence of South Americds repressive military dictators than Gairy's emulation of the practice of ""disaypearilzg" their political opponents."$" Such an atmosphere contributed to the fi~rthererosion of Grenada's already suspect democratic institutions, Moreover, independent Grenada was faring little better economically or socially than had colontat Grenada. Despite some lzalf-hearted and ineffectual efforts by Gairy to enccruratge economic development, the country remained mired in the classic counterproductive spiral endemic to the developing world, selling agricultural prodzrcts cheaply for export to world markets while paying otztrageously inflated prices for imported gt)ods."Th social services that existed were ""backward, inefficient, and operating with a dilapidated infrastructure.'"4+ With illiteracy high by Eastern Caribbean standards and education lagging relative to previous Crenadian standards and those trf the other Eastern Caribbean states, the school buildings themsefws fell increasingly into disrepair. Wealth standards were low; real rneciicaf or dental care required off-island trips, z~suallyto Barbados or Trinidad, for those able tc> finana them, Five years after beccrming the first of the Windward Islands to gain independence, Grenada was, by Eastern Caribbean standards, struggling politically, economicalt.yj;and socially. The first meaningful opposition to Gairy emerged in 1970, after a number of by the populist black power movement sweeping Caribbean leftists, gal~~anized the region, met at Rat Island (St. t ~ c i a ) . ~The " guiding spirit of the meeting has been described as reformist rather than rewtutionary, and no broad strategies were planned; the commitment of the participants was to raise popular consoousness and to confront and challenge the region's continued state of dependence.1" These popujist and anti-imperialist sentiments resonated with the Grenadians, particularly with one young Iawyer, Maurice Bishop, who returned determinecl to clzallenge Gairy's control ancZ ""pktics as usual.'" Several years of this small, informal organizing yielded few results. By 1972 two groups had emerged: the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP), led


57

by Bishop, and the Joint Endeavotlr for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL),"Weither MAP nor JEWEL was long on specifics, but both were inspired by Tanzania's sjamaa experiment, where power was vested in citizen's communal villages; JEWEL members in particular, according to one Grenadian, "were pragmatic Marxists who wanted local sc->cialism. . . [and the] sorts of things very relevant to small island de~efoyrnent:"~TBoth groups called for poyular participation in the country's decision-making process via participatory democracy and people'wssemblies, and both stressed national ccrnsciousness and pride,'"" MAR located in, and largely limited to, tlze capital city of St. George, was characterized by its urban focus, intellectual concerns, and inability to reach a large segment of the poyulation.""NEL, wctrking in the mrrntryside to revi~alize Grenada" farmers and peasants, paid particular attention to the dewloyment of agricultural cooperatives; an t~nsue-cessf~~l 1972 electoral alliance with the Grenada National party (GNP) raised questions about JEWEL'S leadership ability. Recognizing the need for a more broadly based organization with both urban and rural components, MAP and JEWEL merged in 1973 to h r m the Mew fewel Movement (RifM). Despite the clearly radical orientation of the NJM and the abundance of radical rlzetoric, tlze" "197Manifesto ofthe Mew fewel Movement for Pawer to the Peayle and fbr Achieving Re31 Independence for Grenada, Carriacou, Petit Martinique, and the Grenadian Grenadines" "was essentially a reformist dctcument. The primary themes of the NJM manifesto were '""genuine independence,""""sel-reliance,'" "anti-Gairyism," and ""anti-imperialism."" Overall, the manifesto reflects radical democracy, w11ie-h may well have been inspired in part by Manley's democratic socialist experiment that had begun in Jamaica just the year before-"'fi This radical slant fits as well with the NJM's ddecisic3n to join with a variety of groups in seeking to force Galry out of office before Grenada received its independence in 1974; in the estimation of one sclzolar, the NJM became "the driving force fvehitld a growing ccralition of anti-Gairy fc2rces-"151 Gairy was rescued by independence. Neitl~erBritain nor the United States was interested in an unsettled situation in the Caribbean's newest state; both moved to prop tzp Gairy. The anti-Cairy opposition, still hopeful that the 19'76 election wcjulcl remove him from office, joined together in the People" Alliance as a vehtcte to contest the parliamentary elections, Led by tlze NJM, the People's Alliance received 48 percent of the vote and six of the fifieen parliament seats-despite evidence that the Galry regime had tampered with the election results. Witl~the NJM winning three of the s h seats (two went to the GNP, one to the United Peapie's party, a GNP splinter grotzp), NJM leader Bishcrp became the official leader of the opposition. Gairy responded by running rctugilshod over the parliament and reducing its meetings to the minimum manciated by law. There was a corresgclnding increase in censorship, curtailment of civil rights, and prohibition of strikes. Most dramatic, however, was the brutality aimed at the NJM.

58


The 1976 election clarified what everyone on the island already knew, that the leader of the opycrsition to Gairy and y robably the country" most popular politician was Maurice Bishop. The year I976 also saw the return to Grenada of Bernard Coard. Coard, a lecturer at the University of West X~~dies campus in Trinidad, had supported the WfM from its inception and hetped draft the NJM rnanifesto.f" h Incontrast to Bishop, who had evolved into the leader of the antiGr-tiry struggle tlzrouglz his experiences in ""t-te streets,'" Coarcl attained lzis position via negotiation: He joined the NfM in 1974 on the condition that he be appointed to a leadership position, and he demanded and received the safest parliarnenfary district fur the 1976 eiection.I53 During this period the NJM gravitated toward a more conxntionafly socialist perspective, a m o x many scholars ascribed to Coard and his Organization for Research, Educaticrn, and Liberation (OREL).fi'" The members of OREL, which had once attacked tlze NJM as '2%petit-bourgmis party,'" became a party within tl-te party, setting themselves up as ""revolutionary socialists" who formed the "Marxist-Leninist component" of the NJMet55Although QREL was fc~rcedto disband fc~rmallyin 1978, it contir-tued informally and was to play a divisive and decisive role in the fate of Grenada" revrrlutionary process.f" Guard" iirnpressirre cornrnand of theory);his tirelessness, and his outsbnding organinaticrnai skills cornbinecl to propel him, by 1979, to an unquestioned status as tlze number-two person in the NfM leadership. It was in this a n t e x t that the Latin American revolutionary tradition arrived in the Eastern Caribbean. As the NJM gained stature, it became mare ancl more a threat to the increasingly repressive Gairy. In March 1979 Cairy apparent@ ordered the assassination of the NJM leadership while he was scheduled to be out of the country.fi7 Informed by friends, the WfM leaders went into hiding and decided to send into action its armed wing, which totaled fewer than fifty people. At approximately 4 A.M. on March 13, forty-sk people, of:whom only eiglzteen were armecl ancl those poorly, attacked the main army barracks at True Blue. The troops fled; then the WfM forces went to take ccrntrol trf Radio Grenada, where all guards but one had fied. He was waiting trt surrender the station trt the NJM fc~rces,They seizecl all the island's police stations, encountering only token resistance at the main pcrlice headquarters, Fort George. When the Fort George resisters surrendered at 4 EM., twelve hours after the initial attack at R u e Blue, the NJM held total control of: the island, The death toll was three, Thus the Eastern CariNean had had its first extraconstitutionatnsitutinal change of power; a Latin American-style soluticrn to a Latin American-styie problem. Altlzouglz the exact nature of tl-te political victory may be debatable-coup, revolution, or something in betwenlsg-there is iitrle question that the population reacted with great glee to news of Gairy3 overthrow and to the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PEG). The response of the population "was astonishing and fully justified the PEG'S shim that the revcrlution was legitimized by the clearly expressed will of the peop1e,"E9 Undoubtedly the NJM was


59

celebrating as much as any group; its leaders, lzowever, now fbuncl tlzemselves faced with the rather unexpected and daunting task of running the country. Five days iater the PRG, renamed the People's Revciluticinary Government, was officially proclaimed, The PRG was bmad based: It included trade union leaders, professionals, and business leaders. In contrast to Nicaragua, h o w x r , and akin to Cuba, there was little doubt as to who was in ctintrctl: the N J M and the new prime ministerr, Mauricc Bishop. Bernarcl Coard, soon to be deputy prime minister, was named minister of finance, The situation inherited by the PRG could not be ccimpared to the destruction confronted by the revolutionaries in Cuba or Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the revolutionaries h u n d a country in which the political institutions were discredited. The economy was weak and the country poclr even by Eastern Caribbean standards, The social system w s a ""sambfes."l~~~ The E"fXmoved quickly, pursuing a strategy of: measured reforms ancl broad, popular support built around the gradrtal introduction of populist politics, social irnprotrement, and economic change. The gclvernment promised elections, and most Grenadlans apparently expected the ""rvo," as they called it, to introduce its reforms and tlzen pass quickly back to tlze Westminster system with which they w r e familiar,f6' It was a situation reminiscent of Bolivia in f 952, but this time the popufation was more conservative than the revoluticinary leadership, We can now turn our attention to the efforts of: the Grenadian social revolrttionary leadership to institutionalize and consolidate the revc>lution.These efforts resembled what W have seen in each of the three other cases considered here, The government structures were partly reconfigured, new programs designecl to mobilize the population were introduced, and the yeopte of Grenada were invited to take part in runni~zgthe country. This was the initial, pubtic face of the revolutionary process. Yet as suggested earlier, there was also a primte side to the sociaf rewlutionary process, one that many islanders were, despite rurnors, apparently unaware of until the encl. Arr_v consideration of pubtic efforts to institutionalize and consolidate the process mtzst be paralleled with exploration of the internal dynamics of the revoluticinary prctcess, for it is there that the seeds of the revolution" destructiczn were sown by the revolutionaries themsetves. It almost seems that the demise of the revc3lution was fixed at the same time it was getting off the ground. The PRG, building on i t s apparent revolutionary legitimacy, moved to institutionalize the revolutionary process within days of:political victory. Behre the end of the month, the PKG had reptaced the suspended constituticln with an initial paclcage of ten ftzrndamenfal ""peopiek saws," which w r e followed by a number of others, including some clauses from tlze previous constitution. The structure of the provisional government was also orztlined, including the resurrection of parisl-r councils as forurns fur popular participaticin. Popular participation was, in fact, one of:tlze hallmarks of the Grenadian social revc>lutionaryprocess. T1ie island" refatively small size and population made feasibie the type of participatory democracy that had been discussed elsewhere in

60


the abstract. Organizations sucl~as tlze National Women's Organization (NWO) and the National k u t h Organization (NYO), the trade unions, and ""popular assemblies" wouXd represent popular sentiment.'" The initial popufarity of this political process is not disputed: There was a high degree of-participation across tlze island.""lt least in theory, the Grenadian peoylte would hold the country" leadership accountable, No plans were announced for succession, The government also began to lay the groundwork Eor the tangible benefits that, along with the charisma and magnetism of the prime minister, were central to the support for the social revolutianary process. Medical care was improved, made free, and more doctors ancl nurses were Izired. Sclzool lunches were provided, and school capacity was increased at the same time that fees were drastically cut, Milk was made available to mothers and infants, major housing projects were undertaken, and access to piped water was provided, A literacy campaign effectively wiped out illiteracy. As in the other cases considered, tlzese efforts clearly enabled the ccrnsolidation process. Howexr, they did not hetp with the process of institutionatization nearly so dramatically as similar efforts had in BoXivia and Nicaragua. Despite the pcryularity of the new participatory politics and the success of the social programs, the instltutionafization process has been considered a failure.[h" As it became apparent that decisions were being rnade by the leadership regardless of the popular will, participatcrry democracy lost its luster and the popular organizations began to wane. Qf particular concern to many Grenadians were the lack of means to hold their leadership accountable ancl the PRG's contit~uecl6~ilul-eto mafee provisions for succession. Speciffcally, the citizens wanted to reinstitute the electoral process with which they were 6amijiar. Shortly before the end of the revolrxtian the PKG moved to convene a constitutional convention charged with, amcong other things, setting up etections. This seems tcr indicate a belated rea~gnition of popular sentiment by at ieast some within the leadership; many claim that it was Bishop. At least one scllolar Izas suggested that Coard, tlze consummate bureaucrat, felt that the ccrnsofidation process had pltapd tcr Bishop" advantage and feared that institutionalizatic~nw u f d ensure Bishop" continued As is so often the case with the Crenadian revcolutionary process, appearances w r e deceiving. The projects and pragrams noted above and the 13RG's attention to the ""people" Iaws," which had effectively replaced the constitution, seem evidence of: institutionaliizatian, This appearance was supported by the emergent, if not entirely welcome, bureatzcratization, f i t at least WC)Eact~~rs actively tzndercut the success of the instituticznaiizarion process, The first, Thorndike suggested, was the piecemeal Fdshion in whiclz the PKG continued to implement the pmgrams and run the goxrnment itself.'" bnstitutianaltzaieiczn fo'ollowed no coherent, logical pattern; masers were often dealt with st~nylyas they arose, as in the early days of:tlze revolution in Cuba. Rrbaps more destructive, hrrwever, was the failure to adopt any measure of accountability: Lines of responsibility were no clearer within the PRG than they


61

were to the population at large. Sitnultaneaus with tlze population's appreciation of the improved heafth care, new educational oyycrrtunities, and the increased sense of community was its resentment over the lack of accountability. As a resutt, the public perceived tlze PRG-anc2 specificldlly the NJM-as a new rulhg class. Moreover, it soon became evident that neither the pcryufar organizations nor the assembties would be abte to alter the leadership; the lack of an electoral process reinforced the lack of: a successionary mechanism, The PRG's 6~ilureto create the pcrlitical mechanisms necessary to sustain the revc>lutionaryprocess d o ~ m e dthat The consofidation process fared a bit better-largely because of the charismatic figure of Maurice Bishop. The spirit, one scholar argued, not the structure, made the revrr1ution.E" Xtl-rers,na"rng the essentially reformist character of the prcrcess in Grenada, suggested that the most revolutionary aspect of the Grenadian exyericnce was "the widespread challenge to psychological dependency.'"# hitially the revc>lution enjoyed a great deal of popular support, although it is difficult to discern how much of that was for the social revotutionary process, for the ouster of: Gairy, or for tlze leadership of: Bislzop. It is cfcar that people trusted the PKGthey believed that they were invc~lvedin the pracess, that the Z%G wotzld well represent their interests, and that increased opportunity was likely, People also kit that in Bishop they heard a voice of tlze future, a person articulating their hopes and vision. Xn f 983, Bishop told an audience in the United States that the Grenadian people were ""always at tlze center and heart and fr~c.tcus"of all revolutionary activities..uo If the popufation was in fact always the center of PRG attention, however, it was as the object of what Mandle described as a largely ""pternalistic" preach."' "kternalistic socialism:" according to Mandle, assumes that the pcryulation cedes gcjvernance to the ruling party (in this case the NJM), and in return, the government implements benevolent programs, which benefit the gopufation, Key here for the question of: consolidation is the set of: assumptions made about the population: They are not equals with the leadership, they may not organiz tcr make demands, they must mobilize to support tbe decisions the government makes on their belzalf. Mandlc was undoubtedly correct in lzis estimation that paternalism, under stress, ""can turn quite ugly: . . . Benevc>lentpaternalism is no less authoritarian for being benevolent in its intentic~ns~"jTz There was never a program in Grenada designed to win the hearts and minds of the ycryufation.E" In fact, there are indications that some elements of the revolutionary leadership held the majority of the population in contempt; others looked upon the population more 6avorably but nonetheless considered the citizens to be tznderdeveloped, tzndereducated, and unsophisticated. The revc3lutic3n3s popufism, then, was simuXtaneously its area of peatest strength and greatest contradicti0n.~T4This can be seen in the prrsition of the NJM and its internal dynamic, specifically the ccrmpltex relationship between the two leading figures of the Grenadian revctiuticrn, iMaurice Bishop and Bernard Coard.

v-

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Scl-tofarsof tl-te Grenadian revolution agl-eed that one of its defining characteristics was the WJM leadership" desire to ccrntrol every aspect of the social and political process in the country The party feaders appeared to have been much Iess concerneel with the status of the economic system, since they understood themselves to be in the national-democratic stage of socialist re~r.rluttcrn,"~ In practice, this translated into an extraordinary pragmatism. Clctgnizant of the position of capitalism in Grenadian society and tlze importance of:private property, the NJM nationalized only Gairyk holdings, introduced a mild land refc~rmtwo years after political victory, and made little effort at ruraI cttlXectivizati~tn~~~6 The results of these policies were high gmwtlz rates ancl an economy tlzat was widely hailed as a success and even was lauded by the W r l d Bank and the IMEU7 Atthough the X3RG allowed the economy to go its own way?it turned its attention closely to pofitics and society, In the view of the NJM leadership-a view that predated political victory-Grenadian society and by extension its political institutions were ""bckward."""g Therefore, the leaders decided to monopolize p o w r while they gradually ied the popufation toward a new society. For four and a half years, tlze NJM totally dominated politics in Grenada in pursuit of its vision-no other organization w s allclwd to operate, Decisions were made and then implemented by the NJM.E79"hiis is not to suggest that there was not a commitment witl-tin the NJM to develop popular partidpation. However; the leaders were not convinced that the people were ready to control their CWZ~ destiny. The problems with the instituticrnalizatiion process may have occurred because of:riAs in tlze NJM. There is littfe question that there were disagreements over syecific policies and ideological differences within the leadership and, for that matter, within the NJMk s ~ i k i n g l ysmall membership: There were only seventy-tvvc, members when the revolution disintegrated.ixQ1;"erhaps the most impclrtant conflict was betwen Bishop" vision of a more open, broadly based party and government with greater popular accountabiliv and Coardk adherence to a Leninist vanguarcl party structure tlzat would speed socialist transition. It seems clear tl-tat the specifics of this and other areas of a3ntention increasingly became secondary to the discord between the unquestioned leader of the revolu"eon, Maurice Bishop, and tlze person who emerged as his primary challenger, his friend and deputy, Bernard Caard, Every w r k on the Grenadian revolution since the coup d'dtat wrestles with Bislzop ancl Coard's comytex relationslzip and the respective roles they played in the social revs>lutionaryprocess. It is agreed that Bishrrp was a charismatic, visionary figure who was poyularfy acclaimed the leader of the social revctltrtionary process. A widely reported graffito arotlnd the island after Coard and his old OREL clique staged their coup d'ktat was, "No Bishop, no revr.r."ml Vet the fact that Bishop was more than simply a charismatic figure is indicated by his efforts shortly before he was overthrown to institutionalize the revolution. Scholars seem equdly in accord that Coard was a natural bureaucrat who believed not in the individual but in immutable structures. Coard, however, was conscitrus of the im-


63

portance of retaining popular support ancl recognked, at least to some extent, the importance of consolidation. Nonetheless, although both individuals cfearty felt that the Grenadian poyuiation had to be led, Cczard seems to have been generalfy contemptuous of the Grenadian Throtzgh much of the post-political victory process in Grenada, the rewlution was organized-same wczuld say managed-by Coard, He was the detail man, the bureaucrat, who thrived on interparty debates and tlze minutia of decisionmaking, He also apparently craved the pcssition of prime minister, to which he felt entitled. Although Cczard and Bishop may have agreed on many details, Coard lacked Bishop's touch with people, in Fdct., any connection with tlze population and their feelings. Bishop, in contrast, seems ttr have been Grenada" C~stro:a man who could do littte or s o wrcsng in the eyes of the peoplte, the person they trusted, the person who o&red them opportunity, the person who articulated h r them a vision of the future. It may never be clear what prompted Coard and his follcswers to depose and then murder Bishop in 1983, Some agrihuted it to differences over policy; others, to ideological splits, A common reference point among bath sets of: scholars was Coardk S~tlinistproclivities."%Perhaps the mast compelling argument was made " is impossible by Weine, who suggested that the real issue was p e r ~ n a l i t y ~ i It here to do justice to the comyfexities of: Heine's analysis. However; tlze puzzle, for hirn, is why Coard, seemingly at the pinnacle of the power that he had been asyiring to all his life, wc?utd ""risk it all for an endeavclr so dubious as trying to Be facto unseat tlze revolution's maximum leadelr;""M "shcsp, after all, was Coardk friend, mentcsr, and staunchest defender. Msret)ver, Heine argued, their policy disagreements were slight, and their ideological differences have been exaggerated.Ig6 Heine therefc~returned ttr a psychoanalytic analysis of Bishop and Cllard and concluded that Coardk seed for power and prestige, his ccrmpulsive behavior, and uldmately his capacity for sefl"l.delusion forced hirn to remove the obstacje in his patlz-Maurice Bishoy."7 The Grenadian revoluticzn led to the most serious attempt to introduce socialism into the Eastern Caribbean; this is perhaps the final sense in which the social revolutionary process represented the intrusion of: Latin Arnerica.""Mb effbrt alone bwught Grenada closer to countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, which traditionally had relatively little fin the case of Cuba) or no (in the case of Nicaragua) contact. wit11 the states of the Eastern Caribbean. One scholar of: the Caribbean, hrswever, suggested another reascsn that the Grenadian revc3lutionary process garnered such attention, Gordon K. Lewis argued that "Grenada, of all the islands of the archipelago, was cl~osento become tlze rendezvous of new efements."~Vtill, Lewis noted, the Grenadian revcslution was tor:, brief to establish anything new; as any one remembers it at a result its importance may be primarily symbctlic"0-if all. Grenada is important for this sttzdy because it was a srjcial rev01utic)n that failed either to instituticznalize or to consolidate. In that sense, it offers us the oy-

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portunity to assess tlze relative imporfance of these Factors, It seems clear tlzat despite the four years of constant U.S. hostility, the revczlutionaries might have survived the internal strife if at Xeast institutionalization had occurred, By the same token, consolidation might Izavr created a mare committed population, willing to fight for the gains of the social revs>lutionaryprocess, Although in both cases the revolution wt3uXd likely have ultimately failed, it probably wtjuld not have simply disintegrated,

CONCLUSION: THE f MPORTANCE OF CONSOLIDATION I have argued in tlzis clzayter that consolidation is a usehl analytic concept tl-tat merits attention by those interested in exploring the social revolrttionary process. As the four brief case studies here demonstrate, consolidation provides another approach to understanding how and why the processes unfoided as they did, By woiding an overemphasis on state structures, we are able to consider revolutionary processes in a fuller and more meaningful way. After all, consoiidatir;7n-the project of social transformation-is the ultimate goal of social revolution. As flarnton suggested, social revolutions are it~lzerentlydramatic and hopeful Yet, it is difficult to assess the realization of these promises and visions. The no"ron of consolidadan provides a vantage point from which to make such assessments. The Bolivian revc>lutir>n,which institutionalized but failed to consolidate, faded into obscurity, leaving little behind to commemorate its occurrence. Forty years after the Cuban revolution, the level of institutionalization remains an open question, as the degree of csznsolidation is so intimately tied to the figure of Fidel Castro that only his demise wilt allow an accurate assessment of a revolution that clearly lzas left its mark on Cuba ancl the world, Whereas over a decade later it is yczssible to get Grenadians to talk with some poignancy abcrut the revczlutionary process, Grenada" failure eitlner to institutionalize or to consalidate seems to have left little, if any, mark on Grenada or the world.""" After thirteen years the fate of the revofutlon in Nicaragua has remained unclear. The f 9% ekctiion seemed to indicate a triumph for tnstitutitznalizatlon, Wlzat tl-te election suggested about consolidation was less clear. The Pact tlzat the Sandinistas received 41 percent of the vczte in the face of the dire economic situation and the opposition" care not to threaten the revolution" cme agenda suggested that a significant degree of: consolidation lzad occurred anci that life was unlikely to return to the yrerewlutionary patterns; in Chapter 4 we will consider what tl-re resufts of the 1996 election mean, There is little question that there are discernible connections among tlze four cases. Some of these linkages are obvious; others are not so readily apparent. A focus on institutionalization and consotidation sertres to reinfora what W already


65

know and illuminate p~wio~lsly maqinalized or omitted aspects. The imcation of consolidation clarifies the degree to which the ittnscious, intentictnttl choices and actions of individuals make an impact on the social revolutianary prctcess, Tinat is the bcus of Chapter 3, specificcllly the role played by soeiai ~volutionary leadership in the transformation process.

CHAPTER THREE

utionary Leadership: ogy and Strategy Revolutions dct not happen but are made, guided by the conscitrus plans and significant choices of revoluticrnary leaders throughout the three phases of the social revolutionary process. Social revolution in particufar4efined as it is by tlze effort to transfcrrm society-is largety the result of, composed of, and driven by human action, not simply structurai phenomena. The process is overall neither mindless nor aimless, although both of these elements may be evident in specific instances. It is, rather, predominantly purpcrsive, gsral-directed behavior. If this is the case, a set of questions follows: Who directs the revotution? For what purpose? Tb what goal? These questions point to the importance of leadership and of:social revs>lutionaryideolofcrrand strategy. The third phase of the social revolutionary process, which follows political victory, is the defining phase, It is drtring tlze imptausibty complex and protracted process of scrcietal transformation that the efhrts of groups and individuals have their most obrsious and dramatic impact: People act, make strategic choices, and influence one a n o t h e ~As a result, this plzase of the social revolutionary process is best tznderstood as a period of purposeful adaptations to a variety of political circumstances, as the revolutionaries seek to transform the political, economic, and social structures of their society, Leaders must bargain, compromise, and negotiate in an effort to institutionalize and ccrnsolidate the revs>lution-both amsrng themselves and with the population. They consider options and make choices, Omitting tlze element of:conscious action and decision from the analysts of:social revs>lutionaryprocesses, as structuralist or deterministic perspectives do, is a mistake. If we agree that consolidation, institutionalizatioa, or a mix of the two represents the paths available in the post-political victory period, W should ask how such paths are chosen, To the degree that structrarat,explanations might recognize the existence of suclz paths, they would be presented as cleternnitled-perhaps even predetermined-srr severely constrained; in either case the w r k i n g presumptionlassumption is that choice is largely irrelevant, My contention is that

SOCIAL KEVOLIJTLQNARY LEADERSHIP

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srrcl-tchoices are made by the social revolutionary leadership. On occasion, as perhap"n the Crenadian case, such decisions are made in isolation. As a rule, however, the revciluticinary leaders consider the interplay of the wants and needs, the memories and tlze visions of the population in whose name the revolution has been made, their cwn vision, and the domestic and international @actorsthat impinge on their ability to realize the social revolutionary project. This is not to deny or denigrate the importance of: structures or the reality tlzat there are conditions that may confine the range of options available either to the leadership or the population. ""Objective" ainditlons undctubtedly create an atmosphere that may be conducive to insurrection, pofitical victory, or transfc~rmation, W11at is not at all cfear is that such conditions in and of themselws have mtr-ved any society into or through revc->lution.Therefore,the focus of this chapter is on the social revotutionary leadership in the post-political victory period, those elements that constitute the leadership, and their implication h r the social revcrlutionary project. Leadership-particuiarly political leadership-has received a great deaf of attention in oral and written lzistory; Kejai ancl Phillips pointed out that over tlze centuries, philosophers and social theorists have proffered diffiering concepts of political leadership. Some of the better known include Piato's "philosopher kings,'" Maclziavellik 'krince," CGayte" '""great man,"" Pu'ietzsche's "superman," Freud" '""primal father," and Lasswell" '""political manm3'2Since Miortd War XI, social scientists have built on such no"rrons and toolced at questions of and about feadership in a variety of ways,These studies are broadly of two types: speculative analyses focused on archetypes of leaders and their functions"n8 empirical analyses of characteristics, social backgrounds, education, and occupaticin.-" Although pc->liticalscientists w r e part of this mc>vement,the increasing attention to analytical models in the 1960s brought on by the so-calted behavioral revolution in the social sciences often ignored Ieaders. Only recently has the importance of leaderslzip in society been ""rediscovered" by most pofiticaf scientists.6 But they largely ccrntinue to neglect such questions as why peoplte opt for revc3ltltion in general and noticeably avoid the challenging and enigmatic question of revolutionary leadership spedlrically.7 Social revolutionary leadership has received surprisingly little attention frcirn political scientists; the few studies done have focused afxnost exclusively on psychological 6~ctors.KThere are a number of problems with such studies, two of which merit mention here. The first is that the organization of revc3lutionary behavi~r,that is, the csinstitution of revolutionary activity; cannot be explained by analy~ingpersonality traits of: revolutionaries,The second is that the examination of rewlutionary personalities is not hefpful in explaining the emergencewhere or when-of revoluticinary activity. PsychotogicaX explanatic>ns,unless they can establish. a link between individuats>pecific experiences as tl-tey are socialized into society and as their personality dextoys and their subsequent pc->liticalbehavtor, seem problematic. Many people share the experiences that supposedly

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shape tl-tose who are most often identified as revolutionary leaders, Yet remarkably few people, even by the most generous of definitions, engage in revc>lutionary or quasi-revolutionary activity, much less become revctiutionary leaders, Until this mystery can be solved, it would seem tlzat psychological explanations remain suspect. Still, psychological studies of revctlutionary leaders may offer important insiglzts into the dynamics of revolrttionary leadership across the three plzases of the social rem>lutionaryprocess," Perhaps of greatest use have been the efforts to categorix revotuticznary leadership. In particular, scholars have discerned different categories of leadership. Brinton" typology identified the rotes of revt~tutionaryleaders accczrding ttz their skills as idealists, formulators, propagandists, agitators, and c ~ r g a n i z e r s ~ ~ ~ Hopper cataloged leaders for each of the four revolutionary stages he distinguished: the agitatol; in the preliminary stage; the prophet anci the reformer, in the populiar stage; the ""satesman:>n the formal stage; and the administrator-executive, in the finaf, institutional stage of the revolutionary process," H~iloffnerreduced the number of types of leaders in mass movements to tlzree, drawing distinctions among the ""men of wordsI" fanatics, and the ""practical men of action:"> Eckstcin discerned leaders as ideolog~tes,organizers, experts in violence, demagogues, anci administrators." Rejai and Phillips difkrentiated among fotznders, agitators, generals, scholars, and professional revc3lutionaries in the process of pczlitical revoltztion.1~ f put f c ~ r w r dtwo specific propositions in this chapter, The first is that there are two distinct types of leaders critical to the social revolutionary process, visionary and organirational, Visic-,nary leaders generate the social revolutionary ideology, which combines a critique of the previous regime and society with a compelling vision of the future. Organizational leaders work with the visionary leaders to create the sociat revolutionary strateg and to ixnylernent it, The seconcl proposition is tl-tat these two types of leaders may be associated with the strategies of institutionalization and consolidation. W e r e a s both types are criticat during at1 three phases of the social revoluticznary process, this cttnnection is clearest after political victory when the leaders seek to transform society. As a rule, visionary leaders are most readily identified with the consc->lidation process: They energize the poptzfation, present the social revoluticznary ideology, e. is the province of the orand articulate a vision of the f ~ ~ t u rXnstitutionalizatian ganizational leaders: They work to create the structures that undergird the social revoiuticznary process, Excessive dominance by one type of Xeader or leaders and the resultant preponcierance of either institutionafizallan or consolidation, as the Bolivian and Cuban cases suggest, comes at the expense of the other, A leadership that finds itself Iocked in a struggle ctver the apyrczyriak path, as arguably happened in Grenada, is likely to selhdestruct. A more bafanmd leaderslzip, such as that evinced in Nicaragua, appears to allow the rewlutionaries to pursue institutionatizaticzn and consolidaticzn in a rczughty simuXtaneous and mutually reinforc-


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ing fashion, Xn each case these leaders-visionary and organizational-conkont not just the exigencies of the domestic situation but the inescapable cornpiexities of the international s i m d o n as well,

VIS18NARY AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHXP The proposition that revoluticzns do not succeed without acctdrnplished and able leadership is, as Greene suggested, self-evident and perhaps tautologic at.^^? Nonetheless, the point is irnyczrtant. Spc>ntanec>usuprisings are by definition tznorganized; potentially strong mrrtPements can be undermined by leadership problems. Historically, vision and ideology without coherent organization and strategy have not succeeded; organization and strategy wi"Eout a guiding vision and ideology have degenerated into stultifying bureatzcracy. Vision and the organization to realize that vision are the hallmarks of social revolutionary leadership. Visionary leaders, who articulate tlze social revolutionary idecrlogy, are verbal and dynamic people with broad, popular, often charismatic appeal." Qrganizatianal leaders, who seek to translate the social revol~ltionary ideology into reality, are ooften faciturn ancl methodical people who work behind the scenes.lqoth types of leader may be quixotic ideatists, hesitant to make ctdncessions, or pragmatic realists, Mr;illing to maneumr and compromise as they seek to maxirnize popular support; bat idealists tend to be visionary leaders, whereas realists are mrrre likely to be organizational feaders.19 Most of the Familiar Latin American revolutionary leaders demonstrate characteristics of both visionary and organizational leadership. X contend, nonetheless, that it is wrthwhile to categorize them. Ernesto "Che7%uevara (Cuba), Tcjmhs Borge (Nicaragua), and Maurice Bishop (Grenada) all had or have fcjrunidable organizational skills, but they are most usefully uncierstood as visionary leaders whose greatest skill fay in their ability to articulate the social revolutionary ideology and arouse support for it. Ccznversely, whereas Juan Lechin, Victor Pax, and HernAn Siles (Bolivia), Raixf Gastro (Cuba), t>aniel Ortega (Nicaragua), and Bernard Coard (Grenada) alf have err had demonstrated skills as visionary leaders, they are more productivefy regarded as peoplmhose primary talent lay in organizational leadership. It is irnpcrrtant to note that these categories are not rnutuaffy exclusive: Some visionary leaders have been as much organizers as orators or vice versa, In fact, visionary and organizational leadership may be found equally in the same person. V, I, Lenin and Leon Trotslv in Russia, Macr Zedong in China, Ho Chi Mi~lbin Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba all resist categorization-they filled both roles, often simultaneoustyy2~ It is atmost certainly no ccrincidence that these five people wczuld likely top any list of ""great" xvcrlutionary leaders. Just as a social revoluticzn must have both instituticznalizat-ion and consotidation to succeed, rev-

70


olutionary leaders need both vision ancl organization. m e n these elements are embodied in one person, the task of balancing the strengths of one leader with those of another is simplified or elirninated.2" As lzas been suggested tlzroughout, the three plzases of the social ~volrttionary process are distinct, yet intimately bound to each other: Social rewtutictn is a prctcess. In the broadest sense the phases are tied together by their part in the larger historical. struggle within a specific society and, in the increasingly complex modern world, between societies. At another levet the phases are linked in their dependence on each other and on the visions and people that may but do nctt necessarily, carry over. Yet each of these periods is at least partly definecl by its particular reality and is populated with people suited to the demands of that phase. Some leaders flourish during the insurrection, able to rally people to the process or organize the grctundwork for the prctcess; others thrive during the battle h r political victory. m a t is clear is tl-tat not all leaders can lead across all three stages of the social revctlutionary process,"

Vanguard Parties The place where the visionary and organizational leaders meet is in the vanguard party, The vanguard is, in tbeary, a self-selected, self-abnegating, and disciplined revctlutionary elite, which seeks to lead a mass-based transformation of society. In practice, hctwever, the vanguard often becomes an institution, The vanguard may be distit~guishedfrom other elitist conceptions of: leadership by tlze emphasis on mttbilization and transformation of the peoylte rather than their marginalkation and disernpowerment," Inlzet-ent in the vanguard concept, Gilbert poit~tedout, is itnmense ideological tension: The vanguard seeks to liberate and empower tlze people and at the same time to control and transform them.24 The concept of the vanguard political party was most explicitly advanced by Lenin, who, drawing on Kari Marx, argued that revoiutions were made by a small cadre of professional revctlutionaries and that revolutionary ""idctctrination"" of the population was not possible; peopie had to be brctught tct consciousness, guided much as a bricklayer uses a guideline to keep the wall being built straight." In another analogy, Lenin assumed that the revofution would be propetled by popular discontent but that the population could not steer. Thus the vanguarcl party existed to give bearitlgs to the revoftttion. To attain this position, how.rer, the party must appeal ttt the values and interests of the people, albeit careftul1-y. Popular part-icipatic~nthat was out of cttntrctl, undirected, was a risk to the revolutionary project. Others discerned a more complex relationship, a critical dialectic betwen the vanguard party and the popufation. 'Rotsky, for example, argued that ""Mrlthout a guiding organization tlze energy of: the mass would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-box, But neverthefess what mttves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam.""" Grarnsci emphasized that it~tellectualskills and theoretical


71

knowledge could be acquired and developed by workers, arguing that neither politics nor history could be made withotzt "this sentimental connection:hvvhh must be "provided by an organic cohesion in which feefing-passirtn becomes understanding ancl tlzence knowledge."z7 This is clearly the prrint from which the FSLN began in Nicaragua, Ornar Cabezas, revolutionary hero and former C D 6 director, explained that the Nicaraguan vanguard never sought to impose structure "top down" on the poyulaticrn, Specifically, according to Cabezas: "We want the peclple to organize for what they want to dcr . . . to work for tl-xe tllings they want. We seek to stimulate people to resolve their own problems. We tell the people that tlzey can transfc~rm their own reality if they organize.'"Wtrra Maria Tkltez, a hero of the rewlution and holder of various important posts including minister of health, had insight into the complex relationship b e ~ e e nthe vanguard and the population: ""There are a few men and women who at a given moment in history seem to contain within themselves the digniv of all the people, They are examples to all of us. And then, through the struggle, the people as a whole reclaim the strength and dignity shown by a few.'"g Although the vanguard party leads, it does so as the peoyie's representative. The concept of the vanguard party coincides neatfy with an increased rectignition of the rofe played by people. For Lenin tlze population had to be appealed to and manipulated by people. Trotsky cfearly implied that people taking action w s the key, and Grarnscl argued that politics and history were made by people. Caberas anci Tkllcz plainly acknowledged that people were central to the social revc>lutionaryprocess. The people who ct~nstitutethe vanguard party, then, operate as both a catalyst and a guide for the population. The people should be aroused ta organhe in pursuit of their interests, and then, with the social revolutionary leadership as modets, individuals (it is assumed) will choose "cc~rrectly" from tl-xe options they created for themsefves, Stimulation of the poyvrlaf on-via the cultivation of: revolutionary values, consciousness-raising, and educationand setting an exampie to the peoyie are profoundly bound tzp in and refiant on visionary and organizational leadership,

Visionary Leadership Vision here refers ttr the rare capacity to consider "misting realities as transformed possibilities" and to inspire a ctillective image of a better futureswPricir to political victory, the visionary leadership is engaged in two intimately related projects. First, it draws attention to popular grievances ancl dismntent with the status quo and its maintenance. Sectinif, and more impclrtant, the leaders proyclse a vision o l the future in which these grievances and discontent are rectified, Thus the social revofutionaries seek both to undermine the regime in power anci to rally the population to the social revc>lutionaryprc~jectand elicit from them the ccimmitrnent and devotion necessary h r the struggle,

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The outcome of: the period of institutionalizatioa and cansolidation that follows political victary depends on visionary leadership. The revcrlutionary scjciety's institutions have been undermined, and people" traditionai consciousness about their lives has been challenged, Thus visionary leaderslzip is not simply "functic>nally useful" but necessary during this yeriodS3Thetransformation of society requires daring, commitment, creativity, adaptability, and vision. The visionary leaders must provide bath it~syirationand direction to the people mobil'ed on behalf of the social revc3lutionary project and attract others to the struggle. As a result they are at the forefront of tl-xe consalidation process, exhorting and energizing members of the population to take control of their own lives ancl determine their destiny. Critical to the social revcrlutionary prc3ject are the tasks of promrrting new ~ d u e s , mobilizing people, and pursuing the reconstruction of the social consensus, often rent duriizg t l ~ eilrsurrection andlor the political victory. Visionary leaders, then, articrzlate, yramrrte, and in some sense sell the social revolutionary prc3ject. Therefore, they seek to articufate and justiFy the desires of the poyufadon, killdie dramatic visions of: the future to justi* the sacrifices of: the present, and evoke the fervor of community-the sense of Liberation from the alienated and atomistic y a t . Visionary leadership is virtually always charismatic in nature, In the saciat revolutionary cantext, charismatic leaders call for tlze rejection of societal convention and the established political crrder and, in their place, proycrse new and different forms of s~crietaforganizaticrn. W f h respect to societies where institutions are weak to begin with (such as those considered here), Heine suggesteci that ""charismatic leadership can be a precious, vital reso~rce-"~2' Charismatic leaders promote, advance, and facilitate the social revotutionary process by their ability to give voice to people's needs ancl aspirations as part of:tlze vision of:tlze future that the revt3lutionary leaders yropcrse.'iWence charisma can be a critical ingredient for transformative leadership, particularly when the cottective leadership is supplemented by a charismatic figure who has heroic qualities anci appeals strongly to the people. What does this mean in practice? According to Max Weber" work on charisma, one knction of:leadership is to bring society to at least accept and perlzaps adopt new moral, principles because new ccrnditisns or newly organized groups cannot be absorbed under tile otd morality3"n the absence of a cultural doctrine legitirnizit~gand institutionalizing new social activities, cl~arismaticleaders intervene in order to institute new moral principles. Charismatic figures raise the promise, the potential, of rejecting convention and creating possibiiities for the people, The period during which authority is transkrred from the existing order to the alternative vision esycrused by the charismatic or visionary leader is one characterized by revolutionary potential, Xr is hard to capture the essence of visionary or charismatic leadership on paper or even on film-it is best witnessed. Such leadership varies dramatically from one individual. to another and is often manifest in elusive factors: tone of voice,


73

gestures, a pattern of call and response, a relationship to the population rooted in its knodedge of the particular leader, a shared pain and suffering, a shared joy, and an asst-tciationof citizens7ives with the fife cof the particular leader, Although the contribution of these or otlzer factors may be difficult to assess, tl-te impact is undeniably red, There are two cases of charismatic ieadership particularly relevant for our purposes, The first illustrates charismatic leadership primarily by example; the second combines example with speech making, Both brief profiles may offer some insight into the cttmpelling character of charismatic ieaders. Ernesto ""Che" Guevara is a compellhg figure in lzistory, as a spate of recent wctrks (not to mention commercial and cultural iccrnography) attests.%%n Argentinean physician who suffered from asthma, Ctlevara m s radicalized by his firsthand experiences of the Botivian revotutionary process and the invasion and overtlzrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala in 1954, which was orchestrated by the United States. By 1955 he w s in Mexico City, committed to assist Fidel Castrct, who was preparing to retrrrn to Cuba and pursue the revolution. Once in Cuba, Guevara quickly rose to tlze position of Castro's chief lieutenant: He became an imycrrtant military and political leader and the revc)lution's primary idectlogue, A measure of Guevards stature can be seen in Castro's astute pairing of him with anctther chief lieutenant and orztstanding organizational leader, Camilo Cienhegos, in perhaps the mast important military and psychological campaign of tlze revolrttion. Guevara and Cienfuegos were sent to replicate the Parnous ""tcendiary" march of the Cuban War of independence when national heroes Antonio Maceo and General MBximo 66mez lit up tile sugarcane fietds." hTh reyfication was lzugely successft~t,evoking the link with Cuba's iadepenclence war and capturing the popular imagination. Moreover, the ability of Guevara and Cienfuegos to rally the population to the revolutionary cause and their military skill have became important elements in Cuban revolutionary mythology as well as in the enshrinement of both Guevara and Cienfuegos as nationat Eteroes.%7 m a t tl-te population found so appealing in this instance anci many others was the message Gllrevara bl-ought, tlze ideology he proclaimed or-more accuratelypracticed. "A neat swing of the machete," accctrding to Guevara, ""ctting the stalks like a pro, will do more than a long speech,""" Guevara believed strongly that peapte were conscious actors who could create their own reality, The ideafogy he articulated, as a result, was focused on the emergence of a "new person"who valued moral rather than material incentives as the standard of success, This revofutictnary individrtal would transcencl personal ambition and work for the greater good of all. Guevara" vision inspired a social doctrine that redefined relations b e ~ e e n people and the state, Personal worth woufd be measured in terms of devotion to the revofutionary struggle rather tl~an.by tlze accumulation of money and power: It is important to recognize that Cuevarism emerged as a coherent ideology largely in retrctspect. Guevara essentially mixed idealism and pragmatism with a

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heavy dose of: voluntarisrn and action. The revolution "must have a great deal of humanity and a strong sense of justice and truth in order not to fall into extreme dogmatism and cold schofasticism, into an isofation from tl-re masses, We must strive every day so that this love of living humanity will be transfc~rmedinto actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a mc~vingforce."w The ""true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love,"4j his or her most ""barrtiful quality" i s the capability "of feeling any injustice committed against anyone, anywhere in the wczrlft'4 People were made to feel that they coufd change themselves and their world and that all tlzey lzad to do was do it; tlzeary would follow. Talk was less important then action-Guevara reportedly liked to quote the maxim of Cuban hero Jos& Martl': "The best way to speak is to act." Castro, who, as f-fodges pointed out, shared "the same fundamental premises," wmmarized this perspective as "the duty of: every revolutionary is to make the revolution" and "many times practice comes first and then the thec>ry,"G "or Guevara the emphasis was on revc~liutisznary attitudes and new sensibilities that w u f d devefop atong the way, as the social revolutionary process unfolded. People would learn by doit-tg in Guevara" view: "We walk by walking,"4+ The charisma of ""Cke'"("%is bolzemian getup:kne Cuban revolrttionary wrote, "and his air of- a revolutionary prophetm"$)transcended the Cuban revolu tion. The ideology Guevara articulated cczntinues to be a significant force among a wide assortment of revc~lutisznariesthroughout the world. Radicals from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, tlze Middle East, North America, anci Oceania lzave enshrined Guevara's commitment to action and declaration of revolutionary love as the core of their social revolutionary ideofogy." The "myth of Che'9looms large and Eras played a profound role in the development of tlze Nicaraguan social revolutionary idecrlogy. Guevara's vision has been at feast equal to that of Sandino and more important tl-ran that of Marx or Lenin in the formation of Nicaragua" social revolutionary ideology.46 In fact, it is inkresting to note that the FSLN has a pantheon of deceased charismatic figures: Sandincl, Guevara, and the party's soriginat visitznary leader, Carfos Fonseca. The FStN3spropensity for enlisting the images of:dead men is almost certainly no accident. Live charismatic figures can be divisive, often devetoying cults of personality and perhaps pursuing their own agendas, which may differ fram that adwcated by tlze collective leadership." The FSLN chose to pursue ""a norganizational ideology that rejects the personalistic leadership of the caudz'lla."@ Accordingly, it establislzeci a modet of:collective leadership within the vanguarci that proved practical and popular across all tlzree phases of tlze social revs>lutionaryprocess.4' The apparent lack of a clzarismatic figure within tl-te FSLN vanguard does not mean tl-tat there were nn leaders with charisma, no one to fill tlze visionary role. Tombs Borge, the only surviving founder of the FSLN, emerged as just such a figure in the post-political victory period, Borge is not in the pantheon with


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Sanclino, Guevara, ancl lzis former colleague Fonseca, nor is lze likely to be. For some Nicaraguans he is the epitome of the revt)lution$ extremes. Nonetheless, fbr many others he represents a iink with those charismatic figures; his own charisma is evident. Altlzough Borge is small in stature, lzis voice is powerful ancl poetic; his rorzsing speeches, as Citbert pointed orzt, frequently ttrld of a future free from greed, need, oppression, and ctxptoitation, relying on ""simple, unpretentious language'2ncl frequent invocations of the Bible.50 A particularly pc~werfulexample of Barge" masterful styfe can be fbund in his stirring 1982 May Day speech in Managua's Carlos Fonseca Piaza of the ltevolution, Borge told the crowd: Here, rxear the tomb of Carlos Fonseca, we sl-rould like to speak a little with our brother and tell him . . . the anger, the texzderness, the tburnii~gcoals, the hupes belong to yorr . . .your dreams have come true! Here is yorrr wrking class, our wrking class with its calloused hands and its shining eyes . . .s~andingat atter~tion,which will he faithf111 to ycxr untir victory, until blood, untif death, . . . We are the gatherers of your resurrection. We are not frightened by pha~lto~ns . . . by rnttrnmies . . .by i m p rialism, rxor are W afraid of Cairrs. . . . Qnce we said to you . . . ""Fee homeland or death!" But today we say to ycm, we are moving toward a new society, we are rnoving toward development and consolidation of a revolutionary party, the Sandinista ?&ational Liberation Front, as the party of the wcjrkers and peasants, of the intellectuals and the Nicaraguan patriots, we axe moving toward the total eliminatioll of the expIoitatiorr of mar1 by man, and we say to you, regarding the belief and thoughts of our people: Free ht~melandor deith.51 The lzallrnarks of Borge's rlzetorical style, lzis invocation of patriotism, his invofvement of tlze population, lzis evocative religious imagery, ancl the promise of a better future are all in evidence. Barge" speeches are made more compefling by the story of his life, which the people know well. He spent years in struggle and isofatton in the jungle, experienced brutal attacks on his family, and endured cruel tc>rture at the hands of the Somoza regime." 2Barge can speak of pain ancl suffering, grief and deprivation, from firsthancl experience, Altlzough few Nicaraguans can match lzis harsh experiences, Borge is well aware that almost all have known hunger and hardship, denial and distress.-"Watevertlzey may think of him, ancl Barge is certainty not the most popular of the revofutionary leaders, Nicaraguans are aware that lze knows of what he speaks, Furthermore, Barge" broadly pc~yuliststyle served to identify him as ""the FSLN" most charismatic leader."34 And this, Gilbert suggested, was the primary reason that Borge, the FStN3 ' h o s t compelling leader," was passed over when the party selected its 1984 presidential candidateassAlthough he commands a devout fo'ollowingamong a significant segment of the populaf on, Borge has not been tlze revolution's central figtlre. The commitment ttr collective leadership among Nicaraguds rewlutionary leadership was undeniably prctfcjund, a commitment dramatically reinforced by

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what they came to see as the ""lsson of Grenada"": the leadership splits, the United States sends in the Marines," &rrge% charisma stands in marked contrast to the resolutely uncharismatic Daniel Ortega, masterfui pragmatist and coalition builder, who has been one of the revolution" ppreeminent organizational leaders. And from the nine-member National Directorate, which included Borge, it w s clearly Daniel Brtega who emerged as first among equals,li7 This is an important reminder that charisma alone is not sufficient to account for the transft~rmationprocess. An c~veremphasison the ycrtency and ability ofvisionary leadership results in the ""great person of history" hflacy. Charisma"ec figures cannot by themselves move a society into revolution ancl on occasion may in fact find themselves rushing frantically (as iri 1.917, when the Bolshevik leadership was caught unprepared by the spontanecrrzs uprising) not to be left behind by events," W ~ a ist critical is the social revolutionary ideology tlzat is articulated: It is tlze visionary leaders' primary tool in the pursuit of consolidation,

Social Revolutionary Idealog Ideology generally refers to the realm of thoughts and ideas in circulation in any society, Specificalfy, a good working definition inscribes ideczlogy as a package of relatively consistent ideas people draw on to make sense of their place in society and the wcrrld amund them; crften attendant to this is some sort of vision of what society and the w r l d should be like and lmw that vision might be realized, An ideology is intimately related to people's material conditions; tlzey neither exist in a vacuum nor appear out of thin air. An ideolofcrr is ct>mposed of sets of attitudes toward the various institutions and processes of sociey, prczviding the believer wit11 a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be. In so doing it organizes the tremendous complexity of the m r l d into something fairly simplte and understandable and also guides behavior, As a result, any ideotogy is really a set of ideologies anci not some monolithic position free of:disagreements ranging from the subtle and nuanced to the dramatic, from the friendly to the deadly. Since several competing ideologies are inevitably extant in society, some set of values or beliefs some group holds as truth, the issue of ideology is often a central one across the various stages of revc3lutionary proces~es.~g A social revolutionary ideology is a strong critirlue of tlze previous regime and society; it provides a framework for bath the articulation of social ills ancl obstacfes and the creation of the new society. As a result, it rationalizes, legitimizes, and justifies the demands that the social revolutionary leadership places on the people and supplies dignity to their actions. Ideally, the leaderslzip articulates a vision of the new scjciety and thereby promotes a sense of unity, solidarity; cohesion, commitment, devoticzn, and sacrifice among the people; the ideczlogy is vital to the allimportant task of mobili~ation. The French revc3lution provided the paradigm for future rewtutionaries-advancing a new cause (democracy) in the very belly of the beast feighteenth-


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century Europe) ancl offering the world the powerhl ideals of "liberty, equality, fraternityn";%".th Rights of Man" "js]; and the sovereignty of the pec~yle(their right to seff-determination), These principles still stand and-often paired with some sort of grancl vision sucl~as international revolution, a classless society, freedcrm from foreign domination, or the return of a moral, indigenous, or religious tradition-sustained the rrvcbXutlonary tradition that has dominated the mendeth century; Russia (1917), Chitla (19492, Cuba (1959), Iran (19791, and Nicaragua are all good examples, In modern Latin America the iegacy of the French intermined with same of the attendant visions became rallying cries for the population. The social revolrttionary ideology, building on the mobilization that occurred in the earlier phases, reorients the yoyulaticrn and taps its energies for the realization of sclcial revolutionary objectives," A&er political victory in Bolivia there was no clear social revolutionary ideafogy; ratlzel; there were competing ideologies of varying stripes, few of which m u l d quali@ as social revcrlutionary. In Cuba the focus was on the creation of "the new man [sic] ""band what came to be rekrred to as Guevarism, Grenada seems to Erwe lacked any coherent social revofutionary ideology and, like Bolivia, was beset by competing perspectives, specificatfy Bishop" broad-based, if vague, socialist populism and Cc~ardkStalinist vanguardism. Nicaragua has had probably the most compelling, if not necessariiy the most coherent, social revoluticjnary ideology: Sandinismo. Sandinisma is notthe thought of its namesake, though elements of Plugusto C h a r Sandino? views are incorporated into it. Sandit~o,an immensely popular nationalist and poptzlist guerrilla leader in the 1920s and 1930s, successfully fought to oust the U.S. Marines, who had been occupying Nicaragua atmost a n tinuously since 1912.62The United States left behind in Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza Carcfa, ""E YannquiP as the head of the National Guard, paving the way for a forty-five-year dynastic dictatorship." Sl~ortfyafter tlze Mariraes withdrew, Somoza ordered the assassination of Sandit~aancl tlze massacre of approximately 300 of his followers. There is a very real sense in which the ensuing history of Nicaragua may be understood as a continuit~gtension between the rule of the Somaza Family, or Somocismo, and Sandinismrr, at feast to the degree that Sandinismo came to represent the alternative, The Somoza family symbolized the continuation of U.S. domination and attention to the needs of the country's elite at tlze expense of the majority of the population, Sandino in martyrdom served as an enduring catalyst of what became a lengthy struggle and a reminder of the aspiraticrns of much of the population. Although Sandinds personal ideology was tzndcrubtedly ccrmplex, the idecrlogy that he articulated to the population and thereby passed on to histcrry was marked by ixnpassionecl nationalism, resistance to foreigners, ancl Izostility for imperialism and the abusive aspects of capitalism; it offered a ycrpufist perspective on ccrllective wetfare," This simplified rendition of Sandino's thought was articulated

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by one of the FSLN" fcfunciers, Carlos Fonseca, who emphasized Sandit~o'srevolutionary behavior and anti-imperialism, Although Fonsec-t, interpreted Sandino through Marxism, he felt that Sandino helped him interpret Marxism ftor the specifics of Nicaraguan reality," 5 s a result, Sandinismo, according to former vice president Sergio Ramirez, represented "the expression ofotzr deepest identity. It is the defense of the nation, of its politicaf, social, and cultural valuct~''66 Perhaps tlze most succinct and most often quoted depiction of Sandinismo was provided by Thomas Walker, one of the premier schc>larsof Nicaragua: Sandinismo is "a blend of nationalism, pragmatic Marxism, and Cathotic Humanism."b7 As such, Sandinismo clearly exists as a meeting place fc~rmany different perspectives, including some that are frequent@ considered ccrntradictory. Drawing on such diverse traditions in constructing their unique ideology has required pragmatism and resufted in a lack of dogmatism on the part of the Sandini~tas~bB The FSLW's espousing an ideology as eclectic: as Sandinismo has a number of implticattons, not least of which is a commitment to pcrlitical pluralism, a ccrmmitment that, in this case, derived from three sources." The first was the nature of the idcofagy itself, drawn from a broad, and not historically intrtitive, spectrum. The s e a ~ n dw s the conditions confronted by the rewlutictnaries after the pcrlitical victory. The new gczvemment inherited a country whose capital city had not been rebuilt after a devastating 1972 earthquake, a country that was plagued by underdevelopment and poverty and that had seen destruction of some parts during the civil war, Under the circumstances, the FSLN needed to maintain its broad-based, multiclass coalition to undertake the crucial program of national rec.onstruction.70 The third source of the commitment to potitical pluralism was the internal pluralism of the FSLN itseEf. The FSLN has a long pluralist history; its early activists reflected various radical persyecti~es.7~ By 1974 the FSLW was actively recruiting ail across the country" p d t i c a t spectrum, inclt~dingthe Democratic Conservative party (PCZD), the Liberal Independent party (PLI), the Chamber of Commerce, tlze Nicaraguan Xllstitute of Development, the Nicaraguan t>emocratic: Mcmrnent (MUM), and the tzniversity faculty." This Aexibility and tolerance received its greatest test in the f 970s when the FSLN was reemerging in the national consciousness and gaining in popularity: At that point the party split into factions over disagreements about Marxist theory and the stratee for victory. The Prolonged Pcjpular War tendency fGPP) h e w d most closely to the FSLN's earlier strategy of emyhasizit~ga slow, patient, cautious ""accumulation of farces" and campesino support in the rural areas, with logistical backing frc~murban arease7" more ""r-rmditionaf" Marxist line was advocated by the Proletarian tendency, which argued that Nicaragua had evolved and that the workers rather than the campesinos were the hope fbr revolution.7" In the aftermath of the GPP-Proletaria, split, a third faction emerged: the Insurrectionat tendency (popularly known as Terceristas, or the Third Force), distinguislzed from tlze other tendencies by its yragmati~m.~TTke Terceristas adl~ocateda policy of creating a broad, muXticlass alliance and staging bczld military acticzn to overthrow Somoza, and its


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members were willing to make the compromises necessary to do so.76 With the Proletarian leaders marginalized and the GPP leadership largely out of action, the Tercerista faction foolc control of the FSLN and began to implement its uftimately successf~-rl strategy,77 In 19'78 the three factions reunited and agreed to a system of collective leadership. To attain this, the integriy of each tendency was respected and a nine-person National Directorate was establislzec1. The latter consisted of: tlzree members of each group: Barge, Henry Rtziz, and Bayardo Arce from the GP1"";Jaime M%eelock, Carlos NhAez, and Luis Carri6n represented the Prctletarlan tendency; and flanief and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado were tlze Tercerista emissaries. In the directorate, each @actionbrought its social revolutionary ideology and its social revc3lutionary strategy together under the rubric of Sandinism(>-78 Beyoncl pfuralism, Sanclinismo also advocated partidyatory democracy and foreign policy nonalignment, both rootcc1 in national self-determination, national and international dignity, and a mrrre just, or humane, social order-all of which were realized, Ancrther ramification of this ideology is a mixed economy, composed of a private sector-individual and cooperative ownerslzip-anc1 a state sector; this has also been established.'The FSLf\l$ flexible perspective on capitalism drew more from Sandincl than from Marx. Sandino, although he regaded "WalI St. bankers" as implacable foes,BQhad no fundamental objection to capitalism. He wrote, ""Capital can yltay its part and grclw; but the w r k r s should not be humiliated or exyXoited.""" Undoubtedly the conditions that argued for political plrtrafisrn also encouraged pursuit of:m mked economy.82 Specifically, the FSLN characterimd the revoluticrn as "a popular, democratic and anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle that is based on a political prcrject of national unity anc1 an economic project of a mixed economy.'"M7Taken tc>gether, these elements add up to a vision of a dramatically new scjciety tznlike any other in Central America or Nicaragua, Whereas the leaderskhoices unquestionably were made with an eye to tlze international audience, tlze envisioned new society faithfully reflected the ideology. Clearly, such a new sclciety would require the population to change many if not all of its basic conceptions about society and its operation. TIltts, the final implication of-the ideology af Sanditlismo was tlze creation of a new person: a new Nicaraguan, The popular sentiment in Nicaragua, accrclrding to one Nicaraguan lawyer and leader of opposition to the FSLN, is that Sandinisrna represents a ""correction" to Somocismo." "ecifically, former vice president Ramx'rez argued that Sandinismo in practice represents for most Nicaraguans a way of acting, a political and cultural behavic>r. . . mcwe than anythi~lgit is a conviction, an idea, an attitude to life. We have taken. respo~lsibilityfar the fact that we were born here, that we live here, that we must defend what we have, the unity and independence of our t e r r i t o ~. . . This is beyond any ideological ter~derzcy.It is what rnohilizes people, whether they have Marxist ideas or rxot. Xt is a powerfir] fbrce for unity. Elespect for the country, for its integrity and independexzce.8"

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Sandinismo, tlzen, is a mecl-tanismtl-trouglz which the population has been able to redress the ycrlitical, social, and eccrnomic inequities and injustices that made up Nicaraguan history This ideology made possible the retention of a vanguard party anci a commitment to profound socioeconamic transformation even as political cryposition was being institutionalized, the private sector was largety being presewed, and traditional civil liberties estabtished, Most social revolrttionary leaders bring with them a new yofiticaf and cultural system with an etaborate ideology entailing a new institutional order, Of the cases considered here, only the Bolivian leadership appears n o u o have brought such an ideology with it. It is a serious mistake, however; to suggest tlzat where a social revcrlutionary idecrlogy is present, it is neassarily imposed upon the ycrpulation. Individuals have their own sets of feelings, ideas, and expectations, some of which are distinctly antisystemic and even perhaps revolutionary, but which do not necessarily corresyonci to the vision of the vanguard. Popular attitudes lzave played roles in both limiting and extending various decisions made by the leadership in all the cases considered here, Rud&a r g ~ ~ that e d these attitudes repl-esent a ""pop~tlar'5ideology,which "is s o t a purely internal affair and the sole property of a single class or group.""" Rathex; it is a mix of two distinct parts, I n h e ~ n ideology t is "a sort of'm&mer"smilk2xdeotogy based on direct. experience, oral tradition or blk-memory and not learned by listening to sermons or reading borrksf Derivecl ideoloe is ""bcrrrowed from 0thers, often taking the form of a more structured system . . . such as the Rights of Man, kprtlar Sovereignty, Laissez-faire and the Sacred Right of Property, Nationalism, Scscialism, or the variorzs versions of justification by Faith." There is not, Rudi continued, a "Wall of Babyjon" b t w e n these two types of ideology, and in fact. there may be a great deal of overlap.87 As a result, social revolutionaries seek to transfer or transmit their ideotogy via the agents of poiitical sociatization. The resulting ideology will differ from that held by tlze social revolrttionaries, which may lzave been cobbled together from amrrng various factions, as in Bolivia and Nicaragua, because the social revcslrztionaries3ideotogy inevitably either blends or clashes with elements of the preexisting culture to produce a new ideology. This is where tlze vanguard party (composed of both the visionary and organizational leadership of the social revt3lution) must mediate the relationship b e ~ e e nthe populafon and the revotutionaries.

The Link B e m e n Ideology and Action: Organizational hadership Visicrnary leaders engage and mobilize the popujation; organizational leaders draw on the fafents and vigor of the population in an attempt to make concrete the promise of the social revolutionary ideology. fluring the first two stages of tl-te social revolutionary process, the organizational leadership must arrange fr~rfr~od,


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arms, and otlzer necessities, coordinate military actions, maintain communication, and provide internal discipline and justice. As a result, at the point of political victory (the transfer of sovereignty from the otd regime to the revolutionaries) organizers are usually the leaders responsible fc~rthe ail-important process of instirntionalizath. During the final, defix-ting phase of the social revolutianary process, organiration is the link between idealogy and action. The social revolutionary leadership mtzst have the capacity not only to devise, spread, and inculcate its vision of radicaf change but also to create and maintain, the necessary institutianaf apparatus fc~rthe realization of that change. Organizational leadership, therefcjre, focuses on the reestablishment and reorganization of the state structures. In the drive to legitimate the social revc)lution$ status and increase popular allegiance, the leaders pay particular attention to making such institutions more accressible to the population. These factors-reesrablishment and reorganization of the state structures to make them functional and accessible to the majority of the population4efine the prcrcess of institutionalizaticzn. Organization reyl-esents tlze "mad to political power: Huntington argued, and those whcr organize politics ccrntrol the future." lt is the organizational leadership that provides the political infrastructrrre for the new sodefy. It is no coincidence that just five months after the political victory in Nicaragua, a front-page eciitorial in the FSLN newspaper Barricacla by directorate member Carlss N6fiez was headlined, "hconslgna es: organizacitin, organizacitin, y m4s organiracibn" "he [guiding principle] is organization, organization, and more organization).K" All revoiutionaries suppose themselves engaged in creating a better future: That is the lixndamentat premise of social revofutiona9"In seekixzg to institutionalize the social revolution, the organizational leaderslzip confronts three critical issues. The first is that the revcrfutionaries must take into ccInsideration the sensibilities of the people or risk alienating and turning them away from the sociaf,revolutionary process. In otl-ter words, the new organizational norms and practices that the revolutionaries propose must be at least broadly consistent with those prevalent in society at large. The second issue is accessibility: Organizational leaders must overcome tl-te popular conviction that the state is no friend of the general poputation. In other words, the institutions must be (re)conceived in ways that ccrnvince citizens that they can trust the government and have something to gain by interacting with it, Ketated to this is the third issue: commitment, In any sociat revolution a significant part of the pcryulaticrn is committed tcr the revolution: These people will remain with the process in the face of the worst conditions. The reasons for this vary, but people often act this way because of the conditions under wl~ichthey had been living or the life they envision in the future. There is a larger segment of the population, however, that simply conforms to the process: Those people may defect under stress. The revolutionary feaciers must attempt to reach. them; in Fxt, their loss is liteely to signal the Eailure of the sociat revcrfutionary process.

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The revolrttionary leadership confronts these three problems together. In practice, hrrwever, the first two fall trr the organizational leaders; only the element of commitment is realfy shared equally, Thus organizatitrnal leaders may be most usefully thought of: as either ""ptatical men of action"91 or "administrator-executives"" who create the new arrangements that enable the realization of scrcial revolutionary goals. The problem is that there may be a significant gap b e ~ e e nthe skills needed to acquire government power and those necessary to exercise it. In Bolivia the MNK began as a highly organized political party and retained its organizing abilities throughout much of its existence. MNR teaders Juan Lecbin, 'Viaor P&L,anci Hernhn Siles are all best understood as organizational leaderseg" Lecht'n was perhaps the closest tcr a charismatic figure, a labor moement leader and organizer unccrmfortable with theory but adept at negotiations. Paz v a s a prc3fessor; he held variczus posts in the finance ministry, including a brief stint as minister of economics, and was a longtime deputy in the parliament; he was regarded as very articulate, and his skills a a pczwer broker were legendary, SiIes v a s a founder of the MNXt and son of a former Bolivian president; he served in parliament several times anci was considered the driving force of: the internal sector of' the party, where he prcrved his wmpetence at adroit political manet~vering.The MNK, with st~ch~ r t ~ t standing organizational leadership and a reliance on its legacy as a political party anci as victor of the 195f etecdon, movecl quickfy and confidently to iinstitutional2~~ the revt>lutic>n(see Chapter 2). Afthough prcrving prc3ficient at the establishment of institutions consistent with st-tcietalnorms and the creation of a sense of accessibility tl-te MNR had h r less success generating commitment ratl-ter than conformity from the population. The revolutionaries failed to dramaticaUy change Bolivian society or the daily life of much of the popufation,Y" Ra61 Castro, an avid proponent of administration and efficiency, was almost certainly the greatest organizational leader in the Cuban revcrlution. Raijf made up for his brother" aavrsion to instltutianafizat-ion (see Chapter 2) with minute atteattan to detail. Ka6l first demonstrated lzis organizational prowess as the revolutionaries expanded in their Sierra Maestra strcrnghrrld. His style was particularly evident, however, wl-ten he was sent in 1958 by his brcrther tct open a ""second front.'%Afr securing the area militarily, Ka6l moved quickly to set up a structure for the region. m e r e a s Fidel and Ctlevara referred to organization in their exhortatictns, Ra61 iz-ttroduced literacy programs, health programs, education programs, union organization, civic administration, peasant militia, ancl agrarian reform in the area under his controf.Ys These institutions were consistent with socletat norms, accessible, and created a high degree of commitment frcrm the poyufatton. After political.victory, Radl and his people proved adept at creating a ""hidden" "infrastructure that aided in the conscrlidation process. As suggested in Chapter 2, Grenada" Bernard Coard proved to be one of the revolution" premier organizers, Although Coard was a relative latecomer to the NJM, his status as an effective organizer was evident, in part, when he was appointed head of the party" '""organizingcommittee" ayear befbre the political vic-


83

tory Heine describecl Coard's ""unquestionecl ability as an organizer" ancl rekrred to him as ""a first rate organizer.'"g"Although Bishop may have brought Grenada to the attention of the world" "pofitical doncjrs,""as Heirte pointed out, "Coard's thorough foXlow-up work ensured that feasible ymject proposals were prepared and submitted, thus leading to the Eastern Caribbean" most ambitious devetopment projects of the early eighties'"~"7oardk inclination and fondness for plannitlg paid dividencls with the Grenadian economy, widely hailecl as one of the success stories of the brief P I G tentzre in office. Ultimately, however, as discussed in Chapter 2, Coard's sobsession with organization p-tayd a critical rote in the selfdestruction of the Grenadian revolution. His conviction that only an improved organization tznder the guidance of an efficient manager-stzch as hirnselfcould save Grenada's revcolutionary process fueted the other problems confronting the increasingiy divided revolutionary leadership, Perhaps the mast lziglzly successful organizational leadership has been demanstrated in Nicaragua, particularly by Daniel Ortega, As was ncoted earlier, the FSLN had decided to follow an organlxational, idecology rather than one reliant on visionary or charismatic leadership. Ortega yositioneci lzirnself as a calm, cool bureatzcrat amidst more ccolorful yersconalities, even ailtowing his younger brcjther, Humberto, to d o much of the writing and talking for the T e r c e r i ~ t a s . ~ T I ~ u s flanief Ortega was able to emerge as the ""tader of the pragmatists,'"The collective leadership model proved realistic and yc~yular,particularly in the final phases of the social revolutionary process, when there was widespread recognition among the leaders that the pragmatists were the glue holding the group togetlzel: In the period after political victory; Daniel Ortega was the one officiat member of the FSLN selected to serve in the initial Government of National Reconstruction, He fs~cusedspecifically on the administrativelexecutive branch and the armed forces. Basically copying Raiil Castrcss program from Cuba, with allc>wancesmade for Nicaraguan sensibilities, Ortega oversw the quick establishment of institutions tlzat were consistent with societal norms, open and accessible to tlze yopufation, and, most important, engendered commitment to the sitcial rewlutionary process on the part of the population. In all four cases, the organizational leadership took its cues from the social revolutionary ideology. Having achiexd yc~liticalvictory, the vanguard party must implement the promises made and visions ctxtcdfled. This is where the organizational leaders turn ideology into action; their plan to do so is the social revoltttionary strategy.

Mobilizing the hpulation: Social Revolutionary Stratem Every social revolution has a revolutionary strategy that emerges frcom the social revcolutionary ideology. In this context, revc3lutionary stratea denotes the social revolutionaries"pfans in the post-political. victory peritod for the operationaliza-

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tion, irnpfemen~ation,direction, and coordination of the constructive transformation of society. Thus the revolutionary stratee is composed of a variety of strategies for dealing with the issues that arise and are bcjund together by ideology, The social revolrxtionary strategy evolves from the idealistic visions of the transformation process that the revc3ltztionaries had before attaining pczwer. Prior to poiiiticaf victory, revctlutionaries often espouse broadly popular programs, wl~ichmay be neither coherent nor realistic. Furthermore, tlze conditions may either facilitate or constrain the revc3lutionary strategy they seek to d e ~ l o p . ~Even " when they are able to ""test" their strategy in ""liberated" weas, revc~luticznaryleaders are often forced to adopt more pragmatic strategies after they win political power. Morecltper, revoltztionary leadership, particularly of the vanguard type, may evolve during the o&en lengthy social revoltztionary process, There are certain broad variables that are present after political victory, They may be grouped as the economic, political, and social structures that confront tlze revs>lutionariesand the skill, commitment, and creativity the leaders demonstrate in fashioning the toots and undertaking activities to realize their objectivesei0"t is not just the contemporaneaus value of these variables that must be considered. Past legacies have profc~undrepercussions on contemporary processes. The organizaticznal leadership creates all the actions, policies, instruments, and apparatuses necessary for tlze constructive transformation of society, This entails the deplc3yment of pes>ple,material, ideas, symbols, and force in the pursuit of the social revolutionary objectives, Specifically, the revoluticznary strategy has as its princiyat component the mobilization and socialization of the population. The reasons for this are perhaps most clearly seen in the case of Nicaragua. Let us review the history of the FSLM."Z The party was founded as a vanguardist revolutionary organization in 1961, and dtzring most of tlze ensuit~g eighteen years it was a small underground mt>wment struggling to bring about a social revc~luticzn-a one point membership fell into the dozens, FSLN members survivecl torture, jail, tlze death of important leaders, ancl infigl~tingthat split the organization into factions, It led the population in Iuly 19'79 to c3verthrc)w one of Latin America" most firrnfy entrenched dpastic dictatorships. Ail these factorsthe laborious struggle, tlze intraparty turmoil, ancl the eventrtal success-are impczrtant to tznderstanding the FSLWk social revolutic-tnary strategy. The character of the FSLN leadership was forged during the long and arduous struggle against Somaza. The earfy years of the revoiudanary process, drtring the insurrection, saw the emergence of a distinctly Christian martyr-like ethos of self-"-sacrifice, discipline, modesty, and colfective spirit,i03 Sergio Ramirez, NicaraguiZs former vice president, likenecl membership in the FSLN to a "monastic order [in which members] take a vow szf silence, suffer great privations, make sacrifices, and take a Christian-like vow to the death-as we say, putria o r n ~ e r t e , It' ~is~perhaps ~ then not surprising that like the Church, the FSLW would evcdve a top-dczwn, hierarchical system of internal gotrernment: Issues were debated, the leadership chose a position, and everyone was expected to implement


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and defencl it without question. That ayyroacl~was well suited for the struggle against the Somrxa regime, a struggle where ""you don" carry on a debate in the middie of a battlee9'105 Althougl~tlze FSLN developed the democratic centralization and vertical lines of command characteristic of a vanguard party, it did not fit neatly with cccrnventional. notions of such a party, Because of the pecufiar nature of the Nicaraguan revolution, particularly the llistorically. unusual role of the bourgeoisie, the FSLN represented the broad pc~putarmajority rather than any single dass. As the behavior of the Sornoza regime became more and more excessive, a variety of opposition groups turned to the FSLN as the anty organization capable of ousting Somaza.'ok The result was that the Nicaratguan revolution dexloped a multiclass nature.107 It is significant that the FSLN, rather than propagating a stereotypical ""dictatorship of the profetariat," ~mughtto combine vanguardism and pluralism.108 The FSLW emerged from the political victcsry as Nicaragua" dominant political force, a status underscored by the adulation that the majority of the population accorded to Eos mtachl-rchos (the boys). To the Nicaraguans, the victorious FSLN "in their ragged uniforms . . . a y p e a ~ dscrawny, Izeroic, unbelievably young. They embodied the best of exrything that three and a half million peoylte who w r e used to seei~zgtheir nation treated as a fourth-rate banana republic might dream oE"o9 They w r e heroes. By virtue of its stature, the FSLW was sufficiently strcrng-and popular-to set itself up as the government; however, the FSLN resisted the temptation tct do so,11"Qnstead, one of the FSLWk priorities was the establishment of state institutions that were distinct from the party. This served a dual purpose: aiding the creation of strong institutions (perhaps the leaders had Cuba in mind) and freeing the FSLN from specific responsibility for ""stmy1y'~fhegovernment. In Pact, it quicldy became clear that the FfLW had almost as many permtztations as there were possibilities. As the vanguard of the revoluticzn and in response to the almost total collapse af Nicaragua's civil society*the FSLN saw its primary task as providing guidance in all situations-whether welccrmed or not, The result was such deep i~ivolvementin such a wide variety of groups that at times it became difficult to discaern where the FSLN left off ancl certain organizations began. The initial FSLW strategf. called for pragmatism in the pursuit of socialist-style redistributive prcsjects and democratic pluralism. At the same time, the contra war ancl U.S. economic embargo absorbed tlze energies of the FSLN and distorted the debates over social revt3lutionary strategy. In particular, debate focused on the FSLN's rofe in the creation of the new Nicaraguan societry. The leadership continuecl to reflect tlze tripartite split that had emerged during the xnid-]i970s, a division ccsdified in the careful distribution of the various government ministries; according to Gilbert, however, two factions evolved: the ideofogues and the pragmatists. The differences centered on a variety of issues such as the role of the private sector, support for revolutionaries in neighboring countries, and relations with

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the United States and the Soviet Union,'" The ideolagues in the leaderslzip, Borge, Arce, and Ruiz (the three representatives of the Prolonged h p u l a r War tendency), pushed a more radical vision of the revotuticrn."3 Since pragmatism was the hallmark of the Terceristas, it is no surprise tlzat the pragmatists included their three representatives-the Ortega brothers and 7lirado.H'" But Weelock, leader of the more radicaX Profetarian tendency, was an important ally in pushing the pragmatistsbagenda, and the other two Proletarian tendency represenfatives, Carrihn and Ntifiez, supported this position as we11.U5 The two groups respected each other and wcrrked closely together, but each pursued its vision of the new Nicaragua. The resultant strategy was appropriately vague and highligl~tedby a program of pc~liticalpluralism, a mixed economy, and a nonaligned foreign policy, mixed with the mt>bilization and socialization of the population. The social revolrttinnary strategy had as its prit~cipalcomponent a cammitment to the participation of the Nicaraguan people, Participation refers to people's wilfingness to inwfve themselves in the process of the revotution. The support of- the population and the ability to mobilize them it1 large numbers are central to sustaining the social revc~lution,as it inevitably encorznters obstacles and opposition both internally and externally, In Nicaragua there was a particuiar commitment to and attention paid to tlze popular organizations. The canviction was that such groups wc~uldempower and link the pc~yufationto the social revcllutianary process, Although initially this strategy m e w i t h great success, giving the FSLN a strong base of popular support, by the mid- 1980s""ithe mass organizations had become chiefly mechanisms through which party policy was implementedS";crating participation proved d i f f i c ~ t t , ~ ~ krticiyation may be engendered in a variety of w q s , but it is not easily accompiished. As we shall see in Chapter 4, leaders are not able to dictate the process without regard to the population; the ability to elicit support and maintain progl-ess cannot be directed from above. It was tlze failtlre to remember and aypreciate this point, according to Omar Cabezas, the charismatic hero whom the FSLN charged with resurrecting, reorganizing, and directing the ailing Sandinista flefense Committees (CUSS),that was instrumental in their downfall: ""fn tlze past errors were committed in telling people how to organize and what to organize for. They are adults, not children, they knctw what they want and what they need,"n7 If Cabezas" proposition is accepted, it is important to look at how and where peopie chc3ose tcr expend their energies beyond their daily struggle for subsistence. The lengthy and exacting revoluticrnary struggle, the party splits, the political victory, and subsequent differences within the leadership all shaped the social revolutionary stratee that the FSLN pursued. The struggle Ec~steredhierarchical and centralist tendencies that were to same extent mitigated by a growing recognition of:the imporfance of: p l r t r a l i s m . ~ ~ ~recognition his was thrown into high relief by the FSLN's victory in July 1979, The transft3rrnatic)n of society was no longer a


87

theoretical discussion-opportuni.ty lay before the leaders. By building on the very real threats to Nicaragua" sot~ereigntyand inlrcrking themes of struggle, sacrif ce, and patriotism, the government was able to move along the consolidaticrn process ancl convince a significant majority of the population that they lzad a profound stake in the social revc3lutirrtnary process.

ANTIPATHY FOR THE WVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION As we have seen, the social revcrlutionary leadership must bargain, ccrmpromise, and negotiate in an effort to institutionalize and ccrnsolidate the revc>lution.Those tasks are complicated by the leadersheed to address both domestic conditions and tlze international situation; one school of thouglzt cantends that revolutions can occur only in a permissive wcrrld context.llg Within the country they must move quickly to instantiate the social revolutionary iQecrXogy and to devise an effectke program for the promotion of tlze social revolutionary project. Such efforts are equally critical internationally: The leaders must seek, at the very least, to neutralize goeentlaIly and historically intrusive internaticrnal,forces or, if yossibie, to get them to support tlze revolution. Because social revc3lutions infltlence and are in turn influenced by the internatianat system and the actors in it, manipurlatian of the international situation is an important component of revofutianary strategy across all three phases. Tllere are certain dynamics inherent in social revt3lutions that conspire to "iinternationalize"" it,120Virtually all tlze power contenders during the revolutionary situation vie for international support, The weaker insurgents seek such support to neutralize the pcjwer wielded by the gclxrnment and, if necessary, ccrmpete with other factions, The government, for this reason, opposes such assistance and often seeks international support for its position. As a result, revolutions are often internationalized well before the achiexment of political victory. This has particularly been the case in Latin America, where standard U.S. operatitlg proceciure has been to intervene against any perceivecl revolutions, often prior to political victory. The Nicaraguan revolution is the prime example of early internationalization. Besides the extensive U.S. connections with the Somaza regime, other countries, primarily Latin American, were heavily involved on bath sides. During the insurrection, the Scsmoza regime received suyprrrt from Argentina, El Salvador, Grraternata, Israel, and South Africa, The FSLN received support from Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, and Venez~~ela, Unofficial aid to both sides came from other countries and organizations, After potitlcai victory, social revolutionaries may be conkonfed by another dynamic if an attitude toward revoiution different from tlzat of the social revofutionaries prevails in the international system. Further, specific actors may act re-

88


gardless of tlze dominant ""eimate of opinion" in the system.122' Those who are friendly to the nascent social revczlutionary gotpernment may provide economic or military assistance, facilitate the Aow of supplies and funds, and boost morale and hopes. Those who oppose the new government are likely to seek to isolate the social rewlution and support its foes, perhaps to the point of participating in destabtiizing activities or the overthrow of the new government. The fate of the social revolrttion, then, depends in part on attitudes in the international system and agendas of other actors in the system at the time it occurs. AS a result it is incumbent upon the revolutionary leadership to accurately gauge these variables and to manipulate them with the maximum possible efficiency. Such manipulations are not easy, but every effort must be made to capture international support and, if possible, money and material. The key issue is to ensure the survival of the sc)cia1 revoluticzn without jeopardizing its independence. This may be accomylislzed in a variety of ways, it~cfudingadopting a pragmatic ayyroach or one designed to appeal to other Ieey state or nonstate actczrs in the internatianai sptem. Xn fact, the threat or reality of international opposition, particularly invasions, can either galvanize the yczyufatic>n (thereby strengthening the revt3lution) or fatafty cripple it. MigQal argued that exkrnat threats to the survival of the leadership or the sovereignty of the state require the leaders to move boldly and quicuy tr~wardinstitutionalizatic~nand ccznsotidation.12"zuccess will be affected by the degree to which the internationat system allows the leaders to avoid or cope with the problems that confront tlzem."3 Manipulation of international support lays the groundwork for the project of consolidation, which is the lleart of the constructive transformation prczgram. Active international opposition creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to imyltement any social transformation. This can be seen dearly in the final phase of the social revcdluticznary process in ltussia, which was invaded by Allied troops from 1917 to 1921. Certaix-rfy this has also been a major factor in Nicaragua, which was besieged by U.S.-sponsored forces from 1981 to 1990.'" The social revoluticznaries, as a result, must move rapidly to consolidate their international, support, Altl-tough the international situation may affect tlze social revolrrtionary ideafogy, its greatest ramifications are for the social rewlutionary stratem Visionary leaders, after at!, not only critique the former government but also articulate a aision of the frtture, ideally taking into account the realities of the international situation. This almost certaink cczntributed, for example, to the ascendancy of the more pragmatic ideology put h r t h by the Tercreristas in Nicaragua. Xt is, however; entirely possible for visionary leaders to ignore the demands of the international situation and advtzcate social revc>lutionaryideologies that not onfy Ry in the face of international convention-which is n a ~ n u s u a Xfor a social revolutionary ideology-but are considered abhorrent by most people. The radical lexling egalitarian visions of I%l Pc~tand the Khmer Rouge (Cambodia) and


89

Abimael Guznnhn's Peruvian Communist party (the Sl-tining Pdth), h r example, have engendered very little international support. Organizational leaders, however, are charged with realizing the social revcdfutionary ideology. As a result, the exigencies of the international situation represent a critical dimension for them, The organizational leaders must seek ttr counter those in the internatianat system most opposed to the revolutian and appeal to those most inclinecl to support them. The Nicaraguans, for example, developed an international strategy that cornbined a variety of approaches (see Chapter 4 h r a more ctxtensive discussion), In essence the social revolutionary government sought to combine a package of moderate and mixed reforms, designed to disarm critics in the United States and Latin America, with social democratic and socialist transformations, designed to garner support from other socialist states and revolutianary regimes. Aftlzouglz NicaraguiZs international maclzinations almost certainly contributed to the revc>lution's initial success, they coufd not otrercome the animosity of the United States, animosity that grew first into hostility and then obsession. The international strategy did not succeed in maintaining tlze FSLN in power; bat it dtres seem to have p rotected the revc>lution.

LEADERSHIP AND THE ATION OF SOCIETY Revolutions fundamentally concern people-they are created by people, led by people, and fought and died for by people, To show how people make revolwtians, I focused on the two types of social revolrttionary leadership, the visionary and the organizational. As W have seen, in Bolivia the revofution was dominated by organizational leaders who implemented a program of institutionalizatian, At tlze same time, the absence of any reaf visionary leaders left the social revc>lutionaryideology unarticulated. The feadersyailure to generate the support of the populaticrn was central to tlzeir inability to consalidate the revolution. In Cuba the situation was somewhat different-there was an abundance of both visionary and organizatianat leadership, Fidel Castro combines both quafities, Ka6l Castro is an organizational leader of great ability, Camilo Cienfuegos's skills as an organizer w r e prodigious, but his stature as a visionary cannot be ignored. Conversely, Che Guevara-one of the best examples of a visionary leader-had strong organizational skills. In Cuba, however, the decision was made to actively avoid institutionafizatim and focus on the prcrcess of consatidation, The Cuban revolutianaries were convinced that in Russia, China, Mexico, and Bolivia, institutionalizatim had derailed, distorted, even destroyed the social revcrltztionary process. Ctlevara ex-

so

SacIAL KEVOLIJTLQNARYLEADERSHIP

plained that the Cuban revolutionaries? aavrsion to institutionalization came from ""our fear lest any appearance of formality might separate us from the masses and from the individual, might make us lose sight of the ultimate and most important revolutionary aspiration, which is to see man lifted from his alienation."u5 The Cuban leadership was ccrmmitted to learning from what they perceived to be the mistakes of their revc~luticznarypredecessors, The apparent conflict between organization and vision in Grenada seems to have helped doom the social revcrlutionary process. As in Cuba, there w r e leaders of both types-Maurice BisX?op, the charismatic visionary, and Bernard Ccrard, the committed organizaticsnal genius. In contrast to Cuba, however, where the organizers were relegated to a behind-the-scenes role, Coard" apparent desire to be out in front precipitated the colfapse rrf the revc3lutionary process. Nicaragua atso benefited from a combinaticzn of visionary and organizaticznal leaders, In contrast to tlze Cubans, lzowever, the Nicaraguans sought a balance bet w e n the t~ types of teadership; in contrast to the Grenadians, there were no p o w r grabs. Leery of the power of personal leadership and concerned with the mechanics of succession, the Nicaraguans created a collective leadership, In opting for balance, the nine members of the National Directorate divided the resyonsibilities in the state and party among themselves in a carefuf, calculated manner. Xt was no accident, as Gilbert pointed out, tl-tat both the security f'orces ancl the economic decision-making prrwrs were divided among the three factions,f" It was hardly a coincidence that the securiy forces w r e split n a ~ o n f yb e ~ e e nthe two most powerful Fdctions but also between a visionary leader and an organizational one. Tercerista Hurnberto Ortega, a masterful organizer, was minister of defense, with contrcjl of the military. The revolution" greatest living visionary leader,"WGI)P leader Tombs Borge, became the interior minister, with control over both the police and the state security forces. A similar situation existed with respect trt the economy" The key post of minister of agriculture went to Jairne Wlzeetock, leader of tlze Proletarian tendency and a visionary leader. The Ministry of Planning, however, was entrusted to Henry Ruiz of the GPP, a talented organizer, whct was popularly kncIwn in Nicaragua as "Modesto" h r his low-key and humble manner From the earliest days of the political victory it was clear that the competiting, visionary leadership of Borge woufd be bafanced by the pragmatism and organizational leadership talent of llaniel Ortega. Thus, althuugh florge spoke for the gc1""ernment on sexral key issues related to the ccrnsolidation of the revolutionjustice and human rights, women" and children" issues, literacy, h e d o m of the press, and the rote of the popular church-Ortega was tlze directorate's cl-toice to be the FSLN? 1984 presidential candidate. Across the social, revolutionary processes in Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, it is possible to discern tlze individuals who were or are organizational or visionary leaders and the role they pltityed in the final, transformative period. The poin"es that revofuticznary leaders learn and make choices, The paths that


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they chnase-or woid-are based on their ~~ncierstanding of tlze past and their sense of the pcryufation. The chrrices that they make are central to the process that unfo-fds and can in fact mitigate the structures and conditions that confront the revolutionary process, Nowhere lzas this been more apparent than in the Nicaraguan revcrlution.

CHAPTER FOUR

Making the Revo ution Re The Nicaraguan Revo 1979-1990 Is the Nicaraguan revolution "overn"?id the 1990 election consign the Nicaraguan revolutit~nto the ctbscurity of the Grenadian revczlution or force it to join the Bczlivlan revofuticzn as little more than a historical reference point? Fczr many people who perceived of tlze election as a refermclrxm on the revolution, tlze results raised just such questions, These questions lead to the ones I deal with in this chapter: Xf the Nicaraguan revolutian was successfufly institutionalized and a significant degree of: consolidation was acl~ieved(as X have arguecl), how did tlze Sandinista Nationaf Liberation Front-the vanguard of the revolution-lose the etecdan? Does this foss represent a repudiation of the revofution? There is clearly something different about tlze revolution in Nicaragua. The program of Sandinism(+pluralism, a mixed economy, a nonaligned foreign policy-seems closest to Scandinavian social demacraq, Fourteen years into the revolution the degree of economic and political pluralism Ear exceeds that of- any comparable social revolution, Nicaragua is well into the third phase of the social revoluticznary prctcess, the transformation of society. Despite overwhelming odds, the program of institutionalization has been comytcted. The contra war left more than 30,000 Nicaraguans dead and tens of thousands of other citizens munded, orphaned, or hameless.1 To put this number in some perspective, as Cooper pointed out, these 30,000.1- deaths mean that nearly twice as many Nicaraguans per capita w r e killed in the contra var as were U.S. soldiers in both wczrM vars, Korea, and Vietnam combined.2 Nicaraguds economy was also devastated anci its infrastructure destroyed.+ The psychotogical and emotional damage wrotzght by the war and economic privation is immeasurabte. Despite this, the Sandinistas created a mixed economy and a political system that is remarkably open by any stanciard, The Nicaraguan government has confronted a ~ ~ n i q uset e of problems and has c3vera)me many of them.

MAKING THE REVOLUTION REALITY

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The status of the effort to consolidate tlze revolution is not so clea~cut,in part, becatzse of the more elusive nature of consolidation. judgment is further nuanced because consolidation has to do with the waly that people Xoolc at and go about living tlzeiw lives on a dq-to-day basis: It is by nature not a rapid process.Wonetlzeless, it is ycrssible to assess the status of consolidation by inxstigating its indicators: economics, geography3and popular attitudes, The purpose of this chapter3then, is threefold. First, it offers a preliminary assessment of ccrnsotidation,based on a small-scale investigation of ci3nsolidaticrn in Nicaragua during 1988-1 9tS9.s 1 thus begin with a discussion of the primary indicators of consofidation-trust, opportunity, anci a vision of the f u t u ~bounci , tagether by a sense of empcrwerment, Seccmd, I return t~ a discussion of institutionalization in Nicaratgua, paying specific attention tcr the international and dcrmestic context of the 1990 election. In the third and find part of this chapter I explore the juncture between institutionalization and consolidation in terms of the 1990 Nicaragua election and briefly ccrnsider the implticaticrns of the 1996 election.

CONSOLIDATION IN THE NICAMGVAN REVOLUTION In the preceding chapters I argued that consolidaticrn is an independent concept worthy of being explored, and I discussed the importance of individual actors and tl-te role of leaders, Now I shift the focus directby to the process of cansofi&ation in Nicarapa. Chapter 2 demrrnstrated the utility, viability, and importance of distinguishing b e ~ e e nthe consolidation and the institutionafirration prcrcesses in the final phase of social revolution. The critical role of cansofi&dtion in the social revalutionary process hetyed explain the failure of the Bolivian revoltztitrn. Exploring consolidation during the Cuban revolutitrnary process helped explain the unusual rekationslzip between Fidcl Castro, the poputatiaa, the government, anci the revalcrtion; recc3gnition of the importance of consolidation may also prove useful in ascertaining what unfolds afier Castro3 eevntrxal demise, A fbcus on consolidation shed light on the degeneration and coltapse of the Grenaciian social revolutionary project. The utillity of conscrlidaticsn as an analytical tool can perhaps be most neatly demonstrated in explaining the unusual success of the Nicaraguan revcrlution. The issue of the success or Failure of the consalidatinn process, however, is complicated by its etusive nature. Unlike institutionalization, which may be assessed by considering institutions created by new governments, consolidaticrn is pritnarily evaluated via an understanding of peoyte" attitudes, or "popular attitudes." Mmsurernents of institutionalization have long been one of the criteria used by sociai scientists to investigate the status of a state and its various mmponcmts; by focusing on a set of structural characteristics, social scientists have been able to achieve a relatively high degree of precision in their assessments. Consoli-

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dation, in contrast, is decidedly noninstitutionaf and nonstructural in character. It is obviously more difficult tc:, be precise with a concept that is based on people's attitudes; the payoff, however, more than makes up for the loss of precision. The process of consolidation cannot be ft~llyunderstood by paying sole attention to ""objective" inincatc>rsof such structural factors as economics and geography. The Nicaraguan case seems to suggest tha"eideas can countemail structural factors or, at the very least, shape and profouncily after tl-tem. As a result, understanding vcrltzntaristic factors, such as popular attitudes, is Icey tc> grasping the support for the social revolutionary process in Nicaragua. Popular attitudes indicate tlze population's view of and relations with the government and the revolutionary process, This is not to say that there is no place f:br mrrre traditional social science variables. People" econctmic situaticrn-as they perceiw it-and geographical Xocation are two other factors that would seem to be of: use in assessing the status of consctlidation, althrrugh, at least in my research, the geographic factor has proven inconclusive, In sum, a consideraticrn of the variables of economics, geography, and popular attitudes provides indicators as to the status of consofidation."

"A Roof for My Children Is a Wonderful Thing": After Pof itical Victory Economic adversity, in some form, is ahays present after the transition of pofitical power in a revolutionary situation. Oflea, there is the Right of domestic and international capital either prior to the re\~crlutionaries>politicalvictory or at the onset of the transformative period. CcrmpXicaticrns may also arise if the battle for political power entailed destruction of: the plzysical infrastructure, for example, plants or farms. Furthermrrre, past legacies of development and dependency often have a probund impact on contemporary processes, Tt is not easy to alter conditions tlzat may be centuries old and reinforced or ""popped up" as mxnucl-t by external Ebrces as internal trnes. Any or all of these factors can constrain the economic programs undertaken by the new government and make rectificaticrn of past inequities difficult. Some economic Factors, however, may faciiitate tlze planning and introduction of changes. A tradition of strong, centralized gtmernment may be useful if the new goal is centrafi~clplanning, afthough this advantage may be undermined by a legacy of centralization that was harmhl to the population-a difficult factor to clverct>me,Another pcrssible benefit wrufd be the availability of previously unobtainabte foreign investment and economic assistance, Historically, however; social revolutions have rarely if ever seen such benefits. Failure to expand the economic pie is assumed, at least in theory, to undermine the ability of a government to maix-ttain or gaill broad popular support. In social revolutionary processes, for wample, most people expect the rectification of their economic grievances, IPeflecting on this, Fidef Castro once noted that after the revolutionaries had achieved yoilti~alvictory in Cuba, ""many people thought


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they had stepped into a world of ricl~es,PVhat tlzey had really done was to win tl-te opycrrtunity to start creating-in the midst of underde~lopment,ycrverty, ignorance, and misery-the waXtt.1 and well-being of the fixture,"To date no social revolutionary government lzas been able to realize fully the popular expec~ations; it is not clear to me that any gotPernment could do so. The economic situation in which the Nicaraguans found themselves in the mid1980s was disastrous. A combillation of revolutionary ehaustion, government mistakes, the U.S. trade embargc~and pressure on international lending institutions, the contra war, and natural disasters had left almost ail Nicaraguans in dire straits. By any measure tlze economy was a complete catastrophe: Urban wages had 6r\llen drastically-tcr perhaps only 5-10 percent of 1980 levels,x basic commodities were scarce, unempfc3yment was endemic, grrxrnment services had been reduced, and the currency was constantf-ylosing its value. Per capita income fell every year after 1984, and inflation in 1988 peaked at the astounding rate of 33,600 percent.9 In the aftermath of that staggering inflation rate, the government undertook massive eccrnctrnic restructuring, adopting IMF-svXe austerity measures-an amalgam of currency devaluations, massive cutbacks in government spenditlg (tlze cessation of mcrst grrvernment subsidies and the end trr cutback of many social programs, especially in the areas of health and education), wage cmtrols, and significant publicsector layoffs." Taken together, these measures added up tcr ""svere (and distinctly orthodox) austerity measures.""" The IMF told the Nicaraguan gctvemment that the measures adopted were harsher than those that it would have remmrnended and strongly suggested tlzat the government reconsider them." The UN Economic Crrmmission on Latin America assessed the measures as "Dract>nian."~3 X t is not surprising, tl-terehre, tlzat forty-nine of the &fly people interviewed indicated displeasure with tlze economy," Such figures normally coincide with a dramatic loss of support for the gcrtPernment. Indeed, a widespread perception of economic: disaster should place a damper on the ability of the government to inculcate a new ideology. In Fact, the reverse seems to lzave been true: Some degree of consolidation was achietred even in the face of these terrible eccrnomic conditions, This finding seems to support the argument that structural emnomic reality can be mitigated by social revolutionary ideology, The question is flow Central to the answer is the fact that most people tzse their own relative econctmic position before and after the beginning of the revolutionary process as their measurement, rather than basing tlzeir judgrnent on their level of absolute wealth.iSIt is striking that in the face of a catastrophic economic situafon, when individuals were asked to relate their previcrus situation to their current lot, the majority responcied that even though they yersonaliy might have less ncrw, crverall things were better,'" Of the people interviewed, 42 percent identified themselves as being better off than before, albeit in some cases only marginally so. Many cited tlze free healtlz care and education, two of the ccrrnerstc>nesof the gcrvernment's social revolutionary project. One young man provided the example of his sister in rural Le6n,

96


not Par from tlze town of La Pxz Centro: ""Bfcfre slze had nothing and to me now she stilt has nothing . . . but her children can get medical help, go to schoof, get clothes. To her this is a lot!""" A tailor who lived in a housing project in Lecin explained that before the revolution, he lzad no lzouse: ""I-otlses were started after the Triumph . . . it is very empweringto have a hsruse. It is a big change for me, I had four kids and no house. Hwing this house is like a fcjrtune, Having a roof for my children is a wonderf~~l thing.""" A young woman who worked as a maid summed it tzp this way: "It's better now. Not economically, but in all ways."'" Twenty-six percent of the people interviewed described themselves as being in more or less the same economic situation as before the political victory m e ~ r e a s most of these people simplty said that things were roughly the same, a few mentioned that things were harder for everyone or that their ecclnomic situation had not changed for reasons unrelated to the economy. One young man who was on his seconcl tour with the Popular Military Service (SME))compared tlze economic situation before and after the political victory by noting: "I could say that it is refativefy similar, but there are other factors now to take into account. For example the war we are in. The war lzas made it bad, there are terrible ecanomic problems, . . . The economic probfems we @acenrw are at the general level. Before it was all on the poor. Now everpne" biting the bul1et:"O A woman who cooked at a restaurant said, "It's lzard for everyone, but I think that it's better now.'Qi An older w m a n who w o r k d washing dothes echoed this and yslinted out: "It's hard for everyone. Money is worthless and no one has enctugh."~~ Sentiments similar to these cropped tzp among the 32 percent of those interviewed who identified themselves as having been better off before the revolupeople mentioned prices having risen, less ecanomic stability and tion.2""fhse low wages, Here, too, people noted (ofiea at length), the impact of the contra war on their standard of living. Several critical factors emerged from these interviews, The first is that individuals? perception of their relative economic status (were tlzey better off than they were ten years ago?) played a significant role in their acceptance of Nicaraguds profound economic QifficuXties, People seemed to feel that if things were better, the struggle and difficulties lzad been wortlzwhile, Also important is their perceytion of where they were relative to their fellow citizens (did they have more srr less than those who were their relevant reference group?). Finally, they aslced thernselves, We= things harder for everyone? Of those who indicated that their relative economic situation had remained mrrre or less the same, 62 percent pointed out that things were harder for everpne and 23 percent related that they were currently better off tl~antheir peers. Among those who identified their economic situation as having been relatively better before the revcrlution, X aX acknowledged that today they were still better off than most of their felI~wNicaraguans anci only two peaplc felt they were not better off tlzan their peers. The few walthy Nicaraguans interviewed did not particularly envy their


97

frteacis and colleagues who had "taken their wallets" and left tl-te country. Several pcrinted out that those who had left, particularly, for the United States, had not found the business climate mgeniaf or their skills and baclcgrounds helpful, Xt is important to note tlze rofc people assign to their own government in all this: Do they see their economic well-being, or lack thereof, as the result of the government or blame other factors?2WOEthe people intewiewed, 80 percent mentioned economic mistakes made by the government. Yet only 20 percent partially blamed the gcrvernment for their eccrnomic situation, and only 6 percent placed the blame tcttally on the government, Most people expressed the view that the U.S, embargo anci the contra war were sucl-t drains on the economy tlzat they outwighed the gcrvernment's mistakes. Further, even those whcr held the gc3vernment partially responsible gave it high marks for being willing to admit its mistakes in the economic arena. This led to nlany people" perception that steps wcjuld be or had been taken to remedy these errors, Among those interviewed were two people who argued that the country" ccurrent economic problems stemmed largely from the government" having ""sded" tlze population in the period immediately after the revolrttionary triumph. A gcItPernment agronomist from Bluefields explained: "At first the government spoiled the people like a parent spoils a child. . . . What happens when you stop spoiling a cl-tild?She gets mad, she pouts, That's how Nicaraguans are behaving ttrday. They want the government to give them everything, do everything, make this place a heaven fbr tl-rern.'"Yhis view was ecl-toedby an older businessman who said: ""Ifhink the revolution has made some mistakes, For example, they set price cc~ntrotsand subsidized food, gas, fertilizer, all types of things, There was net way the government could maintain this, So nctw that the government cannot continue this, people don't thank tlzem for the years tlzey did and illstead just complain that prices are at actual cost."% born this perspective, then, the government was to blame for hav111g promised too much and thereby failing to make clear, as Castro suggested, that citizens lzad won the right to struggle for a new future, not simplfy to expect it. Among those who assigned complete blame to the government, many focused on what they perceived as the government's an ticayitatist, anti- U.S. stance.27 Tl-rese people all dismissed the notion that there was any meaningful "mixed ecttnomy" in Nicaragua, arguing that it was simply on a fast track to communism. A young architect trying to explain his outlook finally said, "The Front [the FSLN] is too radical for Nicaragua and has failed the pectple.'"B Xn contrast, 94 percent blamed the United States partly or fully for their economic situation, hcusing particularly on the costs of fighting the contra war and the deprivations clwing ttr the eccrnomic bfock.de. Even those who blamed the government for at1 of Nicaragua" economic problems mentioned the difficulties created by tlze war anci the economic blockade. An older man who sold newspapers in one of LeQnk markets believed that the gcrvernment was to blame because

98


so many mistakes had been made wit11 the economy bat allowecl that ""tze war lzas r felt hurt us and the economic blockade too.'"g A ycjtzng gotpernment w c ~ r k whcz the government was partially to blame summed up the sentiment of many, potntizlg out with resignation, "We can't say . . . [what] could lzave been achievecl in economic development if not for the economic blockade and the war imposed on our country.">Wiven the overwhetming impression that Somoza had had the country in an economic stranglelzofd, tlze "host chance" for economic development in the aftermath of Somoza" fall-regardless of where peoplte assign the blame-is a strong and recurrent theme. People's perception of their economic situation, bath individual ancl coflective, appears to have played a consequential but not pivotal role in goxrnment" ability to consolidate the revolution. Nicaragua" economic condition should have profoundly shaken Nicaraguan society. It does nett seem to have done so, Economic conditions not nearly so severe as those in Nicaragua have resulted in massive demonstrations, paralyzing strikes, coups d%tat, or rebellions in other Latin American countries, most recently Rnezuela, and in countries around the world. Historically, the reality reflected by numbers such as tlzose mentioned earlier has even been a precursor t c ~revc3lution. Yet none of these phenomena occurred in Nicaragua. The economic disaster did probundly shake people" Fairlz in the tafents and decision-making abilities of the leadership of the revolution; but the people" rresyonses were peaceful, democratic, and powerful, There seems no doubt that emnczmics played an important role in the outcome of the 1990 etection, bat it also seems clear that the economic disaster was not sufficient to overcome the c~verallfaith that people had developed in the new system. The failure of the economy, afthough it has undoubtedly sfowd the consofidation process, lzas not stopped it. As we have seen, tlze Nicaraguan government under the FSLN implemented an austerity program. It: included: dramatic currency devaluaticzns, a drastic cutting of the sociaf programs that had been the heart of the social revolrttion, a $4 percent reduction of the budget, and the elimination of 34,6100-35,000 government jobs," These actions were considerabfy more severe than those that sparked victlent popuIar reactions in the Dominican Repubtic, Brazil, ancl Venezuela in the early 1990s. The population's apparent equaniznous acceptance of this massi-tre economic restructuring demonstrates at feast in part how effective the consolidadon process has been. Perhaps the strongest indicator, however, which will be explored later, was the peaceful transfer of power after the 1990 election.

Where You Live and M e r e Yau Stand: After Political Victory lPJhere an individual lived before and after the revczlution at first appeared to be a pcztentially tzseful tool in assessing whether she supsyczrted the sociaf revolutionary


99

process. It seemecl cammon sense that those it-t tlze fc~refrontof the cantra war were likely to be politicized. Moreot~er,much has been made, particularly with reference to revolutionary situaticzns, of urban-rurat, distinctions, Finally, many people inside and outside of Nicaragua make reference to people's location as an explanation for an individual's support (or lack of support) for the social revolutionary process, Specifically, two interrelated geographic ditnensions appeared ~ l e v a n tFirst . in importance is whether people lived in the midst of the areas where the government and the contras were fighting. The ""czntra front" azmprised smaller cities sucl-t as Esteli, Matagalpa, Ocotal, Bocoa, and Jinotega and the rural areas near the borders. The war forced many people ttz move from these areas into the major cities; the presence of those who stayed in or in some cases mt>wd to the contra front was construed as an act in support of the revcziuticzn. These people, Sltater suggested, were in a very real sense the frontline troops in the government's battle to control and defend Nicaraguan territory and sovereignty." Not surprisingly> the cantra front is atso where many people perceived the revoluticzn to have been strongest, that is, where it enjoyed tlze greatest cammitment among the population, The second dimension is whether people lived in the urban areas such as Leiin, Managua, Masaya, Esteli, and Mafagalpa, which were the heart of the final struggle for political victory during 1978-1979.14 As noted eartier, botl-r revotutionaries and scholars of revolution generally draw a crude distinction b e ~ e e nurban and rurat, poyulaf ons, The camman wisdom is that people in rural areas are less engaged in t l ~ eprocess of institutionalization than are those who live in urban centers; presumably the same wczuld hold true for consotidation, 'This should be even mare the case when, revofu"eonary romanticism and mytl-tofagy aside, political victory was largely achieved in neither the mountains nor the corzntryside but in the przorer barrios (neighborhoods) of Masaya, L e h , and Managua. Yet in the late 1980s what one encountered in Nicaragua was a rural population tlzat was engaged and active, particularly in contrast to the more disilfusioned urban pt>p~lation.~S Beyond respondents' vague comments and asides, the interviews turned up litttc to support either of the first two di~tinctions,~6 This may have been a result of the geographic location in which the interviews took place and the relatiwly small number of interviewees. Although responses offered somewhat greater support for tlze urban-rural distinction, this too may have been more conclrxsively tested had there been more interviews with people in rural areas. As it was, those respondents from rural baclcgrounds were, proportionally, Far more engaged in and supportive of tlze revolution than tl-tose from urban backgrounds, This, however, may be explahed by their comparative youth and status as students. Overall, geography did not prove to be a particularly useful .factor fbr assessing support for the revolrttion or for determining the cansolidation of the social revolutionary process in Nicaragua,


Ennpowerment After Political Victoryr Popular Attitudes in Society k p u l a r attitudes (as we saw in Chapter 1) represent a befief system. To explore pcoyufar attitudes abc->utconsotidation, f focused on the indicatc>rsof consolidation first mentioned in Chapter f: trust, opportunity3 and a vision of the aixture, bounci togetl~erby a sense of empowerment. It is important not to lose sight of hcow intimately these are linked.

T r . Of the people interviewed, 54 percent clearly indicated that they trusted the govarament, Many of tl~esepeople lzad a deep conviction that society had changed and that things were different from the S~mozaera, Several factors appeared central to their perception that things were different; important among them was the perception that the government was willing to admit its mistakes. IPelated to this was the widely held perwption that ""unlike any other government in our history . . . [this one] treats people like adults.""' FinaUy, with reference to both these points-and in dramatic contrast to their treatment by tlze country's previous gcovernments-these peoplte were convinced that the gowrnment was making a good-faith effbrt to report its activities c;crnsistently and honestly to the popufattan. This was neatly s u m m a r i ~ din the reaction of one worker, who lzad just watched President Ortegds 1989 New Year" Message: "Did yotz see Uanielito tell us the mistakes that had been made? We trusts us. He Zcnovvs tha"ef he tells the people that they tried anci fiailed or that they cllose wrong they will understanci. Listen, in how many countries dco the leaders say h e rnade a mistake\or h e were wrong? ?t is a sign of respect.""" For a population tong marginalized, even brutalized, anci denied basic rights, the receipt of respect from its government is significant. Things were equally clear for the 26 percent that did nourust the government. Asfied about trust, a travel agent in Lecin simply dismissed the government as "totalitarian~.""" One regional opposition leader ctxptained his distrust with the contention that it was impossible to trust a ""government [that] has carefully not defined itself."" One of his colleagues concurred, charging "We can not figure out what they are-communists, Marxist-Leninists, capitatists.""" A wc3man who made her living washing clothes argued that the gctvemment was simply not to be trusted: "No good can come of them. They are destroying the country They talk about development and take away fand, they talk about freedom and force people to move, They have no respect.'"Wany of rl~esepeaple felt that the new government was simply more of the same. Not surprisingly, 20 percent of those interviewd could be best characterized as unsure, This was particularly apparent with regard to the government" ability to manage the country. There was, for example, some concern that the government wcou1B not h o w how to deal with peace. One older man, echoing the fears of several people, pointed out rather rueft~irliythat "you do not learn about peace fight-


1101

ing in the mountains.""" One t~niclueexplanation was offered by a young woman who said that she trusted the government" economic decisions but feared its political stance: ""Politics is the problem, it i s terrible, I am not with the government in that resyect.'"4 Others were concerned less with ability than with strength. A surprising number of people claimed that Nicaraguans required strong and fcjrceful leadership because of their Latin or Xlldian "natures," This perspective was well articulated by an older ccrnstructicrn worker who explained that his concern was not with the government" ability to govern per se but with the manner in which it had chosen to govan. Specifically, lze expressed his skeyticism about tlze strength of those individuals running the government. According to him: "The Sandinistas have good ideas, but they don" know how to run a gcrvernment. Mdhen Daniel and Sergio were elected, they shoufd have taken power. They were elected by the people to take power. You can not lzave a country run by nine men-sometitnes it even seems like mrrre than nine, Rtrple want to know who is in charge." Until those ""at the trtp" would take charge, he continued, the government wctuXd not be sufficiently strong to run Nicaragt1a.4~ Even though a majority of those interviewed indicated trust fcjr the government, it was clear that there was some wariness, and over a quarter were outrightly distrustfuf. This spillcc1 over into peapie's perceptions in interesting ways. Although the i~lterviewsdid not capture this nuance wetl, f found that people distinguished between the FSXJN, whicl-r they seemed to trust more factuafly, they trusted specific party leaders), and the government, whiclz they seemed to trust less. It is also interesting to note that whereas it was tznclear whether responsibility for the honesty of the elections was assigned to the FSLN or the government, there was a palpable sense of trust (perhaps hith would be a better ward) that the 1990 election worzld be run fairly and that the results m u l d be respected.46 Opportmiq. Seventy percent of the peoylte interviewed believed that the gcwernment had affi~rdedNicarag~zansmore opportunity and greater equality. All these people, as wll as some others, mentioned the access to education and the government's efforts to provide housing. Many noted tlzeir newifound ability to get things accomplished. One wcjman who worked as a maid epitomized this view: ""Ian go to a government office, see someone without paying for it and somerlzing may be done. I never thought I would see this . . . and I know from others that yorz d o not see this in, say, Mexico or in Honduras;"47 For people whose basic notion of government had long been that it was something that was best avoidecl, such cl~angeswere significldnt. Some people did add interesting caveats. When asked whether greater opportunities and equality existed, one man responded: ""Potically, yes. Morafiy, yes, Economically, no . . . but that is because of the wat.,'"Wne woman pointed out that although there was greater opportunity and equality crt~erall,"there are prcrbferns for women.""" Another woman, who was a strong supporter of: tlze government,

11 02


elaborated on this idea. The revolution, according to lzer; had won rights for w m e n , but primarily the "right ttr wcrrk two jobs. The right to have children, keep the house and go out and w~rrk."5~~ Of those interviewed, 18 percent felt that tlze government had not provided greater opportunity or equality. Most of them felt strclngly that access to higher education and housing was dependent on one's standing with the FSLN, This was less the case wit11 the access to government bureaucracy, afrlzough all of these peopie were dismissi* of the notion that the Nicaraguan gclvernment was any more efficient than it l-rad ever been. One man argued: ""S you can go in to see them, and most will not fake anything, bat they are helpless, so it is a waste of everybody's time. They are there for the gcltPernment to pay them and for us to go get pieces of payer frt3m.""" The notion of eflicat;;y and efficiency in Nicaragua, according to a young architect, is a smoke screen," As fir as equality, one man who believed tl~atthere was more ooportunity qualified equality by sayit~gthat it existed ""in studying, yes, but in work and politics, 11ir.~'53 An older woman snorted derisively when we talked about opportunity and equality and said simply, '""They hate anyone with money. UnderstandZ"54 Twelve percent of those interviewed were unsure whether the government had provided more opportunity or greater equality, The overriding atdmde among these people seemed to be that it was difficult to say, girren the conditions in Nicaragua. Interestil-rgty,they split evenly on whether it vas the fault of the gcwernment or of what one wctrnan described as "our unfortunate internationat situation.'"T"fh (other common theme here was that time m u f d tell-it was simplfy too early to say. With the central place accorded education and housing, along with health care issues, as the care of: the social revolutionary pmject, it is perlzaps not surprising that there woufd have been such a strong perception that the gclvernment had provided both greater opportunity and equality. Somewhat more surprising was the degree to whiclz peaplc felt that they could accomplish tlzeir goals. As with the earlier discussion of respect, the sense that government offices were open and relafveiy responsive to them was pcuvcrrfzul and real, The amount of service these offices actually provided was clearly seconciary to tlze powerful message of: access that was sent. Vision. of the Future.

Tlne overwhelming majority of those interviewed were eager to discuss their visic>ns of the future, Moreo-ver, their discussions were animated and positive. Only a few people declined to discuss the future or were pessimistic about it. It was particularly interestilzg that tlzere was a clear difference in hrrw people discussed their vision and that the difference vas related to the individual" agee There was a wellspring of: positive feelings for the Sanciinistas among people over thirty. These are the people wh~rw r e most directly affected by the excesses of the Sornoxa years, and their memories of that period are strong and clear; there


11 03

is no interest, even among those critical of the government, in returning to tl-tat era or way of dcring things. This resctlution is a p~rwerfulindicator that consolidation has occurred, At the same time, many of' these people were weary, and their support for the gc1""ernment and the social revc3lutionary process had been tempered by ten years of government mistakes, the contra war, and the U.S. economic embargo. Because many of these people no longer expected to see in their lifetitne tlze things they believed that they had fcjught for, they feft some frustration and even bitterness. A relatively p u n g government agronomist who had returned to Nicaragua from Mexico to &fightin the revolrttion explaineci with a world-weary sigh: "I think we expected too much, too soon. Things will be better fbr my children. Of that I have no doubt. In many ways it is better for them already. But it is too fate for me."56 Anotlzer man, with some exasperation, expressed his frustration by asking: "So they beat Somoza, they got rid of the National Guard. Great, And since then?'"7 In contrast, those who came of age since the revolution were not as harsh. In talking with a group of young wctmen at one of Leiin's retigious high schools, I asked four students to respond with the first tl~ingthey thought of- when tlzey heard a certain name. First E mentioned the pcrye, M t h very serious faces they responded slowly and thoughtfully: " d o t of luxury," ,""%"strctng tradttictn, hard on those who don't agree:" ""a fcrrmidable man, but he needs to change," and ""a man who does not understand us.""" 8 e n I asked about President Ortega, smiles broke out and the answers came fast: "future," """$veXopment," """possibiiities," m d ""ralizing prospects for peace.'"'" At the very least, this says something about the success of the social revc>lutionarystrategy in terms of the project of political socialization, This generational difference is also mirrored in the very way that people tafked about their visions of the future, Older people {a relative term in the Nicaraguan context) tafked about how great their hopes were for their children" futureseemingly conceding that their owl1 prospects were somewhat dim. 1x1 dramatic contrast, the youth often talked eloquently, at length, and almost ccrckily about the future they envisioned for themselves and their cohorts even in the face of incredible obstacles that lay in their patlz. A majority of the people interviewed rated high in all three of the indicators used to ascertain, popular attitudes about the government, Trust was the weakest category: This is probably not surprising given the economic situation it1 the country, government admissions of mistakes and mismanagement, and traditionai Nicaraguan atftudes toward government. W a t did seem surprising was the streagh of people" bbeef that opportunities and equality had been so much greater in the ten years since the revc31ution. Although Nicaragua" ddisastrc>useccrncrmic situation had curtailed opportunities, the ieadersihip had clearly created a perception that such opportunities were available and that there were a number of possibilities, As a result, very few people doubted that a better future fay down the road; their vision of the hture was strong, Of at feast equal importance, as will

11 04


be seen in Chapter S,was tlze powerful sense of empowerment generated by all these factors combined.

Gonclusioxr: Cdlnsolid~ionin Nicaragua The process of consolidaticrn-the project of social transhrmafan-is in a very real sense the ultimate goal of:social revolution, Historically, social revolrttions offer grand promises and dramatic visions. To date, it is difficult to argue that they have gutfilled either, As we saw in Chapter 3, althouglz the leadership makes the decisions and seeks to dictate the timing of the ccrnsolidation process, it is the people who must tolerate, accept, or (ideally for the revc>lutionaries)reconceive their belief systems to accept the saciat revolutionary ideotogy and reorder their lives accordingly in the service of the revolrttion.~~~ Without the participation of the population there can be no successhl changes in the eccrnomic, pc~litical,or social spheres of society. Therefcjre, there is a continuous and pervasive effort to mobilize the people and enlist their energies, loyalties, and skills in creating tlze new society, The Nicaraguan gc?vernment after the political victory expended great energy in pursuit of these goals. The fate of the revolution in Nicaragua may be open to debate; this is evident in the description of: the FSLN leadership offered by one older man: ""Imy heart I love them like I love my sons, In my head f think they have made many mistakres, M q b e too many."b1 This stands as a succinct summation of- much of- what was discussed in the interviews. W a r was clear-and expltored more fully in the final section of this chapter-is that many people continued to believe that the promises and vision of l979 w u t d be fulfilled, with or witl-tout the FSLN. This conviction, as we slzall see, drew sustenance from the success of the institutionalization process,

INSTITUTIQNALf ZATION REDUX THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIG CONTEXT OF THE l990 ELECTION The 1984 elections and the 1987 ratification of tl-te constitution were two slzining jewels in the FSLN" effort to institutionalize tlze Nicaraguan revolution. The final jewel in the crown was to be the 1990 ejection. The election, however, represented far more than the closure of the institutionaltzatian process, It was atso imbued with great promise by the social revolutionary leadership and lzeraXdecZ as the commencement of a historic new era of peace and economic growth. Thus there existed the perceyticrn that both the present and the ftiture were hanging on this one election-an. extraordinary burden to place on a single event among the myriad that have occurred throughout Nicaragua's history and within the process of the revolution.


11 05

To deny the complexity of Nicaragua's 1990 election would be disingenuous, yet its multiyte levels, subtlety, and degrees of intrigue are largely beyond the scope of this section. It is not the nuances and intricacies of this electiczn that interest most people. Katlzel; the spotliglzt is on why the FSLN lost and the irnyfications of that loss for the social rem>lutionaryprocess, 3% answer those questions, it is necessary to retrrrn to the ix~stitutionaiizatlonproms, specifically the international and domestic situation in Nicaragua leading up to the election.

The World Comes to Call: The International Coakxt The Nicaraguan revofution-even befctre political victory-was overwhelming and profoundly conditioned by the international contat, The rctle of the international system and the need for leaders capable of dealing with it were discussed in Chapter 3. W a t merits some attention here is the degree to which attacks on and support for the Nicaraguan ix~sfi"ttionafizationprocess prctduce repercussions for the consofidation process,. Specifically, I shall focus on U.S. effurts to overthrow the gc>vernmentof Nicaragua and on the supyclrt for the Nicaraguan government that was derived from the various regional peace processes.

The United States, 1(38&3"388. IJerhaps the single most remarkable aspect of the institutionalization process-the 1984 election, the constitrxtionaX process, and the 1930 election-was that each phase occurred while Nicaragua was under a large-scale direct and indirect attack from the United States." On 9 March 1981, six weeks after taking office, Xtonatd lteagan approved a ""pregidential finding" to fd known as the "cantras" provide $19.5 million to the peapie tl~at~ r ~ t r become (short for ct~ntrarevoluciorzarios).~~ For four years, the Xlleagan administration took great pains to deny one of the ~rortd"worst-kept secrets, U.S. efforts to overthrow the government of Nicaragua," In fact, the overthrow of the Nicaraguan gcjvernment became a privrzary goal of the Reagan administration; by 1986 the pretense had been dropped entirely,"W.S. policy was to overthrow the Nicaraguan government; if that could not be achiewd, the poficy sought to destroy the Nicaraguan economy, discredit the government, and so thoroughjty exhaust: the popvrlaf on that the "Nicaraguan example" woufd exist solely as a negative one for those in the Third Wrld.6" The Unikd States approached the destructiczn of the Nicaraguan economy at a variety of levels: in international, regional, and locaI boardrooms and on the ground. The United States intmduced a sweeping trade embargo, devastating for a cotzntry long dependent on U.S. markets for export and on U.S. products, notably machinery, for import, Tct intensiEfr the pressure of tile embargo, the United Slates intervenecl to block loans from private ancl ixzternational lending agencies as weif as allies in Wstern Europe. On the ground, the contra war proved tc>be "a frighteningly effective instrument of ecttnomic aggression."fl Attacks were de-

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signed to displace people and force meager public hncis away from popular social programs-with the added ""bonus" of sharply reducing agricultural production and krther destrctying Nicaragua" ravaged infrastructrrre, Xn its contit~uingdrive to discredit the Nicaraguan government, the United States adopted a pctlitical-ideological campaign to Belegitimize, subvert, and sabotage the efforts aimed at the institutionalization of the democratic process," By 1984 the issue of Nicaragua anci the FSLN had become a U.S. policy obsession, one that ewntuatly overwhelmed the entire ft~reignpolicy decision-making process and cufrninated in the Iran-Contra debacle," Despite the best efforts of the Reagan administration and its allies fforts tlzat included serious vioiations of domestic and international law-U.S. policy began to unravel in 1987. m e n Rctnald Reagan left office in Jantzary 1989, he had not fulfilled his commitment to overthrctw the Nicaraguan government, Many Nicaraguans celebrated iiteagan's exit-the popular stogan was "";eagan se va, la revolution se queda!" (Reagan is going, the revcolutiton remains). Nicaragua was, however, far from free of the United States, and the legacy of the Xteagan administration continued, Xn the United States the Xran-Contra Affair raised concerns tlzat the president of the United States and his staff had sought to subvert the Constitution in their support of the cttntra policy: The dctmestic and international reverberations of the hifed contra policy were substanttaX.7Wentral America was on the brink of a regional war; tensions between the military and civilians in El Satvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were higher than at any time since the f 930s. Atthough many Nicaraguans were undo~rbtedtybuoyed up by having outlasted Ronald Keagin, they had precious little else to raise their spirits. One Nicaraguan, with a hopefui smile and a wistfuf tone, thought that with Reagan out of office and his country at rock bottom, tlzere seemed nobvel-e to go but up.7W.S. pctlicy had proven highly successful in wreaking havoc throtzghout the country and exhausting the popujation, Latin herica, the Esquipulas Accords, and the $990Elections, The Nicaraguan revoiution might never have occurred had it not been for the support of otlzer Latin American countries, particularly Costa Kica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, and Venezueta, These ccountsies also played central roles in helping Nicaragua in the early years of the revotution, and in 1983 three of them-Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela-were joined by Colombia in the Contadora process. Focused Xargefy on issues of security between the United States and Nicaragua, this collective efftjrt to stern direct U.S. intervention set the stage far a regional peace initiative, which it~clrxciedprovisions for it~ternattonallyobserved elections througllout Central America, The draft treaty t h a w a s produced through the Contadora process called h r limiting arms acquisitions, renouncing support for insurgent groups, eliminating foreign military personnel and bases, and holding open elections. Initially Nicaragua was the only one of the Central American countries unwilling to agree


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to the treaty draft-a public relations opportunity not lost on tlze United States, When Nicaragua reversed its position, however, the Reagan administration was caught off guard and moved quickly to pressure its alfies-Honduras, Clctsta Rica, as a result, the plan fell anci El Satvador-to find Fault with the draft.$%en, throtzgh, there was great glee in the h a g a n admini~tration.7~ The heav-handed tactics of the United States, however, proved to be an embarrassment to some U.S. allies in Central America. By mid-1987 the U.S. behavior toward the Contadora process and the disintegration of U.S. poticy toward Nicaragua had presented an opening h r regional negotiations without outside support. The Central American states-including those that were pro-U,S.-saw the opening and stepped in, The breakthrotzgh 0ccurred in August when the Centrat American presidents met in Esquipulas, Guatemala, and signed ""Tl-re Procedure for the EstabXisi-tment of a Strong and Lasting Peace in Central America7"(known variously as the Central American Peace Accords, the Arias Peace Plan, or, most commonly, the Esquipulas Accords), Guided by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias-----whowas awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts-tlze Esquiyuias Accords were designed to bring peace and democracy to Central America. Specific provisions banned international support for insurgencies-i1ic1uding the use of nationat territory as staging areascaffed for tlze release of all political prisoners, provided for tlze complete restoration of civil rights, and outlined a framework for open electoral processes in all the countries, Enforcement w u f d be by the International Ccjmmission of Verification anci Security (CXVS) comprising repl-esentattves from the UN, the OAS, and the Crotzp of Eight-the Contadcrra countries plus ""the Support GrotzpnArgentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay. The Esquiyufas Accords proved to be mucl-t easier to sign tlzan to implement, This situation was further exacerbated by the decision of the five Central American countries to resewe for themselves the right to veto any part of the CXVS reports tlzat they fc~unciproblematic, The draft of rlze first report was highly critical of the United States and its four Central American allies-particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras-and praised the efforts of liii~aragua.~"his served to embarrass the other Central American governments anci infuriate the h a g a n administration." H Elalvadcrr and Honduras, under heavy U,S, pressure, demanded the elimination of the CXVS as the price for continuation of the Esquipulas Accords. The offending draft report was witl-tdrawn and a new version considerably more favt~rableto the United States and its Central American allies-and ctdrrespondingfy less favorable to Nicaragua-was circulated.76 Problems aside, the Esquiyulas Acccrrds were a positive step for Nicaragua. By far the greatest benefit for the Nicaraguan gotPernment was the reccrgnidon of the legitimacy and permanence of the revolution: Nicaragua" seighbcjrs were prepared to acknowledge at least the institutiorzutkat&z of the Nicaraguan revolution. This, coupled with the apparent military defeat of the contras and the call by the other countries for the disbanding of the cttntras and an end to U.S. aid h r

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them, was perlzaps the major reason for the eagerness with whiclz tl-te Nicaraguan gc1""ernment embraced the peace process.77

The Domestie Context, 1988-1 990 Given the overwhelmingly positive aspects of the Esqrxipulas Accords for Nicaragua, it is perlzaps not surprising tl-tat the government moved gdster and tartber than any of its neighbors in implementing the changes called for.7T71he Nicaraguan government opened talks with the contras in March 1988 in the Nicaraguan town of SapoB, near tlze Costa Rican border, although tlze Esquipulas Accords did not obligate the government to do ~ 0 - These 7 ~ talks resulted in agreement on a sixty-day cease-fire, acceptance of ""interim" nnomifitary aid for the ctbntras, and the release of half the ctbntra prisoners held by the government when the contras moved into designated zones inside of:Nicaragua.80 Eerlly reminiscent of its responses to the Cctntadora and EsquipuIas agreements, the United States reacted qrrickty to pressure its allies, the civilian ctbntra leaders who lzad signed the accords, to back out. W e n the latter refused to do so, the contra leaders who had agreed to the deal were berated by their CIA suyporters and hundreds were removed from contra leadership and staff positions worldwide-BWy June these recatcitrants were reptaced with contrit hard-liners, who w r e ytaced tznder the nominal direction of Somrrza-favorite and long-time contra miXirary leader Colonef Enrique Bermbdez. The new leadership immediately issuecl demands that it anticipated to be completely unaccep~ableto h e government. As a result, the negotiations collapsed and ccrntra activity, which had never ceased comyletely, rapid1y increased. As we have seen, by early l988 the economic situation in Nicaragua had cleteriorated disastrcrusly from that of the first years of the revc>lution.The government introducled austerity measures in early X988 in an attempt to regain some control of: an economy run wild. The brunt of those measures fell clirectiy on the people least equipped to deal with them, and some Nicaraguans felt that the FSLN was abandoning those in whose name the revoiuticzn had been made and they purported to rutc.Kz Making matters w r s e , at the same time that the FfLW" cconstituency of poor farmers, the ycryular urban sectors, and new professionals (state employees, teachers, and health care wrkers) feit themselves under attack, the government was reaclltng out to those most opposed to the revolutionary proje ~ tThe . ~program ~ dubbed concertaciblt (working together) was designed to promote unity and win over Xandtords and the bcturgeotsie by offering production incentives and promising an end to confiscations, To many FSLN supporters it seemed all too apparent that ccrncessions were being made to the wealthy while they were being told to tighten their belts yet: again in defense of the revoiution.84 As Vilas ycrinted out, "The Sandinistas>ragram of structrzral adjustment vas no different from anyone else's: It favored the rich and hurt the p0~."85


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Furthermore, the government Fdiled to include or at least consult the popular organizations in the decisic~n-makingprocess; this meant that there was relatively littfe public aptanation of the new policies. Many Nicaraguans apparently interpreted suc11 behavior as arrogant or indicative of: the FSLN's increasing inability to deaf with bad news,Kh There seems little question that people were no longer willing to accept: the cttntra war and L7.S.economic pressure as the primary exptanations for their economic circumstances. Resyclnding to this, President Ortega acknowledged in June 1988 that the measures appeared contradictory to the directiczn of the revcdfuGon, He w n t on, howeve& to explain that "this must be uncierstood as a necessary step to prevent the economy frc~rncctllapsing and to create the conditions so it wit11 recczwr and become stronger."" Still, eEorts were undertaken to txicrease the levef of informatian available to the population and increase popular participation in the decision-making process. The challenge for the FSLN in the period prior to the election was to reconcile the discrepancy between those who were bearing the burden of the austerity program and those wham the government assumed would support it in the election. In many ways the economy would prove to be a pivotal issue in the election, as the government sought to rectify the situation while bafanclng the demands of the business community, which the government hoped could help rescue the economy, with those of:tlze generat populdtion, By the tirne the election campaign began, the economic situation had rebounded a bit Erczm its iow point.88 By the second half of 1989, inflation was down to 10 percent per month, and tl~erehad been a dramatic increase in the goods ayailable in the marketyltaces. But the ectsnomic ""panorama" remained bteak, particularly in the street, and few could affc3rd to partake of this relative abrmdance of goods. Moreover, in an ugly reminder of: the years prior to political victory, access to these goods w s rationed strictly by income-the gctvernment subsidies and redistribrxticzn programs that had, as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) pointed out, tong mitigated inequalities had been cancefed because of the austerity programSwW~ateverpositiw results were being achieved by the austerity program did not filter down to the day-to-day fife bilizaticznby 5 I)ecember.Y" Of particular interest was the reform that dealt with the financitlg of political parties, The 1988 Nicaraguan Electoral Law, drawit~gon those of Costa Kica, knezuela, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Spain, had provided for state funding of potiticaf parties based on the proportion of votes received in the preceditlg electicdn.YVhe reform drew in equal parts from the 1988 law and the U,S,/oyposition demands.. Half of the public funding wcruld be divided according to the proporticzn of votes receitred in the previous election. The other hatf wc~ulcf be divided equally between all parties or coalitions that chose to field a presidential ticket. The result is more generorzs frnnding for minority parties than that fczt:,r_lnd in the other Centrat American states, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, or the United States." 13"ehaps most remarkable was the ccrncession that allc>wedfor the unlimited amrrunt of fc~reigncampaign financing,'" The U.S. funding of its chosen ally for the 1990 elections, the UPSO, was massive by any stanclard. On 24 October 1989, the U.S. Congress voted to provide $3 million in overt assistance, primarify throtzgb the National Endc~wmentfor Democracy (NED), to the UN0 and i t s affiliated gro~ps.~%Althoughnot all the money ached the UNO in time for the campaign, largeiy for bureaucratic reasons, almost $3.5 million in cash and roughty $200,000 in material aid did.""( A further $5-$12 xnitfion was provided to the UN0 covertly through the CXA,Wl Although the amount rrf money dcrnated by the United States and the extensive U.S. invc)t.vement were clearly significant, the rtrle they pltayed in the campaign is less clear. In fact, the FSLN ran the more visibly expensive campaign, AXthough the FSLN" foreign cash contributions totafed only slightly over $400,000, the funds were bolstered by over $3 million in material aid from abroad.f0VThis tactic may have been a strategic btunder, howver, and ultimately contributed to the government's defeat. As some U.S. citizens living in Nicaragua poitltecl out, it seems not to have occurred to anyone that "the lavish campaign could actually


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alienate voters: whose ow11 economic privations made thern "bath to see suclz conspicuous spending in times of enforced austerity for the pcryular se~tors."l0~ In this section I have presented an overview of the playing field on which the parties would compete in 1990. Not surprisit~gly,the situation did not remain static. As in any electicln campaign, shifting and jockeying continued tzntijt the very end-wit11 parties switching in and out of alliances andlor splitting, the sway of international events, such as the U.S, invasion of Panama, anci domestic events, such as demonstrations-but the basic parameters w r e those orzttined above. What merits our attention before we continue, however, is what this suggests about tlze status of institutionaiizatinn in Nicaragua, These basic parameters indicate that an essentially democratic and plturalist political system had been established in Nicaragua and thus provide evidence of the institutionalization of the Nicaraguan revolution. In July 1979 very few envisioned that the revolutionaries who llad achieved the political victory would work to build democratic institutions in a ccruntry with no meaningfLtI history of them, Yet ten years after that political victory, the process of institutianalizaticzn was so deep and so strong that the government-dominated by the sociat revolutionary leadership and acting against the advice of, among others, Fidel Castro-felt obligated by the system it had created to hold elections. It lost and it left. As much as the r 990 election offers evidence of the success of tlze institutionalization p rocess, it also p rovides an important way to gauge the consolidation process. [It is, therebre, usefuf as we examine the participants in the 1990 electiczn and tlzeir campaign strategies, to shift the focus slightly. Reflecting on the campaign strategies of the FSLW and the U N 0 brings us into the realm of consolidation, As a result, many of the elements in the next section are central to the exploration of tlze significance of the 1990 election anci tlze insights it provides us into the ccrnsolidation of the revolution.

THE NEXUS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION: THE 1990 ELECTION PARTICIPANTS M D STMTEGIES If institutionalization is funciamentafly about political. structures and consofidation about tlze degree to which tlze population embraces the core of:the social revolutionary project, then the 1990 election campaign presents an obvious meeting place, Nctt even those campaigning from the ultraright suggested any desire to return to the Somoza era or dismantle most of the new institutions created by rlze gc1""ernment since ycrlitical victory. If one accepts the thesis that politicians of various stripes provide insight into the mindset of the general population, this clearly. suggests a widespread recognition among Nicaraguans that the revofution has in fact been institutionalized.

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With it~stitutionalizathaccepted, the focal point of- the election-debated vigorously and emotionally-vas what the 19'79 revc3lution had meant, that is, how it shoufd be interpreted and who rightfully coufd make such interpretations. Almost every party proclaimed itself the rightf~~l and proper lzeir to the process begun by the pctlitical victory over Somoza, Several, most notably the Movement for Revotutionary Unity (MUR) and the UNO, made being the heir the centerpiece of their campaigns, When tlze debate slzifts to who has the riglzt to continue the revolutionary process, the question then squarely beccrmes one of consotidation: Has the revolution reached a stage at which it is sacrosanct, accepted and respected by all, simply a part of their everyday life? One way to assess the degree to which ccrnsolidation of the social revc3lutionary project has been obtained is by considering the strategies emylc~yedby Nicaragua" poolitical parties as they sought: office in the f 990 election, A IOW level of consolidation, perhaps even no consolidation, would presumably result in parties runnir~gagainst the sociaf revc3lutionary process in generaf or at least its most obvious manifestations (the highest-profile programs of the social revoXutionary project). A lzigher degree of-consolidation, in contrast, would be inclicated by tlze greater extent to which the political parties focused on the achietrements of the revoluticzn and prctmised to protect and even extend tl-xosegains. The 1990 election campaign has largely been treated as a contest between tlze incumbent FSLN and the U N 8 ccralition, This does capture the heart of what transpired, but it misses one aspect that is imporeant in regard to bctth institutionalization and consolidation, In point of fact, the 1990 election included eight parties besides the FSLN and the UN0-all ten ran presidential tickets and several ran full or large states for the National Assembly Aftbough my primary hcus must be on the two major conteaciers, the strategies of the other opposition parties merit at least brief ccrnsideration here for three reasons, First, they indicate the range of ideolctgicat diversity availabte to Nicaraguan voters-a spectrum much greater than is available anylzere else in the Americas. Second, the wideopen nature of the 1990 election campaign is another sign ofthe institutionalization of the social revolutianary process. Third, and most important for our ptzrposes, tlzeir strategies speak to the status of consalidation.

The Third Path: The Non-UN0 Opposition Shortly before the 1990 election, the presidential candidate of the Movement h r Revolutionary Unity (MUR), Moisds Wasstrin-a popular former Sandinista member of the fGKN anci FSLN mayor of Nanagu plained to one writer that choosing betwen the FfLN and the U N 0 was like choosing betwen hanging yourself and shoodng yourself.i04 At least eight political parties seemeci to agree anci sought to provide the voters of Nicaragua with less dramatic alternatives. Four of these parties presented centristlreformist pltatforms, one presented an tzl-


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traright perspective, HassBn's MUR offered "tl~etrue spirit'kf the Sanclinista revolution, and two stafeed out the territory to the left of the FSLN. What merits attention is that ail the parties except the tiny* ultraright Social Conservatism party (PSOC) respected, embraced, or sought to build on tlze social revtrlutionary p r o ~ e s sThe . ~ ~four ~ centristlreformist parties drew on their resyeclive Chrisdan Democratic and Social Democratic backgrounds to provide a ""third patlz'yor Nicaragua, a path tlzat would sitnultaneausly honor and moderate the gains of the sociat revcrfuticrnary process.^^^ The MUII. was drawn from Nicaragua" various leftist parties, though mostly the FSLN, and identified itself as the true representatives of the revofution ""sharn of bureaucratism ancl carrrtytionP'R7 The Revolutionary Wsrrkers party (PRT) and the Marxist-Leninist h p u lar Action Molrement (MAP-ML) sought to radicatize the social rewlutionary process, specificafly to push it farther ftaster.108 Not many Nicaraguans, apparently, shared Hass8n" p e r s p e c t i ~on the choice between the UNO and the FSLN. In 1984 the oppositisjn parties had polled roughly one-third of the vote,109 In 1930 opposition voters overwhelmingly supported tlze UNO slate. The eight non-UN0 opposition parties garnered only 4.7 percent of the presidential vote and 5.1 percent trf the National Assembly vcrte."o The small percentage reflected the degree to which the electorate was polarizecl; the choice over the course of the campaign was effectively narrawecl to pro-FSLN versus anti-FSLN. The UWO" broad political spectrum, its anointment as the sole recipient of the massive U.S. ftzrnding,'l1 and its unexpectedly shrewd choice of presidential candidate-all 6~ctorsto be explored at length below-made it the logical choice as an alternative to the FSLN. The preponderance of support fcrr the UNO, which encompassed a wide range of views, does not negate the fdct that an equally wide array of views was wailable among the non-UN0 opposition. As LASA pointed out, "There was a ccrnsiderable and broad spectrum of political options during the period of jockeying for position prior to tlze election.'"" The variety of parties as well as their ability to mount campaigns serves as further evidence of the depth of institutionalizatic3n. That at1 but one of the parties espoused a deep commitment to the cttntinuaticrn of tlze social lrevolrttionary process in some fc~rmsuggests consofidation.

"Everphing Will Be Better": The FSLN's 1990 Election Strategy The FSLN slate for the 1990 election featured tlze same ticket as in 1984: Daniel Ortega for president ancl Sergio Ramirez for vice president. Batlz men lzad been part of the five-member JGRN, which had been named prior to the defeat of Somoza and had governed Nicaragua until the 1984 elections, In 1984, Ortega and Ramlirez were elected easily at the lzead of the FSLN ticket. Thus both men had been intimately invsrll~ectin running the country since the political victory-

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which fit wit11 tlze notion of a vanguard party. The FSLNk decision nonetheless raised two unfortunate specters: It suggested that the party did not want to rock the boat, and it raised the prospect of corztiltuismo in a revolutionary society.ii+ Xt seems plausibte that the voters feared continuismo by either Ortega or tlze FSLN after eleven years in pclwer, Continuismo has been a common practice throughout Latin America, and as an appropriate Bescripticrn of the Somoza Bynasty, it is a ready rekrence point for the Nicaraguan population. The decision to run the OrtegalRamirez ticket, then, may well have raised some suspicions that the FSLN was engaging in cnntinuz'smo. Such concerns would have resonated poorly with many in Nicaragrta for whom the possibility ""violated a deep Nicaraguan sentiment against reejection, which grew out of the inwterate electoral practices of Anastasio Somoza and his sc->n."uqTheFSLN seemed to be changing from an unusuafty conceived type of political party to a political party of the type that was all too familiar to many Nicaraguans, This also reflects a picture of the FSLN as somewhat distant, perhaps even estranged, from the pc~yulation, Xf tlze FSLN was not estranged from the general population, the campaign that Ortega and Raml'rez chose to run highlighted the degree to which they were out of torxcl-r with the people, As LASA pointed out, the "maxnpaign was highly personalistic, focusing on the cl~aractetristicsand attributes of the candidates""" Having produced a vague piatform short on specifics, the FSLN sought tc:, ""fcrcus attention on the personality and attribrrtes of President Ortega. They hcused upon his experience, cXose relationship to the people, 6~milybonds, and broad suppart from a wide range of people, including sports figures and other perscrnalities."~~ Rather tlzan dealing with the substantive issues confronting t l ~ epeople, the contra war and tlze military draft, as well as tlze economy, the FSLN slogan was the glib "Tc~dosser mejor" (Everything will be better), The strategy was reminiscent of the very wc~rstsort of content-empt-)i;U-S,style itlcuxnbent campaign. A band and fireworks would announce Ortega? arrival on horseback (or in the ""Uannymr>bile"in intzrban areas). "El ggallo" (Ortega's coc1cn")oufd be rigged out in blue jeans, bright FSLN-supplied nickname-""the shirt, and cowboy boots to convey a lively, yainttlzful, macho, debonair image meant to ccrntrast with his older, female opponent, Popular songs rewritten to emphasize Ortega's virtues wcruld be sung, Xocal groups would perform, beauty queens crowned, ancl gifts doled out.H7A vague, positiw speech, with grortzp cheerleading led by the president, wottzld follow Finally, photos would be t a k n with supporters, and more fireworks and music wcruld send off the president."'" The message was simple: Thanks to the FSLN, life was good; with the FSLN, life w u l d get better, At a time when the overwhelming daily reality for the vast majority of Nicaragrzans was austerity and poverty, the FSLNk expensive makeover of Ortega and Ramirez as patronage-dispensing, gift-giving, baby-kissing, glad-handing


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cheerleaders seems quite curious. EquaXly strange to mmy Nicaragums must have been the FSLW's candidates>uublic rediscctxry of their Cathctlicism-invokng "the Lord" in speeches and attending mass. Finafly, nct one could blame the weary and worn people if they found the promises of a better world after the election suspect. The intent of the FSLN strategy-developed in consuttation with media and public relatictns speciatists from other Latin American countries, France, and West Germany, ancl a private Managua-based polling firm1 Ig-cvas to isolate Ortega from ""negative opinions associated with specific problems" and present the president as a "warm but commanding figure, with roots among the people, but tested, experienced, ancl capable of- leading the nation to a better future."Izo Tb many Nicaraguans, hc)wever, it mtzst have appeared an effort to ignore the ecctnomic devastation and the war-perhaps even the revc3lution itself. The FSLW appears to have assumed that it w u f d benefit from some fundamental bond with the population.121 In fact, the expense of the FSLW campaign, the assumption that the victories of-the past coufd be trumpeted and the failures disregarded, and the conviction that the opposition would be ""tainted" by its link to the United States or the contras served ta highliglzt tlze estrangement of the FSLN from the Nicaraguan pctyufation. As one observer noted, the FSLW basically ran the campaign as if the people had no memory and no interest in the past.E22 One implication of this is that on the one hand, the FSLW had failed tc? transcend its character as a vanguard party, and on the other, the yctyufation had transcended the need for the vanguard.'" 3 s will be explored more fully below, the population ""gew'Yaster than the party. As with Humberto Ortega's conviction that it was the population that fed the FSLN during the revc>lution,it wotzfd seem that it once again was the population that took the lead. Nicaraguans apparently felt confident that they could protect the Izard-won aclzievements of their revulution-perhaps even protect them better-withc~ut the people w h ~ had t fed them to these gains. The feelings of many were undoubtedly summed up in the thoughts of the Managua taxi driver who told a reporter: ""The muchuchos [boys], they had good intentions. Theyke done their best, But it's time for a change."lz4 Sucl~confidence goes beyoncl the reality of institutionati~arionto suggest a retativefy lzigh degree of cansolidation. In the process of successfully institutionafizing the rewlution, the FSLN provided the popuIation with the very tools necessary to turn them out of officee, That the FSLN leadership Izad the confidence to do so says a great deal about its faith in the process of consolidation; the leaders were apparently cctnfident that the gains of the social revofution wctuld nctt and coufd not be reversed, The population was apparently similarly confident and was therefore prepared to trust the gcltrernment to those not in the vanguard-but tc? others, w h ~ in t a very real and meaningft~lsense carried with them the FSLN's and the revolution" seal of approval. This brings us to tlze saga of tlze UNO and tlze candidacy and campaign of Viofeta Charnorro,


Daiia Violeta: The Naisnal Opposition Union and Its 1990 Election Strateg The UPSO brouglzt together a bmad alliance, which ranged from the farthest rigl-tt of Nicaragua's pc~liticalspectrum to the farthest left. This confederation seems to have been bctund by a common antipathy for the FSLN, a mutual desire far power; ancl a lzealthy appreciation for U.S. financial incentives. Wracked by internal bickering, pushed and pulled-mtzch of the time willingly-by U.S. desires, this unlikely coalition not only won the 199t3 elections but also held together surprisingly well in the critical first montlzs after that victory anci lzas remained a vaguely coherent organization. Because the U N 0 3 existence has been largely defined by its Bpantine political intrigues, extreme ideological vagaries, and intense personal rivalries, its maintenance of such a coalition has required strenuous efforts and adroit maneuvering tlzat has not always been entirely successft~l.Early on, these effc~rtsbrought ccrmpromises such as those on who wc~uldbe the coalition's presidential and vice-presidential candidates, deals on the candidates on the slate for the National Assembly, and the modification of and eventual general retreat from the UWO platform,

The lifiiO's Fadiotls. Prior to 1979, there was no meanit~gft~f political space in Nicaragua in which parties ccruld develop and grow- This stunted pc~liticaldevetoyment resulted in parties ffike those in most of Latin America) that were little more tlzan personalistic vehicles, often with no real apparatus or public fc~llowing. Another consequence is that interpersonal or familial relationships were often a more reliable indicator of which parties might line up together or reach accommodations tlzan similar political. perspectives. This explains why the parties that made up the U N 0 have tended not to create within the alfiance new factions that reflected their political stanceseEz5 There were three clear factic~nsin the U N 0 from its inception. One group of five parties embraced the four far-right microparties affiliated with COSEIJ and one of Anotlzer faction consisted of tl-te three leftist parties and the the rightist parties.1226 coalition's largest party, the center-right Liberal Independent party (PLI); this faction was dubbed "The 4 from '884;" reference t~ their participation in the 1984 election.'" A disparate set of five small parties, which nearly replicated the UPSO's breadtl-t of political perspectives in miniature, constittlted tl-te third faction.tz8 The COSEP facdon collected elites that had been heavily involved in the domestic opposition since 19'79,uL"For the 1990 election, CQSEP and its affiliates put forth tlze "Hue and White Plan for National Salvation," wMrhh promised a drastic curtailment of the rewlution and evoked notions of ""Ssmocismo sin Somoza."H"0o guide the country, this Faction proposed Far-right former COSEP president Enrique Bolaiios, who was not affiliated with any political party. "The 4 from '84" bought tc>getherthe most established parties in the UNOHE and the only parties that at various times since 1979 had supported tlze social rev-


11 117

olutionary process. Because of ideological. differences, this Faction proposed no coherent program akin to the "Hue and m i t e Plan.'%~ather, its message was built arctund the befief that the FSLN had had its chance and now it was someone else's turn-specifically, professional politicians such as PLf's Virgilio Godoy, former JGRN minister of labor (1979-1984) and one of the leaders of opposkion in the Nationat Assemblyi+zIn fact, it was this image of themselves as the established class of old-time politicians that Eurtlzer bound together tlzis Faction, The third faction was the most ideologically diverse, ranging from the far right through the right to the center, Commonatities in this factictn were nowreadily apparent, but it did seem held together by a combination of personal ties anci the k c t that members were not wetcome in the other factions,133 This Factictn emerged as the standard bearer for the preferred candidate of the United States, the former JCRM member Violeta Chaunorro, Like BotaActs, Chamarro was not identified with any political party. The working assumption, according to most scholars and c~bserwrs,was that COSEPk high profiie and power wctuld allow it to place Bctlafios in the presidential slot anci that Godoy would receive tlze vice-presidential position as a sop to , under U.S. pres"The 4." In the face of fairly seriorzs divisions, h o w e ~ r and sure,iJVhe Pactions united bebind Chamorro as the coalition's presidential canciidate. Godoy rather tlzan Bolai?ios got the vice-presidentid slot.135 The choice vas tactically clever-the PLI's credentials w r e sotid and Godc->yfir easily with the notion of ""fe revolution betrayedm-and represented a further setback for COSER f 990 Election Strategy. With the ticket of Chamorro anci Godoy and a COSEPheavy National Assembly slate, the U N 0 seemed to offer tlze people exactly what it purported to be, a broad umbrefla that all Nicaraguans could gather under. 13erhaps mast important, a f cket topped by a former JGRN member and the hrmer JGRN minister of labor lzad uncieniable revolutionary credentials; and U N 0 candidates could argue that the FSLN had betrayed the 19'79 revctlution, forgetting the needs of the very people that it had fought for. But what was the UNO's program? How would it articulate its vision of Nicaragua? flisputes centerit~gon this-the party platform and the direction of the campaign-continued throughout the campaign. Crreation of the UPSO platform, not surprisingly, entailed a great deaf of negottation. COSEP's efforts to force the adoption of its ""Uue and m i t e Plan" "me tcr naught, atthough elements of it found their way into the platfctrm. Ultimately, the document produced was suitably vague, mocierate, and-not unlike that produced by the FSLN-short on specifics, Although the piatfarm did call for a review of many of the government" score prctgrams, Charnorro led many of the UN0 assembly candidates in assuritlg the voters that the U N 0 proposed na rollback of the gains made under the rewtution. The U N 0 pclsitioned itself as ""te true foltowr of Sandino:" dedicated to ""carry out tl-re true revc~lutictnPi~~

li $ 8


The UNO's campaign strategy, then, ecl~oedthat ofthe FSLN-an almost exclusive focus on the p residential candidate. Yet there was a critical difference. Many obsemers suggested that the U N 0 had selected Chamorro for the same reason that many assumed that she was part of the JCKN in 1979-1980: her symbolic value. It m u l d be disingenuous to suggest that Chamorro was initially selected far other reasons-she l-rerself embraced the designafon on ~ c c a s i o n . ~ + ~ This perception was unclerscored by the U N 0 3 creation of a Political Council, composed of one representative fmm each member party and presided over by Godt~y,that was meant to make the cttafition%strategic decisions. Both the UNO's klitical Council and tfze FSLN mistakenly assumed that a symbolic figure was necessarily an insubstantial one. Shortly after her nomination, Chamorro demanded respect from a reycrrter who insisted on referring to her as ""symbol" that was being "manipulated," Such contempt would result in lzer victory, slze warned. She hrtlzer reminded people that the FSLN leaders were the ones who had first asked her to participate in politics when they invited her to join the JGRN-"These were not empty words, and she moved quickly to ensul.e she would be more than the UNO's front person. Chamrrrro surrounded herself with a campaign team led by. her son-in-law Antonio Lacaycl and Lac;tycl"stwo brothers-in-law, AAledo Cksar and Chamorrok son Pedro foaquin, fr. She anci her team quickfy es~abfishedthat they had their own tecl.1nocratic and pragmatic agenda and little time for the concerns of the UN0's Political Guncil and the otd-fine politicians who dominated it. COSEP fared littie better: Clzamorro's advisers were also the founders of the Commission on the Recuperation and Development of Nicaragua (COKDENIC), a moderate, tecbnocratically oriented alternative to the COSEP3sold guard, Neither group was pleased.140 In the enstzing squabbling, which fasted throrzghout the campaign and was highlighted by a public fistfight between PLl3 IPolitical Ctruncit representative Jairne Bonilta and Lacayo, Chamorro stayed above the fray and emerged as the only person providing colzerence to the UPSO coalition. Chamorro made no pretense abt~uther backgrotznd or her abitities, making it abundantly clear that she considered herself neither a potitician nor an expert but rather "a bond of u n i v and a bridge between a team of experts, tfze peapie, and the yofiticians who have gathered around me."E4f Although there is disagreement on how long she served this role for the country, it is evident that she did serve in such a capacity for the U N 0 early on anci that she did so for many Nicaraguans, While the FSLN scrambled to remake Ortega's image, the U N 0 quicHy discr~vered it coufd just let ""tfoiia Violeta," as she was popularly referred to, be herself. Everyone in the country knew her story: wife of revolutionary martyr Pedro Joaqufn Chamorro, member of the JGRN from 1979 to 1980, owner of the opycrsition paper La Prensa, and matriarch of a family divided among the FSLN, the domestic opposition, and tfze contras. Cllamorro stressed the tradition of her martyred husband, her cwn nationalism and service to the revcrlution, her motherhood, and her Catholicism. The U N 0 campaign picked up on these themes of


11 113

national recondliation, family, anci religion, and presented Chamorro as a living iccrn, a rewlutionary version of the Virgin Mary.142 The U N 0 had no need to ctxaggerate in its presentaticrn of Chamorro as a revcdlutionary-her credentials as widow of a martyr of the revolution were impeccable. She liked ttr pcrint out that "if [her husband, I%"edro Jsaquin] had not died, those boys, the Sandinistas, w u f d still be in the mountains todayep'1""As for her progl-essive sensibilities, Chamorro cl~argedthe FSLN with exploiting tlze workers and peasants and making a mockery of the revt~lutionaryslogan "Workers and Peasants Tc~wardPower!"""4 Her final campaign speech included the assurance that "the workers" would always take part "in all things related to their jobs and lives."145 These hardly seemed the words of a ccrunterrevcrIuti~znary. Even the FSLN recognized her revcrlutionary credibility. On the tenth anniversary of the revolution, Ortega praised her " h m and courageous position when W negotiated with the Yankees . . .she would not accept the Yankees' impositions.)'l4~ Moreover, Ortega said, Chamorro had behaved patriotically and remained true to her ccrnvtctians, nctt betraying anyone. People" knowledge of her very public life anci praise suclz as Ortega's made later FSLN attempts to paint Chamorra as a contra or little more than a U.S. puppet seem peculiar at best. It also enhanced her ability to claim that the revctluticrn that her husband had helped bring about and that slze lzad served had been betrayed by the FSLN. Faced with attempting ttr reconcile coalition partners whose politics ranged from the far right to the -far left, the UNQ uftimatefy ran on little more than its anti-FSLN character anci a surprisingly cl~arismaticpresidential candidate whose energy, sincerity, and moral authority took her ""symbolic" role far beytjnd what anyone in or out of Nicaragua had anticipated, In many cases, Nicaraguans supporting the UPSO confessed to knowing little about the alliance" platform, Wlzat they knew was that the UNO, specifically Uofia Vicrleta, offered an alternative to the FSLN that also promised to remain true to the vision of the 1979 revcdfution, which they continued to cl~erish.

M o Wan? The Outcome of the 1990 Election In 1990,86 percent of the eligible voters in Nicaragua went to the polls and delivered a result that strrnned nearly everyone. The U N 0 received approximately 55 percent ofthe vote, compared to roughly 4 1 percent for the FSLN, In tlze National Assembly this translated into fifty-one seats for the U N 0 and thirty-nhe for the FSLN. The U N 0 domination was total: The FSLN won only twcr ejectoral regions-one by a handful of votes-and lost badly in many of the places it was considered strong, including Managua. Moreover, the U N 0 won 99 of the 131 municipatities, including Managua and the country" third- and hurth-iargest cities, Granada and Matagalpa. It also won in 28 of the o t l ~ e rlarger cities (20,000-s) and 71 of the smaller cities (under 20,000). The U N 0 victory was clearly impressive by any standard,

11 20


The meaning of tl-tese results, however, remains considerably less clear ancl continues to be debated. There are three themes that haw dominated the interpretations of the 1990 etections. The first is repudiation, although who or what is being repudiated varies: the revolution, the revolutionary process, the FSLN, or even, in an interesting twist, the U.S./ccrntra forces. The seccrnd theme is ehaustion: The population was, h r a wide array of reasons, simply too tired to continue with the social revolutionary process. A third theme is that the Nicaraguan popufation was essentially blachailed by the United States. These and similar anafyses are Rawed by a basic misreading of bctth the outcome and tfze implication of the election. In Pact, the 1990 election and subsequent peaceful transfer of power indicated the success of the institutionafization process and a significant degree of consolidation. It is a mistake to construe the electoral failure of the FSLN as a hilure of either instituticrnalizath or consolidation. It is an equally serious error to read it as a repudiation of either the social revolution or the sociaf revolutionary process, The mechanics of the electoral process intrcrduced by the FSLN and implemented twice despite inauspicious circumstances demonstrates the success of hstitutionafization in Nicaragua. It is hard to imagine more convincing proof of that than the peacefut transfer of p o w r to an opposition atigned with the country's worst enemy But what of consolidation? If a significant degree of:consofidation has been achieved, how did the FSLN, the vanguard of the revc~lution,lose the election? The 1990 election provides ample evidence of: the extent to which consofidation has been realized. The essential quality of ccrnsolidation is an tznwiHingness to accept: a return to the waly things once were; the majr~rityof the Nicaraguan population would never allow their lives or the conditions they live in to retLlm to their pre- 1979 status. Rather than repudiating the revc)tution, Viofeta Chamorrcr embraced it, promistl~ga return to the glories of the first few years after the political viaory The UNO's posture as tfze genuine voice of: the revofution is indicative of the degree of consolidation achieved. The U N 0 did not run a particularly positive campaign or offer any meaningful program to improve the tot of the population beyond promising to end the contra war and the economic embargo; instead, it simply ran against the FSLN. Syecificalfy, the UNO's sapyeaf to the populaticrn was based on the charge that the FStN could no longer advance the process of the social revolution, whereas it, the UNO, ccruld. That is indicative of a profound degree of consolidation. Prtcrr trr 1979 few people a n y h e r e had ever been concerned with whether there were elections in Nicaragua. It was only in the aAermatlz of the 1979 revolrttion that such concern began to be articulated; and the institutions created by the revc~lutionmade elecrions possibfe.147 The day after the $990 election, Senator flavid Durenberger (It-Minn.) told his colleagues on the Senate floor that it lzad been


11 2 1

the Qrtega brothers, and others who really began the revolution to democracy in Cetltrrzl Axnerica, It was not the president of the United States. XI was not the CIA, It was not any of the so-mlted dexnocratic institutions of this country, It begail with the s the shries and seventies agai~zstthe Somoza regime. It people who took to the I ~ i l in is these peoiyle who begm the revolution to democracy whell they went to the hills. Few 13eoiyleendorsed tlzeir tactics. No ogle today eexzdorses their tactics. But the results are in that election.148

This election, mrrreotPer, was hailed widely as a model of fairness and probity.""" There were people, however, who recognized the success of the ejection-day process while questionit~gthe atmosphere that surrounded the entire process from start to finish. Skfar, for example, likened the c~veraltprocess to the 1980 ""electoral cczup" engineered by the United States in Jamaica, wliere the combination of ""economic boycott, decapttalization, arrsterity fin which the International Monetary Funci played a critical rote), media manipulation, sabotage, m ~ ~ r d e r , bombings, and other violence rotted back the Manley gc>vernment%ssocia[t programs, erczded its credibility and popular support and resulted in its electoral loss to the U-$.-backed party of:Edward Seaga."""" Sklar argued that although she had not thought such a fate wcjuld befall Nicaragua, this is in fact what happened. A more common contention has been tlzat the people of Nicaragua were blackmaited in a sense, forced to vote with a gun held to their head by the United States, which offered an implicit ultimatum: Unseat the FSLN or the cttntra war and tlze economic embargolyressure will c o n t i n ~ e . 1Alejandrc) ~~ Martinez, a Ebrmer Nicaraguan official, explained: The election was a nearly perfect process-not because we Iost, but because the mechanisms that W set up wrkeci technicaUy . . . and stir1 W must say that the eiection was unkir and undemocratic. A detailed analysis shows that the election was unfair and undernacratic not because the government made it that m y but because the people faced unfair conditions in which to vote that were created by people outside of Nicaragrra, People were forced to vote with a pistol to their head.152

Therefore, Martinez contended, the majority of the poyulatic~nchose the only "mtional" mute and voted for the UNO. Such interpretations of the situaticzn dct not seem unreasonable and, in fact, would be lzard to deny per se.. At the same time, they address only a part of: tlze Nicaraguan reality. Hc>wever dramatic a role the U.S. pressures played-and it wctutd be foolish. to deny their impact or import-it is also true that there was a great deal of popular sentiment against the FSLN, In Fact, as a number of: people have yczinted out, considering the circumstances, the FSLN's receiving almost 41 percent of the vote is astounding. Nonetheless, as in 1984, the electiczn occurred under extraordinary conciitions. Moreover, as in 1984, tlze citizens expressed their yreference.

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Nicaragua's 1984 ancl 1990 elections marked tlze only two times in history tl-tat a group of revolutionaries w s wiling to risk its power and test its popularity at the polls-acdons long characterized as impossibie,"+ The 1990 election led to the first time in lzistory that revof~~tionaries walked awdy from power when they were voted out.

A Victory for the Revolution, a Defeat for the Revolutionaries: The 1990 EXections and &nsofiQation; the 19% Election and the Future of the Revolution Consolidation, as we have seen, refers to the embrace of the ccrre of the social revolutionary project by a significant majority. of the population. Successful consolidation is characterized by the wilXi~zgnessof the population to defend the gains made tllrouglz tlze social revolutionary process. Xt seems clear that this is what the FSLN brotzght to the Nicaraguan populaticrn. There is enormous tension latent in the concept of the vanguard party. The vanguarcl seeks to liberate ancl empower the brutalized ancl disenfrancl~ised,Emycrwerment, hcrwexr, like demrrcracy, entails risks for leaders. Having given peapIe power over their own lives, the vanguard must be p r e p a ~ dtrr adapt to the new situation or lose its place of prominence. Its time, at least as the vang~~arcl, has passed. The tension b e ~ e e nthe vanguard and the poyvrlaf on first manifests itself after political. victory, when the vanguard tries to direct tlze transformation of the ycryulation, and it peaks when the rewlutionaries have succeeded at their setf-appointed task, that is, when the peopfdiscover their voice and take cttntrcrl over their lives. They have been empowered, In Nicaragua tlze sense of: empowerment among those who had been brutalized into indifference was and is palpably clear. Along with this empowerment i s a fortitude to resist any threat to the gains they have realizecl or tlze power they now know tl-tey have, Arturo Cruz, Ec~rmerfGKN member and pseudcrcandidate for the 1984 presidential elections, recognized this in the aftermath of the f 984 presidential noncampaign. It is rxaw clear that the revtllrxtionary process is sornel~otuirreversibie-that Piiicarabwa will not return to its former feudalistic status which prevailed prior to July 1979. . . . Revolutionary social transfc~rmatiorris rxot questioned, Even the starrncllest adversary of the Sandinistas-the Nicarag~anDemocratic Force (FUN)-pretends to justify its xnilitary stand on the ground that the revolutioll has beell betrayed by the FSLN.I54

Cruz's comment suggests that as early as 1984 the consofidation of:tlze revofution was we11 under wdy ancl, at least from his persyectivc, already ""irreversible." There is, in fact, a very real sense in which the U N 0 3 1990 campaign strategt. reflects the same ctdnviction: that ctdnsolidation of the revolution is welf under


11 23

way. From the selection of the canciidates to the speeches made, gEat efforts were made to assure people that there wcruld be no rollback of the revoft~tionarygains and that the U N O would respect not just the jaws but the norms and mores of the Nicaraguan revolrntion as well. In much the same w y that the Esquipulas Accords represented recognition by the other Central American countries that the Nicaraguan revolution had been institutionailzed, the UNOk decision to present itself as the authentic voice of the revolution acknobvfedged the consolidaticsn of the sociaf revs>lution. Atthough Nicaraguan voters undoubtedly heard and were perhaps even reassured by the UNO's promises, they also demonstrated a degree of sophistication and csnffdence, They understcrod that the hard-won gains of the social revolutionary process were not tied to one organization, one program, or one person. Rather, the gains of the revoluticrn were based in them, the people, Moreover, they clearly felt that they could protect the gains they lzad made if tl~osegains were threatened by the U N 0 srr any other segment of the population,15Vhe FSLN had given them the tools, teaching thern how to mobilize and organize to accomplish what tl~eywanted and defend their interests, As Cruz recognized, things lzad changed-the revcrlution of their hearts and minds could not be taken away, The degree of consotidafon found in Nicaragua suggests that nothing could return matters to the former state. If it remains too soon to state definitively that the Nicaraguan revolution has been consolidated as we await the arrivaf on the public scene of the "first generation of the revctluticrn" (as was discussed in Chapter l), neither is it reasonable to assert that it is dead anci gone, tlze 1996 election an epitaph, The 1990 election process demonstrated that the frnndamental changes in Nicaraguan society are not in immediate jeopardy because they are now part of both the material and ideological conditions of people" eevryclay lives. The period primarily examined here ends with the 1990 elections. Circumstances ~nnderthe 1990-1996 Chamorro admitlistration tended to confirm the conclusions reached here; matters are a bit less clear in the aftermath of the 1996 etecdon, as will be discussed later. Nonethefess, several events in particular under Chamorro stand out, The first was Chamorro's reteattan of much of the FSLN bureaucracy, including Hurnberto Ortega as head of the armed fc~rces.Although there was specuiation in the United States that this reflected some sort of deal, it is more platnsible to credit the promise Chamorro made all along: that lzer primary commitment was to continue the revt3lutionary process. That same commitment fueled a split in the U N 0 coalition that had been present from the start. Essentially the division was between Clzamorro and the technocrats whom she appointed to run the country on the one hand and those who, in @act,did envision either rolling back some aspects of the sociai revolution (COSEP and others on the right) or reslzaping it in their image (the old-time PSN and Communist h r t y of Nicaragua 1TXdeN] ptrjiticians) crn the other. These grcrtzps controlled the majoriq of the UNO's assembly seats and rallied around Vice President G o d r l ~ y ~ ~ ~

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The Godoy supporters charged that Clzamorro was ""yotecting" the revolution and even alleged that she was a ""coset Sandinista." As proof, they cited several of her actions, including her settling of two major strikes by agreeing to defend the gains of the revolution, her 6~ilureto integrate the contras into tlze armed forces and the pcrlice, and her efforts-with mixed success-to stcrp then U N 0 mayor of Matnagua, Arnotdo Alemhn, now president, from removing the syrnbctls of the revolution. Moreaver; not only were former government emplojrees retained, bat most attendant policies also remained in place. Ironically, the FSLN pragma"ests became Chamorro" most significant supporters and were the key to the implementation of lzer administration" programs. Their view was that Chamrrrrcr and her technocrats shared a ccrmmitment to the revc>lutionand that by working with them, the FSLN w u l d assure that the revcrlution continued. Although populanspecu~ationthat the FSLN prapa"ests and Chamorro's wing of the UN0 would form a new coalition to contest the 1996 elections proved tznfounded-the former largely left the FSLN and joined the Sandinista Ixenovat-ioniMovement (MRS), led primarily by former Vice President Sergio Kaminzz ancl otl-ter members of tlze FSLN National Directorate, whereas the latter rallied primarily around the National Prc>jectparty (PRONAL) and, initially, Chaxnorrok son-in-law and Minister of the Presidenq Antonio LacayoE"it bespeaks the popular perception tl-tat rather than a break, Chamorro represented some sort of continuation of the revc>lutionaryprocess, By the same token, the popufar perception-inside Nicaragua and out-is that the winner of tl-te 1936 election, Arnoldo AfemBn, does represent some sort of definitive break with the rewlution, a repudiation of the process, a victory for the ""couterrevoiuticrnaries," perhaps even a return of Somocismo atbeit sin Samoza (without S~moza).Several factors caution against sucl-t a fdcile interpretation. It seems highly improbable that the Somocismo sin Surrlozla wiH be the result of Alemhnk victory. In part this reflects changed internationat circumstances that involve Nicaragua" traditional patron, the United States, and the strictures of instimtions such as the International Monetary Fund and the Wcrrld Bank, But even more it reveals a changed Nicaragua in which even AEemhn has had to back down from some of his lzarslzer rhetoric ancl more grandiose plans in tlze face of opposition from a stijl strc>ngFSLN, a constellation of smaller parties in the spirit of the revolution, and the general populaticrn, which still knows how-and why----to defend itself. The losses Nicaraguans continue to suffer will have Far more to do with the ea~nomicausterity measures first intrc>ducedby the FSLW tclwifrd the end of its tenure, which were continued by Charnorro and remain in place under AlemBn, than with any concrete plans of tlze AlemBn administration. Nicaraguan sc~cietytoday looks tznlike anything Sandino, Fonseca, or even those ""ragged heroes" of f 979 anticipated, largely because each of these failed to recognize the dialectical relationship that exists between tl-tose who seek to rule in the name of the peoylte and the people in whose name they seek to rule-a failure that seems equally apparent among thctse currently in powr. This rejatlonship


11 25

constructs the new society and therefore sets the stage for the consolidation process, Although it does ncrt fit neatly with Leninist theory, it is perhaps the point at which the vanguard, having accomplished its historical task of guiding the population to social revolrttion, withers awdy* The consolidation of the social revctlution r e p r a a t s a permanent mark on every facet of society. Institutionalization can be undone f as in Bolivia) or stifling (as in Mexico). But the success of:consolidation means that even in the face of setbacks, nothing reverts to what it was befbre; the tenets of the revcrlution become central to the society. A change of government wctuld not, could nett signie a return to the past, which is why a case like Cuba-consalidation with no institutionaliziztion-remains an open issue. The day after the 19911 electic~ns,Dora Maria TCllez, Nicaragua" minister of health and one of the herctes of the revolution, told a reporter that "if all we did was to make Nicaragua into a nation, that was still tlze mast extraordinary thing W ccruld have achieved?'" The contention here is t h a u h e FSLN did ftifr more than that: It shctwed a brutalized and disenkanchised pc~puI"i~nthe limitless possibilities inhel-ent in tlze social revolutionary promise and worked with the people to make some of those pc~ssibilitiesreal. It w u f d be disingenuous to look at the circumstances in which the vast m2jority of Nicaraguans find tl~emsefvestoday and claim complete success far the Nicaraguan revcrlutic>n. It is too early to tell whether we can consider the Nicaraguan revotution fully consolidated; as noted earlier, only time will tell, The facts, however, that the central debate in the 1930 election was over who would best be able to reafize the promises of the 1979 revolution and that the 1996 etection continued a peaceful demacratic prctcess are powerful indicatrtrs that the processes of instit~~tionafizatian and consolidation remain-however shakilyunder way, As long as Nicaraguans ccrntinue to tell stories, sing songs, read books, and see plays that tell the story of the saciaf revctlutionary process begun in 1979, that process cannot and wiU not be erased.

CHAPTER FIVE

Bringing Peop e Back In: A New Vocabu Exploring Revo utionary Processes I will begin tbis chapter by reviewing the theoretical approach advc3cated in tbis book, In particular, f witl reemphasize some of what may be gained by the use of consofidation as a distinct analytic tool, concentrating on the rctles played by individuals and their ideas, ideals, and learning in the sociaf revolutionary process and the continuing puzzle presented by change, Then f witl consider the practical utility of the approacil: how useful the concepts of institutionatizatlon ancl consolidation are for investigating other phenomena related to transition and transformatic~n,especially transitions t o socialism and revolutions in prctgress.

THE THEORETICAL THEMES In light of the theory proposed here and the four cases analFed, what insights into theorizing about the social revc>luticrtnary process have been offered? Three merit mention here: first, the need to reincorporate individuals as conscious, intentional, p ~ w e r f ~actors tl able to affect their world; secand, the need to recognize that ideas, held by people and embedded in and reflective of cultural ccrnstructions, carry weight and that they carry across time and state boundaries; and third, that change remains an enigma, rarely understood in all of its imylicatians and manifestations by protagonists, antagrrnists, or those of us intruding from the outside and always open to interpretation.

Individuals The historical world, that is, the world's past as we understand it, is fundamentally the w~)rI&of human action. Structures are significant; there seems little question that they can serve to constrain people" choices and actions. Whereas

BRINGING PEOPLE BACK IN

11 27

the it-tteractinn between people" conscious and intentional actions anci structures defines the limits of decision and action, it is primarily the actic>nsof people that define the possibilities of action, Thus people hold the key to moving beyond the largely structural anci in some cases deterministic explanations that characterize most social science theorizing about sociopofitical change. Social scientists, in their efforts to understand and explain the w r f d , have tended to marginalize individuals o r omit them altogetl~er.Institutions and structures, aftborzgh they tzndeniably acqtzire a momentum, an existence that at times rnay appear to be their own, are constructions, artifacts created and populated by people. Yet the exploration of the role played by individuals is absent from most sclcial science theorizing about change and revc>tution. The central assumption has been that people dcr not ""make" revolutions; rather, because of the configurations of structures or the confluence of classes or other social groups, revolutions "happen." Never; it-t tl-te view of-those social scientists, has a revoltztionary mowment, mass mowment, or vanguard party created a revoltztionary situation that brought it to political power. The situation, instead, is structural, and the behavior of people o r groups can be t~nderstoodonly in those terms, This is a serious mistake, Such a perspective ignores the fact that pec3ple3s thoughts and actions-lzowever lzaphazarcl or spontaneous-are tlze mediating link betwen structural conditions and social outcomes, Structural ccrnditions, moreover, do not unconditionally dictate what people do; instead, they place certain limits on people's actions or demarcate a certain range of possibilities, Within the revolutionary process, there is more than one pcrtential outcome. Structural conditions may define the possibilities for revoiutlonary insurrections or the options available after political power has been seized, but they do not explain lzow specific groups or individuals act, what options they pursue, or what possibilities they rnay realize. There is thus a significant omission it-t the social science literature on revolrttions in generaf and sociaf revolutions in particular: people. At the same time, it seems increasingly apparent that revolutions are human creations rather than inevitable natural processes-revevolrttion> as f>unn pointed out, is Punciamenfally an actor's cc~ncept.~ As jonas notes, ""Human actors are not simply karriers of structures7but also "generators of them.'"Therefc~re, one should invoke theories tl-tat can take agents and structures, both with meaningful roles, into account. However, it seems ironic that the most dramatic and purposive of human actions has been redcrcled to an essentlaffy structural process, with people consigned to little more tlzan hnctional, robotic roles, There are two moments when the critical role of individuals is discernible in the social revc~lutionaryprocess. Leaders play a unique role in the social revolution, organizing the population and, perhaps mast important, articulating the vision-the ideas and ideals-around which tbey rafly. The core of ccrnsolidation is the pcrpulation" respcrnse to these efforts, the degree to which the individuals who constitute the brcrader population accept the

128


efforts of the leaders anci shape them to their reality, We need to refocus the discussion of profound change or transformation on the power and possibility of individlxais to control their destiny-

Ideas, Ideals, and Learning Besides recognizing the power anci purpose of people, social science tl~earists shcruld evaluate the power and promise of ideas and ideals by studying the manner in which social revolutionary leaders invoke, manipulate, and build on timeless conceptions to arouse and mobilize the population. Tl-te ideals of justice, liberty, equality, democracy, oppcrrtunity, and freedom (from fear, from hunger, from disease; of assembly, of speech, of religion) remain pwerfuland cornpetling in a wcjrld where many people" daily lives reflect none of these. These ideals become, in a very real sense, the touchstone of rlze revolrxtion, and tlzey carry the revc>ltztir;7nariesand the pcryulation through the arduc>rzsstruggle, Idea streams, historically connected, transcendent ideas, are powrful, pervasive, and timeless, This is not to ignore tlze Fdct that in practice many perhaps most, of the ideals may be betrayed once political victcrry has been achieved, Historically, the achievement of political victory has not been sufficient to guarantee that the visions af tlze revolrttionaries or the population-which are not necessarily, in Fact, may rarely be, the same-will be realized. Nonetheless, sfogans predicated on trust, oyyortrxnitlt; and a vision of the aixture abound and reflect the prcrwess of ideas and ideals. Idea streams-transmitted via people-are pt3werful and pervasive and travel across time and space. PeopXe learn, taking into account past experiencles and factoring in new information. Althougl~it would be disii~genuousto srsggest that social revt>luticznssomehow constitute an unbroken process, it is evident that modern revoludons have to some degree imitated (or, as Dunn suggested, attempted to imirate) volutions of France, Rt~ssia,Mermico, anci China, Bejlond these lzistorit l ~ ""cassic" e cal ccrnnections b e ~ e e nearlier and later revcrluticsns, there are strong historical and current connections among the modern revcrlutions. Both types of connections are discernible in the modern Latin American revolutions considered here. The connections are across time and within time, across culturaf boundaries and within them. The revc~futionariesin Botivia looked back explicitly to Mexicct; Cuban revolutionaries drew on a wide array of sources, including tlzeir own struggle for independence, Mexico, Sandino in Nicaragua, the incomplete revcrlution in Bolivia, even the destruction of democracy in Spain ( I93&1939) and revc3lutionaries were inspired and influenced by Guatemala ( l 954 f ;"Nicaraguan Mexico, their cwn past, and the Cubans, The Grenadians drew on the Eastern Caribbean" anticctlonial and sodalist legacy, the Cubans, the contemporaneous Nicaraguan revolution, anci tlze various socialist experiments in Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname, The connections are across time and within time, across cultural bounds and within them.


11 29

How much did the Cuban revolutionarics%bility to itlvoke fosk Marti and his vision figure in their stzccess? Did the Bofivianshnnwillingness to evoke a revolutionary or even a rebellious tradition serve to derail the revolutionary process? There seems little question that in Nicaragua the revolutionaries' use of the figure and perscrna of Sandino was central ttr their success. Might a similar culture of resistance and rebetlion have made a difference for the Grenadians? How werelare the efforts of Salvadoran, Peruvian, and Mexican revolutionaries affected by their ability ttr invc~ke,evoke, and manipulate the legacies of Farahundo Marti, Josk Carlos Marigtegui and Ttipac Amaru, and Emitiano Zapata, respectively? The transmission of revolutionary ideas, ideals, and learning merits far more attention than it has received in the study of rewlution to date.

Change It is impossible to gauge with any precision the ramifications or implications of cl~angeas it unfolds. The relevance of the myriad fiacets af change is varia;blc, and some factors may not make their presence felt for years. Morecrver, change differs in degree from level to level, from the life cof an individual to the status of the international system. Xt is in some sense an enormous continuum, perhaps even a Mijbius strip: one seamless, infinite process in which the medium is ideas and the currency is learning. Only time and distance make possible plausible e h r t s to assess societal change comprelzensively. Even then, the perspective invoked will inevitably color the picture painted. Finatly>a note of warning, The exploration of the processes of instituticznalization ancl consalidation serves as a powerfttl reminder that change is no panacea. This dcres not mean peoplte should accept or tolerate bad situations; in many such cases, almost any change, any acticzn, is better than inacdon. Rather, it reflects the recognition that Izowever easy it may be to discuss change in tlze abstract., in the practical world it is an intricate, perpltexing, and protracted process. Despite the dramatic visions and promises inherent in tlze social revoltlticrnary process, the pace of change (particularly after the most easily resolved issues are dealt with) may not be dramatic. This is the sentiment captured in Castro's comment cited in Chapter 4, that despite the understandable assumpticzns and presumable intentions of both tlze revolutionaries and the population, what political victory obtains is the upportzib-tnnityfor people to change their world for the better: Change is neither automatic nor inevitable, In many cases social revotutlons have simply replaced tlze domit~anceof the traditional elite wit11 an equally powerfttl and pervasive bureaucratic party elite, The profoundfy voluntaristic nature of social revcrlutions means that the process is often marked by the flaws of their creators; brutality, corruption, and incompetence all may be present in varying degrees. But there are tangible and extraordi~zarydifferences that cannot and shcruld not be ignored.


The Practical Contribution Although the distinction b e ~ e e ninstitutionalizaticzn and consolidaticzn is subtle, it is significant. An important cantribution can be made by treating cansolidation as a distinct ccrncept and pairing it with institutionalizaticm as dual analytical lenses, None of the points made in this chapter regarding the importance of individuals, the power of ideas and tlzeir circulation, ancl tlze multikrious and enigmatic character of change are new; in @actthey have been arotznd for as long as people have wrestled with nozticzns of metamorphoses of varitzus types, By focusing on consofidation we are reminded of the importance of such issues and forced, despite their dif5cult nature as ccrncepts, to include them in discussions of change, esyeciaffy social revc>lutic>narychange, that purycrrt to offer a plausible scenario of the processes that are involved.

THE PUCTICAL WILIITU The analytical lenses of institutionalization and ccrnsolidatic~nbring into focus and render problematic previczusly undervaftzed or omitted facets of the social revctlutionary process. Having proposed a new set of toots with which to think about social revolrttionary processes, f t~sedthose tools to analy~ethe four modern Latin American revcrlutions,An c~bviousquestion, hc>wever,is whether such a perspective has any utility beyond the study of social revolutionary processes. What advantages might this approach lend to the study of transitions to sociafism, which have traditionally been rendered in almost purely institutional terms? Might such a persyecti~rebe useful in assessing revolutions that have not yet achieved political victory? The next section begins wit11 a recapitulation of the revc>lutionsexplored eartier and is foffawd by brief discussions of how institutionalization and consotidation might be useful in the investigations of transitions to socialism, In this section I consider the utility of my approach for assessing revcrlutions in progress and thtrse yet to come,

The Latin American Revolutions Considered Here We lzave considered four cases of modern Latin American revofutions: Bolivia,

Cuba, Nicaragua, ancl Grenada, I argued that the 6~ilureof the Bolivian social revolutionary leadership to consolidate the social relrolution is central to tznderstanding the historical stature, or lack thereof, of the Bolivian revcdtution, The faiture to institutionalize the sociat revofution in Cuba leaves questions about the hte of Cuba after Castro, whereas the success of the ccrnsolidation process there helps explain the staying power of the social revolutionary process and Mrfiy the revolution in some form will tikefy survive Castro's eventual demise. By considering Grenada as a case in which neither institutionalizatil>n nor consolidation occurred, I provided a framewczrk that can encompass the cIash bemeen revczluticzn-


11 3 1

ary leaders (as well as tlze impact sucl~conRict lzas on society) and the result of the alienation of the leadership from the prrpulation. Finally, the case of Nicaragua, in wl~ichI contend that both institutionalization and some degree of consalidation took place, helps explait1 the continuance of the social revolutionary process in the face of a variety of crbstacles and the tznpreadented electoral defeat of the revotuticrnary leadership,

Transitions to Socialism in Latin b e r i c a and the Caribbean Nonrevt)lutic>narytransitions to socialism,4 such as those in Chile C 1970-19731, Guyana ( 19'70-3985), Jamaica C 1972-19RO), and Suriname C 1980-19831, lend themselves to institutional ctxpfanaticrns for severat reasons, t w of which stand out. The first is that leaders in these countries Faced trying to install new systems while the existing systems were still viable and variorzs grotzps in society were battting for their control. The second is that the interaction between the states and the international system played a significant role. A fc~cuson structures tlzus offers yltauslble and pcrwerful explanatic~nsfor the failure of socialism in those corzntries. Given that failure (as wll as the apparent collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and some of tlze African revolrxtions such as Angola and Mozambique), one may ask whether transitions to socialism remain a fruitful reference point for social science investigadons, The structural, or perlzays, more narrowlyf institutional, response to tlzis would seem to be no. Yet a consideration of these same four cases from the perspective of consolidadon suggests otherwise, Xn practia, Latin American sociaiisrn has never been akin to the doctrinaire socialism that existed in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union; typical descriptions have ranged from "trropical socialism" to ""sat-of-thepants socialism" tcfo"hourgeots-democratic socialism."W~owlEresnand Western assumptions about tlze ineluctable connection between free markets and democracy are not shared by much of the world. The specific neoliberal model yromtzlgated by the United States lacks a social component that i s criticaf h r democratic it~stantiationit1 Latin America and the Garibbean.Qocialism in Chile and Jamaica vas largely marked by the attention to the social concerns of the ycrpulation and the redistribution of wealth; in both cases the democratic electoral systems that brougl~tthe socialists to office were scrupulously resyected.7 Thus socialism and democracy w r e profoundly linkd. Latin American sodalism, in practicre, may be best understood as an effort to provide the social component absent from U.S. conceptions of Western democracy, which has traditionally been fc~cusedon "rerespect for rights and the rule of law, freedom 01"speech, institutionalizing of electoral procedrrre and separation of powers, checks ancl balances, etc.'" In Latin America the commitment to opportunity and a vision of the kture retains great appeal, especially when ccrntrasted to the "liberation" offered by market emnomies. The obligation to end poverty, feed people, and

132


improve lzealth and educational opyorti~xritiesis inlzerent in the regional conception of socialism. %is helps explain why the socialist legacy in Chile remains a vibrant element of the effort to remnstruct democracy despite the best efforts ol the Pinocl~etdictatorship to eradicate memories of the socidists' short time in oBce.9 Xt also helps explain why the Jamaicans returned the socialists to office in 1989. Since the late 1980s leftists, progreaives, and socialists have availed themselves ofthat most radical method of change-the ballot box-to came to powex; share p~rwer,or p~rsitionthemselves as the significant and loyal tryposition throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, This i s not: to imply some monolithic fbrce of leftists, progressi-ves,ancl socialists is cutting a swath across tlze region. The diversity of the progressive fbrces that have emerged with the return of the military to its barracks and the arrival of democratic procedures is impressie, representing strategies that range from a renewal of traditional left politics in the region to a complete break with that past. Whatever their difirences, the characteristic shared by political forces such as the Radical party in Argentina, the Wrkers" party in Brazil (PT), both the Socialist party and the Party for Democraty in Chile, Colombia's M- f 9, the FMLN in El Salvador, Mexico's tlemacratic Revolutionary party [PRD), Nicaraguds Sandinistas, the Broad Front in Uruguay; and bctel~the Movement to Socialism and the Radical Cause in Venezuefa is the one that has defined progresshe pofitics since tlze Industrial Revolution-a commitment to social justice, The Jamaicansbeelection of Michaet Mantey, a vice president of the Socialist International, says a great deal about the continuing power ancl promise of tlze socialist vision. Afthough Manley has abandoned his high-prafite if mild confrontations with the United Star-es,which sought and got his ouster, and with the International Monetary Fund, fie remains committed to the gains made and maintained throrzgh almost a decade of opposition rule, He explained to two scholars: "We s o w d the seeds of social revotution. . . . We altered class retaf ons, Household helpers now enter by the froat door, ancl poor Jamaicans have an unconscious reflex assumption about their rights. The poor tzsed to say WO f have rights?Wow they know they do, and he who has rights forgets the time when he didn't have thern."""T"flt indicates ccrnsolidation as it has been defined here, The focus rendered via consolidation help"to explain why socialism continues to appeal to many people in Latin America and the Caribbean." As the gap between the haves and the have-nots continues to expancl in tlze region, nonrevolutionary socialism may offer the best m y out for millic~nsof people.

Modern Latin American Rev~lutians-in-Pmgress: El Salvador and Peru The fbcus on institutir;7nalizationand consolidation, particularly the fatter, is integrally tied to what I have described as the third and final phase of the social revolutionary process: the effort to fundamentally transftorm society once the revolu-


11 33

tionaries have achieved political victory The processes that are central to this effort (to institutionalize and consolidate the revctlution) are also rooted in and related to those that predate the political victory Nevertheless, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the period prior to political victary ancl in the one that follows it. For example, prior to pcrlitical victory; revc3lutionary leaders concentrate on garnering support for the revotutionary organization rather than for the revolutionary process; after political victory, the leaders? failture to m o x beyond the organization to develc->pstzpport fen the process is likely ttr doom that process, This suggests that the concept of consolidation draws attention to the vital role of the mobilization of: the poptulation, One implication of this focus is that ccrnsolidation should prove a valuable conceptuat toc->lfor inquiring into revc3lutionary processes that have not yet achieved ycrlitical victory ( the transition of sovereignty to the revolutionary leadership), Alt11ougl-t considerably fewer than during the 1960s and 197Us, a variety of revolutionary movements remain thrarzghout Latin America and the Caribbean. The two with the highest profiles, in Fact, the only two in the past ten years considered viable contenciers h r power in their resyectiw countries, have been El Salvador's Farabundcr Martl National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Rruvian Communist party (VCP or PCP-SL), popufarly known as Sender0 Luminost-,(the Shini~zg Patlz)." SSIrlarities between the two are, however3limited. The FMLN and its political wing, the IPevcrlutionary Democratic Front (FDK), are the latest in the fine of modern Latin American revolutionary movements distinguished by broadbased, multicfass coalitions, Perhaps as a result, the FMtN has become the first such organization to reach an acccrmmodation with the very gc->t"ernrnentit w s trying trt rtvertbrow. Sendero Luminoso, in contrast, is substantially different from the four cases considered here. Katlzer than seehng accommodatian with the goxrnment-or even with potentially like-minded allies-Sendero has chosen the route ofc'"prieing viofence," in a total war against atf. Can institutionalization anci consalidation, and particularly the nation of:consolidation, offer insight into either of these processes-which have yet to achieve political victory? In other words, what might these concepts tetl us about revcdtutionary processes such as El Salvador's, quiescent at this writitlg, or Peru's, which at this writing seems to be on the verge of new extremes of struggle?

El Salvador:A Second-Generation RevaEution Reaches an Accommodation The revolutionary process in El Sal~adcrrhas attracted a great deal of attention from scholars since the early 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~There - ? wc~uldseem to be two primary reasons for this, The first is the rote played by the United States, whose ixtvolvernent in El Salvador has been its most overt, extensive, and lung-lasting interventittn in Latin America since the introduction of the Good Neighbor Policy in the 1930s. The semnd factor seems to have been the massiw, systematic violence employed

134


by the Salvadoran government against tlze population: In eleven years approximately 75,000 people were killed. According to Booth and Walker, ""Virtually all objective observers blame at least 80 percent of these deaths" on the Safvadctran government and its affiliated death squads.'"n early 1992, hawever, El Salvador's revolutionary mtt-vement and government reached an accord that ended the fighting and outlined a plan fbr the reintegration of the revolutionaries into the gctvernment and society, The SaXvadorans can trace their revolutionary struggle tcr the ill-fated indigenous and peasant uprisings of 1932, remembered as Ea h/fatanza (the Slaughter). More immediately>however, the revolutionary situation evolved in the early 1970s and was fueled by massi* gctvernrnent terror and brutality; by 1979 the government was murdering trtPer a thousand peoylte a month,lj In late 11979 there was an allegedly ""rformistr" "civil-military coup d2tat. Within the next year some of the moderate and leftist civil and popular organizations bancled together as the FUK, and the corzntry" five guerrilla groups of various Marxist stripes united as the FMLN; shortly thereafter, these two groups ft~sedinto one organization, the FMLN-FDIZ, with a political wing (FDK) and a military wing (EMLN). The FMLN-FDR received international recognition as a legitimate opposition f-trceai6 The FMLN-FUR tlzus resembles the other social revolutionary movements we have been assessing. It is most similar to the FSLN in Nicaragua, but cXear and meaningful ccrmyarisons can alst:, be made with Bolivids MNR, M-26-7 in Cuba, and the NJM in Grenada." m a t all share, albeit to varying degrees, is a bmadbased, multiclass character conclucive to coalition politics, Moreover, the FMLNFDfl, has linkages to the Mexican rewltztion and ttr figures such as Sandino, whom MartI briefly joined in Nicaragua, as well as strctng bonds with both the Cubans ancl tlze Nicaraguans, The FMLN-FUIZ situates itself, according to one crbserwr, "in the democratic revc3lutionary tradition of the Mdestern Hemisphere, which encompasses such diverse experiences as the American, Mexican, and Cuban revolutions, as welt as myriad Ytiberalhr nationalist revolutions ancl p e r riIla mclvernents atper the past t~ hundred years."lB Just as the C ~ ~ b revolrttionaries an bad, the FMLN-FUIZ was able to control significant parts of El Salvador; at times as much as a third of the country was ""liberated territory.'' h these areas, the FMLN-FUR effiectivety operated as a gclvernment seeking trt intrcjduce its social revolutionary project. During the decade-long struggle, the FMLN-FL>Kestablished schools, lzospitals, a justice systern, social welfare y rograms, and accountable local gcrwrnments. Partially reflecting these accomplishments, the FMLN-FDR by the mid- 1980s had shifted from a more radical project focused on nationalization, economic planning, and agrarian reft~rmto one of meeting socicteconomic needs, demanding respect for human rights, and renewing notions of Safcivadoran nationatism.19 The imyl-essive degree of institutionalization tlzat occurrecl within the FMLN-FDK-damir~ated areas indicates that some degree of consolidation was reached. Despite its best


11 35

military anci political efforts, lzowevel; tlze FMLN-FUK was tlnable to establislz itself beycrnd its rural stronghrrlds, Between f 98 I and 3 989 the FMLN-FDR larrnched several " h a t offensives,'" substaattaX mifi~aryeffurts it~teaciedto oust the Salvadoran government; they did not result in the military defeat of the gc>vernmentor the demise of the FMLNFDR," O stalemate lingered while talks b e ~ e e nthe government and the FMLNFUIZ sputtered off and on between 1984 and 1989, When the FMLN-FL>R's 1989 offensix highlighted the continuing political-military impasse, the talks were pursued with a new intensity; they culminated in the 1992 agreement on a wideranging plan that brought an enci to tlze war anci laid tlze grounchork for the incorporation"" of the revcrlutionaries into "civilian, political, and institutional life.'" 1 Like the Nicaraguan elections, the Salvadoran peace accords raise the question of where tlzis leaves the revolutionary process. The glib response is tlzat the revolution is rrver. Yet that is not entirely clear. The revt3lutionaries were not militarily defeated and were able to negotiate a political and saciat accord with the government as equals. Altlzouglz the primary focus of the accord was on the military and the security forces, implticit in the agreement reached was acceptance of some core elements of the revotutionary project. FM1,N leader Shafik Handaf,pointed out that there was a basic agreement on '~ocioeconomicmatters: including such critical issues as ""the just distribution of land, the elirninaticrn of huge farms, the financing of farm credits, the expropriation of haciendas and farms which are larger tlzan 245 lzectares [an area larger than 500 football fields].'"2 Some obserwrs cautioned that these represent only minor socioeconomic reforms, but mast observers agreed that they nonetheless signal the beginning of a new process." It iis thus yltausible to argue that the FMLN-FUR, despite its failing to achieve a political victory analogous to the four cases ccrnsidered here, did achieve some degree of consatidation, Of murse, we must construe consotidation somewhat differently tlzan we have been, posititlg consolidation as predicated upon yczlitical victczry, At the same time, the ccrncept of a3nsolidation draws attention to the anitudes of and the role played by people, ~ c usefu' r ul components for explaining the unprecedented negotiated resolution of revolutionary confiict in El Salvador. The success of the FMLN-FUR in presenting its revolutionary project to the population and convincing people to embrace it served it well in bringing tlze gcrvernment to the negotiating table, If ccrre etements of the revt3lutionary project are integrated into El Salvador" social, potiticaf, military, and economic structures as well, it is not imylatlsible to argue that tlze revolutionary process, in some sense, ccrntinues, This is even more the case if, as has been suggested, the Salvadczran government respects the instituticrns and structrrres that the FMIdN-FU42created anci maitltained in the country's '""tierated territoriesI91r is Fdr too soon to say with any certainty that the war in El Safvador is over; at the same time, recent events suggest that revotutionary organizations similar to the FMLN-FDR may

136


achieve political victories of a different sort and consolidate the process in new ways. In 1997 the FMLN won not only the mayoralty of San Sal~adcrr,the most t other key cities that, important potitical office after the presidency, b u ~ h a of combined, contained 45 percent of the population. The FMLM also won the second-largest bloc in the Congress, twenty-seven of eighty-fc~urseats (the ruling ARENA party won twenty-eight)," A "negotiated revolution:" saving " d o t of blood, a lot of f~l-tmanlives, anci a tot of destruction" i s a compelling anci powerful c~ncept.~"

Peru: A New Generation. of Revolution in the Andes? The Peruvian Communist Party-Shining Pdth (PGP-SL), commanty referred to as Sendero Lumit-toso (the Shining Path), made its first public appearance it-t 1980." Since, academics and other obsertrers have struggled to understand and explain Sendercr Luminoso. There are, however, some areas of consensus, chief among them that it is ~ ~ n l i kany e otlzer revolutionary movement witnessed in Latin America. Particularly notable have been SenderoH disdain for either atlies or compromise and its enshrinement of violence, If interpretations of Sendero Luminoso are somewhat controversial, its history is weif documented: The outlines are reasonably clear, and the imminent transltation of wcorks by leading Peruvian scholars will hrther enhance our knowIedge.27 Sendero originated out of a series of splits within the kruvian Ctrmmunist party betwen 1964 and 1970. Under the leadersl~ipof Abimael Guzmkn, a philosophy prokssor from one of Peru's regional uniwrsities, the Senderistas spent the 1970s developing anci ref nit-tg their perspective anci their plans, Peruvian antl-tropologist Cartos Ivhn Llegregori, one of the leading scholars of Sendero, pointed out that this strategy was the opposite of what most of the Peruvian Left were dcting at the same time. The result of Sendero's inward turn anci isolation was '"ideological rigidity and organic cohesiveness, until it became a sort of dwarf star-the kind in which matter gets so compressed it acquires a specific wight, disproporticrnate to its size."B h 191980, as Peru returned to democracy; Sendero Luminoso emerged publicly to denounce the election, Since then, Sendero has managed ttr control parts of rural Peru, black out the capital of Lima at will, and maintain its relatively isolated status-it seems to have made no mare than the occasional, transitory alliance in order to reach a particular objective and continues to brutally attack all those not amflated with it, Senciero Luminoso" antipathy for allies-internal or external-does not fit with the cases ccrnsidered here: Even the closet Stalinists in Grenada's NJM sought allies and forged alliances. Sender05 sonfy connection to Peru's rich revolutianary heritage (which ranges from Tdpac Amaru in tlze sktcenth century, Tixpac Amaru I1 in the eighteenth century, Victor Haya Be fa Torre's American I3opular Alliance party in the 1920s, 1930s, and f 94Os, Hugo Bianco in the f 960s, and even the first


11 37

years of the late 1960s revolutionary military government) is its vague invocation of the fc~underof the Peruvian Communist party> ]cos& Carlr-ts Mari6tegui.l" Sendero has brutally attacked all of Peru5 progressive forces as wetf as the other major-and more traditionally Latin American-revolutionary movement.3Q Particularly brutal murders of progressive leaders of the poor illustrates their consistent determination to leave no middle ground in Senderok drive to heighten the contradictions," SclzoXars and observers concurrecl that Sendem forges alliances only with those that it can control; as a result it has at times made strategic choices to reach its obje~t-ives,~~ If Senclero Luminosa% internal linkages are few, its external connections are nonexistent. Acccrrding to Henry Uietz, a leading Sendero scholar in the United States, Sendero receixs "virtualtly nothing from outside sources. . . . Moreover, this absence of material support is by intent."3"ome of Scndero's earliest public activities (in f 980-1 98 1) included attacks on tlze Soviet, Chinese, Cuban, and Nicaraguan embassies in Lima.@ In its perception, the Soviets had betrayed the people" interests and the Chinese were ""capitalist-imperialist dctgs," in part, the Sendero ctaimecl, because Mao 6~ileclto go 6ir enough with the Cultural Revolution. Other Latin American revc-tluticrnaries, notably the Cubans and the FSLN in Nicaragua, have been ""ecoria.~-ed. . . as 'petty bourgeois refc3rmis~s,"~"hastro is a "traitor;""imply a "revisionist servant of tlze United States;"nd Guevara was a ""corus girl."" The failure of the Nicaraguans as revolutionaries was most evident in their willingness to turn over power after losing the f 990 etectic1n,~8 There are a few external reference points that Sendero Luminoso both invc>kes and evcokes: One is Mao" Cultural IPevolution, although Sender03 reverence for it is tempereda39The otlzer common rekreace point is ""the specter of Cambodia's Pot Pot ancl the Khmer Rouge.'"o In both cases, the ideas that were appropriated connect violence with succes~.In spite of Latin America" long tradition of revolutionary activity, the discussions of Sendercr Lurninoso dct not cite the region" cold quasi-revolrttionary movements, the broad-based, mutticlass Latin American revolutionary moxments considered here, or even the region" nnarrcjwer, mrrre violent urban revolutionaries of the f 960s and 19.70~~ According to Gustavo Gorriti, another of Peru's premier ""Senderologtsts,"" Sendero is ""wholly unrelated to other Latin rebellionsP"1 Moreover, he contended that "in Latin America" violent milieu, the Shining Path insurgency stands out.'"z Along with its self-imposed isolation, perhaps the defining characteristic of Sendero Luminoso is its glorification of violence. This is where Sendero relates most directly to the Khmer Rouge and Mao" CuZturaf Xtevcdtution; for that matter, it is perhaps where they lzave a connection to the French revolution, in which terror became an instrument of the rewlutionary process, Sendero has, according to Degregori, cc"maximtzedand lionized violencen~;another obsemer contended that its message "is that terror, not bmad support'hill bring power" Peruvian researcher Nelson Manrique concurred, adding that what "matters is not so much that adversaries are being eliminated in ever increasing numbers, but how the

138


killing is done-with fury and an orgy of extreme cruelty,"M Senclero's 6~varite wctrds, according to Americas Watch, ""are dest.roy, eradicate, erase, and dismgt~tle"; Americas Watch concluded that there "can be no question that murder of the defenseless, often in grotesque P~slzion,is Senclero poticy."""- h the estimation of Sendero"~leader, CtlzmBn, ""Violence is a tzniversal law . . . without revc>lutionary violence, one class cannot be substituted for anctthex;an old order cannctt be overthrown to create a new one,"& As a result, Starn arguecl, for the Senderistas, to ""kill is to contrihte to the forging of %a Wueva Llem~cracia,~ Tb die is to become a martyr:"? SeacZero Lumitloso has been able to controf parts of Peru, including some of the shantytc3wns arotznd Lima, and is particularly strong in its home base in the department of Ayacucho. In the areas that Sendero does control or innuence, there has been some attempt to institutionaii~a system of government, Gorritl describecl Sendero control as reflecting its policies in ""emmunal afpairs, itlcluding education, security, and taxes.'%4 Sender03 control, however, is ultimately predicated on a brutat system of justice, often summarily carried out according to its precepts." T k r e has been no real effort to "win the bearts and minds" of the yctyulation, except perhaps through terror against those Sendero has determined are the ""enemies" of the popufation-increasingly often people who seek to organize and lead the population in the struggle for their riglzts. Seaclero appears to believe in the salutary effect of heightened ccrntradictions and immersion in the revolutionary struggle, It has made net discernible attempts to create trust or develop a sense of opportunity; the vision of the ft~tureit offers is vague, perhaps intentionally so-soEmpowerment is attainable onfy thrctugh the party GonsoXidatian, to the degree that any effort has been made at it, appears to be rooted in a brutal application of revofutionary justice tlzat grows out of- Senclerofsdefining theory, the power, promise, and purification inherent in violence, In some ways Peru" ssituacan does resemble that of EI Salvador. Sendero Luminoso's violence, for example, has not occurred in a vacuum, The Per~~vian mifitary has matched the Senderistas-brutality with brutality and far surpassed their record of killing. Most scholars and observers agreed that Peru's matary is responsible for the deaths of most of'tlze 20,000 people klled since 1980." Another similarity with El Salvador is the apparent stalemate between the government and Sendero Lumtnoso. Unlike the case with El Salvador" FMLN-FUR, however, this has not prompted Senclero Luminoso to consider negotiations, If anytlzing, tlze recent coup shrtuld strengthen Sender03 effort to ""highten the contradictions" of Peruvian society and bring tl-re country further into crisis, This is atso, theref(,re, a critical jrzncture for the revolutionary process. Having sought to bring Peru to crisis, Sendero finds its predictions confirmed by the cotzp; the destruction of demacraq seems unlikety to halt the revolutionaries' acti~itiesand bodes if1 for the fttture. Sendero Luminoso has made itself ubiquitous in Peruvian societythe working assumption is that it has infiltrated virtuaffy every level of society.52 Most observers believe that Sendero, at least as it is currently configured, cannot


11 39

win, but they have little confidence that the government can defeat Senciero.9 llespite the dramatic 1992 capture of Guzmkn, Sendero nonetheless retains strength in the countryside and has the ability to last for the Iong term. Although it is doubthl tlzat Sender0 will again tlzreaten to take control of:the state, as it seemed so close to doing in 1992, there is every reason to expect the group siH become Peru's '""chronic insurgenq.'"'" Certainfy the abject failure of the Peruvian government to improve conditions for the vast majority of tl-te population provides Sendero with fertik grotznd,

The f nstitutionalizalisn and Consolidation of Revolutions-in-Progress Institutionalization as it has been conceptualized lzere-rooted in tlze state structures-would of course have to be reconfigured to be of: much use in analy~ing rewtutions-in-progressS Llominguez and Mitchell's scrrk on the role of revolutionary parries suggested one approach that w u l d likely prctve fruitful; Wickham-Crowley's analysis of the wise anci 6ifX of what Ize referred to as ""guerrilla governments" might be another,'TThere is undoubtedly some utility in considering institutictnalization within territory controlled by revolutionaries, but it is unclear what is gained by doing so. Consofidation would also have to reconceptualizeci, but less dramatically so, and the payoff:may be greater. If the relationship b e ~ e e n the revotutionaries and the population is important-most revolutionaries see it as central-tlzen a focus on tlze elements tlzat f have proposed as canstituting consolidation w u l d seem extremely tzseful. The same factors that enable consolidation-trust, sense of oyyortuniz-y,and a vision of the future, all undergirded with the perception of: empowerment-should be useful in assessit~gthe status of the revc>lutionaryprocess prior to political victory.

THE CONSQL1DATlG)N OF SOCIAL MVOLUT10N The brief discussion in this chapter highfights the twct most critical aspects of sacial revolution. The power of social revolution may Iie in its promise of possibilities, but tl-te reality lies in reconciliation and the adaptations necessary to keep the hrrye alive, The project of social revolution is to transform society and the in&viduals who constitute it, that is, to take peopfdbeyond politics so that they live the revolution. I n practice such a program confronts very real limits. T11e economic and yc->liticalvagaries of the international system, domestic pressures, even natural disasters, all combine to present the sociat revolution with a constant cl-tallenge. As Robert Darnton suggested aborzt the per>yte of France at the time of the French revolution, the people in social revolutionary societies are not extraordi-

140


nary: They are unexceptional people who find themselves in exceptional circumstances." Determined to build a better fife, they find the promises of the social revoiuticzn battered as the saciaf revolutionary process unfolds. The immense majority of: humanity five in fear for themselves and their clzildren-fear of: hunger; of disease, of ignorance, of abuse. As long as people are Ebrced to live like this, they will seek both freedctm from such a life and their Bigniy as human beings. The cf~allengetlzus becomes not only to reach the vision of the sociat revolutionary project but also to continue the process,

Epilogue: The Future of Revolution in Latin America and the CaribbeanCanon and Revision Much of this boolc has been devoted to questicrning the canonical theories of revolution and arguing for a new vocabufary in our examinations of revoIutions, specifically for the need to recognize a meaningful distinction between tlze institutionalization and the consolidation of revc>lutionary processes. I have tried throughout to demonstrate that such a revision is more than simply a mafier of semantics; rathel; it is a revisioning meant to capture real people intentionally making real and consequential choices in a real world and an endeavc)r to create for them a more substantial place in the academic study of revoluticrn. As X will suggest later, only by taking people ancl tlzeir actions into account can we make sense of the current revt)lutionary processes in Latin America and the Caribbean. A nearly five-hundred-year-old tradition of rebellion and revolution in Latin America ancl the Caribbean"uggests we should be vary of reant claims about the demise of rewlutions, that their "vogue" has passed,%onsigned to the margins of history, with any remnants being inexplicable Cold War leftovers perhaps even Fdilen into the hands af nefarious drug traffickers, Xn the region taday are active rewlutionary situations-significant guerrilla molrements cjperate in at least Colombia (the Xtevotutionary Armed Forces of Ccrlombia [FARCI), iMexico (the People's llevolutionary Army [EPK] ancl the Zapatista Army far National Liberation EZLN] ), and R r u (the TrClpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement [MRTAj and Sendero Luminoso). Moreover, the democratic procedures and ""neotiberat reforms:" whiclz lzave done little a r nothing to promote either the empowerment af largely disenfranchised people or the social welfare of prafc~undlyimpverished populations, wctuld seem to be laying the groundwork for those of tomc~rrow. Xt is important not to exaggerate. tJemocracy-syecificaI1y Western democratic procedures-has been far more successful in Latin America and the Caribbean during this cycle; democraq is wider, if not necessarily deeper, than in any previous cycle. During tlze 1980s ancl 1990s tlze trend toward democracy was strong and steady; every ccruntry in the region except Cuba has had free, open, and fair elections, and many have experienced the peaceful transfer of power bemeen op-

positlg parties, X n a region notoriously c a d toward democratic proceciures and the relil~quishmentof office, these are no small feats. Equaily striking have been the attention and at least nominal commitment to, if no-espect for, human rights anci dignity and some of the tangible efforts made in these areas. Yet even a cursory examination of the state of the hemisphere shows that meaningf~tldemocratic practices remain weak. Few of these democracies are inclusive-based instead on elite pacts and the continued marghalization of the region" indigenous populatis~ns-and notable setbacks have occurred: the autogoi"pe, dubbed a "RGjicctup:' in Peru; the coup in Haiti; the popularly supported coup attempts in Venezueta; Paraguay's "noncoup";-;"Ecuador" ccanstitutionally dubious ""congressional coup" (in which the military served as the final arbiter and kingmaker); continuing popular calls far a cotzy in Panama; the rote of Guatemala" military in first supporting and then destroying an effort to emulate the Fujicoup with a Serra~zazo;illtimations of continzaktno by Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentina; and ominous noises from the military and its partisans in both Brazil and Chile, where General Pincrchet l-ras retired from the military and moved into his lifetime seat in the senate. As for human rights, although the generals are back in their barracks, they have left their iegacy and retain their minions. A palpable sense of justice has not yet taken hold in mucl1 of tlze region, and death squads remain activc in a number of countries-most notably El Salvador, Peru, Guatemala, and Brazil-and are resurgent in others. Dernocrac-y in Latin America and the Caribbean is arguably institutionalized, although I would be remiss not to note tl-tat countries across the region find themselves with corrupt and ineffective judiciaries, weak and often aimless political parties, subservient iegistatures, and militaries that remain out of the reach of civilian control. Tl1e instantiation of democracy, lzowever-what in the context of this book might be wnstrued as demrrcratic wnsolidation-remains etusive.4 At the end of the twentieth century, more people in Latin America and the Caribbean live in poverty than did twenty years ago, and incame distribution lzas wrsened.The numbers remain staggeril-rg:""Nearly hatf the region's 460 million people are poor-an increase of 60 million in one decade. Meanwhile, the number of Latin American billionaires rose from six in 1987 to 42 in 1994, a figure that is widely repcrrted and resentedSnTThesocial and economic deprivation is stulti+ing. And political ""rhrrns" not confy have yet to make meaningf~tirldifferences in the material conditions of people's everyday lives bat have also 6~ilecito transfc~rm their idecrlogical conditions; as a result, they undercut the w r y democratic processes it is ciairned they portend. This suggests that not only are the structural conciitions present that make revolution a possibility but that increasingly frrtstrated popufations will begin to cast about for ways in which to change their wctrld-and revolutian remains one such option, The Failure of nealiberalism to redress the grievances of tlze region's poor and disprrssessed is ever more apparent. Again, it is imprrrtant not to exaggerate. W e r e a s the advent of neoliberafism was driven at least in part by the paucity of

credible alternatives for solving the widespread economic P~iluresthat had become endemic to Latin America and the Caribbean, the region" rewlutionaries have not produced a markedly better record in confronting the monumental inequities tlzat are commonpXace thmugl~outthe region. Profounci political, economic, or social transformation a n y h e r e in the region has remained elusive Ebr all sides. If the region" modern revotuticzns have not probundly changed the material conditions of people" lives, tlzey have lzad a lasting impact on tlzeiw idealogical conditions, changing their perceptions of their place in the m r l d and their views of their relationship with both the government and themsefves,~ But will revolution as we are used to it be the path tlzese people take? Social movements seem to have center stage at this point, enabled and ennobled by transnational issue networks that have clearly had real influence. Communalism, especially related to indigenous peoples, continues to expand, Associatians around gender, ecology, and religion appear vibrant, But successes to date are shallow and few, and frustration seems to be mounting, The potential for and possibiliv of revotutionary activity as a plausible method of redressing the grievances of millions of yeayle iz-t the region remains real. Real too is the extent to which the modern revolutionary mythos-the commitment to potitical, econczmic, social, psychoIogtcal, and cultural justice-resonates with embattled and embitterred populatons the global tide of nealiberalism is drowning, driving and inspiring peoylte to seek tc>change the material and idec>logicalconditions of their everyday fives. It seems extremely unlikely that the current lull in relative terms of what might be considered revolutionary activity will last. Real people in the real wcjrtd will continue tc>struggle far justice and dignity regardless of whether W choose to recognize it as such, whether "reevoiuticzn" may have lost some of its teleological dimension-a contested proposition-or even whether we define the phenomena we are interested in as ""rw31utionn or something else.8 A surprising number of people under an array of: circumstances have left the private space of tl-teir homes and fouglzt in public space for public goods in pursuit of private desires, How and why they cross that thresbrzld from the inside to the outside in an effort to transfcjrm their w r f d remains the central pvrj.,zi.,te for us all. Students of: revolrttion need to take seriously the notion that tlzearies of: revc>lutionare rooted in and driven by individuals and the culture they create and transmit, This occurs primarily through the mechanisms of collective memory, symbolic politics, and the social context of politics inciividuafs create.%s long as people(s) confronted with pr~fc)undinequities and unable to redress their grievances through the existing system articulate compelling stories with engaging and empowering plots, revolutions will be made. " " X f ~ b uHave Ghosts, Then E"ou Have Everphing"

Glfective memory, symbc)Iic politics, and the power and potential of that tool kit in the social context of politics are cridcaX to our unders~andingof the state and future

of: revolution. A number of implications flow from this; twa are important here. The first is that the way(s) in which we ccrnstruct history and our understanding rrf it is heavily peopled, populated by the constructs we put there and the way we unders~andthem; places both real and imagined are """prsonedPmPeople tell ancl retell stories of resistance and rebellion, stories imbued with great meaning, freighted with import, and f d l c~fghcrsts of tl-tepast who still haunt-and perhaps even interact witl-t-our present. Thus people in Mexico speak of: revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata-murdered in 1919-in the present tense and contintze to report stghtings of his fabled white horse, and people from around the world claim Che Guevara is still dive, spotted "like the white horse of Zdgata. He is everyhere.'" This relates to the second important point, In Griswold's compelling estimation, "The meanings attribtzted to any cultural object are fabrications, woven from the symbotic capacities of the object itself and from the perceptual apparatus of those who experience the object."" 2riswt)ld captures something prafc~undand impcrrtant that resonates in Latin America and the Caribbean: There is apparently ""an old Andean traditicrn, specifically &male, which conceives of history as a wcrven cloth; it consists in recog~zizingthe warp and weft3the texture, tlze forms of relationships, in b o w i n g the back from the front, the vafue and significance of the detailed patem, and so on. In other words, we are trying to read in the book of life tl-tat wbiel-t has never been recarded in written form; we are attempting to c a p t ~ ~ r e the image brought to mind and rexaled in the msrment of the interview before it r are derived from wha and what we is iost again to slIence.""" J ~ i understanclings are, particularly as revealed by the stories we tell ancl the ideology and ideas they reflect, facets deeply embedded in the culture(s) W create. This suggests that we have to pay afitenticrn ncrt onfy to people and the stories they tell but also to the cantext in which they tell them, It means, in addition, recognizing that many of the world" peoylte live in a time of their cwn-if time Ear mare acutely mythological than cl~ronological." Hence the calm explanation from Cornmanclante Kamona of Mexico's EZLN that lzer people have struggled for five hundred years and more and wiH think nothing of struggling for another five hundred years or longer. Although to many such phrasing seems lirtfe more than rhetoric, X conteacl that it reflects a different ~~nclerstanding of:both time and pltace, of a world that is perhaps just outside our tzsual social science andlor rationalistic realm. It is in this sense, as I will touch on later, that an ""atien" mctdept such as magical realism-a literary concept commonly associated witl-t some Latin American and Caribbean literature-may be of some tzse in understanding what in the context of the new w r l d order might be seen as magical revolutions,

Toward a New Vocabulary Eor Revolution Attempting to link the future of revcrlution in Latin America and the Caribbean with the Latin American and Caribbean literary concept of magical realism is perhaps not intuitive, Usrrally attributed to Crrban writer Atejo Carpentier in the

1940s, the term magical reatkm is used to denote a literary style that blends fact and fiction." The tzse here prompted by Latin America and the Caribbean's sloried tradition of revolution and rebelfion in which, to borrow Kapuicihski's brief description of Latin America as a whole, "Fz.ct. is mixed with fantasy here, truth with myth, realism with rhetoric."lb Thus the ccrncept of magicat revolzltiarz, meant-however inelegantly-m inrsoke magical realism, might be of some use in assessit~grevolutionary processes under way in contemporary Latin America and the Caribbean. There is, in some sense, a recurring plot fine with regard to revofutions in Latin America ancl the Caribbean: Revolutions happen; they are practically part of the region" 'k"romanticn&>ra and fauna," Moreover, as SBncl~ezLira and Vitlarreal have pointed out, "we ail know that many Worth American leftist intellectuats have a tendency to romanticize the violent social processes south of the border, It seems that, for tlsern, we will always be curious and exotic subjects in need of redemptic>n:"g Certainfy North American and Eurcrpean scholars have displayed such a penchant since the Mexican revolution and have exhibited popular fascination in tl-tose regions with the Mexican revolution, especiatfy tlze ""heoic" p e sentations of IJanchc) Villa and Erniliano Zapata, and with the Cuban revc3lution and the mythotcrgizlng of Gbe-a prcrcess that more than thirty years after his death appears apace, even reneweel. Yet Me~co's"modern'Tapatistas, the members of the EZLN, consciously sought to evoke the romanticism of revolution in ~ ~ alf, who is credited with deciaring that it is choosing their name; it is Z a p a " after ""btter to die on one's feet than live on one's knees"""-a phrase rimled in its romanticization of revc>lutton onty by Che's pprclamatisn recentfy invoked by Peru's Guevarist MKTA, named after modern Peru's first great revotuticznary hero, that the "true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love.'" The utility of magical revotution for making sense of the revotutionary process under way in Colombia seems somewhat limited, Yet lve decades of:""csronic insurgencyB"2"l-rave recently reached a point where Colombia" FARC seems prepared to contend for state power. The FAKC has built a strong local base, predominantly tlzrougls its emphasis on lancl reform ancl greater democratization of the Ccrlombian political system, With 13,000 soldiers and perhaps another 4,000 members in allied movements, the FARC may be the largest and best armed revolutionary movement in the world today.21 As a result, it has been able to establish effectively a duaf-pwersystem in much of Colombia, with large ""liberated zones" and a presence in the majority of the country" muninicigafities-all of which has resulted in increased U.S. intervention in Colombia.2~Reliable available information does suggest that the FARC is consciously seeking to both institutionalize and consolidate its hold on those regions it controls; whether it will be able to extend that control throughout the country remains to be seen. In Peru, on the other hand, magical revc>lutisn certainly seems to apply. Sendero Lurninoso" uunusuat stance and actions, discussed in Chapter 5, seem to

refiect a decidedly magical realist approaclz to the world it1 which the group's members have proclaimed themselves the intellectual heirs to the French revr~lutionary Left, to Mao" Cultural Revolution in China, and to Pcrf Pert's Cambodia (both of whom are seen as havitlg hileci to go far enough), as well as considering Sendero to be the center of worfd Marxism. Despite its very real threat to Peruvian stabilitlt; Sendero seems unlikely to contend for pcower any time soon, The same can be said for tlzose who purport to represent the ghost af T6pac Amaru, the members of Peru's MRTA. The MRTA starts from a mtzch more familiar place, invoking Che and the Cuban revofuticrn, the Andean revolution, and trrugully's urban guerrillas the T~~pamaros, especially in its Robin Hood plzase. But it tcro has magical realist altusio>ns,Manco Inca's rebetition against the Spanish occupiers in l536 lasted tzntif 1572, when his last surviving son, T~lpacAmaru, was captured and beheaded. In f "78 Tdpac Amaru XI, along with Tfigac Katari in Bolivia, spearheaded the Great Andean Rebellion until he was captured and quartered by the Spanish. Fused in popular memory, these Tdpac Amarus became the subjects of a variety of folktales and tegends, as wetX as the basis for other revcdtutionary movements in tlze 1920s and 1960s prior to the emergence of tlze MitTA. The primary fbci of this version of T6pac Amaru have been the seizure of state p o w r and the promise of social justice, This currently smatl group seems to pose little threat to state powex= Another Cuev"cf.ristperspective is seen in Mexictfi EIJR, whose members are arguably ""cassic" Cuban-style Latin American revcrlutionaries.Their June f 996 Manifesto of Agua Blancas announced their intention, led by a vang~zardparty, to overthrow the government with the use of arms and to bring people" demrrcracy. and social justice to Mexico, The EPR is a merger of fourteen smaller groups, akin in this sense ta organizations such as the FSLN in Nicaragua anci the FMLN in Ef Salvador; the mrrst important of these grotzps appears to be the armed wing of the early 1970s leftist group Party of the Poor, perhaps the region" for example, John Foran, ""Discourses and Social Forces: The Role of Culture and Cuitrrral Studies in Understanding Revolutions," in Foran, ThmrkE'ng Revolutz'otzs,or Eric Selbin, "I?evollution in the lteal World: Bringing Agency Back I d Y n Tke~rizz'u;sa Xevolullians, Probably the most rxotable exceptions to this have heen Wolf, I)etasarzt \Vat-s ofthe ?i.vPntiethC:ent~r$and Scott, The Mval Ectjnon~y($the Petjsunt, for wllorn people are ctearjy relevant. Wickl~am-Crowleyrecently suggested that Waif? Pectsartt Wars of the 'Ibetztieth C;entury; Paige, Agrarian Re~wl'utkn;and C. Titly, From M~biiizatlutlI ~ Ke~jc~luriorz I (New Uark: ltalsdom House, 1978), all agreed that ""movernel~tsmake revolutiot~s"fl.Wickham-Crowley, (;uerrillfasund Revol'urz'nnin La d l .America: ~ R (,2ur11~um five Stud)) of lrzsurgents rnvzd Regimes Since 1956 (Princeaxl: Princetoll University Press, tW22),pp. 5-6. It is cer~ainty the case that Paige and "filly, who will be discussed here, provided space for people, partictrIarly in ccar~trastto strudur&jistsrepresented by work such as T: Skocpoi, Strttes and k c i a f Relrnlutiorz (Ca~~fbridge: Caxnbridge Ut~iversityPress, 1979).The mntentio1.t here, however, is that in both cases people remain at the mercy of what are understood here as stniatlres. 15. See Habsbawm, who argued that ""corrmparative students of rerrtjltxtion in the past ge~lerationhave concentrated their attention overcvhelming2y on its causes and the cir-

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

1151

curnstances determining its outbreak or success'? E. Hobsbawm, "Mevolution:Yn R, Porter and M. Teic1-1,eds., Kevt~lutiurzit9 f1isrory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 119861, p. 115. 16, As Wickham-Crowley pointed out to me, i~lstitrttionalizatiuahas some broader irnplicatiotls in the social sciences. I11 sociology, fafar example, "it refers to the creation of hortds taken for granted,' with their accormpanyi~zgvalues and norms, In the key insritzxtional areas of family*religioxl, political life, econornic life, etc."I~n political science, howhas largety become confiated with state-buitding andlor ever, the term irzstituti~r~aEizf~tZ'ny1 the maintenance of state stnicturea Since part of the arglment here is that institutionalization and corzsoiidation are profoundly and Intimately- related, this duality, or perl~aps, possibility, is exactly the reason that I have chosen to use the word instz'tutinnulizu~irtrz, 17. This is not to deny the obvious proftrsioxl of collcomitant uninter~dedcallsequences as well, 18, Hobsbawrn, ""Ievolution:>y. 2 1 . Such Gameworks, for Wobsbawrn, appexed to be i~zstitutionaltybased. Walker similarjy argued that if revolutiorzs are in fact to be revtllrrtionary, they ""must im~nediatelyexnbark on social prograxns designed to improve the human condition of the previorrsly exploited ma-iority. . . . Such programs are important rxot only for their i~ltrinsichuman impact but also because they provide opportunities fur popular participation and tend to build a social base for the revoltxtiorx": Walker, ""Xtroduction," p. 4. As with Hohsbaw~n,however, the prograrns and legislation that Walker listed are largely ir-tstitutionalin character and ot-qjective. 19. Interview. lecin, Nicaragua f 1989). 20. See also Knigilt, who suggested that a successful revolutiorl is denoted by ""substantial and irreversible socio-political changen":night, ""Social Revolution,""p. 181. 21. M, X, FinXey, "ltevoIutian in Axltiquity:" in R, Porter and M. Teich, eds,, Revolution in FIistnry f Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 47, 22. Same feel the term has so lost its utility that social scientists should dispense with it entirely. IPerllapsthe strorzgest case made for this can be found In J. Walton, Reluctulzt Rebels: C:ot~zj?arariveStudies c$ Revolutiorz and Ulzclerde24elojrur1ent f New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 23. Finley, "Rewlution in Antiquity," p. 47. 24, R, Ap,'cPoyuiar Xnterventio~~ in Revolutionary Situations:" in C. Bright and S. Warding, eds., St-r3lemizkifzgalzcl Social ,Vovemenis: Eissgys in izlrislory alzri TIteary f Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 19841, p. 323. Aya yreifaced this with a point similar to Finleyks,rxotitzg that there is "no strch thing" as a ""correct" "finition since " " d f i n i t i ~are ~ neither right nor wrong" (p. 322). 25, Goldstone, ""Theories of Revoltxtion." Goldstone corzsiderd Paige, Agrur-iurz Xe~lolufz'nn;S. N . Eisenstadt, Re~jc~ludurzs and the 2j"uns$1rlrzatz'nnof Societies f New York: Free Press, t 9 B ) ; E. K, Trirnberger, RevoEudon ji.orrz Abnl~e(New Brunswick: 'rransaction, t 978); and d Revc~lufz'nn,as the "third generation" tltheorists. I \vottld add ColdSIiocpc>L,Stales u ~ Sociuf stclne Xzil-rmseilf to this list; see J, Goldstone, Rewlution and Rebellion in the ixiurly Mcldern 1VnrEl-l (Berkeley: University of Catiforxria Press, 1991). A good brief overview of Goldstone3 cot~tributiox~ is X", Mosl~iri,"Itevolutionary Confiict Theory in an Evolutionary Perspective," hz Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, Revoltitions of the Late 7"~teuzlktizC:erztury, pp. 29-35. 26. This "first generation,'kccording to Goldstone, "Theories of Revtlltxtion," p. 425, Includes l'? Sorokin, "TheSocioirogj~t?fKevi~ltktion(Philadelphia: Liyyincott, 1925); L. Edwards,

152

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

The N;:ErlarltlIIistt?ryof Revolution (Chicago: tiniwrsity of Chicago Press, t 927); G. Pettee, 2'he 12roctlffofRevolulintz (New h r k : Harper, 11 338); and C. Brinton, Rntziovny ofRewl~liior~ (New York: Vintage, 1965). 27. The "second ge~leration"theorists listed by GoMstone, ""Theories of Revolution," p. 425, include J. Davies, "prowarda Theory of ElevoIutianPAvnerict~tjSocinlogictzl Review, vol. 27, no, 1 (1962); C. Johnsorz, Rewlutionury Change f Boston: Little, Brown, 1966);S. Huntington, Pt~lifictnlOrder in Ct"zartgingSocieties (New Haven: Vale U~liclersityPress, t 968); T. R, Gurr, Wky Men Rel~el((Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1970);and TiIly, From Mohilization to Revolution. 28, Hahshatum, "Revolution," p. I 0. 29. Uavies, "Toward a Theo;r)bof Kewl~ltio~l'~; Gurr, Why Men Rebel; M. Kejai, jlke Cr~mpurtrrz"~.ct Stlactjf ofRevolutiouzar)~ Stmfe:y (New York: McKay, 15277). 30, Brintcln, The Arzatour~jtljfRevt~luliorz;Johnson, Re~~c~lutz'nnury [Charzge. 3 1. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution:' p. 426, 32, Skt>cpol,Stutes urtd SockE RewEution, 33. This fourth generation is suggested thy Foran, "Theories of ltevolution 1Xevisited;l" and seems srrpyorted by Sktccyoi, ""ReRectiorzson Recent Schoiarsllip:" Wickham-Crtlw1ey, ""Srrictural TI~eoriesof Kevofution," and John Foran, ""Itrc>dtlction: in Il'heclrhirrg Revc~Eutiorts. 34. Farrest CoLburn, Il'he Vqzke ofRevo2zttion iri I't~or CCoulzlnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Eric Selbin, i;2/X~~Ierrt l,arirs Americalz Rewlutions (f3orzider: Westview,1993); Eric Selbin, ""Kewlutioniis the Reat World: Bringing Agency Back In," in Il'heclrliing Revolu tiorzs. 35, This is most readity seen in TIzeorizitzg Xe~lolutiorts,edited hy John Foran, whicll Includes chapters by Foran, Coldstone, Goodwin, Selbin, and Wickhaxn-CrowXey. See also fohn Foran, "Revolutionizing TfheorylTl~eorizingRevolutions: State, Culture, and Society in Recent Works on Revolution," in N i k i Keddie, ed., Debaiing Revc~lutions(New York: New tiiork University Press, 1995); jack Goldstorze, Xe~loEutiorzancl Rehelliart in the EurEy hillclern World ffcferkeley: University of California Press, 1991); jeff Goc>dwin,State and Revolution 7945-1991 (Cambridge: Calxbridge University Press, 1998); and Timothy Wicuarn-Crc~wlcy,Gzben-illasand Revcllullon in Latin America: R C;(~nzpumtz'veSf tidy ofltzsurgent-s and Regimes Since If356 (Princeton: Princetoll University Press, 1992). Other calls are collected in Keddie, llehuiitzg Re~joltrl-inns. 36, See also T, 13oswel1, "iVtlrld Revolutions and ltevolurions in the World Systexn," in T. Roswell, ed., Revolution in the World System (New X1rk Gxeer~wood,1989), p. S,Boswell suggested that ""three theories do~ninatcthe literature on rewlution: Marxist class analysis, relative deprivatiorz, and resorxrce mo>bilization:"elative deprivation theory, represented by the wc>rliof Davies, "Tc)ward a Theory of Revolution," and Gurr, \Vhy Men Reheil, is not considered here and llas faded in prominence. Elesource mobilization theory refers to the work of Tillyl From Mc~hilizatz'nnto Revcllutirtrz, which is called l-tere the politicat conflict xnodel, 37, AIthorrgl~X agree with GoIdstorze\ placement of TiIly and Huntingtorz with the second gelleration of theorists, their works relxain important and highly influer~tialreferellce poi~zts, 38. This brief overview benefited greatly from discussions with Arlg~stNirntz. For an exceltent concise overview of Marx" tthougl~t,see A. Nimlz, ""Marxism: An Xllterpretative

NOTES TO CHAPTEK t

11 53

Essrzy,'"n The C1xford (;i.~wzi~ut~r"on to Politics oftfie tVirdd (Oxford: Oxford Ulsiversity Press, 11 392).

39. Dunn, Modem Revolutiouzs, p 9, See also Kimmel, Revolutiouz, p t 6, where he invc~kedthe contention of Marx scholar Kobert Tucker tlsat the concept of ~ w l u t i o nis the "fieoretical axis" of Marx's early work, "the master theme of MarxS thought"XKirnmel was quotixlg R. Tucker, "The Marxian Revolutionary 1dea:"n 6, Friedrich, ed., I2evolt~lion(New York: Atherton, t 9661, pp. 218-2 19, 40, Skt>cpol,$lutes and SockE Revolution, p, 7, 41. K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in K, T~~cker, ed., The Marx12lzgels Reader, 2d ed, (New k r k : Norton, 1978), p. 4-82.The entire qrxote reads: "Today the prt~tetariatalone is a really revolutionary cfass. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern ixldustry, The proletariat is its special and essential product, The lower middle cfass, the small ma~lufacturer,the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bouxget~isieto save froxn extinction their existexlce as fractions of the middle class-they are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. May more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history*'" 42. K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Rrumaire of Lorxis Bonaparte," in Tucker, Tke M~urx-l;npls Reacler, p. 595. 43, Tiilly, From Mi~hilizaiinnto Xe~lolutiort.Kimmel, Revolution, pp. 206-2 15, took this a step further and a r g ~ e dthat Tilly in fact prt~videda synthesis of agency and strttcture. 44, Tilly, From Mobillizutiouz tcl Revc~lurictrt,p 84. See also C. TiXIy, 'cI<evolutio~ss and Coilective Vislcnce," in F. Greenstei~land N.Potsby, ens., 2'he I-i~zndbookofI>oliticalScieuzce (IXeading:Addison-Wsliey, 1"375), pp, 506-508, 45, Tiilly, ""Revolutiorzs and Collective Violence," 13. SOS. 46. I11 fact, Tilly warned of the yroblexns posed in anaiyzing coitectiw action because ""po~devary continrxorrsly from Intensive i~zvt3lvernentto passive compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal": Tilly, Frmn hil~hilizarz'nnfa Revolution, p. 7. Atthorrgil Tiljy argrred that ""raj people do not get together to Act Cotfectiveiy" (p. 1431,It seems clear that real people rnake reat choices in the real world. 47. Ibid., p. 191. "ltevoiutionary situations" are distinguished thy. ""mtzitiyle mvereighty" l g for "contr~Lof a single sovwhere the government is in cornpetition with c ~ m p c t i ~bIocs ereigrz polity" (ibid.), 48. Titly, From Molailiz~ztionIn XevoEution, p. 193. A ""rvoiutionary o~~tcome" occlrrs ""when a single sovereign polity regains corltrol over the governxnent'"(t7. t 9 1 ). 49, Tiillgr (ibid., p. l%), rxoted that ""extremely revolutiorzary situations do rxot necessarily prt~ducecxtrernely rewlutionary outcomes.'%min, seeking to explain why 'b2rc~rldWar I was not sparking the anticipated revolutions, argued that there was no grrarantee "that today" rewlutionary situation . . . will p r o d ~ c ea revolutior~":V. I. Lenin, ""7"le Cotlapse of the Second Xnternatiax~al,"(;;ollected w?rks, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Pubiishers, t964)>13. 214. Dix similarly noted tlsat "many revolutions are begun, hut few are brought to fruition": R, Dix, "Why ltevolurions Succeed and Fail," IJnlz't).;vol. 16, no, 3 (I984), p. 423. 50, Tilly, From L"M~biliz@!ulînn to Revnlulion, p p 2 16-2 X 7. 51, Brian Meeks, Cf~ribheauzRevc?buriuns ar~dRevoburiorrary j'l?eory: Arz Assessl?zenr of C:t{hu, Nicurttguu und Grenuda (Lc>rzdon:MacMiItan Caribbean, 1"393), p. 15. 52, Ibid., p. 192. 53. Kimmel, Xevnlutiort, p. 2 X 5.

154

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

54. A structural perspectitre, according to Skocpol, stresses "objective relationships and conflicts arnong variously situated groups and nations, rather than the i~lterests,outlooks, or ideologies of particular actors in revoIution"5kocpoX, Skttes and Socii~lRe~/olutinuz,p. 291. 55. Huntirrgton, Ptjlira'ct~lOrder in Clzartging Societies, p 266. 56. Ibid., p. 264, 57. See also Tilty, who argued that "Wuntingtoxh definition stresses clutcomes, not the political process that leads to these outcomes": TilIy, From 4Wnhitizaiinnlo Revolulinn, p. 1133. 58. Kimmel, Rezjolulion, p. 65. Aya aiso itzvoked the volcano metaphor to describe the structuralists, See Aya, "Theories of 12evotution Keconsicfered,'\?p, 40,49-50, and ""Popular Intervention in Elevoiutiox-tarySituations:' pp, 323-325, 59..The failure of soda1 sciei~tiststo constnie revolutions as processes was rl~tedas early as 1965 by H, Eckstein, ""Qnthe Etiology of Internal Wars:' Ifistory at~ck"Theory, vol. 4, no, 2 (1 SfiS), pp. 136-137. 60. Skc?cpol, States and Socii~lRevoburion. 61. Ibid., p, 4. 62. Ibid., p. 5, 63. This is reiterated by the three stages of revoltxtion that Sktccpoi identified: f 1 ) the collapse of the old regirne state; (2) the mass mclbilization of the peasantv into class-based uprisings; and (3) the recax-tsolidatiotlof state power by a new elite, Kimmel, Revolutiouz, p. 1185, however, waested that Skocpc>L's formt~lationremains essentially tied to outcomes and lacks ""process:" which he defined as ""how huxnan beings actually make a revolution.'" 64, Skocpot's ""tree rnajor principles of analysis" are a "nort-voluntarist, structural perst7~"tve"on the causes and process of revolution; a ""s)istematicreference to international structrrres and wrid-historical deve1opments"";nd a conceptiorz of states "as ad~ni~zistrative and coercive orga~lizations. . . that are potentialy autontjmous from fthoug1-tconditioned by) socio-econornic interests and structures": Skocpol, Stages ~ u SocimE d RevovnEulion, p. 14. 65, Skocpol subsetluelltly applied her methodology to xnodern social revolutions. Irr the article ""Rntier State and Sl-ti" Ifslam in the Iranian Kewlution;"' 2'heory arzcl Socz'et3vat. 11 11, no, 3 (19821, Skocpol specifically collsidered the case of Iran, owhieil she suggested as an exceltent test of her argtlment. 1x1 another article, "Social R e v t l i ~ t i oand ~ Mass Military Mobilization~:' w~rld X"'oEitics2vol. 42, no, 2 (1988), Skocpol was concerned with xnass rnilitary mobilization and Incltxded brief consideratiorz of Kolkia, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and in the Third World in Iran, Finally; f. Goodwin and SIiocpof dealt broadly with rev~~Iuti~on ""Explaining Revtliutians in the Third World,'Tolilz'cs and Societ).: voi. 17, no. 4 ( 1989). 66, In one response, Ski~cpoLcontended that she had simply been "misunderstcocod" and "11ever xneaxit to read intentional group action out of revolutiod" TT,Skocpol, ""CulturalIdioms and Pc>liticatIdeitlogues in the Kewltttiona~~ Keconstrttction of State Pc~wer:A Kejoinder to Sme1l:'frturnul qfMocIem liist-or): vol. 57,no, 1 (1(385),pp, 86-87, Altl-toughher subsequent w r k on revolutiorz has corztlinued to be I~eavilystructurai, people have crept in. This is most apparent in SkacgoI, ""Social ElevoIutions and Mass Military Mobilizatiom:"nd Good~vinand Skocpol, ""Explaining Revoltxtiuns In the Third World:hwtte there is even a qrtestion posed about ' L ~ t i ~Persuasive n~. evides-rce for this can be fou~ld,among other places, in Fliolf, Peasunf Wars ofthe Twentier/zCeuztury 78, Skocyol, Slates and SockE Rewlution, p, 4, 79, Ibid., p 5. 80, The relationship between which, Dunn poi~rtedorxt, proves to be ""contingent and p. mi. elusive": Drxnn, Moderrz Re~jc~ilutinns, 81. Althorrgh the insurrection emerges from the conditiorzs that precede what is defixzed here as social revolution, I chose to begis1 with insurrectio~lbecause it is a far snore readily identifiable period than the one that precedes it, 82. Most definitions of revc~tutior~ explicitly or implicitly suggest that decisive changes ihappexz rather suddenly, AIthorzgh there is indisputably an identifiable break when the revolrxtiortaries take power from the ""old regime," the transformative period is a lengtl-ry process fraught with complexity and cotltradictions, 83. Kt>chanek,"Perspectives on the Study af Revolution and Social Cl-range,"13.3 19, About the French Kewlution?" New E~rkKe84, K. Darnton, "What Was Kevol~~tionary tjiew O ~ R E I vol. O ~ S35, ( I 9 Janrrary 1989), y. 17. 85. H. Arendt, Cln Revi?lzklion (New York: Rnguin, 19651, p. 28. 86, Ibid., p 42. 87, Kandalt Coilins, Weheriun Saciologicat Il'heory (NW York: Cambridge University Press, 1"386), p. 261. 88, Cited in Kirnmel, Xe~lolutiort,p. I 86, 89. See also J. Dorninguez and C, Mitcl-rell,"The Eloads Not Taken: Institutionalization Politics, vol. 9, no. 2 (197771, and Politicat Participation in Cuba and Ko1iriia:Y~otnj~aumrz'vcr p. 1173. In their discussion of the institutionatizatiua of revc~lutionaypolitical parties in Bolivia and Cuba they defirzed institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and yrc>ceduresacquire value and stability."

156

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

W. See SkocgoX, States and Socii~lRevolution, p. 2% Such a narrow definition of the state makes it as a specifically pc>liticatset of institutions is anatyticalfy usefi~f.This defi~litio~n easier to explore the relationship bet~veenthe state and other spheres, such as the econolxy or, i~nthe case of this project, society. "3. Axl exceflerzt source on the diEerence between majoritariarz delxocracies such as the Wsrminster model predominant arnong the former {and crrrrent) British co)o~~ies in the Eastern Caribbean and co~lsociarional(or cotlser?rsual)delxocracies sucln as Switzerland is A. Lijphart, I>emrtcmeies:Ptztter~sc?f1M~1juriluriun~ unli C>ortsensuuE Cioverntrzent in TwenlyOne (:ou?ztries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 11384). Lijphai? lnas also specifically considered the case of Grenada and other Eastern Caribbean states, See A. Lijphart, ""Size, Pluralism and the Westminster Modd of Democracy: Implications for the Eastern Caribbea~n," in J. Weine, ed., A Revoluhn Aborted: The Lessons of Grevrada (Pittsbul-gh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 11390). Not everyclne agreed that tlle British legacy is one of democracy. Ktzrlansky suggested that this is "orle of the great British mytlrs.'TThe British, he argued, ""did not bring democracy to their colonies. The colonial system was a plantocracy": M. Ktzrlansky, A Cc~nrinentclflslrnn~ls:Suul-clzingfir the Garr'bhealz Dwrivsy (Reading: AddisonWsley, 19921, p. 290. 92. j. Heine, ""Introdrtction: R Revi?ilutionAborted," hn J.I-leine, ed., A Kev(~lutionlilhorted: The I,essons I$ (;ren@daCX7iitrsburgh:University of Pittsbtrrgh Press, 1"390), p. 8. Lijphart, ""Size, Pluralism and the Westminster Model of Democracy," p. 321, pointed out that newer democracies lack not only strong democratic traclitiolls but also strong informal canstraints on government power. Without such restraints, l-te argued, "the Westminster model easily spells excesses of xngority power and of the polver I?fpc~pulctrbmders" (ibid. [emphasis added]), Tlne authority of some chief execrrtives in the Eastern Caribbear~Inas been greatly enhanced by the role they (or their kthers) played in ieading their corzntry to independence, 93. Htine, ""Introduction: R Revolutirtrz Aborted," p. 8. 94, Ibid. 95. This was called tc:, my atte~ntionby Leslie Anderson. "3. One can say that some form of institutionaliatio~~ has occurred in Cuba, especially if one considers Fidel Castro aa institution-wllich might not be as inapprrjyriate as it sounds. See, for example, Habei, who referred to the "institution of Fidet"":. Habel, Cuba: The Rezjolulion in Peril (London: Verso, 1% 11, p. 150, W . This includes both tlne promotion of r l ~ e"party line:-hat is, the government's version of reueaiity, and the preventiorr of acts of violence and sabotage aimed at the revolution, These elements have made these committees ""nc)toriouswin the eyes of srjme who regard them as littfe more than propagandistic surveiltance ix?istruments,Most critics, however, will concede that they have served tct bring a formerly distant and disinterested governxnent into the xleighborhoods and thereby have exlabled the provision of previously unobtai~nablesocial and medical services and econr>micassistarnce. "3. X-ty 1970 0 anuxnher of other revolutionary institutioxls had colxe into their own, in terms of membership and activities, and the sFtem of revolutionary i~~strtrction begun In t 960 was reaching fruition. 99, Hawever, the CURS served the Cirbans well during the 1961 tl.S.-sporrsored Invasion, 100,I11the 197Qs,perlnaps because of the emergence of other i~rstitutionsand a highly successfir1socialization prrjcess, the CDKs moved away from their innr>vativeand prtjgres-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

11 57

sive tradition and degexierated into little more than the administrative and vigilance organizations they are most co~nmc)nlycaricatured as. 101. Irs what amotznted to a last-ditch effort to revitalize them, the CDSs were reconfigured into Community Development Committees (CUCs), under the leadership of revolutionary hero Ornar Cabezas. According to Williams, Caberask "efforts to depoliticize the CDSs f including changitag their narne to Community Development Committees) revitalized and bmadelled participation"": H, Williams, ""The Social Prograxns:" in Walker, Revolutiort arzd C o ~ r t t ~ r r e w l u t ii37~ rMcartlguu, t p. 201. One of the best disc~rssiorzsof the transformation of the GUSs is P. La Karnee and E. Polakt~ff,"Transformation of the CUSS and the Breakdown of Grassroots Democracy in Revolutionary Nicaragua:We%$jPoEitiwl Science, 1-10.18/19 ( 1990). An excellent general discussion of the grass-roots organizations i1-I Nicaragua as they move into the 1990s is L, Haugaard, ""Inand Out of Power: Zlilemxnas fur Guassrc>otsOrganizing i1-I Nicara~wa,"Socialisnz and Dernacruc;y,vtd, 7, at), 3 (1991). 102, ""Biaiectical" here refers to the process in which a coxiceyt or its reaiizatioti is preserved and fuffifled, that is, made complete, by its ol~posi-te. 103, The relationship between fegitimaq and consolidation is relatively weak. (The two are eqtrated by J, Uoming~xez,""Pdificall Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean," in M. Weiner and S. Htlntingtc>n,eds., Utzdersruading Llevelupmeni [Boston: Little, Brown, 19871, p. 76). Legitimacy is generaity used with specific reference to politics and the pojiticai syste~n(see, e.g., M. Weiner, ""Matching Peoples, Territories, and States: Post-Ottoman Irrede~ltisxnin the Baikdns and t l ~ Middle e East," in D. Elazar, ed., Governing I'el~r~les~ n IIkrrilori~s d [Philadelphia: ISHI, 198.21, p. 1131) and is inherently about acceptallce of the rules of the gaxne (Skocpol, States and Social Revolutkn, p. 25). Consolidation, in contrast, refers more broadly to society and its varied aspects. Still, there may he some overlap. See, far example, MigdalS conceptualizatinn of legitimacy as the popular acknowledgment of a particrrlar social order f J. Migdal, "A Model of State-Society Relations,'?n H, Wiarda, ed,, New Llirec~ic~rzs in C;omi~urt;rtive I~oIItics[BOII~~CS: Westview Press, 19853,p. 50). The reiatiorzsbip hemeen consolidation and hegemony is more complex, It Is itnpossible to do justice to the richness and complexity of hegemc)r-Iy i1-I this brief space. F ~ ~ n d a xnentally, however, according to Graxnsci" understanding-the most famous and cornillon delineatic~n-lsege~nony refers to the manner i1-I which the bourgeoisie, the econc>mically dorninallt cfass in a society, establishes and maintains its rule, that is, domination, See A, Gramsci, SeEections frotrz the Prlson Notelmaks, Q. Haare and G, N. Smith, eds. (New %rk: International Publishers, 1971). There is a consensual eIernent to this dorrrtinatiors: Uirections from the top are willingly blrotued by the rest of society, Dominance Is mair~tai~zed through pragmatic intellectual and moral teadership by those Grarnsci referred to as "intellectrrab:kho play an organizationai role in society, who brxn~xiateand constantly revise a lattice of institutions, social relations, and ideas, which cor~vincespeopfe to s~ibmitto conditiolss when it is not in their best interests to do so. Wegelxony is ultimately about the manufadure of consent and the creation of accornmc>ciationby those wlso govern society Hegernony is cornmonIy conceived of as intimately r&ted to the alt~ruraland intellectual splleres of society, areas critical to the process of cur.tsc>lidation.The push fbr hegemony m doubtedty contributes to the generatio11 of a popular idedogy, thereby assisting in the proand relations that cronstitutes the popduction of the more compltlx web of beliefs, hel-~avior, ular altit~~des that peopl&rir-Ig to their eveqday lives and characterizescona~lidation. Conventional corzceptua;tizatiorzsof hegemony ignore the extent to which "srthordinate" classes can infiltrate the ideolohy of the dominant class; the f a c ~ is ~ son consent and corn-

158

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

pliance (J. Scott, We~tponscf the Weak: Everj~dajffirms I$' Peasant Resistance [New Haven: Yale University Press, 19851, p. 317). Some i11terpre~"ions t)f Grarnsci exylt~rethis, for exarnyie., C. MouRe, ""Hegernoly and Ideology in Graxnsci;"' in C. Mouffe, ed,, (;mnlsci uuzd hilurxist Il'heory (Btaston: Rot~tledgeand Kegan Paul, 1979). Consolidation, reRecting the multiclass character of most post-VVarld War I1 revoiutions, does not presume a dominant class. 1x1 addition, arz ix~tegralassumption of corzsoiiof the social revoludation is that the organizatioll of society emerges from the co~llllter~ce tionary leadersl~ipand the poprriation, which have made the revolution together. Whereas institutiona1iz;ltion may be i~nposedfrom the toy dowil, consolidation cannot be. I-legemorzy rnary he corzsensual, hut power resides at the top. Overfap would be most evident in an argurnent such as that in D. Brc>wil,""Sndinismo and the ProbEexn of De~xocraticHegemony,'XatErt iqmerica~~ Perspective, vol. f 7, 110. 2 (1990). Brown distinguished betwen "authoritarian hegemony," where power resides at the top, and ""ctmocratic hegemony:" which "involves the constrtzction of a new unity thro~xghthe acceptance of various social grorrps3niwrgent i~zteresrs"(p.44). Krowrr"s subsequent discussioll of democratic ilegemo~syin Nicaragua is ctlmyelling, indicating where hegernony and corzsoiidation may owriap. 104. A, Stepan, ?'he Stule and Society: I;"eni itz (I'otfzparaftvePerspectiw (Princeton: Prirzceton University Press, 1978); C. Clapl~am,?"hir~lIVnrlcl Polr'tic-s (Madison: University of Wisconsi~lPress, 1985); Uominguez, "Potitical Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.', 105. D. Levi~le,"Venezuela Since 1958: The Go~lsolidationof Democrat$' in j. Linz and A, Stepmdeds,, "The B T ~ C E ~ ~ofBLlemocrgitic MVZ Rega'ma: Lutiva America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); J. Lizzz, T h e Nrrukduwtt of De?rzacrr~licXegiirzes: C:risis, B r e ~ k d o ~ vand n Ii~juilihrium(Baltimore: Johns Hot~kinsUniwrsity Press, 1978); 1%.&ufman, ""Liberalism and De~nocracyin Sorrth America: Perspectives from the 197Qs;Yrz G. OW~onnetl,f? C. Schinitter, and L. 'bZrlritehead,eds., Transitions fmm Aulkzoriluriarz Rule: C:onti~urgtiveI"erspari~ws(Ra;ttimore:ifol~ns Hopkins University Press, 1986); G. QDorznebi, l? Sclsmitter, and L. Whitehead, Ilj"Unsili~rzslrt~rnAuthorirmn'un Rule: Pr(~sj~ects fir Demacnrcy (f3altirnore: Johns Hopkins University Press, f 986); S. jonas, "Elections a ~ l dPansition: The Nicarag~anand Guatemalan Gases:' in J. Booth and M. Seligson, eds,, Elections u ~ d Democrtdcy in Cmtrul Amerilru (Chapel Will: University of Worth Carolina Press, 1989); H.E. Sergio Lacayo, ""Consolidating Uernocracy Under Fire:" in I. M,Kirk and G. W. Schuyler, eh., Centml America: Democrgicy, Des~elop~rrent, and Ghavzge (New York: Praeger, 1989); if. Peeler, ""Uetnocracyand Etections irt Centraj A~nerica:Autumn of the Oligarchs?'" d iri C:crrztml Amertr.6 J. I-li@eyand K. Gunin Booth and Setigson, EIecriarzs u ~ I>enzocrucy ther, eds., IiEE'fesand Ilerrzncraiic C:nnsaEid~tior~ & Latin Amer&$ and Southern Emro$~"f(=ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); S. Mainwaring, G. OWonnetl, and J. Vaienzueia, eds,, Xssues of Democmtic Consnbiticdutiorz: The New South Arnerican Deurrocmcies iua C;omyurt;rtiz/eI;"ersj~ecrive(South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1992); j. Linz and A. txaienzueia, The Fggilure ofi""residelztz"mlIJenlocmcjf: C o ~ Perspectives t (f3altimore: fol~ns Hapkins University Press, 1994); L, Diamorzd, f. Linz, and S, M. Lipset, IJo"nEiicsin Ilevekol~ingCountries (Boulder: Lynne ftierlner, 1995); It, Gunther, P. N. Diamondorous, and H. Ptrl~te,The Politics ofllemocmtk Cor~soEldui+orz(Baltimore: follns Hopkins University Press, 1995); J. Dominguez and A. LowenthaI, C;orzstrticting Ilernocrulic Governance: Latin Awzericu and C'ar-ibFrel.rrzitz the 1990s (Ilaltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1B6); f. Linz and A. Stepan, eds., Pro/rlems c$LJernocrulic YFansiliorz arzcl c:f~nsr~lidation: Sf~tatl~ern

NOTES TO CHAPTEK t

11 59

Europe* South Africc~,and Post-Comurrunist li~rope(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 11996). Any nulllber of debates and discussions can be f o ~ ~ nindthe lively journal of Democmcy. See, in particular, G. Q"Ionnel1, "illusions About Cax~soXiBation:"lv~lrnul c# Democmc;t; vc~l,7, at), 2 (April 19361, and R. Gunther, l? N. Uiamondorous, and H, Puhle, ""ODonnellk IIllusions: A ltejoinded"Jotnmul of Democmc~vol. 7, no, 4 (October 1996).A usehi overview of the most recent research is J, Kelfy, '""emocracy Redrxx: Hotu Real Is Amerisart Reseul-clz Review vol. 33, no, l (1(398), Democraq in Latin America?" 106, Prr~habiythe rnost i~nportantexamples of this work can be fc~~:,und In R, Fagen, C. D, Ueese, and f . L. Coragio, eds., lkunsiliorz arzd Llet~elopm~":1)roblerns r.?fllThirl-2 Wtjrld SocialEsm (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986). See, in particular, J, L. Coraaiio, ""Economics and Pc)Litics in the Tra~lsitionto Socialism: Reflections on the Micaragwan Exl~erience";R. Fagen, "The Politics of "Transition"';and P. Marchetti, "War, Popular Participation, and Transition to Socialism: The Case of Nicaragua," Allother example is J. Petras and F. Fitzgeraid, "Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to Socialism,""Ladn Americ a Prrr~f~ectz'ves, ~ vol. 15, rro. 1 (1%88). 107. See, for example, L. Diaxnond, "llethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidatiun,'"~nurrzul nfDrlvzncruc1/,vtjl, 5, rro. 3 (July 1994);""Ithe Third Wave Over?"lourrzcnl o$l)ernacruc;y,vcd. 7, no. 3 (July 1996);""Consotidati~lg Ue~nocracyin the Americas:" Arznuls nfiize Alrzertcwn Acuriemy tllfPoiiticul urzd Sne'igl Scieraces, vol. 550 (March 1"37), 108. The tendency to simply equate institutionalizatioa and consolidation is common, Stepan, far examt~le,argud that institutionafization denotes, amollg other things, ""l-at a regime has consolidated the new political patterlls of succession, control, and participation" (IT;Cte Stcitca and Society*p. 2132). In a similar vein, Cfaphalx equated cox~solidatianwith the role played by poiiticat parties and adrninistratiun and maintai~rsthat "mrxch of the process . . . [represents] a return to the authoritaria~lismof cofolliai rule'7Tkird World hll'tics, pp. 66-68). Taking Ctaizharn" perspective to Its logical extreme, Lamounier directly defined institutionalization as consolidation, See N. Larnortnier, ""Brazil: Inequality Agaixrst Democracy? in L, Diamorzd, J, Linz, and S. M. Lipset, eds., Ilemocmey in ill>e~jeEopirzg Cktinirz'es?Vi31.4: Latin Amen'ca (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 19891, p. 44. Initially, it would appear that Diamond, Linz, and Lipset took issue with sr-rch perspectives, sr-r~esting that stability rests on both i~lstitutionalizatiuaand consolidation (p. wiii). Yet just a few pages later, Diamond and Linz proposed that the sole distinction betweell institt~tionalirzati~n and consolidation rests on the extension of suffrage to nonelites in the consolidation phase. (L, Dialxond and J. Linz, "Introduction: Politics, Society and Democraq in Latin America," in Diarnond, Linz, and Lipset, Iletnc-tcracy in il3ezjeErjplplg C:nuntries, p. 8). This distinction echoes ODonnelt and SchmitterS contmtion that the "most visible and noisy manifestation" oaf consolidation occurs via the extension of the franchise. G, O'D~onnell and F! C, Schmitter, Trarzsittor%sfri~mAuthoritarian Rule: ?tniative C;orzcltisions Ahoikt Uncert~inDenzacmctw IBaltimore: f ol~nsHopkins Ulliversity Press, l 986), p, 43. Q'Donnell and Schmitter did mentic~ntwo other efernents: "historic compromise" and discrete reft3rms. The former refers to bringing ""tong-excluded participants into partial governing responsibility"; the latter to such relativeiy lotu-level changes as ""e~angesin the electorai code and party finance statutes; Inure egective voter registratiox~;more equal legislative apportionment; more transparent pubiic i~rforxnatiorracts; greater adminbtrative decentralization; lower barriers to party formatic>nand parlia~nentaryrepresentation; dissolution of corporatist monopolies and obiigatory associations; easirrg of citize~lshipreqrxirements; and so forth." III Latin America, to date, most efforts at ""historic compromise" have in

160

NOTES TO CHAPTER t

practice been inter- or even intra-dire pacts concerning the rules of the game, that is, institutionatization. The discrete reforms listed qrlite clearly fail in the arena that has been defined here as institutionaiiatioxz. I agree with O3onnell. and SehrnirterS assessment that, partictllarly as a package, these reforms can significantly promote democratization and are important as such. Were as well, to date, such discrete reforms represent negotiating points among and between elite grorrps ifz society. Comolidation, in all of these conceptualizations, is rt~otedin tile expansion of voting rights arnong the populatiors. 109. Frrrther, the evidence suggests that few schotars have considered the i~npllicationsof consolidatic>ninto institutionalizati~n,For example, when pressed on simply whs~i~ning consolidatiorz as an independent concept, Scl~mitterargued that democracy sl~ouldnot he consolidated but rather simply chosen by the majoriq (l? Schmitter, public presentation, May 1988, U~liversityof Minnesota, Minneapoiis). While ailowing that consolidation mity somehow reduce u~lcertainty(which corresponds in vneral terrns with the position adopted here), he likened it to the Grarnscian n o t i o ~of~"war of position'' a1d tied it to the reemergence of structtrres. Recatrse this reemergence revolves arotrnd iabor codes, party democratic consolidatioll is ultimately evidellt codes, and so forth (B ia Southern E~~roye), when internal regrriations and exterxzai status are established. This perspective accords at least in part with the position that Whitehead has taken, wggesting that consolidation is stxbstantively sl"grtit"redby the ability of the goverflment to engage in external activities, such as the pursuit of foreign policy goals. See L. Wlzitehead, "Internationai Aspects of Dexnocratization:Yn O'Donneil, Schxnitter, and Faitehead, ?i.unsirinuzsfrom Aut-tzt~ritarian Rule: C;i~myumlz'veIferspeclives, p, 18. 110. J, M. Maraveit and J, Santamaria, ""Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy,'Yn G. O'Il)onnelt, P. C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, eds., Trulzsirx'nnsfrnmAuthnrifcgrit~ut Rule: Southerrt Eurolp~e(Baltimore: Jol-tnsHopkins University Press, lY86), p. "7. 111. Ibid., p. 89. 112. Ibid., p. 73.. 113. A similar result occurs with orze of the only expiicie clefittitions of consolidatiorz offered by a scholar of revc?lutions, Calvert divided revc?tutions into three stages: ""peparation, action, and consolidatiors'": Peter Calvert, Revoltrtictn and Xnterrtational Z301irics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19841, p. 4. It is ironic, Calvert lamented, that "the key to the relationship between the act of a political revolutirrrz and the aspiration to social change" remains "the part o.f the revoltxtiorzary process most lacking in a theoretical framevtrork.'Terihai3s equally ironic is that a11 the elements that, according to Calvert, produce consotidatiorz across hvo stages are unquestionably institutional in character (pp.22-23). 114. Fage~l,"The Pc)Litics of ?Tra~lsition," pp. 25 1-252. 115. Ibid., p. 259, "Integrative" refers to people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs coming to see themselves as one. "Patriotism" refers to identification with the "yatria" and connotes far Inore in Latin America than is cornxnonly suggested by the term patriotism in North America. l 16, Coragio, "Economics and Polities in the Transition to Socialism," pp. 155-156. 117, Marchetti, "War, Poprtlar Particilzatiun, and Transitiorz to Sc,cialis~n:"pp. 309-3 10. l 18, Axzn SwidIer, "Culture in Action: Symbols and StrategiesS2merica13S~~cio10gic~~l Retjiew, vol. 51,no. 2 fAprif 19861, p. 273, SwidIer describes the tczol kit as consisting of "syymbols, stories, rituals, and wtjrld-views." 11% H. Vandell, ""Xcieolgy ofthe Nicaraguan Kevolution,'\WnntlzEy Revleu: voi. 34, no. 2 1982>,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 120. C. Geertz, The Interyretadon ofCulrures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 121. Intemiew. Lkon, Nicara~wa( 1989). 122. Hobsbawrn argued that revolutiolls canlrot be said to ""conciude" until they have ei-

ther been overthrown or are sufficiently safe from overthrc>w.See E, Hc~bsbawm,"RevoLutioniyin Porter and Teich, Rewlurian in ZiTa'srory.pp. 23-24, 123. Ibid., p. 35. 124, Ibid. 125, M, Gabaldon, Interview. Minneapolis, Minnesota ( l"389). 126. Hobsbawm, "%evolution,"p. 32. 127, Ibid., p. 35. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130, Ibid., p. 33.. 13l . Ibid. 132. Hobsbawm {ibid., p. 12) agued that this rxature of social revolutions as creative acts is true regardless of the causes or motives that make people act or the inevitable dift-erences behiveen their intentiom and the resrrlts of their actiom. 133..George Homa~ls,""Brin@ngMen Back In," Arnericarz SocirtLr1gica2Revie$%vol. 29, no. 6 f December 1964). X thank Timothy Wickham-Crowley for Introducing me to this piece, 134. Besides I-lrtntington, I>y,"Revcotutionary Politics," '11 l. MaIlo~and K, Thorn, eds., Beyf~rzcltlze RevclImtictrz: BoEiv1~1SZt~ce1952 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 11371), p. 120.

Chapter Two 1. This cfaim receives support froxn Xbse SyaIdingk impressive Gt~~~ittIlisitf and Relcolutiouz in Nicarttgua: OJ?F)OS~~EOYI and Acmrnmod~tti~~n 1979-1993 (Chayd Will: University of North Carolina Press, 3994), p. 209, and from the most recent of Torn Walkrk unift)rmly outstanding edited wlumes on Nicarag~a,Nicuragua Willzotdl Illzisions: titegim~Ili-ctrzs$~rmation urzd S L T U C I Adj51~1menfs L I ~ ~ ~ ~ it2 ihe 1990s (Wil~ningtoa:SK Books, 1997); 'bZraLker

gexierously co~~cludes that ""much of the material in our volume confirms the validity of Selbin's argt~ment""3. 303). Less sanguine assessments are rife; a partictriariy compelling set can be found in G. Prevost and H. Vanden, eds,, The Utztlermiuaing ofii-reSurtdinz'slu Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). For an example of the view that tlse revolution is essentially tjver, see K, Baxter, "Under the Volcano: NeoLiberalism Fi~ldsNicaragua:?'he &rion, vol. 226, no, t 2 (6 April 1998). 2, Not that srrch assistance is ever treated as unimportant or take.en for granted. Only the po>l~~~lation can Eurnisb the viral supplies, recruits, and Inteiligence necessary for the revolutionaries to wrvive and succeed. The longer the battle, tlse more ilnlslorta~ltsuch assistance becornes to offset the wpe"iority of the government forces in resotlrces and ntlmbers, 3. X worxld be remiss rxot to comment on the use of the phrase ""wir their hearts and minds." Long identified with the endeavor of corxnterrevolutiorz, according to Stubbs, the phrase was coined by British High Commissioner General Sir Gerald Temples during the 11348-1960 merriHa war in Malaya (he is later said to have referred tc:, it as "tliat nauseating phrase X tl~inkI invented"") See R, Stubbs, l1eart-s a r ~ di2/12"uac;Zs in C;uerrilla Wctrfire: The ~MulayarzIimergency 1948-1960 f 0xfc)rd: Oxford University Press, 19891, p, l. The revolutionaries made clear their belief that their victory worxid he tied to obtaining and maintaining popular support, and the British responded with the coxept of WHAM, Winning tlse Hearts and Mi~sdsof the Masses, Although f am uncornfu~-tablewith the use of counterrevoiutionary terminology to describe or discuss revolutionary behavior, the notion of ""wi~zninghearts and mirsds" can be a useful and simple sl~orthandfor describing the consolidation process rxndertaken by the social revolrrtionaries. 4. H. Ortega, ""Nicarabwa-The Strategy of Political Victo~,"I11 7: Barge et al., Suadinistas Si~efjk(Mew York: Pathfil~derPress, 119821, p, 58. 5. This point has been made by, alxong others, V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Secaxld International," (:ollrcied Works, vol. 2 1 (Moscotu: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 2 14; C. Tiilfy, Frotrz 4WohilizationIn RevtlIutior~{New k r k : Randorrm House, 197131, p. 199; and R. Uix, "L"lirhyKevcotutions Succeed and Fail:' 1%3EifsVOL. 116, no. 3 ( 19X4), p. 423. For their specific quaes, see Chapter 1, note 44,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

li 63

6. DunkerIey pointed out the paucity of books in English that consider the revolution ""with more than passing referet~ce"and noted that "wen in Spanish [the revolution's] bibliography cantlot cornpare with that of the revoIutions in Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, or eveil El Salvador'? J. llunkerley, Rebellion in tlze Veins: Political Struggle in RoEl'vin 1952-1982 (London: txerso, 19841, p. xiii, Notable exceptions have been J, Doxninguez and C. Mitcheit, ""The Roads Not Taken: Institutionalization and Political hrticipation in Cuba and B o l i v i a ~ ~ o r r i z t Pv oe Z i t i ~VCIJ. 9, no. 2 (1977); A, Knight, ""Social Ilevolurion: A Latin American Perspective:' Bulletin of Latin Arrrericirn Research, vol. 9, no. 2 (1990); and the excellent body of work by Susall Eckstein: "The Impact of XtevtoIution on Social Wetfare in Latin America:Y"IReory m r d Society* vol. 11, no l (l"32); "Transformation of a '1RevoluStt~diesin Society uncf tion from. Below': Bolivia and Internatioxlai Capital:" Com~~7.amti11e %Iistur~ vol. 25,110, 1 (1983); "Revolution and Eledistribution in Latin America,""in C. McCiintock and A. F. L~owenthaf,cds,, jl%e 1;"erut)ianExperinzent Recorzsir-lered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19183); "Revolutions and the Restructuring of National L>oEZ'fI^cs, vcd, li 7, nco. 4 ( li 385). Econc>mies,"Ck~zpt~ratZ'w 7. Uunkertey, Rel~ellionin the Veins p. xiii; J. Malloy and E, Garnarra, Revolutirtrz u ~ Red action: Bolivia 1964-1985 (New Brunswick: Tra~lsactionPress, 19881, p. 2 , 8. Dunkeritey described it as a ""political revc~iuticjn":UuAerley, Rekllion in the Veins, p. xiii. Severat scholars clearly considered Bolivia as a social revc~tution:S. Huntington, J-)flll'fical Order in Charzgiag Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 275; J. Kelly and H. Klein, Revnin R. Thorn, "The Ecor~ornicTransformation:" in Mdtoy and Thorn, Beyotzd the Revoluritjrz, pp. 186-2 12; Ktein, Bolivia, p. 233; and Dunkerley, ReI~elltortkt he Eitzs, pp. 54-65. 1% &laIloy, "Revolutionary Politics,""p, 1 113. 20, The reasons fbr such I~esitation,according to Mailoy fihid,,pp. 124---125),were manifold. At base, he argued, ""t threaten the agarian stnicture was to threaten a complex system of valtxes and a way. of life traceable to colonial timesn (p,124). Moreover, " h e Issue of agrarian reform awakened fears that ran deep in Sj3anisla-speaking BoliIvia. The relationshil3 between the Spanish-speaking culture and the suppressed India11 ct~tturewas pervaded with mutual hate, distrttst and fear" ". 1125), 21. Klein pointed out that ""lwever reluctant the new regime may have bee11 to attack the l~aciendaprohiem seriously,the massive mohilizatiun of the peasants, now the majority of the electorate, and the systeixatic destruction of the land tenure systelx forced the regifne to actm":Klein, Bolivia, p. 234. 22. Mafloy; Bolivia, p. 209. 23. Klein, Bnlivh, pp. 235-236. AIthorrgh It Is sotnewhat unr~sualin Latin A~nerica,governments in the dewloping w r t d have often played on the innate consel~atismof the rural population. Land reform has been used not only as a progovernxnent strategy but even as a countcrrevofutioaary tactic. See, in particular, A. McCoy, ""Land Reform as Cour~ter-lXevoiurion:U,S. Foreign Policy and the Tenant Farmers of Asia:2~uZkedn o{Couzcerne~lAsian Schnlnrs, vtjl. 3, no. I f f 97 1 ). 24. And, arguably, it was one that was consolidated: Agrarian reform seelxs to be the only revoiutionary gain that survived. This raises the possibility that particrxiax aspects of a rewlutiuaary project may he consolidated. More likely, flowever, it reflects the transformation of the indigerrous poprrlariorz into a bul~varkagainst the revoiutionary process, a status reflected in Koxhorough's description of the Bolivian peasants as ""beneficiaries and

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

li 65

counterrevolutior~aries"":X. ltoxborough, ""Theories of Revolution: The Evidence From vcd. 3, no. 2 (19X9), p, 105. Some schofars speculated that Latin America:' LSE Qut~rterl~ the success of agrarian reform in Bolivia caxltributed to Guevara" 11967 hilure in creating a rewlutic>~lary situation. 25. To take but one example, MaUoy cited the remark of Jlialter Guevara Arze, a xnajor MNR leader, that the Rolhians set orrt ""t make a Mwican Kevolutiorz, but without ten years of Pancho VillaV"alloy, Bsbit~ia,p. 235. See also E. Galxarra and J. Malloy, ""Bolivia: Revolutiorz and Keactiorz," in H. Wiarda and H. Kline, eds., Lulin Americtzuz Politics and Ilevelupme~zt,3d ed. (Boulder: 'b2restvie~3 1990), p. 367. 26. Domingrrex and Mitchell, "The Roads Nt?t Taken,'". 193, n, 2, described the MNR as ""cmplex and adaptable, relatively autonc>mous,but very seldom cohere~lt:' 27. Ibid., p 1%. 28. Maflt>y,LfoEivitz, p. 171. 2% This is one of the primary reasoils that the Cuban revolution has been enshrined thro~xghorrtmuch oftlie less developed world. As Wright pointed orrt, "The Cuban Revoiution owes its vast innuence in Latin h e r i c a to the fact that . . . it exnbodied the aspirations and captured the itnaginations of Latin Axnerica" rmasses as no otlier political movement had ever done": 2'. Wright, Latin America iin the Era of rhe C u b u ~Kevc~Eutinn(New X~rk: Praeger, 199 I ), p. xi. 30, A good brief overview of the continued success in these areas can be found in "Jewels in the Crown; The Pdew Intemationuli;st, no. 301 (May 1998), pp. 27-28, Mare historical but stifl good brief c~vewiewsof Cuba's slicess in these areas can be found in M. Azicri, Cubtlr: ;FOifitE'cs,E C O Y E O ~and ~ C Society S, (London: Pinter, 19881, pp. 46-69; I. del Aguila, C,"Lcfiu:Diiemmbrs clfn Revolution {Boulder: Westview 19881, pp. 80-86; or L. Pkrez, fr., Cuba: Betweeuz Rejfrrn and Revt?lutz"ou?(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 358-374. A recent example of those critical of the revolutiorz who rxonetheless acknotuledged its success in social issues was K. Kabkin, C:~baal>i)Eitics:2'he Revc~ilutinnuryExjjerimeuzt. (New tiiork: Praeger, 1991), pp. 53-55. S11e was also representative of such scholars in her admonishment that the improvements are not as dramatic as they appear because Cuba was one of Latin America" snore developed caurltries at the time of political victory, Kirk provided an interesting counterpoint to this view, exploring how Cuba" social policies have fared vis-a-vis Venezuela-a roughly parallel case-over the sarxe time. See J. Kirk, "Cuba at 30: Hotu Fares the Rev~ltxtion,"C:i~nrzdiunIliirzeuzsion, no. 718 { 3989), pp. 13-15, Xri a purely critical review, Eberstadt colxplairled that even critics of Cuba sr.rcl~as ""Pesident Reagan's C~ornmerceDepartment" and the Organizatiorz of American States recognized GtlbaS claims: ""lrespective of tlleir political incfinations, it seems, the consensrls of virtualfy ail inft~rmedobservers is that Cuba has made model progress against disease and ignr>rance,those two basic scourges of low-insorne nations": N. Eberstadt, "Did Fidd Fudge the Figures? Literacy and Health: The Cuban Model," Caribbean Review, vol. 15, no, 2 ( 19861, p. 5.Eberstadt contended that s1ic1-1views were "h~idamentafly~ ~ n s o t ~(ibid.). nd~' Far more common, horvever, remain critiques that accept the successes in the social arena while decrying Cuba's domestic potitical structrrre. See, for exampie., TE: Szulc, "Rdelismo," Wilson Quarlctri~vol. 12, no, 5 (2988), p 57, or H.Thornas, G. Fatrrioi, and J. C. Wiss, ?'he C,"lhun Rewlutinn, 25 Veun I,tirter (Rorxlder: Wesmiew, 1%84), p. 56; the latter conceded in a higllfy critical assessment that it "woutd be churtisll not to recognize some social changes itz Cuba since 1959 which must he said to he positive. . . . Some Crxban medical and educational achievements have been quite impressive."

166

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

3 1. L, PCrez, Jr., Cuba m r ~ the d United St~ites:Ties c$Singulrtr Xntimi-~cy(Athens: Uniwrsity of Georgia Press, 1990>,p. 239. 32. Ibid., p 3 14. 33.. K. Fagen, ""CharismaticAuthority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro," 'lit'eslem 1""oEifica1 QuarterI~~; vol. 18 (l964), p. 282. 34. Pkrez, C:tlE~u,p. 238. 35. M, Haiperin, The Etming ofFi6i"el Chstro (f3erkeiey: University of California Press, 198X), p. 87; LeoGrande, ""Prty Development in Revoiutiortary Crxha,? lournuE oflnteramerican Studies arzd \%~rldAfiirs, w l , 21, no. 4 ( 19791, p. 469, According to Hatperi~l, who lived in Cuba from 1962-1968, Castro "set himself up as a model nonbureaucrat . . . he even appeared to be outside the government, and, like his listeners, a victim of its myriad of dull, parasitic, paper-pushing and payer-storing officiais": HaIperin, 1%eTaming of l:iAeE Chstrcl, p. 87. He cultivated the image that the revc~iutionwas "not the idiotic creatures who fitted the ministries ancl messed everything up'"ibid.). 36. E. Guevara, Velaceremos: The Specc:ci?esund Miritip'urgs of CIze Guevurra {NW Xxk: Sixnola and Scbuster, 19681, yy. 220-225. 37, "The Program Manifesto of the 26th of Juiy Movement (Novernher 1956)" had ten points: national sovereignty,econr>ixicindependence, work fix aill social justice, education Eor all, political democracy, civil authority, freedom of conscie~ace,put~iicmorality and constnictive frier-tdsliipwith all countries. A. copy in En@ish can be fi3und in R. Bonachea and N. tXdldCs, eds,, Ctkbla in Revolution (New York Anchor 13ooks, 1972). 38. K. Fagen, "Continuities in Cuban Kewltltionary htitics," Mmzthly Kevz'e~.lsvol. 23, no, t t ( t 9"72), p. 35. 39, On this point, see, for example, ibid., pp, 26-27. Moreover, Castafieda notes, "The cornpiex process of the Sierra wotzid be tratasformed into a magnificent, straigbtfoward epic." J, Castafieda, C;iztrzf~aBero: The Llife urzd lIealh of ClIze C;ue%ji~r~t {New York: Alfred A. Knopf, f 9971, p. 140. 40. f . Hahel, C:tlhu: The Xevolu tiort itz kn'l (Lor~don:TSerso, 1992 ), p. 92. 41. A fine brief discussion of Castro's conception of "direct democracy" a n be found in C. Bengeisdorf, The Prohlerrz ofllernocpztc~~ ius Cuba: Betweeft Vision arzd Reuliy (New York: Oxford University Press, 19941, pp. 79-89, 42, J, P. Saxtre, Snrtre crn Cuba (New Y u k BaIXentine Books, 19611, pp, 122-127, There seems little question aborrt the '"irect" mcnnnponent. As LeoGrande pointed orrt: ""Ihis travels, Castro gave the ordinary Cuban direct access to the center of govert~xnentai po%ver-himself. He wrrid often spend horrrs with small grorxps of people discussing local prt~blems,ordering action to solve prt~blems,or explaining wily the problems were unsoLvable": W, LeoGrande, ""Mass Pr~iiticalParticipation in Socialist Cuba,'Yin J. Booth and M. Seligson, eds., 1>yeesncertainly do not appear to be constrained by the traditliortat bounds of such a relationship in their qtrestions, statements, and demands,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

li 67

43. M, Azieri, "Twenty-sk Years of Gu ban XXevoiutionary Polities: Axi Appraisal," in in. fclnas and N. Stein, eds., Democracy iri Lcktin Amen'cl~:Visiurzsand Reality (New York Bergin and Gar\bey, t 9901, p. t 64, 44. A slightly different view, highlighting the "incipient institutional order;"'is offcred in the excellent M, PCrez-Stable, The C-uhauz Remlution: Origins, Chune, auzd Lepcy (New tiiork: Oxford University Press, X993), pp. 99-108. 45. PCrez, Cuhci: Bet~veenReform auzd Revr~lutiouz,p. 3 1 9. 46. del Agrrila, d'ufiu,p. 159. 47. By most accounts, Castrok closest advisers besides Guevara appear to have been his younger brother, Ra61, and Cetia S&nchez. 48. Castro's turn to the PSP has been described by del Ag~lila,C;tiha, p, 55, as "tactical:' The PSP, according to Pkrez, Cuba: Betweeft Reform and Revolution, p. 323, was an organization of ""sng~lardiscipline and preparation, with historic ties to mass organizations and political ctlnnections to the sociaiisr bioc.'TPtrez quoted Castxo to the effect that the PSP "had men who were truly revoiutionary, loyal, honest, and trained. I needed them" (ibid.). This view was supported by others, for example, LeoGrande, "Party Developlnent in Ilevolutionary Crxba," p. 458; Rabkin, Cuhurz Politics, p. 48. 49. LeaGra~lde,""rrty Development in Kevciiutionary Cuba," p. 462. 50, Ibid., p. 463. 5 1. The OKI/Escalante affair proved not to be unique. The tensicin between the old-line Coxnmunists of the PSP and Castrok gguerrilta caterie has surfaad and resurfaced throughout the thirty-plus years of the revolutionaiy process, often around issues that reRected the texision betweell the PSPistas2esires to institutionalize the revolutionary process and thefidelistlas' reaction against srrch efforts. 52, Cited in Azieri, Cubu, p, 39. 53. del Agtrila, C:tlE~u, p. 77, The ""absenceof mediating i n s t i t r ~ t i oor~ rules of poiitical behavior," del Aguila arg~ed,""reinforced Castro's special relationship with the masses" (p. 68). See also PCrez, Cuba: Nel~veer~ Xej)rm urtd RewEutz'ar~,p. 3 19. 54, PCrez-Stable, The Cuba Kev(~lutic~n, p. 98. 55. LeoGrande, ""Prty Development in Itevolutionary Cuba,'"?. 478; del Aguila, Cuba p. 68.

56, d d Aguila, Cuba, p, 74. 57, Halperi~r,The Thmitzg clfFideE C:~stra,p. ix. 58. The former three goals were suggested thy Ilabkirr, Cuban Politics, p. 67, the latter by Thomas, Farrriol, and Wiss, The (;idhurt Re~jolulion,p. 15. 59. Excellent discussions of how such efforts at demc)cratization have pfayed out in Cuba In terfns of democratic norms and procedtxres are C. Kengelsdorf, "The Matter of Democracy in Cuba: Snapshots of 3 Moments:' in S. I-lalehskjr and 7, Kirk, eds., 'Ihnsfirmution mrzcir SfrugIe: Cuba X.aces the 1990s (New York: Praeger, f 9901, and M, Pet-CL-Stable, ""Socialism and Democracy: Sunle Thoughts After 30 Years of Keuoluticln in Cuba," in Halebsb and Kirk, Transfi~rmutionuuzd Stn~ggle 60, The term rzeo-kslÊ'tulionuIhere is borrowed frc3m del Aguita, Cubtz, p, 157, who used it to characterize Cuba in the 19880s.Azicri, "Twe~nty-shyearsof Cuball Xtevolutionary Palitics," p. 145, characterized this same period as ""postinstitutiorzal." The point aborrt the country's institutions being brought in from the peripheq is from LeoGrande, "Party Development in Revolutiorzary Cuba," p. 457.

168

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

61. Wayne Smith, Public presentation, Latin American Studies Spring Lecture Series, "C~lbaSince the Revolution: An Assessment:' University of Minnesota, Minneapolis (1987). See also Smith, "Coml-xlentary,'5in J. Suchiicki, ed., Problems c?fSuccession irs Cuba (Coral Gables: University of Miami, North-South Genter f6r tlze Institute of Interarnerican Studies, 19851, p 82. Slnitb was chief of the U.S. Interests Sectiorl (eEectiveiy arnbassador) in Havana from t 979 to 19882, 62, Susan Eckstein, Rkickfiourr the X;uture: Cuba Ui?der G a s m (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1"34), p. 6. 63. Aa excellent overview piece on the rectification process is M. Azicri, "The Cuban Rectification: Safeguarding the Revolrxtiorz While f3uifding the Future" in Halebsky and Kirk, ?"runsfi~rmcriirtrzrzand Strtdatc 64. F. Castro, "Ilmportant Problerns for the Whole of Ta~tert~ationai Xtevoiutionary Thought:' New luzternalirtrzml, no. 6 ( 1987). 65. These anonymous Cuban politicians are cited in 1,adl.t Arrrericat~Regional Re$?art: C,iariltbeulz Report, 7 Nowe~nber1% 1 (RC-9 1-09). 66. Dornilslguez and Mitchell, "The ltoads Not Taken:\x 176. 67, See also Rengefsdurf, 'The Matter of Democracy In Crrba:". S 1. According to Martinez Heredia, a Cuba11acadccnic: """Tie process of rectification was initiated by Fidel Castra, and he has been the principal force and protagonist behind it. The question of leadership emerges clearly here. Fidel has fulfilled fi~ndarnentalroles at every phase of the revolution, The great mitjority credit him for his role in its ixslception, the history of the prtjcess, tlze present-day society, and above &I, the goats and pfans to wliich it aspires. The people see in him the dialectic of their own power and the power of the revolution, which is .fundamental to their political life. As trustee of the spiritual unity of the corxntt-y, it is natural that it would be Fidei who would clexzounce contradictions, make the harshest criticism of past mistakes, give directiorz to the rectieing course, and assure the fraternal relations of all those who support tlze revofutionary cause": F. Martinez I-leredia, ""Cuban Sovol. 18, r?to2 (1991), p. 29. cialism: Prospects and Challenge:' Ltirtin Amerit-~nPersyecij~~es, Martinez Heredia added that "ET power of his vast moral authority, Fidelb leadership in the presexzt process offers cotlfidence in the permanent revolutionary principles, experienced feadership for directing tactics and strategy, expresses cohesion and unity; prc>vicies clarification and canscientiorzsnessat a pedagogical ievel, and dexzounces the shortco~xings of the people and the system" (p. 36, n, I). 68. Azicri, Ctdba, p. "7. 69, See also Hahel, C,"ubu, p. 150, wllo referred to the ""istitrrtiorz of Fidei." Castro w u l d undoubtedly reject that s~icha thing was possible. He told one intemiewer: "I am neither pragmatic nor dogmatic. I arn dialectical. Nothing is perfnanent, errerything cl~ar?tges" (cited i11 E-iabel, p. 107). 70, FSLN-Secretariats Waciox~alde PropagacZa y Education PoXitica, cited in D. Giibert, Sandinbtas: 2'he P ~ r t yu ~ the d ilr'evoll~liorz(New York: Basil Blachvelt, 19881, p. 37. Parenthetical term inserted by Giibert. 72. Many have cataiogt~edthe situation, Prevost, br example, described the destruction of the Solxoza regime as "total: The National Guard collapsed, as did Soxnuza's ruling Liberal Natiorzal party (PLI). . . . The task the . . . [FSLNI faced was enormorxs: the organization of an entirely new state and military apparatus": G, Prevost, ""The FSLN as Ruling Z'Y~ N i c ~ r a g ~( Korrider: a WestPart)*:"n "F. Walker, ed,, 1r"evoEutin8 alzcl f~nun~errevnltt~iorz view, 1991), p. 107. See dso A. Reding, "The Ev(,lution of Governmental Institutions,'' in

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

11 69

WaIErer, Revolution and Gou~zterrevolutiot~ in iVictnrtrguu, p. 15. Eleding suggested that " p p ular rem~ision"with Nicarag~a'sdiscredited and disgraced institutions was SC) intense that "wen the btlildings in which t l ~ einstitutions had been housed-most notably the Natiorsal Palace-had to be converted to other uses" (ibid.). Keding also made an i~nportantpoint about the nalxe of the new government: ""The JGRN was coxnrnonly referred to as the jzrtzta, a term that in Englisll has come to be associated with dictaforships by cliques of Latin Axnerican generals'"^. 23). The inspiration, Eleding argued, was not the South American military juntas, but the ""ail-but-forgotten precedent in r?tei&boring Costa Rica, where another civilian jurztu i-~lledfor eidsteen rnonths in 1948-1949" (ibid.). This was in the aftermath of the Costa Rican civil war. 72, There is a wealth of good material on the institutionalizatim process undertaken by Nicaragua? social revolutionary governxnellt in the post-political victory period. Especially useful are a number of the chapters in the wlttmes edited by T. Walker: Nicaragua in Revolution (New York: Pxaeger, 1982); Nicarfzguu:The fint Five Ye~rfi(New York: Praeger, 1985); Rewlul+on urtd Ckunlerrevolu~+onin Nicurt~gug;In the latter, see In partictllar the chal"ex by Reding, ""The Evolution of Govert~xnentaiXrrstitutions." Also helpful are J, Booth, The lind and he Regi~zrtz'uag:?&e Nicuruguurt Xevolutistz, 2d ed. f Boulder: Weswiew, 11 385); Gilbei-t, Sarzdinistl~s;and T. Walker, Mcuragutz: 2'he Lcknd r$ Sarzclint~~ 3d @d.(Roulder: Westview 1991). Good brief overviews that discuss the post-political victory institutionalizatitin process include J. Booth and 7'.Walker, UrzdenturzclingClcntrtllAmerica (Woulder: Westview, 19891, pp, 66-70; D. Grynspan, ""Nicaragua: A New Model for Popular Kewltttiun in Latin America: in 7. Goldstone, 7: K, Gurr, and F. Moshiri, eds,, Revol~ltiarzs of the Lute Twerrtietlz C:entury (BuuIder: Westview, 1991); S, Tonas, "EIections and Transition: The Nicaraguan and Guatemalan Gases," h J. Booth and M. Seligsorz, eds,, 12lecikns mrncir Demclcmcy in CerrtrulAvnerim (Chapei Hill: Uluiwrsity of Worth Carolina, Press, l"39); and S. Jonas and N. Steir~,""The Construction of Democracy in Nicaragrra," "@tinAwzericurz I'ersl~ecrives,vc11, 11 7, no. 3 ( 11 390). 73, A transcript of one srrch "Carra al Pueblo" can he forrnd in M. Dixon, ed,, Nicargguw Ligder Siege (San Francisco: Synthesis, 11385), pp. 1157-168.. In practice, Serra pointed out, sr.rch exercises had their Liabilities: "Thou@ carnt~laintsand demands that the authorities resolve existing problems abounded, there was freqr~entlya lack of foLlt?w-up on the accords and promises made at the meetings": L. Serra, "The Grass-Xtoots Organization$?in Wdlker, Xevnlulion urtd CounterrevoEutz'nn in Nicaragua, p, 52, Beyond srrch assemblies, Serra noted, there were also xnedia outlets, specifically radio shows and letters calurnlls in the newspapers. 74. Kedi~lgnoted that "for the first time in the history of major social revcjtutions, the ancien rkgiirne was spared violent retributionV"eding, ""The Evolution of Goverxmental Institutions:' p. 18, Meczks similarly notes that "no "ed terrorhucceeded the "11ite terror" of the dictator SornozaS final years in powex""rBrian Meeks, Crtribbcruvz Revolutions and Revoluliorzmry Theory:An Assessment r$cufiw, Nicuragucz and Grenada (London: Macmifla~l Caribbean, 19931, p, 84. For more on the FSLNS nodon of retribution, see the discussiol~ on Torn;is Borge in Chapter 3. The orzly significant goverxment crackdown after political victory was on some of the radicals who had fought alongside the FSLM during the final strugle and cansidered the new ecorzomic, political, and justice systems as abandonment of the social revc~iutionayproject they had envisioned during the insurrectic)n.The Manrist-leninist 130prrlarAction Movement f MAP-ML) was the only other organized grcjtrp to take part in the fidlting during the final stniggle. According to LASA, the MAP-Ml leaders

170

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

"were jailed by the Sandinistas in 1980 when they pressed too hard far an acceleration of the revc~lutionayprocess"":ASA, "The Electoral Process in Nicara~wa:Domestic and Intert~ationalXnRuences,""Report of the Latin Americaxi Studies Association Delegation to O b s e l ~ the e Nicaragwan General Election of November 4, 11984 (Austin: LASA, 19841, p, 9. According to 13iack, rnernbers of the Workers Front (who may have been ctlnnected to MAP-ML) and the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PGdeN) were also jailed, See G. Rfack, Pz'uunflhcfthe Peopb: ?'be Sandinism Rewltrtian in Nict~raguu(London: Zed, 1% l), p, 234. 75. Actually, the first post--.politicai victory elections, according to LASA, were the locai electic~nsfor the Municipal Gc>vemmentsof Keconstnictic>nin 1979 shortly after political victory. See LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under Xxzternationai Pressure:%eport of tlle Latin Arnerisa Studies Association Commission to Observe the 1990 Election (Pittsburgli: LASA, 1990), p, 13. Booth and Flialker also made note of these Iocal elections in U ~ d e r stt~fldingC>erzlrcrfAmerica, p. 67.2'. 'b2'icMiarn-Crowley pointed out that there were a 1111mber of '"antested elections" h the nineteenth and earty twentieth century, albeit with ""sverety restricted franchise:' '76,Iri 1990 the nurrrber of these observers was unprecedented. For Inure on the views of the ohsemers, see note 102 helotu. 77. There are those who disagree that these ewnts are unique. 7: Wickham-Crc>wley noted that In 1893 there was a peaceful transfer of potuer from the Conservatives to the Liberals. Pastor, however, a r g ~ ~ ethat d " h a November 4 1928, the United States supervised the first YR~'Presidential election in Nicaraguan history, . . . On January 1, 1929, far the first and only time in Nicaraigua~lhistory, power was transferred peacefi~lly":K. Pastor, Con~Ierrzrzedm Rqjetition: The United States and Nicurjua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19871, p, 25. This received some support from LASA, whicll stated that "the presidential elections of 1928 and 1932, organized and sztj>ervisedby the Utzited States, axe gmerally accepted as having been free of fraudulent vote currnting" "mlshasis added): LASA, ""The Electoral Prc>cessin Nicaragua," p. 4. LASA pointed out, flo~wever,that the leading candidate was rxot permitted to run, that there had been an almost constant U.S. occupation since 1912, and that a U.S. Marine was posted at every polling place (ibid.). I concur with Theodore Fliright, whom Pastor cited in a note to his claim, Wriglit corltended elections callnot be coastrtted as ""free" when supervised by wliat Pastor disingenuously referred to as a ""at3reign military presence" "astor, C:ondemned to Rq~etition,p. 326, n. 3 1). Most people, I believe, w u l d agree that the over 5,000 U.S. Marines, srrpported by eleven cruisers and destroyers, that oversaw this election and traxisfer of power were by any reasor~ahledefinitiorz an occrrpation force, 78, Prerevc>LutioaaryNicaragua, Close argued, ""knew neither liberal democracy nor hll'l'ics, Bcortnmics, utrd Society even constitutional government": D, Close, Pliic(~~ruguu: (Loadoa: Pinter, 19881, p. 107. Stahter-Sholk pointed out that "fc~rrnali~lstitutionsof democraq bad lost their substantive xneaxiing ullder the Sornoza regime, as caristit~~tions were rewritten and elections manipulated tc:, legitimize the diaatorship": R, Stahler-Sholk, "Building Democracy in Nicaragua,'7n G. Lopez and M, SthoX, eds,, Libemliztrrian m r ~ Red ~.lemocrutizutiunin Lutin America (New tiiork: Greenwood, 1987), p. 61. To the degree that there may have been a tradition of electoral democracy, LASA described it as "&in and discredited," M S A , ""Electoral Dexnocracy Under International Pressure:ky, 7. Sc,me observers a r s e that the l996 electorat process was ""atep backward" but few seem prepared to suggest a return to the prerevolutiorzary-era m a m i c s , See, for example, ""Democraq W a k -

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1171

ened? A Xteport on the October 20,1999 Nicaraguan Elections" "ambridge and VVashington, D.C.: Hemisphere Initiatives and the Washingon Oftice on Latin America, 1997). 79. LASA, ""Eectoral Democracy Utlder International Pressure,'". 7. Somozak cynical manipulation of elections staged for his benefactclrs in the United States was hardly original but simply followed in the footsteps of those who had isreceded him, his older brother h i s and their father, Anastasio Sc,mo>za Garcia. Electiom, fbr most Nicaraguans, according to LASA, "mearit little more than autrlmatic ratificatiurs of candidates chosen thy. the incumbent party and the U.S. goirernrnent"AASA,"The Electoral Process In Nicaragtra? p. 4. 80..The nc?velist Graharn Greene, in his book about Pana~xa'sGeneral Omar Trrijos, noted that ""Sorno>za had frequently called elections and, thus, had legitimized his dictatorship, if only i11the eyes of the United States, by winning all of thern with huge 1x;l,ic3rities. ~ So 'election' for most people in the crowd was a word whirl1 xneaxit trickery, W Nelectiols' was a prt~miseto them of no tricke~y":G. Green@,(;etling to K~zowtlze (ieneruf (New York: Sirnon and Scbuster, 1(384),p. 187. Althou@ most Nicaraguans may have bee11 waxy of any promises of elections, some Nicaragrrans were calling for thern. Pedro Joaquirr Cl~atno>rrc)'s Delxocratie tinioxl of Liberation (UF3EL)-a xnultictass coalition of workers, srnaiX btlsiness people, and traditiorzai elites4emanded free elections when it was forxned in 1974. The UDEL collapsed in the wake of Cha~xorrok1978 assassination, widely attributed to Sc,moza and his crorzies. The assassination was a key event-perhaps the catalyst-in setting the stage for the final popular insurrection against the Somclza regime. Cliarnt>rrowas enshri~iedas a ""Hero and Martyr of the Revolution." Current president Violeta Chamorro was married to him. 81. "The Historic Program of the FSLW:%rst released in 1966, does not me~ltiollelections per se. Hotever, the first section of the docrrment, which outlines the formatiorz of the revolutionary government, iists as its first measure of political character the creation of a political structure ""rat allotvs the full particil2ation of the entire people, on the national as weU as the local level fdeyar-tmentaf, municipal, neighhorhoc>d)":FSLN, "The Historic Prr~gramof the FSLN:" in Rorge et al., Surtdinislus Sj~wk,p. 14. The FSLN's perspective on democracy and com~xitrnentto the dwetopment of a democratic framework cvc~lvedinto a carnxnitxnent to political pluralism that ionas and Stein argued was retated to four fattoss: f l ) the FSLNk desire to overcome Micarag~aSlack of democratic traditiejns; (2) the pluralistic nature uf the FSLW itseffi (3) the ideological pluralism that has undergirded the social reiraiution; and (4) the F5LN3sinterest in maintaining a broad-based, mrxlticlass coalition. See Jonas and Stein, ""The Cotlstruction of Democraq in Nicaragua: pp. 13-1 4. 82. W, LeoGrande, ""Who Lost Nicaragr~a?Was the Left Wrorxg About Nicaragt~a?" 'lylkurz, vol. 5, no. 3 (19901, p. 15, 83, L, Serra, ""?"~eSandinista Mass Qrganization,~,"in Walker, Nicunrguu irz Rezjolulion, p. 96. 84, Nicaraguan socioIogist M a r v i ~Ortega, ~ cited in B. Fliright, ""Vluralism and Vanwardism i11the Nicaragua11Revolution," Lutitr Rmericu~Persj~ectives,vc~I.17, no, 3 (1990), p. 42, 85. f. L. Coraaiio, ""Ecorzomics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism: Reflections on the Nicaraguan Experience: in R, Fagexi, C, D. Deere, and J. L, Curagio, eds., Rmsition alzcl Ileveloj>trzent: Problems ctfTk2'nI World SuckEism f New York: Monthly Review; 19861, p. 97. Nayardo Arce, one of the leaders of perhaps the most radical faction, the 12rc)longed Pop~tlarWar tendenq (GPP), and the FSLW party director f f 979-1990), defined the "fbur

172

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

princiyles'kf the FSLNS project as ""amked ecotlorny, political pluralism, genuine nonalignment, and participatory democrac~r."1HCA (Central American Histt>ricaIInstitution), "Toward a New Cotlstitutioll," envin, vol. 4, no. 53 (November 1985). Migt~elD'Escoto, farmer foreign minister (1979-1990) and a MaryknriLl priest, identified with the mclderate Terceristas, identified "four fundalxelltal pillars" of Sandinista thought: nationalism, democratic aspiration, the Christiarx elernent, and aspiratiarx to sociai justice. See M. Dzscoto, ""Nicaragua: Unfinished Canvas:" St~ourners,March 1983. Jairne Meetock, former minister of agriculture f 1979-1WO) and one of the leaders of the Proletarian tendency, argued that from the start, the FSLN had ""included in our program a call for elecpar M r t u tiorzs, and we maintain this position": J. Wheelock, El gran des~#n: e~tre-rvista I-i~zmecker (Manakwa: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1983), p. 78. 86, Qn 20 July 1979, the Junta of the Government of National lteconstruction ( f G W ) prt~mulgatedthe "'Fundamentai Statute of the Republic of Micarag~a,"which, along with the ""F~ndamentaIStatute on the Elights axid Guarantees of the Nicaraguan ;Peapie? issued a month later, served as PJicaraguds constitrrtion until 1987, According to the "hndamentai Statlite of the ltepublic of Nicaragua'"(FB1S-LAILl 1979, p, f l), ""a soon as cotlditions of national recorzstruction perxnit, generai elections will be held for the National Assembly . . . i~nc o n f o r m i ~with the new electoral law, which will be prt~m~~lgated i~ndue time." This commitment was strengtlnened by the previously mentioned 1979 electiom held fur the local Mtinicipal Governments of Kecornstructioa. 87. For an excellellt brief discussioxl of this viewpoint among the FSLN ieadershib,, see Gilbert, Surrdirtz'slus, pp. 34-36. Other gocid reviews of Sandinista attitudes toward democracy axe Jonas and Stein, ""The Cu~~struclion of Democracy in Nicaraguan";right, ""Vluralism and Vangrxardism in the Nicaraguan Revolutionn;and Reding, "The Evolution of Governmelltal Instit11 tions.'" 88. H. Qrtega, ""FLN: Statement on the Electoral Process," in R. Leiken and R, Rt~E->in, eds., Il'he C:e~tmI Arnericurz C:risis Reader (New York: Summit Books, 1987), p. 227. 89, Booth and Walker pointed orrt that despite the fat least initial) scorn of natiorzal elections, wllich had been used in the past to legitimize the old dictatorship, local elections were held throud~ourthe country irnlnediateiy after the political victory, See 1300th and Waker, Iki~dersturzclingC3erzfrftlAmericq p. 67. (30. "f'his is evident in a series of st7eeches cclitected in B, Marcus, ed., Nic~traguu:The t~ Peol~Ee'sI\'ewEu t ion: Sj?eeci.rwby Sandinistu Leuders (New York: Path finder, 19885). S~lrzdinis See, in particular, T. Borge, ""This Is a Revolution of the Wclrking Peoyie,'\~, 173; S. Ramirez, ""Our Prr~misesWere Made to the Poorest of Our Cotintry;". 191; and D, Ortega, "hkAre a Verc)b Small Country Confrc>atinga Truly Colossal Farce," p. 196, and "The Sandinista Peolziek Revoltrtion Is an Irreversible Political Reality:" p, 2 10, 91. According to Keding, Cartos Tunaerman, Nicaragua" former ambassador to the United States, explained that Nicaragua wrztlted to adopt Western ideas about pluralism and the electoral system with socialism's idea that wealth must be spread around. See A. Xteding, ""Under Construction: Nicaragua" New Polity," in Rosset and 1, Vandermeer, eds,, Niclar~~gug: Unfinlsbre~lRevolution (New b r k : Grove, 1986), p. 346, "This view was echoed by Cartos Fernalldo Chamorro, editor of the FSLPJ newspaper Barricud~,who noted that "ifwe lnwe a mixed econorny, we must have a political system that corresponds to that; we want to institutionalize dissent and opposition" (1. Lobel, "The Meaning of Democracy; Regresentatiw and 13articipatoryDemocracy in the New Nicaragrxan Corzstitutioln," Untwnity ofPittsburgh tutv Revielv, v&. 49, no. 3 119881, p. 84, cited in Jonas and

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1 73

Stein, "The Construction of Democraq in Nicaragua," p. 14). According to former fcjreign minister Mil);ueL D%scoto, the FSLNk commitment was not just to pro forma democracy: "IVe are talking about real participation, We are quite aware that democracy exztails social democracy, econornic demc)cracy, pojitical democracy, and many rights, such as the right to work, to a fa~nilywage, to learn, to read, to write-all those different rights that p rovide us with an opportuni.ty to participate and not he manigrrlated": Df)"Escoto, "Nicarapa: Unfinished canvas.'"^ Wuxnberto Ortega had before him, DXscoto" argulnent made it clear that democracy worrld be defined by more than elections, 92. Pastor, C;[~rzdemrzeu'to Rej~ett'tirtrz,p. 307. 93, Ibid. 94. The Council of State was Nicarag~aSi~lterirnlegislative body It had an FSLN majority but included opyositinll parties and representatives of social groups. For more on this and the other brarlches of the JGKM, see Booth, ?'he &cl arzcl the Li"eginni~g> pp. 29-43. "3. USA, ""The Electoral Process in Nicaragua," p. ii,Specifically, according to USA, it was modeied after ""key comporzents of the French, Xtajian, Austrian, and Swedisln electoral systerns" "(t7.29). 96, Ibid., p. 12. 97. Bepnd its legislative powers, the National Assembly was also directed to draft a new constitution for the country. 11% its function as constitutiorzal conventiorz, the assembly was designated to define its own powers as well as those of the executive branch. (38. This information, as weit as that which ft>llows,was drawn from. USA, "The Electoral Process in Nicaragt~a,"pp, 12-13. The assembly elections w u l d be based on a proportional represelltatio~zmodel. The country was divided into nine multimember geographical districts, with the nr~mherof delegates per region apportioned by population, Itather than voting for individuals, voters would choose a predetermined, party-specific slate of candidates wl~osepositiorz on the slate was set by the party. According to LASA, this was "likely to strengthen internal control and disciplhc withi11all the existing politicat parties." Given the traditiorz in most of Latin America of political parties servirzg as iiftle more than whiclcs for personal ambition, this was prewmably aimed at creating parties not solely built on one individual, The choice of proportional represer~tatianwas widely interpreted as a com~nitrnentto encourage pluralism; LASA, for example, stressed that the kind of proportional represer~tationsystem chosen "tilts the National Assembly toward political pluralism, by assuring the representation of a wider range of interest and opiiniorzs within the electorate than would be achieved ~lxzdera U.S. style single-member district system'yp. 1 2). Others saw it as a ploy to fragment the opposition. The election was to be overseen by the Supre~neElectoral Council (CSE), The CSE was assigned the tasks of establishing the voter registry and setting tlze electoral calendar, both to be carried out In constxltatiort with the National Council of Political Parties, composed of one representative from each of the Iegaily recognized parties, and charged with overseeing the eitectiorl ca~npaignsand canducting the actual balloting. The CSE was given the status of a fc~urth,autonr>mc)usbranch of government with tlze authority to make decisions free of governmental infltlence. 99, R, Gutman, Nlanuntl Rqwblic: The M~iking I$ American Policy in Nicaragua 1981-1987 (New York: S i i n ~ ~ and z Schuster, 1988), p. 239; H. Sklar, W~zstzington3Wt1r on Nict~rl~guw f Rostor~:Sc,uth End, 1%88), p. 1%. 100. At the center of these efforts in the United States was the O&ce of Public Uiplomacy fbr Latin America and the Caribbean. Specific efforts inctuded pamphlets prepared for selected members of tile media and Co~lgress,the manipt~lationof the media via non-

174

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

government foreign policy experts, and putting presstzre on U.S. allies, ft3reign labor Ieaders, and foreip journalists to condemn the elections, See K. Bort~sageand P. Kombluh, ""Behind fXeagan%Pmpagallda 13litz:'Ni\vi;lrion, 13 April 1985. The short-lived Office of Public Diplomacy (1983-1987) was a true Wrashingon hybrid. Authorized by President Keagan in NatianaI Sect~rityDirective 77 (NSDB 771, ""Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," the Office of Public Diplomacy was run by the Natiorzal Security Cour~cil(WSC), housed in the State Department, and staffed by the Defense Department, the Agency for International Derrelopment (ATD), and the U.S. Informatior~Agertcy (USIA). See P. Komhluh, "Nicara~a,"iin l'? Schraeder, ed., Iraterveniiarz in the 19805: U,S, Foreign hiicy in the TItirtl JZ/hrld (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 19891, p. 245; Sklar, Washitzgtt~a'sW L on I ~Nir;urr~gul;c, p. 245, The Orweltian term pcdhfic Ai~)l"lomuc)r referred to the Keaga11 administration's decisiorl to conduct psycl~oiogicalwarhre operatiorls in the United Sttltes, the type of operation, accordi~lgto one senior U.S. official, "the military condtlcts to influence a populatioll in a denied or etlelxy territory" "(ibid.). Priority was placed on ""overt and covert propaganda, pressure on the media, and illegal iobbying tactics to manipulate pubIic opinion" "omblub, ""Nicaragua,"p, 246). A 1987 General Accourlting Office investigation conclxxded that the Office of Prrhlic Diplomacy had sought to manipulate both the media and the public primarily througll the planting of stories in the press and the ghost writitzg of "op-ed" pieces (p. 245; Sklar, JVashittginnW~ron Nict~rl~guw, p. 247). Rased on the viofation of the restriction that bars the use of federal fi~ndsfor publicity or propaganda ptzrposes not authori~edby the Congress, the U.S. Cox~gressordered the Office of Public Uiptornac~rfur Latin America and the Caribbean shut in 1987. 101. Cruz first became affiliated with the FSLN when he left the Xrrter-herican Development Rank to hecorne a me~nberof I h c the ~ Grouiz of Twelve. The Grouiz of Twelve was co~xyosedof prominent btlsiness people, iawyers, priests, and educators who in October 1 9 7 announced their opposiitiorz to Somoza and support for the FSLN. Xlnmediately after political victory Gruz was named president of the Central Bank. Later he served briefly in the JGRM and after that as Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States, Upon leaving that post, he returned to the Inter-Arnerican Development Bank, The CD coalition was a varied but cor~servativegroup centered around the Superior Council of Private Enter13"se (CQSEP), a very conservative nationat business organization, Nt~minatedat the instigation of rile United States, Cruz returned to Nicaragua and 13romptly allnounced that he worrid abstaitr from the elections unless the goverflment complied with the CD's previously released ""nine points" "ASA, "The Electoral Process in Nicaragua:" p. 19). Xri December 1983 the CD had published nine points that they characterized as reqrxirements for ""athentic elections." See Demc)cratic Coordinator, "Electic~nProgram," in Leiken and Rtlbin, The Centmlirimericulz C3risis Reader, pp. 284-288. The government accepted all the demands related to the election itself-abolition of press censorship, access to state-owlled xnass media, and suspension of the exnergency restrictiorls on freedom of assembly, poiitical mobilization, and unicrn activity i~nposectin Maz-ch 1982. More controversial were dexnands that the FStN separate itself from its involvement with state institutions, repeal certain laws yertainixlg to private property, and open negotiations with the cuntras. Three days after his return, Cruz allnounced that the Cl> would buycott the dectioll but that he worxtd continue as a candidate. Negotiatiorzs aimed at resolving the CD3 participation culminated in talks between Cruz and Bayardo Arce at a meeting of the Socialist International in Kit, de Janeiro, which produced a prt>viisisrlalpact. Tile CD droizped its caJf fur contra t a l k and the government agreed to aU of the CD demands, i~ncitldingpostponing the elec-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

11 75

tian until January 1985. (This inforrnatian is all from LASA, ""The Electoral Process in Nicaragua," pp, 19-20.} What happened next remains unclear: Spect~lationcenters on hard-liners on both sides, but the pact was not firialized (see p. 20, or Gutman, Balzatza Diplotfzuc)r,pp. 247-253, on these negotiations). Even if Cruz and the CD had mnted to run, the contra leadership and the Ul~itedStates never intexided that they do so (LASA, "The Electoral Process in Nicaragua," pp. 19,29; Gutman, Nurturtu DipEclmucx pp, 232-235; Jonas and Stein, "The Construction of Democracy in Nicaragua," p. 19). See also note 105. 102. LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre:" 13.8. 103. Gutman, Lftlnarza L)ij?lurnoc3p. 241. 104, Cited by Sklar, WtzshingtonS War on Nicuri~guu,p. 193. Sklar cited M. Cook, "The Reluctant Candidate," N;:ldnn, 13 October 11 384. 105. This role for Cruz and the CD has been widely coxifirmed by high-ranking U,S. officials in both the United States and Nicaragua. See, for example, Booth, 2Re End and the Begkning, p, 217; D. Gilbert, ""Nicaragua? in M. Blachman, W LRoGratide, and K, SIiarpe, eds., C,"clnfi.or~tingXe~lolutisn:Secz~n'tyThmugh Iliplrtmucy in Ce~~tral iqimeric~(New %rlc Pantheon), p, 111; El. Gutman, "Nicaraguan Turning Point: Wow the 1984 Vote Was Sabotaged:Watl'orz, vtd, 245 (7 May 1988);Grxtman, Rurzurttl Ilipiornucy~pp. 235-255; Jonas and Stein, "The Gonstrttction of Democracy in Nicarabwa," p. 19; Pastor, C:clntlemrzer;Z lo Rej~etitiorz, p. 248. U.S. efforts also i~rcfudedpressure on the candidates of the three moderate parties in the race not to participate (Gutman, "Nicarabwan Turning Pc~int,"and Btlnarza Diplaurrucl.; p, 253; Jonas and Stein, p, 19; LASA, "The Electoral Process in Nicaragua;"\pp. 30-31; J. Oakes, "TraaudYn Nicaragua: New York jl"t'mes, 15 Nc>vember 1984; Pastor, Chnde~rrrzedto Rqeririon, p 250; SMar, W~~slzingscrn'f WIZT. OYI N i c u r j ~ app. , 198-2610; T. Flialker, Reugun Verst-lsthe Sundinistus: The UszilecEured War on rv'icuri~guu[Boulder: Westvietu, 19871). After refusing considerable financial incentives, Democratic Conservative party (PCE)) candidate CIernente Gtrido and Poprriar Social Christian party (PPSC) candidate Mallrisio Diaz both chose to remain in the race (Sktar, \Vashi~gtorz"sWar011 NZ'car~~gtk~, p. 198). The United States was Inore successifUjt with the man widely seen as the nrxmher hvo calldidate in the election, former fGKN minister of labor and Liberal Independent party (PLI) candidate Virgilio Godoy. Two weeks before the eiectioii and the morxiing after meeting with the U.S. ambassador, Godoy withdrew from the election (LASA, "The Electoral Prc~cessin Nicaragua:" p. 30). The PLX relsrudiated Godoyk snove, relxained in the race, and ran third, Since all presidential candidates who gai~redover 1 percent of the vote were seated in the assembly, Goday received a seat, 106, Grxtman, ""Nicaragrxan Turning Poi~rt,"p. 645. As the U.S. staiking-horse, Cruz was supl3osed to disrupt and discredit the election, a rrjle he has since claimed to regret. See Pastor, C3andemrzed to Rej~"ilinn, p. 250; W. Smith, "Lies Ahorrt Nicargua:" Fnrekus P a l i q no. 67 (19871, p. 93. By 1988 Cruz was taking pains to disassociate himseff from his former colleagues, considering his affiliation with them "the biggest mistake X have ever made in my life": A. Cruz, f--Itzrvr;rr6lIduw BtllEetirz, vc11. 39, art, 3 f Spring 119881, p. 25. Nonetheless, in 1984 Cruz and his colleagues in the opposition perfcjrmed their role admirably. 107, It seexns particularly rxoteworthy that the opposition parties that participated-all of which. had registered serious cumpiaints during rlie course of the carnyaigri-agreed that overall the election was open and fair*See Sklar, Washiragton3 w ~ rart Nicurt~guw,pp. 206-209. SIilar included comments by some of the prominent domestic opposition Ieaderespecifically Mauricio Diaz of the PPSC, Rafael Cordova Rivas of the PCD, and Eduardo Coronado of PLI. PPSG calldidate Ma-ttricioDiaz went as far as to state that the elec-

176

NOTES TO CWUTER 2

tions proved "that it was possible to initiate the construction of a Western-s~le,democratic electoral sygem within a revoLutio~iaryyroces" (p. 206). Dlaz expressed similar sentiments in CAHX, UpLdcrtcr, 17 July. 1986. This view w s eclloed by the international obsemers as wf l. Tftall~sof ctbsemers from the Britisli Houses of Cornnzons and h r d s , the Irish parliament, the Dutch government, the Socialist International (which was not particularly stzyporrive of the revolution in Nicarawa), and the Latin American Studim Association all agreed "that the electirrns had been clean, competitiw, and meaninghll"":LASA, "Electoral Democracr Under Internatitmai Presure:? 9, Americas Watch noted that the ""debate on major social and political questions . . . Iwas] robust, orrtspc~ken,even strident" and described the eledicln as "a modiel of probity and fa:airness"":gnericas Watch, Human RigFtts in Nicc~rt~gdu: Rec~gun,Rhrptoric c~ndRmliy (MewYork: Americas Watch, 19851, p, 3. Even former mernb-ers of the U.S. Congress and U.S. diplomatic corps appraised the elrxtion as a significant step &at was rel~sonabfywell done under the circumstances. See Smith, "Lies 1%99- The United States condernr~edthe elecrioris as a fraud, a drainatie About Nicara~a,"" contrast with the enthusiastic U,S. endorsement of the 1984 electzions in neighboring Ei Salvador, which were consgicuc~uslyless open and considerably less fiir than those in Nicarag~a.Many people who campared the ~o elections were much more impressed with t1lerse in Nicarapa, The British Liberal parry's report on the Nicarawan e l ~ t i o n sfor , example, described &ern as "&r superic3r to EL Salvador's of the sarxle yeaS: Tonas and Stein, "The Constnrction of Democracy in fJicarag11a: p. 17. s Nicaragua,""p. i, 108. U S A , 'The Electoral P r ~ e s in 109. If the eicction had been run in the manner of a U-$.-style winner-take-all, the ESLN would hdve been awrded n i m y of the ninetjr-sh seats. 110, The three center and right pasties polled 29.2 percent (Wenty-nine assembly seats), well over a quarter of the total vote. The PCU, heirs to the tradition of the Nicaraguan Consernative party, received 54 percent (fourteen seats). Despite the absence of its presidential candidate (see note 105), the PLI, which had splintered off Rom the elder Somoa9sNationalist Ll't>eralpart-).(PLN) as a progressive antidictatorial force, received 9.6 percerrt (nine seats). The PPSC, which had split from the PSC in 1876 b ~ a u s its e memkrs mnted to advocate armed stn~mleagainst the Samoa regime, received 5,6 yercttnt (six seats). The three small parties to the left of the FSLN fared considerablyworse, polling only 3.9 percent (six assembly seats) of the vole among them, The Nicaraguan Socialist p a ~ y (PSN), founded in X944 as an orthtxtox, Moscow-orientedCommunist party, received 1,4 gxexcnt (two seats). The Gommtlnist Parv of Nicaragr~afPCdeN), a 1966 PSN affshmt, received 1.5 percent (WO seats), The Marxist-Lenlinig Pogttfar Action Movement f MAPML), representing a quasi-Maoist pempective irz Nicaragua, received 1 percent f t t ~ seats). o 11l. Close, Nicr-2r~gut& p. ia 37, 112. Ibid. 1t 3. The FSLN, Vickers not&, "was not immune to the influetlee of the dominant political cuhure . . .traditional politics colored eveq stage"": Vickers, ""A Spider's Web," NACM Report on the Arnerict~~ vol. 24, no. 1 (Jtrne 1990), p, 20, In grarticular, Vickers later sugested, at least at the xninisterial level there an incIination toward the atd yersonalistic, caudillo sqle of leadership (p, 22). See Gilbert, Sarrcdinistias, p, 47, on this same point. A prtJpensity for tradirio~dtMicarapan ptitics may he even more l&ely under the new government, O%nc pointed clrut that the "new government carries with it the legacy of Nicaragua's traditional elie: 500 years of internecine war fa^, accommadation with an occupying U.S. army, pacts with the Somoza dictatorship, antif a semi-fiud~lpnliticldb sryle

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

11 77

based on personal platronidge and fiamily bon~ls":T. OXane, ""The New Old Order:" NACLA Rej~ortarz he Americas, vcd. 24, no, l (June 1990), p. 29 (ernphask added). To take but one small exarnk~le,Violeta Charnorro is the fifth Charnorro to ser* as presidexzt of Nicaragua in the past h ~ ~ n d r eyears. d See M. Linfield, ""Human Rights," in Walker, Ke~joEzdliorzand Gourzterrevoludon in Nicarl~gzw,p, 279. Those interested in the myriad ctlnnections between and arnong Nicaraguds ""old aristocracy" and the FSLN should consult S, Stone, The %Ierl'tl~@ of the Conyuistt~&rs:Rulz'kzg CIassa 222 Cetztral Americafrom Corlyuest to the SUIZJinistas (Lincoln: Ulziversity of Nebraska Press, 19901, yy. 37-40. 114. tanas and Stein, ""The Gonstrttctic~nof Derntlcracy in Nicara~wa,"p. l l . 115. LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre:" y. 1. 116, Historically, the majctrity of the populaticln has had little direct isnpact on 4ecisic)ns made by the revolutiotlary leadership. 117, Gilbert, Swrzclinistl~s,p. 3. 118, The FSLN remained largely true to its self-consciously chosen vanguardist role and kept party membership minimal. See M. Massing, "Who Are the Sandinistas?" New York Review ofBooks, vol. 35, no. 8 (19881, p. 53, or Gilbert, Sarzcirinistas, p. 52. 119, Eckstein argrred this Is particrrlarly true for goverxments that are democraticaily elected and thereby seek to maintain the status quo. See S. Eck$tein, "Power and Popular Prr~testin Latin America," irz S, Eckstein, ed,, Power urzd Pol~ulnrPro test: I,ulin Arnerkzn Social Mo~,ements(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 41. 120. No effort was made to stay the exnergence of non-FSLN-affiliated organizations. Many new organizations did form and masly old ones were rejuvenated and resurrected in the a&ermath of the political victory, 121. Interview. LeBr.1,Nicaragua ( 1989). 122. j, Heine, "'Xrrtroduction: A Revc?Zurion Aborted," in inJ, Heine, ed,, A Revcllution Al~ortecl:The Lessons ofGren~&(Pittsb~rrgh:University of Pittsbrrrgll Press, 19901, p. 3. Xn the Caribbean, I-leine a r g ~ e dthe , Grenadiasl revolution ""sands only after the Haitian Revolution of 1804 and the Cuban Revoiution of 1959 in the scope and degree of change brougllt tc:, pc>liticatinstitutions (atbeit ohviottsly on a much smaller scale).'"^^ a sirnilar vein, Arnbursley suggested that the revotutioxlary process ""rpresented the highest level of class strttggle attained in the English-speding Caribbean since the turnttltuous slave uprisings of the sewnteenth and eighteenth centuries": F. Arnhursley, "Grenada: The New Jewel Revtllrxtion,""in F. Axnbrrrstey and R. Cohen, ecls,, Crisis in he Caribbean (New b r k : Monthly Review, t983), p. 1%. 123, G, Leuris, C;ren~dcz:TheJeweE13espoiled (Baltimore: Johns Hapkiias University Press, 113871,p. 2. 124, Cited in C. Sunsl~irze,The C;iarihbeurt: SuwivaL SrrwEe, alzil Soz~ereignty(Boston: South End, l988), p. 168, 125. As Meeks notes, ""l g~resentedthe United States far the first time since the Vietnamese War with an opportunity to reassert its hegmonic tendencies"' Meczks, C;~rihbearz Revolutions uuzd Revoluta'auzury l'heor3 p. 2. 126, A quick sampling finds r?tomentiorz of the Grenadian revoltxtion In J. DeFrorzzo, Revolu&ionsauzd Revolutionizry n/fovenzertts(Boulder: Westview, 1991); Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, XevnEulions of the IdateEverzrierh Cerzrury Q. Kim, ed,, Xevnluiior~sin the 2'hir~dWorld (Leiden: E. f. Brifl, 11991); T. Greene, C:onzi~aratz'veKevoEulic~nuryMc~vemenis, 3d ed. (Engtewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990); M. Kimmel, Revolufi~rz:A Sociologicul It$te~rzrefatictrz(Philadelphia: Ternpie University Press, 11390); B, Schutz and R. Slater, Revolu-

178

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

rior? and Politicul Charlge in the j'l?ircif World (Boulder: Ly~zneElienrner, 1990); J. Dunn, hil~~lern KevoEutic~ns,24 ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Goc>dwin and T. Slcocpol, "Ex1,laining Elevotutions in tine Third !liarid:" Polz'tl'wr n r d Society, vol. 17, no. 4 (1989); or Porter and Teich, Kevolutiorz in I1istol.y; Grenada is me~ltionedin P* Calvert, Revtlluricrrz rnvzd Ch~~zterrevc~lt~tiorz (MinneayoIis: University of Minnesc~taPress, 19901, and In the vtjltxme edited by T, Bostvell, Rewlulion in the Witrld System (New %1rk: Greenwood, 1989), but no reference is made to the revolution: The former has one reference to the U,S. i~rvasionand one to tl,S, destahilization; the latter Inas three rekrences to the invasion (two in an interview with former U.S. president Jim~nyCarter). Nor does the Grenadian rerrtjltxtion seem to appear In recent w r k related to the study of revoltxtion, such as T. WicMzam-Crc>wtey,Gtterrillas and Revolutiorz in Latin Americu: R Ccln~jjaratz've Stucty c-tfXrzsurge~tsand Regirnes S i l ~ c e19% ((Princeton: Princetcln University Press, 1992), or assessments of social movements, such as S. Eckstein, 1%31.verarzcl Po~~tklar l>roresr,or A, Escobar and S. AIvarez-, "TheL;2/1~king crfSocial Rlitvements iuz Lurin Americrr: Idend[)<Strat: egy, u n ~ lI2emncmcy (Bo~xlder:Westview, 1992)-alt1zorrgln this may well he due to Grenada" snon-Latina heritage, 127, Heit-re,A Xevoluticlr~Ahnrtecl. 128. Cited in Lewis, Grenada, p. 35. 129, See, for exampie, J. Heine, """flzeHero and the Apparatchik: Charismatic Leadership, bliticat Managelnent, and Crisis in Revolutionary Grenada:Yn Heine, R Revolcrsiati! Aborted; S. CXark, "Tlze Second Assassination of h4aurice Bishop," New Int-ctrnatiorzul,no. 6 ( 1987); Lewis, Grenada; K. Schoenllats,""Grenada: The Birtlz and Death of a Revoltttion,'5in K, Schoexzhals arnd It. MeIanson, Revolutiorz rnvzd Intervention ira C2revrada: The New Jewel ~lilnverrzer~t, The United Stt~fes, and ihe Grihbeurt (Boulder: Westview, 1985). Heline offerred probably the most nuanced discussion of the corxplex yerst~tlalrelationship that existed between the hvo men; Clark presented a fascinating accorrnt oftheir political relationslnip. 130. See, for example, L. Wlzitehead, "Democracy and Socialism: Keflecticlns on the Grenada Experience," i ~ Heline, r A Revolution Alrorte~tor I>.Henry, ""Scialism and Cuitrxral Transformation in Grenada,'' in ibid. The most compelling articrtlatic~nof this position, one that is virulently resistant to the gross Bishop-Coard siirnylificatialn is Meeks, C;~ribhearzRevi?ilutionsarzcl Revol~srkrzmry7jl"hmr)i;pp, 165-1 79. Meeks, a famaica~l,wc~rked in Grer~acZaduring the revolution arnd is obviously fa~niliarwith alt of the key players and debates. 131. See, for exarnk~le,J. Mandle, Rig Revolutiorz S~zallC:o~ntry:The Rise rnvzd F6411 o{ zjze C;ren~dctXevolutior~(Lanham: North-Sorrth Publishing, 1985); rI:Thorxzdike, C;renubltz:Politics, Ecorzomics, ~ n Society d (Boulder: Lynne Kienner, 11 385); and A, hyne, P. Sutton, and T. Thorxzdike, Grerzurla: Revolution alzcl In~/tjsz'ort(NW Yisrk: St. Mart-ir~?~ 1984). 132. Visionay and orga~lizationalleadership are discussed at lerzgth in Chapter 3. 133. As noted earlier, the G ~ n a d i a ncase fits rather uncomfortably into the designation assigned to it here, as ifl~~strative of rno institutionatizatio~land no consolidation, Several scholars have argued that institutiornalizatim was relatively far along at the time of the corrp d'ktat and subsequent V.S. invasioll. See, b r example, Heine, ""lrztxodtrctian,'>. 15; ""The Hero and the Appaxatchik:" p, 247, Writing while the revolution was still urnder way, 21 1, made a sirnilar argument. that is, prior to the U.S. Invasion, Amhursley, "Grenada:". Tlle consensus, however, seecns to be that institutionalization failed, See, for example, Payne, SuZ-fon,and TIzorndike, Greuzuda, pp. 35-39; Mandte, Big Re~~oEufion Slrzull , 192). Nanetlieiess, Singllarn, who presaged Gairy's dictatorial excesses, prc>videdan argrrment helpful ta understanding the complex relationship bettveen leaders who led the Eastern Caribbean nations to statehood and the population in the Eastern Caribbean. 138. The links with General Pak Chung I-lee and the Uuvalier regime were noted in H, ~ ~ ~ i US. ~ t t Xntjbtsion and the Carihbe~uzIlisQ'Shau&nessy, C;renadtir: An E y e w i m e s s R ~ ~ ofthe mry "I'hal:Pm~tolced11(New York: DodA, Mead, 19841, pp. 69-70. The connection with SOxnoza was noted t)y M. Boodhoo, ""Violence and Mititarizatiox-r in the eastern Caribbean: The Case of Grenada,'"n A, tiio~xngand D, Phillips, eds., M i t l t u r i z a r ZPI ihe RZ;nn-ffispartic Carr'bbealz (Boulder: Lyilne ltienner, t 9851, p. '7 1. 139. Koodhoo suggested that ""the 1977 military agreement with General Augusto Pinochet of Chile, which catled for the training of Grenadians in Chile and arms transfers, clearly indicated Gairy" future direction'VIloodhcro, ""Violence and Miiitarization in the Eastern Caribbean," p. 71). On these links, see atso OShaughnessy, (irerzmda, pp. 69-70, who noted the Chileans claim that their support for Gairy in Grellada would serve to counter Cuban aid to Jamaica. 140. Thorndike, Grenudrz?p. 39, 141. A n~xmherof people noted the Introduction ofthis practice, See, for exampie, Sunshine, C;renuda, p, 50, Lewis concluded that toward the end, Gairy's '""unspeakdbie atrocities'kconstituted ""a veritable reign of terrorn":ewis, C;ren~dcz,p, 37, Swzall 142. Mandle referred tc:,this as ""the plasltation econc:,myW"a~~dle, Big Re~jc~ludurz C,"cluntry,pp. 5-8, 143. Lewis, Grenuclu, p. 25.

180

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

144, Gairyk 'YrrzditionaI" opposition was from. the Grenada National party (GNP), which represented the country" middle class, the Chamber of Commerce, ernplc>yers,remnants of the colonial aristocracy, and the elite, The GNP heId office froxn 1957 to 1961 and 11362 to 11967. With politics simiiar to those of Gairy and his orga~lization,the Grenada United Labor party (GULP), Lewis pointed out, the GNP supported yrik~ateownership of probxrty, an ongoix-rgretationsl~ipwith Britairt, the endorsement of the social stattrs quo, and the acceptance of elitism in politics (Lewis, Grenudik, p. 16). 145. 'E Thorndike, ""People" Power in Tl~eoryand X3ractice:3n Heine, A XevvEution Aborted, p. 29. Jamaica" Trevor Munroe, according to Thorndike, was the only open ""Marxist-Leninist"; Marrrice Bishop, he suggested, was one of the reformers, Elsewhere, Thorndike wggested that nonetheless, "Marxist theories predominated" and cited the inRuellce of Mtlx~roe(Thorndike, Grcmudik, p. 24). Aithough M ~ ~ n r was o e undoubtedly innuential, the independent black Marxism of Trinidad3 G.L.K. James was probably more important. Jarnes cor~ceivedof direct democraq via a network of local citizer?rsbssembiies;he saw the stnrgle af blacks as distinct from, aibeit related to, the socialist stnrggle af Marxist parties. Lewis, C;revrtrg#iz,p 25, referred to Jarnes7sperspectitre as ""Marxist yoyuiism:%n exceflerlt brief discrrssion of the populist black power movefnent In the Caribbean can he found in Sunshine, 2Re Citribhean, pp. 58-41. WaLter Kodney, Trevcjr Munrt~e,and Clive Thomas are some of the people most commorzly associated with this movement, which influenced the struggle of most of the srxbseque~ltleftists in the regit~n, 146. MAP resulted from the unification of two smaller groups, the Matielxellt for the Advancement of Community Effort (MACE), formed by Bishop, his law paiqner, and others to focus 011 political education, and the similarly focused Cornlrrtinee of G ~ ~ l c e r n Cited izens (CCC). 147. B. Steele, Interview St. GeorgeS, Grenada ( 1994). Greragda, p. 42; ""People" Power In Tl~eoryand 148. See, for descriptions, Tl~or~~dike, Practice," p. 31; and hyne, Sntton, and Thorndilce, Grerzadl~,p. 9. 14% See Q"Shaughnessy, Greuzudc~,p, 46, or Amhursley and Dunkerley; C;reragdn, p. 23. 150. Although, as A~nbursleyand Uunkerley, C(;renudu,p. 24, pointed out, the w r d socialism is not even mentioned in the document. Thorndike, C;renadtir, p 45, nonetheless, described the early NJM as " ~ ~ n c m p r m i socialist sn in gerleral outlook: albeit not consciausiy Marxist, 151. Thorxrdike, ""People" Power in Theory and Practice? p. 32. Perhaps the most Important of these was the National Unity Council, a coalition of middle-class groups such as ~ , churches, poprriarly known as the "Cornthe Chamber of Commerce, trade u x ~ i o and mittee of 22." 152. Clark, "The Second Assassination of Maurice Kisllop,'>. 22; Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik," p. 222, According to Heine, Goard also was sent to London in 1973 to discuss plans ft3r Grenadian independe~lceon behalf of the opposition. The inhrmation here on Coard is drawn largely from the two sources in this note, 153. Heine, ""The Hero and the Apparatchik:" p. 223. 154. Amh~rrsieyand Dunker1t.y;far examyte, argued that "Coard pIayed a leading role In drawing the party [the WJM] towards official ct3mmunisxn"A:nbursley and Dunkertey, C;ren~dcz,p. 27. Thorxrdike, Grerzurlu, p. 50, made a similar point. Althorxgll It came to he dominated by Coard, OKEL was fol~ndedin 1975 by a group of Grenadian secondary school srzrdents wllo considered themsetves Marxist-Leninisb, Caard, according to Heine, was "their intellectual 1511111 and mentor": Heine, ""The Hem and the Appar&chik: p. 223.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1181

Qn Coard's early role within OEtEL, see also Thorndike, C;renadtir, p 50, and Clark, ""The Second Assassi~lationof Ma-ttrice Bishop," p. 22. 155, The first and L;zst quotes are from Clark, ""The Second Assassinatioll of Maurice Bishop," p. 222, The self-description is from Thorndke, Grerzmda3p. 50. 156, Meeks disptztes this, Meeks, Caribbean Revobutiouzs and Xewlutionur~fTIzeor): pp. 168-1 70,

157. Gairy was traveling to New York to iobby the Use of Outer Space Cotnmittee of the United Nations {UN) orz the need for a UN agency to Investigate UFQs and other cosmic phe~lomena,one of his particular interests, from an observation center in Grenada. On Gairy" decision to dispose of the NJM leadership, see O%Shaughnessy, C;renudu, p, 78; Thorndike, Grenah, p. 54; and Lewis, (;renadtt, p. 78. On what Heine, "Introduction,'". 13, described as Gairyk '"rotesque efforts" at the UN, see also Qxhaughnessy, C;renuda, p. 77; Thorndilce, Grerzada, p. 54. 158. Coup &'&tat was the designatioll of Q'Shau@nessy, Grcmudik, p, 77; Payne, Sutton, and Thorxzdike, C;reragdn, p. 13; and Lewis, C;ren~da,p. 77, Ambursley and Dunkerley opted for the notion that it was "in a strict sense . . . iess a revolution than a popular ctlup.'? Thorndike, Grerauda, p. 54, terxned it an insurrectit~n,wl~ichresonated with Clark"s deof Mallrice scription of it as an "armed uprising": Clark, "The Second Assassir-tatio~~ Risl~op," p. 23. Mandle, Rig Revolution SmuEt Cclginiry, pp. 16-17, artd Schoenhals, "Grenada," p. 33, dubbed it a rewlution, an argument made most compellingly by Htine, who sr.z~estedthat it was a xnisrake to understand the NJMS seizure of power as ""akanquist coup de main led by a srnait group of conspirators.'"ather, Heine contended, this "was simply the culmination of six Fars of lsrolitical struggle in which Bishop and his colleagues had effectively lnanaged to generate a corzsiderahie arnorrnt of supyort"":eine, ""introduction:". 14, 'Tile argument here is that the entire process is most usehlEy understood as a revtlltxtionary process, albeit one that failed to result in a sociat revoltxtiorz. 159. See Thorndike, (irenuds p. 55, who described the population3 reaction as ""a1 island-wide carnival." Amhrxrsley and Dunkerfey, C;rer~adik,p. 30; Mandle, Rig Revolzrticln Swzall C;t~u?zlry, p. 118; and O%hauglnnessy;Grenu~la,p. 79, ail ct>ncurred. 160. These assessments axe, respectitrely, from Thorndike, C;renud~t,p 32; Mandle, Big Revol~ltiorzSmall Churztr8 p. 22; and Lavis, Grerzadt~,p. 25. 161. A nurxrber of authors suggested that if the N J M had held elections, it would have won l~andily.See, br example, Schoenl~ais,""Grenada:' p. 33; Thorndike, Greuzudr, p. 560; or Faitehead, "Democracy an8 Socialisxn," p. 309, 162, These first two, according to Jtrdy EHen Witliams, "were the hvo most orgartized, weU organized grc>ups." During the revolution Williarns wc~rkedwith the Cathofic Youth Organization. fudy EIIen Wiltiams, Ix?ttexviewGorxye, St. John", Grenada (1"344), To some extent, accordi~lgto Sunshine, Il'he C;~ribhearz,p. 1103, this was realized. She noted that "at the xnonthly xneetings of the grassroots councils, Grenadians debated local, national, and international issues in a format somewhat like that of a New England tt>wnmeeting. Most xnajor legislation underwent criticlue by these councils and by the NFliO, tlie NYO, and the trade unions, 1x1this experimental process, the mass organizatiom worxld discuss proposed legislation and send back recornmendations to the governxnent, which would tale their suggestions into accorxnt before pas"ing the law In final form, The rtationai htrdgets for botl-t 1982 and 1983 went through this prt~cedure:' Sunshine pc>intedout that this process was possible hecatrse of Grenada" [email protected] Nonetheless, she conceded that this systern of "popular de~nocracy"was also deceptive, since not all the leaders were equally corn-

182

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

xnitted to such a process and reality often reflected decisioxls made thy a haxidhl of officials in the capitat. ""The fulcn~mof pc)wer,'Thorndike poi~ltedout, "dearly and unambiguously Iay with the Central Coxnmittee'? 'Thorndike, C;rerzag#fz,p. 90, Bishop, Sunshine suggested, was the charnpioa of the prtjcess of participatory democracy. See Sunshine, jl%e (CILlril?beclrrz, p. 1103. 163. Amhursley and Dzrnkerley, Grer~uda,p, 37; Tl~orxzdike,Grenada, p. 89; "People's Power in Theory and Practice,"'p, 41; Sunshine, The Carihbertn, p, 103, Weine described this itzr~ovativepolitical structure as "one of the most important experiments in grass roots democracy to have taken place in the Caribbean": Heine, ""ltrc)dtlction' p. 16. As wifl be discussed, the experiment seems to have failed, 164, This, as indicated in note 127, was argued by Paytle, Sutton, and Tlloradike, C;renu~#fz, pp. 35-39; Mandie, Big Revr~ltrtionSrrlull Gountr).;pp. 18, 102; and Thorndike, Grerzadf~, p. 68. Htine clairned that the revc~lutionwas in fact poised to institutionalize at the tirne it self-destructedIwas overthrown. See Heine, ""ftroduction:>x 115; "The Hero and the Apparatchik," 13.247. 165, Heine, "TIihe. Hero and the Apparatchik:" p. 247, It is plausible to speculate tbat Coard was also fearh11tbat the eiectiorzs, which seerned increasingly likely, wrrid further se1-v~to ~tre11gthenBishop. 166. Thorxzdike, C;rerzi.rr-lla,p. 68. 167. Hcine a r g ~ e dthat "blaming the failure of the revotution on its Pack of institutionalization is a non sequitur." To wit, he said that "the timing of t l ~ eCoard facrio12s hid far power was designed to avoid the instit~~tionalization and consolidation of Maurice Bishop" rule. . . . In some sense, the revolution faiied bec~~tue it was about to institutionalize itself" (empl~asisin the original): Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatcl~ik,'\. 247, This is a caxnpelling point, btlt it would seexn to support xny ctlntention that the revolutionary process was r~otinstitutionajized at the tirne the social revolutionary process ended, 168, Uavid tewis, cited in Lewis, Grerzad~t,p. 33, 169, Payne, Sritton, and Thorxrdike, Grerzr.rdia,p. 34. 170. M. Bishop, "Maurice Bishop SpeAs to U.S. 'bZrilrkingkople:' in B. Marcus and M. Taber, eds., Mtztirice Bishop Speaks: 7"he Grenada Rev06~ktlort 7979-1983 (New York: Pathfinder, 19831, p. 294. 171. Mandle, Rig Kewlurian Small CountryI pp. 53-56, The information that ft>llowsis aiso from Mandle, 172. Ibid., p 74, 173, See also Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike, C;renubllz, p. 105, 174. Sunshine, The G~ribbean,pp. 101-102, 175. Xn seeking a theory that worxid allow precapitalist states to begin the transitiorz to socialism without the obligatory capitalist stage, several Soviet scholars in the mid-3970s advanced the notion of a "non-capitalist path'"^ constructing socialism, See R, lilya~lovsky~ Socialism and the Newly Irzdependent Nt~dnns(Moscc~w:Progress Publishers, 19'74.4);X, Andreyev, The Norz-G~~~~itr~lz'st i,%~y (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 19744);and V. Solodivonikov and V. Bogoslovsky, Nor~-CIe-~j~ituEz'sl Ile~~loj~merzr: Arz Hz'storicuE Outline (Maxow: Progress Publishers, 1975). The "non-capitalist path" consisted of three stages: ""decolox~izationand the kshapinghf the norzcapitaiist way; national-democratic transfermatioas; and sodalist society" (Thorndike, Gre-enab,pp. f 9-20). The nationat-democratic stage was the critical period when contradictions between socialism and capitalism and their proponents were greatest. For mclre on this, see Thorndilce, (;renudn, pp, 20-22; "Peo-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

11 83

ple's Power in Theory and Practice:", 35; or Mandte, Big Revolutiouz S ~ z a l lC:(Sunq";3p. 48-53, 176. See Thorndike, ""Pople's Power in Theory and Practice:", 37, and Sunshine, The C;~ribhearz,p. 101. 177. Heirre, ""ftrt~dtlction:\x 17. As Heine pointed out, this was dramatically diEerent from the treatxnent these hvo organizations accorded similar efforts in Jamaica and Chile. 178. As Thorndike noted, the ""backwardness of Grenadian society was . . . a constantly reiterated theme": Thorndike, ""People" Power in Tl~eoryand Practice:"* 38, 179. Ambursley, "Grenada," p. 21 1; Mandle, Big Re~jc~lldtirtrz Swzafl wof a political regime in the interest of broad societal change": Kejai and d p. xiv, n, Given the inclusion of ""broad societal change," it Phiflips, Lr~yakjstsu ~ Leaders, strikes me as peculiar that Rejai implied that revolutionary leaders somehow disappeared after what has beer1 defi~iedhere as political victc)~.Certainly in the four cases under consideration here, all the leaders w11o were important ""dmringand perhaps i~nmediatelyhefi~re~'-lecl~in,Paz, and Siles in Bolivia, the Castro brothers, Cie~lfinegos,and Guevara in Cuba, Bishop and Coard in Grenada, and the nine commandantes in Nicaragua-remained important, in fact critical, leaders after the political victory. 1I. C. Rrinton, Anutotny ctfRevolutz'cln(New York: Vintage, 19651, pp. 107-1 19, 12. Hopper, "The Revolutionary I%rocess,"pp. 270-279, 13. Woffer, The True Believe& pp. f 29- 151. 14, H. kkstein, Internul War: P.~clbliemsurzd Apj7rotlclites @?ew tiiork: Free Press, 1"364), p. 26,

I S,Rejai and Phitfiips, Leblders (;ifRevalmtinn, pp. 131-13!?, More recently, Rejai and Philips generated a set of hypotheses and propositions about revolutionary leaders, See Rejai and Phillips, Ifiy~lislsund RevnEul+onurEes,Xn this project, the third jrt their ongoing analysis of revolutionary leadersl~ip,they explored the differences between poiitical leaders who are "revolutionarieS%and those wl~oare "loyalists:%evolutionaries are those wl~orisk their lives "by playing a prominent, active, and continrrirrg role thro~xghorrtthe revolutionary process" @. xiv). See note tO above on tl~eirnotion of "thmu&out the revolutionary process.'%oyalists are ""re counterpart of a revoiutioxlary in a key political (elective) or governxnental (appointive) position"" (ibid.), ltevolutiollaries are distinguished by their positive and optimistic views of the population and their power&] visions of social justice and the need to ""right wrongs" "7. 112). There is, however, a significant degree to which revolutionary leaders are sirnikar to not~revolutior~ary ieaders; this is, Greene noted, one of , Revothe ""best-documented irt~niesof revolutionary xnovements": 1: G ~ e n eC:ompumtive lurionurj~Moveyrrents, 3d ed. (Engiewood Cliffs: Prex~tice-Halt,t990), pp. 41-42. The inverse of this, clearly, is that revolutiowary ieaders are largely dissimilar fmm those in whose name they claim to struggle, Qne implication of this, Greene noted, is ""obvious and dramatic: the great mass of those who would be Liberated are unable to tiberate themselves'yp. 42). Green@"point is welt taken and reinforced acrcjss the cases here; none of the prirnary rewlutionary leaders-lechin, Paz, and Siles in Bolivia, the Castro brothers, Cienkegos,

186

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

and Guevara in Cuba, Bishop and Coard in Grenada, and Rorge, the Ortega brothers, and Wheelock in Piiicara~wa-wc>uld be readijy identified with the majorit17 of the population they purported to represer~t. 16. Greene, C:o~zj?amtz've Kevc~EutinnuryMh/l;r7veme~zts, p. 55. 17. This rou@ly corresponds with Brintods idealis or formulator, Hopper's agitator or prophet, Hoffer's 'haofwrds3'br Eckstein" ideotogrxes or derz~agogues.It does rxot correslmotld with the categories created by Rejai and Phillips, 18. This category, rs)rrghly; parallels Krinton" propagandist or organizer, Hoppeis administrator-exect~tive,Hoffer's "practical men of action," or Eckstein's organizers or adminbtrators. Xt does rxot corresporzd wit11 the categories created by Rejai and PlhiIliys. 19. It is w r t h 110titlgthat in the four cases considered here, the category of quixotic idealist-or in its more negative incarnation, doctrinaire mandarin-appears clearly only in the case of Grenada's Berllard Goard. 20. Xt is interestirtg to note that ltejai and Ph'rllips" lists of those with exceptional verbal skills-peopie ""prticuiarty skiIIEzrl at fashiorzjlzg and propagating revcolrxtionary ideologies'Land those with "qpeciat.orgaxzizationalsklls'3ave some overlap. Eight of the thirtyone revolutionaries are on both lists, Tlzese eight people include the five listed h e r e q a s tro, Ho, Lenin, Mao, and 'li-otsky-plus Samuel Adams (United States), Nen Bellrt (Algeria), and John Pyrn (Englar~d),See Rejai and Philliys, Loybtlists arzd Xevolutionurie~~ p. li $4.In terms of this project, the United States and England had political revc~lutions; Alpria might be caxzstrued as hwing had a political revolution; however, it was xnust clearly a war of national indcpendence/anticoLo~~i;tl war of liberaticln, Certainly none of these people has exzjoyed tlze stature accorded to the other five revolutiollary leaders on the list. 22. The case of Leon Trc>tskyis illustrative. Trc1tsk;r"s stature as one of the leaders of the Xtussian revolution is second only to Lenin's; if:Leriin was ""Ee mastermind: Trotsky "was the the Twenties lo the Eightifi (New active agent"A3. Jolznsor~,~WodernTimes: The WorEdO~am 'fork Harper and Kcow, 1983),p, 63. Trotsky's talents were extraordinary: "a britfirji~ltoratc>r,a first-rate organizer in. his tenure as Commissar of War, and a Marxist theoretician of first r a e : K. Alexander, Ilkofskyisnz in Lacin Arnerzcu (Stanford Hoc)ver It~s%itute Press, 19731, p. 4. Trotsky%vision, Bpamism, axzd charisrna were essential irt the early part of the ftussian revc~lution;he has been described in tlzis period as an ""extraordina~lpubiiic speaker" who ""dazzled the worK~igckasses of St. Peterrsbtlrg'hitA his oratory; as a result, Trotsky pkayed the key role in bringi~lgthe critical Petrograd militay garrison over to the side of the revolutionaries, See, respectively, E, Wilson, Er tke 1:i;rzI~tndSmfitjn:A Sluc1y in the Writing and Actitlg of FIistnry (New York: Doubleday, 19401, p. 42 1, and J. Riftington, Are itz ~ h ~WiniJs c ofMen: Origins r_?flfieRevoEurz'onary Faith (New York Basic Nooks, li980), p, 468. According to Wilson, Trotsky ""could hanclte the grim Mamist logic with a freer and more sweeping 11and so as to make an instmme~ltfor persuasion and wield. the knife of the Mmist iror~yfor purl3osa of public ehibition, when he would Bay the officials aliw and, turning their sldns inside out, display the ignominious carcasses concealed by tlleir assurances and promises; he could dip down axzd raise a laugh from the peasant at the core uf every Russian prole~ariaxzthy. hitting off something with a proverb or fable from the Ukrainian crourltryside of his youtl~;he co~xld point epigrarns with a swihness and a cIeaxzness that woke the wonder of the clwerest intetlectrxais; and he could throw wide the horimns of the rnind to a vision of that digniv and liberty that eveT rnan arnoilg them there should enjoy; Rewee11the vision and the horrible carcasses that stood in the way of their attaining It, the a~xdiencewould be lashed to fury": Witstln, 2i1 the Finland Station, p, 421. Trt~tswsorganizational slcills proxd equally crucial

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

11 87

early 0x1 in maximizing popular support fc)r the October f 917 lfoishevik cotzp; the coordi~dtion "was essentially T r o t s w task"": W Rosenherg and M. h u n g , jlktinsfortning Russia and Ghinu: Revt~lutit~nary Struggle in the Tkentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 119821, p. 54. On TrotskyS role as the leading organizer of the 11917 Bolshevik seizure of power, see 1, Ilec~hcher,The Prophet Arurrctd: Trotsky: 1879-2921 (New York: Vintage Rooks, 19541, or B. Miolfe, 7"hree 12rhn ~Madt.Ffistory: A Riogrq7himE Efistnr~4th ed,, rev. {Newk r k : Dell, 1964),Later, TrotsEs-yS pragmatism and ability t-o maneuver and cornproxnise were central to the creation of the Red Arrny and the subsequent direct-ion-as wil as exhortation and encourage~xent-of that army in battle against both the 'bZErhitcAr~xyand the illvadir~g AIIied armed forces, The scholarly consenscrs on Trotsws l~andlingof the Red Army from 11918 to 1920 is surxmed up in Kosenberg and Yo-ctr~gkdescription of his "remarkable Ieadership'? ltosenberg and Young, 7'runsfirmt'lgRussia end China, p. 63, Throughotzt aff three phases of the social revt)ftttionarc)aprocess, Troksky demc>nstratedhis skills as both a visicmary and an organiz~tiotlalleader: Trc3tsky prt.lved less adept at orgallizing in the context of internai party politics, where he was badly otrtmaneuvered by Josepl~Stalit't.Althaugl~the reasorzs for this are complex and multifaceted, ogle yopukar interi7retation has beet1 that Stalin relished the detaii and mi~zrrtiaeof running the goirernment orz a day-to-day Ihasis, a process with wllic11 Trotsky was fair Iess intr-ihwcd. 22. To take an exampie, military feadersl~ipis often of critical importance dcrrit'tg the Insurrection and political victory. Ht~berMattzs (Ct~ba),and Eden hstora (Nicarqua) were important military figures wl~o,to varying degrees, proved ill suited for the tlransfarmation phase, Historically such people have rarely been part of what might be considered the vanguat-8, 23. D. Gilbert, Sendinistus: TIte Party alzri the RevuEutlnr~(New %rk: Basit Klackcvell, 19881, p. viii. This is significant, Most other ft3rms uf political change involve efforts to at least marginaltze and preferably rxelxtralize the po3l~ulation. 24. Ibid., p. 33. 25, This paragrapl~Is largely drawrr from Lenin" classic statement ofthe role o f r l ~ vane ward, \Vhal Is fa Be Done? (New York: International hblishers, 1986). See in partimlar the discussion "Can a Wesvspaper Be a Collective Orgainser'ylsd (pp. 156-1661, where Lenin drew the anatc3gy with bricklaying as well as an interesting notion of the party as texnyorary scaf-faldingthat is erected to assist in the construction of a permanent building and then torn down and disposed of after the edifice is complete, See aiso the secriorz entitled "The Working Class as Vanguard Fighter for Democracy" (pp. 78-93). F. Moshiri, ""Revoiutio~~ary Conflict "flrecrry In an Evoiutionary Perspective," in J. Goldstone, 7: R. Gurr, and F. Mc>shiri,eds., Revolrltirtrzs of the Late jlil..etztietkz C:entury f Boulder: Westview, 1991 ), p. 10, suggested that the vang~xardnotiorx comes directly from Mam and Engefs, citing spccificafly thc Chmmunl'st hilunqesto: ""The corxmunists, therefore, are o a tl-te one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working cfass parties of ewly country, that section which pushes fcrrward all the others; on the other hand, they have over the great xnass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the Iine of march, the c ~ n d i t i oand ~ , the uliti~nategeneral resrrfts af the proletarian mowrnent": K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Coxnmunist Max~iksto: in R, Tucker, ed,, The Mtzm-EngeEs Rettder, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p, 494; aisa cited in Moshiri. Further evidence of this position by Marx and E~ltjfelscan be found in a rt~ughlycontempc>raaeoclspiece, K. Marx and F. Exligels, "Address of the Central Committee to the Cornrnunist League:" in ibid., pp, 50 1-5 11.

188

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

26. L, Trotsky, Ilistory c$ the Russirrlz Revolution (Arm Arbor: Ulliversity of Michigan Press, 19571, p. xix, 27. A, Gramsci, Selecrions f i m the Prison Notebooks, Q, Hoare and G. W. Smith, eds, (New York International Publishers, 19711, p. 418. 28, Irrtervia~~ P~neloya,Nicaragua (June l"39). 2 9. Randall, Sgrzdz'no3 1I)t-lughters: Test itnonies of Nictlrb~guurtIVomen irz Struggle (Van couver: New Star Books, t 98 I ), p. 53. 30. S, Mioiin, hlitlcs urzd Vision (Kostorz: Little, Rro%vn,19CiQ),p. 4-31;. This Is cited in M. Keren, ""Itroduction," Infernational I;"oliticc~lScience Review, vol. 9,110. 1 ( 113881,p. l . Kere11 pointed orrt that alttltougll every ""leader endowd with vision may he called "visionary' . . . vision alone is . . . no Farantee of effective soda1 tra~lsformation,"Of greater i~lterest, therefore, are those Kern dubbed ""visionary realists, those leaders who, while endowed with a visic)n, atso possess a good sense of political reality" ((ibid.). 3 l , Dror described visiollary political leadership as "functionally useful and perhaps necessary drrring accelerated c h a n g e v 9 r ~ r""Visionary , Political I,eadership,'". 9, 32. J, Meine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik: Charismatic kadership, Political Management, and Crisis in Kevolrxtionary Grenada," J. Heine, ed,, A NevoEurion Abortell: The Lessarzs r_?fCrenurla(Pittsburgh: University of Yittsburgll Press, 1990), p. 247. 33. Ibid. 34. This paragraph is drawn from Weber. See I-I. Gerth and C. brright Mills, From Max Weber:Iissriys in Socioltjgy (New Yc~rk:Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 245-252, 35. Most i~xportantare the three bir~grayhies:Jon Lce Anderson, (:he (iuevam: A Re~jcllurionarj~Lije (New York: Grove Press, 1997); Joxge Castafieda, CotrzpuAeri?:Il%e L@ and Ileultl clfCbe Gzcevunr fNew)"ork:Alfred Knopf, 1997);Paco Ignacio Taiho 11, Guevurra,Also Kfiown as Ghe (New York: St. Martin's, 1"37), A nurnber of excellent articles were yublisl~edaround the thirtieth anniversary of Ghe" death; perhaps the most compellirag and most succinct is Michael L 8 y , "Chek Revolutionary Hr~manism: Mr~rztPzyReview, vol. 49, no. 5 (October 1997). Discussions of "Che chicm-watcl~es, beer, clothing, and the likecan be found in a number of popular magazine% 36. From 1868 to 1898 the Cuballs waged an almost continuous struggle for independence, a stnlgle truncated by the U.S. entry into the Cuban War of Independer~cean the side of the Cubans, 37. On the decisiorz to burn the srrgarcane, see C. frrdson, Cuba urtd h e Rezjolul+onury ,;2/1yr/z:The hliticul Education of the Cuban Rebel Arm){ 7953-1963 (f3ou1der: Fliestview, 1984)) p. 179, or C. Judson, ""Cor~tinuityand Evcjlution of Revoltxtionary Symbolism In Vercfe Olivr~,,"in S. Hatebsky and J. Kirk, cds., Cuba: 'Ikenty-l:ive Years of Rezjolutian, 3959-1984 {New tiiork: Praeger, 1985), pp. 235-236. Rot11 of these pieces are excellent sources on the importance of Cuban revolutionary ~ n y t h o l o aas welt as the places of Guevara and Cienhegos in that ~xytlrolagy, 38. f. P. Sartre, Sc~trtreor1 C:ubu. (New York: Balleatine Nooks, 19611, p. 53. 39, E. Guevaxa, ""Notes on Man and Socialisxn in Culra:TG'he Guevblrn Speaks (New York: Pathfixtder I%ess, 1"37), p. 136. 40, I'crid. 41. E. Guevara, "To His Children," CXe Guevcim and the Cuban Xevolutiort: IVrz'tings urzd S~~eecilzes cfErneslr:,CRe Guevam (New York: hthfinder Press, 15)87),p. 371. 42, On the simitarity of Guevara" and Castro's view, see D, Elodges, I$zteEEee'ruulFoundafz'orzsof the Nicl~ragzianRevc~lcllr'on(Austin: University of Texas Press, 11986), p. 11 75. The

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

11 89

Castro quotes here, cited in ibid. (p. I n ) , are from. two speeches. See F, Castro, "The Second Declaration of Havana" ((4 February 11362), and "Qeech""(113 March 19671, in M. Kenner and J. Petras, eds., Fidel CLlastro ,Cyetdks (blew York: Grove Press, 196%),pp. 104, 131. 43. Quoted in Hodgs, 1rltelfec.cluaXl:ottndatz'nnsr~ftheNEcaragtkan KEV~JIU~ICIM, p, 175, 44, C. Franqui, IJiary ofthe Cubuvz Revoltition (New York: ViKng Press, 1"380), p. 504. 45,111the estimation of Liiwy: ""Fr those who reject the pseudo-Hefegelianrxotion of the "end uf history' with its primal belief in the eternal nature of capitalist exploitation, as far those wl1o condemn the heinous crimes generated hy this system and the Imperialist New World Order" exclt~sionof the people of southern nations from the global polity, Che's humanist revoltxtionary orxtloak rernai~zsa wi~zdowopened to a future of a different s0rt." LSwy, ""Che" lKevolutiunary Hrtmanism," p. 6 , 46. Several peoiyle l~avesuggested this, See, for example, M, Massing, ""VVho Are the Sandinistats?"New b r k Review c$Nrruks, 7~01.35,110.8f 1988), p. 53. Hodges argled that despite ""adherents in virt~iatlyevery Latin American catzntry,'%~uevara's ideology found its home in Nicaragua, married to ""the written and unturitten legacies of L: great foik hero and naof the Nic6truguufz tional redeexner,'%~ugusto Sandirro, See I-lodges, XnteZIectual t.i,u~z~~ario~zs Rezjolui-inn, pp. 172- 173. 47. This was clearly an issue in Grenada; see in partimlar I-leine,""The Hero and the Apparatchike7TTheseconcerns hover arorxnd the edges o f any meaningki discrrssiorz of Castro. 48. Gilbert, Sarzclinistl~s,p. 47. 49. The other three cases offer varying contrasts to this. Bolivia%leadershiiy xnay be usefi~llythought of as a false coltcctive Icadershii-conse~lsus, compacts, and consistency were iargety transitory. With respect to Cuba, it is difficult to talk about any meaningful coilective leadership, especially once Guevara left. Norletheless, it is perhaps possible to talk about some sort of quasi-collective leadership during the insurrection, Grenada wotzid appear to he a clear case of failed cotlective leadership, particularly since the poiarizatiorz hemeen the two principal leaders resulted in the colfapse of the social revc~lutionaryprocess. 50, Gilbert, SandPnistas, p. 47. 5 1.7: Borget "This Is a Revolution of the Worki~lgPeople," in B. Marcus, ed., Nicaragua: The Sundinistl~Peopke"sevolution: Sj~eechesby St~vzdinistf~ Leaders ((New York: Pathfinder Press, 19&5),p. 38. 52, Barge" wife was kilted, and he was unxnercihlly tortured. Wodges pointed out that Rorge was beaten rxntif he screamed, 11e was locked in a cetl lined with ice, and he had electric prrods used on him. M ~ e naccording , to Hodges, Sotxoza decided to drive him insal~e by treatitzg him like an animal, Rorge was subjected to ""nine months in chains and cornpletely covered by a hood; nine mclnths compfetely naked and cold; nine mclnths on a diet o f crumbs:'Whe~r he was released, Hadges rxored, ""h was skin and bor~esand too weak to sta~ld":H~odges,lrziellecfutzlFoundations cf the Nz'ctjrr~guarzKolr{?Eution,p, 266.. Kinzcr atso described the "serious and sustained torture . . . [and) inhuman brutality." b r g e sugered. See S. Kinzer, Blood t$Bmthers: L,$e arzcl Wctr in Nicaragzia (New York: Putnam, 1991), p. t 80. 53. Given their shared history and knotvtedge, Korge's famorxs w r d s to his torturers, ""I told them: 'I am going to get back at you; now caxnes the hour of my revenge, and my. revenge is that we are not going to Ilarm a single hair on your I~eads,">pokethat much more powerfully to the population in the aftermath of potitical victory*See T. Norgc, "On Htlman Kigl-rts in Nicaragtra,'3in 3". Rorge, C. Fonseca, D. Ortega, H, Ortega, and f. Wheetock, k York: Pathfinder Press, 19821, pp..87-88. Despite a profound cornSandizzistas S ~ ~ e a(New

190

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

xnitxnent to avoid physical torture, Borge was ayparelltly not averse to psychological torture. See Kinzer, for example, wllo a r g ~ e dthat althot~gll""Borge had decreed an end to the old-style forms of torture that had been used in Latin America for generations, and which he himself had sugered . . . he had implanted a much less blor~dythough arg~abtymore effective system of ctlercive pressures." "nzer cotntinued that instead of llaving "'prisoners kicked and beaten, tortured with electric prods, or hurned with cigarette butts, he [ Borge] had them sealed into poorly ventilated dark closets, where heat was interlse and inmates lost their sense of time, Confinement was Internrpted at odd intervais fbr long, drairzing and for threats against either the i~lmateor the i111xatcSfarxily": Kirlzer, interrc>gatic->ns Blond of Bro tizers, p. 181. 54. Gilbert, Swrzclinistf~s, p. 43. 55. Ibid., p. 44. 56, I first heard this point made by A~tgustNirntz i11 1985. Massi~lg,"Who Are the Sandinisras?" p. 59, quoted an anolymous dipiornat to this effect, 57,Some have srzggested that this was due, in part* to the roie played by his brotl~er Hulrrtberto. It certain@ was the case that Hulrrtberto penned m a y of the ?krcerista positions, As head of the army, Ejtzxmberro was also strongiy positioned hel~irzdhis brother, It is the traditional Latin American strc>ngllotdof powerinteresting to note that in chc>c>sing the head of the army-H~rmberto was ahle to retain his position in the new goverxment. 58. This is thought to be the basis far Trots;kyS dictum that revolutions are the "mad insi7iration of histary"". Trotsky, My l,$e (New York: Pathfixider Press, 1930), p. 20. The MNK i11Bolivia was equally unpz-epared for the direction of events dtlring the struggle for political power, and the Monirnb6 and Matagalpa uprisings in 1978 similarly caught Nicaragrxa" FSLN trailing behind the popuiatiorz. 59. For a hrther discussion see E. Selbin, ""fdcology:" in J, Goldstone, ed,, The litzcyclopeJia oflDBEiticul Revolzlfiorts (Washingturz, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Rooks, 1998). 60, See, for exampie, Gra~xsci,Selectiurzsfm~.~ the I%n'sarzN(~tehooks,p. 78. 61. Xn the first editiorz I translated the term Frntrzhre rzuevn as person," reflectitzg both my own sensibilities and those I believe were reflected by Guevara. Such an interpretation of Guevarak perspecti\re is bolstered by L&wy'.ssnote with regard to Clre's use of the term man, which Liiwy contends ""does not mean that he was in cahoots with the patriarchy'" hrther, in 19663 Che was proclaiming that "the Iiheratioln of woxnen is yet unfirrishecl": LLT"~;C:he3sXevnlulior~aryI1Turrzbmzfm, p. 7 , note 5. Karen Karnptuirth, howver, xnakes the cornyelling conterltion that such interpretations let: ""sexist revolutionaries off the hook too easily. XF they had mnted to say 'persona r?tuevaior "er hrrxnano r?tlxevo9hey could have easily done so." K. Karnpwirtli, personal corxmunication (May 1998). My own experience interviewing revolutionaries incti~~es me to agree with Kampwirth. 62. U.S. troops first i~ltervenedin Nicaragua in 1909. From 1912 to 1933, "with the exception of a short period in the mid-l92Os, the United States maintained an occupation force i11 Micarag~a: according to J.Booth and "F. Walker, Ui2rrferslundi~g ugll Borge; another told me that she ""cmto" "ndino via Jesus Christ. 66, S. Rarnirez, ""ftemiew," in W Gentile, Nz'cc~r~~gtka (New York: W. W'.Norto~l,1989),p. 129' 67.3'. Walker, Nicuraguu: The first Five Years (New tiiork: Praeger, 1985), p. 24, The eclec-

tic nature of the ideology was reiterated in other scholars' viavs of Sandinisxno, Wodges characterized Sarxdinbmo as "a composite of the rxationaf and patriotic values of Sandino and of the ethical recasting of Mamism-Leninism in the light of the philosophicaf hurnanism of the young Marx." Sandinisrno "shares:" according to Hodges, aspects of other iden I n t e r p ~ t e dsornewllat otogies, notably tiberalismS ""befief in basic h ~ ~ r n arights,'baft>eit diRerently, ""new" CGhstianity's ""beIief in tile ultimate redemption of the poor and oypressed:" and the "Mamist philosophical tradition cult of a new socialist manW":odges, Inalkctual 1:oundutions of the Nicaruguuuz Rewlutiou?,p. 288. ltuchwargex defined Sandinismo as ""acornpiex mixture of nationalism, anti-imperialism, Marxism, liberation theology, and classical liberalism'? G. Eluchwarger, People in Power: 1:orgI'ng U C;rassroots Ilemocracy in Nictirrt~guu(South Hadtey: Rergin and Garvey, 1987), p. 74. Close simiIarly described Sandinisrno as a "blend of Sarldinrjs anti-imyeriaIist revolutionary nationalism, Christian moral values, liberal concerns about human rights, Nicaraguan patriotisln, and Marxis~n-i~otll orthc~doxMamism-Leninism and the more voluntaristic latinate version":

192

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

D. Close, iVictnrtrgua: Politics, Econourrics, auzd Society (London: Pinter, 1"38), p, 110. Serra invoked comparable elernents to identie Sandinismo as the u~lioaof ""rvc~tutionaychristianity, historical xnateriaiism, and the thought of Sandino": E. Serra, ""lec~iogy,Eleiigion and the Glass Struggle in the Nicara~wanKevc>lutioa,"in K. Harris and C. M. Vilas, eds., Nict~raguu:A Revr~lut-z'iflz U~iirerSiege (Lotldan: Zed, 19851, p, 166, 68. f. Booth, The Errd arzd h e Regitzrtifzg: Tke Nicurt~guurzXe~~olutiort, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview 1985), pp. 146-147; D. Slater, ""Socialism, Democracy, and the Territorial Xmyeralive: Elements for a Cornparisorz of the Cuba11 and Nicaragua11 Experiences,'"~ntij)ude, vcd. 18, no. 2 (1986), p. 178; T. Walker, Reagun Versus the Sandirtz'stms: ?"lzeUadeckired Weir an Nicurgguu f Rorxider: Westview 19871, pp. 3-4; D. Close, Nictlrt~guu,p, 110, 69, This discussion draws on S. jonas and N. Stei~l,"The Constniction of Demc)cracy in Nicaragua:%~atilzAmerict~tjPerspcrctives,vol. 17, no, 3 (1990), pp. 13-1 4. Jonas and Stein argued that pluralissn was rcwted in three sotlrces: f l "tlle desire to overcorne the centuriesold Iegades of repression and tack of experier~cein democratic politicsn";(2) ""the evolution of the FSLN itsdf drrring the last years of the insrrrrection, specifically, Its develctpment into the coalition of three tendellcies which xnade victory possiblem";nd (3) ""ieological plural ism:"^ these three, fonas and Stein added a ""more strtrctural hasis t'or pltxralism In the Nicaragua11Revolution . . . the Sandinistas had to carry out a program of national reconstruction," I have done little more than rearrange and merge their list and perllaps push pluralism. Bll;lce Wright called my attena bit finrther their notion of the FSLN's i~~ternal tion to the discussioxls of Sandinista pluralism in 1%.Burbach and 0. Nbfiez, Fire in the Americas f loadon: Verso, 11 3871, and J. Wheelock, El p n desuflo: enirevistl~por M(~rtmI-Jarnecker (Icfanagua: Editorial ~ u e v dNicaragua, 19831, they are also cited in Flirigbtk interesti~agarticle orz pluralism and vang~xardismin the revolution, See K. Wright, "Plrrralism and nnguardism in the Nicaraguan RevoiutionP Latin Rmerict~nPersyecrives, vol. 17, no. 3 (1990),p. $1. 70, fonas and Stein,""The Cc>nstrttctionof Uesnocracy in NicaragwaP p. 114. 71. Burbach and N6fiez, Fire in the Ameriws, p. 56.These included Marxists, Maoists, Trc>tskyites,and their variar~ts. 72, FVheelock, Elgran destiflo, p. 73, 73..Gilbert, Smndinistas, p. 8. Hodges, lnfellecfualFoundations of the Nicaragziun Revi?ilutiouz, p. 234, described the GPP as " h e heirs of the FSLNk original rural organization'Xfter poiitical victory this faction focused on the Grxevarist rxotiorz of the ""xlewperson.'" 74, Gilbert, S~.tndinistas,p 8. Prior to political victory, this group stressed organizing and propagandizirzg in poor neighhorl~oodsand factories and emphasized urhar1 guerrilla tactics. For more on the Pmtetar-ia~ltendency, see Hohges, luztellecrual Fottndckliclns of the pp. 233-239, Nicari~guaaXe~~olutkra, 75, Gilbert, Swrzclinistl~s,p. 8. 76. A good disct~ssionof the Tercexistas is in Hodges, Xnteblectual Fouwzdations of the Mcarr~guarzRe~,olution,pp. 239-245. 77. Gilbert, Sr~ntlinistclls,pp. 8-9, 78, This process of negotiation, compromise, and unification expiai~rsfin part), why the Terceristas\xnore yragxnatic approach assulned sr.rch a central role in the social revolutionary process. Xt aiso accorrnts fbr some of the confusion (both domestically and internationally) about the FSLN" exact views at the time of political victory and in the earliest yean of the transforxnation process. 79. H. Sklar, Washington? \Var on Nicuragua (Boston: South End Press, 19881,p. 36.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

11 33

80. Hodges, XnteZIectucal 1:ounrZadons ofrjze ivlictnrtrguan Revolution, pp. t t 6-1 2 1. 8 1. A. Sandi~lo, El yensumiertto viva, 2R ed., selected and with an introduction and notes by Sergio ltarnirez (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1981), pp. 183- 184; this is cited in Gilbert, Swrzclinistr~s,p. 22. Sandino's writings as edited by Karnirez have been translated into English, with some additional editing, thy. K. Gotlrad urlder the title Sarzdina: The Test;mary ctfu Micuraguurt Ptslrht, 1921-1934 (Princeton: Princetorz University Press, 1990). 82, Xrr 1985 directorate melxber Rayardo Arce described Sandinismo as ""a political project . . . wl~ere70 percent of the econorny is In private hands, where you have 12 legalIy existing political parties, where ail religion is freely operating, wl-rere you have radios and newspapers that freeiy operate pro and con": DI>. Engfislrr, "%re Are Sartdinistas: Conversations with Nicarqua" Embattled Leaders:'Molhpr]orzes, vc~I.110 (Aupst-September 1985), 1" 22. 83, K. Harris and C, Vilas, Nicuragutz: A Kev(~lutionUncler Siege (Lo~ldon:Zed, 1985), p. t. This is cornpietely in character since carlceyts such as ""national? ""popula2" and ""dmocratic" have figrrxed far more prominently in the words and actiorzs of the leadership than either ""Marxist-Leninist"or "~-~mm~rlist." See Slater, ""Sciajism, Democracy, and the 'jferritorial Imperative,'". 163. 84. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua (1989). This was echoed by an older man who at one time had worked as a veterinarian on one of Somoza's ranches, who also noted: "We heIieve in Sandinismo, The Sandinistas are more or less ho~lorablepeople, quite unlike Soxnuza." fr-rterview.Lebn, Nicaragua (1989). 85. Karnirez, interview,'^. 1130. 86, G. XZudC, Ideokogy and Ptjpubr Protest (New York: Palltheon, 1"38U), p. 28. This elltire paragraph Is drawn from there, 87, RudC stzggested, as an examt~le,that ""among the Yinherent9eIiefs of one generation, and for~nirrgpart of its basic ctxlttrre, are many beliefs that were originalfy derived from outside by an earlier one" ((ibid.). 88. S, Runlington, Political Order in d'lzgnging Soclelies f New Haven: Yale University Press, 19681, p. 461. 89. Gilbert, Salzdinz'stclls,p 41. The translation of ci~nsignuis my own. 90. This point was made to me by John Dunn in a conversation at the University of Mimesota, Minnerzpoiis ( l99 1). 9 2. Hoffer, T h e ?"rue Believe& p. 146. "3. Hopper, ""The Revolutionary Process:" pp, 278-279, 93, Illfr>rmationorz the three is targeiy from f. Dunkeriey, Rebellior~in he Veirzs: PoEE'tic~~i Struggle in Bolivia 1952-1982 (Lo~ldon:Verso, 11 3841, pp. 40-44, 94, See Ibid., pp, 50-53. 95. This draws on one of the best brief descriptions of KaQl Gastrok efforts: Judson, Cuba auzd the Revolutiortar~~ L2/lyth,13p. t 39- 149. 96. Htine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik:>p. 224-225 (Heinek is perhaps the most detailed yersollal analysis of Coard). Probably the most tborougll political allaiysis of Coard is S. Glark, "The Second Assassination of Maurice Kisl~op,"New Intcrrr?uiînnul,no. 6 (1987).

97, Weit-re,"The Hero and the Apyaratchik: p. 224. 98. Gilbert, Swrzclinistf~s,p. 43. 99, Ibid. 2661011, Htlntington, I~oliticaliOrder in C:ha~giagS~~cZ'eties"~,?.

194

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

101. XXejai, The Co~rrj?trrtrtive S r u 4 ofRevolurionarj~Stmtegyf p, 26. ltejai referred to these two as ""cndditions" and "manipulables,"" 102, There are several good references. The best is GilbertS esser~tiaiSnuzdinist(~s,which is the only large-scale compz-ehensivestudy of the FSLN to date. Good brief ovelnliiews may be found in the volumes edited by T: Walker: Nicarttgua in Rewlurian (New York: Praeger, 1982); Nic~raguu:;The Fint Five Veurs {New tiiork: Praeger, 19885); and Rectgart Ersus the Savzdiraisras: The Urrcieclnred W@ron Nimrc~gua(Boulder: Westview, 1987). 11).Nolan, The Ideology of tlze Sgrzdi~zistlasarzd tile Nicijraguun RelroEu tion f Coral Gables: Xnstitrx te of f r-rternational Stl~dies,1984), outlined the FSLM7sideotohy, based on oral and written records. Part 2 of fledges's invaluable text on Sandino, IrzteElectuul Foundlatiorts of ~l-reNin~rl~guwlz ii~vestigationintt:, the lineage and formation of the FSLM7sideRevolutirtrz, is an i~isightfi~l ology. Far the yersk7ective of soxne key particib~ants,see Gabezask entertaining autobiography, fire frt1~111the Mouniuin; M . Edelman's i~lterviewwith Uora Maria Tellkz, in NA(;I,A Xej>ort012 the Arrrericirs, vol. 20, no, 5 ( 19861, and Itandall's intervim with her in SavzdiraoS Ilaughlers; and the key speeches and cioclrments available in Rorge et a/., Smdinistus Speuk, and Marcus, Nict~ragzra.The classic statement of the FSEW rernains their 1969 ""The Mistoric Program of the FSLN,'?n Rorge et al,, Sandirzistlas ,"ipettk, 103. Altliough it wcjuld be a mistake to overstate any similarities bemeen the FSLN's eighteen-year struggle in "the wilderr~ess"and the early Christiarl Ixfartyrs, there is a tradition arncjng Latin Armerisan revc~iutionariesof casting their struggte in exactly those terms (see Chapter 4, note 144). 'Fl~isis certainly how the FSkN saw irseff. The FSLN leaders were ail raised in the Catholic church, mc:,st were altar boys, and several, including Borge and Daniel Ortega, are said to have ctonsidered the priesthood. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, this invocatiorz of relligiorrs themes resurfaced in Violera Charnorrok 1990 preside~xtial camyrtign. 104, Massing, "Who Are the Sandinistas?'"~, 53. 105. Gilbert, Sarzclinisti~s,p. 52, 106. Qlzposition to the Somoza regime by wealthy and middle-class Nicaraguans increased dramatically in the aftermath of the 1972 earthqt~akethat destrc>yeddowntown Managua. The bourgeoisie watcl~edfirst in amazement and then in anger as Somoza yocketed the miHions of dollars of internatiol~alaid that came pouring into the countv. 107. Qne of the best overviews of this is Mark beringhaxn, Revolutiovz anti the ,;2/1ttkiclass C;izuEitiour in Nictzrt~guu(Pittsburgh: University of Piittsburgl-r Press, 1996). 108. Nicaraguan sociologist Marvin Qrtega, ""Sandinismo y revoluci6n: posibilicfades de una experiencia piualista de Izqrxierda en la revoluci6nn (mirneo cited in R. Wrigl-rt,""Puraiism and Va~lpardismin the Micaraglan KevolutionP p. 42). brright explicitly addressed the retationsl~ipbetween vangrrardiism and plzwalism in the Nicaragt~anrerroIutinnary prtjcess. It is interesting to note that the FSLN was the orzly leftist party in Nicaragua that did not call for a ""dictatorship of the proletariat," Tl'lx, according to Massing, led ""Soviet bloc officials" to decide that the members of the FSLN were ""romantic adve~ltrtrerswith littie real unders~andingof Marist theory" "and East Europeans to brand their style ""socialism In the tropics,'heant to connote" a frenetic, seat-of-the-pants brand of Mamism": Massing, "Who Are the Sandirrisras?"p. 52, 109. A, Guillermoprieto, "Letter from Managrxa,'%e+v Yorker, 25 March 1990, p. 83. 110. Even in the Junta of the Government of Naticjnal Keconstrttctic>n(JGRM), where the FSLN held a three-to-two majoritp ail decisiorzs were made on the basis of consensus rather than vc)ti~lg.The Cou~lcilof State, which likewise had a FSLN majority, had a similar

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

11 35

practice. Nor did the FSLN reconfigure itself as a political party, In fact, membership estimates from the early PO&-politicalvictory period range from 3,000 to 5,00tl, Aithotrgh there was a strong party organization led by party professionals, membership, according to Gilbert, was limited to those who were invited to join aper qualifying thrc?ugh a lengthy prograrn of apprenticeship that stressed cornrnunity service and self-abnegation. See Gilbert, Sartdi~zisfbzs,p. 52. Gilbert estimated that there were 16,000 to 50,000 activists-less than l percent of the country's population, Massing, in "Who Are the Sandinistasl'"3ut membership at 24,000 in 1988; LASA estimated it at 30,000 in its postefectior~report. See LASA, "Electoral Uemclcracy Under International Pressure: Report of the Latin Arnerica Studies Association Cornmission to Observe the X990 Election f Pittsi7tlrgh: LASA, 1"390), p. 15, 111. Gilbert, Sauzdivaist(~s,pp. 43-45, Not surprisingly, these factions mirror to some extent the visiclnary (ideological) and organizational (pragmatic) types of leadership that were discussed at length in Chaj7ter 3. 112. Ibid., p. 45. l 13. Ibid. 114, Ibid. 115, Gilbert argued that the positions of Carricin and Niiiiez were slot clear (ibid.), but by 1989 the hvo were definitely aligned with the pragxnatist positiorr. 116, Erica Pc~lakoffand Pierre La Karnee, ""Grass-RootsOrganizations," in T. Wrafker,ed., Niccdrl~gziaWithour Illusiouzs: Reginie lkansitiouz and Structural A~@tlstnrertt in the 1990s (WriImin@on:SK Books, 19971, p. 185. In the estimation of Pt~lakoffand La Ramke, "'They were 13Jlagued by pmblerns of sectarianism, verticalism, and abuses of authority, all consequences of the Frentek democratic centralisxn and the goverxmentk increasing bureaucratizatian" "(itsid,). 117. Interview. Poneioya, Nicaragua f f 989). 118, There is a famous maxim, variousjy attribtitcd, that snore or less says, ""TI~ hillslmountains dolit breed democrats? 119. This is perhaps most beat~tifr;rlly artimlated in the classic Walter Goldfrarrk,"Theories of flevoiutiol~and ltevolution Fliithout Tl~eory :The Case of Mexico,""Theory and Society, 7~01.7,nos. 1-2 ( 1979). 120. This "internationalization" is exacerbated when the social revolution is combined with a war 01national independence, Angola and Mozambique itrvtjlved the dissojutiol~of VortugaI" empire, NATO interests, South Africa, other Africa11 cau11tries and the United States. 121. Kejai, Il'he C;orni~r-rrntiveStudy of8evolcrtirtrzrnr)rStr~tegxp. 44. 122. Migdal, "Vision and Practice:"?, 28. 123. Ibid., p. 30. 124, Nicaraguan politics has always beexi internatianal?ted. From its earliest postindependence experience with the Central A~nericantmion thriztfgh today, Nicaragt~anpolitics has rarely, if ever, been solefy about Nicarapa. Although the nature of the U,S, role in Nicaragrxa is extensive, few have matched the Srjmoza regirnels) as U,S,-oriented creatures. The entire dynasty was buift on U.S. power and access to that power gained in exchange for services rendered, The litany of services rendered to the United States by the Somo7as is impressive, In 11954 Nicaragua provided a staging base for the U.S. overtl~rowof the Guatemalan goverxment, a Eavor repeated in 1961 when the United States needed traitring conareas, staging areas, pc>rts,and airfields far the invasion of Cuba. In 1965 Micarag~~a

196

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

tributed troops to the U,S. invasiall of the Dominican Itelsrublic and offered to send more to fight the war in Southeast Asia f J. Booth and 7: Walker, U~derstttrtdirtgCzenlnrl Am~rz'cu [ffot~lder:Westview, 19891, p. 31). Under the Somoza regime the United States had no stauncher ally is1 the UN or the Organization of Americas1 States (OAS) than Piiicarama. It is hardly surprising that even the Carter administration, which had activeIy sotzght to alter the U.S. traditional postrxil-e in Latin America, felt obiiged ro Ilelp the Somoza regime in Its final days. After ail, both the first and last Sornoza were poptrlarly knwrr as "the last Marine" and the first Somoza was allegedly the wbject of Franldin KoosewLt%(fin)fasnous phrase, "He may be a sonofabitch, but he's our sont>fabitch:' a remark that Sornoza treated as a badge of honor. (Maxly people cite this phrase; for a recent example, see S, Rarnirez-, vol. 24, no. 8 [ 19911, g, 25.)As with other ""Nicaragrra:Confession of Love,? Titis ~M~~gazlne, ""tldges of honor" he wore, hcrtvever, Somoza may have created this one himself. It is rxot entirely clear that RoosewLt ever said it or that it was even said about Somoza. TI~omas,for exampfe, attributed the resnark to William Wietand, director of the Oftice of Caribbeasl and Mexicar1 Affairs for the U.S. State Department, who gaid, ""Xn~owBatista is collsidexed by mar1y as a son of a hitch . . . hut America11 interests come first . . . at least he is our son of a hitch"":. Tkomas, Cuba: The Pzrrsuit ofI;reetiom (New Xxk: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 977. I was recesltly asstired by a collcag~ethat John Foster Dulles, U.S. secretary of state during the Eisenhower administration, made this remark about the dictatclr of the Doxninican ftepublic, Rafaet Ti.ujillo. Xtegrzrdless of the original subject, all three men provide an excellent fir with the commerlt. For most of Nicaragrra's history and at least since 1855, the corxntry's internal politics have been ix-rtimately tied to the United States, Nicaragua is not unique in this. The legacy of the Monrtje Doctrine and U.S. notions of rnaslifest destiny generated a sordid history for the United States in Latin Atnerica, particularly in GesltraI America and the Caritrheazl betweell 1898 and 1934, When, under the auspices of Franklll~rRc)oseveltk Good Neighbor Pr~iicy,the United States turxzed its attention briefly elsewhere, it left behind a sFtem set up to its Iiking. (For an excellent discrrssion of the ""setting UP [of] the sy.stesn," by the United States, see W LaFeber, Iraevitr~bteRevolu~lnns: 2'he Utzited Stufes in C;enirulAmertc~2d ed. [New York: Norton, 11384l).The return of the United States to an actitrist policy in Latin America in 1948 (begiming with Costa Rica's civil war) was marked by intewention or prevention of percekd revtltrxtionary threats: British Guiana, 1952-1954; Bolivia, 19664; Brazil, 1964; Guatemala, 1954; Cuba, 1961; Dominican Republic, f 965; Jamaica, 11372-1980; Chile, 1973; Grenada, 1983; El Salvador since 1980; and Peru since the xnid-f 980s. U.S. policy in this regard remains in place. 125, Guevaxa, "Motes on Man and Socialislx in Cuba:" p. 129* 126. Gilbert, Sunclinbtus, p. 47. 127, The role of dead visionary leaders in Nicaragrra was significant also. It is discussed in Chapter 2.

Chapter Four 1. l? Kornbltth, "U.S. Role in the Gounterrewltttion," is1 7: Walker, ed., Revc~lutiurzund Cou~zterrevobrtiorzin Nic~trttgua(Boulder: Westview, 1991),p 344. The figure of 30,865 that he cited is from the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Presiderrt. 2, M, Coolzer, ""Soaring Prices, Plungitag Hopes," ViElltge Voice, 25 July 19889, 3.. Kc~rnbfulicited official Piiicaraman statistics that ptaced ""property destruction from CIA/contra attacks" at $221.6 tniltion and production losses at $984.5 million, He added

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

11 37

estimates &)m Nicaragua11 ecollomists that placed "monetary losses due to the trade ernbargo at $254 xnillioll and the ioss of development potential h x n the war at $ 2 5 billio11": Kornbluh, ""U.S, XbXe in the Counterrevolutio11:>~224.For any country such nurrrbers are significant; for a poor cotzlltry they are devastating, 4, See the discussion in Chapter t cax~cerningthe dificulties of ascertaining precisely when car~solidationis "cti~nplete." 5, This discussion relies heavily 01% interviews and fieldwork during the winter of 1988-l989 and the sumxner of 1989. My research was based in and around the state of Lebn, dorrrinated by the city of Lebn, Nicaragua" second-largest city. The importance of the interviews was twofold: Interpreted according to my theoretical approach, they alIowed me to ascertain the importance of the variables identified and therefore to discern srrpport for or opposition to the revolutionary project through word and action, The yeople interviewed were located with what Bertaux dubbed the ""snowball sampling" "strategy. and Society: 2'he Lifi I.-listory A{>j>rr~aclz ifz the Social Sciences See D. Bertaux, Bz'(~grf~j>lzy (Beverfy Hills: Sage, 1981). Broadly, the questions asked fell into five categories: support for or opposition to the government; types of activism; economic sitttatic:,~~ before and after the revo1utic)n; geographic location before and after the revolution; and attitudes about trust, opportrtnity, and the future, In general, the interviews were "structr~red"and ""open-ended." 1 iinte~viewedfifty people: eighteen women and thirty-WC:,men, The ages ranged from eighteen to eighty-three, with the greatest number, thirty-four, between eighteen and thirty-nine. Ail hut one person had some schoc:,ling, and twenty-six had degrees rarl@ng from high schoc:,l tc:, advanced. Arnong the fifty there were tell professionals, nine government workers, seven businesspeople, sewn workers, seven students, four teachers, three homemakers, two entertainers, and one large landowner, Half of the yeopie interviewed belonged to organized grorrys with the largest nrxmber, ten, being members of the Sandinista Youth, Four people identified tl1emselves as active members of opposition parties, Forty considered themselves to have been Involved in some form of popular protest or demorzstratlon, Incltxdi~zgten w l ~ ohad participated in antigovernment protests or derrmonstrations in the preceding few months, Atthorxgh these nrxmbers are undorrbtedly orz the high side-and reflect possibly a Etif of exaggeratior~by those Interviewed-they nonetheless shc?w that participation came to be seen as a positive attribute by Nicaraguans, regardless of whether it was for or against the goverxrment. This Is especially noteworthy in a courxtry where participation was historically, at the very least, strongly discorxraged. Moreover, this participatiorz seerns to run across a relatively broad si?ectrum of Nicaraguan society, ranging from the poorest to the most afGuerit, Finally, the interviewees were decidedly weighted toward urhall backgrounds; Thirty-sh lived in urban settings (i?optzlationsof 20,000+) prior to political victory, and forty-six did at the time that they were interviewed. 6. Virttlally everyone I spoke with discussed the ecor~omy,particuiarty how bad it was, and made some reference to either their or other peopfe" ccEIrrent versus previous econorrric status. This was cor~sister?rtfy invoked thy. people as one of the key deterrninallts of their support or the support of others. Less often, but stiH with some frequency, people irnplied that their support or the support of otl~erswas related in part to their geographic iocation, ~rtrticularlythe prrjximity to the contra war. In both cases these were cfearty reIevant categories for people and appeared to be critical fractors in determining support, or lack thereof, for the conso1id;ttion prt?cess. 7 , F. Castro, Cirunma, WeeMy Review (15 December 113681,p. 3.

198

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

8, J, Collirrs, D.Coursen, and D.Drukker, "20-21) Hindsight: The Anatoixy of the FSLN Defeat," Nicaragua Il'hr(1~4ghOur Eyes: 2'he BtllEetin r;?f US (32izens Lbirzg in Nicuragucz, w l , 5, no. 1 (1990), p. 3; LASA, ""Eectoral Democraq Under Irrternationai Pressure," Report of the Latin Arnerica St~~dies Association Commission to Observe the 1990 Election (Pittsbtlrgh: LASA, 1990),p 19; J, Riccardi, "The Nicaraguan Mked Ecconotny: From. Itevolution to StabiIizationP Aguinst tlze Currerzt, rxo. 25 ( 1990),p. 39. "3 The figure of 33,600 percent was provided by Alejandro Martinez, the minister of planning and hrrdget from mid-1988 to February 1990 and the minister of ft~reigntrade and commerce from 1979 to 1988 (A. Martinez, pt~blicpresentation, University of Minnesota, Minr~eapcrlis/May 1"30]). Estlirnates have ranged frcm 20,000 to 36,000 percent: H. Vandell and T. bralLc@rstated tl-tat inflation "finally exceeded 20,000 percent" in 1988 (""U.S. Foreign Itetations with Nicaragua During the Reagan Years?'%aper read at the meeting of Arnerican Political Science Association, 31 August-3 September 1989, p, 116); D. Close pegged it at exactly 21,742 lwrcent (""The Nicaraguan IXevoIution: Toward the Next Ten kars:" G g ~ ~ L f iDimerzsion, an rxo. 7/8, 1989, p. 10);whereas M. Cooper cited 25,006 percent (""Soaring Prices, Plunging Hopes:", 29); Erzvfo said the innation ""l-ptlged 30,000 l7ercent" (""Eonomy,'\erzz-);in, vol. 8, no. 96 j Jrrly 19891, p. 8); and W. Gasparirzi and X). Dye placed the figure at 36,000 percent (""GrcowingPains: Sandi~listaNicaragua" DUificult First Decade," In These Ernes, 19 July 19629, p. 12). Riccardi, citing the "ann~xai1988 estimate from the Ministry of Planning and Budget" (cof which Martinez was minister), also put the rate at 36,000, See j. Riccardi, ""Economic PoXicy,7YinWalker, Revoltrrian and Cou~zt-carrevc1lu5:ian in Nicarr~gu~c, p. 265. In a note, he pointed out that estimates varied widely, and he i~lcluded one that catnptzted the rate at t t ,500-by far the towest number. 10. The centerpiece, as it were, of these tayoffs were the estimated 35,000 state employees fired in the first half of 1989 in what was eu phemistically termed compuct~zcidcin(compacting). 11. LASA, "Electoral Uernocracy Under International P~ssure,''p. 19, 12. Mart inez, prrblic presentation, 13..C. Was, "What Weat Wrong:WAtio~l of geographic distinctions has cropped up ofte11in popular accounts of Nicaragua since the revolution began. See, for example, A. Levie, rv'icurugug: The Peoj~lie S1)a~kf South I-ladley: Bergin and G a ~ ~ e1985), y, or P, Davis, Where Is Micarr~gzia?(New York Simoli and Scliuster, t 987). 33. U. Slater, ""Socialism, Democracy, and the Territorial Imperative: Eleinents for a Coxnpariso-onof the Cuban aiid Nicaraguan Experierices:%ntipocle? vol. 18, no. 2 (11986),p. 174. 34. Although the rural peasantry nurtured the revolutio~iariesfor at least sevexiteen years and the revolutionaries thernselws tended to b c u s on the "heroic guerrillas in the mcluntains: as Massey pointed out, it was the 11rba1l poor who did much t)f the fighting and dying toward the end of the insurrectionary process. See D. Massey, Nicaragaa (Phiiadeiphia: Open University Press, 19871,pp. 20-2 1.

200

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

35. Althou& this reflects in part the lorsg-standing relationship between the FSLN and the campesinos, another explanation for this rnay be that the expectations of those in the urban areas have not beers met: in full. 11scotltrast, the comparatively lower expectations of marly of those in the 111ralareas rnay well llave been surpassed. A separate issue is that there is an increasingly urban population. The war and the ecotlomic conditions resuited in yeopie heading for the cities, particularly Managrra and Lecin. Both are said to have at least dorzbled in population since 1979. 36. Almost everycjne had some story to tell abor~tpeople they knew or, more com~nonly, had heard about, whose support was determined by where they lived before or after the revolutiior~.%t rxeither of these factors seemed to be particrrlarly irx~portantin determining personal support for the vast majority of those interviewed. It may be that intemiews conducted in the contra front, perhaps in a city like Esteii, would be more useful in assessing this factor. 37. Xnterviav. Lebn, Nicaragua ( 1989). 38, Interview. Lebn, Nicaragrxa (1 989). The NW %ar% Message is Nicaragua's equivalent of the U.S. president" annual State ofthe Unioxl address. 39, Interview. L e h , Nicaragua ( 1989). 40. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua f 1989). 4 1. Interview. Le6n, Nicaragua ( 1989). 42. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua f 1989). 43. Interview Lebn, Nicaragua (1989). This is a variatioil 01% the maxim cited in the notes to Chapter 3 to the effect that the mountains do not breed demc9cracy. 44, Interview. Lebn, Nicaragua ( 1989). 45, Interview. Lebn, Nicaragua ( 1988). 46. This is stzpported thy severat of the polls that were ctlnducted in Nicaragua during the 1989 preelection period. A September-October 19889 ITZTANI-TNOP poil found that 75 percent of those polled felt that the elections would be free and honest; only 9 percent feit that they w u l d IIC)~.See "Update: Media Watch: Nicaragua's PoII Wars,'". 14, A n Octaber 19129 CID-Gallt~ppoll found that 77 percent of those pc>lled felt that there would be honest elections (ibid., p, 15). The 1989 Greenberg-Lake poll cited in note 24 found tlsat 72 percent of those polled felt that the elections w-ctld be honest; 7 percent fett that they would not and I l percent were ulldecided (ibid.). This certainly suggests some ievei of trust had emerged between the government and the pop~tlation, 47. Interviav. Lebn, Nicaragua ( 1989). 48. Interview. Nagarote, Nicaragrxa f f 989). 49. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua f 1989). 50, Interview. Le6n, Nicaragua ( 1989). 5 1. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua f 1989). 52, Irrterrriav. Lebn, Nicaragua (1988). 53. Intemiew. Chichigalpa, Nicara~waf 1989). 54. Irrterrriav. Lebn, Nicaragua (1989). 55. Interview. Le6r1, Nicaragua (1989). 56, Interviav. Lebn, Nicaragua (1988). 57, Interview. Le6n, Nicaragua ( 1989). 58. Intemiew. Lebn, Nicaragua f 1989). 59. Interview. Le6n, Nicaragua ( 1989).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

20 1

60. T. Wicfiarn-Crc1~1ey,"Winners, Losers, and Also-Rans: Toward a Comyaratiw Sociology of Latin Arxerican Guerrilla Move~xents,"in S. Eckstein, ed., I'ower und Poptklar Protest: 1,adn Americuur. Socl'ul i2/loverrzents (Rerketey: University of California Press, t%89), p. 156, 61. Irrterviav. Lebn, Nicaragua ( 1989). 62, Indirect attacks began even prior to political victory, and pIanning for direct attacks was concurrent wit11 it, As early as 1977 the Carter adrninistratioll was exigaged in efforts to forestail a FSLN victory; in 1978 Carter arrthorized Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suyport for ""democratic elements" in Nicarag~ansociety (Newsweek>8 Nc>vemI-rer11982). During Sornojza" waxing days i~zoffice, the United States and elements of the Nicaragrran eiite offcred ""Slsxocismo sin Somoza" ('%t>mc>zaism"without Sorntlza) and tried to cobbie together a government that would exclude the FSLN and rely on a ""cleansed" National Guard. Sirxttltaneously the Carter administration was seeEng to alter the ctrmposition of the lxrovisionat gwernment junta that had been allnounced in Costa Rica on 16 Tulle 1979, which included non-FSLN elements, Interestingly, the resistance to U.S. Interference in the junta" ccaxnposition, according to Robert Pastor, former director of Latin American and Carihhean affairs on the National Security Corrncil in the Carter administration, came from the JGWNk "mt)derates:" Atfonso Robeto and Violeta Cliamt)rro, a stance Daniel Ortega recailed with pride In his speech orz the revc>lrrtiorz%tenth anniversary*See, resgectively, R. Pastor, Ckn~lernneu'to Rqetition: 2'he United Stales arzd Mcarf~gziu(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1"377), p, 168, and D. Ortega, ""Ortega Braises XtevoXution on Anniversar$ FBIS-LAM (20 July 19891, p. 41. For the perspective of the Carter administration on these evexits in general, see Pastor. Interpretations of the same events and processes that are less generorxs to the Carter administration can be found in W. Sklar, Wrshiusgs-clnWaron Nicurt~guu(Boston: South End, 19881, pp. 7-56> and W. Leo Grande, "The United States and the Nicaragrrarx Revolrrdor~:Yn 7: Walker, ed., Nicrnrguu itz Xe~lolutinn (New b r k : Yraeger, 11 3821, pp. 63-77. Even as Somoza fell, the United States was laying the fot~ndationfor its future policy, Qn the same day that the revolutionaries achieved political victory, according to Dickey, the U.S, gc>vernmentsalt a DC-8 jet disguised as a Red Cross relief plane-in violation of international agreexnent-into Managua to evacuate some of the rernainir~gleadership of the bated National Grlard. Over the next several days U.S. "oiseratives" &riti&edrelnna~ltsof Sornuza's U.S,-created praetorian guard to Miami to prepare for the battle to oust the new goverxment of Nicmragtla. See C. Dickey, I ~ t 1 1the Cant-ms (New York: Sirnoti and Schustex, 19861, pp. 51-55. Official codification of this policy came within six months of the political victory, wllen Carter signed a ""presidentialfinding" authorizing the CIA tcr begin providing approximately $1 milliosl to anti-Sarldinista elements in and orrt of the victorious coalition. See E, Chamorro, "Confessions of a Contra,"'Wew Republic, 5 Allgust 1985; Los Angeles 'I"z'rr?es,3 March 11385; K. Wbodward, Veil: The Secret Wtzrs ofthe CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Boclks, 1987), p. t t t. 63. I't'ashi~glorzPost, 8 May 1983. The public birth of the coatras came in March 11381 when Parc11,a'eiWl~gc~sirre reported that Nimraguan exiles were training at private military camps in Florida and elsewhere in the United States. See E. Adams, ""Edes Rehearse fix the Day They Hope Wilt Come," Pc~mdeiT\/I~guze'na15 March 1981, pp. 4-6, Two days iater the story was picked up by the New Brk Times.Qn 23 Novernber lsrzg-term stxppcrrt for the contras was sanctioiled by National Security Decision Directive 11 7 (NSDD-1 7), which included the decision to "work pri~narilythrorxgh norz-Americans [sic] . . . but in some cir-

202

NOTES "TOCHAPTER 4

curnstances CIA xnight (possibly using U.S. personnel) take unilateral paramilitary actiotl" (Woskrington Post, 8 May 1983). The "non-Americans" included Argesltines, who had agreed to arm and train the contras (LosAngeles Times, 3 March 19851,"unilaterally controlled Latin assets" (UGLAs)+ontract operatives drawn from Sotivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras (P. Kornbluh, ""The Covert War:" in T, Walker, ed., Reugun Ersus tlze Sandinistus: The UnJecEarecl War on Nicurgguu jBorrider: Miesmiew, 19871, p. 291, and an Taiwanese, ""Rhodesians;""and the CIA's usual ragtag mercenary army of C ~ ~ b exiles, Southeat Asians. Xn December, Reagan signed a ""pesidex3tiai Gnding" authorizing hirther coves-t activities f Wasi"zi~gtc11.~ Post, 8 May 1983). Ten days prior to the signing of NSDU-1 7 , Secretary o f State AIexander Haig was asked at a hearit~gof the V.S. House of Represenlald the committee that the United tives Foreign AEairs Committee whether he c o ~ ~ assure States was not and would not be involved in either direct or indirect attexnpts to overthrow or destabilize the Nicaraguan government. His respclnse was succinct: "McI, I would not give you such an ass~zrax~ce": J. Goshko, "Haig Won't Rule out Anti-Nicaraguan Action:" IVashitzgion Post, 13 Novernber 1% 1. 64. These der~iaEsbemme ail the more important when the U.S. Cotlgress voted unanirnorxsiy on 22 December 1982 to bar the use of U.S. funds "for the purpose of c>verthrowing the government of Nicarag~a"f the first Boland Amendment). In an attempt to forestall Eurther congressional cutofi, cm 27 April t 983, Reagan assured a joint session of Gongress that he did not seek to ~ v e r t h r ~the w government of Nicaragua. The text of the presides~t's remarks was in the Washingmu Post, 28 March 1983, p. A12. Almost a year later, with further restrictions still an important issue in the Congress, according to Smith, Keagan wrote Sellator Howard Baker (4 April 1984) to assure him not only that he was not trying to destabilize or t~verthrowthe Nicaragtran government hut also that he did not seek "".to Impose or compel any particular forxn of government there"". Smith, ""Lies About Nicaragua," Foreigrz PoEicj~no. 67 (19871, p. 88. Perhaps as a result, great effort was expended to give the appearance that the activities of these Nicaragua11""feedosn fighters" were purely homegrotvn. To handle atvkward questiom, accordkg to Sklar, the operation was presented as an already existi~lgArgentine operation to train the contras (Slifar, WcgshingscmS War on Nicurc;guu, p, IOU; the U,S, paid Argentina $50 milfioll for this "senice"). Behind the pretense, however, the United States was busy; the contra leaders were 0ftes1 told which actiotls were to be taken otl their behalf-on some occasions after the fact, as they were being llanded the press release to read in which they were takir~gcredit for the Secret War action, See L, Cockburn, Our cf Control: The Story oftfieReugcz1"IRCdjminis1mtE'or~~ irz Nicaraguu, he XIlegaliiirrns Pipeline, ~urzdrite C;iZr~tra 'lkP1rztgC201~natior~ (New tiiork: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), pp. 2, 10-1 11; Kcjrnbluh, "The Covert War," pp. 25-31; Sklar, Mi~tshirzgron3 Wii7r on Nicaraguu, pp. 149-155. At the same time that the Reagan administration was deqing that the United States sought the overthrc~wof the Nicaragr~anpvemment, the CIA was assuring the cotltras not only that such an overthrow was their joint xnission but also that they would do so soon fCocki>t~rn, (Jut cif CJr~ntrol,p. 110; Dickey, With the Contms, pp. l 12, t 56-158; El. Gutman, Bcrvzuvza Republic The Mnking ofArrrericcrn Policy in Nic~trlapuw1981-1987 [Newtiiork: Sixnon and Schuster, 19881;New Republic95Aug~xslf 985; New York Times, 7 December 1982). 65. Smith, "Lies About Micaragrra," p. 888. The empl-rasisor? the primacy of the goai is mine, In early 11985 Keagan, who likened the contras to the ""faunding fathers" of the United States, admitted at a 21 February press conference that his goal in Nicaragua was "to remove [the gc>vernment]in the sense of its present structure:' Pressed as to whether

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

203

that would necessarily entail the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, XXeagan responded, ""Not if the present gc)vernment wcjttld turn around and . . . say "uI1clen"Smith, ""Lies About Nicaragua:", 88). Atnid increasingly open discussion of the U.S. efforts to overthrc>wthe gcjvernment of Nicaragua, confirmation came from two high-lewL, uni~npeachable sources. Xri February 1986, White House spokesperson Larry Speakes was asked if the ptrrpose of U.S. poiicy was to c>verthrmthe Nicaraguan government. Syeakes resi?onded,"Yes, to be absolutety fralrk"' ( b sAngeles Ernes, 19 February 1986).A few rnonths later, White House Chief of Staff Dorzald Kegan was eqtralily candid on NRC" '"feet the Press." Asked abtatrt the Nicaraguan gc)vemment,Regan responded, "We have to get rid of it in some way or another. . . . What we want to do is to try and help those who are trying to ~ ar\jUilorzc;ltWeek/&22 July 1986, p. overthrc>wthat communist government": W ~ ~ s h i a g1't11~1 9 , and New E>rker,7 JtrIy 1986, p. 64. 66. Jonas and Stein argued that although the contra army-created, fi~nded,trained, and directed by the Uliited Stateewas anticipated to be a central component of the Eleagan ad~z~iniistration's effort to c>verthrotuthe government of Nicaragua, the United States was prepxed to ""sttie" for simply xnaking Nicaragua a xnemorabfe object lesson for the rest of the Third WarXd. See S. Jorzas and N. Stein, ""The Construction of Dernocraq in Nicarag~a,"Lckrin Arnericarz Persj~ectives,vol. 11 7, no. 3 1990), p. 23. jonas and Stein cited a Pentagon official who explained that ""2,000 hard-core guys corrld keep the pressure on the Nicaragian government, force them to use their econc?mic resources for the military, and prevent them from solvilig their ecollomic prol?lemsW"(ibid.). The United States, in fact, srxpl3orted considerably more than 2,000 troops.. By 1983 there were 11 5,000 contra troops in Honduras alone, according to D. Giibert, "Nicaragua:" in M. Biachman, Fli. LRoGxande, and K. Sharpe, eds,, C,"clafror~tz'ng RevoEulion: ,"iecz~rz't-y Through Dipbmucy in C:ertlrapiuj Awzerica (New York Pa~~theox~, 1"386), p. 103, TI-terewere Inure troops with the Uernocratic Revoiutionary Alliance (AKDE) in Costa Rica as welt as hvo small indigenorrs armed mowments on the Atlantic Coast. All received substa~ltialU.S. aid. 67, LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre;". S. 68..The preferred method, according to fc~nasand Stei11,was to try to prc>vc~ke gc)vemxnent ""eackdowns'hon the opposition. See Jonas and Stein, ""The Constmction of Bernocracy in Nicarag~a:' p. 24. In srlppcjrt of this they cited contra leader Enrique BeruInhdez's 1986 expla~~ation that the colltra military attacks were designed, not to ft3ster dexnocratic reforms, but to ""heighten repression" "bid,). An almost pecrrliar yet corzstant sidelight of the effort to discredit the Nicaraguan government was administration efhrts to jink Nicaragua with what tl1e V.S. government apparently considered the "'autiatus" of the world: tlie So~vietsprior to their Gorbachev-Led tra~lsfi~rmation from "the evif empire:' the Cubans, the Libyans, the North Kc>reans,the late Ayatollah Kl1omeixzi in Iran, and ""Such American drttg dealers." See the discussion of the U.S. Office of Public Uipfomacjr in Chapter 2, note 95, 69, Ht~ndredsof rnilfions of dollars and a massive e f i r t , however, were not producing quire the exampfe that the fXeagan admit~istratianhad sou&t. Besides accruing soxne internatio~~al sympathy in the face of tl1e all-out U.S, attack-mucl1 as the Cubans had twerity yeltrs before-the revolution ctlntinued ayrtce. As a resuit, Jonas and Stein argued, the United States ""vie~uedthe [ 19841 Nicaraguarx election, Constitution, and political prtjcess in generat as a "hreathnot because they were insu@icienily democmric, btll because they were ton ~.lerrzncmrzlr,l1ence too attractive to other countries"":,fonas and Stein, "The Construction of Demtlcracy in Nicara~wa:' p. 24 (emphasis in original).

204

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

70, For rnore on the violation of U.S, and international Iat~,see J, Wackei and D. Siegei, Irz C:t~nternpft)fC>t~ngress: 2'he Rec~garrKecr~rcdorz C:e~trulAmen'cl~(Wasl~in@on,U.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1985), pp. 128-136. Domesticalty; there continued to be serious questions about the role of Ceorge Bush, then vice president (Washiagtorz Post, 10 June 1990; M. Byme, ""Illuminating Notations from the Smndal" Chief operative,'"^ These Times, 20 Jrrxle 1990); and the role of xnarly of the ma,jor failed savings and loan institrxtions in the CM'S cantra-supply network (see P. Brewton, series on the Savings and Loan Scandal and the CIA, Ffoustan Post, 6 February; 18 February; 21 February; 2 March; 1I Marcl1 1390).Internationally, there contintled to be fallout from the U.S. protection of CIA operative loft11Hul!, whose extradition was sorrgl~tby Costa Kica. H1.111 was charged by the Costa Ricans with international drug trafficking, violation of the net~tralitylaws, and i~~volvexnent in the 1984 murder of eight people in the CIA's failed attempt to assassinate Edkn Pastora-a ft~rmerFSLN hero who had gone into exile but was refusing to work with either the CIA or the U,S.-backed contras-and bkame it on the Nicaraguan government (J, 13lei&ss, ""IShort," In These Ernes, I4 February 1990; N. Wax and M. E'iardesty, "Drug Trade: Farmer John's Homegrown Connection? Zeta Mctgaziric, April t"390). 71. Xnterview. Managua, Nicaragua ( 1989). 72, LASA, "Electoral Democracy Under Internationat Presstire:' p. 5; Smith, "Lies About Nicaragrxa,'"p. 97-98, 73. SMar, Washington? Wctr orz Mcarc~gul;c, pp. 300-308; Smith, "Lies About Nicarag~a," p. (38. A National Sectirity Council background paper exulted, "We have trumped the latest Micarag~mnlMexicanc f i r t s to rush sigrtatt~reof an unsatisfactory Gontadora agreement'" (Sklar, W~~shitzgt~jrrS \%LT.OYI Nicctqaa, p. 304; HackeI ancl Siegel, In Consenzpt of Gorzgress, p, 22). 74, J, Booth and T, VValker, UrrcierstandingCenrml America (Boulder: Wstview 19891, p. 137.

75. Ibid. 76, Ibid. Walker learned about the itzner wrkings of the commission from a diplornat involved in the GIVS (pp. 179-180, n, 9). 77. These accords alst~pkayed a central role in the texnporary defeat of further U.S. military aid to the contras in the U.S. Congress. 78, This cornyliance, as well as the xloncompliax~ce of Nicaragua3 neighbors, was recagnized by the CIVS (Jonasand Stein, "The Construction of Democracy itz Nicaragrxa," p 25; Booth and FValker, Urrcierslcnnding Gerrtrulilrrrerictr,p. 137) and the Latin American Studies Association Cornmission orz Compliance with the Central American Peace Accord (LASA, . . . and New Risks:' Report of the Latin America11Studies "Extraordinary Opyc>rt.~lnities Association Commission orz Compliance with the Centrai American Peace Accord jPt>ittsburgh: LA%, 1388]), Even the New York Times, whose coverage of Nicara~wamay be best characterized as cot~siderablyless than sympathetic, hailed the behavior of the Nicaraguan government in movi~lgto put in place the accords. For more on the New E~rkifima's stance on Nicaragua, see, for example, N. CI~oxnsky,"M1 the News That Fits:" mute Rlertgfer, no. I4 (198h),p. 56, and ""U.S. Polity and Society: The Lessorzs of Nicaragrxa," in Walker, Rec~gt~n Versus the Sandiriistas; E. Herma n, ""l,moynespeak;"Tet-u ,Wagri~zine,May t 988; Skfar, Washirtgton's War OPTNicgrt~gu~, pp. 6749,204-206; and J. Syence, "The U.S. Media: Covering (Over) Nicara~wa:' in brakes, ibid. 79. Booth and Walker argrxed that the Reagan administration's strccessft~lmanipulation of the media and pt~hlicopinion created a situation where "the Sandinistas found them-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

205

selves to be in the curious position of having to take a xnajor step beyond the [Escluil,uias] accord in order not to appear to the U.S. p t ~ b f cand Congress (then being pressed for more aid to the contras) to he in fur-tdarnental violation of that agreexnent": 1300th and FValker, Ligdersruadie C;entrul Rmen'cl~,p. 138, 80. Operating rules and locations were to be jointdy decided upon and the humanitarian aid was to be char~nelledthrorrgh m~xtuailyagreed-rxpon neutral, i.e., rxon-U.S., organizations. See ""Sayoh-A N m Benchmark? eutvfo, vol. 7, no, 83 (1988). Verification would be handled by Nicaragua11 Cardinal Miguel Qhando y B r v o and the QAS. 8 1. Booth and Walker, Li).lr~iersruadi~g C;enirul Amen'cl~,p. 138. 82. Cooper, ""Soaring Prices, Plunging Hopes'" Cotlins, Coursen, and Drukker, "20-20 I-Iindsigllt:\?.. 3; Vibs, "What Went Wrong:' pp. 11 2-13.. 83. Vilas, " W a t Went Wrong," pp. t 2-1 3, 84, Ibid. 85, Ibid. Vitas related that in April 1989 catton ""magnates"w e e awarded Iarge sr-rbsidies that they had not reqtrested while at the same time cotton worker" demands for a raise to a xninirntrm wage that would cover basic foudst~~ffs were ttrrned clown. Worse, Vikas noted, when tllose hardest hit by the austerity measures reacted and demanded lnigher wges, the g(>vernmentresp(~ndedwith angry accusations, branding people as antirevc~lutionaryand pawns of the United States, Orte state emptoyee toid a reporter that the FSLN was going too far to woo the oppc>sitic>n, "a~ndthat's a mistake for two reasons. First, becat~sethe Sandinistas don? yet understand that no xnatter what they do or say, the private sector doesn't want to w r k with them, it wa~ntsto get rid of them! And the second rnistake is the Sandinistas tilinking the Nicaraguan people will automatically understand. . . .They want tu have people pull togetller to Improve the ecorzomy? Fine. R u t you don't ddo that by letri~zgthe priwte sector piss ail over you and then ask the poor to gacrifice. You do it by kicking the rich in the ass. People risk no longer knotving what they are fighting for, or no longer caring about the revolt~tion,but instead just struggling to eat": Cooper, "Soaring Prices, Plunging Hopes,'"p. 24-25 (emphases in original); also cited In H. Sklar, ""Many vot. 13, no. 4 (April l990), p. 17. Nicarag~aVoters Cry Uncle: Xelu M~~gt~zirze, 86, The arrogallce was discussed with me by Father Miguef Gabaidon during an interview in Mirnneapolis, Mirnnesota, in 1989. The view that the FSLNH leadership was uninterested in ""bad news" was noted in Coilins, Coursen, and Drufier, ""2-220 Hindsight:' pp, 3-4, and A. Guillermo~~rieto, ""Letter from Marxagua:" New Yo~ker,26 March 1990, pp. 88-89. 87, Quoted in fonas and Swin, "The Constrt~ctionof Democracy in Nicaragrra," p, 3 1. 88. Martinez, public presentation, 89, LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre;". 19, 90. This was not lost on the FSLN. It recopized the importance of the cconc?my and

understood that things had not improved for the mlljority and mi&t even have worser~ed, k t the FSLN was eqr~atlycornvinced that the people would not hold it res~3onsihfefor their dire straits, In fact, as Vilas pointed out, the ""belief that an adjustment progntm cautd meet with popular acquiescence turned out to he a teclnnocratic fax~tasythat cost the revotrrtion deariy""itas, "What Went FVrong," ,71' 13. In any country an election in the ahermath of an austerity program sucln as the orze i~ttrcldrrcedixr Nicaragrxa w uid threaten the tenure of the incumbents. The g(>vernmentbdieved, however, that it could defy this logic by blarnittg the economic crisis on the war and the embargo and directing the focus of the campaign to other issues,

206

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

"3. Nevertheless, as LASA pointed out, the United States was able to minimize the cancessions made by the Nicaragua~lsand to keep worfd atte~ltion,and the concomitant pressure, focused almost solely on Nicaragua ratl-ter than Central America as a whole. See LASA, "Electoral Uernocracy Under Interrlational Pressure;' p. 9. "3. See ibid., pp. 9-10, This was a further attempt to discourage the proliferation of small parties, Syecificaily, the rules goverxring the legislative elections were rewritten to favor the larger parties. This clause, wl~ichwas dropped in later negotiations, specified that a party could win a seat in the National Assernhly onty if it won more than 5 percent of the vote nationwide. The logic-common in one form or a~lotherin rnost Western democracies-was to encourage the formation of true poiitical parties rather than small passorzalistic whicles. This continued efforts intrc>dticedin the laws for the 1984 elections, (33. LASA, "Electoral 1)emocracy Ul-tder I~~ternational Pressure:' p, 10. 94. Ibid. "3. Xbid. Even after August, the til~itedStates ctlntinued to act throtzgh the opposition parties and the other Cex-ttrajAmerican states to demand changes in what were the region's xnost liberal dectoraX laws. 96, ""Stting the Rules of the Game: Nicaragrrds Reformed Etectorai bw,'ken~~i"u, voi. 8, no. 95 (19X9), p, 29. In Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Guatemala parties receiving less than 4-5 percent of the vote are inefigihle for prrbiic funding. In the Ul~itedStates, public fbnds are grant" on the basis of the preceding election results, according to wllich parties are classified as mitjoxity (over 25 percent), minority (5-25 percent), or new (under 5 percent). In Nicara~wa,however, the United States and the opposition de~wandedthat public funds be divided equally; if this were done in the Ul-tited States, the Comxnunist Party U,S.A. and its perenniaJ presidential candidate, Grrs Hall, wrrld receive the same amorxnt as that year's Xtepublican or Democratic nominee. 97. Xbid., p. 33. 98. Mary countries, including the United States, prcjhibit foreign fiinding of political parties. Yet under intense U.S. pressure and the implicit threat of the gritnary og~position party's bc:,ycotti~lganr:,ther election, the Nicaragua11gc)vernment agreed to the legalization of foreign knding of the political campaigns. According to the law donations of material aid were duty free. Cash donations had to be reported, and 50 percent of the amount received had to he turned over to the Etectorai Council's fund, which was being used to defray the administrative costs of the election, "3. The NED was created by the Reagan administration in 1983 as a bil~artisanorganization dedicated to ""promoting democracy abroad." The NEIYs 1985 annrxai report is more specific about its missitin: "flarlning, coc:,dinating and implementing ir~ternationalpolitical activities in support of V.S. poiicies and interests retative to rxatiortal sectrrity.'Yee W. Robinson, "U.S. Overt Inte~~ention: Nicarag~a"Electoral Coup: C;i~vertAction Iqfirmatiouz Bulletin, no, 34 (Summer 199U), p. (3. Operating throu& an array of subsidiary and related orgmkations, the MED has been most active in Af&a~listan, Chile, Easter11 Eurclye, Nicaragua, the Philippines, 13aIand, South Africa, and the former Soviet Union, See W, Skfar, ""Uoilars Don? Buy Democracy," Nicurt~guurzPersj~ecti%jes, 18 f X990), or the report by the Council 0x1 Hemispheric Affairs and the Inter-Hemispheric Educatioll Xtesource Center, "National Endowment for Detnocracy (NED): A Foreign Policy Brancl1 Gone Aww" (Albuquerque: Resource Center, 1990). In Nicaragwa the filnds were designated tc:,support civic education, pail-watcher tt-ai~zit-rg, voter registration, a corztitzgenq fund, and support for sorne election obsemers. Another $3 miflion-pfus of MED mc>ney,accc~rdingto Sharkcy,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

207

was received by various offshoas of the UNO: the Institute for Electoral Promotion and Training (IPCE); the Council of Trade Uizion Unification (CLTS) (Sfiarkq noted that from 1984 to 1988 CUS aim received $500,000 from the Free Trade Union Institute, the AFLCIO conduit for NED moneys); Via CLvica; the Center for Youth Formation; and the Nicaraguan fn,"orxan"sMwernent. I,u Prensa the newspaper owned by the UN05 spresidential candidate, received $470,000 from the NED for the election. See f. S h a r k e ~ "Nicaragrxa: Axlato~nyof an Election,""Co~rrmonCatlse, vol. 16, no, 3 (1990), pp, 25-28. The UNQ and its affiliates also received hundreds of thorrsands of doltars in private dunatiorzs from U.S. citizens. 100, LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre:>p. 25-26, 101. Ibid., p. 24; Sharkey, ""Nicarag~a:Anatomy of an Election," p 224. 102, LASA, ""Electoral Detnocracy U~lderInternational Pressure," p. 226, 103. CoLlins, Coursen, and Urukker, ""2-20 Hindsight:" p, 3. 104. F, Goldxnan, "Daniel, Dona Violeta, Democracy: On the Campaign Trail in Nicaragrxa,'Yfarf~er's(February 1990), p. 78. 105. The PSOC was the persorlal vehicle of Fernando Agaero, a ft3rmer leader of the Nicaragrxan Conservative party who had ties to Somoza. 106. "Navig"i11g the Electoral Map," envit~~ vol. 8, no. 99 ( 11389),p. 113. These four parties i~zcltxdedthe Social Christiar~party (PSC), wllich for the f 990 election created an alliance with one of its offshoots, the Pc>yularSocial Clzristia~lparty (PPSC), and the north Atlantic Coast-based Organization of the Nations of the Motherland (VATAMX), and three ~ n i croparties: the Democratic Conservative party (PCD), the Central Arnerican Unionist party (PUCX), and the National Unity Liberal party (PLXUN). The PPSC, which had been part of the gover~~irzg cualitiorz immediateiy after the political victory, ended up split between the alliance of the PCS and the PPSC and the UNO, 107, LASA, ""Electoral Democracy Under International Pressrrre," 13. 18. 108. The PIIT, Trotskyites affiliated with the International Workers League and the Forrrrh Xllternational, felt it was time for an "authentic revtllutian," which worxld eradicate 13). MAP-ML charged the FSLN's economic program ("Navigating the Electoral Map:". that to date the revolution had ""betrayed socialism and the workers" hlpursuit ""of staying in power and maintaining a privifeged standard of jiving that separates its Leaders from the Nicaraguan masses": ‘"'ideologies in Conflict: Platforms of Four Nicaraguan Political Parties,'%er~io,vol. 8, no. IOI f t 989),p. 37. 109. Three of the parties discussed here-the PGB ( l 4 percent), PPSC (5.6 percexzt), and MAP-ML ( 1 percent)-accorrnted for over 241 percent of that vote, The three other opposition parties that ran in the f 984 election, PLI (9.6 percent), PCcIeN C 1.5 percent), and PSN (2.3 percent), were part of the UN0 in 1990. 110. These fieres were bolstered, respectively, by the 1.2 percent received by the MUR's Hassrin and the 1.6 percent National Asselxbty vote tallied by the PSC slate. 1l l. Although the president of the National Endowment for Democracy CNEU) assured the U.S, Sellate Fareign Elefations Comxnittee that the NED funds were designed to ellsure that o13position parties wrrld become at1 "enduring force in Nicaragua11 society and the guarantor of pluralism,'?he orlly one of the nine opposition parties to receive NED h n d s was the UNQ. An NED o f cial later expiained that "if f ~orzgxesshad wanted morzey to go to other parties, it should have said so:' See Shaskey, "Nicara~wa:Anato~nyof an Election," p. 24. 112. LASA, "Electoral Uernocracy Under International P~ssure,"p. 18,

208

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

113. Ibid., p. 41. Couzrintlismo was defined by LASA as ""aeif-perpetuating hold on power:' Wriarda and Ktine similarly defined it as "the prolonging of one" term in office beyond its constitutional limits": H, Wiarda and H, Kline, ""GovernxnentMachixrary and the Role of the State:' in Laiirz Amen'cl~1)'olitz'csarzcl DeveEupmeni, 3d @d.(Boulder: Westview, 1990), 13. 885. 114, Vilas, "What Went Wrong," p, 15. Such corzcern,Vitas suggested, was heigl~tenedby the FSLNS decision to include numerous refalives of Sandinista Xeaders on their National Assembly slate. 115, LASA, "Electoral Uernocracy Under International P~ssure,"p. 20. 116, Xbid, 117. These ranged from baseball caps and T-shirts to "articles of clothing, toys for the childrerz, emblems, toiietries, etc'? Vilas, " m a t W n t VVxong,'"?. 14, 118. This description is drawn primarily from U S A , "Electoral Democracy Under International pressure:"^ 2 1, as well as various descriytioxzs including L, Bensky, "Caxnpaigning with the Sandinbtas: Everything Will Be Better?" Nariorz, vtk 250, no. 9 (1990), p. 303; Goldman, "Daniel, Dona Violeta, Dernocracy,'"py. 74-75; Guillerxnoyrietu, ""Ltter from Managrxa," pp. 88-89; J.Preston, "The Defeat of the Sar?tdinistas:Wew York Review of Books, 7~01.37,no. 6 ( l9901, p, 27; and Was, "What Weat Wrrong," pp, 14-15. Goldnlan described a sirnilar scenario at ar%appearance by Oxtega's running mate, Kamirez {"Daniel, Doaa Vit~leta,Ue~nocrac)r,"pp, 71-72). l 1% LASSA, "Electoral Democracy Under I~lternationaiPressure," p. 2 21. 120. Ibid. 121. Guillermoprieto, for exalxple, noted the assurnytion ""tat the Sandinistas' spiritual link with the people was so strong that It could override any temporary romance with the opposition'": Guitlermoyrieto, "Letter from Managua," p, 89. 122, Ibid., p. 88. 123. See also ColEins, Coursen, and Uruher, who argued that the FSLN ""apparently faired to understand that the time In whicl~a majority of the pop~tlationsaw It as a vanto act as a vanguard party, complete with a vertical strucward had passed, By contin~~ing ture and a largely secret decision-~xakingprocess, the FSLN separated itself' from the general populationn":atlins, Cottrsen, and Dru&er, ""2-20 Hi~ldsight: p, 3, 124. Goldman, ""Daniel, Dona Violeta, Democracy,'", 71. "Mucfiachos" is isan affectionate rxickname for the "bys" who lead the FSLN, 125. A political alignxnent would likely have resulted in at least four factions: the Far Right {Neo-liberal party IIaALI], National Action party (PAN], De~nocraticParty of National Confidence JPDCNJ,Constitutic>nalistLiberal Party [PLC], and National Conservative party [PNC]); the Right ([Nationaii Conservative Action party [ANC] and Popular Conservative Allia~lceparty [PAPG]); the Genter (PLI, MDN, Central American Integrationist party [PIAC], and Social Delxocratic party [PSDj); and the Left (PPSC, PSN, and PCdeN). Vilas, "What Wrent Wrong:' p. 16, identified six ""broad ideological currents" that made up the UNO: yrtrties from the old Conservatik~eparty, those that g r m out of the old Liberal party, social democrats, social Christians, Communists, and the Central American integrationists. Iinvio categorized the makeuy as conservatives, liberals, social Christians, social democrats, and Mamists (split into Communists and socialists). See "ldeoiogies In Conflict," p. 28. 126. The PAN, the PDCN, PLC, and the PNG. The rightist party was the PAPC.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

203

127. The leftist parties were the PPSC dissidents and Nicaragua" two pre-political vietory leftist parties, the PSN, founded in 1944, and its 1967 offslioc>t,the YCdeN. 128, The far-right PAL], the rightist AWC, and three centrist parties, the MDN, the YIAC, and the PSD. 129, Xt was a point of great pride, according to a former member of COSEP (Interview. Lerjxz, Nicaragua 19891, that members had not left tlie currntr)r.or joined the contras, although they strongly supported the cotitras"efforts. As we have seen, COSEP was an integral part of the CD in 1984 and thus boycotted the election, 130, Blue and white are the colors of the Micaraglan flag. 131. The PLX and PSN had been fotrnded in 1944, the PCdeN in 19667, and the PPSC In 11376. The PLC ( 11367) and MDN ( 1978) are tlse only other coalition partners that existed prior to 19679, In cotitrast, seven of the other parties have been in existence since only 1984. 132. For an interesting discussion of Godoy's role in the National Asselnbly, see A. Reding, "Under Construction: Nicaragua" New E"olity,'"n P. Rosset and J. Vandermeer, eds,, Nict~rl~guw: Unfirzished Xe~~oEutl'sn (New tiiork: Grove, 1985). 133. The PALX, tlse MDN, and tlie PSD ail apparently bore ""srigmas" of which the others were leery. The IJALIS blemish lay in its creation and dorrtinatiorz by former Somoza allies, The MUN and the PSD were stairled by their contra connections. In bath ccases their most itnportant leaders-the MDN's Robelo and the PSDk AAlfredo CQar and Pedro foaqtrt"n Chamorrc>,Jr.-had left Nicarag~aand joined tlie contra political directorate. Neither the ANG nor the PIAC, Iackirrg party structure, had aquired iegrzi statlis as parties prior to the electic~n, 134, ""Navigating the Electoral Map;"\x I t ; USA, ""Electoral Bernocracy Ullder International Pressure:" p. 17. 135, Xt is interesting to note that it was apparently threats by the PSN and PGdeN to quit that assured Godoy of the vice-presidentiai slat over Rolafios. It was, QXane pointed out, hard enough for them to accept a ticket headed by one of Nicaragua's rnost poweilfill families-acidilxlg tlie leader o.f the currntry's most reactionary elements worxid apyarentty be too much. See T. O'Kane, ""The New Old Ordcr,'WAthat ""one thing is clear, the 26th of July [the guerritla movernentj, the Sierra Maestra, and you are three separate entities and only one God3'":(=. Franqrxi, Ilr'ary of the Cubtzn RCIWIUI~QN (New York Viking, t980), p 2'71. The proliferation of Christ-like pictures of Guevara hirnself in the years after his death hrtller attested to the rningling ofrhe revolutionary and the religio~~s in Latin America. 143. Ghamorro, News Conference, p. 12. The effort OF the FSLN (which Included hivo of her children and one of her brothers-in-law) to divest Charnorro of her husband's surname was an ill-ctlnceived attempt to disassociate hex from Pedrv Joaquin's martyrdom and atmost cestai~llya tacticat error. If allything, it served to remind people of the reverence they felt for her I~usbandand rnade the FSLN look meall spirited, 144. V, Charnorrcz, Campaign Syeecll, Radio Catbtica. FBIS-LAM ( t 9 December 1989). 145. V. Cl-tarnorro, Final Carnyrtign Speech, Managua ltadio Curporatioxl. FBXS-LAM (20 February 1990). 144. Qrtega, ""Ortega Praises Kevc~Iutionon Annivessar$' p. 41. 147. G o l d m a ~argrxed ~ that "men iike Reagan and Rush""began "not surprisingiy, if ironically. . . to care about free, fair efections in Nicaragua in the surnmer of 1979 . . . ; irorziJI.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

21 1

call3 because it was the political space opened that suxnlxer by the revolution . . . that far the first time made it possible to talk about free and fair Micaragwan elections and, mclre important, tile establishment of a true and progressive democracy": Goid~nan,""Daniel, Uoaa Violeta, De~nocrac)r,'". 70. 148. D, Durenberger, "Congratulations to the Nicaraguan PeopIe,'Xongrtrssionul Record-Seutute, vol. SX 563 f 26 Febr~rary1990). 149. The 1990 Niaraguan dedion was perhaps the xnost intensely observed in history. The UN and OAS sent hundreds 05 obsemers, who were present throughout the process. On election day, commissions from virtually every Western Esiropean parliament, reprmentatives ofthe election offices from every Latin American and most Caribbean nations, and a wide array of international delegdtions induding the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of State (forxner U,S, president Carter%organization), the European Parliament, Freedorn House, the Latin American Studies Assaciatior~,and a myriad of ot11er grt>upscontributed to the more than one thousand observers who were present, None of the major monitoring groups jtrd2;ed tile election process to be anphiug less than fair, open, and hor~est. 150. SMar, ""Many Nicaragua Voters Cry UncIe:\x 18, l5 1. M, Dxscoto, "There Was Fraud, But the Revolution Mion,'"~urr-Ecuda I~ternucrclnul, vc~i.10, no. 314 (2 1 April 1990), p. 18; Martinez, public presentation; C. Peters, "Letter from Managrxa,'Teru ~M~ilgctzinc; April 1990, 152, Martinez, public presentation, Martinez is the former minister of both budget and planning (1988-1990) and of foreign trade and carnxnerce (1979-f 988). 153.7: WicM~am-Crowleysuggested that the 1373 midterrn electio~lsin Chile represented another such case. Xri fact, Salvador AIIendeS Popular Uliity party (UP) received aimost 50 percent of the vote in the April 1971 locallmunidpal eiectiorzs and 43 percent In president had the March l973 midterm cax~gressionilid e c t i o n e t h e first time a ""Cl~ilea~z ever been able to Increase his srrpport In a midterxn congressional election": Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, M ~ d e r nL,alt?-~Rmen'cl~,3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 137. The figures are frcm pp. 136-137. X arn uncomfortabie about describing the longtime i?ofitical fi~nctionariesof the UP as revc~iutionaries-l wcjuld be inclined to call them. rekrrnists-and it seexns pertirrer~tto me that they, having been dected in the first place, w u l d not be loath to put themselves before the public agdir~,I know of nothing that would call into cluestion the UP'S ctlmxnitxnent to democratic electoral procedures. In cantrast, to the best of my knowiedge, no revolutionary movement that came to power via armed insurrection had, prior to the FSLN, ever held gsoyuIar elections in which the opposition was allowed to participate freely. "Nicara~wa:The Sa~ldinistaKegirne at a Strategic 'b2'atershed;"'Stmlegic Ke154, A. C~VZ, tjiew, Spring 1984, p. l l . 155. Berman argued that "Nicaraguans who voted against the party" were "in their own xninds . . . defending the revolution.--agai~ the Saxldinistas"". 13erman, "Who Lost Nicarag~" A Response to 'b2'illiarn M. LeaGrande: I13r'kktln,vol. 5, no, 3 ( 1390), g. 17. 156, This split was serious. The U N 0 right tried to remove Chamorro froxn the ticket even before the electiorz when she was on a trip outside the corxntry. Largeiy because of U.S. pressure, that effort failed. 157, Good short overviews of these parties and their piatfor~nscan be found in J. Butler, U. Dye, J. Spe~lce,and C, Vickers, ""Uernocracy and fts Discontents: Nicaragt~ansFace the Ejection" (Cambridge: Hemispheric Initiatives, 1896),pp. 32-34. 158. Preston, "The Defeat of the Sandinistas:" p. 28.

212

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

Chapter Five 1. J. Dzrnn, 1Modert-r RelmEutmns, 2d ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1"3S}, p. 226, Dunn, in a 1991 conversation with me, stressed the importance of this idea. 2. S. Jonas, The Ratd~for C;ucaten~ula:Rebe& 1Jeat.j~Sguacis, rnvzd US. Pozver (Boulder: Westview, 11 33 11 ), p. 4. 3..To take one example, Hodges describes how ALberto Bayc~,a loyalist Spa11id1Air Force officer forced irzto exile after the destructiorz of the Spanish Keprrbiic in 19339 by the fascist ft>rces,hooked with and trained surviving Sandinistas in the 1940s in Costa Rica, B a p subsequently trained Castdz; Cuban exiles in Mexico, where his "star" student was Che Guevara. In Cuba, Nayo and Guevara helped train a new generation of Nicarag~anexiles, passing on to them Iessorzs from Spain, Sandino, Grxevards 1954 experiences watching the destruction of dernocraq in Guatemala, and the ilif-fated Caribbeaxi Legion. The latter was a collection of progressive fighters in the region dedicated to overthrowing Cetltral Axnerican and Caribbean dictators. Bayo specifically trained the expeditionary fi~rcesthat sailed against the first Sornoza in 1948 and the Dominican Republic's Trujillo in 1949. See D. Hodges, Xntelkcruub Foufzclations[$the ~VictzruguavzRevoludon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 19861, pp. 167-172, For more on the Caribbearl Legion, see C, Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: Ykhe Rrztidictt~torialSiruggle in the Curibhean, 1945-1959 (Coral Gables: University af Miami Press, 1974). 4, Not everyone wotzid describe these ftmx cases as socialist. Stoile pointed out, far example, that some ""Marxist carnmentators . . . liave challenged the claims to gelluine socialist practice by the Manley regime i11 Jarnaica in the 1970s and by Guyana under the late Forhes RurxzhmmVX.Stone, "Whither Caribbean Socialism: Grenada, Jamaica, and Guyana in Perspective," in f. Heine, ed., A RevoEulinn Aborted: The Ikssons of Grenada (Pittsbrrrgh: University of Pittsburgll Press, 19901, p, 291. Howe similarly noted that the Jaixaican socialists have "especidly in Marxist eyes, t~rtlyratlzer d t ~ b i o socialist ~ ~ s credentials": S. Howe, ""Marhey Vices, Socialist Virtues,'Wew Siutesmun urzd kciety, vol. 2, no. 35, p. 23. The title of the Latin American Kurea~<shook aborxt Grxyana is G~nyuna:The Pr~zudulentRezjoluliouz (London: Latin American Bureau, 19884). Sunshine has cl~aracterizedthe Surinarnese as "relucta~ltrevc~iutionaries"": C, Sunshine, l"izr:C:r;tribbarz: S Z ~ P V ~Struggle* V L $ ~ , arzd Sovereig~ty (Boston: South End, 113881,p. 1181. 5,This last apparently refers to Sca~~dinavian-style social democraq 6. Axi interesting discussion of this issue can be found in A. Lowerthai, ""Ltirr America: Ready for Partnership," Ibreigrz Afal'rs, vol. 72, no. 1. ( 1992/1993), See also, C. Vilas, "Latin America: Socialist Perspectives in Times of Cholera:' S~~ciaf Jusz~L-&; VCI~.113,110.4 (1992); L. Whitellead, "AIternatives to "iberal Democracy': A Latin American Perspective," in D. Held, ed, Prosj~ectsfir IJerrzucr~~cy: North, South, 1iast9West (Starlfard: Stanford Uniwrsity Press; 1993); 1. Roxborotzgh, "Neo-Liberalism in Latin America: Limits and Alternatives," 'I'hird World QtlurterEli; vol. 13, no. 3 (1992); and D. Scliriebcrg, "Dataline Latin Arnerica: The Growing Fury,'' 1I:reigsz Policy, no. 106 f, 997). 7. Ironically, in both cases, the effort to distort: andlor destroy democracy ca:xe in iarge part from. the bastion of democraq, the Ullited States. Henry Kissinger, national security adviser to (a114later secretary of state for) U.S. President Kichard Nixon, declared after the 1970 election of fongtitne Chitean Se~aateleader and three-time presidential candidate Salvador Allende, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Corxrnunist

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

213

due to the irresponsibility of its own peopIe'3this remark is cited in a number of places, most recentiy, M. McCIintock, lutstruwzent,c qf Terror: U.S, C;uerrillu War$~re, CourzterItzsurgenc3",Counter-Terrorisnz [New X1rk Pantheon, 19921, p,419. U.S. efforts to instigate a coup d2tat In Chife 11ave been well documented; see, for example, W. Klurn, The CIA: A Forgotten Hislory, U S GlobtlE Interyenlions Since IVnrkJ Wii7r 2 (London: Zed, 19861, pp. 232-243; S. Herslil, Tke Price ~J-Vo~ver (New X1rk: Summit, 1983), pp. 258-296; and f. IJrados, President? &SecrelWurs {NewYork: Wiilliam Morrc>w,1981;), pp. 315-322. The U.S. efforts to destabilize ecorzomicalty the government of Micl~aelManley in Jamaica are equally well documented: see, b r exampie, Klurn, The CIA, pp. 299-304. Xn both cases the United States and its locai allies were successful: In 1973 the Chilean military c>verthrevvthe goverxment and i~rstituteda brutal seventeen-year military dictatorship; the Jamaicans fared sotnewhat better after the socialists were unseated in the 19880 election to he repiaced by a South End, conservative government. W. Skiar, Wii7slzittgton7s War on NCttragug (ROS~OIZ: 19881, pp. 390-392, and others have referred to 1980 as an ""electoral coup:" 8. S. Amin, ""The Xssue of Democracy in the Contefnporary Third World,'\SociaEisnz urzd Democmc;t; no. 12 f 19911, p. 95. Amin also noted (ibid.) that "hkstern democracy has no social dimension," 9. Chile's Sociatist party is the second strongest political force within the country" ruling Democratic Coalition alliance; party leader Senator Kiccardo M6ficz said, "Sodafism is not dead, but it is ever stronger in the conscience of the cxpjoited and the hurxiliated and of those who, despite the obstacles, are striving for a better wcorfci'? Latin Rmericarz Negirtrzml Rep""": Soulhern Corze K e ~ ~ nK%91-10 rf (25 Uecesxber 19911, p. 3. 10. K. Rurt>sageand S. Landau, ""Lonely Manley:' hil~rherJt~rzes*VOL. 16 (March-April 19911, p. 29. l l, Other interesting cases that speak to the contin~~ed power of socialism in Latin America and the Caribbean islclttde the Wri,rker5 party in Brazil, which almost won the 1989 election and seems poised to do very weff in the next election; the soLe of Uruguay's former urban ~$uerriflas,the T~~pamaros, in that country" sopposition coalition, the Broad Front (FA); and the October 1992 election of longtisxe Marxist Gheddi 1agas1 is1 Guyana. 12. The FMLM is named for Augustin Farabundo Marti, described by 2300th and Walker as ""rrcharismatic Marxist intellectuaf," who brieay fought alongside Srxndino in Nicaragua before ret~irningto El Salvador to organize peasant uprisings against the government; he was tortured and lcilted hy the Saivadoran governinellt in 1932. See J, Booth and T. FYalker, Urrcierstunding Gerrtml Americtr (Boulder: Westviex 1"39), p, 33. The Peruvian social revolutionaries popularly kllown as Selldero Lurninoso (the Shinillg Path) g r m out of a variety of splits withill Peru" C~clrnrnu~lists and dubbed thelxsetves the Peruviall Colxxnullist Party-Shining Path (PCP-SL); the latter term caxne from the subtitle of their party newspaper, "By the shining path of Golxrade JosC Carfos Naxidtegui"":. Dietz, "Peru's Serldero hxninoso as a XZevoIutionary Movement," Journal of Political anti Mititarjf Sociololty, no, t 8 (19901, p. 121;; D. Poole and G. Renique, ""The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Serzderotogists and the Shining Path" of Peasaxit Rebellion: Rrilledn clf1,atl'n Arrrerican Research, vol. 10, no, 2 ( 1991 ), pp, 141-142. According to Luis Arce 13orja, editor uf El Diurr'o, a newspaper sympathetic to the PCP-SL, ""Sndero hrninoso is a pejcjoxative term, used by the foreigil and bourgeois press; the correct name is Communist Party of Peru, PCP'" A. Fohema, "There Is No Other Way: An Interview With h i s Arce Borja,"'NAGIA Report on the Amerkgs, vol. 24, rxo. 4 C 199011991),p. 23.

214

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

13. There are mariy exceIIent pieces on the revolutionary process in El Salvador, Particularly 11stsfLllare T. S. Montgome~y,Kevt~lutirtrzirt El Sal%?ador:Origins arzcl Ev(1lution (Woulder: Westvim, 1982); J. llunkerley, The Long War: Uicmtorsl~ipand Rebellion in El Salv(2dor (London: "Jerso, 1982); Power in the Isthmus: A 1)nlificalHistory cfM(~6lernCIerzfrftlAmerica (London: Verst~,1988); M, McCLintock, j'he Arrlerican Gnuzecrion, Vol. l: Sate Terror auzd Popular Xesisierzce it2 EI Salvur-ior (kondorz: Zed, t 985); 3'.Karry, El Sal~~t~dor: A Ckutztry C;uide (Albucluerque: Inter-Hemispheric ltesource Center, 1990); and Americas FVatch, El S~lvador'sI3ecude of Terror: fllrmr-rrtXigl.rfs Since lize Assussinurkrz rtfArcizbishnp Rnrnercl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19911).Good brief averviews are Booth and WaLker, U12~lerstttrtdingCentrttl Amer-ica, and J, Dunkerley; ""E Salvador, 1"336--89,'Tt1litiwlSuicide it2 Latin America crrzcl Qt2zer Essays (London: Verso, 11992). Insight into the FMLN-FUR and its thinking is available in two pieces by teader J. VilXaEobos, ""A Dernucratic Itevolution for Ei Salvador,'Ymeigrz I>"ulicy,no, 74 (19891, and ""f"opu1ar Insurrection: Desire or lteality?" Latin Americauz Perspectivt?~, vol. 16, no. 3 (1)389);and in S. Miles and 13, Ostertag, ""FILM New Thinking," NACI'A Rq?nrt on tlze Anzer-icus, vtd, 23, no. 3 f t 989). "fina Kosenberg offered solxe interesting insigl-trsinto the Far 1;light in her chapter, "The Laboratory;"?~C M Jrerz Trialence a l ~ the ~ l Violertl in L ~ t i nAtrzer-ica (New York: Witliam Morrow, 19991). 14. Booth and Walker, Urzdenturzcling C;enfrtll America, p. 85. Long and Srriyth cited El n QfGce, w l ~ i c clailned l~ that most Saivadoran Salvador" Romar~Cathoiic H ~ ~ m aRigl~ts dead were kiHed i11""deliberate assassi~lationca~xpaignscarried out by gc>vesnmentsecurity forces, elite U.S.-trained battalions, and xnilitary death squads": T. Long and F. Svyth, "How the FMLN Wc>nthe Peace," Village &>ice,vof. 37, no. 7 (19921, p. 19. krhaps the xnusr comprehensive assessment of the death and destruction in Et Salvador was offered by Americas Watch, IiE Sulvr;ldorS Decur-ie of Terror. The figure of 75,000 Is from Long and Smyth (""How the FMLN Wc~nthe Peace: p, 19). 1300th and Walker, writing three years earlier, put the total at 70,000 f Urzdersimrzdir~gC:enlruPiuj Amer&$, p. 85). 15, Booth and Walker, Untlersluadiag C;entrul Amen'ca, p. 35. 16, Mexico and France both recogxtized the FMkN-IFDR as a ""beltigerent fctrce"S:oth and brakes, LjMdersi~adirzgC;e~traIAmertr'~p, 8 1; Uunkerley assigned it ""hefligere~ltstatusn":Dunker1ey, Pozver in the Isthurrw, p. 385; according to Americas Watch, it was a ""represe~ltatiwi?ofitical force": Americas bratch, El Sctl~?ador"fecadet?filkrr(~r, p. t 0. 17. Wickham-CmwXey highlighted solxe important differences betweell the FNLNFDR and the FSLN, most important, that the FMLN-FDR was never as muitiictass or broad based as the FSLN, See T. FVicXrbam-Crow C2uerritlas uuzd Revr~lurianin Latin Alnen'cct: A C,"clntpurgtiveStudy offrtsurgeutls alzcl Regitrzes SStce 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19921, pp. 285-287. The MNK and NJM were probably most akin to the FUR, since ail three were composed of oppositiorz politicians of variorrs stripes. The FMLN probably resembled more M-26 in structure, although M-26 could not be characterized as Marxist. 18, M, Davis, " m a t Brought EI Sa1vadtir's FMLN to a New Kind of Power:" C~TISS-Roach, no. 19 (1992), p. 12, Davis pi>intedout that the Saelvadorans have not only looked within their own ihernisphere. He noted that there was a vague collnection with ""Estertl: European Communism" and that inspiration was drawn from other Third World ""arzti-imperiaXist" "rugfes (p. 13). 1% Dunkertey, Power in tlze isthmus, pp. 467-408. 20. This period did, however, see the near-demise of the FMLN-FDK. As WickhamCratuley poixzted orrt, a number of the i~nportantFL)R figures decided to participate in the

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

2 15

1988 and 1989 electioils despite misgivings and even outri$t oppositio~~ by the FMLW leadership. The new party that was formed, the Demc>craticConvergence (CD), even criticized the FMLNS use of violence. 21. N. Svarzman, ""Salvadora~lsAchieve Peace:' Ili'mes cft?zeAmericas, 8 J a n ~ ~ a1r392, y p. 1. It is also worth noting that, according to Long and Smyth, the iate f;loberto ll%ubisson, widely credited as the man who began and oversaw much of the government and quasigovernlxent terror, had predicted when the I'ar-right ARENA party was elected in 1989 that it wrrld be able to negotiate a setdement with the FMLN-FUR. See Long and Smyth, "How the FMLN 'bZf)a the Peace:' p. 20. 22. The Handal ytrote is from K. Gomex, "Race Agreernent: Interview With Skafik Rank Press Dipsl, vol. 8, no. 2 dal of the FMLN," Latin Amen'cae Netvs Uj~date:M f ~ n t hForeign (1992), p. 21; the details are from J, Metendez, "Writing the History of the Peace," Latirs Americ~rzNetvs Ilf?cil~tc: Mt~nthlyE:c>l.eignPress Dipst, 7 ~ 0 1 . no. 2 (1992), p, 23. 23. Long and Smyth, "How the FMLN FYon the Peace," p. 22; Davis, " m a t Brc~u@tEi Salvador" FMLN to a New Mind of Power,'". 18; and D, Dye, "The Peace Accords in a Nutshelf:" In These Il't'mes,v& 16, no. 18 (19921, p, 8, As Dye put it, "Though tile accords also contaix-r social and ecorzornic planks, they don? by themselves achieve the social justice goals sougl~tby the FMLM. By ending gross repression, they open up space in the political arena br the /eft to press for rehrrn by peaceful means for the first time in Safvadoran history" "(ibid.). 24. This information is from ""Srong Showing thy FMLN in Congressional and Mapral Elections:' MA%vs ""Shining Path's Tourth SwordYdeoto~y,'"lotkrnal r$IJr~lilicularzcl hilililary S~ociolr~g$no. 18 (1990). On Maribtegui in general, see H, Vanden, National Marxbnl in L a t l ~Arrreric~t:Josk C;~rlosMuGdlegu15 Th'hoqht and Polz'rics (Boulder: Lynne Kier~ner,1986). 30, The T6pac Amaru Revotutionary Movement (h"tTA). As Rosenberg pointed out, the MRTA "reveres Che Grxevara . . . publishes Intellectual tracts, seeks ta form allhnces with left-wing groups, sends its truclps out to da the necessary political drudgery of organizing, and tries to i~zgratiateitself with the poor sectors of Peru": 7: Kosenberg, "Dialectic," Childrtzrz if Cain, p. 151. For the Senderistus, Kose~lbergnoted, the MRTA were simply more borrrgeois rerrisiorzists. Qne Senderista intervie~vedby Puertas explained that the

216

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

MltTA "is the principal enerny of the revolutioii and there will ultimately have to be a confro~ltationwith them": L. Puertas, ""Senderista," New Internatz'rtrzafist,no. 11 97 ( 11 9891, 1" 10. 31. K. Kirk, ""Sinnig Path%War on Hope: Murder in a Shantytc~wn,"Natirtrz, 7~01.254, no, 12 (1992); Degregori, ""A Dwarf Stiar,'", 13. The phrase ""higlztexz the contradictions'" refers to the notion that the way to hasten the corzflict of opposing forces or i~rterestsor even ideas is to exacerbate the ter~sioiibetween them, One avenue for this, as suggested in the text, is to wipe out any middle ground so that only the polar opposites remain and, In the the case of Peru, people are forced to chose one side or the other, 32. This srrggests at least some of the elements of pragmatism that characterized the other cases we have studied. brickham-Crowley noted two ""minor exceptions": Sendero "Formed a 'tactical alliance' in late 1985 with . . . the Tdyac Axnaru Xtevoiutionary Movement; and it had ties to the Peruvian kasantsT~onfedcrationof Apurfmac": WricMlamCrowiey, C;zierritlla uuzd Revt~lutiouzaries,p 403, n. 138, 33. Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Kevoiutionary Movement,'>p, 136, Xn DietZ's estimation, ""Gtobat.actors have thus had only minimal or no influence oti Serzdero, aside from rhetorical Ideoiogicai statefnents of support, and the reverse Is true as well: Sendero has not had, nor has it sou&t to have, influence on other rewlutionaiy mc>vementsW (p. 137).

34. N. Ma~nriqrte,""Time of Fear," N A U A Repl~rtorz the Americas, VOI. 24, 110, 4 (1990/1991), p. 29. 35. The descril3tion of the Soviets and the lament about the Ct~lturalKewlution pulling up short are from Eloset~berg,""Uialectic~~, 150; the remark about the Chinese is from P. Symmes,"Out tcz Lunch with Sendero:'~Americlun ,Sj)ectlator,vol. 24, no. 12 61992),p. 27. 36, Dielz, ""Veruk Selldero Lurninoso as a Xtevolutionary Movement:\x 132. 37. Castro as a traitor is from W i c f i a m - C r y , Guerrillus arzd Xevofzrlinn, p, 298; as reuisic)nist sewant, from Symmes, ""Out to Lunch with Sendero," p. 27; the Guevara reference Is from Rosenberg, ""Uialectic,'\~. 151. 38. Ftjuerna, "There Is No Other Way," p, 25; Kose~nberg,"Dialectic," p. 150. 39, As one Set~deristaexplained to Rosenberg: "When De~igXiaopit~gbegan to exhibit counter-revc~Iutic~~nary tendencies, he was seat tc:,care for pigs to proletarizc him, And look what Iiappened. IF Iie had been liquidated, he wouIcSt13 have caused all these probjexns. Mao was only the head of the party, while others Izeaded the state and the military, Weke learned from that, The party has to controt everything. Absolutely everything'? ltosenberg, "Dialectic:>. 150. Deng Xiaoping was perhaps Sendexo" favorite target. Xn 1980 the Sendero hung dead dogs from traffic lights and lampposts throughout Lima with placards proclaiming, ""Deng Xiaoping, sorzofabitch." Reniyue reported one discrrssion where Ueng XiaopIlng was regularly referred to as an ""infected pustule": J. Kenique, "The Revc?lution Behind Bars:" 1VACLA Rlej>?jllorton t/zeArrrerI"cas,vol, 24, no. 4 (199(_)/1991), pp. 17-18, 40. Starn, "New Literature on Peru's Sendcro Luminoso:' pp, 220-221. According to Syxnmes, however, mine feel that the Khrner ltouge fell short, Nthough they had ""re right techr~iyues,they simply lacked an effective Communist party to carry the revoftrtion to its endD":ymrnes, "Out to h n c h with Set~dero:". 27. This echoed the carninent about the faifure of the Glrtt~xraiRevolutiorz in note 36. 41. G. Gorriti, ""The War of tile Pl~ilosophcr-King:The Strange Career of the Shining Path," Ne+vRepublic, vol. 202, no. 25 f f 990), p. 18, 42. Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

2 17

43, Degregori, ""A Dwarf Star;""p. 12. The other ubserver was Kirk, ""Shining Path's War on Hope," p. 412, 44, Matsriclue, "'Erie of Fear: p. 36, 45. Americas 'bZEratch,l'ertl Up~llerFire: Hurnarz Rights Sirtce the Return to Democrttcy (New Haven: VaIe University Press, 1"392), pp. 59,64. Emphasis in the original. 46. Cited in Starxz, ""New Literature on Peru's Sendero Luminoso:". 2 19. 47. Xbid, In support of this, Starn cited Guzm4n"s visiorl of himself as a "revolutionary across ""ariver of blood" into the promised land: ""People of Moses" kading his $ir>lIc>tvers Peru, . . . today your finest children, flesh of yi>ur flesh, steel of yc)r~rsteel . . . have unleaslled the redwi~zdand the Aaming banner of rebeIIion . . . the children of your powerf111 womb offer you their armed actions and their lives." Earlier in his article, Starn cited GuzrnPll as well, telling his litltowers tl.rat their "armed struggle has begun, . . . T11e invincible flames of the rewltltiun will glow, turning to lead and steel, . . . There will be a great rupture and we will be the makers of the new dawn, . . .!lie shalt collvert the black fire into red and the red into pure eight" (p. 2 X 2). 48. Cited in Arnericas Watch, IJeru Ul?cirer Fire, p. 58,Victor Smith, a 13ritish sociologist and ""Senderologistn noted that after dispensing revolutionary justice, Sendero tries ""t reorganize agrimltural prc>du"ian, distributing fivestock between rich and poor peasants. And they Instruct farxners to cut back food production to the level needed to srrstain the family and feed the g~erillaarlny. The aim is to starve the towns and heighten urban dissatisfaction. Sendero then appoints its own supporters to positions of authority, selecting cadres to direct prc>dtlctionand distrihutiun, organize party cells and cht>oserecruits for the guerilla army": V. Smith, "A Shining Path of Blood,'Wew Zn~ernatl'onalist,no. 197 ( 1989),p. 9. 49. Manriclue, ""Time of Fear;""pp. 33-34, described how people are executed and "Draconian punisl1ments" meted orxt for drinking and adultery, According to Smith, ""Sender0 atways follows the sarne prclcedure when it enters a new area. Al the Landlords, mediumscale merchants and State representatives, like district governors or j~xsticesof the peace, are either killed or ordered to leave or resign their pt>sts,Criminals are hallled up before "people"' cotzrts. . . . Marly are suxnlxarily executed in bloody fashioxl'": Smith, "'Pi Shining Path of Blood," p. 9. Gorriti a r g ~ e dthat Sendertis control is often ""superficial and to some degree enforced by terror-but the state does not have ctlntintzity," Cited in Americas Watch, Perm Un~lerFire2p. 58. 50. Wheat argued that Selldero recognizes that "Few Peruvians desire a government modelled after the Gang of Forxr and Chixza" Crritrxxal Revoltxtion": Wheat, ""Shining PatIz"s Ti~urthSword' Ideoloa: p. 53. The result, he contended, is that "Sendero emphasizes the evifs of the current political system rather than detailing Its own plans far Peru's firt~re.'~ Wheat dso cited Berg, wlio a r g ~ e dthat it was in Senderc$s interest to "keep its program ohscure and vague, because then peasants can continue to sympathize with its actiorss while basically remaining opposed to ideas of collectivization and revolution": K. Berg, ""Sndero hxnilloso and the Peasrzntry uf Anda huayla$' I;ournul c$ lnteruunerict~tjStudies :,canrZIVorld Af~rl'rs~vvl, 28, no. 4 f 198613 9871, p. 193. Degregori, "A Dwarf Star," p. 16, suggested that some see the ""revoiution as a means for social mobility:" 51, Lel~mann,"The Shinil~gPath to Terror." Americas Midtcl~,Peru Uszder Fire, pp. 13-20, documented the governmentk slaughter; it was a recurring theme throughout the book. Americas Midtch put the overall death toll since 1980 at 18,600 dead and another 3,500 ""disappeared" by the government and therefi~represumed dead (p. 142).

218

NOTES TO EPILOGUE

52. Americas Watch argued that ""Sendero is, in fact, ornnipreser~tin Peru'? A~xnericas Watch, Perm Cinder Fire, pp, 62. 53. Uegregori, "A Dwarf Star," p. $6,clearly thought that Sender0 had reached its limits, an attitude shared by other kruvian observers such as Gorriti, ""The War of the Phifosopher-King," p. 21, and Manrique, ""A Time of Fear," pp, 37-38, Non-Peruvians seem to agree, See, for e x a m p l ~Starn, "New Literature on Peru's Sendero Luminoso? p, 224; Lel-xmann,"The Shining Path to Terror," p. 10; Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement: p. 124; and Smith, "A Sllining Path of Blood," p. 9, None of these people ruled out an eventual victory fur Sendero, but they clearly think it improbable. T11e real threat, Manrique warned with eerie prescience, was "'a xnilitary coup or the de facto militarization of the state, which wrrld destroy the popular organizations, the Left, and the democratic progress achieved at the grass roots in recent decadesl'A 1992 Peruvian novel, he continued, ""entitled 'Atttti's Colts: The f 992 Coup in Pe1~13aysout the implications of such a development: Sendero is defeated at the cost of 600,000 lives, the elimination of all democratic organizations, and a dictatorship tasting 25 years. F a a t makes the book so disturbing is that it seems absc~Iutelycredible, given where Peru stands today, especialfy sirzce the military admitted in Nove~nber1 1 9901 to having prepared contingency plans for just such a scenario. (The miiitary's plans assumed that the dictatctrshiy wor~ldlast only 115 or 20 years.) Such a catastrophe is not, of course, the only way out; the book could well have been writterz as a way of exorcising the possibility of a coup. Perhaps if we look over the brink of the abyss we will find a way to avoid falbing Into it": Manriqrre, "A Time of Fear:" pp. 37-38. As of this writing, the Aprif X992 coup is more than a year old. 54. A term coined by Colombian sociologist Eduardo Pizarro and used in this conte& in f. Bust and J. Lcipez Ricci, "Shining Path After GuzmQn,"rVIZC:LA Rejjort on the Americas, vol. 28, no. 3 (I994), p. 9. 55.f. Domingrreil,and C. Mitchell, "The Roads Not Taken: X~lstitrxtionaiizationand Pr~iiticai Particillatiorz in Cuba and Kolivia:T~;izlrzf~unrti~~e Pnlilics, vol. 9, rxo. 2 (1977); 7: Wckhasx-Crowley, "The Rise and Sometirxes Fait of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America:" in Exj~EoringRevol~ltZ'on:Ess~tjlsOB LBII'MAmerican Insurgency and Kevc~lutionuryjlkec~ry (Armonk: M, E, Sl-tarpe,1991 ). 56. R, Darnton, " m a t Was Revolutionary About the Frencll Revoltrtiorx?'We+vB r k Revol. ~ S35 , (19 Janrrary 19891, p. 20. tjiew O ~ R E I O

Epilogue l. In 11513, on the idand of Hisyaniola, native chieftain EnriqttiHo took up arms against his erzcr~mendero(the former conquistadores and other privileged Spaniards granted estates by the Spanish crown) and the colonial authorities. D. Castro, Guerrilbcd liliarfii~rnin I,tirtz'n Atrzertcw (Wilmingtorz: SR Books, 1"398), p, ii, 2, F. Cotburn, The Vogue clfRezjolulion ira Poor Countries ((Pritzceton: Prirzceton University Press, 1994). Not least in their twentieth-century bailiwick, Latin A~xericaand the Caribbean; see, for example, C. Figueroa fbarra, "%&wreck and Survival: The Left in Central America,'Xcitrlt Americldn Persi~ectives,vol. 24, no. l (Jatluary 1997). &fore general proclamations of the end of revolutiorxs can be found in three corzference papers: R. Snyder, "The End of Revtlitrtion?""(San Diego: ESA, 1996); A. Gilbert, "Revc)lution,War, Genocide: The Assault on the Idea of Revc~ltttionaryProgress" "oronto: International Studies Association, 1997); and f. Goodwin, ""Ithe Age o f Revolutions Over?" ((Minneapotis: Inter-

national St~idiesAssociation, 1"38), The staying power of revolution for academics would seexn to be indicated by a spate of current books and articles. These include volu~nesby J. Goodwin, State and Relroluticln 1945-7991 (earnbridge: Ca~xbridgeUniversity Press, s York: St. Martin", 1997), and T. t998), M, Katz, Revolutions ar~dRlevt~ltrrionarjfW ~ v e(New D. Mason, Revolutiouz in the C:ountrj~side:Rej>refsion,Revoltrrian, and the Rational Peusunt (Boulder: Fliestviml ft3rthcorning); important artictesichayters such as J, Foran, ""The Future of llevolutions at the F~M-de-SiLcleSm ?bird w ~ d dQuarterly, vol. t 8, no. 5 (1"37), and D. McAclarn, S. Tarrow, and C. Tilty, "Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movexnents and l;levoIution," in inFirf, tichbach and A. Zuckerman, eds., C o ~ r r p l r i Pt~la'tiss: v Rutiouzulitj~Glulrlare, and Slrucrttre (Cambridge: Calxbridge University Press, 1397); as well as edited voluxnes by Castro, ibid., and J. Foran, ed., Theorizing Revoludons: New 41~1rouches Fom Across the Discipliuaes (New York: Routledge, 1997). 3.. A. Valenzrteta, ""Prag~ay:The Coup That Uiddt Happen," journal rfl1ernocmc;t; w l , 8, no. 1 (January 1 3 9 3 , 4. For a more ill-depth exploration of this issue, see the conference paper by Jennifer Mathews and Eric Selhin, """TlileGeneration of Uark~less:The FaiIure of Uemcrcratic Consolidaticrn in Chile" (Tampa: Southern Political Science Association, 1995). Den.~ocratic consolidation has become a popular catchphrase, used knt)win@y-if vaeely-by students of transitions/transfc>rmations to democracy to cover a multitude of contexts and processes, almost all of them either synonymclus or conflttted with what I wouId co~lstrtte as institutiunaIization, 5. Accordi~lgto Gel-t Kosenthal, executive secrevav of the United Nations Commission on Latin Asnerica and the Caribbean, "the levels [of poverty] are stILl considerably higher than those ot.tsemed in 1980,whiie income distribtrtion appears to have wrsened in virtuaily all cases? Quoted in D, Scllrieherg, "Dateline Latin America: "TheGrowing Fury," Poreign Pnlz"c3 no, 106 (spring 1"37), p. 165. 6. Xbid,, pp. 165- 156. 7, As Paige eloquently puts it with regard to Central America: "At the end of the revoiutionary decade, if all this hope and valor did not create the utopia that some, perhaps unreaiistically, dreamed of, neither did it l e m the world unchanged. Central America has heel1 transformed in Eundarnentai ways by the ttrrnult of the 198fSs,which opened up a future urtd the long denied to the majority of its peoples." J, Paige, CJoRee alzcl I-"s~ver:Xe~~olutinrr Rise nfI3etrzocmcy ha C:erzrrralAmerica (Carnhridge:Hatward University Press, 1997), p. xii. 8. Xn the mid- 1960s some prominent scholars proposed that the concept of irztemul war would be more useful than revolution, See, for exarnt~le,W. Echtein, ed., Itzt-carrrtrlWar (New York: Free Press, 1964), and H. Eckstein, ""On the Etiolagy of Etltemal !liars? llistory and TIzeor): vol. 4, no, 2 ( 1965). More recex~tly~ Flialton made a similarly strong case for the term revr~lt;J. Wzlton, Reluctclnr Rel~els:Go~rzptrrtrtive Sttldies c$Revolution and Utt~lerdevelopmer~t (New Uarlz: Columbia Uniwrsity Press, 1984). Qther efforts have sou&t coxnlxon grc~und between the sttzdy of social revolutions on the one hand and phenolxena such as coups d'ktat, rebeltions, political violence, and social rnovelxellts 0x1the otiler. See, respectively, E, K, Trirnherger, Kevoludon fiom Above (New Brunswick: Rangaction Books, 197%);Flialton, Reluctt~tjrRebels; Eckstein, ed,, Int-ctr~alWar; X, Feierabend, R, Feierabend, and T, R, Gurr, eds., Anger, Violence, and Poliriw: 1%(r?1ries and R e s e ~ ~ x(Englewood h Cliffs, N.J.: PenticeHail, 1972); and T. Fliickham-CrowIey, "Winners, Losers, and Also-Rans: Toward a Comparative Sociotohy of Latin American Guerrilla Movements: in S, Echtein, ed., Power und I%(71)~1ar Prutes~:L~tZ'l"tAmerican Social M[~l/emetzts(Berkeley: University of California Press,

220

NOTES TO EPILOGUE

1989). None of these ventures really stzcceeded; despite its mtzltifarious character and the arnbibwity with which it has been used, too many scholars still find to(:, rn11c11 utility in the concept of revolution to disl~loseof it, 9. E. Selbin, "Revc~tutionin the Real 'bZri,rld: Bringing Agency Back In," in Faran, @d., TIzeorizirsRevolutions, pp. 123, 130-1 32. 10. "We moderxrs," Bell has stxgested, "&spite our mechanistic and rationalistic ethos, Iive in Iaridscapes filled with ghosts." M. Mayerfeld Bell, "The Ghosts of PLacep Theory uvzd Sncief3 vol. 26, no. 6 (December 1997>,p. 813. 11. Although made in a slightly different context at a time when his brother was still very mucl1 alive, Martill Guevara" aapropcrs remark was prescimt; qtroted In H. B. Ryan, f S~jies,und Dij~lumois(New York: Oxford Uni2'he l:till cfC:he C;uelram: A Story r ~ Solciiers, versity Press, t 9981, p. 36. Ryan cites FBIS, DK no, 2 11, 1 Novernber t 965, ""Fther Denies Che Guevara Death." 12. Bell, "The Ghosts of Place,""p. 83 1; he cites W. Griswold, ""The Fabrication of Literary Meaning:'Americun iournul nfSocioEog~vol. 92 ( 1987).The actual title is "The Fabrication of Mealling: Literary Interpretation in the Ul~itedStates, Great Britain, and the W s t Xndies" and the josxrxzal rlumber is S frcm May 1987; this qrxate Is drawn from p, 1079. 13. Andean Oral History 'bZri,rkshop (THOA)/S. Rivera Crtsicanqui, "Indigenous Miornen and Corrtmunity Resistartce: History and Memory,'?in E. Jelin, ed., IVomen urzd Social C2h~~ge in 1,ut in Americu (London: Zed, 19901, p. 180. 14. P. Mojzes, Vztgosl~zviunXnfemo: Ethnoreligiozrs Wctrf~rein the Ralkavzs (New York: Continuum, 19942, p. 40. Mojzes defines this as follows: "Concepts of the past and present are so intermixed that a grievallce of Long ago is perceived as a present affliction. Likewise . . . a present action may not only vindicate brrt actrrally eradicate and reverse a past defeat." 15. Fratict:, argues that "rnugic realism, the term coined by Alejo Carpentier in the t 940s, has hecorne an advertising girrzmick, a word synartymous with %exoticism.'" J. Frartco, "Remapping Gufture:?n A. Stepan, @d.,Americas: hTew1fttevret.lmliveEssays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 179, emphasis in the origirzal. Cahrera Infante denies that this was Carye~ltier'sterm or that it is the appropriate term or is even Latin American: G. Cabrera Infante, "Alejo Caryentier, A Shotgun Cuban:Yn G. Cabrera Infante, ed,, Meu Ctiba (New York: Farrar, Srraus and Giroux, 11394), p. 386. 16. R, KapuScihski, The Soccer War (New York: Vintage, 1992), p. t 52. 17, See, for amplification on this topic, A. Dorfman and A, Mattieart, F101.1);to Read 1)nrzmld IJtick: Xrrz~?eriulismIdeologjf irt the Disney Chmic (Amsterdam: International General, 19711, and G. Black, Tlz'fieC;rtudNeigi.xbor: f-1m.v the Unitet$States Mi"mte the Ffistclry nfC:erztmti Americct und the C:t~rihi~ean(New York: hntheon, 11 388). 18. M, SBnchez Lira and K, Villarreai, ""Mexico 1994: The Ruins of the FutureiYn E. Katzcnberger, ed., First Worll-2,fia, fia, flu! Il'he Zal~t~risla Chaflenge (San Fra~lcisco:City Ligl~ts,19951, p. 223. 19, He likely lifted this phrase from his fellow rewlutionary martyr, Prkxedis Guerrero. See W. AIbro, To Die on E3ur Feet: ?"he Life* Times, avzd Writings clfPrcixedz's G. C2uerrero (Fort Miorth: Texas Christian University Press, 1996). 20. The term ""chl-onic insurgency" was coined by Coioxnbiaxl sociologist Eduardo Pizarrcl; see if. Burr and I, Liipez Kicci, ""Sltinirzg Pat11 After Guznndn," NAGA Rej?nrt on he Americas, vol. 28, no. 3 (113941, p, 9. 2 1. These numbers are from J. Petras, ""Latin America: The Resurgence of the Left,'We+v Lefl Revjet+/,no. 233 (1997), pp. 33-34.

NOTES TO EPILOGUE

22 1

22. Qn the farmer, see R, Vargas Meza, "The FAltC, the War, and the Crisis of the State,'" NAC;IA Rqort on ihe Americas, vol. 3 1, no, 5 ( 1398); on the U.S.. role, see 6.bunger, ""1J.S. Entanglements in Colombia Continue? iVACLA XZe~clortcm the Avrericus, vol. 31, no. 5 ( l998),

23. Focistus denotes a calx~-xlitl-xlent to Cbe's scfc>ctl theory" of insurgency, whereby a small, dedicated band of revolutiar?tariescan create the conditions necessary to foment a revolution. 24, D, La Rotz, ""Mwico at a Turning Point, Part 2: Deeper Crisis and Blocked Reforms:" Agf~insrthe (;ZIrretzf,110. S6 (Januay-Febl~~azy 1997), p. 33.. 25,See G. Gatsioporxius, "The EPR: Mexico? '"Other%uerrillas,'%ACLA Rej~oriart he Americas, vol. 30, no. 4 (1997). 21;. Foran, "The Fu tuxe of Xtevolutions at the Fi:z"n-de-Sitcle, " p. 804. 27. G. Gcimez-kt-ra, ""The Subcommandante of Perfc~rmance;"'in Katze~lberger,First W~dd, 11~1, 1 l lin, ~ pp. 90-9 1 . 28, R, Samrxel, ?I/$e~iters $Memory: Plkst ~ n Presen~ d it2 Contenzpar~ryCuitzdre f London: Verso, 1"34), p. 70, 29, See, for example, Foran, "The Frrture of Revolutions at the Fin-1.le-Si2cle,""pp. 813-814. 30. J. Markoff, '""~easants Help Destroy ar?t QId Regime and Defj a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Mt)vements:'Amen'c~~njournal cfSociolog8 vol. t 02, no, 4 (January 199"7, p. t t 39, 3 1. An era opened from one perspective by the Allied invasion of Russia dtlring its revclIution; tens of' tbousarids of troops from Canada, Gechosiovaka, Fratzce, Great Britain, Italy, fapan, Poland, the United States, and ejsetvhere spent: three years s~lizportingthe White Army" efforts to unseat the revolutionary government. The Iittle discussed Allied i~rtenentionin Rt~ssiawas one of the major joint, multitzatior~ajmilitary operations of the mentieth century. 32, Cited in W, Rowe and TS, SchelIing, Memory gncl Mnt2er~il-y:I"npul6zr C>zklt$rreit$ IJ(ztitt Anzerz'ctr (London: Verso, 1991), p. 89. It is interesting to note that "the marvelous, on which twrztieth-cexztury magical realism is based, has its origins in the calorsiaf period, and was transmitted above all by women, The transmission occurred in the gap betcveen tactical obedience and pragmatic evasion, ohedezco pero no courzl~lo(3obey but X do not accept" (ibid., p. 231, From such subversive notiom much may fallow. 33. W. Goldfrank, ""Vraxis, Shmaxis: Comxnentary on VVager:" Journal of World Systenzs Rcrsettrch, vol. 2, no, 2-e f 19996).

Acronyms AID ANC ARDE CCG CD CD CDC CDR CDS CIA CIVS COB COMIUOL COKDENIC COSEP CSE CUS EPR EZLN !?ARC FUN FUR FMLN FMLN-FDK FSLN GNP GIJP GULP IPCE JEWEL TGItN

Agency fc~rInternational Devehtyment National Conservative Action party Democratic Revolutionary Alliance Committee of:Concerneci Citizens Demrrcratic Conxrgence Democratic Cczordinating Committee Community llcvelopment Committee Committee for the Defense of the Itevc>lution Sandinista Defense Committee Central Intelligence Agency International Commission of Verification and Security Bolivian Warlcers Ccznfederation Bolivian Mining Corporation Commission on the Kccuperation and Devetopment of Nicaragua Superior Council of Private Enterprise Supxeme Electoral Council Council of Trade Union Unification People" Revolutionary Army Zapatista Army for National Liberation Revolutic~naryArmed Fctrlles of Colombia Nicaraguan f>emocratic Force IPevsrlutionary Dems>craticFront Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Revolutionary Democratic Front Sandinista National Liberaticzn Frctnt Grenada National party Prolonged h p u l a r War tendency Grenadian United Labor party Institute for Electoral Promotion ancl Training joint Endeawrzr for Weltfare, Education, and Liberation Junta of the Government of National. Xtecctnstructiczn

ACRONYMS

LASA M-26-7 MACE MAP MAP-ML Ml l N MNK MKS M IXTA MUR NED

NSC NW0

MY0 OAS OKEL OR1 PAL1 PAN PAPC PC12 PCdeN PCFSL PDCM PIAC PLC PLX PLIUN PLN PSC PPSC PRD PRG PRI PIXONAL PET PSC PSU PSN PSQC PS!'

Latin American Studies Association 26th of July Movement Movement for the Advancement of Ccrmmunity Effort Movement for rlze Assemblies of the People Marxist-Leninist Popular Actism Mc>vement Nicaragrran Democratic Movement National Revofutionary Movement Sandinista IPent3vation Movement Tiipac Amaru Revc~luticrnaryMovement Movement for Revolutionary Unity National Endowment for Democracy New Jewel Movement National Security Council National W;amenYsOrganization National Youth Organization Organization of American States Organization for Research, Education, and Liberation Integrated Kevcjlutionary Organization Neo-Liberal party Xatianal k t i o n yarty h y u l a r Consewative Alliance yarty Democratic Ccrnservative party Communist Party of Nicaragua Eruvian Communist party-Shining Path Democratic Party of Nadonal Clonfidence Central American Integrationist party Constitutionalist Liberal party Liberal Independent party National Unity Liberal party Nationalist Liberal party National Ccjnservatitre party k p u l a r Social Christian party Demsrcratic IPev~>lutionary party Provisional Revotutionary Government ftater, Pec~ple's Revolutionary Government) Institutionalized kwlutionary party National Prcjject party Kevolrttionary Wc~rkersyarty Social Christian party Soclat Democratic party Nicaraguan Socialist p;lrty Sociaf Conservatism yarty Popular Socialist part-).

PT

PUCA PURS SME" UCLA UDEL UN UN0 UP USXA YATAMA

Workers's party Central American Unionist party United Party of the Socialist Revatution b p u l a r Mili~aryService unilaterally controlled Latin assets Dernt~craficUnion of Liberation United Nations National Oppcjsition Union Pc)guIar Unity party U.S. Information Agency Organization of the Nations of the Motherland

Index Accountability,60-6 11 Ahms, GrantIey, 55, 179(n135) Adarns, Tarn, 179(n135) Agrarian reform, 16,134. See also urrder Bolivia; Crrba; Nicaragua Agrarian societies, 27 AIemhn, Arxzoldo, 1 24 Allende, Salvador, 2 11(n153), 212-2 11 3(n7) Axnaru, TBpac, 129,136,146 Amalv, TBpac 11,136,1144 Axnerican ltevolution, t t Americas Watch, 138 ANG. See National Conservative Action party Andean revc~iution,See Great Andean Rebeltion Antibwa, 55 Axlti-Semitism, 34, 163(nlO) Arce, Bayardo, 79 ARENA party (El Salvador), 136,212Cn21) Argentina, 87,107, 142 Arias, Oscar, 107 Ar~thoritarianism,hreakdo5vn of, 19 Aya, K,, 4 Barbados, 55 Bnrricf~do(FSLN), 81 Batista, Frtlgencio, 52 Bayo, Aiberto, 212tn3) Ray af Pigs invasion ( 1961),43 Bermddez, Enrique, t 08 Rixd, Vere, Sr., 55,179(nldS) Bishop, Maurice, 55,56,57,58,59,611,62, 63,69,83 murder (1983), 63,180(n146), 183(n181)

NIack power movement (Grenada), 56 13lanco,Huge, t 36 ""Rtue and M i t e Plan b r National Salvation'"(GOSEP), 116 Boland Amendment f 1982), 202(n64) Nolafius, Enrique, 116, 117 Bolivia, 145 agraria~lreform, 35,36,37,164-165(nn 20,2 1,241 coup d'ktat, 11 5,34 indigenous population, 37 Left, 35,36,37 middle class, 3 4 3 5 military; 35,36,37, political parties, 34-35,37, 16&116S(nn 21),24) and s~ilccession,11 5 tin miners, 35 and U~iiteclStates, 38 workers, 35,36 Bolhian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL), 36 Bolhian revoiution f f952), 2,27-28,64, 89,129,150(nlO) failed, 3 1 ideology, 77,128 as ixrcarni?lete, 28,33-34 and institutionalization, 17-118,26, 36--37,38,82,89 institrxtionaiizationwithorxt cansoiihtion, 29,30,38-39,82 leadersl~ip,26,2&,34,3C~38,68,69,82,89 natic~nalization,36,37, I64(n18) and pokxular srrpyorf, 34,35,36 Bolivia11Wc>rkersConfederation (COB), 36,37,38

Banilla, Jairne, t t 8 Booth, J., 1134 Barges, TomAs, "7-75,76,79,90, 189-19O(nn 5 1-53) Brazil, 98, 107, 142,213(n l t ) Rritztorr, C., 68 Broad Front (FA) (Uruguay), 2 13(n11) Rzxreaucracy, 17,43 Cahezas, Qmar, 71,86,157(n101) Cabral, Amilcar, 32 Cambodia, 88,137 C;~mj~esinos (Bolivia), 37 Capitalism, and revolution, 1,2 Caribbean, See Eastern Caribbean states Caribheall Legion, 2 12(n3) Carpentier, Alejo, 144-145,148,220 (nls) Carribn, Lt-~is,79,86 Castro, Fidel, 15,3(1--3 1,39,40-4 1,43-44, 45,4ti, 69,73,82,89, 156(n96), 168(n67) and Grenada, 54 Casrro, Ra61,69,82,89 Catholic Wuxnanism, 78 C,iazadPlist~zcl,55,74 CD, See Democratic Coordinating Committee CDCs, See Gosnmunity Development Coixmittees CURS. See Committees for the Defense of the ltevolution CD%. See Sandi~ristaDefense Committees Central America11Irrtegrationists party (PIAC) (Nicaragrxa), 208(r%125) Central Asnesisan Ui~ionistparty (PUCA) fNicaragrra), 207(n 106) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S., 108, l 10,2Ul(nn 62,63) Centralized gcjvemment, 94 Cksar, AIfredo, 118 Chamber of Commerce (Nicaragua), 78 Chamorro, Carlas Fernando, 172-1731n91) Chamorro, Pedso jsaquin, 118,113, 173fn80) Chamorro, k d s o jsaquin, Jr., 118

Chamorro, Viioieta, 117,118-1 19, 123, 124, 17&177(n113), 201(n62), 210(11n 142,143),21 I(n156) Cha~lge,129. See ulsrt Transformation Charisma. See kadership, visionary Children, 16,40,60 Chile, 56, 131, 132, t42,2f t (n153), 212-213(n7) Chinese sevc~ltttionf 1949), 2,10,17,69, 146 "Chronic insurgency," 145 CIA. See Central I~~tetligence Agenq Cienhegos, Camilo, 73,89 Civil society, t 9,211 CIVS, See Internationai Commission of Verification and Security Class-based movements, 6 Class conflictlstrrtggle, 2, 11 Coalitions, 7-8 Coard, Bernard, 55,58,59,611,62-63,69, 77,82--83,90, 183(nti 181, t83), 186(n11 3) CQU. See Baiiviatl:Fli~rkersCoxlfederation Cogoverxmnent f Eolhiia), 36 Colburn, Forrest, 5 Collective action, 7 Collective leadership, 74,75-76,79, 189(n49) Collective memcjr")",11 43- 144 Collective will, 26 Cotlins, Kanda tl, 13 Colombia, t 1, f 06, t 4 1 , t 45 Colonial legacy, 15 CQNIBOL, See Boiiviaxl Mining Corporation Commission on the Recuperation and Development of Nicaragua (CORDENIG), 118 Cotxmittees for the Defense of the Rewltttion (CURS) (CUBA), 18, 156-1 57(nn 99, t 00) Cornmtlnafism, 143 Cotxmunal village power (z~jnurrua),57 Cornmunisr Party of Nicaragua (PCdeM), 123,20?(n1109),208(nl25) Community Development Committees (CDCs) (Nicarag~a),71,157(nlQI)

Conservatism, 17 Consolidation, 12-1 3, li 3-20,29,93--94, 130,139,157-1 58(n 1031, 159-160(11n 108,109) deerred, 4,201-25 democratic, 142,2 19(x14) and end of process, 23-25 and government, 20,2 X , 22-23> 25 indicators, 94,9&99 and poyutar a~itudesand suypol-f,2 1-22, 23,25,32-33,94,10t&li04, 197(n6) See also Leadership; Socialism, traxisition to; under Bolivian revc?iutisn; Cuban revolution; Grenadian revoh tioxi; Nicaragua11 revolution Constitutionalist Liberal party (PLC) {Nicaragrra),208fn 125) Contadora process, 106- 107 C:ontz'nuisrno, I I4,208f 11113) Contras. See Nicarabwa, contra war Cooperatives, 48 Coraggio, J. L., 20 COfUIENXC. See Commission on the Recuperation and DeveLopment of Nicaragua COSEIJ. See Superior Corrncii of Private Entery rise Costa Rica, 87,1O6,107,206(n96) Coups d'eetat, 9, 11,15,142 Cruz, Arturo, 50,122,123,174-175(nlO1) Cuba agrarian reform, 43 coups d%tat, 1C; and dernocracy, 141-142 and Eastern Ekzroi~e,17,46 government, 40-4f,42,44-45 Independerzce, 73, I R8fn36) and internal opposition, 39 military, 43, 187(tn22) and Nicaragua, 87,106 political parties, 43,44, t 67Cn5f) rectification campaign f 19861, X7,39, 45-46,168(n67) social services, 40 and Soviet Union, 17 and successiorz, 15,4Cf and United States, 43,44, li88(n36)

Cuban revoltxtiorz f 1959), 2,23,27,27,52, S4,129,150(n10) ctlnsolidation, 26,28,40,44-45,4S, 82, 89-90,93 ctlnsoiidation without institt~tionalization,29,30-3 1,39-46, 125 and eccmomy, 94-95 ideology, 73-74,?? as i~rcomplete,3 1, infiuence, 16,128,146,150(n10) and institutionalizatio~~~ 17,28,39,40, 41,43,44,45,82,89-90, 167(n60) leadership, 26,2X, 30-3 I, 39,4f, 42-43, 68,69,89 mass mobilization ca~xyaigns,43,44-45 and persorzal pwer, 15, t 6,42,43-44, 45 and political rigl-rts,40 success, 27,39-40,44 and succession, 15,40 support, 43 trat-rsformation,28,4 f -42 Ciritrxral Revolution (China), 137, I46 Darnton, Robert, Id, 139 DX~~bisson, Rt>herto,2 15(n21) Death squads, 142 Dcclaratio~lof the Lacalldon Jungle (EZLN), 147 Dcgregori, Carlos l"iri11,136 Democracy, 15,42,49,57,59,128,13 1, 132,141 trat-rsitionto, 19,48,2 19(n4) Democratic Consenative party ((PCY) (Nicaragua), 78,207(nn li 06,li 03) Democratic Coordinating Committee (CD) (Nicaragua), 50 Democratic Party of National Coxifiderice (IZDCN) (Nicarag~a),208(n 125) Democratic Unio1-r of Liberation (UBEL) (Migaragua), I 7 l (W Deng Xiauping, 216Cn39) Dictators, 5 5 5 6 Dietz, Henry, 137 Direct dernocracy; 42, I 66(n42) Dominican Republic, 98,212(n3)

Dotnincluez, J., 39,4S, 139 Uunn, f., 6, 127,128 Dureriberger, David, 1201-1 2 1 Uuvalier, Francois, 56 Duvaiier, feari-Claude, 56 Eastern Caribbeaxi states, 15-I6,54,55, 141-142 Eastern Ellrope, 17 Eckstein, H,, 68 Econcjmic Commission on Latin America (UN)?(35 Econcjmic dependency, 2 Economics, 22,79,94--98 Ecrrador; 142 Education, 16,2l , 40,60, "3% 102 Efficacy, 2 1,22 Egalitarianism, 41 Egypt, l l Eigh teealbz Bnkmoire (?fL~)l$lS Bonej>arre (Marx), 7 Elections, 11 5, f6,48. See L ~ S Ounder G ~ n a d aNicaragua ; Ejectoral lam, 109-1 f0,206(nn 95,96,98) Et Salvador, 87, t 06, t 07, t 29,133-136, 138,142 E~nployment,16 Exnyowerment:, 2 1,22,45,53,100,104, l38 E~lriquillo(chieftain), 2 18(nl ) EPK, See People3 ElevoIutionary Army Escala~lte,Anibal, 43-44 Escluipulas Accords ( I987), 107-1 08, 109-1 10 Ethnic groups, t 6 Execrrtive arrthority, 14, 15 EZLN. See apatista Army for National Liberation FA, See 13road Froxit ""Face of the People" {Nicarag~anpt~hlic assembles), 48 Fagen, R., 20,41 Farabunda Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) (El Salvador), 133, 135,138,144 Revolutionary Democratic Front: (FDR), 134-3 36

FARC. SWRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FDlL See Elevolutionary Delxocratie Froat Feudalism, 2 Finley, M, I,, 4 FMLN, See F a r a h t ~ n dMarti ~ Natiorzai Liberation Front FMLN-FDR. See Farabundo Marri National Liberation Frtant, Revolutior~aryDemocratic Fxorzt Focl'$las, 144,22 1 (1123) Fonseca, Cartos, "7,78 Foran, John, 5,146, 147 "4 from '84" "(Nicaragua), 116 French revolution 11789), 2,10, 13,24, 76-77, 137,139-140,146 FSLN. Sw Sandinbta National Liberation Front Fujimori, Alberto, 142 Future, vision of, 21,22,8 1,102-1103, 1131 Gairy, Eric, 15-16,55-56,57, 58, 181fnt57) Generational change, 24-25 Geograplly, 22,94,91), t93(n6) Gilbert, D., 70,75,85,90 GNP. See Grenada National party Godoy, Viirgiiio, 117, 123-1 24 GoMfrank, hr.,f 48 GoIBsts~le,Jack, 5 (;ulltes cde ~ s f a d oSee . Coupddt&tat G6mez, MQxirno,73 Good Neigl-rborPolicy, U.S. f f 930~1,133 Goodwin, Jeff, 5 Goriti, Grxstavo, 137 Government, See under Institutionalization Goverxment: coalitiorls, 7-8, 136 GPR See Prc>fongedPopular War Gramxi, Anroniu, "7-71,157-f 581n 103) Great Andean Rebellion f 17801, 11 46 Great 13ritain, 11,57 ""Great persot1 of history" bt'acy, 76 Grenada COUP ( 1979),58-59 election 1976), 57-58 and Great Britain, 57 independence (1967), 55

political parties, 56-57,58,18U(n144) terrorism, 56 ancl Ullited Spates, 57 Grenada National party (GNP), 57 Gre1lacZiax-trevolution (1(379),2, 15,54-64, l28,129,150(nlQ) absence of institutionalization or corzsotidation,29,3 X , 54,6344 collapse of, 3 1,54-55 and cunsoiidation, 61 coup f 1983), 16 ideology, 77 11 7,29,60--61 and institutionaiiS:atic>~~, ieadershiy, 2C;,55,59,60361-63,68,69, 82-83,90 and 13enond power, 16 and popular stxppcrrt, 6 l PKG, 59,SO4 l and sociaiism, 61,62,63 and social, political and economic change, 59-62 and succession, 16, SO and tillited Spates, 54 Griist~oid,W,, 144 Grotzp of Eight, 107 Guatefnaia, 87, 106, 107, 128, 142, 206fn96) Guerrilla movements, 141, 146 Guevara, Ernestto "Che," 32,41,69,73--74, 82,89,144,145,146,212(n3), 215-2 11 6(113O), 22 l(n23) Guevaxa Arze, Flialter, 165jx125) Guevarism, 73,77 Guyana, l28,131,213(nll) Guzmin, Ahirnael, 89,136,138,139 Haciendas f Bolivia), 37,164(nr?t20,2 X ) Haiti, 54,56, 142 Handal, Sl-tafik, 135 Hassrin, Moisks, 112, 113 Haya de la Torre, Victor, t 36 Health care, 16,23,28,40,43, 48,60,95, 102 Hegemorz)4,19,20,157-158Cnl03) Htine, j., 15,63,72,83 Hisyaniola, 2 X R(n l ) Historical materialism, 6

Hohsbwm, E., 3,5,23-24,25 I-lo Chi Minh, 69 Hodges, D., 74 Ifoffer, E., 68 Hornans, George, 25 Honduras, 106,107 Hoppert 14. D., 68 Hotrsing, 2 1,60,96,102 I-lrtman rights, 11 42 Hunger. See Nutrition projects I-lrtntington, Sacnttef, S, 8-9, 10, 11,8 1 Ideals, 128 Idedogy, t O,22,66,"7-880,128 and acriorz, 8 1 inl-terent and derived, 80 and visiorzary leaders, 68,73--74 IMF. Eige International Monetav Fund Ix?tdigenousgrcjtrps, 16,37, f 34, f 43, 164-165(nn 20,241 Individuals, 4,6,7-8,lO-11,25-2% See also GonsoIidation Inefficiency, 17 Inertia, 17 Institutionalization, t 2, t 4-19,24,29, lSl(nl(i), 43 and consolidation compared, 19-20, 159-160(nr?t 108-109,113) and gcjvernment, 11 3,1&15,16,17. See also Leadership and justice, 14, 16 and negative results, 17,443 neo-, 45,101fn60) and yersoilal power, t 5- 16 and revolution, 3, X 4,17,26,43,80-83, 139,142,150(1110), 151(nlX), 155(n89) and rural and urban populations, 99 and social services, 14,16,43, t 34 and s~ilccession,11 5 See also urrder lfoiivian revolution; Cuban revolution; Grenadian revolution; Nicaraguan revolulioll Instit~~tionalized Revo1txtionar)i.party f PKI) (Mexico), 38, 150(nt 0) Insurrectionaf tenderzq (Nicaragua), 78 Insurrections, 9, 11 2, 11 55(1181)

Integrated Itevolutionary Organization (OKl)/Escalante affair (Cuba) (1962), 43-44, t67Cn51) International Commission of Verification and Security (CIVS), t 07 X~~ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), 38, 62,95,124 X~~ternational political economy, 5427, 131, Israel, 87 Jaggall, Gheddi, 213tnl l ) Jamaica, 55, t 28, t 3 1,212(n4) Japan, 11 JEWEL, See Joint Endeavour far Flielfia~are, Mucatiorz, and Liberatroll JGKN. See Junta of the Government of National Recorzstructiorz John Paul 11 (pope), 46 joint Endeavorrr for Mrelfare, Mucatiorz, and Liberation (JEWEL) (Grmada), 57 Jsnas, S., 1127 Judiciary, 14,48 junta of the Government of National IXecaxlstruction (JGRN) (Nicaragua), 47,48,51,112,113,118 Justice. See u~zclerInstitutionalization Kaprt'scihsE, K., 11 45 Katari, T6pac, 146 Kenya, l l Khmer Rouge, 88,137 Kimmel, Micl~ael,1,9, 10 Kissingex, Henry, 2 12-2 13(117) Labor ttnicrns, 36,52,60 Lacayo, Antonio, l 18, 124 LAM. See Latin American Studies Association Latin Arnerica, 15, 113, 1131, 1141 and U,S, intervention, 87, 1"3196(n1 24) Latin American Studies Associatioll f LASA), 109,113, 114. See also individual countries Leadership, 10, 1l, l2,66 collective, 74,75-76,79, 189(n49)

and consoliidatiorz,68-69 and decisions, 67,68 and institutianaiiz;ztio~l> 14,17, 28,127 militaly, 187(n22) organizational, 26,28,55,68,69-70, "7, 80-83,89 l~ahtical,67 studies, 67-68 visionary, 26,55,6X, 69-7Q,71--76,823, 89 Leclsin Oquendo, Juan, 34,36,69,82 Legislature, 14, 15 Legitimacy, 19,20,157-158(n1103) Lenin, V. X,, 7,69,70,71 Lewis, Gordon K., SS,63 Liberal independent party (PLX) (Nicaragua), 78,116,117,118, 207(n 109), 208(n 125) Literacy carnyaigns, 23,28,40,43, 4R,49, 60 Lower middle cfass, 6 Maceo, Axltonio, 73 Magicai realism, t 44-147, 148,220(~115), 22 1tn32) Maltoy, J,, 39 Manco Inca, 1144 Mandle, J., 61 Ma~lifestoof Agua Blancas ( 1996) (EPK), 146 Mantey, Micllael, 11 79(n135) Manley, Norman, 55, t"79(n135),212(n4) Manrique, Nelson, 137 Maoism, 148, See also Cuittlrai Itevolution Mao Zedong, 32,69,137,146 MAY, See Movement for the Assemblies of the People MAY-ML. See Marxist-leninist Pc~pular Action Movelxent Maravetl, J. M., 20 Marchetti, P., 20 Marcos (Subcommandante), 147 Maridtequi, Josk Carlos, 12% 137 Marirzes, U.S., 77 Markc)ff, J., 148 Martl",Farahtxndo, 129 Marti, Jose, 74, 129

Martinez, Alejandro, 121 Martinez Htredia, F., 1168(n67) Marx, KarX, 6-7,7O Marxism-Leninism, 11 11 3,1148 Marxist-Leninist-Popubr Action Movement f MAP-kIL) (Nicaragrra), 113,169-1 "70(n74), 176(nt to), 207(nn 108,109) Mass organizations, 22,60 ~M~illurzza, 134 Matos, Htlher, 1187(n22) MDN. See Nicaraguan I>ernocratic Mt>vement Menckelz, H. L,, 1 Menem, Carfas, 142 Mexicall revolutioll (l910 ) , 2,17,37-38, 128,129,145,150(n10) Mexico, 87,106, 141, 144, 146-147 Michelet, Jrxles, 13 Military, 14,20, See ulso u~zclerBolivia; Cuba; Nicaragua Military socialism, 34, 164(nl2) Miners, 35 MirB Cardorza, Jose, 40 Mitchell, C., 39,46,139 Mixed economy, 79,92 MNR. See National Revolutionary Movement Mobilization of broad popular mpport, l l, 12,4&45,48,52,94, t 6 I (n t 35); 16Q-]i65(11n21,212) Modernizatian, 8-9 Mongoose Gang (Grenada), 56 Movement far Xtevoiutionary Unity (MUR) (Nicaragua), 112,207 (n110) Movement for the Assemhliies of the People (MAP) (Grenada), 56-57,180 (n 146) MRS. See Sa~ldinistaKenc?~ation Matiernent MRTA. See TT6pac Amaru Revolutionary Matiernent M-25-7, See 26th of July Movement Multictass alliances, 2, 110, 11 57-158(n103) MUK. See Movement for RevoltrGorzary Unity

Natiorzai Action party (PAN) f Nicaragrxa), 208(n1125) Na tional cax~sciousness,57 National Gonsel~ativeAction party (ANG) (Nicaragua), 208(n125) Natiorzai Consenative party ((PNC) (Nicaragua), 208(n125) Natiorzai Endr?wment for Democracy (NED), 110,206-207(nn 99, 1109) Natiorzai Guard (Nicaragrra), 4R,77, 201(1162) Nationalism, 35,77,78,134 Nationalizations, 36,37,48, 11 34, 11 64 (n 18) Natiorzai Literacy Campaign (Nicaragrra), 49 Natiorzai Qlzposition Union ( U N Q ) (Nicarqua), 24,32, l 10, 112,113t 116-123. See uEsn Nicaragrxa, election t 1990) governxnent, 123-124 and United States, f 10,206-207(n99), 21 1(n t 56) Natiorzai Project party (PRONAL) (Nicaragua), 124 Natiorzai Revolutiorzary Movement ( M N R ) f Bolivia), 34--39,134,163(n10) coup attempt, 37 election f 1951), 35 factions, 34-35> 36,37,38,39 leaders, 34,35,37-38,82, 165(n25) outlawed as cornmtznist (l95 l), 35 political victiory ( 1"32), 35-36,37-38, 164(nt7) ~~~, Natiorzai I J I X I79 National Unity Liberal party (PLIUN) (Nicaragua), 207(n 106) National 'b2'0men" Organizatio~lf N b r 0 ) (Grenada), 60,182-182fnf62) National Youth Orpnization (NYO) (Grenada), 60, t 8 1-I82(n162) NED, See National Endotument for Dernucracy Neocoiunial government, 2 Neotiheralism, 11 42-143 Neo-Liberal yarty (I"ALX) (Nicaragrra), 208(n125)

NW Jewel Matiement (NJM) (Grenada), 57,58,62,82,134, 134 coup (1979), 58-59 New si~ciety~ 11 2, 13, I4,23 Nicaragua agrarian refc~rm,48 cotlstitution (19892, t 04 contra war, 92,95,99, 108, 109, 196-137(113), 199f11241%201-203(nn 63-66) Council of State, 50 democracy, 48,49,85, (32 earthqx~ake( 1972), 194(alQS) econolny, "3, (34,(35-98, t 05- 106, 10&109,198-199(nn 14-16,241 election (19842, 16,48,50-5 1,102,104, 116 election ( 1990), 16,23,48,92, 11 04, 11 05, 110,111,116,117-123,21I(nI49} election ( 1996), 124 electoral democracy, 16,49,50, 112, 173(n98) electoral laws ( 1"34,1(388), t 09-1 10 goverxment, 47,123-124, See ulso Sandinisra National Liberation Front and Grenada, S6 and IMF; 95 independence ( 11821),48 JGltN, 112,113,118 miii~al")a, 48,77, f 87(n22) political parties, t 6,24,50,78, 112-1 13, 169-1 70(n74), 171(n80), 175(n165), 176(n110), 207jnn t 06, t 08, t 09) social services, 48,454 9S96, 102, 106 and Soviet tlniorz, 186 and United States, 49,50,53,77,86,87, 89,105-f 06,124,195-1(36(n124), 199(n24), 201-203(nn 62-46) and United Slates, xnigration to, (37 U.S. Marines in, 77,1"3C)(n62) U.S, trade embargo, 95,97 Nicaragrxan Democratic Movement (MDN), 78,208(nf 25) Nicaragrxan Xnsfitrxte of DeveLoizment, 78

Nicaragrrar~revoltxtiorz ( 19791, 2, 16, 17-1 R, 46-47,64,84,92,128,150(nlO),

212(n3) and consolidation, 32,47,51-52,53,87, 93,100-104,122-123 and eccmomy, 94-98. See ulso Nicaragua, cantra war ideolog, 74,77,78-80,19 1-Z92i(n67) and institutionalization, 17,44,48, S1, 104,105,107,172-173(n91), 17&177(n113) institl~tionalizationand cansolidation, 29,31,46-54,83,111-125 international support, 87,106-108 interviews, 197(n5) leadership, 26,32,47, 49,53$68,69,71, 74-76,83,90 and personal power, 47 and popular sxrpyorf, 32-33,48,51,52, 71,97-98,99,199-200(nn 34,351 strategy, 86-87,89 success, 32,8&87,92 and succession, t 6,47,48 See also Nicaragrra, election ( 1B0) Nicaraguan SociaIist party (PSN), 123, 207(n 109), 20S(rr125) Ni&t Arxbush Squad (Grenada), 56 NJM. See New Jewel Movement Nobel Peace Prize, 11 07 Nonalignxnent, 79 North Arxerican Free Trade Agreesxent, 11 47 Nhdez, Carlos, 79,8 1,86 Nutrition projiects, 23,40,60 WWO. See National TRPotxen" Orga~lization NYO. See National Yorrtl~Qrgartizatiorz QAS. Sw Organization of Arnerican States Old regirxe, 12 O~"portunity, 2 1,101-f 02 Oppression, 17. See ulso Vicllence Order, l4 QREL. See Organizahlir b r Research, Edtrsation, and Liberation Qrganizatiorz for Research, Education, and Liberation (OKEL) (Grenada), S8,62 Qrganizatiorz of American States (OAS), 107

Peruvian Comm~xnistparty (PGT>/IPCPSL). See Shining Path Plsilippines, 11 Pl~ilips,K., 67,68 Plsilliys, Wendell, t O,25 PIAC, See Central Arnerican Ix?ttegratiorzist i3arty Piinochet, Augusto, 56, 132, 142 PLC. See Constitutionalist Liberal party PLX. See Liberal Independent party PLIUN. See Naticjnal Unity Liberal party Pak Chung Hee, 56 Pluralist democracy, 49,85,92 PALL See Neo-Liheral party PNC. See National Consei~ativeparty Police, 14 VAN. See Natio~zalActiol~party Political institutions, 14 Panama, 106 Pt~liticrjlOrder in Chut~gingStjcietilrs VAPC. See Popular Conservative Alliance (I-funtingtorz),8-9 party Pc>liticalparties Parag~ay,142 communist, 43,70,89, 133, 136 Parish councils (Grenada), 59, 181-182(n1162) institutioaatizatim, 38, 11 55(n89), Particil3atory dernucracy, 59,79, 161(nt35) 181-182(n162) multi-, 15,49 i3a"'ticipation, 22 Party of the Poor (Mexico), t 46 Pastora, EdCn, 187fn22) personalistic, 116 Paternalistic socialism, 61 single, inclusive, ruling, 150(n10) vang~xard,70-7 1,146 Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 35,36,37,69,82 See also under Bolivia; Cuba; Grenada; PCD, See Dernclcratic Conservative party Nicaragua PCdeN. See Communist Party of Nicarag~a Pc>liticaIplt~ralism,5 1,723, 86 PCPIPCP-SL f Peruvian Communist Politicat revolution, See Itevolution, partylSandero hxninoso). See pc>liticaf Shining Path PDCN. See Dernucratic Party of National Political socialization, 80 Politicai victory, 12, X 3,66 Corzfider~ce Politics, symbolic, 143, 144 Peasaxitry, and revolution, 2,35,52, !B9, Pol Pot, 88,137 134,164-1651nn 21,241, 1%-2001nn Pc>yularAlliance party (Peil;~),136 34,351 Popular Consernative Alliance party People's Alliance (Granada), 57 (PAPC) (Nicaragua), 208(n125) People's Kevc~LutisnaryArmy (EPR) Popular Military Service (SMP) (Mexico), 141,146 (Nicara,i~uaj,96 People's Kevoltttioaaiy Government (PRG) Popular protest, 22 (Grenada), 59,60--61 PCrez, Carlos Andrks, SO Popular revoltxtionary movements, 1 1 PCrez, L,, Jr., 41 Popular Social Christian party (PPSC) PCrez-Stable, M., 44 (Nicaragua), 207(nr?tt O6,109), 208(n1125) Peru, 111 Peru, 89, 107,129, 133, 136-139,141,142, Popular Socialist Party (PSP) (Cuba), 43, 167(n53) 144 Qrganization of the Nations of the Motherland (YATAMA) (Nicarama), 207jn106) OKI. See Integrated Kevc~Iutionary Organizatioi11Esca1;fnteaffair Qrtega, Darziel, SI,69,76,79,83,86,90, 100,113 campaign f 1"390), 1 14-1 15,119 Ortega, Husnberto, 32,49,79,83,86,90, 123,190fn57)

Poptzlax Unity yrtrty (UP) (Chile), 21 l(n153) Poptzlism, 16,41,49,56,6I, 77 Poverty, 142 PPSC. See Popular Social Christiall party Pragmatism. See Terceristas Preixrdustriai ecaxzolxy, 2 PRG. See People" Revolutionary Government; Prc)visional Revolutionary Government PKE. See I n s t i t u t i c a Kevc~Iutionary party Prc)letarian tendency (Nicara~wa),78,79, 86, (30 Prr~longedPop~tlarWar (GPP) tendencry (Nicaragua), "7, "7,86,9Q PRONAL, See Natiorzai Project party Prc)visional Kevc~IutionaryGovernment f PRG) (Grenada), 58,59 PKT. See Kevc~iutionaryWorkers party PSC. See Social Cl-tristiaxzparty PSD. See Social Uclnocratic party PSN. See Nicaraguan Socialist yrtrty PSOC. See Social Conservatism party PSP. See Popular Socialist Party Public Dipionnacy for Latin America, Office of, U.S., 11 73-174(nl00) PUCA, See Central American Unionist part)" PLTEtS. See United Party of the Socialist Revotution Ramirm, Sergio, S 1,78,79,84, 113,114, 124 Ramona (Commandante), 144,147 Rappacciaii, Mario, 50 Rat Island (St. Lucia), 56 Reagan, Ronald, SO, 105, 106,202-2031nn 64,65),20&207(n99) XXebeIlions, (3, l l Rejai, M., 67,68 XXevoiution, political, 8, 11. Revoltxtion, social and capitalism, 1 characteristics of? 1,2,3-4,7,8-9, 10, 13..See also "fransformation defined, 1,3,9, 10k-22, ISI(nl8) first generation, 2

&lure, 144-147 ""great:' 1-2,3 and international context, 87-89, 105-108,145,148,221(1Dl) literature, 4-10, 127 opl.zcrsitiitionto, 14 as outcorne, process, and goal, 11,13,25 phases, 12,13,25,52,66 process, 6-?,g-10,11,12,130 research, l-2,3-5,127,128 second generation, 2, 133 stages, 7-8,9, 154(n63) strateby, 66,68,83-87 success, 3,7,9,13--f 4,27, t53jn49) as term, 1,143,2X 9-22O(n8) theory, 5-6, t O,27"28 and women, 7 1 See atso Consolidation; Ideology; Individuals; Xnstitrxtic7~zalizatio1-t; Leadershiy ltevolution, socialist, 6,58,62 Revolutionaf)bArmed Forces of Colombia (FAltC), 14 1, 145 Revolutionary Democratic Front: (FDK) (FMLN) (El Salvador), 133,134 Revolutionary Directorate f Cuba), 43 Revolutionary Wc3rkers party (PRTf (Nicaragua), 113,207(n108) Revolutions, ce~ltllryof, 134, 11 47 ltevolutions-in-progress,t 32, t 39 Robell>,Alfonso, 201(n62) ltudk, C,, 80 Ruk, Henry f ""Modestd~,79,90 ltussian revolution ( t 9 1"7,2, t Q, t 7,23,69, 185---187(n2l),221 (W St. Lucia, S6 SQnchez,Lira M., 145 Sandinismo, "7, "7-880, "3, 1%-192(n67) Sa~ldinistaDefensc Committees (CUSS) (Nicaragua), 18-19,86,157(n1.01) Sandinista National Liberation Front: (FSLW) (Nicaragua)* 16, 3 l , 53,84) 119, 134, 145, 177(nf 18) cuncertacidrz program, 108 factions, 49,78-79,85,124 goals, 46-47,49,71

gwernrnent, 32,47,48,83,84,101, 114, 19&394(11n 108,110) ideology, 74,77,78-80,83 National Directorate, 79 newspaper, 81 ol?positiorr to, 100, 113 and social justice, 49 and support, 24,48,8&87,89,114 wppc>rt,i~lternational,87, 106 See also Nicarakwa, eleciiorz entries Sandinista Kenovati~l~ Movement (MKS), 124 Sandino, Augisto Gksar, 74,77-78, 117, 128,129,134,1(30-191 (nn 64,65) Sarxtamaria, J,, 20 Sarlre, Jean-Paul, 42,16G(n42) Self-determination, 79 Sendero Lr~rninoso.See Shining Path Shining Path f I%ru), 89, 133, 156-1 39, 141, 145-144,217(nn 47-53) Sites Suazo, Mernin, 35,3K Sindicaros (Bolivia), 37 SMar, H,, 121 Skt>cpol,Tl~eda,6,8,9-10, 11,25,27-28 Slater, D., (39 SMP. See 130prrlar Military Service Social Christian party (YSC) ( N i c a r a ~ a ) , 207(n 106) Social classes, 9,27,34 Social Conservatism party (PSOC) (Nicaragwa), 11 113 Social Democratic party (PSD) {Nicaragrra),208(n 125) Socialism, 57,58,61, 128 and democracy, 13l Latin American, 131,2 13(nn 11,12) transition to, 19,62, 130,13 1-1 32, 182-183(n175) Socialist yopulism, 77 Sodalist revolution, See Keve>fution,socialist Social revolution. See fXevolution, social Scxiai services, 2 X , 40, 134. See :rajso under Institutionalization Sc,moji,a Uehayle, Anastasio, 47,48,52,56, 85,114,189(n52), 194(n106), 19%196(n 124) i11ternatic)nal wppc>rtfor, 87,110-1 11

Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 77, 114, 195- 199(n 124) South Africa, 87 South Korea, 54 Sovereignty, 14 Soviet Union, See ut~derCuba; Nicaragua Spain, t28,2f 2(n3) Stalin, Joseph, 4.3 States and Social Revi?ilution(Skc~cpol),9 Structural approaches, 2 3,7,9,10,26,27 Students, 43 Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEI") f P\iicara,i~ua), 11 16,117,118, 123 Supporting hehavior, 23 Surinarne, 128,131 Tanzania, 57 "faruc, Luis, 32 Technc:,crats, 11 23, 11 24 TCllez, Dora Maria, 71, 125 Tempter, Gcratd, 162(n3) Terceristas (Nicaragua), 78-79,83,86,87, 90,192fn78) Third World, 2,152 Thorndike, T,, 60 Tilly, Ghades, 6,7-8 "fin mines (Bolivia), 36, I(iil(n18) Tirado, Victor, 79,86 Transformation, t 3,21),24,25,65, t 04, t 43 and conscious action, 66 as defining concept of social revolution, 1,3,4,9, 11, 12,52,66 of everyday life, 28,143 idealistic visions, 84 period, 24,26-27, 155(n82) and pluralism, 8 6 8 7 and visional7 leaders, 72,90 Transitioxl, 3, 19 Trirnberger, Ellen K., 11 11 Trinidad, 55 "fro&ky,Leon, 69,70,71,186-187(n2X) Trust, 21,22,53, 100-101 "ffiyac Amaru Revoltxtiorzary Movement fMKTA) (Peiv), 141,145,146, 2 1 5-2 16(n30) Tupamarcjs, 11 44,2 13(1111 11 )

Turkey, 11 26th of July.Movement (M-26-7) (Cuba), 40,41,43,134,166fn37)

TSaltxnlarism, 2, 10, 12,25,2&27 VolttntaI-)blabor projects (Cuba), 43 Vo Nguyen Giap, 32

on UDEL. See Democratic U ~ ~ i of Liberation LjIjumau (Tanzania), 57 Undermining behwior, 23 United Nations, 95, 11 07 United Party af the Socialist Revoltxtiorz (PGIKS) (Ct~ba),44 United Beubyle's party (Grenada), 57 United States, 38,43,44,49,50,53,54,57, 173,87,111,133,145,188(n36), 206f nn 95,94,98) Universal suffrage, 36,37 University faculty, 78 UN@. See National Opposition Union UP, See IJoprrtar Unity party Urrutia, Manud, 40 Uruguay, t07,t46,2f 3(n t t )

VVaker, Tbomas, "7, t 34 WaltO~z,J., 11 M r s of indeyexzdence, 9,12,173,188(n36) Weber, Max, 72 'b2'estminster-style parliarnentaI-)b democracy, X 5 'b2'beetc>ck,Jaime, 79,86,90 Wicfiarn-Crowley, Timothy, 5,139 'b2'illiarns, Eric, 55 "Win their hearts and minds:932, 162(n3) Women, 22 1 (n32) associations, 52,60 rights, 16, 102 'b2'0rker2 party (Brazil), 2 113(nll ) Workrk rights, 15 'bzrilrlciBank, 62, 124 VVortcSview, 22 'czrilrldWar II (1m39--11345), 2

&Xidating behavior, 23 Vanguard political parties, 70--.71,80 txanguard theory, 4243,62 Venezuela, 87,98,106, X 42,206(n96) Vietnam, 69 Viias, C., 108 Villa, Pancho, 145 Vilfarreal, R,, l45 Violence, 133-134,137-138,2 117(1m48-5 l )

YATAMA, See Organizatiorz of the Nation?; of the Motherland )"ouch, 52,60

Zapata, Emiliano, 129, 144, 145 apatista Army fur National Liberation (EZLW) (hIXexict?), t 4 1 , 144, t 45, 146147

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