May 1940: the battle for the Netherlands

May 1940 History of Warfare Editors Kelly DeVries Loyola College in Maryland John France University of Wales Swans...

Author: Hermanus Amersfoort | P. H. Kamphuis

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May 1940

History of Warfare Editors

Kelly DeVries Loyola College in Maryland

John France

University of Wales Swansea

Michael S. Neiberg

University of Southern Mississippi

Frederick Schneid High Point University

VOLUME 57

May 1940 The Battle for the Netherlands

Edited by

Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

On the cover: Dutch infantry position behind the Valley Canal (photo: Spaarnestad Fotoarchief, Haarlem). No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Netherlands Minister of Defence. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data May 1940 : the battle for the Netherlands / edited by Piet Kamphuis and Herman Amersfoort. p. cm. -- (History of warfare, ISSN 1385-7827 ; v. 57) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18438-1 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939-1945--Campaigns-Netherlands. I. Kamphuis, P. H. II. Amersfoort, H. (Hermanus), 1951- III. Title. IV. Series. D763.N4M39 2010 940.54’2192--dc22

ISSN: ISBN:

2010001509

1385-7827 978-90-04-18438-1

Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints BRILL, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Typeset by chs:p [Leiden, Netherlands]

printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................................................ ix Colour maps I.

Introduction . ........................................................................................ 1 H. Amersfoort The Netherlands and the war The shock The questions

II.

The Emergence of the German Threat ............................................ 13 H.W. van den Doel The consequences of the First World War Versailles The 1920s: seeking stability Fascism and National Socialism National Socialists in power The German Lebensraum ambitions Conclusion

III. Between Hope and Fear: The Netherlands armed forces in the interwar period ....................................................................... 35 C.M. Schulten and P.M.J. de Koster Introduction The legacy of neutrality After the First World War The cupboard is bare - from 1922 to 1933 Turning point Rising tensions The military geography of the Netherlands Strategic policy Winkelman’s operation plan

vi

contents

IV. The Gathering Storm: The German armed forces in the interwar period ....................................................................... 89 J.W.M. Schulten Introduction The German rearmament Baptism of fire The German operation plan for the Westfeldzug Plan of attack of the 18th Army The alert V.

The Generals’ Duel: Five days of war at the military strategic level . ................................................................................... 139 H. Amersfoort and J.W.M. Schulten Düsseldorf, Friday 10 May 1940 The Hague, Friday 10 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Saturday 11 May 1940 The Hague, Saturday 11 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Sunday 12 May 1940 The Hague, Sunday 12 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Monday 13 May 1940 The Hague, Monday 13 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Tuesday 14 May 1940 The Hague, Tuesday 14 May 1940 Rijsoord, Wednesday 15 May 1940

VI. ‘Fall Festung’: A surprise attack on The Hague . ........................... 179 C.M. Schulten Introduction Ypenburg, Valkenburg and Ockenburg captured by the Germans The continuing battle for the airfields on 10 May The recapture of Ypenburg The battle for Valkenburg Ockenburg back in Dutch hands Further actions against the airborne troops and the battle at Overschie Conclusion VII. Disputed Territory: The battle in the Dutch provinces of Limburg, Noord-Brabant and Zeeland ......................................... 205 H.W. van den Doel Introduction

contents

vii

Operations against the bridges over the river Maas The battle at Mill Passage through Noord-Brabant Zeeland struggles on The final pocket of resistance eradicated Conclusion VIII. The Field Army Defeated: The battle for the Grebbe Line . ........ 261 H.W. van den Doel Introduction The fall of the IJssel Line The attack on the outposts of the IVth Division General Harberts’ countermeasures The German attack on the main resistance sector Chaos among the military leadership The fall of the Grebbe Line The battle at Scherpenzeel The end Conclusion IX. “Vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!”: The battle in the northern provinces ............................................. 321 P.H. Kamphuis The territorial defence of the northern Netherlands A morning of battle and a pursuit in vain The collapse of the Wons Position The offensive reconnaissance mission fails Conclusion X.

Not a bridge too far: The battle for the Moerdijk bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam . ............................................................. 343 H.W. van den Doel The German plans Dutch combat readiness The German airborne landings Consolidation of the German positions Actions by the border battalions and the Kil Group The Light Division takes action Die Panzer arrive on time The battle in Rotterdam

viii

contents The bombing of Rotterdam Conclusion

XI. Myth and reality ............................................................................... 395 H. Amersfoort Still coming to terms with the past? Analysing the military operations Pre-war defence policy: does it require re-evaluation? Annex: Table of land forces rank equivalents . ....................................... 419 Annotated bibliography ............................................................................ 421 Index ............................................................................................................ 449 Biographical notes . .................................................................................... 461 Photo acknowledgements ......................................................................... 463

PREFACE The original, Dutch-language edition of this book was published in 1990, fifty years after the Netherlands became involved in the Second World War. It was the work of a young generation of university-educated military historians who, unlike their predecessors, had no personal memories of the war. Their aim was to subject the five-day war of May 1940 to a critical analysis and thus provide an explanation for the crushing defeat which the Dutch armed forces suffered at the hands of the German Wehrmacht. The sometimes sobering conclusions led to fierce negative reactions among part of the readership, in particular in veterans’ circles. Others appreciated the book as a successful attempt to separate the subject matter from the feelings of anger and shame which had dominated previous historiography. The book achieved good print numbers, was soon sold out and in the following years continued to receive a great deal of attention on the second-hand market, so that in 2005 a revised edition was published, incorporating the most recent academic research in the Netherlands, France and Germany. At present, Mei 1940 is considered to be the authoritative work in the Dutch language on the war between Germany and the Netherlands in May 1940. This spawned the idea for an English-language edition, the result of which you now have before you. This edition again incorporates the latest international academic research on the subject. The text has also been adapted for an international readership. This edition would not have been possible without the contributions of many people. The editors would like to thank their colleagues at the Netherlands Institute of Military History, and in particular the cartographer and graphic designer, Louis Kaulartz. They also owe a debt of gratitude to Heleen Heckman, head of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Translation Service, to the translator, Fiona Nauta, and to Stephanie Lewis and Kate Walsarie Wolff who worked on the translation under her responsibility. Fiona Nauta in particular spared no effort, and it was a privilege to work with her. We would like to thank Sdu Uitgevers in The Hague, who

x

preface

published the Dutch edition, for their prompt permission to publish the English translation. Last but not least, we thank Julian Deahl and his team at Brill Publishers for the pleasant cooperation during the production of this book. Herman Amersfoort Piet Kamphuis

COLOUR MAPS

illustrations

Key to symbols

1

Key to maps and diagrams Army chain of command

air-transportable unit

Dutch unit

XXXXX

Army group

air force unit

Belgian unit

XXXX

Army

French unit

MR

motorcyclist unit

XXX

Corps

navy unit

German unit

XX

Division

infantry unit

SSS

marines unit X

Brigade

tank unit

transport unit

artillery unit

mortar unit

Regiment

engineer unit

machine-gun unit

Battalion

signals unit

mounted unit

Company

III

II

I Squadron, Battery

reconnaissance unit / light unit

motorised unit

antitank unit

armoured train

anti-aircraft unit

cyclist unit

Section

Gr

grenadiers unit

staff unit

DivTr

division troops

medical unit

PERS

personnel

supply unit

paratroop unit

torpedomen unit

2

illustrations 10 May 1940

Initial positions 0

position and/or line (forward) position and/or line sector boundary German army sector boundary German corps division front line

A

Casemate line IJssel, Arnhem-Nijmegen, Maas-Waal Canal, Maas and Juliana Canal

B

Grebbe Line, Valley Position

C

Peel-Raam Position

D

Waal-Linge Position

E

New Dutch Waterline

F

Southern front of Fortress Holland

G

Defence Line of Amsterdam

N O R T H

BORKUM

S E A

SCHIERMONNIKOOG

TERSCHELLING

T

H

E

R

Steenwijk

Enkhuizen Hoorn

Alkmaar

M

Oranje Position (planned) Albert Canal

O

Dyle Line

G Marken Amsterdam B

Haarlem

D

ek

Rotterdam L

Bergse Maas

Moerdijk

Almelo

A

Ma as

Oss

Ghent

3

B

E

L

G

er nd De

Kortrijk

Doornik

Ath

C

re Dend

Seneffe

t au sc E

rpe Sca

Waterloo

Denain

Weert

Ca

na

l

6 Leverkusen

XXX

Genk

Maastricht

Geleen

Cologne

4

Gulpen Aachen 27 Vaals

XXX

Bad Godesberg

Liège

Nijvel Gembloux

Charleroi

XXXX

Dalheim

Visé

Waver

hr Ru

Solingen

XXX

A

M

Hasselt

XXXX

use

Me

Huy

Namur re mb Sa

Roermond

Maaseik

-

Jumet

Quevy

Krefeld

11 ert

Essen

Duisburg Wuppertal

Düsseldorf

l

Tienen

Mons

9

Horst

Cana

U

Leuven

Edingen

Geldern XXX

Budel

Alb

N

I

Brussels

G E R M A N Y

Venray XX

Mol

Heist

Aalst

Wezel Xanten

A

Tilburg

Gr. Nete

O

XXXX

18

Borken

XXX

26

Mill Gennep

XXX

chpens Kem

Antwerp

St.-Niklaas

Nijmegen

's-Hertogenbosch

Turnhout

t

Bruges

10

Zevenaar

Venlo

Brasschaat

held

VLAANDEREN

XXX

Winterswijk

e

Sc

ZEEUWS-

Bentheim

Ahaus

Tiel

Eindhoven Knokke

Zutphen

Rhin

L

Hengelo Enschede

Arnhem

M

Steenbergen Breda Bergen op Zoom

Middelburg

Nordhorn

Deventer

Wageningen Rhenen Lower Rhine

Waal

Zaltbommel

F Zierikzee

1

Aa

Dordrecht

Hardenberg Ommen

el IJss

2

E

Schoonhoven

Meppen

Harderwijk

XXX

Schiedam

Emmen

A

Amersfoort

Delft

an.

XX

Apeldoorn

4 Utrecht

Leiden

S

je C

Zwolle

XXX

1 The Hague

D

ran

Kampen

Purmerend

Zaandam

NO

Hoogeveen

Meppel

Urk

IJSSELMEER

XXX

A

Medemblik

Petten

N

L

Lemmer

Staveren

Ems

E

Monschau

4

Spa Adenau Hillesheim

Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH

N K

Stadskanaal

Ho ofd v.

Eendracht, Zanddijk and Bath Positions

Assen Heerenveen

Den Helder

he

L

Sneek

I

H

tsc

Den Helder Position

p

J

en

Wons Position

K

Win s choter- die

Drachten

Dr

J

WA

IJsselmeer Dam

Groningen

Leeuwarden

N E D Harlingen

s

I

TEXEL

D

Delfzijl

A

SE

VLIELAND

Em

Casemate line in eastern Groningen and eastern Drenthe

Flushing

Norden

ROTTUMEROOG

AMELAND

H

Kapelle

25 km

3

illustrations Airfields around The Hague and the advance of Gruppe Sponeck Valkenburg Airfield 10 May 1940

1

0

Katwijk aan Zee

2 km

2 3-4 Katwijk a. d. Rijn pp

ly

Can

3-4

Valkenburg

Rijnsburg

al

10/5

6

2-2 Valkenburg

11/5

Oegstgeest

11/5

Valkenburg Airfield

ine

De Pan

Rijnsburg

North Sea

Rh

Su

Warmond

Katwijk a.d. Rijn

dunes

10/5 Haagsche Schouw

10/5

Wassenaarse Slag

Rijksdorp Maaldrift

Wassenaar 3-4

Den Deijl Meij en Del

3-4

Kievit

Drinking water pumping station

Pier


3

Leiden

Bier Lap

1

Valkenburg Airfield

Voorschoten

Scheveningen

The Hague

Stompwijk

4

5

1

Leidschendam Ypenburg Airfield

2

3

Kijkduin

Voorburg

10/5

Drievliet

Rijswijk

Ockenburg Airfield 10/5

Rijswijk

Ockenburg

(bridge under constr.)

Hoornbrug

10/5

Loosduinen

Bloemendaal

temporary bridge

10/5

11/5

3 ta

velodrome

xi w

Poeldijk

ay

trambridge

Wateringen

12/5

Monster ’s-Gravenzande

Delft

Kwintsheul

Hoeve Ypenburg

3

3

tram depot

er

Ypenburg

1

3

2

’t Woudt

3 Airfield

Lierhand

10/5

n)

io

ct

tru

s on

Honselersdijk

Naaldwijk

nd

(u

c

Den Hoorn

Hoeve Loos

11/5

De Lier

Westerlee

Schipluiden Burgersdijk

uw ie

N

Maasdijk

Negenhuizen

1

2

Villa Bimini

Zwet brug

Hillegersberg

e

13/5 Zouteveen

10/5

Wa te

Schiebroek

Noord-Kethel

12/5

rw

eg

Poortershaven

Gruppe Sponeck S ch

Kijkduin

1-2 22 Blijrust

airfield

Zestienhoven

Overschie Abtspolder

1

47 47 Loosduinen Ockenburg

Dutch position

2

(a) M-36 armoured vehicle, (a) (b)(c) (b) machine gun, (c) heavy machine gun landings of the Fallschirmjägerregiment

12/5

Gruppe Sponeck’s displacement route to Overschie

Geest

PERS

Rotterdam

Overschie

ie

Meer en Bosch

Zegbroek polder

Ockenburg Airfield

Schans

Kethel

Ockenburg Airfield 10 May 1940

3

2

1 1

Johanna hoeve

Ypenburg Airfield

Ter Heijde

Staalduinen

10 May 1940

German position location of German units

Spangensche Polder

12/5

arrival date planned route to:

1

Queen’s palace

2

Parliament

3

Energy company

4

Coastal battery

5

Radio transmitter

German advance through Noord-Brabant and northern Limburg

4

illustrations

Alblasserdam 10 May morning

Barendrecht

5

0

10 km

ALBLASSER

WAARD

Ophemert

12 May evening Island of Dordrecht

KIL

's-Gravendeel

Tweede Tol

Strijen

BOMMELER WAARD

Rijswijk Nieuwendijk

L A N D A L T E N A

Dussen

Willemsdorp ER

Hedel

Genderen

HE BERGSC MAAS

AM

S

Kerkdriel

Aalburg V A N

Hank

DIEP

Zaltbommel

Werkendam

D RWE E

ME

E NI

Strijensas

Waardenburg

Brakel

B I E S B O S C H

E

UW

Rosmalen

Heusden

Lage-Zwaluwe Geertruidenberg OUDE E Elshout MAASJ LL Hoge-Zwaluwe HO Waspik Moerdijk Raamsdonksveer Raamsdonk Drunen Made Klundert Zevenbergschen- Hoek 's-Gravenmoer Wagenberg Zevenbergen Kaatsheuvel Terheijden D AN

L

NA

RK

Hazeldonk

TEL DIN

11 May morning

TIELER WAARD

GORINCHEM

DORDRECHT

Maasdam

Meteren

Spijk

Papendrecht Sliedrecht Giessendam Zwijndrecht Hardinxveld O U MAADE S

Heukelum

Bleskensgraaf

Oosterhout

CA

W IL

MA

HEL

Teteringen

M IN

’s-HERTOGENBOSCH Helvoirt

Dongen A

Vlijmen

CA

VUGHT

11 May evening

11 May morning

Loon op Zand

N.

+

12 May Schijndel evening

BREDA Rijen

Etten

TILBURG

Boxtel Oisterwijk

11 May morning

Ginneken Ulvenhout

St. Willebrord Heike

Gilze

Moergestel Goirle

Rijsbergen

Best

AA

Chaam 11 May evening

Hilvarenbeek Meerle

CA N.

Poppel

Baarle-Hertog

XX

25

474

Graspeel

6

Lagenberkt

Horst

481

XX

Postel

18

XX

Kasterlee

256

Dessel Lommel

XX MR

Katwijksche Peel

2

Neerpelt

12 May evening

456

2

Luijkgestel

Retie

Gierle

Kapelhof

Molenheide

2

Hof

Arendonk

Mill 3

Westerhoven

12 May evening

TURNHOUT

Bruggen

Vilheide

Eersel

Reusel

454

Langenboom Nieuwmill

Waa

Hapert Bladel

Ravels

XX

254 1

Veldhoven Hoogeloon

12 May evening

10 May 1940

Lagepeel

Meerveldhoven

18 X XXX 6

Lage Mierde

Hoogstraten

The breach at Mill

Middelbeers

SSVD

Baarle-Nassau

IX

Meer

1

12 May evening

XX

TR BE A

Zundert

W

Oirschot

Mol

1 Geel

Balen Kerkhoven

Exsel

10-12 May 1940

illustrations LAND

Lobith Tolkamer

Beumingen

VA N M A A S E N WA A L

NIJMEGEN

Bergharen

RHIN

E

St. Anna

Emmerik

1 XX 0 26 X

Megen

Oijen

Ravenstein

Lith

Wijchen

Kellen Grieth

Kleef

Malden Groesbeek

Oss

Grave

Schaijk Heesch

Geffen

Mook

Gassel

11 May morning

Till XX

Overasselt

254

Calcar XXX

Cuyk

26

Nistelrode

Pfalzdorf

Gennep

Oeffelt Mill

XXX

3

XX

St. Hubert

Uden

Heeswijk

Beugen

11 May morning

ID

Maas Line

Hees

Kevelaer

MS A VA

Overloon

RT

De Rips

Aarle

Blitterswijk Geldern

18 XXXX 6

HELMOND

Wanssum

P E E L Venraij

Beek

NAL WILHELMINA CA XX

Well

Gemert

Bakel

Walbeck

Oorloo Scheide

Peel-Raam Position

Nunen

Arcen

Deurne

Horst

L

NA

Mierlo

Grubbenvorst

Geldrop

Velden

Sevenum

Someren

Helenaveen Maasbree

XXX

Tegelen

Beringen

Someren Eind Meijel

Panningen

Roggelschedijk

Helden

Baarlo

9 Hinsbeck

Steijl

Kaldenkirchen Lobberich

Maarheeze

11 May evening

XX

Belfeld Spurk

Soerendonk Nederweert

Budel

Hushoven

Roggel

Hulsen

WEERT

Heijthuizen

Dorplein St. HuibrechtsLille

Baexem

Born

Buggenum

Brüggen Swalmen Boukoel

Horn Kaulille Kleine-Brogel

Beegden

Stramproij

Bracht

Reuver

Neer Haelen

11 May Swartbroek morning

30

Offenbeek

Budschop

XX X

56 VENLO

Blerick

Neerkant

Wankum

Herongen

Heusden 11 May morning

Leende

Straelen Schandelo

Liessel

Asten

Aalst

MAAS

Griendsveen

CA

EINDHOVEN

Valkenswaard

Wetten

Westerbeek

Lieshout

Hooggeldrop

Weeze

Vierlingbeek

LE IL W

St. Oedenrode

256

Oploo Erp

-

Kervenheim

XX

St. Anthonis

Veghel

ZU

Üdem

Boxmeer Afferden

11 May evening

9

Goch

(see inset)

Dinther

alre

5

Elten

Millingen

Gendt

L

Horssen

Altforst

Dreumel

W AA

ROERMOND

St. Georg

Elmpt Waldniel Nieder-Krüchten

Gebroek Neeritter

Bocholt Molenbeersel

Wessem Thorn

Heel Linne

Wegberg

St. Odiliënberg Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH

6

illustrations

Walcheren, Noord-Beveland, Zuid-Beveland and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen

Kattendijke

3

5

0

Kapelle

Yerseke

Zuid-

38

Vlake

Biezelinge

1

NG

Goudswaard VL

IE

dijk

40 nd-

Bruinisse K R

DUIVELAND

Zierikzee ROOMPOT

O S TE R -

Middelburg

Arnemuiden

Zoutelande Koudekerke

Groede

Hoofdplaat

2

Nieuwvliet XX

Zanddijk position

Hansweert

Hoedekenskerke

Ellewoutsdijk Kloosterzande

St. Margriete

XX

Le

ld opo

Bergen op Zoom

Li js

Kaprijke

dra ina ge

Eeklo

Can al

Knesselare

Axel

38

14

tank ditch Hoogerheide Waarde Rilland Bath position SC Bath HE Kalmthout LD Ossendrecht E

Ertvelde

Waarschoot

17 May

Kapellen

Doel

Lilloo

Nieuwnamen

Koewacht

Ekeren

Kieldrecht

Sinaai

Merksem

De Klinge

ANTWERP

St. Gilles-Waas St. Pauwels

Moerbeke

17 May

Brasschaat

Verrebroek

Zelzate

Wachtebeke

XX

SSG

Berendrecht

Hulst

St. Jansteen Sas van Gent

Essen

Woensdrecht SSD Huijbergen

VLAANDEREN

Bassevelde

St. Laureins Maldegem

Philippine

Canal

Wouw

14 May 20.00 hrs.

Boschkapelle

Sluiskil

60

15

225

Zaamslag Watervliet

Fijnaart

Roosendaal

Zandvliet

IJzendijke

40

Dinteloord

Nispen

E

Kruiningen Krabbendijke

Terneuzen

Biervliet

2

AK

38

Schoondijke Z E E U W S -

Oostburg

ER

THOLEN

15 May 13.00 hrs.

Baarland

38

1

15 May 08.00 hrs.

BEVELAND

W E Borssele STE RBreskens

LK

VO

Steenbergen Oudgastel Nw. Vossemeer Kruisland

Wemeldinge Kloetinge Yerseke S C H ELD Kapelle

’s-Gravenpolder

Flushing

R

16 May 02.30 hrs. 16 May Poortvliet 10.30 hrs. Tholen

Goes

ZUID-

68

St. Annaland

St. Maartensdijk Wilhelminadorp

16 May evening

Oost Souburg

ME

Stampersgat

Kats

16 May Heinkenszand 16.00 hrs.

17 May

16 May afternoon

Stavenisse

Sloe Dam

XX 23.00 hrs.

Willemstad Ooltgensplaat

St. Philipsland

O Kortgene Oostkerke

17 May 12.00 hrs.

WALCHEREN

AM

Oosterland

BEVELAND

Westkapelle

Middelsluis

Oude Tonge

Westenschouwen

Kaasgat

Za Kruinigen

NOORD-

14

Zuid-Beijerland

OVERFLAKKEE

Serooskerke

Kamperland Serooskerke Veere

Aardenburg

T

Middelharnis

N

SCHOUWEN

Colijnsplaat

68

Nieuw-Beijerland

Brouwershaven

Hansweert

Domburg

RI

Dirksland

3

Molen dijk

Beveland

271

V ELI NG G R E E

Canal

Wemeldinge

Stellendam

10 km

40

HA


14-17 May 1940 Ouddorp

Deurne

Melsele Haasdonk

St. Niklaas Basel

Hoboken

Berchem

7

illustrations Grebbe Line

10 May 1940

Huizen

2

0

4 km

Bussum Blaricum

Ermelo

Leuvenum

I J s s e l m e e r

Nulde

Spakenburg

Speulde

Putten V

Laren 18

Bunschoten Garderen

E

Hilversum Baarn

G

L

Nijkerk E

W E

7

S

7

XX

Amersfoort

5

8

XX

A

Soesterberg

C

XXX

21

2

Woudenberg

S

E

2

De Klomp

H

XX

Doorn E

Rijsenburg

Renswoude

15

XXX

2 U

rda

Up

pe

L

Cothen

rR

Amerongen

hin

eC

Schalkwijk

an

.

Wijk bij Duurstede L

e ow

r

10

2

E

Leersum m-

XX

4

R hine

R Elst U

XXX

X

Bennekom XX

19G

A

(p

NEDER

lan

BETUWE

Buren

d)

Rumpt

46

Tiel

Leeuwen

Geldermalsen

Wamel Ophemert

M

Druten Afferden

Puiflijk

Winssen Horssen Bergharen

Kessel

as

Appeltern

29

Batenburg

Maasbommel

Ravenstein Lith

Hernen

Megen

Oijen

a

Gameren

3

Varik Zaltbommel

24

Dreumel

Neerijnen Opijnen

Ochten XXX

al

LAND VAN MAAS EN WAAL

TIELER WAARD

Waardenburg Tuil Nieuwaal

Zetten Dodewaard

44 Wa

B

L in g e

Meteren

Opheusden

Kesteren

X

Tricht

Randwijk

Lienden ne

Zoelen

Buurmalsen

Beesd

Wageningen

Maurik

Rijswijk Beusichem

Renkum

4

Rhenen 8

Eck en Wiel Culemborg

Ede

Veenendaal

22

V

Werkhoven ste

I

Maarn

Driebergen

Odijk

Lunteren

Scherpenzeel

E

Bunnik

Am

L

T

L

4

H

Zeist

Harskamp

Macharen

Haren

Niftrik

Wijchen

Cartografie: Louis Kaulartz / IMG / KL

E

16

8

XXXX

V

R

De Bilt

Barneveld

E

Bilthoven

T

U

R

XXX

4

U

Stroe

7

E

Soest

D

XX

’t Hart

Voorthuizen

L

Soestdijk

8

illustrations

Grebbeberg, outpost sector

11 May 1940


3

Dijkgraaf sche

19

I

N

U

N

D

A

T

I

O

N Landen Voon Hooge

Gr

Outpost line

ift

Veen kampen

burg tank

or Gr

eb

be

ditch

slag

Hooi

10.00 hrs.

12.30 hrs.

1

SSDF

Pomona

landen 12.30 hrs.

Kruiponder

2

2-8

13.30 hrs.

12.00 hrs.

Front line

10.30 hrs. 13.30 hrs.

3 1

3-8

Wageningen

13.30 hrs.

2-8

16.00 hrs.

Maria Hoeve a’s Anna’s Hoeve

12.00 hrs.

Heimerstein

2

1-8

12.30 hrs.

1

3

3-8 17.30 hrs.

Grebbeberg

SSDF Wolfswaard

15.00 hrs.

De Hoop

(former) Hornwork

1

Pumping station (former) Bastions

Klaver en Wolfswaard

1-8

Livonia

Den Dooven orchard

Brickworks

L O

ER

Brickworks

14.00 hrs.

Pothoek

W

Pumping station

Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer

R

H

I

N

sector boundary outpost line / front line

E (a) (b) (c)

Ferry

Brickworks

light machine gun, position protected from fragmentation in steel turret so-called ‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in casemate (e) M18 machine gun (f) 6-Veld field gun (a)

Maneswaard

(d) (e)

(f)

(b) heavy machine gun (c) concrete casemate,

Section of a weapon system indicated in this area German attack 0

250

500 m

15.00 hrs.

time of position of German troops

9

illustrations

I

N

U

N

D

A

T

I

O

N


Grebbeberg From the evening of 11 May until the very early morning of 13 May 1940

arrival 13 May

2

24

3

29

1

29

HOOILANDEN

3

19

ift

20

Gr

1

or Gr

eb

be

Achterberg Kruiponder

1

15

3

8

Windmill

Rear line Front line Landmines

4

2

Vreewijk

8

16 1

1

Stop line

1

19

Anna’s Hoeve

Rhenen

Zoo

19 (-)

2

19

2

LO

1

12 May afternoon

24 (-)

46 (-)

WE R

12 May evening

2 8 (-) 12 May 18.00 hrs. + 20.45 hrs.

Heimerstein

1 2

Rye field

12 May 4.00 hrs.

3

12 May 18.00 hrs.

322

SSDF Pothoek

Grebbeberg

11(-) 1

3

8 (-)

Brickworks

XX (former) Hornwork

207

SSDF

3

Pumping station (under construction)

R

H

IN

322

Livonia

(former) Bastions

E Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer

(a)

light machine gun, position

(b)

heavy machine gun in steel turret

(c)

concrete casemate, so-called

protected from fragmentation

(a) (b) (c)

(d) (e) (f)

(g)

‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in concrete casemate (e)

M18 machine gun

(f)

7-Veld field gun mortar

(g)

front line / stop line / rear line forward line of German troops Ferry orchard German attack

afternoon time of position of German troops Dutch counterattack

0

250

500 m

10

illustrations

±12.30 hrs. 13 May 1940 Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH

Grebbeberg

I

N

U

N

D

A

T

I

O

N

HOOILANDEN

19

Gr

3

ift or

15

1

2 Achterberg

3

Gr

24

eb

be

29

Kruiponder

8

3

Rear line

1

1st target line

Windmill

20

1

2 3

1

29

SSDF

46 (-)

1

Landmines

11 Vreewijk

Stop line

2

SSDF

24 1

16

1

8

1

2

Rhenen

11

2

LO

24 (-)

4

2

8 (-)

19 (-)

1

207

322

Rye field

WE

3

R

Pothoek

Grebbeberg

11(-) 1

8 (-)

SSDF (-) 3

3

Brickworks

(Former) Hornwork

322

Pumping station (under construction)

R

(b)

heavy machine gun in steel turret

(c)

concrete casemate, so-called

protected from fragmentation

(a) (b) (c)

(d) (e) (f)

(g)

‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in concrete casemate (e)

M18 machine gun

(f)

7-Veld field gun mortar

(g)

E

light machine gun, position

H

46

Livonia

(former) Bastions

IN

2 (a)

Anna’s Hoeve

XX

Heimerstein

Zoo

322

Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer front line / stop line / rear line forward line of German troops orchard

Ferry

German attack

afternoon time of position of German troops Dutch counterattack

0

250

500 m

11

illustrations

The battle at Scherpenzeel

13.30-20.00 hrs 13 May 1940 Ba

Cana

l

German sector boundary 0

500 m.

227

1 km

to Am

Front line

Gli

erbeek n- d

Ca

Canal

be

sf

Ne

er

na

l

ek

-

oo

227

he

udsche

bee

-

(-)

k

nte

wo

366

Cana

ulu

697

l

Me

1

der

sc

8 XX 2

ren

Walderveen

Lunte r

5

sch

e

rt

1

XX

eld

beek

ev

der-

rn

Mod


to

outpost sector according to German data March 1940

21 ek

Scherpenzeel

Ca

na

bee

l

256

Lunte

rensc

1

eke

4

rs l o ot

De Groep (tank ditch)

Outpost line

Emmikhuizen

De Klomp

Emmikhuizerberg

2

207

he

Bro

3

12

k

Renswoude

Stop line

15

(-)

be

4 XXX 2 Woudenberg

412 Lunteren 328

15

de to E

(tank ditch)

Roode Haan

1

227 XX 207

19 Oml.-

2

8

2

4 Veenendaal

Geldersch Veenendaal Can. Bi

XX

ss

Benedeneind

id sgr

Leersum

2 X X4

av

10

D op

Hondsenelleboog

ch

22

207

4

ift

1

Middelbuurt

G rif t or

Front line Amerongen

Gr

eb

be

12

illustrations

The attack by the 1. Kavalleriedivision WONS POSITION

AMELAND

WONS SECTOR

Dokkum

Schraard

11/5

Kornwerderzand VLIELAND (Habour)

WONS POSITION

TEXEL

1

Makkum

C-Stg Hd DEN HELDER POSITION

1 Tjeuke Meer

12/5

Den Oever

22

Urk

C-Vg H E LIN WA TER

HOLLAND

TCH DU

Hilversum

Ca

Amersfoort

na

l UTRECHT

Hardenberg Ommen

Zwolle TBO

XXX

10

22

21 1

Nordhorn

O

Warning line Nunspeet

TBF

sector of Territorial Commander in Friesland

Q

Line of defence Epe Line of defence

TBO

sector of TerritorialAlmelo Commander Oldenzaal in Overijssel

F

C-Stg Hd

Commander of Den Helder Position Hengelo Holten Dutch sector boundary C-Vg H Commander ofn.Fortress Holland Deventer a Enschede Gronau German sector boundary tek Apeldoorn en AdvanceTwroute 11/5 Date of advance National border Provincial border HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau Zutphen Lochem

sel IJs

Leiden

Naarden

Rijn-

ZUID-

sterdam

Hoofddorp DEFENCE LINE OF AMSTERDAM

Elburg

GR LIN EBBE E

Am Muiden

NEW

AMSTERDAM

Kampen IJSSELMEER

1 Coevorden

t ch Ve

Marken

2 Emmen Sleen

Hoogeveen

l

Purmerend Zaandam

HOLLAND

F

OVERIJSSEL

se

Haarlem

Beilen GROEP ASSEN

Schokland

IJSSEL LINE

Q

DRENTHE

Echten

Zwartsluis 10/5

Hoorn

NOORD-

IJmuiden

Meppel

Enkhuizen

WEST FRIESLAND

Stadskanaal

10/5 Westerbork

Steenwijk 10/5

Medemblik

Schagen

O

Gieten

Assen

Lemmer

11/5 Petten

10/5

Heerenveen Appelscha

IJs


Staveren

Veendam Zuidlaren

TBF

Sneek Den Helder

l na Ca Winschoter- diep Winschoten

Eelde Drachten

11/5

1

Marum GROEP GRONINGEN

FRIESLAND

Bolsward

Dollard

al an sC Em Nieuwolda

Groningen

11/5

Leeuwarden

Franeker

10/5

Ho ofd va art

NORTH POSITION

12/5

12/5

Allingawier Idsegahuizen Harlingen

Emden

Delfzijl

Bedum Grijpskerk

Makkum BREEZAND

Zoutkamp

Lauwerszee

Kollum

2

MAKKUM SECTOR

IJ

OSTFRIESLAND

GRONINGEN

Ems

43

WADDEN SEA

Dr en tsc he

RW

r Dam ee

m

el

ss

Gooium

Hajum Wons Kornwerd

KORNWERDERZAND

BORKUM

SCHIERMONNIKOOG

ZURICH SECTOR

s Em

KORNWERDERZAND

10 km

0

NORTH SEA

Pingjum

Zurich

Inundation Line of resistance Company sector boundary

10-14 May 1940

13

illustrations

Kethel

Overschie

el ss Ouderkerk a/d IJssel IJ Bergambacht Capelle a/d IJssel

ROTTERDAM

Maasland

Maassluis

SCHIEDAM

Vlaardingen

Schoonhoven Ammerstol

Nieuwpoort

Groot-Ammers

Krimpen a/d IJssel

K Lekkerkerk LE Goudriaan Streefkerk IJsselmonde Krimpen a/d Lek Noordeloos Nieuwenhoorn Slikkerveer Nw.-Lekkerkerk AAS M Kinderdijk UDE Bleskensgraaf O Ridderkerk Heenvliet Alblasserdam Geervliet XX Neder-Slingeland 10 May Barendrecht Oostendam XX end of Rhoon Oud-Alblas Portugaal O afternoon Abbenbroek Spijkenisse Wijngaarden UDE Rijsoord H.I.Ambacht 7 Goidschalxoord Hekelingen Giessendam Papendrecht Heerjansdam Heerjansd Zwijndrecht drecht Gorinchem Heinenoord Oudenhoorn OudZuidland Hardinxveld Puttershoek Beijerland Sliedrecht MAA DORDRECHT SPU Blaak S I Nieuw-Beijerland 11 May 3 Werkendam Goudswaard D morning BEDIJKTE Krispijn Dubbeldam RWE E HA BINNEN MAAS MEvan 't Land Piershil Wieldrecht Kop RI I s l a n d NG Westmaas Maasdam

Rozenburg

SC

HE

UR

NIEUWE MAAS Pernis Waalhaven Airfield Hoogvliet

Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH Carto

10-13 May 1940

The Moerdijk-Rotterdam axis

12 May

Zuid-Beijerland

O

E

K

S

E

Klaaswaal

Stad aan 't Haringvliet

2

Strijen TIENGEMETEN

Middelsluis

W

Numansdorp

VL

A

IE

Den Bommel

of evening Nieuwendijk Dordrecht Tweede Tol B I E S B O S C H E

's-Gravendeel

10-11 May night

KIL

H

Zwartsluisje

28

A

R

D

Strijensas

T

DS

Oude-Tonge

ER

Ooltgensplaat

R

6

Noordschans

RAK

Dinteloord

NT

EL

Fijnaart

Langeweg Hazeldonk

0

5 km

Stampersgat

Made

Den Hout

Wagenberg Zevenbergen

DI

Standdaarbuiten

Terheijden

MAASJE

's-Gravenmoer

Oosterhout

Horst

MARK

AL

N

CA

OUD E

Waspik Raamsdonksveer Raamsdonk

nbergschen- Hoek Zevenbergschen-

Klundert

E

K VOL

Dussen

HE BERGSC MAAS

Geertruidenberg 10 May afternoon Drimmelen

Hoge-Zwaluwe

KR

Hank

Willemsdorp DIEPLage-Zwaluwe AM

Moerdijk

ME

EU

NI

AN

LL

HO

Willemstad

AM

W

Mookhoek Schenkeldijkk

Teteringen

WILH ELM INA

XX

9

CA

N.

14

illustrations

Dordtsche Kil and surrounding area Reeweg-

Zuid

Wieldrecht

Amstelwijck

Wieldrechtsche Gravestein Krab-en Landzicht Kil

church

Kil dyke

Schenkeltje mill water tower

TrekBonaventura

et Vli de Ou

damsche

Polder Pumping station Wieldrecht

KIL

Nieuw-

weg

stkil We


's-Gravendeel Steam ferry

Wielhoven Church

Tweede Tol Killezigt Beerwijk

Langen Dam

Nieuwe

Catharinahoeve

Oude er Be de Ou

pumping station

Beer

Beer

Mookhoek k el M

Nieuwe

polder dij k

g we

om Bo

Polder Kooilandsche

Electric pumping station

Oude

Den Engel

Koperen polder Brabers polder

Ferry

Gorze

Polder

polder

OudBeversoord

jk di er Be

Beneden polder

DORDTSCHE

Strijensche

Wa ch t di jk

Meerkoot

Sass endij k

polder

De Wacht

Mookhoek

Polder

polder

eg ekw Vlo

Polder

Stoope

Willemsdorp Ferry

Polder

Maria Bouwlust polder

A HOLL

NDS

DIEP 0

500 m

15

illustrations

Rotterdam city centre

10 May 1940

German positions on the Noordereiland German position under slip road to Willems bridge (Willemsbrug)

AK

PL AN TA GE

DI JK

SLA

NIE UW E

GOUDS CHE SIN GEL

tram

railway

E HOOG

6

Hotel Weimar Maasstation Koningsbrug

WILLEMSSTR.

5

BOEZEM

4

HUGO

Maashotel Nat. Levensverz. Mij. Witte Huis

OOSTERSTR.

WAR AND E

important objects

3

BOEZEM

LAN GE

OU DE

GED EM PTE

Dutch patrols

SINGEL

Positions of Dutch troops

2

R. VEEMARKTST

T DE GROO

route of German troops

VLI ET LAA N

STRAAT

VEE MARKT

German floatplane

1

RIJWEG

GOUDSCHE

OOST PLEIN

ANSTR.

v.SPA

ER LO OST ER K ACHT

NT EE M

AAT STR ENS AUR ST.L

IGER STE REN BOE R E TEIG ENS MIDD

OTE GRO RKT MA

E UW NIE UWE NIE

4

Station Beurs OUDE HA

H AV EN

K W ER

AN M FF O IN .H E G L R P U K B RI ND E H

SNG I N KO

E AD UK A SS NA

ÔT REP ENT VEN HA

UW AD

OO

ES

PJ M O

OO

RW

EG

HA VE

N

AT

BI NN EN HA VE RS N TR AA T

ST

SP

AT

S IN PR

RA ST

W IL LE M S

N VE HA

RA ST

KA DE

AN LA

DE KA

pedestrian ferry


pedestrian ferry

OM BO JE AN OR

EILAND

pedestrian ferry

16

N O O R D E R -

SE O R

16

11

HAVEN

E W EU NI IK R D EN .H PR

11

pedestrian ferry

AS MA

L BO

MAASKADE

BO

EP HE SC

6

1

M AA SK AD E

LEUVEHAVEN

SC H JUFFERSTRAAT EE P

M AK ER S

HAVEN HAVEN

N VE HA S ER AK M

RKA

STE

NASSAU-

LEUVE

N

WIJVEN NHA WIJ

2

GAT

Maasstation

5

OO

G U R SB M LE IL W

LEUVE

N WIJ

H

3

DIJ K

DE

N VE

. STR ORN THO POS

IN PLE LAAK RDB URS NOO K BE A A BL AK AAT BLA STR ZUID N IJ W N EN HAV AVE

E

BOE REN ADM IRA LITE ITS KAD E

N VE HA VEN HA IET T VL IE NG GVL I R HA ARIN IET L V H ING R HA

G HOO

EIN KPL KER

TZE

AL NDA ENE GRO

RKT SMA KAA

OTE GRO

OOS

AAT STR

AT

TRA

KIPS

16

illustrations

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Netherlands and the war In the Netherlands, the 1940-45 period is referred to as ‘the war’. In all its simplicity, that designation illustrates the huge significance of the Second World War in the collective memory of the Dutch people. The choice of word itself is remarkable. The actual war experience was limited to five days in May 1940, when the Dutch armed forces fought and lost the battle against the Germans, and the period from mid-September 1944 to May 1945, when the Allies recaptured Dutch territory. In the latter operations, the Dutch armed forces played a modest and rather symbolic role. The 1940-45 years were more of a history of occupation than a war experience. Nevertheless, the Dutch people who lived through this period are not inclined to divide their lives into ‘before and after the occupation’. The common parlance is ‘before the war’ and ‘after the war’. In 1940, the Dutch people in general, and the Dutch armed forces in particular, were inexperienced when it came to war. The most recent war experience had been over a century ago. This was in 1830-32, when King William I endeavoured, in vain, to put a stop by force of arms to the secession of the southern Netherlands, present-day Belgium, from his kingdom. In attaching such exceptional significance to the 1940-45 period, the Netherlands stands out from many other European countries, where that place is occupied by the First World War. There, the ‘Great War’ marks a turning point in the history of European civilisation. In the Netherlands, it is impossible for the experience of 1914-18 to have the same intensity. The country was neutral during those years and the mobilised army saw no action at all. Although Dutch neutrality was threatened on several occasions, and the country suffered many adverse consequences of the war, the Netherlands underwent what were terrible years for the rest of Europe

May 1940: a cartoon by L.J. Jordaan expresses the indignation about the German attack on the Netherlands (left); entrances to Amsterdam Central Station are being closed (below).

introduction

3

as a relative outsider. It was not until the Second World War that the average Dutchman was confronted personally with modern warfare. Dutch neutrality in 1914-18 had been no coincidence. Since the midnineteenth century, the Netherlands had remained as detached as possible from the developments in the power politics between the neighbouring great powers, Germany, France and Britain. In the hundred years preceding 1940, the notions of aloofness and neutrality developed into permanent values in Dutch strategic culture and became all but articles of faith in the political and social set of values. The country was even able to derive a certain feeling of moral superiority from these ideas. Whereas the great powers determined their positions in international relations by means of power and force—reprehensible instruments in the eyes of many Dutch people—the Netherlands liked to think of itself as a shining example of the workings of international law. This self-image was undoubtedly misleading. It did not rhyme with the bloody wars through which the colonial administration subjected the Netherlands East Indies on the other side of the world. It also overlooked the fact that, as a “satisfied nation”, the Netherlands only stood to lose from participation in an armed conflict. If the Netherlands were to choose the path of rapprochement with Germany in peacetime, it would run the risk of Britain taking control of the Dutch colonies in Asia. If support from Britain were sought, Germany could be tempted to carry out a preventive strike on Dutch territory. That was the situation the Netherlands faced in 1940. A country and an army without recent war experience, a country which, strengthened by the favourable experiences of 1914-18, hoped to be able to remain neutral again, and a country with an introverted, mainly bourgeois culture. Values such as order and authority, peacefulness, patriotism, industry and self-restraint took precedence over martial values such as glory, valour or self-sacrifice.

The shock All these aspects will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters of this book, but it is useful to point them out briefly here as well. They can explain the enormity of the shock caused by the German invasion of the Netherlands on 10 May 1940. For any individual or society, war is one of the most devastating occurrences possible. It is an experience which disrupts normal life entirely. For the people of the Netherlands, however, inexperienced and mentally unprepared as they were, the shock was par-

4

chapter one

ticularly severe. And that was not all. Within five days the fight ended in a crushing defeat. The defeat was worse than had been anticipated and came sooner. The general assumption was that the armed forces would be able to put up resistance for several weeks and that allies would come to their assistance in the meantime in order to turn the tide. The capitulation on 14 May 1940 dealt a harsh blow to this perspective. It was a traumatic experience. The leading Dutch military journal De Militaire Spectator began its July 1940 issue with a brief review of recent events: “It has now been two months since we began our struggle against an attack by our all-powerful neighbour, equipped with the most up-to-date resources and inspired by an indomitable urge to attack, which was not our enemy up to the point of the attack, and still our thoughts and feelings are dominated by that one thing, the mere Five-Day War”. This sentiment was not limited to the military, but permeated society as a whole. It is therefore no wonder that, even during those five days of the war, explanations for the developing catastrophe were already circulating. Some were harsh in their judgements on the shortcomings of the Dutch armed forces. Others clung to deeds which gave encouragement and which could inspire them not to resign themselves to German occupation. From those five days of war, an image emerged that was very well suited to softening the pain of defeat. An important element of that image was the indignation at the, in Dutch eyes, unexpected and treacherous manner in which the German armed forces had assaulted the country. That indignation was motivated by the constant hope of remaining neutral in the impending Europe-wide war. It was in that spirit that Queen Wilhelmina addressed her people in a proclamation on 10 May 1940, saying: “After our country had, with scrupulous precision, observed absolute neutrality all these months and while it had no other intention but to maintain that attitude strictly and consistently, last night the German armed forces, without any warning whatsoever, carried out a sudden attack on our territory.” The first opinions were also soon expressed regarding the course of the battle. Both the army, including the air forces, and the navy had put up a brave fight. However, as the commander-in-chief, General H.G. Winkelman, put it in his radio broadcast in which he announced the capitulation, “the fight was too one-sided, our troops were up against technological assets for which even the greatest of human courage would be no match”.1 1 V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 291.

Damage caused during an aerial attack on Schiphol airport on 10 May.

Bombs dropped by a German aircraft ruined twelve houses in Amsterdam, killing 44 civilians, on 12 May.

6

chapter one

Everyone knew what the general was referring to: tanks, modern aircraft, paratroops and air-transportable units. Furthermore, the swift defeat was generally attributed to the poor armament and equipment of the Dutch armed forces. In addition, according to general opinion, as if their technological superiority were not enough, the Germans also availed themselves of improper combat methods, violated the law of war and received assistance from a fifth column of German agents and Dutch traitors. In that respect, it was important to note that in one of the key theatres of war, the Grebbeberg, an SS regiment had been involved in the fighting. Official announcements also influenced public opinion during the fighting. For instance, the statements by the Dutch General Headquarters on 10 May 1940 spoke of German paratroops disguised in Dutch uniforms, reported a German officer who threatened to kill Dutch prisoners of war and cried shame over German soldiers using prisoners of war as human shields. In retrospect, the image of the battle thus created was an intriguing combination of truths and half-truths. During the war and shortly after, it provided an initial explanation for the rapid defeat. It may even be better not to speak of an explanation, but rather of justification of the defeat. What people needed was not so much knowledge of the full facts, but rather a representation of events that would make the humiliating defeat bearable. The German superiority combined with the treachery and deceit gave the defeat an element of inevitability, bitter though it was. That shifted some of the responsibility for the defeat. One of the key Dutch historians specialised in the Second World War, Lou de Jong, characterised public opinion as a “simultaneously dramatic and romantic simplification, the bottom line of which was that the Germans, had they only implemented normal combat methods, would not have been able to subdue the courageous and heroic Netherlands. It had required abnormal, indeed criminal combat methods”.2 Although, as was mentioned earlier, reproaches were heaped on the armed forces immediately after capitulation regarding the brevity of their resistance, the view soon took root that that same weak army had managed to halt, or at least delay, the German advance in several places. And the Wehrmacht, it seemed, had paid a high price. All in all, it had still taken the Germans five days to conquer the small country, much longer than they would have assumed beforehand. The losses had been substantial, particularly at the IJsselmeer Dam, at the Grebbeberg and in the 2 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 3 Mei ’40 (The Hague, 1970) 520.

introduction

7

Hague area. This had caused the former two of those theatres of war to be dubbed ‘the Dam of Death’ and ‘the Devil’s Hill’, respectively. The greatest achievement of the Dutch army had been the elimination of the air-transportable troops in the Hague area. This German elite unit, as it was soon referred to, failed to capture the airfields around The Hague and was depleted as a result of casualties and capture. In addition, the Marine Corps, known as the ‘Black Devils’, had made it so difficult for the Germans in Rotterdam, that the latter had had to resort to a full-blown act of terror: an aerial bombardment which razed the entire historic city centre to the ground. Rotterdam thus suffered a fate similar to that of Warsaw, and later Coventry and London. Considering the circumstances in 1940 and the years of occupation which followed, the image portrayed above was unmistakably justified. It made the defeat bearable and, by emphasising the high German casualty figures, gave meaning and significance to the sacrifices made. Moreover, it also served the country beyond its borders, where the government in exile in London had to convince the allies that the previously neutral Netherlands was a valuable ally and deserved allied support on account of its resistance to the German aggression. The government propaganda based on this image had the desired effect. Partly on that basis, the Daily Telegraph was able to say of the Dutch soldiers on 10 July 1941: “It is safe to go tigershooting with them”.3

The questions In the bigger picture of the war between Germany and the allies, the conquest of the Netherlands in May 1940 was only of minor importance. The main objective of Fall Gelb was to defeat the French armed forces and the British expeditionary force which had come to their aid. The point of main effort of the German attack lay in the advance through northern France, via the Meuse crossing at Sedan to the Channel coast at Abbeville. By comparison, the attack on the Netherlands was a secondary mission on the far-right flank, covering the operations in Belgium. That does not detract from the fact, however, that the attack on the Netherlands contained a number of elements which gave it a more general significance, exceeding the Dutch theatre of war. Winkelman’s proclamation, as quoted above, attributes the German victory to the German superiority in modern weapons. At first glance 3 Cited in E.N. van Kleffens, Belevenissen II 1940-1958 (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1983) 27.

A poster of the Prins Bernhard Fonds and Spitfire Fonds to acquire funding for war materials depicts the air attack on Rotterdam (left); the destruction in Rotterdam after the aerial bombardment of the city on 14 May (below).

introduction

9

there is something to be said for that. An armoured division had operated in the southern half of the Netherlands and the attack on the airfields near The Hague and the bridges on the Dordrecht-Rotterdam axis was unique. It was the first time that an entire airborne corps went into action. In the opening phase of the conflict, it was supported by strong air forces. In addition, a great many motorised infantry units operated on Dutch territory. The armoured division mentioned earlier was followed by a motorised SS infantry division, and facing the Grebbe Line, north of the Rhine, were two motorised SS infantry regiments. During the 1940 campaign, tanks, motorised infantry and air forces were the instruments of the Blitzkrieg. That term is central in all discussions on and analyses of the war in 1940 and it is also true for the operations against the Netherlands, which in the Dutch view, after all, had led to Dutch capitulation much faster than the high command, the government and the people had expected. Recent research, however, in particular that by Karl-Heinz Frieser, has shown that the German success in 1940 was not so much underpinned by a well-developed and broadly supported Blitzkrieg doctrine, but rather was strongly dependent on improvisation and even insubordination on the part of a small group of generals.4 This raises the interesting question as to the significance of those modern combat assets for the German operations on Dutch territory. In this respect, it is also important to ask the question to what extent the German attack on the Netherlands was a strategic raid. Clarity should also be sought as to the significance of the losses in personnel and materiel inflicted on the corps. How substantial were those losses and to what extent did they affect later German operations such as the intended invasion of the English coast (Operation Seelöwe) and the attack on Crete (Operation Merkur)? The deployment of SS units on Dutch soil is also remarkable. Later, on the eastern front in the war against the Soviet Union, the SS played an active part in the Vernichtungskrieg against the Russian population in general and the Jews in particular. During those operations, the law of war was grossly and systematically violated. There are also records of German violations of the law of war in the Dutch theatre of war in 1940, and some of those instances involved SS soldiers. The question arises to what extent those violations were due to the National Socialist origins of the SS and whether other factors were involved. The law of war and the possibly criminal nature of the German actions are also important to the debate on the nature and significance of the bombing of Rotterdam on 14 May 1940, immediately prior to the Dutch 4 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995).

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capitulation. What preceded the bombing, was it a tactical, strategic or even a terror bombing? And how did the bombing relate to the possible German fear that the operations in the Netherlands might take longer than had been assumed beforehand, thus jeopardising the operations in France? Considering these questions may lead to the conclusion that they resemble the questions that were being asked immediately after the German invasion. The fact that they are being dealt with again in this book stems from a different need, however, from that in 1940. Then, the motives were outrage over the injustice that had been suffered and the process of coping with a traumatic experience. This book focuses on factual research, critical analysis and scientific curiosity. A number of further questions are also significant. It is a commonplace to say that an army generally can fight no better than the quality of the preparations for an imminent conflict allows. The question is, therefore, whether a different defence policy in the years leading up to the war could have led to a different outcome in the battle. Were the policy of neutrality and the derived military strategy a wise choice? Would a higher defence budget and earlier rearmament have made any difference? Are the political and military leadership to blame in this respect? To what extent was the chosen system of force generation (army organisation and staffing) responsible for the defeat? The answers to these questions must, of course, take into account the strategy, the operation plan and the tactical operations of the opponent, the German Wehrmacht, as well as the latter’s equipment, level of training and structure. Underlying these questions is another, more important, fundamental question. Was there an alternative in the interwar period for the Dutch defence policy, and more generally the war preparations as a whole, which would have provided a better chance of a more favourable outcome to a future war? The Netherlands was a small country, surrounded by large powers which were highly likely to go to war with each other once again. In the eyes of the Dutch defence planners, the First World War, with its destruction and violence on a massive, industrial scale, served as the model for the impending war. But in such an orgy of violence, what would be an effective way to defend the country, given the limited Dutch resources, the small population number and the small territory? Was it even possible anymore to solve the problem of the Dutch territorial defence in a time of total war? Only if we include these fundamental questions in our considerations will we be able to form a balanced judgement on the old problem of the “mere Five-Day War”.

On 16 May, German troops marched into Amsterdam(right), including motor units of SS Regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’ (below).

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chapter one

These questions have determined the structure of this book. This introduction is followed by an overview of international politics in the 1920s and 1930s, focusing in particular on the political developments in Germany. The next two chapters look at how the Netherlands and Germany made their military preparations for another war in Europe, with the focus on the strategies and the operation plans. Chapter 5 deals with the execution of the German and Dutch campaign plans, from the opening of hostilities to the Dutch capitulation. It shows how the Dutch commander-in-chief and the Commander of the Field Army on the one hand, and their opponents, Army Group B commander Fedor von Bock and 18th Army commander Georg von Küchler on the other hand, led their respective operations. The five subsequent chapters discuss, at the tactical level, the course of the battles in the various theatres of operations. The concluding chapter takes stock, analyses the battle and answers the questions which lie at the basis of this study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EMERGENCE OF THE GERMAN THREAT

The consequences of the First World War On 11 November 1918, the guns fell silent in Western Europe; an armistice had brought an end to the First World War. In London, Big Ben’s chimes heralded an end to four years of war, and people danced in the streets of Britain and France. A bloody nightmare had come to an end and the people of Europe were preparing to resume their lives as they were before August 1914. The war, however, had changed their world drastically. To start with, the political map of Europe bore little resemblance to that of 1914. Three mighty empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, had fallen. In Germany, the defeat had cost Kaiser Wilhelm II his position. His downfall began with the actions of the Erster Generalquartiermeister of the German army, General Erich Ludendorff. The latter had reached the conclusion in September 1918 that the war was lost and had insisted that the Kaiser appoint a government that would have enough support among the population. That new government should then immediately begin negotiations with the allied powers. Ludendorff ’s intentions in this respect were twofold. He hoped to win time in order to regroup his armies, while at the same time the civilian government would carry all the blame for the defeat, should that defeat become inevitable. The army would thus be spared the anger of the disappointed German people. Wilhelm followed Ludendorff ’s advice and appointed the liberal prince Max von Baden as Reichskanzler. A number of reforms were carried out in October, and Germany became a constitutional monarchy. These reforms did not go far enough, however, for the American president, Woodrow Wilson, who occupied a prominent position in the allied camp. He wanted a more democratic German government and refused to negotiate a possible armistice. Many Germans, meanwhile, lost their faith in Wilhelm II. The idea that a republican government would be better able to come to an agreement with the allies was gaining ground. On 3 November, sailors in Kiel revolted, revolutionary councils were formed in various

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towns and the social democrats in the government threatened to resign unless the Kaiser abdicated. On 9 November, Wilhelm decided to give up, and fled to the Netherlands. The armistice was agreed two days later. The Weimar Republic, named after the town in which the constitution for the new state was drawn up, was therefore not the result of a conscious choice on the part of the German population. The empire collapsed because the allies demanded it, because the Germans longed for peace and because the German army leadership wanted to save face. The latter was accomplished; when the war came to an end, the army was still in France, its organisation was intact and not a single shot had been fired on German soil. It would later therefore be said that the army had never been defeated, but that it had been stabbed in the back by the home front. In the 1920s, Adolf Hitler was to describe the German defeat as “the greatest villainy of the century”, committed by “November criminals”. This was what prompted him to go into politics: “And I resolved to become a politician.”1 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Weimar Republic was born under an unlucky star. The First World War also ended the tsars’ rule in Russia. Two revolutions, one in March 1917 and one in November of the same year, had eventually established a Bolshevist regime, led by the professional revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The new government was to make peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, abandoning the allied cause. This contributed to the Bolshevist Soviet Union becoming a pariah in the international community, misunderstood, distrusted and abhorred by the entire world. Lastly, at the end of the war, the Habsburg Empire made way for several new nation states: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Politically, Central Europe became a patchwork, with plenty of material to serve as the basis for an international conflict. After all, every country had a significant number of ethnic minorities within its borders, such as the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. The First World War did not, however, only have direct political consequences. The financial situation in the world had also changed considerably. The war had drained the finances of the European powers. They had gone from being creditors to being debtors. For instance, the allied powers, Britain, France and Italy, owed the United States some seven billion dollars. Europe also lost export markets in Latin America and Asia. As a 1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. The First Complete and Unexpurgated Edition Published in the English Language (New York, 1939) 204.

the emergence of the german threat

15

result, after the war, almost every single government in Europe was faced with budget problems, increased by the many welfare payments to war widows and war invalids. There was little money to rebuild the European societies after the massive destruction. None of the governments were able to live up to the high expectations in their countries. Lastly, the First World War decimated an entire generation from a demographic point of view. In total, some 8.5 million people in Europe had been killed and over 20 million had been wounded, many of whom were crippled for life. Germany counted around 6 million dead and wounded; France around 5.5 million. An entire generation had been left behind on the battlefield. In the years following 1918, therefore, Europe was to be led by statesmen and soldiers who already had been in control during the First World War. The European population continued to expect leadership from old men such as Paul von Hindenburg and Henri Pétain. What then, were the direct consequences of the First World War for the Netherlands? At first it seemed as if the government’s policy of neutrality had been successful: the country had remained outside the theatre of war. This was generally attributed to the modernisation of the army, which on the eve of the war had led to a significant increase in combat power, and to the cautious foreign policy, which was aimed at removing any reasons a possible enemy might have for attacking the country. Only later would it emerge that it was largely thanks to the own interests of the warring nations that the Netherlands had been able to remain neutral.2 Staying out of range during the war widely confirmed the idea that for the Netherlands, the traditional policy in the areas of foreign politics and defence, a policy in which aloofness and neutrality were key concepts, was also the right choice for the twentieth century. In addition, in Europe and certainly also in the Netherlands, the atrocities of the battlefields of the First World War had fuelled the optimistic expectation that in the future nobody would settle political disputes by armed conflict anymore. In this respect also, therefore, the experiences of the war meant an enhancement of the neutrality policy, or as Minister of Foreign Affairs jonkheer H.A. van Karnebeek preferred to call it after the Netherlands joined the League of Nations, the self-reliance policy. 2 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1, Voorspel (The Hague, 1969) 38-71. J.A. Fortuin, “Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog”, Militaire Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 21-35. F. Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde van de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1914-1918 en in 1940”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, III (1980) 30-35. R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999) 32.

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chapter two Versailles

Although it was true that, after 11 November 1918, the fighting ceased in Western Europe, what was lacking was a peace treaty between the allies and the defeated nations. To this end, the leaders of the world gathered in Paris. The key players were, on behalf of the United States, the dour puritan Wilson, who wanted to punish guilty Germany and reform the world through his League of Nations; on behalf of France, the staunch nationalist Georges Clemenceau, le père de la victoire, who wanted to curb the German danger for good; and on behalf of the United Kingdom, the fickle Welshman David Lloyd George, who was really more interested in his country’s domestic politics. The eventual results of the peace negotiations, as laid down in the Treaties of Paris, the best known of which is the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, were the products of a compromise between the three allied leaders. For instance, France gave Wilson the space to achieve his League of Nations ideal, although countries such as Germany and the Soviet Union were barred from membership. In return, the Treaty of Versailles included stipulations which were to make renewed action by Germany against France impossible. Initially, France wanted to make the German Rhineland into an independent state, which would be under the supervision of the allies. When this plan was rejected by the US and Britain, at Clemenceau’s insistence the allies signed a treaty of guarantee which promised France immediate support in the event of German attack. In addition, France was given control of the coal mines in the Saarland, which was to be governed by the League of Nations, Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France and France was to receive large sums in reparation from Germany. The German army was to withdraw from the Rhineland and was not to exceed 100,000 men. The latter stipulation, however, did not spell the end of this army. As the allies had banned conscription in Germany, it became a highly skilled and professional organisation. In addition, Germany lost all its colonies, was to relinquish large areas in the east to Poland, including the mining area of Silicia, lost Danzig and was officially given the blame for the First World War. In Germany, it was therefore referred to as der große Betrug von Versailles and the Germans felt they had been unduly humiliated. In the end, the Treaty of Versailles did not bring the lasting peace which it had been intended to bring. It played into the hands of the group surrounding Ludendorff, and discredited the parties which supported the Weimar Republic and signed the treaty. Versailles was both too harsh and

In 1925, with the signature of the Treaty of Locarno, the Weimar Republic accepted its western borders. German continued to harbour objections against the border with Poland, to which it had had to cede large areas of land in 1919 (right); 19 October 1930: the National Socialist Sturmabteilung demonstrating in Neu-Brandenburg against the uniform ban (below).

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too weak where Germany was concerned: too harsh because it punished the Germans disproportionately for the events between 1914 and 1918, and too weak because Germany’s core was allowed to remain intact. From an economic, political and military point of view, Germany remained a potential world power, which would be sure to seek possibilities to review the Treaty of Versailles. In the end, the treaty did not provide France with the security it wanted either. The US Senate refused to ratify the treaties, so that the Franco-British-American guarantee treaty came to nothing. Therefore, when the peace treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, the French maréchal Ferdinand Foch said: “This is not peace, it is a twentyyear truce.”3

The 1920s: seeking stability International politics in the early 1920s centred around Franco-German relations. As has been said earlier, France was very disappointed by the results of the peace talks in Paris. The Rhineland had remained part of the German Reich, and the Franco-British-American treaty of guarantee had not materialised. All France could therefore do was to strive for strict enforcement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1923, it even occupied the Ruhr area, in order to force Germany to make the reparation payments it had been ordered to pay. This resulted in a huge increase in inflation, hitting the German middle class the hardest. France also entered into alliances with the new states in Eastern Europe: an alliance treaty with Poland in 1921, with Czechoslovakia in 1924, with Yugoslavia in 1926 and with Romania in 1927. In Rapallo in 1922, Germany in turn signed a treaty with the other pariah of the international community, the Soviet Union. Both states relinquished all reparation payments, established diplomatic ties and improved their economic relationship. Close military cooperation was established in secret. German soldiers provided instruction to the Red Army and in turn were provided with training facilities, and were thus able to maintain a high standard. The tension between France and Germany was reduced significantly when the Dawes Plan, named after the American banker Charles G. Dawes, was accepted in 1924. This plan entailed France’s withdrawal from the Ruhr area, arranged the German reparation payments and made it possible for 3 See: H.L. Wesseling, Vele ideeën over Frankrijk. Opstellen over geschiedenis en cultuur (Amsterdam, 1987) 238.


19

the Weimar Republic to borrow significant sums of money, in order to allow the economy to recover. International politics appeared to be entering calmer waters. There was a prospect of a stable international order. A clear sign in this respect was the signing of the Treaties of Locarno in 1925. In those treaties, Germany accepted its western border as established in the Treaty of Versailles. It was also determined that Germany or France would receive military support from Britain and Italy in the event of an act of aggression by the one against the other. Interesting to note is the fact that remilitarisation of the Rhineland, if it were to occur, would be considered to be an act of aggression. The Treaties of Locarno also enabled Germany to become a member of the League of Nations. Nonetheless, ‘Locarno’ did not mean a fundamental change in international relations. The stipulations of Versailles remained in force, which was a constant source of dissatisfaction for the Germans. Germany did not accept the borders in Eastern Europe, continued to circumvent the disarmament regulations and in 1926 strengthened its relationship with the Soviet Union. Still, in 1925, there was a collective sigh of relief over ‘the spirit of Locarno’. In 1928, 65 nations even signed the Kellogg-Briand pact, deciding to abolish war as a means of resolving international conflicts. In practice, however, this pact, too, had little significance. For instance, not a single agreement was made on sanctions in the event of military aggression. The Dutch historian A.F. Manning therefore wrote: “The real value? Well, it was an example of diplomacy of the street, adopted by statesmen. A demonstration of the ancient nostalgia for peace.”4 Nonetheless, the aversion to violence that had grown since the Great War and the apparent international détente fuelled the antimilitarism already present in the Netherlands. The expansion of the fleet, considered necessary by the government and proposed in the 1922 Fleet Act, was not carried out, under massive pressure from the population. Government policy itself was also adapted to the decreased military threat. Defence expenditure remained at a low level throughout the 1920s. As a result, in 1922, the duration of the initial term of service for conscripts was limited to five and a half months, the armament was weak and growing out of date, and the enthusiasm for a career as an officer was declining. For the sake of its security, the Netherlands was hoping that a stable balance of power would be restored in Europe and had expectations, be they rather reserved, of the symbol of the apparently organised and stable world order, the League of Nations. 4 A.F. Manning, “Bankroet der optimisten. De politieke constellatie van Europa: 1933” in: A.H. Paape e.a., eds, Bericht van de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1970-1975) 59. See also: Van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede, 73-75.

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chapter two Fascism and National Socialism

Despite the calm on the international stage, in several countries there were large population groups who were dissatisfied with the world in which they lived. Tradesmen, small businessmen, demobilised soldiers and certain intellectuals found that the modern, capitalist and industrialised society of the twentieth century did not give them enough room to develop. Criticism of the industrial society was not a new phenomenon. One only has to think of writers such as Maurice Barrès, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Julius Langbehn and Friedrich Nietzsche, who, each in their own way, had aired their grievances over the existing society even before the First World War. After the war, the dissatisfied were to unite mainly in two large and related political movements, fascism and National Socialism. In March 1919, Benito Mussolini founded an organisation which can be considered to be the precursor of the fascist movement, the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento, a “league of combat” consisting of veterans and former socialists. This group did not have its own ideology, but was centred around the will for power and reaction against the existing social order. It was against democracy as a form of government, against capitalism, against liberalism, against communism, against internationalism and against pacifism. In 1919, Mussolini declared emphatically that fascism was comprised of actions. The people no longer needed ideologies, they needed action. After fascism had gained power in Italy in 1922, however, in the person of Mussolini, and the movement became institutionalised, an ideology of sorts emerged nonetheless. That ideology consisted of a number of elements. First of all, fascism advocated philosophical irrationalism: it doubted reason, placed great trust in intuition and strongly believed in myths such as that of the greatness of the Italian nation. It was therefore not surprising that the book Psychologie des foules (1895), by the French philosopher Gustave Le Bon, was popular among fascists and National Socialists. Another characteristic of fascism was the idea that the individual derives his value from his existence within a state. The wishes of the citizens were clearly subordinate to the interests of the state: nationalism was of essential importance to the fascists. Fascism also assumed a fundamental inequality among humans, which meant for the purpose of government that a leader with superior insight had to lead the masses. Lastly, fascism was the philosophy of terror and violence. According to Mussolini, fascism believed neither in the use nor the possibility of lasting peace. Only war would ennoble the people and give the strongest their dues. An


21

almost automatic result of these concepts was an extremely aggressive foreign policy, aimed at building an empire. The German version of fascism, National Socialism, added another two elements. In the first place, National Socialism was explicitly not focused on the nation state, but on people and race. According to the National Socialists, the world was populated by different races, and within the white race various so-called Unterrassen could be distinguished. Reasoning from a social Darwinist perspective, in Mein Kampf, Hitler came to the conviction that the Germanic or Aryan race was to be considered as the most gifted and most creative. The Aryan race “created culture” and as such stood above races which “maintained culture” or “destroyed culture”. According to Hitler, the culture-creating race should be refined to become a racially pure Herrenvolk, while culture-destroying races such as that of the Jews should be wiped off the face of the earth. The result of all this was the concept of Lebensraum. The superiority of the German people would lead to the annexation of surrounding states and the establishment of a thousand-year Germanic empire. This was to be achieved by fighting, which to the National Socialists meant the same as living, because after all, man was a predator. Hitler once said: “We must shake off all sentimentality and be hard. Some day, when I order war, I shall not be in a position to hesitate because of the ten million young men I shall be sending to their deaths.”5

National Socialists in power When the world economy collapsed in 1929, Germany in particular was in serious trouble. Foreign loans, essential to the German economy, were revoked and factories had to close. Six million people lost their jobs, and the middle class, which had never really recovered from the inflation of 1923, was again hit hard. As a result, few had any faith left in the democratic Weimar Republic, and political groups on the left and right of the political spectrum gained in appeal. It was Adolf Hitler who managed to strike the right note by strongly condemning the Treaty of Versailles as the source of all the misery and criticising the democracy for its inability to solve the people’s problems. He called on the German people to back him. In 1930, Hitler’s party, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) won 107 seats in the Reichstag, partly thanks to mob vio5 Quoted in: F.G. van der Poll, “Totalitaire stromingen” in: Fasen en facetten (Amsterdam, 1962) 256.

A polling station in Berlin during the Reichstag elections on 5 March 1933, the last elections to be held under the Weimar Republic.

Adolf Hitler during the Reichsparteitag of the NSDAP in Nuremberg in 1933.


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lence perpetrated by its strong arm, the Sturmabteilung (SA). In 1928, the NSDAP had only had 12 seats, and it had looked as though the phenomenon Hitler was of a passing nature. In July 1932, the Nazis won as many as 230 seats, making them the largest political group in the country. In the election in November of that year, however, the growth appeared to have halted. The party lost two million votes and 34 seats. Hitler was saved by the nationalist-conservative quarter. The traditional political leaders in those circles wanted Germany restored as a great power and in Hitler they saw a useful instrument with which to channel the general discontent in Germany. On 30 January 1933, at their instigation, ageing president von Hindenburg appointed Hitler Reichskanzler. Adolf Hitler had come to power entirely legally, without ever having had the backing of the majority of the German people.The new government’s first act was to call new elections. Again, the NSDAP did not achieve a majority, despite violence, unrest and the fire in the Reichstag building, which was blamed on the communists. The party did win 44% of the seats, however. The German parliament then put itself on the sidelines, however, by passing the Enabling Act, allowing the government to take all measures “to remedy the distress of the people and the nation”. Then all political parties, except the NSDAP, were disbanded. In a very short space of time, Germany had become a dictatorial one-party state. From the very beginning, Hitler’s foreign policy was characterised by numerous declarations emphasising Germany’s peaceful intentions. For instance, Germany announced it was willing to disarm as long as it obtained equal status in the international community. As early as 1933, however, Hitler decided to abandon the disarmament talks in Geneva and also to leave the League of Nations, the first step towards a completely new foreign policy. Hitler largely removed the threat which emanated from these measures by signing a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934. Until then, the German claims to Danzig and the Polish corridor had always been considered to be the greatest threats to world peace. Now it seemed as if Hitler, no matter how far-reaching his political aims, was considering violence to be a useless instrument in foreign politics. In Germany in the meantime, Hitler dealt with Ernst Röhm’s SA, as Röhm saw an important role for his organisation in the army and posed a threat to Hitler’s position. With this action on 30 June 1934, known as the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, in which the leading figures of the SA met their deaths, Hitler was able to win over the army leadership even further. This contributed to his being able to assume and combine the posts of Reichspräsident and Reichskanzler in August 1934.

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In the German state ruled by Hitler as Führer, the economy was made to serve the preparations for war. The key figure in this respect was Hjalmar Schacht, who as Minister of Economic Affairs and president of the Deutsche Bank was pumping considerable amounts of Deutschmarks into the economy by funding public works, such as the construction of the Autobahnen and an increase in arms production. The leadership of the Wehrmacht, meanwhile, was happy with the new political direction, which, after all, appeared to be facilitating German rearmament, even though many officers had their reservations about the parvenu Hitler and those close to him. Almost imperceptibly, however, the German army was falling into the grasp of the National Socialists. The Luftwaffe for instance, not established until the spring of 1935, was led by Hermann Göring, the second man behind Hitler in the Nazi hierarchy, and the rapid growth of the army allowed many young officers to make promotion quickly. Career opportunities and development possibilities led to Hitler’s bid for power being able to count on increasing support within the armed forces. The image of a peaceful Germany, established after the German-Polish non-aggression treaty, suffered serious damage from Hitler’s attempts to stage a National Socialist coup in Vienna. This failed attempt at Anschluß (1934) first of all led to France’s strengthening its ties with both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and also set Mussolini’s Italy against Germany. When Hitler officially announced German rearmament and the introduction of conscription in March 1935, Italy, France and Britain even united in the so-called Stresa Front. The three countries strongly condemned the German measures and announced their backing of Austrian independence. Hitler had manoeuvred himself into an isolated position. This situation soon came to an end, however. In June of the same year, Britain and Germany signed a fleet treaty. Britain hoped to safeguard its maritime superiority in Europe for the longer term, so that it could concentrate on the Far East. The fleet treaty meant the first crack in the Stresa Front. Not that the understanding between the three countries in the Stresa Front was to hold out for very long anyway. After all, as early as 1935, Mussolini decided that, now that Austria’s independence was safeguarded, he no longer needed France and Britain. Anticipating the anger of Britain in particular, he conquered Abyssinia, present-day Ethiopia. An outraged British public demanded sanctions against Italy, but in practice there were no more than diplomatic skirmishes.


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Adolf Hitler takes the salute in Nuremberg in 1935.

The Stresa Front was no more and on 7 March 1936, Hitler made use of this fact by remilitarising the Rhineland. This not only defied the Treaty of Versailles, but also the Treaty of Locarno. The German Führer was playing for high stakes. Should France have responded with military force, then the German troops would immediately have retreated behind the Rhine. France did not respond at all, however. Hitler’s gamble, against the advice of his military advisers, paid off. A demilitarised Rhineland had left the Ruhr area undefended and protected France against a German attack. Now German troops were at the French border again and the Ruhr industrial area now lay in the rear area. ‘Versailles’ had been revised for good, Germany’s self-confidence had grown and Hitler had strengthened his position with regard to the military.

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chapter two The German Lebensraum ambitions

After his success in the Rhineland, Hitler gradually obtained a better grip on German military strategy, at the expense of the military leadership. Hitler began to unfold plans for the deployment of the armed forces for foreign conquests. These plans were a mix of the opportunistic intention of taking advantage of international crises and a grand ideological panorama. On 5 November 1937, for instance, there was a secret meeting between Hitler, his ministers of Foreign Affairs and War, Constantin von Neurath and Werner von Blomberg, respectively, and the commandersin-chief of the army, air force and navy, Werner von Fritsch, Hermann Göring and Erich Raeder. During that meeting, Hitler spoke of the necessity of acquiring Lebensraum for the German people. The future of the Third Reich was at stake and from that point on, everything was to be focused on conquering Eastern Europe, or bringing it under German influence, no later than between 1943 and 1945. That would be when Germany’s military power was at its height. First of all, Hitler announced, in preparation for further expansion, Austria and Czechoslovakia would have to fall victim to the German hunger for territory, by force if necessary. According to the Führer, a military operation in Eastern Europe could also take place earlier than 1943, in the event that France were to be beset by serious domestic social tensions, or war were to break out in the Mediterranean between Britain and Italy. Von Neurath, von Blomberg and von Fritsch had mainly practical objections to these plans of Hitler’s. They did not yet dare risk a pan-European armed conflict. Power struggles, however, formed one of the key elements of the National Socialist ideology. The critics were therefore replaced within months. Hitler himself became commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, Wilhelm Keitel was appointed Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), von Neurath was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop and von Fritsch by Walther von Brauchitsch. They were not the only ones to be put on the sidelines. After November 1937, some sixty generals were sent into retirement and replaced by more docile figures, dedicated to National Socialism. Hitler had decided that Germany would go into battle, and he had no use for a critical military. The first victim of Hitler’s expansionist dynamism was to be Austria, the country where he was born on 20 April 1889 and which he had wanted to annex in 1934. In a meeting with the Austrian chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, on 4 February 1938, Hitler demanded that Nazis be included in the Austrian government. Von Schuschnigg, however, saw through the

The Saar area was governed by the League of Nations for 15 years from 1919. A referendum in 1935 showed that 90% of the population favoured a return to the German Reich, after which German troops entered the region.

“Peace for our time.” With this message, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich on 30 September 1938. His first declaration was made at Heston airfield.

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intentions of his aggressive neighbour and announced a referendum on 9 March, in which the Austrians would be asked whether they would favour an Anschluß. Two days later, Hitler demanded that the referendum be postponed and when von Schuschnigg refused, he ordered the invasion of Austria. The Western European powers only offered paper objections; Italy declared it had no objections to the Anschluß. Austria was “heim ins Reich”. After Austria, it was the turn of Czechoslovakia. Hitler wished to annex those areas where the so-called Sudeten Germans lived. As these areas were where the Czechoslovakian defences lay, such an operation would also give Germany considerable influence in that country. From the spring of 1938, an atmosphere of crisis continually surrounded the Sudeten question. Britain, too, feared that war might ensue, despite the fact that the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, referred to the Sudeten question as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”. The Franco-Czechoslovakian alliance treaty of 1924, however, rendered the situation potentially explosive. To what extent, then, were Britain and France willing and able to lend Czechoslovakia military support, and how would they react to a German attack in the west? British Prime Minister Chamberlain was an avowed opponent of military involvement in any conflict on the Continent. Priority was to be given to the defence of the motherland, as well as the protection of British interests in the Middle East and the preservation of the Empire. The Chiefs of Staff therefore urged Chamberlain to avoid conflict in Europe at any cost: “without overlooking the assistance which we would hope to obtain from France and possibly other allies, we cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our trade, territory and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time.”6 For the British government, there appeared to be only one policy worth pursuing, namely the appeasement of Hitler. France’s priority in the event of a European war was the defence of its territory, and by no means the interests of countries such as Czechoslovakia or Poland. In order to halt the Wehrmacht, France had constructed an extensive line of defences along its borders with Germany and Luxembourg and its eastern border with Belgium, the Maginot Line. The line stopped, however, at la Ferté-sur-Chiers, some 25 kilometres south-east of Sedan as the crow flies, because the French high command considered the Ardennes to be unsuitable for a surprise attack by heavy German mechanised units. Moreover, in the event of a German attack, the French army 6 Quoted in: Michael Howard, The continental commitment. The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (Harmondsworth, 1974) 120.

After the Munich conference, German troops entered Sudetenland unhindered.

The Germans’ entering Prague on 16 March 1939 convinced the British government that the appeasement policy with regard to Germany had failed. London provided Poland and Romania with a guarantee of security and began negotiations with the French government on the deployment of a British expeditionary force to the Continent.

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leadership intended to establish a defensive front on Belgian territory, west of the Ardennes. Meanwhile, Hitler had demanded that Czechoslovakia cede Sudetenland to Germany, under threat of military intervention. Precisely at that critical moment, Chamberlain decided to travel to Berchtesgaden in southern Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler on 15 September 1938. During these talks, the British Prime Minster said he did not object to annexation of Sudetenland by Hitler, as long as the latter gave the undertaking that there would be no military intervention by Germany. Initially, the German Führer appeared to agree with the British proposal, but on 22 September he announced that Czechoslovakia was to hand over Sudetenland to Germany no later than 1 October. If it did not comply, war would be the result. Europe appeared to be heading unavoidably towards armed conflict when Mussolini proposed holding a conference on the issues in Munich on 29 September. The Munich conference was attended by the leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Britain. The subject of the conference, Czechoslovakia, was not invited. At the conference, the two leaders from democratic Western Europe, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, agreed to Hitler’s demands. The despondent Czechoslovakians could do nothing except feel betrayed and accept the ‘Munich’ decisions. Back in London, however, Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome. He said he had achieved “peace with honour”. “I believe it is peace for our time”, he added. Almost everyone agreed. General Edmund Ironside, then Inspector-General of the Forces, wrote in his diary: Chamberlain is of course right. We have not the means of defending ourselves and he knows it... We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack. We simply commit suicide if we do.7

Chamberlain was later severely criticised for his appeasement policy, but in view of the many difficulties he faced, his actions were understandable. Britain faced a great number of problems. At home there was an economic crisis, severe unrest had erupted in Palestine and in British India a strong nationalist movement had emerged, making reform there unavoidable. In addition, Japan was threatening British possessions in South East Asia and Italy posed a threat to the sea route through the Suez Canal. 7 R. Macleod and D. Kelly, eds, The Ironside diaries (London, 1962) 62. On the position of the British army during the interwar period and directly prior to the fight in 1940, see: B. Bond, The army between the two world wars 1918-1939 and C. d’Este, The army and the challenge of war 1939-1945 in: D. Chandler and I. Beckett, eds, The Oxford illustrated history of the British army (Oxford and New York, 1994) 263-278 and 279-306.

Hitler enters Danzig triumphant on 19 September 1939.

After its ultimatum had remained unanswered, the British government declared war on the German Reich on 3 September 1939. The photograph shows the proclamation being read on the steps of the Royal Exchange.

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The British army would simply not be able to endure a large-scale European conflict on top of all that, and appeasement therefore seemed the only way forward. Win time and strengthen the defence was the motto. Time played an important role in Hitler’s considerations as well, however. He realised that his policy of conquest might provoke France and Britain into rearming. In addition, the risk of a general European conflict was increasing. Despite Germany’s advantage, like France and Britain it was not prepared for such a conflict. It was therefore a matter of quickly achieving a series of successes against smaller powers, but at the same time not jeopardising peace in Europe as a whole. This scheme failed. Britain’s compliant attitude changed when, on 16 March 1939, despite the Munich agreement, Hitler invaded unoccupied Czechoslovakia and divided it into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and an independent Slovakia. The Führer had definitely lifted his mask and the failure of the appeasement policy had become manifest. Chamberlain now guaranteed the two Eastern European states directly under German threat, Poland and Romania, that Britain would provide military assistance if their sovereignty were threatened. After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the French and British military leadership also held extensive talks to discuss strategic policy and London decided to send a British expeditionary force to the Continent. They were convinced that no German attack on the strong Maginot Line was to be expected and that a German advance through the Ardennes would take so long that there would be enough time for countermeasures. The Wehrmacht would therefore, as had been done in 1914, try to invade via the relatively weakly defended northern border of France. It was along this front, therefore, that the best French troops and the entire British expeditionary force would be stationed. In response to a German attack, the French and British troops would enter Belgium, which would have become an ally as a result of the German invasion. The German assault was to be halted by positions on Belgian territory and from there a counteroffensive would be launched towards the Rhineland and the Ruhr area. Without its arms industry, based in those areas, Germany would be unable to continue the war.8 As yet, however, the allied troops would not see action. Hitler was still looking eastwards. 8 For the main outline of the allied operational plans up to the commencement of hostilities, see: K.H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (München, 1995) 100110; R.A. Doughty, The breaking point. Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, 1990) 8-18; P. Taghon, Mei 1940. De achttiendaagse veldtocht in België (Tielt, 1989). �� For a highly detailed description, see B. Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000).


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The east was, after all, where the main areas lay which Germany had lost after the Treaty of Versailles: Danzig, the Polish Corridor and Silicia. Hitler assumed that invading Poland would not provoke a military response from the Western powers; after all, they had done nothing to save strategically important Czechoslovakia either. When Germany subsequently signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939, including a secret protocol dividing Poland between the two countries, Hitler appeared to have a free rein. He therefore decided to go on the warpath. After a staged ‘Polish’ attack on a German radio station in Gleiwitz, the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein in the port of Danzig opened fire on the Polish positions at a quarter to five on 1 September. At around the same time, heavy German units crossed the Polish-German border in various places. “This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our own territory”, roared Hitler in the Reichstag that very same day. “Since 5: 45 a.m. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met with bombs!”9 The German Führer had plunged his people, and with them the rest of Europe, into war. For six long years the world was to remain in the grasp of the many horrors that ensued. The Netherlands, too, was not to be spared the ravages of war.

Conclusion What, then, went wrong during the interwar period? First of all, the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles had not provided a definitive solution for the problems which had landed Europe in a large-scale military conflict in 1914. The European balance of power, which had been upset by the demographic, economic and military growth of Germany, had only been restored artificially; Germany’s potential remained intact. With its very strict conditions, the Treaty of Versailles had laid the basis for future frustrations and rendered the democratic government of the Weimar Republic suspicious in the eyes of conservative Germans. In the second place, the negative economic developments after 1914 had hit the social groups in Europe which should have formed the basis for stable social development the hardest. In both Italy and Germany, but in other countries as well, the middle classes became the victims of the high 9 “Speech by Herr Hitler to the Reichstag on September 1, 1939” in: The British War Blue Book. Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939). Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. Published online by The Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk106.asp

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inflation which came with the economic crises. Opportunistic politicians would use the discontent among these groups in order to gain power. Lastly, various developments in the interwar period, as well as the outcome of the First World War and the bad economic situation, allowed a number of radical right-wing movements to emerge. Once they came to power, they would pose the greatest threat to peace. The fascist and National Socialist ideologies were aggressive, aimed at conflict with a view to seizing power and to expansion. This was to cause international politics to lose all form of reason. It was up to the democracies of Europe to find an adequate response. This set them an enormous task. Not only had the international climate become grimmer, internally the governments of the European democracies were also experiencing problems. The self-confidence displayed by Germany and Italy and the way in which they tackled the economic crisis raised the question as to whether democracy was still the best and most effective form of government, and whether the future did not lie with more authoritarian political systems. This crisis in democracy was evident in the emergence of radical right-wing political parties, even outside Germany and Italy, and in the emergence of democratic reform movements. It was in the midst of all these uncertainties that the Netherlands had to find its way in the 1920s and 1930s. The Netherlands, which had managed to stay well away from European power politics for so long, was also to be confronted with the consequences of aggressive German expansion.

CHAPTER THREE

BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Introduction The defence policy pursued by the Netherlands in the 1920s and 1930s is still considered by many Dutch people to be one of the main reasons for the defeat in May 1940. After all, it is said, not only the poor level of training and the inadequate armament of the Netherlands armed forces were the cause of the defeat, but also, and especially, the policy of neutrality. The political and military leadership had not properly interpreted the signs of the times and therefore had failed to change course when there was still time. As a consequence, the country was unnecessarily poorly prepared when it began its trial of strength with the Third Reich. It is questionable, however, whether such reproaches do justice to the options that were open to the political and military leaders in the Netherlands. A correct assessment of the defence policy therefore first requires an outline of its backgrounds and of the circumstances which faced the leaders in question. This will particularly concern the connections, or lack thereof, between three elements: the policy of neutrality, the military-strategic policy and the availability of assets with which the armed forces were to perform their tasks.

The legacy of neutrality The policy of neutrality, which was brought to an end by the German invasion in 1940, had a history which went back an entire century. The basis was laid in the 1840s, when, after the secession of Belgium, the Netherlands resigned itself to its role as a smaller power. The general opinion was that the country’s security would be best served if the Netherlands involved itself as little as possible in the differences between and aspirations of the surrounding powers. In times of tension or outright conflict,

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Image from a staff exercise in the northern provinces, 15 June 1932.

this policy of non-involvement took the form of neutrality. As long as the Netherlands was not attacked, it would not side with any of the warring parties and would take great care not to give offence to any power whatsoever.�� Should �� the Netherlands be attacked nonetheless, then it would defend its sovereignty by force of arms, with the aggressor’s opponents automatically becoming allies. National defence was to have such a deterrent effect that foreign powers would think better of attacking. This was not the only basis for that deterrence, however. Political and military leaders assumed that the great European powers would not allow one another to conquer the Netherlands, as this would upset the balance of power.�� This �� meant that the Netherlands could always count on assistance from allies.�� Aggression against the Netherlands would almost certainly plunge a foreign power into an armed conflict with the entire alliance. This prospect, it was assumed, would act as a significant deterrent.

between hope and fear

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Dutch security policy, therefore, was based on two main concepts: it would benefit strongly from a stable balance of power in Europe, and the neutrality was an armed neutrality.�� These concepts together formed the political basis for the military strategy in 1940. The Dutch historian H.W. von der Dunk referred to this basis as ‘pseudoneutralism’, as there was a considerable paradox between the non-involvement and neutrality on the one hand, and on the other hand the firm conviction that military defeat would eventually be prevented by one of the great powers.1 The political and military debates on the precise nature and size of the armed forces that would suit this strategy have therefore always been faced with the problem that it was not possible to determine unequivocally what degree of defence effort was required and sufficient. All that was certain was that, as a small power surrounded by three great ones, Germany, France and Britain, the Netherlands would never be able to maintain a defence strong enough to defend itself alone against an invasion by one of those three countries.2 That, 1 For the Dutch strategic policy in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the early decades of the twentieth century, see: W. Bevaart, De Nederlandse defensie (18391874) (The Hague, 1993); W. Klinkert, Het vaderland verdedigd. Plannen en opvattingen omtrent de verdediging van Nederland 1874-1914 (The Hague, 1992); R.P.F. Bijkerk, “Nederlands defensiebeleid in de jaren ’20. Het bestaande beeld nader bezien”, Militaire Spectator, CLXIV (1995) 90-96; R.P.F. Bijkerk, “Actueel militair verleden?”, Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht, XVII (1995-december) 19-24; R.P.F. Bijkerk, “W.F. Pop (1858-1931)” in: G. Teitler and W. Klinkert, eds, Kopstukken uit de krijgsmacht. Nederlandse vlag- en opperofficieren 1815-1955 (Amsterdam, 1997) 282-299 and R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999), passim. For the designation of Dutch security policy as ‘pseudoneutralism’, see: H.W. von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie: het dilemma in de jaren dertig” in: G. Teitler, ed., Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30 (Dieren, 1984) 21. For the altered strategic situation of the Netherlands in the First World War and the contacts with the surrounding powers, see: T. van Gent, Het falen van de Nederlandse gewapende neutraliteit, september 1939-mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 2009). For the strategic planning within the General Staff, also see: H. Amersfoort, Een harmonisch leger voor Nederland.�� Oorlogsbeeld, �� strategie en operationele planning van het Nederlandse leger in het Interbellum (Breda, 2007). 2 The Netherlands was in a similar position to that of neighbouring Belgium, as was noted by other countries. Even before the First World War, the great French teacher and military thinker Ferdinand Foch wrote in his authoritative Des principes de la guerre (which was first published in 1903): “The situation of Belgium is known to you: a neutrality guaranteed by Europe, which is perhaps nothing more than a word, but has, in any case, hitherto guaranteed the existence of that little State; further, the immediate neighbourhood of two great Powers, Germany and France, from neither of which does any serious military obstacle separate that State, by either of which it might be easily conquered if the other neighbour, or Europe as a whole, did not intervene in the struggle. [For the Belgian Army, it would be a matter of developing a specific theory of war which] would have a welldetermined object, namely that of delaying as much as possible the advance of the invading neighbour. The study would then consist in finding out how the Belgian Army can perform such a part, by avoiding the decision by arms and adjourning the judgment of battle.” See: Marshal Foch, The Principles of War (London, 1921) 22-23.

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however, was a negative point of departure. There was no positive point of departure on which military planning could have been based. On the one hand, the armed forces had to be strong enough to form a deterrent. On the other hand, in view of the expected allied support, they were not required to be able to defend the country entirely by themselves. Should the deterrence fail, then the Dutch armed forces only had to be able to safeguard national sovereignty and part of Dutch territory long enough to give the allies time to come to their assistance. The objective of the military strategy was derived from the same principle. It was realistic, but hardly ambitious: gaining time. To achieve that objective, the Netherlands relied heavily on fortifications and defence lines.�� The �� 1874 Fortifications Act concentrated the defence, even more so than before, on the area bordered by the coast, the Amsterdam area, the New Dutch Waterline and a southern front along the major rivers.�� This �� area, which was soon to be known as Fortress Holland, provided good opportunities for a sustained defence and made an enemy invasion an unattractive prospect. As early as the 1840s, however, there were also those who said that part of the army should be kept mobile, rather than being tied to prepared positions and lines. King William II (1840-49) in particular was an advocate of this point of view. These troops, of which some were preferably to be activated in peacetime, would be able to operate as a forward defence in the free space outside the lines, particularly in the Achterhoek and Noord-Brabant.�� In �� the nineteenth century, these plans were never implemented, but troops were earmarked to delay the enemy advance in the area between the border and the major defence lines, by means of demolition and harassment operations, allowing the mobilisation in the rear area to continue undisturbed. If they were to get into difficulties, they could then retreat behind friendly lines. Military developments abroad and a changing threat perception opened new prospects for the mobile troops. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the great powers began to attach greater importance to mobile warfare in their doctrines.�� Future armed conflicts would no longer be centred on fortresses, but move into the open field. From now on, warfare meant manoeuvring with armies and forcing quick conclusions by means of large-scale battles.�� In this doctrine, which was embraced particularly in Germany and France, the offensive operation developed into the ideal of the art of warfare. For the Dutch strategists, this military trend represented both a threat and a challenge. The threat lay in what was generally referred to as the ‘strategic raid’. This would mean that a neighbouring power, without the


39

slightest warning or a declaration of war, would, as it were, overrun the country directly from the barracks, and occupy it, before the Dutch army had had the chance to mobilise. As has already been mentioned, it was one of the tasks of the mobile troops to avert this danger.�� The �� opportunities lay in following the example of the great powers. From the turn of the century, the General Staff had ceased to regard one of the surrounding powers attempting to conquer the entire country as a possibility. Instead, there was the fear that Germany, France or Britain would make use of Dutch territory for their operations in the event of a large-scale conflict. This could be in Limburg, Noord-Brabant or possibly Zeeland. The staunch defence of Fortress Holland would no longer suffice against this threat. If the Netherlands was to be able to act in response to such gross violations of its territory, far from Fortress Holland, it would need to have powerful, mobile troops at its disposal. At the end of the nineteenth century, the term ‘field army’ began to appear increasingly in the debates on the tasks of the Dutch army. Supporters of the idea were of the opinion that the army organisation should have a permanent place for a strong force which was suitable for mounting a mobile defence outside Fortress Holland. This field army would have to be so well trained and equipped that it would be able to strike across long distances from a centrally located concentration area, and be able to switch from one theatre of operations to another, depending on the movements of the enemy. In this view, conscription legislation would have to be reviewed so that the conscripts were on active service long enough to be trained in the difficult mobile warfare.�� All �� these measures were to harmonise the army organisation, the conscription system and the contributions of the fortifications system and the field army to the national defence. The advocates of the field army partly had their way at the beginning of the twentieth century.�� This was possible because in the 1898-1913 period, the lengthy stalemate in the modernisation of the army organisation and the army formation system, which was still based on the 1861 Militia Act, was broken. Various ministers of war contributed, but it was Hendrikus Colijn who eventually gave shape to the system in 1911-1913. Personal conscription was introduced in 1898, and the annual contingent was increased from 17,500 men to 23,000. The duration of the conscription was five years, but in the infantry, which was the main arm, the initial term of service was shortened from twelve months to eight-and-ahalf. The schutterijen, municipal militias, were no longer of any value to modern combat and were therefore disbanded and replaced by the home guard. Every year, the senior draft of the militia was transferred to the

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home guard (landweer) and after another five years to the home reserve (landstorm). The home reserve comprised all ex-militiamen and ex-home guard conscripts, as well as all those who were exempted from the militia. There were more conscripts available each year than the 23,000 who were called up on active service. Due to these measures, the Netherlands now had a trained and mobilisable army (the activated, most recent draft of the militia plus the militia and home guard drafts which could be called up) of around 207,000 men. In the shape of the home reserve, there was a 160,000-strong, albeit only partially trained, army reserve, to replace combat losses and for rotation purposes. The home reserve also meant that the Netherlands now not only had personal conscription, but general conscription as well. There were sufficient numbers of trained soldiers to be able to make a distinction, even in peacetime, between fortification troops and units for the field army, so that the peacetime and war establishments were better aligned. In 1905, a fourth division was added to the field army. Almost half of the mobilisable strength was now earmarked for the field army. The command structure was improved with the introduction of the brigade level: three brigades per division, each with three regiments. The same was achieved with the establishment of a permanent field army headquarters in 1907, which also operated in peacetime. All staffs from brigade level upwards were now already in place in peacetime, so that this aspect of the transition from peace to war would run more smoothly as well. The operational possibilities of the field army were assessed from 1910, during strategic map exercises at the General Staff. The following year, the first of a series of field exercises took place, with entire divisions taking part simultaneously and simulating mobile warfare to the best possible degree. Many people were of the opinion that the favourable course of the First World War for the Netherlands was proof that the decisions made in the preceding years had been correct. It was said that the expansion of the armed forces, the improvements in the organisation and especially the manoeuvre capability of the field army, which had been concentrated south of the major rivers in 1914-1918, together had formed a deterrent which had saved the Netherlands from the carnage.3 These opinions were based on the pre-war improvements in the army and testified to a welldeveloped national self-confidence. On the other hand, they obscured the fact that the great powers, particularly the German Empire, had respected Dutch neutrality for reasons of self-interest. 3 Cf. H.P. van Tuyll van Serooskerken, The Netherlands and World War I. Espionage, diplomacy and survival (Leiden, 2001).


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After the First World War The Netherlands had not been involved in the First World War, but the sense of relief in that respect soon gave way to discord and a feeling of disorientation. The reason for this was the fact that the end of the Great War had shaken Dutch security policy to its very foundations: the balance of power in Europe had been upset drastically and the options for a credible policy of armed neutrality had decreased considerably. The Treaty of Versailles ruled out Germany as a great power, while the British cabinet, so soon after the bloody battle in northern France, was extremely hesitant towards subsequent continental commitment. In this situation, France had a free rein to subdue Germany with power politics and to dominate the continent. Minister of Foreign Affairs Herman van Karnebeek, and with him the mainstream of Dutch politics, understood that the Netherlands had lost its role as baron de balance for the time being. In the 1920s, therefore, they considered it necessary and inevitable that Germany would eventually resume it natural place as a great power. The means to that end was a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles. As a small, non-involved power, however, the Netherlands had little opportunity to effect this independently, and would have to wait and see whether London, which had the same goal in mind, was successful. When from 1933 onwards, Germany began, less and less peacefully, to rid itself of the restrictions of Versailles, the successive Colijn governments hoped that Germany, after it had settled its grievances, would decide not to go to war and return to being a normal power in a restored balance of power. Meanwhile, the armed forces could be reinforced, to support the policy of armed neutrality. Colijn personally was worried in particular about the Japanese aspirations in the Far East. In the 1920s and 1930s, he was one of the key politicians in the Netherlands.�� A member of one of the Protestant political parties, he led five governments and held various ministerial posts. Prior to his political career, from 1892 to 1909 he fought in Aceh as an officer in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, receiving the highest honour for bravery, the Military Order of William. From 1914 to 1922 he was a member of the board of directors of the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, the oil company developing the large oilfields in Sumatra. This background explains why, as a politician, Colijn continued to have a specific interest in the Netherlands East Indies. The sometimes open but usually tacit orientation towards the British continental policy of a balance of power in the 1920s and appeasement in the 1930s was the contin-

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uation of a nineteenth-century trend, and tied in well with the common interests in the Far East.4 The League of Nations could offer no alternative. The cabinet did not believe that the establishment of the League had changed the principle that international relations were all about power struggles.�� Collective security, arbitration and international law would only have any significance after a stable balance of power had been restored.�� Moreover, �� collective security, which meant that all members of the League of Nations would act as one against any country which disturbed world peace, was at odds with the policy of neutrality. The Hague therefore had great doubts regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which governed the composition of an armed force that would bring any aggressor into line on behalf of the League of Nations, as well as the right of League of Nations troops to passage through other members’ territory, and the imposing of economic and financial sanctions.5 From 1934, the Netherlands stated several times, with increasing emphasis, that it would decide on a case-by-case basis whether it would participate in certain sanctions.�� A �� final argument against the League of Nations was that the countries which had emerged victorious from the First World War, and France especially, dominated the organisation. The fact that the Netherlands nonetheless joined the League of Nations in 1920 stemmed from the fear that it would otherwise end up being isolated in the international community.�� In �� addition, people had not yet recovered from the shock of the First World War. Any means which could contribute to the prevention of a repeat of such an orgy of military violence and international anarchy was welcome. In that respect, the League of Nations appealed to the imaginations of many and represented hope for a better future, a future of “a peaceful world order, based on principles such as respect for international law, the scaling down of armaments, peaceful resolution of disputes and economic cooperation.”6 The task facing the cabinets of the 1920s and 1930s was not an easy one. The government’s financial position had deteriorated as a result of the war.�� The �� underlying factor was the high defence expenditure as a result of mobilisation and the various crisis measures that had been necessary to save the country from major disruption. The anticipated post-war recovery failed to materialise. From 1920 to 1927, the Dutch economy was 4 H. Langeveld, Schipper naast God. Hendrikus Colijn 1869-1944. Deel Twee 1933-1944 (Amsterdam, 2004) 339-381, 479-487. 5 G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd. Van Oslostaten tot Benelux, 1930-1940 (Amsterdam and Brussels, 1985) 58. 6 Van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede, 287.

In February 1936, more money was made available for defence, when Parliament approved the establishment of the Defence Fund. Cartoon by L.J. Jordaan in the Groene Amsterdammer of 22 February 1936.

Consultations in Hotel Wientjes in Zwolle during manoeuvres which took place in Gelderland and Overijssel from 20 to 24 September 1937. Second from the left is the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General baron van Voorst tot Voorst. Opposite him, leaning forward, is Captain V.E. Nierstrasz and on the far right is Lieutenant A.H.J.L. Fiévez.

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in recession, not least as a result of the collapse of the German market, which was so important to the Netherlands. This was precisely at a time when the equal treatment of private and state schools and the expansion of social legislation were leading to extra expenditure.�� These circumstances forced the centre-right coalition parties to cut back on other parts of the state budget.�� These cutbacks particularly hit national defence.�� After all, the favourable international situation appeared to allow room for these cutbacks. In the 1920s there was no threat of war. After Hitler gained power in 1933, and thunderclouds gathered over the international skies, however, the Netherlands began to grow concerned. In her speech at the official opening of Parliament in 1934, Queen Wilhelmina said: It must be concluded, with grave concern for the future of mankind, that almost everywhere the tendency towards strong armament has been revived. The Government will do whatever lies in its power to contribute to putting a curb on that tendency.�� It is, however, also obliged to take this phenomenon into account in the implementation of its plans with regard to national defence.7

It was to be some years, however, before this concern manifested itself in defence policy. The worldwide economic crisis which began in 1929, and the financial and economic policy pursued by Colijn, stood in the way of an increase in defence expenditure for some years. By now, a change began to occur among the supporters of unilateral disarmament as well. After 1918, the Liberal Democratic Union (VDB) and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP), two parties which did not bear the responsibility of government, had proved staunch supporters of increasingly drastic cutbacks on defence and these parties had adopted the emblem of the ‘broken rifle’.�� In 1936, under pressure from the developments in Europe, the VDB officially abandoned its pro-disarmament position. The SDAP followed suit a year later, with leaders such as Koos Vorrink, who was a captain in the Amsterdam civic guard in 1940, and H.B. Wiardi Beckman, who was a reserve lieutenant at General Headquarters, giving voice to the changing opinions.

The cupboard is bare—from 1922 to 1933 The other foundation of security policy, that of armed neutrality, also became considerably less firm in the 1920s and 1930s. After the First World 7 E. van Raalte, ed., Troonredes, openingsredes, inhuldigingsredes 1814-1963 (The Hague, 1964) 249-250.


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War, the Netherlands was faced with the task of ensuring that its army kept abreast of the military developments of the great powers. Warfare had undergone a great many changes during the Great War, as well as a huge increase in scale.�� These �� new developments, such as the tactical consequences of the use of machine guns, infantry field guns, heavy field artillery, poison gases, aircraft and the tank, had largely passed the Netherlands by. It was not immediately evident how these developments would fit into the limited Dutch framework. Nor was it easy to make decisions in this respect with regard to army strength and organisation.The challenge was to design an army system which was less expensive in peacetime than that of before 1914, and as a result of which the burden of conscription on the population was as light as possible. Nonetheless, in wartime the system would have to produce an army which followed the trend of scale increase in warfare. It was with this basis that the Ruys de Beerenbrouck government, which took office on 9 September 1918, went to work. The army plan drawn up by the Minister of War, G.A.A. Alting von Geusau, changed hardly a single aspect of Colijn’s pre-war system.�� His only concession was to shorten the duration of the initial term of service for conscripts. Alting von Geusau considered this to be justifiable because as yet there was no significant war threat. In addition, due to the fact that the home reserve had been called up during the mobilisation of 1914-1918, the Netherlands now had 450,000 trained soldiers. Parliament, however, was not satisfied and demanded more cutbacks. Alting von Geusau chose the honourable option and resigned in early January 1920. His successor, W.F. Pop, knew how difficult his task was going to be. He had been acting Commander-in-Chief since 11 November 1918 and Chief of the General Staff since 15 November 1919, and in those capacities he had participated in the civil-service consultations on army reform and had been involved in the extensive discussions with senior civil servants, the rest of the army leadership and the government parliamentary parties after Alting von Geusau’s resignation. These consultations had begun with an internal memorandum, which Member of Parliament and former Minister of War H. Colijn had written at the request of C.J.M. Ruys de Beerenbrouck, the Prime Minister. In the spring of 1921, Pop presented his Bill for a new Militia Act. He maintained the contingent of 23,000 men. Of that number, 15,000 were intended for the main arm, the infantry, and they could be considered fully trained after six months. They were to form the core of the army. The remaining 8,000 would only be partially trained and those who had done voluntary training prior to callup would spend even less time in the barracks, if any at all. Pop wanted

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to form a field army from the most recent draft of fully trained soldiers, to comprise 36 infantry battalions, half of the pre-war field army number. This reduction was compensated by doubling the strength of the artillery: two regiments of field artillery instead of one for each of the four divisions of the field army. Pop’s opting for a small, and therefore affordable, yet well-equipped army was partly in accordance with the conclusions which the French army had drawn from the First World War. In the French opinion, in the next war the artillery would be the second main arm, cooperating with the infantry.�� Overwhelming �� firepower would decide the battle “by wearing down the opponent”. The French 1921 combat manual referred to firepower, rather than manoeuvre, as “the main element of combat” and defined the attack as “the fire that advances” and the defence as “the fire that stops”. Only behind walls of fire would the infantry be able to move across the battlefield.�� Pop was unable, however, to follow another generally accepted conclusion from 1914-1918, namely that the next war would be all about massiveness and stamina. Parliament’s desire to cut back on defence and to have the burden of conscription be as light as possible prevented it. Pop’s solution of a small moderately trained field army, with a large reserve still to be trained, did not tie in with the view that a small power should have considerable military capability in the early stages of a conflict in order to have any chance of success against the armed forces of a great power. Large reserves would be of no significance if the armed forces were destroyed in the first battle. When he realised in July 1921 that his proposal stood no chance in Parliament, and it became clear that the cabinet did not want to resign over the matter, Pop resigned. His successor, J.J.C. van Dijk, had to find another way out of the same paradox of requirements as his predecessors had been faced with.�� Unlike his predecessors, Van Dijk was to succeed in designing an army system which was politically acceptable and also met the minimum requirements on the military side. Van Dijk let go of Pop’s distinction between the core army and the largely untrained reserve. He reverted to the pre-war large ‘single army’, but that meant he could not avoid making greater concessions with regard to the size of the contingent, the duration of the initial term of service and a more limited strengthening of the artillery. It was with this army system, based on Van Dijk’s law of 4 February 1922 “comprising a new regulation of conscription”, that the Netherlands would enter into the confrontation with the German Wehrmacht in 1940.


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The 1922 law allowed a mobilisable army of around 250,000 men to be formed. This would bring the field army back to its pre-war strength of 72 infantry battalions. Due to a later amendment to the law, the total army strength was increased, comprising at least 280,000 men in May 1940.8 This strength was built up out of a large number of relatively small annual drafts, namely fifteen drafts to fill the war establishment, with another five drafts from the oldest trained drafts to form a reserve. Van Dijk achieved this by disbanding the home guard and the home reserve and merging them with the militia. A maximum of 19,500 conscripts would be called up for active service each year.�� The �� advantage was that the burden of conscription on the population was kept to a minimum, because many young men did not need to be called up and therefore were declared extraordinary conscripts. Moreover, a relatively small draft was less expensive than a large one, as it required fewer instructors and a smaller infrastructure. There were, nonetheless, a number of objections to this system. Many men were not called up for national service, resulting in a certain social inequality. In addition, it would become apparent that in 1939 a great many husbands and fathers were mobilised, but many unmarried young men escaped mobilisation. Purely from a military point of view, it would have been better to opt for a smaller number of larger annual drafts. The advantages would have been the fact that the army which was mobilised would have been “younger” and therefore more flexible, and that a larger part of the population would have been familiar with the military organisation.�� In the circumstances of the 1920s, however, the possibility to reduce “the personal and financial burden of military service” was decisive.9 Attempts were made, however, to remove the objections by, if possible, concentrating the older drafts of conscripts in certain corps which were not intended for the front line, the so-called high-numbered regiments. The law also prescribed the duration of the initial term of service. Since 1901, it had been twelve months for some conscripts and eight-and-a-half for others. The Covenant of the League of Nations determined that if two countries wished to settle a dispute by force of arms, they would have to wait for a period of three months after an arbitral decision before opening hostilities. Van Dijk saw this as an argument in favour of shortening the initial term of service by three months.10 For a number of arms and 8 A.J. Groustra and P.W. Oesterhoff, De dienstplichtwet voorzien van aanteekeningen (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1922) 31 and F. Snapper, “Enige sterktecijfers betreffende de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1840-1940”, Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, IV (1981) 91. 9 Queen’s Speech of 21 September 1920, in: Van Raalte, Troonredes, 227. 10 �� J.J. �� de Wolf, Mars in Cathedra 1865-1965 (The Hague, 1965) 67.

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branches, including the infantry, it was reduced to just five-and-a-half months. The conscripted officers and NCOs, the mounted artillery and cavalry, and certain categories of soldiers with specialist jobs served longer, up to a maximum of eighteen months. Incidentally, it was possible to shorten the initial term of service by four months by means of the ‘preliminary exercise’, that is for the soldiers who were assigned to an arm or corps to which this rule applied. This preliminary exercise took place on a voluntary basis, in the soldiers’ own free time, in order to alleviate the burden of conscription and to save money. The preliminary exercise proved not to work well as part of the training system, however, and the costs turned out to be higher than expected as well.�� It was therefore discontinued in 1936. The short duration of the initial term of service was a concession to the wishes of society. Military experts thought it was too short, but as long as the time was put to good use, in their opinion it would still be possible to teach the conscripts elementary military skills. To that end, they were to spend the first and last six weeks of their initial term of service at camps in Ede and Nieuw-Milligen for intensive training in the field. In practice, however, this did not materialise. As regards the refresher training exercises, the law stated that their maximum duration was to be 40 days, generally divided over two periods, and that they were to take place within six years of the year of the initial term of service.�� That meant that there were no more refresher training exercises after the sixth year. The level of training of the older drafts dropped considerably. When various refresher training exercises were shortened, or even cancelled completely, as a result of cutbacks, it meant yet another weakening of the level of training. The 1922 Conscription Act separated the peacetime establishment from the wartime establishment. Unlike the situation before 1914, when mobilisation meant bringing the standing units up to war strength, those units would now be formed from scratch in the event of mobilisation. A major disadvantage was that they would be lacking in cohesion, which had an adverse effect on the combat power. As the army consisted entirely of training units in peacetime, there were no combat-ready troops present. The system also made it very difficult to exercise with large units. The result of all this was a shortage of experienced commanders in the wartime army, which was to become clearly apparent in 1940. From 1922 onwards, another reorganisation was undertaken. Various measures were taken to improve the flexibility of the army and its command and control.�� For �� instance, Fortress Holland Command was es-

Prince Bernhard inspecting the First Armoured Vehicle Squadron in 1936. The squadron was equipped with the Landsverk M-36 armoured vehicle.

The car workshop of the engineers, 1939.

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tablished in 1922. In addition, the Field Army now comprised four division groups (called corps from 1 July 1939) of two divisions each, while the manoeuvre element of the Field Army was increased in 1924 with the establishment of the Light Brigade. Attempts were also made to improve the armament. For instance, in 1922, Van Dijk launched a proposal for an Armament Fund. The fund, which was to contain some 105 million guilders, eventually did not materialise, however.�� Subsequently, the decision was made to spend 60 million guilders in the 1925-1931 period on improvements to the army, but this did not happen either. In those years, there was only one-and-a-half million guilders available every year for armament. Nonetheless, the Ministry managed to order 10-Veld field guns in 1927. The M20 light machine-gun and the Stokes-Brandt mortar were also introduced. The limited financial resources exacted a great deal of the army’s ability to improvise. For instance, the 8-Staal guns, which had been deemed outdated and allocated to the gun reserve, were upgraded in 1927. A year earlier, the 7-Veld field guns had been modified. Further proposals by the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General P.J.H. van der Palm, for additions to the armament and equipment were rejected in 1927. In 1928, the 1922 Conscription Act was amended, separating the conscription from the draft year. That meant that the conscripted officers and NCOs could be called up before the rank and file. This did not change the number of men available for conscription, however. The 1922 law had made its mark on the developments, because it had established the numerical strength and the peacetime and wartime establishments. In this context, Lieutenant General H.A. Seyffardt, who had succeeded Van der Palm as Chief of the General Staff in May 1929, remarked: In 1922, the wartime organisations were established on the basis of the most recently quoted strength. At the time, however, it was not possible to take into account all factors to which modern wartime organisations must conform. In addition, in later years new organisations were established, the personnel requirements of which could not have been taken into account in 1922. Various staffs had to be expanded, the anti-aircraft artillery, the searchlight battalions for the air defence and the motorcycle service in particular set higher personnel requirements than had initially been expected; new machine-gun organisations were established and existing ones were expanded; the organisation for the division group artillery, the infantry guns, the pioneer and pontoon battalion of the Light Brigade, and the company of the transportation corps etc. were established.11 11 �� Report �� of the Chief of the General Staff, 14 May 1930, in: Archief van het Kabinet der Koningin, The Hague, Litt. Z.G., no. 42.


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In the 1920s the Netherlands endeavoured, with the measures referred to by Seyffardt, to maintain an army which would remain a modest reflection of the armies of the great powers, on a scale befitting a small power. The problem was that this had to be done within the confines of the available budget, more specifically within the scope of the 1922 Conscription Act, which fixed the strength of the army at a maximum of 250,000 men. The result was that the continuing modernisation of the army systematically came at the cost of the traditional combat power, namely that of the infantry. The army that resulted from the 1922 army system was supposed to carry out the operation plans of the General Staff. In view of the policy of neutrality, that staff had to take a various number of war scenarios into account. A detailed defence plan was prepared for each of those scenarios. The Field Army would take up a certain position, referred to as a concentration, depending on the situation. In 1925, five such concentrations had been prepared:12 a. a concentration near the Wilhelmina Canal, in the event of a conflict with a power to the south; b. a concentration in eastern Noord-Brabant, in order to take action against a passage through southern Limburg; c. a concentration at the river IJssel, in the event of a conflict with an eastern neighbour; d. a concentration behind the New Dutch Waterline; e. a concentration on the coast and in Zeeland. From 1928, the staff gave these various concentration plans for the Field Army colours, with Concentration Blue applying to an attack by Germany, scenario c. Despite the disarmament of Germany, in the 1920s the General Staff continued to bear in mind the possibility that the Netherlands could be defeated quickly, if its eastern neighbour were to acquire a strong army again. After all, the Netherlands had no combat-ready troops at its disposal. In order to solve this problem (referred to as a ‘strategic raid’), the Conscription Act included a stipulation that in the event of heightened tension, certain categories of conscripts would be called up, to safeguard the general mobilisation. From 1926, this was referred to as ‘strategic precautions’. 12 �� C.M. Schulten, “Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap; de mobilisaties in 1870, 1914 en 1939” in: C.A. Kuyt, ed., Nederland mobiliseert (The Hague, 1985).

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In 1931, the Welter Commission was established, which was tasked with making proposals for decreases in government expenditure, in view of the poor economic situation. Contrary to what was assumed later, the sole purpose of the commission was not to cut back on defence expenditure. Its establishment was, in fact, a turning point in the long series of cutbacks in the defence budget. The commission’s report showed that, with the existing organisation, there were scarcely any possibilities left to reduce the national defence. The only significant cutback for defence was on the salaries, which applied to all government employees.�� Other �� ministries, such as Education, Water Management, and Labour, Trade & Industry had to endure further reductions. It is often thought that the state of the army during a large part of the interwar period was the result of the position held by the left-wing parties, whose watchword was “Not a single man and not a single cent for militarism”. This was only partly true. The social-democrats (SDAP) and the progressive liberals (VDB) did not govern for the greater part of those years. The Christian-democrats, who held a key position in politics and formed the successive cabinets, always supported the cutbacks on defence. The cabinet held the view that expenditure for the army could be limited to the bare necessities, as long as the Netherlands’ neutrality and sovereignty were not compromised.13 It must be noted, however, that there were no signs of increased tension in international relations at the time.

Turning point In 1933, the Netherlands was still in a depression.�� The country was suffering under the poor economic climate and a high unemployment rate. In military circles, the realisation grew that the formation and organisation of the army, developed in 1922, had not led to the desired result due to the cutbacks. In September 1933, the cabinet established a commission which was to design an organisation for the army both in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands East Indies, which would save 20 to 30 million guilders in defence expenditure. This commission, chaired by A.W.F. Idenburg, considered reductions in the wartime establishment to be unjustifiable, however, and only saw possibilities for saving money on the peacetime establishment. Not until the autumn of 1935 were these proposals for the 13 �� For the viewpoints of the political parties, see: J.A.M.M. Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum” in: G. Teitler, ed., Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30 (Dieren, 1984) 42-62.

Exercise with searchlights at the Kromhout Barracks in Utrecht, 16 April 1939.

Queen Wilhelmina visiting units of the First Corps in Haarlem on 4 April 1940.

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peacetime organisation adopted.�� They �� included the introduction of a system in which NCOs became civil servants after a number of years,14 and the discontinuation of the preliminary exercise. In the meantime, a number of events had taken place which had increased international tensions considerably. They were the failure of the disarmament conferences in 1932 and 1933, and the rise of Hitler’s Germany. Major General I.H. Reijnders, who had succeeded Seyffardt as Chief of the General Staff in 1934, was therefore tasked by the Minister of Defence in early 1935 with making proposals for the improvement of the defence. In February 1935, Reijnders submitted a memorandum which packed quite a punch.�� It was based on a long-term study by the General Staff of the latest developments in strategy and demonstrated an acute insight into the consequences of modern warfare for the Netherlands.15 Reijnders began with the assertion that Germany’s military power had grown exceptionally since the country had left the League of Nations, reintroduced conscription and freed itself from the other stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. He drew the conclusion that a European war would in time “have to be considered as a very realistic possibility”. Reijnders also remarked that, in the event of a German offensive against France, Dutch territory, unlike in 1914, would probably be violated, as a result of the increase in scale which warfare had since undergone.16 In order to increase combat power, Reijnders advocated an increase in the annual contingent of conscripts, an increase in the level of training and an improvement of the materiel and equipment. In November 1935, the cabinet, led by Prime Minister H. Colijn, decided to introduce a bill for the establishment of “the fund to improve the materiel and equipment of the army and of the navy insofar as it concerned the coastal defence of the Netherlands”.17 The bill was passed on 18 February 1936. In total, this Defence Fund amounted to 53.4 million guilders, 31 million of which was 14 �� This �� system was the regulation by law of the transfer of (career) NCOs to civil service jobs.�� Conscript NCOs in the rank of sergeant, who had served six years on actual service, were entitled to an appointment as a career NCO or a civil servant in a certain number of jobs. Other categories were marines, corporals of the police troops, marechaussees and soldiers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. See: J. Vennik, Het capitulantenreglement 1935. Toegelicht en van aanteekeningen voorzien (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1935). 15 �� The �� claim by L. de Jong that the pre-war military leadership should be blamed for a lack of vision can therefore be refuted. See: L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1. Voorspel (The Hague, 1969) 636-637; and: G. Teitler, “De krijgsmacht als Cassandra” in: Teitler, Tussen crisis en oorlog, 70-87. 16 �� I.H. �� Reijnders, “Paraatheid Ned.�� Weermacht”, �� February 1935, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DC-NIHM), Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Nederland 1922-1938, box 405, file 1. 17 �Keesings Historisch Archief 1935, 2060.


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for the army.�� The �� main points that required urgent attention were anti-aircraft assets, aircraft, infantry guns and munitions. Effecting the planned materiel investments would take a considerable amount of time.�� Immediately significant were the improved measures against a strategic raid from the east.�� In 1935 and 1936, at Reijnders’ proposal, casemates with permanent surveillance were built near the main bridges over the IJssel, the Maas-Waal Canal and the Maas, vastly increasing the defensive capability of these water obstacles. Personnel of the Corps of Police Troops manned the casemates. The Defence Fund in fact formed a beginning for the improvements to the Dutch army. These plans, which also received support from the VDB and the SDAP, which until then had been strongly opposed to armament, included the establishment of permanently active territorial commanders, the expansion of the refresher exercises and an amendment to the Conscription Act in 1938. The annual contingent of 19,500 men was increased to 32,000 and the initial term of service was increased from five-and-half to eleven months. The latter measure meant that the armed forces had combat-ready troops at their disposal, as the infantry conscripts received their training with the first battalion of the regiment and then served for six months with the second battalion, which was given combat-ready status from then on.�� In �� addition, the size of the army increased with the arrival of larger drafts. The downside was that the problems with the initial term of service and the command in wartime were growing, as the professional officers and NCOs, small as their numbers were, had to be divided over a greater number of troops. The army leadership compensated for this somewhat by allowing reserve officers to become professional servicemen. As early as 1937, General Reijnders set out in an urgency programme what needed to be procured: artillery, anti-aircraft guns, antitank guns, aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles.18 The procurement of the materiel met with obstacles, which led to delays in the introduction. The arms race had now taken on a more general nature, and the demand for arms was therefore great.�� As �� the Netherlands was a trend follower and did not begin rearming until a later stage, and had no major weapons industry of its own, the shortage on the international arms market formed a major obstacle. The problems increased when Germany later prohibited arms exports. The air defence, which was part of the army, was vastly improved in 1938 with the establishment of the Air Defence Command, commanded 18 �� I.H. Reijnders, “Urgentieprogramma”, 4 February 1937, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II. Nederland 1922-1938, box 405, file 15.

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by the competent Major General P.W. Best. The aviation brigade, the antiaircraft artillery and the searchlights, the aircraft warning service and the commands of the air-defence sectors were brought together in a single organisation.�� It �� was well organised, but its combat power left much to be desired.�� Despite the fact that the importance of good air defence was recognised, the air fleet was not very large in 1940: 125 aircraft, 60 of which were obsolete. There were also insufficient numbers of anti-aircraft guns. The Royal Netherlands Navy played a modest role in the defence of the Netherlands. After all, its main task was in the Netherlands East Indies. During the interwar period, the main issues were the 1923 Fleet Act and the 1938 Battle Cruiser Plan. These, however, were fleet plans which were mainly of interest to the overseas empire. In the Netherlands, the navy’s tasks included securing minefields and reconnaissance with regard to enemy landing fleets. Maintaining neutrality in the Dutch coastal waters was also part of its task. The actual defence of the motherland was in the hands of the army, where the following command structure existed before the mobilisation: the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Field Army both came directly under the authority of the Minister of Defence, as did the Chief of the Navy Staff. The army was therefore led by two authorities, on an equal level.�� This meant that there was a risk of disputes over competency and disagreement on the manner in which the country should be defended. The latter problem would become more acute in the second half of the 1930s, as a result of the German threat. In the second half of the 1930s, willingness was growing among the Dutch population and the politicians to establish a more powerful defence. Improvement measures were therefore taken, but they generally did not have sufficient effect. The main problem was the fact that in the design of the 1922 system, and particularly in the hollowing out that occurred later, there was insufficient room to quickly turn the peacetime army into a powerful wartime force if the international situation demanded it. This would have required a larger number of professional officers and NCOs, a considerable pool of well-trained reserve personnel and a substantial materiel reserve.

Rising tensions In early September 1938, tensions in Europe were rising so fast that in the Netherlands, too, military preparatory measures were unavoidable, but the cabinet and Parliament had already taken the necessary steps much ear-

Prince Bernhard receiving a briefing during manoeuvres in the Peel area on 9 October 1939. Opposite him, wearing a flat cap, is Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, Inspector of the Cavalry and Commander of the Light Division.

Exercise with a smoke screen in front of a Carden Loyd tracked armoured vehicle. Five of these vehicles were purchased in the early 1930s, to counter ‘serious disturbances’. They were assigned to the Mobile Artillery Corps.

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lier. This need not come as a surprise. As has been discussed earlier, Dutch security policy was based on maintaining strict neutrality and non-involvement, whilst at the same time assuming that in the event of an enemy attack, the country would be able to count on allied support. On the one hand, this policy was self-contradictory, on the other hand clever use was being made of the European balance of power for the Netherlands’ own security. During the 1914-1918 mobilisation, it had proved to be a useful point of departure for military-political policy. Thanks to skilful political and diplomatic play, always supported by military measures, and always making good use of the assumed German and British reluctance to open up a new front in the Netherlands, the Dutch government had managed to maintain neutrality until the end of the war, albeit with difficulty at times. In the second half of the 1930s, it became increasingly clear that Europe was heading for a new war between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other hand. The Dutch government was to maintain formal neutrality until 10 May 1940. The difference compared with the period before and during the First World War was that this time it would also actively seek certain guarantees from France and Britain before the outbreak of war regarding military support in the event of a German attack. These attempts, obviously, took place in secret so as not to jeopardise the official policy of neutrality. In this period, the Dutch army leadership considered a German attack to be the most likely. In addition, they assumed that, unlike the situation in the 1914-1918 period, it was now no longer likely that the Netherlands would be able to stay out of the impending war. This new situation called for a more active policy of neutrality than before. From a military point of view, the problem lay in the fact that the strategic position of the Netherlands had changed during the interwar period. The importance of the Netherlands in the event of a new war between Germany on the one hand and a coalition consisting of France, Britain and Belgium on the other hand increased for all parties during those years. In the first place, France and Belgium strengthened their border defences in the 1930s. From 1930 onwards, France worked on the construction of the Maginot Line and Belgium built defence works in the Ardennes, along the Meuse and the newly dug Albert Canal between Liège and Antwerp. Consequently, it was likely that a German offensive against France would attempt to circumvent those obstacles in the north by means of an offensive across Dutch territory, through Noord-Brabant and on to Flanders. Another possibility was that, prior to such an offensive against France, Germany would first seize control of the Netherlands in


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a separate operation. In either case, the Netherlands would become more vulnerable to a German attack and, consequently, the question as to what place the Netherlands should have in their operation plans became a more one pressing for the coalition members. That twofold effect was also a factor in another issue. The importance of the Netherlands for the warfare of the great powers increased as a result of the rapid development of strategic air power in and after the First World War. It would be much easier for the RAF to strike the German war industry in the Ruhr area from Dutch airfields than from the other side of the North Sea. Conversely, the Luftwaffe would be able to establish an air warning system in the Netherlands to defend the Ruhr area, while the conquest of the Netherlands would allow Germany to deny the RAF the use of Dutch airfields. As a result of these two developments, in the run-up to the Westfeldzug, France, Britain and Germany would therefore be putting a great deal of thought into deciding which approach to adopt towards the Netherlands. This also forced Belgium, in a similar position to the Netherlands, to determine its position. The Dutch political and military leadership were only too well aware of these developments. This explains why, in the second half of the 1930s, the Netherlands increasingly maintained diplomatic contacts behind the scenes with all the surrounding powers in order to sound out their possible courses of action towards the Netherlands in the impending war. Regarding France and Britain, the question was to what extent they would be willing to give the Netherlands guarantees prior to the commencement of hostilities. For their part, these countries were trying to find out whether the Netherlands would maintain its neutrality or choose sides in the event of a war. All this activity did not, however, result in the Netherlands maintaining its neutrality, as had been the case in 1914-1918, nor did it lead to an alliance between the Netherlands and one of the warring parties prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The reason for this was different for each of the countries involved. The British were greatly interested in using the Dutch airfields, but as long as the Netherlands did not give up its neutrality, they were reluctant to make any commitments regarding support for the Netherlands, both due to a lack of resources and on the grounds that military support would probably not be able to prevent a Dutch defeat against Germany. Any materiel and British units that had been supplied would then possibly fall into German hands. France shared the Dutch analysis that Noord-Brabant was likely to be the first theatre in the German offensive, but was initially more concerned with what to do about Belgium after the latter had terminated

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its military cooperation with Paris in 1936. The French military planners would eventually conclude that the allied front had to be extended into Dutch territory. This decision, which was preceded by arduous discussions and disagreement, was not reached until shortly before May 1940. France’s own interests were decisive in this respect because, like London, Paris expected the Dutch contribution to the allied war effort to be limited. Over time, the way in which the Netherlands figured in the German military plans was to vary from merely making use of the Maas crossing at Maastricht, without any further breach of neutrality, to conquering the entire country. In the end, however, the interests of the Luftwaffe were to tip the balance in favour of the latter option. In this case, too, the strength of the Dutch defence against a German attack hardly carried any weight. In the end, Belgium and the Netherlands had too little to offer one another from a military point of view to persuade each other to make cooperation commitments, either openly or in secret, prior to the commencement of hostilities. Under the given circumstances, there was little that the secret diplomatic dealings with the allies could yield for the Netherlands and, for its part, the Netherlands did not have much to offer the other parties either. The countries thus kept in contact, each waiting for the other to make a move to break the deadlock. This continued until, in the early morning of 10 May 1940, Germany drove the Netherlands and the allies into each other’s arms. A policy of neutrality does not only consist of secret diplomatic talks and sounding out each other’s intentions, however. Visible signs of determination and the will to defend that neutrality by force of arms are equally crucial factors. For instance, in October 1937, a number of units had already carried out a trial mobilisation. Austria’s Anschluß with Germany in March 1938 had led to amendments to legislation being fast-tracked, with the 38/I draft serving as second battalion with the regiments and the conscripts from the 38/II draft (March 1938) forming the first battalions. As a result, for the first time in years, the Netherlands had combat-ready units at its disposal. On 27 September 1938, in response to the continuing Sudeten crisis, telegram O was issued, containing the order to “take positions”.�� This �� ordered the border battalions, formed by the combat-ready second battalions, to take up their positions in the border regions. Together with the other peacetime units involved in this strategic defence, the border battalions now came under the command of the territorial commanders, the Commander of Fortress Holland, the Commander of the Den Helder Posi-


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tion and the Commander in Zeeland. The commanders took the necessary measures to complete the strategic defence. As a consequence, a number of exercises, such as that of the Light Brigade, were interrupted or even cancelled. Between 15 and 19 September, before telegram O was issued, a number of units had already taken part in an exercise in ‘strategic defence’. On 12 September, live ammunition had even been issued to the combatready battalions, and there were trains ready for mobilisation transport. In addition to telegram O, telegram P was also issued on 27 September 1938, which in fact was a prior warning of the proclamation of the Extraordinary Call-up for External Security (BOUV).�� This �� BOUV was initiated by telegram Q, which was issued on 28 September at 04.20 hrs. This mobilised not only seventeen battalions, but also all coastal artillery and the entire air fleet.�� Under �� cover of the border battalions, it placed a protective sphere, as it were, over the country, under which the general mobilisation and concentration could take place.19 This system provided the cabinet with a flexible instrument with which to maintain neutrality.�� It �� allowed border troops to be positioned in all directions and the country to be brought into a state of defence, without having to decide upon general mobilisation immediately. Mobilisation would result in the disruption of daily life, could not be sustained indefinitely and might create an impression abroad of hostile intent, provoking a preventive strike. Telegram A, the warning telegram for mobilisation, was also issued on 28 September, but in view of the result of the Munich Conference, it was decided not to issue telegram B, which was to order preliminary mobilisation. Telegram A was retracted on 3 October. The next day, those who had been called up by telegram Q returned to their mobilisation centres. On 6 October, the units which had reported for duty after telegram O were directed back to their peacetime locations. Tensions mounted considerably again after Italy invaded Albania on 7 April 1939, and telegram O was issued again. Experience had shown, however, that the telegrams should be issued at longer intervals.�� After �� telegram P had been issued the same day, telegram Q was issued on 10 April and the second BOUV was in place. As in 1938, telegram A was issued, but retracted after considerable time, on 27 May. The BOUV remained in force, however. Although the numerical strength was decreasing due to all kinds of leave regulations, the state of alert regarding a possible strategic raid was maintained. 19 �� J.J.C.P. Wilson, Vijf oorlogsdagen en hun twintigjarige voorgeschiedenis (Assen and Baarn, 1960) 42.

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The Polish crisis again increased the risk of war. After the soldiers from the units under the BOUV who were on leave had been called back, telegram A was issued on 23 August. That was soon followed, on 24 August, by telegram B, which ordered preliminary mobilisation on 25 August. On that day, a number of categories of officers and NCOs, administrative personnel and quartermasters were mobilised. This was done with a view to the proclamation of the general mobilisation, which was done on 28 August by means of telegram C. The first day troops reported for duty was 29 August. The general mobilisation did not take into account the declaration by the German envoy J. Graf von Zech on 26 August to Queen Wilhelmina and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eelco van Kleffens, that Germany would respect Dutch neutrality.20 Meanwhile, also on 28 August, the Chief of the General Staff, General Reijnders, had been appointed Commander-inChief of Land and Sea Forces (OLZ).�� This �� changed the command structure. In the wartime establishment, that is to say after the proclamation of the general mobilisation, the OLZ stood above the other commanders in the chain of command. The OLZ did, however, report to the Minister of Defence.�� The �� mobilisation, which was well prepared, went entirely according to plan. The soldiers reported to a number of mobilisation centres, where they received a medical examination and were issued with weapons and equipment. The next phase was to establish Concentration Blue. Transport to the positions did not pose too many problems either, so that on 3 September, the 280,000 troops had reached their war locations.

The military geography of the Netherlands As does any operation plan, the Dutch plan had to take into account a great many factors of influence. One of those factors was the geography of the country. The German plan of attack also had to allow for the specific characteristics of the Dutch landscape.�� In �� order to understand the debate on the Dutch operation plan in the late 1930s, it is important to look briefly at the military geography of the Netherlands and its impact on the defence of the country. The Netherlands lies at the edge of the European continent and is bordered by the North Sea to the north and west. It borders Belgium to the south and Germany to the east. The territory does not cover a very large area. The longest distance from east to west as the crow flies is around 20 �� The �� scene has been described in, inter alia, C. Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001) 263.


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160 kilometres, and from north to south it is around 250 kilometres. The shape of the country is very irregular. A former sea arm, the Zuiderzee, penetrates deeply into the territory. The construction of the IJsselmeer Dam between 1927 and 1932 closed it off from the sea, and since then it has been known as the IJsselmeer.�� In the far south-west, in the provinces of Zeeland and Zuid-Holland, several islands lie in the delta of the major rivers, and in the far south-east, along the river Maas, lies the long and narrow province of Limburg, connecting the ancient Maas fortress of Maastricht with the rest of the country. In that area, the Netherlands separates Belgium from Germany. The country is divided into two by the basin of the major rivers Rhine, Waal and Maas and their estuaries in the Hollands Diep and the Haringvliet. Part of the country lies below sea level, namely large sections of the delta islands and the land west of a north-south line through Utrecht, from the IJsselmeer to the major rivers. Large parts of the north of the country are also below sea level.�� Also, large sections of the land surrounding the rivers lie below the average water level of the rivers. The rest of the country, south of the rivers and east of Utrecht, is above sea level. These are mainly elevated, dry areas consisting of sandy soil. An exception is the Peel area, an elongated marshland in the east of the province of NoordBrabant. The heart of the country lies in the west, encircled by the imaginary line through Amsterdam-Utrecht-Rotterdam-The Hague. In the interwar period, some 40% of the population lived in this area. It contained the key centres of trade and industry, and the two main ports, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.�� The �� latter was, and is, also the capital city.�� The �� seat of government was, as it is today, in The Hague.�� Utrecht was an important intersection of roads, railways and waterways. The Netherlands had maintained a concentrated defence since the middle of the nineteenth century. That meant that only the heart of the country would be defended to the last. From the 1880s on, this area was referred to as Fortress Holland. The coast formed its western front, and its southern front comprised the river Waal and the Hollands Diep and Haringvliet waterways. The north was covered by the IJsselmeer and, after the construction of the IJsselmeer Dam, by the fortifications at Kornwerderzand at the eastern end of the dam. The eastern front of Fortress Holland consisted of a line of forts and inundations running through Utrecht: the New Dutch Waterline. Within Fortress Holland lay the Defence Line of Amsterdam, a circular position around the capital providing the Dutch army a final refuge from any superior enemy.

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The area around the major rivers formed a strong, defensible barrier against any attack on Fortress Holland from the south, from Belgium or France for instance. For an attacker from the east, i.e. Germany, the river area formed a strategic boundary. Any attack on Fortress Holland would have to take place to the north or south of it. The river area itself was not suitable for an advance from the east involving a sizeable force, as there was too little room to manoeuvre. Both south and north of the major rivers, the elevated sandy ground was much better suited for an attack. There, the Dutch defence made use of natural obstacles.�� North of the rivers, those obstacles were the river IJssel, the Gelderse Vallei, which contained the Grebbe Line, and the eastern edge of the polder area of Holland, where the New Dutch Waterline had been constructed. South of the rivers, the first defence line was formed by the river Maas. Behind it lay the Peel marshland, also easily defensible. The most direct and most logical path of attack from the east was north of the major rivers. It was this axis of advance on which the Dutch defence concentrated, which explains the positions of the IJssel Line, the Grebbe Line and the Waterline.�� By comparison, the Netherlands was poorly defended south of the major rivers. If an attack from the east were to take place by that route, it would therefore initially be successful. In order to advance into Fortress Holland, however, the attacker would eventually have to cross through the river area and the further west he advanced, the more difficult that would be.

Strategic policy On 3 September, the day when Britain and France declared war on Germany, the entire Dutch army had been mobilised, but the question was whether they were also prepared for war. The period following September 1939 was characterised by the construction of positions and the conducting of exercises. The new Minister of Defence in the new cabinet of jonkheer D.J. de Geer, which had taken office in August, was Lieutenant Colonel A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn of the General Staff. From 1934, he had worked alternately for the Field Army and the General Staff Division of the Ministry of Defence, and therefore knew the army well. In his new position, he would soon come into conflict with the newly appointed commander-in-chief. This was not surprising.�� The �� scope of their authority was not very clearly defined, so that as a result of a number of specific issues, the minister and the commander-in-chief had to work out where the military respon-

A 6-Veld field gun being hooked up. A battery of four guns was assigned to each infantry regiment. In 1940, the army had 224 of these guns.

A 10-Veld field gun being transported across the Rhine at Rhenen by pontoniers. This type of field gun was introduced in 1927, and was the most up-to-date gun in the artillery in 1940. The army had 56 of these guns.

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sibility ended and political responsibility began. The problems between the minister and the commander-in-chief began as soon as the mobilisation had been proclaimed. General Reijnders, who reported directly to the minister and not to the Council of Ministers, insisted on a state of martial law being declared. The Council of Ministers refused to do so, however, because the OLZ would then be able to take direct action in numerous areas without consultation. A state of war would be less drastic, as it would continue to require consultation with the civil authorities. The cabinet therefore declared a state of war on 1 September 1939, but with the proviso that only those powers could be exercised which were related to establishing combat positions and obstacles. To meet Reijnders’ wishes to some extent, in early November martial law was declared in the areas where the various positions were located. Reijnders was disappointed but accepted this restriction of his authority. In the same period, Reijnders also clashed with Dijxhoorn over the acceptability of social-democratic clubs for conscripts, the mobilisation clubs. This issue was not going to be the last problem for the commander-in-chief, however. There were some tough nuts to be cracked where war policy was concerned. It should not be forgotten that Dijxhoorn and Reijnders’ personalities clashed, and that it must have been difficult for the commander-in-chief to have a minister above him who until recently had worked for his own staff. The general expectation was that the Netherlands, if it were attacked, would have to fend for itself for some time—estimates ran from a few weeks to several months—in a war which could last for a considerable length of time, as had the First World War. A letter from Minister of War J.J.C. van Dijk dated 12 July 1924, for instance, showed that the army would have to be able to fight for three months before it could count on assistance from allies or intervention by the League of Nations.21 That expectation of three months of war was also voiced a number of times in the 1930s.�� In a meeting of the Economic Defence Preparations Committee in 1938 regarding stockpiling of food, the military representative, Captain J.C. Roelofsen, also mentioned the anticipated three-month war.22 In 1937, the goal set for the air forces in wartime was that in two months’ time, 50% of the wartime strength on paper would be delivered by the industry, anticipating the loss of half of the aircraft during that period.23 21 �� M.L. �� van Ham, “De verzorging van de Koninklijke Landmacht in 1939 en 1940” (unpublished manuscript, Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague, s.a.). 22 �� G. Trienekens, Ons volk en de honger. De voedselvoorziening 1940-1945 (Utrecht, 1985) 36-37. 23 �� R. de Bruin et al., Illusies en incidenten. De militaire luchtvaart en de neutraliteitshandhaving tot 10 mei 1940 (The Hague, s.a.) 270.

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As has been mentioned, in the 1920s, various concentrations had been prepared for the defence of the country.�� Under �� pressure due to the international situation, in 1934 and 1935 the General Staff elaborated on Concentration Blue. This was approved by the Minister of Defence, H. Colijn, in 1936. The plans entailed a defence of the ‘heart of the country’ by the IInd and IVth Corps in the Gelderse Vallei area, by Brigade A at the Betuwe Position and by Brigade B at the Maas-Waal Position. The idea of a concentration in a line along the IJssel, which was the plan in 1925, was abandoned. There were insufficient troops available to mount a proper defence of the long IJssel Line. The shorter line in the Gelderse Vallei (Grebbe Line) was more favourable in that respect.�� From �� that position, the Field Army would be able to fall back on the time-honoured New Dutch Waterline (Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie), where the defence was to be sustained to the very end. In Reijnders’ plan, the Ist Corps was garrisoned as a reserve, between the Hook of Holland and Haarlem, and was under the direct command of the commander-in-chief.�� The Light Division would be partly concentrated in the south-east of Noord-Brabant and partly in Apeldoorn. The surveillance troops were positioned along the eastern, southern and western borders. South of the major rivers, the Peel-Raam Position was to be occupied by the IIIrd Corps and the Peel Division.�� The �� concentration directives therefore entailed a defence of Fortress Holland, while the IIIrd Corps was to firmly prevent the enemy from passing through Noord-Brabant and Limburg. The army leadership was now counting on speedy assistance from France and Britain in the event of a German invasion. Of chief importance to allied cooperation were the province of Zeeland, where the British could land, and the province of Noord-Brabant, where the French could deploy. The way in which Reijnders, Chief of Staff since 1934, had had Concentration Blue elaborated brought him into conflict with the Commander of the Field Army, at that time Lieutenant General W. Röell. The latter was of the opinion that by not letting the Field Army engage in a decisive battle in the Gelderse Vallei, Reijnders was underestimating its significance. After all, the Field Army’s tasks had always included mobile and offensive operations. Röell was succeeded in April 1937 by Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, who was also dissatisfied with the role Reijnders had assigned the Field Army. In July 1937, he complained to the Chief of the General Staff that the latter’s description of the Field Army’s first task, namely to mount a “staunch defence” in the Gelderse Vallei, forced it to take up a prepared position. He preferred to have the task changed to “opposing a breakthrough into Dutch territory in the stron-


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gest possible manner”. Such an assignment would give the Field Army the freedom to mount a mobile and offensive defence, by engaging the enemy at an early stage, with flanking manoeuvres in unexpected places in the Veluwe area, along the IJssel, or across the major rivers in Noord-Brabant. In addition, it would be easier to adapt the operations to the actual progress of the German attack. In an internal memo of the same period, Van Voorst tot Voorst followed the examples of great generals from the past, such as Frederick the Great, Helmuth von Moltke and Stadholder William III, and then concluded that it was not possible to derive sound operational plans from the concentration chosen by Reijnders: It is not a matter of destroying the enemy. Every forward movement will lead to divergent action. One then fulfils the enemy’s every expectation. He can opt either to block off the chosen position or to carry out a carefully planned systematic attack on the weakest point.24

In February 1939, Van Voorst tot Voorst yielded to Reijnders inasmuch as he accepted the establishment of a prepared position in the Gelderse Vallei. Opinions continued to differ as to the use of this line. In Van Voorst tot Voorst’s view, Reijnders’ defensive approach was doomed to failure. Defensive operations alone would leave the initiative to the attacker and could, if successful, only win time, but never force an outcome. The Field Army would be beginning a hopeless fight, which could only end in defeat. A forward defence was therefore what was needed to defend the Grebbe Line, by offensive manoeuvres in the Veluwe area. If this were to deter the enemy, and he were to bear southwards to continue the attack through Noord-Brabant, the Field Army would be able to threaten his flank, again by means of an offensive operation. The requirement that the permanent position had to be suitable for offensive operations meant that Van Voorst tot Voorst also rejected the New Dutch Waterline as the location for the last line of resistance. Due to its extensive inundation areas and narrow access routes, it was simply not suitable as a base for an offensive operation. That was why the main line of resistance had to be at the Grebbe Line.25 In addition, Van Voorst tot Voorst had serious doubts about the success of a retreat to the New Dutch Waterline, faced with an enemy which had tried and tested airpower, 24 �� J.J.G. �� baron van Voorst tot Voorst, “Memorie op grond van de ontworpen Concentratie Blauw”, 11 July 1937, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Mobilisatie 19381940, box 440, bundel I, no. 1; See also: J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst to I.H. Reijnders, 16 July 1937, in: Ibidem. 25 �� J.J.G. �� baron van Voorst tot Voorst, “Memorandum I betreffende de ‘Stelling van de Geldersche Vallei’”, 19 February 1939, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Mobilisatie 1938-1940, box 440b, bundel IV, no. 12.

The poster proclaiming the general mobilisation on 28 August 1939 (left); the first day of the mobilisation: a banner shows reservists where to report (below).


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motorised troops and tanks. The distance between the two lines was too short for the Field Army to be able to shake off the enemy properly. Van Voorst tot Voorst also held the view that establishing two major positions one behind the other would be unnecessarily costly. Moreover, the Gelderse Vallei provided better cover on account of the vegetation in the terrain, and was more suitable for the construction of fortifications due to the nature of the soil and the groundwater level. The line there would therefore be better able to withstand air attacks and artillery fire than the Waterline. Lastly, the Grebbe Line, extended to the Maas by means of the Betuwe Position and the Maas-Waal Position, protected a larger part of the country. Reijnders’ appointment as commander-in-chief on 28 August 1939 and the general mobilisation in the days that followed created a new situation. In his new role, Reijnders was now the superior of the Commander of the Field Army.�� As �� early as 9 September, he succeeded in persuading the cabinet to order him, in the event of an attack from the east, to pull back the Field Army to the New Dutch Waterline, without allowing it to engage in a decisive battle at the Grebbe Line. That was the only place where at least some preparation had been made for the country’s defence. Reijnders did not, however, have any troops with which to further bring the Waterline into a state of defence. The Ist Corps, which was supposed to receive the retreating Field Army at the Waterline, was for the time being positioned along the coast, in view of the all-round neutrality. Van Voorst tot Voorst’s approach was better in that respect, even though it did not seem so at first glance.�� Work had been done on a defence line in the Gelderse Vallei on several occasions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Later, there had been plans for work, but they were never implemented. The concentration plans of the 1920s were based either on the Waterline or the IJssel Line. The main objection to the Grebbe Line, the fact that the southern part lay too high for it to be inundated naturally, had never been addressed. A water obstacle could only be established here by building a bombproof pumping station in a stream called the Grift. The only reinforcement of the Grebbe Line in the 1930s had been the construction of a number of casemates at strategic traffic intersections. This had hardly produced a defensible position, however. The main advantage for Van Voorst tot Voorst was that he had sufficient troops to establish a satisfactory position in the Gelderse Vallei. After all, two corps with a total of four divisions were concentrated there. The Commander of the Field Army therefore immediately set his troops to digging, and had them continue unabatedly, even after he had heard in

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Rising inundation near Woudenberg in the Valley Position.

mid-October that the government had ordered Reijnders to retreat to the Waterline if necessary. There was another strategically significant matter on which the Commander of the Field Army and the commander-in-chief differed, namely the defence of Noord-Brabant.�� Together with the north of Belgian Brabant, the area formed the link between Fortress Holland and the Belgian forward defence line, which lay between Antwerp and Liège, along the Albert Canal.�� Together with Zeeland and the north of Limburg, Noord-Brabant was of vital importance to allied cooperation in the event of a German attack. The area therefore had to be defended long enough to give the allies the opportunity to deploy there. The question was, however, exactly where, with how many troops and at what price that defence was to be maintained. The matter was complicated by the policy of neutrality, which precluded any consultations on the matter with Brussels, Paris or London.


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The Peel-Raam Position was chosen as the line of resistance, in accordance with Concentration Blue. Work on this position had begun as early as 1934. It was manned by the Peel Division. The IIIrd Corps and part of, later all of, the Light Division were concentrated further back. Reijnders wanted the defence of the position to be maintained for a number of days. In doing so, however, the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division were not to be exposed to the risk of destruction. Due to a shortage of troops, Reijnders’ wish was, in the event of an imminent breach of the Peel-Raam Position, for the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to retreat to within Fortress Holland, where they would be assigned new tasks. Van Voorst tot Voorst had serious doubts about the feasibility of the retreat plan, and feared that the position would be outflanked on the right, across Belgian territory, as the Belgian army only had weak units positioned there. He therefore proposed to defend Noord-Brabant further to the west, along a line between ’s-Hertogenbosch, Tilburg and Goirle, which he dubbed the Orange Position. The route back for the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division would then be shorter and the enemy would face a difficult advance from the border through an area full of obstacles and demolitions, before he reached the position.�� In addition, the Orange Position was much shorter than the Peel-Raam Position, allowing a stronger defence with the same number of troops. Details of the French operation plans, which became available in late November 1939, reinforced the arguments of the Commander of the Field Army. The Dutch military attaché in Paris and Brussels, Lieutenant Colonel D. van Voorst Evekink, had heard from French contacts, as well as from Belgian sources, that the French commander-in-chief, général d’armée Maurice Gamelin, was planning to establish a forward defensive front in Belgium. This front would stretch all the way to Antwerp. Since 1936, France had been looking into the possibility of military intervention in Belgium. The plans elaborated on earlier Franco-Belgian military cooperation based on their military alliance of 1920, cooperation which had had come to something of a dead end since 1927. In 1936, German troops had again occupied the demilitarised Rhineland, and Belgium had again declared its neutrality. The French high command considered several operational possibilities without coming to a decision. This failure to commit could not continue when the French government declared war on Germany in September 1939. The plan of choice was now the “plan Escaut”. This entailed the French troops and the British Expeditionary Force establishing a defensive front behind the upper course of the Scheldt: from Valenciennes, via Tournai and Oudenaarde, to Ghent.�� In �� early No-

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vember 1939, the French commander-in-chief, Gamelin, was also bearing in mind the possibility that Germany would mount a limited operation with the sole purpose of conquering the Netherlands, or invade Belgium through Dutch Noord-Brabant and Limburg. Both options were equally dangerous, and France would have to respond. In the “hypothèse Hollande”, the Franco-British front would have to lie much further north and east. It would follow the Meuse from the border town of Givet, via Namur to Liège and then turn along the back of the Albert Canal to Antwerp. Paratroops would be dropped on Walcheren and at the isthmus of ZuidBeveland, to enable French ground troops to deploy in Zeeland.�� During the rest of the month of November, this hypothèse developed into a firm, albeit it more limited, plan in the French planning process, the “plan Dyle”. In this plan, Gamelin opted for a front behind the Meuse, from Givet to Namur.�� From there, it would not continue to Liège, but turn northwards to Wavre and from there it would follow the river Dyle to Louvain and then link up with the Belgian positions at Antwerp. Contrary to the “plan Escaut”, Brussels would then also lie behind the allied defence. The airborne landings in Zeeland disappeared from the plans on 23 December 1939. Motorised and mechanised units would engage in mobile defensive and delaying combat operations in the space between the front from Antwerp to Namur and the Albert Canal, in cooperation with the Belgian units positioned there. It was a daring plan, and therefore controversial in the eyes of Gamelin’s subordinate commanders, but he was determined. This plan had not yet set his mind entirely at ease, however. There was a gaping hole in the defence between the Belgian defence behind the Albert Canal and the Dutch Peel-Raam Position. This would allow the Germans to move in behind the Peel-Raam Position and then take Noord-Brabant and Zeeland.�� The physical cohesion with the Dutch main defence at Fortress Holland would then be broken and the Scheldt estuary, and access to the port of Antwerp, would be in enemy hands.�� He was therefore toying with the idea of sending French divisions even further north, as far as Fortress Holland. The link-up point would be in western Brabant, so that the Moerdijk bridges across the Hollands Diep would form the physical connection. This manoeuvre was known as the “hypothèse Breda”. Van Voorst Evekink was able to brief Reijnders in general terms on the latest state of affairs with regard to the French plans.�� No matter how positive these reports were, however, they also made it clear that the French were not planning to advance further eastwards than the Breda area, or Tilburg at a push. In any case, it was not to be expected that a combined defence would be mounted at the Peel-Raam Position with strong French

Members of Parliament visiting the positions of the Field Army in autumn 1939, during the mobilisation. They are being led by the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst.

Hussars-Motorcyclists crossing a water obstacle during an exercise in 1939, using a float.

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units. This argued in favour of the Commander of the Field Army and his Orange Position. Reijnders, however, and following his advice, the cabinet, which had been informed of the French plans in early December, insisted on the Peel-Raam Position, despite all the operational objections. His arguments were of a political rather than a military nature. A position at Breda or Tilburg would leave large parts of Noord-Brabant undefended, with the exception of the border defence and the line along the Maas, and give the Germans the opportunity to invade Belgium almost unchallenged. Such a position would therefore damage the allied interests and that might be held against the Netherlands during peace negotiations after a German defeat. Secondly, in this position it would be a long while before large Dutch units engaged in battle with the German army. This would mean a dangerous delay in the moment when France and Britain would recognise the Netherlands as an ally. The Peel-Raam Position, on the other hand, would bring that moment forward to the first hours of the war and would obstruct the German advance route to the Albert Canal. So even after Reijnders had been appointed commander-in-chief, his differences of opinion with Van Voorst tot Voorst did not come to an end. Even intervention by Minister Dijxhoorn, who had serious doubts about the feasibility of Reijnders’ plans, did not change that, nor did cabinet meetings or consultations with the Queen. The government’s assignment to the commander-in-chief of 9 September 1939 was changed on 7 January 1940, however, although the new assignment contained no firm decisions either. In the meantime, the difficult relationship between Reijnders on the one hand and Dijxhoorn and the other members of the cabinet on the other hand deteriorated noticeably. After the conflict on the state of war, the argument about the mobilisation clubs and the incompatibilité d’humeur between the commander-in-chief and the minister, doubts now also arose about the commander-in-chief ’s understanding of strategy, whilst Reijnders for his part suspected that the Commander of the Field Army and the cabinet were trying to take his place.26 26 �� Particularly �� instructive regarding the difference of opinions are annexes 15 through 18 in part Ib of: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek (The Hague, 1949) from the correspondence between the Commander of the Field Army, the commander-in-chief and the Minister of Defence in the period November 1939-January 1940. See also: De Jong, Koninkrijk. Deel 2. Neutraal, 66-67, 203-221, 235 ff. For an analysis of the problems surrounding the position of the commander-in-chief in Dutch political and military relations in general, and those in 1939-1940 in particular, see: H. Amersfoort, ed., ‘Een kwestie van vertrouwen’. De geschiedenis van het opperbevel in Nederland en Nederlands-Indië. Annex to Van wankel evenwicht naar versterkte defensieorganisatie. Advies van de Adviescommissie Opperbevelhebberschap. The Hague, 19 April 2002.


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During January 1940, tensions surrounding Reijnders mounted even further. The Council of Ministers grew increasingly convinced that the commander-in-chief ’s position was untenable. On 31 January 1940, Reijnders handed in his resignation, after Prime Minister De Geer had informed him personally that Dijxhoorn had threatened to resign.�� His �� resignation was accepted on 6 February. One of the candidates for the vacant position of commander-in-chief was Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst.�� He �� was not eligible, however, as having a Catholic commander-in-chief alongside a Catholic Commander of the Field Army, who was also his brother, was considered inadvisable. It was the former Minister of Defence, J.J.C. van Dijk who suggested Lieutenant General H.G. Winkelman. Winkelman himself had expected to become Chief of the General Staff in 1934. He had retired instead, and the position was filled by Reijnders. Winkelman’s career included such positions as Assistant Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Staff of the Field Army. In the latter position, he had also been the superior of then Captain A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn. From 1938, Winkelman held a position with the Philips lighting company in Eindhoven as adviser on evacuation measures in the event of a war. When the mobilisation was announced, he was called up on active service again, and appointed Commander of the Utrecht-Soesterberg Air Defence Sector.�� On 6 February 1940, Winkelman was appointed commander-in-chief. Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst became his Chief of the Army Staff.

Winkelman’s operation plan The lack of unity between the two main commanders had had its effects on the preparations for a possible war in the late 1930s, as far as the operation plan was concerned. Time was slowly running out. On 10 January 1940, a small German military communications aircraft had made an emergency landing at Maasmechelen in Belgium. On that occasion, documents were seized regarding operations on a front between the North Sea and the Moselle, and in particular an airborne operation west of Dinant. The opinions were divided as to how significant these documents should be considered to be. There were other reports as well, however, such as warnings from the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major G.J. Sas, which indicated that there was a growing risk of war with Germany. Food for thought in that respect was also provided by the fact that the German air force, as well as the British, incidentally, conducted regular reconnaissance flights over Dutch ter-

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ritory and that the German intelligence services were showing an interest in the Netherlands. The kidnapping, near Venlo, of two British secret agents to Germany on 9 November 1939, known as the Venlo incident, was still fresh in people’s memories. Winkelman realised that it was time to put an end to the uncertainty regarding the appropriate strategic policy. Winkelman was also aware, even more so than Reijnders, that the army was not large enough to defend the entire country. Further concentration of the combat power within Fortress Holland therefore appeared inevitable in his view. Another point of departure for Winkelman’s operation plan was to rely as little as possible on the successful outcome of a mobile and offensive operation by the army, because it was insufficiently armed, equipped and trained.�� All �� in all, Winkelman shifted the focus of the Dutch strategy towards a straightforward operation plan, with a strong static-defensive element. The Field Army was bound to prepared lines and positions even more so than before. Winkelman’s measures demonstrate another point. There had never been a sound basis of trust between Reijnders and the cabinet.�� The �� cabinet had therefore constantly kept the commander-in-chief in close check, with carefully formulated instructions. Winkelman, by contrast, did have their trust. He was given much more leeway, and was able to make his own decisions on various occasions, decisions which included political aspects and which could have required consultation with the cabinet. North of the major rivers, Winkelman chose the Grebbe Line as the main defence line. In accordance with the views of the Commander of the Field Army and of the cabinet, he decided that the operational risks involved in a deliberate retreat, as Reijnders had wanted, were too great. He also removed any illusions the Commander of the Field Army might have had of an offensive break-out from the position. The IInd and IVth Corps were to fight the battle in the position only. His opting for the Grebbe Line should therefore not be seen as support for the operational ideas of the Commander of the Field Army, but as a sign of his having a sense of reality.�� The �� course of events had made the Gelderse Vallei into a strong position under construction, whereas much less work had been done on the Waterline. After all the talking that had been done about the Grebbe Line since 1934, initiatives by J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst to improve this line had resulted in a fait accompli, that under the circumstances of imminent war could not be ignored.�� A �� disadvantage of the gradual decision-making process was that nothing had been done yet about the weak point of the position, namely the lack of inundation areas in the southern

A 6-Veld field gun in position in the New Dutch Waterline near Naarden, winter 1939-1940.

The Light Division on field exercise during the 1939-1940 mobilisation.

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part. Construction of a bombproof pumping station did not begin until late 1939. It would not yet be operational by May 1940. The line was also reinforced with troops which were removed from the Waterline and the border defence. The Waterline was now almost entirely devoid of troops. This was not problematic in Winkelman’s view, as the Ist Corps, stationed at the coast, was available as a strategic reserve. It was more difficult for Winkelman to come to a decision regarding Noord-Brabant. The Peel-Raam Position was under construction, but in order for it to be defended successfully, it would have to connect with the Belgian positions and have the certainty of French troops arriving in time. The policy of neutrality officially precluded any consultations with future allies and even the assignment which Winkelman received from the government in early April 1940 regarding war policy did not give him room to conduct any such consultations, no matter how liberally it was formulated. Winkelman, however, considered the issue to be of such importance that he decided, regardless of the risk of serious political damage, to have Van Voorst Evekink seek renewed contact with the Belgian and French army leaderships.27 Winkelman’s expectations regarding the allies, meanwhile, were not inconsiderable, and in fact not realistic.28 As Reijnders had done, he had memoranda deposited with the diplomatic missions in Brussels, Paris and London, which were to be presented to the respective governments after a German attack. In those memoranda, the commanderin-chief set out his operation plans and asked France for an entire corps of four divisions. The French air force was to disrupt German bridge-laying activities across the Maas and IJssel.�� Britain was asked for a division to defend Zeeland, and the transfer of air defence artillery and ten squadrons of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to Fortress Holland. As has been mentioned, the Dutch were familiar with part of the French and Belgian operation plans. Just before his resignation, Reijnders had asked General R. van Overstraeten, Head of the Military Office of the King of Belgium, whether the Belgians would be prepared to extend the Peel-Raam Position into Belgium.�� The �� answer was negative.�� Van �� Overstraeten proposed a combined line between the Bergsche Maas and the Albert Canal, along the Waalwijk–Tilburg–Turnhout line, partly overlapping the Orange Position which Van Voorst tot Voorst had envisaged. An identical request in mid-February from Winkelman to the Belgian 27 �� The contacts with London were more limited than those with Brussels and Paris and mainly concerned navy matters and the possible transport to Britain of the gold of the Central Bank of the Netherlands. These contacts will mostly not be considered here. 28 �� B. �� Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000) 107-113.


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military attaché in The Hague, Colonel P.J. Diepenrijckx, was also turned down. Winkelman’s threat–made with the knowledge of Van Kleffens and Dijxhoorn–that the Belgian stance would force him to practically evacuate Noord-Brabant in the event of war, was equally unsuccessful in changing Van Overstraeten’s mind.�� The latter was left to conclude that the Netherlands, in its evacuation plans, had opted for a “stratégie d’isolement”.29 Subsequently, on 5 April 1940, Winkelman had Van Voorst Evekink consult with French commander-in-chief Gamelin. It became apparent that in Belgium, the French and British troops would respond to a German offensive by forming a defensive front along the Givet–Namur–Louvain–Antwerp line: the “plan Dyle”. Meanwhile, despite persistent doubts among his subordinate commanders, on 20 March 1940 Gamelin had also developed the “hypothèse Breda” into a firm plan, the “plan Breda”. This became part of the assignment of the French 7th Army, which Gamelin had already earmarked for the operations on the French left flank in the “hypothèse Hollande” and the “plan Dyle”. Earlier on, i.e. in the “plan Escaut”, this army had been positioned at Rheims, as a central strategic reserve for the northern front. His decision not to maintain a large strategic reserve, but to deploy it on the left flank instead demonstrates the extent to which Gamelin was convinced that the point of main effort of the German attack would be in Flanders, as it had been in 1914. This expectation had led him to believe that the front in Belgium would be progressively stronger the further north it was extended. It would then be impossible to outflank the troops there and it would lend cohesion to the Dutch, Belgian, British and French operations. On the other hand, the success of Gamelin’s strategy was entirely dependent on the enemy’s actions. If the German main effort were to be elsewhere and if the Germans were able to conduct their operations swiftly, he would be powerless to do anything about it. He lacked strong reserves with which to immediately counter the danger. It would take complex and lengthy manoeuvres by units which were already engaged in combat before he would be able to respond to the actual events of the campaign. Gamelin was of the opinion, however, that he had sufficient time. For the purpose of the implementation of the decisions made on 20 March 1940, the French and British armies were positioned as follows. The French force involved the units of the 1st Army Group, commanded by général d’armée Gaston Henri Bilotte. On the left flank, between the coast at Dunkirk and Lille, stood, as has been mentioned, the mobile 7th Army of général d’armée Henri-Honoré Giraud. Its orders were to advance 29 �� Quoted �� in: De Jong, Koninkrijk. Deel 2. Neutraal, 256.

On 2 December 1939, the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, had a series of photographs sent to the Dutch daily newspapers, to demonstrate the impassability of the inundated areas. In a covering letter, the commander said that he considered the publication of the photographs to be “particularly desirable, also in view of the impression abroad”. This photograph shows a 7-Veld field gun, with a team of horses and a limber. The 7-Veld field gun was introduced in 1904. In May 1940, the army had 310 of these guns.

Machine-gun nest at the entrance to the port of Scheveningen during the mobilisation period.


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through Flanders to a front on either side of Antwerp. North of that front it was to occupy the Antwerp–Turnhout–Tilburg line, so that the connection with Fortress Holland, via Breda, the Moerdijk bridges and Dordrecht, was covered. South of the front it would defend the Antwerp–Louvain line. To the right of the 7th Army, in a staging area south-east of Lille, stood the British Expeditionary Force, commanded by General Lord John Gort. It was to advance to a line due east of Brussels, between Louvain and Wavre. Next to the British, between Valenciennes and Maubeuge, stood the strong 1st Army, commanded by général d’armée Georges Blanchard. It was destined for the front between Wavre and Namur.�� Facing the Ardennes stood the weakest French armies, the 9th Army of général d’armée André Georges Corap, which consisted almost entirely of reservists, and the 2nd Army of général d’armée Charles Huntziger.�� By �� Gamelin’s calculations, the Germans would need nine days to advance through this inaccessible, hilly and wooded terrain by the Meuse. They would then take seven days to prepare to force a river crossing. The Meuse crossing was therefore to be expected no earlier than the seventeenth day of the offensive. That provided enough time to tackle the problems in this sector. Halfway into the sector of the 2nd Army, at the fortification at La Ferté, some 25 kilometres south-east of Sedan as the crow flies, was where the Maginot Line began. From here to the border with neutral Switzerland, France considered itself to be safe. The Netherlands was naturally interested in the advance of the 7th Army in particular.�� On the first day of the war, two of its motorised divisions and one light tank division were to advance to Zeeland and NoordBrabant. Three more divisions were to follow later. In the French view, the Netherlands and Belgium should preferably establish their defence on the Tilburg–Turnhout line as well, so that Giraud’s army would be able to reinforce them.�� That �� same evening, Van Voorst Evekink informed Winkelman of the general tenor of the French plans. It was now clear to the Dutch commander-in-chief what needed to be done in Noord-Brabant. The attaché noted Winkelman’s response as follows: In those circumstances, Peel Position will be evacuated by main forces (approx. 15 battalions remain, without artillery). Main defence will now be: Grebbe Line–Waal Maas–Merwede Group–Fortress Holland.30

Although hardly flattering, Van Overstraeten’s conclusion mentioned earlier was an apt description of Winkelman’s policy regarding Noord-Bra30 �� Questioning of D. van Voorst Evekink, 12 August 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 616.

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bant. On 6 April, the commander-in-chief made the definite decision that the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division would for the time being remain concentrated behind the Peel-Raam Position, in order for their presence to create the illusion of a staunch defence; they were not allowed to engage in combat. In the night following the first day of the war, they would be pulled back from Noord-Brabant. The Light Division would move to Fortress Holland, to form the strategic reserve together with the Ist Corps. The IIIrd Corps would move to the southern front of Fortress Holland and the Waal-Linge Position. In respect of the retreat, Brigade B, positioned in the Land van Maas en Waal area, would move back to behind the southern Grebbe Line, in order to serve as an operational reserve there for the Field Army. After capturing the Maas Line, in Noord-Brabant the Germans would only be faced with the Peel Division, positioned along an extended front. This meant that the defence of Noord-Brabant, and with it, the link-up between Fortress Holland and the allied front, came to depend upon the French deployment in this area. Both military and politically, Winkelman was banking heavily on future events, especially considering the fact that the distance which the German units would have to cover to reach Breda was around half the distance the French would have to go.31 If they succeeded in swiftly breaching the Peel-Raam Position, the Germans had the best chance of winning the race for Breda. A few days later, on 11 April, Van Voorst Evekink informed Gamelin in writing of Winkelman’s decisions. This did not change the plans for the French advance. Gamelin held on to his own reasoning that the defence would be strongest if it were extended as far north as possible. The subordinate commanders in the 7th Army, which was earmarked for the Belgian-Dutch border area, were not informed either. This was to lead to some unpleasant surprises for them in May. In April 1940, tensions in Europe were rising considerably. On 9 April, there came the shocking news that German airborne troops had taken the airports at Copenhagen and Oslo, in surprise attacks.�� In �� addition, it became clear that these troops had received assistance from fifth columns among the Danish and Norwegian populations.�� An �� attack on the Netherlands loomed. As a result of the events in Norway and Denmark, General Winkelman ordered extra security at the main airfields.�� An �� infantry battalion each was assigned to Schiphol, Waalhaven, Ypenburg and Valkenburg. The 1st Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment, which was part of the Light 31 �� K.H. �� Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 108. For the French plans for the operations in the Netherlands, see: Chaix, En Mai 1940, 107-113, 149150, 168-172, 179-183.


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Division, was moved from Noord-Brabant to Wassenaar, a village near The Hague. Armoured vehicles were made available for the defence of Ypenburg and Waalhaven. Roads and certain parts of the terrain near The Hague were blocked to prevent enemy landings.�� On 22 April, the Commander of the Air Defence, Lieutenant General P.W. Best, emphasised to his airfield commanders: After all, the outward defence of the airfield may not be neglected entirely, as there is the possibility that a forced landing of foreign troops may be accompanied by attacks along the ground by paratroops dropped outside the airfield previously, or by malicious elements living here.32

Winkelman saw reason to further strengthen the defence of the heart of the country. The IIIrd Corps was now stationed further west, near ’s-Hertogenbosch, which would facilitate a retreat to Fortress Holland. Six extra infantry battalions were positioned to strengthen the Betuwe front. Two came from Groningen and Drenthe, and the other four were from the eastern front of Fortress Holland. Six battalions, and three battalions of 7-Veld field guns, were sent from the southern front to the eastern front of Fortress Holland. Orders had also been given for the expansion of the inundation areas. On 10 April, all leave was cancelled, but this order was revoked on the 27th. Nonetheless, the situation remained explosive. An intelligence report of 26 April 1940 summarised it as follows: Although the tension appears to have eased somewhat, peace of mind is out of the question. The position of the German troops is such, that at any given moment an attack could be mounted towards the west, whereby the right wing north of the rivers, covered by German troops, could choose its advance through Noord-Brabant.�� The operation against Norway has not weakened the German air force significantly. Presumably, the German airpower is relatively more occupied due to this operation. This can, of course, have a delaying effect on an operation in westerly direction.33

Tensions rose further during the first few days of May 1940. The combatreadiness of certain units was increased, and further preparations for inundations were made. On 6 May, Major Sas warned of a possible attack on 8 May.�� When it did not materialise, leave was granted again in certain cases. On 8 May, reports reached General Headquarters of troop movements on the German side of the border, reports which increased in number over the course of the following day. In two telephone calls in the evening of 9 May, Major Sas was more adamant than ever in warning of a German 32 �� Quoted �� in: F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 103-104. 33 �� C.-Brigade B., “Mededeeling van gegevens no.�� 27”, �� in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II. Nederland 1938-1940, box 415, file 19.

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attack the next morning. The stream of reports which Winkelman had faced that day, increased the credibility of Sas’ reports. At headquarters, the feeling was growing that war was imminent. At around nine o’clock that evening, therefore, a telex was sent out with the following message: “Very alarming reports are coming in from the border. Remain very much on your guard”. The message was sent to the territorial commanders in Friesland, Overijssel and southern Limburg, the Commander of the Field Army, the Commander of the Air Defence and the commanders of the Den Helder Position, Fortress Holland and the Commander in Zeeland, as well as the commanders of the IInd, IIIrd and IVth Corps.�� All commanders were to decide for themselves what measures to take. After 22.00 hrs, Winkelman and Dijxhoorn held a meeting, in which they discussed placing obstacles east of the Maas and the IJssel.�� An �� order to that effect was issued via the Commander of the Field Army to the Commander of the IIIrd Corps.�� At 23.15 hrs, the troops tasked with strategic security were ordered to effect full readiness by 03.00 hrs on 10 May. Never before since the proclamation of the mobilisation had such drastic measures been taken. At around midnight, a confident Winkelman left his headquarters at Lange Voorhout 7 in The Hague. In passing, he said to Lieutenant Colonel J.G.M. van der Plassche, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Division: “The gentlemen can come now, we have done everything we can. I’m going home now to grab a few hours’ sleep”.34 Less than four hours later, the first German troops set foot on Dutch territory.

34 �� Quoted �� in: M. van Blankenstein, “De raadselachtige dienst”, De stem van Nederland, (19 July 1946) 21.


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Broad outline of the organisation of the Royal Netherlands Army in May 1940 The composition of the Royal Netherlands Army in May 1940 was based on the wartime organisation as laid down in 1933 in the manual entitled Samenstelling van de Koninklijke Landmacht op voet van oorlog [Composition of the Royal Netherlands Army on a war footing] (The Hague, 1933). On that basis, the strength of the army fell roughly into two groups, namely the troops which belonged to the Field Army and those which did not. Organically, the Field Army consisted of the Ist Corps, IInd Corps, IIIrd Corps, IVth Corps, the Light Division and the Army Troops and field trains; the 2nd Aviation Regiment was also assigned for the purposes of air reconnaissance. The troops outside the Field Army were intended for the territorial defence and for the lines and positions which were not to be occupied by the Field Army. Following the announcement of the general mobilisation of the armed forces on 28 August 1939, the army took up its war positions in accordance with ‘Concentration Blue’. For this, it was necessary to deviate from the organic composition of various large units. The way in which the command relationships were consequently arranged on 9 May 1940 and, following the developments on the first day of war, in the evening of 10 May can be found in the organisational diagrams elsewhere in this book. A corps (approximately 25,000 men) consisted of two divisions (approximately 10,000 men each) and corps troops. A division comprised a staff, a pioneer company, two machine-gun companies, an antitank company, an anti-aircraft machine-gun company, an anti-aircraft artillery battery, three infantry regiments and an artillery regiment.�� An infantry regiment was made up of a staff, a mortar company (six mortars), a 6-Veld field-gun battery (four pieces), an anti-tank company (six pieces) and three infantry battalions. It numbered approximately 2,500 men. The infantry battalion was composed as follows: a battalion staff, three companies of riflemen and a machine-gun company. The strength amounted to some 750 men on average and a riflemen company usually numbered approximately 160. Each artillery regiment in principle consisted of three battalions of three batteries, and each battery had four guns. In the spring of 1940, the light troops in the Corps and in the Light Division were involved in a large-scale reorganisation, which had not yet been fully completed on 10 May 1940. As a consequence, when the fighting started, the Light Division consisted of a staff, a signals squadron, two armoured-vehicle squadrons, a machine-gun squadron, two hussars-

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motorcyclist regiments, two cyclist regiments, the Mobile Artillery Corps and a division train.�� Because �� of various command arrangements, however, in terms of combat units the commander only had the 2nd HussarsMotorcyclist Regiment, the two cyclist regiments and the Mobile Artillery Corps. Broadly speaking, the following figures apply with regard to unit strength: • corps – approximately 25,000 men • division – approximately 10,000 men • infantry regiment – approximately 2,500 men • infantry battalion – approximately 750 men • riflemen company – approximately 160 men • infantry section – approximately 30 men On 10 May 1940, the total strength of the Royal Netherlands Army amounted to approximately 280,000 men. Of these, after the various changes in the command relationships, some 120,000 men were under the command of the Commander of the Field Army in the evening of 10 May.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GATHERING STORM: THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Introduction When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, its army numbered 2,758,000 men and was organised into 103 divisions, 53 of which, including 6 armoured divisions, had already belonged to the active peacetime army.1 This strong army bore hardly any resemblance to the army of the Weimar Republic, which in 1933, according to the Chef des Truppenamtes, General Wilhelm Adam, would only have been able to withstand two weeks at most of any military conflict. Had it been invaded by France, all it would have been able to do was “inflict a few pinpricks here and there”.2 The weakness of the Reichswehr, as the army of the Weimar Republic was known, was due to the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. Article 231, for example, stated that Germany and its allies were wholly responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. One of the consequences of this Kriegsschuldartikel was that a number of restrictions were imposed on the Weimar Republic in terms of the structure and size of its armed forces, with a view to preventing any more German military operations. Germany was, for instance, not permitted to have tanks or heavy guns, could not have an air force and the size of the German navy was severely restricted: large warships and submarines were forbidden and the personnel complement was not allowed to exceed 15,000. There were also stringent restrictions on the number of personnel in the Reichswehr. It was not to exceed 100,000: 4,000 officers and 96,000 NCOs and other ranks, and Germany had to abolish its conscription legislation. The organisation of the Reichswehr was thus simple: under the 1 B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band I. Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn (Darmstadt, 1954) 65 ff. 2 Wilhelm Deist, “Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht” in: Wilhelm Deist e.a., Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg. Band I. Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979) 400-401.

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Between the autumn of 1934 and September 1939, the German army increased in number from some 250,000 to 2,758,000. Presentations of colours by Hitler himself served to enhance the bond between the Führer and the army. Photograph taken in autumn 1936.

Reichswehrminister and the Chef der Heeresleitung were two Reichswehrgruppenkommandos, one in Berlin and one in Kassel. These Kommandos contained the army’s seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The task of these divisions was, according to Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles, to “be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers”. The Reichswehr had no general staff, nor a Kriegsakademie for training general staff officers. The allies would not allow Germany to have such an organisation, given the part that those particular officers had played in the First World War. The advanced training for officers was, therefore, decentralised and was provided by the Führergehilfelehrgänge in the Wehrkreise, into which the Reichswehrgruppenkommandos were divided. The idea was thus to prevent a situation in which training was given to an exclusive and homogenous corps of staff officers. Because of the high levels of unemployment in Germany after 1918, a great many Germans aspired to a position of officer or lower rank in the

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Reichswehr. Selection criteria were thus stringent, one of them being the way in which the candidates had performed during the First World War. For the officers’ positions in particular, veterans from the former German army were selected. Their political views were mainly right-wing. Recruitment of the rank and file occurred, as had generally been the case in the past, mainly in the countryside, where the population was nationalistic and conservative. This meant that the Reichswehr could certainly not be said to reflect German society. The first Chef der Heeresleitung was Generalmajor Walther Reinhardt. The Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalmajor Hans von Seeckt, should, however, be regarded as the founder of the Reichswehr. The Truppenamt was in effect the continuation of the forbidden general staff. It was made up of sixty officers and its activities were virtually the same as those of the former general staff. In 1920, Hans von Seeckt was appointed Chef der Heeresleitung, a post which he was to hold until 1926. As early as January 1921, Von Seeckt made it clear that he saw it as his duty to make the Reichswehr the basis for the future expansion of the German army, with the aim of regaining Germany’s status as a great power. He therefore called his creation the Führerheer and was willing to circumvent the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.3 German engineers from Krupp, for example, went to Bofors in Sweden, where they developed what was to become the Second World War’s famous 88mm Flak (Fliegerabwehrkanone). Also, with the aid of all kinds of umbrella organisations, such as Aerosport GmbH and the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt, pilots were trained and preparations were made to allow a German air force to be established quickly when the time came. It was for this purpose that a secret treaty concerning mutual support was signed with the Soviet Union in Rapallo in 1922. Germany would provide the Soviet Union with technicians to help to build up the Russian industry and train Russian officers. In return, the Soviet Union was to supply ammunition and other armaments to Germany. The Soviet Union also allowed Germany to use its territory to conduct tank exercises and experiments with war gases. During the ten years that this cooperation lasted, three hundred German pilots were trained in the Soviet Union. In 1925, amid the deepest secrecy, the Truppenamt drew up the initial plans for an expansion of the Reichswehr. Inextricably linked to this was 3 Rainer Wohlfeil, “Heer und Republik” in: Edgar Graf von Matuschka and Rainer Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Republik (1918-1933) (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) 207. For the build-up of the German army after the First World War, see also: K.-V. Neugebauer, ed., Grundzüge der deutschen Militärgeschichte (2 vol; Freiburg, 1993) Band I, Historischer Überblick, 272-294 and 300-309.

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the reinforcement of the Reichswehr’s materiel. The driving force behind the plans was Von Seeckt’s successor as Chef der Heeresleitung, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Heye, who took up the appointment in October 1926. In February 1927, Heye informed Reichskanzler Wilhelm Marx’s cabinet about the secret build-up of the Reichswehr. The Marx government proved willing to support the covert build-up of arms and developed a system which enabled funds to be made available to the Reichswehrministerium without involving Parliament.4 Heye found himself facing major problems, however, when it came to the supply of ammunition. The German industry indeed did its utmost to meet the demand, but the result of the rearmament was limited nonetheless. As well as the rearmament, the Reichswehr also devoted a great deal of attention to the development of military doctrine. The operations of the First World War were studied and analysed, with the focus more on the future than on the past. The First World War, with its futile trench warfare, had demonstrated the need to end any subsequent war by means of a brief, decisive campaign. One of the first results of these analyses was the issue of the manual entitled Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, which was published in 1921. This manual not only looked at the command process and the decision-making, but also organised the cooperation between the infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers and the support services. Elaborating on the German military doctrines of the nineteenth century, the central tenets were the assault and the victory blow. It is the attack alone which dictates to the enemy.�� The �� superiority of commander and unit is shown to the best advantage in that.�� Particularly effective is the envelopment of one or both wings and an attack on the enemy’s rear. The enemy can thus be eliminated. All orders pertaining to the attack must bear the hallmark of the greatest possible resolve.�� The �� will of the commander to achieve victory must be clear down to the last man.5

This view was reflected in the tactical commands. The orders in these commands were always highly specific. For example, attacks had to be “ruthless, without delay and under total concentration of strength”. This aggressive language became the norm for the spoken and written language of the German armed forces. If an attack were to be successful, it had to have a clear point of main effort. That main effort was formed by a concentration of troops, which also meant a concentration of fire power. A major difficulty in this respect 4 Deist, “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 378. 5 Heinz-Ludger Borgert, Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939. Band IX. Grundzüge der militärischen Kriegsführung (Munich, 1979) 543.

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was that, in war, nothing was ever certain. The weather conditions or the state of the terrain could, for instance, be unpredictable, and the enemy could react in a way that was not expected. It was, therefore, considered necessary to be able to shift the point of main effort during a military operation. To make this possible, considerable freedom of action at all command levels was essential. The proviso was, however, that the commanders involved had clear sight of the end objective and all acted in accordance with the same procedures, which were laid down in the regulations. The manual was to remain a means at all times and was never to become an aim in itself. Blind obedience or rigid discipline thus had no place in the Reichswehr. Seen schematically, all levels of the Reichswehr’s command system were in theory as follows: upon receiving a command or order, an assessment of the situation was made. This assessment took into account all sorts of factors, such as the weather, the terrain and the strength of friendly and enemy troops. This assessment led to a decision which would form the basis for new orders. If no new orders were forthcoming, units would formulate their own mission within the framework of the general objective and get to work. The manual on Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen was also elaborated in 1923 with a second part, which was intended for a future army that was no longer subject to the restrictive stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.

The German rearmament At the end of the 1920s, there was a prevailing opinion in German military circles that the complete helplessness should be brought to an end as soon as possible. Not that the country had aggressive intentions, but the presence of a German military force was needed to deter neighbouring countries from attacking Germany. Around 1930, the Weimar Republic would still have been utterly helpless in military terms against any attack by a foreign power. This was illustrated particularly in the many Kriegsspiele which were conducted at the end of the 1920s under the leadership of the Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalmajor Werner von Blomberg. It turned out that a war with Poland, for example, could be fought “only for a short time and with the loss of more German territory”.6 This helplessness was again referred to by the new Chef des Truppenamtes, General Adam, in 1933 in no uncertain terms: “We cannot fight a war at the moment. We must do all we 6 Deist, “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 385-387.

Part of the German rearmament was the build-up of the tank arm. This photograph shows the production of the Panzerkampfwagen III, a model that was introduced into the units from 1936.

A heavy 15cm field howitzer is put in position. This modern weapon was introduced after Germany had decided that it would no longer respect the restrictive stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.

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can to avoid it, even at the cost of a diplomatic defeat.”7 It seemed to be a proposal for some sort of German appeasement policy. In April 1930, Reichswehrminister Wilhelm Groener issued the Weisung entitled “Die Aufgaben der Wehrmacht”. In order to prevent neighbouring countries from invading Germany, the Reichswehr, according to Groener, would have to be three times its current size. Twenty-one infantry divisions had to be formed and armed with heavy artillery and other modern weapons. This reinforcement of the Reichswehr, however, had to take place “within the parameters of the possibilities in terms of equipment and supplies”. Expectations were, therefore, that it would not be until 1938 that these divisions would be supplied with weapons, ammunition and other equipment. In 1933, the new Reichskanzler, Adolf Hitler, made it clear in various speeches that his aim was to put an end to Germany’s military impotence. A definitive step towards the rearmament was the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933. In December 1933, Hitler then decided to set up a 300,000-strong Friedensheer. This army was to form the basis for a Kriegsheer which would be capable of conducting “a defensive war on several fronts with some prospect of success”. This would, of course, only be achieved with the reintroduction of conscription. As a basis for setting up the wartime army, consideration is being given to a peacetime army consisting of 21 divisions (300,000 men), whereby an active conscription period of one year will apply for most of the military personnel. General conscription should be introduced with effect from 1 October 1934.8

The Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalleutnant Ludwig Beck, urged caution. Too rapid an expansion of the Reichswehr would have an adverse effect on the quality of the troops. In May 1934, he wrote: In terms of national politics, it is not right that an army that has been formed so rapidly as an instrument of power for the state should have more value than an army that is two-thirds or half the size, but was built up by solid labour.�� The core of the existing professional army that will be incorporated in this will lose its striking power for good. I would rather rely on 10 people who are secure than on 50 people who are not.9 7 Walter Bernhardt, Die deutsche Aufrüstung 1934-1939. Militärische und politische Konzeptionen und ihre Einschätzung durch die Alliierten (Frankfurt am Main, 1969) 35. 8 “Denkschrift des Truppenamtes in der Heeresleitung vom 14.12.1933 über den Aufbau des künftigen Friedensheeres” in: Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, “Drei Dokumente zur Planung eines 300.000 Mann-Friedensheeres aus dem Dezember 1933”, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, XXII (1977) 115. 9 Bernhardt, Die deutsche Aufrüstung, 70.

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The required 21,000 officers, 7% of the total strength of the Friedensheer, could be recruited from the officer corps of the Bereitschaftspolizei and from the circle of former officers who had served in the First World War. A particular problem was caused by the low birth rate during the war years, which meant that the intakes were too small to meet the demand. In the autumn of 1934, the strength of the Reichswehr had nonetheless risen to over 250,000. Another problem was posed by the “attempts by the SA to form its own army”.10 In the spring of 1934, those within the Reichswehrministerium foresaw that it would be impossible to deactivate the SA by peaceful means, and so from March onwards they worked with Heinrich Himmler’s Schutzstaffel (SS), which was supplied with weapons, ammunition and accommodation. The killing of the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, on 30 June 1934, along with a number of his colleagues, indeed signified the end of the SA, but that did not give the Reichswehr a monopoly in terms of defence and security. It was, after all, Himmler’s SS which had proved indispensable for Hitler. After 1933, the SS developed into a complex organisation. Firstly, there was the Allgemeine SS, a basic organisation comprising members who only served in the SS in their free time; by the end of 1938, they numbered 215,000. They saw themselves as the ideologically pure vanguard of National Socialism. The Allgemeine SS did not, however, have any great political significance. More important was the fact that Himmler had already managed to give the SS virtually total control of the police force in 1934. A major part of the SS was the Ic-Dienst, later to become the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), a multi-faceted intelligence service, which supplied the information that formed the basis for the work of the dreaded Gestapo. In 1933, Joseph (‘Sepp’) Dietrich had formed a military sub-organisation within the SS to serve as Hitler’s personal bodyguard. This regiment was aptly named Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’. More of these SS groups were soon set up, most of which were equipped with weapons and put into barracks. A number of these produced the SS Totenkopfverbände, which were responsible for guarding the concentration camps. The SS regiments ‘Adolf Hitler’, ‘Germania’ and ‘Deutschland’ together formed the SS Verfügungstruppe, a small army which was at Hitler’s personal disposal. After the Anschluβ, a fourth regiment was formed in Vienna: the SS regiment ‘Der Führer’. From the end of 1939 onwards, all armed SS units–Totenkopfverbände and Verfügungstruppe–were known by the name 10 �� “Niederschrift �� über die Besprechungen im Reichswehr-ministerium am 20. und 21.12.1933 zum Aufbau des 300.000-Mann-Heeres” in: Rautenberg, “Drei Dokumente”, 119.

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Waffen SS. The SS Totenkopfverbände were relieved of their surveillance task in 1939 and were fully incorporated in the Waffen SS two years later. The military value of these armed SS units was initially extremely limited. They had a flawless command of the goose-step, but apart from that they had barely progressed beyond a mentality of mob violence. It was for that reason that the SS leaders decided in 1934 to recruit ex-career officers, who would turn these fanatic street fighters into reliable, professional soldiers. The SS Verfügungstruppe would, however, never become an ‘ordinary’ military unit, mainly because some of these ex-career officers used it to experiment with modern ideas, such as (…) the commander of the second SS regiment, ‘Deutschland’, former captain Felix Steiner, who had a considerable influence on the training of the entire Verfügungstruppe. Based on his experiences in the First World War, Steiner (...) believed in an elite army of small, rapid shock forces, made up of extremely well-trained, all-round soldiers.11

So what did the future hold for the Waffen SS? Should they remain a police force first and foremost, perhaps to be deployed against the Wehrmacht in the event that the army should prove politically unreliable, or should they be expanded to form a second large force, independent of the Wehrmacht? The question remained unclear for a long time. Hitler had indeed ordered improvements to the personnel and equipment of the SS Verfügungstruppe on 25 May 1939, thus securing the place of the SS troops as the second Waffenträger der Nation, but he still resisted Himmler’s fervent desire to expand the Waffen SS. It was not until 1942 that he gave in and even started to encourage the expansion. How should the combat value of the SS units which were deployed in the Netherlands in May 1940 be assessed? They coupled aspirations to an elite status and a strong desire to prove themselves on the battlefield with poor military training and minimal combat experience. They were angriffsfreudige, physically strong and well-armed volunteers who were not hindered by too much knowledge of battle. The Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe B, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, remarked in April 1940: “The combat training for NCOs and men of the SS is inadequate; that’s going to cost a lot of blood! What a waste of fine human material!”12 11 �� N.K.C.A. �� in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland. Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945. Deel 1. Inleiding/documenten 1935-1942 (The Hague, 1976) 48. 12 �� Bernhard R. Kroener, “Die personellen Ressourcen des dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942” in: Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller en Hans Umbreit, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg. Band 5. Erster Halbband. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939-1941 (Stuttgart, 1988) 832.

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The German troops who invaded the Netherlands and Belgium used a phrase book. It was clear from many of the phrases that the Germans were counting on the presence of French troops.

Back to the German rearmament. Until the referendum on the future of Saarland that was held on 1 March 1935, much restraint was exercised in public on this matter. After that, however, Hitler, who had become the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces after the death of President Paul von Hindenburg in 1934, announced far-reaching measures. He declared, for instance, during a speech on 16 March 1935, that he no longer felt bound by the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and would reintroduce general conscription that same day. The German army leadership were now able to speed up the expansion of the army. True to form, soon after the announcement of the introduction of conscription, the Truppenamt was renamed the Generalstab des Heeres and in Berlin the Kriegsakademie opened its doors once again. Generalleutnant Beck had drawn up new armament plans in the meantime. The idea was to create a Friedensheer strong enough to allow the mobilisation of a Kriegsheer that would actually be able to implement a multifront strat-

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egy. Such a Kriegsheer would need to have 63 infantry, 3 cavalry and 3 armoured divisions. The previously planned Friedensheer made up of 21 infantry divisions would no longer suffice. It was for this reason that in the “Act pertaining to the build-up of the Wehrmacht” in March 1935, Hitler presented a future Friedensheer of 36 divisions. Hitler’s wishes presented the leaders of the Reichswehr with major problems. In March 1935, the Reichswehrführung did indeed have 21 divisions, but they had not yet reached full strength. Some 280,000 men were under arms, but no more than 109 of the 189 infantry battalions were combat-ready, while the two armoured battalions only had twelve Panzerkampfwagen.13 The Chef der Heeresleitung, General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, nonetheless decided on 2 April that 24 entire divisions had to be combat-ready by the autumn of 1935. To this end, the 56,000 personnel who made up the barracked Landespolizei were incorporated in the army. This improved the quality of the army, as the Landespolizei consisted mainly of NCOs and lower ranks who already had long careers behind them. In the autumn of 1935, the German army reached a strength of approximately 400,000, which meant that the personnel complement had quadrupled in two and a half years. On 7 March 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland, the first offensive action by the newly-formed Wehrmacht. The political success of this action led to Hitler’s decision in August 1936 to involve the entire German economy in the rearmament. The aim was now to create a 2,421,000-strong army by 1 September 1939, although the German army leaders did not expect the expansion to be complete until 1942 or 1943. Things did not proceed without dispute, of course. In particular, the plans of the Inspektor der Kraftfahrtruppen, Generalmajor Oswald Lutz, and his chief of staff, Oberst Heinz Guderian, to make the armoured divisions the main operational unit of the German army met with a great deal of resistance, certainly from the side of the traditional cavalry, which felt that its very existence was under threat. Hitler was, however, receptive to unconventional ideas and he thus made sure that the mass production of Panzer I began in the winter of 1934-1935. Beck, too, allowed himself to be swayed. Without the deployment of armoured units, any attack against an enemy of equal numbers had no chance of success. He decided, therefore, that each corps should have a Panzer brigade. For the armoured units, Beck also foresaw “an independent operational deployment in conjunction with other motorised arms (currently armoured division).”14 13 �� Deist, �� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 418. 14 �Ibidem, 429.

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German infantryman with the MG-34 light machine gun.

Despite this technological modernisation, Generalleutnant Beck still considered the most important factor in the war organisation to be the human element. The Truppenführung manual, most of which he himself had written, stated: Despite technology, the value of the man is the crucial factor; his importance has grown because of dispersed battles. �� The emptiness of the battlefield demands fighters who can think and act independently, who exploit each situation with forethought, resolve and courage, filled with the conviction that it is up to each and every man to ensure success.15

The build-up of the Luftwaffe was the most spectacular part of the German rearmament in the 1930s. From three Reklamestaffeln in 1933, the German air force grew to a strength of 4,093 deployable aircraft in 1939.

15 �Truppenführung. I. Teil (Abschnitt I-XIII) (Berlin, 1936) 3.

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During the same period, the air force also developed more and more as an independent Service.16 In 1933, the German air force was still only regarded as a supporting unit for the army and the navy. But this started to change immediately after Hitler’s appointment as Reichskanzler in 1933. This became particularly apparent with the appointment of the influential National Socialist Hermann Göring as Reichskommissar für die Luftfahrt. Erhard Milch, who as state secretary took on the day-to-day management of Göring’s office, thus declared on 30 January 1933 that it was his intention to incorporate the entire air force, both military and civilian, in a Reichsluftfahrtministerium. As early as 10 May of that same year, the founding of this ministry became a fact. State Secretary Milch immediately set to work on the build-up of the Luftwaffe. The director of Lufthansa, Robert Knauss, was the first to come up with proposals. Just as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had wanted for the navy at the end of the nineteenth century, Knauss wanted to see a RisikoLuftwaffe, which would be such a powerful deterrent that not a single country would entertain the thought of attacking Germany. Milch realised, however, that Germany’s small aviation industry was not capable of implementing a programme such as this. Nonetheless, the construction of heavy bombers was the key element of the first armament plans for the Luftwaffe. This would enable Germany to carry out heavy aerial bombardments to strike an aggressor deep in his own territory. On 1 July 1934, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium presented an extensive construction programme, which envisaged for 1938 a total Luftwaffe complement of 6,671 deployable aircraft: 2,225 fighter planes, 2,188 bombers, 699 dive bombers and 1,559 reconnaissance planes. Göring made sure that the necessary funds were available. This, of course, meant a huge stimulus for the German aviation industry, which still only employed 4,000 personnel in 1933. The aircraft factories Junkers in Dessau, Heinkel in Warnemünde, Dornier in Friedrichshafen and the Bayerischen Flugzeugwerke in Augsburg expanded enormously. In October 1938, there were thus 204,100 people employed in the aviation industry. The programme ultimately proved too ambitious, despite the personal intervention of the Chef des Luftkommandoamtes, Oberst Walter Wever, who as early as May 1934 instructed Junkers and Dornier to design a four-engined bomber. The aims of the 1934 programme could not be 16 �� On �� the build-up of the Luftwaffe, see in particular: Karl Köhler and Karl-Heinz Hummel, “Die Organisation der Luftwaffe 1933-1939” in: Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939 (Munich, 1978) 501-579.

Fabric with a camouflage pattern is displayed in the government clothing store in Berlin.

German infantry cross a water obstacle with the aid of a float containing their clothing and equipment. The pack, referred to in the regulations as Zeltbahnbündel, was made by using half of a tent.

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realised and immediately after the death of Wever in 1936, Göring intervened. He appointed Generalleutnant Albert Kesselring as the new Chef des Luftkommandoamtes and Ernst Udet, until then the Oberst Inspektor der Jagd- und Sturzkampfflieger, as the Chef des Technischen Amtes. What was startling was that the Kriegsspiel “Wehrmachtstudie 1935/36”, a general staff exercise on paper, revealed that the Luftwaffe would not be capable of taking out the French air force. The conclusion was that “the German air arsenal (...) was wholly inadequate”.17 The leadership of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium concentrated, therefore, on developing a Luftwaffe which would be able to provide sufficient support for the army. This meant that the German air force became a primarily tactical air force, in which fighter planes, medium bombers and dive bombers were extremely important. In May 1940, for example, compared to 1,120 bombers of the types Dornier Do-17, Heinkel He-111 and Junkers Ju-88, there were 342 Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers and 1,264 Messerschmitt Me-109 and Me-110 fighter planes. These German aircraft had too limited a radius of action to provide effective support for naval warfare.18 A major problem in the build-up of the Luftwaffe was the recruitment of personnel. In 1933, von Blomberg decided that the officer corps should consist of an “elite corps with the most unbridled desire to fight”.19 For this, the army was obliged to relinquish some of its best people. But the civil aviation industry also lost many personnel to the burgeoning air force. In August 1939, the Luftwaffe was ultimately to comprise 15,000 officers and 370,000 NCOs and other ranks.20 The rearmament of the German navy initially proceeded at a slower and more controlled pace than that of the Luftwaffe and the army. On 18 June 1935, a naval treaty was signed with Britain, which stipulated that the German war fleet must not exceed 35% of the tonnage of British naval forces. This did not, however, apply to submarines, of which Germany was allowed to have as many as Britain. Because of this, the major expansion of the German navy did not get under way until 1938. The German navy commanders expected that in 1944 the establishment of a war fleet would be so advanced that they would have nothing to fear from Britain or any other naval power. 17 �� Deist, �� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 494. 18 �� Karl-Heinz Völker, “Die deutsche Luftwaffe September 1939 bis Juni 1940”, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, XXVII (1978) 196. J. Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London, 1999) 82-86. 19 �� Deist, �� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 478. 20 �� Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart, 1967) 183.

The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on 23 August 1939 sealed the fate of Poland. May 1940

German command structure Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht

The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under the command of Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel is the staff of the Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler.

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine

Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe XXXX

Marinegruppe West

Marinegruppe Ost

1 2

U - Boote

The Oberkommando des Heeres, under the command of General Franz Halder, is the staff of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch. Keitel and Halder command only these two staffs and have no authority over the units that come under the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht or Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres. C

3

4

Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Oberkommando des Heeres

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The more the German rearmament began to take shape, the more attention was devoted to a possible future war and the necessary operation plans. For the German army leadership, there were two key considerations. Firstly, because of the lack of raw materials, Germany would only be able to wage a short war. Then there was the problem of a potential dualfront war. Since the Franco-German war (1870-1871), the German general staff had been taking account of this in the formulation of their operation plans. The main principle that they adopted was that the opponents attacking from two sides had to be defeated one after the other. While one front acted defensively, the other had to attack. In the 1930s, the army trod very carefully in the footsteps of its predecessors in the preparation of its operation plans. That meant that any opponents in mobile warfare had to be defeated quickly. Tanks and aircraft were regarded as important tools in this respect. Because of the use of these new assets, the German warfighting method later became known as Blitzkrieg. These were, however, such traditional operation plans that they once again sought to find an answer to Germany’s classic problem of the dual-front war. By 1937, the German army had progressed to such an extent that it was able to hold its first major exercise. Because of the German territorial expansion in 1938, the rearmament was stepped up another gear and Hitler started to get involved in the military affairs. During the Sudeten crisis in 1938, the German army had 48 divisions. For the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, the Sudeten issue was actually the last straw. He felt that Hitler’s foreign policy was not in keeping with the available military means and he resigned. Beck, who was later to emerge as one of the key figures of the German resistance against Hitler, was succeeded by General der Artillerie Franz Halder. Other senior officers, such as von Blomberg and von Fritsch, also had to step down. In September 1939, the thus purged German army stood virtually as one behind Hitler and his war politics. This army, which had a modern vanguard in the form of motorised and mechanised divisions, was set up at breakneck speed after 1933, which meant that the rearmament targets were constantly raised. All this was only possible, however, because of the efforts of the Reichswehr leaders, who had been doing their utmost since the mid-1920s to recreate a strong German army. Hitler’s accession to power merely served to provide the German army leadership with greater opportunities to achieve this goal.

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Up until the military occupation of the whole of Czechoslovakia, Hitler had managed to avoid a situation in which the territorial expansions of the Third Reich would lead led to a general European military conflict. France and Britain had had enough, however, and on 31 March 1939 they signed a guarantee of military support for Poland, which looked as if it might become the next victim. When Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to invade Poland on 1 September 1939, France and Britain therefore responded two days later by declaring war on the Third Reich. The Second World War had begun. The German people were largely aware that difficult times lay ahead and they were resigned and none too enthusiastic in their response to this latest move by the Führer. Weisung Nr. 1 für die Kriegführung, which Hitler published at the beginning of the Poland campaign, stated explicitly: Now that all the political possibilities of resolving what has for Germany become an untenable situation on its eastern border have been exhausted, I have decided to opt for a solution involving the use of force.21

The way in which the war in Poland had to be conducted had been set out by Hitler in Weisung “Fall Weiss” on 3 April 1939. The aim was to invade Poland by surprise and to destroy the Polish armed forces in a brief campaign. For the German army leadership, the outbreak of war came too soon, certainly now that it looked as if war would also have to be waged on France and Britain very soon. The strategic situation bore a dangerously close resemblance to that of the unsuccessful First World War. Germany ran the risk of once again having to fight a prolonged dual-front war in Europe, while being cut off from the raw materials on the world market by a naval blockade. Although Germany had signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939, the Von Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, it was unclear how long that would hold good, given Hitler’s expansion plans in the east. The military side, too, left much to be desired. The build-up of the army was not complete, neither in terms of materiel nor personnel, and the level of proficiency of the troops—the length of service for conscripts was by then two years on average—was inadequate. Compared to the Polish forces, however, the Wehrmacht was vastly superior in terms of personnel and materiel. Including all the reserve units, 21 � Weisung Nr. 1 für die Kriegführung in: Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. (2nd ed.; Koblenz, 1983) 19.

German soldiers meet in the north of the Polish Corridor, south-west of Danzig, on 11 September 1939 (right); Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, on 9 September 1939, during the Polish campaign (below).

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the German offensive army consisted of 15 Panzer and motorised infantry divisions. In addition, 37 ordinary infantry divisions were deployed. The German forces also had 3,600 armoured vehicles and 1,929 aircraft. In the west, the German army remained safely behind the Westwall, the German defence line along the western bank of the Rhine. It was here that Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb used 12 well-equipped and well-trained divisions and 32 more poorly equipped and trained ones to conduct the strategic defensive. It was not made very difficult for him, however, as the vast majority of the French stayed safely behind their Maginot Line. The German army leadership were able to concentrate all their attention on the fighting in Poland. Poland had lost this war before it even began. It was surrounded by German forces on three sides: to the west by those in Germany itself, to the south by those in German-occupied Slovakia and to the north by those in German East Prussia. Lastly, the eastern border was threatened by the Red Army of the Soviet Union. Faced with this threat, the Polish high command positioned the forces in an all-round defence along the borders. They were thus widely dispersed and would for that reason alone be outnumbered wherever the Germans concentrated their point of main effort. But the Polish army was even smaller than the German attack force. The Poles deployed 37 infantry divisions and 750 armoured vehicles, supported by 900 aircraft. They did have 11 mounted brigades, while the Germans only had one such brigade. However, this advantage had no significance whatsoever, as these units were in effect no longer suitable for modern warfare. The German attack on Poland was carried out by two army groups. Army Group South attacked from the south, under the command of Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt. The other army group, Army Group North, was under the command of Generaloberst Fedor von Bock. They attacked from the north. Together, the two army groups were to execute a pincer movement in the direction of Warsaw, as a result of which the Polish army would be surrounded and destroyed. The point of main effort of the German attack lay with Army Group South. This army group consisted of three armies, of which the 10th Army had orders to carry out the decisive thrust to Warsaw and seize the capital. The commander of this army was Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau and the chief of staff was General Friedrich Paulus. One of the smaller units in this Heeresgruppe was SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. It soon became clear that it performed badly on the front. The main reason for this was the lack of military proficiency. After 10 September 1939, this SS regiment was, therefore, assigned

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a simpler task on the front. The face of Hitler’s elite group was thus saved and the army group was not hindered too much by Sepp Dietrich and his enthusiastic but incompetent SS personnel. The task of Army Group North was first to link up Pomerania and East Prussia by capturing the Polish corridor at Danzig. They would then sheer off to the south in order to support von Rundstedt’s attack northwards. Even during the preparations for the Polish campaign, von Bock had pointed out that it was wrong to give his army group such a subordinate role. He foresaw that large sections of the Polish army would avoid the encirclement at Warsaw by retreating towards the east over the river Vistula. So, after the capture of the Polish corridor, von Bock wanted his army group to execute an encirclement from East Prussia to BrestLitovsk (some 200 kilometres east of Warsaw) in order to head off the Polish army. However, the Oberkommando des Heeres, in other words the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, General Walther von Brauchitsch, and his chief of staff, General Franz Halder, objected to von Bock’s ideas and stuck to the original course, obviously much to the satisfaction of von Rundstedt. Relations between von Brauchitsch and von Bock remained good, despite these professional differences of opinion, but in the case of von Bock and Halder, the disagreement about the campaign in Poland was to lead to personal irritation. This did not detract from the fact that von Bock was by and large considered a stubborn but highly competent, intelligent and ambitious officer. He was one of the few German commanders who had had first-hand combat experience on the front line during the First World War. He had been decorated for that with one of the highest honours, the Pour le Mérite. During the Polish campaign, his Army Group North comprised the 4th Army and the 3rd Army. The commander-in-chief of the latter was General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler. The air support for the army group was provided by Air Fleet 2, which was under the command of General der Flieger Albert Kesselring. The cooperation between von Bock, Kesselring and von Küchler was to run smoothly throughout the operations. Another of von Bock’s prominent subordinate commanders was General der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian. He commanded the XIXth Panzer Corps and was seeking an opportunity to test his theories on the use of armour in practice. Once the German attack had started, it soon became clear that von Bock had been right. Parts of the Polish army indeed tried to escape the grip of von Rundstedt’s Army Group South by retreating across the Vistula. The Oberkommando des Heeres, however, held fast to the original operation plan until 9 September 1939 and only then did they

Massive show of support for the Führer in the Reichstag after the campaign against Poland, 6 October 1939.

In 1940, the German army had about twice the number of horses that they had in 1914. This picture shows a column including a mobile kitchen near Wittenberg, on the Elbe, on the way to the western front on 2 April 1940.

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give von Bock leave to use Guderian’s Panzer Corps to strike out far to the east. Brest-Litovsk was captured on 15 September, thus sealing the fate of the Polish army. France and Britain were unable to help Poland and the Soviet Union invaded the beleaguered country on 17 September 1939 in order to occupy the territory it had been allocated in the pact of 23 August 1939. Germany and the Soviet Union subsequently signed a Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag on 28 September 1939. After the fall of Warsaw the day before, the battle continued east of the Vistula for another few days. Poland eventually capitulated on 7 October 1939, by which time Hitler had turned his attention to France. German losses during the fighting in Poland amounted to 10,572 dead, 30,322 wounded and 3,404 missing. In terms of materiel, 300 tanks and 560 aircraft were lost. The battles were analysed immediately by the German army leadership. Although the losses were not deemed to be abnormally high, the battles showed that the army had numerous shortcomings. The senior staffs had functioned well on the whole. The problems lay mainly in the command at the level of the lowest commanders and their NCOs. There were also failings in the combat training and combat discipline of the ordinary soldiers. It was, for instance, much too often the case that small units had been distracted from their military objectives by undisciplined conduct towards the civilian population. Extensive training programmes were immediately imposed on the troops in order to address these shortcomings.

The German operation plan for the Westfeldzug On 3 October 1939, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group B, was ordered by the Oberkommando des Heeres to go in great haste from Allenstein in East Prussia to Berlin to receive information about new operations. Much to his annoyance, he had to wait until 9 October before he was able to speak to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch. During that conversation, von Bock learned that the Oberkommando des Heeres did not see much point in a western offensive. The risks for Germany which had been identified by Halder since the Franco-British declaration of war on 3 September still existed: a repeat of 1914-1918 was likely and Germany was nowhere near ready for a test of strength with the French army, which was considered to be the strongest in Europe. That same day, however, saw the issue of Adolf Hitler’s Weisung Nr. 6 für die Kriegführung, in which he ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare for an offensive in the west. The Führer had decided “to act decisively and of-

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fensively without allowing much time to elapse”.22 While the staff of Army Group B were moving from Allenstein to Bad Godesberg, von Bock went to Frankfurt am Main to meet Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, the commander of Army Group C, which had already been posted to Germany’s western border, and to take over the part of the front intended for Army Group B. During that meeting, von Leeb pointed out that, because of the political consequences and the Wehrmacht’s military options, he was very much against a German offensive in the west. Von Bock was broadly of the same opinion, although for him the military-technical considerations weighed heavier than the political ones. Army Group B, comprising the 4th Army and the 6th Army, took over the sector of the front to the north of the Sankt Goar–Mittlach–Bisschof line from Army Group C. On 11 October 1939, the commanders-in-chief of the 4th Army, Generaloberst Günther von Kluge, and the 6th Army, Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau, were summoned to Bad Godesberg. Von Bock posed the question of whether a German military operation against France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was possible and, if so, how any such offensive should be conducted. Both von Reichenau and von Kluge rejected an attack on military-operational grounds because there was a serious risk that it would run aground in northern France, just as it had in 1914. Von Bock incorporated the opinions of both his subordinate commanders in a memorandum for the Oberkommando des Heeres, which he submitted on 12 October 1939. In it, he recommended that the initiative should for the time being be left to France and Britain. As a result of Hitler’s orders of 9 October to prepare for a war of aggression in the west, the chief of the general staff, General Halder, drew up an operation plan despite the objections of the commanders of the two army groups. The planning of the Westfeldzug had thus begun. This proceeded concurrently with the preparations for the conquest of Denmark and Norway, an operation which was referred to as Unternehmen “Weserübung”. The task of planning this operation fell to the Seekriegsleitung. Their domain was the naval war with Britain and the economic preparations for war, in particular ensuring the supply of iron ore from Sweden. The Westfeldzug was part of the land war and focused primarily on defeating France. On 19 October 1939, the Oberkommando des Heeres issued Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’. Fall Gelb was the German codename for the offensive in the west. The Oberkommando wanted to deploy 75 divisions in order to defeat large sections of the French army and to occupy the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France. This would, in accordance 22 �� Hubatsch, ��Hitlers Weisungen, 32-33.

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with Hitler’s wishes of 9 October, create favourable conditions for the continuation of the war against Britain. The French army would be weakened, the Channel ports would become available and an “extended forward area” to protect the Ruhr area would be under German control. Halder believed that the point of main effort of the offensive should lie to the north of Liège, so that strong German units could reach Dutch soil by crossing the river Maas at and to the north of Maastricht and could use parts of the Netherlands to the south of the major rivers as an advance area. He did not expect much resistance from the Dutch army. Army Group B, now comprising the 2nd, 4th and 6th Armies, was to be active in the operation’s main effort. This army group, the first to come back from Poland and thus automatically tasked for the time being with the main part of the offensive, had to defeat the Belgian forces, eradicate any French support and advance to the coast. Army Group A, which was positioned between Army Group B and Army Group C, was to protect these operations by advancing south through Luxembourg and the Ardennes. On the northern flank of Army Group B’s operations, a new Armee-Abteilung N(ord), which would fall under the direct command of the Oberkommando des Heeres, was to breach the Grebbe Line to the north of the major Dutch rivers and take possession of Fortress Holland. And finally, Army Group C simply had to sit out the course of the battle in its positions opposite the Maginot Line and then fix the French forces in this line.23 Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’ was only a provisional operation plan, not much more than the “expression of an imposed unimaginative improvisation”, possibly even also intended to show Hitler that he would be well advised to avoid an offensive against France.24 There was thus widespread criticism of the plan. Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, objected to the operation against the Grebbe Line and against the chosen point of main effort, just as Hitler had done, while he was of the general opinion that the German offensive would be too weak. On 22 October, there was a meeting about this between the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres, during which the possibility of abandoning the idea of an offensive against Fortress Holland was discussed. In the days that followed, there were frantic discussions between the German army chiefs about the operational alternatives. On 25 October, 23 �� Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 19391940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1956) 42-51. 24 �� Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957) 32. K.H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 74-75.

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Hitler listened first to von Brauchitsch and Halder, then to von Bock, von Reichenau and von Kluge. The Führer put forward the idea of placing the point of main effort of the offensive to the south of Liège, then to cross the Meuse at Namur and, once the allies had entered Flanders, advance from there to the north-west, thereby isolating and destroying the troops that had assembled in Belgium. This idea took the army leadership completely by surprise. Hitler instructed the Oberkommando des Heeres “to investigate the new idea”. 25 During the subsequent discussions, Hitler backtracked to his earlier ideas, as he so often did. Now the idea was that points of main effort would be formed both to the north and to the south of Liège. The main objective, after a frontal attack, was to destroy enemy troops and to reach the Channel coast. Both points of main effort were to be reinforced with a Panzergruppe, while the deployment of larger armoured units in the 6th Army had to wait until safe crossing over the Meuse could be ensured. The Oberkommando des Heeres took these ideas into account when drawing up the second Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’ of 29 October 1939. The plan to occupy the Netherlands was abandoned completely. Army Group B would now breach the Belgian defence lines with two points of main effort, one on either side of Liège. If this was successful, the operation should achieve the same result that had been envisaged in the draft of 19 October. Whether that would be achieved by veering to the north-west or the south-west after reaching the Antwerp–Brussels–Charleroi line would depend on where the main allied force was situated at the time; in other words, on whether the main allied force would remain in France or move on into Belgium. Army Group A, comprising the 12th Army and the 16th Army, still had to provide protection for the flank.26 On the basis of this plan, Hitler wanted to see an attack as early as 5 November, despite resistance by the German army leadership. The date for the attack was changed because of bad weather. This was to happen on many more occasions in the time that followed, but not only as a result of the weather. Another reason was the inconsistency on the part of Hitler who, by continuing to put forward new ideas, confused the military planning process time and time again. On 11 November 1939, for example, he ordered the staff of Guderian’s XIXth Corps to be transferred from Army Group B to Army Group A and to take command of mechanised 25 �� Hans Umbreit, “Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa” in: Klaus A. Maier e.a., Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg.�� Band �� 2. Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979) 246-247. 26 �� “Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’”, 29 oktober 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 46-51. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 75.

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German paratroops training in a Junkers Ju-52, February 1940.

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and motorised divisions. This corps was to advance on the south wing via Arlon to the Meuse at Sedan. Hitler was not sure whether the bridges over the Meuse at Liège would indeed fall undamaged into German hands. If they did not—a possibility which was reminiscent of the fatal delay that the Germans had experienced at Liège in 1914—then the armoured units of Army Group B would have to stand idly by and watch the offensive run

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aground. Army Group A would thus provide an alternative. For the time being, however, Hitler’s order meant the creation of a third point of main effort, in addition to those on either side of Liège. Hitler was of the opinion that it would only be possible to decide on the actual point of main effort once the operation was under way and more was known about the allied operation. All in all, more and more emphasis was thus placed on the frontal nature of the offensive and the actual objective became even less clear. The change of date for the attack also gave the German army leadership an opportunity to consider the operations against the Netherlands once again. The Luftwaffe in particular objected to the plan to leave the Netherlands alone. After all, British air forces could, in the event of a German attack, come to the Netherlands and from there bomb the Ruhr area. Hitler was persuaded and on 15 November, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht issued what was known as a Holland-Weisung. Army Group B now had to occupy the Netherlands up to the Grebbe Line and also, in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine, prepare an attack on the West Frisian Islands, the islands along the northern coast of the Netherlands.27 The Luftwaffe could then set up observation posts on Dutch soil which would be able to alert the air defences in the event of a British air attack. Von Bock, the commander of Army Group B, was not at all happy about this Holland-Weisung, given that the partial occupation of the Netherlands would mean that the right flank of the 6th Army, which was to advance through Noord-Brabant, would be left unprotected. He had not been able to stand Halder since Poland anyway. Von Bock scoffed that Halder was making him perform a “water pantomime”, which had nothing to do with the main effort in Belgium and which did nothing to affect the threat from the Netherlands itself. The army group felt, therefore, that the whole of the Netherlands should be occupied, so that neither the British army nor the air force would have the chance to entrench in Fortress Holland. Once the Netherlands had been taken, troops would become available for the subsequent advance on Belgium and France. The Luftwaffe was also unhappy with the half-hearted solution offered by the Holland-Weisung. This bungling of the operational planning, added to the fundamental doubt that still existed on the military side as to the capability of defeating France, was crippling for the mutual trust between Hitler, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres. On 23 November 1939, therefore, Hitler summoned the commanders-in-chief of 27 �� Letter �� from Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Walther von Brauchitsch to Heeresgruppenkommando B, 15 November 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 55-56.

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the three Services, the commanders of the army groups and armies, the chiefs of staff of the corps and other high-ranking military personnel to Berlin to convince them of the need for and feasibility of a war against France and Britain. The time, Hitler told them, was ripe to attack the allies. For the first time in German history, the risk of a dual-front war could be avoided, thanks to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The aim of a German offensive was to eliminate France and to secure the European mainland against any British attacks, preferably by signing a compromise peace agreement with London, in order to have their hands free to acquire Lebensraum in the east. The crisis of confidence continued after this meeting, however. The incident at Maasmechelen on 10 January 1940, in which important operational documents fell into Belgian hands, led to more confusion. What had the Belgians discovered, what had they told Paris and London, how much importance would the allies attach to the documents and, above all, what did this mean for the German operation plans? The third Aufmarschanweisung, which Hitler issued on 30 January 1940, was thus virtually the same and equally as unsatisfying as the previous two. The idea was to advance over a wide front to the Channel coast, conquer Belgium and defeat as many French and British troops as possible in order to continue the war against the allies from a stronger position. In accordance with Hitler’s orders of 11 November 1939, Halder foresaw a third point of main effort, in the Ardennes with Army Group A. As a result of the discussions about the Holland-Weisung, the whole of the Netherlands would now be occupied. The impasse which the operational planning had thus reached would not be broken until the middle of February 1940. That was largely due to the chief of staff of Army Group A, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein. Faced with the first Aufmarschanweisung in October 1939, he had already reached the conclusion that the greatest objection to Halder’s operation plans was that they would not lead to the destruction of the enemy and could not, therefore, produce a decisive result. The planned operation cannot have a decisive effect on the war. In terms of numbers, the combat power ratio does not form the basis for a destructive victory against the allied armies.28

This was because the German main effort, in Army Group B, would meet the allied main effort head on, namely the French and British units that 28 �� Letter �� from the commander-in-chief of Heeresgruppe A to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, 31 October 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 119-122. Rundstedt expressed here what von Manstein had presented to him in a memorandum. See also: E. von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, 1955) 91-124, 625 ff. and Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 78-94.

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were on the way to the forward front in Belgium. That would probably end in a stalemate. Von Manstein was also worried that his own Army Group A was too weak to protect Army Group B’s long left flank against the expected French counterattacks from the south during the advance to the coast. Army Group B would thus not only have to expect heavy fighting in front, but would also be liable to dangerous counterattacks on the left flank. Over the period from October 1939 to January 1940, von Manstein was to write seven memoranda in which he gradually spelled out his thoughts about an entirely different operation plan, first to the commander of Army Group A, von Rundstedt, and through him to Halder. Von Manstein wanted to place the German point of main effort further south, with Army Group A. With strong mechanised and motorised units, Army Group A would have to advance quickly through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes via Arlon to the Meuse and cross the river at Sedan. Then, without worrying about their open flanks, the ‘mobile troops’ had to push through northern France at the same tempo to the Channel coast at Abbeville, the Somme estuary. They would thus slip through behind the allied troops heading to the north and north-east. Army Group B’s task was not to defeat the allies in their point of main effort in Flanders but indeed to lure the enemy towards them. The further the allies advanced into Belgium, the better: that would mean that they were leaving northern France, the place where the Germans wanted to force a decision. Ultimately, the entire allied force in Flanders would be surrounded and would end up between a rock (Army Group A, in the south) and a hard place (Army Group B, in the east and the north). The allies would have the sea behind them. Sealed in this “Kessel”, the French, British and Belgian armies would eventually have to surrender or otherwise risk destruction. Von Manstein thus proposed that the attack be directed not at the place where the allies were strong but indeed at the place where they were weak. Sedan lay to the west of the last ouvrage on the Maginot Line and the Meuse front was relatively sparsely occupied here because the French had positioned their best units on their left flank, along the Flanders border. An important question was whether it would be possible for large motorised and mechanised units to advance quickly, in other words in three days, through Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the Meuse and cross the river immediately, on the fourth day. The French had good reason to believe that they could manage with a weak defence here. Von Manstein was lucky in this respect in that in November 1939 the staff of Guderian’s XIXth Corps had been placed under the command of Army Group A

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and sent to Koblenz, which was already home to the army group’s staff. Von Manstein and Guderian were also quartered in neighbouring hotels. As the chief of staff of the Inspekteur der Kraftfahrtruppe, Guderian had been the driving force behind the development of the German tank arm and was convinced as no other of the possibilities of this new weapon. Guderian also knew the Ardennes and the terrain at Sedan from his own experience. He had moved through the Ardennes during the advance in 1914 and had spent a month in Sedan for a general staff course at the beginning of 1918. He confirmed to von Manstein that it would be possible for strong tank units to advance through the Ardennes to the Meuse in three days. Conversely, von Manstein’s operation plan also confirmed Guderian’s own idea that tank units should be concentrated in the point of main effort, thereby ensuring that the whole campaign could be decided quickly and that a futile war of attrition, such as that of 1914-1918, could be avoided. Von Manstein’s subsequent memoranda were thus the result of intensive and stimulating discussions with Guderian. Von Manstein had quickly dealt with the problem of the point of main effort, but he also had a solution for the danger of French flank attacks, which threatened Halder’s plan. He suggested that when the main force of tank units moved from the bridgehead at Sedan to the Somme Valley, the units following immediately behind should break out of the bridgehead in a southerly direction, towards Rheims, Châlons sur Marne and from there to the southernmost point of the Maginot Line at Belfort. They would be able to defeat the sizeable reserves that the French were keeping behind the Maginot Line in Lorraine, long before they could threaten the bridgehead. This offensive form of defence also made it unnecessary to secure Army Group A’s four-hundred-kilometre-long left flank (from the German-Luxembourg border to the Channel coast) with a defensive front, because the French would simply not have the assets with which to attack it. The tank divisions would thus be able to concentrate fully on their race to the west. To make all this possible, however, Army Group A would have to be reinforced. On 30 November, prompted by von Manstein’s first memorandum, von Rundstedt wrote to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres: If this new operational concept, whether it serves as the basic idea for the entire operation or merely as an addition to the attack through northern Belgium, is to be implemented effectively, it is absolutely vital that the army group is brought into line with it in terms of command structure and order of battle.

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As many motorised and mechanised divisions as possible were to be assembled at the point of main effort, according to Guderian himself “preferably all of them!”.29 Up until the beginning of February 1940, the ideas of the von Manstein-Guderian duo had no influence on the discussions about the operation plan between the Oberkommando des Heeres, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Hitler. Halder’s third Aufmarschanweisung, on 30 January, simply expanded on the previous two. That was because Halder refused to submit von Manstein’s memoranda to Keitel and Hitler. Halder was enough of a military professional to see the creativity, even brilliance, in von Manstein’s proposals. But that was precisely his objection: they paved the way for something he was dead set against, namely a premature invasion of France. Also, Halder could not bear to suddenly introduce an as yet undeveloped idea into the planning process at levels above him. Halder was a methodical man, who would only accept an idea once all its aspects had been logically and mathematically calculated and once all staff sections had been consulted in detail. He did not want to run the risk that Hitler would be off and running with von Manstein’s idea before the plan had been worked out. It would only serve to confirm the Führer’s already preconceived notion that the professional staff process was an obstacle in the decision-making process and that it was better to trust purely in intuition and willpower. If that idea went ahead, Halder, and with him the entire military leadership, would no longer have a leg to stand on in his struggle with Hitler. Nothing less than one of the main characteristics of the German military system, namely the independence of the professional military planning, was at stake here. On 27 January 1940, Halder even managed to have von Manstein promoted away. On 9 February, the latter travelled, deeply disappointed, to Stettin to take command of the XXXVIIIth Corps, which was still being formed. Von Manstein was replaced by Generalleutnant Georg von Sodenstern, a man who was known to have no expectations regarding the use of the tank arm. The arrival of winter, which made any offensive unfeasible for the time being, gave Halder the opportunity in the second half of December to study the different operational possibilities in a Kriegsspiel. The setting of a new date for the attack, on 17 January 1940, however, made it impossible to put this intention into practice. After the attack date had been changed 29 �� Letter from Rundstedt to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Brauchitsch, 30 November 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 129-131. H. Guderian, Errinerungen eines Soldaten (Neckargemünd, 1960) 79.

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again, the Kriegsspiel took place after all on 7 February, two days before von Manstein’s departure. His assumptions turned out to be correct. A breakthrough at Sedan by three tank divisions of General Guderian’s XIXth Corps and General Gustav von Wietersheim’s motorised XIVth Corps was to prove highly successful. By this stage, nobody any longer expected major allied resistance in northern France. Since the middle of January 1940, the Germans had been certain that large sections of the British and French forces would enter Belgium. This was a result of the shock reaction in Gamelin’s headquarters that followed the announcement of the German operation plans after the incident at Maasmechelen on 10 January. In response, the French had alerted all their front-line units and mobilised their reserves. The German military intelligence service managed, after cracking the codes, to monitor the huge volume of accompanying radio traffic and build up an accurate picture of the French order of battle and planned operations. Halder gradually became convinced by the outcome of the Kriegsspiel on 7 February and a follow-up on 14 February. So he started work on a fourth Aufmarschanweisung, in which he incorporated the results of the Kriegsspiele. That did not mean that he adopted von Manstein’s ideas in full. In the advance through the Ardennes, Halder wanted infantry divisions to go in front, secure the Meuse crossing and then form a strong, unassailable bridgehead. Only once that had been achieved would the tank divisions of Guderian’s XIXth Corps be able to perform a forward passage of lines through the infantry and break out of the bridgehead towards the coast. That would not be possible until the tenth day of battle. This prospect filled Guderian with horror, and it would have horrified von Manstein too, had he known, because it gave the French all the time they needed to take countermeasures once they had realised that the German point of main effort was not in Flanders but at Sedan. In the opinions of von Manstein and Guderian, the tank divisions should be in the spearhead from the start, on the fourth day, with their own infantry regiments, fight their way across the Meuse and break out to the west immediately. In this campaign, speed and surprise along the main axis of advance had to be more important than combat power ratios. Halder would eventually agree to a vanguard comprising Guderian’s XIXth Corps, but would stick to his opinion that the bridgehead they had formed should first be extended by the infantry divisions from the next echelon before the tank divisions were allowed to break out. In the meantime, Hitler remained uneasy about the operation plans of the Oberkommando des Heeres. In December 1939 and January 1940, his

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thoughts regularly returned to Sedan. Unlike von Manstein and Guderian, who saw Sedan as a prerequisite for destroying the allies, Hitler regarded Sedan as a local, tactical issue: a more suitable place to cross the river than Maastricht, Liège or Namur. Just as in his orders of 11 November 1939, again he dared not commit himself and announced to his generals that he wanted to leave the point of main effort of the operation open for the time being. He wanted the decision to depend on the actual course of the operation. It would not be their own initiative, therefore, but their response to the actions of the allies which would determine the location of the main effort, if it were up to the Führer. On 2 February 1940, Hitler heard for the first time that, as well as the three Aufmarschanweisungen from the Oberkommando des Heeres, there were other plans in circulation. It was his aide-de-camp, Oberstleutnant Rudolf Schmundt, who alerted him to that fact after a visit to the Army Group A headquarters in Koblenz. Although Hitler did not realise the strategic scope of von Manstein’s operation plan, it did provide him with the arguments he needed to impose his will on the Oberkommando des Heeres and thus strengthen his position of power over the reluctant military leaders. On 13 February, he discussed various matters with Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, the Chef des Wehrmachtführungsamtes, and he showed himself to be in favour of deploying the largest part of the motorised units in the direction of Sedan. On 17 February, the Führer then met with von Manstein, who explained his ideas to him in person. Hitler was extremely impressed by them and the next day the Oberkommando des Heeres received orders via Jodl to make new plans which took account of the Führer’s ideas. Halder and those around him had by then abandoned all hope of dissuading Hitler from an attack on France. Halder now felt that, if the campaign against France was inevitable, he should opt for a flight forward and that the best thing for him to do would be to try to achieve a crushing defeat of the allies. Von Manstein’s operation plan offered the best chance for this, as he himself had concluded from the Kriegsspiele. When Jodl’s orders reached him on 18 February, his formulation of the fourth and last Aufmarschanweisung was already well advanced. By that time, Halder had lost another weapon with which to continue his resistance to the campaign in France. During the winter months, Hitler had ordered the attack on several occasions, but had cancelled it each time in the period between the warning order and the implementation order. In February 1940, this time lapse no longer existed. This was the result of the development of what was known as the So-Fortfall, an operation plan for use in the event of an allied attack on Germany. A rapid

The workhorse of the Luftwaffe, the Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft.

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response by the Wehrmacht was of course of paramount importance in such a case. In the months preceding the Westfeldzug, the operation plan for the So-Fortfall was constantly improved and refined, whereby the time needed between the warning order and the implementation order became shorter and shorter. The ultimate result was that the response time for Fall Gelb was reduced from more than six days to a few hours. The opportunity for opposing an attack order had thus disappeared. On 24 February 1940, Halder had finished the Neufassung der Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’. Its key sentence read as follows: The troops deployed to the south of the Liège–Charleroi line will force the crossing over the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan (including both places) and open the way to the northern French border defence towards the lower reaches of the Somme.

In all its simplicity, this sentence placed the attack’s point of main effort clearly with Army Group A: the 4th Army was incorporated in this army group and half of the German armoured units, later organised in Panzergruppe Kleist, were assigned to the 12th Army, which was to bring about the breach at Sedan. The 16th Army was to protect the southern flank of the operation.30 Halder thus abandoned the second attack proposed by von Manstein, from the bridgehead to the south, against the French reserves in Lorraine. The new operation plan was later dubbed the Sichelschnittplan, an analogy which likened the advance to Abbeville to the motion of a reaper who puts his sickle to a sheaf of corn and then chops it down. The impasse in the operational decision-making had finally been broken. The plan of 24 February 1940 combined the genius of von Manstein, the methodical testing of his operational concept by Halder, its execution by Guderian, the will and the authority of Hitler and, finally, the certainty regarding the Franco-British operations in Belgium. That did not mean, however, that everyone was now in agreement on the German side. After the months of unresolved discussions about the operation plan, the breakthrough in the fourth Aufmarschanweisung came as a shock to many. Among the army commanders within Army Group A, and also more broadly within the ranks of the German generals, there was considerable doubt as to the chances of Halder’s operation plan leading to victory. They had not been convinced by the Kriegsspiele of 7 and 14 February 1940. The most outspoken of the critics were the chief of staff of Army Group A, Generalleutnant von Sodenstern, and the commander of Army 30 �� “Neufassung �� der Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’”, 24 February 1940, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 64-68.

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Group B, Generaloberst von Bock. Their arguments were highly reminiscent of the French theories about the obstacle value of the Ardennes and the Meuse. The dense concentration of tank units in Army Group A, the advance though the Ardennes, the Meuse crossing and the open flanks during the advance to the coast were all far too great a risk and actually heralded the failure of the plan. Why should the passage through the arduous terrain of the Ardennes succeed where the crossing of the flat terrain of Flanders had ended in a fiasco in 1914? In both cases, the objective was, after all, to envelop and take out the enemy’s main force. Did Halder actually realise how vulnerable the tank columns were to air strikes on the narrow roads in the Ardennes, certainly if the offensive ran aground on the French Meuse defences? Did Halder really think that the French units in the Maginot Line to the east of Sedan would let Guderian proceed unchallenged? But even if the river crossing at Sedan and the breakout from the bridgehead succeeded, what was the point if Guderian’s corps was then destroyed by the French operational reserves on the southern flank? In these circles, Halder was referred to as the “gravedigger of the tank arm” and his plan was described as “foolish and reckless”.31 This dissension about the chances of success in the point of main effort of Fall Gelb was never to disappear and would even play a role in the execution of the operation. The decision had been made, however, and Halder, ironically the man who had at first opposed von Manstein’s plan the most vehemently, stuck to his decision. The task of Army Group C remained unchanged—to fix the French in the Maginot Line. The task of Army Group B was to capture the Netherlands and thus prevent the country being used as an operating base for the allies. It was also supposed to draw the allied forces present in Belgium and fix them. The operation plan now contained a number of elements which were ideal for directing the attention of the allied high command to the northern part of the theatre of operations and to confirm their expectations that the German main effort lay in Flanders. These elements related to the deployment of air forces. During the first three days of the offensive, the bombers and Stukas (Sturzkampfflugzeuge) would mainly appear near Army Group B, above Belgium and the Netherlands. Over the Ardennes, the Luftwaffe would concentrate on fighter plane actions to engage French and British reconnaissance units. Only when Guderian had to cross the Meuse and form a bridgehead on the left bank of the river would the tactical air support capacity, namely the Stukas, be as31 �� Frieser, ��Blitzkrieg-Legende, 78-94, 102-103, 110-114.

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signed urgently to the point of main effort. There, the bombers would perform interdiction tasks and the fighter planes would gain air supremacy. But more importantly, from the first minutes of battle, Gamelin’s attention would be drawn to the north by the spectacular deployment of a new weapon, the airborne troops. On the morning of the first day of battle, the showpiece of the Belgian fortifications, Fort Eben Emael, which defended the bridges over the Albert Canal to the north of Liège, would have to be taken out by a special air-landing unit, which was to use gliders to land on top of the fort. At the same time, paratroops in the Netherlands would take the bridges at Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam by surprise and airborne troops would capture three airfields near The Hague. For all these units themselves, the tactical assignments were of course the most important, but the real importance of their actions lay at a higher operational level: to deceive the allied high command with regard to the point of main effort of the offensive.32 Given that the capture of the Netherlands had become a significant part of Army Group B’s operations, a decision had already been made earlier, in January 1940, to form a new army. It became the 18th Army, the staff of which was already in the army group under the command of General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler. This was the staff which had led the 3rd Army during the Polish campaign. The 18th Army was allocated the front section to the north of the 6th Army, which was under the command of Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau and was also the location of the point of main effort of Army Group B’s attack. It was supported in its operations by Air Fleet 2 under the command of General der Flieger Albert Kesselring. The decision-making regarding the operations against the Netherlands and the implementation thereof thus fell to the three commanders, von Bock, von Küchler and Kesselring, who had already shown that they could work well together in the Polish campaign. For the development of the plan of attack on the Netherlands, they were able to fall back on earlier ideas on the subject. Similar plans of attack had already been made in 1939 as a result of the Holland-Weisung.

Plan of attack of the 18th Army On 19 November 1939, the Xth Corps, which was part of Army Group B, revealed its own plan of attack. In this plan, one of the infantry divisions of the corps, the 227th, had the task of crossing the IJssel at Deventer and 32 �Ibidem, XXI, 103-105, 301.

When the German army invaded the Netherlands, it used a number of armoured trains in order to be able to push through quickly into the depth.

Delivering indirect fire with German 88mm guns at Maastricht, 10 May 1940.

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Zutphen and then pushing through to Amersfoort by way of Apeldoorn. The 207th Infantry Division was to march on Utrecht via Arnhem and Ede. Both divisions would be provided with a motorised vanguard with extra artillery and engineer support. The unit reporting for this task that same day was SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, which had, however, guarded part of Germany’s western border during the attack on Poland and had therefore had no combat experience. The 227th Infantry Division did not receive its motorised vanguard until later, in the form of SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. Unlike SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, this regiment had indeed gained experience in Poland, but had, according to many Wehrmacht officers, failed. At 12.00 hrs on 29 January 1940, the staff of the 18th Army took over the command in its front sector and the plans of attack could be developed further. The 18th Army was to attack the Netherlands with the 1st Cavalry Division, the Xth Corps and the XXVIth Corps. The general assignment was to occupy the Netherlands as quickly as possible and thus release units for the fighting against the French and British armies elsewhere in the army group’s sector. In support of this task, the airborne corps, under the command of Generalleutnant Kurt Student, would conduct an airborne operation within Fortress Holland. In the 18th Army’s plan of attack, the 1st Cavalry Division played a subordinate role. The division’s task was to occupy the northern provinces and then cross the IJsselmeer to breach Fortress Holland near Enkhuizen. The Xth Corps, on the other hand, attracted considerably more of von Küchler’s attention. This corps, reinforced by the two SS regiments, was to breach the IJssel Line north of the major rivers and attack the New Dutch Waterline. No account was taken of strong defences on the Grebbe Line. The point of main effort of the 18th Army’s attack lay, however, with the XXVIth Corps. This corps had the task of breaching the Peel-Raam Position and establishing communications with the German paratroops who had landed by the Moerdijk bridges. A front also had to be formed to the south in order to ward off an allied counterattack from the direction of Antwerp and Zeeland. On 10 May 1940, the corps had the 254th Infantry Division, the 256th Infantry Division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and the 9th Panzer Division to perform these tasks. Both the infantry divisions had the task of breaking through the Peel-Raam Position in order to clear the way to the west for the other two divisions. In order to check the feasibility of this corps’ plan of attack, Armeeoberkommando 18 held a Kriegsspiel on 28 February 1940 based on the existing plans and order of battle. Another aim of this Kriegsspiel was to train the commanders and staff of the corps and the divisions in making

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decisions and issuing orders to their units. The Kriegsspiel was based on the assumption that, with the exception of the railway bridge at Gennep, all the bridges over the Maas had been destroyed, including those at Mook and Grave. Other assumptions were that Dutch troops would quickly have vacated the Peel-Raam Position and that the Luftwaffe would have eliminated the Dutch air force in a surprise attack and gained control of the airspace. A major problem was the limited road network in NoordBrabant, which meant that there was a considerable risk of traffic jams during the German advance. It was also assumed that British, French and Belgian troops in Noord-Brabant, at ’s-Hertogenbosch for example, would attempt to halt the German advance. During the two-day Kriegsspiel, the participants discussed and analysed all the possibilities of the attack by the XXVIth Corps. In the concluding meeting, von Küchler once again pointed out what the aim of this exercise had been: It was partly to focus your thinking and point out that, in the event of an attack, it is important to deny the enemy the initiative by acting as quickly as possible, that this command post exercise was held. More specifically, the aim of the exercise was to reflect on and calculate, on the basis of the situation likely to arise in the course of the battle, how the battle of the XXVIth Corps in the army’s point of main effort would proceed in terms of time.33

Von Bock, who had himself been present at the Kriegsspiel on 28 February, felt that things had been extremely favourably presented: The commander-in-chief of the 18th Army is acting very favourably for the German side. He has brought down the Maas and Peel positions in two days, wiped out the first wave of British motorised divisions when they were still on the other side of Antwerp and only let two Belgian infantry divisions get as far as Breda. The assessment of the situation regarding the bridges over the Maas is also extremely favourable. Nonetheless, day 3 of the attack is the major battle, but after linkup has been successfully established with the paratroops at the Moerdijk bridge.34

Von Bock’s conclusion was that the 18th Army should be reinforced with two divisions on the third day of the attack, when the advance had reached the area around Breda in Noord-Brabant. This request was submitted to Halder by telephone that same day. Halder rejected it, however, whereupon von Bock, in consultation with Armeeoberkommando 18, came up with another solution. If it became clear that the advance of the Xth Corps 33 �� Armeeoberkommando �� 18 Nr.�� 310/40 �� g.Kdos, in: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg im Breisgau, 8117/5. 34 �� Kriegstagebuch �� Nr.�� 2 der Heeresgruppe B, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/19.

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was going to stagnate, the two SS regiments would be removed and placed under the command of the XXVIth Corps. Von Bock now faced the attack on the Netherlands with confidence. In a situation assessment of Army Group B on 8 March 1940, he again assumed that the fate of the Netherlands could be decided on the third day of fighting. By then, the XXVIth Corps would have reached the Moerdijk bridges, thus denying French and British troops any chance of entering Fortress Holland from Flanders or Zeeland. It was impossible to say beforehand how long the Dutch army would be able to hold Fortress Holland, but victory would in any event be the 18th Army’s. Von Bock was still more concerned about the complex situation in Breda after the third day of fighting, given that there would be three different directions of attack from here: against Fortress Holland, against Zeeland and against Antwerp. He still believed, therefore, that the troops in Noord-Brabant would have to be reinforced on the third day and that when the 6th Army and the 18th Army linked up, a new corps would have to be established in order to ensure effective command.35 There was a special role for the airborne troops. On 4 November 1939, the Oberkommando des Heeres had already told Army Group B about the possibility of conducting airborne operations with the aim of taking out the Belgian Fort Eben Emael and capturing the nearby bridges over the Albert Canal. They also wondered whether airborne operations would also be useful at Namur and Ghent. Von Bock was not very keen on this idea, however. Any airborne operations, which were the province of the Luftwaffe, had to be fitted in with the planned operations of the army group. It was the wrong way round to change or even adapt these operations according to the availability of the airborne units. Furthermore, there had been little experience of using these troops, so their deployment was risky. However, von Bock had no say in the airborne operations at Fort Eben Emael and at the bridges over the Albert Canal. These operations remained under the direct supervision of Hitler himself. After Army Group B had studied the various possibilities for an airborne operation, only the Netherlands remained. On 22 January 1940, the Oberkommando des Heeres gave orders for the preparation of airborne operations at the Moerdijk bridges and at Rotterdam. The motive for this was that it would thus be impossible for the British, who would undoubtedly rush to the Netherlands’ aid, to get into Fortress Holland and entrench behind the New Dutch Waterline. This operation was assigned to the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Air Transportable Division. There were as 35 �� “Beurteilung der Lage der HGr.B nach dem Stande vom 8.3.1940” in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 113-118.

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yet few specific details about the operation, given that Göring was keeping the preparation to himself for the time being. It was not until 6 February that things became clearer for Army Group B, when Kesselring and several staff officers went to see von Bock again in his headquarters in Bad Godesberg. The 7th Air Division was to be deployed at the Moerdijk bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam, while the 22nd Air Transportable Division had the task of landing around The Hague in order to capture the Queen, the government and the army chiefs. This last plan was related to an idea that had surfaced recently, namely to send an envoy, Werner Kiewitz, to the Dutch government at the start of the hostilities to offer a halt to the German attack if the Netherlands accepted German military protection immediately. The air-transportable division had been an ordinary infantry division, which had taken part in the attack on Poland. On 10 November 1939, the division had been given the status of air-transportable division, which meant that it would be flown in transport aircraft to the deployment area. The air-transportable division therefore trained in the rapid embarkation and debarkation of transport aircraft. There was thus no question of it being a special elite unit. The 7th Air Division, which was established in 1938, was, on the other hand, a paratrooper unit and belonged to the Luftwaffe. A German paratrooper had to meet stringent requirements, so this could indeed be described as an elite unit. It was, however, the first that Army Group B had heard of the proposed airborne operation at The Hague. Von Bock was not really interested in the operation at The Hague, because it was not in keeping with his operation plans. If the airborne corps succeeded in its task of capturing the Dutch government, that would, in von Bock’s view, be a bonus. For him, it was more important to capture the Moerdijk bridges undamaged, as this would open the way to Fortress Holland. The airborne operation would commence at the time the German troops crossed the Dutch border. To support the airborne operations and the capture of the Netherlands, Army Group B was allocated General der Luftwaffe Richard Putzier with three squadrons. After some discussion, von Bock and Kesselring agreed that Army Group B’s forward units should be at the Moerdijk bridges on the third day of the attack. For his part, Kesselring promised that Air Fleet 2 would do all it could to prevent the British and the French advancing northwards from Antwerp. The entire plan for the airborne operation, conceived by Student and finalised on 23 February 1940, was not discussed until 14 March during a meeting between von Bock, Kesselring, Student, H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck

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A Kampffliegertruppe’s radio post, Netherlands, 12 May 1940.

and Putzier. As well as being the commander of the 7th Air Division, Student had also been appointed commander of the airborne corps, into which his division had been merged with von Sponeck’s 22nd Air Transportable Division. Because the two divisions would be landing some distance from each other and had different missions, and because Student did not have a corps staff, the 22nd Air Transportable Division would be left entirely to its own devices throughout the operation. On 16 March 1940, von Bock, von Reichenau and von Küchler went to see Hitler in Berlin to report on progress by Army Group B. At this meeting, von Küchler told the Führer in detail about the 18th Army’s plan of attack. In his closing words at this meeting, Hitler assessed the combat power of the Dutch army as follows: “The defence capabilities of the Netherlands should be regarded as extremely limited.”36 The last Kriegsspiel that the staff of the German 18th Army held prior to the campaign against the Netherlands, on 25 and 26 April 1940, pointed in the same direction. Even if six to eight British or French divisions came to the assistance of the Netherlands, the 18th Army would have penetrated Fortress Holland and defeated the Netherlands by the morning of the fifth day of war.37 36 �� Kriegstagebuch �� Nr.�� 2�� des Heeresgruppe B, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/19. 37 �� T. v�� an Gent, Het falen van de Nederlandse gewapende neutraliteit, september 1939mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 2009) 106-107.

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In March and April, the German army leadership focused much attention on troop discipline. This was because they were far from happy about the conduct of German soldiers during the Polish campaign. Military discipline had, in their view, left much to be desired. Plundering and the killing of defenceless civilians had not been unusual. The objections of the German army leadership were not only of an ethical nature; any uncontrolled actions of troops not only damaged the image of the army, but also led, and that was perhaps the most important consideration, to a reduction of combat power. When the German troops took up their positions in the Westwall, discipline was stepped up. Measures were taken to stop the excessive consumption of alcohol, the courts martial dealt out stiffer punishments for absence without leave and, above all, the officers were made aware of their role in maintaining military discipline and order. The Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres wrote to his subordinates, for example: “Once again I must warn emphatically against drunkenness and alcohol abuse. Violations will weigh twice as heavily in these times.”38 Particular attention was paid to the treatment of prisoners of war. The soldiers were also given instructions on how they should conduct themselves towards civilians in occupied territory, a few of them being: 1. Decent military conduct is the primary duty. Any damage to the image of the German Wehrmacht will be severely punished. 2. The occupied country and its population may not be exploited. They are under the special protection of each individual German soldier. 3. Looting and acts of violence towards peaceful civilians will be punished with the most severe penalties under military criminal law. The sentence may be the death penalty.39

The Netherlands’ neutrality was another problem. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht realised that, before the attack on the neutral countries of Belgium and the Netherlands, it would be advisable to convince the German troops of the legitimacy of such an attack by claiming that the allies had violated the territory of these countries first. In the Wehrmachtsbericht of 10 May 1940, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht therefore declared: In view of the imminent extension of enemy operations to Belgian and Dutch territory and the accompanying threat to the Ruhr area, the German

38 �� Armeeoberkommando �� 18, Ia, nr.�� 1330/40, �� “Geselligkeit im Kriege”, 27 February 1940, in: BA-MA, W 3879. 39 �� Befehl �� für das Verhalten des deutschen Soldaten im besetzten Gebiet, 22. Februar 1940 in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/164. In more depth: H. Amersfoort, ‘Ik had mijn roode-kruis band afgedaan’. Oorlogsrecht en gedragingen van Nederlandse en Duitse militairen in gevecht, mei 1940 (The Hague, 2005) 81-92.

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chapter four Westheer will be ready at daybreak on 10 May to cross Germany’s western border in an attack across the widest possible front.40

The alert For the German troops in the Westwall, 9 May 1940 started like any other day. It was warm and sunny. Generaloberst von Bock performed an inspection of an artillery battery. At 11.25 hrs, Army Group B received a telex message from Berlin. The telex had come from the Oberkommando des Heeres and read as follows: “To Army Group B. ‘Yellow 10 May 1940, 05.35 hrs.’”41 This message was transmitted by telephone to Armeeoberkommando 6 at 11.30 hrs. Armeeoberkommando 18 was alerted in the same way two minutes later and they both passed the alert on to their own units. Heeresgruppenkommando B had stressed that the enemy was to know nothing of the imminent attack. This meant that only the key officials would be informed initially and that the troop movements to the assault line would not take place until after dark. Von Bock left his headquarters in the afternoon to check personally on the 4th Panzer Division’s preparations for the attack; this was the unit that was to be deployed at his army group’s point of main effort at Maastricht. At 20.10 hrs, the army group received a telephone message from the Oberkommando des Heeres with the codeword “Danzig”. That meant that the attack was now irreversible. The Heeresgruppenkommando passed the message to its own units in the same way as the first alert. Hitler travelled that night by train from Berlin to a bunker complex at Euskirchen in the northern Eifel. He and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres were to stay there throughout the Westfeldzug. On 10 May 1940, all units received special orders from Hitler. The Führer ended these orders with the following call: What we have seen as a growing threat for many months has now happened. Under cover of a gigantic diversionary manoeuvre in south-eastern Europe, England and France are trying to get into the Ruhr area through Holland and Belgium. Soldiers of the Western Front! 40 �� “OKW-Bericht �� vom 10.5.40.” in: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1960) 4. 41 �� In May 1940, there was a time difference of 1 hour and 40 minutes between the Netherlands and Germany.�� For �� the sake of clarity, all references in the text, with the exception of the German quotations, are based on Dutch time.

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That means your time has come! The battle starting today will decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years. Do your duty! The German people are with you with their wishes for victory.42

Several hours before the attack was to start, the units tasked with capturing the various bridges in the Dutch border area undamaged started on their way. The unrest on the German border had not gone unnoticed by the Dutch, who started setting up obstacles. The atmosphere on both sides of the border was highly charged as troops awaited the break of day.

42 �� “Tagesbefehl �� Hitlers vom 10.50.40” in: Ibidem, 3-4.

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chapter four Broad outline of the organisation of Army Group B and Air Fleet 2 on 10 May 1940

On 10 May 1940, Army Group B was made up of the 6th Army and the 18th Army, both of which consisted of a number of corps. The 18th Army comprised the Xth Corps and the XXVIth Corps, while the 6th Army consisted of four corps, namely the IVth, the IXth, the XIth and the XXVIIth. The staff of the XVIth Panzer Corps also belonged to the 6th Army. On 10 May 1940, only the 3rd Panzer Division, which had not been placed in the first line, was still under the command of this staff. The idea was, after forcing the crossing of the Albert Canal, to reassign the 4th Panzer Division from the IVth Corps to the XVIth Panzer Corps as well and to make this corps the spearhead of the 6th Army. The corps were made up of two or three infantry divisions, if necessary reinforced with a Panzer division. Army Group B numbered 26 infantry divisions in total. It also had three Panzer divisions, the two mentioned above in the 6th Army as well as the 9th Panzer Division in the 18th Army. If we discount southern Limburg, which was merely a transit area for the Germans, there were six infantry divisions, one Panzer division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and a cavalry division involved in the attack on the Netherlands as far as the army was concerned. For the land war, one should also add the Luftwaffe’s 7th Air Division and 22nd Air Transportable Division. The German army thus had one more command level (Land Forces, Army Group, Army, Corps, Division) than the Dutch army (Army, Field Army, Corps, Division), but in the German system not all levels had the same tasks. The staffs of the army groups and of the corps were only responsible for the operational command. The staffs of the armies and the divisions, on the other hand, were also responsible for the personnel and equipment in the units under their command. Army and division thus enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and had relatively large staffs. The organically assigned staff of an army numbered 498 officers, NCOs and other ranks, as well as 1,864 men to look after communications and 280 men for all sorts of other tasks. The basic unit of the German organisation was the infantry division. This usually numbered over 17,000 men. The staff of a division, including the signals personnel, consisted of 38 officers, 6 civil servants, 125 NCOs and 315 other ranks. The infantry divisions usually comprised three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an antitank battalion and a number of smaller medical, support and engineer units.

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An armoured division was made up of more than 13,000 men. The 18th Army had, as mentioned above, just one armoured division under its command, namely the 9th Panzer Division. This Austrian unit had been formed on 3 January 1940 from the 4th Light Division and consisted of two infantry regiments and one armoured regiment. The organic strength of tanks and armoured vehicles was made up of: 37 Panzerkampfwagen I, 59 Panzerkampfwagen II, 40 Panzerkampfwagen III and 24 Panzerkampfwagen IV. The weaponry of Panzerkampfwagen I consisted of two machine guns. Types II, III and IV had, besides a machine gun, a gun with a calibre of 2 cm, 3.7 cm and 7.5 cm, respectively. Compared to the other operational areas of Army Groups A and B, the deployment of German tanks for the attack on Fortress Holland was modest. Moreover, the 9th Panzer Division was, in view of its equipment, one of the weakest of the ten Panzer divisions that the German army had in 1940. The tactical air support for Army Group B was provided by Air Fleet 2, whose commander, General der Flieger Albert Kesselring, was on an adjacent command level with the commander of Army Group B, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock. Air Fleet 2 consisted of: the IVth Air Corps, the VIIIth Air Corps, the 11th Flak Corps, the 7th Air Division, the 22nd Air Transportable Division and Long-range Reconnaissance Group 122. The air fleet was the largest operational unit in the Luftwaffe. The number and type of the units assigned were not set organically. For each operation, the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe made a number of flight units available to the Oberbefehlshaber of the air fleet and these remained under his command until his assigned mission had been accomplished. The air corps was itself made up of wings. The wing was the largest mobile and homogenous formation in the Luftwaffe and normally consisted of a staff squadron of six aircraft and three groups. The group was the smallest operational and administrative flight unit and consisted of a staff flight made up of three aircraft and three squadrons. Each squadron had three flights, consisting of three aircraft each, as well as three planes in reserve. In principle, the air fleet had the same command and organisational structure as the army group. That allowed a flexible response to changing situations and ensured good cooperation between army and air force.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GENERALS’ DUEL: FIVE DAYS OF WAR AT THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

Düsseldorf, Friday 10 May 1940 The night before 10 May 1940 was a quiet one for the staff of Army Group B. The orders had been given and the troops were taking their positions according to plan. For the time being, there was nothing left for Generaloberst Fedor von Bock and his staff officers to do except wait for the break of day. That night, the operations division of Armeeoberkommando 18 moved from Wuppertal to Wesel, where a command post was set up. Von Bock received word from the divisions on the front line that explosions had been heard in Dutch territory. That led the army group to conclude that, despite the strict secrecy measures, the Dutch were expecting the German attack. At 03.55 hrs that night, the commander of the 18th Army, General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler, was present at the 256th Infantry Division to witness the start of the offensive in person. Von Küchler returned to his own command post at 05.00 hrs. At 04.00 hrs, the Luftwaffe reported to Army Group B that all aircraft that were to be involved in the attack on the Netherlands had started and that the airborne divisions of Generalleutnant K. Student and Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck had entered Dutch airspace without having come under fire. The mist had lifted and the weather was excellent. The good news that the railway bridge at Gennep had fallen into German hands undamaged reached Army Group B as early as 04.50 hrs. A setback, however, was the report that all the other bridges across the Maas which the 18th Army had intended to use had been destroyed in time by the Dutch. This was not considered to have catastrophic consequences for the execution of the attack, because Army Group B had taken this eventuality into account and provided extra bridge-laying equipment. Five of the bridges over the Juliana Canal in the path of the 6th Army’s advance had been taken without damage. By around 06.20 hrs, Army Group B had been informed that the air-landing operation at the Belgian Fort Eben

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General Headquarters regularly issued “army announcements” to keep the population informed about the progress of the fighting.

Emael near Liège was proceeding according to plan and that the Belgians had only destroyed the bridge over the Albert Canal at Kanne in that sector. At the same time, it was reported that troops had broken into the Peel-Raam Position near Mill. Von Bock then went to the IVth Corps, where the focus of Army Group B’s operations lay, to see for himself the progress being made at Maastricht. He informed his staff of his findings by telephone at 10.10 hrs. The 4th Panzer Division, which was part of the IVth Corps, was at the time in the process of crossing the Maas at Maastricht and von Bock pointed out that it was imperative that the operation be completed in the night of 10 May. Von Küchler’s 18th Army had been informed by 10.20 hrs that the para operations at the Moerdijk bridges and at Rotterdam had been successful. Although the 18th Army did not have any detailed information, it was assumed that Von Sponeck’s operation near The Hague, conversely, had not succeeded.

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At 11.20 hrs, Army Group B had sufficient insight into the overall situation in its front sector in order to inform the Oberkommando des Heeres, where General der Artillerie Franz Halder was in charge as Chief of Staff. According to von Bock’s report, the developments at Maastricht and Gennep looked promising for the 6th Army and the 18th Army, respectively, whilst no British landings had been observed in the Netherlands yet. In addition, aerial reconnaissance had shown that the British and French armies had still not crossed the Belgian border. For the time being, Army Group B need not expect any threat from that direction. Nonetheless, von Bock urged his subordinate commanders, Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau of the 6th Army and General Georg von Küchler of the 18th Army, to make haste. This was not really necessary, or as von Bock put it in his journal: “This light pressure will not be necessary for either of them, because they know what really matters—I must not, however, neglect any opportunity to push things forward.”1 From the reports that came in later that afternoon, Army Group B concluded that the Dutch Light Division was being pulled back from the Peel-Raam Position in order to be redeployed at Fortress Holland. Although the Peel-Raam position had not yet been breached, Armeeoberkommando 18 expected that the Dutch would soon evacuate that line in view of the situation at Mill. At the end of the first day of war, von Bock was confident about the campaign to come. In his opinion, the resistance put up by the Dutch and Belgian armies had not been very strong. For both the 6th Army and the 18th Army, the situation on the whole had developed according to plan. The orders for 11 May therefore did not divert from the operation plan. The 6th Army was crossing the Maas and now had to hold the bridgehead at Maastricht and cross the Albert Canal at Eben Emael. As far as the Netherlands was concerned, the possibility had been taken into account that the country might capitulate on the first day. In that case, the crossing of the border according to the operation orders issued would have taken the form of a “peaceful occupation”. Von Bock had not taken that possibility very seriously nor, for that matter, the related airborne operation—a Luftwaffe operation. Von Bock was therefore not particularly worried by the fact that this operation had turned out to be a fiasco. In this theatre of operations, his main objective on the first day was the Moerdijk bridges and, fortunately, the paratroops’ attack there had been successful. The operations of the 1st Cavalry Division and the Xth Corps also proceeded according to plan. That corps was already becoming the focus of 1 Kriegstagebuch Fedor von Bock, 10 May 1940, in: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BA-MA), N 22/5.

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operations. Upon reaching the IJssel, the 227th Infantry Division had found that all the bridges over that river had been blown up. It took them until the afternoon to cross the river, and then, due to a lack of bridge-laying equipment, the forward troops were halted in front of the Apeldoorn Canal. The 207th Infantry Division, however, advancing further to the south, had practically reached the Grebbe Line by the end of the day. This was therefore presumably where the main attack would take place. With a view to that attack, this division was reinforced in the evening of 10 May by a battalion of the SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. Given that everything else was going practically according to expectations, the 18th Army saw no reason to deviate from the planned operations. Von Küchler pointed out to the commander of the XXVIth Corps, General der Artillerie Albert Wodrig, that he should advance to Breda as quickly as possible, according to plan. The 9th Panzer Division, which was to establish communications with the German paratroops who had landed at the Moerdijk bridges, was therefore ordered to prepare to cross the Maas as soon as the Peel-Raam Position had actually been breached. The only change to the plans for the advance concerned the bridges over the Maas which the 9th Panzer Division was to use. As the bridges at Grave and Ravenstein had been blown up, the division would cross at Gennep and Mook, as soon as the pontoon bridges there were ready. The SS Verfügungsdivision was also ordered to prepare to cross the Maas at Gennep.

The Hague, Friday 10 May 1940 After a steady stream of communications in the evening of Thursday 9 May, after midnight a certain calm had descended over General Headquarters.2 From 01.30 hrs, however, the headquarters was phoned several times by Lieutenant General P.W. Best’s Air Defence Command, reporting large foreign aircraft formations over the Netherlands. Two hours later it became clear that German raiding parties were attacking the Maas bridges and other locations in the border regions. From 04.00 hrs, by which time day was beginning to dawn, there were reports of bombing raids on various airfields. These raids destroyed many aircraft on the ground. After 05.00 hrs, reports followed of German paratroops landing at and around the airfields of Waalhaven (near Rotterdam) and Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg (near The Hague). Paratroops also landed near Dordrecht 2 The outline of the Dutch command at General Headquarters level is mainly derived from V.E Nierstrasz, Inleiding en Algemeen Overzicht van de gevechtsdagen 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957).


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Meeting at General Headquarters at Lange Voorhout 7 in The Hague: the navy Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral J.Th. Furstner (centre), the army Chief of Staff, Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst (left) and the Commander-in-Chief, General H.G. Winkelman.

and south of the Moerdijk bridges. Near the Maas bridges in Rotterdam, the Germans landed using floatplanes. The Belgians were reporting similar events. There, the target was the bridges over the Albert Canal. In the meantime, at around 03.30 hrs, General Winkelman and his chief adviser, army Chief of Staff Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, had arrived at General Headquarters. They established that the Netherlands was effectively at war with the German Reich. The main thing now for Winkelman was to form a general picture of the situation. Then the commander-in-chief would have to establish what countermeasures were required. Winkelman could leave the execution of his orders to his main subordinate commanders, the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, in Zeist, and the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General J. van Andel, in The Hague. The strategic plan was based on a long and staunch defence of Fortress Holland. This battle would be fought in allied cooperation with France, Britain and Belgium. For this plan to succeed, the area within Fortress Holland would have to be, and remain, entirely in Dutch hands. In addition, the lines of communication with the allies would have to be kept open. For the latter part, Winkelman’s attention was mainly focused on the southern province of Noord-Brabant.

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It was not until around midday that Winkelman had a reliable picture of the situation. For the first eight or nine hours after his arrival at headquarters he could do little other than respond as soon as possible to the worst reports. Close to home, he was able to take action immediately. Just after five, Winkelman placed Major General N.T. Carstens’ Ist Corps under Van Andel’s command and ordered him to eliminate all paratroops and air-transportable units within Fortress Holland immediately. For this purpose, on the basis of measures taken at the time of the mobilisation, Van Andel was also given the depot troops based in Fortress Holland. After the elimination of the German invaders, the Ist Corps would then be available again as a strategic reserve. In the hours that followed, it became clear that the enemy had settled at various locations throughout Fortress Holland. There were Germans at and around the three airfields at The Hague. The bridges in Rotterdam and Dordrecht and those near Moerdijk were in German hands, as was Waalhaven airfield. The enemy landings at that airfield continued all day. According to Winkelman and Van Andel, this could indicate that airborne operations were to be expected elsewhere as well. They thought it would be most likely that there would be actions against Schiphol airport, which had already been bombed, as a prelude to attacks on Amsterdam and Haarlem. Van Andel was therefore also given all remaining aircraft. For that purpose, at around 10.20 hrs, Winkelman placed Lieutenant General P.W. Best directly under Van Andel’s command. This measure also put the 2nd Aviation Regiment, which was to support the Field Army’s operations with reconnaissance and air strikes and therefore took its orders from the Commander of the Field Army, under Van Andel’s command. This way, all remaining aircraft could be deployed wherever the commander-inchief decided the threat was the most serious. At the same time, the situation in Noord-Brabant required attention. At 05.00 hrs, the headquarters was phoned by the commander of the IIIrd Corps, Major General A.A. van Nijnatten, in ’s-Hertogenbosch. He reported that the railway bridge over the Maas at Gennep had fallen into German hands undamaged, that an armoured train had crossed this bridge and penetrated the Peel-Raam Position at Mill and that fighting was in progress within the position. Van Nijnatten was given permission to direct the 2nd Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment of the nearby Light Division to the scene. For the next hour and a half, Winkelman reviewed the situation in Noord-Brabant. If the German breach at Mill were successful, after the Peel Division, the IIIrd Corps and possibly even the Light Division would


145 until 10 May 1940

Dutch command structure Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces

Commander of Fortress Holland

Commander of the Air Defence

Commander of the eastern front of Fortress Holland

Director of the Staging and Traffic Service Commander of the Field Army

Territorial Commander in Friesland (TBF) Territorial Commander in southern Limburg (TBZL) Commander of the Ist Corps Chief of the Navy Staff

Commander of the II nd Corps Commander of the III rd Corps

Commander of the IV th Corps

Commander of the Peel Division

Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TBO)

Commander of the Light Division

Commander of Brigade A

Commander of the Den Helder Position

Commander of the Utrecht-Soesterberg Air Defence Sector

Commander in Zeeland (CZ)

Commander of the 2 nd Aviation Regiment

A

B

G

become involved in the fighting. The retreat planned for the following night would then come to nothing. The Waal-Linge Position, which Van Nijnatten was to occupy, would then remain empty and as a result the Valley Position could be attacked from the rear, from the area of the major rivers. The Commander of the Field Army had already expressed his concern over this danger by telephone. Colonel H.C. van der Bijl’s Light Division must also not be pinned down in combat. That division was to move to Fortress Holland, to form the strategic reserve there. The German airborne landings within the Fortress made this manoeuvre even more

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urgent. Reviewing the situation, Winkelman decided at around 06.45 hrs to order the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to execute the planned retreat immediately, regardless of the risk of air strikes. Apart from two border battalions in the west of the province, that left only the Peel Division in Noord-Brabant, under the command of Colonel L.J. Schmidt. South of the major rivers, the Germans would only encounter any substantial resistance if the French managed to establish their planned closed front in Belgium in time and if they were able to extend it to Fortress Holland. At 06.45 hrs, Winkelman sent a telex to the troops announcing that France, Britain and Belgium were allies. Prior to that moment, the military attachés of those countries had already visited headquarters and Winkelman had had a telephone conversation with the allied commanderin-chief, général M. Gamelin. At around eleven, the military attaché in Paris, Lieutenant Colonel D. van Voorst Evekink, made a report by telephone of a conversation with Gamelin. These conversations revealed that the four French armies and the British Expeditionary Force, which were positioned along the Belgian border, would advance to the Dinant–Namur–Louvain– Antwerp line, so roughly along the rivers Meuse, Dyle and Scheldt. The furthest to the left of those armies, général d’armée H.H. Giraud’s 7th Army, had been intended for Noord-Brabant, but for the time being would remain with the main force and not advance any further than Antwerp. Only the advance guards would immediately advance into Noord-Brabant and Zeeland, over land and sea. The first combined action would be aimed at recapturing the Moerdijk bridges. The Dutch already had the 6th Border Battalion on its way there. With a view to future use of the Moerdijk bridges by French troops on their way to Fortress Holland, Winkelman ordered the Dutch artillery in the Hoekse Waard not to destroy the bridges with shell fire. In order to coordinate the operations in the longer term, Gamelin and Winkelman announced the sending of military missions. One of the results of the Franco-Dutch consultations was that the Commander of the Peel Division was informed of the imminent French arrival at the end of the morning. Schmidt’s relief on receiving this message was tempered considerably by the announcement by the headquarters’ Chief of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson, that nothing at all had been arranged with regard to the cooperation with the French, so he would have to do that himself. While Winkelman set his hopes on Colonel Schmidt for the PeelRaam Position, the recapture of the Moerdijk bridges and the cooperation with Giraud, it was time to return to the problems within Fortress Holland. The greatest threat came from the Moerdijk–Dordrecht–Rotterdam

Series of telex messages of 9 and 10 May 1940 (right); The destroyed rail and road bridges at Zutphen (below).

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axis, the latter city in particular. After all, from Rotterdam the Germans would be able to push through to The Hague. Rotterdam comprised two threats, Waalhaven airfield and the Maas bridges. At Waalhaven, the continuing supply of German reinforcements had to be stopped. Air strikes were carried out to that end and Van Andel also had the artillery launch an attack from Hillegersberg. Recapture of the airfield would, however, be preferable. The nearest force was the Light Division, which by now was entering Fortress Holland. In anticipation of further assignments, Winkelman had already put the division under Van Andel’s command, again expanding his authority. At the end of the afternoon, Van Andel ordered Colonel Van der Bijl to have his division cross the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam. He was then to make his way via IJsselmonde to Waalhaven and recapture the airfield. The attack was to be supported by the 3rd Border Battalion, which was to advance from Beijerland across the bridge at Barendrecht. In the meantime, the British and French air forces would hopefully respond to Winkelman’s request to bomb Waalhaven airfield. An attack was as yet not an option for the Maas bridges, as the Light Division had not arrived yet. On the north bank of the Maas, near the bridges, the defence had to be organised, which at the time was being improvised by only depot troops and a few units of marines. As he no longer had any own reserves left, the next day Winkelman had the Field Army provide Van Andel with two regiments of infantry and an artillery battery. One of those regiments went to Rotterdam. Thus at around midday, Winkelman had made the first decisions regarding the three main strategic issues, security within Fortress Holland, the defence of Noord-Brabant and allied cooperation. All these issues boiled down to the same thing, stopping the German advance and creating the conditions for a sustained and staunch defence of Fortress Holland. The coming hours and days would show whether the actions ordered had had the desired effects. The developments in the afternoon and evening of 10 May gave cause for cautious optimism. There had been few reports from the northern provinces, but it had been established that the Wons Position was still intact. At Zutphen, the German advance guards were crossing the IJssel, but on 10 May they came to a standstill at the Apeldoorn Canal. The Grebbe Line was therefore completely untouched. Only at Wageningen did the first Germans appear in front of the position, late in the afternoon, but they did not attack it. The Commander in Zeeland, Rear Admiral H.J. van der Stad, reported from Middelburg that a French motorised division was on its way to Noord-Brabant, via Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, Walcheren and Zuid-Beve-


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land. Royal Navy ships were arriving at Flushing, the Hook of Holland and IJmuiden. Although they were only setting demolition parties ashore, the important thing was that the British were getting involved. They also promised bombing raids on Waalhaven airfield. In some places at Ypenburg, Ockenburg, and Valkenburg, the Germans were pulling back into defensive positions, blocked off by Dutch units. The IIIrd Corps took up a safe position behind the Maas in the early evening, without having suffered any major losses. In the course of the night, it would cross the Waal. That meant that the Waal-Linge Position would be occupied on 11 May. The Light Division had similar news to report. It arrived in the Alblasserwaard in the afternoon. Colonel Van der Bijl considered the situation at the bridge over the Noord too uncertain to have his troops cross the bridge immediately. He would therefore not be able to participate in the attack on Waalhaven airfield until the next morning. This was not good news, because on that vital Rotterdam–Moerdijk axis, Winkelman suffered another blow. At the end of the afternoon, the 6th Border Battalion reported that it had failed to eliminate the German bridgehead on the south bank of the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk. A second attack would have to wait for reinforcements to arrive, French reinforcements. Those reinforcements were on their way, however. Winkelman received a message from Paris at 21.00 hrs that Gamelin had ordered Giraud’s army to press on to the area between Breda and Tilburg, if possible. Gamelin insisted that if the Dutch troops at the Peel-Raam Position were to retreat, that they also retreat to a line at Tilburg or Breda. An hour later, Winkelman was faced with that retreat. Colonel Schmidt phoned General Headquarters to announce that a German division at Mill had opened the attack and that a breach of the Peel-Raam Position was imminent. He also thought that the southern end of the position was being outflanked over Belgian territory. For that reason, and because the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division had reached safety, he wanted to abandon the position and continue the fight behind the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal. Headquarters reconciled itself to Schmidt’s proposal and Schmidt immediately ordered the retreat. For General Headquarters, 10 May was a tense day. By the evening, it could be established that the first blow had generally been dealt with well. The planned strategy was still feasible. Winkelman realised that the Germans had so far made more progress than he and his staff had assumed beforehand. He did not, however, consider it impossible to halt the German advance.

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Düsseldorf, Saturday 11 May 1940 For Army Group B, the night of 10 May 1940 passed without incident. The excellent communications system meant that all major units were well aware of the favourable situation. The 9th Panzer Division was preparing to press on to the Moerdijk bridges, in accordance with its orders. As the bridges over the Maas at Grave and Ravenstein, which the division was counting on, had been blown up, however, they had to use two Kriegsbrücken, a 16-tonne pontoon bridge at Gennep and an 8-tonne pontoon bridge at Mook. This meant that the Panzer division had to advance through two infantry divisions of the XXVIth Corps, which were also to make use of the bridges, before it reached the Maas. This resulted in huge traffic jams at the bridges, worsened by clumsy, improvised traffic control. The first units of the 9th Panzer Division did not cross the Maas at Gennep until 04.50 hrs. By the time they arrived at Mill, the Peel-Raam Position had been abandoned. During the further advance that day, again it was not Dutch resistance that proved the greatest problem, but the limited capacity of the road network in this thinly populated area. The advance guard did not reach Volkel until 08.20 hrs and it was three quarters of an hour later before it reported in neighbouring Uden. The advance from the Maas, just over twenty kilometres by road, had taken four hours and fifteen minutes. In the meantime, the SS Verfügungsdivision had also been ordered to commence its advance. As this division also had to cross the bridge at Gennep, the traffic chaos there became worse and worse. This unstructured course of events annoyed Generaloberst von Bock and that morning he went to Gennep and Mill in the Peel-Raam Position, to see the situation for himself. He then had a meeting with the Kommandierende General of the XXVIth Corps, Wodrig, whom he ordered to do everything necessary to enable the 9th Panzer Division to cross the bridges at Mook and Gennep as quickly as possible. Von Bock then left for the command post of von Küchler’s 18th Army, which was still in Wesel, also to discuss the traffic situation at the XXVIth Corps. On the way there, von Bock was told that enemy columns had been sighted on the roads from Antwerp to Breda. He wrote in his journal: “So here come the scoundrels already!”3 In Wesel, von Bock was received by the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Erich Marcks. They soon agreed that the 9th Panzer Division should cross the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal as soon as possible. The approaching French troops posed a risk to the paratroops at the Moerdijk 3 Ibidem, 11 May 1940.


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Lange Voorhout 7. In May 1940, the building housed the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces, General H.G. Winkelman.

bridges. Von Bock therefore had a request sent to General der Flieger Albert Kesselring’s Air Fleet 2 to delay the French advance by attacking, and if possible destroying, the columns from the air. Von Bock and Marcks had sufficient faith in the Luftwaffe to hold on to their expectation that the 9th Panzer Division would reach the Moerdijk bridges on time, that is the next day. Then von Bock spoke with Generaloberst von Reichenau, to hear about the 6th Army’s progress. In the night of 10 May, pontoon bridges had been laid at Maastricht for the 4th Panzer Division. By the end of the morning, the capitulation of Fort Eben Emael was reported. A passage had been forced across the Albert Canal. Von Bock therefore ordered von Reichenau to have the 4th Panzer Division advance as far as possible into Belgium that same day, via Tongeren. Von Bock then informed the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, by telephone of the latest developments. During that conversation, he indicated that he expected that, contrary to what had been assumed so far, the Dutch army would mount a staunch defence of the Grebbe Line. He no longer expected any quick successes from the 227th Infantry Division, because the main force of this division was slow to cross the IJssel, across a pontoon bridge at Zutphen, and its advance guards had only just begun crossing the Apeldoorn Canal. The SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’, the only completely motorised part of the divi-

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sion, was therefore removed from the division, and attached to the reserve of Army Group B, in anticipation of a new assignment. Von Bock then decided that the majority of the reserve should be positioned behind the 6th Army’s southern flank. A number of other reserve units, including the SS regiment which had just been made available, were positioned behind the XXVIth Corps. These decisions meant that von Bock was strengthening the main efforts of the 6th Army (advance via Maastricht–Tongeren) and the 18th Army (advance through Noord-Brabant). The prepared plans could easily be executed. Possible countermeasures from the Dutch and Belgian armies, which were considered to be weak, played no role in these decisions. Only the French threat to the bridgehead at Moerdijk had led to some extra measures. In the afternoon of 11 May, the Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando des Heeres, General Halder, decided that, in view of the troops’ progress, the command post of Armeekommando 18 was too far behind the front line and put pressure on von Küchler to move to a new location, further west. At 14.20 hrs, the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst von Brauchitsch, conveyed to von Bock, through his Chief of Staff Halder, the decision that Generalkommando XXXIX, under the command of General der Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt, would be put at the disposal of the 18th Army. As had been anticipated during the preparations for the campaign, this staff would be able to become operational when the XXVIth Corps had arrived in the area of Breda and decisions had to be made regarding the continuation of the battle against Fortress Holland, the Belgian positions at Antwerp and a possible British threat from Zeeland. That same afternoon, Hitler visited the Oberkommando des Heeres at Euskirchen and was very pleased with the overall progress.

The Hague, Saturday 11 May 1940 On the morning of 11 May, Winkelman first turned his attention to Rotterdam. After all, that was where the Light Division was to attempt to recapture Waalhaven airfield. It had to be possible on this day to regain the initiative at at least one of the points on the road from Noord-Brabant to Rotterdam. If the whole road could then be cleared, the link-up with the allied front in Belgium and Brabant would be established. Initially, Colonel Van der Bijl’s reports were not unfavourable. Despite fairly strong German resistance, small groups from his division had reached the other side of the Noord in two places. That was as far as Van der Bijl could go, however. By mid-morning he reported having had to


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from the evening of 10 May 1940

Dutch command structure Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces


Director of the Staging and Traffic Service Commander of the Field Army

Territorial Commander in Noord-Brabant and Commander of the Peel Division Chief of the Navy Staff Commander of the Den Helder Position

Commander of the I st Corps

Commander of the eastern front of Fortress Holland

Commander of the Light Division

Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TBO)

Commander of the Air Defence

Commander of the IInd Corps Commander of the III rd Corps Commander of the IV th Corps Commander of Brigade A

A

B

G

Territorial Commander in Friesland (TBF) Commander in Zeeland (CZ)

pull his troops back onto the east bank again, under German pressure. At around the same time, General Headquarters was informed that the attack on the bridges at Dordrecht by a battalion of the Kil Group had also failed. In addition, the 3rd Border Battalion had not succeeded in reaching Waalhaven either. In order to deal with all these setbacks at once, Van Andel set a new assignment for Colonel Van der Bijl. The Light Division was now to have its main force cross from the Alblasserwaard to the Island of Dordrecht, clear up the German positions there, then advance by means of the ferry at Wieldrecht to the bridge at Barendrecht in order to mount an attack on Waalhaven airfield from there.

Column of Dutch soldiers resting. Rotterdam, May 1940.

General H.G. Winkelman at his desk at Lange Voorhout 7, The Hague.


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There was little news from the Field Army in the morning. Aerial reconnaissance over the Veluwe and skirmishes on the ground indicated that only German advance guards had crossed the Apeldoorn Canal. There was more going on, however, between Wageningen and the Grebbeberg. There, the line’s outpost sector was being attacked. For Brigade A in the Betuwe, the situation was relatively calm. Brigade B, from the Land van Maas en Waal area, positioned itself at Wijk bij Duurstede on both sides of the Lek, as a reserve for the Grebbe Line. According to plan, the IIIrd Corps took up positions along the Waal and the Linge and was reinforced with troops from Brigade G, which was present in the area. The Field Army had thus completed the planned manoeuvres without any major problems. At 11.00 hrs, Winkelman visited Van Andel at his staff quarters to hear at first hand how the battle within Fortress Holland was progressing. The situation on the whole was stable, albeit that Van Andel was as yet unable to provide detailed information on the strength of the Germans within the Fortress. Counterattacks on the German positions were being prepared or had already been carried out, albeit without success so far. Only Rotterdam was a cause for concern. At Overschie, to the north of the city, there was a gradually increasing concentration of airborne units, occupying the road between Rotterdam and The Hague. They were preventing a rapid response to developments in Rotterdam, particularly if the German troops were to try to breach the Dutch defence at the bridges. Given the number of aircraft that had landed at Waalhaven, Van Andel concluded that by now there should be some 6,000 men on the ground there. There was a nervous atmosphere in Rotterdam, as well as elsewhere in Fortress Holland, particularly in the large cities. There were constant reports of new paratroop landings, shootings and fifth-column activities. All these reports had to be checked. Usually they were false alarms, but the many patrols were nevertheless exhausting the troops. Upon his arrival back at General Headquarters, at around midday Winkelman was phoned by the commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt. Schmidt and the French commanders on site at various locations in Noord-Brabant and the Belgian-Dutch border region had held discussions during the night and had come up with a plan for the combined defence. The front was to run from the Maas at ’s-Hertogenbosch to Tilburg, and from there via Goirle and Hilvarenbeek to the Belgian positions to the east of Turnhout. After leaving the position along the ZuidWillemsvaart Canal, the Peel Division would occupy the northern sector of this line and take up position between Tilburg and ’s-Hertogenbosch. Winkelman would, however, have to take into account that the French

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main force would still need another three to four days to move from Flanders to Brabant. For General Headquarters this was important, and on the whole good, news. The build-up of the French front was reassuring in any case. Whether the Peel Division would be able to successfully carry out another change of position so soon after arriving at the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal remained to be seen. Schmidt could give few guarantees in that respect, as he had to admit to not having much control over his troops anymore. By now, it was very important for Winkelman that the Peel Division build up a well-organised front in the agreed area. If they did not succeed, there would be a gap to the north of the French part of the front, through which the German troops would be able to push on to western Brabant and Moerdijk. In the afternoon of 11 May, therefore, Winkelman asked the British government in London to send at least two divisions to Zeeland or Brabant and also to carry out air strikes on Waalhaven airfield. He asked the French high command to have the troops operating in Brabant push through decisively to Moerdijk. The latter request he also conveyed through the Commander in Zeeland, Van der Stad, to the French units in his area of command. Headquarters was unable, however, to obtain a clear picture of the allied cooperation, let alone direct that cooperation. At 14.15 hrs, the Commander of the Field Army, J.J.G. baron Van Voorst tot Voorst, reported that he could no longer establish contact with Schmidt. The only report on the situation in Belgium was that the position along the Albert Canal was in danger of collapsing. All Winkelman heard about Noord-Brabant, via Van Andel, was that a French detachment had been sighted in Willemstad and Klundert. Its commander, however, was not willing to take on the German bridgehead at Moerdijk. Winkelman and his staff were of the opinion that they had a better grip on events during the second day of war than on the first. In and around Fortress Holland, the situation was stabilising. The airborne units near The Hague no longer posed a direct threat and the Germans were making no progress on the Rotterdam–Moerdijk axis. Although it was also true that the Dutch troops were not gaining in the latter area of operations either, that might change the next day if the Light Division carried out its new assignments successfully. That success was closely connected with the fighting in Noord-Brabant, where the build-up of a Franco-Dutch front appeared to be only a matter of time. On the basis of the information available to Winkelman, strategically speaking the situation was more fa-


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vourable at the end of the second day than it had been in the evening of 10 May. On 10 May and much of 11 May, the Grebbe Line did not play a large part in the decision-making at General Headquarters. The line was not yet in any danger. That changed somewhat in the evening of 11 May, when Van Voorst tot Voorst reported that the Grebbeberg was being attacked by weak German units and that nevertheless the outposts had been lost. The Grebbeberg itself came under artillery fire. In the coming night, a counterattack would be carried out to recapture the outposts. In the meantime, the Commander of the Field Army warned that if the resistance in the main line of defence were not stronger than had been the case with the outposts, the enemy would breach the position.

Düsseldorf, Sunday 12 May 1940 On 12 May, it became clear to the German army leadership that there was no actual threat from Antwerp towards the direction of Breda. In the first place, German aerial reconnaissance had shown that no large-scale landings of British troops were taking place or were to be expected on the Dutch coast, as had been feared. In the second place, the reconnaissance showed that the presence of the French troops in the Breda area was as yet negligible. The Luftwaffe apparently had done a good job. The planned operations could therefore be carried out. At 09.05 hrs von Bock sent a telex to von Küchler, again urging him to make contact that day with the units of the airborne corps at the bridgehead at Moerdijk. The units of the XXVIth Corps that were not involved in the further attack on Fortress Holland were to build up a defensive front against Antwerp. Meanwhile, the 9th Panzer Division was making better progress than the previous day. One of its columns had reached Loon op Zand as early as 07.50 hrs, and was advancing towards Geertruidenberg. On the basis of the reports coming in, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Marcks, concluded that the expected crisis situation at Breda would not develop after all. Even if a British landing were still to take place, it would be too late, and the French deployment in western Brabant was also too slow to be able to stop the XXVIth Corps. It was still necessary, however, to issue orders to this corps for the continuation of operations after reaching Breda. In the meantime, the staff of the 18th Army, succumbing to pressure from Halder, was preparing to move the command post from Wesel to Uden. In the early evening, a report reached

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von Küchler’s staff that the 9th Panzer Division had made contact with the German paratroops at the Moerdijk bridges at around 15.20 hrs. It was noted with satisfaction in the journal of the 18th Army: “On the evening of the third day of war, the army has completed the most important part of its assignment.”4 The developments at the Xth Corps at the Veluwe were followed passively by the staff of the 18th Army, while the combat actions of the 1st Cavalry Division in the north of the Netherlands received no attention at all from the army. Von Bock was not very pleased with the situation at the 6th Army that day. Although the crossings over the Maas and the Albert Canal, at Maastricht and Eben Emael respectively, had now been forced, the forts at Liège were still putting up resistance. Although the plan was to have the main force of the 6th Army advance further, with units separating from that force to conquer the forts, it was undesirable to have an enemy pocket of resistance in the army’s own rear area. As there was no information coming in about the exact situation, von Bock went to Tongeren to be informed by von Reichenau and to discuss the further course of the operations. At 19.50 hrs, the Chief of Staff of Army Group B, Generalleutnant Hans von Salmuth, reported to the Chief of Staff of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, General Halder, on the progress made by the 6th Army and the 8th Army. They also discussed the continuation of the battle in Noord-Brabant. They could not make any decisions yet, however, about the further actions to be taken by the 9th Panzer Division, because they did not have the authority to do so. The decision was made later during personal consultations between their superiors, von Brauchitsch and von Bock. They agreed that, now that a wedge had been driven between Fortress Holland and the Belgian defence line along the Albert Canal, the campaign would be split up into two separate operations. One would involve advancing over the Moerdijk bridge to Rotterdam and the other would entail the capture of Zeeland and Antwerp followed by crossing the Scheldt. These two assignments were to be carried out by different army corps, to avoid the execution of the one task detracting from the other. Therefore von Brauchitsch and von Bock decided to make use of General der Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt’s Generalkommando XXXIX, which, after all, had been put at the disposal of the 18th Army the previous day. This corps staff would carry out the attack on Fortress Holland, and to that end was given under its command Student’s Airborne Corps, including the 22nd Air Transportable Division, 4 Kriegstagebuch 18. Armee, 12 May 1940, in: BA-MA, N 126/19.


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or however much of it remained, the 9th Panzer Division, the 254th Infantry Division and the SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. General Wodrig’s XXVIth Corps would form a front against Antwerp, with the remaining 256th Infantry Division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and infantry divisions from the reserves of Army Group B. With the attack on Antwerp coming ever closer, the coordination between the right flank of the 6th Army and the left flank of the XXVIth Corps was requiring more and more effort from von Bock and the staff of Army Group B. This pushed the developments at Generalleutnant Kurt Student’s Airborne Corps inside Fortress Holland and at the Xth Corps at the Grebbe Line to the background somewhat for Army Group B.

The Hague, Sunday 12 May 1940 The third day of the war was to belong to Winkelman’s subordinate commanders. General Headquarters felt it had gained a hold on events over the last two days. The main thing now was to gain decisive advantages in the various theatres of operations. Winkelman and his men would have to wait for that outcome before they could make any decisions on the further course of operations. There was an important part to play for the Light Division. In the course of the day, however, Van der Bijl had little progress to report. The Island of Dordrecht had not yet been cleared out, and by no means had an advance to Waalhaven airfield been effected. It took a long time for Van Andel to realise that this was not so much owing to a weak performance by the troops, but to the unclear command structure at Dordrecht. In what was only a small area, three different officers were in command. The three officers were working at cross purposes and meddling in each other’s business. In the early evening, Van Andel clarified the command structure and decided that the Light Division should be ready no later than the early morning of 13 May at the Wieldrecht ferry to carry out the push to Waalhaven airfield. Van Andel had had reports from both the Kil Group and the Light Division of armoured units on the road between Moerdijk and Dordrecht. On the basis of statements from General Headquarters, he assumed they were French tanks. In Fortress Holland, the situation on the whole remained unchanged. Winkelman’s only measures here concerned Rotterdam. Since the morning of 10 May, around six battalions had been sent to Rotterdam and the staff of the local commander, Colonel P.W. Scharroo, was not prepared for the work that that entailed. The Chief of the Operations Section of Gen-

Princess Juliana and her daughter Princess Beatrix arrive in London, 13 May 1940 (left); en route to England, Princess Irene travelled in a gas-proof carry-cot, carried here by Prince Bernhard on arrival in London (below).


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The Commander-in-Chief leaving the Ministry of Defence at Plein 4 in The Hague, after consultations with the Minister of Defence, A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn, on 12 May 1940.

eral Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson, was subsequently sent to Scharroo, together with a number of other officers. Having arrived in Rotterdam, Wilson judged the situation to be more favourable than he had expected. He therefore asked Winkelman for a fresh battalion with which to mount an attack and at least recapture the Maas bridges. In the course of the day, things began to get serious along the Grebbe Line. In the IVth Corps’ sector the activity was limited to some minor fighting. The IInd Corps, however, and particularly its IVth Division had more to report. The attempt to recapture the outpost sector at the Grebbeberg had been abandoned prematurely. On the other hand, a small German unit had penetrated the main resistance sector that afternoon. Immediate counterattacks were to no avail. Preparations were already under way, however, for a better organised and larger-scale counterattack on 13 May. Lastly, 12 May brought news from the northern provinces. The Germans had breached the Wons Position, after which the Dutch troops

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prepared themselves for a possible German attack at the head of the IJsselmeer Dam. The navy Chief of Staff formed an IJsselmeer flotilla to counter attempts by the Germans to cross over from the Frisian IJsselmeer coast. To be on the safe side, vigilance was stepped up in NoordHolland as well. Of much greater importance, however, was the fact that there was one theatre of operations from which no reports were coming in whatsoever on 12 May, namely Noord-Brabant. Since the telephone conversation with Schmidt at around midday on 11 May, nothing further had been heard from the area. In order to gain insight into the situation, Winkelman ordered a three-man military mission to go to Noord-Brabant in the early afternoon and re-establish communications with the commanders there. This was not much help as yet, because it would be the next day before the three officers reported back and by then their assignment had been overtaken by events. General Headquarters continued to assume on 12 May that the Franco-Dutch front was in the process of being built up and that the recapture of the German bridgehead at Moerdijk could be expected soon. Not that there were no signs to the contrary, but they were difficult to interpret correctly. For instance, Van der Stad reported from Middelburg that parts of the Peel Division were in disarray and seeking safety in his sector. Van Andel heard from headquarters about armoured units in the Langstraat. It was unclear whether these were German or French tanks. A broadcast by Radio Bremen put an end to that uncertainty at eleven in the evening. In that broadcast, the German army leadership announced that its tank units had reached the Moerdijk bridges and were penetrating Fortress Holland. On the third day of battle, the Dutch prospects had therefore worsened considerably. It had not proved possible to retake the initiative anywhere. The allied cooperation threatened to become a fiasco. The French in Noord-Brabant had German tank units on their northern flank, cutting off their route to Fortress Holland. From now on, with the exception of isolated Zeeland, the battle would centre on holding Fortress Holland. The prospects, however, were not favourable. The Light Division’s failure had laid the road to Rotterdam open for the Germans. If they managed to cross the Maas in or near Rotterdam, The Hague would be under immediate threat. The danger could also come from other directions. The situation at the Grebbeberg was uncertain. The outcome of the planned counterattack there the next day would be decisive. The new situation required new measures to be taken. Now that there was no chance of the French entering Fortress Holland, Winkelman or-


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dered the Kil Group to open artillery fire on the Moerdijk bridges. Colonel Scharroo was ordered to advance onto the Maas bridges and set demolition charges under them. That night, code word Irene was also issued, the signal to destroy the oil reserves at Pernis. In view of the deteriorating situation, Winkelman had to consider whether the safety of the Royal Family could be guaranteed any longer. Prince Bernhard, Princess Juliana and their two children had left for England via IJmuiden that evening. Evacuating the Queen had also been discussed on 12 May by Winkelman and the cabinet, but not yet considered necessary. It was perhaps time to reconsider that decision.

Düsseldorf, Monday 13 May 1940 As the operations being carried out by the XXVIth Corps at Rotterdam and the Xth Corps at the Grebbe Line were going according to plan, the staff of Army Group B was not very interested in the battle for Fortress Holland this day. At 08.50 hrs von Bock had informed Halder and von Brauchitsch again in detail about the progress of the battle. Apart from that, however, von Bock still focused most of his attention on the developments at the 6th Army. The ongoing battle at Liège was worrying him greatly. The thought of the delay which these forts had caused the German army in 1914 did not reassure von Bock, given that the 6th Army was making little progress in eliminating them. He therefore asked Air Fleet 2 for increased tactical air support for the 6th Army. To facilitate the build-up of the front against Antwerp by the XXVIth Corps and in preparation for the attack on Zeeland, he asked Kesselring to have Stuka attacks carried out on enemy columns at Breda and Roosendaal. The main effort of the air support was with the XVIth Panzer Corps, which had been formed at the 6th Army on 11 May from the 4th Panzer Division, the 3rd Panzer Division, which had been brought forward, and the 20th Infantry Division (motorised). The unit as a whole was under the command of Generaloberst Erich Hoepner. In the afternoon, the Luftwaffe reported that the threat at Liège had been dealt with and this was confirmed by the 6th Army. For the 18th Army, this day showed signs of the end of the battle for Fortress Holland approaching. At 05.20 hrs, the first vehicles of the main force of the 9th Panzer Division crossed the Moerdijk bridge. At around 06.50 hrs, commander Schmidt of Generalkommando XXXIX arrived in Wesel, where part of the staff of the 18th Army was still present. Schmidt’s appearance prompted von Bock to note in his journal that finally the

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corps was on its way, “which I have been asking for for months”.5 Schmidt was given the assignment, which had been drawn up for him some days earlier, to take the XXXIXth Corps and penetrate Fortress Holland. Before Schmidt could get started, however, there was still a great deal to be done. He and a number of staff officers had travelled in a staff car from his base in Jena, south-west of Leipzig. The rest of this corps staff and the corps troops would not arrive in the theatre of war from Jena until much later. For the time being, he would therefore have to manage with what Student could offer him. Another problem was that he did not know the precise locations of the units that were to be placed under his command, or their command posts. His only option was to go looking for them. It was not until the early morning of 14 May, when he moved into his command post in Rijsoord near Rotterdam, that he gained some hold on his corps. There, however, he was faced with a new problem. Communications with the command post of the 18th Army were not functioning properly. This obstacle would not be removed before the Dutch capitulation. This was of immediate consequence for Schmidt’s command of the air force units in his corps, the Airborne Corps, given that the liaison with General der Flieger Kesselring ran through a liaison officer at the headquarters of the 18th Army. This problem would become even more acute if tactical air support were needed for the battle at Rotterdam. Rotterdam was not the only option for penetrating Fortress Holland, however. An opportunity seemed to be opening up at the Grebbe Line as well. The Xth Corps, which the army group had moved to the background of the picture somewhat over the past days, would, with support from the Stukas of Squadron 4, attempt at 13.20 hrs to breach the Grebbe Line at Rhenen and advance to Fortress Holland via Utrecht. The Fortress would then only be protected by the New Dutch Waterline. The question was therefore raised at the headquarters of 18th Army that afternoon as to what General Winkelman’s plans could be. According to the 18. Armeeoberkommando, there were two possibilities. Either the Dutch troops would retreat behind the New Dutch Waterline and continue defending Fortress Holland from there, or they would block the German break-in at the Grebbe Line. In either case, the Dutch army would staunchly defend Rotterdam. The second option, a continuation of the defence at the Grebbe Line, seemed the most likely to von Küchler’s staff and that therefore formed the basis for the next day’s orders for the attack. In the afternoon of 13 May, Army Group B and the 18th Army were conducting a similar analysis of the situation, based on the question as to 5 Kriegstagebuch Fedor von Bock, 13 May 1940, in: BA-MA, N 22/5.

The blocked entrance to the harbour of IJmuiden.

Panzerkampfwagens III link up with paratroops at Tweede Tol in the early hours of 13 May.

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how the XXXIXth Corps was to continue the battle on 14 May. Von Küchler and von Bock soon agreed that the resistance at the Grebbe Line would soon be overcome and that the Dutch Field Army would then pull back to the New Dutch Waterline. According to von Küchler, that movement would mean Winkelman concentrating his troops at Utrecht in order to block the advance routes to The Hague. He therefore wanted to have the XXXIXth Corps advance from Rotterdam via Gouda to Utrecht in order to catch the majority of the Dutch Field Army in a pincer movement. Von Bock, on the other hand, expected Winkelman to have the Dutch army retreat along the Amersfoort–Amsterdam axis, in order to defend the capital as a last bulwark. After the breach at Rotterdam, the battle would then also have to be continued along the Gouda–Leiden axis towards Amsterdam. If the attack were to concentrate on Utrecht, there was a danger of part of the Dutch army escaping to Amsterdam. Von Küchler, however, would not give in and von Bock sent von Salmuth to his stubborn subordinate commander to convince him that he was wrong. He continued to resist, however, after which von Bock decided that the boundaries of the subordinate commander’s own responsibility had been reached and at 23.35 hrs he personally ordered von Küchler to change his plans. No matter how the 18th Army decided to complete the conquest of the Netherlands, it was beyond any doubt that the Dutch capitulation was imminent. It was therefore time to make preparations to that effect. In the evening of 13 May, therefore, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Erich Marcks, asked the Head of the Operations Division of Army Group B, Oberst Wilhelm Hasse, what should be done when the Netherlands capitulated. Who should conduct the negotiations with Winkelman and what would the position of the Dutch soldiers be? Should they be considered prisoners of war? That would become clear the next day.

The Hague, Monday 13 May 1940 The fourth day began early for the commander-in-chief. That night, Winkelman had visited both the Queen at Noordeinde Palace and the members of the cabinet who were at Bezuidenhoutseweg 30, where the Council of Ministers had been meeting since 10 May. Winkelman set out the state of the country. It was, although not yet hopeless, nonetheless very serious. The ministers concluded that the Queen should leave the country immediately. At first, Winkelman resisted, fearing the effect such a step would have on the morale of the troops, but in the end he concurred with the cabinet’s point of view. The Queen also came to the conclusion that her


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German vehicles in the streets of war-torn Rhenen.

departure was unavoidable. At around nine, she left The Hague to board a British destroyer at the Hook of Holland.6 Later that morning, Winkelman and all the members of the cabinet discussed the situation again. The main question now was whether to give up the fight or not. There was a difference of opinion, but after a heated debate the ministers followed the commander-in-chief ’s advice to keep going. They urged Winkelman, however, not to make needless sacrifices. On the basis of this rather vague guideline, therefore, the commander-inchief had to decide when the weapons would be laid down. For the time being, Winkelman took this as a mandate to continue fighting. At the same time, however, he bore in mind the possibility that communications between headquarters and the subordinate commanders could be cut off as a result of the fighting. With this in mind, the latter were given secret instructions, which entailed, inter alia, that commanders who became cut off had to assume that the government would not cease the resistance under any condition. The word was ‘hold fast to the last man’. 6 For a polemic review of the departure of Queen Wilhelmina, see N. van der Zee, Om erger te voorkomen.�� De �� voorgeschiedenis en uitvoering van de vernietiging van het Nederlandse jodendom tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1997) 141-153. C. Fasseur, Queen Wilhelmina’s biographer, uses persuasive arguments to counter Van der Zee’s conclusion that the Queen’s departure contributed indirectly to the destruction of the Dutch Jews. See C. Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001) 20-24.

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Along the same lines, Winkelman had already taken measures earlier that morning. Major General Carstens was summoned to headquarters at 05.00 hrs, where he was ordered to establish an antitank front around The Hague to stop any tanks advancing from Rotterdam. Closely connected still to the threat at Rotterdam were the actions of the Light Division. It had been in action almost constantly since 10 May, without having been able to turn the tide on the southern front of Fortress Holland. By now, on 13 May, that was looking less likely than ever. Van der Bijl’s division was worn out and, with German tanks now on their way, was faced with a rapidly strengthening enemy. With permission from General Headquarters, all Dutch troops evacuated the Island of Dordrecht in the course of the day. The situation on his front, which was rapidly becoming critical, raised questions for Colonel Scharroo, the cantonment commander of Rotterdam. So far the exchanges of fire across the Maas had had little effect on the city and its population. Now, however, tanks and artillery were approaching and the risk of a German breach was increasing. If it were to come to street battles and artillery shelling, parts of the city ran the risk of being destroyed. Could that risk be taken and what was his troops’ task, Scharroo wondered. Winkelman himself spoke to Scharroo about this. The commander-in-chief let his decision be guided by the conclusions he had drawn earlier that day from his consultations with the Queen and the cabinet. As long as all means of defence had not yet been exhausted, he considered fighting on to be worthwhile. Winkelman therefore ordered Scharroo to defend Rotterdam staunchly and to hold the city to the last man. Evacuation of the city’s population was not discussed. The will to stand firm was also decisive in Winkelman’s stance regarding the navy. Vice Admiral J.Th. Furstner was under the command of the commander-in-chief insofar as the fleet’s contribution to the battle on land was concerned. Winkelman had nothing to do with the ships that were not involved. They were under the direct command of Furstner in his capacity as commander of the naval forces. As early as 10 May, the navy leadership had taken measures in case the motherland was occupied and the battle had to be continued elsewhere. From that day, various warships which were not significant for the land war crossed the North Sea to Britain. When Furstner realised on 13 May that things were going wrong on several fronts, he went to see Winkelman. Furstner announced that he would go to Britain as soon as it was established that the fight should be given up. Winkelman disagreed. His focus was inland. Talking now about what would happen after a capitulation was not appropriate, neither for the army nor for the


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navy. It did not go any further, however, than this exchange of thoughts. Winkelman made no attempt to change Furstner’s mind. What happened at Kornwerderzand, the eastern head of the IJsselmeer Dam, that day was something that Winkelman had not seen so far in the other theatres of operations. The troops stood firm. The news that a German attack there had been unsuccessful was cold comfort for headquarters, however, given that since 10 May the northern theatre of operations had been the least important of all. Much more serious were the Field Army’s problems at the Grebbeberg. In the night of 12 May, the blocking off of the German troops who had penetrated the position appeared to have been successful. At the same time, the command post of the IVth Division was preparing a counterattack which was to drive back the Germans in the morning of 13 May. The reports that arrived at headquarters that afternoon, however, told a different story. The counterattack had failed and at Rhenen the Germans had reached the railway, the last defence. The Dutch troops left their positions at the Grebbeberg in what was increasingly beginning to resemble a rout. Eventually the line along the railway fell as well. Elsewhere in the Valley Position, events concluded more favourably. At Scherpenzeel, in the IInd Division’s sector, the German attacked that day as well, but this time to no avail. This was no consolation to the Commander of the Field Army, however. The breach at Rhenen jeopardised the defence of the entire line. Van Voorst tot Voorst therefore decided that the entire Field Army was to retreat to the New Dutch Waterline. Most ministers had concluded from Winkelman’s outline later that day that not only the Queen, but also the cabinet should leave the country.7 Shortly after midday, the group left for the Hook of Holland where they would be able to find a British warship. They phoned Winkelman from the Hook of Holland. Besides announcing that the seat of government was being moved abroad, they also had instructions for him regarding the war policy to be followed. The instructions, drawn up by Minister Dijxhoorn, repeated the earlier guideline: the commander-in-chief was to continue fighting. Surrender was to be offered if further resistance proved pointless and useless. All in all, the country’s military position in the night of 13 May was not to be envied. Only an incorrigible optimist could count on the tables being turned. Winkelman was no such optimist. Several decisions he made on 12 and 13 May show that he expected an early capitulation to be 7 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, E.N. van Kleffens, and the Minister of Colonies, Ch.J.I.M. Welter, had already left for London in the morning of 10 May 1940.

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the most likely end to the fighting, even though no such doubts could be heard in his orders to the troops. Those orders focused on the determination to fight on. Winkelman’s plan to postpone the capitulation as long as possible in the end focused on the question of what higher purpose was served by continuing to fight. Closely connected was the question of what sacrifices were proportional to that purpose. We can only guess at Winkelman’s ideas in this respect. Most in line with the strategic thought at headquarters before and during those days in May is the assumption that the objective of the battle still lay in allied warfare. Even though the defence of Fortress Holland was at an end, France, Britain and Belgium were holding on. By fixing as many German troops as possible for as long as possible, the Dutch armed forces would at least be able to prevent the German army leadership from moving those units to the front in Belgium or northern France. Closer to home there were common interests as well. Giraud’s advance guards were still fighting in Noord-Brabant, while two of his divisions were reinforcing the defence on the Zeeland islands and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. The Dutch troops there had even been placed under French supreme command. The records do not show what sacrifices, military or otherwise, Winkelman did or did not consider acceptable for the continuation of operations. Nor is it known whether the issue was discussed in these terms at headquarters in the days before 14 May. It is possible that the issue was simply avoided so long as the actual situation did not give cause to make statements on the matter. If this was the case, the decision on when to capitulate not only depended on the resilience of the Dutch army and population, but also on the decisiveness and the means with which the Germans would continue their attack.

Düsseldorf, Tuesday 14 May 1940 For Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, 14 May 1940 was to be a busy day. His command post was still in Düsseldorf, but the front line was moving west, so to visit the forward troops he was having to travel increasingly long distances. This day again, his attention was mainly on the 6th Army. He visited the headquarters of the XVIth Corps in Tongeren and also appeared there in the command post of the 4th Panzer Division. Armeekommando 18 had by then moved to Uden. As the communications with Rijsoord remained flawed, however, the Head of the Operations Division went to the command post of the XXXIXth Corps to be informed of the situation at Rotterdam. At 12.20 hrs he was back in Uden


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and announced that, at 13.20 hrs that same afternoon, after initial artillery shelling and an air strike, the XXXIXth Corps would continue the attack in Rotterdam and then penetrate deep into Fortress Holland. Prior to the attack, a parlementaire would be sent to the commander of Rotterdam to claim the city. It would be clear by now to the Dutch commanders as well that they were fighting a lost cause. Von Küchler was at the Xth Corps that afternoon and concluded from his own observations that the Dutch army was on the verge of collapse. The faulty communications meant that von Küchler’s staff in Uden had not been informed that afternoon of the actual situation in Rotterdam. At 16.20 hrs, when the staff was still counting on a continuation of the fighting, the report came that Rotterdam had capitulated, soon to be followed by the surrender of Utrecht. In a proclamation broadcast at 20.30 hrs on Dutch radio, Winkelman announced that the Dutch armed forces, with the exception of the troops in Zeeland, would lay down their weapons. It was through this broadcast that Army Group B and Armeekommando 18 found out about the Dutch capitulation. When von Bock reported this good news to von Brauchitsch, the latter responded rather coolly. Von Bock’s annoyance was reflected in his journal entry: “I told Brauchitsch, whose response to this not entirely unimportant event was ‘yes’.”8 Von Brauchitsch may have been preoccupied. The most significant development on 14 May for the Oberkommando des Heeres was not the Dutch capitulation, but the situation at Army Group A, in particular the battle at the bridgehead on the left bank of the Meuse at Sedan, which was to be followed by a breakout. The entire success of Fall Gelb could come to depend on it. Von Bock then ordered von Küchler to begin negotiations with Winkelman. As long as Hitler had not issued any further orders, the Dutch soldiers were to be considered prisoners of war, which for the time being sufficiently answered Generalmajor Marcks’ questions of the previous evening.

The Hague, Tuesday 14 May 1940 At General Headquarters, the fifth day of war began in relative calm. The Germans appeared to be leaving Kornwerderzand in peace. The Field Army reported an uninterrupted retreat to the New Dutch Waterline. The troops were tired, but nonetheless they were in the process of taking up their new positions. At the IVth Division and Brigade B, it was to be some 8 Ibidem, 14 May 1940.

After the capitulation: German columns enter Amsterdam …

... and arrive at the town hall.


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time before the defence was properly organised, as much of the equipment and weapons had been lost and some units had been completely dispersed. The question was whether the Field Army would have that much time. The Light Division and the Kil Group also proved to have completed the retreat they had begun the previous day. In Rotterdam, the situation was still dangerous, but stable. Scharroo was making preparations to regroup his troops where the Germans would try to breach the front along the Maas. The threat behind him from the German bridgehead at Overschie was reduced that morning, as parts of the Ist Corps attacked it at 05.00 hrs from several directions. The relative calm at headquarters gave Winkelman and Van Voorst tot Voorst the opportunity to review the overall situation at the various fronts. After careful consideration, they concluded that the situation was as serious as ever, but still not hopeless yet. There was no reason to offer surrender already. The meeting was held because it was necessary to inform the population of the departure of the Queen and the cabinet. While Winkelman was having the proclamation written, he already knew of another person who was about to leave. At 08.00 hrs that morning, he had been phoned by Vice Admiral Furstner who, with reference to the meeting of the day before, enquired whether the prospects had since improved. Furstner’s response to Winkelman’s answer that the prospects were still bleak, was to announce his departure. At around 10.30 hrs, Colonel Scharroo phoned. A few minutes earlier, a German parlementaire had arrived at his headquarters with an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the city. The document gave Scharroo two hours to consider. After that time, measures would be taken that could result in the total destruction of the city. He could not tell from the signature who the authority was who had sent the document. Scharroo, and Wilson for that matter who had been with him since 12 May, did not attach any great value to the document. After four days of fighting, the military situation was still entirely under control. Particularly in view of the vague signature, there was a chance that the ultimatum was a ruse. Winkelman concurred with Scharroo and Wilson. They could not afford to make mistakes, especially not regarding such an important issue as Rotterdam. In order to gain more certainty, Winkelman ordered Scharroo to ask for a new ultimatum that was signed so that it could be seen who was demanding their surrender and in what capacity. By that time it was 12.15 hrs. Two hours later, headquarters tried to phone Scharroo to obtain an update, but to no avail. The line was dead. Winkelman and Van Voorst tot Voorst were not left in suspense very long, however, because three quar-

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ters of an hour later, at 15.00 hrs, Wilson arrived at headquarters to report that the centre of Rotterdam had been bombed and was burning. The air strike had begun at around 13.30 hrs, just after the Dutch parlementaire had received the second ultimatum. Wilson also reported that before his departure he had authorised Scharroo, on behalf of the commander-inchief, to capitulate, unless Wilson were to arrive back by a certain time with orders to the contrary. Winkelman approved Wilson’s decision. What were the consequences of the imminent breach at Rotterdam? Evidently, the German troops could advance further into Fortress Holland. At Delft, however, they would be faced with the antitank front. The road to The Hague was not simply wide open. For the Field Army, the situation looked less favourable, as it could now also be attacked from the rear. Prior to such an attack, however, the Germans would have to deploy their troops in the difficult Dutch polder terrain. That would inevitably take the necessary time. Winkelman’s first reaction, therefore, was to go no further than surrendering Rotterdam. The battle had not yet been decided, even though the prospects had become even bleaker. There was more going on, however. At around the same time as Wilson was delivering his report, General Headquarters was phoned by the staff of the cantonment commander of Utrecht, Reserve Colonel C.E.W. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, a brother of the Commander of the Field Army and of the army Chief of Staff. In the early afternoon, a German parlementaire had appeared near Utrecht, handed over a sealed envelope and announced that an answer was expected within two hours. The German troops that had passed the evacuated Valley Positions had obviously reached the New Dutch Waterline. Assuming that it was an ultimatum for the surrender of the city, Van Voorst tot Voorst had sent the envelope back unopened, as General Headquarters had ordered in the previous day’s secret instructions that the city was to be defended to the last man. The contents of the ultimatum, however, were not difficult to guess, as German aircraft had dropped pamphlets over the city. The pamphlets said that if Utrecht were defended, the city would be considered a fortress and would be attacked with tanks and air strikes. Only unconditional surrender could spare the inhabitants the same fate as Warsaw, it added. Winkelman was now faced with two very similar messages. One was that a defended city had been bombed from the air during the negotiations for a possible capitulation, the other was that another city now lay in the front line and was at risk of being attacked from the air. Winkelman and his staff immediately assumed that there was a direct operational connection between the German actions at Rotterdam and those at Utrecht.


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Both messages obviously came from the same source. It could therefore be assumed that if Utrecht were to be defended, the city would suffer the same fate as Rotterdam. The alternative, the surrender of Utrecht, would mean a second breach of Fortress Holland and would seal the fate of the Field Army. In either case an overall capitulation of the Dutch armed forces in the very near future was inevitable. Was this then the moment when fighting on would be, as the cabinet put it, pointless and useless? Winkelman held consultations by telephone with Van Andel, who was responsible for Rotterdam, and Van Voorst tot Voorst, the Commander of the Field Army and subsequently with the key officers at headquarters. They all felt that the capitulation was inevitable. Winkelman then cut the Gordian knot: the Dutch armed forces were to lay down their weapons. The battle was over. Just before 17.00 hrs, the official telex with the message of the capitulation went out to all subordinate commanders. The telex gave as the reasons for the capitulation the bombing of Rotterdam, the imminent destruction of Utrecht and the consequences of both for the civilian population. The command sought the cause of the collapse of the Dutch defence in the “imbalance in the possession of material resources (…) sometimes coupled with betrayal”. The soldier’s honour had, however, “been fulfilled entirely”.9 Even now that the battle was over, Winkelman continued to bear in mind the interests of the allies. The final stipulation of the capitulation order ordered the rendering useless or destruction of weapons, ammunition and other materiel, adding that this applied in particular to the coastal artillery. After all, a new German front against Britain now existed along the coast. In addition, the capitulation did not apply to Zeeland, because the position of the French troops there was not to be compromised. In the early evening, Winkelman informed the Dutch public about the capitulation by means of a proclamation and a short radio speech. It was now a case of waiting for the further arrangements regarding the surrender.

Rijsoord, Wednesday 15 May 1940 In the night of 14 May, the staff of the 18th Army sought contact with General Winkelman, using Dutch radio frequencies. He was requested to be

9 V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 112.

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The two key German figures in the Dutch theatre of operations, the commander of the 18th Army, General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler (left), and the commander of Army Group B, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock (right). They are pictured here meeting at Rijsoord on the morning of 15 May, shortly after the signing of the Dutch capitulation.

in Rotterdam at the northern abutment of the Maas bridge at 08.20 hrs on 15 May. He would be picked up there for the capitulation negotiations. As there was no answer, von Küchler sent one of his staff officers to General Headquarters, arriving in The Hague at 05.00 hrs. At the same time, Armeeoberkommando 18 was trying to reach Winkelman by telephone via Utrecht. This was also to no avail. Eventually, at 08.00 hrs word reached Uden that Winkelman would be in Rotterdam at 08.20 hrs. Von Küchler himself had already left his command post at 05.50 hrs and had arrived at Rijsoord at 07.50 hrs. He had all protocol measures taken that were necessary for the negotiations to take place in a dignified manner. The local primary school was chosen as the location for the discussions. Winkelman arrived in Rotterdam with a slight delay. There was a German escort waiting for him to take him to the headquarters of the XXXIXth Corps in Rijsoord. The negotiations went smoothly. Most of the time was taken up with translating the agreement. The only dif-


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ference of opinion concerned the German proposal to consider Dutch airmen who continued to fight as franc tireurs. Winkelman rejected this proposal and after some discussion both parties agreed to simply delete this item from the agreement. Winkelman also had included in the agreement, after some discussion, that the surrender did not apply to the Dutch troops in Zeeland. The capitulation document was signed by both parties at 10.15 hrs, with Winkelman returning to The Hague half an hour later. Von Küchler then ordered the photographers of his Propagandakompanie to photograph the Dutch defences on the northern bank of the Nieuwe Maas, to prove that Rotterdam had been a defended city and that the bombing had been justified. Von Bock now also arrived in Rijsoord. He had wanted to attend the negotiations, but was too late, and came to thank von Küchler and his army group for their efforts. Armeeoberkommando 18 moved to Tilburg that day, in order to lead the attack on Zeeland and Fortress Antwerp from there. Von Bock returned to Düsseldorf via Utrecht and the Grebbeberg. The next day, the Heeresgruppenkommando went to a new command post in Aachen, to continue its operations.

CHAPTER SIX

‘FALL FESTUNG’: A SURPRISE ATTACK ON THE HAGUE

Introduction During the night of 9 May, bombers, fighter planes and transport aircraft took off from German air bases for the surprise attack on the airfields of Ypenburg, Valkenburg and Ockenburg. The plan was as follows: first, the airfields would be bombed and machine-gunned to disrupt the defences, then paratroops would be dropped and, finally, the aircraft carrying the air-transportable troops would land on the terrain which had by then been captured by the paratroops. The barracks in The Hague were also to be bombed to prevent the units billeted there from moving to the airfields. The attack on The Hague was entrusted to the 22nd Air Transportable Division, which was under the command of Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck. The division consisted of some 10,000 men, of whom, according to the plan, 4,902 would land at Ypenburg, 3,313 at Valkenburg and 1,049 at Ockenburg. Six companies of Fallschirmjäger had been assigned to the division from the 7th Air Division, while the 22nd Air Transportable Division had had to lose several units to the 7th Air Division. Once the airfields were in safe hands on the first day of battle and enough troops had been flown in, the Germans would break out and advance on The Hague from three sides. Queen Wilhelmina, the cabinet and the top military leaders would then fall into German hands. The airborne troops were expected to operate aggressively and quickly occupy the main junctions on the access roads to the airfields. The possibility of attacks by the British air force in the afternoon of the first day of battle was taken into account, so orders were given to entrench and set up air defences. Because speed of action was paramount, the division commander had also decided that his men should try to seize civilian motor vehicles in The Hague. Lists of garages in The Hague were distributed for this purpose. Throughout the fighting, therefore, German soldiers made constant attempts—some of which were successful—to seize vehicles. While it could be said that the whole operation was spectacular, it was also something of a gamble. The

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An anti-aircraft machine gun of the Hussars-Motorcyclist (left); the defence of Ypenburg airfield was supported by Landsverk M-36 armoured vehicles (below).

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German army leadership assumed, as we have already seen, that once the troops had reached Breda on the third day of battle, there would have been a decisive result and the subsequent Dutch capitulation would only be a matter of time. Perhaps, however, one single day might suffice for the capture of the Netherlands. This would be a possibility if the Netherlands, like Denmark a month earlier, decided not to mount a staunch defence and, shocked by the presence of the enemy in the seat of government, chose to lay down its arms after some token resistance. If the landed units failed to accomplish their mission and the Netherlands decided to fight to the last, then the 22nd Air Transportable Division’s operation would be pointless and the division would be able to do little more than hold its defensive positions and wait to be relieved. The whole operation therefore had more political than military significance, in the sense that capitulation under those circumstances would be a political decision for which there was no urgent military need. It should also be seen separately from the simultaneous airborne operations against the bridges at Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Moerdijk, which were conducted by the 7th Air Division and which were directly linked to the ground operations by the 18th Army. Two days had been set aside for transferring and deploying the Air Transportable Division. The plan was that after the transport aircraft had set down their groups they would keep going back to Germany to pick up new groups. Valkenburg would be taken by the 6th Parachute Company, which belonged to the second battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment. The 47th Infantry Regiment would then be flown in on transport aircraft with supporting artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineer and reconnaissance units. Destined for Ypenburg were the first battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, the first and third battalions of the 65th Infantry Regiment and their support units. And lastly, reserved for Ockenburg were the third company of the 2nd Parachute Regiment and three infantry companies from the 65th Infantry Regiment, under the staff of the second battalion, supplied with some artillery, reconnaissance and logistic capacity. Since the attack on Norway and Denmark, General Winkelman had regarded an attack on the seat of government as a serious possibility. Various measures had been taken in this respect, as a result of which the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General J. van Andel, had various units at his disposal around The Hague on the night of 9 May. In Wassenaar, there was the 1st Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment (1 RHM). Ypenburg airfield was protected by the third battalion of the Grenadiers Regiment and six modern armoured vehicles. Around the airfield at Valkenburg were two companies and a section of heavy machine guns

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from the third battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment (4 RI). The subsidiary airfield of Ockenburg was defended by a detachment of depot troops consisting of 96 men and four light machine guns. These units, the antiaircraft defence and the aircraft stationed at the airfields were under the command of the air defence commander, Lieutenant General Best, who reported directly to General Winkelman. All these units were alerted when the German attack began. Also in Fortress Holland were all the depot troops and the Ist Corps, which was available to the commander-in-chief as a strategic reserve. It was envisaged that after war had broken out, the depot troops and the 1st Corps would be placed under the Commander of Fortress Holland.

Ypenburg, Valkenburg and Ockenburg captured by the Germans Because of the worrying reports from the borders, General Winkelman had ordered all troops for the strategic defence to be put on the highest level of alert with effect from 03.00 hrs on 10 May. At the Air Defence Command, the tension was increased further by reports that foreign planes were flying over Dutch territory. Preparations were made at Ypenburg; engines were warmed up so that twenty aircraft were combat-ready. The commander of the Grenadiers battalion had positioned a company round the landing strip. The heavy and light machine guns had the task of covering this site with their fire and destroying any enemy elements that landed there. That was also the task for the six armoured vehicles positioned at the north-western border of the landing area. Another company was charged with the external defence of the airfield. The fear was that paratroops landing outside the airfield and ‘malicious elements’ coming from Delft or The Hague would attack Ypenburg from the outside. This company was set up mainly along the Vliet between Rijswijk and Delft. A third company served as a mobile reserve. Around the airfield itself were four anti-aircraft machine-gun platoons and two anti-aircraft artillery batteries. Shortly before 04.00 hrs, the airfield was bombed; while the attack caused little material damage, it had a severely demoralising effect on those defending the airfield. Despite the chaos, nineteen planes succeeded in taking off and engaging in combat. The first German assault wave consisted of the aforementioned first battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, with a strength of over five hundred paratroops under the command of Hauptmann Noster. However, the pilots of the transport aircraft had orientation problems, as a result of which the paratroops landed too far from their target and were too

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widely dispersed. Consequently, they were unable to perform their first task, which was to occupy the airfield by means of a surprise attack. The task remained clear for the paratroops: once they had oriented and reorganised themselves, they were to reach the airfield as quickly as possible and ideally via the shortest route. The Dutch defence troops, on the other

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hand, had more difficulty getting a grip on the situation. Suddenly they found themselves in a state of war with the impression that the enemy was everywhere. In the first chaotic phase of the fighting, therefore, there was not much order in the Dutch operation. The confusion was not confined to the company guarding the airfield itself. The battalion reserve also disintegrated rapidly. Sporadic fighting then developed between the paratroops and the grenadiers who were located between Rijswijk and Delft. Affected by the bombing and the parachute landings, these grenadiers were easily swept along by small groups of soldiers fleeing from Ypenburg. The Hoornbrug, the bridge that provided access to The Hague, had a very strong appeal for them. Because the paratroops who had landed shortly before 05.00 hrs lost time in the regrouping and, because of the dispersed landings, were not at full strength, it was around 07.00 hrs before they managed to reach the main entrance to Ypenburg, together with soldiers from the transport aircraft that had landed outside the airfield. They then took control of the buildings at the airfield itself. At approximately 07.15 hrs, the commander of the third Grenadiers battalion had no option but to surrender. Nevertheless, this did not give the attackers, some eight hundred men in all, free use of the airfield. So what had happened in the meantime? At 05.24 hrs, the first group of eight Junkers Ju-52 landed at Ypenburg to set down the infantrymen of the 65th Infantry Regiment according to plan. Instead of being met by the paratroops who had landed earlier, they were met by a barrage of Dutch machine-gun fire. This was delivered by Reserve Lieutenant F.H. Warnaars, the courageous and skilful commander of a small group of grenadiers who had managed to hold their position at the edge of the airfield. The armoured vehicles also delivered targeted fire. The fact that the gunners in these vehicles defended themselves so well is remarkable if one considers that they had had very little training with live ammunition. Corporal J.P.L. Cools, for example, had until then only fired two practice shots from his gun. The next group of seventeen aircraft also stood little chance. Battered by the Dutch anti-aircraft artillery and hampered by the burning planes on the ground, they also came under the fire of the defending forces. Within an hour, it was no longer possible to land at the airfield. New waves of transport aircraft circled around The Hague looking for somewhere to land. Planes landed here and there. The division commander, von Sponeck, for example, who was supposed to land at Ypenburg, set down near Ockenburg. In spite of all the confusion, some Dutch soldiers showed immense personal courage. Conscript

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Private J.C.A. Clasener, for example, captured two German aircrews in the early morning of 10 May. The attack on Valkenburg air base began just like the one on Ypenburg with a bombardment at around 04.00 hrs that also sent many defenders running for cover. At around 04.30 hrs, the first group of paratroops were dropped to the southwest of the airfield, followed shortly afterwards by a second group on the north-eastern side. While some advanced to the airfield itself, other groups pushed ahead to the village of Valkenburg and to Katwijk aan den Rijn, Katwijk aan Zee, Wassenaar and the Haagsche Schouw crossroads. This company’s task–to occupy the airfield and seal off the access roads–was completed successfully. Entirely according to plan, more than fifty transport aircraft carrying personnel from the 47th Infantry Regiment landed from 05.20 hrs, thus increasing the strength to over 850 men. The air-transportable troops that had been flown in were able to disembark without any major difficulty and take up their combat formations. By 06.00 hrs, the airfield was in the hands of the Germans, although it was to prove a lesser advantage than they had envisaged. This was because Valkenburg air base was still under construction and the grass strip was too weak to bear the weight of an aircraft. Soon the landed planes had sunk so far into the ground that they could no longer take off. This meant that the air base had become blocked and completely unusable. In contrast to events at Ypenburg and Valkenburg, the attack on Ockenburg did not start with a preparatory bombardment, although there was a parachute drop there too. As mentioned previously, this involved the 3rd Parachute Company with a strength of 162 men. The attack failed, because only 36 of them landed near the airfield at 04.55 hrs. Navigational errors meant that the others were widely dispersed when they landed. From 05.24 hrs, a wave of seventeen enemy transport aircraft landed, followed less than half an hour later by a second wave of six planes. Some three hundred Germans thus arrived at the air base in a short space of time. Von Sponeck himself landed shortly after 07.00 hrs, also outside the airfield itself. In the course of the morning, the German strength at and around the airfield increased to around six hundred men; added to that number were another hundred or so crew members of aircraft which could no longer take off. The security company at Ockenburg was suddenly confronted with the harsh reality of the war. At 04.00 hrs, the soldiers had been able to observe the attack on Ypenburg. They had seen how four Dutch aircraft had suddenly landed for more ammunition and fuel (which was not avail-

The commander of the 22nd Air Transportable Division, Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck (left) on 10 May 1940 at the edge of the woods near Ockenburg airfield. The swastika flag was to mark the position for German planes. from 10 May 1940

Fortress Holland Commander of Fortress Holland

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able). When they saw the parachute drop, a patrol of a sergeant and seven men turned out. The offensive actions of the airborne troops (from 05.20 hrs) drove the demoralised company from the airfield and scattered them. Only one section held its ground on the terrain. This one surrendered at around 07.00 hrs after being attacked from the rear and losing men. The airfield was thus in German hands. Losses were high on the Dutch side. Of the 96 men in the security company, 24 had died and 18 were wounded, while others had been captured by the Germans. But here too, there was no real victory for the Germans. Aircraft blocked the terrain, making further landings impossible, and the division commander, von Sponeck, had no control of events. He was actually supposed to have landed at Ypenburg and he also had no radio contact with either his units or Generalleutnant Kurt Student, who was in command of the overall airborne operation. Soon his greatest concern was how to escape the imminent encirclement, since it had by then become clear that strong Dutch forces were closing a ring of steel around Ockenburg.

The continuing battle for the airfields on 10 May In a short space of time, the area around The Hague had become a chaotic battlefield. German airborne troops were trying to carry out their tasks, which included sealing off access roads in Loosduinen and near the Haagsche Schouw and Katwijk. Other troops who had not landed at the predicted sites were doing their utmost to join the main force. On the Dutch side, junior commanders acted on their own initiative in attacking the landed troops. In the meantime, the senior commanders, such as the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General Van Andel, and the commander of the 1st Corps, Major General N.T. Carstens, tried to establish some order in the counterattacks. The high-level command process did not, however, run smoothly, as there was no information regarding the strength of the German troops. Important information was obtained from documents that were found in a German plane which was shot down near the Adelheidstraat in The Hague. Other information, such as march orders, was seized in the morning of 12 May from a partially burnt-out aircraft at Ockenburg. Van Andel was not therefore in full possession of the facts until 13 May. The Commander of Fortress Holland found himself faced with three problems: he had to defend the seat of government against the advancing enemy, recapture the airfields and destroy the landed units. He also had to be mindful of the possibility of new landings.

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In complete accordance with the plans, General Winkelman placed the 1st Corps and the depot troops under the command of the Fortress Holland commander on 10 May. In order to be able to provide air support for the forthcoming recapture of the airfields, the air forces were also assigned to Van Andel. He gave orders to the commander of the 1st Corps, which comprised two divisions, to recapture the airfields. Major General Carstens then gave orders to the effect that the Ist Division, under the command of Colonel W.F.K. Bischoff van Heemskerck, should attack Ypenburg airfield, that the IIIrd Division, commanded by Colonel L.H. Kraak, should attack Valkenburg airfield and that the Grenadiers Regiment, commanded by Major J.K. de Visser, should attack Ockenburg airfield. Van Andel thus gradually began to gain control of the situation surrounding The Hague.

The recapture of Ypenburg The German troops at Ypenburg had been in a perilous position since around 07.00 hrs. The airfield was only partially under their control and it had also become clear to them that the proposed offensive towards the seat of government was impossible. It had now become a matter of self-preservation. The fact that the Germans had abandoned any attempt to force their way into The Hague was something of which General Headquarters was, of course, unaware. Van Andel believed there were two dangers to fear: a breakthrough to The Hague through Rijswijk (the Hoornbrug) and Leidschendam and another to Delft. The weakened second battalion of grenadiers was quickly transferred from The Hague to Rijswijk. The same action was taken with an artillery battalion. Depot troops followed and other points along the Vliet were occupied as well. At around 10.00 hrs, an infantry company at Ypenburg, which thought it was dealing with a German unit of approximately 70 men, launched a counterattack. This was foiled by German fire. Only when Bischoff van Heemskerck had arrived and the artillery brought in from Naaldwijk had completed its fire adjustment did the fortunes of war begin to change in the early afternoon. At the Oude Tolbrug, a bridge over the Vliet just to the north-east of Drievliet, there was by then a fierce battle raging. German soldiers who had occupied Villa Dorrepaal kept the bridge under fire, but made no attempt to cross the bridge. Reserve Second Lieutenant G.J.L. Maduro had arrived with a small detachment in Voorburg at approximately 10.00 hrs. It would be impossible to force a way across the Oude Tolbrug until at

After they had landed and secured the airfields around The Hague, the airborne troops were to force their way into the city to capture cabinet officials and the head of state. For this, they were provided with basic maps of the city. These documents fell into Dutch hands when they were found in a crashed Junkers Ju-52. This fragment shows the route from Ockenburg airfield to Noordeinde Palace.

Seized German outline map of the 22nd Air Transportable Division showing, amongst other things, the Jacob Mosselstraat, where the Air Defence Command was based at No. 2.

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least 14.00 hrs. At that time, an anti-aircraft gun opened fire on Villa Dorrepaal and Maduro and his men stormed across the bridge and forced their way into the villa. Eleven paratroops were taken prisoner. Once this breach of the German defences had been made, troops were able to advance further, and the attack at the Hoornbrug gradually gained momentum. At 15.30 hrs, Ypenburg was once again under Dutch control. The Germans put up some resistance for another few hours at several farms, but by around 19.30 hrs that race was run too. From the Hoornbrug, the attackers were now able to link up with the troops in Delft. German airborne troops who had managed to get away unscathed withdrew towards Overschie, where they set up defences with other Germans. All in all, Ypenburg and the surrounding area was once again under the control of the Commander of Fortress Holland by nightfall.

The battle for Valkenburg The first counterattack at Valkenburg was launched by the commander of the third battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment (III-4 RI), Major J. Mallinckrodt. Two companies from his battalion had been dispersed during the battle at the airfield itself, but the major took his remaining troops from Katwijk to the airfield. When he was within 200 metres of the airfield, the attack was halted by enemy fire. The Dutch withdrew to the dunes and took up positions there. By then, the Commander of Fortress Holland had at 05.00 hrs given orders to the 1st Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment stationed in Wassenaar to disable paratroops who had landed between Wassenaar and Valkenburg. This order had two consequences. On the one hand, there were now troops between The Hague and the Germans who had landed at Valkenburg and, on the other, Van Andel lost an important part of his reserves. He would thus, after a while, instruct other troops to relieve that regiment. When it became apparent that Valkenburg air base had fallen into enemy hands, the commander of 4 RI, Lieutenant Colonel H.D. Buurman, ordered his first and second battalions to advance to the airfield. I-4 RI was able to move unhindered from Katwijk aan Zee to the dune area to the north of the airfield. The second battalion, which was in Noordwijk and which was under the command of Reserve Major J.J.N. Cramer, marched to Katwijk aan den Rijn, where it encountered Germans who had managed to push through to there. The advance halted, because Germans who had lodged themselves in houses belonging to the Seminary of the Franciscan Friars (St Willibrord Institution) kept the only bridge over the

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Oude Rijn under constant fire. At approximately 15.00 hrs, Major Cramer managed, through his bold and skilful actions, to oust the Germans and clear the way. While all this was going on, the third battalion of the 2nd Artillery Regiment had sprung into action. At 07.00 hrs, the batteries had been set up in such a way that they could deliver fire on the airfield. When the battalion commander, Major H.J.J.W. Dürst Britt, was denied permission to open fire and made enquiries, the following turned out to be the case. A certain Oberleutnant Hohendorff had made a Dutch ensign who had been taken prisoner telephone to say that there were Dutch prisoners of war in the hangars. “Things will turn out badly for them”, Hohendorff had said, referring to what would happen if the airfield came under fire. The report was disregarded by the Dutch, without any thought for the awkward position of the German officer, who was burdened with around 160 prisoners of war. What is more, in Army Announcement no. 3 issued by General Headquarters, the event was referred to as a violation of the law of war. Literally, it read: “A new cowardly outrage was committed by German troops, when the German commanding officer Hohendorff threatened to kill the captured Dutch airfield troops if that airfield came under artillery fire.”1 At approximately 08.30 hrs, the artillery commenced its fire registration and the airfield came under fire during the course of the morning. The five hundred or so remaining airborne troops subsequently entrenched in the village of Valkenburg, which was to have a hard time of it over the next few days. The airfield itself thus returned to Dutch control by the end of the afternoon. During the morning of 10 May, a battle was also fought at the Haagsche Schouw, the site where the main highway from Amsterdam to The Hague crosses the Oude Rijn. Immediately after landing, paratroops had occupied the bridge and the surrounding area. This meant that the Ist Division’s ammunition supplies were at risk. Various depot troops moved in to break the German resistance and clear the way. With vigour and exceptional courage, Reserve Major H. Mulder and several soldiers managed to recapture the bridge. The passage was thus free once again. There were further skirmishes between Dutch and German troops at several other locations, including one at Maaldrift along the same highway.

1 V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 282. See also the illustration on page 10. The real name of the German officer was Oberleutnant Hohendorn, Zugführer in the 11. Kompanie of the 47. Infanterieregiment. Informal statement by E.H. Brongers.

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In the days that followed, various attempts were made to put the Germans out of action in the village of Valkenburg, but to no avail. Although the Dutch troops had artillery and were superior in number, they were less proficient than their opponents. In firing, the Germans had the advantage of the terrain, which was completely flat and was intersected by canals and ditches. On 11 May, attempts were made first by II and III-4 RI and subsequently by I-9 RI to capture the village. Guns from III-2 RA and II-6 RA supported these attacks. The civilian population found themselves in serious danger during these battles. Artillery fire hit the church and the town hall, where some civilians had sought refuge and where there were also wounded personnel and Dutch prisoners of war. During the first attack, the German commander in Valkenburg told the mayor to ask Lieutenant Colonel Buurman to shift his fire. He in turn promised to put the request to his seniors, but that had no effect before the end of his regiment’s battle and the artillery support continued during the attack by I-9 RI. On 12 May, I-9 RI repeated its attack, with the support of II-9 RI and III-2 RA. Fires were breaking out in the village by this time. In the early morning of 14 May, a delegation of residents requested the evacuation of the civilian population and of the Dutch and German wounded. The commander of the 1st Corps, Major General Carstens, gave permission for the evacuation of civilians, which took place later that morning. He would not, however, allow any negotiations for a ceasefire in order to evacuate the wounded service personnel. Instead, he demanded the surrender of the Germans in Valkenburg. They refused. In order to thwart any possible German breakout, Buurman ordered 2-II-6 RA to deliver fire on the village that afternoon.2 An important factor was the presence of German troops in the dune area near the Wassenaarse Slag. There were about 350 men, who had come from aircraft that had landed outside Valkenburg airfield, some of them on the beach. The mopping-up operation in this dune area was a fiasco. In the night of 10 May, one Dutch battalion was completely dispersed and severe losses later inflicted on another. This group of Germans managed to hold their own until the capitulation on 14 May.

2 M. Witkamp, “4 R.I. Regimentsarts. Verslag Hp.V.”, undated, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DC-NIMH), Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 476, file 2; A.C. de Wilde, “Gebeurtenissen te Valkenburg (Z.-H.) in de dagen 10 tot 15 mei van het jaar onzes Heeren 1940”, undated, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 476, file 1; N.T. Carstens, “Verslag van het Ie Legerkorps van 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”, 20 December 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 473, file 1.

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Ockenburg back in Dutch hands At Ockenburg too, junior commanders took action on their own initiative immediately after the landings. Counterattacks thus came from Loosduinen, where the staff of the Grenadiers Regiment and a machine-gun company, a mortar company, an antitank artillery company and a battery of 6-Veld field guns were based. Led by officers, small groups advanced and reached the vicinity of the airfield. In the meantime, German airborne troops, albeit in very small numbers, began to move to Loosduinen in order to occupy vital intersections in accordance with their mission. They drove the Dutch back to Loosduinen, where fierce fighting was soon taking place. The commander of the Grenadiers Regiment, whose command post was based in Loosduinen, was forced to move it to The Hague. While he was doing so, reinforcements arrived, which meant that the Dutch remained in control of the situation in Loosduinen. In a sense, the danger had not been so grave, as the Germans in Loosduinen were too weak to advance to The Hague with any degree of success. Their primary mission was to block the access roads to Ockenburg and wait until the main force was in a position to begin the attack on The Hague. Events in Loosduinen were also repeated in the nearby Meer en Bosch area. After the reports of the parachute landings, the first battalion of grenadiers, located in the west of The Hague, prepared for battle. One of the companies advanced quickly along the Laan van Meerdervoort, moved past the woods of Meer en Bosch and also got a point patrol to within a very short distance of the airfield. This company too had to deal with Germans who were trying to occupy the intersections. The combat report of Reserve Captain H.A. Gunters, written on 11 May 1940, stated: Marched with safety measures in open formation along the Buizerdlaan– Sportlaan–Savornin Lohmanlaan–Aronskelkweg–Muurbloemweg–Laan van Meerdervoort. Ground was won through Meer en Bosch and the allotments to the south. Some of the unit, about 1½ sections, subsequently crossed the Kijkduinschestraat, but were hampered by fire to such an extent that forward movement became impossible. It was here that the company suffered its losses. When the same part that had been in the allotments then also came under fire from mortars and artillery, troops withdrew to the southern boundary of Meer en Bosch.3

This action was typical of many others in the battle around The Hague, particularly in terms of duration. By means of the route referred to above, 3 H.A. Gunters, “Gevechtsbericht van het gevecht op den 10den mei 1940”, 11 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 475, file 7.

The commander of the 22nd Air Transportable Division, Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck helped personally to dig the field fortifications in the woods at Ockenburg on 10 May.

Seized city map of The Hague, showing the residence of Prime Minister jonkheer D.J. de Geer at Prins Mauritslaan 61, and of the Army Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, Jan van Nassaustraat 60.

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the distance of 2.5 km could be covered in 25 minutes in march tempo. Gunters left at approximately 05.45 hrs. He reached the western edge of Meer en Bosch at 06.30 hrs. After halting his progress for a while, probably to restore cohesion in his company, he advanced further. At the intersection with the Kijkduinsestraat, the grenadiers came under fire during which some men were wounded or killed. Between 08.00 and 09.00 hrs, Gunters ordered his men to pull back to the edge of Meer en Bosch. The entire operation had lasted approximately three hours. The outcome was thus that the grenadiers fell back to the edge of Meer en Bosch and took up positions there. After all these poorly coordinated actions, born out of necessity, the command situation started to become more organised. The grenadiers, reinforced by depot troops, were to attack Ockenburg from the west of The Hague, while a rifle battalion was to advance to Ockenburg from Monster. The attack was to be supported by the first battalion of the 2nd Artillery Regiment that was stationed at Poeldijk. Between 07.00 and 08.00 hrs, the Germans were given a foretaste of the Dutch resolve to recapture Ockenburg. Four Dutch planes bombed the airfield. One of the aircraft, a Fokker T-V, was under the command of Reserve Second Lieutenant Observer B. Swagerman. After accomplishing the mission, his plane was shot down by enemy fighter planes just off the coast. Swagerman was the only surviving member of the five-man crew. He came down in the water five hundred metres from the coastline, managed to get out of his heavy flying gear and swam ashore. He then took part in various other sorties and died on 13 May after an attack on the Moerdijk bridge. Positioned at Poeldijk was the first battalion of the 2nd Artillery Regiment (I‑2 RA). When the battalion commander, Major M.G. van Kesteren, received orders to support the attack by the grenadiers, he sent Lieutenant M.P. Feith to the water tower in Monster as an observer. From there, Feith, who was in radio contact with the battalion, could oversee part of the airfield. At around 08.00 hrs, the battalion fired the first shots. Round after round was fired throughout the morning. The landed planes burst into flames and new landings were hampered. Von Sponeck realised that his lightly armed infantrymen did not stand a chance against the artillery. With a group of around three hundred men, he retreated to the woods at Ockenburg, where he set up his defences. The artillery threat almost became even more serious for von Sponeck. What had happened was, after the observation post had been set up in the water tower, a patrol consisting of a corporal and three privates set off for

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Loosduinen with an ultra-shortwave radio to establish communications between the commander of the Grenadiers Regiment and the artillery battalion at Poeldijk. On the way from Poeldijk to Loosduinen, however, a number of Germans had holed up at Dekkershoekje. They opened fire on the car that was carrying the patrol. One of those inside was killed and the others were taken prisoner. This event meant that it had now become impossible to direct the artillery fire to the targets from Loosduinen as well. Shortly after 11.00 hrs, the grenadiers left their starting position in Meer en Bosch, advanced and engaged with the various pockets of German resistance. While some Germans wanted to carry on fighting, others were waving white flags, which brought about the following situation: At one point we saw Germans waving white flags. Halfway through the entrance [to the airfield], we came under fire from the direction in which these Germans had disappeared. One of our men, G. Damstede, was wounded. Because of what the Germans had done, we were so angry that we gave the Germans what for. We killed some Germans, others surrendered.4

Between 14.00 and 15.00 hrs, the airfield once again returned to Dutch control. Because of the contribution by the Dutch artillery, the losses had remained relatively low.5 When they were mopping up the last pockets of resistance, the grenadiers proceeded with caution. They took two hours to cover a distance of less than one kilometre.

Further actions against the airborne troops and the battle at Overschie On the evening of 10 May, the commander of the 1st Corps issued a defensive order to the effect that The Hague was to be secured. In it, he defined a line which formed a wide arc around the city: from Ockenburg, through Delft, Zoetermeer and Leiden to Noordwijk. His corps was to mount a staunch defence on this line. He also instructed the units at the airfields and near the other concentrations of paratroops to maintain their positions. On the morning of 11 May, Carstens partially retracted this order and, on the instructions of the Commander of Fortress Holland, issued a number of offensive orders. These were designed to eliminate the various groups of German airborne troops and regain full control of the main 4 Statement made by conscript grenadier A. Brouwer, 21 March 1949 in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 475, file 5. 5 C.D. Kamerling, Algemeen overzicht van de strijd om en in de Vesting Holland (zonder het oostfront) en de strijd tegen de luchtlandingstroepen rondom ’s‑Gravenhage mei 1940 (The Hague, 1954) 79.

The 22nd Air Transportable Division had wanted to distribute this pamphlet among the civilian population in The Hague once the city had been occupied.

Ockenburg airfield in the afternoon of 10 May, with Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft and two Dutch Fokker D-XXI fighter planes.

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highway from Rotterdam to The Hague and of the roads in the Westland area. If that succeeded, the threat within Fortress Holland would have been removed, just as General Headquarters wished. On the evening of 10 May, von Sponeck received radio contact from General der Flieger A. Kesselring, the commander of Air Fleet 2. Von Sponeck was told that the attack on The Hague would not be continued any longer. He was to go to Overschie and assemble as much as possible of what remained of his division. It was clear to von Sponeck that some of the wounded would have to stay behind in this exfiltration operation. There were still dead and wounded personnel on the ground at the airfield, Dutch as well as German, who, because of the shortage of medical personnel and because of the dangerous situation, could not be evacuated or recovered by either side. On the morning of 11 May, 2-I Grenadiers Regiment was visited by a German officer, who said he was coming to parley. He requested a ceasefire so that the Dutch and German wounded could be taken care of. Blindfolded, he was taken to Major General Carstens, whose response was clear: “First the unconditional surrender of all the units that are still in the woods, then the wounded will be tended to immediately.” But the paratroops refused to surrender in the afternoon of 11 May, a response which the grenadiers “answered with extremely vigorous fire by all light infantry weapons and heavy machine guns on the edge of the woods at Ockenburg.”6 Similar events occurred at Valkenburg. There, too, the uncompromising demand had been set: unconditional surrender. The demands of battle outweighed humanitarian considerations. On 11 May, not much was happening around The Hague apart from a few skirmishes. At Ockenburg, however, von Sponeck was preparing his exfiltration, entirely in accordance with his new orders. At approximately 23.00 hrs on 11 May, he was ready. Without making a sound, the general and over three hundred men displaced from Ockenburg to Wateringen; Dutch guard posts and patrols noticed nothing. During the night of 11 May, the German group arrived in Wateringen, where a Dutch guard post raised the alarm. Naturally, the commander of the Hague Group who was 6 W. Antheunissen, “De gevechten en verrichtingen van het I Bataljon Grenadiers in de oorlogsdagen van 10 t.m. 14 Mei 1940”, undated, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 475, file 1; N.T. Carstens, “Verslag van het Ie Legerkorps van 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”, 20 December 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 473, file 1; J. Mutters, “Gevechtsbericht van het gevecht op den 11en Mei 1940”, 6 June 1940 in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 475, file 5; Statement by A. Lefeber, 28 March 1949, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 474, map 11; W. Antheunissen, “Gevechtsbericht van het gevecht op den 10en Mei 1940”, 18 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 475, file 1; Battle report by H.P. Wenckenbach, undated (probably autumn 1941), in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 474, file 21.

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stationed there, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel T. Beets, thought that it was an attack on his headquarters. He fought tooth and nail to defend Wateringen. The Germans, however, had absolutely no intention of occupying the village and, after going a short distance in a few captured buses, they left Wateringen behind them. They reached Overschie via ’t Woud and Schipluiden. On 13 May, Dutch troops, who had had a hard time of it in the mopping-up operation between Ypenburg and Overschie, received orders to attack Overschie. This plan was thwarted, however, by an order from General Winkelman to form an antitank front that ran along the Loosduinen–Wateringen–Delft–Pijnacker–Zoetermeer–Leiderdorp–Katwijk aan Zee line. This was because the commander-in-chief was extremely worried about the German troop movements on the Moerdijk–Dordrecht–Rotterdam axis and feared a further breach. The attack on Overschie was cancelled. However, Colonel P.W. Scharroo, the Rotterdam cantonment commander, had no wish to leave the Germans undisturbed. He ordered the commander of the air forces depot to carry out a mission. Under the command of a Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) senior NCO, H.D. Rijhiner, a number of volunteers launched the attack, but it soon became clear that it would be impossible to overpower the German troops without reinforcements. The crew of the armoured vehicle sent as reinforcements saw little point in a battle, however. They had to be forced by a Dutch captain to advance further. When a short time later the firing became heavier and started to come from the houses along the road, the armoured vehicle suddenly reversed at top speed, with the result that one infantryman was killed and another was hit by the vehicle.

The captain rushed to help, but he too was hit so hard “that his left leg was partially shattered and his right leg was broken in three places.”7 Several more Dutchmen were killed in the attack, including Sergeant J.J. Versteegen, who had volunteered for the mission. The Dutch attack was halted after the incident with the armoured vehicle. The next day, however, the assault on von Sponeck’s troops was resumed, this time mainly by three reinforced infantry battalions from Delft. This assault was led by Lieutenant Colonel H.D. Scherpenhuijzen, the commander of the Rifles Regiment. The battalions progressed slowly, despite the fact that some NCOs, such as Sergeant W.J. Kenninck, were 7 M.R.H. Calmeyer and V.E. Nierstrasz, De strijd om Rotterdam, Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952) 163.

The Obermusikmeister of the 47th Infantry Regiment, which captured Valkenburg airfield on 10 May, wrote a Präsentiermarsch in honour of the occasion and presented the score to his regiment commander.

Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft at Valkenburg airfield, burnt out after the shelling by III-2 RA on 10 May. To the left in the background is a Junkers W-34, with a damaged Dornier Do-17 bomber next to it.

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leading the forward troops personally. The Dutch soldiers frequently had to seek cover from low-flying German aircraft, which in any event took little action against the Dutch advance. Before the German troops in Overschie could actually be attacked, however, the bombing of Rotterdam had already brought hostilities to an end.8

Conclusion The battle around The Hague produced a relatively high number of losses. On the Dutch side, almost 500 men died, 80 of whom were killed in the bombing of the ‘Nieuwe Alexander’ Barracks (10 May) and 24 of whom died in the surprise attack on Ockenburg airfield. The number of German dead was not recorded accurately, but was probably equivalent to Dutch losses. At least 800 German prisoners of war were evacuated to England via IJmuiden on 13 and 14 May on the S.S. Phrontis and the S.S. Texelstroom, respectively. Most of them must have belonged to 22nd Air Transportable Division and the percentage of paratroops would thus have been small. Various publications mention a figure of 1,200. In contrast to what is sometimes claimed, this figure—whether it was 800 or 1,200—represents a surmountable loss of combat power. Also, one should bear in mind that about two-thirds of the 22nd Air Transportable Division stayed out of the fighting, given that it was already clear during the morning of 10 May that it would be impossible to fly in any more reinforcements. The German air force also suffered losses, and quite considerable ones too. F.J. Molenaar says on this matter: The total losses of German aircraft in the Netherlands amounted to 328, in other words in ten days more than 12% of the combined losses of 2,694 aircraft inflicted on the Luftwaffe by the air-defence organisations of Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and France and by the air forces of the United Kingdom.9

Later figures are even higher. E.H. Brongers puts the total number of aircraft lost in the battle for the Netherlands at at least 525, although this figure includes all aircraft that were removed from the operations, both temporarily and definitively. The Dutch Air War Study Group 1939-1945 defines a loss in the same way as the Luftwaffe itself did during the Second 8 Kamerling, Vesting Holland, 308-317. 9 F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 944. See also: J.N. Fernhout, “Het verband tussen de Luftwaffe-verliezen in mei ’40 en de Duitse invasieplannen voor Engeland”, Militaire Spectator, CLXI (1992) 364-371.

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World War, namely if the degree of destruction of the aircraft was 60% or higher. According to this definition, the total losses amounted to 375 aircraft. This included approximately 160 Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft. The fighting around The Hague provides a good insight into the stronger and weaker aspects of Dutch military operations. Small-scale, daring missions by a few officers, NCOs and other ranks to capture a particular point were usually successful. Subsequent attacks by larger groups, on the other hand, exposed the weaknesses in the command process. One of the shortcomings was the coordination of the various troop movements. Time and time again, it proved that the troops did not have a sufficiently good command of mobile and offensive combat. The first fire engagement, therefore, often halted the forward movement, which was then followed by a retreat, whether ordered or not. We should not forget in all this that the sudden baptism of fire threw many into a state of turmoil and that there was no time to gain any combat experience. The battle in Fortress Holland was fought in an atmosphere of chaos. The units of the 1st Corps frequently had to follow up reports, usually based on mistaken observations, of new parachute landings. This exhausted the troops unnecessarily. On top of that, suspicions of betrayal and reports of operations by secret agents, summarised under the fear of a fifth column, contributed to the general sense of danger felt by civilians as well as military personnel. The German troops had on their side the great advantage that they had a clear idea of what their mission was. During their preparations, it was impressed upon them that the Dutch army did not amount to much and that victory by means of robust action was theirs for the taking. That did not turn out to be the case. During the air transport, confusion arose because of navigational errors and the actions of the Dutch anti-aircraft defences. Only a third of the division reached The Hague and even then not always at the planned locations. That had an adverse effect on morale. The fighting on the ground drew heavily on the Germans’ combat power, especially when they came under artillery fire. This explains why approximately a third of the landed troops were taken prisoner. However, the groups who managed to mount a staunch defence, such as those in Overschie and Valkenburg, were able to hold out until 15 May. Clearing these pockets of resistance turned out to be too onerous a task for the Dutch army. In Dutch historical accounts of May 1940, much attention has always been focused on German violations of the law of war. De Jong, for instance, said on this matter: “Also in Ockenburg, at two points in the Maas Line and on the Grebbeberg, defenceless prisoners of war were killed and

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that too may have happened more often. Dead men don’t talk.”10 He thus endorses the declaration made by Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst to the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission. It has to be said, however, that as far as Ockenburg is concerned, it is not clear what evidence Van Voorst tot Voorst possessed. Because of this, it is also useful to note that the airborne troops had serious problems with their prisoners of war. At Ypenburg they had many, as they did at Valkenburg, and all in the turmoil of battle. There were few victims among them. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that, barring exceptions, the Germans’ treatment of prisoners of war—as far as the fighting around The Hague was concerned—attested to a good level of discipline.11

10 �� L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 3. Mei ’40 (The Hague, 1970) 332. 11 �� More comprehensive is H. Amersfoort, ‘Ik had mijn roode-kruis band afgedaan’. Oorlogsrecht en gedragingen van Nederlandse en Duitse militairen in gevecht, mei 1940 (The Hague, 2005).

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISPUTED TERRITORY: THE BATTLE IN THE DUTCH PROVINCES OF LIMBURG, NOORD-BRABANT AND ZEELAND

Introduction The German invasion of the Netherlands was, as has been mentioned earlier, the task of the 18th Army. Part of this army was to attack the eastern front of Fortress Holland to the north of the major rivers. The German attack was, however, concentrated to the south of the rivers: “Simultaneously, to the south of the rivers the 18th Army’s main force is to take the bridges across the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk and the Oude Maas at Dordrecht in cooperation with special units.” The main bridges between Moerdijk and Rotterdam were to be captured by paratroops. It was essential for these troops to be joined quickly by the 18th Army. The link-up with the paratroops was not the only task assigned to the XXVIth Corps. During the march through Noord-Brabant this army corps was also to protect the left flank of the 18th Army against attacks from “enemy forces in the Antwerp area”. Which troops were to be deployed for the latter and which for further attacks on Fortress Holland was not yet clear: “The army will decide in due course whether following arrival in the Breda area units of the XXVIth Corps can be turned to the north for use in the battle for Fortress Holland.”1 In view of the importance of the advance through Noord-Brabant, Hitler earmarked the 9th Panzer Division under the command of Generalmajor Alfred Ritter von Hubicki for this task, one of his ten armoured divisions. The path ahead for this division was to be cleared by two infantry divisions: the 254th Infantry Division, under the command of Generalleutnant Walter Behschnitt and the 256th Infantry Division, commanded by Generalmajor Alexander Kauffmann. The SS Verfügungsdivision, com1 Armee-Oberkommando 18, Abt. 1a, Nr. 1/40, “Angriffsbefehl”, 10 May 1940, in: Feldzug in Holland u. Belgien 10.5.-1.6.1940. Gen. Kdo. XXVI A.K., Anl.z.K.T.B. 9.5.1.6.1940, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DCNIMH), Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 178/7.

A German ferry across the river Maas, 13 May 1940. 10 May 1940

Dutch command structure in Noord-Brabant and northern Limburg XXXX

Field Army XXX

3

XX

XX

(-)

1 2 2

XX

5

2 13 17 3

MR

(-)

XX

6

(-) (-) (-)

3

3 6 14 7

6

1

29

Peel

(-) (-) (-)

20x 20

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manded by SS Gruppenführer2 Paul Haußer, was also available to fight on the front line. The armoured division, the SS division and the two infantry divisions were part of the XXVIth Corps. This corps’ commander was General der Artillerie Albert Wodrig. Two other infantry divisions, the 225th and the 208th, were part of this corps, but the latter two divisions remained to the east of the Rhine in reserve for the time being. Along the route towards Breda, the XXVIth Corps had to pass two Dutch defence lines: the Maas Line and the Peel-Raam Position. The objective of the Maas Line was to slow the German advance. The Dutch troops in Noord-Brabant would then have an opportunity to make themselves combat-ready and it would be possible for the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to retreat to Fortress Holland. In order to defend the river Maas, river casemates had been built at all bridges. Between the various bridges over the Maas, barbed-wire defences had been placed along the river and behind these dozens of smaller casemates and field fortifications had been constructed. The Maas Line, including the area guarded by troops belonging to the Maas-Waal Group, was manned by four border battalions and five battalions from regular infantry regiments. At a distance which varied from 9 to 21 kilometres behind the Maas Line was the Peel-Raam Position. This defence line ran from the Belgian border first along the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, then across the Peel area via the villages of Griendtsveen and Mill to Grave on the river Maas. Much of the area through which this defence line ran was boggy and difficult for any attacker to cross. In the northern section of the position, where there were no natural obstacles, what was known as the Defence Canal had been dug in 1939. There were also numerous casemates, many of the S-type, a casemate type capable of delivering frontal and flanking fire, also referred to as the ‘porcupine’. The Peel-Raam Position was therefore not in itself weak, but the garrison comprising what was known as the Peel Division was numerically insufficient for repelling a strong attack. Between Grave and the Belgian border there were thirteen regular infantry battalions, a border battalion and a few support units. The division also had six infantry battalions of the IIIrd Corps under its command. These twenty battalions were spread along the Maas Line and the PeelRaam Position. This force was insufficient to provide long-term opposition. This was, of course, a consequence of the decision taken by General H.G. Winkelman in April 1940 not to defend this position, but Fortress Holland in2 SS Gruppenführer is equal in rank to Generalmajor. For a full list of rank equivalents, see Annex.

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stead. This decision did not help the Peel Division’s position. “I had no artillery, no antitank guns, no signals, no ammunition train, no anti-aircraft artillery, no anti-aircraft guns; I had nothing, nothing, nothing”, in the words of the Peel Division’s commander, Colonel L.J. Schmidt, after the war. They could have built the whole thing into an amazing complex and thus restricted the movement of the attacking force, but they didn’t want to. I begged them to do so, but in vain. My forces were fragmented across many casemates which were constructed alongside each other. There was no depth. You couldn’t fight in those circumstances.3

The army leadership was, of course, aware of the lack of opportunities open to the Peel Division. The order issued to Colonel Schmidt was to slow the advance of the enemy and in the event of German combat superiority to retreat whilst delaying the German advance. The troops defending the Peel-Raam Position, however, were told to fight to the last man and were not informed of the plan to pull back the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to behind the major rivers immediately following a German invasion. In practice, they could do nothing other than hope for rapid support from French or other allied troops. If these guardian angels did not appear, however, then Noord-Brabant was certainly lost.

Operations against the bridges over the river Maas With a view to being able to reach the Moerdijk bridges in one quick push, the German troops had to breach the Dutch defence lines quickly. In the autumn of 1939, Hitler came up with the idea of capturing the bridges over the Maas by deploying assault squads in order subsequently to open a rapid attack on the Peel-Raam Position. The Germans had to take at least a few of the bridges across the Maas: not just for the advance by the XXVIth Corps, but also for the 6th Army, which was to invade Belgium via southern Limburg under the command of Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau. The plans for capturing the various bridges were drawn up by the German military counterintelligence service or Abwehr. To this end, this service led by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris formed a number of special units such as the Bau-Lehrbataillon zur besondere Verwendung 800 in Brandenburg and the Bataillon zur besondere Verwendung 100 in Breslau. These units were partially manned by Dutch WA personnel (military section 3 Testimony of L.J. Schmidt, 23 March 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 19401945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel Ic (The Hague, 1949) 274.

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Pioneers of the German 254th Infantry Division lay a pontoon bridge across the Maas on 10 May 1940. In the background is the burning village of Katwijk aan de Maas.

of the Dutch National Socialist Movement, NSB), who lived in Germany and who had organised themselves into the ‘gymnastics club’ Sport en Spel (sport and games). The group’s leader was Hubert Köhler, a former house painter from Limburg. The conquering of the bridges which the XXVIth Corps was to use according to the operational plans was charged to a group belonging to the Brandenburg-Bataillon, which was under the command of Oberleutnant Wilhelm Walther and stationed in Asperden, near Goch in the Rhineland. This battalion comprised “approximately thirty supporters of Anton Mussert [leader of the NSB] and about eighty German army comrades”.4 The most important bridge to be captured was the railway bridge at Gennep, as the Germans wished to breach the Peel-Raam Position via this river crossing, using an armoured train and a goods train containing the IIIrd battalion of the 481st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Rüdi Schenk. Other targets included the bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal at Heumen, Malden and Hatert and over the Maas at Grave. It was to be expected that there would be traffic congestion at the bridge at Gennep and an alternative route was found for the 9th Panzer Division via the bridg4 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 2. Neutraal (The Hague, 1969) 491.

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es across the Maas-Waal Canal and at Grave. The operation on 10 May against the railway bridge at Gennep, in which the bridge across the small river Niers and Gennep railway station were also targets, was led personally by Oberleutnant Walther. His assault squad also included several members of Sport en Spel. The appointed hour was early on the morning of 10 May. The guards at the bridge over the Niers were overcome by a group of about twenty soldiers, after which the two German trains headed towards Gennep station. The soldiers guarding this station surrendered without putting up any resistance, but the personnel of the Marechaussee (military police force which also carried out civilian police tasks in rural areas) who were on the spot telephoned the sentry post at the eastern end of the bridge and reported: “Gennep captured, blow up the bridge!”5 Precisely at that moment, however, this sentry post was attacked by Walther’s section. Nine men from the Brandenburg-Bataillon, three of whom were dressed in Dutch Marechaussee uniforms, overpowered the sentries and reassured the sentry post on the west bank by informing them by telephone that two Marechaussee personnel would bring four German prisoners across the bridge. The sentries on the west bank believed this message and the sentry in the middle of the bridge allowed the two ‘Marechaussee personnel’ and the four ‘prisoners’ to pass unhindered. The prisoners were delivered to the sentry post, searched and taken away. Their hidden sub-machine guns and hand grenades went unnoticed. “On being taken prisoner we were searched for weapons, during which they only felt in our pockets and therefore only took a few of our arms”, Walther later remembered.6 In the meantime, the two German trains approached the bridge. In response, the sentry at the middle of the bridge telephoned his commander on the west bank to ask whether he should blow up the bridge. The commander ordered him to wait to be on the safe side. A few moments later, at 04.00 hrs, the sentry post on the west bank was overrun and the German trains containing an entire infantry battalion were able to cross the bridge unimpeded and continue on towards the Peel-Raam Position. The German advance had only just begun, but the Maas Line had already been breached. Elsewhere, too, the German Abwehr succeeded in capturing undamaged bridges near the German border. In southern Limburg, the bridges over the Juliana Canal at Stein, Urmond, Berg, Obbicht and Roosteren were taken. Partly as a result of this, the German 6th Army was able to 5 Testimony of J.A. Tak, 8 June 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 434. 6 Letter from Wilhelm Walther to Law Courts in ’s-Hertogenbosch, 5 November 1947, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 515, file 15.

German 37mm antitank gun in position after crossing the river Maas, 10 May 1940.

One of the places at which the IVth Corps crossed the Maas was Maastricht. Picture of the movement of a 37mm Panzerabwehrkanone across the river, with tractor (half-track).

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enter Belgium via Limburg virtually unopposed. At 09.30 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel A. Govers, the Territorial Commander in southern Limburg, was forced to surrender Maastricht to German troops after he had informed General Winkelman by carrier pigeon and by radio that he was completely surrounded.7 To the north of Gennep, the bridges across the Maas-Waal Canal at Malden and Heumen were captured. The company commander at the Malden bridge, Reserve Captain A.W.J. Peeters, had, on realising that the Germans had crossed the border, responded in an alert manner: I request and obtain communications with the bridge sentry and give the order ‘Destroy the bridge’. Everything seems to be in order. I go outside to watch the explosion. Nothing happens. I wait for a while; again I ask the telephonist to connect me to the bridge. He gets a connection. He drops the receiver in fright..., an unknown voice had said to him: ‘Ich wollte den Herr Commandant sprechen’.

In response, Peeters formed a group comprising kitchen personnel and telephonists and armed them with one light machine gun. In spite of this limited weaponry, they succeeded in taking the Germans by surprise. In their panic the Germans decided to surrender. It was therefore possible to blow up the bridge after all.8 The route to Noord-Brabant via Heumen remained. For this, however, the German troops needed to reach the bridge at Grave as speedily as possible. The commander of Gruppe Grave, which was charged with this task, Major Einstmann, did not prove energetic enough, however. When a worried intelligence officer from the XXVIth Corps went to find out what was going on in the afternoon, he found the major fast asleep! By this time, the bridge at Grave had been blown up. The corps staff concluded on the evening of 10 May: The lack of success of the Gruppe Grave is disappointing. It can be attributed to the unexpectedly strong opposition met to the east of the Maas-Waal Canal and to the impression that operations were not carried out flexibly and forward-looking enough.9

The 9th Panzer Division now also had to advance via Gennep. 7 C.D. Kamerling, De krijgsverrichtingen in Zuid-Limburg, Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952) 68-71. 8 A.W.J. Peeters, “Gebeurtenissen bij 1-1-26 R.I. op 10 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 515, file 9a. 9 Generalkommando XXVI. A.K., Beurteilung der Lage am 10.5. 22.00 Uhr, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 551, file 11.

A German column passes a border road block in southern Limburg on the morning of 10 May. after 10 May 1940

Dutch command structure in and near Noord-Brabant Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces

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Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment was removed from the Light Division on 10 May and placed temporarily under the command of the Commander of the Peel Division for the counterattack at Mill.

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The fact that the Maas Line had been breached at Gennep did not mean that Dutch troops elsewhere gave up the fight. It was precisely the lack of good communications that ensured that units were unaware of events elsewhere, and consequently they continued the fight undaunted. The Germans attempted to cross the Maas at over ten different locations. These attempts were preceded by heavy shelling, and the lightest Dutch casemates proved unable to withstand German shells. Next, the Germans crossed the river in rubber dinghies with the aim of putting the casemates out of action one by one. There was sporadic courageous opposition from the Dutch soldiers, however. For example, in the most southern part of the Maas Line at Wessem, Private B. Beekmans continued to fire on the Germans from an S-type casemate when the rest of his comrades had already fled. In the end, after they had eliminated the remaining Dutch troops in the sector, the Germans sent four Dutch prisoners of war to the casemate in order to persuade Beekmans to give up the fight. When they arrived in the casemate they found that he was already dead.10 Near Grubbenvorst, too, German military personnel, in this case the 56th Infantry Division, came up against tough opposition. Private C.J.H. Sleegers in particular distinguished himself. An excellent marksman, he succeeded in impeding initial German attempts to cross the river. After his section commander had been wounded and the remaining members of his section had retreated, he continued to fight until a severe wound put him out of action.11 Near Boxmeer, the Germans had their hands full with the soldiers in a few Dutch casemates, who destroyed a number of German rubber dinghies during their attempts to cross the Maas. Two other attempts were also thwarted. However, when casemate 67 was penetrated by two 8.8cm shells, killing two of the three soldiers inside, Dutch opposition also seemed to have been dealt a severe blow. Casemate 65, commanded by Sergeant J.M.A.F. van Rooijen, continued to fire even though the air circulation system was not functioning. “The powder smoke was very thick and almost burned the mucous membrane in our noses and mouths.” Their firing had its desired effect, however: Boat after boat capsized and their contents sank below the surface. The more losses there were on the other side, the more vicious the enemy artillery fire became. (...) A heavy grenade landed at the bottom left of the embrasure. The armoured steel curled. Everything was twisted and contorted. Another 10 �� J.J.C.P. Wilson, “Het gevecht bij Wessem”, De Militaire Spectator, CXIV (1945) 126127. 11 �� J.J.C.P. Wilson, “Het gevecht bij Grubbenvorst”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 227-228.

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grenade landed and the gun knocked me in the chest. I was dizzy (...) Casemate 65 was finished.12

This kind of Dutch opposition elsewhere along the Maas impressed the Chief of Staff of the 56th Infantry Division during the evening of 10 May: Dutch soldiers have offered strong opposition today at a few positions. The opposition faced by the 171st Infantry Regiment at Broekhuizen, the 192nd Infantry Regiment at Grubbenvorst and the 234th Infantry Regiment at Blerick proves that the Dutch can fight.13

At St Agatha, a village north of Gennep, there was another typical example of Dutch action. As at Wessem and Grubbenvorst, one determined Dutch soldier, in this case Sergeant A.M. Schouten, gave a large German unit a fair amount of trouble. Schouten decided, on discovering a German rifle position on the opposite bank of the Maas, to deviate from his orders only to fire on armoured vehicles and aimed his 8-Staal gun at the enemy. “This was done under a constant hail of bullets. The other soldiers were unable to help; they had completely lost their bearings.” In spite of this, he succeeded in destroying the German machine-gun position. “The third shot was a direct hit at the lower centre of the position. Its effect was to virtually obliterate the machine-gun position, we received no further fire from that direction.” After this, however, the Schouten section came under heavy fire from German artillery. Soldier after soldier was hit by shrapnel. Schouten eventually lost consciousness.14 Partly thanks to his actions, the Germans were not able to cross the Maas at St Agatha until 11.00 hrs. In spite of the vigorous action of individual Dutch soldiers, the vulnerable Maas Line fell. The German forces were simply too strong. From Maasbracht to Nijmegen, nine Dutch infantry battalions had had to oppose six entire German divisions. To a large extent, however, the Maas Line had fulfilled its role: to slow the enemy’s advance. There were virtually no attacks on the Peel-Raam Position on 10 May. The essential thing, however, was that the railway bridge at Gennep fell into German hands undamaged, which enabled two trains carrying the IIIrd battalion of the 481st Infantry Regiment to head along the railway towards Mill and thus towards the Peel-Raam Position. 12 �� Report by J.M.A.F. van Rooijen, 27 December 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 524, file 36. 13 �� 56. Inf. Division, Ia, Kriegstagebuch zum Ärmelkanal bei der 6. Armee �� 9.5.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 559f. 14 �� A.M. �� Schouten, Report on incident on 10 May 1940 at the pedestrian ferry across the Maas at St Agatha, 29 January 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 552, file 10.

German Panzerkampfwagen I in the streets of Rosmalen, 10 May 1940 (left); German artillery command post at Mook, 10 May 1940 (below).

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The battle at Mill While at this point few people in the Netherlands realised that war had broken out, two German trains were heading towards the Noord-Brabant village of Mill, one of the most important tactical positions along the Peel-Raam Position. In addition to the Gennep-Boxtel railway line, a number of roads ran via Mill. In principle, the terrain around the village was well-suited to being defended as it formed a plateau high enough to dominate the surrounding area. The constructed defence works were, however, meant to be manned by a much larger number of personnel than was present on 10 May. Instead of the VIth Division, which was part of the IIIrd Corps, there were only three infantry battalions (I-3 RI, I-6 RI and III-14 RI), which possessed no modern antitank artillery. The artillery present also left something to be desired; it was only on 7 May that the battalions received reinforcements from a battalion of the 20th Artillery Regiment, equipped with twelve 8-Staal guns from the artillery reserves. The troops at Mill formed part of Schayk Sector, under the command of Reserve Lieutenant Colonel J. Detmar. In the area immediately surrounding Mill there was the Ist battalion of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major A. Netze, while the Ist battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major A.J.M. Allard, occupied the position slightly to the north. The artillery battalion was deployed along the Mill–Langenboom road. On the night of 9 May, at approximately 01.00 hrs, Major Netze was awakened by a telephone call giving orders from the Peel Division’s commander to man all positions at 03.00 hrs. Netze warned his company commanders and everyone was in position at the appointed hour. Just after three o’clock, German aircraft appeared over Mill. Reality was slow in taking hold among most of the men. “I still couldn’t really believe that war had broken out, but thought it was an attack on England,” Major Netze said later.15 Then, to the utter amazement of many of the Dutch soldiers, a grey train “comprising four wagons and a locomotive” rode past at a speed of 20 to 30 kilometres an hour. On the rear, flat wagon there were I think four pieces of anti-aircraft artillery. We stood staring open-mouthed at the train, and I said without thinking: ‘Do we have those things too?’ I had hardly finished saying it when shots were fired from the train using light automatic weapons. By throwing

15 �� Report �� by Commander of I-3 Infantry Regiment on events on 10 and 11 May 1940, 21 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 58.

Field graves of soldiers of the third battalion of the German 481st Infantry Regiment at Mill. Photograph taken in June 1940.

The heavily shelled S-type casemate no. 66 at the Peel-Raam Position.

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ourselves flat on the ground and crawling on our stomachs we managed to escape the fire.16

The Peel-Raam Position at Mill had now become the front line. The crew of the German armoured train had spent the first few hours of war in great suspense. Their passage across the undamaged railway bridge at Gennep was a relief, however. The train continued towards the PeelRaam Position. “We passed through Mill. Suddenly there was heavy firing from bunkers, it was the Dutch defence line, the Peel-Raam Position”, one eyewitness said later.17 The armoured train, followed by the troop train, was able to continue through the Dutch defence line unimpeded; the two trains only stopped about 3.5 kilometres west of Mill, near the small stop of Zeeland. The majority of the IIIrd battalion of the 481st Infantry Regiment got off the train here, while the armoured train was shunted with a view to returning to make contact with the advancing German troops. The Dutch soldiers stationed where the railway crossed the Defence Canal had not been idle, however. Led by Reserve Lieutenant M. van Velden, they placed a beam-post obstacle on the track, while three sappers dug up a number of live landmines and placed them under the tracks. We were just about finished when the returning train reached a point about 200 metres away (...) We stood quite near to watch what would happen to the train, not aware of being in any danger.18

The armoured train continued at speed and was derailed. “There was suddenly a terrible bang (..) everything flew about, the train stopped”, one of the German passengers remembered later. “What is going on? No-one can see anything!”19 The Dutch troops immediately opened fire, but the armour on the train provided the Germans with good cover. They in turn fired on the Dutch troops, and subsequently attacked and captured two casemates to the south of the railway line. In the meantime, the battalion that had reached the Zeeland stop in the goods train had also disembarked. The battalion commander, Major Schenk, soon gained the impression that only the casemates and positions were occupied on the Dutch side and that there were no reserve forces to 16 �� Report �� on events witnessed by Reserve Captain L.H.M. Muris from 10 to 13 May 1940, Commander of 3-I-3 Infantry Regiment, 10 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 68. 17 �� Unteroffizier Apel, “Das Unternehmen des Panzerzuges 1”, Militär-Wochenblatt, Unabhängige Zeitschrift für die deutsche Wehrmacht, CXXV (1940) 1044. 18 �� Statement �� by M. van Velden, 2 November 1950, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 63. 19 �� Apel, �� “Das Unternehmen des Panzerzuges 1”, 1044.

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The derailed armoured train at Mill.

the rear. He decided to attempt a surprise attack on the Dutch troops from the rear.20 To this end, he ordered two operations: one in a north-easterly direction and one to the south. Major Schenk personally led the northeasterly attack, which he conducted with two companies. This advance was noticed by the commander of the 1st battery of the IIIrd battalion of the 20th Artillery Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant H.J. Mulder. This battery’s 8-Staal guns were pointing eastwards, however, and had no infantry protection at all. “As I had no machine guns for anti-aircraft or close-combat purposes, I immediately telephoned the Battalion Commander for permission for my battery to fire on the advancing enemy,” Mulder said later. His battalion commander, Reserve Captain S.L. Groenewoud, gave permission to fire one gun, which proved inadequate. Mulder now decided to turn his entire battery more than 90° and to open fire using all the weaponry at his disposal. This also proved unequal to the task of halting the German advance. “As the enemy was apparently not to be put off by the fire from my battery, or at least continued to advance, I asked for assistance from the two other batteries.” With great difficulty—“everything about the outdated 8-cm Staal works with difficulty”—the guns were turned.21 Firing also turned out to be difficult. Captain Groenewoud later remembered: 20 �� “Bericht �� Infanterie-Regiment 481, über den Durchbruch durch die Peelstelling bei Mill om 10.5.1940”, in: A. Claassens and G. de Kruijff, eds., Het gevecht bij Mill. Herdenkingsboek “10 mei 1940 Mill” (Mill 1980) 130. 21 �� H.J. �� Mulder, “Gevechtsbericht van 1-III-20 R.A.”, 6 October 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 528, file 41.

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Due to the risk from our own firing, the method of shooting was (...) such that only one gun per battery could fire at a time, while those manning the guns further forward had to duck and take cover in the trench from the fire and the air blasts.22

The Germans, who had advanced to 400 metres, were eventually driven back by the sixty-year-old 8-Staal guns. The 2nd company under Schenk, which followed a more southerly route, did not have to face Dutch artillery. It was able to capture a number of casemates without a fight, and 210 prisoners were taken from the lines, including a number of officers.23 Part of the Peel-Raam Position manned by the 3rd Infantry Regiment was now therefore in German hands, and it was still only 07.30 hrs. That the success of the Germans was not more widespread was due to the actions of the 2nd section of 3-I-3 RI, led by Reserve Lieutenant G. Bleeker. This section halted the German company which was advancing in a southerly direction. “We were able”, Bleeker said, “to open fire in such a way that the enemy retreated towards the railway embankment.”24 The situation remained extremely serious for the Dutch, however. If the IIIrd battalion of the 481st Infantry Regiment could not be driven out of the Peel-Raam Position, a rapid German advance through Noord-Brabant could not be ruled out. In these critical circumstances, there was little leadership in evidence from the commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt. He devoted a great deal of attention to moving his own headquarters, first from Eindhoven to Hout near Helmond, then from Hout to Vught. Schmidt did, however, order Reserve Captain M.W. Boässon, a Peel Division staff officer, to go to Hasselt in order to contact the Belgian military commander there.25 Major General A.A. van Nijnatten, commander of the IIIrd Corps, responded in a more alert fashion. The withdrawal of both his own corps and that of Light Division was, after all, at risk. As early as 05.15 hrs, he therefore decided to deploy the 2nd Hussars-Motorcyclists Regiment against the German troops at Mill. The commander of the hussars, Lieutenant Colonel A.J.E. Mathon, was given the following order:

22 �� S.L. �� Groenewoud, “Oorlogsbericht van III-20 R.A. (Mill)”, 19 September 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 528, file 39. 23 �� “Bericht �� Infanterie-Regiment 481” in: Claassens and De Kruijff, Gevecht bij Mill, 131. 24 �� G. Bleeker, “Verslag van de verrichtingen van de 2e sectie van 3-I-3 R.I.”, 16 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 70. 25 �� Captain M.W. Boässon was killed while carrying out this order. He crossed a bridge �� over the Scheldt-Maas Canal just as it was blown up.

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chapter seven Enemy has used armoured train to pass through own troop position. Battalion command post allowed itself to be overrun and has been captured. Drive back the enemy so that the old position west of Mill is reestablished.26

The hussars-motorcyclist were not particularly quick to carry out their orders. It was not until 07.00 hrs that the regiment left, comprising 500 men and only armed with 24 machine guns and four light antitank guns, and headed towards Mill, incidentally without Lieutenant Colonel Mathon taking the trouble to contact the commander of the Schayk Sector, Lieutenant Colonel Detmar. The latter could have advised him to attack the German troops in the lines from the northwest, via Lagepeel and Langenboom, in view of the cover provided by the terrain there. Instead, the commander of the 2nd Hussars-Motorcyclists Regiment positioned his 2nd Squadron on either side of the railway line and his 1st Squadron further south. This positioning took up so much time that they could not advance until the afternoon. The advance of the hussars was extremely slow, chiefly due to their advancing through open terrain with few opportunities for cover. The two squadrons were eventually halted by the barbed wire defences and minefields of their own Peel-Raam Position. Only four casemates (522 to 525) were successfully recaptured; along the railway line, the IIIrd battalion of the 481st Infantry Regiment remained in control. In the meantime, the two German divisions which were supposed to advance towards Mill were encountering difficulties in crossing the Maas. The heavy materiel of the 254th Infantry Division, for example, could not yet be taken across the river as a pontoon bridge first had to be constructed. The 256th Infantry Division encountered largely the same problems, but this division’s 481st Infantry Regiment had at least been able to enter Noord-Brabant via the captured railway bridge at Gennep. A little after 12.00 hrs, the regiment’s Ist and IInd battalions arrived in Mill and St Hubert, respectively. Regiment commander Oberstleutnant Friedrich Weber installed himself and his staff in the town hall at Mill. Weber wanted to penetrate the Peel-Raam Position as quickly as possible, as everything pointed to the Dutch being taken completely by surprise. The artillery fire intermittently aimed at Mill was after all quite weak, while the action by his regiment’s IIIrd battalion must also have been a success, although he had no idea where that battalion now was. The attack from Mill and St Hubert was to be continued from 15.50 hrs and supported by the artillery which, Weber assumed, was now on its way to Mill.27 26 �� Diary �� of the 2nd Hussars-Motorcylist Regiment running from 10 May 1940 up to and including 15 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 530, file 58. 27 �� “Bericht �� Infanterie-Regiment 481” in: Claassens and De Kruijff, Gevecht bij Mill, 133-136.

The demolished Wilhelmina bridge at Maastricht, 14 May 1940. 12 mei 1940 10-12 May1940

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This assumption proved, however, to be over-optimistic. Near Gennep, where the German engineers had laid a pontoon bridge across the Maas, traffic chaos reigned. Firstly, the bridge had quickly become unserviceable: “Hugely delayed due to technical difficulties, it was hardly ready for use when a heavy armoured vehicle drove across it and broke it once more.” There was subsequently a great deal of jostling for position: Due to a lack of traffic coordination, there were terrible jams near the bridge. Three columns alongside each other, each of which wanted priority, made crossing difficult. It was impossible to get through in a car.

This chaos meant, among other things, that the artillery destined for the attack on the Peel-Raam Position could not reach the 481st Infantry Regiment. It was only on the evening of 10 May that the Feldgendarmerie intervened, after which the various troops were able cross the Maas in a more orderly fashion.28 Oberstleutnant Weber waited until 14.50 hrs. When by that time there was still no sign of the artillery, he cancelled the attack. He deemed an attack without artillery support to be irresponsible, as the Peel-Raam Position appeared to contain several strong casemates.29 At the command posts of the XXVIth Corps and the 256th Infantry Division, however, it was believed that a rapid breach at Mill was essential to avoiding a delay to the advance on the Moerdijk bridges. The armoured train behind the Peel-Raam Position, which was having increasing difficulty withstanding the fire from the neighbouring enemy bunker, signalled repeatedly: Infantry Regiment Weber may attack! (...) The XXVIth Corps and the division were agreed that breaching the Peel-Raam Position on the evening of 10 May was incredibly important, with a view to the deployment of the 9th Panzer Division.

The corps and the division were unable, however, to make radio contact with Oberstleutnant Weber. Subsequently, division commander Generalmajor Kauffmann sent an ordnance officer, Hauptmann Hertel, by bicycle to Mill, as well as (to be on the safe side) staff officer Major von Bornstedt in a Fieseler Storch (small communications aircraft). These two officers were ordered to inform Weber of the situation and to urge him to force a breach of the Peel-Raam Position. However, Kauffmann left the final decision to the commander on the ground.30 28 �� 256. Inf.-Division, Ia, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, 9.5.1940-31.10.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 559d. 29 �� “Bericht �� Infanterie-Regiment 481” in: Claassens and De Kruijff, Gevecht bij Mill, 137. 30 �� 256. �� Inf.-Division, Ia. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3.

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Once they had arrived at Mill, Hertel and von Bornstedt made it clear to the commander of the 481st Infantry Regiment that he should no longer count on artillery support; this was confirmed by the commander of the 456th Infantry Regiment, who also reported to Weber’s headquarters. Hertel and von Bornstedt advised Weber to attack, which after some thought the regiment commander did. In Weber’s eyes, however, it remained a risky operation: after all, he assumed that the IIIrd Corps was still entrenched in the Peel-Raam Position. The regiment commander set the time for the attack at 19.35 hrs, giving his own IInd battalion the main task of advancing between Mill’s Roman Catholic church and the railway line towards his ‘surrounded’ IIIrd battalion. The Ist battalion was to attack to the north of this position. To the south of the 481st Infantry Regiment, the 456th Infantry Regiment, which for the purposes of the assault was placed under Weber’s command, was also to breach the Peel-Raam Position.31 The German troops were still getting into position ready to commence the attack when the Luftwaffe put in an appearance, an occurrence totally unexpected by Oberstleutnant Weber. A neighbouring unit had in fact requested a bombing raid by Stukas prior to its own assault on the Peel-Raam Position. The aircraft also bombed the Dutch positions near Mill. The attack on the Dutch positions caused little damage. The effect on morale, however, was great. “It was a terrifying raid, especially if you realised that they could have used much more powerful bombs. Furthermore, it was bad for morale as we had absolutely no means of retaliating,” one captain later remembered. “You had the impression that it was constant, because it was as if the target was your own dugout or somewhere in the vicinity.”32 The bombing had the opposite effect on the Germans: “For our troops, the unexpected support was a great confidence boost.”33 Thus reinforced, the German troops advanced. The shaken Dutch soldiers quickly surrendered to German superiority. Reserve Lieutenant M. van Velden, section commander of 1-I-3 RI, noted in his combat report: 18 hrs. Our position is becoming increasingly difficult. We are surrounded on three sides and mortars are making the situation untenable. We have one fatality and several wounded; one machine-gun nest was hit full on and flew in all directions. 18.45 hrs. The situation is becoming untenable. Being shot at from three sides (from Mill, from the train, from the enemy on the right flank). Nothing can be done about it with the three remaining machine guns. 31 �� “Bericht �� Infanterie-Regiment 481” in: Claassens and De Kruijff, Gevecht bij Mill, 137-140. 32 �� Testimonies of Reserve Captain Van Furth, W.L. given to Commander of 6 Infantry Regiment on 4 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 50. 33 �� 256. �� Inf.-Division, Ia. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3.

A formation of Junkers Ju-87 Sturzkampfflugzeuge (Stuka).

Issue of orders to the commander of the third battalion, Major Peltrek, by the commander of the 454th Infantry Regiment, Oberst Castorf, at the Peel-Raam Position to the north of Mill on 11 May 1940.

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In the end, all they could do was to try and save their own skins.34 The Peel-Raam Position, referred to rather exaggeratedly by the staff of the 256th Infantry Division as “the Dutch Maginot Line”, had been breached.35 This also became clear at Colonel Schmidt’s headquarters. Reports came in “that morale had been shattered and retreating was not just being thought of, but that several units were in fact already retreating.”36 It was possible in these circumstances that the entire Peel Division would be destroyed, and Colonel Schmidt decided to withdraw his troops to behind the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal. At 20.30 hrs he issued orders to abandon the Peel-Raam Position at 24.00 hrs, while he himself moved his command post yet again, this time to Tilburg.37 On the first day of war, therefore, both the Maas Line and the PeelRaam Position had fallen. The Dutch troops positioned at the latter had allowed themselves to be taken by surprise during the initial stages of the battle, leading to a number of casemates near Mill falling into German hands. The commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt, responded rather sluggishly, in contrast to Major General Van Nijnatten, the commander of the IIIrd Corps, who immediately sent the 2nd HussarsMotorcyclist Regiment to Mill. This regiment’s counterattack ran into difficulties, however, partly because the commander was not familiar with the terrain and did not request information from the commanders on the ground. Things did not always run smoothly on the German side either. For example, as a result of the chaos at the bridge near Gennep, the 481st Infantry Regiment lacked artillery support, which led to a planned assault being cancelled. The commanders of the XXVIth Corps and the 256th Infantry Division insisted, however, that regiment commander Oberstleutnant Weber attack. It was typical of the German method of command that the decision as to whether to attack or not was left entirely to Weber. In retrospect, the regiment commander made the correct decision: he attacked and his regiment definitively breached the Peel-Raam Position.

34 �� Report by M. van Velden, 9 February 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 63. 35 �� 256. �� Inf.-Division, Ia. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3. 36 �� L.J. �� Schmidt, “Verslag omtrent de gebeurtenissen van 10 t/m 12 mei 1940 in het gebied van den T.B.N.Br.”, 19 June 1942, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 1. 37 �� V.E. �� Nierstrasz, De verdediging van Noord-Limburg en Noord-Brabant. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1953) 235.

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In spite of the rapid fall of the Dutch defence lines, they had fulfilled their primary task: the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division were able to reach Fortress Holland almost completely unimpeded. The road to the Moerdijk bridges, however, was as good as wide open to the German troops.

Passage through Noord-Brabant To many Dutch soldiers on the Peel-Raam Position, the order to retreat to behind the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal came as a complete surprise. In those parts of the line where not a single German had been sighted, there was a great deal of doubt as to the wisdom of exchanging a relatively strong fortification for a canal bank. The retreat was chaotic. Part of the Peel Division marched on foot to the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, others cycled or drove westwards in commandeered vehicles. Artillery, machine guns and ammunition were left behind. The mood among the Dutch troops did not improve when, on arrival at the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, it became clear that this was unsuited to a sustained defence. Most of the ’s‑Hertogenbosch–Helmond road on the east bank of the canal was in fact higher than the west bank. This meant that troops coming from the east could advance almost unseen. More importantly, however, part of the Peel Division had not actually received the order to retreat. The Dutch battalion commanders at Mill (of I-3 RI and I-6 RI) were not informed of the retreat during the night of 10 May and remained at their stations. The west bank of the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal between Middelrode and Dinther, the part to which their battalions should have retreated, remained completely unoccupied. This sector included a bridge near Heeswijk which had not been destroyed. The chances of successfully defending the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal were therefore minimal. Perhaps the French troops which were advancing to Noord-Brabant would be able to offer help. The French units which were advancing towards the Netherlands were part of the French 7th Army, commanded by général d’armée HenriHonoré Giraud. This army comprised the 1st Light Armoured Division led by général de brigade F. Picard, général de division Theodore Marcel Sciard’s Ist Corps, including the 60th Infantry Division led by général de brigade Marcel Deslaurens, and général de division M.B.A. Fagalde’s XVIth Corps. On 25 March 1940, général d’armée Giraud had expressed his army’s task as follows: “Connect Belgian and Dutch defence in the TilburgTurnhout region. Cover the Antwerp, Roosendaal, Dordrecht railway.

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Prevent capture of the mouths of the Scheldt and Maas rivers.”38 To achieve this, Giraud wanted a connected Franco–British–Belgian–Dutch front, in which it was clear to him that Noord-Brabant would form the weakest section. He wanted to deploy French troops into that area, but this would be a risky and time-consuming operation. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Light Armoured Division and two reconnaissance units (a groupement under colonel G. de Beauchesne and a groupement under lieutenant-colonel Lestoquoi) were therefore to be sent on ahead to protect the advance by the main force of the 7th Army. After the 7th Army had been alerted at 05.00 hrs on 10 May, the various units set off at speed. At 22.00 hrs, the Groupement Lestoquoi crossed the Dutch border at Zundert. It was, however, held up there by Dutch obstacles. In spite of this, lieutenant-colonel Lestoquoi continued on to Breda, accompanied by Belgian Lieutenant Hautecler, who was to act as interpreter. After several detours, Lestoquoi finally arrived at the town hall in Breda. There he met the municipal secretary and a member of the civic guard, Major General (Rtd) J.C. Hardeman. The latter called the commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt, to Breda. Some time previously, Schmidt had enquired at General Headquarters as to “how coordination with the French and Belgians had been arranged”. Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson replied that there was absolutely no coordination and left it to the Peel Division “to bring this about”.39 In addition to his command of the Dutch troops in Noord-Brabant, therefore, Schmidt was also given a completely new and complex task: to arrange cooperation with the French troops in Noord-Brabant. With this in mind, initial talks were held at the town hall in Breda during the night of 10 May. They did not bear much fruit. Lestoquoi asked Schmidt to position his troops to the south of Tilburg, while the French lieutenant colonel set his own units, the 2nd Reconnaissance Group of the Ist Corps and the 5th Reconnaissance Group of the 25th Motorised Infantry Division to defending the Wilhelmina Canal from Tilburg to Oosterhout. However, on Colonel Schmidt’s return to his command post in Tilburg at 05.30 hrs, he discovered that Lestoquoi’s request to position the Peel Division to the south of Tilburg did not fit in with the ideas of the acting 38 �� V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 158. Details of the planning and execution of French deployment in Noord-Brabant can be found in B. Chaix, Conception et déroulement de l’intervention des forces franco-britanniques en Belgique au mois de mai 1940 (unpublished thesis Paris, 1999), see in particular pp. 405-439, 503-511. 39 �� Schmidt, �� “Verslag omtrent de gebeurtenissen van 10 t/m 12 mei 1940”.

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commander of the 2nd Light Armoured Brigade, colonel P.E.A. Dario. The latter had his brigade, part of the 6th Cuirassier Regiment, of which he was in fact also commander, and the 4th Motorised Dragoon Regiment take up positions between Tilburg and Turnhout. It was clear that the Peel Division had to face defending the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal alone. Schmidt realised that this defence was a fairly hopeless task and he lost no time in making his way to the Belgian town of Oostmalle, where général Picard, the commander of 1st Light Armoured Division, was to be found. On the morning of 11 May, Schmidt urged Picard to move his troops further east, but he refused. The commander of the Peel Division subsequently decided to withdraw his troops, at that time positioned to the south of Beek along the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, northwards to behind the Wilhelmina Canal, and by doing so to occupy the ’s-Hertogenbosch–Tilburg line using all his troops. On his return to his command post at Tilburg, however, he discovered that this plan had already been rendered obsolete by the events of 11 May. On the evening of 10 May, the Germans had decided to further exploit the breach of the Peel-Raam Position without delay. The orders issued to the XXVIth Corps were thus: “XXVIth Corps to continue the assault westwards on 11 May. The main aim is to capture as much terrain as possible westwards!” Generalmajor Alfred Ritter von Hubicki’s 9th Panzer Division was now also set to work. Across a wide front, the division was to capture the bridges over the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal and to push on and occupy the area around Roosendaal. “The division is to link up with Student’s para units landed near Moerdijk and to defend against a possible attack from Antwerp.”40 As the IXth Corps, part of the 6th Army, of which the 30th and the 56th Infantry Divisions were deployed in the front line, decided to push forward, the Dutch defenders behind the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal were attacked along virtually the entire length of the canal. The reconnaissance battalion of the 254th Infantry Division had been sent on ahead and it had a clear path, crossing the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal via the undefended bridge at Heeswijk. During the course of the afternoon, at about 13.00 hrs, several Dutch civilians raised the alarm and reported the advance of these German troops to the nearest Dutch soldiers, who were stationed along the canal north of Middelrode near Den Dungen and who formed part of the IIIrd battalion of the 14th Infantry Regi40 �� Generalkommando �� XXVI, A.K., Ia/op nr. 1, “Korpsbefehl für die Fortsetzung des Angriffs am 11.5.40”, 10 May 1940, in: Feldzug in Holland u. Belgien 10.5.-1.6.1940, Gen. Kdo. XXVI A.K., Anl.z.K.T.B. 9.5.-1.6.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 178/7.

An antitank gun in a camouflaged position on the outskirts of ’s‑Hertogenbosch, near the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, 10 May 1940, at around 10.00 hrs. On the verge of the road is a light machine gun. On the far right in the background, on the other side of the road, behind the barrier, is a second antitank gun.

The same antitank gun, but this time the photo is taken looking down range. The crew are scanning the skies for German aircraft.

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ment. This report caused some panic among the battalion’s 2nd company or, as company commander Reserve Lieutenant L.C.A. van Kuyk later recalled: “This report created a highly nervous mood among us as (...) it was possible that the enemy would attack from the rear.”41 Van Kuyk decided to completely abandon his position. This flight, in which Van Kuyk’s company decided to follow its commander, was noticed, however, by Reserve Captain G. Wissels, commander of the 3rd company of III-14 RI. He shouted to Van Kuyk asking “how he had received the order to retreat. Hearsay! With difficulty I got the battalion back into position”.42 Nerves were taut; the reconnaissance battalion initially ignored the Dutch battalion, focused as it was on the area around Breda. It was only on the early morning of 12 May that a motorcycle patrol commanded by an NCO headed towards the Dutch units at Den Dungen. This patrol was stopped, however, costing the lives of three Germans and resulting in the capture of six soldiers. This was the signal for the German troops to launch a powerful attack. Battalion commander Reserve Major E.G. Döbken organised the defence. “He gave us courage and said that the men did not look that evil”, one soldier remembered. Döbken was killed shortly afterwards: “Then something terrible happened. The Major saw a gun which he wanted to destroy, but he died bravely like a real warrior at the head [of his troops].”43 This meant the end of the IIIrd battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment: small groups fled westwards in a disorderly fashion, away from the scene of battle. To the south of Heeswijk, the 5th Company of the 481st Infantry Regiment encountered few difficulties in reaching the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal. “The enemy was quickly defeated, insofar as there was opposition at all, the roadblocks, at which the Dutch are masters, were removed.”44 Veghel was occupied and at 09.30 hrs the first patrols reconnoitred the canal bank. The Dutch troops here were determined to hold their ground, in particular because the commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt, had issued the following order: “The task is to hold your positions, with a view to giving the advancing French army a chance to deploy.”45 The allies were on their way! The tide seemed to be turning! When the first German armoured vehicles appeared on the canal bank at Veghel, the Dutch troops (the IInd battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment 41 �� 2-III-14 �� R.I., “Gevechtsbericht tijdvak 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, 521/84. 42 �� 3-III-14 �� R.I., “Gevechtsbericht 10/15 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 85. 43 �� Letter �� by A.A. Buijs to J. Cappon, 19 May 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 521, file 83. 44 �� 256. �� Inf.-Division, Ia. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3. 45 �� Nierstrasz, ��Noord-Limburg en Noord-Brabant, 304.

An antitank gun of the 3rd squadron of Hussars, at Rosmalen on the road from Grave to ’s‑Hertogenbosch during an alert drill, late April 1940.

The German advance through the streets of Veghel, 12 May 1940.

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and the IInd battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment) confidently opened fire. Their 6-Veld field guns destroyed a few German armoured vehicles, while the infantry hindered every attempt to cross the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal. Reserve Captain V. de Kruijff, company commander of 2-II-2 RI, later remembered: At about 11.00 hrs there was a vigorous attack in which the enemy deployed more machine guns and several armoured vehicles. This attack was repelled with unabated courage and determination and the enemy was unable to silence our weapons, on the contrary this attack was also rebuffed.46

Nonetheless, in the end, the Dutch troops at Veghel had to surrender as the 456th Infantry Regiment succeeded in crossing the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal at Erp, to the south of Veghel. The Ist battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment, which was defending Erp, was overawed by the German actions and in the afternoon the first units began to retreat at their own initiative. This withdrawal turned into a wild flight. Then suddenly an order from the left flank: withdraw. Request to commander of the 2nd Section (...) to establish contact with Company Commander and to ask whether this order is correct. No contact can be made with CC. Suddenly diagonally to my left and rear I see two enemy soldiers lying next to each other. I order two marksmen to shoot, receive machine-gun fire in return. Has the 1st Company withdrawn? What is that? First section is retreating south-easterly or along the canal. What is going on? The men report: the 1st Company retreated a while ago. Enemy has crossed the canal in rubber dinghies. (...) situation is now becoming serious. I see, as a result of the open terrain to the rear, other sections withdrawing. Decide to withdraw also....47

Eventually the 481st Infantry Regiment, thanks to the breach at Erp effected by the 456th Infantry Regiment, reached St Oedenrode on the evening of 11 May. “The crossing of the second larger waterway, the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, was achieved without large losses.”48 Along the southern section of the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal there was hardly any heavy fighting. The attack by the 56th Infantry Division in the area between Helmond and Someren quickly led to the Dutch defenders giving ground. In the evening, the German division reached Eindhoven and Valkenswaard. The Germans had certainly not expected such success: “For 46 �� V. de Kruijff, “Verslag van de gevechtshandelingen gedurende de oorlogsdagen”, 10 March 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlandse Grondgebied, box 524, file 26. 47 �� W. Haan, “Gevecht afd. �� Zuid-Willemsvaart door de 3e Sectie van 3-I-13 R.I.”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 524, file 18. 48 �� 256. �� Inf.-Division, Ia. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3.

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German infantry at Breda on 14 May 1940.

the division, 11 May has run an unexpected course. No-one had expected the Dutch to surrender the strong position in the Peel area without a fight.”49 There was now almost nothing left of the Peel Division. Many Dutch soldiers had fled westwards in disarray. It was (…) a wild flight of our retreating troops (...) There was a mix of the many combat troops and support units which formed the Peel Division, which was unavoidable in a withdrawal at such speed and under such circumstances.50

All this greatly amazed the French troops, who had expected to witness a strong Dutch defence by the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division in NoordBrabant. The Dutch troops were referred to by the French as “the dirty northern Boche, the traitors”.51 Colonel Schmidt did not lose heart, however. During the course of the afternoon of 11 May, he decided to withdraw his division to the Tilburg–’s-Hertogenbosch line. Communications between his battalions proved to have been severed, however, and this order was not carried out. 49 �� 56. �� Inf. Division, Ia, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, Teil I. 50 �� Assistant chaplain M.A. Vos, “Verslag”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 526, file 1. 51 �� Testimony of L.J. Schmidt, 1 July 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 523.

A German column along the Wilhelmina Canal at Tilburg.

Dutch soldiers from Noord-Brabant, having reached the comparative safety of Caen, France, 20 May 1940.

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With a view to regrouping the retreating Dutch troops, Colonel Schmidt then decided to move his command post to Princenhage near Breda. He sent his staff on ahead. When Schmidt arrived at his new command post, however, it turned out to be deserted. “A police corporal reported that the officers had gone to Roosendaal, but not a single officer had remained to pass on intelligence.” The Peel Division commander therefore decided to return to Tilburg. It was already starting to get light and in view of the presence of German aircraft, Schmidt drove at full speed and consequently missed a turning. In spite of this, he decided to continue in the same direction. Some time later, near Loon op Zand, he was taken by surprise by the advance party of the 9th Panzer Division. Coming round a bend I found myself in front of the 9th Panzer Division, which had breached the line. I expressed my joy at finally seeing French armoured vehicles, but they turned out to be Germans, who then took us prisoner.52

Following in the footsteps of most of the Peel Division, its commander was now also out of action. The French commander-in-chief, général M. Gamelin, had by this time decided, due to the advance of the German army on the Maastricht–Tongeren axis, to deploy his 7th Army no further than Breda. Its task now consisted of protecting Antwerp and preventing the Germans from occupying the Zeeland islands. “Do not initiate combat beyond Breda”, he signalled to the commander of the 7th Army, général Giraud.53 As a result, the Ist Corps did not advance further than the small river Mark. The 38th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Motorised Infantry Division took up position between Terheijden and Ulvenhout and, to the south, the 121st Infantry Regiment of the same division positioned itself in the area up to Hoogstraten in Belgium. To the north, the Ist Corps was protected by the Groupement de Beauchesne. To the south of Tilburg there was also the 2nd Light Armoured Brigade of the 1st Light Armoured Division, which, however, withdrew to the south-east.54 All this meant that the road to the Moerdijk bridges lay wide open for the 9th Panzer Division. Yet the advance of this division did not progress entirely smoothly. The many obstacles set by Dutch troops slowed their progress, while the Germans also had to deal with serious traffic congestion. In spite of this, the first light armoured vehicles of the 9th Panzer Division’s reconnaissance section succeeded in reaching the Moerdijk bridges at 16.45 hrs on 12 May. The Korpsbefehl of the XXVIth Corps for 13 May reported with satisfaction: 52 �� Schmidt, �� “Verslag omtrent de gebeurtenissen van 10 t/m 12 mei 1940”. 53 �� See �� M. Lerecouvreux, L’ Armée Giraud en Hollande 1939-1940 (Paris, 1951). 54 �� Nierstrasz, ��Inleiding en algemeen overzicht, 166-168.

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chapter seven Communications with the 7th Air Division re-established near Moerdijk. As a result orders have largely been fulfilled. I express my great admiration at the achievements of all officers and troops over the past few days!55

The defence by the Peel Division of the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal had collapsed within a single day. This was no great surprise: the positions could not be defended and German superiority was overwhelming. Once the retreat of the Dutch troops had got underway, the Peel Division in effect ceased to exist. Troop units withdrew in a disorderly fashion towards the west, while division commander Colonel Schmidt, who was given the impossible task by General Headquarters both of leading his own troops and consulting with the French on the action to be taken, was captured. The only organised opposition against the German advance could now be expected in western Brabant from sections of the French 7th Army, specifically the Ist Corps. This corps did not, however, proceed further than the area around Breda due to the German advance on the Maastricht– Tongeren axis.

Zeeland struggles on For the troops in the province of Zeeland, the Germans were now frighteningly close. The Dutch units here came under the Commander in Zeeland, Rear Admiral H.J. van der Stad, who in turn reported directly to the commander-in-chief, General Winkelman. The orders which Van der Stad had received before the German invasion were that as long as the Netherlands was not at war he had to ensure that Dutch neutrality was not breached, and in the event of an enemy attack he had to defend Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and the Zeeland islands as strongly as possible. This had been ordered by General Winkelman so as to keep the port of Antwerp open for allied use. The main effort of the defence was to be located on the islands of ZuidBeveland and Walcheren. This area was protected by two positions: the Bath Position and the Zanddijk Position, whereby the former acted as an outpost position for the Zanddijk Position, which was located between Hansweert and Yerseke. The Bath Position was near the former Bath fort and comprised twelve casemates, a tank ditch and some inundated terrain. The 14th Border Bat55 �� Generalkommando �� XXVI. A.K., Ia/op Nr. 2, “Korpsbefehl für die Fortsetzung des Angriffs am 13.5.40.”, 12 May 1940, in: Feldzug in Holland u. Belgien 10.5.-1.6.1940. Gen. Kdo. XXVI A.K., Anl.z.K.T.B. 9.5.-1.6.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 178/7.

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XXVI. and XXXIX. Armeekorps XXXX

18 XXX

XXX

26

39 XX

SSV

(-)

XXX

XX

9

SSG

XX

254

SSAH

XX

22

XX

7

SSD XX

256 225 208

talion was stationed here, commanded by Major F.G. Triebel, who in turn reported to the regiment commander of the 38th Infantry Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel J.H.W. Bruins. Although the Bath Position only had an outpost function, the 14th Border Battalion had still been given orders to stand its ground. Any retreat to the Zanddijk Position would only be allowed on the orders of the Commander in Zeeland or the commander of the 38th Infantry Regiment. The Zanddijk Position formed the main defence for Zuid-Beveland and thus also for Walcheren. It was to be defended to the last and owed its strength to the inundated polders in front of the position. This meant that the only access to the position was via five dykes. These access roads were more heavily defended; the one over the Tholseindsche Dyke even had its own outpost at Kaasgat, with machine guns, a 6-Veld field gun and an antitank gun. The Zanddijk Position was divided into three sectors, which were each manned by one battalion. The northernmost sector was defended by the IIIrd battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment led by Major U.C.C. Noordenbos, the central sector by III-40 RI led by Reserve Major H.F.L. Krämer and the southern sector by I-40 RI under Reserve Captain A. de Wit. The position was reinforced by part of the 17th Artillery Regi-

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May 1940

French command structure in western Brabant and Zeeland XXXX

7

XX

Nord

Fr

Fr

XXX

XXX

1

16

1

X

1 Beauchesne

4

25

XX

38 92 121

18

Lestoquoi

X

2

16 216

6 4

XX

9

XX

XX

60

74

4

XX

68

18 224 225 341 89 289

241 270 271

59

50 68

command structure on 10 May command structure from 13 May

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ment, by a mortar company and some anti-aircraft artillery. Command of the entire Zanddijk Position was held by the commander of the 40th Infantry Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel P.L.R. van der Drift. Incidentally, on 10 May 1940, Rear Admiral Van der Stad decided not to command the defence of the Zanddijk Position personally as he wished to contact the commander of the incoming French troops in Middelburg. He therefore decided to delegate tactical command of all the Dutch troops in Zuid-Beveland to Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruins, commander of the 38th Infantry Regiment, a decision with which the latter was not altogether happy as he had not been involved in preparations for defending the lines in this area until 10 May. The remaining Zeeland islands were hardly defended at all. There were, however, detachments from the Ist battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment stationed at a few tactically important positions on Tholen. This battalion was given the task of defending the flanks of the Zanddijk Position. On

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Schouwen-Duiveland, Haamstede airfield was protected by a company of surveillance troops and an anti-aircraft battery. Finally, stationed in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen were, in particular, the IInd battalions of the 38th and the 40th Infantry Regiments, respectively, and the 14th and the 38th Reserve Border Companies. The French unit which set out in the direction of Zeeland following the morning of 10 May comprised the 60th Infantry Division commanded by général de brigade Marcel Deslaurens and the 68th Infantry Division led by général de division M.F.G. Beaufrère. The latter division, which did not belong to the 7th Army, came directly under the Commandant en chef des forces maritimes du Nord, amiral Jean-Charles Abrial. The division detachment destined for Walcheren was comprised largely of the 224th Infantry Regiment, commanded by général de brigade Durand, the infantry commander of the 68th Infantry Division. Upon arrival on Walcheren, this detachment came under the Ist Corps. On the early morning of 11 May, général Durand arrived at Rear Admiral Van der Stad’s command post. The French commander was unimpressed by the Dutch troops. Van der Stad later declared: General Durand complained about the limited strength of my troops, in particular the lack of sufficient artillery and anti-aircraft batteries; he also explained that he had received orders to defend the islands to the last and he would do so, yet I gained the strong impression that his greatest concern was to ensure that his retreat route was secure.56

Durand and Van der Stad could not agree on a common defence concept. The French general thought the location of the Zanddijk Position to be tactically incorrect and doubted the value of the inundation areas. He also wondered whether the Germans would attack via the Kreekrak Dam which was defended by the Bath Position. He thought it much more likely that an attack on the coast of Zuid-Beveland would be launched out of Tholen using motorboats. Durand therefore positioned his detachment between Middelburg and Flushing and along the northern coast of ZuidBeveland to the north of Goes. With a view to creating a unified command, on 13 May the Dutch troops which came under Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruins were placed under the command of général Durand, while the entire 68th Infantry Division was placed under the commander of the Ist Corps.57 56 �� H.J. �� van der Stad, “Verslag over de gebeurtenissen na het uitbreken van den oorlog”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 463, file 1. 57 �� C.D. �� Kamerling, De strijd in Zeeland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1954) 16-17 and 19.

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The reports received from Noord-Brabant from 12 May onwards served to increase unease among the troops in Zeeland. First of all, sections of the dispersed Peel Division arrived in Zeeland. It was a motley group: on bicycles, on trucks, on foot, ammunition vehicles, officers without troops and men without officers, some armed, some not (...) According to Lieutenant Colonel Themann, who reported to me in a highly stressed state, they had ‘fought like lions’, no-one had been injured, however; they all gave the impression of being troops who had fled rather than been beaten: rosy-cheeked and in good health, laughing, noisy, joking with the girls and not pale, broken, dejected and exhausted.58

58 �� Van der Stad, “Verslag over de gebeurtenissen na het uitbreken van den oorlog”. Lieutenant Colonel G.E.A. Themann was commander of the 30th Infantry Regiment.

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The reports of the German troops’ advance were also unsettling. The 9th Panzer Division advanced in the early hours of 11 May in two columns, a northern column led by Oberst Wilhelm von Apell and a southern one led by Oberstleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck. To the rear of the 9th Panzer Division, one day later, SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’ of the Xth Corps continued to advance via Kleef and Langstraat. Its units fought against Dutch troops on the bridge at Keizersveer, who then retreated and blew up the bridge. On 12 May, to the south of the 9th Panzer Division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and the 6th Army’s 56th Infantry Division headed westwards. There were, however, no large-scale battles fought between French and German troops in Noord-Brabant. The Belgian army had decided to withdraw to the Dyle Position, which ran from Antwerp via Louvain to Malines. As a consequence, the French 7th Army, inasmuch as it was present in Noord-Brabant, was at risk of becoming cut off from the rest of the French army. At 13.35 hrs on 12 May, général d’armée Giraud was therefore issued with the following order: “Take any measures necessary to deploy your full force in combat on the Antwerp-Namur line.”59 This meant that the 7th Army was to withdraw entirely to the west of the river Scheldt. In western Noord-Brabant, there was therefore only some rearguard action. On 13 May, the XXVIth Corps had the area around Breda under control. Now what? In the Angriffsbefehl issued to the XXVIth Corps on 10 May, the answer to the question of what was to happen once they had reached the area around Breda had been left wide open. Yet, as described in Chapter 5, the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst von Brauchitsch, and the commander of Army Group B, Generaloberst von Bock, had taken measures in this respect on 11, 12 and 13 May. On 13 May the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army, General der Artillerie G.K.F.W. von Küchler, could consequently form a new corps for the attack on Rotterdam, the XXXIXth, which included the 9th Panzer Division, SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’ and the 254th Infantry Division from the XXVIth Corps. The remainder of the XXVIth Corps was ordered to protect the southern flank of the 18th Army against Antwerp “and to do so occupy the area between Breda and the mouth of the Scheldt on 14 May”.60 As a result of the latter order, the SS Verfügungsdivision led by SS Gruppenführer Haußer and headed by SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ set out in the early hours of 14 May via Esschen to Hoogerheide. Woensdrecht was sub59 �� Nierstrasz, ��Inleiding en algemeen overzicht, 168. 60 �� Armeeoberkommando �� 18, Abt. Ia, “Armeebefehl für den Angriff auf die Festung Holland”, 13 May 1940, in: Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht, 300-301.

SS-Gruppenführer Paul Haußer. mei 1940

Dutch command structure in Zeeland Commander in Zeeland (CZ)

XX

68

Fr

38

(-)

2 40

1

(-)

40

2

1

14

3

3

14

3

38

17

(-)

38

1

38(-)

17

(-) 2

1 23 4

3

1

2/38

3

1/38

2 3

command structure up to 10 May 1940 command structure after 10 May 1940 command structure from 13 May 1940

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sequently occupied without a fight at 10.40 hrs. This resulted in the isthmus of Zuid-Beveland being cut off and some French troops at Bergen op Zoom, the 12th Division Reconnaissance Group, led by chef d’escadron G. Michon, being surrounded.61 The 256th Infantry Division and SS regiment ‘Germania’ led the advance on Antwerp, while between 15.00 and 16.00 hrs the first patrols of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ reconnoitred the forward area of the Bath Position. Major Triebel, commander of the 14th Border Battalion which manned the Bath Position, subsequently sent for the three company commanders to come to his command post in Rilland. Shortly after they arrived, at 18.00 hrs, German shelling started. Triebel ordered his company commanders to return immediately to their units in order to rebuff any attack. However, only Reserve Lieutenant J.C. van Breda, commander of the 1st company, followed this order: the other two commanders, Reserve Captain C.H. Mulder (2-14th Border Battalion) and Captain R. Helmer (3-14th Border Battalion), preferred to remain safely in Rilland. Major Triebel had to repeat his order forcefully before the two captains were prepared to return to their men. In fact, they both went to the southern sector of the trench where the company of Reserve Captain Mulder was to be found, so that Captain Helmer was still not with his troops, which in the meantime had come under the heaviest shelling. Once Triebel had been informed of this, Reserve Captain Mulder “was absolutely ordered to stand his ground and to do everything in his power to calm the men. He was also told to order Captain Helmer on his behalf to return to his command post”62. In the end, Helmer did return to his own command post, but he discovered that his men were in the process of fleeing the trench due to the force of the enemy fire. Helmer did nothing to stop them, but again returned to Bath harbour, to the command post of Reserve Captain Mulder. There the two captains decided to flee, taking a large part of the 2nd Company of the 14th Border Battalion with them. This meant that the Bath Position, which had not actually been subjected to an actual assault, was now only manned by small groups, chiefly the 1st Company of Reserve Lieutenant Van Breda. These troops would of course not be able to withstand a largescale German attack and, once Major Triebel had informed his commander, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruins, of the situation, he was given orders at 20.00 hrs to evacuate the Bath Position. The withdrawal could not 61 �� “Rapport �� du Chef d’Escadron Michon sur les opérations de Hollande, du 10 au 15 mai et sur les circonstances de sa capture”, August 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 560, file 2. 62 �� F.G. �� Triebel, “Rapport krijgsverrichtingen”, 29 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 19.

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be described as orderly: Triebel gave no specific instructions and the men retreated westwards without any cohesion. The Bath Position had therefore ‘fallen’ without an actual ground assault having taken place. Particularly weak commanders had not been able to command their troops and had, partially at their own initiative, withdrawn together with their troops. This naturally had a demoralising effect on the men at the Zanddijk Position. This was added to the devastating news that the Dutch army had capitulated but that the troops in Zeeland were to fight on. “The proclamation greatly affected the men, many wept from anger and regret, others (and they were not the lowest in rank) asked why we had to continue fighting when the game was apparently already lost.” Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruins, the commander of the Dutch troops on Zuid-Beveland, succeeded in calming their emotions. The Dutch troops would continue to fight.63 They were supported in this by fresh French reinforcements. During the night of 13 May, a detachment from the 60th Infantry Division commanded by colonel Guihard had arrived on Zuid-Beveland. This detachment comprised the 68th Division Reconnaissance Group, the 27th Infantry Regiment and two battalions of the 307th Artillery Regiment. This detachment did not, however, take up positions in the Zanddijk Position, but along the Zuid-Beveland Canal and on the bank of the Oosterschelde, much to the displeasure of Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruins. He was told by a French lieutenant colonel how simple it would be to impede a canal crossing by means of “diagonal and flanking fire with rifles and machine guns”, but personally thought that “if no further measures were taken by the French command, their defence of the canal would lead to panic”64. The French reinforcements meant that new chains of command were needed. With a view to achieving this, général Beaufrère went to Middelburg on 15 May. He was not particularly impressed by the actions of général Durand, whom he accused of defeatism as he had made no preparations for defence of the Zuid-Beveland Canal. Durand was relieved of his command of the troops on Zuid-Beveland. It was decided that, as of 16 May, général de brigade Deslaurens would command all the land forces on Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren, that contre-amiral C.J.G. Platon (who was in Zeeland with a view to organising sea transport) would take command of the navy and air forces, and that général Beaufrère would command the troops charged with defending the coast of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. 63 �� J.H.W. �� Bruins, “Rapport aan den Opperbevelhebber der troepen in Zeeland over de gebeurtenissen op Zuid-Beveland en te Bergen op Zoom van 10 mei 1940 tot en met 25 mei 1940”, July 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 1. 64 �Ibidem.

Soldiers of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ in front of the Zanddijk Position, on the Tholseindsche Dyke.

SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ under fire on the east bank of the Zuid-Beveland Canal, 15 May 1940.

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Colonel Guihard and général Durand now operated under the command of général Deslaurens, as commanders of the troops on Zuid-Beveland and on Walcheren, respectively.65 On the morning of 15 May, the German attack on Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren commenced. One attack unit, which consisted chiefly of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ led by SS Standartenführer Felix Steiner, was ordered to push through via Goes to Middelburg.66 The Germans were able to advance through the Bath Position unimpeded, resulting in the advance party of the SS regiment reaching the Tholseindsche Dyke in the inundated section of the Zanddijk Line as early as 08.00 hrs. The Dutch troops on this dyke responded particularly quickly: the commander of the 38th Mortar Company, Reserve Captain H. de Groot, immediately gave orders to open fire, (…) to which the enemy responded immediately. Our fire prevented the enemy from approaching. The machine-gun fire from Kaasgat and the fire from the antitank gun were immediately supported by mortar fire, even before I had had any opportunity to order it.67

In the meantime, the Luftwaffe had arrived on the scene and started to bomb the Zanddijk Position heavily, resulting in the death of Sergeant A.N. Westdijk, commander of the light machine-gun group at Kaasgat. In spite of this, the Dutch were able to halt the German advance here. Even in the light of this success, however, the morale of the men in the Zanddijk Line to the rear of Kaasgat had deteriorated drastically, partly due to the impression made by the German aircraft. In the sector manned by the 1st company of III-38 RI, most soldiers fled totally demoralised and in panic towards the Zuid-Beveland Canal. The company commander of I-III-38 RI, Reserve Lieutenant P.F. Goossens, who had sought cover, observed: When the bombing eased, the sergeant-assistant to the commander reported (...) that the shelters had been abandoned and that the position of III-40 RI near the railway had also been abandoned. Company Commander went to left section and saw from a distance that this section’s personnel were speeding away on bicycles.68

65 �� Kamerling, ��Zeeland, 19. 66 � Standartenführer is equal in rank to Oberst. For a full list of rank equivalents, see Annex. 67 �� Report by Commander of the 38th Mortar Company chiefly relating to the major events on Tuesday 14 and Wednesday 15 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 5. 68 �� Statement �� by Reserve Lieutenant P.F. Goossens, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 13.

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At about 11.20 hrs, Major Noordenbos, commander of III-38 RI, ordered all units to withdraw to Wemeldinge, behind the Zuid-Beveland Canal. By doing so, Noordenbos let down the men at Kaasgat. Reserve Captain H. de Groot was amazed to see what was happening in the area to his rear. “The orderly sent to Mortar Section at the Zanddijk returned and reported that there was no-one there, which left us all with a horrible feeling.” Although the soldiers at Kaasgat had repelled a German attack, they were forced to retreat, following the men from the northern sector of the Zanddijk Position who were retreating in chaos.69 Things were not going much better in the central sector of the Zanddijk Position. The troops there became demoralised when they realised that much of the IIIrd battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn “while shouting loudly: ‘The Dutch people will fight no more, then we will not fight either’”. The commander of the IIIrd battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment, Reserve Major H.F.L. Krämer, stationed in the central section, attempted to maintain calm, but in vain: (…) the enormously deep dejection and shock at the capitulation of the Netherlands, the departure of the country’s government, no longer being able or wanting to comprehend the point of fighting on and the heavy air raids had apparently put people into such a state that all ability or reason to fight was lost.70

Between 12.15 and 14.00 hrs, the troops from the central sector of the Zanddijk Position withdrew to behind the Zuid-Beveland Canal. The first SS troops of Gruppe-Steiner appeared in front of the southern sector of the Zanddijk Position at about 10.00 hrs. They advanced particularly cautiously, severely impeded by artillery fire from the IInd battalion of the 17th Artillery Regiment and fire from the French torpedo boat l’Incomprise. Reports of the withdrawal of the IIIrd battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment were not encouraging for the commander of the Ist battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment which was stationed in the southern sector. When some time later he witnessed two groups from his own battalion retreating near the Hansweert sluices, under the pretence of being shot at by French artillery, he realised that the morale of many of the soldiers left a lot to be desired. At 14.00 hrs, following consultation with Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Van der Drift, he ordered his battalion to withdraw to behind the Zuid-Beveland Canal. Following the Bath Position, 69 �� Report by Commander of the 38th Mortar Company in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 5. 70 �� H.F.L. �� Krämer, “Verslag betreffende de oorlogshandelingen van III-40 R.I. vanaf 10 mei 1940”, 24 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 464, file 14.

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the easily defendable Zanddijk Position had now also been abandoned by Dutch troops, without an actual German assault having been carried out. Largely uninspiring Dutch officers had not succeeded in getting the soldiers, who had become thoroughly demoralised by the capitulation of the rest of the Netherlands, to act. This resulted in a chaotic flight, during which many weapons were discarded.

The final pocket of resistance eradicated While all this was going on, the French 271st Infantry Regiment had dug itself in to the best of its ability on the western dyke of the Zuid-Beveland Canal.71 However, the position was weak and shallow. To the rear, the Dutch battalions regrouped: III-38 RI around Kapelle, I-40 RI near Hoedekenskerke and III-40 RI at Baarland. The point of main effort of the German attack on the French positions was along the Yerseke–Kapelle road: deployed to the north was the Ist battalion of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ commanded by Obersturmbannführer72 Witt, to the south the IIIrd battalion led by Obersturmbannführer Matthias Kleinheisterkamp. Following a bombing raid by the Luftwaffe, the first German troops crossed the canal, which resulted in widespread panic among the French troops. The situation quickly proved to be untenable and at 11.00 hrs the order came that all French units were to withdraw to Walcheren. This enabled the Germans to make a rapid advance: at 16.00 hrs Goes was captured and a large number of French troops were taken prisoner. “Enemy resistance is waning and has almost disappeared”, as was recorded with satisfaction in the SS Verfügingsdivision’s Kriegstagebuch.73 Colonel Guihard, the commander of the troops on Zuid-Beveland, had by this time removed to the Sloe Dam and formed a small bridgehead to the east of the dam. The remaining French troops and a few Dutch units entered Walcheren across the Sloe Dam via this bridgehead. A German attack on the 40-metre wide and 800-metre long dam would have been difficult to repel and général Deslaurens, commander of all the troops on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland, viewed the situation rather optimistically: “Situation excellent; no need for Dutch reinforcements. Everything going 71 �� With �� the exception of one battalion stationed on the north coast of Zuid-Beveland. 72 � Obersturmbannführer is equal in rank to Oberstleutnant. For a full list of rank equivalents, see Annex. 73 �� Kriegstagebuch der SS-V-Division. �� Westfeldzug 1940: 1.5.-14-7.1940, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 555, file 18.

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As the bridge over the Zuid-Beveland Canal had been destroyed, SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ crossed using rubber dinghies.

very well.”74 Général Deslaurens had at his disposal the majority of the 224th Infantry Regiment, the Ist battalion of the 89th Artillery Regiment and several Dutch units for defending Walcheren. These were able to successfully repel a German attack on the Sloe Dam on the evening of 16 May. The battalion encounters strong opposition from enemy on the dam and has come to a halt there. Its intention of the whole battle group advancing on Walcheren and commencing the attack during the night cannot be carried out.75

At the headquarters of the XXVIth Corps, General Wodrig was becoming impatient. On 16 May, he ordered that the SS Verfügungsdivision should be “in possession of the island of Walcheren as quickly as possible. […] The main focus must now be to carry out this order quickly!”76 The islands of Tholen and Schouwen-Duiveland were also to be fully captured by the Germans. With respect to the former island, Wodrig’s order was superfluous. On the afternoon of 16 May, following an artillery attack on the town of Tholen, parts of the 15th Machine-gun Battalion led by Oberst Richard 74 �� Kamerling, ��Zeeland, 116. 75 �� Kriegstagebuch �� der SS-V-Division. 76 �� Generalkommando XXVI. A.K., Ia/op Nr. 6, “Korpsbefehl für den 17.5.40.”, 16 May 1940, in: Feldzug in Holland u. Belgien 10.5.-l.6.1940. Gen.Kdo. XXVI A.K., Anl.z.K.T.B. 9.5.-1.6.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 178/7.

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Wirtz had already crossed the Eendracht waterway (a day earlier, Dutch troops had succeeded in repelling an attack) and had reached Stavenisse at about 16.30 hrs. At 02.30 hrs on 17 May, Gruppe-Wirtz crossed to Schouwen-Duiveland. The only fighting was conducted on the streets of Zierikzee. Elsewhere on the island, the Dutch surrendered without putting up a fight. By 07.00 hrs, the entire island was in German hands. The Germans were to experience greater difficulty in capturing Walcheren. However, they were not impeded by the remaining Dutch troops on Zuid-Beveland, even though a retired Royal Netherlands East Indies Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel A.R.W. Gey van Pittius, the Dutch Red Cross delegate to the Zeeland Command, did everything in his power to deploy the remainder of the 38th and the 40th Infantry Regiment stationed near Borssele against the Germans. To this end, on 16 May Rear Admiral Van der Stad appointed the retired officer commander of all the troops on Zuid-Beveland and gave him a declaration which bore the text: “I hereby authorise Lieutenant Colonel Geij van Pittius to act as he sees fit on ZuidBeveland.” Lieutenant Colonels Bruins and Van der Drift, whom he met in Borssele, resolutely refused to obey him, however, and refused to deploy their troops. Gey van Pittius then put his Red Cross armband back on and tried to reach Middelburg to confer with his superiors. Even before he was able to reach the Sloe Dam, he was stopped by a German officer. The officer refused to let him through but did allow him to retrace his steps thanks to his Red Cross armband. Although Gey van Pittius was able to assure Bruins and Van der Drift on the morning of 17 May, on the basis of his own eyewitness account, that the SS regiment did not yet control the area between Goes and the Sloe Dam, and that the Dutch units on Zuid-Beveland therefore still had a chance of defending the area to the east of the Sloe Dam, the two lieutenant colonels continued to refuse to act.77 On 17 May, at about 03.00 hrs, two German artillery battalions started to shell the western side of the Sloe Dam. Half an hour later, the 9th company of the IIIrd battalion of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’, commanded by SS Obersturmführer Rohde, attacked the French. This attack was answered with heavy artillery fire, however, and failed. In spite of our own heavy shelling and air support we have not succeeded in silencing enemy artillery and the accurate firing from the machine guns on the enemy bank. (...) The companies, in particular the ninth company, must dig themselves in again on the other bank.78 77 �� Statement by A.R.W. Gey van Pittius, 14 October 1947, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 465, file 1. 78 �� Kriegstagebuch �� der SS-V-Division.

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After this failed attack, the Germans attempted to break opposition in Walcheren using heavier guns. A devastating artillery attack was launched on the western extremity of the Sloe Dam and at Arnemuiden, while the Luftwaffe bombed not only Arnemuiden, but also Flushing and Middelburg with high-explosive bombs. This raid had a particularly devastating effect on the latter town: the resulting fires could not be extinguished and the historic centre of the town went up in flames. The bombing raids had in the meantime also had a demoralising effect on the French troops at the Sloe Dam, even though général Deslaurens repeatedly joined the front line and tried to boost morale. These soldiers, chiefly reserve personnel over the age of 30, could only think of their personal safety under such circumstances. When after 12.00 hrs, the IIIrd battalion of SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ again attempted to cross the Sloe Dam, the troops were so demoralised that they either remained in their shelters in a daze or tried to escape in a blind panic. Incidentally, the only Dutch unit near the Sloe Dam, the 14th Reserve Border Company from Zeeuws-Vlaanderen led by Reserve Captain C.M. van den Broecke, had already given up as the commander had recognised “the uselessness” of trying to “make a company with no cohesion whatsoever hold its ground”.79 Consequently, SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ could enter Walcheren almost completely unimpeded; the only skirmishes were in Arnemuiden. The suburbs of Flushing were reached at about 20.00 hrs. The Dutch soldiers of the 38th Infantry Regiment offered no resistance at all here, which endangered the French troops’ crossing into Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Thanks to the courageous action of a rearguard under the personal command of général Deslaurens, however, most of the French were able to reach the harbour of Breskens in all manner of vessels. Deslaurens fought until the bitter end: on the evening of 17 May he was fatally wounded by a German bullet. At 23.00 hrs, Flushing surrendered.80 Over the course of four days, SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ had breached the Bath Position, the Zanddijk Position, the position along the ZuidBeveland Canal and the defences at the Sloe Dam. In doing so, the three SS battalions defeated ten French and Dutch battalions on Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren, while a further two Dutch battalions capitulated without having fought at all. The fall of the weak line along the Zuid-Beveland Canal could largely be attributed to the demoralising effect of the German air attacks, and the same could be said of the loss of the Sloe Dam. The actions 79 �� C.M. van den Broecke, “Verslag”, 14 September 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 464, file 19. Cf.: Kamerling, Zeeland, 117-118. 80 �� Kamerling, ��Zeeland, 118-129.

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of the Dutch units can only be described as disappointing. While French troops fought far from their native country (albeit in their own interests), général Marcel Deslaurens among those who gave their lives, the poorly commanded Dutch units surrendered almost without putting up a fight. The Commander in Zeeland, Rear Admiral Van der Stad, who, following the capitulation of General Winkelman, became Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces, had incidentally already removed to ZeeuwsVlaanderen at the express request of the Dutch government in London, which wished to prevent Van der Stad being taken prisoner by the Germans.81 Also in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen at that time was Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who was briefed on the military situation by the commander of the IInd battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment, Major H.P. de Heer, at Oostburg on 17 May. The major advised the prince to leave Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. “The troops allocated to me were no long combatworthy, morale among the remaining small units of II-40 RI and II-38 RI was deteriorating, while the French viewed us with suspicion.”82 Van der Stad’s plan to have Dutch troops play a part in the defence of ZeeuwsVlaanderen came to nothing. On the contrary: général Beaufrère demanded on 19 May that all Dutch soldiers remaining in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen should withdraw, in view of their demoralising effect on the French troops. They made “them uneasy and nervous, they kept thinking that the Dutch were Germans, which could lead to fatal errors”.83 Rear Admiral Van der Stad therefore ordered Major De Heer to move his troops to Ostend. At 21.00 hrs on 19 May, Major De Heer was the last remaining, functioning member of the Dutch military to leave the Dutch province of Zeeland.84 Zeeuws-Vlaanderen would also be occupied by German troops. On the evening of 17 May, the XXVIth Corps shifted its main focus from Walcheren to Antwerp. The 256th and 208th Infantry Divisions breached the northern front at Antwerp on both sides of the Breda–Antwerp road and occupied the Belgian port. Next, the IXth Corps, which had originally been part of the 6th Army, was allocated to the 18th Army and the advance towards the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen began, during which the corps also entered Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. The main focus of the German attack was, however, to the south of this part of the Netherlands, in the left part of 81 �� Incidentally, in spite of this Van der Stad was taken prisoner at Frevent in France on 21 May. 82 �� H.P. �� de Heer, “Verslag nopens de verrichtingen der troepen in Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen”, 3 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 464, file 10. 83 �� Van �� der Stad, “Verslag over de gebeurtenissen na het uitbreken van den oorlog ”. 84 �� De �� Heer, “Verslag nopens de verrichtingen der troepen in Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen”.

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the IXth Corps’ sector. On 22 May, the eastern part of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen was occupied by the 227th Infantry Division. Defensive positions in western Zeeuws-Vlaanderen were now also taken up by the 1st and 2nd Belgian Cavalry Divisions. During the night of 23 May, however, these withdrew to behind the Leopold Canal. On 27 May, the German units also entered western Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the last remaining piece of unoccupied Dutch soil. The battle on Dutch territory was over for the time being. The advance of the XXVIth Corps had cost 190 Dutch military personnel their lives in northern Limburg and Noord-Brabant, namely 5 officers, 28 NCOs and 157 other ranks.85 Later another 27 military personnel would be killed in Belgium and France, chiefly due to the sinking of the S.S. Pavon on 20 May.86 Reliable data on German losses are unavailable, but crossing the river Maas in particular must have cost a large number of lives. The casualty list of the XXVIth Corps for 10 May, which gives a total of 67 killed, seems to be a rather low estimate. At Mill alone, for instance, 42 German soldiers were killed, mostly from the 481st Infantry Regiment.87 More complete data can be given for Zeeland: a total of 38 Dutch military personnel were killed: 5 officers, 7 NCOs and 26 from the ranks. It is typical of events in Zeeland that a much greater number of French troops were killed in combat: the war cemetery at Kapelle is the resting place for 229 officers and men.88 No precise data is available on the total number of German soldiers killed. The breach of the Zanddijk Position resulted in 22 fatalities among SS regiment ‘Deutschland’, while one of the two SS battalions which stormed the Sloe Dam counted 17 fatalities. The attack on Tholen cost Gruppe-Wirtz a further 20 fatalities, and we can therefore assume that the capture of Zeeland led to the deaths of about 80 to 90 Germans.89

Conclusion The advance of the XXVIth Corps through northern Limburg, NoordBrabant and Zeeland was hugely successful. The first major target for attack, the Moerdijk bridges across the Hollands Diep, was reached on the afternoon of 12 May. An important reason behind this success was the capture on the early morning of 10 May of the bridge over the river Maas 85 �� Nierstrasz, ��Noord-Limburg en Noord-Brabant, 482-485. 86 �� Kamerling, ��Zeeland, 153-158. 87 �� Claassens �� and De Kruijff, Gevecht bij Mill, 181-182. 88 �� Also �� buried here are the few French soldiers to have been killed in Noord-Brabant. 89 �� L.W. �� de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945 (Middelburg, 1979) 182-184.

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at Gennep, which enabled an armoured train to advance to the Peel-Raam Position at Mill. This was quite significant. The German army used several armoured trains during the attack on the Netherlands, but the train at Mill played a decisive role in the fall of the Peel-Raam Position. The Dutch troops in Noord-Brabant subsequently offered little resistance. The traffic chaos which ensued at Gennep and the limited road network slowed the speed of the German advance. In fact, it was really General H.G. Winkelman who had already given up on Noord-Brabant before the war had even started. Although NoordBrabant, together with Zeeland, was of vital importance to the allied partnership with the Belgians and the French, he had decided to have the long Peel-Raam Position defended only by the Peel Division and not by the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division. He had also not been able to comply with the wishes of the French and Belgians to focus the defence of NoordBrabant in the Tilburg area. The Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, had also been unable to alter this. He had been a proponent of a defence along the ’s-Hertogenbosch–Tilburg–Goirle line, where he wanted to build the ‘Orange Position’. As a matter of fact, Winkelman opted for what Belgian General R. van Overstraeten referred to as a “stratégie d’isolement”.90 The consequences of this choice, however understandable in view of the size and quality of the army, were dramatic: when the French troops arrived and advanced up to the area around Tilburg, exactly the location of the proposed Orange Position, they only encountered demoralised Dutch units and not the IIIrd Corps or the Light Division. This resulted in the Dutch being given the rather unflattering name of “the dirty Boche of the north”. The lack of any form of coordination between the French and the Dutch prior to the battle also had serious consequences, partly due to General Headquarters simply ordering Colonel L.J. Schmidt, who also had to command the Peel Division, to coordinate with the French commanders. This led to unnecessary misunderstandings and chaos, which in turn played into the hands of the Germans, who were themselves by no means remarkable. The developments in Belgium, where on 12 May the Belgian army withdrew to behind the Dyle Position, were decisive for the outcome of the battle in Noord-Brabant. As a result of this withdrawal, the units of the 7th Army present in this province were also forced to withdraw. In the area around Breda there were only skirmishes involving rearguard parties. In Zeeland, too, there was no effective partnership between the French and Dutch units. This was also partly due to the choice of général Du90 �� See �� Chapter 3.

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rand not to deploy French troops in the easily defendable Zanddijk Position, but instead to position them on the banks of the Oosterschelde and along the Zuid-Beveland Canal. Durand feared a German landing from Tholen, which, in view of the sandbanks and tidal currents in the Oosterschelde, would have been a rather improbable action. As a result of Durand’s decision, the forces were fragmented, something which the Dutch Commander in Zeeland, Rear Admiral H.J. van der Stad, incidentally, did nothing to correct. Once SS regiment ‘Deutschland’ had opened the attack on Zeeland, there was little opposition from Dutch troops. Led by what were often particularly weak commanders and demoralised by the Dutch capitulation on 14 May and the German air attacks, many soldiers fled even before the battle started. The defence of Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren was therefore chiefly carried out by French troops, of whom over two hundred were killed, including the courageous général Deslaurens. Their actions were in vain, however: not only did the SS troops defeat the French units on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland, the German breach at Sedan meant that the French defence was superfluous. They would have left Zeeland on 17 May, regardless. The XXVIth Corps had achieved a decisive victory. A well-satisfied General Albert Wodrig addressed his troops as follows on 1 June: Soldiers of the XXVIth Corps! The operations of the corps in the Netherlands and Belgium have been completed within 22 days thanks to an unprecedented victory. Crossing the Maas, breaching the Peel Position, linking up with our airborne troops in the Netherlands who had been surrounded, reaching the coast, capturing Antwerp, crossing the Scheldt, surrounding substantial parts of the Belgian army in Flanders and fighting the remainder of the British forces are the excellent results of your battle. (...) Long live the Führer, our German people and fatherland and our XXVIth Corps!91

91 �� Korps-Tagesbefehl, �� 1 June 1940, in: Feldzug in Holland u. Belgien 10.5.-1.6.1940. Gen.Kdo. X-XVI A.K., Anl.z.K.T.B. 9.5.-1.6.1940, in: DC-NIMH, Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 178/7.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FIELD ARMY DEFEATED: THE BATTLE FOR THE GREBBE LINE

Introduction “The forces attacking north of the rivers (mobile troops forward) first conquer the IJssel Line as soon as possible and immediately advance against the eastern front of Fortress Holland.” Thus read part of the Aufmarschanweisung for the 18th Army, which invaded the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 under the command of General der Artillerie G.K.F.W. von Küchler. The attack on the Dutch Field Army, entrenched at the Grebbe Line,1 was to be carried out by the Xth Corps. This corps was commanded by General der Artillerie Christian Hansen and consisted of the 227th Infantry Division, reinforced with, among others, SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’, and the 207th Infantry Division, reinforced with SS regiment ‘Der Führer’. The latter regiment was commanded by SS Standartenführer Georg Keppler and, unlike the Wehrmacht units, had no combat experience. The battle in the Netherlands would be this regiment’s baptism of fire. The 526th Infantry Division was also part of the corps, but was held in reserve. As has been mentioned before, the main part of the Dutch Field Army was positioned behind the Grebbe Line. These troops were expressly ordered to mount a “staunch defence”. To this end, the mobilised units of the Field Army constructed an entirely new defence work after September 1939. They placed barbed-wire obstructions, dug trenches, built casemates and prepared fire plans. Where possible, part of the Gelderse Vallei had been inundated. The latter had not been successful, however, at the southernmost point of the Grebbe Line, near the Grebbeberg, where a 3.5-kilometre-wide stretch of terrain remained open and very suitable for an attack. This objection to the Grebbe Line had been common knowledge for a long time, and in earlier times it had been reason enough to opt 1 The orders from the Commander of the Field Army referred to the “Valley Position”. This chapter will use the more familiar name “Grebbe Line”.

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Construction of a field fortification in the Gelderse Vallei, mobilisation 1939-1940.

for other defence lines. With the intention of improving the situation, in the summer of 1939 the engineers had designed a bombproof pumping station which was to create an artificial inundation area. The project was rejected, however, on the grounds of it “being too expensive”. Six months later, approval was given for the construction of the pumping station, this time using a design by the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management. The harsh winter of 1939-1940 meant that by May 1940, work on the pumping station had still not been completed.2 This lack of vigour in the construction of the Grebbe Line was the result of a lack of unity within the Dutch political and military leadership regarding the question as to where the main effort of the national defence north of the major rivers should be mounted. For a long time, therefore, the Grebbe Line was little more than a kind of outpost position 2 V.E. Nierstrasz, De operatiën van het Veldleger en het Oostfront van de Vesting Holland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1955) 20.

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of the eastern front of Fortress Holland. However, even when, after General Winkelman had been appointed commander-in-chief, the cabinet decided to use the Grebbe Line for the staunch defence by the Field Army, the maximum effort was not made to establish a position that could be adequately defended. For instance, the cabinet refused to allow the nec-

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essary hedges and orchards in the Gelderse Vallei to be chopped down, because it feared possible high compensation claims. Not until 8 May did the units in the front line begin clearing trees, pressurised by the circumstances. Ironically, this meant that on 10 May the fields were strewn with felled trees, providing excellent cover for the attackers.3 The defence line consisted of a line of outposts, with the main resistance sector behind it. In the areas where the inundations in front of the main resistance sector provided sufficient protection, the outposts served as a warning system. In the other areas of the Grebbe Line, the outposts were given a “(staunch) defence task”, with the soldiers positioned in little more than simple trenches and shelters. The main resistance sector generally consisted of two lines, the front line and the stop line. The front line was formed by concrete casemates, cast-steel turret casemates, other emplacements and trenches. The stop line behind the front line was to contain any breaches. The soldiers in the main resistance sector were under an “absolute ban on surrendering a single section of the terrain which they were to defend”.4 In the spring of 1940, the German army was still assuming that, after having defended the Grebbe Line, the Dutch army would choose the New Dutch Waterline as the location for the actual defence. Breaching the Grebbe Line was not going to be easy, that much was clear after a spying trip by Hauptmann R. Kriebel of the staff of Army Group B, together with an intelligence officer of the 18th Army, Hauptmann Heinrich. Between 22 and 26 February 1940, these two captains visited the various positions under construction north and south of the major rivers unhindered. Martial law had not yet been declared and nobody could do a thing to stop the German visitors. “It was even possible to go back and forth through the fortification zones, without being stopped once”, reported a somewhat surprised Kriebel. The Dutch reinforcements at the Grebbe Line did not make much of an impression. This did not mean, however, that the Germans thought that the attack would be a straightforward matter: Nonetheless the attack on the Grebbe Line is not easy. It is hampered by the fact that it is made impossible to support the infantry by means of directed artillery fire by the problems in transporting the guns through the boggy terrain, as well as by the difficulty in overseeing the Grebbe Line, which makes reconnaissance and orientation during the attack more difficult. 3 Ibidem, 13-19. 4 �� Hoofdkwartier �� Veldleger, Sectie 1.1.�� Nr.�� 1B, �� “Geval Oost.�� Algemeen �� Verdedigingsbevel voor II en IV L.K.”, 23 February 1940, in: Nierstrasz, De operatiën van het Veldleger, 740-744.


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According to Kriebel and Heinrich, an attack on the Grebbe Line could best be carried out near Wageningen, “where the observation possibilities are more favourable and the position has the least depth”.5 The latter was by no means certain for the 18th Army, even after the head of the intelligence division of the staff of Army Group B, Major Mantey, had visited the Grebbe Line between 6 and 8 March. He concluded that this line had “a deeply extended system of positions” and could best be breached at Wageningen. The attack on the Grebbe Line will be easiest in the area of Wageningen. (…) After the Grebbeberg, which dominates a considerable length of the Grebbe Line to the north, has been taken, it will be easy to render the further defence of the Grebbe Line impossible.6

Nonetheless, the Xth Corps decided to attack the Dutch Field Army along two approaches: the 227th Infantry Division, commanded by Generalmajor F. Zickwolff, would attack along the Apeldoorn–Amersfoort axis, and the 207th Infantry Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Karl von Tiedeman, would attack further south. The latter division held the view that, despite Major Mantey’s opinion, the southern part of the Grebbe Line could best be breached near Ede. Entirely in keeping with the principles of Auftragstaktik, the army group did not impose its views on the division. In order to be able to make a definitive decision regarding the location of the main effort of the attack, the chief of staff of the 207th Infantry Division, Oberstleutnant H. von Zitsewitz, went to the Netherlands to see the situation for himself.7 On 6 April 1940, he filed a report of his trip, in which he concurred with the views of Army Group B that the main effort of the attack should be near Wageningen, because he, too, now realised that “this is where the position is weakest and where there are the best observation possibilities for a strong artillery”.8 The main objective of the Xth Corps for the first day of war was to capture as many bridges across the IJssel as possible, with the main force of the 207th Infantry Division pushing through to Rhenen, behind the Grebbe Line, that very same day. Before they reached the Grebbe Line, the Germans were to expect resistance from five lightly armed Dutch bor5 R. Kriebel, “Bericht über eine Reise durch die Niederlande vom 22.-26. Februar 1940”, 6 March 1940, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DC-NIMH), Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 175/9. 6 Mantey, “Erkundung Holland in der Zeit vom 6.-8-3.40”, 12 March 1940, in: DCNIMH, Collectie Washington Documenten, no. 175/9. 7 Not Generalmajor F. Zickwolff as L. de Jong reports. See: J.W.M. Schulten, “Dr. L. de Jong en de Grebbelinie”, Parade, III-1 (1982) 36-38. 8 Schulten, “Dr. L. de Jong”, 37.

Guard at a bridge over the Twenthe Canal, winter 1939-1940 (left); setting charges for the demolition of a bridge (below).


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der battalions and from troops of the so-called IJssel Line, who were commanded by the Territorial Commander in Overijssel, Colonel J. Dwars.

The fall of the IJssel Line The border battalions positioned in Overijssel and Gelderland had two assignments. Firstly, they were to ascertain whether any troops were crossing the border and report accordingly, and then they were to place obstacles and carry out demolitions. These obstacles were only planned for the paved roads. As the Germans had had ample opportunity before May 1940 to reconnoitre the planned obstacles, they were well aware that they would in fact be of little real value. The army leadership, however, was counting on the border battalions’ activities ensuring that the IJssel Line would not be taken by surprise. ‘IJssel Line’ was, incidentally, a rather broad term for the relatively weak Dutch positions behind the river IJssel. Five battalions, mainly armed with machine guns, had positioned themselves along the 120-kilometre west bank of the river, and had been ordered to fight to the last man. The Commander of the Field Army thus wanted to prevent the subordinate commanders of the IJssel Line from “contemplating a retreat too soon”.9 Defence in the depth, however, was entirely impossible. The only troops between the IJssel Line and the Grebbe Line were three regiments of hussars which, if the IJssel Line were to fall, were to further delay the German advance either on bicycles or on horseback, and maintain contact with the enemy. After completing this task, they were to fall back behind the Grebbe Line and make themselves available to the corps commanders, as reserve troops. The attack by the two reinforced German divisions on the central part of the Netherlands officially began in the early hours of 10 May, at 03.55 hrs to be precise. However, a raiding patrol of Bataillon zur besondere Verwendung 100 (see Chapter 7), in fake Dutch uniforms, had gone in advance, having been ordered to capture the bridge at Westervoort undamaged. The main force of the 207th Infantry Division, with Keppler’s SS regiment at the front, was to advance across this bridge. Other units of this division would try to take the IJssel bridges at Doesburg, and then rejoin the main force. The German plan for the capture of the bridge at Westervoort failed. Even though the raid patrol succeeded in slipping through the line of bor9 A. van der Wiel en V.E. Nierstrasz, De krijgsverrichtingen ten oosten van de IJssel en in de IJssellinie. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952) 110.

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der posts unseen, they were stopped at Didam at 03.00 hrs. Reserve Lieutenant T. Koster was suspicious of their cardboard helmets and strange weapons and alerted his company commander, Captain C.F.H. Seyffart, who in turn warned the Territorial Commander in Overijssel. The latter personally gave the order to disarm the German patrol and to shoot them if they resisted. The disarmament and capture of the Germans posed no problems. Their Dutch guides had disappeared, so there was little point in resisting capture.10 Nonetheless, it did not take long for strong German units to cross the border in the direction of Arnhem and free the raid patrol. Some short exchanges of fire were all that was needed to eliminate the border guard detachments of the 22nd Border Battalion. Meanwhile, however, the commander of the 4th company of the IInd battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment (4-III-35 RI), Captain C.F. Heijnen, under whose command Fort Westervoort and the nearby bridges stood, had been alerted. He immediately ordered all prepared obstacles and barricades to be put in place. This order had only just been carried out when a German armoured train appeared at the bridges. Captain Heijnen was quick to act: “I repeated my order ‘blow them up immediately’ and it was carried out swiftly.” The time was 04.45 hrs. The armoured train was then fired upon with the only 8-Staal gun at the location, which was positioned in one of the river casemates. After eight shots, however, the gun was no longer operable (the breech of the gun had been destroyed) and the casemate had to be abandoned. More or less the same thing happened in the other river casemates. After a few shots had been fired with the machine guns there, these guns malfunctioned as well, leaving the gun crews with no other choice but to retreat. It was therefore not long before Fort Westervoort came under heavy artillery fire. Fire broke out in a key section of the fort and all communications failed. In the end, only two light machine guns remained intact, which made the prospects rather bleak for the Dutch troops. At 08.00 hrs, German infantry soldiers crossed the river in rubber dinghies. An hour later, the fort commander considered the situation to be untenable and tried, unsuccessfully, to escape.11 The Germans then immediately laid a pontoon bridge across the IJssel which was ready at 16.00 hrs. The road to Arnhem lay open. 10 �� A. �� van Soest, “Verslag grensoverschrijding in vak 22 G.B. op 10 mei 1940”, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 498, file 34. 11 �� C.F. Heijnen, “Verslag van oorlogshandelingen, welke op 9 en 10 mei 1940 in de omgeving van Westervoort hebben plaatsgevonden”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 498, file 23.

The IJssel bridge at Westervoort, seen from the fort.

Demolition of the bridge over the IJssel at Deventer on 10 May.

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How were the other German units faring? They encountered little resistance from the border battalions, although they were, of course, hindered by the many obstacles on the route. Most of the Dutch detachments east of the IJssel surrendered without a fight, which was to be expected given their orders and the German forces’ superiority. Other detachments, however, tried to retreat, and several soldiers simply borrowed civilian clothes, took off their uniforms and went home. The German troops were unable to capture any of the bridges across the IJssel undamaged. A regiment of the 207th Infantry Division was quickly able, however, to repair the partially destroyed boat bridge at Doesburg: a number of pontoons were launched to fill the gap in the boat bridge. At 11.30 hrs, the division had crossed the river. Although the 207th Infantry Division had therefore not achieved its objective, namely to capture the IJssel bridges intact, its actions had in fact been highly successful. In a relatively short space of time, it had crossed the IJssel and was able to advance towards Rhenen. The 227th Infantry Division ran into greater problems. Three mobile groups had been formed: Schnelle Gruppe Nord, which, led by the commander of SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’, Sepp Dietrich, was to capture the bridges at Zwolle and Deventer; Schnelle Gruppe Mitte, which was to take the bridges at Zutphen and Schnelle Gruppe Süd, which was to try to cross the IJssel between Bronkhorst and Zutphen. Both Schnelle Gruppe Mitte and Schnelle Gruppe Süd reached the IJssel at around 08.00 hrs, where all the bridges had been blown up. Division commander Zickwolff decided to try and have Schnelle Gruppe Mitte cross the river just south of Zutphen. The first rubber dinghies took to the water at 11.20 hrs, under cover of artillery fire. The Dutch troops of the Ist battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment, led by Reserve Major H.J. Tromp, put up strong resistance, however. The 3rd company, under Captain B. Mulder, distinguished itself in particular by sinking several of the dinghies.12 Many German soldiers were killed. When a number of river casemates had been put out of action by the German artillery, however, and the Dutch troops ran out of ammunition, some German soldiers managed to reach the west bank, at 14.15 hrs. Generalmajor Zickwolff decided to have both Schnelle Gruppe Mitte and Schnelle Gruppe Süd cross the IJssel at Zutphen and, after these two groups had established a sufficiently large bridgehead, a bridge was to be laid across the IJssel, to allow the 227th Infantry Division to advance. Meanwhile, after a rather slow advance (they did not arrive in Deventer 12 �� B. Mulder, “Bericht en gegevens betreffende het gevecht op 10 mei 1940 te Zutphen”, June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 498, file 9.


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until 12.05 hrs), Sepp Dietrich’s Schnelle Gruppe Nord had done little more than establish that it was not possible to cross the IJssel either in Zwolle or in Deventer. The bridges had been destroyed and the Dutch defences looked too strong. Zickwolff therefore decided to have Schnelle Gruppe Nord cross the river at Zutphen as well. It would be some time, however, before the 227th Infantry Division could make the crossing at Zutphen. Not only was the entire division forced to cross the river at one point, there was a delay in the building of the pontoon bridge as well. The parts intended for this bridge had already been used to cross the Twenthe Canal. Zickwolff therefore had to ask the commander of the Xth Corps, General Hansen, for additional materials. It took a long while for new bridge sections to be delivered and, in addition, new delays occurred at the Apeldoorn Canal. It was not until 12 May that the 227th Infantry Division was able to advance towards the Grebbe Line at full strength. The IJssel Line had fallen fairly rapidly, but this was not entirely surprising. There were no reserves or artillery and all the infantry weapons were on the front line. There was no depth in the line whatsoever. The German divisions, with their more modern equipment, were able to breach the weak line rather easily. The German advance was not delayed significantly anywhere by Dutch military operations, except at Zutphen. The fact that the 227th Infantry Division did not cross the IJssel until 12 May had more to do with a lack of materials with which to build the pontoon bridge than with insurmountable Dutch resistance. The defending troops had, however, succeeded in demolishing all the bridges on time. On the one hand this was owing to the fact that the alert system had worked well and on the other hand thanks to the decisive actions of a few officers, for instance in the case of the bridges at Westervoort. All of this was, however, to no avail: the German advance continued.

The attack on the outposts of the IVth Division On the evening of 10 May, the 207th Infantry Division, headed by SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, reached the evacuated town of Wageningen. Everything pointed to the Dutch IVth Division being able to repel the first German attack. The division comprised three organic regiments, the 8th, 11th and 19th Infantry Regiments. On 10 May 1940, the division only had the 8th and 19th Infantry Regiments at its disposal, because the 11th Infantry Regiment had been withdrawn from the division and was operating with two of its battalions as a reserve of the IInd Corps and with one battalion

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from 10 May 1940

Field Army XXXX

XXX

TBO

2

XXX

4 XX

8x

2 4

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XX

7 8

X

(-)

3 XX

A B G

Eastern front of Fortress Holland

5 6

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other units

as a reserve of the IInd Division. One regiment was positioned on and in front of the Grebbeberg: the 8th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel W.F. Hennink. This regiment consisted of the customary three battalions: the Ist battalion, commanded by Major W.P. Landzaat, was to defend the Grebbeberg itself; the IInd, led by Reserve Major J.H.A. Jacometti, was to defend the area immediately north of the Grebbeberg, and the IIIrd was positioned in the outpost sector. The 2nd company of the IIIrd battalion, incidentally, was attached to the Ist battalion, and positioned in the main resistance sector. The IIIrd battalion of 8 RI was commanded by Major C.J. Voigt and was reinforced with four 6-Veld field guns. The battalion’s heavy machine guns were badly positioned: their field of fire was far too limited. In addition, the combat positions were nowhere near ready yet. Despite a missive from Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, the defence works were still covered with wire, netting and camouflage material. They were therefore “mousetraps, from which there were no good lookout possibilities”.13 Effective command was limited in the outpost sector. Not only was the view blocked by hedges and both felled and standing trees (their own group was generally all the section commanders could see of their section), but communications were also inadequate. Only the battalion commander had a phone connection to the company commanders and his regiment commander. Messages between the units of the battalion had to be sent by courier. If necessary, Voigt could contact the main resistance sector by means of the ultra-shortwave radio of the artillery signals officer in his command post. 13 �� Nierstrasz, ��Operatiën Veldleger, 174.

The felling of trees to improve the field of fire.

Digging the Drainage Canal in the Gelderse Vallei, south of the Amersfoort–Hoevelaken road.

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On 10 May, the Germans did not attack the Grebbeberg or the rest of the line yet. Ominous reports about strangely attired German troops were received, however, from the 4th Hussars Regiment, which was to maintain combat contact in the southern Veluwe area and had been driven out by the German division. This increased the tension in the positions, and most soldiers were unable to get any sleep. On the early morning of 11 May, at around 02.00 hrs, a heavy German artillery bombardment began on the outpost sector. Communications within the outpost sector soon failed and the line between Major Voigt and the commander of the 3rd company, Reserve Captain A. Zwarts, could not be repaired. The communications with the main resistance sector also failed. The German artillery fire took out a number of key Dutch positions. For instance, on the southern flank of the outpost sector, a heavy machine gun (positioned at the ‘De Hoop’ cement factory) and a nearby 6-Veld field gun (on the dyke at ‘Rijnzicht’) were put out of action. At dawn, Keppler’s SS regiment ‘Der Führer’ emerged along the entire front of the outpost sector and opened fire. The commander of the 207th Infantry Division, Generalleutnant Karl von Tiedeman, wanted to spare his own troops and had sent the SS, which, being more mobile, were already in the advance guard anyway, in first. Two battalions attacked and one remained in reserve. Sturmbannführer14 Müller’s Ist battalion exerted the most pressure. It operated in a sector between the inundation area and the Wageningen–Rhenen road. This is where the 1st section of 3-II-19 RI was positioned, led by Reserve Lieutenant A. de Haas. These troops’ morale was far from high. When they were told during the night that they could expect a heavy attack, they became, the section commander later said, “very nervous because they were not covered and had no field of fire”. The positions had not been completed by 10 May, while plenty of cover still remained for the Germans. Morale worsened further in the course of the night, when they came under German artillery fire, which they mistook for friendly fire because at the same time, II-19 RA was delivering harassing fire on Wageningen. At 07.30 hrs, the first SS troops of Sturmbannführer Müller’s Ist battalion opened fire on the Dutch section. When Lieutenant De Haas received the report that the northernmost troops were unable to hold their positions, he ordered them to join him. Most of them fled, however, to ‘Kruiponder’ farm, situated on the front line of the Grebbe Line. Lieutenant De Haas was therefore soon left with only one machine gun. There had been no 14 � Sturmbannführer is equal in rank to Major. For a full list of rank equivalents, see Annex.


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hand grenades from the beginning, and the 6-Veld field gun was in a position where its crew were unable to see any Germans in their field of fire. The section commander had little other choice than to retreat as well. At 12.00 hrs he vacated his position and reported to the commander of the 3rd company, Captain Zwarts. The retreat of De Haas’ section caused problems for the entire 3rd company of III-8 RI, however, most notably for the adjacent 4th section. This section was commanded by Sergeant G. van der Esschert. At first, the section had managed to hold its ground, despite the advantage the Germans gained from the farms, barns, chicken coops and orchards in the terrain. “They were not only fantastic shelters for the enemy, but also hugely obstructed our view, which was a great disadvantage to us during the battle”, Sergeant J.H.B. Wissink, one of the members of the section, later said.15 Between Sergeant Van der Esschert’s and Lieutenant De Haas’ sections, however, there was a dyke, and after the SS battalion had driven out De Haas’ section, it had free play to the north of the dyke and was therefore able to advance unhindered. The 4th section was “therefore soon closed in on the left”; the men had no other option but to follow the example of Lieutenant De Haas. Coming from the north, the Germans were then able to round up Captain Zwarts’ 3rd company meticulously and systematically, making good use of the cover in the terrain. This by no means meant, however, that the SS troops, who had little combat experience, felt at ease in the outpost sector. The obstacles in the field made “the enemy almost entirely invisible”, which meant that no artillery support could be requested.16 “The prepared positions in the Grebbe Line proved to be essentially stronger than was assumed according to the available reports”, concluded the Kriegstagebuch of the SS regiment.17 The German troops then succeeded in surrounding and capturing both the 1st and the 3rd section. Captain Zwarts’ command post was now also in danger. The German troops made eager use of the presence of a few hundred cows wandering among the positions,18 and at around 13.00 hrs 15 �� Statement �� by J.H.B. Wissink, 29 August 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 13. 16 �� Hauptman Rechlin, “Mit Pommern und Ostmärkern in 5 Tage von Emmerich nach Utrecht”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 559b. 17 �� SS-Rgt.�� ‘Der �� Führer’, “Auszug aus dem Kriegstagebuch vom 10. Mai bis 12. Juli 40”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 550. 18 �� In June 1940, Captain Zwarts even referred to “± 1500 cows... which wandered through the area of the positions”. Testimony of A. Zwarts, 26 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 13.

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Captain Zwarts, together with about 40 men, was surrounded. Sergeant Wissink later recalled: As this position had by then also been closed in on the right and the enemy was following right behind us, it was fair to say that it was a madhouse in


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the position. It was an infernal noise; the whole position was shaken to its very foundations.

As the position had been built to deliver frontal fire and the Germans were approaching from all sides, the situation was hopeless. After one hour, Captain Zwarts surrendered. The SS battalion which eliminated Captain Zwarts’ company also mounted an attack on the Grebbeberg itself, with about a hundred men. Near the ‘Kruiponder’ farm, the Germans tried to cross the Grebbe, a small river. The 4th section of 2-II-8 RI, led by Reserve Lieutenant H.H.C. Vos repelled the attack, however, and for some time after that no new attempt was made. The German troops were in no hurry: the outposts had to be eliminated first. By now the IIIrd battalion of the SS regiment, led by Obersturmbannführer H. Wäckerle, had begun to move on the southern flank of the outposts. This was the area defended by the 1st company of III-8 RI, led by Reserve Captain G.J. Gouda. At around 12.30 hrs, the SS battalion succeeded in surrounding and capturing the most northern group of his section (the furthest advanced post of the Dutch company). Earlier, the 6-Veld field gun to the south of this section had been put out of action by German artillery fire (see above), so that the section could no longer expect any support from either the north or the south. Section commander Ensign G.J. Bijlsma therefore decided to continue the fight from a position to the rear. Battalion commander Voigt, however, ordered: “Section must stand firm and if necessary position a light machine gun in Rijnzicht with the firing order to protect the left flank”.19 The order was, however, impossible to carry out. Ensign Bijlsma and his men eventually went back to the position of the 1st section of Reserve Lieutenant D.H. Lindeman. The thus reinforced 1st section came under increasing pressure in the course of the afternoon. First it successfully delivered flanking fire on a German attack on the adjacent 4th section of Ensign H. Nahuijsen. The attack was repelled and many Germans were killed. At 15.00 hrs, however, the 1st section was itself attacked. Ensign Bijlsma’s section put up fierce resistance, but another group planted a white flag. The Germans did not appreciate Bijlsma’s continuing to fight at all. After they had taken the position, they dealt summarily with the Dutch soldiers. The only survivor, Private A.H. Könning, later stated: 19 �� C.J. �� Voigt, “Verslag der weerstandbiedende voorposten van 8 R.I. van vrijdag 10 mei t/m zaterdag 11 mei 1940”, 21 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd op Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 1.

Dutch conscripts working on their position (left); pioneering on the Grebbe Line, mobilisation 1939-1940 (below).


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They had me open the shelters and then they threw in hand grenades. The straw pallets were then set alight (…) After it had been set on fire, I crawled through the position, but all the soldiers were dead.20

When Section commander Lindeman became aware of all this from his post further to the rear, he decided to pull back further. Eventually, he and his men crossed the Rhine at the ferry at Opheusden. Despite all of this, the greatest threat to the 1st company did not come from the east, but from the north, where the 3rd company was gradually being rounded up. Major Voigt, the battalion commander, was of course aware of this and made attempts to request artillery fire. Communications had failed, however; couriers who had been sent out were not heard from again and the radio battery was dead. Lacking artillery support, the two sections of the machine-gun company which were in the 3rd company’s sector were surrounded and taken prisoner. The 4th section of 1-III-8 RI, which had earlier been able to repel an attack with the help of Lieutenant Lindeman’s section, now suffered a similar fate: under attack from the north, they were no longer able to defend themselves. Continuing to fire, Ensign Nahuijsen’s men retreated to the Grenshoeve. Major Voigt’s command post was now in immediate danger. To the north, his only protection was provided by the Nahuijsen group, and to the east he was protected by the 3rd section of Sergeant Major B.L.A. Blom, one group of which had already retreated at 14.00 hrs, and by the 2nd section of the machine-gun company. Nobody from the latter section had remained at his post, however: as early as the evening of the 10th and the early morning of the 11th, Sergeants J.C. van der Neut and J.H.W. Sandijck had urged Ensign J. Tack to retreat, because they did not expect any Germans to enter their field of fire. Eventually the section commander gave in without having fired a shot and left his position, having first left behind “a torn white cloth attached to a strip of wood”. Sergeant Major Blom’s section stood alone. The SS troops were having great difficulty capturing this section’s positions. As one of his men later said, Blom was “a stout and calm man,

20 �� Testimony of A.H. Könning, 12 July 1940, in: DC-NIMH Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 4. Nierstrasz, De operatiën van het Veldleger en het Oostfront van de Vesting Holland. Mei 1940, says the following on page 183 about the actions of the Bijlsma section: “Apparently, white flags were placed on one side of the group position by the men, while on the other side the ensign, who did not know this, was firing heavily.�� This �� had serious consequences for both groups.�� The ensign himself, while firing on the parados, was seriously wounded, lost consciousness and when he came round discovered that the positions had been taken by the Germans. They had dealt summarily with the men and set fire to the positions, whereby only one man escaped, by pretending to be dead.”

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who gave good orders and put us at ease”.21 Indeed the entire group put up an excellent fight, until they caught sight of the white flag left behind by the machine-gun section. “First I fired at it”, said Blom, “and then Private Migchelbrink went over there, under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire, to retrieve it. He came back with the flag in his mouth, but had seen nobody”.22 These actions were no longer of any consequence for the defence of the battalion commander’s command post, however. By 16.00 hrs, Major Voigt had been surrounded, and half an hour later he surrendered, considering “further resistance no longer served any purpose and was pointless”. Captain Gouda followed suit shortly after. The Germans now had the opportunity to take around fifty men and storm Sergeant Major Blom’s section, which by then comprised just 12 men. Eventually, the section commander was forced to conclude: “We can’t hold out any longer.” Thus the last Dutch outpost surrendered. By now it was 17.30 hrs. German troops entered the trench and drove the Dutch soldiers out. Three privates from Blom’s group were shot. One of them survived, but the other two died, G. Migchelbrink, mentioned earlier, and J. Riggeling. There is some uncertainty as to the exact course of events. The various witness statements show that tensions on both sides had risen considerably. The battles had lasted all afternoon and Blom and his men had been the last to surrender, and not until there was no other option left. The Germans did not cease firing immediately when the surrender began, Riggeling was very agitated during the surrender and it is possible that a short argument took place between Migchelbrink and a German soldier. The sources also provide another explanation, however, for the deaths of Migchelbrink and Riggeling. Conscript Sergeant L. Meijerink said of Migchelbrink: “When he left the position, he shot one more German, and was then himself shot”. Whatever the case may be, the other prisoners of war were then threatened with execution. A German officer was able to prevent that, however, by suggesting that the men be used as human shields while the outposts were searched. All the positions proved to have been abandoned. To their immense relief, the prisoners of war were taken away unharmed.23 21 �� Statement by J. v.d. Linden, 5 December 1946, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 6. 22 �� Statements �� by B.L.A. Blom, 5 July 1940 and 5 December 1946, in: Ibidem. 23 �� See �� the statements mentioned in notes 21 and 22 and the testimony of L. Meijerink, undated (possibly July 1940), in: Ibidem. See also P.H. Kamphuis, “Onderzoeksrapportage betreffende de gang van zaken tijdens en na de overgave van de derde sectie van 1-III-8 RI op 11 mei 1940”, 11 July 1990, and the witness statements therein by the members of the Blom group who were still alive in 1990 in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 6A.


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Infantry position behind the Valley Canal.

SS Standartenführer Keppler was well pleased: his regiment had endured its baptism of fire magnificently. He therefore decided to mount an attack on the main resistance sector that same night, at 22.00 hrs to be precise, so that his IInd battalion would be able to push through to Rhenen early next morning. During and after the war, there was considerable criticism of the actions of the Grebbe Line outposts. That criticism was undeserved. On 11 May, a battle was in progress in the area between Wageningen and the Grebbeberg, between Dutch troops in incomplete positions and a meticulously prepared advance guard of a German division. Major Voigt’s IIIrd battalion had to contend with extremely poor communications and, partly as a result thereof, an almost entire lack of artillery support. Some Dutch soldiers abandoned their posts, which of course did not make things any easier for the remaining troops. The majority fought, according to German sources, “extremely bravely and tenaciously and generally put up a fight to the very end”.24 Eventually, however, the Dutch troops were defeated in a regular infantry duel, in which the untidy terrain was of great importance to the Germans, despite the uncertainty it brought them. One by one the sections were surrounded, sometimes even before they had seen a 24 �� SS-Rgt.�� ‘Der Führer’, “Auszug aus dem Kriegstagebuch vom 10. Mai bis 12. Juli 1940”.

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single German, and forced to surrender. The state of the terrain did mean, however, that this mop-up operation took all day. It was difficult for the Germans to plough their way through, as a German officer later said. Despite the fact that Major Voigt’s IIIrd battalion had been defeated within a day, it had still completed its task: it had taken the SS troops until 18.00 hrs to gain full control of the outpost sector. In the meantime the Grebbe Line had been fully manned and was on alert.

General Harberts’ countermeasures How were the events of 11 May assessed by the commander of the IInd Corps, Major General J. Harberts? As early as 10 May, the general’s headquarters at Doorn received a constant stream of reports about paratroops which were said to have landed on the Grebbeberg, about suspicious soldiers and about fifth-column activity. All these rumours proved untrue, but did cause considerable tension among Harberts’ staff. On the morning of 11 May, the first reports came in of enemy artillery fire, and at 12.35 hrs the commander of the IVth Division, Colonel A.A.M. van Loon, reported that all communications with the outposts had been lost. Harberts still had no insight at all, however, into what was happening at the Grebbeberg. Harberts suspected that the 8th Infantry Regiment was facing “weak troops only”. When he heard just after 13.00 hrs that both the right and left wings of Major Voigt’s battalion were retreating, the corps commander was furious. The lost ground had to be recaptured “immediately”. “The most dubious point”, according to Harberts, was that our troops appear to be putting up hardly any resistance, otherwise this sudden retreat, without any reports of serious exchanges of fire and without any request for artillery support for the outposts, can hardly be explained.

The possibility that the latter was mainly the result of the loss of communications, as had been reported to the general earlier, did not occur to him. No, it was the “aggravating cowardice among officers, NCOs and other ranks of at least part of III-8 RI” which was to be blamed for the impending loss of the outpost sector. “Quick and forceful punishment of the cowards is necessary as a preventive measure”, Harberts concluded.25 The corps commander was supported in this view by the report that the Ensign Tack’s 2nd section of the machine-gun company had retreated 25 �� J. Harberts, “Gereconstrueerd dagboek over de dagen 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 502, file 1.


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without actually having been attacked. Another report told of a sergeant of the 19th Infantry Regiment who had been arrested in Nieuwersluis in possession of an antitank gun. Harberts considered this report to be “hardly plausible”, but wanted the sergeant in question to be shot if it was true. This would of course require sentencing by a drumhead court martial, but none had been appointed yet. On 10 May an “Organisational Decree for Judicial Procedure in the Field 1940” had been issued, which made it possible for commanding generals to appoint courts martial “in each case when the service will require it or allow it”. Harberts therefore asked the Commander of the Field Army to be allowed to appoint such a court martial. Eventually, at 22.00 hrs, a message from the commander-in-chief, General Winkelman, arrived, stating that the corps commanders were allowed to appoint their own courts martial. At 23.00 hrs, the military judge advocate sent by Van Voorst tot Voorst, Reserve Captain J.J. Plugge, reported to Harberts, as

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did the examining judge, Reserve Captain R.J.W.C. van den Wall Bake, and the officer-secretary for the court martial, Reserve Lieutenant C.H. Beekhuis. All three officers were trained lawyers. The corps commander received them personally and said that “an example had to be made of someone immediately”, thinking in particular of Ensign Tack. Strict punishment was needed, to serve as a “deterrent for the troops”. Harberts demanded of the examining judge that the report on Tack’s conduct be ready by 09.00 hrs the next morning. “You gentlemen will just have to work through the night”, he concluded his speech.26 In the meantime, Harberts had also decided to take military countermeasures. He sent for division commander Van Loon at 18.00 hrs and ordered him to recapture the outpost sector that same night. Van Loon suggested waiting until first light, but Harberts had no patience whatsoever and wanted action. Colonel Van Loon thereupon sent for the commander of his reserve battalion, Reserve Major J.B. van Apeldoorn of II-19 RI, and ordered him to carry out a counterattack “with edged weapons” that night, with the purpose of “recapturing their own outpost positions”. Support was to be provided between the Grebbe and Wageningen by a number of troops of III-8 RI, which would be put ashore by the gunboat HNLMS Freyr, which was on guard duty on the Rhine. “There are no more than 100 enemy soldiers in front of you”, Van Loon reassured Major Van Apeldoorn,27 vastly underestimating the strength of the enemy troops which, after all, comprised two entire battalions. Having received their orders, the soldiers of Van Apeldoorn’s battalion advanced over the Grebbeberg in the direction of the former hornwork, where the attack on the Germans was to begin. Just before they set foot on the Grebbeberg, Colonel Van Loon spoke some words of encouragement to them. The battalion had only advanced a few hundred metres, however, when it came under “heavy machine-gun and rifle fire” from the 8th Infantry Regiment, which was positioned in the stop line and had no idea of the counterattack. Van Apeldoorn yelled: “Hold your fire, friendly troops!”, but to no avail.28 In addition, most of the soldiers on the Grebbeberg were extremely nervous. Not only had they been under continuous heavy artillery fire all day, the stories told by the soldiers fleeing the outpost sector were ex26 �� Testimony of J. Harberts, 16 June 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 19401945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel Ic (The Hague, 1949) 444. 27 �� Nierstrasz, ��Operatiën Veldleger, 209. 28 �� J.B. �� van Apeldoorn, “Verslag oorlogshandelingen II-19 R.I. tijdens de Meidagen 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 510, file 15.


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Dutch infantry position on the Grebbe Line, behind the inundation area.

tremely alarming. The Dutch troops had been particularly affected by the camouflage gear of the Germans. They made a “devilish impression” and for the troops on the Grebbeberg, which kept seeing white flags appear in the terrain in front of them, this did not bode well. To add to the confusion, Ouwehands Zoo, situated on the Grebbeberg, had set free all its tropical birds and its monkeys. The racket made by these animals in the night was too much for some soldiers: they fired their weapons in the direction of every sound they heard. It therefore took Major Van Apeldoorn a considerable amount of time to silence the guns of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The amount of time lost meant that the counterattack had already all but failed. Dawn was breaking, so a surprise attack was now out of the question. The Freyr had also not turned up. Van Apeldoorn therefore decided to do an about-turn. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Hennink had ordered the artillery to open fire on the outpost sector. This action yielded unintended results. The nightly attack on the Grebbeberg by the SS regiment, which was to start at 22.00 hrs was cancelled by Keppler. General Harberts’ countermeasures had been rather poor. This was due to the incorrect assumption that only weak German troops had arrived in front of the Grebbeberg. He therefore attributed the loss of the outpost sector fully to cowardly conduct on the part of his subordinates. He

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thought that by making an example of someone he would be able to put a stop to it. In addition, they would need just one battalion to recapture the lost territory. Poor preparations meant that this counterattack had failed before it had even begun.

The German attack on the main resistance sector What was then the situation with the troops of Christian Hansen’s Xth Corps on the night of 11 May? Two mobile groups of the 227th Infantry Division had reached Barneveld, but the majority of the division was still crossing the IJssel. Generalleutnant von Tiedeman’s 207th Infantry Division had been more successful. The outposts at the Grebbeberg had been cleared and the division was poised to launch its attack on the main Dutch positions. Support was to be expected from three artillery regiments positioned near Wageningen. General Hansen was satisfied: from his command post in Velp he thanked his divisions for completing their first assignment and ordered them to prepare the attack on the New Dutch Waterline. In order to do so, the Grebbe Line had to be taken at all cost. The Dutch artillery fire during the night had convinced division commander Karl von Tiedeman that he was faced with a strongly defended position. “On the basis of the battles of 11 May, the regiment was convinced that an attack on the Grebbeberg would not be possible without strong artillery preparations.” Besides the three artillery battalions he already had (II/A.R. SS; III/A.R. 207; IV/A.R. 256), he brought another two battalions into position (III/A.R. 311; II/A.R. 207). The German artillery was positioned so that it was not visible from the Dutch positions. The Dutch troops on the Grebbeberg were powerless to stop the barrage of artillery fire, which continued all through the morning of 12 May. Shortly after noon, the fire was concentrated on the hornwork and the forward rim of the Grebbeberg. The Dutch troops positioned there were thus forced to take cover in the shelters, where they waited anxiously for events to unfold. At 12.40 hrs, the artillery fell silent and Sturmbannführer Fritz von Scholz’s IInd battalion, which had been held in reserve on 11 May, and the IIIrd battalion of the SS regiment attacked the hornwork. Parts of the 1st and 2nd companies of I-8 RI, the latter company commanded by Reserve Captain R.E.J. Collette, were positioned on the Dutch side. On the night of 11 May, these troops had already been faced with an acute shortage of ammunition. This naturally had an effect on their confidence. The 2nd section of 2-I-8 RI had even retreated. The battalion commander, Major W.P. Landzaat, explicitly ordered Captain Collette to reoccupy all positions. If

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the soldiers in question refused to carry out the order, said Landzaat, then they would just have to be shot. Not a single officer, however, was able to get the retreated troops moving again. The one person who was successful was Private J.F.C. Toelen, an orderly who saw to it personally that a number of the positions were occupied again. “In effect, Toelen was in charge”, another private said later: Although it wasn’t right, we were glad that at least someone was taking charge. The captain did not keep morale up. (…) He was very dejected. Toelen kept up morale and cheered us all up.29

This, of course, did not change the fact that there was a shortage of ammunition. Various sections therefore soon retreated from the hornwork, some in a panic. Other posts raised white flags. Again, Toelen acted at the risk of his own life. “I am a devout Catholic and did not think that I would be killed”, he later explained.30 Toelen conveyed the order to the sections in the hornwork that they were to fight to the last man, after which he also removed a white flag. It was to no avail, however. There was not much they could do with so little ammunition and the German troops took control of the hornwork. The SS units kept going. They repaired the demolished bridge over the Grift and advanced along the so-called hollow road, the road from Wageningen to Rhenen, which had been hollowed out in the Grebbeberg. The 4th section of Captain Collette’s company was positioned north of that road. This section had lent one of its machine guns to the troops in the hornwork, a second was unserviceable and the field of fire of the third, positioned in one of the casemates, was limited. The 4th section was therefore not able to put up much resistance. The enemy would therefore have to be held off by troops to the south of the hollow road. The 3rd section of the machine-gun company of I-8 RI was positioned here, in three casemates. It, too, was unable to do anything, however. Overgrowth, trees which had been felled by artillery fire and smoke from a burning farm blocked their view. In addition, given the way the machine guns were positioned, they were unable to deliver fire on the hollow road. The casemates were attacked from the rear and eliminated by the Germans, who were advancing along the hollow road. They thus established a strong bridgehead across the Grift. 29 �� Statement by J. Gerritsen, 17 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied box 507, file 12. 30 �� Testimony �� of J.F.C. Toelen, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 507, file 12.


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SS taking cover.

The SS troops then expanded this bridgehead, both to the west and to the north. To the north, they first attacked the remnants of the 2nd section of 2-I-8 RI, which then fled. The 1st section, positioned further north again, was put out of action by antitank guns. A number of Dutch soldiers were killed. The same happened further along. Machine-gun and artillery fire put the infantry guns on the front line out of action and the Dutch soldiers were killed, captured or they fled. To the west, German fire also eliminated various casemates until they reached the stop line. German firepower was proving decisive. The Dutch troops, weak and with ineffective support from their own artillery, as yet came off worst. Although the SS troops had established a permanent bridgehead across the Grift, the road by which they had arrived was still being covered by flanking fire from sections of the IInd battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment. This was such a hindrance (the Germans spoke of “heavy fire from the flanking positions”) that SS Standartenführer Keppler deployed his Ist battalion against it. The Dutch troops, confused by reports from soldiers fleeing the hornwork, did not know what to do. Some fled, others retreated. Eventually, on the evening of 12 May, the Germans had control of the front line of 1-II-8 RI, as well as the entire area in front of the stop line of I-8 RI. Had the Dutch not taken any countermeasures then? Indeed they had, but to no avail. The most remarkable counterattack was that by the

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commander of the IInd battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, Reserve Major J.H.A. Jacometti. He had deduced from the reports he received from the front line that small German units were storming the Grebbeberg. The former officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army therefore decided to push the enemy off the hill with a single substantial counterattack.


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“We’ll throw them out and charge them with the naked klewang!”, said Jacometti as he advanced at the head of his troops. The major’s actions, which showed great personal courage, were not in accordance with the applicable tactical regulations. Those regulations stated that in the event of combat within a position, the attack must first be halted and only after order had been restored within the ranks was a counterattack permitted. It was now a poorly prepared attack, carried out without adequate information about the enemy. Jacometti was to pay a high price for his actions. First he was fired upon by friendly troops, who did not know what he was doing, and then upon first contact with the German soldiers he was killed. Other counterattacks also failed. First of all, the 1st company of II-19 RI (the same battalion which on the night of 11 May had been ordered to recapture the outposts) was ordered to advance. The execution of this order, however, went wrong. When they approached the passages through the obstacles in front of the stop line, “(friendly) fire was received to the extent that the attacking groups took cover and partly crawled back”.31 The other companies involved in the counterattack did not fare much better. All these actions even caused a panic among the soldiers on the stop line and the officers had a hard time keeping the line occupied. The panic was then increased by the unorthodox actions of the commander of the IIIrd battalion of SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, Obersturmbannführer Wäckerle. He had decided to advance as far westwards as possible after nightfall. Wäckerle was advancing along the Wageningen–Rhenen road, just as Dutch reinforcements, the IIIrd battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment (reserve of the IInd Corps), were taking up their positions on the stop line. The acting commander of this battalion, Reserve Captain F.R. van der Spek, later recalled: While Captain Steenbergen was still checking the positions of his guns, a few short bursts of fire were heard just in front of me, while at the same time the Germans came rushing at us, just a few metres away, yelling loudly. After a short scuffle, a number of my men and I were captured and taken in the direction of Rhenen.32

Their journey was to end at the joinery works ‘De Stoomhamer’, near a railway line in the depth. Wäckerle’s group entrenched itself here. In the course of these events, the Obersturmbannführer, who had two companies (some three hundred men) with him, had himself been wounded. 31 �� Nierstrasz, ��Operatiën Veldleger, 272. 32 �� Statement �� by F.R. van der Spek, August 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 509, file 45.

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Dutch soldiers resting by the side of the road to Utrecht, on their way back from the Grebbe Line, 14 May 1940.

As a result of Wäckerle’s actions, the Dutch soldiers on the stop line now had to contend with enemy troops in front and to the rear. For many of them, this was just too much and “in a wild flight” soldiers streamed down the Grebbeberg towards Rhenen. The latter could only be reached, however, by means of a viaduct across the railway line and here stood Marechaussee Captain G.J.W. Gelderman, who with all his might tried to stop the fleeing soldiers. “The majority were no longer obeying orders, however, and rushed on in disarray.” In the end, Gelderman even opened fire on the deserters, which cost the lives of some twenty Dutch soldiers.33 The Dutch counterattacks, carried out without direct artillery support and without every single commander on the Grebbeberg having been informed, ended in a fiasco. Only the stop line remained in Dutch hands. The various sections positioned there, however, had no idea as to their situation. For the third time, the soldiers who had already been put to the test were faced with a night of uncertainty. 33 �� W. �� Gelderman, “Verslag omtrent het optreden van een detachement Koninklijke �� Marechaussee op de Grebbeberg”, 31 May 1940, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ib (The Hague, 1949) 167-168; Statement by Royal Netherlands Marechaussee Captain G.J.W. Gelderman, 1 July 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 502, file 14.


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Chaos among the military leadership How had the leadership of the IInd Corps experienced the events of 12 May and what measures did they take? During the morning, Harberts had been busy installing a drumhead court martial. That court martial was to try a case of desertion. The case against Ensign Tack had offered too few leads to proceed with the prosecution, so therefore Harberts’ eye fell on Sergeant J.C. Meijer. The corps commander appointed Major G. Geel as the president of the court martial and Captain J. Greter and Reserve Lieutenant H. Witte as its members. Harberts gave a speech at the installation of the court martial, in which he demanded, in so many words, the death penalty for Sergeant Meijer. I considered it absolutely necessary, because I realised that the officers of our peacetime training, trained with the mentality of, to use the popular phrase, ‘a soft-boiled egg’, might be reluctant to sentence that soldier to death.34

Military judge advocate Plugge responded quickly to this attempt by Harberts to influence the court martial. He urged its members to make their judgement with sincerity and impartiality. Even though they took Plugge’s remark to heart, however, it was no longer possible for them to approach the case with an open mind. What precisely was the issue at hand here? Sergeant J.C. Meijer, of the 19th Antitank-gun Company, had, as section commander, had command of two antitank guns on the front line in the sector of II-8 RI. All he had had at his disposal were antitank shells and as no tanks had appeared it meant his section had had to stand idly by while the outposts were cleared up. They too had come under artillery fire, causing Meijer to lose all contact with his superior officers. As was the case at so many locations on the Grebbeberg, partly as a result of the artillery shelling, the unrest among the men increased and, under pressure, Meijer decided without consultation to retreat. “I’d rather go back than have us shot dead here”, he said. At issue here was the second paragraph of Article 84 of the Military Penal Code. That paragraph stipulated that anyone who in wartime deliberately “vacates or leaves the place, post or vessel of the armed forces under his command without consultation and unnecessarily” could be sentenced to death, or a maximum prison sentence of twenty years. At the inquest, Meijer had admitted to military judge advocate Plugge that he had left his post. When the court martial began at 12.30 hrs, the prosecution therefore demanded the death penalty. For the defence, conducted by Captain J.C.C. 34 �� Testimony of J. Harberts, 16 June 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 444.

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van Erp, there was of course little to be gained in this situation. Van Erp was at a disadvantage to start with, as he was an “officer with knowledge of law”, whereas the prosecution was a fully qualified lawyer. The court martial needed over half an hour to form its judgement. The case was such “that the general opinion was that the only response to the sergeant’s actions was the death penalty”.35 The trial, which thus came to an end, had been conducted entirely according to regulations. The sentence was confirmed by General Harberts not long after. Then, after having spoken with a chaplain for just twenty minutes and having written two farewell letters, Meijer was executed immediately at a firing range near Doorn. Although the trial and the sentence were not in breach of the law, there had still been a degree of carelessness in terms of procedure. First of all there were of course the questionable actions of General Harberts. He underestimated the German attack on the Grebbeberg and assumed that the imminent collapse of the Dutch front was the result of a lack of fighting spirit among the troops. In order to remedy this he wanted to “make an example of someone”, whereby the actual individual who was accused was of no consequence. To this end, Harberts attempted to influence the court martial, thus going beyond his authority. Not the corps commander, however, but the court martial was responsible for Meijer’s conviction. The court martial gave only scant grounds for the sentence. In view of the complete lack of experience of the newly appointed court martial, and the circumstances of war, this was not entirely surprising. What is regrettable is that no further grounds for the sentence were given in what was a particularly complicated case. Meijer’s execution hardly tempered Harberts’ anger at all. Later that morning of 12 May, he was driven to the command post of the division commander, Colonel Van Loon. The corps commander arrived there “terribly upset and yelling and screaming about cowards who had let themselves be thrown out by a bunch of schoolboys” and demanded that Van Loon have the retreated troops conduct a counterattack. (The latter then went personally to get weapons for that counterattack, which meant that he could not be contacted for four hours.) Harberts then left for the commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Hennink, whom he, “openly and in a loud voice”, called “the commander of the regiment of cowards, whose outposts had run away upon the enemy’s approach”.36 35 �� C.H. Beekhuis, “Beïnvloeding van leden van een krijgsraad?”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XXXII (1967) 823. 36 �� Testimony �� of A.A.M. van Loon, 1 July 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid, Deel Ic, 518.

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After that, Harberts went to the headquarters of the Commander of the Field Army at Zeist. By then it was around 13.00 hrs, and the Germans were commencing their attack on the Grebbeberg, unbeknown to Harberts and Van Voorst tot Voorst. Van Loon knew nothing about it either; he was still on his way with the weapons for the counterattack. After Harberts had arrived back at his own command post, at 14.35 hrs he “suddenly, out of the blue” received a report from Colonel Van Loon that “a number of casemates on the front line had been taken by the Germans”. This report made a great impression on the corps commander. He wondered whether the troops on the front line would now also give way “without putting up adequate resistance”.37 Harberts therefore ordered the casemates to be recaptured and made the 4th Hussars Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel jonkheer S.M.S.A.A. de Marees van Swinderen, available to Van Loon. Lieutenant General Van Voorst tot Voorst had plans of his own, however, and planned a counterattack without consulting Harberts. This strange approach is understandable if we realise that even during the mobilisation the relations between the Commander of the Field Army and the commander of the IInd Corps were very strained. First of all, Van Voorst tot Voorst ordered Colonel J.C.C. Nijland, the commander of Brigade B, which was from the Land van Maas en Waal area, to advance on Rhenen “with all available forces” in order to halt the enemy advance. In addition, the commander of the IInd Division, Colonel J.S. Barbas, was to conduct a counterattack with reserve units. This reserve force consisted of two battalions, II-11 RI (reserve of the IInd Division) and I-20 RI (reserve of the IVth Corps) and served “in order to be certain that the enemy” would be thrown from the Grebbeberg “with the greatest impetus”. It was to be commanded by two regiment commanders, Lieutenant Colonel P.J. van den Briel (10th Infantry Regiment) and Lieutenant Colonel J.F. de Ridder (22nd Infantry Regiment). Overall command of the counterattack, including the operations of Brigade B, was given to Colonel Barbas, passing over General Harberts entirely. This course of events can only be explained as a consequence of the extremely frosty relations between Van Voorst tot Voorst and Harberts during the mobilisation period. This time Van Voorst tot Voorst had gone too far, however. Harberts phoned him in a rage and informed him: “I have cancelled your order to Colonel Barbas”. Harberts wanted Colonel Van Loon to be tasked with the coordination of the counterattack, which was not a bad idea. The Commander of the Field Army had, after all, acted on impulse. Although a 37 �� Harberts, �� “Gereconstrueerd dagboek over de dagen 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”.


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quick and effective counterattack was required, Van Voorst tot Voorst had intervened without knowing what the subordinate commanders had already decided. He had given command to a division commander who was not familiar with the situation in the area of operations of the IVth Division. Lieutenant General Van Voorst tot Voorst submitted to Harberts’ decision. The latter in turn postponed the counterattack; first the Germans were to be halted by Van Loon and then “all German troops which had penetrated (…) were to be destroyed (…) using all available troops”. The details of this order were left to the commander of the IVth Division, who did not even know which troops of the IInd Division and Brigade B were available. Van Loon seemed unable to cope with the situation. In his overcrowded command post, exhausted and without a detailed military map, he was unable to formulate orders. Relief arrived in the person of Captain A.H.J.L. Fiévez of the General Staff, who had been sent by Van Voorst tot Voorst. He took over the tasks of Van Loon’s Chief of Staff, Captain G.J. Le Fèvre de Montigny, who said: “that he had not rested in a very long time and was no longer able to think straight”. Fiévez did not have much insight into the situation either, but from the reports coming in he deduced that a threatening situation had arisen which required forceful counteraction. A counterattack “from Achterberg in a south-easterly direction (…) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Land” was necessary.38 At 22.00 hrs, the order was ready: the attack would commence at 04.30 hrs (the troops had been told the Royal Air Force was to carry out a bombing raid at that time), with the purpose of recapturing the front line. Four battalions had been designated, II-24 RI, I-29 RI and III-29 RI of Brigade B and I-20 RI, the unit which originally had defended the crossroads at Woudenberg on the boundary between the sectors of the IInd and IVth Corps. When the order was ready, however, Lieutenant Colonel Hennink suddenly phoned. Fiévez was surprised; “as far as he knew, all of the 8th Infantry Regiment had been dispersed, disbanded and had disappeared”. It was too late, however, to include this regiment in the equation; the counterattack was to pass right through its positions. Fiévez therefore just advised Hennink to “have his remaining troops take cover in the trenches and shelters during the counterattack”. The captain then left for General Harberts,

38 �� Lieutenant Colonel G. Land was the commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which was part of Brigade B.

Dutch soldier killed at the Grebbe Line, 14 May 1940.

Staged scene of a street fight. In the foreground is a Dutch 47mm antitank gun.


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whom he found “in a very serious mood and very much affected by the events”. 13 May was to be a decisive day.39

The fall of the Grebbe Line On the evening of 12 May, the German attack on the Grebbeberg had resulted in a strong bridgehead west of the Grift. Responsible for this achievement was SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, which had now been in action for 48 hours. Division commander Karl von Tiedeman therefore decided on a change of echelon. For the first time since the beginning of the campaign, he deployed an infantry regiment from his own division, the 322nd, led by Oberst Fritz Neidholdt. On the night on 12 May, the 322nd Infantry Regiment took over the positions of the SS regiment on the Grebbeberg. Two battalions of the regiment would push through to Rhenen the next day. The SS regiment was given a new task. Now that the Germans had control of the high ground on the Grebbeberg, part of the terrain to the north, the Achterbergse Hooilanden, was no longer under Dutch fire. The SS regiment was to attack in a north-westerly direction, through this terrain, also with two battalions. After they had taken the village of Achterberg, the SS troops would rejoin the rest of the division west of Rhenen. But first, as a result of the measures taken by General Harberts, they would find themselves directly in the path of the Dutch counterattack. There were problems with this counterattack right from the start. For instance, it proved impossible to have the four battalions ready in time. At 02.40 hrs, not a single battalion commander had reported to Lieutenant Colonel Land yet. Thereupon the latter asked the commander of the IVth Division, Colonel van Loon whether the time of the attack could be postponed. The division commander gave him just fifteen minutes’ respite, which was by no means long enough. Not until 06.30 hrs and 07.00 hrs, respectively, did the Ist and IIIrd battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment arrive at the starting position. The other two battalions were even later. It was after seven when the troops advanced in south-easterly direction. The advance guard on the right, commanded by Reserve Captain Th.C. Vrolijk, was formed by I-29 RI and the advance guard on the left, commanded by Reserve Major G. Schotman, by III-29 RI. 39 �� A.H.J.L. �� Fiévez, “Verslag betreffende de vervulling van de mij door den C.V. verstrekte opdracht in verband met den bevolen tegenaanval bij Rhenen”, 20 May 1940 [Bijlage III bij het Dagboek van het Hoofdkwartier van het Veldleger], in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 494-1.

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The soldiers of these battalions were hardly prepared for their important task. Not only were they lacking good maps of the area through which they were to advance, they had been on the move since 11 May and had hardly had a proper meal or any rest. Furthermore, the battalions— from ‘high-numbered’ regiments—mainly consisted of “fathers aged be-


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tween 30 and 35 with no combat experience, who might be useful in a properly defensible position, but were absolutely unsuitable to conduct an attack”.40 In addition, the promised RAF bombing raid had not materialised, nor had proper fire support from the artillery. Four Dutch light bombers, Fokker C-Xs, escorted by five Fokker D-XXI fighter aircraft, had carried out an attack on the German positions, but had not inflicted much damage. It was the only support that was to be expected for the Dutch counterattack. Van Voorst tot Voorst therefore informed the air defence commander, Lieutenant General P.W. Best, that “the bombing raid had provided relief ” and asked for it to be repeated. Best refused. The condition of the materiel and the airmen’s tiredness rendered a new attack impossible. When the Commander of the Field Army was informed of this decision, he decided to appeal personally to the air defence commander. The situation at the Grebbeberg was critical and the future of the entire Field Army was at stake. General Best thereupon promised to help and ordered what aircraft of the 1st Aviation Regiment were still available to be prepared and to be crewed by volunteers. This order was passed on to the commander of the Strategic Reconnaissance Aircraft Section, Captain J. van der Werf. He told his men that, in view of the gravity of the situation, a new bombing raid was necessary. His words made an impression; everyone offered to volunteer. Thus at 11.00 hrs four Fokker C-Xs, commanded by Reserve Second Lieutenant S.J. Postma and protected by five D-XXIs of the 1st Fighter Aircraft Section of Reserve Captain H.M. Schmidt Crans, embarked on a perilous journey. The airmen included Reserve Sergeant A.F. Postma, Reserve Sergeant B. de Beus, Reserve Second Lieutenant R.B. Lewis and Reserve Second Lieutenant F.C. Bik, all of whom would later be decorated for their efforts. Once they had reached the Grebbeberg, they dropped thirty-two 50-kg bombs on the road from Wageningen to Rhenen, after which they used their machine guns to enter the ground battle.41 The air support was the only ray of hope for the Dutch troops carrying out the counterattack. The exhausted soldiers moved on with lead in their boots, until they literally came up against the first SS troops. Soon, all cohesion was lost on the Dutch side and units were mixed up, resulting in a total lack of leadership. “It was such a chaos of people from various companies, battalions and regiments that even the officers appeared to have 40 �� Lieutenant J. Hogenhout in: L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 3 Mei ’40 (The Hague, 1970) 339. 41 �� F.J. �� Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 197-200 and 297-302.

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no control over their people anymore.”42 From 12.30 hrs, the first Dutch soldiers began to retreat. The retreat became almost complete when from 13.30 hrs Stukas began carrying out dive-bombing raids. The commander of the Ist battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment, Captain Vrolijk, tried to stop the fleeing masses. To his “great dismay”, however, he had to conclude that “what was happening here could not be described as a ‘retreat’, but should rather be referred to as a frantic flight”.43 Hundreds of soldiers were moving westwards, to save their skins. The counterattack was a complete failure. The latter was by no means a certainty as far as the commander of the IInd Corps, General Harberts, was concerned, however. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Land to continue the counterattack “immediately and with maximum force and speed”. According to the general, the Germans were “rather weak, but bold and energetic”.44 In fact, there were four German battalions attacking on and near the Grebbeberg, some 3,000 men, which put Harberts’ remark in a rather strange perspective. Lieutenant Colonel Land only had 400 or 500 men left, “largely unarmed and demoralised”, which meant that a new attack was out of the question. The Dutch soldiers fighting on the Grebbeberg could therefore expect no further support from the north. As has been said before, the troops defending the stop line were faced with the German 322nd Infantry Regiment, of which the Ist battalion was advancing to the north of the Wageningen–Rhenen road, and the IIIrd battalion to the south. The stop line was occupied by parts of the Ist battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by one company of the 19th and part of a company of the 11th Infantry Regiment. South of the road, facing the advancing Germans, were the remnants of the 3rd company of the I-8 RI, led by Reserve Captain P.F. Brittijn. The company was exhausted due to the tension and the lack of sleep. Brittijn sent two officers to his battalion commander, Major Landzaat, to request reinforcements. There were no longer any reinforcements available, however. The German attack came at dawn on 13 May. At first, the attack was repelled; it took the Germans a second attempt to succeed. The German infantry managed to pass through the northern part of the battalion sector, after which they could attack the rest of the stop line from the rear. After a morning of battle, at 13.00 hrs the first defenders began to divert 42 �� Th. �� C. Vrolijk, “Verslag der krijgsverrichtingen van 10 t/m 14 mei ’40”, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 514, file 38. 43 �Ibidem. 44 �� Nierstrasz, ��Operatiën Veldleger, 434.

German infantry passing the bodies of Dutch soldiers in Rhenen, on the road to Wageningen.

The demolished railway viaduct at Rhenen.

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to the south. Panic threatened in the ranks. “A sergeant major of a company that had been beaten back, who was shell-shocked, had climbed on to the parapet and was shot back down; as he fell back into the trench, badly wounded, he urged the men to flee.”45 There was no longer any question of a coordinated defence. Several commanders were working at cross-purposes. While Captain Brittijn was already giving his men permission to retreat, the soldiers led by Ensign F.J.L. in den Bosch in particular were still putting up fierce resistance. Eventually, the company could no longer hold out, and retreated towards the Rhine. North of the Wageningen–Rhenen road, 2-III-8 RI was still managing to hold its ground in the trenches. The Germans shelling was so heavy, however, that without artillery support, by 10.00 hrs it was all but impossible to defend the positions. No artillery support was provided. After all, it might hit the battalions carrying out the counterattack. “Hold your ground, the counterattack is imminent!”, one of the section commanders, Reserve Lieutenant P. van den Boom, said to encourage his men. The German fire was terrible, however. “Incredible, this hell. We’ve never seen it this bad before”, Van den Boom later said.46 In this situation, there was no stopping it, despite the brave efforts of some, such as Private Th.M. Chotzen. This part of the stop line, too, had to throw in the towel. Now the command post of Major Landzaat, the commander of the Ist battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, situated directly behind the stop line, was surrounded. The major had said on several occasions, even during the mobilisation period, that to him the defence of the Grebbe Line meant standing firm, no matter what the cost. Landzaat therefore absolutely did not want to surrender and he personally organised the defence of his command post, situated in the grounds of Ouwehands Zoo. The Germans brought in heavy machine guns and an artillery gun, but not until the Dutch soldiers had run out of ammunition did Landzaat give his men permission to leave the command post. “You have fought as heroes, I thank you”, he said.47 He himself considered it necessary to literally stand his ground to the end. The pavilion was shot to pieces. After the battle, all that would be found were the charred remains of the major, under the rubble at the side of the building were the attack had come from. 45 �� F.J.L. �� in den Bosch, “Verslag 10 mei t/m 14 mei 1940”, 10 February 1947, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 507, file 17. 46 �� “Ervaringen Grebbeberg van lt. P. v.d. Boom”, 9 December 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 507, file 8. 47 �� Reserve Captain A.G. Höpink, “Verslag van de verdediging van het gebouw genaamd ‘Het Paviljoentje’ op den Grebbeberg op Maandagmorgen 13 Mei 1940”, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 507, file 1.


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Further north still of the Grebbeberg, the Dutch soldiers were not faring much better. Once the Germans had breached part of the stop line, they were able to attack the other parts of the line from the rear and eliminate them. At the end of the afternoon, the command post of Reserve Captain J. van den Berg, Jacometti’s successor as commander of the IInd battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, was also surrounded. He had no other option but to surrender. That left the command post of Lieutenant Colonel Hennink. He too knew full well that the fight was over. “I have written a farewell to my wife and children on a card and, having consigned myself to death, I feel completely calm”, he remarked at the end of the aftermoon.48 Hennink would not think of surrendering, however. After dark, he gave the regimental colour to a sergeant and a private, who took it to Fortress Holland. Hennink himself moved with his men in the direction of the Rhine, where he entrenched himself in a brickyard. This would be where he would learn of the capitulation on 15 May. The German 322nd Infantry Regiment having thus taken the Grebbeberg, it subsequently focused its attack on the Dutch positions west of the railway line. These positions formed the ‘rear line’ and were the very last line of defence. Division commander Van Loon had given command of these troops to the commander of the 4th Hussars Regiment, jonkheer De Marees van Swinderen. He was ordered to stop the German troops from crossing the railway line. Van Loon did not, however, inform De Marees van Swinderen of the situation on the Grebbeberg. In addition, the commander of the Hussars Regiment had had hardly any sleep since 9 May. This may have contributed to the fact that he did not consult the commander of the IInd battalion of the 19th Infantry Regiment, Major Van Apeldoorn, who was with him and who was better abreast of the situation. As befits a hussar, De Marees van Swinderen did not order his men to take up fixed positions, convinced as he was that a mobile defence was best. When he received the (incorrect) report that one of his squadrons had been attacked, he decided to position his regiment near Elst, instead of staying at the railway line as Colonel van Loon had intended. All that remained on the rear line were a few infantry units, parts of the 1st squadron of the 4th Hussars Regiment and Captain Gelderman’s group. They thwarted two attempts by Wäckerle and his men to cross the railway line from the joinery works. The Germans thereupon called in the Luftwaffe. At around 13.30 hrs, 27 Stukas bombed the rear line. “The effect was suc48 �� Lieutenant �� Colonel W.F. Hennink, “Dagboek van C.-8 R.I. over het tijdvak 9 t/m 16 mei 1940 (gereconstrueerd)”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 506, file 20.

Recording at SS regiment ‘Der Führer’ for German radio, after the breach of the Grebbe Line. Hauptsturmführer O. Kumm (second from the left) of the IIIrd battalion is speaking.

Dutch prisoners of war after the battle at the Grebbeberg.


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cessful. It gave the infantry real relief. Some of the enemy left their positions in a panic”, according to Kriegstagebuch of the 207th Infantry Division.49 And indeed, for many of the Dutch soldiers, the Stuka attack was too much. They had expected the RAF, and now that this illusion had been cruelly shattered, they moved westwards en masse. Captain Gelderman, who had the viaduct across the railway blown up, was surprised to find that “only 15 men remained in the entire position; everyone was apparently running off ”.50 It was a hopelessly lost cause. In Elst, General Harberts tried to stop the fleeing soldiers, with the intention of redeploying them. The commander of Brigade B, Colonel Nijland, did the same near Amerongen. It was to no avail. As Colonel Van Loon later said, the soldiers were “in such a frame of mind that, had I pointed a gun at their chest with the intention of shooting, they would have been fine with it. They were exhausted.”51 The entire IVth Division was moving westwards in a disorderly fashion, along roads and through woods. The Grebbeberg was well and truly in German hands. Late that evening, the 322nd Infantry Regiment entered Rhenen. The price paid for the entire advance by the 207th Infantry Division was 13 officers killed and 205 NCOs and other ranks; 41 men were missing. More than half of the dead of the division came from SS regiment ‘Der Führer’: 7 officers and 111 other ranks had been killed and 18 SS soldiers were missing. On 16 May, the 322nd Infantry Regiment counted 3 officers dead and 48 NCOs and other ranks, and 20 soldiers missing.52 The number of casualties was greater on the Dutch side. During the battle for the Grebbeberg, 18 officers and 344 NCOs and other ranks were killed. Twenty men were missing. The 8th Infantry Regiment had suffered the greatest losses: 4 officers and 158 other ranks were killed, and 17 soldiers were missing.53

49 �� 207. �� Inf.�� Division, �� Ia, “Kriegstagebuch Nr.�� 3. 9.5.1940-31-5.1940”, �� in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 550. 50 �� Gelderman, “Verslag omtrent het optreden van een detachement Koninklijke Marechaussee”, 168. 51 �� Testimony of A.A.M. van Loon, 1 juli 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 519. 52 �� Verliezen 207 Divisie 10-16 mei 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 559c. 53 �� “Grebbeberg.�� Namen van gesneuvelde militairen”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 610-8.

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chapter eight The battle at Scherpenzeel

With the attack on the Grebbeberg, the leadership of the 18th Army were not putting all their eggs in one basket. If the battle for the Grebbeberg were not to have the desired result, there was another alternative: Generalmajor Zickwolff ’s 227th Infantry Division, which had orders to attack along the Apeldoorn–Amersfoort axis. As has become apparent above, this division’s advance experienced serious delays. It was not until the afternoon of 12 May that the forward units, Schnelle Gruppe Süd, reinforced with the IIIrd battalion of the 366th Infantry Regiment, arrived at the Grebbe Line. They reconnoitred a wide sector from Terschuur, west of Amersfoort, via Achterveld to Scherpenzeel, although the latter actually lay in the sector of the 207th Infantry Division. Since the evening of 11 May, the sector boundary between the two divisions had lain along the Lunteren–Scherpenzeel–Zeist line, with Scherpenzeel on the side of the 207th Infantry Division. The Germans established that the Dutch defence works looked strong and that due to “an increasingly boggy terrain” an attack at Amersfoort was not possible. From the headquarters of the 18th Army, however, von Küchler also demanded an attack by the 227th Infantry Division: “On 13 May, the Xth Corps will continue the attack on the Grebbe Line. Concentration of forces against the centre and southern parts.”54 The reconnaissance had also taught the division staff that the inundations at Scherpenzeel did not amount to much. By attacking here, the division would be able to make a quick gain and make up for the ground it had lost compared to the 207th Infantry Division. Corps commander Hansen at first did not want to allow more than a quick strike, or Handstreich. Generalmajor Zickwolff assigned a battalion for the strike. But when the attack was cancelled as night was falling on 12 May, and the division commander again insisted to be allowed to change the direction of attack of his entire division, the corps commander agreed. They would now attack the next day south of Scherpenzeel, “with a strong concentration of forces” with the purpose of achieving a “breach of the Grebbe Position” and to push through to Zeist. This meant that the division would veer sharply to the south from Barneveld in order to arrive in the Renswoude area, which lay in front of the Dutch position, and Scherpenzeel which was part of the outpost sector. To this end, Hansen moved the sector boundary between the 207th Infantry Division and the 227th Infantry Division further 54 �� Armeeoberkommando �� 18, Abt.�� Ia, �� “Armeebefehl für den 12.5.1940” in: V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 298.


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south, to a line through Ede, along the Arnhem–Utrecht railway line at De Klomp, and on through the Emmikhuizer Berg. The Dutch positions near these villages were defended by regiments of Barbas’ IInd Division, namely the 15th Infantry Regiment (in the north), the 22nd Infantry Regiment (in the centre) and the 10th Infantry Regiment (in the south). The division was supported by seven artillery battalions. As was the case at the Grebbeberg, at first there was great unrest among the infantry regiments. A number of units of the IInd battalion of the 10th Infantry Regiment, a battalion which, led by Major J.A. Claesen, occupied the outposts in part of the Grebbe Line, had retreated in a panic on 12 May when the 368th Infantry Regiment of the 207th Infantry Division had commenced an attack along the road from Ede to De Klomp. The German regiment was part of the corps reserve, and on 11 May it had received orders to advance to Ede and to prepare there for deployment either on the Grebbeberg or at Veenendaal. The attack of 12 May was therefore not or-

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dered, but was a personal initiative of regiment commander Oberst Carl von Oesterreich and had to be aborted immediately when division commander von Tiedeman was informed. The regiment was not to become tied down in battle, because it would then no longer be available to the corps commander. The Dutch officers made use of the break to restore cohesion in the ranks. On the night of 12 May, Generalmajor Zickwolff ordered the attack on 13 May. The Valley Position was to be breached between Scherpenzeel and De Groep. On the right, two battalions of the 366th Infantry Regiment would attack at Scherpenzeel, reinforced with a battalion of the 328th Infantry Regiment and a number of other units. The 412th Infantry Regiment would attack on the left. Through the centre of the breach sector ran a small river, the Luntersche Beek, which formed the sector boundary between the two regiments. The division commander held the other two battalions of the 328th Infantry Regiment in reserve in the woods east of Lunteren. Almost seven artillery battalions provided support to the division. The regiments were to commence the attack at 08.00 hrs on 13 May. They did not make it on time, however. In Barbas’ IInd Division, the cooperation between the infantry commanders and the artillery proceeded according to plan. Communications worked, the requested fire was delivered promptly and in the right locations. This considerably delayed the preparations of the German infantry. During the night and the following morning on 13 May, the Dutch artillery also had fire superiority. The German battalions were still advancing and were having difficulties passing through Barneveld. The village was under heavy artillery fire and there was congestion on this junction of roads. Not until 13.25 hrs, five and a half hours later than the time in the order, did the infantry attack commence. A large part of the day had been lost to preparations. The attack by the 207th Infantry Division on the outposts at the Grebbeberg on 11 May had had six hours’ more daylight. And there, the Germans had needed the whole day to reach their objective. The German side was without SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. According to plan, this regiment had already been moved towards Noord-Brabant on 11 May. As a result, the German attack was carried out even more cautiously than that on the Grebbeberg. One need only make the comparison with the unorthodox actions of Wäckerle’s group. During the course of the afternoon, it became clear that the German attack plan was based on an incorrect assumption, due to the pressure of time. Although the 366th Infantry Regiment succeeded in capturing Scherpenzeel, it did not continue the attack on the front line. The Dutch artillery

German soldiers in the Marktstraat in Scherpenzeel after the capture of the battered village.

Wageningen suffered extensive damage during the battle for the Grebbeberg.

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fire and the obstacles prevented it, but the regiment also wanted to wait until the 412th Infantry Regiment appeared at the front line. The latter unit, however, had run into huge trouble due to flanking fire from the Dutch outposts. Unlike the positions at the Grebbeberg, these positions afforded the Dutch troops a free field of fire. In addition, various landmines did their devastating jobs and, again, the Dutch artillery kept its end up. Zickwolff had not acknowledged that the axis of advance of the 412th Infantry Regiment was not a frontal attack on the Dutch position, but ran practically parallel to it. The division did not have proper insight into the positions of the Dutch outposts, because they were indicated only very roughly on the German maps. The previous day’s reconnaissance, in terrain that at that time was not yet in the division’s sector, had not made up for this. In addition, the effect of the artillery on the Dutch outposts had proved insufficient. In these circumstances, the 412th Infantry Regiment began by securing its flank. To this end, the reserve battalion attacked two strong points in the outposts of the Dutch 22nd Infantry Regiment, the Ravenhorst and Klein Ravenhorst farms, the former of which was the only one which was occupied. After darkness had set in, the situation threatened to get even more out of hand. Zickwolff deployed the division reserve, to extend his flank even further eastwards: The pressure on the left flank is mounting (…) so much that, besides the IInd battalion of the 328th Infantry Regiment, parts of the IIIrd battalion of the 328th Infantry Regiment must be deployed to protect the flank.

The division’s strength was thus split up and moved further and further away from the objective of the attack. In order to understand Zickwolff ’s concern, we must realise that he considered the previous day’s repelled attack by the 368th Infantry Regiment at De Klomp as proof of the strength of the Dutch outposts. As a result, in his view the division’s entire left flank was exposed and there was no physical cohesion with the 207th Infantry Division, operating further south-east. He did not know that this action had been a personal initiative by Oberst Carl von Oesterreich. He thought that, from a military-technical point of view, there was a dangerous ‘dephasing’ taking place between the two divisions. In the end, Zickwolff aborted the operation in order “to make the units available again for the breach of the Grebbe Line on 14 May.”55 The attack would now concentrate on Scherpenzeel.

55 �� 227. �� Inf.-Division, Ia, “Kriegstagebuch Nr.�� 2, �� 1.1.194-30.6.1940.”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 559a.


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The Dutch troops had succeeded in repelling the attack mounted in the afternoon by two entire German regiments. The cooperation between the infantry and the artillery had been excellent and there had been no panic. The IInd Division was spared the confusing battles in the main resistance sector which had caused Van Loon’s division on the Grebbeberg to collapse. “The position is still fully intact, morale among the troops is excellent and we are continuing to keep the upper hand over the attacker”, the journal of the 15th Infantry Regiment concluded with satisfaction.56 The IInd Division had lost 44 men, including 3 officers. Elsewhere, the Field Army had also successfully repelled the German attacks. At Ochten, on the river Waal, on 13 May, Brigade A repelled a minor attack by around 200 German infantry soldiers. At Rhenen, however, where the point of main effort of the attack was, the Germans did succeed in breaching the Grebbe Line.

The end When Lieutenant General Van Voorst tot Voorst was informed on 12 May that the 8th Infantry Regiment’s front line had fallen into German hands, he was well aware that if the Grebbe Line were indeed breached there, the entire line would have to be vacated, otherwise the Field Army would run the risk of being surrounded from the south. That same evening, the Commander of the Field Army therefore had a number of ‘personal directives’ for the retreat drawn up, although he still trusted “that the troops of the Field Army would hold their ground in the currently occupied positions”.57 As we have seen, the events of the next day went particularly badly for the Dutch army. At around 14.00 hrs, Major General Harberts reported to Van Voorst tot Voorst that the situation at the IVth Division had become “very critical”. During the course of the afternoon it became clear that the counterattack had ended in a fiasco and that the defence of the railway line at Rhenen had collapsed. Van Voorst tot Voorst thereupon had a message sent to his corps commanders that the Field Army was to retreat behind the New Dutch Waterline at 20.30 hrs, under cover of the outposts or similar units, and that the headquarters of the Field Army would be moved to Gouda. 56 �� “Dagboek 15 R.I. gedurende het tijdvak van 10-15 mei”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 505, file 1. 57 �� Nierstrasz, ��Operatiën Veldleger, 73.

German military personnel inspected the battlefield after the Dutch capitulation. Here they are shown visiting the hornwork at the Grebbe sluice.

Panzerkampfwagen IV on its way to the Grebbeberg.


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The retreat took place in a reasonably orderly fashion. The Field Army was fortunate that there was mist to the east of Utrecht on the morning of 14 May. The Luftwaffe was therefore unable to observe or disrupt the retreat. In the north, the movement of troops was the most successful; to the south it was the shaken and demoralised parts of the IVth Division and Brigade B which were moving westwards. Here, there was no cohesion whatsoever, weapons were left behind and columns became mixed up. The Field Army retreated behind the New Dutch Waterline, a defence line which had a legendary-sounding name, but which in 1940 existed largely on paper only. Hardly any of the inundation areas, which formed the core of the line, had been flooded. There was little opportunity to flood them now. The water levels in the major rivers were relatively low and the water only rose slowly. In addition, on the eastern front of Fortress Holland, there were hardly any trenches, casemates or machine-gun nests. After all, before the retreat, the line had been almost entirely unoccupied. The Field Army would therefore only be able to mount an improvised defence. In this defence, the IInd Corps would no longer be commanded by Major General Harberts. A broken man, he had arrived at his new headquarters at Jaarsveld, unable to understand why his troops had failed. There was no longer any energy left in him. To Colonel Barbas, the commander of the IInd Division, he said: “tomorrow there will no longer be a IInd Corps and the day after there will be no field army. I will be dead then, because the troops will mutiny”.58 Towards the end of the morning, Harberts was replaced by Barbas. It took the commander of the 227th Infantry Division a while to discover that the Dutch troops were retreating. As the Dutch artillery had shelled a number of locations, including Scherpenzeel, during the night of 13 May, Generalmajor Zickwolff even concluded “that the enemy would defend the Grebbe Line to the utmost”.59 It was not until 09.00 hrs that the Germans discovered that the Dutch positions had been vacated. It still took until late in the afternoon for the 227th Infantry Division to give chase; they were much hindered by landmines and demolished bridges. Generalleutnant von Tiedeman, commander of the 207th Infantry Division, noticed sooner that the Field Army was moving westwards. When the 322nd Infantry Regiment entered Rhenen at 21.00 hrs, all became clear. 58 �� Bijlage �� 3. Behorende bij de memorie dd.�� 30 �� juni 1949 van luitenant-generaal b.d. J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 494, file 3a. 59 �� 227. �� Inf.-Division, �� Ia, “Kriegstagebuch Nr.�� 2. 1.1.194-30.6.1940. ��”

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Before they could give chase, however, the viaduct across the railway had to be repaired. It was therefore after midnight when the 322nd Infantry Regiment and the SS regiment advanced towards Doorn and Zeist. Part of the latter regiment, however, went in a different direction. It advanced along the Lower Rhine to Wijk bij Duurstede. The other regiments of the division moved westwards along a wide front. The 374th, led by Oberst K. Klemm, reached Nederlangbroek; the 368th led by Oberst von Oesterreich, reached Driebergen. They did not have to enter into a new confrontation with the Field Army; General Winkelman capitulated on 14 May.

Conclusion The Dutch Field Army suffered a decisive defeat on the Grebbeberg. Responsible for that defeat was Generalleutnant Karl von Tiedeman’s 207th Infantry Division, reinforced with the SS regiment, which had defeated the Dutch IInd Corps. If we ask the question why this corps, and thus the Field Army, lost the battle, four factors can be identified: material and physical, psychological, organisational and tactical. First the material and physical factors. This does not immediately refer to the better weapons of the German troops. It is true that they were better armed, for instance they had much lighter automatic weapons than the Dutch and more and better artillery guns, but this was not a decisive factor. What was more important was how these assets were used. The terrain of the outposts at the Grebbeberg, for instance, gave an advantage to the attacker. There were of course the many trees, hedges and sheds which were an uncertain factor for the SS troops and which meant they attacked cautiously, but these obstacles provided the Germans with so much cover that they were able to take many of the sections in the outposts by surprise and eliminate them. When establishing the Dutch positions, the assumption had been that there would only be a frontal attack. They had not reckoned with the possibility of attacks from the rear. In addition, the various positions had not yet been completed and the some of the weapons were positioned such that their crews could not get any Germans in their fields of fire. As a result, on the Grebbeberg for instance, they were unable to fire on the German troops on the hollow road. The most important material factor leading to the Dutch defeat, however, was the vulnerability of the communications between the various commanders in the Grebbeberg area. If there was an artillery bombardment of any magnitude, the communications failed. Not only did this mean the senior commanders were in-


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formed insufficiently of the developments, but the artillery in particular was not able to support the infantry adequately, which was of great consequence for the outcome of the battle. After all, the German artillery did operate effectively, so that the attack was conducted by the book. Secondly, psychological factors can also be identified which contributed to the defeat of the IInd Corps. In general, the attacker has the psychological advantage. After all, his objective is a positive one, for instance the capture of a certain area or the defeat of an opponent. On the other hand, the defender’s only assignment is to stand his ground, and if he completes that assignment, he is faced with the same task again the next day. This was indeed the case on the Grebbeberg. The Dutch troops were ordered to mount a “staunch defence”, but it meant that if they were successful, it would only prolong the war. In addition, the German troops had the initiative in the battle, so that the Dutch soldiers had to be prepared for an attack at all times. There were also the many alarming rumours, which meant that at every level, the Dutch soldiers hardly had any sleep during the war. It is evident that the levels of exhaustion were therefore high and that panic easily broke out during artillery shelling or aerial bombing raids. Thirdly, there were the organisational factors. Although the Grebbe Line was a relatively strong defensive work, initially there was a structural shortage of troops, which meant that there were insufficient reserves. For instance, the entire IInd Corps had only one battalion in reserve. Any breach of the line would therefore be impossible to handle immediately. On 11 May, the Germans were at an advantage in terms of combat power, both for the infantry and the artillery. This is in accordance with the military rule of thumb which states that an attack on a prepared defence requires considerable superiority. The IVth Division was supported by five battalions of artillery, whereas the fire support of the 207th Infantry Division was around twice that size. On the Dutch side, six battalions of infantry faced nine battalions of the 207th Infantry Division, reinforced with three battalions of ‘Der Führer’. Over the next few days, however, more and more troops became available in the sector of the IVth Division, so that at the height of the battle there were thirteen Dutch infantry battalions and a hussars regiment available, facing fewer than six attacking German battalions. At that point, there were six artillery battalions deployed on the German side. The problem by now no longer lay in the actual numbers, but in making effective use of the numerical superiority. The Dutch commanders failed to do so. On 12 and 13 May they conducted many small counterattacks, both in succession and simultaneously, but did not succeed in achieving superiority anywhere through concentration of resources, let alone a decisive result. In

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Identification of the Dutch casualties on the Grebbeberg. In the background are civilian labourers who helped move the bodies and dig the graves.

addition, all too often units lost their cohesion during combat contact and slipped from the control of their officers, so that they could no longer be used for subsequent assignments. The fact that the fire support failed was not so much to be blamed on the number of available guns, but rather on the failure of communications with the observers, the lack of firing orders and the shortcomings in command. A typical example of this situation are the events surrounding Brigade B. This brigade formed an extensive reserve for the Field Army and operated in the sector of the IVth Division. Before they could be deployed, however, they had to be moved from the Land van Maas en Waal area to the Grebbe Line. As a result, these troops were exhausted by the time they arrived at their new positions on 13 May, which diminished the value of this reserve, and meant that there was inadequate preparation for the counterattack, which ended in a fiasco. The Germans made better use of the troops they had available. For instance, the 322nd Infantry Regiment, which until that point had hardly been deployed at all, took over the attack on the Grebbeberg from the SS regiment, after the latter regiment had established a bridgehead across the Grift. The battalions of ‘Der Führer’ had subsequently been able to mount a successful attack in the direction of Achterberg.


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Lastly, the most important factors to contribute to the defeat were the military-tactical errors of judgement. The responsibility in this respect lay with a number of weak commanders. For instance, the power of the German troops had been seriously underestimated. On 13 May, Major General Harberts referred to the Germans as “rather weak, but bold and energetic”. But even though only little could be done in the way of aerial reconnaissance as a result of the blow suffered by the Dutch air force on the first day of the war, the events should have spoken for themselves. One of the consequences of this underestimation was that counterattacks were carried out immediately, without preparation, without artillery support and without everyone having been informed. It did not occur to the defenders to block the attack properly first. To quote Major Jacometti, they would just “throw them out”, but reality proved different. In addition, Major General Harberts had become firmly convinced, albeit wrongly so, that the 8th Infantry Regiment was made up of cowards, which led, among other things, to the death sentence for Sergeant Meijer. It was not only Jacometti and Harberts who ordered rash measures to be taken, the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron Van Voorst tot Voorst, was guilty of the same. On 12 May, without knowing what his subordinate commanders had decided, he wanted to conduct a counterattack, giving command to, of all people, someone who was not familiar with the situation in the area where the attack was to take place. They paid the price here for the difficult personal relationship between Van Voorst tot Voorst and Harberts during the mobilisation period. It should be noted, however, that on the German side all did not go entirely smoothly from a tactical point of view either. Examples are the unorthodox actions of Obersturmbannführer Wäckerle, the unauthorised attack by the 368th Infantry Regiment along the road from Ede to De Klomp ordered by Oberst von Oesterreich and the attack by the 227th Infantry Division at Scherpenzeel. These events, however, were not decisive. The German infantry attack on the Grebbeberg, supported by excellent artillery fire, was very successful indeed. The Grebbe Line was breached and the Dutch Field Army defeated.

CHAPTER NINE

“VORWÄRTS DENKEN, VORWÄRTS SEHEN, VORWÄRTS REITEN!”: THE BATTLE IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES

The 1st Cavalry Division is to occupy northern Holland and capture the north-eastern IJsselmeer Dam. Next, the 1st Cavalry Division could be deployed to form a bridgehead to the west of the IJsselmeer for the attack on Fortress Holland from the northeast.

This was the Divisionsbefehl for the 1st Cavalry Division, which, commanded by Generalmajor Kurt Feldt, crossed the borders of the provinces of Groningen, Drenthe and north-eastern Overijssel on 10 May.1 The division was viewed as an anachronism by many, even within the German armed forces themselves. Its core comprised four regiments of cavalrymen who dismounted at the front and fought as infantrymen. These modern-day dragoons were the sole propagators of the illustrious cavalry tradition within the German army. They were strongly bound up in tradition in other ways too: the officers and NCOs were chiefly from old Prussian military families and the majority of the ranks were recruited from East Prussia, an area well-known for its horsemanship. Yet the division had only been created in its present form on 1 November 1939. That was when it had been decided to expand the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had earned its spurs during the campaign in Poland, into the 1st Cavalry Division. In the second half of November, the fledgling division had been moved to an assembly point near Ankum, nor far from the Dutch border, as a result of the order from the Oberkommando des Heeres to Army Group B “to occupy the province of Groningen using only weak forces”.2 From the end of November, the division staff had been busy building and training the unit as well as preparing the assault on the northern Netherlands. As has already been described in Chapter 4, the German plans of attack were continually subjected to change during the winter months. This had several consequences for the 1st Cavalry Division. 1 1. Kavalleriedivision Ia. No. 42/40, “Divisionsbefehl für das Besetzen Nordhollands”, 6 April 1940, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BA-MA), RH 29-1/57. 2 Kriegstagebuch No. 1 of Heeresgruppe B, 14 November 1939, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/18. Groningen denotes Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe.

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Horsemen of the 1st Cavalry Division cross one of the Drenthe canals via an existing, undamaged bridge.

In the first phase of the German plan, when the intention had not yet been formed to occupy the whole of the Netherlands, the capture of the West Frisian Islands of Schiermonnikoog, Ameland, Terschelling and Vlieland was a major target for the operations to be carried out in the north. The driving force behind this was the Luftwaffe, which wanted to use these islands for “air warning purposes”.3 For transferring troops from the coast of Groningen and Friesland to the West Frisian Islands, the Kriegsmarine created a Sonderkommando under the command of Korvettenkapitän Stein which was to carry out its mission using commandeered boats. Neither the Kriegsmarine nor Army Group B was particularly enthusiastic about this assignment, which after all only served the interests of the air force. On 25 January 1940, the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, informed the staff of Army Group B that the whole of the Netherlands was to be occupied. For the 1st Cavalry Division, this change of plan meant that the West Frisian Islands were no longer considered important by the leadership and that the original assignment was eventually cancelled. The commander of the 18th Army, General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler, under whose command the 1st Cavalry 3 Idem, 18 November 1939.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 323

Division now came, decided to deploy the cavalry in the attack on Fortress Holland. The division was therefore ordered, after the capture of the northern provinces, to capture the north-eastern part of the IJsselmeer Dam and to prepare for a landing in the Medemblik–Hoorn area conducted from the Frisian IJsselmeer ports. Sonderkommando-Stein was to carry out the naval part of this crossing. Ironically, German interest in the IJsselmeer Dam arose from an aversion to water rather than, as was assumed by Dutch military planners, a desire for an alternative, nautical route for penetrating Fortress Holland. The latter was to be achieved via the Moerdijk–Rotterdam axis and as a result of breaching the Grebbe Line and the New Dutch Waterline. The capture of the IJsselmeer Dam was directly linked to the latter operation. The German army leadership had, it has to be said, a low opinion of the enemy’s combat power. The German military did, however, fear that old ‘ally’ of the Dutch: the water. A report by the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), tellingly entitled “opportunities for an assault on Fortress Holland”, allocated a substantial role to the modern sluice complexes at Kornwer-

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derzand and Den Oever in managing the water level of inundated areas at the Grebbe Line and the Waterline.4 If German troops were able to capture these sluices undamaged, they would be able to lower the water level in the IJsselmeer and thus cut off the flow to the inundated areas, resulting in the latter losing their defensive power. This would of course take some time. The operation was therefore important in the event that the attack by the Xth Corps on the Grebbe Line foundered. The German army leadership, which was well-informed of the defensive works at Kornwerderzand and Den Oever, was aware that surprise attacks were the only chance of success. Neither paratroops nor navy ships were available, however, for a coup de main against Den Oever, so the north-eastern part of the IJsselmeer Dam—i.e. the Kornwerderzand complex—remained the only operational target. The possibility of landing on the coast of West Friesland, the northern part of the province of Noord-Holland, was based on the German expectation that the Defence Line of Amsterdam, the central redoubt of Fortress Holland, would serve as the final line of defence if the enemy was able to mount a staunch defence (a possibility which, although viewed as highly unlikely, could not be entirely discounted). In the event of such a situation arising, the 1st Cavalry Division was to advance from West Friesland in order to break any remaining resistance. In summary then, both operational targets—Kornwerderzand and a landing in West Friesland—would have a substantially delayed effect on operations elsewhere, even if they were carried out successfully. Only in the event of severe stagnation on the main fronts would the deeds of the 1st Cavalry Division be of great importance to Army Group B and the 18th Army. It is therefore no great surprise that the higher echelons showed little interest in the preparations of the division in the spring of 1940. In this respect, Generalmajor Feldt was free to prepare his men for their assignment in the green Dutch landscape. There were repeated exercises in surprise attacks on bridges, in crossing water obstacles, in removing obstacles and putting casemates out of action. On the basis of gathered intelligence, Feldt drew up the following plan of attack for his 12,000-strong division. He wanted to cross the border at four locations on a line between Nieuweschans and Kloosterhaar, an area covering more than a hundred kilometres. In the north, the 1st Cyclist Battalion (approx. 875 men) was to initiate the attack at Nieuweschans and advance towards Groningen. Simultaneously, an armoured train was to surprise the border guards and 4 Gr. Landesverteidigung OKH, No. 120/39.g.Kdos, 5 December 1939, in: BA-MA, RH 24/10-2.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 325 ride towards Harlingen via Groningen and Leeuwarden. From Harlingen, a lightening raid would then be carried out on the head of the IJsselmeer Dam. In the middle, the 2nd Mounted Regiment, reinforced with a battery of mounted artillery and thus comprising a total of about 2,000 men, would cross the border at Emmer-Compascuum and advance via Emmen and Sleen towards Assen and Beilen. The main effort of the attack by the 1st Cavalry Division lay in the German territorial indentation in the Dutch border to the south of Coevorden. The distance from the border to the IJsselmeer was only 50 kilometres here, so that a rapid advance would on the one hand prevent Dutch units from retreating towards the IJssel Line and on the other hand pose a threat to the Dutch flank to the north. Mounted Regiments 1 and 22, together comprising about 4,000 men and commanded by Oberst F.M. von Senger und Etterlin, were to launch the fiercest assault with the support of almost an entire regiment of mounted artillery. They were to operate along two parallel axes of attack, namely Coevorden–Hoogeveen and Hardenberg–Meppel. The 21st Mounted Regiment, with a force of 1,200 men, was positioned behind this assault sector as division reserve. On 9 May, the division staff was gathered at Lingen for a Kriegsspiel when Feldt received the order from the 18th Army. It was time to synchronise watches: that evening the cavalrymen took up their posts near the border. In his Tagesbefehl for 10 May, Generalmajor Feldt quoted the traditional cavalry creed: “Vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten” [Think forward, look forward, ride forward].

The territorial defence of the northern Netherlands In the meantime, Feldt’s Dutch counterpart, the Territorial Commander in Friesland (TBF), Colonel J. Veenbaas, was struggling with the problem of how to guard, and if necessary defend, a 75-km border with only five infantry battalions and a handful of support units. General Winkelman envisaged two tasks for Veenbaas and his men: timely warning in the event of the Germans crossing the border, followed by “a retreat while slowing the enemy advance as much as possible”.5 The main aim of any retreat should be to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the IJsselmeer Dam for as long as possible. 5 V.E. Nierstrasz, De territoriale verdediging van de noordelijke provinciën (The Hague, 1952) 1.

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12 mei May 1940 1940

Territorial Commander in Friesland Territorial Commander in Friesland

Assen Group C - 33RI

C - II - 33RI

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Surveillance detachments

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Intensive discussions between General Headquarters and the TBF ultimately led to a defence plan in which three lines were allocated a central role: the O Line, the Q Line and the F Line. The O Line was situated close to the border and comprised small border detachments, often of infantry group size (eleven men), which were to raise the alarm immediately in the event of an enemy attack. Next, these “eyes and ears” of the TBF were to attempt to delay a German advance by placing prepared obstacles and by destroying objects prepared in advance. Having carried this out, they were to withdraw to the main line of defence, the Q Line, to fill the largest gaps in the defence. This Q Line, which lay behind a linked system of canals (namely Termunterzijldiep, Oosterdiep, Zuider Hoofdvaart and Oranje Canal), was anything but a closed front. Due to a lack of troops, Veenbaas had to make do with deploying detachments at traffic intersections, chiefly at bridges, where they were to offer opposition for as long as possible. Concrete casemates were constructed at some of these intersections expressly for this purpose. As the Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TBO), Colonel J. Dwars, had positioned his main forces at the IJssel Line, there was a risk of an open flank between the TBF’s sector and that of the TBO. For this reason, Veenbaas extended his Q Line from the Hoogeveense Vaart south of Oosterhesselen up to the IJsselmeer at Zwartsluis. This southern position, known as the F Line, was manned by the IInd battalion of the 33rd Infan-

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 327 try Regiment (II-33 RI). This battalion was led by the commander of the 33rd Infantry Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Groenendijk, as were I-36 RI, the 1st Reserve Border Company and the 1st Border Battalion. His command post was located at Beilen. Together, these units formed the Assen Group. The commander of the 36th Infantry Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Sonne, who led the Groningen Group, was stationed in Vries. This group comprised II-36 RI, the 12th Border Battalion, the 1st Surveillance Troops Company and the 12th Reserve Border Company. Lieutenant Colonel Sonne also took into account the possibility of a German attack over water, via the Dollard or the Ems. Since 10 April, when Winkelman had withdrawn two battalions from the TBF to the centre of the country, Veenbaas had had no reserves at his disposal. This meant that if the enemy breached his line of defence at any point he was unable to call on reserves to plug the gap, never mind to retaliate against the enemy. In such a situation the enemy could easily obliterate the defence lines by means of attacks from the rear. The territorial defence of the northern Netherlands depended greatly on the border battalions: by timely warnings, the destruction of strategically important objects and withdrawal to the Q Line, they were to enable a delay in combat in the main line of defence.

A morning of battle and a pursuit in vain Well before X-Zeit, namely at 03.00 hrs, a German armoured train surprised the station guard and the railway bridge detachment at Nieuweschans. The train would not get far, however. The vigilance of the Dutch guards at the bridge over the Buiskooldiep, some four kilometres further along the line, resulted in the bridge being blown up just in time. Although German pioneers had brought bridge-laying materiel with them and quickly repaired the crossing, the element of surprise was lost. This was immediately apparent at the next railway bridge across the Zijlsterdiep. The alerted troops had destroyed this one completely and were for some time also able to hold back the troops who had disembarked from the armoured train with direct fire. As a result, the train was forced to return to Germany without having fulfilled its mission. Colonel Veenbaas was not immediately informed of this border crossing due to a faulty radio. The first news he received was of German attacks in south-east Drenthe. On the basis of this news, he issued the order to ‘destroy’ at 04.30 hrs. In the meantime, the border detachments that had seen enemy soldiers appear so suddenly in front of them, and this was only the case in part of

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Initial combat for scouts of the 1st Cavalry Division at Coevorden, 10 May 1940.

the O Line, had not waited for this order. In many cases, they had already blown up the bridges at their own initiative after having reported the attack. The battle was rather confusing. In a few places, the defenders were simply taken by surprise. Elsewhere, they operated alertly and efficiently. This was the case at, among other places, the border crossing at EmmerCompascuum. The Germans attempted to use a ruse involving 90 cavalrymen crossing the border hidden in three vehicles covered with sailcloth. This failed thanks to the vigilance of a Dutch sentry. At 05.30 hrs the TBF ordered a withdrawal to the Q Line while carrying out the prepared demolitions in the intervening area. This chiefly involved bridges which played an essential part in the battle. German efforts focused on trying to capture these vital objects as soon as possible. On the main assault axis, the reconnaissance groups, which often operated on horseback or sometimes on motorbikes, had been expressly charged with seeking unguarded or poorly guarded bridges and preventing their destruction. They were not to waste time on demolished or heavily defended objects; a radio report on these would suffice. The ultimate occupation of a bridge often depended on a minor detail. For example, valiant defenders often had to look on helplessly as in several cases detonators failed to

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 329 work or the fuses were extinguished by the wind or, as in one case, how a German lieutenant extinguished a burning fuse at great risk to his own life. On the Dutch side, there were soldiers who, with a total disregard for their own safety, succeeded in blowing up ‘their’ bridges in the face of the oncoming enemy. In total, over the course of that one morning, 236 bridges were rendered unusable in the TBF sector. From the start, the battle on the Q Line was fought rather chaotically on the Dutch side. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the 1st Cavalry Division advanced so quickly in some sectors of the Assen Group that its advance party arrived simultaneously with the withdrawing border detachments. As a result, there was hardly any time to organise the defence. Furthermore, poorly functioning communications equipment constantly thwarted Colonel Veenbaas and his subordinate commanders. Their command relied heavily on the regular telephone network. Telecommunications were paralysed when the railway bridge at Zwolle, which carried vital telephone lines, was blown up. Poor communications and the relatively large distances between units meant that effective command was impossible, even at battalion level. The combat power of a group or section (34 men), largely left to themselves, therefore came to depend more than usual on the personal qualities of the individual commander. These were sometimes lacking in the heat of the battle, but in other cases the commander rose to the occasion. For example, Sergeant K. van de Baaren and three of his men succeeded in surprising and halting a German reconnaissance group from a wellcamouflaged casemate at the Lutterhoofdwijk Canal on the southernmost tip of the Q Line. They were able to hold out for nearly four hours against a force of up to three squadrons. After the four exhausted defenders had finally surrendered, a further drama was only narrowly avoided. The irritated Germans, who had seen a well-loved officer killed, wanted to put them up against the wall as they had apparently misused the white flag during the battle. Luckily, the local innkeeper reported that he had waved a white cushion out of fear. The mayor of Coevorden, who happened to be passing, was able to convince the German officers that the defenders could not have seen the white flag from their casemate. The incident blew over.6 At other locations, too, the Germans met with stubborn resistance. In Groningen, the cyclists came up against strong opposition at Ganzendijk 6 H. Brand, Die lange Morgen in Mei. 10 Mei 1940 (Meppel, 1980) 175-176. For the accounts by the personnel involved (K. van de Baaren, B. Schuiling, M. Vugteveen and S. Beetstra) see: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DCNIMH), Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 469, file 29.

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and Nieuwolda. In Drenthe, the unwavering defence by Reserve Second Lieutenant M.H. de Vroome and his nineteen men at the Oosterhesselen bridge is worthy of mention: they succeeded in countering German superiority for over two hours. At the F Line, too, where the enemy placed the main focus of the attack on the sector between Echten and Meppel, the soldiers put up a brave fight even though they were often completely isolated. In spite of these isolated successes, the general picture was far from rosy. Firstly, there was absolutely no coordination of the defence and its effectiveness was therefore limited. Secondly, and this was of overriding importance, wherever the Germans had decided to force a breach of the line it was merely a matter of time before the defenders surrendered or withdrew. As early as 10.00 hrs, Colonel Veenbaas was forced to conclude that the battle was over–the TBF had expected to put up longer-lasting resistance. Following reports of a German breach at Sleen, he was afraid the Groningen Group would be cut off. At 10.25 hrs he ordered the TBF to withdraw to the Wons Position. He envisaged an organised retreat here: the Groningen Group would withdraw first, covered by the Assen Group. This plan came to nothing, however. The chaos on the Drenthe front and the poor communications led to the withdrawal deteriorating into an improvised sauve qui peut, with a few exceptions. The order did not even reach some of the sections and groups. They were faced with a difficult decision: try to reach the IJsselmeer Dam after all, continue fighting or surrender to the first German they encountered. In the event, all three options were used. The Dutch soldiers threw themselves into the retreat with great enthusiasm and imagination. The majority managed to reach the Wons Position before darkness fell, using modes of transport which included bicycles, (commandeered) cars, buses and trucks. As the TBF was not there to receive them and organise a regrouping, their passing through the position and their retreat across the IJsselmeer Dam was rather chaotic. On passing the lines, the wild stories told by the retreating soldiers, most of whom had not even been involved in actual combat with the enemy, severely tested the nerves of the soldiers stationed there. At 21.00 hrs, Colonel Veenbaas reported to the commander of the Wons Position, Reserve Major B. Smid, that all his troops had evacuated the area safely. After this, the TBF crossed the IJsselmeer Dam himself. His last report proved to be incorrect, and was to have repercussions for several TBF units which only arrived at the Wons Position on 11 May: they were met by friendly fire.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 331 The retreating troops were unhindered by the 1st Cavalry Division on 10 May. The speed with which the Dutch withdrew took the Germans completely by surprise. Even without encountering opposition, they had their hands full in achieving the objectives set for the first day of operations, i.e. reaching the Groningen–Assen–Beilen–Steenwijk line. Exhaustion started to take its toll. Some of the cavalrymen had ridden 120 kilometres in twenty-four hours. Furthermore, the large number of destroyed bridges, many more than the Germans had expected, led to problems for the logistic units and this had resulted in delays. The Kriegstagebuch of the 18th Army described the situation of the 1st Cavalry Division on 10 May aptly: Following reports throughout the course of the afternoon, the 1st Cavalry Division quickly reached the Dutch provinces of Groningen and Drenthe, having encountered innumerable obstacles and destroyed bridges and little enemy opposition.7

In the early hours of 11 May, the Germans set off in pursuit, in transport which included commandeered buses. Their pursuit was to be in vain, however. In the afternoon, the German advance party reached the Wons Position. Feldt ordered his cyclist battalion to clear this last line before the IJsselmeer Line and deployed his troops as follows: the cyclists were stationed in front of the Wons Position with the 2nd Mounted Regiment behind them as reserves; the 1st Mounted Regiment was deployed to the south and southeast of Makkum and the 22nd Mounted Regiment occupied the strip of coast between Stavoren and Lemmer. Korvettenkapitän Stein was immediately tasked with commandeering boats, either for a landing to the rear of the Kornwerderzand complex or for the crossing to West Friesland. His first report showed that the Dutch had acted efficiently when it came to maritime matters: there were hardly any boats to be had and many harbour entrances were unusable.

The collapse of the Wons Position As an outpost to the IJsselmeer Dam, the Wons Position was part of the Den Helder Position, which was commanded by Rear Admiral H. Jolles. General Winkelman had issued him with the following order for the Wons Position: to protect access to the IJsselmeer Dam against a coup de main, to receive the retreating TBF troops and “to attempt to prevent the

7 Kriegstagebuch AOK 18, 10 May 1940, in: BA-MA, N 126/19.

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Wons Position and Kornwerderzand

10 mei 1940

Commander of the Den Helder Position

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enemy accessing the IJsselmeer Dam for as long as possible”.8 It is, however, questionable whether this latter task had been made absolutely clear to the soldiers stationed at the Wons Position. For example, at 16.30 hrs on 11 May, Major B. Smid sent his supply train back across the IJsselmeer Dam. Three-quarters of an hour later, he formally reported to Jolles that evacuation of the northern Dutch provinces was complete and he explic8 V.E. Nierstrasz, De Stelling van Den Helder. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1960) 29. Nierstrasz wonders whether the commander of the Wons Position really was properly informed of the instruction. A note held by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation with a strongly defensive tone, the provenance of which is unknown, states of Bouwe Smid that the commander of the Wons Position was surprised by the order to hold his ground.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 333 itly requested instructions. “Hold your ground,” was the reply.9 The rear admiral was unable to supply the requested artillery, air-defence and air support, however. Self-confidence among the soldiers was certainly not high. The ninekilometre position, which ran from Zurich via Wons to Makkum, comprised field fortifications constructed from wood and earth, which could not be dug into the ground due to the high groundwater level and which therefore protruded high above ground level. These “molehills”, as they were nicknamed contemptuously by the soldiers, were “open to enemy reconnaissance troops, combat aircraft and artillery scouts as if presented on a plate”.10 The planned inundations had not yet been completed. In addition, the retreating TBF troops had had a demoralising effect. There were cases of overwrought nerves. For example, at the office of the commander of the Makkum sector, Captain C. Mars, regular Sergeant Major B. de Jong was shot dead on 11 May after repeatedly firing on his own troops and at civilians. Smid had few troops to deploy against his German opponents; the cyclist battalion had reinforcements of almost a complete artillery battalion and a battery of light anti-aircraft guns. He only had his own battalion, I-33 RI, reinforced by the 9th Reserve Border Company, the 1st company of the 12th Border Battalion (withdrawn from the O Line), the 1st Surveillance Troops Company, the 45th 6-Veld Field-gun Battery and a few other sections from other units. The Germans carried out their attack with professionalism. On the early morning of 12 May, reconnaissance units were sent to sound out various points along the Wons Position. Next, German planes machine-gunned the Dutch positions. Although the air attack resulted in few casualties, it did create a strong sense of fear. At 12.00 hrs, the artillery launched an attack lasting half an hour, the main effort of which was in the sector between Gooium and Hajum. When the guns fell silent, the cyclists went into action. They were preceded by an antitank gun which opened fire on the first field fortification which put up resistance. The soldiers surrendered after the first hit. The white shirt which they held up as a sign of surrender, presently followed by a second and third elsewhere, set off a chain reaction: one post after another surrendered. Within half an hour, the aggressors had captured the outpost sector and had penetrated the line of resistance. The direction of advance took 9 �� “Verslag-bevelen en berichten 10 t/m 14 mei, 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 461, file 5. 10 �� I.L. Uijterschout, �� “De Afsluitdijk en de Stelling van Den Helder 10-15 mei 1940”, Militaire Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 213.

A 6-Veld field gun at I-33 RI in the Wons Position.

A Dutch soldier killed at the Wons Position.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 335 the Dutch soldiers by surprise as it was along the Pingjum–Kornwerd axis. They had expected an assault across and along the number 43 main road. Some of the defence positions were consequently unusable and therefore other positions had to be taken up. The rapid German advance threatened to cut off the left flank, the sector at Zurich. The company commander therefore telephoned Major Smid’s command post. At that moment the latter was busy elsewhere. Lieutenant A.A. Lind, who was at the command post, gave his personal opinion: “If I were you I would retreat to the IJsselmeer Dam while continuing the fight.”11 Major Smid, however, had not yet considered retreating. He was therefore astonished to see 3-I-33 RI withdrawing to the IJsselmeer at great speed. Smid informed the commander of his right sector of this, the abovementioned Captain Mars, and requested him to cover a possible withdrawal of the central sector. He himself would try to bring 3-I-33 RI back into combat. This was easier said than done. Fearing the advancing German troops, the commander of the Kornwerderzand detachment, Captain C.F.J. Boers, had blown up the bridge offering access to the dam and in front of this were a few hundred Dutch soldiers on the Frisian side. Although Smid and other officers succeeded in restoring order, Rear Admiral Jolles gave permission to withdraw across the IJsselmeer Dam. The risk of an air attack on these defenceless troops must have been too much for him. In the meantime, a vicious battle was raging in the central section of the Wons Position, held by 1-I-33 RI under the command of Captain P. van der Linden. This reserve officer, determined to fight until the bitter end, succeeded in inspiring his men to give their all, thanks to his zeal and personal courage. At 16.40 hrs, he too had to surrender to the inevitable, however, and gave the signal to retreat. In Makkum, Van der Linden was forced to face the harsh reality that the adjacent companies had already crossed the IJsselmeer using all the available boats. The courageous defenders of the Wons sector had no choice but to surrender to the enemy. A total of over three hundred Dutch soldiers were taken prisoner by the 1st Cavalry Division that afternoon. The first German soldiers reached the IJsselmeer Dam at 17.00 hrs on 12 May. Under the cover of encroaching darkness, enemy storm troops succeeded in penetrating up to the bridge opening in front of the Kornwerderzand position when they were mistaken by the Dutch soldiers for a group that had got left behind. When the Germans opened fire on one 11 �� Exchange of letters between V.E. Nierstrasz and Captain A.A. Lind, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 462, file 1.

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of the searchlights, heavy Dutch rifle fire drove them back. Two German soldiers ended up in a minefield, “resulting in one man being torn apart by a mine”.12 Feldt was now in an unenviable position: due to a lack of boats, he could not cross to West Friesland, but neither could he carry out an assault to the rear of Kornwerderzand. Furthermore, the gunboat HNLMS Friso from the IJsselmeer flotilla had increased the cavalrymen’s fear of the water by firing a direct hit on a battery of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was deployed in Stavoren, leaving three Germans dead. Feldt therefore only had one option open to him: to try to capture Kornwerderzand via the IJsselmeer Dam which provided no cover.

The offensive reconnaissance mission fails The Dutch soldiers at Kornwerderzand were full of self-confidence and were prepared for battle. That should come as no surprise. Their position was one of the most modern in the Netherlands. It comprised two lines of casemates, one to the east and one to the west of the drainage sluices. The first line was made up of fourteen constructions, including seven combat casemates, a hospital casemate and a searchlight casemate. The second line served primarily as cover in the event of an assault to the rear. All the casemates were constructed from heavily reinforced concrete. The tops were approximately three metres thick. These were generally also covered by a 30-cm layer of earth. On 12 May, the Luftwaffe had already carried out two air raids on the position which did not result in any casualties or cause any severe damage. The detachment—7 officers, 25 NCOs and 193 other ranks—was therefore convinced of its own strength. The soldiers had been stationed there for a while and their commander, the abovementioned Captain Boers, had succeeded in making them into a close team. A highly effective firing plan had been prepared for the 12 heavy machine guns and four 5cm guns in the first line, a plan which thanks to a system of flanking fire covered the entire access to the position. Underground cables enabled excellent communications, even with Den Helder. Boers, who was idolised by his men, was a competent professional soldier, who managed to stay calm during those turbulent days in May 1940. On 11 May, he ordered that the field of fire be cleared by destroying a petrol station and wooden hotel. On the same day, a month’s worth of provisions was obtained and put into storage and the underground water tanks 12 �� “Die 1. Kavallerie-Division im Westen 10.5.40-29.6.40”, in: BA-MA, RH 29-1/54.

German 37mm antitank gun at the head of the IJsselmeer Dam.

The failed offensive reconnaissance mission on 13 May.

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were filled to the brim. On the eastern side of the position, a double row of beam-post obstacles was erected. Dutch engineers laid a minefield in front of this on 11 May. On the night of 11 May, Boers ordered his artillery officer, Reserve Second Lieutenant W.J.H. IJzereef, to send out a bicycle patrol of about ten men towards the mainland. On its return, the patrol reported that it had seen no enemy activity. The events of 12 May described earlier had no effect on the men’s morale. In order to make the position less vulnerable to air attacks, Rear Admiral Jolles sent an anti-aircraft battery and an anti-aircraft machine-gun platoon to Kornwerderzand as reinforcements. These units arrived there in the early hours of 13 May, to the great enthusiasm of the Dutch soldiers who had until then been unable to offer resistance to the enemy aircraft. The three 2cm anti-aircraft guns under the command of Reserve Second Lieutenant G.J. Vis and Warrant Officer J. Kalma were placed in the first line, the second anti-aircraft machinegun platoon was placed in the second line under Ensign Fritschi. The effectiveness of this decision by the commander of the Den Helder Position was proved only a few hours later. During a renewed air raid, the unsuspecting German pilots were treated to heavy fire in reply. In spite of the enemy machine-gun bullets raining down on them, the soldiers manning the guns continued to fire back undaunted. The fierce air defence forced the German aircraft to carry out subsequent raids from a higher altitude. The two sides countered each other’s ruses with new ruses of their own. The German pilots attempted to lull the Dutch air defence into a false sense of security by carrying out mock battles. The soldiers at Kornwerderzand replied by placing stovepipes in a camouflaged construction in order to confuse the aggressor into thinking they were guns. During the course of the afternoon, German batteries opened fire from the head of the IJsselmeer Dam. Their fire, however, had little effect on the three-metre-thick concrete casing. In one casemate a masking cover came loose, blocking the line of fire of the 5.5cm gun, but this was remedied by the fearless action of Private W. Pronk. He succeeded in removing the cover in the midst of enemy fire. The attempt by the 1st Cavalry Division to fire at the casemate embrasures using specially positioned anti-aircraft guns failed. At about 18.00 hrs, Captain Boers saw movement at the head of the IJsselmeer Dam through his observation periscope. In his combat report written on 22 May, he described his impressions as follows: “An enemy infantry section of about 70 men had been sent forward across the dam.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 339 They were fired on with high-explosive grenades from casemate VI.”13 Before firing on and thus halting the German shock troops, Boers had ordered that they should be allowed to advance until they were about 800 metres away. This was achieved thanks to excellent firing discipline. The German troops had no choice but to retreat. The foremost soldiers were only able to return to their lines under the cover of darkness. Three Germans were killed during this offensive reconnaissance mission.14 Just before midnight, the 1st Cavalry Division reported to the 18th Army that the mission had failed. The reason given was that the German artillery and anti-aircraft guns were not able to take out the casemates. The army group thought the attempted assault too insignificant to report in the day’s combat report. All that von Küchler reported to Army Group B was: “Offensive reconnaissance of positions to the north-east exit of the IJsselmeer Dam unsuccessful.”15 The troops at Kornwerderzand continued to operate in an alert fashion. For example, during the night of 13 May, Boers had the soldiers deliver harassing fire from time to time, set off flares and switch searchlights on and off to indicate that the Dutch troops were ready for further combat. Rear Admiral Jolles and his chief of the Army Staff Section, Captain I.L. Uijterschout, had also been busy. After they had sent the air-defence units to Kornwerderzand, they consulted on opportunities for eradicating enemy artillery fire. The arrival in Den Helder of gunboat HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau was used for this purpose. On the afternoon of 13 May, Jolles sent the boat to the entrance of a channel to the north of the dam, known as the Doove Balg, from which the 15cm guns could just reach the head of the dam. Maritime assistance was not without its risks. Jolles had asked British air-defence vessel HMS Valorous to provide the Johan Maurits van Nassau with air cover, but this request was not honoured, and the Dutch ship therefore had no protection against air attacks. This was particularly risky as the narrow channel offered the ship little room for manoeuvre. When darkness fell, the ship fired three trial rounds. On 14 May, German artillery again commenced firing at 08.00 hrs. The German lines were greatly surprised when this was answered an hour later. From 09.00 hrs, the Johan Maurits van Nassau fired on the enemy artil13 �� “Verslag C-detachement Kornwerderzand, kap C.F. Boers”, 22 May 1940, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 462, file 14. 14 �� Official report dated 23 April 1980 from the Deutschen Dienststelle für die Benachrichtigung der nächsten Angehörigen von Gefallenen der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht (WAst), in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 462, file 13A. In what is known as the Ehrentafel in Die 1. Kavallerie-Division im Westen, three fatalities are mentioned. 15 �� 1a. �� A.O.K. 18, “Morgenmeldung 8.00 Uhr”, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/99.

Preparations in Lemmer harbour for ferrying materiel to the coast of Noord-Holland.

Informing the home front, 15 May, following news of the Dutch capitulation.

“vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!” 341 lery positions using her aft gun. The troops at Kornwerderzand observed proceedings via their periscopes and passed on corrections to Den Helder. These were then passed on to the naval ship in code. The first correction was received on the twentieth shot–firing velocity was one shot every 35 seconds. Until 10.30 hrs, the gunboat continued to fire, apart from one pause of fifteen minutes due to the threat of air attacks. Her firing was accurate: Kornwerderzand would no longer be hindered by enemy artillery fire. Only the Luftwaffe could still cause problems for the Dutch soldiers; during the afternoon, two aircraft bombed the position, albeit with little effect. The troops took measures to repair any damage; in addition, pioneers were actively helping to reinforce positions. When Captain Boers contacted the staff of the Den Helder Position commander, he was given the order to capitulate. He could not believe this order and Jolles himself had to confirm it. News of the capitulation was a bolt from the blue for his men. The Germans were also surprised when Captain Boers came to offer surrender. The 1st Cavalry Division had already decided that it was impossible to capture Kornwerderzand without large-scale air support and heavy artillery.

Conclusion The advance of the 1st Cavalry Division through the northern Netherlands went completely according to plan. German losses were limited. From 10 to 15 May, the cavalry division lost 21 men. On the Dutch side there were 22 casualties. Approximately half of the fatalities had occurred during the first few hours of hostilities, a common percentage.16 Thanks to the halting of the armoured train at Nieuweschans and thanks to the Wons Position, German efforts to capture the sluices at Kornwerderzand in a surprise attack were in vain. After having tested the Dutch 16 �� A report by the abovementioned WAst. The Ehrentafel (roll of honour) lists 23 deaths, but includes two instances of drowning on 16 May. The doctor attached to the 1st Cavalry Division notes no heavy losses in his combat report. On 17 May, when the division dressing station has to be moved, he reports 64 patients. These comprise the “sick” and “wounded”. Of these patients, eight are considered “unfit for transport”, (the majority of) these are undoubtedly the most severely wounded. On the Dutch side, in the TBF area 9 soldiers were killed, including a soldier from 1-12 Border Battalion who lost his life at the Wons Position (Nierstrasz, Noordelijke provinciën, 69). During the battle for the Wons Position, 13 soldiers were killed, including conscript Private G. Confurius who was shot by Sergeant Major B. de Jong, and the sergeant major himself (DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 461, file 4).

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soldiers in this modern fortification using air raids on 12 May, Feldt decided to try a further test on 13 May. The day’s operation was certainly not a large-scale assault, but an offensive reconnaissance mission. When the Dutch troops proved that they were not about to surrender, the mission was immediately called off. In contrast to the battle around the O, Q and F lines and at the Wons Position, Kornwerderzand was defended by means of good, efficient command, both at senior level by the commander of the Den Helder Position and on the spot by Captain Boers.

CHAPTER TEN

NOT A BRIDGE TOO FAR: THE BATTLE FOR THE MOERDIJK BRIDGES, DORDRECHT AND ROTTERDAM

The German plans As has been mentioned on several occasions, the advance through NoordBrabant constituted the main effort of the German attack on the Netherlands. One of the missions of the German army elements that carried out this attack was to penetrate Fortress Holland from the south by using the bridges at Moerdijk to cross the Hollands Diep and those at Dordrecht to cross the Oude Maas. To make this possible, those bridges had to be captured undamaged by the Germans, but it was clear that this would certainly be no easy task. The Dutch were not to be given any opportunity to blow up the bridges, and the German army leadership eventually decided that the only way to prevent this was to launch a large-scale attack by paratroops.1 In January 1940, the commander of the 7th Air Division, Generalmajor Kurt Student was advised of this decision. He was promoted to General� leutnant and was given command of a newly formed Airborne Corps, comprising his own division and the 22nd Air Transportable Division. This Luftwaffe corps was given the task of both carrying out the surprise attack on the airfields around The Hague and “keeping the bridges at Moerdijk (point of main effort) and Rotterdam open for the subsequent arrival of the mobile troops coming in via Tilburg–Breda”.2 The 22nd Air Transportable Division was then designated for the attack on The Hague, for which it was reinforced with a battalion and a company from the 7th Air Division. In exchange for this, it had had to give up the 16th Infantry Regiment and several support units to the air division. In the meantime, Student 1 Hans Umbreit, “Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa” in: Klaus A. Maier et al., Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.�� Band 2. Die Errichtung der Hege� monie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979) 259-260. 2 M.R.H. Calmeyer and V.E. Nierstrasz, De krijgsverrichtingen op het zuidfront van de Vesting Holland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1963) 238-248.

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Morning of 10 May 1940: German paratroops descending near the Moerdijk railway bridge. (Composite photograph.)

was formulating his plans for the airborne landings. He split the 7th Air Division into five groups for the attack on the bridges. Gruppe Süd was to land at Moerdijk and Dordrecht and consisted mainly of the Ist and IInd battalions of the 1st Parachute Regiment. The main objective of this group, which was operating under the command of the fanatic National Socialist Oberst B.O. Bräuer, was to capture the Moerdijk bridges; for the bridges over the Oude Maas at Dordrecht, only one company had been reserved, namely the 3rd of the Ist battalion. A second group, consisting of the IIIrd battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment, was to take possession of Waalhaven airfield at Rotterdam and keep control of it so that it could be used to fly in reinforcements. Generalleutnant Student and his staff were also to land here. One company from this battalion, after landing near the Feyenoord soccer stadium, was also to occupy the bridges over the Nieuwe Maas. Student was, however, not at all optimistic about the chances of success of this last action: the company “barely seemed strong enough to prevent the destruction of both bridges nor—if that were to succeed—to secure the bridges until the arrival of the IIIrd battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment”.3 It was the commander-in3 Hermann Götzel, ed., Generaloberst Kurt Student und seine Fallschirmjäger.�� Die �� Erin� nerungen des Generaloberst Kurt Student (Friedburg, 1980) III.

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chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, who therefore suggested that the 11th company of the 16th Infantry Regiment should use Heinkel He-59 floatplanes to land in the centre of Rotterdam, thus enabling a surprise attack on the bridges over the Nieuwe Maas. This idea seemed better than the original proposal and the plans for the group were thus changed accordingly. The group known as Gruppe Nord was the third one to be formed from the 7th Air Division. This group was commanded by Oberst Hans Kreysing and consisted mainly of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Its task was to take over “as a group the occupation of the Dordrecht–southern Rotterdam area and the protection of this area to the east and to the north” from the battalion of paratroops that had landed at the Waalhaven. The fourth group was made up of the IInd battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, which had not yet, however, had any parachute training. It would, therefore, be flown by plane to Waalhaven airfield and move on from there to Barendrecht. The fifth group consisted of reinforcements which were to be brought up in the days following the first airborne landings. For transporting the division, the “Special deployment aircraft wing”, commanded by Oberstleutnant F. Morzik, was available: some 215 Junkers Ju-52 aircraft. All in all, it was a bold plan with a great many uncertain factors. There was a very real possibility that the airborne landings would fail because the Germans had had so little experience in the tactical deployment of airborne troops. And what would happen if the German advance through Noord-Brabant did not proceed according to plan? Nevertheless, the Germans took the plunge and did so successfully: not only did the 7th Air Division capture all bridges according to plan, but it also managed to hold its position until the 9th Panzer Division arrived. The question now is how to explain this success.

Dutch combat readiness The Hollands Diep, over which the Moerdijk bridges lay, formed part of the southern front of Fortress Holland. The area in which the Ist and IInd battalions of the 1st Parachute Regiment were to land according to the plans was defended by Dutch troops belonging to what was known as the Kil Group. This group had its headquarters in Puttershoek and was led by Reserve Colonel J.A.G. van Andel. The core of the group was made up of the 28th Infantry Regiment (28 RI), supported by an extra machine-gun company, several batteries of field artillery and some anti-aircraft artillery.

Southern Front of Fortress Holland

May 1940


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MR

Kil Group

Strijen Sector

28

Wieldrecht Sector

3

34

3/28

23

1

17

25

3

14

6

(-)

1

3

Moerdijk Bridgehead

28

28

14

84

12

19

82 83 from10 May 1940


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The bridges over the Hollands Diep were protected to the south by a number of troops (the 3rd company of III-28 RI, the 12th Machine-gun Company, the 28th 6-Veld Field-gun Battery and the 19th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battery and the 82nd and 83rd Anti-aircraft Machine-gun Platoon) which formed what was called the Moerdijk Bridgehead. The commander of this bridgehead was Captain J.A.C.J. Marijnen. The defence of the northern side of the bridges was the responsibility of the commander of the Wieldrecht-west sector, Reserve Captain W.F.M. Populier. Available to him for this task were the 1st company of I-28 RI, the 84th Anti-aircraft Machine-gun Platoon and a group of police troops. The number of troops available for the defence of the Moerdijk bridges appeared to be sufficient, certainly because, in the event of a German attack, the 6th Border Battalion stationed in Noord-Brabant would be moved to the bridgehead. But little thought had as yet been given to the fixed positions, and at the end of April 1940 the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General J. van Andel, had had the munitions that had been distributed to the troops stored per company. Only the soldiers in the Moerdijk Bridgehead and a few soldiers on the northern side of the bridges carried their ammunition on them. Unlike at Moerdijk, in Dordrecht there were not many troops that could be used for an infantry battle. In the Dordrecht cantonment, the garrison consisted of the Pontoniers and Torpedomen Depot, a unit which had been almost exclusively trained in technical activities, as well as a company of pioneers and a railway engineers company.4 The cantonment commander was Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Mussert, the brother of the leader of the NSB (National Socialist Movement). Mussert had spent his entire career in the torpedo corps and was an outstanding specialist in this area. Nonetheless, he was not considered suitable for a field command post because his “physical and mental health” had suffered to such an extent as a result of serious illness–he had had a brain tumour removed in 1935–that “he would be able to provide little or no leadership in times of crisis”.5 Dordrecht had not been expected to end up on the front line, however, and the army leadership had thus not seen any reason to assign Mussert to a different post. More troops were present in Rotterdam. Cantonment commander Colonel P.W. Scharroo, an engineer officer, had under his command the IIIrd battalion of the 39th Infantry Regiment and three hundred marines, while the IIIrd battalion of the Rifles Regiment 4 A cantonment refers to a number of places situated near to each other in which troops are stationed and where direct engagement with the enemy is unlikely. 5 Calmeyer and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 11.

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had been at Waalhaven airfield since April 1940. The three hundred marines, about one hundred of whom were well-trained, were under the command of the commander of maritime assets, Colonel H.F.J.M.A. von Frijtag Drabbe, who did not come under the cantonment commander but directly under the Minister of Defence. Many of the other troops present in Rotterdam belonged to the depot troops and support units. They had not been trained for combat posts. This formation of the Dutch troops was understandable. The Dutch army leadership were only anticipating limited actions by airborne troops and not large-scale airborne landings. As a result of the German airborne operations in the attack on Denmark and Norway, the defences at the airfields around The Hague—the seat of government—were reinforced. Lieutenant General Van Andel opted—on the basis of the information available to him—to allow his troops in Rotterdam, Dordrecht and on the southern front of Fortress Holland to get some sleep on the night of 9 May and not to place them on a heightened state of alert.

The German airborne landings Early in the morning of 10 May, at around 04.00 hrs, the first German aircraft appeared high above the Hollands Diep. For half an hour, the Dutch shelters and positions were bombed. Shortly afterwards, some seven hundred paratroops belonging to the IInd battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment jumped out of their planes to the north and south of the Moerdijk bridges. They were led in this action by Hauptmann F. Prager, who had been in hospital until just before the German invasion of the Netherlands. Prager was suffering from an incurable disease, but wanted to spend the few months that he had left with his men. Two companies landed to the south of the Hollands Diep, some in the field of fire of the 4th section of the 12th Machine-gun Company. This section, under the command of Reserve Lieutenant J.M. Broekman, had, however, sought cover during the bombardment and were overrun by Germans before they could man the machine guns again. In the meantime, another group of paratroops had landed near the railway station at Lage Zwaluwe. The airborne landings took the troops in the Moerdijk Bridgehead completely by surprise. Once he had realised the gravity of the situation, the commander, Captain Marijnen, hurried to his office, where he telephoned his group commander to advise him of the attack. Marijnen also ordered Reserve Lieutenant F.P. de Jager, the commander of the 28th 6-Veld Field-gun Battery, who was present in his office, “if it

German paratroops after landing at the bridgehead at the Moerdijk, on the Brabant bank. On the left is the road bridge, on the right the railway bridge. The photograph was taken in September 1940, during the recording of a propaganda film in which the operations of the Airborne Corps were re-enacted.

The storming of the village of Moerdijk. Later reconstruction.

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was still possible to go to his guns and do whatever could still be done”.6 De Jager had barely left when Marijnen and several of his men were overpowered by paratroops. The group of Germans responsible for this were under the command of Leutnant Dietrich Lemm. After they had taken out the commander of the bridgehead, the only resistance the group encountered came from a few marechaussees and pontoniers, who were rendered harmless in a short firefight, during which Lemm and eight Dutch servicemen were killed.7 In the meantime, De Jager was trying to escape to the south with two 6-Veld field guns in order to be able to continue the battle, but after one kilometre it was clear to him that he was completely surrounded. Nonetheless, he got one of his guns into position and fired three shots. When De Jager stood up in order to improve the weapon’s aim, despite the warnings from a captain who had joined his group, he was shot and killed. The surrounded soldiers then surrendered. Virtually the whole of the Moerdijk Bridgehead was now in German hands. Only the 3rd section of 3-III-28 RI, which was near the village of Lage Zwaluwe, managed to put up some resistance for a while. By 10.30 hrs, however, some six hours after the first German paratroops had landed, there was nothing left of the Dutch military occupation of the bridgehead. Things were not much better for the Dutch troops of the Willemsdorp Covering Detachment to the north of the Moerdijk bridges. Surprised and many of them still in their nightclothes, they saw German paratroops landing around them. Most of the Dutch troops were surrounded in their shelters to the north of Willemsdorp and forced to surrender. The commander of the Wieldrecht-west sector, Captain Populier, saw a chance to escape and entrenched with several of his men along the road from Dordrecht to the Moerdijk bridges. They were determined to fight to the bitter end and when some Germans drove past in a commandeered bus, one of the lieutenants, F.N. Maas, threw “a well-aimed hand grenade into the bus, which stopped immediately and from which a terrible screaming arose”. It 6 �� Statement by Reserve Captain J.A.J.C. Marijnen, 25 November 1946, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DC-NIMH), Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 486, file 16. 7 It was long assumed that the group of Germans were commanded by Oberleutnant Fritz Lamm, a German who had lived near Moerdijk from 1924 to 1938. Recent research has produced plausible evidence that this was not the case and that the group was commanded by Leutnant Dietrich Lemm. The story of Fritz Lamm was based on a footnote in “Nederland’s verdediging tegen den Duitschen aanval. De Krijgsverrichtingen op het Zuidfront van de Vesting Holland (III) De overval”, Militaire Spectator CXVI (1947) 9. See http://www.waroverholland.com/zfh/index.php?page=oberleutnant-fritz-lamm. Consulted on 3 July 2008.


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was to no avail, however. The Germans were moving from the north and the east virtually unhindered towards the bridges and even Populier was forced to surrender “in view of the hopelessness of the situation and to prevent further needless bloodshed.”8 The Police Troops, who, under the command of Sergeant Major A. van Almkerk, were manning the casemates on the northern bank of the Hollands Diep, held out the longest. Only after the Germans had sealed off the air ducts of Van Almkerk’s casemate, blown up the steel entrance door and thrown a hand grenade inside, did the Sergeant Major surrender.9 The Moerdijk bridges were now entirely in German hands. At Willemsdorp, Tweede Tol and Catharinahoeve (a farm to the west of Tweede Tol on the Dordtsche Kil), the successful paratroops set up their defences and waited for events to unfold. In the meantime, paratroops had also landed in Dordrecht. A section of the 3rd company of the Ist battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment landed on the Zwijndrecht side of the Oude Maas. It soon had control of the bridges, but in order to secure its position definitively, it needed the support of the other part of the company, which had landed in the fields of De Polder (near the Krispijn district). These troops, led by Oberleutnant Freiherr von Brandis, thus set off towards the Oude Maas. Unfortunately for them, the 1st Pontoniers Depot Company, under the command of Reserve Captain H.J. Siegmund, was in the Krispijn district. One section of this company, led by Reserve Lieutenant J. van der Houwen, subjected the Germans to heavy fire, as a result of which von Brandis and others were killed. The Germans, shaken by the death of their commander, were attacked from the south by a group led by 57-year-old Warrant Officer H.P. Koster. A large section of the parachute company was eventually put out of action. Twelve Germans were killed and 82 taken prisoner. Things were thus not looking too good for the German occupiers of the bridges in Dordrecht. Much depended, therefore, on the part of the Ist parachute battalion which had landed as a regiment reserve in the middle of the Island of Dordrecht. As soon as commander Bräuer heard about the defeat of his 3rd company, he decided to go in person to the Dordrecht bridges. Attacks on the rear of his battalion, conducted by the 2nd company of I-28 RI, which was positioned alongside the Nieuwe Merwede, were repelled. An attempt by the ’s‑Gravendeel group reserve to halt the Ger8 Battle report by the Commander of the Wieldrecht-west Sector, undated, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 486, file 11. 9 A. van Almkerk, “Gevechtsbericht van de ‘Groep Politietroepen Willemsdorp’”, 8 June 1940, in: Enquêtecommissie regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel Ib (The Hague, 1949) 172 (annex 80).

Waalhaven airfield, 10 May 1940. Signals personnel from the staff of the 7th Air Division assemble. 10 May 1940

Dordrecht Cantonment

7. Fliegerdivision

May 1940


XX

7

Dordrecht Cantonment

14

1

Pontoniers and Torpedomen Depot

1 2

3

2

2

16

22

4 5 6 1 2 3

22

22


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man advance also failed. Some of the light weapons, as well as the single heavy machine gun possessed by this group (a reserve made up of the 2nd company of III-34 RI), jammed after only a few shots. After that, Bräuer’s battalion only had to deal with the 14th pioneers company, two sections of which were positioned on the road to the bridges. The commander of this company, Reserve Captain W. Mantel, thought he had seen Dutch soldiers amongst the German paratroops, and so, given that he did not want to risk firing on his own troops, he surrendered without a struggle.10 The Germans were now able to take a firm hold of the bridges over the Oude Maas. Generalleutnant Student had in the meantime set off from Germany in his plane towards Waalhaven airfield. He was extremely impressed by the German air fleet: “Wherever he looked, he could see planes, transport aircraft, fighter planes and bombers. All were gliding to the west, as if they were being drawn by invisible hands.” The aircraft were not troubled greatly by the Dutch air defences and after a while the Moerdijk bridges came into view. “To his great relief ”, Student was able to establish that these bridges, as well as those over the Oude Maas, had fallen into German hands undamaged. “This part of the plan of attack had obviously been successful.”11 The general was, however, on the way to Rotterdam, the third landing area for the 7th Air Division. How did the troops due to land there fare? The German airborne units had two objectives in the Rotterdam area: firstly, Waalhaven airfield, vital for the supply of reinforcements, and secondly, the bridges over the Nieuwe Maas, important for the assault on the heart of Fortress Holland. At 03.55 hrs, the first German bombers appeared above the Waalhaven, bombing the Dutch buildings and combat positions. The 3rd Fighter Squadron stationed at the airfield responded swiftly: within fifteen minutes, eight Fokker G-I fighter aircraft had been scrambled. The first fighter to engage the attacking aircraft was that of Reserve Lieutenant P. Noomen. He succeeded in shooting down two German Heinkel He-111 bombers. In all, the Dutch fighter aircraft brought down thirteen German planes before they had to stop because of a lack of ammunition and fuel. One fighter crashed. Despite the actions of the Dutch pilots, virtually all the buildings on the airfield were ablaze shortly after 04.00 hrs. An hour later, some 670 men from the IIIrd battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment, led by Hauptmann K.L. Schulz, jumped out of their planes. Some of them did not land in 10 �� W. �� Mantel, “Beknopt verslag krijgsverrichtingen”, 27 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 485, file 21. 11 �� Götzel, ��Generaloberst Kurt Student, 117-118.

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the right place, however. Some fell into the Waalhaven and drowned while others landed in the middle of the burning buildings and were killed in the flames. The IIIrd battalion of the Rifles Regiment, which was there to defend the airfield, was unable to mount an adequate defence. Most of the combat positions were attacked in the rear and had thus been eliminated. “The lack of cover at the rear for the heavy machine guns exacted a high price”, concluded a commission of inquiry two weeks later. “When paratroops who had landed outside the field had assembled and attacked the positions at the rear, with hand grenades too, there was no stopping them.” To make matters worse, the officers of the IIIrd Rifles Battalion who were not immediately put out of action were not exactly shining examples of strong leadership. Captain J.W. Heemskerk, for example, commander of the 3rd company, began the retreat purely on the basis of the rumour that the Dutch defences at Waalhaven airfield had given up the battle, while in reality several sections were still bravely putting up a fight. Even the battalion commander, Major A.J.R. de Vos, left his command post and set off towards Rotterdam, where he was forced to surrender later that day.12 After a short battle, the airfield was in German hands; around four hundred Dutch servicemen had been taken prisoner. Several attempts by the Dutch to bomb the airfield also failed to make any difference to that fact. An attack by three Fokker T-V bombers, escorted by six Fokker D-XXI fighters, was averted by the actions of nine fast Messerschmidt Me‑109s, during the course of which Reserve Lieutenant Pilot A.H. Bodaan, who had already been hard at it since 03.45 hrs, was one of a number of men who lost their lives. Just as at Waalhaven airfield, there had been German air drops at 05.00 hrs in the city of Rotterdam. One spectacular action was that of a dozen Heinkel He-59 floatplanes which landed, with some 120 men from the 16th Infantry Regiment on board, on both sides of the Maas bridges. The infantrymen rowed to the shore in rubber dinghies and occupied the abutments, the quayside and several buildings near the bridges. After this daring exploit, they quickly received support from 42 paratroops from the IIIrd battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment, which had landed near the Feyenoord stadium under the command of Oberleutnant Horst Kerfin. In the meantime, both Generalleutnant Student and his staff and the IIIrd battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, led by Oberstleutnant Dietrich 12 �� “Rapport �� van de commissie belast met het onderzoek betreffende de wijze, waarop– en de omstandigheden onder welke, het Vliegpark Waalhaven in den voormiddag van 10 mei in handen van den vijand is geraakt”, 29 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 447, file 22.


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Dutch soldiers take cover during the fighting in Rotterdam.

von Choltitz, had landed at Waalhaven airfield. The battalion moved off immediately towards the Willems bridge, their main objective in order to reach the northern bank of the Maas. The German troops were held up for a while near the Afrikaanderplein by the virtually unarmed 2nd company of Quartermaster Troops and the 2nd company of III-39 RI. There were several firefights before the Germans could move on. This gave the Dutch troops stationed in the north of Rotterdam the opportunity to take countermeasures. Various commanders issued orders on their own initiative. Captain J. van Rhijn, for example, commander of the machine-gun company of III-39 RI, received orders from staging commander Lieutenant Colonel P.J. Gaillard to, “with the machine-gun company, occupy the northern bank of the Maas facing the Noordereiland, an island in the river Maas, and prevent more German floatplanes from landing on the Maas.” Van Rhijn then used several heavy machine guns to open fire on the Boompjes, as a result of which the German troops that were there

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had to withdraw toward the bridges.13 Partly because of this, the German bridgehead on the northern bank of the Maas was becoming smaller all the time. A small group led by Oberleutnant Kerfin was eventually able to hold its position in the office block of the Nationale Levensverzekerings� bank. When von Choltitz arrived at the Maas bridges with his battalion, however, Dutch fire had made it impossible for the Germans to cross the river. He thus decided to set up a defence on the Noordereiland. The daring German airborne operation was a complete success. Both Waalhaven airfield and the bridges had fallen in a usable state into the hands of the Airborne Corps. The main reason for this German success was the fact that the Dutch army leadership had not given sufficient consideration to the possibility of a large-scale deployment of airborne troops. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Van Andel was of the opinion that the southern front of Fortress Holland lay in the second line, because it was sufficiently protected by the troops on the Maas and in the Peel-Raam Position. He did not, therefore, feel it was necessary to alert the troops stationed there on 9 May. For the Dutch troops at the bridges and at Waalhaven airfield, many of whose munitions had been stored per company, the actions of the German paratroops in the morning of 10 May came as a great surprise. This meant that, on the whole, they were not able to mount an adequate defence, even though a parachute unit landing in unfamiliar surroundings can easily run into difficulties when faced with robust and prompt action by the defending forces. Such robust action was demonstrated by a small number of energetic Dutch units in Dordrecht, which put a large part of a German company out of action, but that victory was not able to prevent the success of the airborne operation.

Consolidation of the German positions The fact that German troops had control of the bridges over the Hollands Diep, the Oude and the Nieuwe Maas and of Waalhaven airfield did not mean, of course, that they could rest on their laurels. First of all, they needed to prepare for any Dutch counterattacks. After Generalleutnant Student had arrived at the Waalhaven, he went almost immediately with his chief of staff, Major H. Trettner, and a few officers to the south of Rotterdam, where he set up his command post in a school. Further reinforcements were flown in constantly throughout the day. Some of those landing at the 13 �� J. �� van Rhijn, “Gevechtsbericht van het gevecht op den 10den mei 1940”, 12 mei 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 460, file 60.


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Waalhaven were the IInd battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment and the rest of the 16th Infantry Regiment. The 7th Air Division was also reinforced with troops which had originally been destined for the area around The Hague, but had not been able to land there. The island of IJsselmonde was quickly cleared of Dutch troops and, according to plan, the commander of 16th Infantry Regiment, Oberst Hans Kreysing, was given the command in this part of the area of operations of the air division. The Ist battalion of his regiment was charged with the defence of the northern bank of the Oude Maas, where his men relieved the IInd battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment, which had landed earlier. Two companies from the IInd battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment were protecting the western bank of the river Noord, where Generalleutnant Student had been shocked to discover a bridge he did not know about at Alblasserdam, while the IIIrd battalion held its positions on the Noordereiland in Rotterdam. With the intention of personally leading any battles for the bridge over the Noord, he moved his command post to Rijsoord. Within a short time, German units had also occupied the other bridges which provided access to the island of IJsselmonde. The bridge at Spijkenisse was sealed off by 09.00 hrs. Student sent the IInd battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment to the vicinity of the bridge at Barendrecht. The undefended bridge fell into German hands unchallenged, which meant that the troops belonging to the Kil Group no longer had access to IJsselmonde. A weak point in the German deployment was formed by the bridges at Dordrecht, where Dutch troops were keeping the Germans under constant fire. Second Lieutenant J.B. Plasschaert and Sergeant Major A. van Vlierden were making themselves particularly useful in this respect. Supported by only a handful of soldiers and with only three light machine guns, they waged a constant firefight against the enemy at very short range. In the course of the fighting, soldiers regularly risked their lives, such as torpedoman C.M. Oome, who was fatally wounded when he volunteered to go and get ammunition. The actions of these Dutch troops were of such concern to Student that he moved the IInd battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment to Zwijndrecht, apart from the men who stayed at the bridge at Barendrecht. The situation nevertheless remained extremely precarious for the Germans. First of all, Dutch counterattacks were expected from the south by elements of the Kil Group and by units stationed in Noord-Brabant. Furthermore, Generalleutnant Student received word that evening that there was a large concentration of Dutch forces in Alblasserwaard. Would he and his troops be able to hold out until the XXVIth

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Corps arrived? The answer to that question would depend on the Dutch countermeasures.

Actions by the border battalions and the Kil Group There were two border battalions stationed in the west of Brabant, the 3rd and the 6th, which, in accordance with the plan, set off after the German invasion towards Willemstad and Moerdijk, respectively. At 05.30 hrs, the 6th Border Battalion, under the command of Major J.F.W. Hendriksz, was informed of the landing of paratroops at the Moerdijk bridges. Half an hour earlier, on the basis of the instructions which dated back to the mobilisation period, the battalion had destroyed or blocked all the roads leading south, although nobody in the battalion understood why this was necessary, given that the Netherlands was being attacked from the east. Once the battalion had set off towards the Moerdijk bridges, Major Hendriksz did not do a great deal more. He did not mount a concentrated attack, but positioned his battalion around what had in the meantime become the German bridgehead. As a result, a bombardment by four Dutch Fokker C-X aircraft at 17.15 hrs was not exploited. The following day, promising reports were received from the district commander of the Marechaussee in Breda, who said that French troops were on the way. The commander of the 2nd Light Armoured Brigade, colonel P.E.A. Dario, had already decided to send a detachment under the command of chef d’escadron G. Michon to the Moerdijk bridges. Michon met Major Hendriksz just to the north of Breda and they decided to launch an attack on the German positions that same day.14 In the evening of 11 May, the French troops marched northwards. The detachment was spotted by Luftwaffe reconnaissance planes, however. Generalmajor R. Putzier, the commander of the section of the Luftwaffe that was operating over the Netherlands, decided to take immediate action. When the French armoured vehicles arrived in the village of Zevenbergschen Hoek, a large number of Stukas attacked them. One of the company commanders from the 6th Border Battalion gave the following eye-witness account: The German planes spotted the French column and my command post and there was then a bombardment that destroyed everything around me. Any14 �� V.E. �� Nierstrasz, “De Franse en de Belgische operatieplannen van 1939 en 1940 in verband met de Nederlandse verdediging van de zuidelijke provinciën en de opmars van het Franse VIIe leger naar Noord-Brabant en Zeeland in mei 1940”, Orgaan van de Vereniging ter beoefening van krijgswetenschappen, IV (1949-1950) 144-145.


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thing that was not demolished was set on fire. For an hour and a half, we were bombed and subjected to a hail of machine-gun fire from the air. The entire village was razed to the ground.15

Michon decided after that to abort the attack. Hendriksz, too, saw little point in any further attempts to recapture the Moerdijk Bridgehead. He pulled his battalion back behind the small Noord-Brabant river, the Mark.16 After the war, General Putzier described the actions of the Luftwaffe as “the air force’s greatest success in the operations in the Netherlands”.17 The 3rd Border Battalion had in the meantime displaced to Willemstad. This battalion, which was commanded by Major A.G.C. Reijers and which had been weakened in April because it had had to give up two sections to the Border Rifles Battalion, reached the Hoekse Waard during the night of 10 May. Here, it received orders to cross the Oude Maas in order to thus be able to recapture Waalhaven airfield. The plan that Major Reijers made for this was a good one. His 1st and 2nd companies would be taken across the Oude Maas near Heinenoord, after which they would have to advance towards the Waalhaven. His 4th company was to cross the river on the ferry at Puttershoek so that it could then execute a flank attack on the German units north of the bridge at Barendrecht. The 3rd company of the border battalion was one of those kept on standby for storming the bridge. The crossing of the Oude Maas began at 06.00 hrs. Once they had arrived on the northern bank of the river, they quickly encountered German machine-gun fire. Almost immediately, panic broke out among the tired soldiers of the 1st and 2nd companies, “which made it impossible for the company commander and the section commanders to get their subordinates to do their duty”. With men throwing aside their weapons and equipment, it was a matter of “sauve qui peut”.18 Many soldiers disappeared into the reeds in the river forelands, others swam across the Maas. 15 �� A.M.J. �� Mol, “Verslag van de krijgsverrichtingen van de commandant van de 2e compagnie van het 6e Grensbataljon”, 1 July 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 528, file 20. 16 �� J.F.W. Hendriksz, “Oorlog over de krijgsverrichtingen van het 6e grensbataljon in Noord-Brabant”, October 1940, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Part Ib, 173-175 (annex 81). 17 �� Cited �� in: P.G.H. Maalderink, “De open achterpoort van de Vesting Holland.�� Het �� relaas van de krijgsverrichtingen op het Zuidfront van de Vesting Holland tegen de Duitse luchtlandingseenheden in mei 1940”, Militaire Spectator, CL (1981) 207. 18 �� Th. van Leeuwen, “Dagboek van 10 tot 15 mei 1940”, 17 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 528, file 12.

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Casualties from Major D.P. Ravelli’s II-28 RI after the failed assault on the bridges of Dordrecht on the night of 10 May.

After these events, the companies were so demoralised that any new attempt to cross the Oude Maas was impossible. The assault on the bridge at Barendrecht failed too. Once he had learned from the mayor of Heerjansdam “that Barendrecht was occupied by strong German units”, the somewhat lethargic commander of the 4th company, Reserve Captain G.J.A. Manders, decided to do an about-turn, partly in view of “the over-exhaustion of the troops, (...) as well as the fact that there was no communication at all with my battalion commander”.19 This meant that the storming of the bridge, which started at 12.30 hrs, stood no chance whatsoever. Troops who dared to make it onto the 500-metre-long bridge were shot down mercilessly. The counterattack by the 3rd Border Battalion thus achieved nothing. 19 �� G.J.A. �� Manders, “Verslag krijgsverrichtingen 10-15 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 528, file 16.


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In the meantime, the commander of the Kil Group, Colonel Van Andel, had not been idle. When, during the morning of 10 May, he began to feel that Dordrecht would be lost, he decided to order Major D.P. Ravelli’s IInd battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment to cross the Dordtsche Kil at ’s-Gravendeel in order to relieve the town. It took a long time before the troops were assembled. It was not until 7 o’clock in the evening that the thousand or so men of the reinforced battalion were able to cross the Kil on the Wieldrecht ferry. The advance progressed smoothly after that. But once darkness had fallen, Ravelli called a halt, to the considerable displeasure of Colonel Van Andel, who gave the order: “Push on without delay!”. Ravelli, however, considered an advance in a north-easterly direction— towards the centre of Dordrecht—to be unwise and decided to go straight towards the bridges over the Oude Maas. Everything seemed fine until 02.30 hrs, when the forward company came under fire from two sides. Mass confusion ensued. There were cries of “Go back! Go back!” and many began firing indiscriminately. “With the greatest difficulty, the officers managed to get their own men to stop firing. We were on several occasions in serious danger of being shot by our own men”, said Ravelli later.20 Among the dead were a company commander, Reserve Captain W.J.C. van den Bosch, one lieutenant and nineteen NCOs and other ranks. A number of soldiers fled back to the Wieldrecht ferry and spread the word in the Kil Group that II-28 RI had been “destroyed”. That report was somewhat premature. From his battalion, Ravelli managed to form what more or less constituted a unit. On the morning of 11 May, he tried for the second time to reach the bridges over the Oude Maas. This time, his battalion was not met by machine-gun fire, but by fifty Dutch soldiers waving white flags and shouting “Come on Holland!” and “Don’t shoot!”. Ravelli was suspicious and went, strangely enough with virtually all his staff officers, to size up the situation. It did indeed turn out to be an act of treachery. “When I first got very close, I noticed German soldiers on the W[est] side of the road. One of them approached me and said: ‘You are a prisoner!’”21 Thus bereft of their officers, most of the soldiers of II‑28 RI retreated. The bridgehead at the Wieldrecht ferry was evacuated in great chaos and the Dutch troops who were still positioned between Dordrecht and the Moerdijk bridges pulled back to the city in the evening of 11 May. The Island of Dordrecht was thus cleared, 20 �� D.P. �� Ravelli, “Verslag betreffende de krijgsverrichtingen in het tijdvak 10-17 mei”, 29 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 458A, file 31. 21 �� Rapport by Ravelli, 10 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 485A, file 31.

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apart from the city itself. Maybe the Light Division, which was advancing from the east, could offer more solace.

The Light Division takes action After General H.G. Winkelman had placed the Ist Corps at the disposal of the Commander of Fortress Holland, the Light Division was the last remaining part of the strategic reserve of the Dutch army. The division’s commander, Colonel H.C. van der Bijl, led what was regarded in the mobilisation period as the most up-to-date part of the Dutch army. But much had changed since the outbreak of war. On 10 May, the division had been stripped of its armoured vehicles, its two hussars-motorcyclist regiments and part of its mobile artillery. Consequently, its combat power was not much greater than that of a reinforced infantry regiment. At 06.00 hrs on 10 May, Van der Bijl received orders from Winkelman to move his division to Fortress Holland, even though many had expected the Light Division to fight its battles in Noord-Brabant. The commander of the division had barely responded to this order when he was notified by telephone that the Moerdijk bridges had fallen into German hands. In response, Winkelman placed Van der Bijl’s troops under the command of the Fortress Holland commander, Lieutenant General Van Andel, “to be deployed if necessary to occupy the northern bank of the Merwede from Gorinchem to Dordrecht”.22 At the Light Division’s headquarters, however, the words “if necessary” were not received and Van der Bijl thus ordered his troops to occupy the Merwede front. This order also failed to reach all the units, as a result of which confusion arose to the north of the Merwede. This confusion was not helped when, in the afternoon of 10 May, Winkelman authorised Lieutenant General Van Andel to deploy the Light Division against the German occupation of Waalhaven airfield. Once again, Van der Bijl, who was in Molenaarsgraaf at the time, received new orders. He was now to attack the German troops at IJsselmonde by way of the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam and recapture Waalhaven airfield. Furthermore, a cyclist battalion was to be made available to the cantonment commander in Dordrecht. Van der Bijl was not advised of the situation to the west of the Noord or at the bridges over the Oude Maas at Dordrecht. Given that the commander of the Light Division knew that the Moerdijk bridges had fallen into German hands and also that there was heavy fighting in Rotterdam, he should have realised that it was vitally im22 �� Calmeyer �� and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 63.

Pre-war German military map which shows that the 7th Air Division did not know about the opening of the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam at the beginning of the war.

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portant that a strong bridgehead be established as quickly as possible to the west of the river Noord in order to ensure the success of the subsequent actions by his division. Van der Bijl did not act with the necessary urgency, however: the battalion from the Cyclist Regiment (III-2 RW) which had to go to Dordrecht did not set off to the bridge over the Noord until 21.30 hrs. Half an hour earlier, the division commander had gone in person to assess the situation and had heard from a local policeman that the western bank of the Noord had been occupied by German troops during the course of the afternoon and that they had in all likelihood planted explosives in the abutments. The bridge guard confirmed the story.23 Instead of the IIIrd battalion of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment mounting an immediate attack on what were probably only weak German positions on the other side of the bridge–the companies from the IInd battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment sent urgently to the bridge by Student had indeed not yet arrived–Van der Bijl ordered the commander of III-2 RW to go to Dordrecht on the ferry at Papendrecht. A missed opportunity! The following day, Colonel Van der Bijl decided to have a go at recapturing the bridge over the Noord. According to his plan, one group consisting of the 1st Cyclist Regiment would cross the Noord to the north of Alblasserdam and another group, consisting of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment, should gain control of the bridge over this river. The commander of the latter regiment, Lieutenant Colonel H. Mijsberg, put two companies from his IInd battalion, the 1st and the 3rd, in position on either side of the approach road to the bridge. At 03.45 hrs, one section from each company crossed the river in small boats, to the north and south of the bridge, respectively. Their mission was to attack the German troops at the bridge, estimated to number between 20 and 35, from two sides. The crossing itself was a success. After that, the entire operation ran aground. The German troops were alerted by the supporting fire from the eastern bank, both sections were faced with a 30-metre wide stretch of water in their advance to the bridge and the northern section came under heavy fire from friendly troops. The commander, Reserve Lieutenant L. Falkenburg, was seriously wounded as a result. At 08.00 hrs, an attempt was made to storm the bridge from the Alblasserwaard, but it failed miserably. The Luftwaffe then proceeded to bomb Alblasserdam, thus severely demoralising the Dutch troops; no-one

23 �Ibid, 64-65.


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knew how to defend themselves against such air attacks. Eventually, the sections on the western bank withdrew to their own side of the river.24 Van der Bijl then ordered the commander of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment to cross the Noord further north, at the Kinderdijk ferry. But because the Germans had by then reinforced their troops, this attempt failed as well. And what about the 1st Cyclist Regiment? This regiment had already found it extremely difficult to reach the bank of the Noord. This was because it had already been taking up positions on the Merwede front when the order came in to cross the Noord. There were then traffic jams on the narrow roads in the Alblasserwaard because of columns crossing each other’s paths and officers losing their way. Public road maps often proved more reliable than military maps. Despite these setbacks, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel R.C. van Gennep led the regiment in the attempt to cross the Noord, but to no avail. The machine-gun fire from the reinforced German units was too heavy. “There is no chance of success”, said Van Gennep in his battle report: “The well-aimed enemy fire is causing losses and is completely covering the dyke. It also turns out that the Germans have total air supremacy.”25 After all these failures, Colonel Van der Bijl decided that (…) the crossing and the execution of the further task of the Light Division without the reinforcement of armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft defences and/or aircraft would be impossible without extremely high losses, and even then success would be doubtful in the extreme.26

At 10.15 hrs, the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General Van Andel, approved the decision to stop the attempts by the Light Division to cross the river Noord. He now ordered Colonel Van der Bijl by telephone to hold the Noord, clear all German troops from the Island of Dordrecht and then to seize the Waalhaven via Wieldrecht, ’s-Gravendeel and Barendrecht. In other words, what had not been possible by means of a direct route, the Light Division still had to attempt by way of a considerable detour. But at the same time Van der Bijl now received two additional orders: to hold the Noord and to seize the Island of Dordrecht. He had to split his forces and, before launching a concentrated attack on the Waalhaven, have his troops fan out over the Island of Dordrecht to destroy the German forces there. In order to execute all this, Colonel Van der Bijl formed two new combat groups: firstly, a ‘Holding Group’ and, 24 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”, undated [1940], in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 529, file 3. 25 �� “Gevechtsbericht van C.-1 R.W.”, 5 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 529, file 28. 26 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”.

German airborne troops in Rijsoord look at the results of the air attack on Alblasserdam on 11 May.

Paratroops at the ’s-Gravendeelsedijk defending the approach to the Zwijndrecht bridge in Dordrecht.


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secondly, a ‘Main Group’. The task of the Holding Group, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Van Gennep, was to prevent German troops from crossing the Noord. The Main Group comprised the entire 2nd Cyclist Regiment, the IInd battalion of the 1st Cyclist Regiment and the IInd battalion of the Mobile Artillery Corps, and was commanded by the commander of what was known as the Shadow Staff, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. van Diepenbrugge.27 The group was given the task of recapturing the Island of Dordrecht and then Waalhaven airfield. The staff leading this operation consisted of only four officers, while the full staff of the Light Division, including Van der Bijl, made their way to Bleskensgraaf, which was further to the rear. There were other things wrong too. Van Diepenbrugge, for instance, only had limited information about the situation on the Island of Dordrecht, information which was mainly based on what the Commander of Fortress Holland had reported to Van der Bijl. Furthermore, the Dordrecht cantonment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mussert, was not under the command of the Light Division and no contact had been made with Colonel Van Andel, the commander of the Kil Group, in whose area the action was actually to take place. Van Diepenbrugge also decided that the attack, which was to be led by Lieutenant Colonel Mijsberg, the commander of 2nd Cyclist Regiment, should take place over a wide front of some nine kilometres, without any point of main effort and with hardly any artillery. On top of all this, the actions of the German Luftwaffe were having a disruptive effect. The headquarters of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment and the IInd battalion of that regiment were, for example, being bombed constantly. “It’s not producing many casualties”, said Mijsberg, but “it is, however, demoralising the troops because no countermeasures can be taken”.28 Partly because of this, there was not much hope of an orderly crossing at Papendrecht. In the meantime, the mood in Dordrecht had become extremely tense. One commander reported, for instance, that “in Dordrecht there were numerous centres (groups of houses) from which enemy troops opened fire on our men”.29 Rumours were rife about a highly active body of ‘fifth columnists’ in Lieutenant Colonel Mussert’s city. And anyway, could someone with the name of Mussert actually be trusted? In this uncertain situation, the troops of the demoralised Light Division began their all-important but nonetheless poorly prepared counterattack. The ques27 �� The Shadow Staff was set up in case the Light Division was split.�� See: “De Afzonderlijke Staf ”, Militaire Spectator, CXI (1942) 5. 28 �� H. Mijsberg, “Verslag van de gebeurtenissen van 10 mei t/m 15 mei”, 1 June 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 530, file 1. 29 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”.

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tion was very much whether this attack would return the southern front of Fortress Holland to Dutch hands. Lieutenant Colonel Van Diepenbrugge, as mentioned previously, ordered his troops to move southwards over a wide front. In the eastern part of the Island of Dordrecht, where there were only small numbers of German soldiers, the Ist and IIIrd battalion of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment made good progress. At around 10.00 hrs, the Dutch troops had moved so far south that they halted to give the troops in the western part of the Island of Dordrecht the chance to link up. In that part of the island, however, things were going wrong. The IInd battalion of the 1st Cyclist Regiment, led by Major H.C. Kloppenburg, was supposed to launch an attack “in a southerly direction, in order to establish communications with friendly troops who were to cross the Dordtsche Kil at Wieldrecht”. Initially, however, the promised artillery support was not forthcoming, and it was mainly friendly troops that were hit when firing did eventually commence.30 When the battalion wanted to get moving, it ran into an unexpected, but no less powerful, German attack. What had happened? Generalleutnant Student had already been aware on 10 May of the extremely precarious position of his troops at the bridges over the Oude Maas in Dordrecht. It was thus clear to him on 12 May that “the situation in Dordrecht could only be rectified by a German attack”. His plan of attack was that a German unit, led by Oberstleutnant John de Boer and consisting of approximately 560 officers and men, would execute an enveloping movement and thus isolate the city from the rest of the island. The Dutch troops in the city could then be eliminated. Most of Student’s plan worked. After the German troops had executed their enveloping movement, they entered Dordrecht from the south-east. A number of chaotic but fierce street battles ensued. The outcome of this was that in any event the whole of the south-eastern part of the city came under German control. “The enemy’s hand had been forced. Given the limited space, he was no longer in a position to put his numerical superiority to good effect.”31 Nothing more came of the attack by Major Kloppenburg’s cyclist battalion. Meanwhile, the troops in the eastern part of the Island of Dordrecht were still awaiting the arrival of the battalion in question. They were not informed that a German attack was under way. Had they been told, they would probably have set off towards the Dordtsche Kil, thus cutting off 30 �� H.C. Kloppenburg, “Gevechtsbericht 11/12 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Neder�� lands Grondgebied, box 529, file 37. 31 �� Götzel, Generaloberst Kurt Student, 133-134 and 138-139. ��

At daybreak on 14 May, two civilians, W. Gorter and J.G. van Namen, crossed from Zwijndrecht to Dordrecht to mediate in the surrender of the town. Late in the afternoon of 20 May, they repeated their crossing for photographer C. Lips (below).

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the German troops at the Moerdijk bridges from the rest of the Airborne Corps. There would in any case then have been a chance of recapturing the Moerdijk bridges. As it was, they stayed where they were until 17.00 hrs. By 12.00 hrs, it was clear to the Commander of Fortress Holland that the actions on the Island of Dordrecht were not being led properly. Somewhat incensed, he rang the commander of the Light Division and ordered him to go immediately to the battle zone and personally take charge of the operations. Van der Bijl and his staff thus left Bleskensgraaf for the command post of the Shadow Staff to the south-east of Dordrecht. Here, the colonel gave the following order to Van Diepenbrugge: “I want you to mop up the Krispijn area immediately and robustly and I want you to do it now.” Van der Bijl then disappeared without saying where he was going to set up his command post.32 Van Diepenbrugge’s mission was conspicuous in its vagueness; no clear point of main effort had been given. At 17.00 hrs, Van der Bijl sent a captain from his staff with another order for Van Diepenbrugge: the Ist and IIIrd battalions of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment were to go to Tweede Tol. The undertaking was successful at first, but heavy artillery fire from the Germans halted the attack: the Moerdijk bridges remained out of reach of the Light Division. The actions of Van der Bijl and his division had been disappointing. Not only had they failed to recapture the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam even though it had been possible, but they had also taken insufficient action against the German troops on the Island of Dordrecht. The Light Brigade’s action in this area had all the hallmarks of a moppingup operation, with an advance over a wide front. Van der Bijl had also deemed it unnecessary to lead the actions himself. He left this to Lieutenant Colonel Van Diepenbrugge, who only had a small staff and was unaware of the actual situation on the Island of Dordrecht. A number of very real possibilities of bringing the southern front of Fortress Holland back under Dutch control had thus been missed by the Light Division.

Die Panzer arrive on time The chances of any Dutch success on the Island of Dordrecht became slim in the extreme when, at 16.45 hrs on 12 May, the first light armoured vehicles of a reconnaissance battalion of the 9th Panzer Division passed the 32 �� J.J. van Diepenbrugge, “Verslag van de Afz.�� Staf-Lichte Divisie over de handelingen op 10, 11, 12, 13 en 14 mei 1940”, 20 May 1940, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 529, file 4.

The commander of the 1st Parachute Regiment, Oberst Bruno Bräuer (standing) at his command post at Tweede Tol.

Planning and coordinating in the field, near Rotterdam.

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Moerdijk bridges. Oberst Bräuer, commander of the 1st Parachute Regiment, sent Ensign C.A.J. Marijs, whom he had taken prisoner earlier that day, to “the commander in charge of the troops which were operating on the Island of Dordrecht” to ask him whether he intended to put up any further resistance. He added to this that any further resistance would be useless “since an armoured division was ready to move the following day”.33 Colonel Van der Bijl had no intention of giving up the fight, but nonetheless sent an officer to verify the report by Ensign Marijs that German tanks had come across the Moerdijk bridges. The officer confirmed the report, whereupon Van der Bijl sent word to the Commander of Fortress Holland. Van Andel absolutely refused to believe the report about the armoured vehicles, however, and assured the commander of the Light Division that French tanks would break through near the Moerdijk bridges the next morning. Because of that, he insisted that the Wieldrecht ferry should in any event be under Dutch control in the course of the morning of 13 May. Lieutenant General Van Andel received more strange reports in the evening of 12 May. The situation in Dordrecht, for instance, had become so chaotic—everyone was shooting at everyone else—that many were talking about treason. Cantonment commander Mussert was also providing little in the way of leadership and was thus drawing suspicion towards himself that he was in league with the Germans. Consequently, Captain G. van der Mark, Mussert’s aide-de-camp, rang the commander of the Kil Group in a state of mild panic at 18.45 hrs, with the following message: A chaotic situation prevails in Dordrecht. (...) Lieutenant Colonel Mussert is not providing any leadership and is not trusted by anyone. I cannot go on. If Lieutenant Colonel Mussert is not relieved of his command, Dordrecht will be lost.34

Acting on his own authority, even though he had no powers whatsoever in respect of the Dordrecht cantonment commander, Colonel Van Andel, commander of the Kil Group, relieved Mussert of his position and asked Colonel Van der Bijl to appoint a new commander. When the Commander of Fortress Holland got to hear of this course of events, he was extremely surprised. Lieutenant General Van Andel had “complete confidence” in the reliability of Lieutenant Colonel Mussert and therefore refused to sanction the measure by the commander of the Kil Group. On the contra33 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”. 34 �� J.A.G. �� van Andel, “Gevechtsbericht van 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”, 1 July 1940, in: DCNIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 485, file 13.


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ry, he placed all Dutch troops on the Island of Dordrecht, including Lieutenant Colonel Mussert, under the command of Colonel Van der Bijl.35 The commander of the Light Division had in the meantime set off from his command post in Dubbeldam (on the Island of Dordrecht) to Lieutenant Colonel Mussert’s cantonment office. However, given that there were known to be German troops in the south-eastern part of Dordrecht, Van der Bijl decided to travel by way of the railway bridge west of Sliedrecht and the Papendrecht ferry. When he arrived at the ferry, however, it turned out to be no longer in service. Van der Bijl then decided, having consulted the commander of the Kil Group by telephone, to plan the envisaged counterattack in Papendrecht. The plan for this attack was ultimately that the area between Wieldrecht and Tweede Tol had to be returned to Dutch control, after which action could be taken either against the German bridgehead in Dordrecht or against Willemsdorp.36 Although the first German tanks had passed the Moerdijk bridges, Van der Bijl and Van Andel were thus still in two minds. The conclusion they did not draw from the critical situation was that all available assets had to be deployed to recapture Willemsdorp in order to make it impossible for the German tanks to link up with the airborne troops. For the new attack, Van der Bijl split the Main Group of the Light Division into two: an eastern attack group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Van Diepenbrugge, made up of the Ist and IIIrd battalion of the 2nd Cyclist Regiment, would attack along the Zeedijk towards Tweede Tol, and a western attack group led by Lieutenant Colonel Mijsberg would rid the Krispijn district of German troops. The latter task again resulted in a number of desperate street battles. The attack by the 2nd Cyclist Regiment was nipped in the bud. Almost immediately after the Dutch troops had sprung into action, German tanks and aircraft opened fire on them. The bombardment lasted for an hour and a quarter and it was solely down to the cool-headed actions of Captain J.L.H.A. Antoni that the Dutch rank and file remained calm. Suddenly tanks appeared. The yellow recognition panels were probably mistaken for orange, in other words friendly markings, because “suddenly the word was spreading—‘French tanks!’ (...) Many and still more ran behind the dyke towards the tanks; suddenly the foremost tank fired, fatally wounding Cornet J. Offringa and 35 �� W. Thomson, “Verslag van de krijgsverrichtingen van 10 tot en met 14 mei 1940 in de Vesting Holland”, February 1941, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 479, file 5. 36 �� Calmeyer �� and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 125.

The linkup is achieved: at the end of the afternoon of 12 May, the forward detachment of the 9th Panzer Division reached the paratroops at the Moerdijk bridges.

After passing the Moerdijk bridge, a Panzerkampfwagen II rolls past Tweede Tol in the early morning of 13 May. In the group on the right, Oberst Bruno Bräuer (with flat cap).


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others.”37 The IInd battalion of the Mobile Artillery Corps responded swiftly: heavy fire brought the German tanks to a halt. Tactical air support from the Luftwaffe broke the resistance, however. Lieutenant Colonel Van Diepenbrugge requested permission from the commander of the Light Division to evacuate the Island of Dordrecht, which he was granted. That was because Van der Bijl was afraid that what was still left of his division would be destroyed by the tanks and aircraft. Leaving a great deal of equipment behind, the Main Group of the Light Division was back on the north side of the Merwede at 13.00 hrs. The bridgehead that the Kil Group had by then established at Wieldrecht was also dispersed. The 4th company of the 3rd Border Battalion, which had been sent to the eastern bank of the Dordtsche Kil after its actions in Heerjansdam, was completely helpless against the German tanks. Twelve Dutch soldiers were killed, many were wounded and some forty men, including Captain Manders, were taken prisoner. The German tanks rolled on towards Dordrecht. All kinds of barricades were set up in the city. Once again, some Dutch soldiers thought that French tanks were approaching. Reserve Lieutenant C.M.R. Davidson even got some soldiers to wave Dutch flags when a tank came round the corner at his position. The German tank commander gave a friendly wave back and then opened “overwhelming fire” on the Dutchmen.38 A few Dutch units in the city fought bravely, such as a group led by Lieutenant Plasschaert, mentioned previously, and Ensign W.C.H. Dekker, who, entirely on his own, got an antitank gun into position, blasted a hole in a paving-stone barricade and put two armoured vehicles out of action. Because of this, the German tank crews felt threatened in the streets of Dordrecht and pulled back. The Dutch defenders thus got an opportunity to rebuild the barricades. However, Lieutenant Colonel Mussert, who had been “in a highly nervous state”39 all day, still refused to believe that there were any German tanks and insisted that roads be opened for traffic. “You’re seeing things”, he said to several officers of the Cyclist Regiment, thus once again fanning the flames of suspicion about himself.40 Colonel Van der Bijl, who had arrived in Dordrecht the night before, decided in the afternoon of 13 May to evacuate the city of Dordrecht on the basis of the many reports that were coming in about troops who were “over-exhausted, had suffered very heavy losses and were severely 37 �� W.A. �� van den Bosch, “Gevechtsbericht van het gevecht op den 13 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 530, file 39. 38 �� Calmeyer �� and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 144. 39 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”. 40 �� Calmeyer �� and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 148.

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demoralised”.41 During the night of 13 May, the entire Island of Dordrecht was evacuated by the Dutch troops. The remainder of the Light Division took up positions behind the Noord and the Merwede in the course of the morning, wondering constantly whether the fighting had gone so badly because there had been some treachery at play. In Sliedrecht in the afternoon of 14 May, an overstrained reserve lieutenant from the 2nd Cyclist Regiment, A.J. Kruithof, shot and killed Lieutenant Colonel Mussert. The cantonment commander’s last words were: “They were out to get me because my name is Mussert …”.42 Now that the Island of Dordrecht was lost to the Dutch troops, they had to pull out all the stops to destroy the Moerdijk bridges and thus halt the advance of the rest of the 9th Panzer Division. The commander of the Kil Group, Colonel Van Andel, thus received orders in the morning of 13 May to “fire with all the strength of all the artillery of the Kil Group (...) on both Moerdijk bridges and keep this up as long as possible”. The fire from the guns of the Kil Group had hardly any effect, however.43 There was now only one possibility remaining: an aerial bombardment. The Dutch Military Air Arm only had one medium bomber left, however: a Fokker T-V from the Bomber Squadron of the 1st Aviation Regiment. At 03.40 hrs on 13 May, the commander of this squadron, Captain J.G. Sissingh, received urgent orders from the Commander of the Air Defence, Lieutenant General P.W. Best, to fit a Fokker T-V with two 300kg bombs and prepare it for departure. At 05.05 hrs, Best ordered the road bridge at Moerdijk to be bombed “with the greatest possible precision”. Protection could be provided by two Fokker G-I fighter aircraft. “The precision bombing of the bridge is now of the utmost importance”, the air defence commander added to the airmen. 41 �� “Reconstructie �� van het Dagboek van de Lt.D. van 10 t/m 15 mei 1940”. 42 �� Report on the session at the ‘Vredesgerechtshof ’ [Peace Court] in The Hague, 14 �� April 1942, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 480, file 38. Kruithof was arrested on 21 June 1940, after which the Peace Court in The Hague sentenced him to twenty years in prison. He was released on 17 April 1945 during the liberation of Leeuwarden. Under the Netherlands Government’s Occupation Measures Decree of 17 September 1944, the sentence had now become void. Kruithof continued his career with the armed forces. In 1976, he appealed under the Act to Improve the Legal Status of Members of the Armed Forces who joined the Resistance, claiming that his deed had been an act of resistance. The request was rejected, up to the high court. See: Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, LXXXVII (1984) 22.27. M. de Geus, “Vrederechtspraak in Nederland” in: Oorlogsdocumentatie ’40-’45. Zesde Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (Zutphen, 1995) 4886. G.L Coolen, “Een geval van feitelijke subordinatie”, Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, XCVII (2004) 177-184. An apologia for Kruithof is: H. Kleingeld, De dood van overste Mussert. Een reconstructie (s.l., 2004). 43 �� Van �� Andel, “Gevechtsbericht van 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”.

Reconnaissance vehicle from the forward detachment of the 9th Panzer Division on the Island of Dordrecht. XXXIX. Armeekorps from 13 May 1940 XXX

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Parachute and airborne troops listen to the latest news on the radio of a Dutch car. Tweede Tol, 12 May 1940.

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At 05.19 hrs, the Fokker T-V set off under the command of Reserve Second Lieutenant Observer B. Swagerman, escorted by two Fokker G-Is, on its flight to the Moerdijk bridges. Once over the Hollands Diep, Swagerman began the attack. The first bomb exploded in the water, approximately 50 metres away from the bridge. The second attack, this time from the south, also failed: the bomb came down right next to a bridge pillar but did not detonate. Just to the north of Dordrecht, the Dutch planes were intercepted by much faster Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter planes. The latter were far superior. Shot to pieces, the Fokker T-V crashed at Ridderkerk, killing all those on board. Only one of the G-Is returned to base.44 The German troops had struck a permanent breach in the southern front of Fortress Holland; the road to Rotterdam was now open. In order to steer the ongoing German advance in the right direction, the Airborne Corps, the 9th Panzer Division and SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’ were, as outlined previously, merged to form a new corps: the XXXIXth, under the command of the Generalleutnant der Panzertruppen R.F.K. Schmidt. The mission for this corps was to push through Rotterdam into the heart of Fortress Holland.

The battle in Rotterdam How was the situation in the city to which the XXXIXth Corps was advancing? On 10 May, the German troops had occupied the south of Rotterdam and the Noordereiland. On the northern bank of the Maas, a unit of around 50 men, led by Oberleutnant Kerfin, was holding its ground in the Nationale Levensverzekeringsbank building. Early in the morning of 10 May, the Dutch troops stationed in Rotterdam had not been able to drive out the German troops. The first powerful attack after this that the Germans had to withstand came from the Royal Netherlands Navy. The torpedo boat HNLMS Z5, which was lying off the Hook of Holland and which was under the command of Lieutenant Commander W. van Lier, received orders in the morning of 10 May to sail up the Nieuwe Waterweg towards the Maas bridges. At Schiedam, the motor torpedo boat TM 51, commanded by Lieutenant J. van Staveren, joined the Z5 and they both sailed towards the heart of the city. As they approached the Maas bridges, they opened fire on the German positions, “whereby machine-gun nests on the Maas bridge were wiped out”. A number of the German floatplanes were also destroyed. The 44 �� F.J. �� Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 152-153.


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German troops quickly got several heavy machine guns into position and opened fire, wounding the helmsman on the Z5, Junior Rating K. van der Zee, in the thigh. “I was losing a lot of blood, so the commander said: ‘Lie down, man’. I refused to leave and I kept on steering.”45 At 10.30 hrs, the Dutch ships had to withstand an attack by German bombers. The Z5 and the TM 51 carried on firing, however, until all their ammunition was gone. Only then did they pull back. At 10.30 hrs, Vice Admiral J.Th. Furstner decided to send a strong navy unit to Rotterdam. The destroyer HNLMS Van Galen and the gunboats HNLMS Flores and HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau, received orders to sail to Rotterdam “in order to prevent the Germans from crossing the Maas, if necessary with full deployment of the ship”. The Van Galen was the first to reach the Nieuwe Waterweg. Once she was near Vlaardingen, the ship came under attack from the Luftwaffe. Lieutenant E.H. Larive continued the navigation undeterred, although the bombing had caused substantial damage. “Fire control, wheelhouse and 7.5cm gun were destroyed. Everywhere on deck, everything was dislodged and damaged. Engine room and stokehold had to be evacuated. Several of those on board were wounded.” For the commander of the destroyer, Commander A.S. Pinke, it was clear that he would no longer be able to reach the Maas bridges. In the Merwede harbour, although she was already taking on water, the Van Galen was moored neatly, whereupon she slowly sank.46 After the sinking, the navy chiefs decided to abandon further actions on the Nieuwe Waterweg. This meant that the Rotterdam cantonment commander, Colonel Scharroo, had to make do with the troops at his disposal. He did indeed receive reinforcements of some 3,500 men, but because of the fear that the Germans would cross the Nieuwe Maas and the rumours about the actions of a fifth column, he ordered these soldiers to take up mainly defensive positions over a wide front, which meant that he had no resources left for a robust attack on the German positions. To make matters worse, several nervous soldiers smashed up the whole of Rotterdam’s telephone exchange, rendering communications between Scharroo and the Commander of Fortress Holland out of action until early afternoon on 12 May. General Winkelman decided to intervene in the Rotterdam battle zone. On 12 May, he sent the Head of the Operations Section of General Head45 �� Official �� report by Ordinary Rating K. van der Zee, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 445, file 7. 46 �� A.S. �� Pinke, “Verslag van de handelingen van Hr.Ms. ‘Van Galen’ op 10 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 445, file 4.

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quarters, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson, to Rotterdam as his representative. Wilson observed that the troops in the city had too little experience and were too exhausted to undertake an attack on the Willems bridge. He therefore requested a new battalion with an energetic commander. The IInd battalion of the Rifles Regiment, which was stationed in the Hook of Holland, consequently received orders to go to Rotterdam. It was not until 01.30 hrs on the night of 12 May, however, that the battalion actually left—one company had to come from the island of Rozenburg— and when it finally arrived in the city, the soldiers were extremely tired and thus unfit for immediate deployment. In the meantime, worrying reports about the advance of the 9th Panzer Division had been coming in to General Headquarters. The fear was that tanks could reach the city of Rotterdam as early as 13 May. Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst therefore ordered Colonel Scharroo to drive the Germans from the area around the Maas bridges and to prepare those river crossings for demolition. For this, the cantonment commander had to call upon the troops who had already been hard at it since the first day of the war. It was decided that two companies, one of which was made up of personnel from the Marines Battalion led by Captain W. Schuiling, should storm the bridge. They would be faced with German troops who were determined to hold their ground. Oberstleutnant von Choltitz had disregarded as many as three sets of orders to evacuate the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Maas: I cannot follow the order, there is too much at stake. If the bridge is blown up, a new river crossing will have to be created and the breakthrough will have to be won at the expense of an immeasurable number of casualties.47

After they had launched the attack, three sections of the marines group, under the direct command of Captain Schuiling, did not get any further than what was known as the ‘White House’. Another section, led by Sergeant J.C. Zimmermann, managed to reach the access road to the Willems bridge via the Boompjes. Here too, however, the fire from the German troops who were in the Nationale Levensverzekeringsbank building, was extremely troublesome. The marines had to retreat, leaving six men isolated on the bridge. The assault on the Willems bridge had failed, but what had been achieved was “that with the acquired formation of the companies (…), the Maas bridge was kept under sufficient effective fire

47 �� D. �� von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Konstanz, 1951) 65.


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to make any advance over the bridge impossible for the enemy.”48 The advancing German troops would not be able to seize Fortress Holland with48 �� F. �� Lugt, “Verslag gevechtshandelingen ‘Afdeeling Mariniers’ 10 t/m 14 mei 1940”, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 446, file 25.

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out a struggle. In Rotterdam, the Dutch troops were preparing to mount a staunch defence.

The bombing of Rotterdam During the night of 13 May, most elements of the 9th Panzer Division, led by Generalmajor Alfred Ritter von Hubicki, reached the south of Rotterdam, followed by Sepp Dietrich’s SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. Generalleutnant der Panzertruppen Schmidt, commander of the newly formed XXXIXth Corps, arrived in Rijsoord early in the morning of 14 May and set up his headquarters there. Schmidt was under the command of the 18th Army’s commander, General der Artillerie G.K.F.W. von Küchler, who had given Schmidt the following order at 17.05 hrs on 13 May: “The resistance in Rotterdam should be broken by all means available, if necessary threatening to destroy the city and then carrying out the threat.”49 The resistance in Rotterdam, now that victory was near, had to be broken. Chapter 5 describes how, on 13 May, von Küchler deliberated within his headquarters and then with the commander of Army Group B, Generaloberst F. von Bock, about the possibilities still open to the Dutch Field Army for continuing to fight and how, in relation to that and to their own objectives, the German operations should proceed on 14 May. In the afternoon of 13 May and the morning of 14 May, von Küchler experienced the pressure from von Bock and, through him, from the Oberkommando des Heeres, in the form of General F. Halder. The situation at Antwerp and Breda was no longer causing him concern. No crisis had arisen there and the 18th Army now had sufficient depth to cope with the unlikely eventuality that the French or the British should launch an offensive there. More important was the fact that forces had to be made available for the operations against France. At Sedan, the situation on 13 and 14 May was looking promising. It was time to assemble all mechanised and motorised units for the advance after the crossing of the Meuse. This also, therefore, included the 9th Panzer Division, which was fixed in the Netherlands. Also, once the whole of the Netherlands had been seized, its airfields could be used for the air war against Britain. Lastly, the Dutch Field Army would be able to use a retreat to the New Dutch Waterline to make troops available to reinforce the defence in Rotterdam. In short, now that victory was within reach, time should not be lost needlessly. 49 �� H.A. Jacobsen, “Der deutsche Luftangriff auf Rotterdam; Versuch einer Klärung”, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, VIII (1958) 275.


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Against this backdrop, von Küchler gave Schmidt free rein. On 13 May, the commander of the Airborne Corps, Generalleutnant Student, had still expected that the arrival of the 9th Panzer Division would provide enough reinforcement to get across the Maas, but Schmidt realised the following day that heavy artillery would also have to be brought in. Student urged, prior to the artillery shelling, “to paralyse the strong enemy defence immediately at the bridges by a short, heavy bombardment to give German tanks the chance to cross and to leave the confined space near the bridge”. It was the losses suffered by the German tanks in Dordrecht that had led him to this opinion. But the aerial bombardment had to be kept to a minimum. “We simply couldn’t create even more artificial roadblocks or even block entire roads for our attacking tanks by bomb craters or rubble from buildings.”50 Schmidt agreed with this line of thought and got in touch with Putzier’s air corps to arrange the air support. In the meantime, the headquarters of the Luftwaffe had also been assessing the situation in the Netherlands. The Oberbefehlshaber der Luft� waffe, Hermann Göring, was extremely concerned about the fate of Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck’s 22nd Air Transportable Division. It was also clear to Göring that the bombing of the city of Rotterdam was vital in order to break the stalemate that had arisen there. He wanted to use it to force a Dutch capitulation as quickly as possible. The chief of the Operationsabteilung in the Luftwaffenführungsstab, General Otto Hoffman von Waldau, spoke in this respect of a “radical solution”.51 Göring knew he had the support of the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, who had let it be known from his headquarters on 14 May that the Dutch resistance was now to be given short shrift: “Both political and military considerations demand that this resistance be broken quickly.” The sentence had come from Weisung Nr. 11.52 This was the first directive from Hitler since the start of the campaign for the continued operations. Five of the six points that made up the document concerned the developments 50 �Ibid, 275-276. 51 �� Klaus �� A. Maier, “Der operatieve Luftkrieg bis zur Luftschlacht um England” in: Maier, e.a., Das deutsche Reich, Band 2, 340. See also the war journal of the commander of Heeresgruppe B, Generaloberst F. von Bock, which contains Göring’s order to realise “einen Durchbruch zur L.L. Gruppe Sponeck” [a breakthrough to airborne group Sponeck] by means of an “Angriff eines Kampfgeschwaders mit Bombenabwurf auf die Stadt (…) ohne Rücksicht auf die Kapitulationsverhandlungen (…)” [an attack by a wing of fighter aircraft with a bombardment of the city (…) regardless of the negotiations about a capitulation (…)], in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 550, file 3. 52 �� Adolf Hitler, “Weisung Nr. 11” in: Walther Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2nd ed.; Koblenz, 1983) 50-51.

The burning MS Statendam at the Wilhelminakade in Rotterdam.

A burnt-out truck near the Willems bridge in Rotterdam. On the right in the foreground, a shelter.


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at the point of main effort, in Army Group A. The imminent end of the fighting in the Netherlands justified a place for this theatre of operations in the document. As regards the military reasoning, Hitler was referring in Weisung Nr. 11 to the threat picture mentioned earlier that von Bock and Halder painted for him too. A Dutch capitulation would release assets for the operations against the French army and remove a threat on the right flank. Specifying the political need for a swift end to the war in the Netherlands was a signal to Generaloberst von Brauchitsch and his Oberkommando des Heeres that der Führer, as a follow-up to his intervention in the formulation of the operation plan for Fall Gelb, was trying to take “command of the operations into his own hands now as well”.53 Political involvement thus once again threatened the professional autonomy of the military leaders and the Auftragstaktik as a principle of command. Hitler’s endeavours to gain the upper hand over the military leadership were to yield results, not immediately, but later in the campaign, during the encirclement of the allies at Dunkirk. Various levels in the German chain of command thus wanted a bombardment: Schmidt with the aim of penetrating further into Fortress Holland at Rotterdam, Göring with the aim of thus putting as quick an end as possible to the fighting in the Netherlands as a whole. 53 �� The formulation of the Weisung was coupled with skirmishes between the Oberkommando des Heeres and Hitler, the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht. �� The conflict was about the command of and the missions for the armoured divisions in the point of main effort in northern France. But something equally important, if not more so, that was at stake in the conflict, at least for the OKH, was the guarantee of the autonomy of the military-professional decision-making for the execution of the politico-strategic objectives, as it had developed in German military history since the last decades of the nineteenth century. Also at stake was the preservation of the Auftragstaktik as a command principle. The military staff was still able to secure its position at this stage. In the days that followed, however, the combined conflict about the deployment of the armoured divisions and the demarcation of competences grew further. Through Hitler’s Haltbefehl of 17 May 1940, it reached its climax in the Haltbefehl of 24 May. The end of the controversy meant a significant strengthening of Hitler’s position of power in respect of the Oberkommando des Heeres and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See: W. Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939-1945. Grundlagen, Formen, Gestalten (Frankfurt am Main, Bonn, 1964) 108-112 (quotation on 108) and the meticulous reconstruction and analysis in K.H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 315-324 and 363393. For the military reasons for an end to the fighting in the Netherlands, see: Horst Boog, “Luftwaffe Operations against the Netherlands. 10 to 15 May 1940” in: J.P.B. Jonker e.a., ed. Vijftig jaar na de inval. Geschiedschrijving en Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Hague, 1990) 34-35 and the accompanying notes 19-21. The article also appeared as Horst Boog, “Die Operationen der Luftwaffe gegen die Niederlande vom 10. bis 15. May 1940” in: H.-M. Ottmer, H. Ostertag, eds, Ausgewählte Operationen und ihre militärhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford, Bonn, 1993) 347-367.

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The Luftwaffe now had to designate the assets to perform the mission. Generalmajor R. Putzier had a unit which was suitable, namely Battle Wing 4. It consisted of three groups, all equipped with the Heinkel He111 twin-engine bomber. It also had a battle group equipped with the Junkers Ju-88 (also a twin-engine bomber) and a Stuka group comprising thirty Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers. The wing had, however, been assigned to support the operations by the Xth Corps on 14 May against the Dutch Grebbe Line and to attack targets at Flushing and Middelburg. It was, therefore, not available. During the preparations for Weisung Nr. 11 on 13 May, Luftwaffe leaders had already discovered that Hitler wanted to weaken the air forces that were supporting the 6th Army over the north of Belgium in order to make more aircraft available for the operations against Fortress Holland. It was for that reason that the commander of Air Fleet 2, General der Flieger A. Kesselring, withdrew Battle Wing 54 from the VIIIth Air Corps, which was supporting the 6th Army, and placed it under the temporary command of Putzier on 14 May. Putzier then tasked Battle Wing 54, which in contrast to Battle Wing 4 only had three groups of Heinkel He-111 bombers, with the attack on Rotterdam.54 In preparation for this, a signals officer from the wing went to Student’s command post in the evening of 13 May to get the Dutch positions in Rotterdam marked on a map and to draw up the timetable for the air attack. Just before the start on the morning of 14 May, the wing heard that negotiations had begun in Rotterdam about the capitulation of the city. Kesselring, who had had a long telephone conversation that morning with Göring about the question of whether the bombing should go ahead or not, instructed the wing to maintain radio contact as long as possible. The wing knew that red flares would be fired from the Noordereiland if the bombing was not to proceed and it was not possible to transmit the message by radio from Germany to the aircrews. At 11.45 hrs on 14 May, ninety Heinkel He-111 bombers from Battle Wing 54 thus set off from the airfields of Münster, Delmenhorst and Quackenbrück in the direction of Rotterdam. Fifty-four Heinkels were under the command of Oberst Wilhelm Lackner and 36 were under the command of Oberstleutnant Otto Höhne. They were due to arrive over the city of Rotterdam at 13.20 hrs. In the meantime, negotiations had indeed got under way between the German and Dutch commanders. They were progressing very slowly. The first German parlementaire had handed an unsigned ultimatum to Colo54 �� F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging in de meidagen 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 878-884. ��


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Rotterdam Cantonment

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Minister of Defence

Rotterdam Cantonment

Commander of Naval Assets

Engineer troops

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nel Scharroo, in which the Germans threatened to take steps which could result in “the complete destruction of the city” if a response was not forthcoming within two hours.55 It was not the first time that Scharroo had been confronted with the consequences that the fighting would have for the civilian population. Just the day before, at the end of the morning of 13 May, a chaplain and a civilian from the Noordereiland had appeared at his command post. They had pointed out how the residents on the island were suffering as a result of the artillery shelling and how the suffering would be even greater now that the fighting was soon to become heavier. They said they had to be back by 18.30 hrs at the latest because, they had been told, that was when the German artillery was supposed to start shelling the city. Scharroo sent them back empty-handed. He was, just as he had been in the preceding days, optimistic about the possibilities of keeping up the defence, even though little more could be expected from the Light Division and strong German forces were on their way from Dordrecht. Earlier that day, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson had pointed out that a stubborn resistance could result in the destruction of the city, given the effects that prolonged artillery fire could have. The high command had not, however, given a definitive response to this.56 The next day, 14 May, the situation had not really changed as far as Scharroo could see. He still saw no need whatsoever for capitulation and 55 �� Demand for surrender of Rotterdam by C-XXXIX A.K. to the City Commander of Rotterdam and the Mayor, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 555, file 3. 56 �� M.R.H. �� Calmeyer and V.E. Nierstrasz, De strijd om Rotterdam. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952) 154-155. J. Koolhaas Revers, Evacuaties in Nederland 1939-1940 (The Hague, 1950) 532-538.

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considered the ultimatum from the German parlementaire to be of no value at all. After consulting with General Headquarters, he decided to leave the Germans in suspense and therefore asked the German commander for a new proposal, this time a signed one. For this purpose, he sent Captain J.D. Backer to the Noordereiland, who arrived there at 12.15 hrs. Less than half an hour later, the German parlementaire had returned to his masters with the message that the Dutch commander in Rotterdam “was inclined to negotiate on the surrender”, whereupon General Schmidt decided to postpone the bombing.57 At 12.00 hrs, the following radio order was transmitted: “Bombardment of Rotterdam postponed because of capitulation negotiations. Report new takeoff status.”58 But the Heinkels were already under way and radio contact with the crews was no longer possible. The trailing aerials had by then been wound in. Only the firing of red flares—an emergency measure—could now stop the bombing. In the meantime, Captain Backer had received a new ultimatum from the Germans, signed this time, and he left at 13.20 hrs to return to Colonel Scharroo. At that moment, dozens of German bombers were approaching the city from the east and the south. General Schmidt was shocked at the sight of the Heinkels: “For God’s sake, this will be a catastrophe!”, he cried and immediately gave the order to fire the red flares. However, for the squadron which was led by Lackner and approaching from the east, it was too late to see the flares and they dropped their high-explosive bombs. Oberstleutnant Höhne, on the other hand, did see the red flares at the very last minute and his squadron, approaching from the south, aborted the mission. Nonetheless, the effects were dramatic: 158 250kg bombs and 1,150 50kg bombs did their destructive work. The heart of Rotterdam was almost entirely devastated. Because of the loss of the main sources, it will never be known whose bombardment was actually carried out: Schmidt’s ‘tactical’ bombardment, which was in preparation for the storming of Dutch positions on the northern bank of the Maas, or Göring’s ‘definitive’ bombardment, which was to result in the Dutch capitulation. The account of the decision-making that led to the bombing shows in any event that the two are ultimately difficult to separate because of the multitude of commanders and authorities who influenced the matter over the 24 hours from 13 to 14 May. What is clear is that the destruction caused by the bombing and, even more so, the ensuing fires throughout the city were so extensive that the bombardment no longer 57 �� Calmeyer �� and Nierstrasz, De strijd om Rotterdam, 199. 58 �� Generalkommando XXXIX.�� A.K., Abt.�� Ia, Kriegstagebuch Nr.�� 1, in: DC-NIMH, Strijd Nederlands Grondgebied, box 555, file 8.


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bore much resemblance to what Schmidt had intended. It is less apt, however, to talk about a ‘terror bombing’, as do, for example, A. Korthals Altes, E.H. Brongers and M. Kneepkens.59 Such a label too easily equates the intention with the effect. This term also assumes that the deliberate targeting of the inhabitants of the city was itself the objective of the bombardment. This was simply not the case, neither for Schmidt nor for Göring. Another question is how the bombing of Rotterdam relates to the law of war applicable at the time. The points at issue were Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Rules of Land Warfare, linked as they were to the Hague Land War Conventions of 1907. Article 25 forbids the attack on or any form of bombardment of undefended towns, villages, homes or buildings. On 13 and 14 May, Rotterdam was not, however, an open city, but a defended town on the front line, where the Dutch high command had assembled a considerable number of troops. Article 26 requires the commander of the attacking troops, before proceeding with a bombardment, to make every effort to inform the city authorities to that effect. On two occasions, a German parlementaire had demanded the surrender of the city and left no doubt as to the consequences for the civilian population if the surrender was not forthcoming. The two-hour period allowed to consider the response was too short to evacuate the city. The cantonment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, and General Headquarters had already been aware, however, of the danger to the civilian population since the morning of 13 May but had not made any decision to take the necessary steps in this respect. Lastly, Article 27 states that an attacker must take all necessary steps to spare particular buildings such as churches, hospitals, museums, monuments, etc, as much as possible in the event of sieges and bombardments. Küchler’s order to Schmidt, Göring’s intervention, stimulated as it was by 59 �� E.H. Brongers, Opmars naar Rotterdam. Deel 3. De laatste fase (Baarn, 1983) 238241; A. Korthals Altes, Luchtgevaar. Luchtaanvallen op Nederland 1940-1945 (2nd ed.; Amsterdam, 1984) 47. M. Kneepkens, In het rijk van de demonen.�� Het �� bombardement van Rot� terdam en de normen (Rotterdam, 1993). Kneepkens reaches his conclusion by assuming that the bombardment deliberately targeted the civilian population. He also evaluates the bombardment against the prescribed law of war applicable after the Second World War, particularly the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), adopted in Geneva on 8 June 1977. For a summary of the development of the humanitarian law of war prior to that protocol, including the slow development of the written law in respect of air bombardments and the sparing of the civilian population, see: F. Kalshoven, Zwijgt het recht als de wapenen spreken? (The Hague, 1985), particularly 24-27 and 77 onwards. D. Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford, 1995) 106. G. Best, Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of International Law of Armed Conflicts (London, 1980) 262-285. G. Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford, 1994) 49-54.

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Hitler’s Weisung, and the use of ordinary instead of dive bombers are in contravention of this article. On the other hand, however, Stukas were not available. In addition, various measures taken indicate that the Germans were aware of the humanitarian problems surrounding the bombardment. Consider, for example, the marking of military targets on the map, the low altitude (750 metres) of Lackner’s squadron, the discussion between Kesselring and Göring, the arrangements relating to radio contact and the use of flares as an emergency measure; also the fact that Höhne turned away when he saw the flares and, lastly, the decision not to use fire bombs. But that is not all. The preamble to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states that in all cases not included in the Regulations adopted (…) the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.60

This clause, given the risks to the civilian population and the requirement that there should be proportionality between the desired objective and the means used, should have resulted in a greater degree of reticence in the decision-making on the German side. The launch of the aircraft could, for example, have been postponed at the news of the start of negotiations in Rotterdam. Instead, there prevailed on 13 and 14 May the military exigency and the wish for a swift end to the fighting in the Netherlands. One should also consider that no government or leader of the air forces of the belligerents in 1940, or in subsequent years, paid much attention to the said clause with regard to the use of the air arm. Technology was developing at a faster pace than the humanitarian law of war. The bombardment was not a terror bombing in the sense that the civilian population itself

60 � Convention concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, 18 octobre 1907, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1910, No 73, page 106. The preamble is known as the Martens Clause (originally adopted at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and incorporated again in the treaty of 1907). This refers to unwritten common law, such as the principle of military necessity, the principle of humanity, the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, the principle of proportionality and the principle of chivalry or honourable conduct. One can also refer to the draft treaty known as the “Hague Rules of Air Warfare”. It was the product of a conference held in The Hague in 1922-1923. The draft was never formally ratified. Its more detailed stipulations cannot be regarded as applicable law in 1940, but it is important for the assessment of the bombardment of Rotterdam insofar as it was a reflection of the aforementioned unwritten common law that prevailed in 1940.


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Meent in the afternoon of 14 May.

was the target, nor was it a clear-cut contravention of the law of war applicable at the time.61 After the bombardment, Colonel Scharroo had no option but to capitulate: the southern front of Fortress Holland had finally fallen. The German army had suffered heavy losses in the process. In all, approximately 7,240 men had landed between Rotterdam and the Moerdijk bridges, some 1,750 of whom had been put out of action, either killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The exact number of dead is not known.62 On the Dutch side, too, the losses were not insignificant. Two hundred and fifty-eight 61 �� H. �� Boog, “Die Operationen der Luftwaffe”, 362. T.D. �� Biddle, “Air Power” in: �� M. Howard, G.J. Andreopoulos and M.R. Shulman, ed., The Laws of War.�� Constraints on War� fare in the Western World (New Haven, London, 1994) 140-159 and in particular 150-151. F.W. Seidler, A.M. de Zayas, eds, Kriegsverbrechen in Europa und im Nahen Osten im 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 2002) 153-154. R.-D. Müller, Der Bombenkrieg 1939-1945 (Berlin, 2004) 29-71, particularly 58-62. 62 �� Molenaar, ��Luchtverdediging, 938-946.

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troops were killed on the southern front of Fortress Holland and 185 soldiers died around Rotterdam.63

Conclusion The success of the air division, which, under the command of General� leutnant Student, seized and held the Moerdijk bridges, the bridges over the Oude Maas at Dordrecht and those over the Nieuwe Maas in Rotterdam, can largely be explained by the course of the first hours of battle. The Dutch troops stationed on the southern front of Fortress Holland were not put on high alert on 9 May 1940 and were completely surprised by the landing of German paratroops. Before they were able to take any countermeasures, most had to admit defeat, while a number of tenacious soldiers in Dordrecht showed that it was actually possible, with limited assets, to disable a group of paratroops that had just landed. Student’s troops had achieved their objective in a very short space of time. In the area between Rotterdam and Moerdijk, however, the Dutch troops did not take it lying down. They launched a counterattack, in which even the most mobile element of the Dutch armed forces, the Light Division, was deployed. Nonetheless, the Dutch troops failed to drive out the Germans and to recapture the so very important Moerdijk bridges. The reasons for this failure were twofold: firstly, the poor command process on the Dutch side and, secondly, the tactical air support by the Luftwaffe on the German side. In particular the extraordinarily hesitant and confusing leadership that Colonel Van der Bijl gave to his weakened division was the reason why the crucial bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam was not recaptured and why there were no targeted actions against the German troops on the Island of Dordrecht. Instead of a targeted action against the 1st Parachute Regiment, the actions of the Light Brigade were more akin to a mopping-up operation, as if there were all the time in the world. On top of this was the incompetent performance of Lieutenant Colonel Mussert, the cantonment commander of Dordrecht. He provided no leadership whatsoever and was also regarded with deep suspicion because of his name. The actions of the Luftwaffe were extremely important. German aircraft took action at the crucial moments; one only need think of the attack on the advancing French tanks in Zevenbergschen Hoek (the assumption 63 �� Calmeyer and Nierstrasz, Zuidfront, 293-294; Calmeyer and Nierstrasz, De strijd om Rotterdam, 251.


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that the allies would provide support in the event of a German attack thus turned out to be correct). The impact that the Stukas in particular had on the Dutch troops was enormous. The Dutch soldiers, devoid as they often were of any anti-aircraft guns, could do nothing against the German air attacks, which had a severely adverse effect on troop morale. The German tanks finally dealt the decisive blow to the Dutch troops: once parts of the 9th Panzer Division had crossed the Moerdijk bridges and the Dutch artillery had failed to hit the bridges, the race was run. The bombardment of the city of Rotterdam merely hastened the already inevitable defeat, considering the collapse of the Grebbe Line and the planned German operations after the crossing of the Maas at Rotterdam. The surprise airborne landings on 10 May, the serious shortcomings in the leadership of the commander of the Light Division, the efficient tactical air support of the Luftwaffe and the arrival of the German tanks had brought about the fall of the southern front of Fortress Holland.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

MYTH AND REALITY

Still coming to terms with the past? Taken by surprise on 10 May 1940, the poorly prepared Dutch armed forces managed to sustain combat for five days and to bring disarray to German plans. Neither the deployment of elite units nor its superiority in terms of personnel numbers or materiel enabled Nazi Germany to claim a victory, leading to breaches of the law of war and other unfair combat methods being necessary to bring the Netherlands to its knees, the lowest point of which was the bombing of the undefended city of Rotterdam. Left to their own devices by their allies, the armed forces had no choice but to capitulate. In London, however, the Dutch government steadfastly continued to support the resistance. These are, in brief, the prevailing ideas which were held by the Dutch both in and outside the occupied territory in an attempt to come to terms with the shocking, and for some even traumatic, events of 10 to 15 May 1940. Since that time, insight into the actual sequence of events has increased substantially, but specific elements from the view sketched above have proved to be difficult to eradicate from the national psyche: reason enough to test those theories once more. The surprise element of the German invasion can be dealt with quickly. Years prior to 1940, professional Dutch military literature and the general staff already assumed that the next war would start without a formal prior declaration of war. A wide range of measures had been taken against the consequent risk of a strategic invasion, ranging from border security and the construction of bunkers at strategically important bridges to an ingenious mobilisation system. On the evening of 9 May 1940, the armed forces had already been on a war footing for over eight months and, insofar as was deemed necessary, were in a state of alert. At no time previously during the mobilisation of 1939-1940 had the commander-in-chief taken such far-reaching measures as he did that evening. That the Netherlands

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Enemy armoured vehicle on Dam Square in front of the Royal Palace in the capital city, Amsterdam: war becomes occupation.

expected an attack was also clear to the German troops at various locations along the border from the demolition of bridges and other objects. Furthermore, as has been discussed in earlier chapters, there is no reason to call the SS units deployed in the Netherlands elite troops; on the contrary, their military usefulness was viewed as low by the Wehrmacht commanders in 1940. It was only shortly before the campaign against Poland that Hitler had created clarity on a possible war task for the SS regiments. SS regiment ‘Der Führer’ underwent its baptism of fire at Westervoort and the Grebbeberg. Even if parachute units can be viewed as specially trained troops, this certainly did not apply to the airborne troops—they were just standard infantry with a special mode of transport. In addition, the Germans had no experience of deploying two divisions of paratroops and airborne troops, which meant that the deployment of these units involved greater risks than usual. The Airborne Corps was thus not eligible to provide support for the operations tasked to Army

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Group A, the main focus of Fall Gelb. In fact, the use of paratroops at Sedan could even have betrayed the location of the main focus to the allies. Even within Army Group B, the Airborne Corps was deployed on the sidelines, namely the Netherlands, after airborne landings at Namur and Ghent had been rejected. Only the capture of Waalhaven airfield and the bridges on the Moerdijk–Rotterdam axis were viewed as operationally interesting by the army group. After all, it was expected to take no more than five days to complete the capture of the Netherlands. The German plan was to reach Moerdijk on the third day of war. Fortress Holland would then be cut off from allied support and would not be able to hold out for long. By deploying the airborne troops against what was viewed as a weak opponent, the risks involved in such an operation were kept to a minimum and the outcome was reasonably predictable. Furthermore, the German troops in Noord-Brabant only had to focus for a few days on reaching the paratroops at Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam, and after that they would regain their freedom of action. Generaloberst von Bock was even less interested in the airborne operation against The Hague, which really needs to be viewed separately from the advance through Noord-Brabant and the abovementioned landings. This operation was the pet plan of Göring’s Luftwaffe and, of course, also involved a strong political dimension: having troops nearby in case the Netherlands, as had happened in Denmark, gave up the fight following one day of symbolic opposition or, if that did not happen, they were needed to attempt to take the government prisoner. Purely from a military perspective, the success of this operation would have been a stroke of good luck. However, when planning the other operations, Army Group B did not take the latter option into consideration. We must also beware of too far-reaching conclusions as if the actions of the Airborne Corps, the 9th Panzer Division and the SS units in the Netherlands point to a particular importance of the Dutch theatre of war. Within the framework of Fall Gelb, the spectacular airborne landings at Fortress Holland and the Belgian Fort Eben Emael had precisely the function of drawing allied command attention away from the most important theatre of operations, namely the Ardennes and the Meuse sector between Monthermé and Sedan. Paris was meant to believe for as long as possible that, as in 1914, Germany’s point of main effort lay in Flanders, in order that the French and British would continue to reinforce their forward front on Belgian territory. It is also significant that during the course of the campaign against France, in the end all ten Panzer divisions were deployed in the point of main effort in northern France. In the theatre of operations in

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the Netherlands, however, just one Panzer division was deployed and the weakest of the ten at that, namely the recently formed 9th Panzer Division, which was Austrian in origin. In this respect, some common sense needs to be applied to the interpretation of the losses suffered by the Airborne Corps. These were no surprise to the senior command and an elite unit was only affected to a limited degree. The most difficult personnel to replace were the captured pilots and instructors. These losses, insofar as these were suffered during the attack on The Hague, occurred in a theatre of war awarded little importance by Army Group B when viewed within the framework of the invasion of the Netherlands. Finally, one should not give too much importance, with respect to subsequent war operations, to the German loss of aircraft over the Netherlands, even if these losses were substantial. It is certainly going too far to connect this to the cancellation of the German invasion of Britain.1 The Luftwaffe lost chiefly transport aircraft over the Netherlands: air combat power was not affected by this, and that was precisely what was vitally important to achieving air superiority over southern England. The sizeable losses suffered among Luftwaffe combat aircraft did not just occur over the Netherlands but also, and particularly, elsewhere. German air combat power was later dealt further blows during the Battle of Britain, both in terms of materiel and personnel. It is also important to remember that Operation Seelöwe, as the plan for the invasion of Britain was known, never got past the stage of intention and operational studies thanks to the lack of decisiveness on the part of Hitler and a lack of interest among the army, navy and air force. In these studies, a lack of air transport capacity was never considered a serious issue. Ultimately, the plan was ignored in favour of the planning of operations against the Soviet Union. It is also worth noting that the losses over the Netherlands did not stop the Germans transporting approximately 22,000 personnel by air to Crete during Operation Merkur exactly one year later in May 1941. It was only the losses among aircraft and personnel during this operation that put a stop to large-scale German airborne operations during the Second World War.

1 Horst Boog, “Die Operationen der Luftwaffe gegen die Niederlande vom 10. bis 15. Mai 1940” in: H.-M. Ottmer, H. Ostertag, ed., Ausgewählte Operationen und ihre militärhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford, Bonn, 1993) 352. N. Fernhout, “Het verband tussen de Luftwaffe-verliezen in mei ’40 en de Duitse invasieplannen voor Engeland”, Militaire Spectator, CLXI (1992) 370-371.

The transport of French prisoners of war in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, end of May 1940.

In violation of the humanitarian law of war, Dutch prisoners of war are forced to pull a German gun.

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Another argument which is often used to explain the rapid Dutch defeat concerns the German breaches of the law of war.2 These have been linked by various authors to the National-Socialist nature of the Germans, and it is therefore unsurprising that the Waffen SS in particular has garnered such a poor reputation in the Netherlands. The fact that the Germans breached the law of war in certain areas, for instance during the operations to capture the bridges over the Maas and IJssel, is not at issue, and the same applies to the conclusion that some of the breaches were perpetrated by the SS (although it is impossible to say how many) and can be ascribed to the specific nature of this section of the German armed forces. The question is how much significance should be attached to the German breaches of the law of war. After all, it is possible to cite examples of particularly well-maintained discipline on the German side; take the example of the treatment of the prisoners of war at the airfields surrounding The Hague and the outcome of the incident at the Lutterhoofdwijk Canal involving a reconnaissance group from the 1st Cavalry Division. Furthermore, some acts by Dutch military personnel may in retrospect not pass the strict test applied by the law of war. Out of revenge for the wounding of Grenadier Damstede at Ockenburg, his colleagues denied German parachutists the chance to surrender and shot a number of them dead. Some of the German breaches of the law of war were a direct result of incidents which could easily be construed as unacceptable by the Germans. At the Grebbeberg, for example, the Germans became irritated by the fact that they were still being fired on from some Dutch positions while other positions, right next to them, were flying white flags. It was only afterwards that they were able to establish that this was an unfortunate coincidence and not a deliberate act. And the fact that Private Migchelbrink’s colleagues eventually managed to escape from the outposts at the Grebbeberg is an example of regaining combat discipline after the incident of which Migchelbrink was the victim. The incident certainly does not prove that ignoring the rules was accepted practice within the German army or the SS on the western front in 1940. The German troops had been expressly reminded of those rules prior to the Westfeldzug in order to stop them undertaking activities which bore no relation to the military objectives of the operations and which could therefore harm combat power. The breaches of the law of war were therefore no systematic symptom in the sense that they formed part of accepted or even assigned German 2 For a detailed analysis of this issue see: H. Amersfoort, ‘Ik had mijn roode-kruis band afgedaan’. Oorlogsrecht en gedragingen van Nederlandse en Duitse militairen in gevecht, mei 1940 (The Hague, 2005).

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combat methods. They can often be viewed as incidental deviations from the norm which, in most cases and as with the Dutch, arose spontaneously out of the heat of the battle. On the Dutch side, these incidents can also be ascribed to the lack of combat experience. The instinct for survival and other highly primary emotions such as revenge, anger and frustration occasionally proved stronger than combat discipline. This also applied to the Germans. In other cases, the temptation to gain combat advantage by prohibited means won over the assignment to respect humanity. Furthermore, with regard to the SS it is possible that the reputation of the Waffen SS gained later in the war and in a different theatre, namely the eastern front, was later projected onto its actions in May 1940 in the Netherlands and has thus found its way into Dutch post-war reports. The judgement passed by the International Military Court during the Nuremberg trials (1946-1949), which labelled the entire SS as a criminal organisation, has of course also affected historiography. The fact that themes such as the treacherous invasion, the supposed elite nature of the German units, the high German losses and the breaches of the law of war still play a part in explaining the rapid defeat of the Netherlands indicates that the view of the battle which prevailed during the war can still be found in historiography. And there still appears to be a need for that view, however contentious it may be, a need which arises from the indignation about the harm inflicted on national identity in 1940. Speculation which continues to this day on the strategic or tactical nature of the bombing of Rotterdam can certainly only be understood in this light. In all probability, it is a lack of familiarity with the horrors of war which leads a section of the Dutch population to have difficulty, after all these years, understanding why this question cannot be solved definitively by a single historian. In this context, it can do no harm to point out yet again that Rotterdam was not undefended; it was in fact defended on the grounds of a carefully considered decision by the Dutch commander-inchief, without the evacuation of the civilian population from the expected combat zone being considered. It is tempting to draw the same conclusion about some impossible to prove opinions which have succeeded in prevailing, for example the assumption that Rotterdam was the first of a series of Dutch cities which was to be bombed by the Luftwaffe. There is no concrete evidence to suggest such a plan. The only firm fact is that Winkelman decided that there was an operational link between the bombing of Rotterdam and the simultaneous dropping of pamphlets over Utrecht. In reality, these were

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The military cemetery at the Grebbeberg.

two separate events. And with respect to the names of other cities such as The Hague and Haarlem: these are only mentioned in fairly unreliable Dutch sources which merit being taken with a substantial pinch of salt. The bombing of Rotterdam begs the question as to whether it can be explained as a sign of German haste in the Dutch theatre of operations. It could form indirect proof that the Germans underestimated the opposition of which the weak Dutch army was capable in spite of everything. The question of whether the time needed for capturing the Netherlands had been assessed as a critical factor by the Germans cannot be answered in the same way for all command levels and for each of the days of combat. In the eyes of von Küchler and von Bock, 12 May was the decisive day. A crisis had been averted at Breda and Antwerp. The 18th Army had beaten the French 7th Army in the race to reach the cities. The original reason for not getting behind in the intended schedule had therefore been negated.

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The two subsequent days were taken up with the endgame for Fortress Holland, but victory was already there within the Germans’ grasp. On 13 and 14 May, the attention of the Oberkommando des Heeres was increasingly taken up by the success of events at Sedan. The events there were now important to the outcome of the operations in the Netherlands. The motorised and mechanised forces—including those on Dutch soil— would soon have to be concentrated in northern France as part of Army Group A. Hitler’s Weisung Nr. 11 of 14 May, which foresaw this, ordered that the opposition from the Dutch army be broken as quickly as possible. On this point, however, the Weisung, when it was issued on 14 May, had already almost been overtaken by events as the Netherlands had in fact surrendered its arms in the early afternoon. The decision-making on the bombing of Rotterdam largely took place prior to the issue of the Weisung. The key figure in this decision-making was the commander of the 18th Army, von Küchler. He realised that any unnecessary loss of time during the endgame ran the risk of unexpected events. This would be the case if either British or French units did after all enter the Dutch theatre of war. Haste certainly played a role in Göring’s actions, as he wished to help von Sponeck. His wishes led to an intense exchange of words by phone with Kesselring. However, the precise part played in the decision-making by the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe can no longer be established with certainty due to the loss of German archives. Without wishing to detract from the performance of the Dutch army, all that remains is to conclude that the German invasion of the Netherlands went generally according to expectation. These considerations do not point to an underestimation of the opposition put up by the Dutch armed forces. The surprising element is rather to be found on the Dutch side: the armed forces were completely destroyed in five days, whereas a war lasting several weeks at least had been expected. The fact that, in spite of this, a sense of haste can be discerned in the German orders was due, apart from the reasons already mentioned, to the squabbling between von Bock and von Rundstedt. In Poland they had argued over which of them could claim the lion’s share of the victory, and during preparations for Fall Gelb von Bock had had to sit back and watch the main focus gradually being shifted from his army group to that of his rival. During the planning and execution of the campaign against France, von Bock thought it possible that Army Group A would grind to a halt in the Ardennes or northern France and that his own army group would have to force the decision and thus claim the victory for themselves. If that happened, he would have to have sufficient numbers of troops at his

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disposal in order to reinforce his own point of main effort, which lay with the 6th Army in Belgium, with troops which could be removed from the 18th Army after the capture of Fortress Holland. That is why it was preferable for the schedule for the Dutch theatre of operations not to be exceeded by too much. The Germans still encountered some unpleasant surprises, however. Their advance towards the IJssel needed more bridge-building materials than they had calculated, the Grebbe Line was more vigorously defended than reconnaissance had indicated, and in Noord-Brabant it was not the Dutch defences and the expected small capacity of the road network, but in fact the lack of traffic coordination which slowed the advance. These kinds of obstacles are part of military operations and they did not generally endanger the course of the German advance. This was also due to the fact that other events had been taken into account, such as the necessity of command measures at Breda and the failure of the attack on The Hague. German expectations that the fate of the Netherlands, in the event that it did not give up the fight on the first day, would be decided by the end of the third day came true. On the evening of 12 May, the Netherlands found itself in checkmate. The Dutch government obviously shared this opinion in view of its departure for London on the following day. Bearing the above in mind, the last point on which some reserve is due is the significance of German losses. As in all armed forces, the Germans adhered to the principle that operations should be carried out with the fewest possible losses and as such each casualty was one too many. In retrospect, the low losses suffered by the German armed forces during the Westfeldzug were precisely one of the surprises. In 1940, Germany achieved a victory over France in just six weeks. In contemporary terms, to those who had lived through the First World War, this was nothing short of a miracle. From 1914, Germany had spent four years fighting in vain to achieve exactly that same objective. The 1940 victory accounted for approximately 49,000 dead and missing in action. That was a fraction of the number of victims of the First World War.3 Even with regard to the Netherlands, it is simply going too far to explain the German losses— which were similar to those suffered by the Netherlands—as an unexpectedly high price to pay for overwhelming an underestimated opponent. Such interpretations demonstrate once more that the view which prevailed during the war is taking a long time to fade. The most apt example of this preoccupation with the figures detailing German losses, sometimes 3 K.-H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 244, 398-400.

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even going against common sense, is the fight for the IJsselmeer Dam. Although it has been known for a while that the 1st Cavalry Division suffered 21 fatalities between 10 and 15 May and that three Germans lost their lives during the offensive reconnaissance of the casemates at Kornwerderzand on 13 May, some publications persist in talking of the ‘Dam of Death’ and perpetuating rumours originating in 1940 that losses were suffered of up to half a battalion.

Analysing the military operations We must therefore ignore a number of firmly entrenched theories which are used to explain the rapid defeat of May 1940. Let us attempt to establish what the strong and weak points of the Dutch army were and, in comparison, the German Wehrmacht. To begin with, we can say that the Dutch system of mobilisation and concentration of the army, which was designed in the pre-war years, worked effectively when it needed to. The 280,000 conscripts and professional soldiers reached their war destinations without any particular difficulties. Secondly, Dutch soldiers did not generally lack the will to fight once war had broken out. When looking at a random selection of combat reports gathered by the various investigative committees, there can only be deep admiration for the soldiers who simply did what was asked of them in difficult conditions, and often did more than that. The battles along the river Maas, the IJssel and on the Grebbeberg, the battle against the airborne troops on 10 May in Fortress Holland and actions at many other locations give innumerable examples of small, close-knit groups commanded by inspiring officers or NCOs, who fought to the bitter end at their modest section of the front or who successfully launched vigorous counterattacks. German sources confirm the good impression that these small groups made. It must be added, however, that such localised exemplary conduct could not prevent the Netherlands being defeated. There lies the tragedy of the situation for those military personnel involved, especially when their actions proved useless in the face of premature surrender by Dutch soldiers elsewhere in the same position. There was also a small but well-trained, well-functioning unit at the top of the pyramid of command, namely General Winkelman and his General Headquarters. In the midst of what were often confusing, unexpected developments in the theatre of war and confronted with gradually worsening prospects, the senior staff kept their cool and the chosen strategy continued to form the leitmotif for all actions. However, as the indi-

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vidual soldier in his casemate all too soon came to realise that his brave actions had no chance of turning the tide of the war, after just a few days of war Winkelman too concluded that the Dutch war plan was doomed to failure, due to factors beyond his control. Following all the disagreement surrounding the war policy in the second half of the 1930s, Winkelman had opted for an operational plan which he thought best fitted the limited opportunities presented by the Dutch armed forces. In this largely static-defensive operation plan, the Field Army became even further removed than it already was from its original task, namely its capability as an instrument of mobile warfare. The army was now even more tied to prepared lines and positions than it had been under General Reijnders. The objective of the strategy was no more ambitious than to win time, i.e. to continue defending Fortress Holland long enough for France, Britain and Belgium to provide help and to halt the German advance across the full breadth of the front. In the subsequent second phase of the battle, the allies were to counterattack and force the German armed forces to retreat to their own territory. The Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. van Voorst tot Voorst, had rejected a similar strategy in the summer of 1937 as being too negative and too passive. After all, it offered no opportunity for taking the initiative from the attacker. Van Voorst tot Voorst’s view was undoubtedly correct and adheres to the principles of warfare as they were then taught in officer training. The course of the battle did indeed put this to the test. It demonstrated in several cases that Winkelman’s strategy did result in hopeless battlefield situations. The conclusions about the battle on the Grebbeberg have already detailed the psychological and tactical disadvantage faced by a defender against an attacker with specific objectives. And even the most successful Dutch defensive action, that of holding Kornwerderzand, without detracting in any way from the praise due to Captain Boers and his men, could achieve nothing more than a continuation of the status quo. Only unfavourable developments elsewhere could have forced the 1st Cavalry Division to move away. Yet the course of the battle also demonstrates the correctness of Winkelman’s decisions given the circumstances. Perhaps it could be said that even Winkelman had overestimated the skill of his troops in executing the military manoeuvres. The battle in prepared positions generally went well for the army, judging by the battles at the Maas and IJssel, at Scherpenzeel, Kornwerderzand and sections of the Peel-Raam Position. The two most important offensives, however, namely the operation by the Light Division on and near the Island of Dordrecht and the counterattack on the Grebbe Line on 13

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May from the direction of Achterberg, did not lead to the required result. These and other more extensive mobile operations, such as that against the airborne troops in the area surrounding The Hague after 10 May and the retreat from the Peel-Raam Position, exposed the weak spots in the Dutch army. The operations appeared to call for qualities and skills which the Dutch army did not possess sufficiently. During small-scale battles, as we have already seen, this lack could be compensated for by personal courage, even if such initiatives did not always turn out well as the example of Jacometti’s death on the Grebbeberg shows. For operations of any real size, preparatory staff work, thorough combat intelligence with which commanders can reach a realistic assessment of the situation, flawless command, good communications and the coordinated operation of individual units are the deciding factors. Too often, however, something went wrong with one or more of these requirements. The morale of the fighting units also often suffered as a result of simple things, such as the incorrect calculation of times of departure and arrival during movements, slow loading and unloading of vehicles, the lack of detailed maps, resulting in the unit getting lost, irregular meals and a lack of sleep: all issues which harmed the general sense of faith in the commanding officers and the belief that everything would turn out well in the end. This allowed a mood to develop which can loosely be summarised as ‘the organisation doesn’t work, they haven’t got things under control, this can never end well, let’s get out of here’. And this was even before the hardest part, the battle itself, had begun. If that went badly too, it was easy for the situation to progress from bad to worse and the commanders ended up with virtually no control over events. This could of course have serious consequences. At the Grebbeberg, for instance, Van Voorst tot Voorst and Harberts did not succeed in turning their gradually increasing numerical superiority into a decisive result. Such deficiencies relating to the internal organisation of, the command of, and the mutual trust within the larger units must be viewed as playing at least as important a role in the rapid defeat as the shortage of arms and equipment which has been so emphasised in the past–in particular when it involved the deployment of combined arms. The German units demonstrated their superiority precisely by their operational speed, the maintenance of cohesion within operations and the quality and rapidity of their command. The consequence was that Winkelman and his most senior subordinate commanders, the Commander of Fortress Holland and the Commander of the Field Army, were able to take sensible countermeasures on paper for halting the German advance, but that time after time the ex-

A place for contemplation.

On 4 May 2002, Dutch Remembrance Day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army, Lieutenant General M.L.M. Urlings, lays a wreath at the Grebbeberg monument in memory of those who died in combat.

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ecution came too late and the results were disappointing. Accordingly, it seemed impossible to reverse the German victories from the first phase of battle: the Moerdijk bridges and Waalhaven airfield remained in enemy hands, and the airborne units which were blocked off elsewhere in Fortress Holland continued to occupy the Ist Corps, even though they had not achieved their original objective. Furthermore, allied cooperation in Noord-Brabant was particularly unfavourably influenced by the requirements of the pre-war policy of neutrality. Due to this sequence of setbacks, in themselves hardly fatal, Winkelman’s strategy was proved dangerously weak within just a few days. As early as during the night of 12 May, Queen Wilhelmina and her government were informed by the commander-in-chief that the situation was highly serious and that they should discuss whether it was worthwhile continuing the fight. Any local successes could no longer do much to change that general picture. Eventually, the bombing of Rotterdam and the threat of Utrecht being subjected to the same fate led Winkelman to conclude that further fighting was pointless. On top of this, it would soon become clear that the Dutch army could not permit itself to carry on with the deficiencies described above against an opponent as strong as the German army. Of course, not everything went smoothly for the German army either: not all their commanders were equally vigorous, some units had no combat experience, there were fewer vehicles than required and certain operations turned into fiascos, to cite but a few examples. They did, however, meet the basic requirements for success. The planning process for the Westfeldzug had initially been difficult, but once the problems had been resolved, the operational plan was a good one. Some of the German military leadership still retained doubts, but Halder directed the execution of Fall Gelb with a steady hand. The plan clearly indicated the points of main effort, detailed the directions of attack most likely to succeed, but also encompassed sufficient alternatives at both macro and micro level to enable freedom of action to be maintained and consequently allow an easy response to unexpected developments. Army Group B could, if necessary, take over the main attack from A and, again if necessary, the main focus in the Dutch theatre of operations could be shifted from Noord-Brabant to the Veluwe area, while the Xth Corps could choose between two axes of attack for the Grebbe Line and, in the event that the Hollands Diep proved to be an impenetrable obstacle, the XXVIth Corps could aid the assault on Zeeland and Antwerp. The German commanders and their units were also unhindered by the passive and negative objectives which afflicted their Dutch opponents. On

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the contrary, they were able to focus fully on realising tangible and known objectives. When carrying out operations, they were able to rely on their practical staff system and tried and tested rules of conduct with respect to command, known as the Auftragstaktik, and an efficient communications system. The German commanders therefore had a better grip on the course of their operations than their Dutch counterparts. Within the German command system, the commander’s place was preferably as close as possible to the combatant parties. There he could form a realistic picture of the progress of the operation and his presence could offer moral support to his troops. Further back, at the command post, the chief of staff would keep the staff process rolling. While the German commanders, even if they were not at their command posts, succeeded in maintaining contact with their own staff and could continue to direct the staff, on the Dutch side it was often the case that commanders could not be reached for long periods of time; either because they were too far from the front to be able to direct combat in person, or because they had gone to the front in order to be informed of the situation at first hand. The German units which had operated in Poland could fall back on combat experience and, insofar as they had not come up to the mark there, their combat power was by this time improved thanks to adapted exercise programmes. Furthermore, in spite of the losses suffered in Poland, their arms and materiel, at least for those units in the front line, were once more in good shape. This naturally had a favourable effect on morale. It is worth noting the air superiority on which the Germans could rely in the Netherlands almost from the start of combat. This was of particular importance for reconnaissance deep into enemy territory. For example, the lack of activity on the North Sea and on the waterways in Zeeland quickly indicated that there was little risk of a British landing in Zeeland followed by an advance towards Noord-Brabant and Fortress Holland. In addition, the always vulnerable marching columns were not subjected to air attacks, which was particularly fortunate for the XXVIth Corps in Noord-Brabant, plagued as it was by traffic jams. And finally, the Luftwaffe’s air superiority enabled it to provide unhindered tactical support for the troops on the ground, support which the Dutch troops had to do without and which was sorely missed. The material damage caused by the Stuka attacks, the Luftwaffe’s most common method, was in fact generally quite light. The effect on the morale of the Dutch troops was much more damaging. The sum of these factors quickly enabled the Germans to achieve a number of local successes at the desired locations, to exploit these systematically and to convert them into decisive results. The speed at which this

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was done meant that the Dutch commanders were frequently unaware of the actual situation and this impeded their ability to regain the initiative. Such examples are easy to find: the capture of the Moerdijk bridges, the breach at Mill and the advance of the 9th Panzer Division towards Rotterdam. By maintaining forward movement and a high speed of attack, the XXVIth Corps allowed the retreating Peel Division no let-up. As a result, Colonel Schmidt had no opportunity to straighten the situation out—in fact his command contributed to the confusion—and there soon proved to be insufficient time available for creating a combined Franco-Dutch front.

Pre-war defence policy: does it require re-evaluation? The Dutch and German armed forces which entered into hostilities in May 1940 were both the product of the policies pursued in the two respective countries, and specifically those pursued since the end of the First World War. As we saw earlier, they would therefore differ on decisive factors at the outbreak of the Second World War. It is noticeable that the basic principles adhered to in the 1920s did show certain similarities. Both countries reorganised their armies and reduced them in size: Germany was forced to do so by the Treaty of Versailles, while the Netherlands did so on the basis of budgetary priorities, profiting from decreasing international tensions. When Hitler, having thrown off the restrictions imposed by Versailles, gave the signal for German rearmament, many serious difficulties were encountered. The pool of officers and NCOs was too small and there was a serious lack of trained men due to the many years in which conscription had been prohibited. As a result, they had to rely more heavily than they would have liked on the First World War veterans, who were experienced but no longer young. Furthermore, the massive losses from that war were still affecting the age demographics of the German population. Added to this was a long period in which there were severe shortages of arms and equipment, and ammunition supplies would quickly be exhausted if a war was not concluded within several weeks or at the most a few months. Insofar as these problems related to personnel and training, they could be solved prior to 1938, when the strength and size of the Wehrmacht had not yet grown that dramatically. This was largely due to the fact that on creating the Reichswehr it had been decided that this would form the core, out of which in due course a large and modern army could rise, as befitting Germany’s ambitions to be a major power. In the Reichswehr, the pro-

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fessional expertise, experience and traditions of the old army were preserved and further developed in anticipation of this new army. In the 1930s, the Netherlands struggled to overcome difficulties which were very similar to those experienced by Germany: insufficient numbers of officers and NCOs, insufficient numbers of trained men, reservists who were too old and not sufficiently trained. The army formation system designed in 1922 was, however, not suited to remedying these issues; in fact they were largely caused by the system itself and the manner in which it was implemented. In around 1935, when the need for stronger national defences was recognised, there was virtually no coherent basis for rebuilding the forces within the contemporary organisation, never mind the fact that by that point Germany already had the advantage in terms of time. On the international arms market, too, the best opportunities had already passed the Netherlands by. After 1938, the German military advantage only increased, and not just compared to the Netherlands. With respect to military combat power ratios in Europe, time was on Germany’s side at the end of the 1930s. While the Third Reich had its fast-growing army and air force gain operational experience in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland and work hard to build up materiel supplies, the Western allies would only be able to breach the gap in rearmament in the longer term.4 In the meantime, the Netherlands continued its preparations by building casemates, improving border control, forming the first combat-ready units since 1922 and proclaiming the Extraordinary Call-up for External Security (BOUV) at the end of September 1938. It was only the general mobilisation at the end of August 1939 which called up the entire army. Until the early spring of 1940, however, its chief pastime was constructing positions rather than firearm training, conducting manoeuvres for the larger units or combat exercises. L. de Jong has summarised the Dutch post-First World War defence issues in the succinct comment that the war of May 1940 had in fact already been lost by the cutbacks of the 1920s and 1930s. If this is taken to mean, as described above, that the 1922 system was largely responsible for the later shortcomings in national defence, then there is little point in arguing against this. It is, however, a judgement in retrospect which ignores the question of whether any other armed forces policy could have been pursued during the 1920s and 1930s, any policy which could have allowed the Netherlands to enter into the May 1940 war under more favourable circumstances. 4 Idem, 24-30.

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When looking at the background behind the creation of the 1922 army system, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, as R.P.F. Bijkerk has argued, there was no satisfactory solution to the problem of the defence of the Netherlands after 1918.5 The pre-war cohesion between the policy of armed neutrality, the structure of the army, the conscription system and the contribution of the fortifications and the Field Army to national defences could not be fully restored. The increase in scale which the conduct of war had undergone during the First World War, the first proper total war, raised the fundamental question of whether a country as small as the Netherlands was capable of mobilising armed forces which in peacetime could act independently as a credible deterrent. There was also the question of whether the Netherlands could be a valid partner within a group of allies in any large-scale conflict, an alliance which would by definition be of an ad hoc nature. The Netherlands had long struggled with the question of how powerful the armed forces, and in particular the army, ought to be and which tasks they should be able to undertake in order to be able to maintain national neutrality—which after all formed the mainstay of the national defence policy. This issue had influenced political decision-making on national defence almost continuously since 1840. Any pleas for a powerful defence mechanism were always rebuffed with the argument that, as a minor military power, the Netherlands would never have the ability to defend itself alone. The strategy recognised this by relying on support from allies. Dutch national defence would therefore never have to, and never be able to, provide a real guarantee of security. This fact, which was irrevocably linked to the Netherlands’ position as a minor power, has always played into the hands of opponents of a strong national defence. If the First World War served as an example of future warfare—and it is logical to view it as such—then the always difficult issue of what comprises sufficient national defence becomes impossible to solve in practice. In light of this, the mentality of ‘the broken rifle’ which was formerly the most common explanation (and reproach!) for the defeat of 1940 becomes an untenable simplification of reality. There was certainly no political or social support during the 1920s for the high cost of the armed forces which could guarantee the Netherlands’ independence and prevent annexation by a foreign power. The government was cutting back and there was no foreign threat to justify a high 5 R.P.F. Bijkerk, “W.F. Pop (1858-1931)” in: G. Teitler and W. Klinkert, eds, Kopstukken uit de krijgsmacht. Nederlandse vlag- en opperofficieren 1815-1955 (Amsterdam, 1997) 297298.

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defence budget. Furthermore, a familiar principle of the national defence policy, namely the European balance of power, had ceased to exist. No convincing argument had replaced it. Becoming an ally of France was not an option. This would have conflicted with the Dutch policy of aloofness and neutrality. In addition, the Dutch government mistrusted France’s power politics with respect to Germany. Giving up its neutrality and forging an alliance with France and Britain would also probably have had little effect. The predicted result, i.e. allied support, could also be obtained by maintaining neutrality–at least that was the prevailing strategic thinking. With or without the maintenance of neutrality, in the event of a German assault the fate of the Netherlands would be sealed by the resulting power clash between Germany and the Western allies. The result of this clash is, of course, now all too familiar. On top of this, the experiences of Czechoslovakia and Poland did not encourage the Netherlands to give up its tried and tested policy, while any change would turn the risk of becoming involved in a future war into a certainty. Even Belgium, which in view of the First World War had few illusions about its fate in the event of a subsequent round of the FrancoGerman battle for power, went no further than holding secret talks with Paris. The formation of a separate group of allies comprising the small European states with the aim of protecting themselves against German expansion plans was just as unreliable and unattractive. This kind of alliance could have been forged out of what were known as the Oslo states, the politico-economic partnership between the Scandinavian countries and the post-war Benelux states.6 What could the Netherlands expect from the League of Nations? That organisation was at best a promise for the future, but at the time it was no practical alternative to a national defence policy. Faith in the system of collective security, as embodied by the League of Nations, became less and less of a consideration as the 1930s neared their close; the Netherlands had never been an enthusiastic participant in the system anyway.7 And what about timely, powerful rearmament while maintaining the neutrality policy? In this case, too, little would probably have been gained. It is true that Winkelman would then not have been forced to opt for a strategicdefensive strategy. At best, however, the war would simply have lasted longer than five days. The Netherlands would have been spared the national 6 See G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd. Van Oslostaten tot Benelux 1930-1940 (Amsterdam and Brussels, 1985). 7 R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999) 292-293.

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trauma of rapid defeat, but would that have been worth the higher cost to society, prior to the war, and the higher losses and greater damage during it? A final problem was that the various requirements which the new army system needed to meet were difficult to reconcile with each other. It proved impossible to design a system which in peacetime was cheap and demanded only small-scale conscription of the population and yet provided a large, well-trained and well-equipped army in the event of mobilisation. The 1922 system was therefore a compromise with inherent shortcomings, which was further weakened by later cutbacks. The major difficulties were the lack of training among conscripts, the lack of experience among commanders when it came to the bigger picture, and the separation of the peacetime and wartime organisations. In addition, there was little financial room for manoeuvre for investing in modernising arms and equipping the army. Within the restrictions imposed by the 1920s, the system thus affected the future in a way that was unavoidable and at the same time acceptable. It is therefore incorrect to view the pursued policy as the political leadership’s underestimation of the German threat and as an insufficient grasp of the requirements of modern warfare among the military leadership. The requirements made of this policy and of the army system were simply too contradictory to lead to a satisfactory result in both the short and the long term. In the short term, the foreign threat was small, in the long term it was possible that a severe military threat would again arise. In this respect, we should not confine ourselves to simply comparing rapid German rearmament and Dutch rearmament, which is often viewed as too late and too slow. In fact, the German Reich is the exception here and not the Netherlands. Other great powers such as France and Britain also lagged behind Germany when it came to arms. It was more fitting for a minor power such as the Netherlands to follow the example of these countries rather than to outdo them. It is difficult to say how Dutch defence policy compares to other minor powers such as Denmark or Belgium due to the lack of comparable studies, but the general impression is that the Netherlands did not deviate that much from those two countries. The fact that Belgium did not capitulate after five days as the Netherlands had but continued the fight for eighteen days is not just due to the power of the Belgian armed forces–the Belgian army was more than twice the size of the Dutch army–but also to the assignment issued to Army Group B. Its task was to advance at a steady pace, drawing the bulk of the British and French armies towards it so that, once Army Group A had reached

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the coast, those forces could be destroyed on Belgian territory. Until that time, Belgium was defended not only by its own armed forces, but also by those of France and Britain. The above leads us to the conclusion that the Netherlands really had no viable alternative for its pursued security policy in the 1920s and 1930s. It explains why the responsible politicians were not willing to depart from the policy of neutrality and the related policy of military deterrence, even if the policy pursued and the chosen army system were not completely satisfactory. The policy did, after all, have a long history and in view of the outcome of various international crises—1870 and 1914-1918 for instance—it was a successful one. It could be added that it is doubtful whether an alternative Dutch national policy would have had any influence on the German or French political or military decision-making with respect to the Netherlands prior to the outbreak of the conflict. If anything stands out in this decisionmaking, it is the indifference to the power of the Dutch defence mechanism and the value of Dutch neutrality. Both France and Germany allowed themselves only to be influenced by their own interests, as was the case in the Netherlands. Hitler’s main focus was the destruction of France. After the Polish campaign he ordered plans to be drawn up for this purpose. The German staffs included the occupation of the Netherlands in their plans purely out of military-operational considerations, namely to prevent the British forming a bridgehead on the continent within Fortress Holland. The attack on the Netherlands later came to depend on whether the German armed forces felt powerful enough to attack France, as Hitler wanted. The breach of the Dutch neutrality policy was not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle by either the military or Hitler. France’s main aim was to repel a German attack. To this end it would defend itself on a forward front in Belgium. Again for military-operational reasons, this front was to link up in the north with the main Dutch defence, i.e. Fortress Holland. If this was not included in the plans, the allied front could be outflanked via Noord-Brabant and France would be exposed to danger. Paris therefore accepted the Netherlands as an ally prior to the battle and promised substantial military support. One of the major objectives of the Dutch neutrality policy had thus been achieved, but without the Dutch defence mechanism having to contribute much in the way of combat power. The Dutch operation plan for Noord-Brabant, which was not particularly favourable for Gamelin, did not prevent him offering support. Extending the front northwards into Dutch territory was gradually becoming dogma in Paris.

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The authors of this book hope that their arguments make it clear that the rapid defeat of the Netherlands can no longer be explained by the picture which originated during the war. Not all aspects of this picture were factually incorrect: the Germans enjoyed superior firepower, the Netherlands had no tanks, Dutch conscripts lacked combat experience and the Netherlands had started its rearmament too late. Yet it is incorrect to suggest that the five dark years of occupation could have been prevented by the allocation of a higher defence budget from 1922 onwards or if the Germans had not employed all kinds of illegal methods and ploys. The new picture that has gradually been forming as 1940 recedes into history is more prosaic and less exceptional than the old picture. It certainly does not have the same epic eloquence, but it reflects better the historical reality of how the German forces conquered the Netherlands.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

General A large amount of literature has been published about the war in May 1940. The most important books and journal articles to have been published before 1980 are listed in: P.J.A. Korver, “Voorlopig bibliografisch overzicht van de meidagen 1940”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, III (1980) 55-75. For a bibliographical survey of works published after 1980, please refer to the annual publication by the Netherlands Institute of History in The Hague: Repertorium van boeken en tijdschriftartikelen betreffende de geschiedenis van Nederland.�� This publication appeared in print until 1995. The more recent volumes are available in digital format; see www.dbng.nl. Another useful reference is Terugblik ’40-’45. Maandblad van de Documentatiegroep ’40-’45. The chief source of information on Dutch army operations in May 1940 is the collection of combat reports and reports concerning the battle on Dutch territory.�� This �� is held by the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH) in The Hague, the institute which, following several name changes, is the direct descendant of the Krijgsgeschiedkundig Instituut [War History Institute]. The collection is also held in the Central Archive Depot of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. German archives about the battle during May 1940 are held in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau. Copies of some of these documents are held at the Netherlands Institute for Military History. Another primary source, which should be used with discernment, however, is: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. �� Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel 1a, b en c. Algemene inleiding/Militair beleid 1939-1940 (The Hague, 1949). The first survey of military operations, as viewed almost exclusively from the Dutch side, is the document published by the ‘Ons Leger’ association [F.A.J. de Klerck], Beknopt overzicht van de krijgsverrichtingen

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der Koninklijke Landmacht 10-19 mei 1940, in opdracht van den Minister van Oorlog samengesteld bij de Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis van de Generalen Staf (Leiden, 1947).�� Highly �� detailed descriptions of the combat were published by the General Staff ’s War History Department from 1951 onwards in the series De strijd op Nederlands grondgebied tijdens de Wereldoorlog II. The sections on the ground battle, in which V.E. Nierstrasz’s influence was particularly obvious, were published in The Hague between 1951 and 1963. Initial studies had already been published in the journal De Militaire Spectator from 1940-1942 and post 1945. For the general readership, J.J.C.P. Wilson used this series as the basis for his publication Vijf oorlogsdagen en hun twintigjarige voorgeschiedenis (Assen, 1960). Another popular, slim volume from the same year is: D.H. Couvée, De meidagen van ’40 (The Hague, 1960). E.H. Brongers published his first book about May 1940 in 1963, the concise De oorlog in mei ’40 (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1963). For the German market there is the rather unsatisfactory F.S.A. Beekman and F. Kurowski, Der Kampf um die Festung Holland (Herford, 1981). One photographic book is: H. Bredewold and J. Zwaan, 1940–De mei-oorlog. De Duitse pinksterveldtocht tegen Nederland in beeld (Amsterdam and Alphen aan den Rijn, 1975). A survey of some of the light troops is given by J.A. Bom in De Regimenten HuzarenMotorrijders 1938-1940 (Amersfoort, 2000). For information about the cavalry, see E.H. Brongers, De Nederlandse cavalerie in de meidagen van 1940 (Amersfoort, 1998). Those who wish to immerse themselves in the history of the Second World War cannot of course ignore L. de Jong’s magnum opus Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (13 volumes; The Hague 1969-1989), of which Deel 3. Mei ’40 (The Hague, 1970) deals with the German invasion of the Netherlands.�� De Jong’s books have been published in both an academic and a popular edition. This book only refers to the academic edition. The response to the completed works can be found in part 14 Reacties (2 volumes; The Hague, 1991). With respect to the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Second World War, the following are important: K.W.L. Bezemer, Zij vochten op de zeven zeeën. Verrichtingen en avonturen der Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Zeist, 1964), A.N. baron de Vos van Steenwijk, Het marinebeleid in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam and Dieren, 1986), and Ph.M. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (3 volumes; Franeker, 1984-1990). By far the most important book concerning the air force is: F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970). The following popular works can also be consulted with respect to


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the air force: W. Schoenmakers and F. Postma, Mei 1940. De verdediging van het Nederlandse luchtruim (Amsterdam and Dieren, 1985), and Johan P. Nater, 10 mei 1940. Luchtoorlog boven Nederland (Rotterdam, 1982). The military personnel who were decorated with the Military Order of William, the highest award for bravery in the Netherlands, for their actions during May 1940 are listed in: P.G.H. Maalderink, ed., De Militaire Willems-Orde sedert 1940 (S.l., 1982). This book contains a survey of the military operations in which the Dutch armed forces have been involved since May 1940, the service records of the Knights of the Military Order of William and the Royal Decrees which determined who received this decoration. For a survey of the casemates, please refer to H.R. Visser and J.S. van Wieringen, Kazematten in het Interbellum (Utrecht, 2002), under the editorship of T. de Kruijf. P.J.M. Kamps wrote a useful, quantitative reference work, Geschut en mitrailleurs van Koninklijke Landmacht en Koninklijke Marine op 10 mei 1940 (S.l., 1996), including a brief introduction to the typology and provenance of the weapons. Also highly recommended is G. de Vries and B.J. Martens, Nederlandse vuurwapens 1895-1940. Landmacht en Luchtvaartafdeling (Amsterdam, 1993). E.H. Brongers drew up a useful survey of the German order of battle: E.H. Brongers, “Slagorde Duitse strijdkrachten bij de aanval op Nederland in Mei 1940” (NIMH collection). For an overview of German and allied aircraft losses in the Netherlands during the Second World War, see Crashregister: www.nimh.nl. He also wrote about German personnel losses in: “Gesneuvelde Duitse militairen in Nederland mei 1940”, Mars et Historia, XXXII (1998) 46-49. For a survey of the French order of battle in 1940, please refer to: Lee Sharp. The French Army 1939-1940. Organisation: Order of Battle: Operational History (London, 2001) and Guerre 1939-1945. Les Grandes Unités Francaises (Paris, 1967).

Chapter One An idea of the rapid defeat during and just after the war can be gained from: E.N. van Kleffens, The rape of the Netherlands (London, 1940). See also: P.L.G. Doorman, Military operations in the Netherlands 10th-17th May 1940 (London, 1944); L. de Jong, Je maintiendrai (3 volumes; London, 1941-1944); G. Kraemer and G. Ballintijn, De meidagen van 1940. Op oorlogsreportage in Nederland (Enschede, 1945); J. Visser, Vijf dagen oorlog in Nederland. 10-14 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1946), and: W.A. Poort

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and Th.N.J. Hoogvliet, Slagschaduwen over Nederland. De geschiedenis van de oorlog van 10 tot en met 28 mei 1940 op Nederlands grondgebied (Haarlem, 1946). Another illustrative example is the lecture given by G.J. Sas, the former Dutch military attaché in Berlin, on 5 March 1941 in New York, entitled: “De Duitsche invasie in Nederland” (NIMH collection, box 557, file 6). Also: G.H. Hoek, Doodenwacht bij onze gevallenen (Wageningen, 1945); O. Ebbens and E. Wijga, Dodendam.�� De strijd voor en op de Afsluitdijk in de Meidagen van 1940 (Amsterdam, 1946), and: B. Honselaar, De zwarte duivels van Rotterdam (Rotterdam, 1948). An important review of the first three volumes of L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, is: I. Schöffer, “Het trauma van de Nederlandse nederlaag”, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, LXXXIV (1971) 536-551, in which the section on May 1940 is highly praised. The importance of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, now the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, in recording the history of the 1940-1945 period is described in, for example: M. Pam, De onderzoekers van de oorlog: het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie en het werk van dr. L. de Jong (The Hague, 1989) and in: A.H. Paape, “Veertig jaar Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie” in: D. Barnouw, M. de Keizer and G. van der Stroom, eds, 1940-1945: Onverwerkt Verleden? (Utrecht, 1985). See also: L. de Jong, “Ontstaan en achtergronden van mijn werk” in: G. Abma, Y. Kuiper and J. Rypkema, eds, Tussen goed en fout. Nieuwe gezichtspunten in de geschiedschrijving 1940-1945 (Franeker, 1986) 19-29, and: L. de Jong, “The historiography of the Netherlands in the Second World War” in: A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse, eds, Clio’s mirror. Historiography in Britain and The Netherlands (Zutphen, 1985) 215228. For the development of military historiography in the Netherlands, including that of May 1940, see B. Schoenmaker, “Clio at arms: military history in the Netherlands”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, XIV (1991) 82-104. E.H. Brongers has published several books on May 1940 since 1963. The author refutes the sometimes harsh assessments of the Dutch army given by Nierstrasz and De Jong. The titles include, in addition to the abovementioned De oorlog in mei ’40, the following: De slag om de residentie 1940 (Baarn, 1968), Grebbelinie 1940 (Baarn, 1971), Een dag oorlog in Zuid-Limburg (Baarn, 1973), Afsluitdijk 1940 (Baarn, 1977), and: Opmars naar Rotterdam (3 volumes; Baarn, 1982-1983). Some of these titles are still in print. Another illustration of Brongers’ views is: E.H. Brongers, “Kritiek op dr. L. de Jong’s ‘Mei ’40’”, Ons Leger, LIV8 (1970) 1-4, with the subsequent response from De Jong: “Repliek van prof. De Jong op majoor Brongers’ kritiek”, Ons Leger, LIV-10 (1970) 1-2.


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Good descriptions of firsthand experiences include: H. van Heerde, Tusschen vuur en ijzer (Meppel, 1940) on the IInd battalion of the 19th Infantry Regiment, and: E.P. Weber, De vuurproef van het Grensbataljon. Belevenissen van het Ie Bataljon 26e Regiment Infanterie tijdens den Nederlandsch-Duitschen oorlog van 10-15 mei 1940 (Arnhem, 1945). The first edition of the Dutch edition of the present book led to criticism from W.D. Jagtenberg, a Grebbeberg veteran, in his pamphlet Geschiedvervalsing over de meidagen van 1940. Kiest Defensie vóór de SS en tégen haar veteranen? (Wijchen, 1995). A second, revised edition appeared as Ik beschuldig. Vijftien jaar strijd tegen het Ministerie van Defensie over haar boek Mei 1940. De strijd op Nederlands grondgebied (Soesterberg, 2010). He objected in particular to the conclusion drawn in Mei 1940 regarding German and Dutch breaches of the law of war in the Dutch theatre of operations. In 2000, Jagtenberg took legal action against the State of the Netherlands regarding this matter, but lost the case. The issue of breaches of the law of war on Dutch territory in May 1940 is analysed in detail in H. Amersfoort, ‘Ik had mijn roode-kruis band afgedaan’.�� Oorlogsrecht en gedragingen van Nederlandse en Duitse militairen in gevecht, mei 1940 (The Hague, 2005). For a survey of legal proceedings with respect to academic research, see A. de Baets, Censorship of historical thought. A world guide 1945-2000 (London, 2002).

Chapter Two Major recent studies of the First World War include the compact and intelligent The First World War (Oxford, 2002), by the well-known British military historian Michael Howard, and the weighty trilogy (forthcoming): H. Strachan, The First World War (Oxford, 2001-), of which the first volume, To Arms, was published in 2001. The role of Ludendorff in the creation of the Weimar Republic is described in: Martin Kitchen, The silent dictatorship.�� The politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976). The views of Hitler on the German defeat and the fall of the empire can of course be found in Mein Kampf, first published in Munich in 1925. There are two general works on the history of the Weimar Republic which are still worth consulting: firstly Eberhard Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik (Munich and Vienna, 1984) and also: Horst Müller, Weimar. Die unvollendete Demokratie (Munich, 1987). The most important book on fascism is: E. Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich, 1971). The rise of National-Socialism in Germany and the seizure of power by the Na-

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zis is dealt with in: Martin Broszat, Die Machtergreifung. Der Aufstieg der NSDAP und die Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1984); Wolfgang Michalka, ed., Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Paderborn etc., 1984), and: Peter D. Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung (London, 1983). A survey of the history of Hitler’s Third Reich can be found in: Klaus Hildebrand, Das Dritte Reich (Munich, Berlin and Vienna, 1980). For a concise history of international relations in the interwar period, please refer to: G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A short history of international affairs, 1920-1939 (4th edition, 2nd impression; London, New York and Toronto, 1952). The Weimar Republic’s foreign policy is described in: Peter Krüger, Versailles. Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Friedenssicherung (Munich, 1987). Hitler’s foreign policy is described in: Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933-1945. Kalkül oder Dogma? (6th impression, Stuttgart, Berlin and Cologne, 1980). British defence policy is described succinctly by the abovementioned Michael Howard in: The continental commitment. The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (Harmondsworth, 1972). A more extensive look at the policy can be found in: Brian Bond, British military policy between the two world wars (Oxford, 1980). The content of the meeting on 7 November 1937 was laid down in a memorandum by Hitler’s aide-de-camp Oberst F. Hossbach. This Hossbach memorandum, as it is known, has been published in, among other documents: Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg 14. November 1945-1. Oktober 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. XXV, 402-413. The value of this document has had serious doubts cast on it by A.J.P. Taylor in his polemic The origins of the second world war (London, 1961 and later impressions), a book which is still certainly worth reading. Those who do not agree with Taylor can turn to: Walther Hofer, “‘Entfesselung’ oder ‘Ausbruch’ des Zweiten Weltkrieges?” in: Gottfried Niedhart, ed., Kriegsbeginn 1939. Entfesselung oder Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs? (Darmstadt, 1976). The relationship between the German army and the Nazis is dealt with in: Klaus-Jürgen Müller, The army, politics and society in Germany 1933-45. Studies in the army’s relation to Nazism (Manchester, 1987). There is also an interesting article by Gerd R. Ueberschär, “General Halder and the Resistance to Hitler in the German High Command 1938-1940”, European History Quarterly, XVIII (1988) 321-347. The British policy of appeasement and French foreign policy are looked at in, respectively: Maurice Cowling, The impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 1975), and: Geoffrey Warner,


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Pierre Laval and the eclipse of France (New York, 1968). British and French military preparations for the war are described in: Brian Bond, France and Belgium 1939-1940 (London, 1975), and: M. Gamelin, Servir (3 volumes; Paris, 1946). With respect to the French operations in the Dutch provinces of Noord-Brabant and Zeeland, V.E. Nierstrasz wrote: “De Franse en Belgische operatieplannen van 1939 en 1940 in verband met de Nederlandse verdediging van de zuidelijke provinciën en de opmars van het Franse VIIe Leger naar Noord-Brabant en Zeeland in mei 1940”, Orgaan van de Vereniging ter beoefening van de Krijgswetenschappen, IV (1949-1950) 113-182. A very detailed description of this is also given in B. Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000).

Chapter Three An excellent introduction to the historiography of the Netherlands since 1900 is given by: P. Luykx and N. Bootsma, eds, De laatste tijd.�� Geschiedschrijving over Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Utrecht, 1987).�� The �� historiography of the Netherlands during the First World War is starting to take shape, witness P. Moeyes, Buiten schot. Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog 1914-1918 (Amsterdam, Antwerp, 2001); H.P. van Tuyll van Serooskerken, The Netherlands and World War I. Espionage, diplomacy and survival (Leiden, 2001); A. Staarman, Verre van vredig. Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog 1914-1918 (Delft, 2004) and: M.M. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral. The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918 (Amsterdam, 2006). A general survey of the history of the Netherlands during the interwar period can be found in the first two volumes of L. de Jong’s Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, respectively: Voorspel (The Hague, 1969) and Neutraal (The Hague, 1969). More concise are the articles in volume fourteen of Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (Haarlem, 1979): Joh. de Vries, “Het economisch leven in Nederland”, 102-145; J. Bosmans, “Het maatschappelijk-politieke leven in Nederland 1918-1940”, 200-254, and: A.F. Manning, “Nederland en het buitenland 1918-1940”, 336-364. �� A socio-economic history of the Netherlands during the occupation is given by H.A.M. Klemann, Nederland 1938-1948. Economie en samenleving in jaren van oorlog en bezetting (Amsterdam, 2002). A comprehensive survey of Dutch foreign policy in the interwar period is given by R. Schuursma, Vergeefs onzijdig. Nederlands neutraliteit 1919-1940 (Utrecht 2005). An interesting comparison to the situation in

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Belgium is provided by J. Vaesen, Tussen Scylla en Charybdis. De Belgische militaire politiek en de economische crisis 1930-1939 (Brussels, 2003). For an introduction to the parliamentary history of the period please refer to: P.J. Oud, Honderd Jaren. Een eeuw van staatkundige vormgeving in Nederland 1840-1940. Bewerkt en voor de periode na 1940 aangevuld door J. Bosmans (Assen, 1979).�� The �� rise of the right-wing political movements in the Netherlands and media reports on Germany are dealt with in, respectively: A.A. de Jonge, Crisis en critiek der democratie. Antidemocratische stromingen en de daarin levende denkbeelden over de staat in Nederland tussen de wereldoorlogen (Assen, 1968), and: F. van Vree, De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland 1930-1939. Een studie over de vorming van de publieke opinie (Groningen, 1989). The debate on the economic policy of the Netherlands in the 1930s has been given a strong boost by: P.W. Klein and G.J. Borger, De jaren dertig. Aspecten van crisis en werkeloosheid (Amsterdam, 1979). An important work on the contribution made by H. Colijn to pre-war defence policy is: H. Langeveld, Schipper naast God. Hendrikus Colijn 1869-1944. Deel Twee 1933-1944 (Amsterdam, 2004). See also: J. Houwink ten Cate, ‘Mannen van de daad’ en Duitsland, 19191939. Het Hollandse zakenleven en de vooroorlogse buitenlandse politiek (The Hague, 1995). The role of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands in defence matters has been described very accurately by C. Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001). The Dutch policy of neutrality is dealt with in: C.B. Wels, Aloofness and Neutrality. Studies on Dutch foreign relations and policy-making institutions (Utrecht, 1982), while G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd.�� Van Oslostaten tot Benelux 1930-1940 (Amsterdam and Brussels, 1985) describes the specific problems experienced by the small powers. An analysis of the policy on the League of Nations can be found in R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999). An excellent analysis of the way in which the Dutch political and military authorities tried in vain from 1939 onwards to garner foreign support without overtly relinquishing their policy of neutrality is given in: T. van Gent, Het falen van de Nederlandse gewapende neutraliteit, september 1939-mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 2009). The ‘Venlo incident’ has been written about in the popular publication Johan P. Nater, Het Venlo incident. De mysterieuze ontvoering met geweld op Nederlands grondgebied door een SS-Sonderkommando in november 1939 (Rotterdam, s.a.).�� Other sources on the Venlo incident and the role of Major G.J. Sas include the journalistic book B. Tigchelaar, De gemiste kans. Staatsgreep tegen Hitler 1938. Officieren tussen moed en wanhoop (Zwolle,


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2004).A clear and concise introduction to Dutch defence policy can be found in: C.M. Schulten, “The Netherlands and its army (1900-1940)”, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, LVIII (1984) 73-95. The history of the origins of the army system of 1922 is dealt with in R.P.F. Bijkerk, “W.F. Pop (1858-1931)” in: G. Teitler and W. Klinkert, eds, Kopstukken uit de krijgsmacht. Nederlandse vlag- en opperofficieren 1815-1955 (Amsterdam, 1997), 283-299. An older source of information is: H.J. Kruls and H. Staring, Op de bres voor Neerlands onafhankelijkheid (Amsterdam, 1939). There is also an unpublished manuscript by V.E. Nierstrasz on defence policy between 1922 and 1939 entitled: “De voorgeschiedenis van 19221939 (Het Nederlandse leger tussen de 1e en 2e Wereldoorlog)”, which is held by the NIMH (collectie Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II. Nederland 19221938, boxes 413b and 413c). We recommend two articles by F. Snapper for the interesting data they contain: “De gevechtswaarde van de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1914-1918 en 1940”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, III (1980) 16-54, and: “Enige sterktecijfers betreffende de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 18401940”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, IV (1981) 80-118. The discussion about the strategic policy to be pursued, prior to and during mobilisation, has been well summarised in the abovementioned volume 2 of: L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, while attention is also devoted to this topic in: V.E Nierstrasz, Inleiding en Algemeen Overzicht van de gevechtsdagen 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957).�� A �� number of original documents about war policy are published in: Enquêtecommissie regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel 1b. Bijlagen (The Hague, 1949), annexes 5, 16, 17 and 18. J.C.H. Blom has advocated further investigation into and re-evaluation of Dutch pre-war defence policy in: J.C.H. Blom, “‘Durch kamen sie doch’. Het Nederlandse defensiebeleid in de jaren dertig opnieuw beschouwd” in: G. Teitler, ed., Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30 (Dieren, 1984) 116-143. A response to this is: F. Snapper, “‘Durch kamen sie doch’.�� Dankzij de luchtmacht.�� De defensie gedurende de periode 1929-1938 in Europa, Japan en de Verenigde Staten”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, IX (1986) 43-71, to which Blom in turn replied with: “Over geld en gevechtskracht.�� Een reactie”, Ibidem, 72-74. See also: H.L. Zwitzer and P.H. Kamphuis, “De afbraak van de Nederlandse defensie tijdens het interbellum”, Carré, (July/August 1981) 32-35. In this context, one should also refer to H. Amersfoort, Een

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harmonisch leger voor Nederland. Oorlogsbeeld, strategie en operationele planning van het Nederlandse leger in het Interbellum (inaugural lecture, Breda, 2007). In the abovementioned volume Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, G. Teitler demonstrates in: “De krijgsmacht als Cassandra. Toekomstverwachtingen van Nederlandse militairen”, 7087, that the armed forces were well aware of the modern methods of warfare. Other interesting articles from this volume are: H.W. von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie: het dilemma in de jaren dertig”, 5-23; J.A.M.M. Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum”, 42-62, and: H.J.L. Vonhof, “Defensiepolitiek van Liberalen en Vrijzinnig-Democraten in de jaren dertig”, 63-69. The mobilisation is dealt with in: W. Klinkert, J.W.M. Schulten and L. de Vos, eds, Mobilisatie in Nederland en België 1870-1914-1939 (Amsterdam, 1991), and: F. Snapper, “De mobilisatie 1939/1940 en de oorlogsdagen van mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CXL (1971) 450-459. An illustrated report of the mobilisaton period is given by J. Zwaan, De mobilisatiemaanden 1939-1940. Beelden uit de mobilisatie van 29 augustus 1939 tot 9 mei 1940 en de voormobilisatie van 27 september 1938 tot 28 augustus 1939 (Amsterdam and Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979). There are also many, often richly illustrated regional works on the mobilisation. One example is: M. Brink and C. Cramer, Ergens in Nederland... Herdenking mobilisatie 1939-1989 (Veenendaal, 1989), which focuses chiefly on the Grebbe Line. Other typical photographic books are: J. Klingens: Het paardenvolk in mei 1940. Panorama van de veldartillerie (Amsterdam, [1985]), and, by the same author: Het krijgsvolk van weleer. Panorama van leger, luchtmacht en marine in mei 1940 (Voorburg, s.a.). There is a sympathetic biography of Commander-in-Chief Winkelman: T. van Middelkoop, Een soldaat doet zijn plicht. Generaal H.G. Winkelman, zijn leven en betekenis als militair 1876-1952 (Zaltbommel, 2002). A rather one-sided biography of his predecessor is provided by E.H. Brongers, Generaal Reynders. Een miskend bevelhebber 1939-1940 (Soesterberg, 2007). The change of high command is analysed in P.W.M. Hasselton, De wisseling van het opperbevel in februari 1940 getoetst aan de praktijk van de Oorlogswet in de periode 18871940 (Venlo, 1995). The problematic position of the commander-in-chief in Dutch political relations is discussed in H. Amersfoort, ed., Een kwestie van vertrouwen.�� De geschiedenis van het opperbevel in Nederland en Nederlands-Indië (The Hague, 2001), an annex to J. Franssen et al., Van wankel evenwicht naar versterkte defensieorganisatie.�� Advies �� van de Adviescommissie Opperbevelhebberschap (The Hague, 19 April 2002).


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Pre-war policy with respect to air defence and the role of the air force during mobilisation are described in: R. de Bruin et al., Illusies en incidenten. De militaire luchtvaart en de neutraliteitshandhaving tot 10 mei 1940 (The Hague, [1988]). The history of the navy in the interwar period is described concisely in: Ph.M. Bosscher, “Bezuiniging en oorlog 19181945” in: G.J.A. Raven, ed., De kroon op het anker. 175 jaar Koninklijke Marine (Amsterdam, 1988). Aspects of the materiel policy are dealt with in: H.J.G. Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet! De maritieme bewapeningspolitiek van het kabinet Ruys de Beerenbrouck en het succesvolle verzet daartegen in 1923 (Bergen, 1984). One could also refer to the somewhat unsatisfactory book on the Corps of Police Troops: J.P.E.G. Smeets, De Politietroepen 1919-1940. De politie-militair als steunpilaar van het wettig gezag (Soest, 1997).

Chapter Four The two-part bibliography by Walter Held is essential when studying German military history. In addition to listing published war histories and journal articles, it also contains a survey of the German post-war Traditionsverbände. Walter Held, ed., Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Eine Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur (2 volumes; Osnabrück, 1978-1983). German military history of the Second World War is dealt with comprehensively in the series Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. This standard work, published under the auspices of the Bundeswehr’s Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, comprises eleven volumes. For the build-up of the Wehrmacht and the preparation and execution of Fall Gelb, the following are of importance: Wilhelm Deist et al., Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Band I. Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979); A. Maier et al., Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Band 2. Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979), and: Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans Umbreit, Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.�� Band 5. Organisation und Mobilmachung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Erster Halbband. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939-1941 (Stuttgart, 1987). The history of the Reichswehr is dealt with in: M. Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit. Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtspolitik 1924-1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980). See also: B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945. �� Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band �� I. Das Heer bis zum Kriegs-

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beginn (Darmstadt, 1954); F.L. Carsten, Reichswehr und Politik, 1918-1933 (Cologne and Berlin, 1964), and: Edgar Graf von Matuschka and Rainer Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Republik (1918-1933) (Frankfurt am Main, 1970). A short Dutch-language survey is: M.M.A. Roeder, “Het Duitse leger in het Derde Rijk (1933-1945)”, Spiegel Historiael, XXIV (1989) 210215. A comparison of the innovations with respect to conducting war in France, Britain and Germany is given by W. Murray en A.R. Millet, eds, Military innovation in the interwar period (Cambridge, 1998). A general survey of German military history can be found in K.-V. Neugebauer, Grundzüge der deutschen Militärgeschichte (2 volumes; Freiburg, 1993). The background to the build-up and deployment of the Luftwaffe are dealt with in detail in: H. Boog, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 19351945. Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung (Stuttgart, 1982); Karl Köhler and Karl-Heinz Hummel, “Die Organisation der Luftwaffe 1933-1939” in: Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939 (Munich, 1978), and: Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart, 1967). A survey of German tactical and operational doctrines is given by: Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht. Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wertungen in zwei Weltkriegen (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Martin van Creveld, Fighting power. German and U.S. performance 1939-1945 (London, 1983); Robert J. O’Neill, “Doctrine and training in the German army, 1919-1939” in: Michael Howard, ed., The theory and practice of war (Bloomington, 1965) 143-165. An essential volume for gaining insight into the German military issues is: KlausJürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck, Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabchefs des deutschen Heeres 1933-1938 (Boppard am Rhein, 1980). The history of the Sturmabteilung is described well in: Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone. Geschichte der SA (Munich, 1989).�� The �� many publications on the SS include the following noteworthy books: Bernd Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten.�� Die Waffen-SS 1933-1945. Studien zu Leitbild, Struktur und Funktion einer nationalsozialistischen Elite (Paderborn, 1982); Rudolf Lehmann, Die Leibstandarte. Band I (Osnabrück, 1978), and: Heinz Höhne, Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS (Munich, 2002). The introduction to N.K.C.A. in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland. Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945 (2 volumes; The Hague, 1976) also provides a great deal of information about the history of the SS.


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Over the years, access to German primary sources has been increased substantially by various source publications. Those concerning Fall Gelb are: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939-1940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1956); Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1932-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2nd impression; Koblenz, 1983), and: Die Berichte des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1939-1945 Band I. 1. September 1939 bis 31. Dezember 1940 (Munich: Verlag für Wehrwissenschaften,1983). An authoritative study on the origins of Fall Gelb remains: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957). The best study on this which is currently available is Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995). It is also available in translation: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis, 2005). Good information on the most important German generals who were involved in the attack on the Netherlands can be found in: Richard BrettSmith, Hitler’s generals (San Rafael, 1977). It is certainly worth reading the memoirs of the German military attaché in Brussels and The Hague, Friedrich-Carl Rabe von Pappenheim, Erinnerungen des Soldaten und Diplomaten 1914-1955 (Osnabrück, 1987). Hitler’s air force aide-de-camp, Nicolaus von Below, gives a fascinating description of the events at the Führerhauptquartier in Als Hitlers Adjudant 1937-45 (Mainz, 1980).

Chapter Five In view of the fact that almost the entire archive of the Dutch General Headquarters (AHK) was destroyed in The Hague’s rubbish incinerators following the capitulation, there are few sources on the decision-making by Winkelman and his staff. Lieutenant General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst wrote a report from memory in 1940 on the AHK’s view of the battle, and this was included in the reports published by the Government Policy 1940-1945 Inquiry Committee: “Notities van luitenant-generaal H.F.M. van Voorst tot Voorst over de mobilisatie 1939/1940 en de Meidagen 1940” in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Deel 1b. Bijlagen (The Hague, 1949) 96-114 [annex 59].�� The committee’s reports also contain an overview by Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson of the decisions taken at the AHK, drawn up immediately following capitulation at the request of General Winkelman. The overview is, however, confined to 10 and 11 May as Wilson was sent to Rotterdam on 12 May: J.J.C.P. Wilson, “Globaal ver-

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slag van de op 10 en 11 mei genomen beslissingen bij het A.H.K. (Sectie 1), opgesteld door het hoofd van de ‘sectie operatiën’ van het algemeen hoofdkwartier” in: Ibidem, 61-62 [annex 33]. A thorough reconstruction of the events at headquarters is given by V.E. Nierstrasz on pages 63-128 of his Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957), which was published as part III/subsection 1 of what is often referred to as the ‘green series’.�� This �� term refers to the colour of the binding of the multi-volumed standard work, the official title of which is: De strijd op Nederlands grondgebied tijdens de Wereldoorlog II. See also: T. van Middelkoop, Een soldaat doet zijn plicht. Generaal H.G. Winkelman, zijn leven en betekenis als militair 1876-1952 (Zaltbommel, 2002).�� Interesting contributions are also made by: J.P.B. Jonker, A.E. Kersten and G.N. van der Plaat, eds, Vijftig jaar na de inval. Geschiedschrijving en Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Hague, 1990). For the German side, please refer to the following source publication: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1960). The detailed Kriegstagebücher can also be consulted.

Chapter Six As early as 1940-1942, De Militaire Spectator featured a number of articles about the fighting around The Hague, which often included personal experiences. What is striking is that in the initial years of the German occupation this theatre of war attracted much attention. The articles which appeared in De Militaire Spectator are: J. Moorman, “Het Ie Depot Infanterie bij de verdediging van Den Haag, Wassenaar en Ypenburg”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 293-304 and 346-350; W.F. van Gunsteren, “Mijn belevingen bij Valkenburg 10-13 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 453-455; E.L. van Swieten, “Een episode uit den strijd om Ockenburg. 10 t.m. 12 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 490-507; J.W.R. Brueren, “Uit de krijgsverrichtingen van het Ie Depot Infanterie”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 44-45; D.A. van Hilten, “De gevechten op en om het vliegveld Valkenburg op 10 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 57-61; B.J.H. van Roosmalen, “De gevechten op en om het vliegveld Ockenburg en in Loosduinen en omgeving”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 281-304; D.A. van Hilten, “De overval op het staf-kwartier van de Groep ’s-Gravenhage van het Westfront Vesting Holland in den nacht 11/12 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 399-408; T.W.M. van Grotenhuis van Onstein, “De gevechtshandelingen van het II bataljon


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Grenadiers van 10-14 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 438451, and: H.J.J.W. Dürst Britt, “Gebeurtenissen bij III-2 R.A. van 10 tot en met 14 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CXI (1942) 137-147. Several recollections also appeared in Mavors. Maandschrift voor officieren en reserveofficieren van alle wapens en diensten: W. de Vletter, “Uit mijn oorlogsdagboek”, Mavors, XXXIV (1940) 669-676 and XXXV (1941) 47-55; . N. Hubbeling, “Tijdens de oorlogsdagen in het IIe depot ber. artillerie (Voorschoten)”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 182-192, and: J. van Kessel, “De strijd op en om een vliegveld”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 257-280. More appeared immediately after the war: A.T.C. Opsomer, “De verdediging van het vliegveld ‘Ockenburg’ door de 22ste Depotcompagnie Bewakingstroepen op 10 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CXIV (1945) 13-22; “De herovering van het vliegveld Ockenburg”, De Militaire Spectator, CXIV (1945) 69-71, and: J. van Benthem, “Verslag van een overval op het vliegveld Ypenburg op vrijdag 10 mei 1940”, Ons Leger, XXXII (1948) 29-34. An account which captures the mood but does not include much relevant detail can be found in: H. Kuiper, Ypenburg. Onze strijd tegen de parachutisten (Sneek, 1946). Further references include: C.A. de Bruyn and A.C. Verschoor, eds, Gedenkboek voor de vrijwillige Landstormkorpsen, Luchtwachtdienst en Luchtafweerdienst (Leiden, 1949). All these mostly personal reports and accounts, along with the official battle reports, helped to form the basis for the part of the ‘green series’ that deals with the battle within Fortress Holland: C.D. Kamerling, Algemeen overzicht van de strijd om en in de Vesting Holland (zonder het Oostfront) en de strijd tegen de luchtlandingstroepen rondom ’s-Gravenhage mei 1940 (The Hague, 1954). Another reference is of course: F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940, (The Hague, 1970). J. Sjoerds wrote: “Leiderschap, gezag en verantwoordelijkheid. Krijgsgeschiedkundige voorbeelden uit de strijd om Ypenburg”, De Militaire Spectator, CXXV (1956) 612-619, and anyone who wishes to know more about the deployment of Dutch armoured vehicles at the airfields should consult: F. Vos, “Pantservoertuigen van het vooroorlogse Nederlandse leger. Herinnering aan de strijd om het vliegveld Ockenburg”, Ons Leger, LV-2 (1971) 5-7 and LV-3 (1971) 30-33. E.H. Brongers, De slag om de residentie (Soesterberg, 2004) is of particular interest because of the comprehensive reproduction of quotations from eyewitness reports. Brongers also wrote: “Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck”, Mars et Historia, XXIII-4 (1989) 11-20. More recently, he wrote: De slag om Ypenburg. Mei 1940 (Rijswijk, 2000). Virtually all German sources about the airborne landings have been lost, so the following reference will have to suffice: F.A. von Metzsch, Die

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Geschichte der 22. Infanterie-Division. 1939-1945 (Kiel, 1952). The details in this book have been incorporated by Kamerling and Molenaar in their works about the war. Other German books about the airborne landings in the Netherlands which briefly cover the fighting around The Hague are mentioned under Chapter 10. For an analysis of the significance of the German aircraft losses, see J.N. Fernhout, “Het verband tussen de Luftwaffe-verliezen in mei ’40 en de Duitse invasieplannen voor Engeland”, Militaire Spectator, CLXI (1992) 364-371. An English-language account of the airborne landings in Fortress Holland is provided by B. Perrett, Seize and hold. Masterstrokes on the battlefield (London, 1994) 60-81. The fortunes of an anti-aircraft defence battery are recounted in B.C. Dresens, De geschiedenis van de 13e batterij Lu.A. 1939-1940. Oorzaken en gevolgen van de gebeurtenissen bij de 13e batterij Lu.A. en andere batterijen (Grollo, 2002). A well-written airfield history is given by J.H. Schuurman, Vliegveld Bergen NH 1938-1945 (Bergen, 2001).

Chapter Seven The foremost work on the brief struggle in southern Limburg is from the ‘green series’: C.D. Kamerling, De krijgsverrichtingen in Zuid-Limburg. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952). E.H. Brongers wrote a popular work about this struggle entitled Een dag oorlog in Zuid-Limburg (Baarn, 1973). On the subject of the defence by the Maas-Waal Group and the Betuwe Group, the ‘green series’ includes: V.E. Niertrasz and A. van der Wiel, De verdediging van het Maas-Waalkanaal en de Over-Betuwe. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952). The fighting in the Maas Line was of particular interest to J.J.C.P. Wilson, who wrote various articles on the subject: “Enkele algemene gegevens betreffende de Maaslinie”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 211-220; “Het gevecht bij Grubbenvorst”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 221-232; “Het gevecht bij Boxmeer en Sambeek”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 319-353; “Het gevecht bij Mook”, De Militaire Spectator, CXI (1942) 71-92, and: “Het gevecht bij Wessem”, De Militaire Spectator, CXIV (1945) 111-133. P. van Haren, G.A. Gerards and H. van Dijk also compiled Standhouden... 10 mei 1940. Het verhaal van 12 uren oorlog in Katwijk, Cuijk, St. Agatha en Oeffelt (Cuijk, 1981), a commemorative book describing the actions of the IInd battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment. J.P.C.M. van Hoof wrote “De 8 staal in de Maaslinie, 10 mei 1940”, Mars et Historia, XIV (1980) 169-172 and 201-205, and: “Nogmaals de 8-staal in de Maaslinie”, Mars et Historia, XIX (1985) 24-29. In the 1963 and 1964 volumes, S.L.Groenewoud wrote a series about “Gebeurtenissen in ’40


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rondom ‘achtstaals’”. The 8-Staal gun in the Maas Line and in the PeelRaam Position are looked at in: “De Maaslinie”, Ons Leger, XLVII-9 (1963) 21-24; “De Peel-Raamstelling: de Rips-Noord (II-20 RA)”, Ons Leger, XLVIII-1 (1964) 21-22; “De Peel-Raamstelling: Zeeland-Mill”, Ons Leger, XLVIII-2 (1964) 16-19; “De Peel-Raamstelling: Maarheeze-Weert I-20 R.A.”, Ons Leger, XLVIII-4 (1964) 13-14, and “De Peel-Raamstelling (I-20 R.A.)”, Ons Leger, XLVIII-6 (1964) 15-18. See also H.A. Robbé Groskamp, Artillerie 1880 in Mill 1940 (Utrecht, 1997). In H.J. Mulder en de strijd bij Mill. Een episode uit de Nederlandse artilleriegeschiedenis (2nd impression; The Hague, 1993), H.W. van den Doel looks at the fighting at this important intersection. Further publications are: H. Ringoir, “Verraderlijke overval op de brug bij Heumen. Herinnering aan de meidagen van 1949”, Ons Leger, LIV-4/5 (1970) 36-40; A.H. Paape, “Doorbraak naar de Peel. De overval op de brug bij Gennep” in: A.H. Paape et al., eds, Bericht van de tweede wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1970-1975) 338-339, and: N.K.C.A. in ’t Veld, “Sport en spel. De voorbereidingen voor de brugovervallen” in: Ibidem, 343-345. The following popular work was written about the BauLehrbataillon zur besondere Verwendung 800: Herbert Kriegsheim, Getarnt, Getäuscht und doch Getreu. Die geheimnisvollen ‘Brandenburger’ (Berlin, 1958). A more recent publication is H. Bentzien, Division Brandenburg. Die Rangers von Admiral Canaris (Berlin, 2004). A comprehensive account of the operations of the Dutch troops in northern Limburg and Noord-Brabant is given in: V.E. Nierstrasz, De verdediging van Noord-Limburg en Noord-Brabant. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1953), a volume in the ‘green series’, and: E.H. Brongers, Opmars naar Rotterdam. Deel 2. Van Maas tot Moerdijk (Baarn, 1982). Both books, however, give a disproportionately large amount of coverage to the fighting along the Maas Line. A. Claassens and G. de Kruijf, eds, Het gevecht bij Mill. Herdenkingsboek ‘10 mei 1940 Mill’ (Mill 1980) is a commemorative work, which includes many source fragments. J.J.C.P. Wilson wrote: “Het gevecht bij Mill”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 79-127. Another publication about the Peel-Raam Position and the Maas Line is: J.S. van Wieringen, “De kazematten van de Peel-Raamstelling en van de Maaslinie en wat er van over is”, Terugblik. Maandblad van de Documentatiegroep ’40-’45, XXVI (1988) 26-45. Another publication to appear immediately after the war, written by Reserve Major E.P. Weber, was De vuurproef van het grensbataljon. Belevenissen van het Ie Bataljon 26e Regiment Infanterie tijdens den NederlandschDuitschen oorlog van 10-15 mei 1940 (Arnhem, 1946). A reserve warrant officer from the 27th Infantry Regiment, L. Huizingh, also put his recollec-

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tions on paper in: Terugtocht uit de Peel. Journaal van een Nederlandsch soldaat van 10 mei tot 8 juni over zijn terugtocht door Nederland, België, Frankrijk, Luxemburg en Duitschland (The Hague, 1940). An uncomplicated work is: H. Lina, Dagboek van een motorordonnans. Herinneringen van een Grens-motor-ordonnans–van den Peeldivisie 2-19 mei 1940 (Amsterdam, s.a.). Other published recollections are: A. de Kloet, “Verslag van C.-III-30 R.I. over de periode 9 mei 1940-14 mei 1940”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 65-84; A.J.R. Buijtelaar, “I-27 R.I. in de verdediging”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 85-94; H. Peters, “Uit het dagboek van het 2e Grensbataljon”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 33-46, and: H.A.J.A. Peters, “Het 2e Grensbataljon bij den terugtocht van de Maas naar de Peelstelling”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 167-169. A.M. van der Rijken, Zimpe zampe zompe in de Peel (Eindhoven, 1981) is little more than a book for boys. A.G.J.M.F. van der Kroon, “Het gevecht bij de brug van Keizersveer (13 mei 1940)”, De Militaire Spectator, CXI (1942) 37-65, provides detailed accounts of the skirmishes at Keizersveer that were only briefly touched upon in the chapter. The events in Bergen op Zoom are covered in E.G.H. Härtel, Vijf dolle dagen... in mei 1940 (Bergen op Zoom, 1984). On Willemstad, D.J. Leij wrote Willemstads panorama. Mobilisatie zuidfront Vesting Holland meidagen 1940 (Oosterhout, 2000). On Bergen op Zoom, there is J.A.F.M. Luijten, Bergen op Zoom. De verdediging door het Franse leger (Soesterberg, 2004). Publications on the German side are: C.H. Hermann, 68 Kriegsmonate. Der Weg der 9. Panzerdivision durch den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1975). Barbara Selz, Das grüne Regiment. Der Weg der 256. Infanterie-Division aus der Sicht des Regiments 481 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970), and: Unteroffizier Apel, “Das Unternehmen des Panzerzuges 1”, Militär-Wochenblatt. Unabhängige Zeitschrift für die deutsche Wehrmacht, CXXV (1940) 1044-1045. The French have also played their part in the historiography about May 1940 in the Netherlands. However, in P. Paillart, Les quarante jours du 2e G.R.C.A. en Hollande, en Belgique et en France. 10 mai-18 juin 1940 (Abbeville, s.a.), and: Général de division Jean Molinié, La 25e division motorisée dans la bataille de France. Division d’Auvergne (de Breda à Lille et à Dunkerque) (Leroux, 1956), the operations on Dutch territory are of secondary importance. Particularly informative is also: M. Lerecouvreux, L’ Armée Giraud en Hollande 1939-1940 (Paris, 1951), and some technical information about the French forces can be found in: F. Vos, “De Franse bondgenoot in de meidagen van 1940”, Ons Leger, LVI-7/8 (1972) 16-20 and LVI-9 (1972) 15-19. Further references are: H. van der Tuin, “La défense de Bergen op Zoom par l’armée française (mai 1940)”, Revue his-


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torique des armées, XXVIII (1973) 90-109, and: D.W. Alexander, “Repercussions of the Breda variant”, French historical studies, VIII (1972-1973) 459-488. There is also the previously cited B. Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000). On the fighting in Zeeland, the ‘green series’ includes: C.D. Kamerling, De strijd in Zeeland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1954). In 1980, H. Amersfoort also wrote the informative “Zeeuwse toestanden. Bevelvoering en besluitvorming op Zuid-Beveland, 14-15 mei 1940”, Militaire Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 227-249. May 1940 is also covered in L.W. de Bree, Zeeland 19401945 (Middelburg, 1979). Also dedicated to this subject is J.N. Houterman, “Deutschland” verovert Zeeland. De Duitse inval in Zeeland Mei 1940 (Middelburg, 1991). In the style of a boys’ book is W. Abeleven-Labberton, Zeeland vocht door… (Utrecht, s.a.). In 1940, Wim Brandt wrote about the SS Verfügungsdivision’s Aufklärungsabteilung which was operating in Zeeland: “Aus dem Feldzug in Holland. Eine motorisierte AufklärungsAbteilung im Westen”, Militär-Wochenblatt. Unabhängige Zeitschrift für die deutsche Wehrmacht, CXXV (1940) 417-420. A brief biographical outline of général de brigade Marcel Deslaurens is included in “Les officiers généraux français morts au cours des opérations de mai-juin 1940”, Revue historique des armées, XXXIV-4 (1979) 220-241. See also: Captain Bichon, “Het verhaal van de dood van generaal Deslaurens”, Maandorgaan van de Documentatiegroep ’40-’45, XIX (1981) 214-217 and 256-260. H.A.J.A. Peters, the cantonment commander of St. Laurens, a small town to the north of Middelburg, wrote: “De laatste onderdeelen van het Ned. Leger in Zeeland geven zich over”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 173-175, and: “Van Middelburg naar Vlissingen”, Ibidem, 177-181. A detailed account of the fighting at the Sloedam is given by R.E. Hoebeke in Slagveld Sloedam (Nieuw- en Sint Joosland, 2002) 44-168.

Chapter Eight By far the most important source on the fighting in Overijssel and Gelderland is: A. van der Wiel and V.E. Nierstrasz, De krijgsverrichtingen ten oosten van de IJssel en in de IJssellinie. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952). There are, however, a few inaccuracies in this work, although these are corrected in a later work by V. E. Nierstrasz entitled Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957). A publication on the mobilisation and May 1940 in Twente is: C.B. Cornelissen, Storm uit het noorden. Mobilisatie en Duitse inval in Twente 1939-

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1940 (Oldenzaal, 1985). In their book De Pruus komt! Overijssel in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Zwolle, 1990), which is certainly worth reading, C. Hilbrink, M. Kienhuis and K. Vos commend the way in which the border battalions performed their task. A personal report from the IJssel Line is offered by T. Wassenaar, Douwe Wassenaar. Soldaat in een roerige tijd (S.l., 1997) The history of the Grebbe Line in early times is described briefly in J.C.T. van Blommestein, De Grebbelinie. Van militair verdedigingswerk tot cultuurhistorisch erfgoed en natuurmonument (S.l., 1978). See also S.J. van Wieringen, “De kazematten van de Grebbelinie en wat er van over is”, Terugblik. Maandblad van de Documentatiegroep 40-45, XXIV (1986) 150-164. For the history of Ede in May 1940, see E. van de Weerd and G. Crebolder, Ede in wapenrok. Twee eeuwen militaire geschiedenis in de gemeente Ede (S.l., 2004). Immediately after May 1940, several articles about the fighting on the Grebbeberg appeared in De Militaire Spectator: J. Visser, “Het 16de Regiment Infanterie in de Grebbestelling en in de Vesting Holland”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 406-414; V.E. Nierstrasz, “Hoe majoor W.P. Landzaat, commandant van I-8 RI, op 13 mei 1940 op den Grebbeberg sneuvelde”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 366-369 and 432-433; V.E. Nierstrasz, “Het sneuvelen van majoor J.H.A. Jacometti, commandant van II-8 R.I. op 12 mei 1940 en de verdediging door luitenant-kolonel W.F. Hennink, C.-8 R.I. van zijn commandopost op 13 en 14 mei 1940 op den Grebbeberg”, De Militaire Spectator, CIX (1940) 508-518, and: V.E. Nierstrasz, “De lichte troepen van de Valleistelling (Grebbelinie), in het bijzonder I R.H. op 12 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 247-260. These articles can of course also be found in: Onze oorlog 10-14 mei 1940. Verzameling van publicaties van de krijgsgeschiedkundige sectie van het Hoofdregelingsbureau en andere artikelen, verschenen in Militaire Spectator Juni 1940-Juli 1941 (The Hague, 1941). Other articles written almost immediately after the fighting were: L.P.R. Haring, “De 2e sectie van 2-II-11 R.I. van 7 tot 15 mei”, Mavors, XXXIV (1940) 705-726, and: J. van der Heijden, “Op voorposten. Korte episode uit de oorlogsdagen van mei 1940”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 145-156. A successful corps history is provided by S.J. de Groot, Vestingartillerie in het Veldleger. 19 RA in de Grebbelinie en Betuwe 1940 (Amsterdam, 2002). Another good publication is J.J. van Heyst, Dagboek van 2e Compagnie, Ie Bataljon, 24e Regiment Infanterie (Rijswijk, 2000). The attack by the German 227. Infanteriedivision at Scherpenzeel is described by V.E. Nierstrasz in: “De op 13 mei 1940 bij Scherpenzeel tot staan gebrachte aanval van de Duitse 227e divisie”, Ons


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Leger, XLV-6 (1961) 5-9. The most complete work about the operations of the Field Army, also written by Nierstrasz and part of the ‘green series’, is De operatiën van het Veldleger en het Oostfront van de Vesting Holland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1955). The history of the SS Standarte ‘Der Führer’ was recorded by the former SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Weidinger in: Kameraden bis zum Ende. Das SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment “DF” 19381945 (Coburg, 1999). This ex-SS officer, however, views history through tinted glasses and, for the actions in the Netherlands, virtually copies the regiment’s Auszug aus dem Kriegstagebuch held by the Netherlands Institute of Military History. And then there is the latest reprint of E.H. Brongers, Grebbelinie 1940 (Soesterberg, 2002). A useful and informative introduction is provided by the website of the De Greb Foundation: www. grebbeberg.nl. Immediately after May 1940, a number of popular works were written by eyewitnesses: H. van Heerde, Tusschen vuur en ijzer (Meppel, 1940); Corporal Homa, Onze 80-urige oorlog. Belevenissen in en om de Grebbelinie (Amsterdam, 1941); H. van Hoof, Z.66. Een verhaal van een commandopost ergens in de Grebbelinie (Amsterdam, 1940), and: N.J.A. van Exel and J. Gerritsen, Ons werk aan de Grebbe (Amsterdam, 1940). The last book is about the work of the chaplains on the Grebbeberg. Written about the mobilisation period in the 44th Infantry Regiment’s IInd battalion, stationed at Ochten in the Betuwe, was W. Jonasse, “Mobilisatie ’39’40 bij II-44 R.I.”, Terugblik. Maandblad van de Documentatiegroep ’40-’45, XXVI (1988) 61-88. An important publication regarding the death sentence of Sergeant J.C. Meijer is the Organisatie-besluit Rechtspleging te velde 1940 (Staatsblad, 1940 no. 283). This was published in the Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, XXXVI (1940-41) 4-6, as indeed was Meijer’s death sentence, which can be found on pages 139-141. Meijer’s case was the subject of a legal debate at the end of the 1960s. For this, see J. Leyten, “Een voorbeeld”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLII (1967) 385-386, and: A. Berkhout, “Eén voorbeeld”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLII (1967) 503, which ensured that Sergeant Meijer’s death sentence was publicised. Also: H.H.A. de Graaff, “Generaal en krijgsraad te velde in 1940. Een noodzakelijke verduidelijking”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLII (1967) 814-822, and: C.H. Beekhuis (the officersecretary of the court martial in question), “Beïnvloeding van leden van een krijgsraad?”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLII (1967) 822-824, which defend the course of events in May 1940. The sentence was criticised by H.J. Marius Gerlings, “De generaal en de krijgsraad te velde”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLII (1967) 1062-1067 (with a ‘postscript’ by Beekhuis) and

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by H.M. Voetelink, “Pleidooi voor een sergeant”, Nederlands Juristenblad, XLIII (1968) 317-323. From a military-legal angle, H.L.M. Kramer wrote “Het krijgsraadvonnis van 12 mei 1940”, Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, LXI (1968) 577-586. His argument is, however, clouded by Cold-War thinking. Anyone wishing to know all there is to know about Sergeant Meijer’s death sentence should, however, read J.F.A. Boer, De zaak van sergeant Meijer (Amsterdam, 1970). In this book, the author argues in Meijer’s defence. On 20 November 1970, the Ministers of Defence and Justice presented to Parliament a summary of an inquiry they had launched into executions involving Dutch service personnel in the war days of May 1940: “Onderzoek terechtstellingen meidagen 1940”, 20 November 1970, in Handelingen der Staten Generaal. Zitting 1970-1971. Tweede Kamer. Bijlagen, no. II.038. This summary was prepared by the lawyer and historian C. Fasseur.

Chapter Nine There are two parts of the ‘green series’ which deal with the operations by the Dutch armed forces in the northern provinces: A. van der Wiel, De territoriale verdediging van de noordelijke provinciën (The Hague, 1952), and: O.J. Siersema and V.E. Nierstrasz, De Stelling van Den Helder. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1960). The latter work, written mainly by Nierstrasz, who kept up a probing correspondence with some of the key players for the purpose, is more critical of the defenders than the earlier volume. In his Afsluitdijk 1940 (Baarn, 1977), E.H. Brongers offers more than the title suggests; he also gives an evocative account of the fighting on 10 May. Important sources for the operations by the German troops are: “Die 1. Kavallerie-Division im Westen 10.5.40-29.6.40” and the “Erfahrungsbericht der 1. Kavallerie-Division über den Einsatz in Holland und Frankreich”. Both documents were written after the fighting and can be found in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (respectively: BA-MA RH 29-1/54 en BAMA RH 29-1/570). If one is willing to put up with the blusterous language, Leo Leixner, Von Lemberg bis Bordeaux. Fronterlebnisse eines Kriegsberichters (Munich, 1941) provides additional reading. The author followed the operations of the 1. Kavalleriedivision as a member of a National-Socialist propaganda company. Useful information about the atmosphere among and the character of the cavalrymen is offered in F.M. von Senger und Etterlin, commander of the Reiterbrigade in May 1940, in: Die 24. Panzer Division vormals 1. Kavallerie-Division 1939-1945 (Neckargemünd, 1962).


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In a pleasant, reliable style, H. Brand describes the fighting around Coevorden in: Die lange morgen in Mei. 10 mei 1940 (Meppel, 1980). J. Poortman, Meppel in de meidagen van 1940 (Meppel, 1979) contains little information. Not much more information is added by W. Bakker in his Tussen Duitse cavalerie en Canadese brencarriers. Meppel en omgeving in oorlogstijd (Meppel, 1990). A detailed account of the fighting for the bridges over the Termunterzijldiep is provided by the (unpublished) paper by J.W. Elsinga, Nieuwolda. 10 mei 1940 (Bergum, 1990). J.P. Koers also looks at the importance of this waterway in the Tijdschrift van de Historische Vereniging Scheemda, no. 14 (1994) 23-24. Franz Lenselink offers a reliable overview in his Delfzijl 1940-1945. Een terugblik op vijf jaren van oorlog en bezetting (Bedum, 1995). The first article about the battles in the border area appeared in 1941: P.H. Pott, “De grensverdediging in onze Noordelijke Provinciën”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 452-456. Dutch historiography has always placed the emphasis on the fighting at Kornwerderzand. An informative article by Lieutenant Q.J. Ham, deputy detachment commander there in May 1940, was issued under the title: “De verdedigingswerken aan het Kornwerderzand gedurende de oorlogsdagen”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 170-181 and, because it described the troops retreating from the Wons Position as a “disorderly mess”, provoked furious reactions among the defenders of that position. In separate rejoinders, Reserve Major B. Smid and Reserve Captain P. van der Linden defended their troops against this reproach; these texts can be found in the article: “De verdediging van den Afsluitdijk”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 305-317. The extent to which Smid was weighed down by the (self‑)reproach for not having put up more resistance is shown by a highly apologetic, anonymous note about him in the archives of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. Largely responsible for the myth of the ‘Dam of Death’ are O. Ebbens, who, as a member of the Leeuwarden division of the Voluntary Home Reserve Corps of the Air Defence Service, served in the anti-aircraft battery at Kornwerderzand, and the journalist E. Wijga. In their Dodendam. De strijd voor en op de Afsluitdijk in de Meidagen van 1940 (Amsterdam, 1946), they put the number of attackers at six to eight hundred, of which about half were supposed to have been killed. A great many authors have— unfortunately—used this book as a primary source. See for example: D.H. Couvée, De Meidagen van ’40 (The Hague, 1960), and J.J.C.P Wilson, Vijf oorlogsdagen en hun twintigjarige voorgeschiedenis (Assen, 1960). H. Jonkers blended the information available to him into a pleasantly readable whole in “De gevechten bij Wons en Kornwerderzand. De slag om de

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dodendam” in: A.H. Paape et al., eds, Bericht van de tweede wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1970) 371-372. It was the former Captain I.L. Uijterschout who came up with the term Totendeich; he was the chief of the army staff in Fortress Den Helder and in June 1940 he instituted an inquiry into the German operation. In “De Afsluitdijk en de Stelling van Den Helder 1015 mei 1940”, Militaire Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 211-220, the same Uijterschout tried to get the genie back into the bottle by explaining that the German attack on Kornwerderzand had not been a serious, large-scale action. B.J. Haijer, an orderly, kept a diary of his adventures in the 1st Security Troops Depot Company during May 1940. His story appeared in printed form in 1940. Soldaat op de Afsluitdijk (Leeuwarden, 1980). For the history of the construction, design and arming of the Kornwerderzand complex, one can best consult: J.R.Verbeek, “Grepen uit de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de verdedigingswerken van Kornwerderzand”, Mars et Historia, XXIII-3 (1989) 18-22, or the relevant passages from his standard book, Kustversterkingen 1900-1940 (Haarlem, 1989). The deployment of HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau is discussed in: A.N. baron de Vos van Steenwijk, Het marinebeleid in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam and Dieren, 1986); Ph.M. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel I. Voorgeschiedenis en de verrichtingen in Nederland, de Europese wateren en het noordelijk deel van de Atlantische Oceaan tot het uitbreken van de oorlog in Azië (december 1941) (Franeker, 1984), and: J. Nuis, “Hr. Ms. Johan Maurits van Nassau en Kornwerderzand, 13-14 mei 1940”, Mars et Historia, XXIII-3 (1989) 2224. A few salient details are provided by: Artillerie Mededeelingen A. Verslag van de Artillerie-Verrichtingen aan Boord van Hr. Ms. “Johan Maurits van Nassau” tusschen 10 en 14 mei 1940, nr. 133 (Batavia, 1941). The ‘Dam of Death’ myth started to lead a life of its own in many circles. Although the hundreds of German deaths referred to by Ebbens and Wijga are increasingly taken with a pinch of salt (Brongers, for example, claimed in the Bolswards Nieuwsblad in 1980 that the German losses were mainly wounded personnel), the question of what the 1. Kavalleriedivision did with the dead and wounded continued to intrigue G.A. Bontekoe. His Rondom de Slag om de Afsluitdijk (Leeuwarden, 1980) tries in particular to make it clear that the Germans attempted to use a brilliant cover operation to disguise their own failure at the Afsluitdijk; bugles and mouth organs were apparently played on the numerous (sic!) medical transports to drown out the moans of the wounded. This bitter little book shows once again how great the divide between imagination and reality has become. J.A. Bodewes, in his Buigen en barsten. De oorlog 1940-1945


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in Noord-Nederland (Haren, 1991), adopts Bontekoe’s theory without any reservations whatsoever. Members of the Kornwerderzand Foundation (www.kazemattenmuseum.nl), who also maintain the Kornwerderzand Casemate Museum, began an oral history project in 1999. Veterans from the Wons Position and Kornwerderzand were interviewed in this context. Interviews were also held with veterans of the 1. Kavalleriedivision. The reports are kept in the museum and can be consulted there.

Chapter Ten Primary sources which give an account of the fighting on the southern front of Fortress Holland are available at the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH). These describe the operations by the Dutch troops. There is little material available on the subject of the operations by the German forces, since most of the war journals and battle reports have been lost. The most important book about the history of the fighting on the southern front of Fortress Holland is M.R.H. Calmeyer and V.E. Nierstrasz, De krijgsverrichtingen op het Zuidfront van de Vesting Holland. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1963). This last part of the ‘green series’ about the land war is the most readable part of the series, partly because all sorts of abbreviations that were used earlier for military posts have now been replaced by the full name of each of the servicemen in question. A summary of this part is given by P.G.H. Maalderink in “De open achterpoort van de Vesting Holland”, Militaire Spectator, CL (1981) 191-220. The myth of the fifth column is dealt with by L. de Jong in his dissertation entitled De Duitse vijfde colonne in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Arnhem, 1953). E.H. Brongers describes the battles on the southern front of Fortress Holland in the first and third part of his Opmars naar Rotterdam (Baarn, 1982-1983). The first part is subtitled “De luchtlanding”, the third part “De laatste fase”. These are Brongers’ most successful books, which, in contrast to some of his earlier works, give well-considered accounts of the German operations. The memoirs of the chief of staff of the Kil Group, Reserve Captain M.R.H. Calmeyer, were published by J. Hoffenaar under the title Herinneringen. Memoires van een christen, militair en politicus (The Hague, 1997). The operations by the Light Division at the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam are described in M.R.H. Calmeyer, “Het gevecht aan de Noord, 11-14 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CX (1941) 129-167,

446


and: A. Korpel, De strijd om de vergeten brug (Alblasserdam, 1980). On the subject of the Light Division’s I-2 RW, J. Eggens wrote: “I-2 R.W. gedurende de oorlogsdagen”, Mavors, XXXV (1941) 321-352. In the commemorative book De militaire wielrijders. Het ontstaan van twee roemruchte regimenten (S.1., 1995), L.P.J. Knoops also devotes a great deal of attention to the deployment of the cyclists. The events in Dordrecht in May 1940 are described by J.A. van der Vorm in: Dordt open stad. De meidagen van 1940 in Dordrecht (Dordrecht, s.a.). Second Lieutenant J.B. Plasschaert committed his experiences to paper in 1942 in “Een episode uit den strijd om Dordrecht”, De Militaire Spectator, CXI (1942) 105-115. J. Rinse did the same in “Ervaringen van een mitrailleur-compagnie (M.C.-II-28 R.I.)”, Mavors, XXXIV (1940) 685704. The events in Hook of Holland are recorded in H. Onderwater et al., Oorlog rond Hoek van Holland 10-20 mei 1940 (Hook of Holland, 2000). The fighting in Rotterdam is described in: M.R.H. Calmeyer and V.E. Nierstrasz, De strijd om Rotterdam. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1952). A romanticised but historically reliable report of events is given by A. Wagenaar in: Rotterdam mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 1963). Particularly appealing is: K. Mallan, Als de dag van gisteren... De Duitse overrompeling en vernietiging van Nederlands eerste havenstad. Rotterdam 10-14 mei 1940 (Weesp, 1985). The actions of the Royal Netherlands Navy during the fighting in Rotterdam are recorded by Bert Honselaar in De zwarte duivels van Rotterdam (Rotterdam, 1948). A number of passages in this book should, however, be taken with a pinch of salt. A somewhat less felicitous attempt to save the naval operations from oblivion is W. Hornman, De helden van de Willemsbrug. Rotterdam, mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 1984). More appealing are the recollections of Knight of the Military Order of William Charles L.J.F. Douw van der Krap, Contra de swastika. De strijd van een onverzettelijke Nederlandse marineofficier in bezet Europa, 19401945 (Bussum and Antwerp, 1981). For the operations by the Military Air Arm, one should of course consult F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970). For operations by the British Royal Air Force, one should read H. Onderwater, En toen was het stil… De luchtoorlog boven Rotterdam en IJsselmonde 1940-1945 (Baarn, 1981). Private K.Th. de Graaf of the signal troops recorded his recollections of the fighting in Rotterdam in his unpublished diary Hoe we in Rotterdam de oorlog meemaakten (NIMH collection).


447

Books that were published on the German side about the fighting were: D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Konstanz, 1951) and: A. Kesselring, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag (Bonn, 1953), two books containing recollections of German officers. Written on the basis of notes left by Kurt Student was Hermann Götzel, ed., Generaloberst Kurt Student und seine Fallschirmjäger. Die Erinnerungen des Generaloberst Kurt Student (Friedburg, 1980). Other German works are: A. von Hove, Achtung Fallschirmjäger. Eine Idee bricht sich Bahn (Leoni am Starnbergersee, 1954); V. Kühn, Deutsche Fallschirmjäger im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1974); W. Pissin, Der Einsatz der Luftlandetruppen im Westen 1940 (Hamburg, 1958); C. Bekker, Angriffshöhe 4000. Ein Kriegstagebuch der deutschen Luftwaffe (Oldenburg, 1964); and: W. Kamman, Die Geschichte des FallschirmjägerRegiment 2, 1939 bis 1945 (Miesbach, 1987). All these books deal with more than just the German operations in the Netherlands; the Second World War did, after all, continue after May 1940 for the German soldiers. The fighting in the Netherlands in May 1940 does not usually feature very prominently, and it has to be said that the details in the book by A. von Hove are not reliable. A further reference is R.J. Overy, The Air War, 19391945 (London, 1980). The lack of sources about the bombing of Rotterdam has encouraged the wildest speculations to be written on the subject. An attempt to adopt an academic approach to events was made by H.A. Jacobsen, “Der deutsche Luftangriff auf Rotterdam. Versuch einer Klärung”, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, VIII (1958) 257-284. On this article, see: H.C. Bajetto, “Het bombardement van Rotterdam”, De Militaire Spectator, CXXVIII (1959) 31-35, and: J.J.C.P. Wilson, “Het bombardement van Rotterdam op 14 mei 1940”, De Militaire Spectator, CXXVIII (1959) 87-92. A reaction to the opinions of L. de Jong about the bombardment is given by J.W.M. Schulten in: “L. de Jong en het bombardement van Rotterdam”, Parade, IV-3 (1983-1984) 2-7. A. Korthals Altes, Luchtgevaar. Luchtaanvallen op Nederland 1940-1945 (2nd impression., Amsterdam 1984) also covers the bombardment. An approach from the point of view of international law is given by L.J. Hartog in: “Het bombardement op Rotterdam op 14 mei 1940”, De Gids, CXXII (1959) 227-250. On this subject, see also: M.W. Mouton, “Volkenrechtelijke aspecten van het ‘Ultimatum’ aan Rotterdam op 14 mei 1940”, Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, LIV (1961) 225-241. M. Kneepkens, In het rijk van de demonen. Het bombardement van Rotterdam en de normen (Rotterdam, 1993) and P.W.M. Hasselton, Het bombardement van Rotterdam 14 mei 1940. Incident of berekening? (Amsterdam, 1999), view the bombardment as a terror bombing. The latter book also

448


devotes much attention to the role of General Kurt Student and his ‘Nazi ideology’. A highly speculative work is Loek Elfferich, Eindelijk de waarheid nabij. Analyses en emoties naar aanleiding van het bombardement op Rotterdam (The Hague, 1983).

INDEX Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations. Aachen, 177 Abbeville, 7, 118, 124 Abrial, J.C., 243 Achterberg, 297, 299, 318, 407 Adam, W.A., 89, 93 Albania, 61 Albert Canal, 58, 72, 74, 76, 80, 126, 130, 135, 140, 141, 143, 151, 156, 158 Alblasserdam, 148, 357, 362, 364, 366, 370, 392 Alblasserwaard, 149, 153, 357, 364, 365 Allard, A.J.M., 217 Allenstein, 111, 112 Almkerk, A. van, 351 Alsace-Lorraine, 16 Alting von Geusau, G.A.A., 45 Ameland, 322 Amerongen, 307 Amersfoort, 128, 166, 265, 308 Amsterdam, 2, 5, 11, 38, 44, 63, 144, 166, 172, 191, 324, 396 Andel, J. van, 143, 144, 148, 153, 155, 156, 159, 162, 175, 181, 187, 188, 190, 347, 348, 356, 362, 365, 372, 373 Andel, J.A.G. van, 345, 361, 367, 372, 376 Ankum, 321 Antoni, J.L.H.A., 373 Antwerp, 58, 72, 73, 74, 81, 83, 114, 128, 129, 130, 131, 146, 150, 152, 157, 158, 159, 163, 177, 205, 229, 232, 239, 245, 247, 256, 259, 382, 402, 409 Apeldoorn, 68, 128, 265, 308 Apeldoorn Canal, 142, 148, 151, 155, 271 Apeldoorn, J.B. van, 284, 285, 305 Apell, W. von, 245 Ardennes, 28, 30, 32, 58, 83, 113, 117, 118, 119, 121, 125, 397, 403 Arlon, 115, 118

Arnemuiden, 255 Arnhem, 128, 268, 309 Asperden, 209 Assen, 325, 331 Augsburg, 101 Austria, 14, 24, 26, 28, 60, 412 Austria-Hungary, 13 Baaren, K. van de, 329 Baarland, 252 Backer, J.D., 388 Bad Godesberg, 112, 131 Baden, M. von, 13 Barbas, J.S., 296, 309, 310, 315 Barendrecht, 148, 153, 345, 357, 359, 360, 365 Barneveld, 286, 308, 310 Barrès, M., 20 Bath, 247 Beatrix, Princess, 160 Beauchesne, G. de, 229, 239 Beaufrère, M.F.G., 243, 248, 256 Beck, L., 95, 98, 99, 100, 105 Beek, 232 Beekhuis, C.H., 284 Beekmans, B., 214 Beets, T., 199 Behschnitt, W., 205 Beijerland, 148 Beilen, 325, 327, 331 Belfort, 119 Belgium, 1, 7, 28, 32, 35, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 124, 125, 133, 134, 143, 146, 151, 152, 156, 170, 201, 208, 212, 239, 257, 258, 259, 386, 397, 404, 406, 414, 415, 416 Berchtesgaden, 30 Berg, 210

450

index

Berg, J. van den, 305 Bergen op Zoom, 247 Bergsche Maas, 80 Berlin, 22, 77, 90, 98, 111, 117, 132, 134 Bernhard, Prince, 49, 57, 160, 163, 256 Best, P.W., 56, 85, 142, 144, 182, 301, 376 Betuwe, 85, 155 Beus, B. de, 301 Bijkerk, R.P.F., 413 Bijl, H.C. van der, 145, 148, 149, 152, 153, 159, 168, 362, 364, 365, 367, 370, 372, 373, 375, 392 Bijlsma, G.J., 277 Bik, F.C., 301 Bilotte, G.H., 81 Bischoff van Heemskerck, W.F.K., 188 Bisschof, 112 Blanchard, G.M.J., 83 Bleeker, G., 221 Blerick, 215 Bleskensgraaf, 367, 370 Blom, B.L.A., 279, 280 Blomberg, W. von, 26, 93, 103, 105 Boässon, M.W., 221 Bock, F. von, 12, 97, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 139, 140, 141, 150, 151, 152, 157, 158, 159, 163, 166, 170, 171, 176, 177, 245, 382, 385, 397, 402, 403 Bodaan, A.H., 354 Boer, J. de, 368 Boers, C.F.J., 335, 336, 338, 339, 341, 342, 406 Boom, P. van den, 304 Boompjes, 355, 380 Bornstedt, von, 224, 225 Borssele, 254 Bosch, F.J.L. in den, 304 Bosch, W.J.C. van den, 361 Boxmeer, 214 Boxtel, 217 Brandenburg, 208 Brandis, Freiherr C. von, 351 Brauchitsch, W. von, 26, 107, 109, 111, 114, 151, 152, 158, 163, 171, 245, 322, 385 Bräuer, B.O., 344, 351, 353, 371, 372, 374 Breda, 74, 76, 83, 84, 129, 130, 142, 149, 150, 152, 157, 163, 181, 205, 207, 229, 234, 237, 239, 240, 245, 256, 258, 343, 358, 382, 402, 404 Breda, J.C. van, 247

Bremen, 162 Breskens, 255 Breslau, 208 Brest-Litovsk, 14, 109, 111 Briel, P.J. van den, 296 Brittijn, P.F., 302, 304 Broecke, C.M. van den, 255 Broekhuizen, 215 Broekman, J.M., 348 Brongers, E.H., 201, 389 Bronkhorst, 270 Bruins, J.H.W., 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 254 Brussels, 72, 73, 74, 80, 83, 114 Buiskooldiep, 327 Buurman, H.D., 190, 192 Caen, 238 Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen, 256 Canaris, W., 208 Carstens, N.T., 144, 168, 187, 188, 192, 196, 198 Châlons sur Marne, 119 Chamberlain, N., 27, 28, 30, 32 Channel coast, 7, 114, 117, 118, 119 Charleroi, 114, 124 Choltitz, D. von, 355, 356, 380 Chotzen, Th.M., 304 Claesen, J.A., 309 Clasener, J.C.A., 185 Clemenceau, G., 16 Coevorden, 325, 328, 329 Colijn, H., 39, 41, 44, 45, 54, 68 Collette, R.E.J., 286, 288 Cools, J.P.L., 184 Copenhagen, 84 Corap, A.G., 83 Coventry, 7 Cramer, J.J.N., 190, 191 Crete, 9, 398 Czechoslovakia, 14, 18, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 106, 412, 414 Daladier, E., 30 Damstede, G., 196, 400 Danzig, 16, 23, 31, 33, 109, 134 Dario, P.E.A., 232, 358 Davidson, C.M.R., 375 Dawes, C.G., 18 Defence Canal, 207, 219 Dekker, W.C.H., 375 Dekkershoekje, 196 Delft, 174, 182, 184, 188, 190, 196, 199

index Delmenhorst, 386 Den Dungen, 232, 234 Den Helder, 60, 86, 331, 336, 339, 341, 342 Den Oever, 324 Denmark, 84, 112, 181, 201, 348, 397, 415 Deslaurens, M., 228, 243, 248, 250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 259 Dessau, 101 Detmar, J., 217, 222 Deventer, 126, 269, 270, 271 Didam, 268 Diepenbrugge, J.J. van, 367, 368, 370, 373, 375 Diepenrijckx, P.J., 81 Dietrich, J., 96, 109, 270, 271, 382 Dijk, J.J.C. van, 46, 47, 50, 66, 77 Dijxhoorn, A.Q.H., 64, 66, 76, 77, 81, 86, 169 Dinant, 77, 124, 146 Dinther, 228 Döbken, E.G., 234 Doesburg, 267, 270 Dollard, 327 Doorn, 282, 295, 316 Doove Balg, 339 Dordrecht, 9, 83, 126, 131, 142, 144, 146, 153, 159, 181, 199, 205, 229, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 350, 351, 356, 357, 361, 362, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 373, 375, 378, 383, 387, 392, 397 Dordtsche Kil, 351, 361, 368, 375 Drenthe, 85, 321, 327, 330, 331 Driebergen, 316 Drievliet, 188 Drift, P.L.R. van der, 242, 251, 254 Dubbeldam, 373 Dunk, H.W. von der, 37 Dunkirk, 81, 385 Durand, P.S., 243, 248, 250, 258, 259 Dürst Britt, H.J.J.W., 191 Düsseldorf, 139, 150, 157, 163, 170, 177 Dwars, J., 267, 326 Dyle, 74, 146 East Prussia, 108, 109, 111, 321 Eben Emael, 126, 130, 139, 141, 151, 158, 397 Echten, 330 Ede, 48, 128, 265, 309, 319 Eendracht, 254

451

Eifel, 134 Eindhoven, 77, 221, 236 Einstmann, 212 Elst, 305, 307 Emmen, 325 Emmer-Compascuum, 325, 328 Emmikhuizer Berg, 309 Ems, 327 England, 134, 163, 201, 217, 398 Enkhuizen, 128 Erp, 236 Erp, J.C.C. van, 295 Esschen, 245 Esschert, G., 275 Ethiopia, 24 Euskirchen, 134, 152 Fagalde, M.B.A., 228 Falkenburg, L., 364 Feith, M.P., 195 Feldt, K., 321, 324, 325, 331, 336, 342 Fiévez, A.H.J.L., 43, 297 Flanders, 58, 81, 83, 114, 118, 121, 125, 130, 156, 259, 397 Flushing, 149, 243, 255, 386 Foch, F., 18 France, 3, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 54, 58, 59, 60, 64, 68, 73, 74, 76, 80, 83, 89, 106, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 134, 143, 146, 170, 201, 257, 382, 397, 403, 404, 406, 414, 415, 416 Frankfurt am Main, 112 Frederick the Great, 69 Friedrichshafen, 101 Frieser, Karl-Heinz, 9 Friesland, 86, 322, 325 Frijtag Drabbe, H.F.J.M.A. von, 348 Fritsch, W. Freiherr von, 26, 99, 105 Fritschi, A.Th., 338 Furstner, J.Th., 143, 168, 169, 173, 379 Gaillard, P.J., 355 Gamelin, M., 73, 74, 81, 83, 84, 121, 126, 146, 149, 239, 416 Ganzendijk, 329 Geel, G., 293 Geer, jonkheer D.J. de, 64, 77 Geertruidenberg, 157 Gelderland, 267 Gelderman, G.J.W., 292, 305, 307 Gelderse Vallei, 64, 68, 69, 71, 78, 261,

452

index

262, 264, 273 Gennep, 129, 139, 141, 142, 144, 150, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217, 219, 222, 224, 227, 258 Gennep, R.C. van, 365, 367 Gey van Pittius, A.R.W., 254 Ghent, 73, 130, 397 Giraud, H.H., 81, 83, 146, 149, 170, 228, 229, 239, 245 Givet, 74, 81 Gleiwitz, 33 Goch, 209 Goes, 243, 250, 252, 254 Goirle, 73, 155, 258 Gooium, 333 Goossens, P.F., 250 Gorinchem, 362 Göring, H., 24, 26, 101, 103, 131, 345, 383, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 397, 403 Gort, Lord J.S.S.P.V., 83 Gorter, W. 369 Gouda, 166, 313 Gouda, G.J., 277, 280 Govers, A., 212 Grave, 129, 142, 150, 207, 209, 210, 212 ’s‑Gravendeel, 351, 361, 365 Great Britain, 3, 13, 14, 16, 19, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 58, 59, 64, 68, 76, 80, 103, 106, 111, 112, 113, 117, 143, 146, 168, 170, 175, 382, 398, 406, 414, 415, 416 Grebbe, see also Grift, 277, 284 Grebbeberg, 6, 155, 157, 161, 162, 169, 177, 202, 261, 265, 272, 274, 277, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 318, 319, 396, 400, 402, 405, 406, 407, 408, 417 Greter, J., 293 Griendtsveen, 207 Grift, 71, 288, 289, 299, 318 Groenendijk, W.A., 327 Groener, W., 95 Groenewoud, S.L., 220 Groep, de, 310 Groningen, 85, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 329, 331 Groot, H. de, 250, 251 Grubbenvorst, 214, 215 Guderian, H., 99, 109, 111, 114, 118, 119,

120, 121, 122, 124, 125 Guihard, 248, 250, 252 Gunters, H.A., 193, 195 Haagsche Schouw, 185, 187, 191 Haamstede, 243 Haarlem, 53, 68, 144, 402 Haas, A. de, 274, 275 Habsburg Empire, 14 Hague, The, 7, 9, 42, 63, 81, 85, 86, 126, 131, 140, 142, 143, 144, 148, 151, 152, 155, 156, 159, 162, 166, 167, 168, 171, 174, 176, 177, 179, 181, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 201, 202, 203, 343, 348, 357, 397, 398, 400, 402, 404, 407 Hajum, 333 Halder, F., 105, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 129, 141, 152, 157, 158, 163, 382, 385, 409 Hansen, C., 261, 271, 286, 308 Hansweert, 240, 251 Harberts, J., 282, 283, 284, 285, 293, 295, 296, 297, 299, 302, 307, 313, 315, 319, 407 Hardeman, J.C., 229 Hardenberg, 325 Haringvliet, 63 Harlingen, 325 Hasse, W., 166 Hasselt, 221 Hatert, 209 Haußer, P., 207, 245, 246 Hautecler, G., 229 Heemskerk, J.W., 354 Heer, H.P. de, 256 Heerjansdam, 360, 375 Heeswijk, 228, 232, 234 Heijnen, C.F., 268 Heinenoord, 359 Heinrich, 264, 265 Helmer, R., 247 Helmond, 221, 228, 236 Hendriksz, J.F.W., 358, 359 Hennink, W.F., 272, 285, 295, 297, 305 Hertel, 224, 225 ’s-Hertogenbosch, 73, 85, 129, 144, 155, 228, 233 Heumen, 209, 212 Heye, W., 92 Hillegersberg, 148

index Hilvarenbeek, 155 Himmler, H., 96, 97 Hindenburg, P. von, 15, 23, 98 Hitler, A., 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 44, 54, 90, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 130, 132, 134, 142, 152, 171, 205, 208, 378, 383, 385, 386, 390, 396, 398, 403, 411, 416 Hoedekenskerke, 252 Hoekse Waard, 146, 359 Hoepner, E., 163 Hoffman von Waldau, O., 383 Hohendorff, 191 Höhne, O., 386, 388, 390 Hollands Diep, 63, 74, 149, 205, 257, 343, 345, 347, 348, 351, 356, 378, 409 Hoogerheide, 245 Hoogeveen, 325 Hoogeveense Vaart, 326 Hoogstraten, 239 Hook of Holland, 68, 149, 167, 169, 378, 380 Hoorn, 323 Hout, 221 Houwen, J. van der, 351 Hubicki, A. Ritter von, 205, 232, 382 Hungary, 14 Huntziger, C., 83 Idenburg, A.W.F., 52 IJmuiden, 149, 163, 165, 201 IJssel, 51, 55, 64, 68, 69, 80, 86, 126, 142, 148, 151, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 286, 400, 404, 405, 406 IJsselmeer, 63, 128, 162, 321, 323, 324, 325, 326, 335, 336 IJsselmeer Dam, 6, 63, 162, 169, 321, 323, 324, 325, 330, 331, 332, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 405 IJsselmonde, 148, 357, 362 IJzereef, W.J.H., 338 India, 30 Irene, Princess, 160 Ironside, E., 30 Island of Dordrecht, 153, 159, 168, 351, 361, 365, 367, 368, 370, 372, 373, 375, 376, 377, 392, 406 Italy, 14, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 33, 34, 61 Jaarsveld, 315 Jacometti, J.H.A., 272, 290, 291, 305, 319,

453

407 Jager, F.P. de, 348, 350 Japan, 28, 30, 41 Jena, 164 Jodl, A., 122 Jolles, H., 331, 332, 335, 338, 339, 341 Jong, B. de, 333 Jong, L. de, 6, 202, 412 Jordaan, L.J., 2 Juliana Canal, 139, 210 Juliana, Princess, 160, 163 Kaasgat, 241, 250, 251 Kalma, J., 338 Kanne, 140 Kapelle, 252, 257 Karnebeek, jonkheer H.A. van, 15, 41 Kassel, 90 Katwijk, 187, 190 Katwijk aan de Maas, 209 Katwijk aan den Rijn, 185, 190 Katwijk aan Zee, 185, 190, 199 Kauffmann, A., 205, 224 Keitel, W., 26, 113, 120 Keizersveer, 245 Kenninck, W.J., 199 Keppler, G., 261, 267, 274, 281, 285, 289 Kerfin, H., 354, 356, 378 Kesselring, A., 103, 109, 126, 131, 136, 151, 163, 164, 198, 386, 390, 403 Kesteren, M.G. van, 195 Kiel, 13 Kiewitz, W., 131 Kinderdijk, 365 Kleef, 245 Kleffens, E.N. van, 62, 81 Kleinheisterkamp, M., 252 Klemm, K., 316 Klomp, de, 309, 312, 319 Kloosterhaar, 324 Kloppenburg, H.C., 368 Kluge, G. von, 112, 114 Klundert, 156 Knauss, R., 101 Kneepkens, M., 389 Koblenz, 119, 122 Köhler, H., 209 Könning, A.H., 277 Kornwerd, 335 Kornwerderzand, 63, 169, 171, 324, 331, 335, 336, 338, 339, 341, 342, 405, 406 Korthals Altes, A., 389

454

index

Koster, H.P., 351 Koster, T., 268 Kraak, L.H., 188 Krämer, H.F.L., 241, 251 Kreekrak Dam, 243 Kreysing, H., 345, 357 Kriebel, R., 264, 265 Krispijn, 351, 370, 373 Kruijff, V. de, 236 Kruithof, A.J., 376 Küchler, G.K.F.W. von, 12, 109, 126, 128, 129, 132, 139, 140, 141, 142, 150, 152, 157, 158, 164, 166, 171, 176, 176, 177, 245, 261, 308, 322, 339, 382, 383, 389, 402, 403 Kumm, O., 306 Kuyk, L.C.A. van, 234 La Ferté-sur-Chiers, 28, 83 Lackner, W., 386, 388, 390 Lage Zwaluwe, 348, 350 Lagepeel, 222 Land van Maas en Waal, 84, 155, 296, 318 Land, G., 297, 299, 302 Landzaat, W.P., 272, 286, 288, 302, 304 Langbehn, J., 20 Langenboom, 217, 222 Langstraat, 162, 245 Larive, E.H., 379 Le Bon, G., 20 Le Fèvre de Montigny, G.J., 297 Leeb, W. Ritter von, 108, 112 Leeuwarden, 325 Leiden, 166, 196 Leiderdorp, 199 Leidschendam, 188 Leipzig, 164 Lek, 155 Lemm, D., 350 Lemmer, 331, 340 Lenin, V.I., 14 Leopold Canal, 257 Lestoquoi, 229 Lewis, R.B., 301 Liège, 58, 72, 74, 113, 114, 115, 116, 122, 124, 126, 140, 158, 163 Lier, W. van, 378 Lille, 81, 83 Limburg, 39, 51, 63, 68, 72, 74, 86, 135, 205, 208, 209, 210, 212, 257 Lind, A.A., 335 Lindeman, D.H., 277, 279 Linden, P. van der, 335

Linge, 155 Lingen, 325 Lloyd George, D., 16 London, 7, 13, 30, 32, 41, 60, 72, 80, 117, 156, 160, 256, 395, 404 Loon op Zand, 157, 239 Loon, A.A.M. van, 282, 284, 295, 296, 297, 299, 305, 307, 313 Loosduinen, 187, 193, 196, 199 Lorraine, 119, 124 Louvain, 74, 81, 83, 146, 245 Lower Rhine, 316 Ludendorff, E., 13, 16 Lunteren, 308, 310 Luntersche Beek, 310 Lutterhoofdwijk Canal, 329, 400 Lutz, O., 99 Luxembourg, 28, 112, 113, 118, 119 Maaldrift, 191 Maas, 55, 60, 63, 64, 71, 76, 80, 83, 86, 113, 129, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 155, 158, 161, 162, 163, 168, 173, 176, 206, 207, 208, 209, 209, 211, 214, 215, 222, 224, 229, 257, 259, 354, 355, 356, 359, 378, 379, 380, 383, 388, 393, 400, 405, 406 Maas, F.N., 350 Maasbracht, 215 Maasmechelen, 77, 117, 121 Maastricht, 60, 63, 113, 122, 127, 134, 140, 141, 151, 152, 158, 211, 212, 223, 239, 240 Maas-Waal Canal, 55, 209, 210, 212 Maduro, G.J.L., 188, 190 Makkum, 331, 333, 335 Malden, 209, 212 Malines, 245 Mallinckrodt, J., 190 Manders, G.J.A., 360, 375 Manning, A.F., 19 Manstein, E. von, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125 Mantel, W., 353 Mantey, 265 Marcks, E., 150, 151, 157, 166, 171 Marees van Swinderen, jonkheer S.M.S.A.A. de, 296, 305 Marijnen, J.A.C.J., 347, 348, 350 Marijs, C.A.J., 372 Mark, 239, 359 Mark, G. van der, 372

index Mars, C., 333, 335 Marx, W., 92 Mathon, A.J.E., 221, 222 Maubeuge, 83 Medemblik, 323 Meer en Bosch, 193, 195, 196 Meijer, J.C., 293, 295, 319 Meijerink, L., 280 Meppel, 325, 330 Merwede, 362, 365, 375, 376, 379 Meuse, see also Maas, 7, 58, 74, 83, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 124, 125, 146, 171, 382, 397 Michon, G., 247, 358, 359 Middelburg, 148, 162, 242, 243, 248, 250, 254, 255, 386 Middelrode, 228, 232 Migchelbrink, G., 280, 400 Mijsberg, H., 364, 367, 373 Milch, E., 101 Mill, 140, 141, 144, 149, 150, 207, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 227, 228, 257, 258, 411 Mittlach, 112 Moerdijk, 126, 144, 146, 149, 152, 156, 157, 159, 162, 181, 199, 205, 232, 240, 323, 343, 344, 344, 347, 349, 358, 374, 376, 392, 397 Molenaar, F.J., 201 Molenaarsgraaf, 362 Moltke, H. von, 69 Monster, 195 Monthermé, 397 Mook, 129, 142, 150, 216 Morzik, F., 345 Mosca, G., 20 Moselle, 77 Mulder, B., 270 Mulder, C.H., 247 Mulder, H., 191 Mulder, H.J., 220 Müller, S., 274 Munich, 30, 32, 61 Münster, 386 Mussert, J.A., 209, 347, 367, 372, 373, 375, 376, 392 Mussolini, B., 20, 24, 30 Naaldwijk, 188 Naarden, 79 Nahuijsen, H., 277, 279 Namen, J.G. van, 369 Namur, 74, 81, 83, 114, 122, 130, 146,

455

245, 397 Neidholdt, F., 299 Netherlands East Indies, 3, 41, 52, 56 Netze, A., 217 Neurath, C. von, 26 Neut, J.C. van der, 279 Niers, 210 Nierstrasz, V.E., 43 Nietzsche, F., 20 Nieuwe Maas, 177, 344, 345, 353, 356, 379, 392 Nieuwe Merwede, 351 Nieuwe Waterweg, 378, 379 Nieuwersluis, 283 Nieuweschans, 324, 327, 341 Nieuw-Milligen, 48 Nieuwolda, 330 Nijland, J.C.C., 296, 307 Nijmegen, 215 Nijnatten, A.A. van, 144, 145, 221, 227 Noomen, P., 353 Noord, 148, 149, 152, 357, 362, 364, 365, 367, 370, 376, 392 Noord-Brabant, 38, 39, 51, 58, 59, 63, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 116, 129, 130, 143, 144, 146, 148, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 170, 205, 207, 208, 212, 217, 221, 222, 228, 229, 237, 240, 244, 245, 257, 258, 310, 343, 345, 347, 357, 358, 359, 362, 397, 404, 409, 410, 416 Noordenbos, U.C.C., 241, 251 Noordereiland, 355, 356, 357, 378, 386, 387, 388 Noord-Holland, 162 Noordwijk, 190, 196 North Sea, 59, 62, 77, 168, 410 Norway, 84, 85, 112, 181, 201, 348 Noster, 182 Nuremberg, 22, 25, 401 Obbicht, 210 Ochten aan de Waal, 313 Ockenburg, airfield, 142, 149, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 202, 203, 400 Oesterreich, C. von, 310, 312, 316, 319 Offringa, J., 373 Oome, C.M., 357 Oostburg, 256 Oosterdiep, 326 Oosterhesselen, 326, 330

456

index

Oosterhout, 229 Oosterschelde, 248, 259 Oostmalle, 232 Opheusden, 279 Oranje Canal, 326 Oslo, 84 Ostend, 256 Oude Maas, 205, 343, 344, 351, 353, 356, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 368, 392 Oude Rijn, 191 Oudenaarde, 73 Overijssel, 86, 267, 268, 321, 326 Overschie, 155, 173, 190, 196, 198, 199, 201, 202 Overstraeten, R. van, 80, 81, 83, 258 Palestine, 30 Palm, P.J.H. van der, 50 Papendrecht, 364, 367, 373 Pareto, V., 20 Paris, 16, 18, 60, 72, 73, 80, 117, 146, 149, 397, 414, 416 Paulus, F., 108 Peel, 57, 63, 64, 129, 207, 237 Peeters, A.W.J., 212 Pernis, 163 Pétain, H., 15 Picard, F., 228, 232 Pijnacker, 199 Pingjum, 335 Pinke, A.S., 379 Plasschaert, J.B., 357, 375 Plassche, J.G.M. van der, 86 Platon, C.J.G., 248 Plugge, J.J., 283, 293 Poeldijk, 195, 196 Poland, 14, 16, 18, 23, 28, 32, 33, 89, 93, 106, 108, 109, 111, 113, 116, 128, 131, 321, 396, 403, 410, 412, 414 Polder, de, 351 Pomerania, 109 Pop, W.F., 45, 46 Populier, W.F.M., 347, 350, 351 Postma, A.F., 301 Postma, S.J., 301 Präger, F., 348 Prague, 29 Princenhage, 239 Pronk, W., 338 Puttershoek, 345, 359 Putzier, R., 131, 132, 358, 359, 383, 386 Quackenbrück, 386

Raeder, E., 26 Ravelli, D.P., 361 Ravenstein, 142, 150 Reichenau, W. von, 108, 112, 114, 126, 132, 141, 151, 158, 208 Reijers, A.G.C., 359 Reijnders, I.H., 54, 55, 62, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 406 Reinhardt, W., 91 Renswoude, 308 Rheims, 81, 119 Rhenen, 65, 164, 167, 169, 265, 270, 274, 281, 288, 291, 292, 296, 299, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, 313, 315 Rhijn, J. van, 355 Rhine, 9, 25, 63, 108, 207, 279, 284, 304, 305 Rhineland, 16, 18, 19, 25, 26, 32, 73, 99, 209 Ribbentrop, J. von, 26 Ridder, J.F. de, 296 Ridderkerk, 378 Riggeling, J., 280 Rijhiner, H.D., 199 Rijnzicht, 274, 277 Rijsoord, 164, 170, 175, 176, 176, 177, 357, 366, 382 Rijswijk, 182, 184, 188 Rilland, 247 Röell, W., 68 Roelofsen, J.C., 66 Rohde, 254 Röhm, E., 23, 96 Romania, 18, 32 Rooijen, J.M.A.F. van, 214 Roosendaal, 163, 229, 232, 239 Roosteren, 210 Rosmalen, 216, 235 Rotterdam, 7, 8, 9, 63, 126, 130, 131, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 198, 199, 201, 205, 245, 323, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 353, 354, 355, 355, 356, 357, 362, 371, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 397, 401, 402, 403, 409, 411 Rozenburg, 380 Ruhr area, 18, 25, 32, 59, 113, 116, 133, 134 Rundstedt, G. von, 108, 109, 118, 119, 403

index Russia, 13, 14 Ruys de Beerenbrouck, jonkheer C.J.M., 45 Saarland, 16, 98 Salmuth, H. von, 158, 166 Sandijck, J.H.W., 279 Sankt Goar, 112 Sas, G.J., 77, 85, 86 Schacht, H., 24 Scharroo, P.W., 159, 161, 163, 168, 173, 174, 199, 347, 379, 380, 387, 388, 391 Scheldt, 73, 146, 158, 229, 245, 259 Scheldt estuary, 74 Schenk, R., 209, 219, 220, 221 Scherpenhuijzen, H.D., 199 Scherpenzeel, 169, 308, 310, 311, 312, 315, 319, 406 Scheveningen, 82 Schiedam, 378 Schiermonnikoog, 322 Schiphol, 5, 84, 144 Schipluiden, 199 Schmidt Crans, H.M., 301 Schmidt, L.J., 146, 149, 155, 156, 162, 208, 221, 227, 229, 232, 234, 237, 239, 240, 258, 378, 382, 383, 385, 388, 389, 411 Schmidt, R.F.K., 152, 158, 163, 164 Schmundt, R., 122 Scholz, F. von, 286 Schotman, H., 299 Schouten, A.M., 215 Schouwen-Duiveland, 243, 253, 254 Schuiling, W., 380 Schulz, K.L., 353 Schuschnigg, K. von, 26, 28 Sciard, T.M., 228 Sedan, 7, 28, 83, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 171, 259, 382, 397, 403 Seeckt, H. von, 91, 92 Senger und Etterlin, F.M. von, 325 Seyffardt, H.A., 50, 51, 54 Seyffart, C.F.H., 268 Siegmund, H.J., 351 Silicia, 16, 33 Sissingh, J.G., 376 Sleegers, C.J.H., 214 Sleen, 325, 330 Sliedrecht, 373, 376 Sloe Dam, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257 Slovakia, 32, 108 Smid, B., 330, 332, 333, 335

457

Sodenstern, G. von, 120, 124 Someren, 236 Somme, 118, 119, 124 Sonne, J.H., 327 Soviet Union, 9, 14, 16, 18, 19, 24, 33, 91, 106, 108, 111, 398 Spek, F.R. van der, 291 Spijkenisse, 357 Sponeck, H. Graf von, 186, 245 Sponeck, H.E.O. Graf von, 131, 132, 139, 140, 179, 184, 185, 187, 195, 198, 199, 383, 403 St Agatha, 215 St Hubert, 222 St Oedenrode, 236 Stad, H.J. van der, 148, 156, 162, 240, 242, 243, 254, 256, 259 Stavenisse, 254 Staveren, J. van, 378 Stavoren, 331, 336 Steenbergen, H.J.M., 291 Steenwijk, 331 Stein, 210 Stein, W., 322, 331 Steiner, F., 97, 250 Stettin, 120 Student, K., 128, 131, 132, 139, 158, 159, 164, 187, 232, 343, 344, 353, 354, 356, 357, 364, 368, 383, 386, 392 Sudetenland, 29, 30 Suez Canal, 30 Swagerman, B., 195, 378 Sweden, 91, 112 Switzerland, 83 Tack, J., 279, 282, 284, 293 Terheijden, 239 Termunterzijldiep, 326 Terschelling, 322 Themann, G.E.A., 244 Tholen, 242, 243, 253, 257, 259 Tholseindsche Dyke, 241, 249, 250 Tiedeman, K. von, 265, 274, 286, 299, 310, 315, 316 Tilburg, 73, 74, 76, 80, 83, 149, 155, 177, 227, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 239, 258, 343 Tirpitz, A. von, 101 Toelen, J.F.C., 288 Tongeren, 151, 152, 158, 170, 239, 240 Tournai, 73 Trettner, H., 356 Triebel, F.G., 241, 247, 248

458

index

Tromp, H.J., 270 Turnhout, 80, 83, 155, 228, 232 Tweede Tol, 165, 351, 370, 371, 373, 374, 377 Twenthe Canal, 266, 271 Uden, 150, 157, 170, 171, 176 Udet, E., 103 Uijterschout, I.L., 339 Ulvenhout, 239 United Kingdom, 16, 201 United States, 14, 16, 18 Urmond, 210 Utrecht, 53, 63, 128, 164, 166, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 309, 315, 401, 409 Valenciennes, 73, 83 Valkenburg, 185, 191, 192 Valkenburg, air base, 84, 142, 149, 179, 181, 182, 185, 188, 190, 192, 198, 200, 202, 203 Valkenswaard, 236 Veenbaas, J., 325, 326, 327, 329, 330 Veenendaal, 309 Veghel, 234, 235, 236 Velden, M. van, 219, 225 Velp, 286 Veluwe, 69, 155, 158, 274, 409 Venlo, 78 Versteegen, J.J., 199 Vienna, 24, 96 Vis, G.J., 338 Visser, J.K. de, 188 Vistula, 109, 111 Vlaardingen, 379 Vlieland, 322 Vlierden, A. van, 357 Vliet, 182, 188 Voigt, C.J., 272, 274, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282 Volkel, 150 Voorburg, 188 Voorst Evekink, D. van, 73, 74, 80, 81, 83, 84, 146 Voorst tot Voorst, C.E.W. baron van, 174 Voorst tot Voorst, H.F.M. baron van, 57, 77, 143, 143, 380 Voorst tot Voorst, J.J.G. baron van, 43, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 143, 156, 157, 169, 173, 175, 203, 258, 272, 283, 296, 297, 301, 313, 319, 406, 407 Vorrink, K., 44

Vos, A.J.R. de, 354 Vos, H.H.C., 277 Vries, 327 Vrolijk, Th.C., 299, 302 Vroome, M.H. de, 330 Vught, 221 Waal, 63, 83, 149, 155, 313 Waalhaven, 84, 85, 142, 144, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 344, 345, 348, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 362, 365, 367, 397, 409 Waalhaven airfield, 352 Waalwijk, 80 Wäckerle, H., 277, 291, 292, 305, 310, 319 Wageningen, 148, 155, 265, 271, 274, 281, 284, 286, 288, 291, 301, 302, 304, 311 Walcheren, 74, 148, 240, 241, 243, 248, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 259 Wall Bake, R.J.W.C. van den, 284 Walther, W., 209, 210 Warnaars, F.H., 184 Warnemünde, 101 Warsaw, 7, 108, 109, 111, 174 Wassenaar, 85, 181, 185, 190 Wassenaarse Slag, 192 Wateringen, 198, 199 Wavre, 74, 83 Weber, F., 222, 224, 225, 227 Weimar Republic, 14, 16, 19, 21, 33, 89, 93 Wemeldinge, 251 Werf, J. van der, 301 Wesel, 139, 150, 157, 163 Wessem, 214, 215 West Friesland, 324, 331, 336 West Frisian Islands, 116, 322 Westdijk, A.N., 250 Westervoort, 267, 269, 271, 396 Westland, 198 Wever, W., 101, 103 Wiardi Beckman, H.B., 44 Wieldrecht, 153, 159, 347, 350, 361, 365, 368, 372, 373, 375 Wietersheim, G. von, 121 Wijk bij Duurstede, 155, 316 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 13, 14 Wilhelmina bridge, 223 Wilhelmina Canal, 51, 229, 232, 238 Wilhelmina, Queen, 4, 44, 53, 62, 76, 131, 163, 166, 169, 173, 179, 409

index Willems bridge, 355, 380 Willemsdorp, 350, 351, 373 Willemstad, 156, 358, 359 William I, King, 1 William II, King, 38 William III, Stadholder, 69 Wilson, J.J.C.P., 146, 161, 173, 174, 229, 380, 387, 389 Wilson, W., 13, 16 Winkelman, H.G., 4, 7, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 143, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 188, 199, 207, 212, 240, 256, 258, 263, 264, 283, 316, 325, 327, 331, 362, 379, 401, 405, 406, 407, 409, 414 Wirtz, R., 254 Wissels, G., 234 Wissink, J.H.B., 275, 276 Wit, A. de, 241 Witt, F., 252 Witte, H., 293 Wittenberg, 110 Wodrig, A., 142, 150, 159, 207, 253, 259 Woensdrecht, 245 Wons, 333, 335 Woud, ’t, 199 Woudenberg, 72, 297 Wuppertal, 139 Yerseke, 240, 252 Ypenburg, airfield, 84, 85, 142, 149, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 190, 199, 203 Yugoslavia, 14, 18

459

Zech, J. Graf von, 62 Zee, K. van der, 379 Zeeland, 39, 51, 61, 63, 68, 72, 74, 80, 83, 86, 128, 130, 146, 148, 152, 156, 158, 162, 163, 170, 171, 175, 177, 205, 219, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 248, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 409, 410 Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 148, 170, 240, 243, 248, 255, 256, 257, 399 Zeist, 143, 296, 308, 316 Zevenbergschen Hoek, 358, 392 Zickwolff, F., 265, 270, 271, 308, 310, 312, 315 Zierikzee, 254 Zijlsterdiep, 327 Zimmermann, J.C., 380 Zitsewitz, H. von, 265 Zoetermeer, 196, 199 Zuid-Beveland, 74, 148, 240, 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 250, 252, 254, 255, 259 Zuid-Beveland Canal, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 255, 259 Zuider Hoofdvaart, 326 Zuiderzee, 63 Zuid-Holland, 63 Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal, 149, 150, 155, 156, 207, 227, 228, 232, 233, 234, 236, 240 Zundert, 229 Zurich, 333, 335 Zutphen, 128, 147, 148, 151, 270, 271 Zwarts, A., 274, 275, 276, 277 Zwartsluis, 326 Zwijndrecht, 351, 357, 369 Zwolle, 43, 270, 271, 329

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Professor H. Amersfoort (1951) studied history at the University of Leiden (1978) and subsequently worked at the Netherlands Institute of Military History. In 1988, he obtained a PhD with his thesis Koning en Kanton. De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgsdienst hier te lande 1814-1829. In 1994, he was appointed Professor of Military History at the University of Amsterdam. In 2006, he joined the Netherlands Defence Academy as Professor of Military History and Strategy. (editor, contributor) P.H. Kamphuis (1953) studied history at the University of Groningen before working at the European Movement in the Netherlands for two years. He worked at the Army Institute of Military History from 1979 and in 1990 he was appointed Director. When the various military history institutes merged in 2005 to become the Netherlands Institute of Military History, he was appointed as the new institute’s first director. In 2000 he took up the post of Secretary-General of the International Commission of Military History. (editor, contributor) Professor H.W. van den Doel (1962) taught at the University of Leiden after obtaining a degree in history in 1987. From October 1988 to February 1990, he worked at the Army Institute of Military History as part of his national service. In 1994, he obtained a PhD with his thesis De stille macht. Het Europese binnenlands bestuur op Java en Madoera, 1808-1942. He is currently Professor of ‘General History from 1870’ at the University of Leiden. Since 2007 he has also been Dean of the Faculty of Arts. (contributor) P.M.J. de Koster (1963) studied contemporary history at the Catholic University of Nijmegen. From April 1989 to June 1990, he completed his national service at the Army Institute of Military History. From 1992 to 2006 he worked for the Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the Ministry of Justice and since the end of 2006, he has worked for the Return

462

biographical notes

Migration & Departure Service of the same Ministry. (contributor/pictorial research) Dr C.M. Schulten (1933) obtained his degree in French linguistics and literature at the University of Leiden in 1962. He worked in secondary education for a number of years and then in 1966 was appointed as an academic researcher at the Grotius Institute. In that same year, he obtained a PhD with his thesis Contribution à l’étude des termes militaires français en néerlandais 1567-1625. From 1974 through 1989, he was Head of the Army Institute of Military History. He held the post of Secretary-General of the International Commission of Military History from 1980 to 1990 and was its President from 1990 to 2000. From 1990 to 1995, he was Director of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. (contributor) Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Dr J.W.M. Schulten (1933) completed his studies at the Institute of Technology (1955) before attending the Royal Military Academy (rank promotion 1956). He held various troop and staff positions with the Signals Service Arm and meanwhile studied history at the University of Utrecht (1974). From 1976 to 1991 he taught Strategy and Military History at the Royal Military Academy. In 1998 he obtained a PhD from the University of Leiden with his thesis De geschiedenis van de Ordedienst. Mythe en werkelijkheid van een verzetsorganisatie. (contributor) L.C. Kaulartz (1950) worked for the Topographic Service of the Ministry of Defence from 1967 to 1983, as a cartographer and lithographer. He has since then been working as a cartographer and graphic designer for the Netherlands Institute of Military History. (cartography) Captain T.A.H.F. Olivier (1974) studied history at the University of Groningen and completed an internship at the Army Institute of Military History. As a regular officer candidate, he was appointed as an academic researcher at the Institute in 1999. In 2007, he took up a post with the ISTAR battalion. (pictorial research)

PHOTO ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Archief War Photo Holland, Amstelveen: 165 (top), 186 (top), 194 (top), 197 (bottom), 334 (bottom), 352. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz: 22 (top), 29 (top), 100, 102, 110 (bottom), 123 (top), 127, 132, 211 (bottom), 235 (bottom), 237, 306 (top), 322, 337 (top), 340 (bottom), 371 (bottom), 374 (top). Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague: cover, 8, 17 (top), 27 (top), 29 (bottom), 31 (bottom), 36, 43 (bottom), 48, 52, 57, 65, 70 (bottom), 72, 75 (top), 79, 82, 90, 94, 143, 151, 176, 189, 200, 209, 216, 218, 220, 226, 233, 235 (top), 238, 249 (top), 253, 262, 266, 269, 273, 277, 281, 285, 289, 292, 306 (bottom), 311, 318, 328, 334 (top), 337 (bottom), 340 (top), 399 (bottom), 402, 408, 417. Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam: 5, 8 (bottom), 11 (top), 70 (top), 154 (top), 159, 172 (top), 180, 206 (top), 211 (top), 213, 246, 298, 303 (top), 355, 391, 396. Spaarnestad Fotoarchief, Haarlem: 2 (bottom), 17 (top), 22 (bottom), 25, 27 (bottom), 31 (top), 102 (top), 104 (top), 107, 110 (top), 115 (top), 147, 154 (bottom), 160, 172 (bottom), 223, 314 (top). M. Brink, Veenendaal: 303 (bottom). H.P. Deijs, Rhenen: 167, 314 (bottom). L.J. Jordaan: 43 (top). M.G.A. Jordaan-Everts, Zelhem: 2 (top). J.A. van der Vorm, Dordrecht: 163 (bottom), 292, 349, 360, 366, 369, 371 (top), 373 (bottom), 377, 384 (bottom). J. Winters: 11 (bottom), 249 (bottom), 344, 384 (top), 399 (top). The Netherlands Institute of Military History has made every effort to establish rights for the use of the illustrations printed in this volume. Should any party find that their rights have been infringed, they are kindly requested to contact the Netherlands Institute of Military History.

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History of Warfare The peer-reviewed series History of Warfare presents the latest research on all aspects of military history. Publications in the series examine technology, strategy, logistics, and social development related to warfare in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East from ancient times until the early twentieth century. The series accepts high-quality monographs, collections of essays, conference proceedings, and translations of military texts.

Recent volumes in the series 20. Macleod, J. & P. Purseigle (eds.). Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2004. 978 90 04 13264 1 21. Worthington, D. Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648. 2004. 978 90 04 13575 8 22. Griffin, M. Regulating Religion and Morality in the King’s Armies 1639-1646. 2004. 978 90 04 13170 5 23. Sicking, L. Neptune and the Netherlands. State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance. 2004. 978 90 04 13850 6 24. Glozier, M. Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King. Nursery for Men of Honour. 2004. 978 90 04 13865 0 25. Villalon, L.J.A. & D.J. Kagay (eds.). The Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus. 2005. 978 90 04 13969 5 26. DeVries, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology, Update 2004. 2005. 978 90 04 14040 0 27. Hacker, B.C. World Military History Annotated Bibliography. Premodern and Nonwestern Military Institutions (Works Published before 1967). 2005. 978 90 04 14071 4 28. Walton, S.A. (ed.). Instrumental in War. Science, Research, and Instruments Between Knowledge and the World. 2005. 978 90 04 14281 7 29. Steinberg, J.W., B.W. Menning, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. Wolff & S. Yokote (eds.). The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, Volume I. 2005. 978 90 04 14284 8 30. Purseigle, P. (ed.). Warfare and Belligerence. Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2005. 978 90 04 14352 4 31. Waldman, J. Hafted Weapons in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. The Evolution of European Staff Weapons between 1200 and 1650. 2005. 978 90 04 14409 5 32. Speelman, P.J. (ed.). War, Society and Enlightenment. The Works of General Lloyd. 2005. 978 90 04 14410 1 33. Wright, D.C. From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China. Sung’s Foreign Relations with Kitan Liao. 2005. 978 90 04 14456 9 34. Trim, D.J.B. & M.C. Fissel (eds.). Amphibious Warfare 1000-1700. Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion. 2006. 978 90 04 13244 3 35. Kennedy, H. (ed.). Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria. From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period. 2006. 978 90 04 14713 3 36. Haldon, J.F. (ed.). General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics. Sources, Problems and Methodologies. 2006. 978 90 04 14769 0

37. Christie, N. & M. Yazigi (eds). Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities. Warfare in the Middle Ages. 2006. 978 90 04 15024 9 38. Shaw, C. Italy and the European Powers. The Impact of War, 1500-1530. 2006. 978 90 04 15163 5 39. Biggs, D. Three Armies in Britain. The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397-99. 2006. 978 90 04 15215 1 40. Wolff, D., S.G. Marks, B.W. Menning, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, J.W. Steinberg & S. Yokote (eds.). The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, Volume II. 2007. 978 90 04 15416 2 41. Ostwald, J. Vauban under Siege. Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the Spanish Succession. 2007. 978 90 04 15489 6. 2009 Distinguished Book Award 42. McCullough, R.L. Coercion, Conversion and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV’s France. 2007. 978 90 04 15661 6 43. Røksund, A. The Jeune École. The Strategy of the Weak. 2007. 978 90 04 15723 1 44. Hosler, J.D. Henry II. A Medieval Soldier at War, 1147-1189. 2007. 978 90 04 15724 8 45. Hoyos, D. Truceless War. Carthage’s Fight for Survival, 241 to 237 BC. 2007. 978 90 04 16076 7 46. DeVries, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology, Update 2003-2006. 2008. 978 90 04 16445 1 47. France, J. (ed.). Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages. 2008. 978 90 04 16447 5 48. Meyer, J. (ed). British Popular Culture and the First World War. 2008. 978 90 04 16658 5 49. Jones, H., J. O’Brien & C. Schmidt-Supprian (eds.). Untold War. New Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2008. 978 90 04 16659 2 50. Burgtorf, J. The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars. History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120-1310). 2008. 978 90 04 16660 8 51. Villalon, A.L.J. & D.J. Kagay (eds.). The Hundred Years War (Part II). Different Vistas. 2008. 978 90 04 16821 3 52. González de León, F. The Road to Rocroi. Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659. 2009. 978 90 04 17082 7 53. Lawrence, D.R. The Complete Soldier. Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645. 2009. 978 90 04 17079 7 54. Beckett, I.F.W. (ed.). 1917: Beyond the Western Front. 2009. 978 90 04 17139 8 55. Whetham, D. Just Wars and Moral Victories. Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages. 2009. 978 90 04 17153 4 56. Miller, S.M. (ed.). Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918. 2009. 978 90 04 17751 2 57. Amersfoort, H. & P. Kamphuis (eds.). May 1940. The Battle for the Netherlands. 2010. 978 90 04 18438 1 58. Murdoch, S. The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713. 2010. 978 90 04 18568 5 59. Fagan, G.G. & M. Trundle (eds.). New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. 2010. 978 90 04 18598 2 ISSN 1385-7827

May 1940: the battle for the Netherlands

Jagdwaffe - Attack in the West may 1940

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Hitler's Preemptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

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The Netherlands

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The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for London

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The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

The Battle for Tomorrow

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The Netherlands

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

The Battle For Survival

The Battle for Survival

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Duncragglin

The Battle for Guadalcanal

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Duncragglin

Battle for the wilderness

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

May 1940: the battle for the Netherlands

Jagdwaffe - Attack in the West may 1940

Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

Hitler's Preemptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

The Netherlands

The Netherlands

The Battle For Survival

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for London

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Gotham

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

The Battle for Tomorrow

Battle for the Stars

The Netherlands

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

The Battle For Survival

The Battle for Survival

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Duncragglin

The Battle for Guadalcanal

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Duncragglin

Battle for the wilderness

The Battle for Skandia

The Battle for Christmas

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