Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism Stanley Moore This book clarifies a problem central to the current w...
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Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism Stanley Moore This book clarifies a problem central to the current worldwide crisis of communism. That crisis reflects the extent to which communists now disagree about the nature
· ~~~~a'I~WoW~~~-gew from Deng, Brezhnev from the Eurocommunists is in the last analysis their choice of goals. Marx contrasts two types of postcapitalist economy: in one exploitation has been abolished but not exchange; in the other both have been abolished. Moore examines the arguments Marx offers to support
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. . . _., to a com This is not to assert that it predicts transttiO•· · · Is · neutra 11 y, It munist economy but that, taken htera d1 · 1·~s tween the two. Yet since the Manifesto Imp 1...- • an . 'tl y "r::~~~sserts, Critique of the Gotha Program exp IICI . capitalism will be replaced im~ediately. by. soc eventually by communism, why IS the pomt
57
It is important because Engels-though he oversiml'fi s the connection-correctly links the passage prePd! t~ng expropriation of the expropriators, in the section tc t . 1'tst accumu 1atton, . . h t he the tendency o f captta Wit on sage describing a socialist economy, in the section on pP h . mmodity fetishism. Marx constructs that ypothettcal c~cialist economy as an example of a mode of production :ree from commodity fetishism. Almost immediately afterward, he predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism. His socialist example renders this prediction neutral between socialism and communism. His later prediction is rendered similarly neutral by the vagueness of its language. Their shared ostensible neutrality invites conflating the two predictions. . Marx predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism in a passage that recalls some themes of philosophical communism. In what seems a digression from his central argument, he contrasts the types of religious belief characteristic of capitalist and precapitalist cultures. Nature worship corresponds to stages in the development of the forces of production where men's relations to one another and to nature are restricted within narrow limits. Protestant Christianity with its cult of abstract man corresponds to the capitalist stage of development, to a society dominated by commodity exchange. Marx continues:
~he religious reflection of the r.eal world can wholly dtsappear only when men encounter in their practical, W?rkday life none but transparently rational relations With one another and with nature. The structure of the social life process-that is, of the material process of Production-does not strip off its mystic veil until it becomes the creation of freely associated men, under their conscious, planned control. Such a society re-
56
Chapter Five
We Communists are accused of proposing to abolish personal property, acquired by one's own labor-the property which is the basis of all personal freedom, activity, and independence ... Do you mean the p.roperty of the small artisan and the small peasant, whtch preceded capitalist property? We do not need to abolish it; for the development of industry has lar~ely destroyed it already and continues to destroy It every day ... Property in its present form is based on antagonism of capital and wage labor ... In capttahst society living labor is simply a means to increase accumulated labor. In communist society accumulated labor is simply a means to develop, broaden, and enrich the life of the laborer ... In capitalist society capital has independence and personality, while t.he living individual is dependent and lacks personality .. Yet the bourgeoisie call abolition of this state of affairs abolition of personality and freedom! 7 To trace Marx's concept of individual property back through still earlier writings is to reveal its ori~~ns. in philosophical communism. THe solution for w~at ~uhnng calls the dialectical enigma of property which IS both individual and social is that in Marx's usage individual property is not opposed to social property, but to dehu• manized or estranged property. s_ To weigh the textual evidence is to r~ject the .clatm that Marx's analysis of capitalist accumulatiOn culmmates in predicting transition to a specifically socialist economy. This is not to assert that it predicts transition to a communist economy but that, taken literally, it is neutral between the two. Yet since the Manifesto implies, and The Critique of the Gotha Program explicitly assert~, ~hat capitalism will be replaced immediately. by. soctahsm~ eventually by communism, why is the pomt Important.
t?e .
Capital
57
It is important because Engels-though he oversimplifies the connection-correctly links the passage predicting expropriation of the expropriators, in the section on the tendency of capitalist accumulation, with the passage describing a socialist economy, in the section on commodity fetishism. Marx constructs that hypothetical socialist economy as an example of a mode of production free from commodity fetishism. Almost immediately afterward, he predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism. His socialist example renders this prediction neutral between socialism and communism. His later prediction is rendered similarly neutral by the vagueness of its language. Their shared ostensible neutrality invites conftating the two predictions. Marx predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism in a passage that recalls some themes of philosophical communism. In what seems a digression from his central argument, he contrasts the types of religious belief characteristic of capitalist and precapitalist cultures. Nature worship corresponds to stages in the development of the forces of production where men's relations to one another and to nature are restricted within narrow limits. Protestant Christianity with its cult of abstract man corresponds to the capitalist stage of development, to a society dominated by commodity exchange. Marx continues: The religious reflection of the real world can wholly disappear only when men encounter in their practical, workday life none but transparently rational relations with one another and with nature. The structure of the social life process-that is, of the material process of production-does not strip off its mystic veil until it becomes the creation of freely associated men, under their conscious, planned control. Such a society re-
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Chapter Five
quires, however, a material basis-a set of material conditions which are the unintended product of a long and painful process of development.n Upon what grounds does Marx predict the total disappearance of commodity fetishism? His wholly static analysis of commodity exchange in the opening chapters of Capital provides no evidence or argument to support such a prediction. The reference to freely associated men suggests that abolition of exploitation is one of the conditions he has in mind; and his subsequent discussion of capitalist accumulation provides both evidence and argument for predicting fulfilment of this requirement. Is abolition of exploitation the only condition? If Marx explicitly identified abolishing fetishism with transition to communism, abolishing exploitaton with transition to socialism, the disparity of the two predictions would be clear. But since both are presented as neutral, it is easy to conflate them-to regard the first prediction as adequately grounded on the evidence and argument, presented five hundred pages later, for the second. At the level of overt argument, the two long-range predictions Marx makes in Capital do not extend beyond the transition from capitalism to socialism. Yet, without openly admitting it, he complements the arguments he develops within the framework of historical materialism with an argument, developed within the framework of Hegelian philosophy, for the moral desirability of communism. From the first appearance of Capital, Marx was criticized for relying on Hegelian formulae instead of empirical evidence in his prediction of proletarian revolution and his analysis of commodity exchange. In the Afterword to the second edition of Capital, he replied to some of these criticisms. Distinguishing between the rational and the mystical elements in Hegel's dialectic, he
Capital
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wrote that in Capital he had openly proclaimed himself Hegel's pupil-adding that in the chapter on commodities he had "coquetted" with Hegel's distinctive terminology.10 His use of Hegel's terminology, however, was more than mere flirtation. To follow its clues is to uncover two basic debts the pupil owed his teacher. First, his analysis of commodity exchange relies upon the central assumption of the Logic. Second, his critique of capitalist society parallels the central argument of The Philosophy of Right. In Capital Marx devotes almost one hundred pages to commodity exchange and money before reaching the topic of exploitation. His opening chapter parallels in terminology and reasoning the chapters on Existence and Appearance, near the middle of the Doctrine of Essence, in Heg~l's Logic. The analysis of commodity exchange is developed in terms of the contrast between appearance and substance, accident and essence. Its initial premise is that exchange values, which relate commodities with one another, must reflect some nonrelational property of each commodity taken separately-its value. Applying in this fashion to commodity exchange one variant of the basic assumption of Hegel's Logic-now called the Doctrine of Internal Relations-Marx asserts that exchange value is related to value as appearance to substance. 11 In the final section of the opening chapter, dealing with what Marx calls commodity fetishism, the contrast between appearance and substance inherent in commodity exchange is developed into a critique of the formalism pervading every level of capitalist culture. Through commodity exchange, Marx asserts, relations between men in the process of production take on the appearance of relations between things in the process of exchange. Capitalist society-where for the first time in history most products take the form of commodities-is accord-
60
Chapter Five
ingly characterized by pervasive conflicts· between form and content, appearance and substance, accident and essence. 12 This critique of capitalist society parallels the critique of civil society in The Philosophy of Right. According to Hegel, the institutional embodiment of the contrast between substance and appearance, essence and accident, is the contrast between community and society. Substance is distinguished from appearance as that which can exist by itself from that whose existence depends on something else. Because the existence of any man depends on the existence of some community, communities exhibit the independence of substances, indiviquals the dependence of appearances. Hegel writes in Paragraphs 144 and 145: The objective ethical order (Sittlichkeit) ... is substance made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form. Hence it posits within itself distinctions whose specific character is thereby determined by the concept, and which endow the ethical order with a stable content independently necessary and subsistent in exaltation above subjective opinion and caprice. These distinctions are absolutely valid laws and institutions ... To these powers individuals are related as accidents to substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, have the shape of appearance, and · become actualized. The family and the political state, those elements in the complex structure of Hegel's ideal state which clearly exemplify the primacy of the group, he calls substantial. Civil society, that element which seems to exemplify the primacy of the individual, he calls the external, or apparent, state. 1 a Civil society is for Hegel-as capitalist society is
Capital
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for Marx-both a realm of commodity exchange ( V eriiusserung), whose economic tendency is increasingly to pit the poor against the rich, and a realm of alienation ( Entiiusserung), whose metaphysical characteristic is the opposition of existence and essence, appearance and· substance. For Hegel, subordination of civil society to the political state mediates, in the sense of reconciling, the sociallension between poor and rich as well as the metaphysical tension between appearance and substance. 14 A corresponding double role is assigned by Marx to proletarian revolution. The social order that replaces capitalism, he predicts, will end the opposition between appearance and substance as well as the distinction between rich and poor. The parts of Capital that most closely parallel parts of The Philosophy .of Right are the analysis of capitalist accumulation, where Marx predicts the end of capitalist exploitation, and the analysis of commodity exchange, where he predicts the end of commodity fetishism. Granted that Marx discusses questions Hegel raised, does he support his answers by Hegelian arguments? Examination reveals that his analysis of commodity exchange is Hegelian in this stronger sense, but his analysis of capitalist accumulation is not. In predicting the end of exploitation, Marx characterizes capitalist property as the negation of individual private property, and postcapitalist individual property as the negation of the negation. Yet this prediction concludes some two hundred pages of economic argument, developed wholly within the framework of historical materialism. In reply to those like Mikhailovsky who interpret the Hegelian language as evidence of Hegelian argument, Marx can point to nine chapters of economic analysis, packed with empirical data, to show that he has
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Chapter Five
made use of Hegel merely to describe the pattern, not to establish it. 15 In predicting the end of commodity fetishism, Marx uses only the language of historical materialism. Yet though he suggests that the grounds for this prediction are the same as those for predicting the end of exploitation, examination of his subsequent account of capitalist accumulation reveals no economic grounds for predicting the end of commodity exchange. Apart from this empty promise, the earlier prediction derives its plausibility from an argument that abolition of commodity exchange is morally desirable. That argument, suggested ratper than . explicitly stated in Marx's analysis of commodity exchange, is a counterpart of the argument presented in The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts. Its starting point is different. Feuerbach's account of man's essential nature has been replaced by the analogous, though far more complex, account of Hegel. The rest of the argument is unchanged. Its unstated premise is that the greater the conformity of appearance to substance, existence to essence, characterizing a social order, the greater is the moral worth of that social order. Its stated premise is that appearance is opposed to substance in cultures based upon exchange economies, but not in cultures based upon natural economies. The conclusion follows that; other things being equal, cultures based upon exchange economies are morally inferior to cultures based upon natural economies. Buried in his account of commodity fetishism is the demand for a rebirth of community that Marx first raised in 1843. 16
6
Two Types of Socialism: Marx against Marx
The moral argument in Capital-like its counter. parts in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts and The Critique of the Gotha Program-asserts the superiority of· communism to socialism. Yet it seems nullified by Marx's claim that fetishism would be eliminated in the socialist economy described in Capital. To explore this difficulty is to question the basis for that claim. On what grounds can Marx assert that abolishing exploitation, without abolishing exchange, will end commodity fetishism? In the final section of his opening chapter, Marx gives four examples of economies free from commodity fetishism: Crusoe's economy, a self-sufficient patriarchal economy, a feudal economy, and a socialist economy. 1 The first three are natural economies, in the sense that individual producers normally consume what they produce instead of exchanging it for what others produce. But in the socialist economy, where individual producers normally consume what others produce, will not distribution of consumers' goods require exchange? On what grounds can Marx deny that every socialist economy is an economy of commodity exchange? And on what grounds can he deny that commodity exchange-even in a classless economy-entails commodity fetishism? 63
Chapter Six
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This is partly a question of definition. In the opening section of the chapter on commodities, Marx writes: A thing can be useful and a product of human labor without being a commodity. Someone who satisfies his needs with products of his own labor creates use values but not commodities. In order to produce commodities, he must not only produce use values, but use values for others-social use values. If all goods produced for exchange are commodities, then trading certificates of labor for consumers' goods in a socialist economy is buying commodities. However, a few paragraphs later Marx adds:
In the traditional Indian community there is social division of labor, but products do not become commodities. To take an example nearer home, labor is systematically divided in every factory, but this division does not function through the workers exchanging their individual products with one another. Only products of different labot processes, carried on independently for the accounts of different private individuals, confront one another as commodities. ~f ~~ly
goods produced for exchange between private Individuals are commodities, then socialist distribution does not involve selling commodities. This definition of commodities enables Marx, in The Critique of the Gotha Program, to contrast socialist exchange with commodity exchange.!! The issue ceases to be merely verbal if we ask whether the sources of fetishism in economies dominated by commodity exchange will be absent from socialist economies. This question is too general to permit a single answer. In The Critique of the Gotha Program Marx describes one type of socialist economy: in The
Two Types of Socialism
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Communist Manifesto he suggests a different type. From the first, it can be argued, the sources of fetishism have been eliminated: from the second they have not. The socialist economy described in The Critique of the Gotha Program differs from a capitalist economy in two respects relevant to the survival of fetishism. Because producers' goods are not exchanged, the role of exchange is radically curtailed. Furthermore, in exchange of con·sumers' goods for certificates of labor, price does not diverge from labor cost.a In the third volume of Capital Marx writes that in precapitalist economies commodities normally exchange at prices proportionate to their labor costs. And in the first volume he writes of precapitalist social formations: In the ancient Asiatic, the antique, and similar modes of production, transformation of products into commodities and men into commodity producers plays a subordinate role-though this grows more significant as these communities approach their dissolution .... In comparison with capitalist society, these old social organisms of production are far more simple and transparent. 4 From these considerations it seems plausible to argue by analogy that transition to the type of socialism described in the Critique-by limiting the sphere of exchange and equating price with labor cost-will dispel to a great extent the illusions of fetishism. Marx asserts that the socialist economy described in the Critique will be as free from fetishism as the communist-that in neither will the labor cost of a product take on the appearance of a material property of the product, its value. 5 Whether or not this claim is an exaggeration, viewing these economies in terms of a transition
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Chapter Six
from society to community suggests that the restriction and simplification of exchange predicted for the socialist economy will be transitional-a preliminary step toward complete elimination of exchange. That explains, though it does not justify, Marx's calling this type of socialism the lower stage of communism. To turn from The Critique of the Gotha Program to The Communist Manifesto is to encounter a quite different type of socialist economy, which does not eliminate or even weaken the sources of fetishism. According to the Manifesto, victory of the proletariat will inaugurate a process of piecemeal socialization. The transitional program proposed. for advanced capitalist countries includes the following measures:. I. Abolition of property in land and use of ground rent for state expenditures. 2. Steeply progressive taxation. 3. Abolition of the right to inherit. 5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, through a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of transport in the hands of the state. 7. Multiplication of national factories and means of production, extension and impr_ovement of arable land, in accordance with a social plan. 6 The immediate result of introducing these measures would be a mixed economy, combining socialism with capitalism. Many units of production and exchange would continue as capitalist enterprises. The functioning of this capitalist sector would involve markets for means of production (though only a rental market for land), labor markets, and markets for means of consumption. Pre-
Two Types of Socialism
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sumably these markets would be subjected to regulations and restrictions quite different from those in the preceding capitalist economy. And presumably the socialist sector would function through these same markets. The ultimate result of these measures would be a socialist economy, combining markets with planning. The measures of the transitional program that would ultimately abolish exploitation-confiscating the land, ·prohibiting inheritance-are not measures that would abolish exchange. After attainment of a wholly socialist economy markets could continue to regulate all of production, together with the private sector of consumption, within a framework of planning. Division of each year's total product between means of production and means of consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of means of production among different units of production could take place through markets. Division of each year's total production of consumers' goods into a portion destined for communal consumption and a portion destined for private consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of the portion available for private consumption could take place through markets. Division between workers and nonworkers of the portion of consumers' goods available for private consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of the workers' total share among individual workers could take place through markets for labor, in combination with markets for consumers' goods. A classless economy of this type-combining markets with planning-is now called market socialism. To examine the cormection between socialism and fetishism is to cut beneath the surface of Marx's argument. The claim that every type of socialism would be free from fetishism is indefensible. Yet qualifying this
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Chapter Six
claim to render it defensible results in opposing the two long-range predictions which the argument of Capital conftates. The type of socialism required for Marx's discussion of commodity fetishism is that of the Critique: the type appropriate for his discussion of capitalist accumulation is that of the Manifesto. To recognize this incompatibility is to separate the covert from the overt argument of Capital. The prediction that commodity fetishism will disappear is exposed as a moral imperative, based upon principles of philosophical communism, disguised as a factual statement, based upon principles of historical materialism. Why is the socialism of the M a11ifesto more appropriate than the socialism of the Critique for Marx's account of the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation? Two sets of arguments suggested by Marx himself can be used to support this claim. One set is concerned with historical continuity, the other with economic workability. Marx writes in the Critique that the transitional classless economy which succeeds abolition of exploitation will be stamped in every respect-economically, morally, and intellectually-with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges} Which fits this description better, the socialist economy of the Manifesto or that of the Critique? The transitional measures listed in the Manifesto constitute a concrete program for advancing from a wholly capitalist economy, through a mixed capitalist and socialist economy, to a wholly socialist economy. What would be a comparable program for advancing from a capitalist economy to the socialist economy of the Critique? The type of socialist economy described in Capital corresponds to the type predicted in the Critique. The
Two Types of Socialism
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first example of an economy free from fetishism is that of Robinson Crusoe, whose bookkeeping-according to Marx-equates cost of production with labor cost. The fourth example is a socialist economy which exhibits all the characteristics of Robinson's labor on a social rather than an individual scale. In this economy then, as in Crusoe's economy, cost of production is equated with labor cost. Yet Marx writes that he has chosen to discuss this socialist economy solely for the sake of a parallel with commodity production. s The parallel would have been still closer if he had chosen for his example the socialist economy implicit in the Manifesto-where, as in capitalist economies, costs of production diverge from labor costs. The type of socialism implicit in the Manifesto is the type implicit in the program of Lassalle. During the period of rivalry between followers of Marx and followers of Lassalle, Liebknecht asked Marx to write a preface for a new edition of the Manifesto. The preface Marx and Engels wrote in 1872 does not mention Lassalle by name. But it denies the efficacy he claimed for his major political proposal-introduction of universal suffrage. And it withdraws any support the transitional program might provide for his major economic proposal-establis~ment of producers' cooperatives with state aid. No particular importance should be ascribed to the transitional program, its authors now assert, · because parts of it have become obsolete. Its obsolescence they attribute to the tremendous growth of modern industry and the concomitant growth of the trade union movement, together ~ith the political experience gained in the French RevolutiOn of 1848 and the Paris Commune. Perhaps some parts of the original program had become obsolete in the course of twenty-five years. But was the type of socialism pre-
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dieted, after three more years, in The Critique of the Gotha Program a revision of the transitional program of the Manifesto appropriate to these changes in the situation of the proletariat? Or was it appropriate solely for presenting socialism as an unstable preliminary, rather than a viable alternative, to communism? Examining the Preface of 1872 in its historical context points to the conclusion that Marx disowned his former economic program, not because it had become obsolete, but because it had become the program of Lassalle. 9 These arguments from continuity can be complemented by attacking the socialism of the Critique as economically unworkable. Such a criticism can be derived from arguments developed by Marx himself in attacking as utopian the economic programs of Gray and Proudhon. Discussing classless economies in The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx writes: Within the cooperative society based upon collective ownership of the means of production, producers do not exchange their products. Nor does the labor embodied in these products appear as their value, as a material property they possess; for here-in contrast to capitalism-individual labor is no longer indirectly, but directly, a constituent part of the aggregate labor of society. 10 What is meant by contrasting a direct with an indirect connection between individual and aggregate labor? The statements that producers do not exchange their products and that the labor costs of these products do not take the form of values imply that indirect connection is connection through a market. But, as Marx suggests elsewhere, attempts to connect individual labor directly
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with aggregate labor present serious difficulties. One is the difficulty of calculating hours of labor contributed by different producers. Another is the difficulty of calculating the labor costs of different products. Discussing in his Critique of Political Economy the classless exchange economies proposed by Proudhon and by the Ricardian socialists Bray and Gray, Marx writes: The theory that labor time should serve directly as money was first systematically developed by John Gray. He proposed that a national central bank should ascertain through its branches the labor time expended in producing different commodities. In exchange for each commodity, its producer would receive an official certificate of its value-that is, a receipt for the labor time the commodity contained. These banknotes-of one labor week, one labor day, one labor hour, and so on -would then serve to claim other commodities, stored in the bank's warehouses, which had cost an equivalent amount of labor. Marx goes on to argue that this scheme for connecting individual with aggregate labor is self-defeating. Since labor time is the intrinsic measure of value, why use another external standard? Why is exchange value transformed into price? Why are the values of all commodities computed in terms of one exclusive commodity, which is accordingly transformed into the appropriate expression of exchange value-that is, money? This was the problem Gray had to solve. But instead of solving _it, he assumed that commodities could be directly compared with one another as products of social labor. Yet they are only comparable as what they are. Commodities are immediate products of separated, independent, private labors; they must
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establish themselves as embodiments of universal social labor through their alienation in the process of exchange. On the basis of commodity production, labor becomes social labor only through the universal alienation of individual labors. But Gray, treating the labor time contained in commodities as directly social, treats it as communal labor time-as the labor time of directly associated individuals. If this were the case, a specific commodity-such as gold or silver-would not confront other commodities as the incarnation of universal labor; and exchange value would not become price. What is more, use value would not become exchange value; products would not b~come commodities; and consequently the entire basis of bourgeois production would be abolished. But this is not what Gray had in mind. Goods are to be produced as commodities but not exchanged as commodities. 11 This criticism pivots on Marx's contrast between abstract and concrete labor. Commodities of different kinds are produced by qualitatively different kinds of concrete labor-mining iron, growing wheat, weaving linen, and so on. But the values, or labor costs, of these commodities are quantities of homogeneous abstract labor-what Marx calls in this passage universal social labor. One hour of concrete labor, highly skilled or unusually intense, is equivalent to more than one hour of abstract labor. 12 Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation the authorities of Gray's central bank could ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required to produce each commodity. They could not, according to Marx, calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of concrete labor. That calculation could be accomplished only through
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establishment of equilibrium prices for the commodities in a competitive market-a process which involves divergence of prices from labor costs. In proposing that goods be produced as commodities-as products of separated, independent, private labors-but prohibiting their exchange as commodities-at prices which diverge from labor costs-Gray's program is therefore self-defeating. Does this criticism apply to the socialist economy sketched by Marx in The Critique of the Gotha Program? He states there that in the classless economies of the future individual labor will be directly a part of the aggregate labor of society. He also states that in the transitional socialist economy each worker will receive a certificate stating the amount of labor he has contributed (less a deduction for the common fund) ;then exchange it for consumers' goods that have cost an equivalent amount of labor. How, in such an economy, could the relevant quantities of labor be ascertained? The authorities could record the quantities of concrete labor contributed by each worker. Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation they could also ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required for producing each· of the different kinds of consumers' goods. They could not, according to Marx's critique of Gray and Proudhon, calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of concrete labor without recourse to competitive markets. Why translate concrete into abstract labor? Why not count any two hours of concrete labor as equivalent? This is the solution of Proudhon and Dtihring, but not that of Marx. In The Critique of Political Economy, it is true, Marx seems to assert that translation of concrete into abstract labor is peculiar to the capitalist mode of
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production. But in Capital he writes that the problem of allocating labor, in appropriate quantities, among specific kinds of productive activities is central for every system of production; and his language clearly implies that solution of this problem involves translating concrete into abstract labor. In a simple economy-like that of Crusoe or that of a self-sufficient household-this translation requires no formal mechanism. In the complex economy of capitalism the translation is effected through the mechanism of the market. Some corresponding mechanism is required by any complex socialist economy .1 a In the socialist economy implicit in the Manifesto translation of concrete into abstract labor could be effected through competitive markets for labor. But this solution is impossible for the socialist economy described in the Critique-or for any communist economy. Marx writes that labor time plays a double role in the socialist economy described in Capital. On the one hand, it measures each individual's share in the common labor and consequently his share in that portion of the common product available for individual consumption. On the other hand, its socially planned allocation maintains the proper proportion between different kinds of work and different needs. In a communist economy, calculation of labor time will lose its distributive function. But in the communist economy that- Marx envisages will not calculation of labor time retain its planning function? How then can planners calculate the proper proportion between different kinds of work and different needs? Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation they could ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required for producing each different product. How could they calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of con-
Two Types of Socialism
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crete labor? If in every complex economy a labor market is required for translating concrete into abstract labor, the communist economy that Marx predicts is not simply remote but unattainable. In all his major economic writings-from The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts to Capital-Marx attacks the proposals, made by Proudhon and the Ricardian socialists, for establishing classless exchange economies where certificates of labor time would serve as money. In these critiques four different lines of argument can be discerned. The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts present a philosophical argument, evaluating morally the institution of exchange in terms of a theory of man's essential nature. An economic argument-claiming that in such economies ratios of exchange could not be proportional to labor costs in every case because competitive markets would be required to balance supply and demand-is given its clearest formulation in The Poverty of Philosophy. A second philosophical argumentderiving from the discussion of quantity and measure in Hegel's Logic the claim that determining the labor cost of any commodity requires exchanging it with a standard commodity-is given its clearest formulation in the Grundrisse. A second economic argument-claiming that in such economies competitive markets would be required to translate concrete labor into abstract labor-is given its clearest formulation in The. Critique of Political Economy.14 To compare these arguments is to encounter once again the conflict between communism and historical materialism. The persisting influence of his moral argument apparently blinded Marx to a consequence entailed by both his economic arguments-that the only workable complex classless economies are socialist economies with competitive markets.
Responses to Four Challenges
7
Responses to Four Challenges, 1871-1880
Why do the many volumes containing Marx's writings after 1848 contain only a few paragraphs dealing with postcapitalist economies as unified systems of production and exchange? The standard explanation-first suggested by Marx in the Afterword to the second ·edition of Capital-is that scientific socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utopians speculate about the socialist future: Marxists analyze the capitalist present. 1 To focus on the contrast between socialism and communism is to suggest a different explanation. Marx does make predictions outlining the structure of postcapitalist economies. Some he supports with empirical evidence and economic analysis: one he does not. To support his prediction that socialist economies will develop into communist economies, could he have produced arguments which conformed to the requirements of scientific socialism? Or would the attempt have plainly exposed his inability to reach a communist conclusion from the starting point of historical materialism? The plausibility of the standard explanation has been decisively weakened by publication of manuscripts Marx left unpublished during his lifetime-notably The German Ideology and The Critique of the Gotha Program. 76
77
The German Ideology was written from the standpoint of historical materialism and scientific socialism. Yet it contains discussions of communist society comparable to those presented in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. The striking change from extensive discussion to cryptic paragraphs does not date from 1845, when Marx abandoned the standpoint of philosophical communism. It dates instead from 1848, when in The Communist Manifesto he first recognized (with reservations repeated in his later work) the practicability of a socialist alternative to communism. Furthermore, the change in what he planned to write occurred even later than the change in what he wrote. In 1851 he planned to devote one entire volume, out of a projected four, to socialist theory. In 1858, thirteen years after adopting the standpoint of scientific socialism, he planned to combine a critical history of socialist theory with his critical history of political economy. 2 Publication of The Critique of the Gotha Program revealed that in 1875 Marx had predicted, not only what type of classless economy would replace capitalism, but what second type of classless economy would replace the first. Both predictions exceed the limits Marx had suggested two years before in his Afterword to the second edition of Capital. These considerations are sufficient to refute the explanation suggested by Marx, which focuses on the contrast between utopian and scientific. But they are insufficient to confirm the rival explanation which focuses on the socialist alternative to communism. To support that hypothesis, I shall examine four responses elicited from Marx by situations which challenged him to state his views on postcapitalist economic organization. The statements in his Afterword to the second edition of
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Capital and his Notes on Wagner are restricted to problems of theory. The statements in The Civil War in France and The Critique of the Gotha Program also involve programs of contemporary socialist movements. I shall discuss the latter first. Marx presented The Civil War in France to the General Council of the First International on 30 May 1871. Nearly a month earlier Frederic Harrison had published an article "The Revolution of the Commune," with which Marx took issue on a number of points without citing the source of the opinions he attacked.R Defending the Commune as a major advance in the class struggle of workers against capitalists, Harrison writes: Primarily the Revolution is a political, but really and mainly a social movement. And the first is but the manifestation of the second. This struggle of the capital against the provinces, of the great cities against the country, of the Republic against Monarchy, of Communal against Parliamentary government-what does it mean? There is one thing which inspires and causes these. That one thing is the struggle of the workman against the capitalist ... And so all of these contrasted systems virtually spring out of the grand contrast of all society, those who live by their labour, and those who live by accumulated capital. And the transcendent importance of this crisis is this-that for the first time in modern Europe the workmen of the chief city of the Continent have organized a regular government in the name of a new social order. But Harrison, a follower of Comte, does not identify this new social order with communism. That the revolution has a strong communistic side is a weakness, he
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writes, because communism is incompatible with human nature. That [new] social order as yet is most vaguely apprehended; but it is not to any sensible extent a system of Communism. There may be an element of enthusiastic Communists among the leaders: but the people are not, and never can be, in a body Communists. It is one of the vulgar calumnies against Comte that his system countenances Communism, of which it is the most resolute opponent. It is, as he proved, the very starting point of all society to recognize property under proper conditions ... He showed that to exercise over the individual that amount of control, and to exact from him that amount of social devotion, which is essential to every system of Communism, it would be fatal to leave him in possession of his own family, to the individualist interest of his own household. 4 This attack provoked from Marx the following reply: The Commune, ... [apologists for existing society] exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few ... It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour. But this is Communism, "impossible" Communism! Why, ·those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system ... have become apostles of cooperative production. If cooperative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist
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system; if united cooperative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production-what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, "possible" Communism? 5 This reply contains more rhetoric than argument. It is dogmatic if "communism" is used here in the sense that Engels used it, during the next four years, to distinguish the views he shared with Marx from the socialist views of Proudhon and Lassalle!1 In that case, possible and impossible communism coincide: tbe unviability of the socialist alternative is simply assumed. On the other hand, the reply is evasive if "communism" has been tacitly redefined, through the contrast between its possible and impossible varieties, to include the socialist alternative. In that case, Marx's reference to possible communism is wholly irrelevant to Harrison's attack on impossible communism. In any case. the reply is obscure, because its language is not clear enough to disclose which of these readings corresponds to the author's intention. The possibility that in this passage Marx intended to stretch the definition of communism to cover all kinds of socialism can be ruled out, it might be argued, on the basis of external evidence. Throughout the preceding twenty-eight years he had repeatedly contrasted communism as an economic system with other types of socialism. Yet against this evidence must be weighed the fact that what was unclear suggestion in 1871 became, four years later, explicit characterization. Describing a classless exchange economy in The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx calls it, not socialism, but the first stage of communism.7
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At first reading The Critique of the Gotha Program seems lacking in focus-a jumble of criticisms, some basic and challenging, some petty and unfair, linked objectively by the text of the Gotha Program and subjectively by Marx's hostility to Lassalle. From the confusion, however, two sharp theoretical distinctions emerge: an economic contrast between what Marx calls the first and second stages of communism; and a political contrast between proletarian dictatorship and what Marx calls vulgar democracy. Lenin finds a focus for the Critique by interpreting the first as a contrast of ends and the second as a complementary contrast of means. This double contrast, he suggests, divides orthodox from revisionist Marxists-with the consequence that many who have called themselves orthodox are classified by Lenin as revisionists. Pursuing the final goal of a socialist economy by the path of parliamentary democracy, contemporary German Social Democrats are heirs of Lassalle. Pursuing the final goal of a communist economy by the path of revolutionary dictatorship, the Russian Bolsheviks are heirs of Marx. s To accept Lenin's interpretation of Marx's question does not entail accepting his endorsement of Marx's answer. Let us grant that The Critique of the Gotha Program raises the crucial problem of choosing either socialism or communism as a final goal. Then let us examine the methods by whic~ Marx argues his case. Marx's discussion of the transition to socialism is dogmatic, in predicting that every such transition will involve the same type of socialism. Upon what grounds does he assert that in every socialist economy consumers' goods will exchange for certificates of labor in quantities proportionate to labor costs? Why does he dismiss in 1875 the alternative he suggested in 1848? The Critique
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of the Gotha Program does not tell us. In place of reasoned argument, it offers simple prophecy. Marx's discussion of the transition to communism is evasive, in appealing to an argument he does not produce while deprecating the argument he does produce. The argument he makes is moral, a comparison of socialist and communist distribution in terms of an ideal of justice. Yet after offering it, he ridicules such appeals to justice as the obsolete ideological nonsense of democrats and vulgar socialists. A scientific discussion, he suggests, would demonstrate that continued development of the forces of production will render inevitable replacement of socialist distribution by communist distribution. 1) Yet such a demonstration cannot ·be found in The Critique of the Gotha Program-or elsewhere in his writings. Marx's discussion of socialism is obscure, in resorting to abuse of language for suggesting the transitional character of socialist economies. He calls socialism a kind of communism. Yet he also asserts that socialist distribution, since it is based upon exchange of equivalents, is "in principle" bourgeois. 10 Why is it bourgeois? The capitalist mode of production is a system of exploitation through exchange. The socialist mode of production is a system of exchange without exploitation. There is no more justification for describing socialist distribution as in principle bourgeois than for describing c;apitalist distribution as in principle socialist. To read that the classless economy which replaces capitalism will constitute the first stage of communism yet remain in principle bourgeois is to receive the impression that this economy will be inherently unstable, irremediably transitory. But this is wholly a rhetorical effect. Analysis reveals that the transitory character which Marx ascribes to socialism, rather than deriving from tension
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between forces and relations of production, derives instead from tension between the ordinary use and the tendentious misuse of words. This persuasive effect is strengthened by the ~e~ni tions Marx assigns to three terms central for the descnphon of socialist economies-commodities, money, and wages. In the transitional economy described in the Critique consumers' goods are not commodities, as Marx defines commodities, although they are goods produced f?r exchange. In this economy certificates of labor contnbuted are not money, as Marx defines money, although they are the accepted medium of exchange. In this economy producers do not receive wages, as Mar~ define~ wages, although they receive incomes for workmg, which they spend in buying consumers' goods. 11 According to M~~x's usage, establishment of socialis~ eliminat~s commodities, money, and wages. But accordmg to ordmary usage,. establishment of communism has this result. The rhetoncal effect of this tension between two sets of definitions is to suggest that eliminating commodities, money, and w~g~s in one sense but not the other is a first step toward ehm~ nating them in both senses-that socialism is ~ transitional stage between capitalism and communism. T? accept this suggestion, however, is to mistake verbal manipulation for economic analysis. In writing both The Critique of the Gotha ~rogran: and The Civil War in France. Marx confronted Immediate practical problems as well as basic theoretical issues. In both cases, for example, a clear and thorough statement of his communist position would have revealed how little support it had among any of the cont~nd ing factions. During the same peri~d two other Sit~a tions, free from such tactical constramts, challenged htm to clarify and defend his views on the character of
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postcapitalist economies. Yet his responses to this second set are no more straightforward than his responses to the first. In 1872 and 1873 appeared the second edition of the first volume of Capital, with an Afterword in which Marx commented on some reviews of the first edition. Discussing different conceptions of the method employed in Capital, he writes: Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me, on the one hand, with treating economics metaphysically; and on the other hand (imagine!) with confining myself merely to critical analysis of the given, instead of writing recipes ( Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. 12 · Marx refers here to a review of Capital by de Roberty, a follower of Comte, which concludes with the following observations: In one word, the richness of Marx's work is due mainly to its employing, for the first time in the service of socialist ideas, the rigorous methods of science. But while recognizing these merits ... we hasten to add that the root idea of the entire work is in our opinion, if not completely false, at least too little in accord with known laws regulating the economic order to have a decisive influence on the struggle of labor against the despotism of capital. In our opinion the social question is strikingly misplaced when, instead of investigating the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution of wealth, a theorist confines himself to analyzing its constituent elements -telling us, for example, that the source of the income produced by capital is unpaid appropriation of human labor. Now the profit of capitalists may be what you
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please: it is nevertheless a necessary gear in the mechanism of modern industry. We conclude by expressing the wish ... to find in subsequent volumes of this remarkable work a little less dialectic and even greater use, if that is possible, of the inductive method. 1 a To compare these criticisms, in their actual wording, with Marx's report of them is to discover three discrepancies. First, the criticism that Marx does not investigate the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution of wealth is reported as a demand that he provide recipes for the cook-shops of the future. Second, de Roberty does not criticize Marx for confining himself to critical analysis of the given. Instead, he criticizes him for providing an analysis of the given that is radically incomplete-for confining himself to exposing the origin of profit in unpaid labor while neglecting to analyze the role it plays in the processes of production and distribution. Third, these two criticisms are complementary. Marx's failure to analyze concretely the processes of capitalist production and distribution is responsible, de Roberty suggests, for his failure to specify the basic features of the socialist production and distribution that will replace them. It can be argued that these criticisms are mistaken. It cannot be argued that Marx reports them accurately. By his distortion of de Roberty's criticisms, is Marx suggesting that the sole alternative to utopian speculation is analysis without prediction? Taken in its narrowest sense, the principle of restricting analysis to the given bars any prediction at all. Such an absolute prohibition seems implied in equating de Roberty's call for an investigation of the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution with a call for providing recipes for the cook-shops of the future.
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Yet so sweeping a rejection of prediction is incompatible with Marx's practice in Capital. The argument of that work culminates in predictions: class polarization, increasing misery, expropriation of the expropriators. Marx's aim, he states in the Preface, is to analyze the given in the sense of discovering its law of motion-to find in the present the basis for predicting the future. 14 Marx's practice in Capital is consistent with his pronouncements on method, both before and after he published the second edition. Contrasting scientific with utopian socialism in The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy, he distinguishes two kinds of prediction: the scientific kind differs from the. utopian as empirical investigation from visionary speculation and as description from prescription. Delimiting the field of scientific prediction in The Critique of Political Economy, he writes that transformation of the economic conditions of production can be determined with the precision of natural science-though transformation of the ideological superstructure cannot. Outlining in Capital the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, he writes that capitalism produces with the inexorability of a natural process its own negation-collective ownership of the means of production. In his reply to Mikhailovsky-written four years later than his Afterword to Capital-his earlier position is reaffirmed. 15 Instead of caricaturing de Roberty's criticism, Marx might consistently have replied to it along these lines. First, by denying that the aim of Capital was to construct an ideal of sound production and just distribution. Second, by asserting that its aim was to find in the present the basis for predicting the future. Third, by citing those sections of Capital which predict abolition of capitalist exploitation and disappearance of commodity fetishism.
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At this point, however, his reply would be incomplete; for it would not answer the question de Roberty raised concerning the system of distribution that will replace capitalism. In completing his reply, Marx would face three choices: to specify a socialist system of distribution; to specify a communist system; or to specify initially a socialist, eventually a communist, system. The first choice would expose him to the charge that he had abandoned the attempt to base a communist program upon the foundation of historical materialism. The other choices would expose him to the charge that he had substituted, at a crucial point, moral prescription for scientific prediction. Faced with a challenge he could not answer without sacrificing either the goal of communism or the claims of scientific socialism, he dodged the question with a jeer about the cook-shops of the future. During 1879 and 1880 Marx wrote a lengthy reply to the critique of his economic theories presented in Wagner's Lehrbuch der politischen Okonomie. These notes on Wagner contain his final response to the challenge to clarify and defend his conception of the classless economy that will replace capitalism. Attacking Marx's labor theory of value, Wagner writes: It is not only irrelevant to the formation of exchange value in contemporary commercial transactions. It is also irrelevant-as Schaffie has clearly and conclusively shown in his Quintessenz and his Socialen Korper-to the relations that must of necessity develop in· Marx's hypothetical social state. Marx comments: The social state which Herr Schaffie has so kindly "developed" for me is here transformed from the social
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state that his hypothesis falsely attributes to me into Marx's "social state." Wagner continues: A striking example is that of corn and similar crops, whose exchange value would have to be regulated by a system of "social taxes" rather than solely by labor cost, in order to counter the effects of fluctuating harvests upon relatively constant requirements. Marx comments: Nonsense, every word of it! ... I have nowhere spoken of "social taxes." And my analysis of value is concerned with capitalist relations-not with applying this theory of value to the "social state" constructed, not · by me, but by Herr Schaffie for me. 1n Is it true that Schaffie invented the socialist economy he attributed to Marx? In The Quintessence of Socialism he specifically cites the account of a socialist economy in the first chapter of Capital, pointing out that Marx presents this account as a hypothetical construction. Accurately paraphrasing the passage, Schaffie identifies the basic features of that economy: collective ownership of the means of production; distribution of consumers' goods in proportion to work contributed; and use of labor time as the sole measure of cost, both in planning total production and in distributing consumers' goods. 17 Is it true that Marx does not apply his labor theory of value to socialist economies? Because he defines 'value' as coextensive with commodity fetishism. and confines commodity fetishism to class societies, he does not apply the word to socialist economies. 1 s But the central principle of his theory of value-that labor time is the sole measure of real cost-he does apply to socialism. In the classless economy discussed as a hypothesis in Capital-
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and predicted as a transitional stage in The Critique of the Gotha Program-labor time is the sole measure of cost. Furthermore, in The Critique of Political Economy and The Poverty of Philosophy Marx uses a subordinate principle of his theory of value-that real cost is measured in units of abstract rather than concrete labor-to deny the viability of the socialist economies advocated by Proudhon and Gray. 1H What then are the facts? Marx had been correctly reported by Schaffie. And he had applied his theory of value to socialist economies. Why then did he deny those facts? Had he forgotten in 1879 what he had written in 1847,1859, 1867,and1875? The sweeping denials in the Notes on Wagner, like the bold prophecies in The Critique of the .Gotha Program, are responses to a difficulty that derives, not from the general requirements for scientific prediction, but from the particular circumstances of Marx's intellectual history. The inconsistency of his four responses with one another-together with their level of logical cogency and factual accuracy, so strikingly inferior to the usual level of his writing-reflect a frustration whose roots can be discovered in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx adopted communism as a goal, on moral and philosophical grounds, before he adopted the approach of historical materialism and scientific socialism. For nearly forty years he fought the socialist alternative-first in the program of Proudhon, later in that of Lassalle. Yet the principles of historical materialism and scientific socialism, applied to the present in order to predict the future, do not point beyond a socialist society. After the Manifesto, and to a greater degree after Capital, communism became for Marx a goal he was unwilling to abandon but unable to defend.
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This tension, latent in the development of his ideas, became manifest in their subsequent history. To examine its role in the doctrinal disputes of the last one hundred years is to find in the conflict between communism and historical materialism a key to the dialectic of Marxism.
Notes, Works Cited, Index
Notes
Passages are cited by paragraph number rather than by page number, on the assumption that the inconvenience of counting paragraphs is outweighed by the convenience of using any of a variety of editions, including English translations. In some translations the correspondence of paragraphs is not exact: but the divergence is seldom substantial. The editions I have used are identified in the section Works Cited.
Chapter One. Statement of the Problem 1. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, para. 4; ch. 5, sec. 3, paras. 6, 11, 12. Also Lenin, "A German Voice on the War," para. 5; Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," thesis 9; Lenin, "From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New," paras. 6-7.
2. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, paras. 1-3; ch. 5, sec. 4, paras. 12-13. Also Lenin, "Plan staty 'K voprosu o roli gosudarstva,'" paras. 1-2; Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," point 19, throughout; Lenin, "Report on the Review of the Program and on Changing the Name of the Party," paras. 1-3; Lenin, "Report on Subbotniks," paras. 2-9. 3. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, paras. 1-3; Engels, "Vorwort zur Broschtire lnternationales aus dem 93
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II
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'Volksstaat' (1871-75)," para. 7. Also Marx; Die Klassenkiimpfe in Frankreich, sec. 2, paras. 6-4 from end; Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, sec. 3, para. 11; Engels, "Preface to the English Edition of The Communist Manifesto, 1888," para. 5. 4. On usage among Marxists prior to 1917, see M tiller, Ursprung und Geschichte des Wortes "Sozialismus" und seiner Verwandten, part 2, ch. 3, div. 3, sees. 9-10; div. 5, sees. 6-7. Also Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, vol. 1, intro., para. 2; Kautsky, Die soziale Revolution, part 2, sec. 4, paras. 6, 10-13; sec. 8, paras. 5, 9, 13, 26, 28; Tugan-Baranovsky, Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 27-40; Bernstein, "Tugan-Baranowsky als Sozialist," para. 20; Plekhanov, "Frantsuzskii utopicheskii so~sializm XIX veka," para. 1, note. On Lenin's references, covert and overt, to TuganBaranovsky, see Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 5, sec. 3, paras. 6, 10, 11, 12; Lenin, "A Liberal Professor on Equality", throughout; Rubakin, Sredi knig, vol. 2, intro. to sees. 401-409, para. 3; Lenin, "Book Review: N. A. Rubakin, Among Books," throughout; Lenin, Karl Marx, bibliography, para. 4. Comparison of "A Liberal Professor on Equality," paras. 2-7, with Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 20-26, shows that in 1914 Lenin had not read Tugan's book. Repetition of this criticism in State and Revolution shows that he still had not read it in 1917. If Tugan was his source, the connection was indirect. Rubakin's book provides the requisite link. 5. Tugan-Baranovsky, Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 27-40; ch. 4. div. 1 (Saint-Simonians); div. 2 (Cabet); ch. 5, div. 2 (Owen, Fourier); ch. 6 (Godwin, Proudhon). 6. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 26. For use of the term 'wages' in this connection, see ch. 4, note 6, below.
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7. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 29-31. 8. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 16-3 from end. For the socialist origins of these measures, see Ryazanov, Explanatory Notes to The Communist Manifesto, div. 2, sec. 46, throughout. 9. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, last two paras.
10. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 18, paras. 3, 4, 6, 8. 11. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 18, para. 15.
12. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 24, last para. For background, see "Ansprache der Volkshalle des Bundes der Gerechten. November 1846," point 2; point 4; point 10, question 3; "Ans prache der Volkshalle des Bundes der Gerechten. Februar 1847," paras. 3-1 from end; "Entwurf cines Kommunistischen Glaubensbekenntnisses," questions 16-18; Engels, "Die Kommunisten und Karl Heinzen," div. 1, paras. 14-18; div. 2, paras. 1-4; Hess, "Die Folgen einer Revolution des Proletariats," div. 1, paras. 1, 4; div. 2, paras. 5-8; Engels to Marx 25/26 October 1847, last para. For tactical implications, see Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 25, paras. 1, 4; Marx/ Engels, Manifest der Kommunist(schen Partei, part 4, paras. 2, 5-6. Chapter Two. Philosophical Communism 1. Marx, "Briefe ·aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbiichern," letter 2, paras. 7-9. See also Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. 17 "Der Unterschied des Christentums vom Heidentum," paras. 2-3; ch. 18 "Die christliche Bedeutung ... ," para. 1; Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen
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Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-3; Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, ch. 5, div. 2, paras. 6-11. 2. Tennies, Marx: Leben und Lehre, part 1, sec. 1, final para.; foreword, para. 2; Tennies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, foreword, para. 7; conclusion, sec. 9, throughout; Tennies, "Vorrede zur dritten Auftage, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," paras. 1-2. 3. Engels, "Der Sozialismus in Deutschland," part 1, para. 1. See also Engels, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent," sec. 2, throughout; Engels, "Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten," paras. 4-26; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," throughout. 4. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, .ch. 1, paras. 2-3; Feuer bach, Grundsiitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, sees. 41, 53; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," intra., sec. 1, sec. 2; Marx to Feuerbach 11 August 1844, paras. 1-2; Marx "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-7, 20-29; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit,'' paras. 26-32; sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," paras. 7-10. The role played by Feuerbach's theory of human nature in Marx's conversion to communism is wholly obscured in the account Engels wrote some forty-five years later. Contrast with the passages cited above, Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, sec. 1, paras. 6-2 from end; sec. 3, throughout. 5. Feuer bach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. 7 "Das Mysterium der Dreieinigkeit ... ," paras. 5-7; ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ," paras. 1-2; Feuerbach, Grundsiitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, sees. 23, 41, 59, 60, 63; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," intra., paras. 1-6; sec. 1, para. 3; sec. 2, para. 9; Hess, "Socialismus und Communismus," paras. 3-6, 9-11 ; Hess, "Ober das Geldwesen," throughout; Engels, "Umrisse zu einer
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Kritik der NationalOkonomie," divs. 1, 3, 6, 9, 11; Engels, "Die Lage Englands. Past and Present by Thomas Carlyle," paras. 10-8 from end. For Marx, see ch. 2, notes 1 above and 6 below. For the definition of alienation and estrangement in terms of conflict between existence and essence~ see Marx, Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie, part 2, ch. 2, para. 3; ch. 3, paras. 19-23; ch. 4, para. 7. 6. Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbuchern," letter 3, para. 5. On the potentialities of democracy -not simply as a form of government but as a type of culture-for curing estrangement and achieving community, see Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 279, paras. 13-1 from end; comment on sec. 289, paras. 3-7; intra. comment on sees. 304-307, paras. 14-33; comment on sec. 306, paras. 1-17, 31 ; comment on sec. 307, para. 9; comment on sec. 308, paras. 25-38, 43; Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbuchern," letter 2, paras. 7-17; Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part 1, paras. 3940, 44-48, 56-59, 67, 74-75, 95-112; part 2, paras. 35-36, 50, 54-59. 7. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-7, 20-29, 33-49. Compare Engels, "Rapid Progress of Communism in Germany," installment 2, throughout. Eventually Feuerbach followed Hess, Engels, and Marx in identifying communism with the realization of community. See Feuerbach, "Das Wesen des .Christentums in Beziehung auf den Einzigen und sein Eigentum," paras. 7-18. 8. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 2-8. For explicit references to these theorists, see Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosischen Jahrbuchern," letter 3, para. 5; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, preface, para. 4; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 4,
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para. 38; Marx, Notizbuch aus den Jahren 1844-1847, excerpt from page 25; Marx, Die Klassenkiimpfe in Frankreich, sec. 3, para. 20 from end. 9. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 3-6. Also the same work, sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," para. 82; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, para. 3, note; para. 10; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 3, paras. 1-2. 10. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 13-14.
11. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Arbeitslohn," para. 36; sec. "Bedtitfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 18-19, 29-35. Compare Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'economie politique," comment 1, para. 23. 12. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 59-61. 13. Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 4, sec. 4, comment 3, paras. 18-20. 14. Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'&·onomie politique," comment 1, paras. 19-23; comment 2, throughout; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Arbeitslohn," paras. 45-48; sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 10-23, 26-34; sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 21-30; sec. "Bediirfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 1-7; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 2, paras. 44-45, 57. Compare Feuerbach ' Das Wesen. des Christentums, ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ,"paras. 1-2. For the development of this ideal through a series of contrasts between classical and modern culture, see Aristotle, Politics, book 1, ch. 4, sec. 3; book 2, ch. 9, sees. 2-4; book 7, ch. 9, sees. 3-8; ch. 14, sees. 9-14; ch. 15, sees. 1-6;
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book 8, ch. 3, sees. 1-6; Rousseau, Du Contrat social, book 3, ch. 15, paras. 1-3, 9-11; Schiller, Vber die iisthetische Erziehung des Menschen, letters 5-6, 26-27, throughout; Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, preface, paras. 11, 33; ch. 5, div. 2, paras. 1-11; ch. 6, paras. 1-6; Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, ch. 1, paras. 23-28, 35-43; ch. 3, div. 1, paras. 4-16; div. 3, paras. 15-31; Feuerbach, Das W esen des Christentums, ch. 17 "Der Unterschied des Christentums vom Heidentum," paras. 2-3; ch. 18 "Die 'christliche Bedeutung ... ," para. 1; ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ," paras. 1-2; Hess, Die europiiische Triarchie, intro., div. 1, para. 2; div 2, paras. 2-3; div. 4, paras. 1-4; Hess 7 "Socialismus und Communismus," paras. 9-11; Hess, "Philosophie der That," last para.; Hess, "Ober das Geldwesen," sees. 8-11; Hess, "Systeme des contradictions economiques ou philosophie de Ia misere. Par.P.-J. Proudhon," paras. 2-3; Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 279, last para.; Marx, "Briefe aus den DeutschFranzosischer Jahrbiichern," letter 2, paras. 7-9; Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," para. 3; Marx, "Zur J udenfrage," part 1, paras. 6-1 from end; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 2, para. 57; subsec. 3, paras. 12-13; Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen bkonomie," part 1, sec. 1, paras. 2-3; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, para. 2; ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 21 "Progressive Epochen der okonomischen Gesellschaftsformation," paras. 8, 20-24; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 11, para. 8; ch. 13, sec. 3, div. 2, paras. 11-12. 15. On exchange without e·strangement, contrast Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sees. 65-68; Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'economie politique," comment 1, paras. 2-17; Marx,. Grundrisse, appendix "Fragment des Urtextes ... ", sec. 3, div. 2, para. 1; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 1, para. 13. On identification of alienation with estrangement, contrast Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment
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on sec. 261, para. 6; comment on sec. 279, paras. 9-5 from end; intro. comment on sees. 304-307, paras. 18-2I ; Moore, "Karl Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,'" sec. 4, paras. 9-I1. Also Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," para. 30; Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ch. 8, paras. 1-5. Also Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 8, sec. 4, para. 6; Gauvin, "Entfremdung et Entausserung dans la Phenomenologie," intro., throughout; sec. I, throughout. For attacks on egoism preceding his conversion to communism, see Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 289, paras. 3-7; intro. comment on sees. 304-307, para. 28; Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part I, paras. 39, 75, 93-II2; part 2, paras. 34-37,.50-60.
I6. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 37, 38. Also the same work, sec. "Bediirfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 9-I 0; sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," paras. 81-82. For background, see ch. 2, note 7, above. I7. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," para. 4. 18. For the cleavage between labor and enjoyment in undeveloped communism, see Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 20-34; sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 2-3, 7, 2I-30, 32. On true socialism, see Hess, "Socialismus und Communismus," para. 9; Hess, '-'Ober die Noth in unserer Gesellschaft," paras. 29-35. Chapter Three. Historical Materialism I. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, paras. 4-5. 2. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, para. 8; Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. I, paras. 1-2, 4; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie,
Notes to Chapter Three
I01
vol. I, ch. 3, part I, div. I, sec. 6, subsec. C "Der humane Liberalismus," paras. 9-I7. On Feuerbach, see also Marx, "Thesen tiber Feuerbach," theses 4-7; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 2, paras. 6-9. On the relation of philosophy to empirical knowledge, see also Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 5, sec. 2, throughout; ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 4, paras. 3-10, 35-38; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, ·paras. 22-26; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, paras. I-5; observation I, throughout. 3. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 2, intro., throughout. On true socialism, see also the same work, vol. I, ch. 3, part I, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. A "Der politische Liberalismus," paras. I..,.. 7; subsec. B "Der Kommunismus," fourth logical construction, para. 3; subsec. C "Der humane Liberalismus," para. 1; vol. 2, ch. 1, sec. A, paras. 7-17; ch. 4, paras. · 24-26, 50-51; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 1, div. 3, throughout. For background, see ch·. 2, note 18, above. On moving through philosophy to communism, compare Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 2, para. 5; div. B, sec. 3, para. 10; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 1, para. 44. 4. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. 1, div. A, sec. I, para. 11. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 5, subsec. "Die Gesellschaft als biirgerliche Gesellschaft," subdiv. 2, para. 58; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 7, para. 11; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 1-:-9; part 4, para. 2; Marx "Konspekt des Buches von Bakunin Staatlichkeit und Anarchie," comment on p. 279 of Bakunin's book. 5. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, paras. 1-7. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 1,
I I
I
102
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div. A, paras. 6-10, 22-26; sec. 2, paras. 10-13; div. B, sec. 3, para. 10; Marx to Annenkov 28 December 1846, paras. 6-8; Marx, Misere de La philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 2, throughout; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 59-61; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, para. 4. 6. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, paras. 11-21; sec. I, paras. 8-1I; div. B, throughout. On the interconnection of division of labor, exchange, and private property, contrast Marx, Kapital, vol. I, ch. 2, para. 9; ch. I2, sec. 4, paras. 1-4, 7-9. 7. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, paras. 15, 18; sec. 1, para. 13; div. B, sec. I, para. 25; sec. 2, para. 1; sec. 3, paras. 1, 3. Also Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 21 "Progressive Epochen der okonomischen Gesellschaftsformation," paras. 14, 20, 24; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. I, sec. 4, para. 16. 8. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, paras. 7-10. Compare the same work, vol. I, ch. 1, div. B, sec. 3, paras. 1-9; div. C, paras. 7-13; ch. 3, part I, div. 2, sec. 2 "Phanomenologie .. ," paras. 24-26, 55, note; sec. C "Mein Selbstgenuss," paras. 1-3; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 9 "Das Geld ... ," para. 2. 9. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. I, ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 6 "Das hohe Lied ... ," paras. 10-11, 16-17. 10. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. 1, div. A, sec. I, para. 10. Also the same work, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, sec. 1, para. 3, note; sec. 2, para. 2; div. B, sec. 1, para. 26; sec. 3, paras. 2, 10; div. C, para. 5; ch. 3, part I, div. 2, sec. 6 "Das hohe Lied ... ,"para. 49; Marx "Arbeitslohn," div. A, point 1; div. C, sec. 8, throughout. II. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, para. 9. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 1,
Notes to Chapter Three
103
div. B, sec. 3, paras. 6, 8; ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 5, subsec. "Organization der Arbeit," paras. I2-13, I6. 12. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 1, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. B "Der Kommunismus" fourth logical construction, para. 3, note. In one other pass;ge Marx attacks Griin's critique of Proudhon, referring to his own critique in The Holy Family without any further analysis of Proudhon's ideas. See the same work, vol. 2, ch. 4, sec. ." Proudhon," throughout. 13. Marx, Misere de La philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 2, paras. 1-2; ch. 1, part 2, paras. 34-31 from end, paras. 4-1 from end. On the first premise, see also Marx to Annenkov 28 December 1846, para. 8; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part4, para. 1; Marx, "Arbeitslohn," div. C, sec. 6, point 5, para. 5; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 2, paras. 1-4; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, para. 4; Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 51, para. 5. 14. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 1, part I, paras. 12-I7; part 2, paras. 93-IOO. Also Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part I, paras. 7-8; and the passages cited in ch. 3, note 6, above. See further Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 1, para. 22, note; vol. 3, ch. 10, para. 13; ch. 20, paras. 10, 24. 15. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 28-14 from end. 16. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 13-9 from end; Bray, Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedy, ch. 11, paras. 7, 14-15. I7. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, para. 8 from end. I8. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 7-6 from end.
104
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Notes to Chapter Four
19. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommun.istischen Partel, part 3, sec. 2, paras. 1-4; part 2, paras. 16-3 from end. Compare Marx/Engels, "Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland," points 7-17. For background, see ch. 1, notes 8 and 12, above.
105
risse, ch. 3, sec. 3, div. 13, subsec. "Entfremdung der Arbeitsbedingungen ... ," para. 3. Marx defines wage labor as the sale of a commodity, labor power. He defines commodities in turn, not simply as goods that are exchanged, but as goods that are exchanged between private individuals. See ch. 6, note 2, below. It follows from these definitions that payments for work in a socialist economy are not wages. See, in addition to the passages cited above, Marx, "Arbeitslohn," div. A, point 1; div. C, sec. 6, point 5, throughout; sec. 8, paras. 1-3; Marx, "Lohnarbeit und Kapital," installment 1, paras. 7-9; installment 3, paras. 1-4, 13-19, 25-26; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 20, paras. 3, 7-15; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 4, sec. 3, paras. 1-9; ch. 17, throughout; vol. 3, ch. 50, paras. 4-2 from end; ch. 51, paras. 5-7. According to Marx's definition of wages, the transition from capitalism to socialism abolishes wage labor. But according .to the ordinary definition of wages, as incomes received for working, wage labor is abolished only with the transition from socialism to communism.
20. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Parlei, part 2, para. 15 from end. 21. Marx, "Planentwurf zum dritten Abschnitt des Manifestes der Kommunistischen Partei," throughout. For background, see ch. 1, notes 8 and 12, above. Chapter Four. Critique of the Gotha Program
1. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec: 4, para. 15. 2. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 26. Compare Marx, Kapital, vol. 2, ch. 18, sec. 2, para. 18. 3. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 26-27, 30; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15.
7. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 4-5, 9-10, 19-20, 26, 33-34.
4. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15; Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 30-31.
8. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 32.
5. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 33-34; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15. Also Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 3, div. 13, subsec. "Entfremdung der Arbeitsbedingungen ... ," paras. 1-3; Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen bkonomie," sec. 2, paras. 3-4, 24-31; Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 51, throughout.
9. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 31.
10. Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 49, para. 1. Also the same work, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 48, paras. 6, 10-11; div. 50, paras. 2-4. 11. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, paras. 1-4, 15-16; div. A, paras. 1, 3, 9, 14; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1, paras. 3-4, 9-14, 19; sec. 2, paras. 7-8, 14-15; ch. 17, para. 16; ch. 13, throughout.
6. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 2, paras. 3, 6-7. Also Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 59-61; Marx, Grund~
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