I: [Logical Individual and Spatio-temporal Particular] Peter F. Strawson Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Jun., 1957), pp. 441-457. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28195706%2917%3A4%3C441%3AI%5BIASP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH A Quarterly Journal VOLUMEXVII, No. 4 SYMPOSIUM* LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS
1. I shall speak of two philosophical ideas which are easily distinguished, though traditionally related. One is the idea of a logical individual or logical subject (an individual): the other is the idea of a spatio-temporal particular (a particular). The correlative of the idea of an individual is that of a predicate. The idea opposed to that of a particular is often said to be that of a universal. But since 'universal' has often had a restricted philosophical use, I shall usually speak of non-particulars as opposed to particulars. The idea of an individual and the idea of a particular are both extremely familiar in philosophy, but a rough indication is necessary of which ideas I have in mind. For the word 'individual" has sometimes been used to express the idea I am expressing by the word 'particular', and the word 'particular' has sometimes, though less commonly, been used to express the idea I am expressing by the word 'individual'. The distinction between individual and predicate is not, prima facie, a distinction of category. I t is a formal distinction, and belongs to logic. I t is not, that is to say, a distinction between one kind of thing and another kind of thing. I t is a distinction between two ways in which things may appear in discourse, or be introduced into discourse. We may, however, give the following meaning to saying of something that it is an individual or that it is a predicate. We may say of something that it is an individual if it can appear in discourse as an individual, and that it is a predicate if it can appear in discourse as a predicate. This neither excludes nor compels the conclusion that every individual is a predicate and vice versa. Borrowing the terminology of some logicians, we may then say: An individual is anything which might be designated by a singular term; or anything included in whatever the variables of quantification might range over in any true statement with a positive existential commitment; or anything designated by any expression which could coherently replace the 'x' in the formula 'Fx'. There appears to be no restriction of category on the objects of which the designations can coherently fill this place. Less formally, we may say: Anything which can be reckoned as a soand-so, and can in principle be identified as the so-and-so which it is, is an individual. (We refer, in speech, both identifyingly and non-identifying-
* Presented at Duke University on December 5, 1955.
ly to individuals: we refer identifyingly when we refer in a way which is generally meant to indicate whicL is the so-and-so to which we are referring, non-identifyingly when we refer in a way which is not generally meant to indicate this). Anything, then, which can in principle be identified, distinguished from other things and counted as one, is an individual. And this seems as much as to say that anything whatever is an individual. Evidently, to say that something is an individual is not to say that, whenever it appears in discourse, it appears as an individual. I defer, for the time being, the question, what exactly it is for something actually to appear in discourse as an individual. I have merely wanted to indicate the categorial comprehensiveness of the range of things which can so appear. I t is a little more difficult to say what it is for something to be a predicate, i.e., to be able to appear'in discourse as a predicate. Following the same lines as before, we may say, first: A thing is a predicate if it can stand to some expression which can coherently replace the 'I?' in 'Px' in a relation analogous to that in which an individual can stand to some expression which can coherently replace the 'x' in 'Fx'. Let us not say, angrily, that there is no such analogous relation; when I say 'Socrates is wise,' do I not speak of wisdom as well as of Socrates? And let us not say, hastily, that the two relations are not merely analogous, but identical; for that would be to prejudge an issue we have yet to discuss. Now preserving the parallel with the remarks about individuals, let us try to find something less formal to say about predicates. Perhaps we might say this: that for something to be a predicate, it must be able to yield a basis for counting, or grouping, or classifying in some way, things that can appear as individuals; it must supply a principle of such counting or grouping or classification. To say this is not to say that actually appearing as a predicate is identical with being used in one of these ways; nor is it to say that the ability to be used in one of these ways is a sufficient condition of the ability to appear as a predicate; it is only to say that the ability to be used in one of these ways is a necessary condition of the ability to appear as a predicate. To say more would, again, be to prejudge the issue. Both these explanations, and particularly the latter, are tentative. We shall see later how little their power to illuminate is, how much they need to be supplemented. But at least we can see now that, on either style of explanation, the notions of individual and predicate are correlative. Evidently the notions of an expression which can coherently replace the 'x' in the formula 'Fx' and of an expression which can coherently replace the 'F' in this formula are correlative. The notions as informally explained are correlative too. For, on the one hand, a predicate was said to be, at least, something which could yield a principle for counting or grouping
individuals. And, on the other hand, an individual was said to be anything which could be counted as one so-and-so, and could in principle be identified as the so-and-so which it was. For there to be individuals therefore, there must be such fillings for "so-and-so" in this sentence as introduce principles for counting an individual as one, i.e., principles for enumerating and distinguishing members of a group. Things which can supply of themselves such a principle (and can appear as predicates) may be called primary predicates. Not all predicates are primary predicates. For instance, wisdom is a quality which can supply a principle of grouping or counting things (and can appear as a predicate); but it can supply such a principle only if we know whether we are to count, or group, men or remarks or decisions, etc. So wisdom is not, by itself, a primary predicate. (For the purposes of formal logic which is not required to explain all of its fundamental ideas, the difference between primary and non-primary predicates does not matter, whereas the analogy between them does; so the difference is not, and need not be, formally recognized.) Let us note two features of these preliminary explanations. Since anything is an individual, any predicate is an individual, i.e., anything which can appear as a predicate can appear as an individual. This is in accordance with the tradition. But the question, whether everything which can appear as an individual can also appear as a predicate, seems to be left open. According to the tradition, the answer is 'No'. Later, we shall &e reason to run counter to the tradition, in order to explain it. The distinction between particulars and non-particulars, unlike the distinction between individual and predicate, is a distinction of category. If we seek a general theoretical account of this distinction, we may perhaps find it by pushing to the limit theoretical doubts about identification of particulars. We may then say that it is the mark of a particular that its position in the single, unified spatio-temporal system which we ourselves occupy is, in the theoretical extremity and in a certain sense, essential to its identity, to its being the particular it is, and not another like it; whereas it is the mark of a non-particular that, though we can sometimes sensibly speak of its position (location or distribution) in this system, its position is not in this way essential to its identity, for there cannot be even a theoretical necessity of distinguishing it from another quite like it by means of its position in the spatio-temporal system. This account requires some modification, since there are certain types of particular (e.g., private experiences) which do not themselves have position in the system; but particulars of such types as these are always and necessarily identified by reference to particulars of other types (e.g., persons) which are located in the system. There are other ways of expressing what is substantially the same account: e.g., by saying that, in the theoretical extremity, identifying references to particulars, unlike identifying refer-
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ences to universals, must ultimately incorporate some demonstrative element.1 For the purposes of the following discussion however, it does not matter whether such a general account of the category-distinction is accepted unreservedly or not. I t will be sufficient if there is rough agreement about what are to count as sub-categories of the two major categories of spatio-temporal particulars on the one hand and non-particulars on the other. Such agreement is surely not difficult to arrive at. Suppose we open the lists as follows : particulars include particular persons, material bodies, events, etc.; non-particulars include qualities, properties, relations, species, numbers, sentences (types), etc. In general, there will be little difficulty in continuing the lists in a n agreed way, in finding an agreed application for the distinction, even though there may be difficulty in finding an agreed statement of it. Let us note some of the ways we have of making identifying references to particulars. If the particular is sensibly present, we may sensibly indicate it, using perhaps a phrase including a demonstrative. In this case I shall say we directly locate it. If it bears a proper name, we may use its name. Alternatively - and this is a resource available when neither of the first two is available - we may use a definite description; and such a description will often, implicitly or explicitly, introduce the particular as the one thing of a certain general kind which stands in a certain general relation to some other particular which could be identifyingly referred to in one of the first two ways. 2. My problem in this paper is: How are we to explain the curiously central position which particulars have traditionally been held to occupy among individuals ? There can be no doubt that this central position of particulars among logical individuals is a fact of the philosophical tradition. I t shows itself in two complementary ways, which might be described by saying that a central place has been claimed for particulars both ontologically and logically. To consider first the ontological claim. This takes the form of a doctrine to the effect that only particulars exist; or that only particulars exist really; or that particulars exist in the primary sense of the word 'exist', and that other things exist onlyin a secondary or derivative sense or senses. I n Locke, this doctrine appears in its simplest and least qualified form. "All things that exist being particular," he says, compressing the doctrine into a phrase, as if it were so obvious as to need no argument and almost not to need explicit statement. Often the doctrine appears in a much more qualified form than this, primacy of existence being claimed, not for the class of particulars in general, but for some sub-class of this 1
Cf. also, Strawson, Particular and General, P.A.S. 1983-84.
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category. Thus Aristotle says of primary substances that they exist in the primary sense, that the existence of other things is subordinate or derivative; and primary substances (e.g., the individual man or horse) are certainly particulars, though not all particulars (e.,g. a sneeze, a flash of lightning) are primary substances. Another very different claim of primacy of existence on behalf of a subclass of particulars is characteristic of the tradition of atomistic empiricism, in which the favored subclass is that of impressions or sense-data or sense-contents. Or again, it seems evident to a contemporary logician like Quine, that the right direction for any reductive drive is 'nominalistic', i.e., toward an ideal set of sentences in which the variables of quantification range only over concrete particulars. I do not, of course, wish to say that ontological preference has always been in favor of particulars. Some have refused to show a preference, like Moore, who asserts that universals exist in the very same sense as non-fictitious particulars do. Others, like Russell at some periods, have shown the opposite preference; and among these I take Plato to be pre-eminent. But on the whole it seems to me true that to most of the players, as to most of the watchers, of the philosophical game, the claim of particulars (and perhaps especially some subclass of particulars) to be said to exist in some basic, unchallengeable sense, has always seemed wonderfully strong; whereas the claim of qualities, numbers, relations, and universals in general has seemed at best dubious and artificial, Go be pressed, if at all, only in some strained and secondary sense of "existence." I have still to show in what sense the claim of ontological priority on behalf of particulars (or some subclass of them) is a claim that particulars (or some subclass of them) have a special place among logical subjects. A logical subject, or individual was said to be anything designated by an expression which could coherently replace the 'x' in the formula 'Fx'. But, as far as logic goes, whenever something of the form of 'Fx' is asserted, then the corresponding statement of the explicitly existential form '(32) Fx' can be inferred. (The logical subjects are also the things we explicitly state to exist.) To claim a primary (or the only true) sense of existence on behalf of the members of some category (say, particulars), therefore, is to claim that particulars are the primary (or the only true) individuals, the only things of which the designation can, with unqualified propriety, take the '2'-places in the fundamental formula. I t is to claim, so to speak, that the form 'Fx' has primarily, or properly, only one kind of filling, that other things figure in it only secondarily, or by courtesy. I t is to say that the apparent category-indifference of the form is an illusion, that a t most it exhibits, toward things other than particulars, a category-tolerance. The doctrine of the ontological priority of particulars is, then, also the
doctrine that particulars are the primary, or the only true, individuals. I t demands, at the least, explanation. But even more widely and generally accepted is the doctrine I shall be mainly concerned with, the doctrine of the logically special place of particulars among individuals. This doctrine is expressed by saying that particulars can appear in discourse only as logical subjects, never as predicates, whereas non-particulars can appear both as subjects and as predicates. So particulars are unique among individuals in never appearing in any other role but that of individuals. This doctrine, too, calls for examination; for, in the first place, it is far from clear, and in the second place it has been, at least once, powerfully disputed. If we combine the two doctrines, we have the result that particulars are individuals only and the only (true) individuals. The formal distinction between subject and predicate is no longer independent, is made subject, so to speak, to the category-distinction between particulars and universals. I t is, then, a fact of the philosophical tradition that particulars have been accorded a central place among individuals. I t remains to try to explain this fact. But I am anxious to emphasize that I do not regard what follows as more than a part of the explanation. 3. That powerful challenge, of which I spoke, to the doctrine that particulars can appear in discourse only as logical subjects, never as predicates, comes from Ramsey. Ramsey set out to inquire whether there was any ultimate logical distinction between particulars and universals, and in the end decided there was none.2 This is not to say that he denied there was any distinction. There is no reason to think, for example, that he would have disputed the view that particulars are distinguished from universals by the fact that their spatio-temporal location is, in the sense previously suggested, essential to their identity; or by the fact that, in the theoretical extremity, identifying references to them must incorporate some demonstrative element. These were not the sort of differences he was concerned to deny. Perhaps he would have called them merely epistemological. But the sort of difference claimed in the doctrine we are now to examine, vix., the doctrine that particulars can appear only as logical subjects, never as predicates, did appear to be just the sort of difference he would have admitted to be an ultimate logical one, if he had believed in it. What he denied was precisely that there was any category of things the members of which were marked out from all others by being confined to one of two roles in the fundamental logical game of assertion, or the even more fundamental game of assembling the constituents of a proposition. And his denial of this takes a very radical form: the form, namely, a Ramsey, "Universals",
ahall not now consider.
Mind (1925). Later he changed his mind, for a reason I
of denying the very existence of any such logical distinction of roles, a t least a t the level of the singular non-quantified proposition. At this level a t least, the subject-predicate distinction is, from the point of view of logic, an illusion; there is just no sense, from the point of view of logic, in the idea that one of the items spoken of in such s statement appears as predicate, the other as subject. This does not mean that we cannot continue to say, if we like, that predicates supply principles for grouping or classifying things, whilst individuals are things for which such principles exist. We can continue to say this. But it does not mean quite what we thought. We thought it meant, ilzter alia, that given a singular proposition such as we conventionally represent by the form 'Fx', we could ask which of its constituents appeared as individual and which as predicate, and-get an answer simply by considering the proposition itself and the character of its constituents. But what are we to be guided by? Not, surely, by the grammar of the sentence. As Ramsey says, we are not schoolchildren doing grammatical analysis. Then are we to be guided by the rough characterizations of predicate and individual which I have just given?,But, as Ramsey points out and as we shall see in more detail later, this characterization yields us nomason for making one choice rather than the other. Then are we to decide simply by considering the categorial character of the constituents, i.e., simply by considering the categories to which belong both the individual we then decide is the individual in that proposition, and the individual which we then decide appears as a predicate in that proposition? Thus suppose the proposition in question is "Socrates is wise," and suppose we decide that the individual in this proposition is Socrates and that wisdom appears in it as a predicate. Do we claim to tell this simply from a consideration of the relevant individuals, and their respective categories? If SO,what more are we saying than that they belong to the categories they belong to, that Socrates is a particular and wisdom a universal? What further logical point are we making about their roles in the proposition? Ramsey would say we are not making any such point. For, in saying that Socrates is the logical subject and that wisdom appears as a predicate, we are pretending to answer a question which has no sense, a question which does not arise at the level of the non-quantified singular prop~sition.~ But if Ramsey is right, then how does the talk of individuals and predicates arise a t all? Why do these ideas bulk so large in logic that even the symbolic form of the simplest sentence seems to be trying to mark a distinction? Or is the distinction wholly an illusion, a projection of grammar into logic? An answer which many modern logicians would perhaps be willing to Compare: I n the atomic fact the objects hang together like the links in
s,
chain.
give, and which Ramsey would perhaps not dissent from, is the following. The logical distin~t~ion between subject and predicat,e (or, at the linguistic level, between singular term and general term) arises because we quantify, e~ist~ent~ially or universally or in a way which is not quit'e either of t8hese; because we say "all" or "most8" or "some" or indefinitely refer in the singular with "something" or "a so-and-so"; because names give place to bound variables. At t8helevel of the quantified ~ent~ence, whatseverwe quantify over are individuals; and looking back from the level of the quantified sentence to the related singular sentence, we read t8hedi~t~inction back into this sent8enceand say that whatever is designat'ed by those names in this sentence which have given place to variables in the quantified sentence, is an individual, a logical subject, while what the rest of the sentence introduces appears as a predicate. But not,hing in the nature of of t8he singular prop~sit~ion the con~t~ituents compels us t80 quant,ify in one way rather than the other. Indeed we quantify in both. If we look a t the singular sentence "Socrates is wise" from the stsandpoint of the quant'ified sentence "None but the wise deserve the fair," we shall be inclined t80count Socrat8esas an individual and wisdom as the predi~at~e. But if we look a t the same singular sent8encefrom the point of view of the quantified sentence "All S~crat~es' virtues were possessed by Plato," we should count wisdom as t8heindividual and Socrates as the predicate. The whole distinction is relative t'o our decisions to quantify. Everything which can yield a principle of counting or grouping (a predicate) can also be among the things we quant,ify over (an individual); everything which can be among the things we quantify over (an individual) can also yield something which can serve as a principle of countsing or grouping (a predicate). Nothing plays either role esselztially; and, indeed, a t tjhe level of the singular ~ent~ence, t8hevery distinction of roles does not exist. In this account I have, of course, mated Ramsey's doctrines with Quine's, and produced (I think) quit'e a powerful child. His very existence is evidence against the logical doctrine of the central position of particulars among individuals. But let us submit him to a slightslyless abstract kind of examination, t'hough a sympathetic one. First of all, we must get rid of some of the obscurity att'ending t8hisnotion of "t'he same thing appearing bot8h as individual and predicate," and get rid a t the same t8ime of a probably grammar-based prejudice which is apt to make us miss the whole point of t'he issue by just t,hinking it self-evident (though perhaps in need of explanation) t'hat particulars cannot, while qualit'ies, etc., can, do whatever it is to "appear as a predicate." One of the things that helps t80make us blind here, is t8hat8,t8houghboth "S~crat~es" and "wisdom" are nouns, we can speak of predicating wisdom of something (which we do by means of the adjective "wise"), but it does not make sense to speak of predicating Socrates of ~omet~hing, and whatever we do by t'he
LOGICAL SUBJECTS A N D PHYSICAL OBJECTS
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adject'ive "S~crat~ic,"it does not seem to us that we could right'ly call it this.4 But this point is quite superficial: or, if important, it itself does not constit'ute, but demands, explanation, like the prejudice we might, use it t'o support,.Sticking to t'he view of a predicate as yielding a primary or non-primary principle of counting or grouping, we can easily see that Socrates, no less than wisdom, can yield such a principle. Evidently, however, not a primary principle, not a primary predi~at~e. "How many t'hings are of Socrates" is not an answerable form of question as it stands, for we do not know what to count. "Of Socrates" does not itself supply a primary principle of counting. But if we suppose a primary predicate already supplied, a kind of thing specified, then we can certainly use "of Socrates" as a principle of count'ing or grouping among t'he things picked out by t'he primary, predicate. Thus we can certainly ask "How many speeches are of Socrates?" or "Which speeches are of Socrates?" And in yielding only a secondary predicate, Socrat'es is not inferior to wisdom. In using wisdom as a principle of counting or grouping, we must know whether t'he things we are to count or group are men, remarks or decisions, et8c. So far the Ramsey-Quine child is robust enough. At the level of the simple singular sentence, taken in abstract'ion from possible quantificat'ions, the distinction bet'ween appearing as an individual and appearing as a predicate does not - as far as logic is concerned -exist. The difference between the verbal forms in which Socrat'es and wisdom make t'heir appearance in "Socrates is wise," between the verbal forms in which t'he t'able and brownness make their appearance in "This table is brown," is a mat8t8er of grammar and not a matter of direct logical interest. Like t'he actual use we make of the verb "to predicate" - which I referred to just now - it is at best a sign, and not an e~planat~ion, of our preference for particulars as individuals. "Socretes Wisdom" or "Brownness this table" would do just as well, and perhaps bett'er, as employing designations which are grammatically similar. Only a t t'he level of quantification, where noun or adject'ive designations give place t80 variables can we speak of what t8hevariables range over as individuals, and of what t'he designations attached to those variables introduce as predicates. But since the variables of q~ant'ificat~ion may, without impediment from logic, range over particulars and non-particulars alike, there is no reason in logic why we should regard ~art~iculars as pre-eminent'ly the individuals. However, the situation is not as simple as this. For though variables of quant'ification may, without impediment from logic, range over particulars and non-particulars alike, there may be a very good reason, in t'he independent differences between ~art~iculars and universals, why particulars should in practice be pre-eminently the things over which the variables 4 Even here we might hesitate when we think of the phrase 'Socratic dialogue' which is sometimes a kind of dialogue and sometimes one of Socrates' dialogues.
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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
of quantification range. And if we can find such a reason, then we can drive a wedge between the doctrinal parents of the Quine-Ramsey child, by showing Quine's preference for particulars as individuals to have rational foundations which are at least connected with logic. 4. But when are we properly said to quantify over the things of which we speak? I shall not answer the question by considering what ordinary sentences are adequately represented by paraphrase in the quantified forms of logic. I shall say: We are properly said to quantify over the things of which we speak whenever we do not definitely identify those things, and whenever, though we do identify them, we do so indirectly, by reference to something already taken as identified. To understand this criterion, we must, above all, free ourselves of prejudices founded on grammar. Thus, when we say 'Socrates is wise', the things of which we speak are Socrates and wisdom and both are definitely identified, one by the ordinary proper name 'Socrates' and the other by the adjective 'wise'. We must, a t this point, in this way, go against the feelings our grammar gives us, if we seek not merely to record those feelings, but to understand them. So I shall deliberately use the word 'name', or the phrase 'direct'de~i~nation',for any expression, noun-like or adjectival, which is used definitely to identify that of which we speak in using it, and which does not perform this function by specifying some relation of that thing to some other thing. Then we may say that we quantify over anything of which we speak otherwise than by name. In the sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'This table is mahogany', as normally used, 'Socrates', 'wise', 'This table', 'mahogany' all count as names. No quantification occurs in these sentences. But whenever we use a plural form (e.g., "the so-andsos" or "so-and-sos" or "three so-and-sos" or "some so-and-sos"), we quantify over so-and-sos, unless the plural expression really is shorthand for a conjunction of singular names, as perhaps the phrases "the deadly sins" or "the cardinal virtues" are. And whenever we use an indefinite phrase like "a so-and-so" or "some so-and-so or other," we quantify over so-and-sos. And whenever we use a phrase of the form "the so-andso which. . .," where the relative pronoun introduces a specified relation of this so-and-so to something else already directly identified, then we quantify over so-and-sos. How, then, do particulars and non-particulars respectively stand in relation to our needs to quantify? To answer this, we must consider again the ways in which we may speak, identifyingly and non-identifyingly, of particulars and non-particulars. If a particular of which we wish to speak bears a proper name, then we may, in favorable circumstances, introduce that particular into our discourse by means of the proper name, a direct designation; and no quantification occurs. But let us a t first neglect the existence of ordinary proper names for particulars. Then, so
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long as the particular of which we wish to speak is present and, hence, is directly locatable, we can introduce that particular into our discourse by means of a directly locating demonstrative phrase, a direct designation; and no quantification occurs. But if we cannot identify the particular in this way, and yet wish to speak identifyingly of it, then - in the absence of proper names - we are forced to fall back on one of those relating phrases, which identify the particular as "the so-and-so which" stands in such and such a relation to something already taken as identified. And here, on one of the tests which I have suggested, quantification occurs. Of course, we may, alternatively, avoid recourse to such relating phrases b,y giving up the ambition to speak identifyingly of the particular we speak of. This is very often scarcely a sacrifice. If I say "He picked up a hammer and rushed at me," I do not wish, at this stage in the story, to be bothered with questions about the identity of the hammer. My audience may not know what hammer I am talking about; but very often there is no reason why they should, or should wish to. So the possibility and adequacy of indefinite references to particulars comes to our rescue in the facp of the difficulty of making identifying references to them. But indefinite references once more involve quantification, on the tests I suggested. And it is evident that, on these tests, and given that we neglect proper names, quantification must always come in when we speak of a certain particular which is not present, i.e., cannot be directly located.5 And to this extent we already have - based on considerations about the identification of particulars - powerful reason, which cannot be paralleled in the case of non-particulars, why particulars should figure in discourse as individuals, i.e., be quantified over. But what about proper names? What right have I to neglect them? Why shouldn't it a t least theoretically be possible that every particular we wish to speak of should bear a proper name, so that every one could in principle be directly and identifyingly designated whenever it was introduced into discourse? - Well, one might answer, first, that this wouldn't be enough to avoid the necessity of quantification. I t would be necessary also that every speaker, every time he wished to speak of a particular, should know which particular it was and hence which name to use. And, of course, for communication not to be impeded, it would be necessary for everyone to know the names of all the particulars which anyone in his circle was likely to speak of. These of course, are just the ordinary requirements for the successful use of proper names. And no doubt it would be possible to imagine conditions of discourse in which these requirements could be satisfied for all particulars of which the parties to these conditions ever wished to speak. Evidently, they would be 6
But see next footnote.
wonderfully unlike our actual conditions of discourse. I do not wish to say much about proper names - a complex and difficult subject to treat in detail - but it would be worth reflecting upon the conditions which are necessary (a) to make it worth giving a particular a proper name, and (b) to make it possible to use a proper name successfully in an actual communication situation, in which one wishes to speak of a particular. I t would then be evident enough how rarely these conditions are satisfied for any given particular and any given occasion of discourse. Most particulars are, so to speak, short-lived and undistinguished, terribly like others, figure only in brief stretches of few lives. Yet, at a given place and time, any member of this undistinguished crew may assume enormous temporary importance. One might say: it is the there and then which gives the undistinguished particular its place in discourse, and because it is only the there and then (together with a general character which it shares with uncounted others), it does not qualify for a place of honor in discourse, vix., a proper name. Thus, once we have got principles of counting under which they fall, particulars constantly obtrude themselves upon us as subjects of discourse; but few as things to which it is worth giving a proper name. I t would be quite false, though it would simplify my thesis, to say that proper names really are definite descriptions in disguise. But it is quite true that a particular is well qualified to receive and be referred to by a, proper name in proportion as there exist a large number of diverse and interesting definite descriptions which apply to it. Roughly speaking, the axe which chopped off Charles 1's head does not bear a proper name because this is - to us - the only interesting thing about it. (But perhaps in the family circle of the executioner it had a proper name.) Particulars, then, constantly appear in our discourse as things that we cannot directly designate or name: as things that we cannot directly locate (using a demonstrative phrase like "this table") because they are not present, and cannot refer to by a proper name because they do not bear one or, if they do, it is of no use in a given communication situation; as things, consequently, to which, when we refer, we must either refer indefinitely ("a so-and-so") - and this is often enough - or, if we refer identifyingly, do so by specifying some relation of them to something else already taken as identified.6 But both these latter ways of bringing them 6 Here, and in the preceding two or three pages, I am over-simplifyingthe situation, in order to keew aualifications, a t least in the text. down to a minimum. For of course i t often happens that, in a certain circle or in certain circumstances, we may refer identifyingly to a so-and-so (a particular) as "the so-and-so," without relying on any part of the linguistic context to specify any relation in which the so-and-so in question uniquely stands to something else already taken as identified. In such cases the phrase "the so-and-so" functions, for the nonce, just like a proper name functions. For the successful use of proper names is generally in just the same way dependent on their L
a
into discourse involve quantification, i.e., if we bring them in, in either of these ways, we bring them in as individuals in the logical sense. Of course I am here appealing in part to extra-logical considerations (where "logical" has its narrowest sense): to something about the nature of particulars, and to something about the nature of the world we live in. But these extra-logical considerations are very general and very fundamental. They operate together with the logical meaning of "individual" to secure particulars a pre-eminent place as individuals. For consider how different it is with non-particulars. They cannot be undistinguished in the way particulars often are, i.e., distinguished only by a there and then; for so to be undistinguished is, for non-particulars, to be indiscernible, i.e., for non-particulars, to be identical. Most particulars which are, at one time or another, worth speaking of are not worth naming; but nearly all non-particulars which are ever worth speaking of are worth naming. This is not to say that all have names or are worth naming; and it is even less to say that it is always necessary or always possible to use their names if they have them. We say things like "He died of an obscure tropical disease" or "He died of the obscure tropical disease Robinson had"; and here we quantify over non-particulars (diseases) by bringing one into our discourse without directly designating it. But the most powerful incentive for recourse to quantification when we bring a certain thing into our discourse, cannot exist in the case of non-particulars as it exists in the case of particulars. For the incentive can only exist in the case of a thing such that its position (location) in the spatio-temporal framework is an essential part of its identity. And it is the mark of the non-particular that its position (location or distribution) in the spatio-temporal framework is not an essential part of its identity. Notice I do not say that the incentive in question consists i n this necessary fact about particulars. I t is the conjunction of this fact with other facts which provides the incentive; but it is the presence of this fact in the conjunction which makes the incentive unique to particulars. Among these other facts are the following: that we and our audience cannot directly locate all the things we wish to speak of; that our speech largely deals with those situations, incidents, needs, activities, which (trivial or important) make up the mainly commonplace narrative of our lives, or, in other words, that most of our discourse is a sort of daily, empirical, pragmatic affair; that in these situations of which we speak, there constantly figure things of which the only significant, but still very significant, difference from countless other things, is just their figuring in the situation our discourse currently deals with, is just their being in employment within certain circles. Examples of "the so-and-so" phrases which sometimes have this character are: within court circles, "the king"; within the family circle, "the house," "the cat," "the baby," etc.
the place at the time that they were. Things which have just this kind of claim on our attention, this kind of entrde into our talk, are necessarily particulars; but because they have just this kind of claim, this kind of entrde, they make their entree (unless they can be directly located) under the cloak of quantification. If discourse were always of a more elevated nature, were not predominantly of this daily, empirical kind, then t8herewould be no reason why particulars should keep their place as the pre-eminent individuals. We should lose the most powerful of incentives for quantifying over particulars. And perhaps in philosophy it is sometimes contempt for this kind of discourse that underlies an inclination to dispute the right of particulars to this place. But, whatever one's preferences, this daily empirical kind of talk remains the fundamental kind. I t might seem that in discussing in the way I have done the topic of quantifying over particulars, I have oddly neglected the most obvious kind of quantification - namely 'generalization', in the ordinary sense of this word: speaking of "all so-and-sos" or "most so-and-sos" or of ,'so-and-sos in general." Should I not have thought it at least as important to find a reason why particulars should be pre-eminently the things we generalize about as to find a reason why individual particulars should be pre-eminently the things which are brought into discourse otherwise than by direct designation, i.e., should be brought in by indirectly identifying or non-identifying references, instead of by name or demonstrative phrase? I think the answer to this question is 'No,' and' for the following reason. I t is a familiar point that when we are dealing with generalizations involving open classes of particulars, we could in principle always express the propositions in question as a singular proposition stating some relation (e.g., inclusion or overlap) between non-particulars (classes or attributes). For '(x)Fx-~Gx' we always have the alternative 'acp.' If we are to regard the formulation which explicitly involves quantification over particulars as somehow more fundamental, more explicative, than that which does not (which involves no quantification at all), we ought to have a reason for doing so, and not simply be expressing a prejudice. That reason exists, but necessarily below the level of generalization. At that level we cannot claim to be bringing into our discourse just certain specific, though unspecified, members of the class about which we are generalizing. (If we are talking about so-and-sos in general, the question "which (of the) so-and-sos?" is empty; or at most, it invites us to stop generalizing.) And if we nevertheless claim to be bringing particulars in, in a general way, and not merely universals (and this is the claim we make when we insist on the quantified form as fundamental), then we must find the reason at that level of discourse at which we can claim to be bringing certain specific particulars into our discourse. That level we
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have already examined, and found excellent reason for quantifying, a t that level, over particulars: - in that general nature of things and of our interests which makes it inevitable that we should constantly want to bring a certain particular into our discourse without being able, and often without needing, directly to designate it. Having a t this level found an explanation of our being pre-eminently committed to particulars asindividuals (by the quantification test), we have also a reason for reemphasizing this commitment at the level of generalization. So the crucial thing is the thing I in fact put first: namely the interplay between, on the one hand, the direct designation of a certain thing (whatever its category), and the introduction of that thing into discourse by means of a non-identifying reference, or a reference which, though it identifies, does so by means of a more or less explicit claim that the thing in question is unique in standing in a certain specified relation to some other thing. I t is, we might say, the occurrence of the words "a so-and-so" (whether or not in an implied context of ". . . which is unique in that it alone stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing") that teaches us decisively that something is appearing in discourse as,an individual. The words are decisive because they enable us to locate that formal asymmetry which we look for in vain so long as everything appearing in discourse appears there named or directly designated. When we speak of "a so-and-so" and remain at the level of non-identifying reference, we speak of one of the things which fall under a certain principle of counting or grouping (specified by "so-and-so") without specifying the thing itself and hence without specifying any principle of counting or grouping which the thing itself might supply. One might say: The thing itself appears as an individual because it fails to appear as a possible predicate. When we speak of "the so-and-so which" uniquely stands in a certain relation to something else taken as identified, then indeed we specify a unique one of the things which fall under a principle of grouping or classifying specified by "so-and-so"; and so we do indeed specify a principle of counting or grouping which the thing itself might supply. But the specification is indirect; it rests on the claim that the thing is unique among so-and-sos in standing in a certain relation to another (named or directly designated) thing. Borrowing its identification in this way from another thing, it does not itself appear named in discourse, and so appears as an individual. To appear as an individual is to be, though in principle nameable, on this occasion anonymous. Unless we find here, in the difference between named and anonymous appearance, the source of the formal asymmetry of subject and predicate,' I do not see where it is to be found. If we do find it here, we find also a reason why particulars are the predominant individuals. For, as I have argued, there are overwhelming reasons why particulars should thus appear unnamed in discourse and just these reasons, in the nature
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of the case, cannot be reproduced in the case of non-particulars.7 To avoid a possible misunderstanding, I must make a remark about my use of the term 'quantification'. My use of this expression, in the connexions in which I have used it, does not, of course, represent a wholesale surrender to the view that the logical features of sentences of ordinary speech of the kinds which I have been, by implication, considering, are accurately and adequately represented by their being re-written, on orthodox contemporary lines, in the symbolism of logic. By no means. The point is simply that as regards those features of sentences which I have been concerned with, the differences and the reservations do not matter. The essential thing, from the present point of view, about the items over which the variables of quantification range in a sentence using the symbolism, is that those items appear in discourse unnamed, not directly designated. Similarly, from the present point of view, the essential thing about those devices of ordinary speech which I have been concerned with is that the things they bring into discourse are brought in unnamed, not directly designaf ed. 5. To sum up. We are presented, in logic, with a distinction which claims to be formal, the distinction bekween subject and predicate. We are presented, in the philosophical tradition, with the view that items of one very broad category, namely spatio-temporal particulars, are preeminently the things which go, in terms of this formal distinction, on the side of the subject. So strong is this association that the doctrine in question is, on one traditional interpretation of the distinction, part of its very meaning; so that it is senseless, on this interpretation, to speak of predicating a particular. This fact of the tradition demands explanation: it should be possible to explain it as a consequence of the nature of the distinction itself, in its purely formal aspect, together with some differentiating facts about particulars and non-particulars. Evidently, then, it must be possible to give an account of the formal distinction which is, in itself, independent of any account we give of the category-distinction. Evidently, too, this account must go beneath the surface of grammar; for grammar reflects, and does not explain, the traditional version of the distinction. So we must find an asymmetry, not merely grammatical, in the ways of which we speak of the things of which we speak. Such an asymmetry we can find in the difference between two ways in which things of which we speak may appear in our speech of them; in the difference between appearing named and appearing unnamed, between 7 This is not to say that reasons i n some ways analogous may not be found in the case of some types of non-particulars. Some types of non-particulars are the predominant individuals within the class of non-particulars. Which, and why, is another question and another story.
appearing directly identified and appearing unidentified or not directly identified. We can then see how the nature of the category distinction between particulars and non-particulars, together with our own situation and the needs which discourse meets, provide an overwhelmingly powerful reason why particulars should appear anonymously, though not only anonymously, in our talk. Reasons, in some ways parallel, for the anonymous appearance of non-particulars can also be found; but none with the overwhelming practical importance, in daily discourse, of those reasons which are necessarily peculiar to the case of particulars. The things which appear predominantly as individuals are, predominantly, the individuals. This predominance is reflected in asymmetries in the grammar in which we talk of these and of other things, whether we quantify or not; and these grammatical asymmetries are further reflected in the asymmetry of application of semi-grammatical semilogical expressions like the verb "to predicate"; and these asymmetries lead us, mixing grammar, ontology, and logic, to say that the predominant individuals can never appear in discourse as predicates, but only as subjects. But I do not think that the story I have told is the whole story, though I have sometimes written as if I did. PETER F. STRAWSON. COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OXFORD.
