Logic of Life: Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, 24)

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24

THE LOGIC OF LIFE HEIDEGGER'S RETRIEVAL OF ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF LOGOS

CHARLOTTA WEIGELT

ACTA UNIVERSITA TIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24

THE LOGlC OF LIFE Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle' s Concept of Logos CHARLOTTA WEIGELT

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL

Doctoral dissertati on Department of Philosophy Stockholm University

S- 106 91 Stockholm

ABSTRACT ln the work of Martin Heidegger, the quesl for the proper philosophical beginni ng is motivated by an awareness of the "historicaI" nature of thought: ilS dependency upon the be gin ni ng of philosophy in the historica! sense. This study explores the early Heidegger's attempt to provide philosophy with a new beginning by explicitly addressi ng the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as Ille philosophical origin, which ph ilosophy cannat avoid to confront without remaining naive with respect ta ilS own foundation. Heidegger 's projeci is here considered with respect to how it conceives of the question of human reasan, and it is taken to be d riven by the ambiti on ta corne to grips with a traditional logical and theoret ical ideal of cognition. Turning to Aristotle as the alleged originatar of this ideal, Heidegger focuses on the concept of logos, taking as his point of departure Aristotle's classica! detinition of man as zoioll logon echoll, commonly rendered as "the rational animal". The stud y explores Heidegger' s retri eval of Aristotle's concept of logos . In this pursuit, Heidegger tS guided by the assumption that this concept must be traced back ta Aristot le 's understandi ng of life and praxis, since it is based upon an experience of speech as the basic trait of human cognition. 11 is shawn how Heidegger on the basis of his interpretation of Aristotle tries ta develop a notion of a speaking or discursive reason. Thereby , he hopes to overcome an idea also present in Aristotle: that the supreme form of knowledge is cOlltained in the simple apprehension of nous . lt is argued (hat the point in revealing the "practical" foundation of Aristotle's notion of logos is essenti a!ly to find out what it means for philosophy to be a fonn of praxis. The reby , the aim is to show that Heidegger affirms Aristotle's idea that philosophy as theory, theoria, is the supreme mode of praxis. For this reason, the therne of logos is situated w ithin the comex! of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. A guidi ng assumpti on is that Heidegger think s that the concept of killesis, change, provides us with the ontological background to Aristotle's inquiry inlo logos. lt is shawn how Heidegger argues Ihat Aristotle conceives of logos as a kind of kinesis. Yet he also s hows that Ari stot le was not able to fully affirm {his because of his assumption that. being in the true sense is not kinesis but entelecheia, unchanging, complete activity, wh ich belongs not ta logos but to nOlis. Key words: Heidegge r, Aristotle, logos, kinesis, phenornenology, teleology, assertion, sunthesîs, dihai resis, theory, praxis, everydayness.

© 2002 Charlotta Weigelt

ISBN 91-22-01996-0 ISSN 0491-0877 Printed by Akadem itryck AB Edsbruk 2002

1Il.\ 11I' II I III/1'(lllI uIIOIi 1Il PllIl ll1 l' ill lI l Pl dJu'iophy NIUI k!lIll l1l 1J III VI.i I ~d l y S 11111 'I I Slt is first of ail accessible or with respect to how it has been interpreted tradilionally, the investigation Ihen proceeds to an analysis of the structures that are constitutive of the

Heidegger' s interpretation of Aristolle 's underslanding of lheorelical life is Einleitung in die Philosophie (1928/1929).'3 Accordingly, my interpretation primarily conccrns Heideggcr's encounter with Aristotle du ring this period, when the project of fundamental ontology is being devcloped, and it is not my intention to exhaust ail the views lhat Heidegger ever held on Aristotle. However, sinee it is not my aitn to give a chronologica l exposition of Heidegger 's thought, i.e. to trace a development or perhaps a change in Heidegger's attitude towards Aristotle, 1 use later lexts whenever they are bene/ici al

mode of speech under consideration. Finall y, on the basis of this a nalysis, it is asked what kind of access to being and truth is admitted by that particular mode of speech. To some extent this is also the order o r th e Huee main chapters, so that each of them represents one of the Ihrce points enumerated above. . Accordingly, Chapter Two centres on Heidegger's encounter wlth w hat is in his view the tradition al or cornmon conception of logos.

to my argument or seem to throw light on Heidegger's earlier position,

Il owcver, Heidegger is not entirely prepared to aseribe this conception

th us assuming that the later works are not opposed to lhe earlier ones to such an extent that lhey musl be kept slriclly apart. '" For the truth is that wh en it cornes to Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle , it is not entirely easy to delimit a hOll1ogeneous "early" view that cou Id be

ln Aristotle hill1self, since he thinks that it has its origin in a specifie -

contrasted with a "Iater" position. The ambiguity lhal Heidegger wants to locate in Aristotle is retlected in Heidegger's interpretation, causing it to point in at least t\Va directions: one which puts emphasis on what Heidegger regards as Aristotle's metaphysics of presence and the primacy of propositional thought, seeing this as the final target of the destruction of the history of ontology and [agie ; and another which concentrates on the phenomcnological character of ArÎstotle's thought, receiving from it the very means to pursue this destruction. In Chapter One, 1 give a survey of the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle in order 10 loeate the place of Aristotle wit hin Heidegger's philosophical project, and also in order to indicate the background to the question of logos as a philosophical theme in· Ileidegger. This chapter thus has a somewhat introductory character. The three following chapters deal with each of the three levels of logos that Heidegger regards as most important: theory or science, everydayness and

IInd in sufficient - interpretation of Aristotle. That is to say, in the tirst Hltl ge o f his inquiry into logos, Heidegger cannot direct ly tum to MiSIOlle himself, for Aristotle' s philosophy of logos is accessible only Ilil

Ihe basis of a confrontation with the received view on this topic. On

titi s v ic w, Aristotle is, if not the originator, then at least a major pl'o poncnt of a theoretical, or as 1 will cali it, an epistemic ideal of \'OHl);ti o ll , according to which the assertion is the primary mode of ~p ce~ h , since it is the basic element of truth and knowledge. The overall nl ll' 01' Ihis chapter is to show how Heidegger tries to question this view Il ti n inl erpretation of Aristot le. His basic argument is that, wh en 11 11 1t! ~ ill g th e assertion in tenns of sunthesis and dihairesis, Aristotle ItUN IImnagcd to point out a basic feature of hum an understanding as 1I\'h, tHllI1 e ly its discursivity or "as-structure". On the basis of this \ 1111 111, Il uidcggcr argues that assertoric speech as theoretical articulation PIl\t( IJpp oSes an unthematic mode of understanding and articulation ,, 11I1'1i Ihu ~ is Ihought to make up a more basic level of man's d l" ,1I'Mlv il y or logos. ' 1 'hh.:ggcl" s preoccupati on with the pre-theoretical, everyday logos is Ihr Ill ple (J I' 'lltlpl e r Threc. Il will be shown how Heidegger makes use II I hl'i 111 l1 l1 ys is

or cverydayncss

in ord er to reveal precisely the

12 GA 21) GA 24 and GA 29/30 respectively. References to Sein und Zei! are !lot to the Gesamtausgabe but 10 the Niemeyer edition.

" ~'" tl Il Y", phenOlllenal basis

GA 27. ).1 As regll!~ls Heidegger' s interprctation of Ari stot!e, il is nbovc nll one IrHor 1exI fhM is of interest, as il is co ncc rn cd with the 11 0tion of" lCi VIlOtrt: " VOtll WCIit1 tl und Ilcgrilf der in thi s fllH:ll yR i ~. The qu esti on I d hl U,1Ii1 will hCI'c I II Il HI' III e x lc ill he I I' '/lI ed ftS fi ql1 c:-: li o l1 COl1 cl;rnil1 g

Il

01' AriSloll e's phi losophy 01' logos, which

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

th e discursive nature of action , regarded as a sHent mod e o f arti c ulation.

Âl'istotl c, as several ofllis students eventually became Aristotle scholars ln tll eir own right. 15 Among these, Gadamer should be mentioned in plu·ti eular, sinee, as wc will see below, his interpretation of Aristotl e has III its lurn had considerable impact on the contemporary view on the ,. ·I"ti on between Heidegger and A ristotle. Il owcver, though the Iiterature on Heidegger's philosophy as a whole h Il QW has become immense, th cre are sti ll co mp aratively few stud ics thcm!lti s in g the relation to Aristotle in particular, though tllere are of (·(lIII·~C 'l ui te a few thattouch upon this issue. The reason why it used to

For this reason, this chapter focuses on Heidegger's interprctation of Aristotle's analysis of praxis and its mode of understanding, deliberation. Wh en bringing together logos and action, it becomes possible not only ta regard action as a form of logos or articulation, but also ta conceive of logos in its tUrll along th e lines of action, that is, ta estab lish a teleological or ontological perspectiv e on logos, interpretin g it in terms of kinesis. Wh en the nature of logos thus has been furth er elucidated , it is possible to approach anew the question concerning the theoretical and its mode of discourse, this time from th e perspective o f teleology. This is the task of Chapter Four. Here 1 focus on Ar istotle ' s and I-Ieidegger's respective understanding of philosophy, sug gest ing that He idegger actually affirms the Aristotelian notion of th eory as th e supreme fonn of praxis, though he is convinced that it must be given a new foundation. Basieally, H eidegger's way ta retd eve Ari stotle 's noti on of Ihcoria is ta emphasise its discursive nature, thereby questionin g the tr adition al su premacy of noetic, "intuitive" thought.

ln Chapter Five, 1 explore the relation between ontology and " Iog ic" in Heidegger and Aristotle. Beginning with Heidegger 's idea that the tendeney in Aristotle to identify speech as such with assertoric speech is intimately connected with his understanding of being as presence, 1

show how Heidegger's attempt at trans form ing Aris totle's ontology must be seen against the background of hi s re interpretation of Aristolle's concept oflogos.

3. A survey ofprevious literalure ln spite of th eir polemi c tone, Heidegger 's lectures on Aristotl e very seldom involve an explicit confrontation with rivaliing interpretations of Aristotle . .Iaeger and Ross, the most famous Aristotle scholars around the tum of the last century, are only mentioned oeeasionally, and for the most part with respect to philologieal matters. This is perhaps not sa surprising, for Heidegger's main target of criticism in this connect ion is

c1early not a particular interpretation of Aristotle, but an entire trad ition whic h, as _ he sees il , ultimately points ba ck to th e scholasti c interp retat ioll of !\ristotl e. Heidegger's proj eci o f" Iibel'lllill l' Aristotl e Ij'om 8choiasti ciS Il1 has givcn wa y 10

fi

rH.:W Ir'lI ditilll1 of' \V tll'k on

Iltlruct rclative ly little intere st is, in part at Jeast, that the lecture courses J

II,,' ltl\,;ggcr devoted to Aristotle during the twenti es were for a long lim e

lUll e '\,;ssiblc to ail but a few scholars . Broadly speak in g, the tendency of lI u,: "\.I lli er'! lit erature on Heidegger and Aristotle is to emphasise w hat is

as fundamental differences between the two thinkcrs, in Plllil eular w ith respect ta ontology. Heidegger's ontological proj ect is ,.~" liS " profound critique of Aristotelian metaphysics, which seeks to l hu1l ell ge il S basic assumptions. This is the central idea of Werner tvllll·X'S by now elassical work Heidegger und die Tradition (J 961).

I l,'14(1 I'(I \,;d

II1I HI~ h Marx discusses other thinkers in the tradition in addition to

Il totl e (l11uinly Hegel), the overall aim of his work is to argue that in

,",k,· to

und erstand Heidegger's notion of being and essence, it is IIOVCill llI g lhc vicw on know ledge of' lhe prescili dll y, Wilh Ihi ~ idcn, he docs nOlmC!l nlO suggesllhat there is a conceplion or seiellec in G"cck l11 0 ll g hl that would have sorne modern equivalenl. 65 On the co nl l'lII'y , in vicw o r Aristotle's tripartite divis ion between the " Iheorcl ical phil osophies" (phifo sophiai theoretikai) of theo logy, physics and malhemalics, Heidegger argues that it is important to nOie thal whereas the Greeks regarded the sciences as different kinds of philosophy, the modern view has it the olher way round. 66 Bul in spite of this difference, Heidegger thinks thal th e nolion of epis telile rightfully might be said to display an ideal of know ledge lhat has bearings upon the modern view on philosophy and science alike. Thi s is the idea, mentioned above, that true knowl edge coneerns the un iversal and lhe immulable and moreover has a deductive structure. 67 And on his view, thi s is thc reason why one has looked to preci se ly Ihe mat hematical sciences for a mode l for know ledge as SUCh . 68 Just as Ari stotle thinks that ep isf eme ca l1 oil ly presuppose ilS own basic princip les, Heidegger argues lhat science necessarily is blind to ilS own foundati on and possibilily, fol' lhi s is accessible to philosophy only. ln a way not dissimilar to Thomas Kuhn, Heidegger thin ks lhat the possibilily of scientiCic progress requ ires periods of "normal science", during wh ich the princi ples, crileria, methods elc . upon which lhe sCÎentific work rests, are nol put into question . Since this involves a certain naiveté, Heidegger thinks th al lrul y fruil[u! scientific \York happens in limes of cr isis, wh en it becomes urgenl 10 sc ienti sls themselves to re fl ect upon their basic concepls, logic, epislemology etc. 69 However, even though thi s kind of fou ndational research invol ves a transformation in lhe underslandin g of being, il cannot be idenlical 10 philosophical reflection, for it wi ll never be the task of science ta rai se the fundamental questions concerning trulh and being, nor to approac h

knowkdgc and und crslandin g as such, phil osophy is ab le to understand

sc ience as a possibil ity fo r human ex istence, i.e. as a parti cular form of

life. But s ince this is, or su He id egger argues, prccise ly the proper

philosophical per5peclive on science, as it is lhe ri ght approach 10

th e nature o f sc ientillc conduel in a way that is ina ccessib le to the scienline perspecti ve ilselr. For this reason , philosophy should not try to

imil ale sciencc, lhough this is exactly what has happened in philosophy. Arislolle's characterisation of the difference between first philosophy and lhe olher sciences is to some extent, though certainly in a differenl way, preserved in Heidegger. As noted above, He idegger describes science as an ontical inquiry which deals witll a specifie region of be ings, whereas phi losophy as ontology, although it has an ontical foundation, does not in the same way con cern ilself wilh a demarcaled field of research, as it has the capacily to ask with respect to anything what and how it is. This is also Heidegger's position prior to the introduction of the projecl of fundamental ontology, since life' s access to its world must be anal ysed without prejudices as to what different kinds of entities there are. In this sen se, philosophieal refleclion cannol be "positing" or objectifying: il must reach a leve l o f meaning more basic than thi s, parti y in arder 10 be ab le to understand prec isely how the scientific disciplines are con stituted. For the demarcation of a particular region ofbeings is rooted in an objectity in g act, which makes it possible to approach beings as e.g. phys ical obj ects . In this way , as science circumscribes ilS fie ld of research, il adopts a certain "attitude" (Einstellung). Thereby it estab lishes and res tri clS th e ways in which beings can be given and known , as il assumes a specifie kind o f knowledge and a particular mode of givenness. 70 Bul philosophy cannol restrict itself to a single position or atlilude, sinee ils task is to gel allhe gi venness of beings as such, prior to any di vision into di fferent kinds of beings; correlatively, it seeks to uncover the fundam ental characlerislics orman's access to beings, whether scientific, practical, etc. ln Heidegger 's view, this kind ofphilosoph ical inquiry should make it possible to see how both philosophy and science have their origin and poss ibility in the constitution of Dasein, in its understanding of being, which is the condition o f possibilily of human aClivity as such. But since science is restricted in the way JUS! outlined, it do es not cnact ils

65

unde rstan ding o f bCÎll g as fu ll y as philosophy, wh ich has access to th e

66

nature o r undcrstanding prior to the specification imposed by sc ience.

GA 62*, p. 21. GA 24, p. 24; GA 27, pp. 18- 19. Aristotle m.ke, hi, divi , ion in Met. 1026.18-19. 67 Cf. GA 19, p. 34. 'EItU:nT1I1'l is further discussed in the next chapter. 68 See GA 17, pp. 81- 83. 69 S2. p. 9 ; GA 24, p. (: 67.

42

70 For Ihe cUllce pl nf !','1I11/d/llll};. ~cc (,hupler Four, in paJ'li cular Section 3.

. ·11

C' II AI" I'I 1( (lN I ' \·'01' Ihi s t'cuson, what sc ience is in part , philoso pll y 1" Il " ideggcr puts it o n olle occas ion, phi losop hy il1 thls mo rc scic ntilic than science itsclf. 71

ni

!t il t

() I il S

'"'IN 1., ,, ·tllll ll y

5. Heidegger's critique of ethies Philosophy should not be a theoreti cal discipline in the same sense as science, b ut nor should it be " praetical", if that is taken to mean that philosophy sh ould artieulate a world-view or be an ethi es. Heidegger's relation to clhics. and to practical phi losophy in ge neral, becomes a particul arly urgent malter in connection \Vith Ari stotl e, s ince Heidegger has turn ed precisely to Aristot lc's " practical philosophy ", hi ~ Poli/les, Rhetorie and not least th e Nieomachean Ethies, in o rder to find a testimony of A ri stotl e 's ins igh t into th e fact ieity of life and it s experien ces. Of parti cul ar impo rt ance in thi s co nnectio n is Ihat the Ethies does not encompass a scientifte methodo logy, wh ich to Ari stotl e means that ethics does not 50 tnuch ask "why" human co nd llet is as il is, reducing il to certai n bas ic princip les and causes, but rather seeks to make clear " that" il is of suc h and such a nature, thus tak ing a nOI1reducti ve view on life. However, one of th e most stri king features of Heidegger 's interpretation of the Ethics is that he does not read illi ke a wo rk on ethics in the co rnrnon sense, but regards it as an analys is of human existenc e as a who le, prior to th e divi sio n between the theoretical and the practi cal, or belween whal is and w hat should be. 72 But considerin g that Heidegger's ow n work ha rd ly is " neutral" in to ne b ut c learly permeated by the co nvi cti on that there is an au th entic possibili ty for human existence - to ta ke ho ld of one's ow n ex iste nce and to deeide in favou r of the truth - his stated suspicion of eth ies might seern a bit surprisi ng. It becomes unde rsta ndab le, however, w hen related to hi s understanding of the notion of ph ilosophy as wo rld- view, in connecti on w ith whi ch Heidegger tri cs to show that to questi on a traditiona ll y theoreti eal approac h to life does not have to lead to a 7i reduction of the theoretical to tht: prac lical.

Aceord ili S 10 Il cid cgge r, cven th ough th e not ion of ph il osophy as worlel -v icw m ighl scem diametrical ly opposed to the idea that phi loso ph y should be mode lled a fter th e positive sciences, both v iews an..: in nlet th e Qutco me of a rcsignat ion concerning the tas k and worth or phil osop hy. They both stom from the belief that phi losophy must try to j usti fy its existence by referring to sorne kind of "practical" utility." Aga ins t thi s, Heidegger wants to retrieve w hat he regards as the tru e spirit ofGreek philosophy: philosophy as pure Saehforschung, as a kinel of resea rch which is eoneern ed w ith the fundam ent al quest ions of phil osoph y and wh ic h reali ses th at thesc qu est ions are worth pursuing for their own sake and not because of theÎr re leva nce to " practica l"

mauers. 75 Now ethi cs does not necessaril y have to be norm ative in kind, in other words, it does not have to endorse certain valu es on the basis of wh ich it is possible to distingu ish belween mora lly jllstifi ed and unjustifi ed behaviour ~ it can also be cri t ical, th at is, investigate the fOllndatio n of val uation, the reason why we eonsider some thi ngs to be good and others not, etc. According to Heidegger, however, phi loso phy should affirm neither ofthese alternati ves. First, w h y cou Id philosophy not be a cr itieal ana lys is of the phenomenon of va lue and va luati on? ln fact, l-leideggcr 's criti cisl11 of the philosophy of va lue propounded by the neo- Kantians ean be secn as a contri bution to such an analys is, insofar as thi s c ri ticism ail11s at showi n g th at these thinkers fai l to see th e phenomenon o f va lue since they are still movin g within the opposition of what is and what should be (Sein and Sollen), objectivity and subj ecli v ity, th eory and practice, etc. T hey have j ust reversed the tradi t iona l priority and th us take th e

GA 27, p. 2 t9. Heidegger's in terpretation o f the Eth ics is discussed in Chapter T hree . 1] Heidegger deals with the not ion o f philosophy as world -view primari ly in connection with the ph iJosop hy of va lue (Wertphil osophie) of the neo-Kan ti ans Windelband and Ricken, and also w ith respect to Lotze. These thinkers a re discussed ex tensive ly in the who le first part of GA 56/57: l, and a s im ilar disc uss ion takes up

most of Heidegger's li me in the olhe r course con tain cd in th is volume: " Phanomenologie und transzendenta le We rt philosophie" (GA 56/57:2). See also GA 58, § 2. N Cf. GA 29/30 , p. 3. ?5 The ward "p ractical" is Heidegger's own, GA 19, pp . 254 ·255 . There Heidegge r c laims !hat it is cha ractcristic of our time that even the most sc icntifica!ly oriented ph ilosophy can nol res ist from appeal ing to "the practical" for its j ustification, since it is anxious to show that its otherwise " theoretical" results have a determinate value ta the extent thal they cOlllribut e 10 the formati on of a worl d-view. ln Ihis lectu re, ll e id eggcr accuses Ch ri stia nity for this deve lopment, arguin g that because of the innucnce or C hristianity on phi losophy, phi losop hy was put on a par with literature, nlusic, Ci e. , i.c. \Vi th c ullurn l ph c nonl e ll~ in general, wh ich we re thought ta be of use in so fu r as tlley cOlitriIJut !.!d 10 tl le education o r a soc iety I,> hy 11111111''': '',93 Accordin gly, Arislollc almosl always begins hi s discussions \V ilh Cl statement of the cunent opinions of the matter at hand , und he is also Ihe first la write something like a history of philosophy, No t because he thinks we should re main there or assumes that doxa represents the trutll, but because he is convinced that the hi gher form s of knowledge grow out of less elaborated modes of understanding, and th at opinions, even ifthey are confused, nonetheless contain some element of truth, insofar as they are developed in contacl w ith the things whose nature he is about to explore, ln ather \Yord s, doxa is, al th e QutseL at least, w hat provides philosophy wilh an aim and direction, Initially, Ihe phi losopher cannol deliberate on the opinions of the past, but must take his stat'tin gpoint from Ihem, ass uming that traditional phi losoph ieal questions are meaningf111 and worth posing, Thi s principle is put to work al the beginn ing of th e Metaphy sics,

10 US,

where A ri stotle introduces his inquiry inta th e nature of philosoph y or

wisdom , He noies that it is gene rally assumed that w isdom is knowledge of primary causes and principl es; accordin gly, Aristotle declares this opinion to be the point of depa rture for his discuss ion ," The dependency on doxa does nol end Ihere, however, for since there is no simple access to Ihese principles and causes - they are supposed to represent the ullimate level of explanat ion - Aristotle concludes that the best thing is to begin by questioning the common opinions about Ihe wise man, When we know what is peculiar 10 him, we wi ll , hopefully, be clear abo ut the nature of wi sdom itse! f, and eventuall y be ab le to reveal the nature of Ihose prineiples and causes the knowledge of whi eh is precisely wisdom," At this poi nt, Arislotle has finall y achieved the in itiall y stated las k of developing his own form u,lation of the essence of philosophieal work, and Ihe resu lt of his inte rro gations proves 10 be that the search for the primary causes and principles is in tàct the same thing as the quest ion conce rning bein g as bc in g .96 Hence Aristotle is now in a 93

E.g . E. N. l095b2 -4, PI/ys. 184a I 6- 18; M el. I029b l O-13 . In GA 62*, Hei degger

discusses at length how Aristot le in the Melaphysics achieves his concept o f cro$ia Ihrough an examination of the cornillon op inions concern ing il; see in particul ar p. II. ., Met. 981 b27-29, '.15 Met. 1.2. 96 Mel . J003a21- 32 .

52

NI:l

positi on 10 say th al the philosophers of the pa Si have been posing the same question he is posing now, though Ihey were not fu lly aware o f what they actuall y were seekin g, since they were not ab le to art icu late their question as the question,concerning being as being, As these chaplers in the Metaphysics make c1ear, Aristotl e turns to doxa not onl y in order to find out whal the causes and principles o f beings are, but also in order to discover thal they eons!i!ute the theme of philosophy, What is the moti ve behind this mode of inq uiry? Accord ing to Aristot le, ifwe do not pay altcntÎon to such diffieu lti es pertaining to th e tap ie ta be discussed that have been st~tect in th e tradition, wc w ill

not be able to do a\Vay w ilh the problems, since we will not know what Ihe difficullies consist in , Wc will be, as he says, like men who do not know where they are headin g, for the te/os of our research will remain concealed to us, Hence, even Ihe ab ility to pose philosophieal questions in th e right way requires a e lear view o f the way in which the th ink ers , 97 orthe past used to pose tllese questlOll s.

He idegger hardi y eve r uses the word "destru ction" itself in connection with Aristotl e, but he often emphasises that Aristotle ' s philosophy proceeds as a critique of its predecessors," On this view, Aristotle wo uld thus have a ffirm ed Ihat on the one hand, philosophy must receive its tasks throu gh an cncounter w ith th e tradition, but that

on the olher hand, this tradi li on is o nl y lru ly accessible to the person who has a lready begull to engage in philosophical q uest ions, that is, who has succeeded in seeing through the surface of doxa and reached behind il. Heidegger' s idea thal Ari stotle pursues his ph ilosophieal in vesti gations as a critique of hi s predecessors is imp ortant to keep in

mi nd in connection w ith the ques tion about what ki nd of origin Aristotle is to Heidegger. For Heide gge r occasionall y seems to th in k that the reason why philoso phy must in volve a confrontation with A ri stot.l e is that hi s work represents th e "natmal" views on the world, w hich arc no t achieved throu gh an encounter w ith the tradit ion as is th e

case wilh later phi loso phy , ln thi s way, Aristotle would Ihus be re lati vely "simple" or unmediated origin,99 But in view of his emphasis on the aspect of eri!ique in Aristotle's work, it is c lear that He idegger M el. 99 5 a 2 4 ~ b4. 18. pp. 2 8 5 ~ 2 8 6 . PA , p. 264. fi') Sec hnpter T hrcc, Sec tion 1.

9J

'lMGA

51

l'liAI' Il ' 1( ON I' lhinks th at such a vicw on I\ristolle is lOO simpl e. t\l'I slotl

,1 ,"1

wOlk is lIl\

origin not 50 much on account of ils "carly" and imml.!dint.~ CIHll'lIc tc.:l", but above ail because of its philosophieal power. And it is a rdlccled origin, as it is based upon a confrontation with carlier thought. In other words, Ar istotle had 10 "destruct" hi s tradition no less than Heidegger.

7. Historical interpretation and systematic philosophy We have seen that the destruction oflhe tradition necessari ly in volves a retum to Aristotle, which should make us reali se not on ly that his thOll ght has heen concealed by th e tradition, but also that our present

situation is constitutcd by this concea lm ent. ln relation to this predicament, Heidegger envisages the following task: "ln accordanec wilh our position, the original posilion should be developed anew, that is, thi s position is aecording to Ihe changed historical situation something different but still the same.,,100 Historical relleetion should not only enable us to understand ourselves, but also make it poss ibl e to understand the past, i.e. Aristotle, in su eh a way that we release him from the tradition W I But the task of Iiberaling Arislotle's "original position" is pursued not simply for the sake of bcing able to reinterprel his philosophy against its tradition al reeeption, but above ail in order to make his philosophical position or situation accessible again, 50 as to undersland his mode of questioning. 102 The idea that Aristotle too was forced to develop his philosophy Ihrou gh a critique of his predecessors, and in parlieular of Plato, is occasionally employed by Heidegger in order to compare his own philosophical situation to Aristotle 's. For just as Aristotle is the c10sesl heir to the legacy of Plato, so is Heidegger 10 Ihal of Husserl. Accordingly, Heidegger hop es Ihal, by lurninglo Aristotle, he could bring out the true meaning of Husserl's phenomenology in the sa me way Ihal Aristotle had radicalised Plato. This self-interpretation constitutes the background to Heidegger's leclure course Sophistes, where Heidegger suggests thal, when Husserl 100 GA 63, p. 76: "Entsprechend unserer Stellung ist die lJrsprünglich e Stellung wieder neu auszubilden, d.h., sie ist entsprechend der getinderten historÎschen Lage etwas anderes und doch dasselbe." 101 GA 19, pp. 4 13.41 4. J02 Cf. GA 62*) p. 2, and above, pp. 24-25.

54

fram cd hi s noti on o r intcntiona lity, he in faet redi scovered an idea whi l.:h had long bcen lost, but which \Vas realised already by Plata when he claimcd that specch is a'ways about something, it always ha s the fonn of logos linos. 103 Thus the philosophy of Plato and in some sense also Husserl represenls somèthing new in Ihe history of phi losophy ; but being new, their thinkin g was also vaeillating and unfulfilled, It had to be brought to completion by their fo ll owers: Aristotl e and Heidegger. For if il was Plato's (Husserl' s) achievemcnt to discover intentionality, it was Aristotle 's (Heidegger's) merit 10 gi ve il its true signification by showin g that it must be situated within an ontology of human li fe, which is nol developed in Plato (Husserl). Hence, when Heidegger says that "There is no scientifie underslallding, i.e. historieal return to Plato, without a passage thal goes Ihrough Aristotle.,,'04, he wants to imply that on ly through his OIV II philosophy can Husserl 's thinking be understood, just as Aristotle ' s philosophy sheds new light on Plato. Plato is more difficult to uilderstand th an Aristotle, because his ideas and queslions are nol yC I fu ll y developed and point in many direclions, whereas in Aristotle thcy are "worked out in a more radical and scientific way".105 With the names substituted , this means that Heidegger has fulfilled certain possib ilities which no doubt were inherent in Husserl 's thinkil1g but which were hidden to Husserl himself. In Ihis way, Heidegger has nol on ly radiealised Husserl's philosophy and taken it a slep further, bui he has also artieulated a new horizon with in which to interpret it, in that he has inv it ed into I-Iusserlian phenomenology the onlologieo-te leo logica l dimension , whieh he has received From Aristotle. Precisely on this point, however, it becomes elear how Aristotle's histori eal situation differs [rom that inhabited by Heidegger. Heidegger understands his own philosophy to be reintroducing the question of being 10 philosophy, thereby breaking wilh an epistemologieallradilion wilhin philosophy and reawakening a tradition of ontologica l work that J03 GA 19, p. 598. In the Sophisl, 262eS·6, Plato says: "It is nccessary that a se ntence, if il tS 10 be a sentence, is about somethi ng; without thts someth ing it is impossib le." r'A6yov àvayKalov, owv1tep~. nvoc; Elval Myov, 11~ of: nvàç à,suvawv.") 0.1 G A 19, p. 189: "Es gibt kcin wissenschart liches VersUind nis , d.h. hi storisches Z urOckgchc l1 zu [)talo aime Durchgc hen durch Ar istotc les." Whole se ntence

ita lic iscd by lI eidegger. 105·GA 19.pp. II - 12.

55

:I IA I''I'ER ONE was at il s mûs t powerl'ul during th e anc ie nl CI'U. ' lI llIll~1 1111 Il · I d l."~gc r 's acco unt, w ith Aris totl e and fo ll owed by an incrcasin g Inl\;1c~ 1 in th e nature of know ledge in stead of bein g) whi ch, as wc saw abovc. is OIlC o f Heid egger 's charges aga inst Husserl. This mea ns th al Il eidegge r 's

histori cal position is marked by th e need lO crilicise the history not only bec a use of its for ge tfulness o f bein g, but a lso beca use of its forgetfuln ess of A ri stotl e, insofa r as it has es tablished what in Hei degger 's view is a far too one-s id cd pict ure of hi s thin kin g. Consequ entl y, Heidegge r 's cri tique has to be two fo ld: il must be directed against the traditi on so as to re lease the true Aristotl e, who w ill provide Heidegger with th e phil oso phi eal lools w ith whi eh to criLieise the trad iti o n, an d w ho the reby partakes in th e trans format io n o f pheno menology call ed for by Heidegger. Bul eve ntu all y, lhe criti que against the tradition will encompass A ri stotle as w eil. Thus the " tru c" A ristotle has seve ra l faces, and o ne of th e maj or moti ves behin d He id egger's interpre tatio n o f Aristotl e is to ass ert prcc ise ly Ihi s ambi guity, s in ce it indica tes th at A ristot le is do in g fo undali o nal philosophica l work an d has not go t stuc k in establishe d pos itions or "standpoints" . Aeeordin gly, the pl ace of Ar istotle in Heidegger's projeet revea ls how importa nt it was fo r him to overcome th e distin clion between historie al an d systemal ie phil osoph y, O n He id egger's acco unt, systemat ic philosophi s in g and hi storiea l in terprelatioll do Ilo l o nl y represen t two compalib le e nd cavo urs, but w ill ind eed turn ouI unsuceessful if pursued in isol ation from eaeh other. The atte mpt to do away w ith this di stin cti on is re flected ciearl y in th e lect ure course Phiinomen%gische /nfelprefationen ZIl Aristote/es , 106 ln this wo rk, as in many others, Heidegg er see ms la never aeco mplish the init iall y state d tas k; instead he spends lhe entire lime OIi preparato ry \Yo rk,107 Ari stat le is hardl y menti oned at ail , but Heidegge r, seemingly preparing himself for th e in ter pretati o n, onl y presen ts lo hi s audien ce an "" GA 6 1. See al 50 GA 56/57, p, 132, O lhe r examp lcs arc GA 19, wh ich was to be a course on Plato 's Sophist, but Heidegger devoled half of iL to Aristotle; and "Ei nle itung in die Phânomenologie der Rel igi on", Phtillo men'Jlogie des religi6sen Lebens (GA 60), whe re H eidegger \Vas supposed to speak about Christ ian ity, but spent 50 mu ch time on the introduc tion, whic h \Vas itself a discussion about the very meaning of introduction, that the studen ls complained.

ex p li cn ti oll o f fac ti ea l liI'c, A s th is clearl y s hows, preparatio n or clarificali ol1 or lh e situa tio n peculiar to philosophica l in terpretation is of ccnlru l importancc to Heidegger. This k ind of methodological rell ection sho ulcl not o nl y enab le us to avo id incorrect interpretati ons, but also help us to und ersta nd what it means p ursue philosophy and what happens whe n one reads a ph ilosophieal tex!. However, as he himself says: The re is no point in methodological speculat ions when there is no Ihing [Sache} behind Ihcm. We wanl !i rsl of ail Lo pursue concretc Interp retations and Icave the " quest ion of method" bch ind. Ta be sure this question involves more than the wo rd indi catcs; it is , "111 lts turn a rcscarc h mto ' namely th'Illgs thcmse 1ves. 10.

Meth odology is a justified end eavour to th e exle nl that it belongs to the ana lyti c of human li fe or ex iste nce, w hose mode of bei ng is prec isely interpretati on or exp licat io n. But just as a theory of int erpretati on wi ll be uninformative if it fails to aeknowledge th e to som e exlent unique character of every ind iv idual aet o f expli cati on, met hodo log ieal spec ul ati ons must go together w ilh actua l phil osophiea l interprclati on, for if they are pursued w ithout a specifie context, th ey will be devoid o f con tent and too general to be of use to the indi v idua l case, Or rath er, methodology eannot but be dependent upon actual philosophical work, for even he w ho claims to undertake methodological qu est ions w ill onl y be shaw n lO ha ve framed his meth odology on th e bas is of hi s ex pcr ienccs of sorne specifi e situati ons of int erpretat ion, whi c h he cove rll y has turn ed inlo a general model. Accord in gly, as Heidegger remarks in th e above- mentioned course on Ari stotle, we should not believe th at lhe preparatory work eould be regarded as th e systematic, tnd y philosophieal part whi le the follo wing interpretati on of Ar istotl e is j usl a hi storiea l exegesis, Co nversely, we mu st n ot thi nk th at the introducti on is arbitrary, as if it would be nothi ng but the express ion of the author 's pre fe re nces, while the ex plicat ion o f Ar istotl e is wh al is objecti vc ly lrue, l09

107

56

108 G Il 19, p. 62: "Mcthodische Spckul al ioll cn haben ja we ni ~ Sinn,. werm kejt~e Su c!1c dnhinlcr stcht. Wir wo Ucn zlltlllchst kOllkrele l ntcpreta tl on trelben und dIe

'Mclh oden rragc' 7urOck stcll cll. Frc ilich is t dicsc ist ll!hnli ch se lbst wieder Sachforschung." Ill') (}A 61, p. I IO .

57

dann mehr, ais das

Won besagl; sie

'11 i\ I'TER ONE On Il c id egger's accoun l, w ilhin pl1iluso plll c nl UI. II\!/ Iy nl l'I 1$ no such thing as history of philosophy in th e sense o f ti O lll Cll dll ~ \;xlcl'llal to

t\ rÎ S10ll c w il l! hil11 in Ihi s . Thi s lll cant that he had to make a genuine fl UClllpt lO undc rSland the doxa laid down in Aristotl e's works , 50 as to

the systematic pursui!. Il is not only the case Ih at a " prcpura lory" analysis of factical life will pave the way for a proper eneollnler wi th Aristotle, but this preparation is itself prepared by a reading of Aristotle. The philosophy of làetieallife eould not work as a proper preparation to Aristotle if it was not from the beginning projeeted in the light of an interpretalion of the nature and aim of the philosophieal problematie in Aristolle. That is to say, the aim ofthe reading of Aris tolle is not merely

be ab le to lake a step beyond hi s horizon, thereby receiving the poss ibility ofrevealing the inherent but perhaps unfulfilled possibilities in Arislotle. ln accordanee with this view, Heidegger coneeives of his philosophy as a retrieval (Wiederholung) of Aris totle: it projects itself towards possibilities that are contained in A ristotle 's work, but these

to achi eve a heig hte nerl awareness of wha t presuppositions one wi ll

enaet when approaehing the "thing itselF', for 10 Ihis "Ihin g" belongs Aristotle's interpretations of it. In other words, if the task of philosophy is ta let li fe and ils logos be expressed, one way to do sa is prec isely to make visible Aristolle' s logos. For if philosophy is a speeili e mode of life, of its own theme, then the philosophieal explicati ons of life may be

poss ibilities are truly accessible only on the bas is of a crit iq ue that is 2

direeted ogainsl some of their implications and presuppositions.11 In lhi s way, one eould say that Heidegger's aim is to develop a philosophy Ihat both was and was not articulated by Aristotle himsc1f.

investigated as an int egra l part of lire itse lf Por thi s reason , the inquiry into logos must involve an inqu iry into Ari stotle's "speech" on logos.

And al! the di fferences belween Heidegger and A ri sto tl e notwithstanding, one might in faet say that it was Aristotle who initiated or at least prepared such a view on philosophieal wo rk. For as we saw earli er, Aristotle claims that the suecess or fa ilure of philosophieal investigations depends upon th e ab ility to encounter doxa in the right way. This means on th e one hand that the sys tematic pursuit cannot do

without historieal investi gations, but on the other lhat the fruitfulness of our interpretations of doxa requires a systematie ambition from us. Il requires that we have ta ken a step beyond the leve l of opinions, othenvise we wi ll not be able to get a clear v iew of them, "For on every

subjeet the earliest philosophy is like one who fa lters, while being new and in its beginning. " 11O Beeause of this interdependence of historieal and systematie research, Aristotle th inks that hi s own philosophieal results cao be described as saying something that in a way both has and

has not been articulated before. l l l Heidegger did not think of Aristotle as faltering. His aim was no doubt to formulate his own philosophieal agenda, but he wanted to take ~,1O M~l. 993a,15 -1 ~: . "If~ÀÀt~o~uivtl

yàp ËOtKEV

O'tê VEa tE Kat KŒt apxaç 01)00." I II

h 1tpdrrll

$t Àooo$ia

1tEPl

rrcivn:ov, II ~

Mel. 993al 1-15 .

58

Sec ( iA HI p. 270. 1

,9

Clli\PTER TW O

Chapter Two

THE EPISTEMIC LOGOS

1. On the task ofquestioning a traditional intetpretation oflogos Following his own dictum that phi losophy is possible only as critique, Heidegger's shifting approaches to logos as a ph il osophieal theme ail have one thing in common. [f yet with various degrees of explicitness, they involve a confrontation with that conception of speech which he regards as altogether dominant in the history of philosophy, l10tably so far as the development of logic is concerned. This is the view that the declarative scntence or the assertion (die Aussage) is the locus of trulh and knowledge.' A decisive step in this direction was ta ken by Aristotle when he singled out th e assertion as a form of speech particularly worthy of interest, which must be investigated separately, since its basic characteristics are not shared by the other modes of speech. [n De Interpretatione, he deelares that: Every sentence is meaningful, though not as an instrument but, as wc said, by convention. Not every sentence is an assertion

though, bUl only thase in which trulh and falsity are present. There is not truth and falsity in every sentence; for example r: prayer is a sentence, but il is neither true, !l Of false. 2

l "Assertion" is the common translation of Heidegger's tcrm Aussage. It may pcrhaps seem at b it awkward to speak about a "negative assertion", but as Heidegger does not make uny distinction bctwccn affirming and Ilcgat ing sta te ments as far thei r assertoric force is concerned; to deny that something is the case is no Jess an assertion than ta affirm this . The meaning of "assertion" will undergo change as the analysis proceeds, but init ially, it refers ta the indicative, whose basic runction is ta state or assert "something abOLIt something", tt Kal"c1 'tl voS, lO use Ar istotle's expression (see e.g. De An. 430b26). Though for the most part! wil l use the tenn "assertion", J will occasionally also speak about "statement" or "propositional speech", but without any difference in meaning. 2 De lnlerpretatione ("De [III."), 16b33- 17a4: "Ëcrtl ôÈ Àôyoç Cl7tClÇ ,I èv Olll l ()V"t 1K6C;.

auX

wç op-yQVOV M, à",),: W01l:Ep eïp r)1:CH

KC11à cr\JVe l; KllV. ànO$CLv't"I ~o "

60

8t\

0\1 n(ic;,

On th e bas is o f this dcJinition of the assertion or logos apophantikos, Aristolle was able to dismiss the non-positing modes of speech from his " Iogical " investigations. Since they cannat be true or false, their investigation belongs to the disciplines of rhetoric and poeties 3 ln doing this, he at the same time cleared the way for instituting th e judgement as a model for genuine cognition, since the judgement is the kind of knowledge that finds its proper expression in the assertion and thus can be true or false. 4 The critique that Heidegger directs against this conception of logos does 110t primarily aim at showing that other modes of speech th an the assertion, su ch as questions, imperatives, etc ., are also of interest in connection with truth and knowledge. Rather, it seeks to challenge the very category of indicative speech itself, Illaking lhe assumption that this i5 not a homogeneous phenomenon when taken beyond its formai or logical context. Heidegger does not dispute that there is a particular

form of knowledge and truth peculiar to the assertion, and the point of departure for his inquiry is the conviction that one must take seriously the ciaims made for the primacy of the assertion in this respect. What he does criticise is a treatment of the assertion, and of language in general, as something that can be investigated in isolation, without reference to ils role withio human understanding and action. In other ward s, the target of Heidegger's attack is above ail a philosophieal interpretation of the assertion that he regards as too limited or one-sided in that it has discarded the context of speech as something external to the meaning and nature of speech. This has resulted in a static conception of speech that docs not pay attention to the activity of speaking but only ta its result, i.e. preciscly the assertion. For this reason, the task that Heidegger sets himself is not merely to show why the inquiry into logos must refrain from looking upon the assert ion as a basic model for speech, but a1so and equally to question Èv (~ tO a Àll8euElv il \!/E.uôeo8co UnapXEl" OUl( eùxn M-yoç pév, uÀ).; OÜt' OAllOnS OÜ1:E: 'VEUOr')S."

ci n'

ÈV onCIal ÔÈ

U1tCiPXël, OlOV

l',

J /Je. 111f. 17a4 -7. .1 And silice A ri s toll c [!link s [hal the pos itive judgc lll cnt g ives more knowledge th an

Ih e tlcgal ivc, Ile dcc lnrc s the fi fSl sy ll ogisttl 10 bc the 1ll 0S 1 sc iell tific one . Tt is the ol1fy sy ll ol:\ ism Ihll l is hOlh pos iti ve rl nd l.lni vc rsal. Sec PO.l"lerior Ana /ylies ("An. j 'ost.") 1.1 '1. 25.

(JI

'11 1\1''1 1,1{ '1 W() the formai or logica l app roach to lan guage 1'01' th " hcnc l1t o f " phenomenologieal interpretation. ln order to revea l the nUlur" of the

llltde rstand why th e a ssertion ha s been granted this specia l cpistemological status requircs ultimately that one should also examine

assertion, and of speech in genera l, th e forma i ana lys is is not cnou gh, insofar as it focuses on the logico-grammatica l, "slatie" [eatures of

the ontolog ica l assum pt ions that organ ise such a view on speech. In this

speech, for in order for something to qualify as an asserti on, a special

kind of situation must obtain. Since this condi tion is shared by ail modes of speech, whieh means that speec h reee ives its specifie character or differentiation - sueh as assertoric force - on ly within a g iven contex t, it was wrong to sup pose th at the asser ti on should be

chapter, however, 1 wi ll - on ly touch brie fly upon that aspect of Heidegger's anal ysis. ln th is connection, Aristotle is initially approached as the ori gi nator of the for maI or logical approach to language, together \V ith its elllp hasis on assertoric speech, which He id egger thus wa nts to c hall enge. But w he n tracing thi s int erpretat ion of lo gos back to

s ing led out merely on th e bas is of Hs grammar and lag le. As an

Ar istotle, Heidegger l'i nd s that Ar istotle's understand in g of

a lternative to this kiml of Iinguistic analysi s, Heidegger proposes to seek the foundation not just of propositiona l speech but 31so of uttered, "concrete" speech as such in a more primordial discursivity belonging to man. Wh en reach ing th is more [undamental level of th e constitution of speech, wc will have the opportunity to sec what reatures are pecu liar preeisely to the assertion. furt her, if it sho uld turn out - and it w ill that there are forms of understand ing that arc not propositional in kind and therefore cannot be coneeived of \V ith the assertion as a model, but yet make up the foundation of propositiona l speech and thought, then we cannottruly comprehend the nature of the assertion itself un less wc c1arify these other forms ofunderstanding. It should thus be no ted that l-Ieidegge r's inquiry in to the assertion

propos itional speech is in ilS turn based upon a braader notion of

will eventua ll y lead to a tra nsfo rm ati on of th e ent iJ'e problcmatic.

Initi ally, he goes along with the form ai perspective on language, and

affirms what he takes to be th c cOl11mon meanin g of "assertion ", aceording to whieh it refers td an ullered or pronounced statement - der ausgesprochene Satz, as he puts it. s But eventua lly, tbe assertio n w ill be regarded as a speci fi e mode of access to the \vorld. Par th is reaso n, a central question for the phenomenologica l analys is concerns wha t kind of k.nowledge is involved in assertoric speech. But of equal importance is the quest ion of what kind of ideal of kn ow ledge goes along \Vi th the focus on the asserti on in philosophy. Th is is, on Heidegger's account, a theoretical ideal of knowledge, what 1 will cali the "epistemic" ideal of cognition, thereby referring to that kind of knowledge which Aristotle designates as epis/eme. Fin ally, Heidegger (hinks that to fu ll y

speech, even though Aristotle may not have been entire ly clear about this himself. In virtue of this double tendency in his thou ght, he can show the way forward to a beller understandi ng of the essence of speech. Thus on the one hand, Aristotle is the target of Heidegger 's " destruction" of the history of the philosophy of language: he is the sti ll not accurately explicated origin of that which in this context first of ail "shows itself' , that which is primaril y given ta the investi gatio n of logos, namely the notion that language and thought are essenti all y invested w ith a propositional structure. Here it should be noted that Heidegger regards Aristot/e as the origin of this notion of language not because he takes this to be an obvious fact, but because this has become the common view on Aristotle. In other wards, the po int of departure for I-Ieidegger's inquiry into logos is not simply Aristotle himse lf, but rather a traditiona l in terpretation of Aristot le. Accordingly, the first task that Heidegger sets himself is that of exploring Aristotle 's understanding of the assertion. More specificall y, he secks to revea l the structure which in Aristotle's view constitutes the possibil ity o fm aking an assertion. This is the structure of sun/hesis and dihairesis. In do in g so, however, He id egger fin ds that A ri sto Ll e 's ana lysis or thesc concepts, albc it too limited in its approach sin ce Aristotle Feil short of inquiring into their existential foundat ion, may ncvertheless be extended beyond the sphere of propositional speech, to th e domain of human undcrstandin g as such, co nceived of at a deeper level than that of concrete speech. Within the lirst stll ge or the illqlliry into logos, that is, before he bl.:gins clnhonllin g hi s OWIl vicws , Il cidcggl:1' (h us thin ks il necessary to

' CA 2 1, p. 1;,10.

62

ül

'11 Al'llm 1 Wt) de vo le SOJl1C c lTOrl to jU Sl li slcning 10 Âri Sloli c !lnd 1\1 w lHlI Ill' h!l' ln !'l lly abou t the meaning and nature of logos. A s he put s il, hc hu . Il'llmin g

ally new conception of logos and ilS relation to truth and knowlcd gc, wc must first try to get behind the history of logic, down to its origin, and listen to Aristotle's own Collegium logicum. 6 2. Sunth esis and dihairesis as the basic constituents o/the assertion ln the 1925/26 lecture course Logik, whi ch the fo llowing discussion primarily draws upon, Heidegger sets out to discuss what logic is, describing il in a preliminary \Vay as a discipline Ihat in vcst igates speech, logos, insofar as il ean be truc and ral se. 7 Thus tb e question of

logos is from the beginning formulated as a question concerning the nature of truth. In the lectures that fo llow, Heidegger devotes mueh time to a carefll l serutiny of different modern views on the relation between truth and speech, notably with respect to Husserl and Lotze, eventuall y working himselfback to A ri stotl e' s work as thcir supposcd ori gi n.

Since Aristotle states that "Truth and fa lsity are a matter of combination and separation"S, the initi al task must be to exami ne the meaning of comb inati on and separation , sunthes is and dihairesis. Heidegger' s interpretation of these concepts puts focus on what he will later state to be one of three basic features of the assertion, namely predication, by which he understands the dctcrm ination (Bestimmen) of the subject by means of the predicate.' According to a common view, sunthesis and dihairesis are related to affirmation and denial, kataphasis and apophasis, in such a way that sUl1thesis and kataphasis fonn one pair, and dihairesis and apophasis makc up another. The ensui ng result is that to make an affirmation, for in stance that "man is white" is to combine the two concepts "man)' and "white", whereas to deny the same thing would be to separate them from each other. lo One could thus ' GA 2 1, p. 25. 'GA2 1,p. 6. 3 De In/ . 16a I 2-13 : ''n:Epi. yàp OU9EOlV K(.Il ôwi peoi v Èo·u tO o/eûooo:; 'tE

KUl1Ù

à,~aéç." 9 GA 2 t, p. 133 . The other two characteristî cs are "mani fest ation" or "showing" (Aufze ig ung) and communication. These are treated be low. 10 See e. g. 1. DOring, Arisfoteles . DarsteiiuIIg und Interp r etatio n seines Denkens, p. 66 ; W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 26; E. Tugendhal, "Der Wahrheilsbegr iff bei

Ari stoteles", p. 252.

64

say thut SlIlIfltes is and dihair es is explain what is involved in making an affi rmative and a negative judgement respectively. Il eidegger, however, rejects this interpretation and argues instead Ihal denial and affirmation alike involve both combination and separation. Whether you affirm or deny that man is whi te, you bring logether or "synthesise" "man" and '\vh ite", and th is implies at the same time a form of separation, not only in the sense that "man" and "white" are kept apart in the assert ion , but al 50 that, in making the assertion, the property "white" is singlcd out among other possib le properties. 11 This interpretative move is very important to Heidegger; in fact, it settles the horizon for his interpretation of the Aristotelian logos as such, and it also provides him with a background to his own project. The reason is that this interpretation opens the possibility of taking the struct ure of sunthesis and dihairesis beyond the context of predication On the propositional leve!. Granted that dihairesis represents the act of " spelling out" or separati ng subject from predicate in the assertion, it can be understood as a kind of apprehension that, insofar as it singles out that qual ity which is to stand as prcdicate in the assertion, may fun ahead of and be constituti ve of predication. Hence, there are two claims involved in Heidegger's interpretation: first, to make an assertion means both to combine subject and predicate and to separate them from each other. Secondl y, predication (s unthesis ) is based upon a foregoing separation, which gives you access to an object in a particlliar regard . As an interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger seems to be confident in the appropriateness of the tirst claim, but hesitates as regards the secon d, for whereas the former still moves within a formai concepti on of th e asserti on, the latter indicates someth ing about its foundation. But even though Heidegger in the end wi ll conc illde that s untllesis and dihairesis as portrayed by Aristotle are too formai to capture what he himself is after - namely a synthet ic-dihairetic nature pertaining not only to propositiona l speech and thought but to man 's very existence, as weil as to the givenness ofbeings as such - he is not prepared to tie Aristot le to an entirely logical conception of this structure.12 Heidegger's hesitation in thi s connection is to some extent caused by an ambiguity on the part IIGi I 2 1. p. t39;SZ. p. 159. ~2 (iA 2 t. p. t 68.

' ll l\l''l'ER TWO or i\rislotle, who does IlOl al\Vays stale cxplici tl y \V hoth e, ho ls lIsi ll!; the concepts o f sl/nth esis and dihairesis \Vith an o nto logica \ or togical meaning in milld . However, Heidegger does not co nsidcr this ambi guity only as a problem, but thinks that it is also w hat is tru ly fru itfu l in A ri stotie's conception of sun/hesis and dihairesis . [ wi ll returo to th is point below. But tirst so mething more must be said abo ut the notions of kalaphasis and apophasis, su ch as they are und crstood by Ar istotle. In De Interpretatione, th ey are defincd as follow s : "A ffirmation is an asse rti on predicating one th ing of anoth er, and negoti on is an assertion deny ing one thing of another." l) Note is that it is not a (grammatical) predicate that is amrmed or den ied of a (gramm a ti cal) subj ee t, but a quality of a thin g. ln this way, th e assertion by its nature "aims at", and is guidcd by things. Ifwc look ta the Categories, wc ftnd the following distinction between the assert ion and its object: T hat w hic h falls u nd e r a ffirmatio n and nega lion is no t itse lf a ffi rmation or ncgat io n, fo r a ffir mat ion is an aftirming speech , and negation is a negati ng speech, bu i Ihat wh ic h rai ls under 14 affirmat io n and negali on is not speech.

How are wc now ta understand sun/hesis and dihairesis in this context? As stated ab ove, Heidegger's idea is that to eve ry asserti on, regardless of whet her it affirms or de ni es sOl11cthing, thcre belongs a sy ntheticdihairetic structure. The cruc ial text for He idegger in thi s conn ection is De Anima. F irst, as He idegger notes, Ar istot le states th at s lll1thesis is necessa ry if falsity is to be possib le, an d s ince negatin g assertions apparentiy also can be fals e, thi s seems to impl y th at sunthesis belongs to apophasis as we il. " Aristotie explains why th is is 50 : "For cve n if [one were to say that] w hite is not white, one hàs brought [wh ite and ] not- w hite into a combi nation ."" And he add s: " lt is equall y possible to

cn l! a il thi s di vis ion .,, 17 I\ s far as 1 kn o\\', thi s is the cnly place in

Ar istot lc·s works that can really be taken as contirmin g Heidegger's interpretation. On th e other hand th ough , 1 can not see that Aristotle ever 18 says a nylhing that con tra dicts Heidegger on th is point. And as we w ill see shortly, Heidegger points to precisely thi s passage in De Anima as a k ind of tuming-point as far as the inq uiry into logos is coneerned : it makes up the end-point of Ari stotle's a nalys is of logos, a nd thereby, it marks th e limit of the traditional inquiry into logos as such. For this reaso n, it also provides Heidegger \Vi th the startin g-point for his attempt ta take the analysis ur logos a step rurth cr than what Aristotle himself did. But so far _ the preliminary co nclusion that Heidegger draws is that, once we realise that dihaires is cann ot be ide ntitied with denial and slm/hesis with amrmation, we see not on ly that every asserti on has a sy ntheti c-dihairetic stru cture, b ut a lso th at thi s is a more bas ic pheno menon than affi rm atio n a nd denial : "Combination and separation precede affirmation and deni" l as th e condition of their possibility and as the condition of possibility or conceal ing and uncovering.,,19 With

sun /hesis and dihairesis, we thus seem to have found th e basic structure of lo gos as assertion. T he next question for H eidegger is how far the Oxford Class ic al Texts edi tion. See also De lnl . 16b23-25, where A ri stotle remarks that not only the word bcing (El vat) bul nl so " no t-bei ng" (!l~ dvat) implics a ouvgeOl j l..:CI itsdl"

6X

and a n affirmative stat ement to ontological combinat ion, it is not easy ta dccide whethe r Aristotle also thinks that, when passi n g e.g. a negative judge ment on somethin g th at is dihairemenol1 we are only Cllactin g a

d ihairesis and not a s lll1/h esis - unless we take the ab ove quotations From De Anima as evidence in favou r of Heidegger 's interpretation. Or rat he r, it seems suffi cie ntly clear that Ar istotlc at least occas ionall y thinks that sunthesis is pred ication, whelher affirmati ve or negative, but it is more doubtful whether he has also enl ertained th e idea th at thi s sUllth esis must be a\;l.;ompanied by a dihairesis . As mentioned above, one problem in this co nn ecti on is that Ari sto tl e is not so careful in distinguishin g between th e linguisti c and th e ontological level (that is,

the meanin g of a stale ment a l'firmin g or denying that a quality belongs to a n abject and th e obj ect' s mode o f existence respective ly). More precisely, A ri stotle does not always specify exaclly what kind of co mbination or separati on he has in mind; that is up to the read er to understand from th e contex!. But in view of Heidegger 's claim that Aristotle has a not ion of a synthetic-dihairetic structure belonging ta the asserti on as l uch, whelher it is an affirming or negating assertion, it seems that a di stinction must be drawn between separation al the object ive and al th e linguisti c level respecti ve ly. For if th e dihairesis of speech represen ts th e di scernment of one predicate amon g others, it is appli cable not only ta the situation where we hav e a separat ion at the objective level, but also ta the one where we have a combin ation. The reverse also holds, of course. Thal is to say, we combin e th e tenn s in speech or lhou ght ev en w h en th eir ontological counterparts are di vorced from each othe r. What should one think of thi s seeming ease w ith wh ich A ri stotl e moves between th e onlological and the logical or lingui sti c level? Among Ari stotl e scholars the opi nion is rathe r w idespread that he, and the Greeks in general, had a somewhat nalve co nception of language, or more precisely that th ey were sa thorou ghly at home in their lan guage that has a composi te na tu re ( in contras! to the incomposite, à crûv9cta, substan c~s). E.g. in De Allima, whc n Aristot le discusses (and rejects) the idea that the soul IS a o ù vO e o t " of con lrnri es (407b27-408a I8), and below, when he remarks that the clClllCtHS COllSlÎ llll c tll ill H" in virtn c ar " a partic u[ ar formul a and sy nthesis" O..6'YC!l tl Vl KCl I 01)\'0""0 1 1) , 111(1n l . ,

'1lA 1''1 I,R 1 WII

'\ IAI''Il;J\ '1 WO

that they wert! nol abl e la rellcclupon il. t\ccordil1 gly. Hlldull u ( 'ussÎn

bctwccn thcorctical and cvcryday speech.27 But al the same lime, when th us mak ill g logos, and in particular logos apophantikos , into a theme of its own, Aristotle made possible the subsequent divorce of language from lh e ontological domailj, as weil as pavin g the \Vay for the notion that not only human thinkin g in its essence is propositional, but ev en being itsel r. But on the other hand, to the extent that Aristotle' s logic remains intimately connected w ith ontology, which makes Aristotle extend the app li cation of sun/hes is and dihairesis beyond th e context of

has designatcd Aristot le's phil osophy as a "happy phcIlOlll cllology", referring to the view that Aristotle sees no problems co nneetcd with the transition from the perception of a thing to its Iinguistie express ion ." Heidegger has olso put forward the idea that the Greeks were "fall en to" and absorbed by language. Indeed, he claims, the Greeks were in a sense in love wi th 10gos.24 And because Greek life to such a great extent was centred on speech, in their society the greatest threat 10 a lire of knowledge and truth came prec isc ly fro m la nguage, th e c learest c,;xprc,;ssioll ofwhich is th e emcrgence ofsoph ism. 25 But Ihi s on ly s hows

the immense effort Ihat \Vas demandcd from Pl ato and Aristot le to seize the possibi li ties of lan guage so as to frame a new philosophi cal conceptuality and to devclop a science o f logos. And, Heidegger continues, \Vhat is truly extraord inary is that in this pursuit, Plata and A ri stotl e did not look for a gu id ing ci lie elsewhere, ou tside G reek

soc iety, but managed to retrieve th e possibi lity of a scientilic att it ude

towards speech trom wit hin Greek life itself: "They made good the possibilities of speaking. Thal is the origin of logic, the tcaching of logos,,,26 Still, the emergence of a criti ca l re tlection on logos in Aristotle is somethin g that H ei degger considers 10 be at the sa m e time both fruit fui

and problemati c. As he sees il, it is in part prcc isely because Ar istot le

did not completely trust in language but saw that ail form s of speech are Iimited in differen t ways as far as th eir power of arti culation is concerned, that he reali sed the need to distinguish between different kinds of speech which admit of dilferent kinds of access to the world. ln particu lar, He idegger argues, il mad e A ri s tot le awa re of the difference 23 Aristote et le logos. Contes de la phénoménologie o;'dinaire, p. 4. See also the cssays "La charte de la phénomènologie" and "De "objet de la sensation au sujet de

la phrase" in the same work. Cassin herself, while beginning her own work \Vith Ihis characteri sation of Aristotlc's philosophy und ta sorne extent affirming it,

nevertheless seeks to question il as being tao one-sided. ln this connection, one migh t also mention R. Mortley, who bas traced the history of a growing mis trust of language. He thinks that it originates in Plata and is st ronger in him than in Aristotle. See From Ward to Silence 1. The rise al/dfall oflogos, pp. 1 1Off.

" GA \8, pp. 262 -263. 2.> GA t 8, p. t 08. 26 GA 18, p. 109: "Sie machten Ernst mil den Moglichkeiten des Sprechens. Dns ist der Ur.~pf'lmgder Logik, der Leine vom ÀÔ'Yoç. Sec also GA 17, p. 18; G/127, pp. 5 7 ~ 58.

70

propositiollal s peech, thi s is also somct hin g th nt Heidegger beth

endorses and questions. Heidegger too wants to use these concepts with such a broad application, since he believes, just as Aristotle, lhat the ways in which beings are given are constitut ive or our ways of thi nkin g and speakin g, and that one shou ld therefore seek to find something like a cerum en structure to th ese do mains. But as indi cated , in Ari stotl e. the Iinguistic (i.e. predicat ive) and the o nto logicall eve l are often fused . and thi s Heidegger wants to avoid , since he thinks that th e result of thi s

fusion is that bath being and language are in th e end common ly assigned a propositional nature. ln this way, the seeming lack of a re fl ection on logos prod uces essentia ll y the same outcome as its contrary, the Hlogical" attitude outlined ab ove. For as Heidegger sees it, even though Aristotle saw that th cre are di ffe rent levels or aspects or slln/hesis and dihairesis, he did not manage to fu lly elucidate the relation between them. As a consequence, Aristotle was too vague about the foundation of the assertion, sa that thi s analys is of logos to some extent remained fixed on the level of proposition al speech. This idea of Heidegger' s is parti cularly important to keep in mind when readin g his interpretation of Aristot le's discussion of sunthesis and dihairesis, for it explains hi s vacillating stance towards Ari stotle on thi s point. More precisely , Heidegger does not vacill ate as regards the ambiguity in Ari sto tl e himself, but because Aristotle's thinking in this context poi nts in two direction s, He id egger hesitates as to w hether he should grant

Aristotl e ail understandin g of the w ider ontological impl ications of sunlhesis and dihairesis.

27' Cf.

(,lI nplUl' " hl'cc. Scclh1ll 2.

71

CHAPT ER TWO

CII APTEI{ TWO

ta l-lowev er, Heideg ger' s respons e ta thi s prediea ment is not j ust e separat e the ontologieal From the linguistie level, aseribin g ta languag have no its Qwn struct ure of sunthe sis and dihaire sis which would e 10 a structur this takes he equivalence in the things themse lves. Instead ry bounda the deeper level of speech Ihan that of Ihe asserlio n, where Ihat between languag e and being can be dissolved anew, in such a way this In e. structur retic Ihey are both discove red la have a synthet ic-dihai mcanin g of \Vay , one ca n say that Heidegger tries to bring out the truc

by Aristot le's attitude towards the re lation between language and being,

di sti nc ti on showin g th at A risto tle indccd \Vas ri ght in blurrin g the

ll y between Ihe two, althoug h it shou ld be done at anoth er, onlologica prior leve l. in Thus at the end of hi s discuss ion of sunlhes is and dihairesis Aristotle, when Heideg ger raises anew the questio n of where one sholiid of look in arder ta get a cilie as to what conslilules the basic struct ure logos as assertion, he states that: Apart from an esse ntial , though agai n tao vague indica ti on, Aristotle himself decJines to answer. He and the Greeks - and the ensuing tradit ion as a who le - have neg lected to interrogate Ihis structural ph enomenan in it s own right. Co mb ination anu l separa tion are the struclUre s by means of \\Ih ich, and as the fina with in rema 1'0 ... clarilled, is ent, stage, the assert ion, the judgell1 A ristotle him self, he could not Iiberate himsclf from his g orientation tow ard s language - for the Greeks so met hin ures struct the him, in n, shaw be ll wi as imposs ible - and sUlllhes Îs and dihairesis and their relations ta truc Jnd false karaphas is and apopha sis are not at ail so tran sparent as 28 compared to how they were elaborate d abovc.

on This Hvague indicat ian is, 1 take it, the passage in De Anima ately slln/hes is and dihairesis diseussed above. And, Heidegger immedi H

zu unbestimmten GA 21, pp . 141- 142: "Von einer wesent lichen, abe r doch wieder die Grieche nund Er t. Auskunf die selbst es Anwei sung abgese hen, versagt ArÎstotel unt erlassen , diesem und die weitere Tr adition überhaupt - haben es Trennen sind die Strukturphan omen noch ci gens nachzufragen. Verbinden und \V ird, ... UIll St~ukt~re n, mit denen aIs einem Letzten die Aussage , das Urtei l gekHirl fille! der Sprnche icfung Oricnt der von nicht er ist so bleiben, zu be l Anstoteles selbst Slcll 110.;; 11 :tC igè/l l o~gek~m m e,~ .- fLlr .die Griechcn c.ine Unm oglichkcit - uli d wl c Jl l" lr lll UlHcli " ' l' IlIl 1I1ld ipcou; a lh und ; COI O\)\,O n Strukture lle e Ihl11 bel wlrd, smd 28

Wahr llnd Falsc ll 1(mc):$ucu c;

lil le!

OItO$U01Ç k c i ll csWCH~

\V ic sic obclI herausgcarbcÎlcl wlIrdcn."

II lIdl

11111 "II dIUI'I Htl\.'ht IH

'

logos aSSCI1S. il is oil ly on the basis of a more far-reac hin g inquiry inta actually le Aristot what and that one wi ll be in a position to underst meant by this Uvague indicati.on" concern ing sunlhes is and dihairesis.

4. The as-structure e the The next stage in Heidegger's analys is of logos is th us la continu ion investigation into sunthesis and dihairesis sa as to reach the foundat g in someth from Ollt sets of the assertion. Where should he begin? He 100 gave he wh ich he takes ta be problcmatic in A ri stotle, the fa cl that him much priority ta Ihe synthet ic element in speech, for this made other of cast the at tion predica attach undue impo11a nce la the aspect of as feature s of speech. Even sa, Aristotle's concep tion of predica tion ta sunlhe sis contain s an insight o f great importa nce, namel y that predica tion belongs an "as-structure". Th is is , Heidegger argues, the Aristotle's great achieve ment over agai nst Plata. Wherea s Plato in ing,29 someth Sophisl discovered th at every propos ition is always about as Aristotle took one step further in determining the Slructure of speech this ts interpre ger Heideg li kala tinos: "something about someth ing".30 and as saying that to pred icate an attribut c of a thing means to display il, thereby to see it, in a specifie regard; ta see il as (ais) some thing, rather 31 than as anoth er. Ta interpret li kola linos in thi s \Vay means of course if ta have already taken a step outside a strictly linguistic sphere, for n "saying as" pertains to a "seeing as~', wc are faced with a questio have wc is, That concerning th e nature of this kind of access ta beings. to that of predication: to be 1l0W encountered a level of meaning prior one must understand il as lity, qua ab le to as sert that a thin g has a certain being of such a quality. 's Thi s s hould thus serve as a further elucida tion of Heideg ger cation Predi interpre tation of sun/hesis and dihairesis discuss ed above. thi s as sunrhesis mean s to say something about something, and sis , dihaire ng foregoi a of cOInbination is only possible on the basis speech al whi ch cannot, consequ entl y, be said ta reside in proposition the o nl y" but must rather be recogn ised as an acti vity that precedes when on, rehensi propos itio na l level. In thi s sense, th e momen t of app 21J (' f.

ln th'

hnpl c,. One, p. 55. 1111 . ! 702 1Ir.

Il ,,'/.. p. J ~() . 1hll ~ J Icld l.:"Hl'1's III , is /\ , i ~ t o IJ c's l~.

Il

1

'II A!,'II ' I{ '1 W()

'II A I''J'EK TWO

you takc notice of a n a bject in a certai n regard , und h ' Ill''"' "" ill ~ ll' out" a parti cul ar featu re of il, is as much in vcsted wi th th e as~sll lI!;t lll !.! liS is th e e nsuing predi cation. Of course, th is m uch A ri stotl" 100 \Vou Id agrcc upon; i.e, th at ta predication there belongs a foregoin g apprehcnsion,

we il aS 11H11 whi ch is 10 be intcrprcted itsclf, are taken apart and . • 33 must be ke pt aparl in the cnactme nt 0 f t1le mterpretatlon.

where you pay attention ta a particular feature of the abj ect in question, but the point Heidegger wants ta make is th at this dihairetic "seeing as" ca nnot be conceived aft cr th e m ode) of predi cati on, s ince it does not belong exclusively to propos iti onal speech (and tho ught) but to man 's very existence. Pu t in another \Vay, ma n 's most funda me nt aJ way of be ing in the wor ld is mark ed by an as-st ructu re of it s ow n, an d thi s means th at his ex isten ce is essenti all y co nstituled by exp licàtion (A IIslegllng). The articu lÎIHhlll g, nflch ciller Kopuln ." Il" '':l'frit deI' l'(! lt ll! /I V(!/'II/I/!fl, A 59RIB 626. I,.l Ik II/r . 16b 22 ~ 25: "où yùp l' IvOI i\ l' I~ elv(!I cr q)l (,'i6v éo n '[O\) rrpaY)1otoç;. oùô' ,\ùv ( l~ 'Iv dlt\lI

111

uence.

°

h'. N. VU .

lU II I

'I ht!

('o ll(/i l irJII , site argues Ihnllllnn has always had ri tcndency, Ilot least l.:l1 Co urngc produ ctio1l inslcnd of II cl ion. sil\cc th e former \Vay of

/(1/1// ( 11/

pi\ lltlclnllll ,

If)

II I

'liAI' Il ' 1{ IIIIU 1 CIIAI''I loR 'III RUE M islol/

b ' , , C: le e mg 01 poiesis is illljJcrfccl pdll llll'lly Ibl' leleo log ie'll reasons: ItS Illovement 's . l " ' . ' . 1 1l1COmp ete and Hs end IS cXlcl'lml 10 il , since il IS a proeess lllvolvlllg cha T d 1/

literatu re relatin to

.

n ge.

0

~y,

hO WCVC l",

cs pcciall y in the

', , g HeIdegger and Anslotle, the moral impli cal ion s of th e d ISlmctlOn between prod t' d ' . uc IOn an actIOn are cmphasised more stronglY, Even If one does not identify poiesis with production of works b ut takes It ln the wide ' ' f b' , ' . r sense 0 nnglng somcthing abOlit, it is still a mall er of achlevlng a result, something of use, The idea is that th' mlodel hl as become decisive ta our way of relati ng not just to things bt:~ a SO 10 lU mans But 50 it is a g d " " r lie ,pOIeSIS and teclme a re inappropriate ~odels for our behaviour to\Vards and understallding of humans ~or t cy make us regard humans as means, as so mething \V hi ch c ' b con tro ll ed and calculated upon instead o f as li d . an e .

"

,

ree an

unpre dl c lable

age l~t s,' ,whosc Inl eraction is a 'wa ys oll e of cha ll enge and c han JC ThcICJ.OIC, hum an bchaviour must be understoocl' t

f ,g , h. . 111 crrns 0 praxis and 1one~'ls. where the former is more or Jess identifi ed with human IllteractlOn, and the latter is regardcd as a kl'nd f' If d ' h' J ( a se -un crslandmg w I C 1 cames through such interaction TI t ' . . . H) 18 to say thraugh

l!

~nteract lOn:

on e

d~velops

uma n, whl ch then

tS

an unders la nding of whal il- m e~ns 10 be retlected bac k on one 's sel f-underslan din g. J 1

. However, one has also sensed the diffi culties in co nce ivin g of aCli Wlthout recourse to producti on, not least sinee it has been thoug~t th:~ A n stotle hllnself tended to d d " ' un erstan praXiS ln tenns o f poiesis .32 In re/ating 10 Ih e wor/d is eas ier and ad mit s of f . • A nd she beljeves that this te d . nOie control o ver humans Ihan the latter l' ' n ency [s present a lrend . A' ~mderstood aClion in tenns of produclion 1'0 A r Y, III , rrstol et Le. I hat he mteraction and the poss ib ility of ta l..:' " end t: aC ll o n IS the sarne as hurn an \~hereas production represents a fon~~l~/ct r vc pa rt ln the constit~tion of society, 'd~sc~pe from Ihe uncertalnly and aH the dlfficu!ti es inherent in pol iti cal lit'", A involving an affinnation of thc 1~~ra~cOJ Ing ~b.~.he understands the vita activa as membcr of (he sociely , responsl 1 lIy one has towards olhe rs as a l" < ~ A ~roponent of Ihis vie\\' is J. Tamini au:>.: Lectllr e d ~ / ' , EssG/s slIr Heidegger see also F VI ' "D". s e omo/agie fondamellta/e . radical isation heidegg~rienne-de I ~ PhO' IP', h ~'I'(W' ~u1llme praxis: L'assimilation et la 32 Th' . . . I OSOp le prat ique d'Ari stote" , [S pOint IS dlscussed by R. Bernasc . fi. . . ' . EXlsting, pp, 2-24. S Broad ie Etl i ' h OllJ ,. eldegger III QuestIon The Art of although A ri stotle w~s not as' COI~f~~:~lIab:,,:s:~I/ed.ha. s s~ggested (Ch. 4. III) that q,pOVTlcJu; as one usually has claimed he tende~ to t~' ~tl~C~OI1 ,between tÉXV'l and ~enns of the 't'ÉÀûÇ of 't'ÉXV 'l and th~ re fo h ~. lm 0 t e TEÀOÇ of ~p6v'lO't,.aestrukl/O/7 IS a construc Ion ' l Ï~ . weys in w hi ch life has or relates to itself, But since Ide IS re, ' If in terlns of ils pre-organISe or pre't If for its dealings ill lIlllin alcd, address lllg Its e , '( blocks Its access ta 1 se , 1'I 1I'uc tlll cd occ upatio ns, 1 . .. . ltaneouslv a ~ :-l tund in th e way. \\() Thu s th e co n5tructlOI1 IS Slmu

ccs rw..:On ,or 1 Heidcgger 's account, whereas

IIIK

( ;A 6 1. p. 120:

" B CWCg llll g

des fak lischen Le b ens .ln d e r begegnishafte n Richtung

huf cS sc lbsl. " 10'1 cr. ( !A 61. p. 13 1. 1 III

UA 6 l , pp. 1 1 9 ~ 120,

14 1

'1I AI'I I ' 11 111I1I1

Hdcstructi on" , thou gh not only in th e seml!,; o !

l' li A!''! ER 'IIII \ EI', I,.' ll·Ul tllg

un ob stac

le to an ima gine d self-tran spar ency on Ihe pari o f lile , '1h ' dcSl1'uc li on indi cale s fini tude a lso in the sens e that life as it CO IlSll'lIclS ilsc lr s imu hall coll s ly destroys that which il \Vas and 8150 wha t il co uic! be. 111 To fail lo the wor /d is to fa ll to the pub lic exp l icati on oft hin gs. Tha t is to say, in eve ryd ay lire , wc are " illu min ated " or ach ieve our und erst and ing thro u gh our acce ss ta al read y esta blished opin ions , doxa . Thu s here we return ta the poinl at whi ch this cha pter bega n: dox a as • basic phe nom eno n of eve ryd ay life. As stated the n, wh en exp lori ng Aris tot le's und e rsta ndi ng of dox a, Hei deg ger is not mer ely out to establish the basi c trait s of evcr yda y life, but he a lso wan ts ta kno w how Aris totl e's con cept of logo s is rela ted to (Ar isto tle's und erst and in g al) eve ry day spee ch. Of part icul ar imp orta nce in this con nect ion is to see how A ri stot le co nce ives of th e re la ti on be twe en eve ryd ay and them et ical spee c h. Fo r cvc n thou g h ll eide gge r thin ks tha t Ar isto tle a ffirm cd c/oxa as a form of uncl crsta ndin g in its ow n ri ght, he susp ects th at Aris tot !e's att itud e tow a rds c/oxa is gov erne d by hi s noti on of theo ry in part ic ular and by his onto logica l ass llmp tion s in gen era /. Bas ical ly, Hei deg ger 's idea is th at Aris totl e cou Id not find the limi t, the peros, in eve ryda y Iife. For doxa is itse lf imp erfe ct, w hil e bein g inca pab le of hor iz ein , of deli mit ing il S abj ect 50 stri ctly as ta be a defi nitio n, since it on ly says w hat thin gs are " more or less " , Mor cov er, the th in gs of eve ryd ay con ce rn arc a lso imp erfe ct, sinc e th ey are cha nge able. lI2 T his idea of theo retic al spee c h as horizein, as com pl ete dem arca tion , is som eth in g that Hei deg ger can nat just take ove r, sinc e he be liev es, agai n, that thi s idea is root ed in the noti on of bein g as Fertigsein. Sti ll , in spit e of his hesi tanc e o n th is poin t, He idegger thin ks, as was also note d abo ve, that Ari sto tl e's dia gno s is of do xo dep icts essential aspe cts of ever yda y Iife, incl udin g its shor tcom ings . Of parti eula r imp orta nce to Hei deg ger is to emp hasise that li fe in dox a is a litè dom inated by assertio ns , th at is, spee ch inso far as it has bec ome sep arat ed from th e very acti vity of spea king . To som e exte nt, wc alw ays rcm ain dep end ent upo n doxa in thi s sens e, for if one co uld See H, Rui n, "Think ing in Ruin s Life, Deat h and Dest ructi on in I-Ie ideg ger's Ear ly Wr iting s", whe re this des truc tio n is expl i cate d in te rms of Ruinanz, the " nJ jnous" mov emen I II

112

t of Iife, See GA 18, pp, 132, 139-1 40 ,

142

,

" . , v..'Îth o ut ha v in g m ade o nes e lr the l ' ' k ' Il) th e I aun eall on s o l' Ol)ini ons a shar ed wor ld 111'1 h: IH; C}; 1lHlt 111,1 ' C l J , ' 1 , ,' bl' Il But thl. s 15 a 5 0 th e mas t prab lem allc Il Il,, ld Il\lI he l'0SS I c. . f' b e of its falli ng, Ii fe te nds to , " or eca us plll' 1l 0ll1 CIHl ll 0 l CV ~I y(h( y li , bl ' · ' li'ca dy esta IS he d opi ni ons 50 th at the li t, 't llll C "~ Il \rt n g 1c d " \1\ , d " ," ' ann ihila ted, . in g th1l1gs \11 a new way , 15 1" ", lhil II Y 0 1 chan ge, o f see . 'ble by prov idin g the agen t , , l 'C mak es act Ion pOSS I ANwc saW car l ICI, C OX l , h d r: iti on of rhet oric as , ' the \\ \\ 1\ uim and ehrcC \l on, Acc ordt n g ta t e eill1 " ' 'ble ta con vinc 1 e the aim hy whl ch It IS pOSS I of l' IIWC I' 10 sec t l e tll can~ ' , , 1 h con vinc ing argu men ts, In orde r to 1Il ..' 101 ie is la crca1e op m!O os thrOl g h or gen erally con trol the . III hieve th " , the spea kc r nlU st try to can ge 1 k . . 1 r tle spea e r is not prim aril y out to ""It lldcs 01 hls leal.ers.. How eve . ' h th'n , f h 's aud ienc e ta t e l g itsel f but rath er to let ,11, COl Ihe " Ite ntlo , n 0 1 f . aks in favour 0 a ce rt al'n attit ude tow .rds th e thin g. Ilu,' 1I1 sec W 11d' t spe, , , '1 d' s not pnm an Y see the thin g but a cert a1l1 cco rdin gly, the .all lenc e doe nd so rhet oric al spee ch is characte ri sed by 1111 'rpr etat lon o t It, a doxo, a them selv es . W hen this I I ~ Cll re l'or opin ions and not for h h ' t e t mgs hllpp cns, " e rnpt y spee ch" , Gerede, anse s:

11111 \II HI ' !'}; Io nd w ll al 15

S d I C.

re

s ecch whic h has the facti cit)' to ~ dev'e lo a certa in contentment,not to ICI the thlllgs be seen , but: P The dom inati on of . d' that whl eh one tilUsays S, rcnHlI1l stan mg bY , b' r. Dase in and mak es tt emp\y speec'11 pree1'sely conc eal s emgs Lor , . , da ld al 50 10 the P05Slbt hl Y bl ind la lhat whic h has been unc avere 1 , Ullco vcn ng, 11 4 l.oXos is :Irst of ail emp \y

or

e nds tow .rds emp ty spee ch, it spea ks not so tll, o rur a S evcryda y spee ch t h' • 1 t 'eall y sec so met mg, b t mor e for the s ake of U IIiile h III 0 1'( el' 0 1 . . .' th 'lt IS for the sa k e 0 f spee ch itself. In this way , Il 'vcl opll lg a pmiO ns, ( , i t logo s tend s 10 ta k e. t h e p lace of pra xis in eve ryda y ilile cou l(l say l1a , 1 r as we wi ll see in th e ncx l 1lre..:, Thi s is a lso wha t, hapl~ens 1~1 t 1e o Yt'· 'ay For in emp ty spee ch , , , 15 111 an mau h t en l e v. ,'l1 l1 l't CI', bul hc re It lapp e l . ' . ther words one 's spee ch Ull e sl1caks wi tb oul gcn uine d lsc\o sure , or 111 a , 11'(iA 19 pp 25-27 , ,, II I ( lA 1; 197: " Dcr )"6 yoç isl ZlIII11d lSI 1 G'l'cde d'ts di e Fakt iziüit hat, die (l.I~"111Ce c i o~nl'üm l iche Genil gsam ke it " ' . Sn chen n; cht s e hc lI l.lI l n s~'C il so n(l c rn " b " , Oic ll e rrschaft des Gere des • 1 bl Clbc n WIIS 1\Hl I 150 'SI\ot nU I(,ub ildclI , be l dcm sic' 1' ' lCI! ~)l , , I~S Scicndc undbmac hl also blln d gege n da s v" I!lchll cll t »cnl de rtl1: tl as ~SC~ II .( .. " uf~~e dcck l c lIl1d InOijll CllC Âiil dcckcn,

19

1'11

(' II AI'I I' I( 111101

'1IAI''1I\H '1'I1 HI\Il

rcmain s an Hemply significH tioll", ~I halls III ,"Illy. i, is nol l'lI lfillcd by ail uncoverin g of the thin gs thernsclvl,,;S, bu t " Ill y conlinncd by ongo in g speech, as one 's op inions are taken IIp by Olh c l's who co nlinu e to speak

1\ I l yduy lire nS [1 \V holc, thal is, irphil osophy is unablc to move beyond 11 1\ l' ~l1lnlH.~S CVCl'yda yness and inslead lets it constitute its standard.

about Ihe opinions which have been ullercd. In Ih i, way, Ihe resull of ongoing speech is that the assertions are eventually cul off tram the acls of uncovering that once were their origin, This leads in its turn ta the sedimentation of assertions: they gain a kind ofself-sufficiency, insofar as Ih e speech that is conducted so lcly for the sake of speak in g contmuously sustams them . In this way, logos as doxa becomes bath the origin and th e dri ving force of speakin g with one anoth er, that is, it becornes the ultimate te/os of everyday speech. l 15 What happens when esta blished op in io ns gel the lIpper hand aver th e activ ity of s peakin g? O ur cx periences become anony mou s and

seemingly ava il able to everyone but in reali ty to no one, since no one bothers to make Ihe experiences for himsclf when th ere are alread available expli cat ions of them. Thus hav in g an opini on means that on~ does not hav c to seek anymore; tbi s is the cssential fcature of doxa as Aristotle co nceives or it , w hi c h lets him di stingui sh doxa From d I"b . 11 6 • el eratlOn . In thlS way, th e activity o f speech find s Hs end in doxa: the speaker takes hold of that which is souled instead of deciding or choosmg for hllnself. I-Iowever, thi s stability only intensifies the restlessncss, for, as Heidegger says, it is characteristic of doxa that one always can cont inu e ta speak about il, in other words, it is implied in il Ihat the Ihin gs about whi ch it speaks can alwa ys be dirferen!.l" Accordingly, living in doxa gives ri se to a ccrtain kind of instability, it causes one to be on the move, to continue the speech, Since the stability of oplll ions IS dlusory, the discussion is continuously no urished by a constant des ire for rest. Howev er, empty s peech is not primaril~ a problem ta everyday life Itself, From its point o f vie\v; for obvious ly , th cre are a number of dea lin gs in everyday Ii fe in con ne.ction with w hi ch il would be pointless t? ask for a more genuine form of uncovering than that which ju st f~lI ows whal "one" says is Ihe right thing ta do. The real problem arises 1t phdosophy rcmains nai ve in its relation to everyday speech or ta .

1"

nr

\VUS indi catcd alrcady in the previous chapter, Heidegger thinks 1 III 11 1111 It is beca usc 0 1' philosophy's fa ii to doxa that speech has been IlIlll 'l'slood in tenll S 0 1' iegomelloll rather th an legeill, so that the "" " li "l1 has been considered to be of greater philosophical importance 11 11111 Ihe ac ti vily of speaking. This has had two consequences, which are Illllli li lll' 10 uS by now: one has objectified speech, believ ing that it has a Il Il Hic 0 1' bcing simil ar 1O that o f things; thus one has lhought that h\l\w 1U gC can be used as a tool, Ilot seeing that its essenc,e lS un covenn~. \' l'{) lIdl y, o ne has come to beli eve that th e q uestion of ~ruth IS 1 llUlleetcd \Vith the assertion, and not \Vith the activity of speakmg, and II lhc idca oftrulh as correspondence has arisen, ln this way, Heideger III ~]lCS, Ihe phil osophical care for legomenoll has obstructed its access to Il ',tWill.ll~

If) ('o /lcludillg remarks Whut task rcmuins arter the explication of everyday li fe? lnsofar as an "'"Cli li ai aspect of everyday life is that it is fa llen to the wo rld of IlIlI ccm , whi ch it moreover understands in terms of a public l' ' pliealcdness, th e task still remains to account for the nature of IHllh c nt ic understandin g, that is, such understandi n g tha1 is able to \])lIl1l er Ihc fal lin g of everyday li fe, However, this has to some extent I,,'cli l'ulfi lled by means of the di scussion of ph/'ollesis . To be sure, the 1CIi SOIl why ph/'olles is has been treated in this chap ter is that, wh en IIl c'lll'cting ph/'onesis as self-understanding, Heidegger paves the way I tll' n co nceptio n of phronesis in accord an ce w ith wh ich th is for111 of tllld ersllIlld in g is regard cd a s ail integral part o f human exis te nce as l'I ueh, be il in ils authenli c or illauthenti c mode. But insofar as pltronesis \." 111 ulso be rcgardcd as authentic selr-understanding, it points. t~\~ards. III ' " eXl chapler. FrI a bOlh Aristotlc ""d Heidegger, Ihe possJlll hl y 01 ph il o~o ph y is foundcd on phrollesis, th" t is, 0 11 an illsight int o \V hat IS ~lIod roI' oncscl r. III . l'ill III/ri Ze i!. 1h.:idcggç [' says ubo ut hi s ana lys is th at l' Il w ill torn

to Dus 'i n's di Slillcti vc il nd most rar-reachin g possibili tics of disclosul'c. : :~ GA 18, p. i 5!. E.N. i142b6-1 S. See also He idegger ' comment in GA 18 pp 137- 138. 117 GA 18, p. 59. ' .

144

II I

Scc( ;A II), pp. 26-27.

C' II A J'II ' I( 111 1\ 11

[hi ~

" tif) TI ' ,0, lC 111 05 t f' l ' 1 t e O UIl ( ln tee me Or . h' . ' e, l uuslcc y pllroll e.~·i.\· i n th e sense o f aut entIc care for one' s j ' jC' l ' , own !te. nstead, It be lon gs 10 philosophy as

in ord er lo get information élbout

bcl ug

far-rea '1 ' 'b'j " , c "ng pOSSl 1 lly 01 dlsc los urc i5 no [ concern. H owever nor is it not xl 1b

Il'0 111

Il lcs'

[ 0 ") '

Chapter Four

ontologleal knowledge, which not only breaks with everyday eoncem but also moves beyond the confines of self-understanding, Therefore, to tllln ta the phllosophleal logos is, at Jeast as Heidegger sees it to tum to the most onglllai possibility of logos.

THE PI-lILOSOPI-lICAL LOGOS

'

1 I>/ii/usophy as an uriginal pussibi/ity fur lugos

Wli cil [ul'I1ing to Heidegger' s understanding of the philosophieal logos, [II i, siudy retums to the question coneerning the nature oftheory, with whi ch the inquiry into logos originally began, though from a new J1 ~ rs J1ec li ve, ln the meantime we have followed Heidegger's attempt to cSltl bli sh a connection between logos and kinesis, according to which it I.~ Il ot. onl y th e case that human activity as such is invested \Vith a di sc ursive structure, but logos must in its tum be conceived ofalong the ll ,, ~s

of action, Against this background, the task remains to determine wllll l il could mean to regard even philosophy as a form of action, and 1'1'0 111 th ere on to make clear \Vhat directives issue From such a co nce pti on of philosophy for the question concerning the scope and !l nl ure o f th e philosophical logos. A s indicated at the end of the

j1I'cv iolis chapter, one way to motivate the shift from everydayness to philosophy is to point to the necessity of exploring the most "farl'~nchin g and di stinctive" possibility of diselosure, which is authenticity, 111 whi ch lire becomes truly itself or eigen, as opposed to inauthentic, Uil Oll y ll1 0 US

'09

SZ, pp. 1 39~ 140: "Und sic wird sich an d"

.

ErschlieJ3ungsmoglichkeilen des Dase 'lns [[ Je ausgezelchnete n weittragendsten . la ten llm vo ' [ [ Selenden entgegcnzuneh1ll en. " n 11Ilen (cn Au rschl uf3 dicscs !

lire . In thi s chapter, however, authenticity will be

eonsidercd as itself a possibility for philosophy, More speeifieally, it is 1\ IllOllcr of sho wing what it could mean, from Heidegger's point of vicw, 10 stand in an authentic relation ta the tradition, and, one could pCl'haps say , to have an authentic Mitsein with Aristotle. 0 11 Il cid eggcr's account, wh en tracing the most far-reaching or (H iginal possibilily of logos, we will simultaneously encounter its limits. III ~hi s way, Ih e sca rch f·o r an authcnlic logos should make it possible to 'l n.alll 1.'H.:r ibl.: ~hc phenomcllon or l ogos as a whol c. And the most farl' 'lichilig possibili[)' or logos is, in Hcidcggcr's view all east, lo be found IH'\.:cil'l.:ly in !\ ri sloll c' s work und il S com.:cpll HlIil y, on account o f the

146

1117

CII I\ I'II ' I( HII II(

' 11 1\ 1' Ii m l'OUI(

innuencc it has cxerl ed on ph il osoph y and 0 11 Weslern Ih oughl as s uch, Accordin gly, granted that philoso ph y ncccssaril y rema ins tied to its Aristotelian beginning, the attempt to revca l th e limÎts of Ar istotle 's logos at th e same lime aim s at dem ons trat in g th e limits of th e philosop hieal pursuit as sueh.

n:p,lu.d Ihe non.discursive di sc loscdncss of 110 /IS as a condition of logos, Iholl gh il is Il cc essaril y cnac ted through logos. But in this chapter, wc \V iII see how Aristoll e, due to hi s suspicion of the limited scope of logos, trics ta liberate n'lus from its un ion with logos . Th is point l'eceives fairly extensive treatment by Heidegger, since he thIIlks that, \V ilh th e concept of nous and the concomitant view on theoria as a kind (lI' vision, Aristotle has not only eneountered the limits of logos but also pointeo out the limits of his own view on logos. In the end, he could not ul'fi nn Lhat speech rather than vision is the most original posslblhty for

We have a lready seen how Heidegger, in trying to let Aristotle's logos exp lieate itself, has touched upon th e limits of Aristotle 's project on several occasions. But now th is logos must be illterrogated with r~s~ect 10 il s own mOSI original o r far-reac hing possib ility , where ilS !lIl1ll S supposed ly should be particlil arl y vis ible. And on Heidegger 's account, it is precisely in connection with Aristotle 's conception of philosophy thal we can rea ll y see the power as weil as the limits of Aristotle 's projeet. When try ing to cireumscribe the scope and nalure of Aristotl e's philosophy, howe vcr, Heidegger does not s imply go behi nd Anstotle 's back, as il were, but int errogatcs Aristol le himseJf with respect to what he takes to be the most origina l possibility of logos, and thlS lS precise ly philosophy. In Aristotle 's words: philosophy as theory, theorlG, lS the supreme form o f praxis. This chapter centres on I-Ieidegger' s interpretation of thi s idea. r wi ll argue that Heidegger in faci also adheres to Ihis view of philosophy, though he belteves that it has to be transformed. For 0 11 the one hand \V ith the notion of theOJ'ia as supreme praxis, Heidegger hopes to b~ able to reconci le th e theoreti ca l and the practical and th us al so ta overcome Ihat epistemic conception o f logos which has led to the primacy of assertorie speech. Bul on the other hand, he Ihinks that the way in which Aristoll e conce ives of theoria explains why Aristotle hlmself evenluall y eSlablished logos apophal7likos as the primary mode 01 speech . For even though theoria is regarded as a fonn of action il simultaneol1s1y gives expression ta an idea l of knowl edge as visi~n, nous , rather Ihan speech, logos. And logos apophantikos is that mode of speech which has the pm·ver o f making th ings visible, though not ill the same degree as vision or nous Îtse lf. To help theoria be that which it was intended to be, namely the ultlm,ate form of praxis, Heidegger has to show that also philosophy as a seemg of the ultimate principles is a discursive mode of thinking, To achIeve thls, he has to come ta grips \Vith Aristotle's notion of nous. As we saw in the prevous chapter, Heidegger think s thal il is possible to

148

!/l'ax is fiS thcOI'ia.

,

'

S in ee there are reasons to be li eve that the role of non-dIscurs Ive Iho ught in philosophy constitutes a div iding line between He idegger !l nd Adstotle, this notion is accorded a central place in this chapter. Il owever I-leidegger's philosophy itself bears witness to a suspicion of di scurs iv~ reasoning, notably in hi s idea that philosophy involves a fn clical break with speech as such, whatever [orm it may have, At lcast (ln th e face of it, he scems to have tried to conceive of a specifie kind of cxpcrience that would be somewhat similar to th e noetic experience "" li ed for by Aristotle. This is the idea of the Augenblick, "the wink of the eye", which i s simultaneously a mom ent of truth. ,WLthout II l1licipating too much of the subsequent discussion, one I11.ay Just note Ihat one of the reasons why it is possible to see a eo nnectIOn between 110 ilS and the Augenblick is that none of them is a mode of reasoning. I\ nd Heidegger uses the notion of Augenblick atleast partia ll y in order 10 complicate the relation between experience and linguistic expression, os he seems to imply that this kind of momentary, singular expen ence lS Ilot entire ly expressible . Further, since the Augellblick is o ne of Il e idcgger ' s morC important tem poral concepts, designat ing an HUlhcntic presence, it plays an important role in hi s attempt to c~me to grips w ith the Ar istotelian con cept of time in ge neral and wIth _the noti on of presence involved in the concept of nous ln partlcu lar. rhe juxtapos ition of nOliS and the A ugenblick thus also brings us into th e lieurt of the quest ion coneerning the nature of temporality. The chapter begins with an exposit ion of Heidegger 's and Aristotle's res pecti ve views 0 11 Ihe gcnes is of philosophy, w ith partieular foc us on tlie idea th at th e poss ihilit y o r phil osophy requ ires an interruptron of cvcrycla y speech. 1 w ill IÎrsl cxpl nrc J Icidcggcr's claim that thi s idea

'11 1\ 1"1 HR l'OU R

'111\1'11 ' 1( HHII< makes Aristotl e develop hi s concept o f prllxis i" such a way as ta guarantee the possibility of non-disc urs ive vis ion, whi ch is Ihought to completely surpass everyday, discursive conduet and thus ta preserve the initial break away from il. Then 1 w ill show how Heidegger, turnin g to the very same concept of praxis, sees another possibility for philosophieal vis ion, the Augenblick, which lets him frame his idea of philosophieal aetiv ity as counter-movement and retrievaJ. With this notion, he seeks ta affirm the di scursive nature of philosophical praxis whil e s imulta neous ly revealing il S finit ude. r'' inally, 1 will discuss the consequences of this idca for the question of th e poss ibilities and limitati ons Înherent in philosophical speech or articulation .

2. The l'ole of interruption in the genesis ofphilosophy How docs philosophy ari se, how ca n il be Illotivated [rom with in the perspective of eve rl'day life? This questi on seems to be particu larly worth posing when exp loring th e lradition al estecl11 for philosophy as metaphys ics, as proie philosophla, which places philosophy at the top of the hierarchical order of knowl edge. This view is ollen accompanied by the idea th at philoso phy not only makes up a particularly farreaching or compreh ens ive form of knowledge, bu t that it is also something exceptionaJ and extraordinary, so mething which cannot be conceived of simply as a continuation of our everyday understanding of the world . For the ri se of phi losophy is not only concomitant with but indeed dependent upon a negligence of everyday concerns - which however does not prevent p hil osop hy from aspiring ta possess the ultimatc truth even abo ut that everyday life on whic h it has tumed its back. This is how Aristotle sees it, and even more sa Plata. In th eir view, it is not bec au se philosophical w isdom is especially useful to us that il can Jay claim ta superiority , but becau se its abjects constitute the most ad mirab le and overwhelmillg aspects of rea lity. And it is possibl e ta uncover the truth about th ese things but yet be ignorant in "practicaJ'" everyday matters, as Plata has brought out most cJearly in Theaeleilis. Here Socrates portrays the philosopher as a man who, because of a total lack of interest, is sa completely ignorant of his neighbour that he does not even know whether he is a human being at ail or pcrhaps so mc other creature, But whal a human be ing is, thi s he is intercs h.: d in and sccks to

150

lIudcrstu nd . 1 i\ ri stot lc expresses a similar view in the Ethics, as he dl Me lisses SOlll e or th e di fferences betv,'cen phronesis and sophia, notin g Ih l1t pcople co mm only think that men Iike Anaxagoras and Thales are wise (sopllol) )'et unabl e t~ see what is good for their lives (they are not /1111'0 111111 01) , and that people " say that they [Anaxagoras and Thales] kllOw that wh ich is exceptionaJ , wonderfuJ, difficult and divine , but not IIIlything lIseflll , for they do not e xp lore the human good,,,2 1n th e Me fQphyslcs, Aristotle suggests that the sciences th at do not ni lll at utilit y co uld arise only when such arts that provide man with the I1 ccess iti es of li fe had been developed, as th is for the tirst time enabled IIlen ta have lei sure 3 Only when it was not necessary ta be continuously " ccllpied with hllman affairs was it possible ta tum the attention away Ii'om thin gs of immediate concern and to direct it towards more abstract tliings. This is particularly true of philosophy as sophia, as Aristotle Stll tcs in th e famou s passage in the Metaphyslcs: That il [philosophy] i5 not product ive is clear also from thase wl~o fifst phi losophised, For il is through wonder lhat men now beglll and originall y began 10 philosophise, wondering first al common

perplexities, and th en by gradu ai progression being perple xed by greater thin gs as weil , ." , He who is perplexed and wanders thinks that he is ignorant ( .. .); hence if il was to escape ignorance

that men began to philosophise, il is obvious that Ihey pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for the sake of uny thing useful.

4

l'liiloso phy ari ses out of wonder (ta thaumazein), from a feeling that the wo rld is no longer familiar but on the contrary more or less obscure and Ilvc rwh e lmin g. Here we can see how Aristotl e co nfirms th e v icw cx pl ored in the previolls chapter, that the ordinar)' perspective on li fc is Iwodu cti ve or poictic, wh ich makes us pursue our act ions for th e sa ke o f 'JlIcoefeIIlS, 174b l M6, N, 11 41b6 . 8: "Kat Tt €pu't'o jJ Èv Kat 9alJjJ.OCHIl Ka t xa4Tt ôè OV ),éyetCLI '/to À ....~ axwç".a ,(.1 ~poç 'ô" " ' av ' ." . . ta èv yàp Ot l oùatat, ovw ),eyEtal. ta on na, ~

~~~i~~\~~~~;:~~ô~~il otaiav. ~ ~eopai ~ atEp~aE.~1 ~ ."o,6t~t~1 ~ "~~~:':,~ ~ yevvl1 r~Ka

oùcri aç

~

nôv n:peç t11v oùoiav

À.Eyo~ÊvO)v ,

oùataç'" " Kat ou. 'C 'I ov " a').)" ~ 0' rr t..w.-~ 48 Met. 10280 24.29: " wmE. 10 rrp(~'tùJç ov " DV

c'i11."

206

11 'tOu'Cwv 'tw oç a rr

207

~

m'iOta av

( 'II AI'II -I( I-IVI

t II Al' ttl ( II Vt-

II ~wcvde r, as menti om.:d in th e bcg il1nin ~ 01 (!I ls chllplcJ' llei dcg'gcl' 1 " conv lllcc that , ev en lilOUg 11 "Il tS /"I 0 1lS and 0 not logos Ih, a l is ab le to ;::serv~ or corresp ond to the nature or be in g whcn Ihis is interprct cd in as : smo l~.rese~ ce, III th at nous d~es not li ke logos understand ilS obj ec t e IIlg,. m terms of someth mg el se, it is nevertheless logos that is govenlln g Anstotl e's ontology: Aristol~e ~love

strives indeed, as we have seen, in the idea of sophia 10

eyond logos 10 a l1 oe in , which is l'ree l'rom legein. BUl

;~~ rded

more carefully . evcn his detcrmin ation o f that wh ich a. es up the arc h e, that wllich is ad "l, " . ach teved b l ' fina! 1 . . t lall elon, 15 no t LI !Il 1 )C o n entatlOn frolll /0 . TI', u Ihe facl Ihal Ihe rundamenial as, the characle r of h/lpokeimelloll , Iha\ which alrcady' us 10 ad. vance . det" . ' the altog e.tl1er pnmary 01 e prese nce; that is the formaI J ~n~l~atlo n of somethln g that is fiS stlch. And 10 be sure th ' ;;po that is to say, Ihm wh ich alrcady is Ihe;c

~y

deIC~~~;la1 i~:, oC~~':1C;I~p~are'lt Ji~S b~r~>

eu~'eIIO",

i'~

ab:~~~~ n~se:~i~;g,fr\~~~:I~~l ~C~i~:~I~:i~ r~'~/;~~iI~: . ~I.lnt in a spee~h

ad vance, before ail speech, is the re fo r th; X!st~lg con text, ln about which one 5 k . s speec , namely that : . pea s, - IlIa( IS the hupokeimenon the on the OUSla III the forma I sense Th e basl'c ch l ' d l" ' , be in g , is . aracter ot re neve rom the contex t of logos itself.49

Recalli h k ng th e quotati on above ' whcre Heideg ger staled that tlle upo eimeno . . connec kinesis" we n was " uncovc ' red. r.01. t1le fi[rs t t!Jne III tion with

con ce t: fsee that He idegger apparen t ly thinks that A ri stotle 's p 1011 0 OUSlQ as hup 0 k el/HenO . . n may be interro gated f h perspec tive of logos as we Il l' rom t e s hould of course hardl as rom th e perspec tive of kinesis . This Heide ' , . y cO ~le as a surpn se at thi s stage, where gger 5 ldea of an essentwl co nn ect ion between logos and kinesis GA 19 , p, ...û4., ,Anslole ,. zwar wie v ' ' O'o$ia libe r den ÀÔvo'" hin 'H'sleszustrebt e,' e '- d \ If gese llen haben, in der Idee der ' 1 ~, n III VOEtV as fre ' , t ' bese h.en Ist auch, sei.ne Besti mtTI ung desscn, \~as letzt 1 1; .V?I~l AtYE tV: Ab,er genauer nur III der Onent lcrung am ) 6 - e aPX Il 151, was aOlCttpET OV i5t Gru nd best immung des av d' ,'c o', dgewCo'll llen - Das zei gt sic h dari n, dan , , \ I o t a en larakte d' . was 'lm vorh inein schon vorliegt der g'. .. ' Anwese r es \l1tOKEt~ ' nz pn' maren 1 '. dE\'OV . hat, . des sen ' estun mung von etwas \Vas überha l ' U ,nlel1 , as 151 die fonn ale B al . " up ISl. nd zwar 151 d' . . . 50,, was !Ill vorhmein schon da ,'st gese hen aus d H' bl' !eses \J1tOKEl)lEVOV ' das ln emem Sprechen über etwas Ivas' · B em 111 lck auf das ÀÉyElV: Was , "' , l i n espreche n eines 49

~oç

di~

. d Z ln: vorhlnem ver allem Sprechen für dieses da i . . ' selen en usammenhanges \Vlrd , _ das ist das U1tOKei~Evov das 6 s~, na~h.ch ?as, worüber gesprochcn Grundch arakte r des Sei ns wird aus d 'z v, die O\laLa III formale m Sinn Der < em .usamille nhang des ÀoyoçscJbst ~cschÔI;n."

208

nll'cady has bec Il deu il \\1 1111 on 11 IILllIlh c l' nI' uccnsio ns, No\\' it is time to tl'y la scllic th e l'Cllltii.l1l bdwcc n th csc t"'JO concep tS. Wc have secn carl icI' th at Il cidcgge r thinks that the concepts that are needed to explai n the naturc of kil1esis, namely paiesis and pa/hesi s, must also be taken into a~count in connection with 10gosSO Just as the movabl e being is affecte d by something that moves or is produc tive, logos gets affected by its object. Or as Heideg ger puts it: "Think ing is nolhing but this pros, thinking require s in v irtue of ils being: being open la samelh ing difJe/'el1/; its be in g cannot be understood or be origina lly sccn, if not the Ito whot ' is there".5 t C lea rl y , th e idea of ~uch an openness in logos and kinesis is in Heidegger's vicw one of Aristot le's most important insights . Howev er, the problem w ith Aristotl e's concep t of kinesis retums in his concept of logos. For just as Aristotl e has to explain the possibility ofmove ment and change by positing a moyer, he is in need of a productive reason, a nouS paie/ika s, in order to accoun t 52 for the object, the "to what" oflogOS. On Heideg ger 's accoun t, logos is rea ll y the primary theme of Aristoll e's ontolog y, since it is th e notion of the discursi ve structur e of logos that lets Aristot lc re gard the wor/d as chan geable, as marked by kinesis , ln thi s way , logos wo rk s as an a priori in Ari stot le's philosophy.53 But as we have seen earli er, Heideg ger also thinks that Aristot le's concep tion of logos in its turn is determ ined by hi s underst anding of kinesis , in accord an ce \Vith which logos itself is regarde d as an activity th at is afe/es, incom plete, and thus of a di fferent kind than the perfcct nou S. M oreover , insofar as Ar istotle tends ta interpre t kinesis in t e r11lS of product ion, 50 that th e final explana tion of kinesis is reached only w ith the el ucidation of a produce r that is not itselfpr oduced, this makes Aristotle, or that is at least Heideg ger's idea, conclud e that the proper task of logos must be to make accessi ble this produc er as thal which kinesis really is, namely the presenc e or e ntelt;;ch eia of ousia as essence.

~ Chapter Three, Section 8. ~I GA 18,

p, 234: "Das Denken ist nicht s anderes aIs dieses ltPOç, das Denken ZI/III anderen, sein Sein kann nicht verstanden werden, prim(lr geschell werden, wenn nicht das Wozu da ist". Sl Sec Chllptcr Threc. Section 7, 5) PA , p, 265,

verlangt seinem Sein nach: ofJen sein

209

1 Il \ 1' 11 Il 1 1V I

6. The primot.:y oftlie ClsSértion alld the questioll aj'he/II!!, As we saw in. eonncetÎ on with J 'Icid egger ' s di sc ussion of e veryday ~peech, tlle basIc character of logos, whatevcr fbrm it may have, is that It makes the world present or accessible by explicating it in di fferent regards. But a.s not~d in the former section, even though Heidegger suggests that, ln Anstot le ' s ontology, lo gos prescribes in advance the ways in whi ch the world can be given, he also thinks l'hat Aristotle 's understanding of logos is in its turn affected by the notion of being as presence, so that logos is thought to make present that which in some sense already was present. It is th is feature of logos that has granted to il Ifs prol11l1lent place in Aristotle's ontological investigations: This b~·eaki!lg fil 0.( logos, of the logic a l in Ihis slric1.ly Greek sense , Ir/ta Ihe ques.llon concerning Ihe on is II/Oti\!ated by the fact that the on, the bemg of beillgs as such, is inlerpreted primarily as pres.ence and that logos is the way in which 1 prùnarily make sO/17ethmg present, narnely that about which 1 speak.54

ln Chapter Two, we tb llowcd Heidegger's idea that Ihe reason why the assertion, logos apophantikos, could become a model for discursivity in general should be sought in way Aristol le determines Ihe assertion when he characterises it precisely as apophantikos, stating that its fundamental trait is that it makes ils abject manifesl as il explicates it. Even though Heidegger himself to some degree affirms this mterpretatron of Ihe asserlion and has tried to elaborate upon it, he is nonetheless conv lllced that it is intimate ly bound up with Aristot1e's u~derstanding of being in terms of presence. When bcing is identified wllh presence and regarded as somelhing finished and vorhanden, that IS, as ~omething which is constantly "there" for us, the idca arises that the pnmary task of logos as sueh, whatevct form it may have, must be to cO~Tespol1d to and preserve this prese nce. S5 And sinee it is the assertIOn alone Ihat really can be said ta achieve this, it deserves ta be called the primary or superior mode of speech.

" .GA. J9,

p.

.1 25 :. "D/eser

Einbruch des Àoyoç, des Logischen in diesem stren

?ne~hIScl~e~ Sun, tn. chese Fragesleltwig /lach dem av ist dadul"ch morivierl, daJ3 da; ~~' ~Sd~etn . des S.erendeJ: selb~f, primar ais Anwesenheit interpreti'!rt islund der

oyo., le An IsI, zn der Ich Inll· etwas, namlich das, worübcr ich sOfech e ... .. . vergegemvdrtige." 1 , p' OIIG/ See GA 18, pp. 214ff.

T o be sure, I\ l'lstoll \ ,IIH"oj 11 111 huvl' li l' "dul:l ivc vic\\' o r s peech . Ile docs not wanl 10 s u g~ "s l 1/ 111 1 11 11 l, milS speech CO LI Id be ana lysc d usin g the stru cture o r Ihe fl sscl'li OIl - in th e grammati cal sense - as a model , as sumin g c.g. lI\at a l bottolll tilere is an indicative ke rnel in c very mode of speech. In his view, there are different form s o f semamein, of signifying, and only the assertion signifies by means of making manifest, since only it can be true or fa lse. 56 But precise ly because Aristotle does not think it possible to reduce ail fonns of speech to that of the assertion, he regards the assertion as mare interesting in connection with thl;ory anù knowledge. And if Heidegger is correct, the consequence of this is thal, because of a certain theoretical bias on A ristotle's part, he tends ta think that making manifest is the most important aspect of speech as such, sa that it is only the assertion that really fulfils the essence of speech.

or

When speech is conceived along these li nes, the subject of speech is ascribed a certain priority over against its poss ibl e attributes or predicates . For as noted in the discussion ab ove, the subject is thought to be what is already present before we begin ta speak, since it is that in virtue ofwhich there is something at ail about which one can speak, and so the important thing is that this subject is made visible such as it is, that it is addressed in terms of attributcs that are proper to it. In ather wards, ifspeech is to perform its funct ion ofmaking manirest correctly, it must "submit" to the subject, it must let itself be governed by this, sa that the subject in its truth or in its disc lasure, and nothing eIse, constitutes the end of the speech. As we saw in the analysis of the assertion in Chapter Two, Heidegger is convineed that, in order 10 undcrstand the nature of the assertion and the motives behind its alleged supreme powers, it must be interpreted precisely with respecl to its end. Il is not enough ta regard il as a grammatical category, as the class of indi cative sentences or propositions, or ta refer to its htct-stating or predicative funct ion. For wh en a speaker is out to convince, threaten, etc., that is, ta bring about an effect on his audience or in general ta pursue a course of act ion of sorne kin d, the subject of his speech is ta sorne extent pushed into the background, whether or not his utterances are assertions in the

55

56

De II/l , 16h13

17f1 11,

2 10

2 11

l' ll ilP II 'I( II VI t '1tAJlI t' I( J' IVil grammatical sense, sincc the end of his speech is n OI I'clI l' y 10 makc (his subject manifest, to revcal ils nature. Thus OIl L! coulcl say Ih at, in thcsc circumstances, speech tends to poilll bcyond ilse lf, whcreas Ih e asserlion can be sa id to cali altention to its subjecl, in Ihat its aim is 10 make it manifest just for the sake of making il mani/est. From a teleological perspective, non-assertoric speech must accordingly bc described as a fonn of kinesis, leading over to a new situation of speech as it brings aboui an effect. In this way, such a logos is aleles, whereas the assertion is more akin to energeia, since it does not have any extcrnal end.

How~ver, wh en the primary tn sk of logos is thou ght 10 cOllsist in th e unco ve ri ng of its object as this is in itselt; and wh en the worthiest objects of logos moreover are themse lves purely present and not on the way towards any th ing, it also becomes clear why the assel1ion, insofar as it is has thc form of legein li kOla linos, in the end is regarded as an inferior farm of ex press ion. Illstead, th e s uperior logos is logos kath hauto, s ince this do es not ascribe ally predicate to the subject which is J

foreign or external 10 it, thal is 10 say, si nce it has n o thin g ta do \Vith

that which is kOla sumbebekos, As wc sa\V in the previous chapter, th e notion of essential predication is in its turn motivated by the idea that the powers of logos in general are weaker than thase of nOliS, since nous can reveaJ and preserve its abject witho ut modification, in that it does not like logos understand its object as something, in terms of something else, Accordi ngly, it seems that one could say that, what motivates Aristotle to regard logos apophanlikos as the superior l'orm of speech is simultaneously what makes him sec the limits ofthi s mode of speech as weil as of logos as slich. lnsonlr as the lirst philosophy is not a universal discipline, but is a theology, concerned \Vi th Ihe supreme beings of reality, tirS! of ail God as the ultima te princip le of reality and then other simple entities such as pure forl11 s, its access to its th eme must be non-disc ursive in kind. 57 COl1sequentl y, the question of being, th e investigation of what it mealls 57 For an in vest igation ioto the re lation between onto logy and the%gy in Ari stot le, see H . Weid ellla nn, Metaphysik und Sprache. Eine sprachphi/osophische Umersuchung zu Thomas von Aquin und Aristote/es. As the title imp lies, Aristo!/e is here contrasted \Vith Thomas Aquinas, whe re the latter is said 10 airn at a slricll y universa l ont%gy,

, 'II y a quest'on ity ' since to bc \Vo ule! Ih us SCc ll1 to be pnnclpa J , of ident ' c. ' bein gs arc 1I0t undcrsloo d 111 ' t crms 0 f somethmg simple , dlfferent. ,rom h -Iowevcr lhis is denied by Aristotle, In thls connectlOn, e 1 1 I 1 lcmse ves" , l' i ht ' d'cate seems l0 ln l , the realm of simple bemgs, . even thoug l It m g make up an ideal ofbeing, is something of a speCIal case. A ' t II ' bcmg ' as bcm ' g, 011 he on ' .does The question COll cern mg . not. fi.S 0 .e . ~ s seek 10 establish the reason why a thi ng IS Ilself, for that IS ln orms u '. l.;ul task but the question always concerns the reason why not a meanmg" , " If " Wh something is somelhing oth er, something dlfferent from,ltse, e,n tll e ' why' , il is always m the sense ' g COI' we are scare llm II . "why does thl s b 1 t II ' [?",58 Thi s is of course hardl y surprisll1g 111 connectlon 1 t take e ong 0 la, w ith the investigation of " ord inary" assertions" s uc 1 as, o .. ' ducated" Aristotle 's own eX3l11pl c, " 1~ he man IS e , 1.e , such asselflIOns 1 whose atlributes are kota swnbebekos or be lon g to SO~l e 0 IlC categories except ol/sia, like the category of quality, quantlty, etc, In these cases, wc arc apparentl y asking why a con crete, con~posJte OUSI5~ , e dowed with some pro perty which does nol belong to ItS essence, A ristotl e go es on to show that our question is of the kl'nd also' when we are interrogating abou t the essence of a thmg, 1 ne . b u,t Il' 1 faet , W le n mi ht believe that such a question asks about 1'd enllly,

~o:ever

s~,e

O~ing

1o for the "what" of an individual thing, we are asklllg why some , matter is of a definite kind, Aristolle contmues: Thus what wc are seek ing is the cause (Ihat i~, ~he fo rl11 ) in v irtLl~ of which the matter is a definite thi ng; and thl s IS the ,s ~bst~nce.~ the thing. Il is clear, then, that as regards simple en~l tleS, I1l QUJ? and explanation arc impossible, but they reqUire a dlfferent mo e ofi nquiry.60 S ,IJ11 p 1e en lOfes 1 l , Ù1 C abo vcb mentioned mode of questi ollin g is not poss ible, for essences c~n ~ appre 1len d e d by nOliS . onl y . There/ore, to the exlent "that the questIon 10 what it means for a particular being to be is a questIon concernlllg w ly

W hen we are inqu irin g into essences or

'",' , .., .,

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i(;).)..o à).).