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yielding further technological advances and further 86. It 'felt' harder because the exhausted soil was yielding less, so there was less plant cover for 87. e. Feathers are heavier and cheaper. Foam is less yielding, more springy, doesn't last as long as do
SENSE AND STRUCTURE IN LEXIS 88. inevitable. In the meantime, dolphin research is yielding new data on the ways in which man's senso 89. t rewriting of his tax program, Mr. Reagan is not yielding on his demands for 25 percent cut in pers 90. y is to drive through a car cleaner. The bliss of yielding self and car to be soaped, washed and bru 91. 3,200 kilos of wheat per hectare. By 1966, highyielding strains of wheat had been developed that 92. old breeze across the oceanic warmths of the ever yielding sub-continent. Even his shabby clothes 93. ishments in St. James's began the slow process of yielding to clubs and commerce. I have chosen to 94. qual fervour, Premier Sagasta was progressively yielding to American demands and the diplomacy of 95. should at least in part be conceded, or else of yielding to extremism what earlier was refused to 96. of this ditch. But all the while, though he kept yielding to these invasions of sleep, he could not yields 97. of new land into cultivation, and an increase in yields. But there has been practically no expans 98. an perhaps make this protein in relatively large yields. For example, at the moment there are some 99. al more fertilizer than Europe to achieve similar yields. In 1975, developed countries used an aver 100. oot zone where they stunt plant growth and reduce yields. In the Punjab seepage has raised the wate 101. en, economics supplies only one— whether a thing yields a money profit to those who undertake it 102. an activity carried on by a group within society yields a profit to society as a whole. Even natio 103. the rents set by a city control board. This board yields, about once a year, to the landlords' plea 104. lure to damp down inflationary expectations. Bond yields almost everywhere are higher than before 105. oured areas — which were already enjoying higher yields and greater wealth than the rest. So the 106. reducing only 80 per cent of the average regional yields, and these are low because landlords under 107. ere exported to Turkey, India and Pakistan. Wheat yields doubled in India between 1964 and 1972, and 108. ency to permanent cultivation. Where this occurs, yields drop to an abysmally low level. As popula109. ng to the same patch of ground too frequently, so yields fall and the soil is exhausted, sometimes
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JOHN McH. SINCLAIR 110. is the spur: poverty may be shared, but when food yields fall too low, some of the people on the 111. paddy has gone on producing the same or increased yields for centuries, even mill 112. 87 in the cropped area over the last decade, and yields have risen by 5 per cent while populat 113. of the soil quickly falls off after clearance — yields in the third year may be down to only one 114. ine and more hospitable to cultivated plants. The yields in the first year of shifting cultivation 115. wall, a group of Barrier Canyon paintings, still yields intriguing detail. A visitor points to 116. of Brompton Road and Thurloe Place Knightsbridge yields insensibly to South Kensington. The pave 117. lation grows, or at best a permanent decline in yields, irrigated paddy has gone on producing 118. ed acute proportions. At Bangladesh's low average yields of half a ton of rice per acre, a man 119. adolescents. Free acting out and talking through yields satisfaction. At the same time it 120. tion of components and vastly increased explosive yields (such as from fuel air weapons — the 121. hey are allowed to charge. The rent control board yields them an extra seven and a half per cent 122. lable means to prevent it. Ovid recommends: 'Love yields to business, be employed, you're safe' 123. of nature at the first touch of spirit, before it yields to spirit's cosmic venture that we call 124. come self-sufficient by 1956. In 1970 her average yields were four times the 1940 levels, reaching 125. ins are late, the growing season is cut short and yields will be slashed. Famine and disease follow
REFERENCES Bolivar, A. 1986. Interaction through written text: a discourse analysis of newspaper editorials. Ph.D. thesis. University of Birmingham. Butler, C.S. 1985. Systemic linguistics. London: Batsford. Carter, R.A. 1987. Vocabulary: an applied linguistic guide. London: Allen and Unwin. Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan. 1976. Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
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Hanks, P.,et al. 1979. Collins English dictionary. London and Glasgow: Collins. Johansson, S. 1985. A survey of computer-based English language research. IAME News 9 (May). McCarthy, M.J. (Forthcoming). Some vocabulary patterns in conversation. In R.A. Carter and M.J. McCarthy, eds., Vocabulary in language learn ing. Harlow: Longman. Moon, R.E. 1987. Monosemous words and the dictionary. In A.P. Cowie, ed., The dictionary and the language learner. (Lexicographica Series Maior). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Phillips, M. 1985. Aspects of text structure. Elseviers: North-Holland. ------. (Forthcoming). Lexical structure of text. (Discourse Analysis Mono graphs, 12: English Language Research). Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Renouf, A.J. 1984. Corpus development at Birmingham University. In J. Aarts and W. Meijs, eds., Corpus linguistics: recent developments in the use of computer corpora in English language research. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 3-39. Stock, P.F. 1984. Polysemy. In R.R.K. Hartmann, ed., Lexeter '83 pro ceedings. (Lexicographica Series Maior). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Ver lag. 131-140. Yang, H-Z. 1986. A new technique for identifying scientific/technical terms and describing science texts. Literary and Linguistic Computing 1, No. 2:93-103.
TEXT, TERMS AND MEANINGS: SOME PRINCIPLES OF ANALYSIS
M.K. Phillips English Language Services Department The British Council In 1944 Jorge Luis Borges published a short story called 'Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote'. In it Borges purports to describe a literary pro ject devised by a modern French symbolist poet. The poet in question, Pierre Menard, had set himself the task of writing Don Quixote. That is to say, his intention was not, trivially, to copy out the original but to under take an entirely new task of composition the outcome of which would be identical, word for word, with Don Quixote. Borges first surveys some of the implications of this project. He discus ses what is involved in attempting, as a twentieth-century poet of French mother-tongue and nationality, to create a seventeenth century Castilian masterpiece. He then proceeds to develop a critique in which he evaluates an extract from the two versions of the novel, that of Cervantes and that of Menard. I offer here my translation of the crucial passage: Cervantes' text and that of Menard are verbally identical but the latter is almost infinitely richer. (Its detractors would say more ambiguous; but ambiguity is a kind of riches). It is a revelation to compare Menard's Don Quixote with that of Cer vantes. The latter, for example, wrote (Don Quixote, first part, chapter nine): . . . truth, whose mother is history, the rival of time, storehouse of actions, witness to the past, example and admonition for the present, warning for the future. Written in the seventeenth century, written by the ingenio lego Cer vantes, this list is nothing more than a rhetorical eulogy of history. Menard, on the other hand, writes: . . . truth, whose mother is history, the rival of time, storehouse of actions, witness to the past, example and admonition for the present,
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M.K. PHILLIPS warning for the future. History, mother of truth; the idea is startling. Menard, a contempor ary of William James, does not define history as an investigation of reality but as its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what happened; it is what we judge to have happened. The concluding phrases — 'example and admonition for the present, warning for the future'—are unashamedly pragmatic. The contrast between the two styles is also striking. Menard's style, which is deliberately archaic and essentially foreign, smacks of a certain affectation. It is otherwise with his precursor, who handles with ease the normal Spanish of his day (Borges 1980: 431-432).
Borges' conceit, whilst fantastic, is not fanciful. I have quoted it at some length because it goes, I believe, to the very heart of the problem of how texts mean. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of the lin guistic foundations of Borges' ingenious exercise in comparative literary criticism. There is one ultimate fact about text. This is that it consists of elements of linguistic substance juxtaposed in linear sequence. In the case of written text the skilled reader somehow internalises from the encounter with graphic substance a model of some aspect of 'reality'. This is what consti tutes the meaning of the text. Unless it stands in some describable relation to the world of phenomena, a text has no meaning for it cannot be related to experience. The fundamental problem posed by text, then, is to eluci date the nature of the relationship between text and reality which allows meanings to be created in this way. How does it come about that complex non-linear conceptual structures are realised through the ultimately linear organisation of language substance? That such non-linear conceptual structures are elaborated is widely accepted. Text linguists argue that this process underlies the reader's ability to summarise, paraphrase and generally to state what a text is about. This ability raises some interesting problems. Van Dijk has pointed out that to be able to state what a book is about depends on the processing of thousands of sentences which cannot normally be memorised individually by the reader (Van Dijk 1977a). In general, it is the 'gist' of a discourse which is recalled rather than its wording. Studies such as those of Sachs or Clark and Clark (Sachs 1967; Clark and Clark 1977) attest the relative sub sistence of semantic memory as opposed to the uncertainty of recall of syn tactic structure. The appreciation of textual meaning is thus a large scale phenomenon which does not depend directly on particularities of linguistic
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form. It has been suggested that meaning becomes available to the reader through the activation by the text of conceptual 'schemata'. This is the notion which underlies the work on the cognitive representation of narra tives by such investigators as Rumelhart, Thorndyke, Van Dijk and Kintsch (Rumelhart 1975, 1977; Thorndyke 1977; Van Dijk 1977a, b; Kintsch 1977). The difficulty with this approach is that 'schemata' are postulated to fit the text to be analysed which are then used to explain the text. There is a fundamental petitio principii. It will become clearer later that the basic insight is in essence correct, but it is clearly pointless to look to this work for sound methodological guidance. Indications as to the nature of the problem and how to tackle it must be sought elsewhere. Saussure furnishes two important clues to exploring these issues. He was one of the first to see clearly that if reality is to be represented in lan guage, then there can be no necessary relationship between the 'structure' of reality and the categories of language. This is the point of his first princi ple of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and this provides the first clue to the problem of textual meaning. He postulated that the linguistic sign consists of an arbitrary relationship between a 'signifié' and a 'signifiant' obtaining within language. He stated his first principle in the following terms: The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is 'arbitrary' (Saussure 1974: 67).
It is usually assumed that the point of this principle was to assert that there is no systematic correspondence between form and meaning. But this was well known long before Saussure's time. In the seventeenth century John Wilkins (1688) addressed himself precisely to the problem of designing a linguistic system in which the relationship would not be arbitrary. There is a more important aspect to Saussure's postulate. This is that both 'signifiant' and 'signifié' are categories of language. I take the follow ing: 'There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language' (1974: 112) as a disavowal of the notion that what is signified can exist apart from the signifier. This position has one crucial consequence. The categories of reality are the categories of meaning fur nished by language. In this theoretical sense, reality is articulated by lan guage. It is thus possible for text to project 'reality' and for different texts
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to project different 'realities'. How can language be constructive of reality? The notion seems to be counter-intuitive suggesting, for example, that a chair is a fundamentally linguistic rather than a phenomenological object. But so it is; certainly some chairs have physical existence (in some philosophically acceptable meaning of these terms!) but what counts as a chair is essentially a linguistic question. The pages of Scientific American abound in pertinent examples, such as the following: For the atom, the nucleus and the proton, then, the mass of the system is at least as large as the kinetic energy of the constituents and in some cases is much larger. If quarks and leptons are composite, however, the relation of energy to mass must be quite different. Since the prequarks have ener gies well above 100 GeV, one would guess that they would form compo sites with masses of hundreds of GeV or more. Actually the known quarks and leptons have masses that are much smaller; in the case of the lepton and the neutrinos the mass is smaller by at least six orders of magnitude. The whole is much less than the sum of its parts (Harari 1983: 58).
Here a model for phenomenological reality at its most fundamental level is described. It should be noted, however, that there is no direct linguistic evi dence in this extract that this is simply postulated. Many of the sentences have the linguistic form of assertions of fact and the use of 'known' to mod ify 'quarks and leptons' is interesting. It is either elsewhere in the discourse or in the context of shared knowledge that an indication of the hypotheticality of the content must be sought. In other words, quarks are created by talking about them. Perhaps this accounts for the proliferation of funda mental particles. This view of language finds support in contemporary sociology. Berger and Luckman (1967: 30) enquire 'How is it possible that subjective mean ings become objective facticities?' and argue: We have seen how language objectifies the world, transforming the panta rhei of experience into a cohesive order. In the establishment of this order language realises a world, in the double sense of apprehending it and pro ducing it (1967: 173).
Thus the implications of Saussure's first principle provide a clue to the nature of the relationship between text and reality. The perspective may appear unusual. After all, vocabulary is commonly considered to refer to real world entities whilst the view described above suggests that the notion of reference is an illusion. Yet Saussure (1974: 68) was clear about the sig nificance of this principle:
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No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its proper place. Princi ple I dominates all the linguistics of language; its consequences are num berless. It is true that not all of them are equally obvious at first glance; only after many detours does one discover them, and with them the primordial importance of the principle.
The apparent unconventionality of the position thus reached is so only because of a failure within the Anglo-American linguistic tradition to assign to Saussure's principle 'its proper place'. The issues involved would seem less unusual within the French 'post-structuralist' perspective. The use, for example, of the term 'discours' by Foucault (1970: 311) reveals that he con ceives of a discoursal function of language which imposes structure on real ity: In other words, language in so far as it represents—language that names, patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes them visible in the transparency of words. In this role, language transforms the sequence of perceptions with a table and cuts up the continuum of beings into a pattern of characters.
It is perhaps not surprising that such a conception of language should stem from within a philosophical tradition rooted more in rationalism than empiricism. The second clue that Saussure provides arises as an immediate conse quence of the principle of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. That notion accepted, the rest of linguistics can be seen as a specification of the limits to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness does not and cannot imply mutual substitutability of signs: Since one vocal image is no better suited than the next for what it is com missioned to express, it is evident, even a priori, that a segment of lan guage can never in the final analysis be based on anything except its noncoincidence with the rest. Arbitrary and differential are two correlative qualities (Saussure 1974: 118).
Linguistics then becomes a specification of the limits to arbitrariness. The distinction among signs is thus crucial and language can be seen as a system in which the value of an item is determined by its position in the system, This is what Saussure meant by the term 'valeur'. Again, these notions are usually given a particular interpretation. 'Valeur' is held to arise from the systematicity of 'langue'. Hence it is possi ble to claim, for example, that the 'meaning' of nominative in a five-case system of declension is different from its 'meaning' in, say, a six-case sys-
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tem. But it is also arguable that the notion can profitably be applied to the analysis of 'parole'. The most fundamental characteristic of 'parole' is, as Saussure pointed out, its linearity. As Sinclair (1980a: 111) puts it: 'succession is the only ulti mate relationship of elements'. This means that 'valeur' can also be viewed as a property of the syntagm arising from the distribution throughout the linear stream of language substance of distinctive segments. Even syntax can be seen as a system of inferences from patterning in linear succession, although as Sinclair (1980a: 112) again points out: 'Syntax is rarely pre sented as a set of limitations upon the free combination of those elements that require to be distinguished'. This suggests that an investigation along these lines might provide information about the way in which conceptual structures are elaborated on the basis of critical juxtaposition of elements. In other words, how does textual sequence lead to cognitive order? In such an investigation it would be inappropriate to invoke semantic criteria, since it is the semantics of text which it would be the purpose of the study to reveal. The second clue provided by Saussure is thus to the methodology for exploring the relationship between text and reality. It conveys an important message. It suggests strongly that words can be viewed as units of textual organisation and that a knowledge-free distributional analysis of the terms used in a text might furnish insights into areas of vocabulary which fix the relationship between form and meaning. Again, however, this approach to text through the analysis of the dis tributional properties of its linguistic substance may seem a perversely unconventional way of proceeding. It implies a deliberate refusal to be seduced by the attractions of discourse analysis, text grammar or syntactic structure. Indeed, it could be considered an outmoded technique. Harris' (1952) view of discourse analysis was essentially distributional but his methods no longer find favour. There is, then, a requirement to justify the approach to text which reflection upon Saussure's principles has suggested. Here a number of per tinent considerations suggest themselves. Linguistic substance itself has its own meaning-bearing properties which can be exploited to enhance the conceptual meaning. In the spoken language use can be made of 'special effects' such as comical accents or unusual pitch. Manipulation of graphic layout and type faces contributes importantly to the creation of meaning in the written language. In languages such as Arabic where cultural develop-
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ment has engendered a strong calligraphic tradition, the linguistic sign often acquires a multiple symbolism by virtue of the interplay of sense and form. This aspect of language has been elegantly exploited in English by Scott Kim (Kim 1981). Many types of word play depend upon the possibility of exploiting the medium to add to the message. Crosswords, palindromes, word squares and acrostics are all manifestations of the use of language relying heavily on language substance. Another familiar example is onomatopaeia. Poetry in general places great value on the properties of substance and employs often to good effect the meaning possibilities inherent in rhyme, assonance, metre and alliteration. The bridle of Chaucer's monk once heard 'gynglen in a whistlynge wynd' can still be heard today. A rose by any other name could not rhyme with 'those' or 'enclose', but Will Shakespeare knows that as things are it always will, just as he knows the power of a pun. On the other hand, the tension between meaning and substance accounts for the kind of paradox reported in Hofstader (1981) such as: 'This sentence no verb'. Such phenomena should not be considered as mere eccentricities of the language system operating on the periphery of meaningfulness. They are, on the contrary, manifestations of a potential central to the nature of lan guage. This is the possibility of exploiting the medium in which language must necessarily be realised to meaningful effect. It is this property which renders much literary creation possible. Thus an advantage of adopting an approach to text which focuses on the substance of language is that litera ture can be viewed, not as a sophisticated excrescence on an assumed more fundamental communicative function, but as rooted in the very core of lan guage and basic to its use. Sinclair (1981) has pointed out that to be able to accommodate literature naturally within its description is an important goal for any linguistic theory. The realisation of this potential is not restricted only to the more obvi ous manifestations of artistic activity. In expository prose the substantial nature of the linguistic sign may be somewhat suppressed, but its influence can still be felt. Thus it is possible to speak of prose having a rhythm or cadence and of aesthetic effect. Less august examples of language use also point in the same direction. The phenomenon of phatic communion illus trates that meaning can sometimes reside less in the semantics of the dis course as in its substance, the simple fact that something rather than nothing is said. The converse is also true and the absence of substance, that
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is, silence, also has a role to play as Basso (1972) has pointed out. Likewise, with taboo language expletives, for example, the significance is in the act of utterance, not in the denotation, which, indeed, may command a physical impossibility. To summarise the argument so far; first, it seems likely that the prob lem of textual meaning can fruitfully be thought of in terms of the projec tion by the text of a reality. Secondly, this projection is brought about by a mechanism which must be discernable as a patterning of textual substance. In other words, a study which seeks evidence of such patterning might be expected to throw light on how texts relate to reality and hence on how they mean. Significant methodological consequences stem from such a position. The study would be addressing itself to a large-scale phenomenon in two senses. It has already been observed that perception of textual meaning is a high order process not directly dependent on the organisation of text at the local level. The implication of this is that information relating to such local structuring is irrelevant to the task of discerning latent patterning in textual substance. This means that information of a morphological and syntactic nature can largely be ignored. Secondly, the distribution of distinctive elements throughout the linearity of text may be expected to lead to patterns which are only detecta ble over considerable extents of language. Most lexical items occur infrequently. Even in a highly specialised expository text of some 50,000 running words where particular technical terms may be expected to achieve unusually high frequencies, it is exceptional that the occurrence of a single term exceeds 1% of the total. The repetition of most lexical items upon which any kind of patterning must be based is an extremely rare event. Consequently, as Sinclair (1980b: 15) points out: Even a glance at the statistics of word occurrence suggests that to gain access to the characteristics of language one requires texts of length that puts them well out of scale of direct human observation.
Thus observation of such patterning is difficult and requires the assistance of computers. Techniques for studying texts in this way are in their infancy. It was also noted earlier that if the object of such a study is to elucidate the semantics of text, then semantic information cannot be assumed. In other words, the analysis must be knowledge-free. Thus to the rejection of morphological and syntactic meaning can be added the exclusion of infor mation relating both to discourse organisation and lexical homonymy. If
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large-scale patterning of the type that theory suggests in fact exists in text, then it should be recognisable formally from the distributional elements in text. Evidence is now available from an initial study of a restricted number of texts that such an approach to textual analysis can indeed throw light on the issues raised here. Five undergraduate science textbooks, two novels and a work of popular science were analysed for evidence of lexical pattern ing (Phillips 1985)1. From the findings of this study it is possible to draw a number of conclusions about the way in which different classes of text create meanings. At an initial level of analysis it appears that the processes at work are somewhat different in the case of the five science textbooks from those operating in the three non-science texts. As can be seen from the table in the notes, the type-token ratios are considerably higher for the science texts. This is because the number of distinct lexical types in these texts is smaller than in the other texts. Moreover, since the type-token ratio is an increasing function of the number of types, a text such as the chemical engineering sample, which is shorter than the others, has a type-token ratio which, although already quite high, would be even higher if the sample were as long as the rest. In other words, the vocabulary of the non-science texts is more diverse, that of the science texts more restricted and hence the average frequency of occurrence of any lexical item tends to be greater in the science texts. The higher density of a relatively small number of lexical items in sci ence text means that they tend to cooccur in recognisable patterns. By exa mining the frequency of such cooccurrences it is possible to distinguish net works of lexical items which regularly articulate critical areas in the cogni tive content of the texts. A network is distinguished as a distinct pattern of organisation by virtue of the relative strength of association obtaining among its member lexical items. Obviously the text as a whole constitutes a vast network, since every word in it over the span of the whole text cooccurs with every other. By focusing on significantly high frequencies of cooc currence, it is possible to isolate individual networks. The sense of 'signific antly' in this context is fully discussed elsewhere (Phillips 1985). In brief, it refers to a threshold level beyond which the cluster analysis procedure used to identify networks fails to distinguish distinct groupings of lexical items. These networks can conveniently be represented in graphical form where the nodes stand for lexical items and the edges represent the exis-
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tence of significantly frequent cooccurrence. Thus in one of the science texts the following pattern of association occurs:
Figure 1 This indicates the importance of these notions in the text in question, which deals with chemical reaction engineering. The phenomena designated 'temperature', 'composition' and 'pressure' are brought into consistent rela tion and thus an aspect of reality is consciously structured by the text. The text is organised through the association of certain lexical items and thereby a particular conceptualisation of real-world phenomena is presented to the reader. These lexical items constitute what may be called the 'terminology' of the text and may themselves be referred to as 'terms'. Support for this interpretation is provided by Benson and Greaves (1983). In a small-scale study of the descriptive and instructional literature accompanying a hi-fi system they demonstrated that lexical sets can be determined syntagmatically. This is to say, on the basis of the regular cooc currence of items separated from each other by relatively small numbers of intervening words, groupings of lexical items can be discerned which clearly articulate the principal cognitive content and functional purposes of their texts. The existence of such networks provides, then, a major clue to the way semantic structures are derivable from the linear sequence of text. In other parts of the chemical reaction engineering text referred to ear lier, the following networks are observed: compositiondependency temperature given
pressure Figure 2
In this network it can be seen that the node corresponding to the term 'temperature' tends to occupy a central position, where 'central' is defined
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as attracting significant coocurrence with the largest number of the terms forming the network. The network exists largely because of the critical occurrence of this particular term. In this sense, the term 'temperature' can be said to 'organise' the network. The concept for which it is the label is crucial to the structuring of our understanding of this aspect of reality. A finding of the study referred to earlier is that there is a relatively restricted set of these 'central terms' (or 'nuclear nodes' as they are called in the study) in science texts which have a particularly important organising func tion to perform in projecting the writer's view of his subject matter. Empir ical investigation suggests that they rarely account for more than 20% of the total lexical vocabulary of a text. The organising function of such terms appears to extend beyond their immediate environment and to contribute to the overall structure of the text. This gives rise to a perception of what may be called the 'macrostruc ture' of the text. It can be argued that the following network is, in a crucial way, 'similar' to the network illustrated in Figure 2, where similarity is defined as having the same central term and at least one other in common. variation temperature pressure drop Figure 3 Figures 2 and 3 represent networks found in chapters two and five respec tively of the same text. The recognition that similar networks thus exist in widely separated locations in the text indicates that semantic relationships extend over long stretches of text and create large-scale patterning. These patternings have been determined for the texts in the study and it has proved possible to provide an interpretation for them consistent with the organisation of the subject matter in the text. In other words, it is argued that large-scale patterns of lexical organisation are responsible for the struc ture of the subject matter as projected by the text. At this level of analysis, the five science texts appear to be quite shar ply distinguished from the non-science texts. There is very little evidence for similar patterns of association in the non-science texts. In the two novels the networks that can be observed tend either to reflect common col locations such as 'sort' and 'thing' or 'telephone' and 'box' or represent the
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juxtaposition of the names of the principal characters. It can be surmised that the latter associations arise in part through the structuring of dialogue in the novels. Even in the popular science text, which speculates on the future impact of computers on society, there are relatively few networks which clearly indicate the kind of subject matter structuring which was observed to be the case with the chemical reaction engineering text. A further point of difference between the two classes of text is that in the non-science texts the proportion of central terms is much higher, reach ing betv/een 50% and 70% of the total. In other words, there is almost no evidence for a restricted set of organising terms responsible for the structur ing of the cognitive content of these texts. It is thus not surprising that the evidence for lexical macrostructure is correspondingly weak. Thus there is little indication of regularity of lexical patterning in the non-science texts either at the local level or on the macro-scale. It is perhaps to be expected in the non-science texts, and particularly the novels, that what the texts are 'about' should not be straight-forwardly revealed by clues provided by patterns of lexical association. The truth of literature is literary rather than literal. And yet the inability to distinguish significant patterns of lexical association in these texts has certain crucial consequences. The first inference that can be drawn is that there is no reason to ascribe more significance to one sequence of signs rather than to another. None would appear to be more probable than any other and thus, it could be argued, a purely random sequence would carry as much meaning as the sequence chosen by the author. In non-science text, then, it is dif ficult to see that there is any area of vocabulary which helps to fix a definite correspondence between the text and reality. This conclusion appears so improbable, shocking even, that the suspi cion arises that the reasoning must be flawed. It can perhaps be countered by pointing out that it assumes that the totality of a word's meaning arises from its contextual use. It could be argued that if the notion of 'sense' is accepted, then it becomes clear that certain senses are more likely than others to be capable of juxtaposition with each other. The price to be paid for this argument is that it is necessary to invoke extratextual knowledge to explain the semantics of text and that meaning cannot be sought wholly on the basis of clues provided by the text. I shall return to this point below. In the meantime it is necessary to ask how far 'sense' is itself a fixed and immutable property of the word. For the problem with sense is that it can only be derived from our experience of language; in other words, it has to
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be generated by some form of regularity in the use of words. In order to examine the question further it is appropriate to return to consideration of the science texts. For in these texts it was seen that certain regularities of patterning do exist. Perhaps, then, these texts can provide some clue as to the genesis of sense and thereby reinstate the text as the location of its own semantics. But in fact it seems that if this new level of analysis is adopted, the distinctions between the two classes of text begin to blur just where they appeared to be most dissimilar. I shall take as an example the history of a term which is very com mon in one of the science texts in the corpus. The text deals with classical mechanics and the term to be investigated is 'force'. As a noun 'force' has a number of potential meanings available to it. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary lists the following eleven primary meanings: I.
Strength, power 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Physical strength As an attribute of physical action or movement Power or might (of a ruler, realm or the like) A body of armed men, an army Physical strength or power exerted upon an object Mental or moral strength Of things (in non-material or moral relations): Power to influence, affect or control Of a law etc.: Binding power, validity The real impact or significance (of a document, statement or the like) (Without article prefixed) A large quantity or number, plenty Physics, etc. Used in various senses developed from the older popular uses
These eleven sub-headings themselves comprise thirty-two sub-categories of which four correspond to meaning eleven. In addition a further four derived meanings are listed as well as a number of phrasal uses. Although the reader is likely to be predisposed to take occurrences of the term 'force' in the mechanics texts in the sense of I.11 of the OED, it is clear that there is scope for interpretation even with such an apparently obvious technical term and that its 'scientific' use may be fairly elastic. In other words, a final decision as to the precise import of the term can only be made by taking account of the delimitation of its semantic scope provided
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by the textual context. Thus the 'instantial' meaning of a term depends on its relationship with other terms in the text. It is perhaps with some relief, then, that the reader encounters as the first significant patterning of the term 'force' in the mechanics text the fol lowing network: force periodic
applied Figure 4
In a chapter entitled 'Linear Motion' and containing sections dealing with oscillators, it is comfortingly clear that the pertinent meaning is that of 'periodic force'. But this certainty is short-lived. In the next chapter the rel evant network is found to be: force central
conservative Figure 5
The 'meaning' of the term has undergone modification and is being rede fined by a new verbal context. The reader's faith in the supposed precision of scientific terminology may not yet be shaken, but it is clear that s/he has to keep an open mind and be prepared to modify the meanings s/he has assigned to terms as the text unfolds. In the present text, the new pattern just established is reinforced in the following chapter, but the next significant occurrence forces, if I may be permitted the term, a further reinterpretation. In chapter eight a new pat tern of association emerges: work
force
sum
subject external
moment Figure 6
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The meaning of 'force' is now defined by association with such terms as 'external', 'moment' and 'work'. The view of the phenomenological world projected by this grouping is somewhat different from what has been set up previously. There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether this view will predominate in chapter ten of the text (Figure 7), but it appears to establish itself more firmly in chapter eleven (Figure 8), although the occurrence of 'conservative' in the relevant network recalls an earlier pattern.
acting
corresponding Figure 8
Figure 7
The final two chapters, however, abandon this newly established use in order to revive earlier meanings: subjected
problem
force
solve
central
force periodic Figure 9
Figure 10
It seems, then, that even in scientific text, far from a particular term unequivocally structuring a unique cognitive area as had earlier been suggested, it must rather be concluded that each word in each text is con tinually defined and redefined by its use throughout the text. Firth (1955: 46-47), who first systematically developed the contextual theory of mean ing, had already observed that such variability is characteristic of word meaning:
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Thus if there appears to be an element of randomness in the non-science texts, it also appears that a degree of semantic indeterminacy must be expected for the terms which contribute to the structuring of science text. Meanings are not static and in consequence the reality projected by a text is constantly threatening by some Protean transformation to elude the reader's perception. It is now time to draw together the threads of the discussion and to see what conclusions are suggested by the findings of textual analyses based on the theoretical principles discussed earlier. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that it is not possible to view word meaning in isolation from the function of terms in a given text. Not only is the meaning of a term deter mined by the patterns of significant association with its fellows in text but, reciprocally, these patterns are essentially concerned with structuring the text. As Sinclair (1982:1) puts it: 'terms are by no means independent of text: in fact they help to create it'. It is the behaviour of terms in a given text which creates meanings. At the same time, however, terms cannot be considered fixed entities. This is the second main conclusion. Text can be seen as a dynamic network of shifting relations among terms which thereby undergo continual semantic modification. This is perhaps not a new insight. Hjemslev argued forty -one years ago that language has to be viewed as a network of relations and correctly perceived that this view stemmed from Saussure, whose ideas formed a point of departure in this paper and who, according to Hjemslev (1947: 69) was the first to call for a structural approach to language, i.e. a scientific description of language in terms of relations between units irrespective of any properties which may be displayed by these units but which are not rel evant to the relations or deducible from the relations.
What is new and provided by the present study is evidence for the validity of this view. The study thus furnishes evidence for the contextual view of term meaning proposed by Firth. Meaning arises as a function of the behaviour of terms in text, and each fresh occurrence of a term is located by reference to previous but provisional patterns of use. Thus the tangibility of sense as enshrined in the dictionary and perceived as a psychological reality is, as was discovered earlier with its companion concept reference, an illu sion. Sense is a derivative of textual relations which are constantly fluctuat-
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ing and the reader applies a kind of semantic calculus to fix the meaning of a term at any one point in the text. This position has one very important consequence which is the third and final conclusion of this discussion. If the notion of fixed meaning, of sense, is simply a convenient fiction, then the model of reality projected by a text is only available to the reader if he reads into it his own perceptions of structure. In other words, the content of the text depends on what the reader brings to it. Thus it is that a text can mean different things to differ ent readers. In conclusion, I should like to return to the extract from Borges with which I began this discussion. It is now possible to see how Borges could develop two totally different views of what are at one level identical texts. It is the meanings available to a particular reader, which depend on the idiosyncracies of individual experience, which determine the meaning of a text. The reality projected by a text is not preexistent, as Saussure rightly observed, but is constructed through the interaction of readers and text. Thus, despite their literal identity, the Don Quixote of Cervantes and the Don Quixote of Pierre Menard are distinct literary creations. The reader's knowledge that one is a product of a seventeenth-century Spanish ex-soldier and the other a turn-of-the-century work by a French symbolist will result in the perception of quite different meanings, some of which Borges has, tongue in cheek perhaps but nonetheless validly, suggested. The particular meaning of each work cannot be attributed to the text, for at this level the two works are indistinguishable. As with the phenomenon of lexical structure in the corpus discussed here, it is not the terms used which give rise to meaning but the value given them by the reader. Thus, to adapt the letter of Borges' thesis but without distorting its spirit, we can say: we cannot define a text as an investigation of reality but as its origin. Text does not mean what it says; it means what we have judged it to have said.
NOTES 1.
The data on which the discussion in this paper is based were obtained in the course of my doctoral research at Birmingham University. This was a computer-assisted investigation of lexical patterning in a corpus of science texts. The corpus consisted of the following five first year undergraduate texts: Ahmed, H. & P.J. Spreadbury. 1973. Electronics for engineers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Kibble, T.W.B. 1973. Classical mechanics. 2nd ed. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. Levenspiel, O. 1972. Chemical reaction engineering. 2nd ed. New York: Wiley Morris, J. Gareth 1974. A biologist's physical chemistry. 2nd ed. London: Edward Arnold. Sonntag, R.E. & G.J. Van Wylen. 1971 Introduction to thermodynamics: classical and statistical. New York: Wiley. In addition, for purposes of comparison, analyses were undertaken of two novels, Mrs Dalloway by Virginia Woolf and The Human Factor by Graham Greene, as well as of one popular science text, The Mighty Micro by Christopher Evans, published by Gollancz. The analyses of these texts consisted in selecting a subset of the lexical items in each text according to a well defined procedure, each lexical item being lemmatized. Each sub set was then investigated for evidence of regularity of cooccurrence of its members and syntagmatic sets were formed using a cluster analysis technique. The resulting sets, which I have called 'networks', were represented graphically as illustrated in this paper. These networks formed the basis for a study of the contribution made by lexical organisation to text structure. 2.
Frequency distribution characteristics of the texts in the corpus:
Electronics Mechanics Chem. Eng. Physical Chem. Thermodynamics Human Factor Mrs Dalloway Mighty Micro
Numberof tokens (N)
Number of types (V)
Mean type frequency (x)
60363 63068 48124 62001 66644 62003 65730 60383
3252 3309 3235 4555 3321 6767 7834 7291
18.6 19.1 14.9 13.6 20.1 9.2 8.4 8.0
REFERENCES Basso, K.H. 1972. T o give up on words': silence in Western Apache cul ture, In P.P. Giglioli, Language and social context. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 67-86. Benson, J.D. and W.S. Greaves. 1983. Field of discourse: a theoretical vantage point enabling more effective use of computer assisted colloca tional analysis. Paper presented at Association for Literary and Linguis tic Computing (ALLC) Conference, San Francisco. Berger, P. and T. Luckman. 1967. The social construction of reality. Har mondsworth: Penguin. Borges, J.L. 1980. Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote (Ficciones (1944)). In Prosa Completa Vol. 1. Barcelona: Bruguera. 425-433.
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Clark, H.H. and E.V. Clark. 1977. Psychology and language. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Firth, J.R. 1955. Structural linguistics. In F.R. Palmer, ed., Selected papers of J.R. Firth 1952-1959. London and Harlow: Longman, 1968. 35-52. Foucault, M. 1970. The order of things. London: Tavistock. Harari, H. 1983. The structure of quarks and leptons. Scientific American 248,4:48-60. Harris, Z.H. 1952. Discourse analysis. Language 28:1-30. Hjemslev, L. 1947. Structural analysis of language. Studia Linguistica 1:6978. Hofstadter, D.R. 1981. Metamagical themas. Scientific American 244,1:3441. Kim, S. 1981. Inversions: a catalog of calligraphic cartwheels. Peter borough, N.H.: Byte Books. Kintsch, W. 1977. On comprehending stories. In M.A. Just and P.A. Car penter, eds., Cognitive processes in comprehension. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 33-62. Phillips, M.K. 1985. Aspects of text analysis. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Rumelhart, D.E. 1975. Notes on a schema for stories. In D.G. Bobrow and A. Collins, eds., Representation and understanding: studies in cognitive science. London: Academic Press. 211-236. . 1977. Understanding and summarizing brief stories. In D. Laberge and S. Jay Samuels, eds., Basic processes in reading: perception and comprehension. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 265303. Sachs, J.S. 1967. Recognition memory for syntactic and semantic aspects of connected discourse. Perception and Psychophysics 2,9:437-442. Saussure, F. 1974. Course in general linguistics, trans. by W. Baskin. Lon don: Collins. Sinclair, J.McH. 1980a. Discourse in relation to language structure and semiotics. In S. Greenbaum, G. Leech and J. Svartvik, eds., Studies in English linguistics for Randolph Quirk. London: Longman. 110-124. . 1980b Computational text analysis at the University of Birmingham. ÏCAME News 4:13-16. . 1981. Planes of discourse. Mimeo. . 1982. Remarks at ASLIB Conference. Mimeo. Thorndyke, P.W. 1977. Cognitive structures in comprehension and mem ory of narrative discourse. Cognitive Psychology 9,1:77-110.
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van Dijk, T.A. 1977a. Text and context: explorations in the semantics and pragmatics of discourse. London: Longman. . 1977b. Semantic macrostructures and knowledge frames in discourse comprehension. In M.A. Just and P.A. Carpenter, eds., Cognitive pro cesses in comprehension. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 3-32. Wilkins, J. 1688. An essay towards a real character and a philosophical lan guage. London.
POLITENESS AND THE SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES IN ENGLISH
Christopher S. Butler University of Nottingham Nottingham, England
1.0 Congruence and the Analysis of Directives The work of Halliday since about 1970 has been characterised by the postulation of system networks at each of several levels, options at any of the 'lower' levels being interpreted as a recoding of options at the next higher level. In a recent paper (Halliday 1984), three non-phonological levels are proposed. At the supra-linguistic level of 'social context', distinc tions are made between the exchange of information and the exchange of goods and services; in either case, the speaker may give, demand or accept the commodity exchanged, or may give on demand. At the semantic level, such choices are reinterpreted in terms of initiations and responses by means of the speech functions of statement, offer, question and command. Further recoding occurs at the grammatical level, in terms of the mood categories, basically declarative, interrogative and imperative. I have attempted to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the model in detail elsewhere (Butler 1986): here, I wish to take up just one of Halliday's points. Halliday points out that although the possible mappings between options at successive levels are numerous (indeed, if there were a one-toone relationship there would be no point in postulating separate levels), there are certain 'congruent' realisation patterns which occur in the absence of any good reason to the contrary. For instance, if the speaker wishes to make an initiating move which gives information, the congruent realisation of this set of features at the semantic (speech function) level is a statement,
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and the congruent grammatical realisation of this semantic choice is a declarative clause. Similarly, demands for information are congruently realised as questions, then as interrogative clauses. Later in the paper, Halliday hints that the concept of congruence may be rather less clearly relatable to the exchange of goods and services. In the case of offers, the problem is that languages do not seem to have clearly defined grammatical patterns for the congruent realisation of this class of act. In the case of commands, the problem is rather different: there is a form, the imperative, in English and many other languages, which is claimed to be the unmarked realisa tion, and yet its use is rather restricted, the function of securing goods and services more often being performed by a variety of non-congruent realisa tions. The following are just a few of the many ways in which a speaker might try to get an addressee to open a window: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
I order you to open the window. (explicit performative) Open the window. (imperative) Open the window, could you? (imperative + modalised tag) You must open the window. (modalised declarative) Can you open the window? (modalised interrogative) Could I ask you to open the window? (performative embedded inside a modalised interrogative construction) Haven't you opened the window? (non-modalised interrogative) The window's still closed. (declarative with related, but not iden tical, propositional content) It's hot in here. (declarative with more distantly related proposi tional content)
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate non-congruent realisations of directives1 which contain a modal verb. I shall first review work which shows that the motivation for the selection of one realisation of an illocutionary act rather than another is related to politeness phenomena. I shall then present briefly a semantic analysis of mood and of the 'root' modals in Eng lish, and use the semantic features to predict (i) the acceptability, or other wise, of a given combination of mood and modal verb as a possible direc tive, (ii) the speech act classification of each potentially directive form, (iii) the relative politeness, in a given social context, of the various possible forms. Finally, I shall present the results of extensive informant testing of these predictions.
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2.0 Politeness in Linguistics Some linguists have been sceptical of any attempt to relate linguistic forms to politeness. Sadock (1974) points out that certain requests are inhe rently rude because of their lexical content, whatever their syntactic form. Davison (1975) offers a number of arguments against politeness as a key factor in the analysis of indirect speech acts: it is, she claims, hard to define politeness; it is a property of individual speakers; polite people do not always use indirect speech acts, and not all utterances in polite discourse are indirect; utterances can be polite without being syntactically marked as such; and so on. These criticisms appear to insist that if the concept of politeness is to be of any value in linguistics, we must be able to treat it as an invariant property of sentences, attributable directly to their lexicosyntactic form. But the relationships involved here are, in fact, much more complex than this. It would be quite erroneous to think of politeness as hav ing a simple, unidimensional relationship to the form of sentences. If the concept of politeness is to have any explanatory value at all, we must expand our linguistic horizons beyond the consideration of formal properties of sentences, to include the effects of the context of utterance. It is not surprising, then, that the most enlightening discussions of politeness have been in work in the areas of speech act theory, implicature, and the like, which would be considered by many linguists as part of pragmatics. Heringer (1972) differentiates requests from orders in terms of a politeness condition attaching to requests, namely that the speaker believes the addressee would not object to whatever he is being asked to do. Lakoff (1973, 1974) proposes two general rules of 'pragmatic competence' — 'be clear' and 'be polite' — and relates these to Grice's (1975) conversational maxims. The politeness rule subsumes three more specific constraints: don't impose; give options; make the addressee feel good. Even the clarity rule can be seen as a special case of the politeness rule, since clarity avoids wasting the addressee's time, and so imposing on him. Mohan (1974) also uses the concept of politeness to build on Grice's conversational principles. He argues that for the explication of indirect speech acts, principles addi tional to conversational postulates are required in order to justify the con veying rather than the stating of what is being put across (see also Leech's work, reviewed below). Such justifying principles take the form of second ary implicatures, some of which are based on politeness. Other writers who have recognised the importance of politeness and
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related phenomena in the study of directives include: Fraser (1973), who proposes a 'mitigation marker' morpheme reflecting the degree of polite ness of a sentence (though see my remarks above concerning the danger of such an approach); Searle (1975), who claims that politeness is the main motivation for indirectness in requests; Lee (1975), who suggests that defer ence conditions play a part in determining the sentential realisation of a particular illocutionary force; Ney (1976), who invokes politeness in distin guishing various request forms; Fraser and Nolen (1981), who distinguish between politeness (interpreted as abiding by the rules of a conversational 'contract') and deference (according respect to the hearer). The most detailed and illuminating work on politeness, however, has come from Brown and Levinson (1978) and from Leech (1980, 1983). Brown and Levinson (1978: 60) observe that the utterances with which people choose to express themselves frequently diverge markedly from a rational, efficient mode of communication in which the Gricean maxims of quality, quantity, manner and relation are strictly and overtly adhered to in an uncomplicated way. They also demonstrate that such divergences show a remarkable degree of similarity across diverse languages and cultures. To account for this, they propose that conversationalists apply politeness stragegies whose function is to pay attention to the 'face' of their inter locutors, that is 'the public self-image that every member [of a society] wants to claim for himself (Brown and Levinson 1978: 66; see also Goffman 1967). Face consists of two aspects: negative and positive. Nega tive face is concerned with freedom to act, and the right not to be imposed upon by others; positive face is to do with the desire for positive appraisal of one's self-image. Some acts, both verbal and non-verbal, are inherently face-threatening. Occasionally, we may wish to carry out such an act in the most efficient way, regardless of the effect on the face of our conversa tional partner: in such cases, we produce what Brown and Levinson call a 'bald on record' act. But more usually, conversationalists employ strategies, of varying complexity, for the minimisation of face threats. The more threatening the act, the more the speaker will attempt to minimise the threat, in general. However, speakers do not usually choose strategies which are less risky than necessary, because to do so might be construed as indicating that the act is more threatening than is really the case. Directives are inherently face-threatening because they represent impositions on the addressee. Redress strategies are thus likely to favour the minimisation of the hurt to the addressee's negative face. Brown and
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Levinson discuss in detail the various strategies involved and some of their realisations in English and other languages. The basic strategies are: the avoidance of presumption/assumptions about the hearer's wants; giving the hearer the option not to act; and communicating the speaker's desire not to impose on the hearer (compare Lakoff's rather similar suggestions, men tioned earlier). Although all directives are inherently face-threatening, the extent to which redress is necessary depends on other social factors. Brown and Levinson (1978: 79ff.) isolate three such factors: the 'social distance' between the speaker and hearer; their relative 'power' (see also Brown and Gilman 1960); and the degree to which the action being requested is regarded, in the culture concerned, as threatening to the hearer's negative face. See also the work of Ervin-Tripp (1976), showing that in the selection of an appropriate form of directive, familiarity, authority, rights and duties, also the difficulty of the task, all have a part to play. The greater the social distance and the severity of the task, and the smaller the power difference, the more need there will be for redress of face. Leech (1980, 1983) regards politeness phenomena as part of a set of rhetorical principles which guide the management of conversational interaction. Borrowing, and considerably stretching, the use of terms from Hallidayan linguistics, Leech distinguishes between 'interpersonal' and 'tex tual' rhetorics, each of which consists of a set of principles. The textual rhetoric, with which I shall not be concerned here, subsumes the principles of processibility (concerned with focus and end-weight), clarity, economy and expressivity. The interpersonal rhetoric subsumes the Cooperative Principle (CP) of Grice (1975, 1978), the Irony Principle and the Politeness Principle (PP). Leech's (1983: 81) formulation of the PP is as follows: In its negative form, the PP might be formulated in a general way: 'minimise (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs', and there is a corresponding positive version ('Maximise (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs') which is somewhat less important.
The link with Brown and Levinson's negative and positive politeness is obvious. By polite and impolite beliefs Leech means 'respectively beliefs which are "favourable" and "unfavourable" to the hearer or to a third party, where "favourable" and "unfavourable" are measured on some rele vant scale of values' (Leech 1983: 81). Leech points out that in one sense the PP has a higher regulative function even than the CP, in that in many situations of communication, unless the social equilibrium is maintained,
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largely by the exercise of politeness, the channel of communication may well break down, at least to the extent that cooperativeness can no longer be assumed. Politeness, in Leech's (1983: 123ff.) view, is to be seen as a set of scales on which illocutions can be graded between inherently polite and inherently impolite: (i)
the cost-benefit scale, concerned with the cost or benefit, to the speaker and/or hearer, of the action, A, which is proposed; (ii) the optionality scale, concerned with the degree of choice allowed to the hearer (h) by the speaker (s); (iii) the indirectness scale, concerned with the number of steps, in a means/end type of analysis, which link the illocutionary act to the goal the speaker is trying to achieve; (iv) the authority scale, concerned with the power of one participant over another; (v) the social distance between participants (which can be seen as inversely correlated with Brown and Gilman's (1960) 'solidarity'). The values on each of scales (i), (iv) and (v) for a particular social interaction will determine the degree of indirectness employed by the speaker in order to observe the 'Tact Maxim' of the PP, namely that the cost to the hearer should be minimised. Leech (1983: 127) expresses these relations succinctly as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
the greater the cost of A to h, the greater the horizontal social distance of h from s, the greater the authoritative status of h with respect to s, the greater will be the need for optionality, and correspondingly for indirectness, in the expression of an impositive, if s is to observe the Tact Maxim.
Leech also suggests, more tentatively, further maxims, of generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement and sympathy, subsumed under the PP. Summarising this all too brief account of recent work, we may say that politeness plays a crucial role in maintaining social relations during every day conversational interaction, and that the linguistic strategies employed by speakers will be conditioned by a number of socially determined factors, including the relations (of status, authority, solidarity and the like) between the interactants, and the cost, to speaker and hearer, of the action being
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negotiated. We may expect that an utterance which is appropriate as a directive in one social context may be seriously inappropriate in another. For instance, (10) below would be inappropriate in the context of drill sergeant/recruit interaction, because the highly asymmetric authority rela tions make the redress of negative face unnecessary, and a bald command such as (11) is perfectly acceptable. (10) Could you possibly stand at ease? (11) Stand at ease. On the other hand, between adult strangers, or even acquaintances, (12) would be much more appropriate than (13), largely because of the shift in authority relations. (12) Could you possibly pass me that book? (13) Pass me that book. A corollary of this, however, is that in a given social situation, defined in terms of social distance, authority and cost/benefit relations, the range of possible forms of a given illocutionary act will be perceived as differing in their relative politeness. In order to test this hypothesis, it seems sensible to start with the most neutral possible situation, where the cost of the act to the hearer and the benefit to the speaker are minimal, and the participants of equal status and at a medium to large social distance in terms of acquain tanceship and solidarity.
3.0 Politeness, Speech Act Classification and the Semantics of Mood and Modalisation in English In this section, I shall show that we can predict, from the semantics of mood and of the modal auxiliaries, certain properties of the use of modalised sentences as directives. Firstly, we can predict which of the syntacti cally possible combinations of grammatical mood and modal verb will be available as potential directives and which will not. Secondly, we can pre dict the speech act classification of the potential directives as orders, requests or suggestions. Thirdly, we may hypothesise relative politeness orderings for the various available directives in the 'neutral' social context defined earlier. Reformulating this in terms of congruence, what I hope to achieve is an account of the constraints on the range of possible non-con gruent as well as congruent realisations of directives, and also an account of
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the politeness differences between these realisations, as used in a particular social context. Lack of space forces me to give only a rather brief and over-simplified account of this complex area. For instance, I shall not discuss the precise theoretical status of the term 'directive': in fact, I regard it as a category at the level of discourse organisation. Furthermore, I shall not be able to jus tify the semantic networks I propose, or to give formal realisation rules. And I shall be able to discuss only a subset of the predictions which can be made about politeness. Full details of all these important matters can be found in Butler (1982 and 1987). 3.1 Semantic Force Options
Figure 1: simplified network for semantic force
Figure 1 shows a simplified network for 'semantic force' (that is, the semantics underlying grammatical mood) in English. It is based on refine ment and extension of the ideas put forward by Hudson (1975), who argues for the recognition of semantic 'force markers', which are associated with sentence structures independently of their context of use, and which, together with the knowledge of coversational participants about the context and the cotext, allow the inference of possible illocutionary forces for utter ances. For futher discussion of the relationship between semantics, speech acts and discourse in this area, see Butler (1987). Only those parts of the network relevant to our immediate concerns will be discussed here. Predications with the feature [+performative] are those in which the speaker actually performs the act specified by the lexical verb. They could be further classified according to the type of verb (see
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Leech 1983), and a full account would have to examine the relationship between these subclasses and the non-performative expression of state ments, questions, etc. Semantic statements are defined in terms of the fea tures [-question, -exclamation], and have as their defining property the fact that the speaker is encoding his (actual or purported) belief in the truth of the proposition. Questions are defined in terms of the feature [+question], glossed as the encoding by the speaker of his (actual or purported) belief that the addressee knows at least as much as he does himself about the truth of the proposition (or, in the case of a wh-question, about the value of the questioned variable which would make the proposition true). The underly ing semantics of imperative-form sentences is captured in the feature [—informational], for which the gloss is that the predication is concerned with the performance of a hypothetical future act by the addressee. The feature [+question tag modification] is present for those sentences in which the speaker modifies his basic choice of semantic force by indicating his (actual or purported) belief that the addressee knows at least as well as he does himself whether the proposition is true (or, in the case of [-informational] predications, whether it will be made true). The various types of semantic force relevant to our discussion of potentially directive function are illus trated in (14)-(18) below. (14) I tell you to open the window. [+performative] (15) Open the window. [-informational] (16) Open the window, will you? [-informational, +question tag mod ification] (17) You will open the window. [-question, -exclamation, -question tag modification] (18) Will you open the window? [+question, -exclamation] 3.2 The Semantics of the 'Root' Modals Let us now turn to the semantic analysis of modal verbs. This owes a great deal to Halliday (1970a), but also to Palmer (1979) and several others. In the present account, modals are seen as representing semantic predicates in their own right. So, for example, one semantic interpretation of (19) is as shown informally in (20), where dots separate arguments and predicates, and brackets indicate a 'rankshifted' predication. (19) You can open the window. (20) Addressee . be able . (addressee . open . the window)
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The entry conditions for distinction within modal meaning are fairly com plex (see Butler 1982, Chapter 8), and will not be discussed further here. Rather, I shall use the term 'modal predicate' as a cover label for the com plex set of defining features. Furthermore, only the 'root' meanings of the modals (Halliday's 'modulation') are involved in the potentially directive forms under discussion here. The distinctions in root modal meaning rele vant to our discussion are shown in Figure 2.
root modal predicate
Figure 2: A semantic network f or modal predicates
A notational convention not previously used in systemic linguistics has been introduced here. It so happens that the pattern of interaction of the four systems is very regular, in that nearly all the combinations of features allowed by treating the systems as simultaneous are in fact well-formed. There are, however, a few exceptions. These could be handled using the normal 'and' and 'or' bracketing notations, but the networks would then become complex, and the underlying regularities would be obscured. The notation
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indicates that the [b/c] choice is available except where [a] has been chosen (note that [a] can itself be a conjunction or disjunction of features). Some times, this means that the distinction is neutralised altogether: for instance, where the features [nec, modality-] are chosen (corresponding to the form needn't — see below), there is complete neutralisation of the [+/—tenta tive] distinction. In other cases, it may be necessary to associate one of the two features [b] and [c] with any selection expression containing [a]. For instance, if [+discourse participant involvement, vol] are selected (corres ponding to shall), the selection expression must also contain the features [-tentative, modality+]; as shown by the asterisks attached to the 'un marked' options in the network. I shall now say a little about each semantic system. The [poss/nec/vol] system represents the three basic types of root modal meanings: possibility (including ability and permission), necessity (including obligation) and vol ition. The [+/—tentative] system distinguishes semantically between the pairs can and could, may and might, will and would, must and should/ought. The [+/—discourse participant involvement] system reflects the distinction, recognised by many writers on modal semantics (see, for example, Palmer 1974, 1979; Leech 1969, 1971; Antinucci and Parisi 1971; Mitchell 1974; Lakoff 1972a; Lodge 1974), between senses of the modals which involve a discourse participant (the speaker in statements, the hearer in questions) as the immediate source of constraint, and those where the source of con straint is more general. Discourse participant oriented modal uses are characterised by their incompatibility with past time (the speaker cannot impose a constraint on a past event), and by the fact that the recipient of the constraint must be a person rather than a non-personal animate entity or an inanimate object. The [modality+/—] system is concerned with whether the modal meaning itself has a negative element combined with it — that is, the distinction between possible and not-possible, necessary and not-necessary, willing and not-willing. In addition, the predicate rep resented by the main verb in the sentence may or may not have a negative
-
-
+
+ + +
± discourse participant involvement
Ø
+
+
-
+
-
+
-
+
-
± tentative
+ + + -
+ + + +
+ + -
+ + -
modality +/—
willingness
volition/
participant
discourse
guarantee by
obligation
¡general
participant
by discourse
obligation
ability
permission
semantic gloss
will would won't wouldn't
shall
must should/ought needn't must/have to should/ought needn't/don't have to
can could can't couldn't
may/can might/could may not/can't mightn't/couldn't
-
Ø
+
Table 1 : Realisations of selection expressions from the root modal semantic network
won't/will not wouldn't/would not won't not wouldn't not
shan't
needn't not
mustn't shouldn't/oughtn't needn't not mustn't/haven't to shouldn't/oughtn't
may/can not might/could not can't not couldn't/ mightn't not can not could not can't not couldn't not
realisation main predicate + main predicate —
Note: In the final column, not indicates a stressed negative, often accompanied by a falling-rising tone -
vol
nec
poss
poss/nec/vol
130 CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
131
element combined with it. The various combinations of features and their realisations are shown in Table 1. For evidence for the claims made here (for instance, that should/ought and needn't can be either [+discourse par ticipant involvement] or [-discourse participant involvement]) see Butler (1982, Chapter 8). 3.3 Predictions from the Semantics 3.31 Acceptability I shall confine my remarks here to showing why certain combinations of mood and modal verb result in sentences which are not readily available for use as directives, while other, closely related forms are. First, compare (21) and (22): (21) You may open the window. (22) May you open the window? The root meaning of may, according to the network in Figure 2, has the fea ture [+discourse participant involvement], so that (21) is roughly equiva lent to (23): (23) I permit you to open the window. Applying the same reasoning to (22), we arrive at an interpretation in which the speaker is asking whether he grants permission to the addressee. This is clearly an extremely odd thing to do, and we may expect (22) to be unavailable as a directive. Now consider (24) and (25): (24) I may ask you to open the window. (25) May I ask you to open the window? Although (24) could be interpreted, with an epistemic meaning for may, as a statement of the possibility that the speaker will ask the hearer to open the window, as a directive with root meaning for may, it is odd, because it is strange to state that one has one's own permission to do something. But (25) is perfectly acceptable, since the speaker appears to be asking the addressee for permission to request the action. A rather different kind of explanation for unacceptability can be seen if we compare (26) and (27): (26) You will open the window. (27) You would open the window. In (26) the speaker adopts a very strong position by asserting either that the
U/S U/S
s U/S
u/s
u
U/S
U/S
U/S
might
Key: U unacceptable order R request S suggestion
ought
should
must
U U
U R
U
R U
U U
u u
U
U
U/R
u u
R
U
u
R
U
u
U U
u
u/o u u
U
U
U
R U
U
U
o u o
R
U
U
R
U
U
U/S
U
TELL
R
U
ASK
QUESTION PERFORMATIVE
U
o/s
R
Table 2: Hypotheses regarding acceptability and speech act classification
X/Y some informants will give X, others Y, both in considerable proportions
u u u u u u
u u
u u
u/o o
shall
o s s
R
U/R
R
U
would
may
R
R
U/S
R
R
O/S
R
R
R
O
s
o/s
NON-QUES POSITIVE NEGATIVE NON-INFO NON-INFO STATEMENT PERFOR MATIVE NON-EXCL QUESTION QUESTION POS. TAG NEG. TAG (=state ASK TELL ment)
will
could
can
Ø
MODAL
SEMANTIC FORCE / POLARITY
132 CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
133
addressee will definitely carry out the act, or that he is willing to do so (de pending on whether will is interpreted as a future or a volitional modal). Both interpretations contravene the negative politeness strategy of giving options, and not presuming upon the addressee's goodwill. We therefore expect (26) to be an inherently impolite, but possible, form of directive. In (27), however, the modal would has the added feature [+tentative], and this tentativity clashes with the strong speaker position. We might therefore predict that sentences of the form shown in (27) would be unavailable as directives. The full set of forms predicted as unacceptable on the basis of these and other arguments can be seen in Table 2. Detailed arguments for indi vidual cases can be found in Butler (1982, Chapter 9). 3.32 Speech Act Classification As a general rule, we might predict that those directively available forms which appear to refuse the addressee any options, and/or represent the imposition of the speaker's authority and/or will, will be classified as orders, while forms which explicitly encode the offering of options will be perceived as requests. Straight imperatives, also sentences involving the performative tell (as in I (must) tell you to open the window), and modalised statements with will (see (26)) and must (expressing the imposition of an obligation), leave no options apart from outright refusal to comply, and so would be predicted to be orders. Sentences with question semantic force (that is, those with inter rogative form), or with question tag modification, explicitly encode the offering of options, and so are predicted to be requests, as are sentences with the requestive performative ask. We shall see below, however, that in certain cases the meaning of the modal verb itself interacts with the seman tic force to create a complex meaning which is most readily interpretable as a suggestion, the defining characteristic of suggestions being that, unlike orders and requests, they are made for the benefit of the hearer rather than for that of the speaker, and therefore do not call for negative politeness strategies. The complete set of predictions for speech act classification can be seen in Table 2. 3.33 Politeness The more work the speaker does in attempting to minimise impositions on the addressee, and to maximise the options afforded, the more polite we should expect the directive to be in our 'neutral' social context, though it is
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CHRISTOPHER .S. BUTLER
possible that at the top end of the scale there may be a 'saturation' point beyond which further linguistic mechanisms achieve no additional increase in perceived politeness. (As I noted earlier, this simple prediction would not hold in all social contexts: for instance, if the authority relations were highly asymmetric, or the social distance very small, the piling up of polite ness strategies could be interpreted as ironic or sarcastic.) We might expect, then, that modalised declaratives will be treated as less polite than the corresponding interrogatives (a claim frequently made in the literature: see, for example, Heringer 1972: 43; Lakoff 1974: 44; Mohan 1974: 454; Forman 1974: 166; Brown and Levinson 1978: 140; Fraser and Nolen 1981: 102-3; Leech 1983: 119ff.); that bare imperatives will be perceived as less polite than imperatives with tags; and that forms with performative tell will be less polite than the corresponding forms with ask. Since the performatives are the most transparent of all forms of a speech act, we should expect the bare command performative I tell you . . . to be less polite even than the bare imperative. A further general prediction is that sentences with [+tentative] modals will be regarded as more polite than the corresponding [-tentative] forms, since the expression of tentativeness is in agreement with the negative politeness requirement of minimising imposition: as Brown and Levinson (1978: 178) and Leech (1983: 121) point out, the past tense modals indicate a hypothetical action, and no assumption is made that the hypothetical world is closely related to the real one. For discussion of tentatives in rela tion to Could you . . . ? vs. Can you . . . ?, Would you . . . ? vs. Will you . . . ?, etc., see also Twaddell 1965: 15; Leech 1969: 236, 1971: 120; Palmer 1974: 127, 1979: 87, 135; Ney 1976: 15; Fraser 1973: 301; Fraser and Nolen 1981: 102-3; Heringer 1972: 43. It might be expected that the same relation ships would be shown also in question tags on imperatives. Furthermore, we can predict that in directive statements [+tentative] should/ought will be more polite than [-tentative] must, might more polite than may, and could more polite than can (see, for example, Leech 1969: 237, 267 and 1971: 121; Diver 1964: 345). Let us now turn to the effects of individual modal lexemes (will/would vs. can/could, and so on). In statements, we should expect modals with the feature [+discourse participant involvement] (that is, shall, may, one interpretation of must) to be impolite, since the speaker, by his choice of modal, overtly indicates that he himself is the immediate source of con straint, so contravening the requirements of negative politeness. Will is also impolite, because it indicates the speaker's assumption either that the
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
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hearer will in fact do the act, or that he is willing to do it. Statements with can are interesting, because of the polysemous nature of the modal. Where can has the feature [+discourse participant involvement], and so is equiva lent to may, it should be impolite, for the reasons given above. Where it is [-discourse participant involvement], referring literally to ability, the speaker is simply pointing out what it is possible for the hearer to do, and this interpretation does not necessarily involve any imposition on the hearer. We might therefore expect politeness ratings for can statements to be somewhat mixed. Negative modalised statements without any tag are, of course, normally used as prohibitions rather than to get someone to do something, and so are not relevant to our concerns. It is generally agreed that will/would/can/could occur standardly with directive function in the interrogative and also in imperative plus tag con structions. At the time when this research was conducted, I saw no good reason for expecting will and can (or would and could) to differ in polite ness (see the hypothesis set out in Section 4.223). Since then, however, Leech (1983: 120) has pointed out that if, in reply to a Will you . . . ? request, the hearer answers No, I won't, he is placing his own wishes above those of the requester, whereas if, in reply to a Can you . . . ? request, he replies No, I can't, he has a get-out, since no-one can be held blameworthy for not doing something if he is unable to do it. Leech advances this as an explanation for his claim that Can you . . . ? is seen as more polite than Will you . . . ? The effect of negativity on the politeness of interrogative directives is rather complex. Let us consider won't and can't. It has been pointed out (see Close 1975: 264, Zandvoort 1975: 74) that Won't you . . . ? signals an invitation. Green (1973: 73) claims that Won't you . . . ? is more polite than Will you . . . ?, but Fraser (1973: 303) places won't below will on a scale of politeness, and Fraser and Nolen (1981) predict that the positive modals will generally be more polite than their negative counterparts. For Forman (1974: 167) Can't you . . . ? is a suggestion, while for Fraser (1973: 303) it is only slightly more polite than a bare imperative. Green (1973: 73) points out that Can't you . . . ? can be either a suggestion, as in (28), or an impo lite order, as in (29), according to the propositional content. (28) (= Green's 69a) Can't you put the meat on first? (29) (= Green's 69b) Can't you be a little quieter? The reasons for this are fairly clear. Since a question of the form Can't you X? is a question about a negative proposition, it can be glossed as 'My
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CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
assumption was that not-X, but I am now questioning it'. In the case of (28), where there might well be circumstances, unknown to the speaker, which affect the feasibility of the action, both the initial assumption and the new questioning of it are reasonable, and there is no necessary implication of impoliteness. But in the case of (29), where the hearer's ability to do the act cannot be in doubt, the initial assumption is clearly untenable, so that the question is inevitably ironic, and heavily biased towards a positive response, and hence towards the hearer's compliance, so infringing the requirements of negative politeness. For a similar analysis see Leech (1983: 122-3). We might therefore expect informants to show mixed reactions to Can t you . . . ? forms according to how they view the act concerned. The position with regard to negative modals in tags is unclear. Lyons (1977: 761) suggests that a negative tag is used when the speaker has reason to believe that the hearer may not comply, and that it is frequently accom panied by paralinguistic features indicating annoyance or impatience. We may also note, however, that it is polite for a speaker to assume that the hearer will not be willing to demean himself by doing what is required of him, in which case a negative tag should be more polite than a positive one. This fits in with Lakoff's (1972b: 914) claims for invitations, namely that (30) is more polite than (31). (30) (= Lakoff s 13) Come in, won't you? (31) (= Lakoff s 16) Come in, will you? In view of the conflicting factors involved in the interaction of negativ ity with modal meaning, it seems wise to make no predictions of relative politeness (except that can't might be expected to be rated rather lower than can by some people), but to see what emerges from informant tests. Finally, I shall say just a few words about modal plus performative combinations (see Fraser 1975). We should expect forms with ask to be more polite than the corresponding forms with tell. We might also expect I must tell/ask you to. . . to be more polite than the bare / tell/ask you to. . ., since it purports to indicate that the speaker is under some obligation to make the order or request, and so mitigates to some extent the imposition on the hearer. We should expect the interrogatives May/might/can/could/I ask you to . . . ? to be extremely polite, since they can be interpreted in terms of the speaker asking the hearer for permission to make the request, so maximising the options allowed. 3.34 Relationships between Speech Act Classification and Politeness Since the status of a directive as a request or as an order is based on the
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
137
authority relations perceived to be encoded by the directive, we may pre dict that there will be a correlation between speech act classification and politeness, such that those directives classified predominantly as requests will be polite, while those classified predominantly as orders will tend to be impolite. Since suggestions do not involve authority relations, they are not expected to show any significant correlation with politeness.
4.0 Hypothesis Testing 4.1 Methodology Arguments such as those in Section 3 led to the formulation of a large number of hypotheses concerning the relationships between semantic fea tures (and hence, ultimately, lexicosyntactic form) and the acceptability, speech act classification and politeness of various modalised forms. An informant testing program was devised in order to obtain evidence which would support or disconfirm these hypotheses. A set of test items was generated by combining each of the 9 relevant semantic force/polarity types (statement, positive question, negative ques tion, non-informational (that is, imperative syntax) with positive tag, noninformational with negative tag, statement with request performative, ques tion with request performative, statement with command performative, question with command performative) with each of the 10 modals will, would, can, could, may, might, must, shall, should, ought, in sentences con cerned with the act of opening a window. In addition, 3 non-modalised forms were included — the bare imperative, bare request performative and bare command performative — giving a total of 93 test items. After a pilot project to test the methodology, and consequent revisions in test proce dures (see Butler 1982, Chapter 10), these 93 items were presented to a group of 112 first year undergraduates, both on paper and in spoken form on tape. The taped version used standard, unmarked intonation and stress patterns for each formal type of sentence (see Halliday 1970b).2 informants were asked to judge whether each sentence, as spoken on tape, was a possi ble way of getting someone to open a window. If the sentence was judged to be a possible directive, the informant was asked to classify it as an order, request or suggestion. From the results of this test (see Section 4.21) a set of 35 directives with at least 80% acceptability was isolated, and used in politeness rating tests. 97 informants were asked to imagine that they were trying to get an
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CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
acquaintance of the same age and sex to open a window. The sentences were presented on paper and on tape, and informants were asked to rate each one on a politeness scale ranging from 1 (very impolite) to 7 (very polite). A computer program was written to compute the median politeness rating for each directive, the median being a more suitable measure of cen tral tendency than the mean, since it would be unjustifiable to assume that equal intervals on the scale represented equal jumps in politeness. The pro gram also performed the sign test to assess the statistical significance of dif ferences between sets of ratings for each possible pair of directives. A dis cussion of these statistical techniques can be found in Butler (1985). Dif ferences were regarded as significant if the probability of obtaining them by chance was 5% or less; in fact, many of the differences proved to be signif icant even at the 0.1% level. 38 informants were available for re-testing on politeness ratings after 3-4 weeks. Sign tests revealed that for all but one of the test items there was no significant difference between ratings on the ini tial test and the re-test. The testing method thus showed a very high degree of reliability. Two informant studies of politeness in directives previously reported in the literature differed in important ways from the investigation reported here. In Mohan's (1974) study, which originally suggested the lines along which my own testing might proceed, 80 American informants aged 18-35 were presented with the same hypothetical social context used in the pre sent study (acquaintances of the same age and sex, one trying to get the other to open a window), and asked to rate each of 19 directives (only 10 of which were modalised) on a scale from 1 (at the least polite end) to 5 (at the most polite end). Medians were calculated, and the significance of differ ences between median ratings assessed statistically. Fraser and Nolen (1981) took 25 directives (15 of them modalised) and generated pairs of them randomly, then presented 45-50 pairs to each of 40 American college students, and asked them to state which member of each pair indicated the greater degree of deference, defined as respect for the hearer. A computer program was then used to obtain a rank ordering for the 25 directives. One major difference from both Mohan's study and my own was that the direc tives were made absolutely neutral as to content (for example Will you do that?). Furthermore, no social context was specified, even though Fraser and Nolen state, in their discussion of deference, that it is associated with activities or utterances, and not with sentences as such. The significance of differences between ratings was not assessed statistically. In both of these previous studies, the directives were presented to informants in the written
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
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form only, and no tests of acceptability or speech act classification were undertaken. The findings of both investigations will be compared with those of the present study at relevant points in the following discussion. 4.2 Hypotheses and Results of Testing 4.21 Acceptability and Speech Act Classification Table 2 summarises the detailed hypotheses made concerning the acceptability, as a directive, of each of the 93 items tested, and the speech act classification predicted for the acceptable items. Table 3 shows the results of the acceptability test: it can be seen that for only 3 of the 93 forms is there a clash between predictions and findings. All 3 cases concern the embedded performative type: I shall/'will/'tell you to . . . were accepted by only 67% of the informants, while Must I tell you to . . .? was accepted by 85%, a higher proportion than expected. It is perhaps significant that the only discrepancies were concerned with a form of directive which is almost certainly less common than the other types studied. In Table 4, for each of the 35 directives accepted by 80% or more of the informants, the predicted speech act classification is compared with the predominant classification given by the informants. A test item was regarded as being predominantly of one speech act type if 60% or more of the informants classifed it as such; and items which did not achieve a score of 60% for any one speech act were classified as 'mixed'. The results con firm our predictions to a very high degree, although some directives had a rather more mixed classification than had been predicted. 4.22 Politeness Rating 4.221 Hypotheses Relating Politeness to Speech Act Classification Table 4 also contains data relevant to the following hypotheses: H1: Directives classified mainly as orders will be relatively impolite. H2: Directives classified mainly as requests will be relatively polite. H3: Since politeness is not really an issue in suggestions, directives classified mainly as suggestions will be neither particularly polite nor impolite. Median politeness ratings for orders range from 1.04 to 3.18; all but one (I must tell you to . . . ) having values no greater than 1.62. The median of the median ratings for orders is 1.32, which clearly supports H1 above. Ratings for requests vary from just below the mid-point of the scale to the
1
should might
might
shall
must should ought will may can could
70-79
80-89
90-100
will would can could
ought
may shall
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
won't couldn't shouldn't oughtn't
can't
wouldn't mightn't
shan't
will would can could
0t ag
can't won't
couldn't
wouldn't
must
will 0 modal shall
would might ought
may
can could should
ASK
must
0 modal
shall* will*
can could may might
ought must
shall
should ought,can may, could
would
will
ASK
should
|
might
would
TELL
must*
might
can could may
shall ought
should
will would
TELL
STATEMENT + PERFORM. | QUESTION + PERFORM.
Note: Asterisked items are those at variance with predictions
mightn't oughtn't shouldn't
might
mayn't mustn't
20-29
must
shan't mayn't
may, shall should ought
10-19
NON-INFO. NEG.TAG
SEMANTIC FORCE / POLARITY NON-INFO. POS. TAG mustn't
would
NEGATIVE QUESTION must
0-9
POSITIVE ACCEPTABILITY STATEMENT QUESTION
%
Table 3: Degree of acceptability for the 93 forms tested
CHRISTOPHER S. BUTL
140
MIXED
≥ 60% SUGGESTION
≥ 60% REQUEST
≥ 60% ORDER
CLASSIFICATION
should S>0[S] 2.29 may S>0[0] 2.19 can S>0[0/S] 1.82
ought [S] 2.15
could [S] 2.85
will [O] 1.04 shall [] 1.09 must [O] 1.32
STATEMENT
NEG. QUEST.
can't R>S>0 [O/S] 2.12
couldn't R>S[U/S] 3.77
shouldn't [S] 3.37 oughtn't [U/S] 3.02
will [R] 4.73 would [R] 5.62 won't [R] can [R] 3.65 4.94 could [R] 5.64
POS. QUEST.
NON-INFO. NEG.TAG
will [R] 4.20 would [R] 4.70 can [R] 3.67 could [R] 3.99
can't R[0/S] 2.64
won't R>0[R] 2.83
0 tag [O] 1.36
NON-INFO. POS.TAG TELL
0 modal [O] 1.12
must [U/O] 1.62
may [R] 6.74 might [R] 6.62 can [R] 5.96 could [R] 6.46
ASK
TELL
QUESTION PERF.
2.15 to 3.37 (=1.22)
3.65 to 6.74 (=3.09)
(=2.14)
to 3.18
1.04
RANGE OF MEDIANS
2.94
4.94
1.32
MEDIAN OF MEDIANS
will R>0[R] 2.74 must 0>S R shall 0 > R SS[R] [U] EVITCERID DESILADOM FO SCITNAMES DNA SSENETILOP 2.66 1.08 0modal 0>R[R] 141 1.64
must [R] 3.18
ASK
STATEMENT PERF.
SEMANTIC FORCE / POLARITY
Table 4: Predominant speech act classification and median politeness ratings of the 35 'acceptable' directives
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CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
very top, with a median of 4,94, on the polite side of the mid-point, so sup porting H2. Suggestions received rather lower ratings than expected (2.15 to 3.37; median 2.94), but do fall clearly between orders and requests. A second way in which we can test the relationship between speech act classification and politeness is to calculate the Pearson product-moment coefficient (r) for the correlation between the median politeness rating of a directive and its percentage classification as a particular speech act type. We should expect a strongly negative correlation for orders, a strongly posi tive correlation for requests, and a near-zero value for suggestions if, as I have suggested, politeness is not an issue here. The values calculated clearly support the hypotheses: orders requests suggestions
: r = —0.78 : r = +0.87 : r = -0.09
The values for orders and requests are significant at the 0.1% level, whereas that for suggestions is clearly non-significant. 4.222 Hypotheses Relating Politeness to Semantic Force The following hypothesis subsumes a number of detailed claims about the relationship between politeness and semantic force: H4: Within the limits imposed by the acceptability of particular modals in combination with particular semantic forces, the politeness ordering of the semantic force types for a given modal form will be: increasing statement
statement + command performative
statement + request performative
politeness positive question
question + request performative
non-informational (imperative) + tag
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CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER
The relevant data are summarised in Table 5, which shows that every one of the predictions made in H4 is confirmed, for each modal where appropriate pairs can be tested. The results agree with those of Mohan (1974), who showed that for can the order of increasing politeness was statement, state ment with ask, question, question with ask; for will the statement was less polite than the question; and for may the statement was less polite than the question with ask. There is also agreement with Fraser and Nolen's (1981) finding that for can, can't, could, couldn't, will and won't, the imperative . plus tag form is less polite than the corresponding interrogative. Table 5 also shows data relevant to the following hypothesis concern ing non-modalised forms: H5:
The politeness ordering for the non-modalised directives studied will be:
Again, the two sub-hypotheses contained in H5 are supported by the data. The data in Table 5 also allow us to make observations on comparisons where no direction of difference was predicted (and which therefore require a 'non-directional' sign test, as opposed to the 'directional' test used where the direction of difference was predicted). The most interesting and impor tant finding is that in all cases negative modals are less polite than the cor responding positive modals, when combined with any given semantic force. As far as the interrogatives are concerned, this confirms the findings of Fraser and Nolen, who showed that won't was less polite than will, can't less polite than can, and couldn't less polite than could. In imperative plus tag constructions, Fraser and Nolen found that couldn't was less polite than could, but that will was rated below won't. 4.223 Hypotheses Relating Politeness to Modal Semantics Data relevant to the following hypothesis are incorporated into Table 5: H6: For any given modal lexical item, and any given semantic force, the [+tentative] modal (if available) will be more polite than the corresponding [-tentative] modal.
POLITENESS AND SEMANTICS OF MODALISED DIRECTIVES
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All predictions but one are confirmed, the exception being the pair Might/ may I ask you to . . . ?', which shows a non-significant difference. The most likely explanation of this is in terms of a saturation phenomenon (see Sec tion 3.33): the interrogative form with may is already so polite that further signals of politeness have no added effect. The could/can pair in this con struction does show a significant difference; however, the median rating for the can form is lower than that for may (5.96 as against 6.74), and is pre sumably below the saturation level. My results confirm Fraser and Nolen's to a large degree: they found could > can, couldn't > can't for questions, and wouldn't > won't, couldn't > can't for tags. But they also found, inexplicably, that will was more polite than would in questions. However, as mentioned earlier, no tests were carried out to assess the significance of the difference observed. Data for comparison of individual modals in directive statements are given in Table 6, and allow us to test the following hypothesis: H7: In modalised statements, the modals will show the following politeness ordering: 3
All the predictions made by H7 are supported, except for comparisons involving may. You may . . . achieves a significantly higher politeness rating than You can . . . , and shows no significant difference from You should . . . or You ought . . . . The explanation is probably that may, through its use in the polite May I . . . ?, has acquired an overall connotation of politeness. Table 6 also shows that must is more polite than will and shall in state ments, and should more polite than can; the differences between will and shall, should and ought, can and ought, are non-significant. Mohan found the order may > can > will for statements. Table 7 shows comparisons between the modalised statements with various modals, and the bare imperative. It can be seen that You/can/could/ may/should/ought . . . are significantly more polite than the bare impera-
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Table 7: Comparison of politeness of bare imperative and modalised statements tive, You must... is not significantly different, while You will/shall. . . are less polite than the imperative. Hypothesis H8 concerns politeness in interrogative directives: H8:
In modalised questions the modals will show the following polite ness ordering:
The relevant data are given in Table 8, which shows that all predictions con cerning the acceptable forms in the above series are confirmed, with the exception that Won't you . . . ? and Couldn't you . . . ? show no significant
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difference, the reason not being immediately obvious. Table 8 also allows comparisons to be made between modals grouped together in H8. The most interesting of these findings are the non-significant differences between will and can, would and could (which go against Leech's claim - Section 3.33), and the fact that shouldn't is more polite than oughtn't, whereas in modalised statements should and ought showed no significant difference. Mohan, also Fraser and Nolen, found that will was more polite than can in questions (a finding which is at odds both with the results of the present study and with Leech's claims), though Fraser and Nolen also found that would and could had very similar ratings. In Fraser and Nolen's study, couldn't was marginally more polite than shouldn't, though of course we have no way of knowing whether the difference was statistically significant. Predictions involving tagged directives are given in H9: H9:
In directives with non-informational force (imperative syntax) plus a question tag modification, the modals will show the following politeness ordering: increasing politeness
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Table 9 shows that all but one of the comparisons support the hypothesis, the only discrepancy being that could and will show no significant differ ence. The finding that will is more polite than can, and would more polite than could, is particularly interesting in view of the fact that these pairs show no significant difference in interrogatives. These findings, though not those on questions, also support Leech's claims about these modals. Fraser and Nolen's findings were compatible with my own, except that their infor mants rated won't above will.
5.0 Conclusion The very high degree to which the hypotheses are supported shows quite clearly that it is possible to correlate the relative politeness and speech act classification of modalised directives with the semantics of mood and modalisation, as defined in terms of systemic choice. The study reported here, though revealing some important properties of the large range of noncongruent realisations of directives, needs to be supplemented by further studies testing the politeness of certain directives in different social con texts, in which factors relating to authority, 'horizontal' social distance and the cost/benefit scale are systematically varied.
NOTES 1.
I shall prefer the term 'directive' to Halliday's 'command' on the grounds that the latter is often taken as equivalent to 'order', whereas 'directive' can be used to cover all kinds of action-seeking acts.
2.
Although this meant that the important and interesting effects of stress and intonation could not be studied, it was clearly essential to control as closely as possible for all vari ables other than the lexicogrammatical features under test. The inclusion of prosodic var iables would, in any case, have given a battery of test items which would have been far too long.
3.
Brackets around a modal indicate that the form was predicted to be unacceptable to some informants. Curly braces are used for sets of modals for which no directional predictions regarding relative politeness were made.
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REFERENCES Antinucci, F. and D. Parisi. 1971. On English modal verbs. Papers from the 7th Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society. 28-39. Brown, R. and A. Gilman. 1960. The pronouns of power and solidarity. In T.A. Sebeok, ed., Style in language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 25376. (Reprinted in P.P Giglioli, ed., Language and social context. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. 252- 82.) Brown, P. and S. Levinson. 1978. Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena. In E.N. Goody, ed., Questions and politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 56-324. Butler, C.S. 1982. The directive function of the English modals. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Nottingham. ___ 1986. What has systemic functional linguistics contributed to our understanding of spoken text? Proceedings of the 1984 Working Confer ence on Language in Education, Brisbane. Brisbane: Brisbane College of Advanced Education. . 1985. Statistics in linguistics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. . 1987. Communicative function and semantics. In R.P. Fawcett and M.A.K. Halliday, eds., New developments in systemic linguistics. Lon don: Frances Pinter. 212-29. Close, R.A. 1975. A reference grammar for students of English. London: Longman. Cole, P. and J.L. Morgan, eds. 1975. Syntax and semantics, 3: Speech acts. New York: Academic Press. Davison, A. 1975. Indirect speech acts and what to do with them. In Cole and Morgan 1975: 143-85. Diver, W. 1964. The modal system of the English verb. Word 20:322-52. Ervin-Tripp, S. 1976. Is Sybil there? The structure of some American Eng lish directives. Language in Society 5:25-66. Forman, D. 1974. The speaker knows best principle, or why complicated facts about indirect speech acts are really obvious facts about questions and declaratives. Papers from the 10th Regional Meeting, Chicago Lin guistic Society. 162-76. Fraser, . 1973. On accounting for illocutionary forces. In S.R. Anderson and P. Kiparsky, eds., A Festschrift for Morris Halle. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 287-307. . 1975. Hedged performatives. In Cole and Morgan 1975: 187-210.
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Fraser, . and Wm. Nolen. 1981. The association of deference with linguis tic form. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 27:93-109. Goffman, E. 1967. Interaction ritual: essays on face to face behaviour. Gar den City, New York: Doubleday. Green, G. 1973. How to get people to do things with words. In R. Shuy, ed., Some new directions in sociolinguistics. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 51-81. Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Cole and Morgan 1975: 4158. . 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation. In P. Cole, ed., Syn tax and semantics, 9: Pragmatics. New York and London: Academic Press. 113-27. Halliday, M.A.K. 1970a. Functional diversity in language, as seen from a consideration of modality and mood in English. Foundations of Lan guage 6:322-61. . 1970b. A course in spoken English: grammar. London: Oxford Uni versity Press. . 1984. Language as code and language as behaviour: a systemic-func tional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In R.P. Fawcett, M.A.K. Halliday, S.M. Lamb, and A. Makkai, eds., The semiotics of culture and language, 1: Language as social semiotic. Lon don: Frances Pinter. 3-35. Heringer, J. 1972. Some grammatical correlates of felicity conditions and presuppositions. Working Papers in Linguistics (Ohio State University) 11:1-110. Hudson, R.A. 1975. The meaning of questions. Language 51: 1-31. Lakoff, R. 1972a. The pragmatics of modality. Papers from the 8th Reg ional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society. 229-46. . 1972b. Language in context. Language 48:907-27. . 1973. The logic of politeness; or, minding your P's and Q's. Papers from the 9th Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society. 292-305. . 1974. What you can do with words: politeness, pragmatics and per formatives. Berkeley Studies in Syntax and Semantics 1. 16:1-55. Lee, 1975. Embedded performatives. Language 51:105- 8. Leech, G.N. 1969. Towards a semantic description of English. London: Longman. . 1971. Meaning and the English verb. London: Longman. . 1980. Language and tact. In G.N. Leech, Explorations in semantics
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and pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 79-117. . 1983. Principles of pragmatics. London: Longman. Lodge, K.R. 1974. Modality and modal verbs in English and German. Ph.D. Thesis, University of East Anglia. Lyons, J. 1977. Semantics, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mitchell, K. 1974. Making sense of English modals. In Annales du Centre Regional de Documentation Pédagogique de Caen, 24- 25 octobre 1973. Institut National de Recherches et de Documentation Pédagogiques. 1324. Mohan, B.A. 1974. Principles, postulates, politeness. Papers from the 10th Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society. 446-59. Ney, J.W. 1976. The modals in English: a floating semantic feature analysis. Journal of English Linguistics 10:8-20. Palmer, F.R. 1974. The English verb. London: Longman. ___. 1979. Modality and the English modals. London: Longman. Sadock, J.M. 1974. Towards a linguistic theory of speech acts. New York: Academic Press. Searle, J.R. 1975. Indirect speech acts. In Cole and Morgan 1975: 60-82. Twaddell, W.F. 1965. The English verb auxiliaries. 2nd ed. Providence: Brown University Press. Zandvoort, R.W. 1975. A handbook of English grammar. 7th ed. London: Longman.
ON DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES IN THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH
Eirian C. Davies University of London London, England
One of the major contributions which Systemic Grammar has to offer in the study of syntax relates to the concept of multiple components of the gram mar (Halliday 1969; 1970a, b; 1973 et passim). In the area of modality this multi-dimensional approach has interesting connections with distinctions made between epistemic and deontic logic (cf. Von Wright 1957: 58; Haack 1978: 4-8). Halliday's (1970b) discussion of modality and modulation in Eng lish, in which he noted distinctions in potentialities of tense, may be linked with Haack's comments (1978: 195-7) on the relevance of considerations of tense to the development of more satisfactory formal modal logics. In taking 'possibility' as the topic for this paper, I want to confine discus sion to a rather narrow area of modality: that which is neither deontic nor epistemic, but has to do with probability judgements in relation to the occur rence of events.1 I hope to show that an element of 'discourse meaning', relat ing to the textual component, is realized by modal verbs of 'prediction' here, in addition to a component of probability meaning relating to the ideational component. In the course of the discussion I offer a somewhat revised and extended version of earlier proposals (Davies 1979: 139-145) with respect to the latter area of meaning, and suggest that two different kinds of possibility are realized, by MAY and MIGHT respectively.2 I want to begin outside the area of modality by considering, informally, some basic factors underlying everyday, rule of thumb, notions of what makes certain remarks 'relevant' things to say, and others not. Suppose that the London Evening paper I bought had a headline which read (1)
The Government has not resigned.
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It is 11th April 1985. There has been no question of Mrs. Thatcher's govern ment resigning. Such a headline would be very difficult to interpret, except as a 'lead-in' to the disclosure of a previously unsuspected political crisis. As a statement of fact, it would be no more, and no less, true today than on any other day since the last general election; but it could nevertheless be expected to be treated as 'hot news'. On a (somewhat) more muted scale, gossip col umns can sometimes be accused of containing examples of what could be cal led 'innuendo by denial'. To deny a proposition not previously entertained as at all likely by the addressee(s) to whom it is made may have the marked prag matic significance of suggesting the relevance of the corresponding affirma tion. I have illustrated, with a negative statement, what I take to be a more gen eral phenomenon of the potentially marked significance of 'stating the obvi ous'. Givón's (1978) illuminating discussion of the greater 'markedness' of negatives, as compared with affirmatives, in terms of discourse-pragmatic presuppositions, is relevant here. He claims that while affirmatives 'are used to convey new information on the presumption of ignorance of the hearer, negatives are used to correct misguided belief on the assumption of the hearer's error'. This approach would certainly do much to explain the signifi cance of (1); but, while negatives may give the clearest cases of such 'correc tion', and may be predominantly found in this use, affirmatives can be used at times to similar effect. That is, what is at issue in what follows, is perhaps better seen as 'contradiction' (discourse negation) which can also be achieved by an affirmation rather than 'denial' (propositional negation) as such. Suppose, for example, I solemnly assure you that (2)
Snow is white.
One quite natural response would be for you to query what might have arisen to make me think otherwise, or to make me think that you (/anyone) thought otherwise. That is, by affirming a proposition regarded as self-evidently true, I am interpreted as having brought forward for attention the possibility of its contradictory. The basis for such an interpretation, I suggest, is a natural tendency to believe that our conversational partners normally abide by the 'conversa tional maxims' as outlined by Grice (1975-1979), or something very like them. Perhaps, then, it is an assumption that what is said is 'relevant' which leads us to consider the contradictory proposition in the case of statements of the obvious, whether affirmations or denials. Statements of the obvious are
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interpreted as not themselves relevant, per se, at least in certain contexts, preeminently those of the news media.3 I suggest that there is a tacit conven tional division in any speech community which underlies judgements of 'rele vance' of the type we have been considering. That is, a given set of proposi tions is regarded as 'known'. The content of this set of known propositions will vary among different sub-groups in society, in different places and at dif ferent times. It may, in fact, be used to define group-membership, both by outsiders and by those belonging. The stock of common knowledge rep resented by this set of propositions establishes which assertions will count as 'statements of the obvious' and which can count as conveying some new infor mation. That is, the concepts of new information and of common knowledge can be seen as mutually defining complementary sets of propositions. The question of which propositions belong to which of these two divisions of the universe of discourse is not a feature of language but of social group, and of time and place. But the division itself, the fact of there being a distinction, can be seen as underlying part of the way in which a natural language works in use. I shall follow Kartunnen and Peters (1979) in referring below to the set of propositions of common knowledge at any given point in a text/linguistic interaction as the Common Ground (CG). I have used the term 'relevance' above, but in the framework of Grice's (1975) analysis, (1) and (2) violate rather his first maxim of quantity than the maxim of relation. The examples he gives of floutings of these maxims could be seen, however, to proceed from a single source, though with different effects. To say (3)
The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?
in response to the remark 'Mrs. X is an old bag' at a genteel tea-party, is to impute 'inappropriateness' to the preceding remark by uttering a comment ostentatiously unconnected with it. This involves the introduction of a new topic into the discourse.4 To write (4)
Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his atten dance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.
as a testimonial, where what is needed and expected is an opinion on his suita bility to teach philosophy, is 'to fail to answer the (implicit) question relev antly'. That is, such a testimonial would be interpreted as failing to say explicitly what you thought of Mr. X. as a potential philosophy teacher. But to utter (3) in the context given could also be interpreted as a failure to say what you thought (about Mrs. X). The different 'effects' in context surely
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have something to do with the discourse feature of whether or not your opin ion on the topic is directly sought. The point I wish to suggest is that failure to 'make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)' is one way, among several, in which a speaker may flout the maxim 'Be relevant'. Example (3), by introducing a topic not 'led up to' in preceding discourse, provides too much of what is new in relation to what has come immediately before; (4) fails to follow on by providing too little of what has been specifi cally prepared for; but both are examples of what might be called 'principled inappropriateness' to immediate needs at the given stage of the transaction. It seems allowable then to think of (discourse) relevance in terms wide enough to include the first maxim of quantity, (so perhaps thinking of the maxim of relation as a 'supermaxim' 5 ). My suggestions so far have run as follows: 1. Given the presence of a group (G) of propositions in the CG opera tive in Context a , it is possible to assess the relevance of uttering a state ment, S, of a proposition p in Ca where either, (a): p is itself a member of G, or (b): p is the contradictory of a member of G. 2. Given that the major purpose of the speech event taking place in Ca is to convey information, there is a prima facie case for saying that it will be non-relevant to utter S if (la) holds true; and relevant (although perhaps not 'appropriate' 6 ) to do so if (lb) is the case. Given, further, that the utterance of a sentence S stating that p in Ca is judged non-rele vant on the grounds of (la), this in itself can sometimes be taken to pro duce a conversational implicature amounting to a proposal for a revision of the CG such that the possibility of the contradictory of p be included in it (if the speaker is assumed to be abiding by the co-operative principle). Grice (1975: 49) distinguishes between the 'violation' and the 'flouting' of a conversational maxim. 'Stating the obvious' must always be the latter, since of its nature it cannot quietly mislead, but there is a proviso here in the form of 'obvious to whom?'. The addressee in cases where he perceives S as a statement of a proposition within the CG has two lines of reasoning open to him (given that he believes that the speaker is abiding by the CP): one is of the kind outlined by Grice and leads to the deduction of one kind of conver sational implicature; but the second leads to a deduction about what the speaker believes to be present in the CG, and thence, more indirectly to a dif-
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ferent kind of implicature.7 That is, the addressee may conclude that if I state that p, I do so on the (normal) basis that I believe he does not already know that p ; that is, I do not believe p to be within the area of common knowledge. The significance accorded to this conclusion will vary with the speaker's status. In the case of (2) above, the conclusion that a newspaper editor had indicated that he did not believe his readers knew that the government had not resigned would carry the suggestion that the matter of its resignation was in doubt. 8 In discussing the CG in this way, we are in the area of 'pragmatic presup position' (cf. Stalnaker 1974: 199-201). Two approaches to the relation between CG and what is actually said appear to be: (i) Given that it is relevant to state 'that p' in Context C, what other proposition(s) (q, (r...)) are required to be present in the CG to make this the case? (ii) Given the pre sence of certain propositions (q,(r...)) in the CG, is it relevant to state 'that p' in context (that context in which the given CG is operative)? Of these the second approach has been less explored, and it is this which is of concern in the present discussion. It raises the fundamental problem of how to assess or 'discover' what is present in the CG at any given stage in a particular speech event (other than by examining preceding 'co-text'), if not by implicit references to the content of CG through what is uttered. One par tial solution to this difficulty would be to consider contexts which themselves clearly supply information, which will be automatically part of the CG for all participants in a speech event taking place in them. (This approach rests, not so much on a type of context, as on a class of features commonly known in a large range of cases such as those to do with location in time and place). In exploring whether certain features of 'meaningfulness' in a sentence should be accounted for in the (grammatical) semantics or within pragmatics it seems possible to argue as follows. We might expect that, if the utterance of a sentence, S, is judged 'bizarre' in context C, this must arise from some kind of 'mis-match' between what S conveys in itself (its meaning) and some feature(s) in C. If the nature of the mis-match is that of contrast (or, in the clearest cases, outright clash) we should be able to infer that the features in what S conveys which are involved in this mis-match must belong to its context-independent meaning, since they contrast with features in C; and that they should be accounted for within the semantics. But what we have been discussing so far, under 'statements of the obvious', are cases where the proposition stated in the utterance of S is iden tical with one present in CG: that is, the inappropriateness of 'total match-
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ing'. The point here seems to be that the infelicity involved arises from the violation of a pragmatic principle (a conversational maxim), but that this could no more be perceived without the sentence meaning just what it does than could cases where inappropriateness arises from a 'clash'. I would claim that by no means all 'clashes' give rise to inappropriateness (Davies 1985: 242-6); and one burden of the present discussion so far is that, further, a contrast of propositional content between S and CG is a necessary element for appropriateness in an information-conveying exchange. How ever, clearly not all propositional identity, either between S and CG, or between consecutive or neighbouring sentences within a text (especially if occurring in separate turns), is inappropriate, though it may be redundant. Pragmatic principles can be taken as varying in their application according to the type of context, and, in particular, according to the purpose of the exchange, and the relations of the participants. What is at issue, then, is the operation of some 'lower order' pragmatic rules which give different necessary conditions for the satisfaction of the con versational maxim 'Be relevant' according to different types of language events. In some types, such as those where the main business of the exchange is phatic communion, it may be relevant to utter sentences affirming proposi tions present in CG; that is, it may well be relevant to make informationally redundant utterances. This could be thought of as 'affective relevance': the utterance of S is relevant because of the reassurance of agreement/common assumptions which it conveys. Here again, however, it would be by virtue of the context-independent meaning of S, that its utterance could have that pragmatic effect. The present discussion is narrowly confined to language events in which the over-riding purpose is to convey information. In these, I am suggesting, the applicable pragmatic rules are such that they assign a marked status to redundancy. That is, in this class of events the utterance of a sentence stating an informationally redundant proposition (one present in CG or in preceding co-text) counts as a violation of the maxim 'Be relevant'. So far, we have considered only relations between the propositional con tent of an indicative sentence and the CG. In terms of systemic grammar, propositional content falls under the ideational component. It is a truism that sentences of the kind illustrated (major finite) can have a context-indepen dent ideational meaning. What is more controversial is whether they also have a 'relevance meaning' falling under the textual component. On the basis of the discussion so far, the 'relevance' status assigned to the utterance of S
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in context is accountable for in terms of a relation between the ideational meaning of S and the contents of CG. On this approach, relevance is a prag matic, and not a semantic, phenomenon, since it varies according to contex tual factors. However on Givon's (1978) approach, this is not the case. If it is accepted that negation in indicatives always means 'this sentence corrects a previous error of the hearer', then this is to ascribe a semantic feature of 'con trary to previous supposition' to the grammatical feature of sentence nega tion. That is, Givon's analysis associates an element of discourse meaning with sentence negation: this is equivalent to claiming that the relation between the hearer's knowledge (the set of propositions known to the hearer/ assumed by him to be true) and the propositional content (ideational mean ing) of S is realized in English syntax. Understood in this way, sentence nega tion realises both textual and ideational meaning in systemic grammar terms. It is a device for emending the CG by deletion, or rather for challenging another's view of what belongs to it, or his proposal of what should be added to it. It is, in fact, easy to refute this interpretation of negation in cases where a single proposition is denied successively by two different speakers. That is, in English we can agree by uttering a negative statement as in Speaker A: SpeakerB:
They haven t taken that factor into account yet. No they haven't.
While the first utterance could be thought of as correcting another's misap prehension, the primary significance of the second is to convey agreement. If it 'corrects' it does so only indirectly, by virtue of agreeing with the previous utterance. (This example suggests that the 'other' whose misapprehension is corrected by a negative indicative need not be the addressee.) Not unexpec tedly, it is not negation as such which realizes this feature of discourse mean ing, but negation of a particular proposition. Where this is done twice, the 'correction' does not apply from the second to the first; this element of the meaning of negation is tied to sentences, not utterances of them, and is neu tral to repetitions by different speakers. I have suggested earlier that positive indicative declaratives can also be used to emend CG. Givón's analysis of negation could be taken to imply that the positives should be seen as adding to CG, as opposed to their negative equivalents which are marked as deleting from CG: they both emend it, but in opposing fashions. On this interpretation, the grammatical polarity system with sentence scope realizes a semantic distinction within the textual compo nent. This suggestion in no way conflicts with the accepted view that polarity
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realizes a semantic distinction within the ideational component, given a multi-component model. The test cases for this view will consist of examples such as (1) and (2) above. Where the relevant contents of CG can be checked independently of the given S, it is possible to compare what is present there with what is said in uttering S. There can, in principle, be a number of differ ent results as outcome from such a comparison, but those which have con cerned us so far (all restricted to ideational meaning) are: (i)
The propositional content of what is said is identical with a propo sition in CG. (ii) The propositional content of what is said is the contradictory of a proposition in CG. (iii) The propositional content of what is said is not present in CG (and is not directly related to any proposition which is present in CG).
(1) and (2) illustrate (i) in this list. On the basis that the relevance condi tions applicable to an information-conveying exchange are operative, (1) and (2) are redundant and non-relevant in context, by virtue of their ideational meaning. But (1) and (2) are perceived not only as redundant, but also as 'bizarre' in some further sense. On the hypothesis above, this bizarre quality can be seen to result from the fact that in each case the relationship with CG realized in sentence polarity is not that which obtains in context. That is, sen tence negation in (1) marks it syntactically as having the discourse meaning of deleting an element in CG, but that element is not present in CG, and not available for deletion. Positive sentence polarity in (2) realizes the discourse meaning of adding an element to CG, but that element is already present in CG and cannot be added by saying (2). Both (1) and (2) realize a discourse meaning which appears demonstrably false. It is on the basis of the discourse meaning in each case that an addressee will attempt to infer conclusions which preserve, if at all possible, the assump tion that the speaker was abiding by the Co-operative Principle in saying what he did. Given that (1) and (2) are uttered in the course of an information-con veying exchange, the purpose of which could be summarized as progressive emendation of the CG, the addressee has two conclusions he can draw; both have to do with the CG, and are rather unlike the illustrations of conversa tional implicatures given in Grice (1975). In either case the addressee must infer that the speaker's view of what constitutes the CG differs from his own. With a positive sentence his infer ence will be that the speaker believes something to be lacking in CG which he (the addressee) believes to be present, and with a negative sentence he will
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infer that the speaker believes something to be present in CG which he him self had not before thought to be so. From either of these conclusions, and depending on his degree of certainty and estimate of the speaker (and the speaker's sources of information) 9 the addressee will proceed to a judgement as to who is more likely to be right about the fact(s) at issue, himself or the speaker, and will accordingly revise or retain his own view of what is present in CG. 10 The notion that an aspect of discourse meaning (falling under the textual component) is realized in surface grammar by the polarity system, which simultaneously realizes a distinction in ideational meaning, is in harmony with Halliday's general approach. In what follows, I want to explore the ques tion of whether this hypothesis has something to contribute to the analysis of non-deontic MAY in 'predictive' use, relating to future events/states of affairs. Let us begin with MAY by considering cases where the presence/absence in CG of a given possibility or probability is discoverable from context, inde pendently of what is said. I shall adopt a strategy of outlining contexts in impoverished terms, taking only the needed salient features as supplied by them to CG. If we take two locations at opposite extremes with respect to commonly known normal rainfall we can take them as contrasting contexts of utterance. Place A we will say is a tropical rainforest, where it rains on 360 days of the year, and Place let us take as a part of the Sahara desert where it rains, perhaps, on three days in two years on average. To say (5)
It may rain today
in A is odd, that is, apparently unmotivated and redundant; similarly with (6)
It may not rain today
uttered in B. (There is no indication in either A or that the weather on the day in question is going to be atypical.) Let us suppose further that the purpose of the conversation is the same in both cases: to plan what to do in the course of the day in question; and that what can be done depends on whether or not it rains. This topic is therefore, in principle, germane to the progress of the plan-making transaction. If to say (5) in A or (6) in is redundant, we should look for features of meaning in these sentences which are present in the respective CGs. Nondeontic MAY, as here, is generally understood to mean 'possible'; roughly: 'not precluded', 11 but also 'not certain'. If we take the utterance of (5) in A, the CG contains knowledge of a high probability of 'it's raining today', a near
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certainty. (5) can be seen as qualifying that degree of near certainty; and it seems intuitively as if the oddness of uttering it in this context results more from the element of 'reservation' which it so conveys than from its being redundant. If so, this oddness has less to do with 'stating the obvious' than with understating it; and more to do with a discrepancy between what is said and what is present in CG than with similarities between them. The analysis I want to propose is as follows: (i) (ii)
(iii)
Part of the meaning of non-deontic MAY is to do with discourse relations and falls under the textual component of the grammar. The meaning feature concerned could be labelled 'contradictory': that is, part of what MAY means in S is 'contradictory of existing CG expectation', The ideational meaning of MAY here is: 'a probability of .5 or more, but of less than 1 (certainty), that the event will (future) occur'.
The expectation supplied from the physical context to CG in A above is that 'it's raining today' is highly probable. The belief that x is highly probable commits the holder to the belief that x is not less than equi-probable; so, in terms of the ideational component alone, (if we accept (iii) as a reasonable analysis of MAY) the use of (5) in A must be seen as expressing a consequ ence of what is held in CG. Though it might be viewed as a 'downtoner', in view of the fact that MAY extends the lower range of envisaged probability to include equiprobability, its ideational meaning still largely overlaps with that supplied by context to CG. In terms of its ideational meaning alone (5) should be perceived in A more as a mild disclaimer conveying some reserva tion in this context than as the bizarre remark which it appears to be. Com pare in this respect (7)
It should rain today
uttered in the same context, which although more clearly redundant (full overlap of probability with CG) seems somewhat less, rather than more, strange. If we take MAY in (5) to realize, in addition to the ideational meaning proposed in (iii), a feature of discourse meaning, 'contradictory', contradic tory of CG expectation, we can analyse as follows: Present in CG in A 'Highly probable that it will rain today'/Probability of
(5) It may rain today Discourse meaning: 'contradictory of CG' Ideational meaning: A probability of
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nearly 1.
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.5 or more (but of less than 1). Combination of meanings: Denial of a background CG probability of less than half.
That is, if the ideational meaning is a probability of 'greater than or equal to .5 (but less than 1)' and the discourse meaning is 'contradictory of CG', the combination of these kinds of meaning gives (5) as denying an element in CG which is not present in the CG in Context A, namely that of an estimated probability of less than .5, but greater than 0, 'unlikely'. So to utter (5) in A is to attempt to revise CG by deleting an element which is not present in the CG in Context A: namely that of an estimated of (2) in the context sketched for it above. 12 The distinction claimed between uttering (5) and (7) in A, can be related to the feature of discourse meaning 'contradictory of CG'. I suggest that this is realized by MAY, but not by SHOULD. SHOULD, though it excludes almost the same area of probability as MAY, by virtue of its ideational mean ing, does not realize an explicit contrast with CG. In this way it conveys no sense that what it ideationally excludes is present in CG; and the use of (7) in A does not produce as sharp a clash with context-supplied common knowl edge as that of (5). SHOULD operates in discourse as a device for adding to CG, as in the case of positive indicatives, rather than as a deletion device, as in the case of negative indicatives and MAY. The use of (7) would, on this analysis, be unmarked in cases where there was a lack of any probability expectation in relation to 'its raining' , rather than in cases where there was some expectation of 'probably not' (a probability of less than .5, but greater than 0) as for the unmarked use of (5). The use of (7) in A would be 'marked' as far as expecta tion concerning the probability of 'its raining' is operative in CG; but its use would not convey that the speaker was countering an assumption in CG that rain was unlikely, but would merely suggest that the chances of 'its raining' had not been previously at issue (and were not common knowledge). The proposed analysis can be summarized informally as follows: (i) (ii) (iii)
MAY 'discourse means' that the opposite of its own ideational meaning is present in CG. SHOULD 'discourse means' that its own ideational meaning is lacking from CG. The utterance of a sentence containing MAY acts to delete the opposite of the ideational meaning of MAY from CG.
EIRIAN . DAVIES
166 (iv)
The utterance of a sentence containing SHOULD acts to add the ideational meaning of SHOULD to CG.
I will examine 'own ideational meaning' and the 'opposite' of it in greater detail below. The analysis predicts that to utter (6) in Context will be as bizarre as to utter (5) in A, but that the use of (6) in A, and of (5) in would be unmarked. So far we have restricted discussion to artificial contexts and marked uses of predictive MAY as helping to throw into sharper relief the presence of the claimed discourse element in its meaning. In the nature of things, such instances are unlikely to be found in texts, and it seems a case where appeal to native speaker intuition and constructed examples is justified and useful. Taking the interpretation of MAY so derived, I turn now to some examples of unmarked usage in texts, specifically the racing columns of two 'serious' British daily newspapers (The Daily Telegraph and The Times). (8) (9)
Bill Holden does well with his small string, and his Love Walked In may take the Tonbridge Handicap. 13 However, he shaped like a sprinter on several occasions and, being a son of Mummy's Pet, may not be at his best over seven furlongs on testing ground.14
MAY can be contrasted with SHOULD in racing predictions, as in (10) In the absence of Sarab and Provideo the veteran Vorvados should win the Abernant Stakes. 15 which is a more confident forecast than (8). In horse racing, as in any activity where there is only one winner of a given event, the unweighted statistical chance of any particular individual coming first is a probability of 1 divided by the number of contestants. 16 While I am not suggesting that the ordinary reader is in any way consciously aware of any mathematical calculation of this kind,17 it would I think be fair to say that the common ground shared by writers and readers of racing 'tips' includes the notion that, if there are no specific grounds for thinking otherwise (such as previous performance etc.) the ordinary chances of winning for any particular individual are less than 50 : 50 (in a normal field of more than two entrants). That is, the CG contains an underlying expectation that for any individual there is less than an equal possibility of his winning. On this basis, to assert (8) in the racing pages of the press, can be seen as entirely natural and unmarked in terms of the interpretation given to MAY
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in (5) above. That is, (8) in its second clause, contradicts an underlying assumption of less than even odds that this particular horse will win the race in question. This is why it's worth including (8) in the column. The case is similar for (9). Here the preceding text has discussed three horses which on previous performance and other grounds seem capable of winning the Burton Overy Stakes. This in turn is treated as an indication of likely success in more important races later in the season, the Newmarket classics. The horse refer red to in (9) is 'Rotherfield Greys', but the article has the heading 'Charge Along's chance to put colts in their place'. The CG here, as created through co-text, contains some expectation of Rotherfield Greys' winning and gives grounds for this; he has 'run consistently in top company last season' and came third in a much more important race than the present one then; he was 'a credit to his trainer'. (9) as a whole counters the positive expectation thus previously suggested in co-text, the contrast being marked by an initial adver sative adjunct, however. It gives grounds for predicting the opposite in its first two clauses, and the discourse contradiction itself through MAY NOT in its last. ('Seven furlongs on testing ground' is a description of the course over which the race in question will be run.) In this way MAY(NOT) here can be interpreted along parallel lines to those given for MAY in (5), as contradict ing the expectation in CG. The negative form MAY NOT is taken as realizing an assumption of a probability of more than .5 in CG, and its use acts to delete this, and to replace it with its own ideational meaning (of equal to or less than .5, but greater than 0). The positive probability, having been suggested in cotext, is available for deletion, and the use of MAY NOT in (9) is unmarked. (10), on this analysis, represents unmarked usage if the chances of the veteran Vorvados winning had not previously been of much interest (before the more likely winners Sarab and Provideo were withdrawn). I want now to consider the area of ideational meaning with respect to probability MAY and SHOULD in more detail. MAY is generally taken to realize a semantic feature: 'possible'; but there seem to be two partially conflicting senses in which this term can be commonly used: (i)
(ii)
as in possible world semantics, where what is actual is also, ipso facto, possible: 'possible A'. On this basis, since what is necessary is actual, what is necessary is also 'possible A'. as often used informally, where what is possible is part of what is non-actual: that part which is not impossible: 'possible B'. On this basis, what is necessary is not 'possible B', since what is necessary
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is actual and what is actual is other than what is merely 'possible B'. With respect to future events the feature 'actual' cannot apply: but phys ical necessity is not excluded. A sentence such as (11) All men will die can be said to illustrate its expression. Here what is claimed is an 'inevitablity', which contrasts with 'possibility'. We could perhaps say of WILL in (11) that it realizes a probability of 1. On this basis we would then say of WON'T that it realizes a probability of zero. The denial of WILL in these terms can be seen as 'not-inevitable: a probablity of less than ; and the denial of WON'T, 'not inevitable that not: a probablity of greater than zero'. I take the denial of WILL ('not-will') to be realized by MIGHTN'T, and the denial of WON'T ('not-won't') to be realized by MIGHT. This gives MIGHT(N'T) as realizing a discourse meaning of 'contrastive', in parallel with MAY (NOT). The ideational meaning ascribed to MIGHT in this way is a probability of 'greater than zero' ; and that to MIGHTN'T is a probability of 'less than 1'. Hence the ideational meanings of MIGHT and WILL overlap on that of WILL (a probability of 1); and those of MIGHTN'T and W O N T on that of WON'T (a probability of zero). If MIGHT(N'T) is said to realize 'possibility', this is 'possibility A', for the parallel to the 'necessity' term, the absolute WILL(NOT) is included within it. The conjunction of MIGHT and MIGHTN'T on this analysis gives: 'a probability of more than zero and less than . This is the area of 'possibility B', which excludes the absolute terms WILL(NOT). I suggest that MAY(NOT) and SHOULD(N'T) realize ranges of probabilities within this area, based on the relations 'greater than', 'equal to', 'less than', as follows: SCHEMA I: Probabilities greater than 0 and less than 1 MAY: SHOULD: MAY NOT: SHOULD NOT:
'greater than or equal to .5' (gE .5) 'greater than .5' (gt .5) 'less than or equal to .5'. (1E .5) 'less than .5 (1t .5)
Put informally, MAY realizes a probability of 'even odds' or higher (stopping short of certainty/'inevitability'); SHOULD realizes more than 'even odds' (also stopping short of inevitability). The negatives can be seen either as giv ing the same degree of probability for a negative proposition/non-occur rence, or, as above, involving 'less than even odds' for positives.
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169
I am not suggesting that native speakers of English perform calculations giving decimal point probability ratings when using modal verbs, but that the relational notions concerned are operative in the ideational semantics of those forms. Schema I indicates that the combination of SHOULD and SHOULD NOT, jointly applied to a single predication, results in a self-contradiction: (12) Vorvados SHOULD and SHOULDN'T win whereas the combination of MAY and MAY NOT does not have the same effect (12') Vorvados MAY and MAY NOT win but realizes equiprobability. In terms of Schema I, MAY and SHOULD NOT, MAY NOT and SHOULD are mutually exclusive pairs. We can show this in the following sys temic diagram (adding mnemonics): Diagram 1.0 Ideational semantics of probability modals Probable' (Probability gt .5) SHOULD Not probable' (probability 1E .5) MAY NOT
•Improbable' (Probability 1t .5) SHOULD NOT Not improbable' (Probability gE .5) MAY
If we display the analysis of oppositions of discourse meaning given ear lier for MAY and SHOULD this yields: Diagram 1.1 Textual semantics of probability modals Additive' SHOULD
Deletive' MAY
The most natural presentation of oppositions in linguistic form can be shown as:
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EIRIAN . DAVIES Diagram 1.2 Surface form of probability modals
Diagram 1.2 also reflects a conflation of diagrams 1.0 and 1.1, as can be seen by mapping them both on to it, to give: Diagram 1.3 Forms and combined ideational and textual meanings of probability modals
It seems, then, that it is a combination of ideational and textual meaning which is realized in linguistic form. The analysis earlier proposed for the ideational meaning of WILL and MIGHT can be set out as follows: SCHEMA II: Probabilities of 1, 0, GT 0 and LT 1 WILL: WONT: MIGHT: MIGHTN'T:
probability of 1 ('inevitable that positive') probability of 0 ('inevitable that negative') probability of Greater than 0 ('not (inevitable that negative)') probability of Less than 1 ('not (inevitable that positive)').
(Note: the following convention is used in abbreviations: UPPER CASE (GT/GE:LT/LE): 'Up to and Including a probabil ity of 1/0'.
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lower case (gt/gE; 1t/IE): 'excluding a probability of 1/0'. 'Equal to' is shown as 'E' in all cases, since it is used only where 'Equiprobability; (a probability of .5) is included in the range given.) In ideational meaning, WILL and MIGHT are not mutually exclusive; and so also for WON'T and MIGHTN'T. The analysis predicts that, jointly applied to the same propositional content within a single sentence, the fol lowing combinations of items will have zero overlap in the probabilities they realize and will produce a self-contradiction: WILL and MIGHTN'T; WON'T and MIGHT (contradictories); WILL and WON'T (contraries). In the remaining pairs there is some overlap between probabilities realized, and the sentence resulting from their conjunction is not self-contradictory: MIGHT and WILL; MIGHTN'T and WON'T; MIGHT and MIGHTN'T. More specifically, MIGHT and WILL overlap on a probability of 1, MIGHTN'T and WON'T on a probability of 0. The area of overlap for MIGHT and MIGHT NOT is the whole range of probabilities less than 1 and greater than 0: that is, it is the area divided up in SCHEMA I between MAY(NOT) and SHOULD (N'T). This analysis can be shown diagrammatically as follows: Diagram 2.0 Ideational semantics Tnevitable-that-positive' (Probability of 1) WILL Not(inevitable-that-positive)' (Probability of Less than 1) MIGHTN'T
'Tnevitable-that-negative' (Probability of 0) WON'T 'Not (inevitable-that-negative)' (Probability of Greater Than 0) MIGHT As with Diagram 1.0, Diagram 2.0 differs from that which would be most natural for displaying distinctions of surface form, namely:
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Diagram 2.1 Surface form WILL WONT MIGHT MIGHTN'T We have taken MIGHTN'T as realizing the denial of WILL ('not-will'), and so for MIGHT and W O N T . In terms of ideational meaning this 'denial' has been shown as 'other than': MIGHTN'T realizes the full range of prob abilities other than 1 ; MIGHT the full range of probabilities other than 0. But I want to suggest that an element of discourse meaning also enters into this contrast. If we return to the artificially extreme context of the rainforest on a day following a run of five consecutive dry days, so that the CG contains knowledge of a probability of 1: 'it will rain today', it does not make sense for me to say (13) It might rain today even though ideationally the probability range realized by MIGHT includes the probability realized by WILL. MIGHT can be seen as an item, the dis course meaning of which is to delete a probability of 0 from CG. To use it where a probability of 1 is held in CG makes no 'discourse sense'. An appro priate challenge to the utterance of (13) in the circumstances sketched would be: 'What makes you think it won't?' On this approach MIGHT(N'T) parallels MAY(NOT) in its discourse meaning: both are 'deletive'. There is also a similarity in ideational mean ing in that both include equiprobability (.5) within the probability ranges which they realize. They contrast here with WILL(NOT) and SHOULD(N'T) which both exclude equiprobability. SHOULD(N'T) has been treated as 'additive' (to CG) under discourse meaning. It remains to explore whether this feature also applies to WILL(NOT) as symmetry would demand. In fact it seems reasonable to treat WILL(NOT) as additive. The utter ance of
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173
(14) Water will boil at 100° Celsius or (15) Asbestos won't burn would be unmarked in a context which was empty of probability expectation with respect to their propositional contents. If they are thought to deny MIGHTN'T (boil), MIGHT (burn) respectively, this is in terms of ideational meaning only. In the same way, the utterance of any positive indicative declarative constitutes a rejection of its negative equivalent. To say (16) It will rain today in the rain forest context sketched for MIGHT above is merely redundant: it does not convey that the speaker assumed a probability of Less Than 1 in CG, and so was countering a (in this case non-existent) misconception. On this basis, the distinction in surface form between the items WILL and MIGHT appears to realize a difference in discourse meaning (as for SHOULD and MAY in Diagrams 1.1, 1.3). If we combine the two ideational analyses we arrive at the following synthesis: SCHEMA III Probability of 1: Less Than 1: less than 1 and greater than .5: less than 1 and greater than or Equal to .5 Equal to or less than .5 and greater than 0 less than .5 and greater than 0: Greater Than 0: 0: One way of displaying this analysis could be as follows:
WILL MIGHTN'T SHOULD MAY MAY NOT SHOULDN'T MIGHT WONT
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EIRIAN . DAVIES Diagram 3.0 Ideational semantics: probabilities
SHOULD (less than 1 and greater than .5) MAY NOT (greater than 0 and less than or Equal to .5) SHOULDN'T (greater than 0 and less than .5) MAY (less than 1 and greater than or Equal to .5)
This diagram does not, however, indicate that the probability range realized by MIGHT intersects with that of WILL (as also for MIGHTN'T and WONT). The analysis is more satisfactorily represented as follows:
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Diagram 3.0.1 Ideational semantics of probability modals
In this case the network fragment for ideational meaning itself reflects the distinctions between items in surface form without reference to textual meaning. This is because an ideational distinction, 'exclusive/inclusive of equiprobability' co-varies with the discourse distinction 'additive/deletive'. We need to examine the notion of discourse meaning more closely. In discussing Givón's (1978) analysis of negation in English the point was made that it does not hold for other than the first of more than one consecutive (or sequentially close) denials of a single proposition in a limited section of text. Negative indicatives can be used to express agreement in discourse. When this is done, they are often elliptical, but this is not necessarily the case. I take the proposed discourse meaning of probability modals to be exactly the same
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with respect to this limitation. Everything suggested above or below on this topic refers to their occurrence in sentences whose utterance constitutes a 'first mention' in this sense. Any probability modal may be used to express agreement, or disagreement with another participant in a conversation if 'first mention' is not involved.18 Where more than one probability modal applies to the same propositional content within one sentence I take dis course meaning as used here to apply only to the first.19 So far, in exploring discourse meaning, we have derived a grouping of MAY(NOT) and MIGHT(N'T) as 'deletive', and proposed that these items be seen as devices for countering a 'current error' in CG, linking them in this respect with the analysis of indicative negative declaratives. The 'error' coun tered by an instance of this last category is given in its corresponding positive. But this is not so for MAY(NOT) and MIGHT(NT) (which I shall refer to for convenience below as the 'M group' of probability modals). I have earlier suggested that MAY is a device for deleting 'Improbable' from CG; and that its use where CG clearly contains 'Probable' is bizarre for this reason. If this is accepted, we can note that 'Improbable' represents the complementary 'probability range' within the area 'greater than 0 and less than : that is, the area in which 'possibility B' applies. We can then propose that, in a parallel way, MAY NOT deletes 'Probable' in CG. If we extend the analysis along these lines to MIGHT(N'T), the range of probabilities con cerned includes 1 and 0, and these limiting terms constitute the complemen tary values. The analysis can be set out as follows: SCHEMA IV M group MAY MAY NOT MIGHT MIGHTN'T
Delete in CG It
.5 ('shouldn't') gt .5 ('should') 0 ('won't') 1 ('will')
This analysis predicts that if MAY is used in a context where the proba bility held in CG is 0, it would be perceived as, to some extent, surprising. For example, to say (17) He may live for another twenty years of a centenarian is to make a more perplexing statement than if MIGHT were used, even though the latter includes within its range the probability value of
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1. To say (17) sounds as if the speaker knows something that the rest of us do not, as if his view of CG is different (that it contains 'shouldn't' here rather than 'won't'). MAY NOT and MIGHTN'T can be analysed similarly in rela tion to a probability of 1 in CG. In a parallel fashion, to use MIGHTN'T where CG holds a probability of 'gt .5' (rather than 1) is also to some degree marked, as to use MIGHT where CG holds 'It .5' (rather than 0). For exam ple to say (18) Shadeed mightn't win the Derby suggests that the speaker believes the general view is that Shadeed is certain to win. MAY NOT in (18), as the form for deleting 'should' rather than 'will' conveys an assumption of less universal confidence here than MIGHN'T. In a context where 'should' is all that is present in CG, (18) is a surprising remark, a marked use. Similarly, to say (19) It might snow tomorrow (on June 1st in London) is more reasonable than to say 'It MAY snow tomor row'. On the present analysis, this is not so because MIGHT is 'weaker/more doubtful' ideationally; its probability range includes 1, which that of MAY does not. Rather, it is because MIGHT acts to delete 'won't' as opposed to 'shouldn't' from CG; and to use it is therefore to indicate an assumption that 'won't' is what CG contains. This is a more reasonable assumption in this case than the 'shouldn't' which would be indicated as believed present in CG by the use of MAY in (19). The analysis predicts that the often noted 'greater doubtfulness' of MIGHT, as compared with MAY, is not a feature of its ideational meaning (the probability range which it realizes itself), but results from the probability range which it is its discourse meaning to delete from CG. If the discourse meaning of the M group can be given for each partly as 'that which it deletes from CG', we should now consider how the discourse meaning of the 'additive' group can be characterized. Here I have suggested that SHOULD(N'T) and WILL(NOT) operate against a neutral background in CG, a lack of any probability-expectation. If so, it would seem that they can be characterized only in terms of the ideational meaning which they themselves each realize. But, as with positive declaratives, the utterance of a sentence containing one of these modals functions to exclude what is other than the ideational meaning realized. The unmarked use of the additive group is said to occur where CG is neu tral. This suggests that where CG contains any probability expectation relat-
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EIRIAN . DAVIES
ing to the proposition to which they apply their use will be marked. So, the analysis predicts that to use any of this group in (19) would produce a strange effect. It seems self-evident that not only is it strange to say, in London on June 1st, (20) It should snow tomorrow or (21) It will snow tomorrow but that this can be fully accounted for by the clash of the ideational meanings concerned with our knowledge of the world (i.e., the contents of CG). If this is accepted, we can go on to explain the oddness of (22) It shouldn't snow tomorrow and (23) It won't snow tomorrow uttered in the same context, in terms of the redundancy of their ideational meanings. In (22) and (23) we could phrase this as 'strangeness' resulting from attempting to add something to CG which is already present there, and compare it with the earlier analysis of (2)Snow is white. In the first pair, (20) and (21), we could say that the strangeness results from attempting to add to CG a probablility value which is specifically excluded from it by virtue of being the contrary of what it already holds. In both cases the strangeness arises from the fact that CG contains a probability expectation (0) in relation to this proposition. If, on the other hand, someone said, in the same context (24) It should be fine on Friday or (25) It will rain tomorrow neither would usually be strange in this way because, given the unpredictabil ity of English weather, there is unlikely to be any agreed probability expecta tion in relation to 'its being fine on Friday'/'its raining tomorrow' in CG. The same analysis applies here to SHOULDN'T and WON'T. I am arguing, perhaps, on a fine point. But what I want to suggest is that (24) and (25) are unmarked in the context not because they more accurately reflect the CG, by virtue of their ideational meanings, but because they genuinely add to it here as it is their discourse meaning to do. The foregoing discussion can be summarized as follows:
ON DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES IN THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH (i) (ii) (iii)
(iv)
179
All probability modals discussed here have a discourse meaning of changing CG. They do so in opposite ways: The M group are deletive; the others additive. The discourse meaning of the M group is: (a) that they are deletive and (b) for each modal, that which it deletes (the opposite of its own ideational meaning). The discourse meaning of the remainder is: (a) that they are addi tive and (b) for each modal, that which it adds (its own ideational meaning).
From this analysis we can derive the following network fragment for dis course meaning in this area: Diagram 3.1 Textual meaning
This can be more satisfactorily shown as follows:
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E I R I A N . D A V I E S
Diagram .1. WILL WONT MIGHT MIGHTN'T
SHOULD SHOULDN'T
MAY MAY NOT
Diagram 3.0.1 gives two types of possibility in terms of what MAY/ MIGHT 'contribute': their ideational meaning whenever used, whether in first mention or not. Diagram 3.1.1 gives two types of possibility in terms of what these two verbs delete from CG when applied to the 'first mention' of a proposition p held there with some probability rating. This type of textual meaning is not operative in 'second mention': so that ideational meaning cannot be said to determine textual meaning in terms of whether it is opera tive or not. Further, ideational meaning in a given instance may be 'consonant' (in cluded in or overlapping) with CG, while the discourse meaning concerned may be at variance (as in the case of MIGHTN'T in (18) if CG probability was less than 1). In ideational meaning, MIGHT realizes a wider range of probability val ues (GT 0) than MAY (gE .5), and could in this respect be said to express more 'doubt'/'uncertainty' in the sense of being less specific. On the other hand, while it allows a lesser probability value (It .5) than MAY, it also allows a higher (1). The greater 'tentativeness' which MIGHT is generally held to communicate in unmarked first mention use can be more fully accounted for by invoking the area of discourse meaning within the semantics of the textual component, which shows it to assume a zero probability in CG as available for deletion. I have argued for the semantic, as opposed to pragmatic, status of the
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'discourse meaning' attributed to the set of modal verbs discussed. If this is so, what is involved is not a matter of semantic presupposition. In the case of the M group, what is taken to be 'assumed' in CG is itself a modality, and its assessment for truth value is philosophically problematical. We have taken a different question: namely that of whether it is true that the 'assumed' prob ability is present in CG. It is on this (pragmatic) factor that the (marked/ unmarked) pragmatic significance of using an M modal is said to depend, by virtue of its having an invariant discourse meaning (the textual semantic fea ture 'deletive of (v)' where 'v' is a probability value). In the narrow area of the grammar discussed, distinctions within textual and ideational meaning yield the same set of surface grammar items. This obscures the claimed degree of independence between the systems of seman tic features realized. But a multi-component approach, such as that funda mental to Systemic Grammar, can both account for such phenomena and encourage further investigation of problems to do with the borderline between pragmatics and the semantics of grammar.
NOTES 1.
Cf., independently, Davies (1979: 141, 156), Palmer (1979: 3-4) on an area of non-deontic modality distinguished from that of epistemic modality by virtue of applying to events as opposed to propositions. This distinction is not uncontroversial. It is not made in Lyons (1977), and is denied in Coates (1983). The area concerned would fall principally under 'modulation, in Halliday (1970b) on syntactic grounds. For the purposes of the present paper, I wish to use it as a restrictive device, to limit the range of the discussion. An integ rated system of contrasts appears to operate within it.
2.
I retain the suggestion made there that the area of modality concerned belongs principally under that area of the grammatical semantics to do with ideational meaning ('the perfor mance plane'). 'Ability' CAN was also included there under this heading, but distinguished from a set of 'prediction' modals of which only WILL and MAY were discussed in any detail. An attempt to integrate SHOULD and MIGHT is made in the present account. (OUGHT TO is taken as equivalent, in terms of ideational meaning, to SHOULD).
3.
As a special case of language events in which the main purpose is to convey information. In other types of event with different purposes, 'statements of the obvious' may be perceived as 'relevant', as in phatic communion.
4.
In this particular instance, the remark could also be thought of as a statement of the obvi ous; but this feature is not necessary to the effect produced. Anything 'unconnected' would do, such as 'John and I are going to Portugal this year' etc. There is, then, a distinction between new information (defined as the statement of propositions not present in the CG) and 'new topic' ('not connected with preceding remarks').
5.
Grice suggests a close connection between the second maxim of quantity ('Do not give more
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E I R I A N . D A V I E S information than is required') and the maxim of Relation (1975: 52-3); but it is not clear to me why 'too much information' should be treated as different in kind from 'too little infor mation' in this respect.
6.
Other measures can enter into the assessment of 'appropriateness' such as 'politeness' etc.
7.
This second kind of implicature would be equally 'conversational', but based on different premises, namely ones about who knows what. For example, depending on the status of the speaker, and the addressee's independent access to reliable information, the addressee may conclude that the speaker knows (and believes others to know) something which he (the addressee) does not; and he may then add this to what he accepts as CG. Or, he may con clude that the speaker does not know something which he (the addressee) does know with certainty, and knows others to know; and from this he may infer conclusions about the speaker's information, state of mind, etc. Or he may conclude that the speaker thinks that he (the addressee) does not know something which he does in fact know, and which he knows that most others know; and from this he may infer conclusions about the speaker's opinion of his knowledge. And so on; the possible permutations are quite wide, depending partly on a further distinction which can be usefully drawn between a direct addressee, and a 'hearer/reader' who may not include himself, or be included by the speaker, amongst those directly addressed.
8.
In this case, the newspaper reader's reasoning might go as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
The purpose of this headline is to convey information; What it says has been part of a nation-wide CG since the last general election; In terms of this known CG the headline writer is stating the obvious and flouting the maxim 'Be relevant'; but, I accept that he is abiding by the cooperative principle; therefore he must be assuming that the contents of CG have altered with respect to the proposition at issue, and that CG now holds its contradictory (otherwise to state that previously held proposition would not qualify as giving 'news', and I accept that this is what he believes himself to be doing).
9.
Other factors are also relevant here, such as what the addressee would like to believe, and so on.
10.
As in fn. 8, he may also revise his view of the speaker as a reliable source of information, or of himself as generally in touch with events. The brief and partial sketch indicated here, represents a very slight incursion into a wide field within pragmatics. One major point is that 'CG' is Common Ground, which raises the important question of 'Common to whom': an 'in-group', a social class, an entire speech community or culture, merely the speakeraddressee pair, and so on. The range of inferences to be drawn is correspondingly varied.
11.
Cf. Perkins (1983).
12.
Substituting 'expectation' as that which is 'corrected'/deleted from CG.
13.
'The Daily Telegraph' 10th April 1985.
14.
'The Times' 25th March 1985.
15.
'Hotspur' in 'The Daily Telegraph' 17th April 1985.
16.
Skyrms(1966).
17.
Where the final size of the field was not yet known it would not in any case be possible to make the calculation.
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18.
The question of restrictions in this area, and of differences both in types and degrees of 'op position' between the members of different pairs of probability modals, is of considerable interest. So also is that of allowable combinations of them within, as opposed to across, sen tence boundaries. Links across and within 'turns' are also significant. I discuss some of these issues in a paper currently in preparation.
19.
John may pass his exams easily, and should do so would be equivalent for these purposes to John may, and should, pass his exams easily. In either case, it is only MAY in these exam ples which would be analysed in terms of discourse meaning.
REFERENCES Coates, J. 1983. The semantics of the modal auxiliaries. London: Croom Helm. Davies, E.C. 1979. On the semantics of syntax: mood and condition in Eng lish. London: Croom Helm. . 1985. On types of meaningfulness in discourse. In J.D. Benson and W.S. Greaves, eds., Systemic perspectives on discourse. Vol 1: Selected theoretical papers from the 9th International Systemic Workship. Nor wood, New Jersey: Ablex. 229-247. Givón, T. 1978. Negation in language: pragmatics, function, ontology. In P. Cole, ed., Syntax and semantics 9: pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. 69-112. Grice, P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J.C. Morgan, eds., Syntax and semantics 3: speech acts. New York: Academic Press. 41-58. Haack, S. 1978. Philosophy of logics. London: Cambridge University Press. Halliday, M.A.K. 1969. Options and functions in the English clause. Brno Studies in English 8:82-88. (Reprinted in Halliday and Martin 1981.) . 1970a. Language structure and language function. In John Lyons, ed., New horizons in linguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 140-165. . 1970b. Functional diversity in language as seen from a consideration of modality and mood in English. Foundations of Language 6:322-361. (Partly reprinted in Kress 1976: 189-213.) . 1973. Explorations in the functions of language. London: Edward Arnold. Halliday, M.A.K. and J.R. Martin, eds. 1981. Readings in systemic linguis tics. London: Batsford. Karttunen, L. and S. Peters. 1979. Conventional implicature. In C-K Oh and D.A. Dineen, eds., Syntax and semantics 11: presupposition. New
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York: Academic Press. 1-56. Kress, G., ed. 1976. Halliday: system and function in language. London: Oxford University Press. Lyons, J. 1977. Semantics Vol. 2. London: Cambridge University Press. Palmer, F.R. 1979. Modality and the English modals. London: Longman. Perkins, M.R. 1983. Modal expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter. Skyrms, B.L. 1966. Choice and chance: an introduction to inductive logic. Belmont, California: Dickenson. Stalnaker, R. 1974. Pragmatic presuppositions. In M.K. Munitz and P. Unger, eds. Semantics and philosophy. New York: New York Univer sity Press. 197-213. von Wright, G.H. 1957. Logical studies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Waterlow, S. 1982. Passage and possibility: a study of Aristotle's modal concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
THE ENGLISH PERSONAL PRONOUNS: AN EXERCISE IN LINGUISTIC THEORY
Robin P. Fawcett University of Wales Cardiff, U.K.
1. The Problem The aim of this paper is to explore, in relation to a central and yet rela tively self-contained part of the grammar of English, an issue of theoretical importance in systemic theory: the relation between the levels of FORM and SEMANTICS. 1 It is also an issue in certain other theories, though the different basic assumptions about the nature of language that each theory makes have resulted in their expressing it in different terms. The paper might therefore appear to be addressed primarily to those concerned with the development of systemic theory, and only secondarily to those working in other theoretical frameworks. But I hope that the paper will offer more than this to the non-systemicist. It should also illustrate, in a small way, the value of the systemic approach both in raising questions about features at the semantic level and in capturing relationships between them. For example, Leech 1969: 104 and Leech 1981: 112 both use system networks —indeed, the differences between the two raise interesting ques tions. There is a section heading in Lyons' Introduction to theoretical lin guistics (1968: 413) which reads: '"Having meaning" implies choice'. Sys tem networks (and their derived equivalents in stratificational theory) offer the most comprehensive notation so far developed for modelling paradig matic relationships, and I would like to suggest that they could usefully be in wider use than they are at present. I therefore hope that this paper may encourage those who have not done so to try out this notation. And for those who are already familiar with it, the paper may nonetheless contain one or two surprises.
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Our line of approach will be to examine several alternative ways of modelling the same data (the English personal pronouns), introducing as we go some central concepts in systemic theory. You might ask: 'Why choose such a simple set of data?' The answer is that these relatively uncontroversial data are intended to make it possible for us to focus relatively MORE of our attention on the theoretical issues involved, and relatively LESS on the interpretation and description of the data. Even with these relatively simple data, however, we shall find ourselves in the position familiar to any linguist — and indeed to any scientist — that when one looks closely at even the most apparently straightforward data, one finds more questions arising than one had expected. The theoretical question that is to be examined here is the following: in the framework of an explicit model of language, at what LEVEL do the systemically organised FEATURES which are typically recognized in systemic grammars belong? Do these networks of features belong at the level of FORM (i.e. 'syntax'/'grammar' and lexis') or do they model relations between features that are SEMANTIC? Or, as Hudson's writings some times suggest, do they belong somewhere in between? Or, finally, are there TWO levels of contrasts here: a higher, semantic one and a lower, formal one? (In the alternative metaphor used in the Chomskyan framework, the question would be expressed in terms of 'how deep' the networks of choices between features are.) For further discussions of this issue see Fawcett 1980: 39-46, Fawcett 1983: 111-21, Fawcett 1987, and the Introduction to Halliday and Fawcett 1987. The answer to these questions might be that it depends on the inten tions of the linguist who constructs the system network. But it seems to me that, despite the fact that different systemic linguists may DESCRIBE their networks in rather different terms, the networks themselves are patently intended to capture the same types of insights as each other. I am referring to networks such as those that are often labelled 'transitivity', 'theme', etc., offered in Halliday 1968: 201ff., 1973:40 and 1977: 208ff., Hudson 1971: 71 (reproduced in McCord, 1975: 199) and 1973: 544; Fawcett 1973/81: 155ff., 1980 and forthcoming; and Berry (1975: 189, 190). Despite their differ ences, these are all what Martin 1987 has termed 'first level' networks (as opposed to the higher (or deeper) 'socio-semantic' networks proposed in Halliday 1973: 89 and Turner 1973: 153ff., which Martin terms 'second level' networks). The details of the various first level networks differ in var ious minor ways that are not significant for our present purposes. What is significant is the great difference between the ways in which those responsi-
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ble for these networks describe them. Sometimes the features in the net works have no necessary connection with any meaning, while it is claimed of others that they ARE meanings. The strongest syntactic position is taken by Hudson in English complex sentences (1971: 12), where he emphasises that what he has to say concerns 'grammar, to the exclusion of semantics, lexis and phonology'. However, in a later paper (1974: 10) he specifies that the networks 'must be deep enough to make contact with the semantic rep resentation', and in yet another paper (1973: 509) he goes so far as to describe his networks as 'representing syntactic/semantic properties'. An example of the strong semantic position is Halliday, in Text as semantic choice in social contexts (1977: 176). He begins by summarizing his model of language, describing it as having 'three levels or strata: Semantic (semology) Lexicogrammatical (lexology: syntax and morphology and lexis) Phonological (phonology and phonetics)'. He then goes on to describe the four 'functional components' of the seman tic stratum, making it clear that this is the level where the networks of transitivity, theme, etc., are located. However, in other writings (e.g. 1973: 92ff.) he has placed these same networks WITHIN the lexicogrammatical level and reserved the term 'semantics' for the 'second-level' 'socio-semantic' networks mentioned above. (Halliday might however claim that to use the term 'semantics' in these two ways is not as inconsistent as it might appear, on the grounds that BOTH networks have what he terms 'meaning potential' (Halliday 1973: 84ff.). Moreover he might cite in support of the concept of 'meaning at many levels' Firth's notion of 'modes of meaning . . . stated at a series of levels, which taken together form a sort of spectrum' (Firth 1951/57: 220).) Halliday's position remains far from clear. As Butler (1985: 94) points out: 'it is frankly difficult to know what counts as semantic and what as syntactic in [his] later work'. Even Halliday's recent major work on the grammar of English fails to resolve the dilemma. He intro duces the book by describing it (1985: xx) as 'a "functional" grammar . . . based on meaning', and yet on the same page he writes that 'we cannot yet describe the semantic system of a language'—which seems to imply that there is a level of description of rather great importance beyond that which he is describing in that work.
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My own position is that I have argued against the notion that the social semiotic networks constitute an integral level of language, and I have suggested a less direct relationship between them and the tri-stratal model set out above (Fawcett 1975, summarized in Butler 1985: 81-2). However a tri-stratal model does, in my view, approximate to the facts, though in a highly simplified way (Fawcett 1983: 115-8). Enough has been said to show that this issue is still wide open. My intention when I first planned this paper was that, by focussing on an extremely restricted part of the grammar of English, I would be able to bring a small but solid piece of evidence to the discussion. But I must admit from the start that this paper will not result in the kind of logically conclusive evidence that I hoped. I think, however, that a sufficient number of interesting points emerge in the course of the exploration of the topic for the experience to be worth sharing. And the reason for the ultimate failure to clinch the argument is itself a matter of some importance.
2. The Method of Approach Consider the problem, then, of writing an explicit grammar — a generative device — to specify all and only the 'personal pronouns' of Eng lish (henceforth, for brevity, simply 'pronouns'), i.e., I, me, you, he, him, she, her, it, we, us, they, them. Let us follow three principles: 1) 2) 3)
We shall use the concepts and notation of systemic theory. We shall ignore wherever possible any repercussions of this part of the grammar on other parts, or other parts on this part. We shall follow a policy of first trying to account for purely FOR MAL contrasts, and only moving on to consider SEMANTIC contrasts when our inability to construct a satisfactory model forces us to. (The criteria for 'satisfactoriness' will be discussed.)
We shall in fact find that we need to consider three alternative models. As we develop our network to incorporate first the insights of traditional grammar and then a more explicitly semantic approach, we shall encounter problems of various kinds, some of which may come as a surprise even to those familiar with systemic theory. Some of these problems take the form of prices to be paid in additional complexity for what we gain in terms of semantic insightfulness, and in such cases we shall need to consider the
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alternatives, and to decide whether or not the price is worth paying. At a number of points you will be invited to test the claims made here by attempting to draw system networks of your own. The basic systemic concepts that we shall need to introduce are the fol lowing: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
a system, dependency, a system network, a selection expression, a realization rule, a realization.
We shall also introduce a small number of derived concepts: the six given above are those required in any systemic grammar that is more complex than a single system.
3. Model 1: A Purely Formal Grammar EXPLICITNESS and SIMPLICITY are two criteria for judging alter native models which linguists usually value highly. The concept of explicitness is integral to the concept of model-building, and simplicity is often regarded as equally integral. But we need to be wary of placing TOO high a value on simplicity. Perhaps we might reasonably take the position that so long as simplicity reflects an aspect of PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY it is right to value it highly. Psychological reality is thus a third criterion. But it must be said that it is a criterion of a rather different sort. Simplicity is the type of criterion that guides the construction of a THEORETICAL model. At a later stage such a model might be subjected to some type of EMPIRI CAL evaluation. The results of such investigations would then be taken into account in revising the model . . . and so on. This is the ideal prog ramme: the reality in linguistics today is that there is much less interaction between these two means of developing models than there should be. And here, reluctantly, we shall not be able to invoke psychological reality. If we now apply the two theoretical criteria of simplicity and explicitness as we construct a system network capable of generating the personal pronouns of English, we shall undoubtedly arrive at that shown in Figure 1. Let us look carefully at how this notation is to be read.
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pronoun-
I me you he him she her it we us they them
Figure 1: Model 1: the simplest system network We need to begin with the concept of SYSTEM. A system is defined as 'a set of features, one and only one of which must be selected if the entry condition to that system is satisfied' (Halliday, 1967: 37). The ENTRY CONDITION in Figure 1 is [pronoun]. (Hudson has proposed the useful convention that features should be enclosed in square brackets when they are referred to in running text.) We note that the features are, in this case, THE ITEMS THEMSELVES. The notation therefore represents a state ment that we may gloss as follows: 'If and only if you select the feature [pronoun], you must then select one of the features [I, me, you, he, him, she, her, it, we, us they, them]'. (Notice that in a system network the verti cal order of the features carries no significance.) Since in this micro-gram mar the FEATURES are identical with the ITEMS, there is no need for realization rules to state how the features are to be realized. This micro-grammar is undoubtedly both explicitly generative and sim ple: it therefore meets the two criteria that we have just introduced. How ever, we will probably agree that the system in Figure 1 fails to satisfy us: we are left with the sense that there is more to be explained about the Eng lish pronouns than has been said so far. We should therefore add as a third criterion EXPLANATORY POWER. (This is not to be confused with the sense of the word 'power' in which a model may be said to be 'too powerful' when it generates outputs that are not wanted. Explanatory power is always desirable.) Let's apply this criterion to Figure 1. It may not appear to explain much, but can we say that Figure 1 has NO explanatory power? What does it say? Two things: it asserts (1) that the items listed are all and
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only the pronouns of English, and (2) that one must choose one rather than another of them. This is not as negligible as it may at first appear — a point to which I shall return — but we certainly expect something more. What is lacking in this model? Clearly one lack is any recognition of the traditional subcategorizations of the pronouns as 'first, second and third person' pronouns, and so on. Let's now see what happens if we try to intro duce these into the system network.
4. Model 2: A Grammar Incorporating the Traditional Subcategorizations These traditional subcategorizations of the English personal pronouns are in fact simply a set of systems. There are four of them, and they are set out in Figure 2. It is not always realized that systems in systemic theory and sets of labels of this sort are systems, and that sets of subcategorization state ments of the traditional sort can be essentially the same type of phenome non. What differs is the viewpoint: the concept of systems is associated with the generative approach to language, and the concept of labels with the classification of linguistic units occurring in texts. Thus, if one starts with a bit of TEXT such as the single item me one may reasonably ask: 'How is it to be classified?' A possible answer might be that firstly it is a (or 'has the feature') 'pronoun', and secondly that it is (or 'has the features') 'first per son', 'singular' and, let us say (to use a misleading but nonetheless tradi tional term), 'accusative case'. From the perspective of the TEXT, then, a system network is a CLASSIFICATORY device. But suppose we start with the GRAMMAR, regarding it as a set of rules that specify linguistic behaviour, and ask 'What texts can it generate?' Then the answer — at least, the answer given by a systemic linguist — will be in terms of the rele vant systems (together with the other parts of a systemic grammar that we shall come to shortly). From this second perspective a system network is (part of) a GENERATIVE device. It is sometimes assumed that only generative grammars need to meet the criterion of explicitness, and that grammars designed for analysing texts need not. The truth is that we need an explicit grammar for BOTH tasks, if we are to carry them out efficiently. The difference is that it is rather easier to get away with half-worked-out ideas in analysis than in generation. I would say, then, that a good grammar must be an EXPLICIT grammar, and it must be usable both as a GENERATIVE device in the PREDIC-
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TION of potential texts and as a CLASSIFICATORY device in the ANALYSIS of actual texts. The two emphases are not in conflict in sys temic theory (and should surely not be in any satisfactory linguistic theory.) 2 Figure 2 therefore presents, in the notation of a systemic generative grammar, the traditional subcategorizations of the English pronouns. What, we may ask, are the criteria upon which they are based? They are traditionally said to reflect 'distributional criteria'. What this means in our case is that certain pronouns, when they are Subject (more properly, when they expound the head of the nominal group filling the element of clause structure that we call the Subject), typically CO-OCCUR with certain finite verbs. Thus, the category of PERSON is involved in the co-occurence of I with am and you with are, and the category of NUMBER in I with am and we with are. The category traditionally called CASE is also involved, because we find I at Subject (to slightly over-simplify), but me elsewhere. The usual way of characterizing these PERSON and NUMBER relation ships is through the concept of 'concord', such that the verb is said to 'agree with' the Subject in person and number, and we shall return to this shortly. 'But', one might ask, 'how do we justify the number distinction for pro nouns that are NOT Subject?' How far, for example, are we justified in say ing that us as well as we is 'plural'? The answer is that, once the distribu tional criteria have been set up, linguists use their semantic intuitions to extend the categories to other pronouns. In other words, the criteria are not as formal as they first appear. There is no implication here that there is something dubious about invoking semantic criteria; in the fuller model towards which we are working the central component is the semantics, and semantic criteria have an honourable place. In such a model it becomes possible to see the 'concord' between Subject and verb not as 'cause' and 'effect', but as two 'effects' of a single semantic fact. Let's now examine Figure 2 more closely. Each system, you will notice, has a label, printed in capitals, and this is a common practice in writ ing systemic grammars. However, such labels play no part in the use of the grammar as a generative device, and they are simply there to make it easier to discuss the grammar. In some systemic grammars (e.g. Hudson 1971: 71 and Martin 1983: 50) numbers are used instead. In the second micro-grammar for the pronouns of English that we shall construct we shall use these time-honoured categories. And we shall try to ensure that, as far as possible, it is a network at the level of FORM, not
THE ENGLISH PERSONAL PRONOUNS
pronoun
first second third
pronoun
singular plural
pronoun
masculine feminine neuter
pronoun
nominative accusative
193
Figure 2: The systems considered relevant in traditional grammars SEMANTICS. Form, then, is the level at which ITEMS exist as formal items, and the level of the STRUCTURES that relate those items. Clearly, there is no possibility of realizing the features that we may attach to a pro noun such as [singular] in a structure, in the way that changes in the struc ture of a clause, for example, may indicate a change of MOOD, such as [declarative] or [interrogative]. But we can invoke the formal concept of the ITEM, and we can set ourselves the task of devising a system network in which EACH ITEM IS GENERATED ONLY ONCE. If we succeed in doing this, we could say that we have constructed a system network that is, in one sense at least, genuinely 'formal'. Thus, while we shall want to gen erate a 'nominative' I and an 'accusative' me, we shall not want to generate both a 'nominative' and an 'accusative' it. Nor is there a 'masculine, third person, plural, nominative' they; they is simply 'plural' and 'nominative'. Similarly there should not be a 'singular' and a 'plural' you. By accepting this criterion we can, I think, claim that the network is in some quite solid sense 'formal', even though terms such as 'singular' and 'plural' are evi dently also related to meaning. Perhaps we might claim for a 'traditional feature' system network of this type that it would probably be possible to link it in some quite simple way with a network that expressed truly seman tic choices. It might perhaps be seen as hovering, as it were, somewhere between the purely formal system shown in Figure 1 and some purely semantic system network — perhaps as implied by Hudson's 1973: 509 suggestion that system networks should 'represent syntactic/semantic prop erties', and by Halliday's (1985: xix) description of a 'functional' grammar as 'one that is pushed in the direction of the semantics'.
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We have now reached the point where we must introduce the second basic concept in systemic theory: that of the DEPENDENCY that may exist between two SYSTEMS. Consider the CASE system. We shall wish to say that, if we select the option [first] in the PERSON system, we must then select one of [nominative] or [accusative] in order to generate either I or me. But the CASE system is NOT relevant to [second], where we must gen erate the single form you. The system of CASE is therefore DEPENDENT on a logically prior choice of PERSON. Figure 3 shows the notation for dependency. (Note that the network is far from complete in other respects.)
Figure 3: Dependency in a system network In a precisely parallel way, we shall wish to say that one of the GENDER features [masculine], [feminine] or [neuter] must be selected if we have pre viously selected [third] in the PERSON system. On the other hand, the GENDER system is simply not relevant to the features [first] or [second]. Dependence may therefore be defined as follows: Given two systems, Sys tem A and System B, System is dependent on System A when a feature in System A is (or is part of) the ENTRY CONDITION to System .. We are now in a position to define the third basic concept: that of a SYSTEM NETWORK. A system network is any set of systems that are interdependent in the sense of 'dependent' that we have just defined. (The minimum link between systems in the same network is to share the same entry condition, in a way that we shall meet in section 5.) It may be useful to point out that systemicists sometimes refer to what is, strictly speaking, a SUB-network of a more complex system network as a 'system network' — and sometimes simply as a 'system'. At this point the reader who would like to involve her/himself actively is invited to spend a few minutes with pencil and paper, trying to establish which of the systems in Figure 2 have as their entry condition a feature in another system. Note that we have NOT so far introduced any ruling on the question of whether or not a system may appear more than once in a net work, so that a system may appear as often as it is needed. But we HAVE
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ruled that each item must be generated once only, since we are attempting to incorporate that explicitly formal criterion into our network, It is probable that the result of any attempt to capture the dependen cies between systems will produce a network similar to that shown in Figure 4. (Any differences are likely to be due to the characteristic of the notation that the vertical order in a system is not significant.) Figure 4 also shows, on the right, the REALIZATIONS, which we shall come to shortly. We now need the fourth basic notion, which is that of a SELECTION EXPRESSION. This is the cluster of features that are collected, in moving through the network from left to right, and that together specify any ONE of the pronouns. Here are three selection expressions from Figure 4; together with their realizations: [pronoun, first, singular, nominative] .ƒ [pronoun, second] you [pronoun, third, singular, feminine, accusative]... .her It is perhaps surprising that we have found ourselves referring to REALIZATIONS, when we have still not introduced the logically prior notion of REALIZATION RULES. A realization rule is a statement that a given abstract FEATURE will be REALIZED in a given ITEM or STRUCTURE or in some aspect of INTONATION. (We shall here only be concerned with realizations as items, and not with realizations in struc ture, such as those associated with the THEME and MOOD networks, for example, or in intonation.) The work of the realization rules is to make the relatively abstract features of a selection expression 'more real'; hence the term 'realization'.
Figure 4: Model 2: a traditional feature network and its realizations
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In Model 1 there was no need at all for realization rules, because the features in the system were identical with the items that it generated. But we do need realization rules in the present model, if only of a very simple type. As we have seen, each pathway through the network specifies a dif ferent selection expression, in a way that ensures that there is just one REALIZATION for each TERMINAL FEATURE in the network. (This is not always the case with system networks, as we shall see.) In the present case, therefore, the realization rules can therefore take the form of a DOT TED LINE connecting each terminal feature in the network (and so each of the twelve selection expressions that may be chosen) to the appropriate item. To summarize: Model 2 appears to be a reasonably satisfactory genera tive device. It generates all and only the personal pronouns of English; it incorporates the subcategorizations that are traditionally recognized; and its realization rules are extremely simple. It is at the level of form, at least in the sense that it is constructed on the principle that it must generate each item once only, and it is semantic, in the sense that the traditional labels seem to have at least their origins in meanings. However, this network would be severely criticized by most systemicists. We shall take account of these criticisms as we attempt, in the next section, to build a more economical version of the model. (Because it is at the same level as Model 2, we shall consider it as a variant of Model 2 rather than a third alternative, and call it Model 2a.
5. Simplifying the Network in Model 2 Most systemic linguists would wish to modify Model 2 so that each of the two systems of NUMBER and CASE occurs only once in the network. It would be said that a network such as that shown in Figure 4 fails to cap ture certain generalizations. We would, for example, be urged to capture the generalization that both [first] and [third] enter the NUMBER system, whereas [second] does not. Similarly, most systemicists would try to bring together in some way those features that are entry conditions to the CASE system. Two questions that must be asked are: (1) (2)
Is it possible to satisfy these criticisms? If so, is there a price to be paid and, if so, is it worth it?
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(Outside the goal of trying to construct the most economical explicit gram mar possible, other considerations come into play, such as usefulness for teaching purposes. See Fawcett 'forthcoming' for a discussion of these). The answer to the first question is 'Yes', as we shall shortly see, and most systemic linguists would also answer 'Yes' to both halves of the second. Yet we shall shortly uncover some problems which should give us pause for thought. It is in fact relatively easy to solve the problem of the CASE system, but to do so we must introduce another of the notational conventions of sys temic theory. We can, if we wish, gather together the five pathways which must lead to the choice between [nominative] and [accusative], and link them together with a left-opening 'or' bracket, as in Figure 5. This is what is termed a DISJUNCTIVE entry condition.
Figure 5: systemic notation convention: a disjunctive entry condition The notation reads: 'If and only if you choose any one of the features [sing ular], [plural], etc., you must then choose [nominative] or [accusative]'. Notice that the feature [plural] appears twice in Figure 5; this indicates that the problem of the NUMBER system remains. We want to know whether it is possible, by rearranging the dependencies between systems, to ensure that the NUMBER system appears only once in the network. If we find that we cannot do this, or that we can only achieve it in a roundabout way, we shall want to ask why. We shall shortly come to the second point at which you are invited to consider the problem for yourself. Before you do so, however, I must make available to you two further conventions: those that are illustrated in Figure 6. So far we have noted the right-opening square bracket found in the SYS TEM itself, and the left-opening square bracket of a DISJUNCTIVE ENTRY CONDITION. Curly brackets, however, mean not 'or' but 'and', so that in Figure 6 the first diagram conveys the meaning of SIMUL-
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TANEITY, thus: 'If and only if you choose a, you must then choose BOTH one of b or AND one of d or e'. 3
Figure 6: Two systemic notational conventions: simultaneity and a compound entry condition. The left-opening curly bracket in Figure 6 is, like the left-opening square bracket in Figure 5, concerned with the ENTRY CONDITION to a system: it is a CONJUNCTIVE entry condition, and it is to be read as fol lows: 'If and only if you choose BOTH 1 AND m, you must then choose one of n or o'. We have now encountered all the conventions that may be used in an attempt to make the network in Figure 3 more economical. Each of the three additional types of bracket shown in Figures 5 and 6 provides a means of expressing not simply a relationship between FEATURES (as a system does) but between FEATURES and SYSTEMS and even, if necessary, between SYSTEMS and SYSTEMS. This is the point at which you are invited to put them to use, in order to construct a variant of Model 2 as shown in Figure 4, in which NO SYS TEM APPEARS MORE THAN ONCE. Let me warn you: it will not be easy, and some ingenuity will be needed to find anything approaching a satisfactory solution to the problem. I shall argue that this fact is, in itself, highly suggestive. Let us now look briefly at some of the solutions that might be prop osed. A tempting 'second-best' would be a network such as that shown in Figure 7, which however introduces the new feature ['not second']. (Note that the labels for systems are omitted, to save space.) The drawback to this solution is that ['not second'] is certainly NOT a traditional feature for a pronoun. Nor does it seem likely such a network would be helpful in mak ing links to some other, explicitly semantic system network: if there is to be any grouping of two of the 'persons' together it seems more likely, on intui tive semantic grounds, that [first] and [second] might be grouped together as 'interactants', as opposed to the 'non-interactant' 'third person'. (This
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distinction will in fact be seen to be supported when we come to Model 3.)
Figure 7: A variant of Model 2 (Figure 4) that contains the ad hoc feature 'not second' Another 'second best' solution would be that shown in Figure 8. THIS IS IN FACT Hudson's solution (1971: 60, reproduced in McCord 1975: 200). But you will note that it generates you twice over, and so fails to meet the particular criterion for a FORMAL network that we have set ourselves. We shall however shortly incorporate what is essentially the same pattern in a SEMANTIC system network.
Figure 8: A variant of Model 2 (Figure 4) that generates you twice
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The only possible solution to the problem that meets the criteria is the network shown in Figure 9. The problem is that even those who are fully accustomed to the systemic notation are likely to find this diagram consid erably harder to read than Figure 4. This is because we have been forced to introduce places in the network where a pathway encounters as many as THREE brackets before finding another feature, such that the middle brac ket represents a relationship between one relationship between features and another relationship between features. This undeniably adds a new dimension to the complexity of the model, and so to the difficulty of under standing the relationships it is trying to highlight. We need to ask whether the relationships involved in this part of the grammar really are as complex as this. (This is not the place to discuss whether or not they may be this complex elsewhere in the grammar, but see Halliday, 1968: 206.)
Figure 9: variant of Model 2 (Figure 4) with complex bracketing relationships The position that we have reached is that it seems to be impossible to construct a network which meets the criteria which we have set up and which avoids the complex relationships of Figure 9. If Figure 9 is unacceptably complex, we must ask: Have we made a wrong decision at some point? And, if so, where? Let us consider in turn each of the major guidelines that we have been following. Firstly, systemicists may simply be wrong to try to capture in their net works generalizations such as those concerning the NUMBER and CASE networks, so that Figure 4 is in fact fully acceptable. But agreement that the generalizations SHOULD be captured without repeating systems is so widespread that we shall ignore this for the moment. (I shall return to the point in the concluding section of the paper.) Secondly, the English pro-
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nouns may, contrary to our intuitions, really be an area of the grammar that is so complex that it requires the intricate relationships between features used in Figure 9. Thirdly, we may be wrong to regard the traditional sys tems of PERSON, NUMBER, GENDER and CASE that are set out in Figure 2 as a set of FORMAL systems. Could it be that these traditional features are in fact fully fledged SEMANTIC features? If so, we are involved with a new level of language, and we may be wrong to try to make the network 'formal' by generating each pronoun once only. For example, the item you may be semantically ambiguous, one meaning being singular and one plural. There is of course a fifth possibility, which is that the con ventions of systemic theory may be inadequate for describing elegantly what are in fact very simple paradigmatic relationships. This last possibility is particularly interesting, because it draws atten tion to a fact that has not so far as I know been pointed out till now. This is that the model of paradigmatic relations offered by systemic theory is NOT capable of handling ALL types of classificatory relationships. (See the Appendix.) In other words, a systemic grammar is not as powerful as is sometimes suggested, and is consequently a more interesting theory. Thus, the theory incorporates a strong hypothesis as to the particular range of types of paradigmatic relationship that are found in natural languages: that the features between which we choose are related to each other in principle in all and only the ways that we have indicated here. (I say 'in principle', because we must allow for the temporary dislocation of a network in the process of historical change. But even then we would expect the relation ships, if they have been correctly identified, to reassert themselves in the course of time, though often in relation to new features.) My view is that the relationships that the theory highlights ARE likely to be the right ones, and that it is fourth guideline (i.e. the attempt to tie our network to the level of FORM) that has caused the problems. How ever, before we move on to consider a SEMANTIC model, we should remind ourselves of the second of the two questions we asked a few moments ago: If it HAD proved to be possible to draw a fully satisfactory network, would the price to be paid have been worth it? The cost would in fact be that the realization rules would have been considerably more com plex. But since they would have been complex in precisely the same sort of way that the realization rules for our third model will be complex, we shall consider the question in relation to those rules.
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6. Model 3: A Grammar with a Semantic System Network Suppose that we now remove the requirement that each item should be generated once only. To do this is in fact to take the crucial step in estab lishing the network as being at the level of SEMANTICS. The reason is that we have now made it possible for the phenomenon of NEUTRALIZA TION to occur. Neutralization is simply one of the types of what Lamb (1966: 17) calls 'interstratal discrepancy', and it is such indications of the lack of a one-to-one relationship between a meaning and an item or struc ture that alert us to the fact that we are dealing with two distinct strata of language. For example, there are two meanings, which we may gloss as 'not heavy' and 'not dark', both of which are realized in the single item light. Similar cases of neutralization, I want to suggest, occur in the pronoun net work of English. In other words, sometimes A SINGLE ITEM MAY REALIZE MORE THAN ONE SELECTION EXPRESSION. It is because this phenomenon of neutralization occurs in Hudson's network for pronouns (Hudson, 1971: 60, reproduced in McCord, 1975: 200) that we are alerted to the possibility that his network may in reality be a SEMAN TIC network. (It uses the traditional terms, and in it the PERSON and NUMBER systems are entered simultaneously, with [third] and [singular] providing a compound entry condition for the GENDER system: in other words, the relationships are essentially as in the semantic system network shown in Figure 10, even though the labels are different.) Since the system network that we shall construct will be semantic, we shall feel free to replace those of the traditional labels that do not directly express the meaning for which they stand. You will therefore find in Figure 10 the feature [performer] instead of [first], the feature [addressee] instead of [second] and, by extension, the feature [outsider] instead of [third] in what is now labelled the INTERACTANT ROLE system. Sometimes the label is designed to make a specific point, as in my substitution of [male] for [masculine] in what is now the SEX system, where I wish to indicate that in English (as opposed to languages such as French and German) we are con cerned with fully semantic features, as opposed, for example, to cases such as das Mädchen (German for the girl), where the neuter gender is purely formal. There are a number of significant points of detail to be made about the network for Model 3. First, notice that the entry condition is now [thing] instead of [pronoun]. The term 'pronoun' is typically used as a label for a
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Figure 10: Model 3: part of a simplified semantic systemic
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network
class of items at the level of form: in the semantics we are concerned with meanings relevant to 'things', in a sense of 'thing' that includes persons, only some of which are realized in pronouns. Second, notice the row of dots between [thing] and the two systems in which 'things' must select features. The dots indicate that there are other systems between the two points shown that are omitted here for simplicity. The rows of dots after [quantified], [lexical classification] and [naming] similarly show that there are other systems not shown here. Third, you will see that the overall network allows for the system of QUANTIFICATION (which is large and complex) to be entered in parallel with the INTERACTANT ROLE network, to generate expressions such as all of us, two of you, some of them, two pints of it, etc. (all of which involve pronouns), as well as all of the books, two of your friends, etc., which do not. In what follows we assume, for simplicity, that the feature [unquantified] is always chosen. Fourth, note the crucial point that, when [interactant] is chosen, the realization can ONLY be in a pronoun (or some nominal group such as the ones we have just exemplified with a pronoun at their head), while an 'out sider' has many choices open to her/him/it. Thus there is NOT the close relationship at the semantic level that the traditional approach to the per-
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sonal pronouns of English suggests. The plain fact is that once a 'thing' has been classified as an 'outsider', there are many complex choices open to it which are simply not there when the referent is an 'interactant'. Most of the relevant systems are entered from [lexical classification], and they include the option to show that the referent is or is not some 'specific' entity, and if 'specific', whether or not also 'particularized' (as in books vs. some (=s'm) books vs. the books); whether or not the meaning of the noun at the head of the nominal group is recoverable (as in two recent books vs. two recent ones); and whether the 'thing' is a 'count' or a 'mass' thing (s'm books vs. s' m water). None of these choices, then, are relevant to interactants. And there are a good many others. Fifth, notice that although, as I have said earlier, the vertical order of features in a system is not normally significant in systemic descriptions, it could in fact be put to work to carry the meaning 'Try the features in this sequence'. Thus if we were to put this little network into a computer as part of a grammar of English, it would be more economical to try the features in the sequence shown here, because this is the sequence of the frequency of the three types. In one grammar that I have written (Fawcett in prepara tion) I have actually specified suggested frequencies for each feature in a system. Sixth, you may have noticed that the traditional terms 'singular' and 'plural' do not appear in the network. This is because they are used in the NUMBER system that is dependent on [lexical classification] and [count], which (roughly speaking) puts s onto plural nouns. In the present network the question is phrased in terms of whether the referent is 'one' or 'óneplus'— which says the same thing as 'singular' and 'plural' in different words. Seventh, you may wonder why the 'third person pronoun' network is called the TOKEN CLASSIFICATION network. The answer is that it shows broad similarities to what I term the CULTURAL CLASSIFICA TION network, i.e. the network that specifies the meanings made available to us by our culture's classification of things in terms of the nouns of our language (see further Fawcett 1980: 217- 20). It would be possible to have a slightly simpler network here if we decided to ignore this parallel, because it happens that we use the same pronoun, it, for both 'mass' things, e.g. to refer to some apple that is about to be served as food in purée form, and things that are [count, one, non-person], e.g. an apple on a tree or in a shop. (This is in effect what is done by Hudson (1971:60, reproduced in
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McCord 1975: 200) and in Martin 1983: 50.) But I find this less than satis factory, in psychological terms; it seems more plausible to assume a single classification system for 'things', and to allow it to be ambiguous as between 'mass' things and things that are 'count, one, non-person' —just as we shall shortly see that we need to treat you as ambiguous between 'one' and 'oneplus'. (Indeed, even Hudson's rather formal network permits that ambiguity, so why not this one?) Eighth, you will observe that we have introduced a totally new feature, [sex unspecified], into the SEX system. This is intended to account for cases such as they in texts such as when someone wants to borrow more than six books at a time, they must obtain special permission. This is an option that is by no means in the semantics of all native speakers of English. Some use instead he and him and this is reflected in Martin's (1983: 50) characteriza tion of he as [human, unmarked]. Others insist on he or she and him or her, or she or he and her or him, or, in writing s/he and him/her or her/him. Note that this option is only required for singular outsiders, because sex is not specified at all for plural outsiders in English.4 We turn now to a general point. What do the feature labels in such a network actually MEAN? While these replacements for the traditional labels are intended to give a clearer indication of what the selection of any particular feature involves, they still need spelling out further. Let's take as an example the feature [outsider]. Notice that this may well be selected when the referent is a human being who is both physically present and a member of the smallest socially recognisable group that also contains the performer and the addressee. S/he is not an 'outsider' in sociological terms, therefore: only in terms of the interactant roles that the semantics of Eng lish allows. The term 'outsider' is however fully appropriate because, in broad terms, s/he is referred to by selecting from the same semantic fea tures that would be used if s/he were absent. It is of course fully acceptable in our culture to select the feature [outsider] in referring to non-persons (i.e. objects and animals not being treated as 'persons') that are present (though this would not necessarily be the case in all possible cultures), but problems of some sociolinguistic interest arise in the case of persons. When adults or medical practitioners use the semantics for outsiders in referring to children or patients who are both present and conscious, they usually give offence: the person is being treated as if he were an object, and s/he feels that his/her personal status is being diminished. The 'felicity condition' for choosing [outsider], then, might be something like 'the performer con-
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siders the referent not to count as a member of the social group that is set up by virtue of the current communicative action'. Yet in practice we often need to refer to non-interactants who are pre sent. Some conventions have been established that soften the impact of being treated as an outsider, at least to some extent. First, we increase the frequency of the use of the relevant proper name. We thus invoke one of the two uses of the 'vocative' form, that of expressing the appropriate point on the scale of social distance/intimacy, and as a consequence we cut down on our use of the 'third person pronouns', which are markers of outsiders — objects, animals, and absentee persons, etc. Second, such proper names are sometimes followed by here as in John here will show you the way. Third, and most significantly, they are practically always accompanied by a kinesically mediated act of communication such as a gesture or a smile to the 'outsider' — who, in this separate act of communication, is the addressee. This discussion has taken us beyond the specification of the feature [out sider] as we have explored some of the ways in which we overcome a limita tion in the English system. But it has illustrated the point that it is NOT the business of semantics to model ALL POSSIBLE MEANINGS. This brings us to the final question for this section. It is this: What are the criteria that determine what features to recognise in the semantics of a language? For example, in the system that we have just been considering, we might ask: Should we introduce a fourth interactant role, which we might term 'acknowledged overhearer'? In an interactional approach to language, e.g. from the viewpoint of discourse analysis or of social psychol ogy, we might well want to recognize this as a significant category, so should we therefore include it in the semantics? If so, what about 'known but unacknowledged overhearer'? The answer must be that IT DEPENDS ON THE LANGUAGE. We need to make a distinction between 'possible meanings' and 'meanings that are built into the organization of a particular language'. (We shall omit here the question of whether it is possible to delimit the set of meanings that MIGHT be built into the organization of a language, i.e. the question of semantic universals.) The SEMANTICS of a given language, then, contains THOSE MEANINGS THAT ARE BUILT INTO THE ORGANIZA TION OF THE LANGUAGE, in the sense that the items, structures and intonation of the language force us to recognize that such features play a part of some sort in the generation of those items and structures. In other words, every semantic feature must have a reflex at the level of form. In
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this approach, then, the level of semantics is not as 'deep' or as 'high' or as 'abstract' as it is sometimes taken to be (though the problems that remain are real enough). When we come to the realization rules for this network in the next section, we shall see what is involved in 'having a reflex at the level of form'. This, as we shall see, is NOT limited to the simple one-to-one type of relationship that we had in Figure 4.5 Thus, the network shown in Figure 10 makes a number of highly specific claims about the semantics of English. For example, it claims that English is not concerned with sex distinctions in relation to the performer and addressee, or to outsiders that are also plural. Other languages, of course, ARE concerned with sexual meanings in these areas, as well as with a number of other distinctions, such as those realised in tu and vous in French, which are not significant in this part of the grammar in English. The semantic system networks of such languages are therefore rather differ ent. The possibility of a comparative analysis of the semantic systems of languages in systemic terms is one possible fruitful future area of applica tion for this model of language — with the proviso just mentioned that the labels on features are not always an adequate guide to the meanings they represent. A feature, then, is specified in THREE different ways. First, 'upwards' through the 'felicity condition' for selecting it to the 'knowledge' that guides the choices (cf. Austin 1962, Searle 1969 and elsewhere, and Fawcett 1984: 165ff.); second, 'sideways', to the other features in the network with which it is in complex paradigmatic relationships of choice, dependency, simul taneity, etc; and third, 'downwards' through the realization rules to items, structures and intonation at the level of form. This brings us to a matter which the discerning reader may already have noticed. If we really are to insist on having a reflex at the level of form, what is the justification for making the [addressee] select between [one] and [one-plus]? The answer depends on a bit of the grammar that lies outside our current brief: the system shown in Figure 11 (which can be slot ted into Figure 10). This apparently minor addition allows us to choose, in appropriate circumstances, not only himself and myself rather than him and me, but also yourself ox yourselves rather than you—thus demonstrating the need to show that a referent that is [addressee] must also be either [one] or [one-plus]. (In the present grammar 'reflexive' and 'intensive' pronouns are seen as essentially the same phenomenon — a position that needs a justifi cation which it cannot receive here.)
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Figure 11: How the INTENSITY system fits into Model 3 (Figure 10) Finally, you may have noticed that the CASE system has disappeared completely. The reason for this is clear within the framework of a semantic approach. The so-called 'case' is determined by whether or not the referent is functioning as the subject of the clause, and the choice as to whether or not to make it the SUBJECT THEME of the clause is a semantic choice related to the 'referent situation' of which the 'referent thing' is an element. We are only slightly simplifying if we say that it is the choice in this system, which is primarily realised in the CLAUSE rather than in the NOMINAL GROUP, which determines that the realization of a selection expression in our network will be, for example, I rather than me. Thus, although these 'situation' features AFFECT the realizations of features in the 'thing' net works, they are not, in themselves, 'thing' options. We shall have to take account of this influence in the REALIZATION RULES for our network in the next section, but it would be misleading to build this system into our network.
7. Model 3: The Realization Rules Let us now turn to the realization rules. The most frequently used notation in systemic theory is to set out the features and their realizations in two parallel columns, the FEATURE column and the REALIZATION column, and I shall use this notation here. Sometimes we must also state the CONDITIONAL FEATURES; that is, features that must also be selected if the realization is to take a particular shape. 6 The realization rules that are needed to complement the semantic sys tem network in Figure 10 are set out in Figure 12. Thus, Figures 10 and 12
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together constitute the generative grammar for the pronouns that we are considering. The grammar is used as follows. First, one moves through the system network, collecting the features that make up a selection expression. For example, we might choose [thing, unquantified, performer, one]. We then look up each feature in turn in the left hand column of the realization rules, which is headed FEATURE. In this case we find that only [performer] is listed. The REALIZATION in the right hand column will depend on what other features have been co-selected. In the case of every rule the realiza tion is simply that the head of the nominal group which we are generating (symbolized as h) is EXPOUNDED by the item that is specified. The two CONDITIONAL FEATURES columns show that if [one] is co-selected, and if [subject theme] has also been selected in the appropriate 'situation' network, the realization is that the head of the nominal group will be expounded by the item I. The dashes show that in the unmarked case, when the thing is NOT the subject theme, the realization is me. Finally, FEATURE performer
CONDITIONAL FEATURES one
REALIZATION
subject theme
h
