Liberalism without Perfection

O i er alis m JONATHAN

O

QUONG

e e

A

\ era\\s NATHAN QUONG

O

e

e

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LIBERALISM

WITHOUT

PERFECTION

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WITHOUT LIBERALISM PERFECTION JONATHAN

QUONG

OXFO RD UNIVERSITY

PRESS

OXFORD LWlVl3R.4ITY

PR.ESS

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Published Jn the United Slates Oxforen, 'Oil Rawls and Political Liberalism', ill TirL' COJ// IWyeCoattpunan to Anu·k, Samlicl Ereeman, ratiori ]olm Lo,hts,that is, regprdless of how inorally disvaluable one'.s choices are. Ferhaps a conceptiori of the good which in]Ì[LË|C priorLEY raLic]1al clLDiCC ËØF ilSOWH lo Itii]1]I[hialli alttËbuted SiLEWULLid 60 Llle or LexicitL WflgËhl iluurd1L[h|·'. itupil'ILib will alrike mosL people as a pretly C V[t'W UÚ hllIÏhian job, but I thiilk lhis 2' reinarks I.kration. Also Richard Iligger's di.scrission Ir>>-6. this INuiod ar. see see var uawis's

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Republican Challenge to Liberalism', in Aiaronomyemd tiit Chanenges to Libemiism, John Christman and 1001Anderson.eral iiisists Liral stictL il Lil>rralcoiicer.aciers tieverilirless telliain algtlostic al.3elil[IJ LË principles. Political liberals certi nul deny this mourrale thesia (antl [11Llol it is a peraling rnembers of society urakes perstuis equal .

Possession of these moral powers is ascribed to citizens s[nce they seem necessary to explain how people can he full participants in a fair system of social fOT

cooperatiorL

Thus,

TUtüdË$

reasonable

OfÂT.

for example, believe that some citizens are naturally inferior to others, nor can they believe that political society is a form of social cooperation meant to benefit some people entirely at the expense ofothers. Even rnere strongly, reasonable persons believe not merely that everyone should benefit from social cooperation, they believe that the burdens and benents of social cooperation of are to be fairly distributed. Although the exact specincation fairness is not giverl by the first component of reasonableness alone, the commitReciprocity is a crient to fairness clearly implies what Rawls calls reciprocity desire to cooperate with others on terms all persons can accept. Reasonable Of COOp€EBliOD, persons are thus willing to propose arld abid€ $ÿ fair têTUS provided that others will do likewise." In short, reasonable persons believe that fair terms to regulate soclety must be mutually acceptable to similarly motivated persons; they are committed to the idea that principles of justice shOL1ÌÔË30 subject to public Justification. Since reasonable citizens are coniniirted to living by rules that are acceptable to other reasonable people, and since they also accept that reasonable people disagree in deep and irresolvable ways about moral, religious, and philosophical issues, they will accept the further ideal that liberal prlacipics and institutions must be justifiablewithout reference to particular conceptions of the good or other controverslal doctrines. Otherwise, those principles and institutions could not be justined to the constituency of reasonable citizerls, and they wou]d thus fail

petons do

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Wiral Kind of Liberalism?

39

to meet what Rawls calls the liberal principleofiegitimacp

the thesis that political it is exercised in accenknce with a constitution the power is only legitimate essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light ofprincipics and ideals acceptable to their common human reason? 'when

1.5.3 A political conception if being reasonable

eschew

appeals

to conceptions

of the

good and other controversial doctrines when establishing legitimate political princiof justice? pies, what values or reasons can be used in developing our conception Political liberals argue that we must present a conception of justice as pLLTOly political.Recall the definition of a political conception from Section I.]. Political conceptions have three features: they make no perfectionist judgementsor other means

we must

metaphysical claims, they are robust across permissible conceptions of the good, and they are limited in scope to matters of justice, citizenship, and political legitimacy or obligatiott ln bullding our theories of Justicewe can only draw on ideas that are political in this limited sense. Rawls assumes citizens are freeand egnal, though the political conception of the person ernployed by Rawls offers a slightly difTerent view on the way in which persons are free than the one mentioned in the preceding discussion of reasonabic people. Rawls' political conception of the person assumes people are free in three way (a} they possess the capacity to Frame, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of their own good, (b) persons see as self-authenticating of af valid claims that ts,their interest in the pumuir the good life (asthey sources understand it) enlËtles them to press claims on others and for others to press claims on them, tEus making them subject to duties and obligations, and (c}finally,persons for their ends and adjusting their are viewed as being capable of taking responsibility expectations according to what they are entir]ed to aceive. Citizens næ equa] in the sense that tEey are each assumed to have these features, and no distinction is made Eriternis of goater or lessercapacities betweencitizens. This is a view only regarding how we should see ourselves as citizens: it makes no claim to be a full theory of personhood or personal identity. Society is lhen characterized (followingthe of social cooperation over time for mutual account ofthe reasonable) as a fairsystem benefit. Again, this is presented only as a view of how we should understand our the political point of viev: it does not preclude having other vievs society about the intrinsic value of certain communal forms of association. This political conception of cit[zens and society provides us with three important political values: freedom, equality, and fairness. Rawls then uses his famous position' as a device of representation that models these values and systemarizes our considered judgementsinto a political conception comprised of 'thernselves

nom

'original

L3¯¡. " Ibirl., Ibid., 29-35.

" Ibid., 32.

40

Liberalism Without Perfection

I will not rehearse the det ails of two rnain principles, which he calls justiccas fairness. the arguinents from the original position both because l assume they att sufficiently well-known, and also because I arn only interested in the general idea of a political conception of justice,not in the merits ofRawls's particular conception." The political conception of justiceprovides principles (including basic rights and liberties) that are freestandingin the sense they can be presented and defended without reference to any particular conception of the good or other values over which TEZ¾OELable people disagree. The principles are derived using only the values of freedom, equality, and fairness, and these values are themselves taken from the political conception of citizens as free and equa], and of sectety as a fair systern of social cooperation for mutual betrefit. We thus have liberal principles of justicethat can be justinedon rnoral grounds to all reasonable persons, and are legittrnate for that reason. We have, in other words, a solution to the puzzle of how legitirnare political principles are possible in light of the fact of reasonable pluralisrn.

1.5A Tlie overlapping consensus The concepts discussed so far provide what Rawls sometimes refers stage' in the exposition of political liberalisrn In the first stage,

lo as "the first we develop a

of justice,one thaL appeals only to public or political free-standing conception values, and does rior presuppose the truth or falsehood of any particular cornprehensive doctrine or other views over which reasonable people disagree. Once this is done, however,there is a second stage where we must see if the free standing conception can achieve what Rawls calls stability for the right reasons. This type of slability has two elements." The first addresses the issue of whether people regulated by the free standing conception will who are raised under institutions acquire a sufÏicient sense of justiceand willingness to act justly.The second part of stability, more central to politica] liberalism, is the idea of congruence. Rawls oEjusticeto be stable is that argues that part of what it rneans for a conception endorsing and acting in accordance with its principles must be congruent with society." each person's rational good under the ideal conditions of a well-ordered It was Rawls's dissatisfaction with the account of congruence he provided in A Theory ofhtstice which led him to revise his views on stability and develop tEe idea of an overlapping consensus. In Political Liberalism, Rawls assurnes that, due

*

Tur ruore detail cm ibe two principles of justiceand the argurnents Ernin the original position see Etawls,]usdeeds Edirness. A ResmitmenMCaailbridge. Harvard Unleersity Press,2001L parls Il and ]]I. (IOBJÎiOn EfêtlYlil]l d |1atid clarincation of thf Also see San1Ll€Ë [70111Ell OrigËñill i.ttgLltl3ddÎ$ |.1 in his Rawls (New York• Roulledge, 2[KU I, chapter 4. Ruwls, Polidad Liberalism, 133. ]bid., L4L. society, according in R.iwls, is one where [a] A well-orciered epts and knows th,it everyone others accept the same conceptierL of justiœ, ( (31Lhe basic struclure of the society is publicly known La satisív fl1at coilception, and (c) citl2ens have a normrilly effective sense of justice: a williilgness to Bild abide by lair terms pTovided oth ille lion-public Llle pet's[ t•clive (113311 crusuus wlliell of ntir own coinprehensive cloctriiir, Pudc justincalloit is achieved when c-achn-asonable person in a COI1CCgt|UEL. sociely wucks out the tull justification of the pulLt|C2 38M. See ilaid.. ''

See Jbid., 2L4, 227-30. Ibid.. 224.

Liberalism Without Perfection

42 according

to Rawls, are under a non-enforceable

rneral

duty ofcivility to adhere to the norms of public reason when debating and voting on fundameittal political

rnatters.

To illustrate the

of this moral duty, suppose weare considering the issue prostitution should be legal. Someone whose oligious doctrine holds praastitution to be sinful and prohibited by God cannot oppose the legalization of prostitution solely for that reason. lf she were to advocate criminalizing prostitutiim for that reason alone in a political forum, or if her vote in a referendum was would sole[y based on that reasoil, she be in breach of the moral duty of civility. would offering only religious She be a reason for her political position, and thus she would not be offertrig a reason that could be acceptable to all reasonable persons. However, suppose the citizen in question also believed that legalizing of vulnerable pralstitution would effectively legittrnate the exploitation women and childreil by legaliairig obtained by pimps through vio]ence and other coercive methods. with the duty of civility, Our citizen could, consistent oppose the legalization of prostitution for this reason since she would be appealing to liberal values (fi-eedomand equality), and the basic liberal right to bodily integrity and freedom from assaulL This is not to say that public reason supports rnaking prostinition illegal, only that the argurnelit just sketched appears colisistent with the moral duty of civility. Even if our citizen is also moved byher beliefin the religious reason, indeed even if the mligious mason is her motiva ring rensar; to oppose legplization, so long as she assault provides a sincerely believesthe claim about exploitation and foedorn sufficient public reason to oppose legalization, her opposition to legalization is perfectly consistent with the norms ot' public reason. More generally, we can say that public reason's duty of civility requires citizens olily to support policies (on Eundamental political rnatters) when they sincerely believe they have a sufficient public reason l'or doing so.' Which reasons actually motivate them are not relevant in deciding whether their actions are consistent with the duty of civility. natLLrc

of whether

'agreemeilts'

nom

"¯ Rawls, B,Lticnf COftLLH[h. atlLEE

Oliff[LS

J.iberadam, 217. By non-enforceable

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I mean

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and ÏRiswlsis ILË[]1bell view of plibli< reason which permits of enforcemeni,1 Rawls also allows for an or citizerLS puliLica[ alvance non-ÿublic CIchutepmvided thev provide public reasurLS ËD tu reasons in Of Vi€W USEY VifW, ËDAll 000150. [ Of thd illC ibid,, 247. For the even more permissive 5LIPPDtl 5 t l€lf wjde view Tlie [dea Plibli< Revisited', Coßerred ot' Reason in [0pers lCambridge Harvard see LLJ99), 591-4. Llniversity Press, 9.r' The aquinenL presenled is obviCLIS AllÅÃÌ|6 310Ì Ull€ | lat I necesarily calderse. IRQliSÉd, 11000 PfDS(lËLlÌÑOJl coniplete arguineilt abdLlÎ l 16 (O ifLIOPPOfill€ Iniiny Oi lf POËLt|Cû] I |ËVOË WOUË$ considevotions, perhaps most obviously, whether makirig prostitution illegal ritight violate the hesic rigl]IS ÏJerlic·s Et]ar.il OFL Ll]e el til 1CT (ICJ¾iËlLLEC5 DE | 1eir cuslui]1ers, fut i[LSEFLii.LiVC iigLLO]enLS 21ILE CLa] and indiscrilRiB2΀ iBVasiOD Of an[OOOLRy. |3Liril.]Lt5. Imprisoniiig a person prevents him front almost all autanallioni †Ìldt ÊOP3Yiß of coercion 99ay be less severe, hur they all invade autonomy, and they all, at least in this world, do it in fairlyindiscrirniriate way. That is, there is a no practical way of ensuring that will victims' choice of restrict the the coercion repugnarir options but will not irircrfere with their other choices.

Raz is saying, roughly, that we ought to etnbrace the harm principle on the basis of two premises: a factual premise lthe combination of 13--15 above), and a normative premise {[6 above):

Factual

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I do not doubt that these two premises, if true, deliver some version of the harm principle. What I dispute is that our commitment to the harm principle ought to be conl.ingent on the truth of the Octual premise. lf this premise is tief true, L.heti on Raz's view, we no longer have a sound argument in favour of the barrn principic. But i think we should be committed to the harm principle regardless of whether the factual premise is true because Raz has misideritined the relevant normative consideration that ultimately grounds our commitment to the harm principle. Let me be very cicar regarding mv objection to Raz's argument for tlie I am rot objecting to the mere fact that the argument harm prËnciple. is contingent upon certain Ecl.ual claims. MOSL arguments for practical principles in politkal philosophy will depend, at some point, on factual considerations. My objection sort oí factual is that Raz's argument is contingent en the wnmg

ä bric11y noted butil by JercanyWaldron in 'Autonomy and .Saulliern California ?.mv Rev ewn¯• (1989), 1 I l l:, as well as SW ifL Mulhall arLA $Ì EiÊCPUË58RiËUFFFFNFFFIÉffffinn3, 339-4Ü. Raz, MoreWyofFreedont, 4|B-9. For a siinilar statement see Ra2, "Liberalisin, Scepticlsm, and LNinocracy', in Edaks er ;Ile PuWk Domnier, l24. This

I'CTFAtion

»vtry

about Rut's arguinrat

m Raz's Morality

of Fn:edern',

TireArgtamentfromAritorrorny cransiderations,

and this reveals that Rar's argurnent

ultimately

55 rests on the wrong

sort of normative considerations. Why do ] hold this view regarding lhat

Raz's argurnent

for the harrn principle? One

when

I consider cases where the facLual premise is falsified. I continue to believe the harni principle ought to apply. Suppose tecEnological advances have made it possible to precisely control people's preferences and impulses via a chlp implanted in the brain. The degree of precision is such that only effect thev have is to prevent us we could design the chips so that the oneand from choosing bad options. So long as we are going to make valuable choices, the chip remains inactive, but if the chip senses we are going to make an unworthy choice, the chip prevents us from doing so. The chip would not interfere with our braii, function in any other way. Cransider a second example. Suppose Albert has decided he would like tra get back together with his ex-girlfriend Betty. The relationship was objectively bad EorAlbert: Betty is a rnean and manipulative person, and Albert ts rauch better off without her in his life. But, lovesick and lonely, Albert decides to go over to Betty's apartnient and beg her to take him back. Carl, a nosy neighbour of of action cicarly Albert's, knows this course not in Albert's best interests. So, is Àlb@Ti in ÑÏ6TOOrn (O gT Vgni im (EØmgO ng at the crucial momgfLT, C&rl OÇÑ5 reason

is

for a couple of hours until Albert has been persuaded by Carl about Betty's flaws, and changed his rnind about getting back together with Betry. Albert was not going to be doing anything else during those hours other than begging Betty to take him back. In these two exaniples the factuni prenlise above is fa]se. In the first example the state could implant the chips without impinging on anyone's autonomous pursuit of the good. In the second example, Carl prevents Albert from pursuing choosing preventing him from autonornons]y the good. a had option without Thus, on Raz's view, the harm principle does not seem to apply in these exampie.s." I believe,however, that such a conclusion is unwarranted. I think the hann principle ought to apply in both cases. Raz's argument cannot explain this result, and the reason it carmet explain this resvit is becausethe argenleilt does not offer of the harm principle. The examples the right account of the moral (OLLndations with preventing peop]e from choosing suggest that there is something wrong badly, even when this can be done without limiting their ability to choose valuable options." Althotigh my aim is not to develop art alternative argument for the harm principle here, to the extenl. some version of the harm principle is a over to Betty's house. Carl keeps Albert locked in the room

$5? Seineoile miglu object illat the brain in1plani eraniple<eilt'uses the jáiLl€ $ÏOCO il in 69 US ËOT CIGE 0, $†EgLLLrcs h<wlilyins·36]OT1. for reunrLs that have noih'LBg IOt"

'

Liberdism Without Perfection

56 valid principle of

liberal justice,I believe it is fundamentally justlEledby appeal to the moral status of persons, that is, the harm principle is generally a sound principle of political momilty because it ensures that citizens are not treated in a certain type of paternalistic fashion, one which demeans Lheir moral status as free and equal persons. This idea will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter 3, and so I wil] say no more about it at this point. Because the argument

in this section relles oli intuitive reactions to certaiti stylized cases, it is not rneant to provide any kind of decisive proof that Raz's formulation of the harm principle is flawed. L readily concede that some people might not find the exarnples to be troubling: same might feel the harm principle is indeed inappropriate when the factual premise is falsified. For these people the argunient in this section will, at best, merely have clarined thesense in which their commitment Eacts. Eut manv to the harm principle is contingent on certain readers. I assume, will share my intuition about the cases above, and my aim is primarily to draw attention to the fact that Raz's argument for the barrn principle examples, where coercion can be used cannot explain these intuitively trOLLbling to prevent people fmm choosing badly without inipinging on their autonomous pursuit of the good. There are two plausible ways a defender of Rammight respond, but fiTst let me in defenceof Raz's position. First, one note two responses that cannot be mounted cannot respond to the first example by casting doubt on the state's ability to distinguish good ways of life from had ones (or Carl's ability in the second example), and thereby arguing that it would be dangerous or counterproductive to allow the state (or Caril to make such decisions. Raz's arganient is premised on the assumption that there are better and worse ways to live, and that provided the stare can be trusted to make such decisions,there is nothing il]iberal or wrong about the state basing policy decisions on such distinctions, at least when they do not threaten our autonomous pursuit of the good Given that Raz makes assumptions about better and wo se forms of life, it is only reasonable to use these sarne assumptions in developing objections to his position. Second, someone might be tempted to respond that removing bad options via a chip in the brain threatens to make it too easy to choose the good: choosing the good [s only valuable when the possibility cíchoosing badly also exists. But, regardless of the truth of this claim, it is not available to Raz since he explicitly denies that bad options are necessary in order for the autonomous choice of the good to be of value. Let us now turn to two replies in Rafs defence thal are more plausible. Raz argues that in this world there is no practical way of prohibiting the pursuit of bad options without also inipinging on people's liberty to autonomously pursue the

"

'

For Raz se valificatioit see Morahtv of Frarlorn, a L2, 427-8. " ]bid., 411-1. A modi(led version of Raz's pcailiun,

'"

wherr

Lhe exilence

cl'

bad oplions was inoclincatiori vainehic of -1(L[Ollomy, the this ise entL for prciblern, this blit necessary exen imLances of would have maior repemussions the theory. lt far irnply thaL the for the rest government might be duty botmd to create bad options when they do not exist, an idea that seems deeply counter-intuitive, and is also at odds with the spirit of Rds libem1peig, VolunJe T)ffLY HornJ MíLED (f€, re Self f Gdord: Oxtord University Press, l986), L6| or Peter de excLL.IS Avoiding Affairs cinherg alrnosi VC 34 r20tm), 7¾. Paternalism', Philosopliy Public [ is y concerned willi wllat lic ca]h "legal paternalism', aaid lie does reregni·¿c that paternalism may exist OLlË|ÚC 30 ifgill COili X( ËG Wllys lilitt are noi Lil.>erty-Ilmitialg. 'PaterT1Ellist]C 5 This point wus, to my knowlerige, fint made in PiernartiGerl antLCharles M. Culver, i[L Bettar iour Pliitosophy & PuerlicA(friërs6 ( l97tà 45--37. Also see :Jie exLended tiiscussion ÍOËln UilLVt·rsiiv dat'FNftËÍTPJa 31itucilt•Bler Ì $ailt licalc•r Press, l9e clial.;ter L. KleitLÑg, 6 SËflÇC il who rnighi argue that 1he exaniple is innhelpflLE MFCfl1;L §IÇ1IOOK Big 11 (ÇÊT111|OT1 L-or tEt<me |Ji'IEOFILislistic. corisiLlL"U EllÚ$ÏÎL'I¯J)illivC SCQiliifLO WilÚfB lË10ËJ1.¾ rd C]d % [O ITUNIËLLSdâLI¶ËLLet [0 00 the riglit thing this allemoon. Flere ] thin k the fatherdoes not aci polemalistically in 1\1e normal sense ot'Ihal *

.ifonaf

.

word.

¯6,

Liberersince he 100 benefits(even iFbe does viel realize it) (IO[El EllL |'I[t.servalLLM1 OËlllO IMOELLin10MI,ËJLLL 1 561 LËLLSCOllC [Ti 5 6 13CFO. L [n this exampic I assume Meess to tlic monuitteilt is. in principle, e ellidable mild1|il.is we do iloi lhe t'ace sori ol'public goods issue cent'ronied in section 3.3·1. +'

65tate

Paiernalism watching

<md

Perfactionism

95

is not spreading amongst the rest of the population because Eew have experfeilced it and come to appreciate its value. But people regularly try new things, even when they are uncertain about their potential value. If prohibitive cost is not the problern, svhy would people not be svi]Iingto try the opera? There opera

are a number of possible explanations: (a) prejudice, (b) an excessively conservative disposition, (c) lack of available leisure time, or (d) lack of adequate informatioti about the activity. [ thi]]k (a) and (b) illiply a ilegative judgemetitabout those who refuse to try the opera, that is, if the state believes people are not experiencing valLlable activities because ofeither (otal tiiC tiil(LLrc of what is v.iluable betweersperfectionists: (b) and non-getECClionists about wheihet Lhe state may legiLimalely dehales betWeen getEccliorLists arl Ear per!«tionist Ivasons: (c} debates abolit how, if at all, flie deilial of nioral slatus might be welghed ag,iinst tlic potential benefitsof paternalistic polim a non-perfectionist theory of justice. In order for perfectionist justice to practically distinguish itself from nonperfectionist theories of distributive justice,such as Rawls' or Ronald Dworkin's theory, it must be the case that the distribution it recommends will differ from the distribution recommended by those non-perfectionist theories. The perfectionist

and Legitimacy Justificcuiem

123

it will differ because perfectionist justice will distribute resources unequally in order to give each person the amount they need to achieve the same

argues

that

theories merely aim at an equal level of flourishing, whereas the non-perfectionist An initial diÏIlculty with this claim (a problem that distribution of resources/I will be familiar from the literature on egalitarian justice)is that it renlains thüEL others underspecified in as to why some people xquire more msources order to achieve the same level of flourishing. There are four general reasons why this might be the case. and thereby lost seine of First, it might be that someone has acted impfLLdently, sonierimes requires the prudent to Even if we bellevethat justice his or her msouTres. compensate the imprudent (i.e. everyone is entitled to a second chance) it is iniplausible to suppose that justiceniust be conspletely ÏElsensitive to considerations of personal responsibility; that the prudent must always compensate the imprudent no matter how many times the imprudent fritter away their resources. If perfectiontheories mcomm€ELd ist and non-perfectionist different distributions, I da not think it is because perfectionists must be committed to \tte implausible thesis that justice should be insensitive to considerations of personal Tysponsibility. Moreover, since and regarding non-perfectionists can the role do disagree amongst themselves

personal responsibility shovid play itL distributive justice there is no particular positlen on this issue which a perfectionist could stake out which would necessarily distinguishperfectionist justicefrom non-perfectionist theories. Second, suFpose that sorneone requires a greater tEan average share of resources to achieve an average level of dourishing for reasons having to do with a physical disability,or sonie other personal deficiencyfor which we do not think he or she should be held respons[ble, In th[s case we may (depending on our other views about

justice)allocate that person a greater than average share of resources,

but this is a conclusion called luck egalitarian

that ruany non-perfectionist theories will also reach. Sotheories of justice can justify this conclusion, as can sufficieELÌZTË2EL approaches, as can theories of social or dernocratic equality, none of which necessarily require recourse to perfectionist judgements." People who, for reasons beyond their control, lack sonie physical capacity or ability whose absence makes it more difficult to make use of external resources are, under marly conternporary theories of justice,offered a larger than equal share of resources to compensate t¯orthis t¯act The point is that we do not aced to adopt any particular theory of human flourishing in order to arrive at the conclusion that sonie people with physical disabilities or personal resource dencits are entitled to a greater than equal share of resources as a matter of justice.

Ag;tin,

the surne point

tuuld

he rustle with n,garti

to any

propusati psilem of' distribution

(Púcrilarian, Sudleiettlarian, This is not 10 say 1hal these approaches to discribullve juslice are inectnpalible n illi pert¯eclionism, orLly tÑ|Lt they need UtÌgcD1CD15. noi tie(;ind (L¾HB1 y SFÇ HOE) gfDLL0dCf.,l 1D ¶lÇrÎÇÇt|DTllst FËL SOgliiM[ ihoory Of equalily QB Û10[DOB[ C 10d 110H-þdTÏL"L'[iOdiMI Dworkink of tesourc 5 id þ In'personal Ihcory that offers compf¶SILtion for personal handicaps or other inequ:ilitics resourecs'. See Dwarkin. So1·erügn Virtue, chapter 2. etc.L

" "

124

Libernüsm Without Perfection

Third, suppose that some people require more resources or advantages than others in order to achieve the same Icvelof flourishing because some people hold false views about the good life, and thus will not spend their resources correctly. That is, they will squander Lheir resources on unworthy or less valuable ends as compared to other, more discerning, citizens. The perfectionist covId maintain that those who spend their resources wisely, and thereby achieve an average level of flourlshing in a relatively efikient manner, are required by justiceto subsidize thera additional resources or advantages to comless discerning citizens-giving pensate them for the fact that they will make relatively poor choices with the they are given (perhaps targeted compensation in the form of services resources will not be missFestl·" resources or subsidies to ensure the additional I do not believethis thesis is one that ve-y many people will ind plausible. EitEer for which wedo not think he someone suffers from a genuine disability, something should be held responsible, in which case a non-perfectionist theory can advocate compensation, for his gemisor preferences, in which or else he is in fact responsible case it seems perverse to claim that he is entitled to addilional resources or advantages tO COEFLpensate for Lis'poor' choices. One does not bave to be a lucl<egalitarian to accept the more minimal thesis that the appeal to responsibility must play some role fri a theory of justice,if you believesomeone else is suffering under a mistaken conception oE the good, and is thus rnissFending resources, it would be an act of charity or generosity to offer him further resources to spend on more valuable pursuits, but it is difficult to claim that thereis a duty ofsocial justiceto provide this aid, as this would be inconsistent with the idea of individual responsibility upon which 3tlÿ pÌaUsible conception of distrEbutive justiceneeds to rest to some degree. Again, if a pert'ectionist theory of justicediffers from non-pert'ection[st theories, I do not believeit is becauseperfectionism must be committed to a differentview about the significance of personal responsibility to distributive justice. Thus far I have considered three potential ways a perfectionist theoryof justice rnight differ from a non-perfectionist HOH€ OŸ account, but on closer examinatiOEL them proved plausible points at which the two theories might diverge. There is, however, a fourth possibility, one which more plausible? Suppose (to borrow and mod[fy an argument that welfarist egalitarians press against their resourcist opponentsP that some people require more resources than others to achieve the ¯s

same level of flourishing

becaLLS€

diÍÍCffül

POOplc

Deed

10 PLLTSLLOdËfÍCffDE

activities in order to flourish, and some activities are more expensive than others. For example, suppose that in order for Gary to flourish he must pursue a career as a gardener, and in order for Cathy to flourtsh she must pursue a career as tharL carpenter. Gardening, however, turns out to be a more expensive career carpentry, and thus Gary's fair share of resources, on the perfectionist account, SLICl) El POlick

WOLIld

pûlcl'J10]iB[ic

lionever.as I ar_euedin Cliapter 3, tilat 1) " Note.berieficiaries. inlencied 49. TJ)is suggestion is raade in I[urka, " See for examplc C. A. Cohen. 'Expensive Taste Rides Again'. in Dworkil> ·]rmlimel

(Oxford: Blacl<well,2000, 10-13.

ils

PerlectioniSIÏL',

DJJd

Burley, «i.

WË[ŸLtCgûld10

His CriÊËLS $1|SÌlllf

and Legitimacy Justificatiem

125

be greater than Cathy's fair share. lEwe assume that Gary is not responsible for the fact that gardening Esmore expensive than carpentry, and if we further for the fact that he needs to pursue a career in assume that Gary is not responsible gardening in order to flourish, then Cary is not responsible for the fact that he needs niore resources than Cathy in order to achieve the same level of flourishing. If this argument is sound, perfectionist judgementsart (a} essential to determine should

an indiv[dual's

just share of resources, and (b) such judgementscan justify a

of resources

that wi]I differ from the major non-perfectionist theories while remaining sensitive to considerations of individua[ responsibility. This proposed account as to how perfectionist justicemight differ fmm nonperfectionist justiceis plausible, and a full assessment of it would tala us beyond the scope of the present chapter. I will, however, highligbr several serious diftifDT culties that this account must confront. In order to justifycomp€ELSBÊiCEL Gary, Etmust be true not simply that Gary's gardening is more expensive than Cathy's but also that gardening is the anhavny that Gary can achieve the same carpentry, level of flourishing as Cathy. This, however, is a fairly implausible assumption with regard to most people. Most people de not just have one activity they must order achieve an average levelof flourishing. More Illoly there will be to pursue in

distribution

optiorLs a range or set of

for each person, any one of which

would

yield the same

level of FIonrishing if pursued. On this more plausible view, Gary and Cathv will have differentchoice sets for Let us say Gary can choose from (a, A c)

nourishing.

if he wants to acEieve an average level of flourishing, and Cathy can choose from (d, e, f), With this assumption in place, at least two further premises need to be true in order for the perfectionist argument for conipensation to hold. First, Gary's set must be more expensive than Cathy's. That is, either Gary's set must be on average more expensive than Cathy's, or more strongly, perhaps every member

of Gary's set is more expensive

than every member of Cathy's set. Second, it must be the case that Gary cannot, or should not, be held responsible for the expensiveness of the set of options which oifer him the opportunity to flourish. of these problematic. Both Take the premise that further premises, however, are This Gary's set must be more expensive than Cathy's set. prenlise is made problemat[c by the fact that any personal handicaps that might mal<e one person's option set more expensive than another's would be compensated for by a resourcist non-perfectionist theory such as Dworkin's. That is, a non-perfectionist theory like Dworkin's will already have equalized for deficits in personal resources that might otherwise cause one person to have a more expensive option ser than another. What the perfectionist must therefore insist upon is that there can be cases where one person's option set remains more expensive than another's even after we have distributed external resources equally and compensated for any inequalities [n personal resources. But what then would be the explanation for why one person's option set was still more expensive than another's? If it is merely because one person prefers more expensive activities than another, then it is not clear any further compensation is called for. This would be to compensate someone either for his subjective preferences or his involuntary expensive tastes. Compensating for the former is in tension with a plausible account of the

Libernüsm Without Perfection

126 role personal

responsibility

ought

to play in a theory of distributive

justice,

whereas compensating for the latter is counter-intuitive and appears inconsistent with a central feature of liberal perfectionism· personal autonomy. The idea of involunLary expensive tastes leads us dirtcLly to the second premise: that Gary cannot be held responsible for the expensiveness of the option ser which allows him to flourish. If this premise is essential in order to justify a perfectionist conception of justice,perfectionism appears to reject the idea that citizens are firein the sense they can take responsibility for their own ends, and adjust their expectations in light of the resources they are entitled to. This view of citizens as free is both plausible and attractive, and I be]ieveit repmsents a core Lhe liberal intuition. By ConLrast, Du proposed perfectionist account of justice, citizens are conceived as unfree in the sense of being unable to take responsibility for their plans and preferences, and as inescapably bound to follow a certain narrow range of options in order to lead a successful life. In addition to being an arguably unattractive conception of political personality and rnoral responsibility, it may also be problematic given liberal perfectionism's usual emphasis on the value of penonal autonorny. Can it really be true both that one of the most undertaken important things in living a good life is that the options have beca autonomously chosen by the ind¯vidual, and that individuals cannot be held for the costs of the options they choose to embrace; Though I wi]I not try to show that it is impossible for a liberal perfectionist to coherently embrace both of tEese propositions, it seems very difncult to see how this could be done. Thus, I bel¯evethat a perfectionist theory of justiceis unlikely to offer a plausible explanation as to how a state might gain the moral right to impose distinctively perfectionist distributive principles, that is, principles that would practically deviate t'romthe distributive proposalsofleading non-perfectionist philosophers. 'Ib summarize the argurnent of the chapter so far, even if Ferfectionist state policies are justified,all things considemd, perfectionists have failed to show how the state could have the legitimate authority to irapose, never mind coen-ively enforce, such policies. On the one hand, explanations that appeal to the idea that we each ought to accept the pedocrionist state's authority becauseour lives will go better as a result are gullty ot'æntlating the questlan of what we should do with the question of who has the moral authority to decide what we must do. On the other hand, explanations which appeal to the duties of justicewe owe each other fail to justifyanything other than a just distribution of resouxes or advantages, something that does not requiœ recourse to perfectionist reasoning. Fither way, we have little reason to believethat states possess the legitimate authority to issue and enforce perfectionist æmmands. responsible

M

THE ARCUMENT

FROM NATURAL DUTY

t have argued that political legitimacy is not estabilshed by the capacity of states to help citizens better comply with the all the reasons that apply to them. Political legitimacy,however, is not a fiction: states can sometiraes be legitimate. The

and Legitimacy Justificcuitm

12¯¡

be legitimate is best explained by the familiar argument from natural duty. In illis section, I briefly sketch the argument from natural duty reason

states

can

before moving on, in Section 4.5, to expInin how this argurnent may he deployed wilkin the broader framework of political liberalism. In this section 1 present orie version of an argument wEich is already established in the literature on political position. While legitimacy, though it is, as all such arguments are, a controversial there are objections that can be pressed against the natural duty position, and I note a few of these below, I do not try to answer all these objections here. I helieve these objections can and have been met by advocates of the natural duty position elsewhere.

Furthermore,

even

if

one

rejects

the argument

duty that i skcLeh in this section, this should not unduly

follow. Provided one believesthat (a) and

in favour

of natural

affect the arguments that

Elon-perfectionist

liberal states can be just, be legitirnate, then the argument Eor

whatever reason, just states can (M f¯or political liberalismdeveloped la the book's subsequent chapters can proceed even

the specific natural duty position advanced here.-E Let us begin with a familiar example. A and B arrive at the scene ofan accident. A is a surgeon and R has no medical expertise. Assume that B is under a duty of justiceto aid the victims of this accident. Under these conditions, I have already suggested, A can become a legitimateauthority with regard to B. This is because a A's can best Eulnl the duty he is under, the duty to aid the victims, by accepting directives as authoritative, rather than by trying to decide for himself how to with B's duty til pmvide aid to the victims. A's ruedical expertise, in clinjunctliin provide aid to the victims, gives A the legitimate authority to tell B what to do, and also to use some rueasure of coercion to enforce these commands, suppose A tells B'hold this man by the shoulders arld keep him still while I work to stop the bleeding'. 8, however,hesitates, wondering if he would do better by leaving the UELder these conditions Ï think A has the legitimate scene to go call for help. authority to use some force. If B tries to walk away A could permissibly grab B by the arm til stop him and pull him back to the wounded man. Ry enforcing Eis directive in this way Aviolates no right ol'B's. A is rather ensuring that B complies with the duties he is under. R has no valid complaint about the way be has bggtL treated by A in this story. B cannot protest by saying LyOU C3DHOf (Orte me to fulnl my duty to aid the victims-whether or not i til]nlthis duty is up to me to decide'. This statemeitt misunderstands the nature of rights aitd duties. To be under a duty to perform some act for someone else means precisely that the dutybearer lacks the right to decide whether er not to perform. without

[n skelching Ihe nalural-driy sFproach l draw heavily on ihe arguments developell by Danic] McDermell ifl his 'Duly-Based Legi1imacy'. Ihough he would nel endorse everyttlitig I say hem. For other versions of ille argument Irom natural duty see Jeremy Walditfl. LSpecial Ties and Natum] Fhdosophy I lics', J PuhNC Afþwy 12 (1993].,22-¯¡ Chnstopher Heath Wellman, int Pblitical Legilimarv's PhHosophyd· Pubüc AQcrrrs Samaritan ism, a 2M LY%L2 [ 1--37; ut Chnslopher TherL' l' f [-LeatliWellmail and A. Joliil Simmons, Is f)" I i.$$Ïl lÎ ËÑ LJniverslly I'r<ss. 100SLcllapter L L

Libernüsm Without Perfection

128

duty to aid the of the accident, but that does not iinply that I must fulfil the duty in the

But could victiins

B sti]I not protest by saying

'I know I am under

a

A tells me to. I am still free to decide for niyself how best to fulnl this duty, and so A has no authority here'? This statement, however, contains a more subtle misunderstancling of the nature of rights and duties. E is not at liberty to manner

try and fulfil his duty to the victims of the accident in any manner he sees fit. Suppose, to begin with the most obvious case, B decides the best way to fulfil his duty to the victims is to walk away and do nothing. E cannot deffELd himself by saying thaL it is his decision how best to fulfil the duty he is under. Even if B believesthat this course of action will help the viettrns of the accident, A knows it will not, and thus A would be within his rights to stop B from walking away. T'he duty B is under requires not merely that he take some coune of action in aid of tEe victims, rather it can be speciFled as requiring that B take tEe course of action that wi]I do the most to help the victims (within the limits of what costs B can reasonably be recluired to bear). If this story is roughly correct, it supports the following duty-based conception of legitinune authorityOne way to establish that a person has legitimate authority over another person involves showing that the al]cged subject is likely better to fulfilthe dutics of justicehe is under if lie accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to directly fulfil the duties he is under hirnself.=

Notice that this conception does not claim the appeal to duty is the only way to establish that orle PCf500 ha5 ËCgitimat€ BUrhority over another, i do not heredeny that consent, fair-play, associative duties, or other argurnents might under certaiEL conditions ground claims of legitimate authority, l only present the duty-based conception as one way (I believe the most plausible way) by which legitirnare authority can be justinedin the absence of consent, or under circumstances where consent cannot have the appropriate norrnative force, I assume, following Rawls, that each person is under a natural duty of Justice which "requires us to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us, It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves'." Rawls argues LhËsnatural duty can be derived via the device of the original position, but we need not rely on that claim here. If there is some just institution X that is necessary to secure the basic rights or claims of person P, then person P has a claim against everyone else to support and comply with institution X insofar as this is necessary to maintain X and does not come at an unreasonable cost to others. Each person whose rights and claims are secured by X has a similar claim against others, It thus followsthat if we fail to fulfilour natural duty of justice,we fail to provide specific others with whaL we owe them as a matter of justice. Now suppose, as political liberalism does, that the main function of the liberal state is to create and sustain a just or fair frarnework of rules and institutions-a .ie

'"

The wording here has been adapted from Rafs service concep1ion ot'autliciily. ÑMP 500 ibid., 2Ÿ3--6. Rawls, TALWy QQUffiff, Ÿ9.-1

and Legitimacy Justificcuiem

129

within which citizens can basic structure pursue their different conceFtions of the good. The state, on this view,is a complex web of rules and institutions whose of justice.lt protects primary task is to establish and secure the conditions people's basic righLs and freedoms, secures a just distribution of resources, and ensures that those who violare the rigEts of others arecaugEt and punished. To be sure, BELy existing state can only imperfectly realize these aims, but these are the goals any state ought to pursue. A reasonably just state is one that does a reasonably good job establishing and securing the conditions of justice.I assume dLLly Of juSliCC [0 whiCËl any such state qualifies as a rigiltful object of the natural we are all subject.

We still, however, have not established the legitimacy cí reasonably

Consider

what

just states. L

someone niigEt say La response to the argunient thus far. course', the sceptic says, 1 accept that 1 am under a natural duty to support and comply with just institutions, but this does not establish that any partiador institution or set of institutions, even if reasonably just, has legitimate authority over me. There are, after all, many reasonably just institutions in the world, and even though the natural duty of justicenieans I must do a certain arnount to support such institutions, 1 am at liberty to decide which one(s) I will support: This, of course, is a version of the well-known particularity problemfor natunil The weakness of such theories, duty theories of legitimacy and obligation? according to the objection, is that they lack any sound way of establishing why the particular states to which we belong are the ones that have legitimate authority over us when there are many equally just state or non-state institutions. Why should the United Kingdoni rather than Nonvoy (or Oxfani) have legitimate authority over me? I wi]l not try and provide a complete answer to the particularity problem mainly because I think this problem has been convincingly he dealt with by others." I will only make the followingbrief reply. Consider a world where each penon accepts the natural duty of justice,but no one believes they owe tEis natural duty to any particular institution: each individual exercises their own discretion as to which reasonably just institutions to support, Fach reasonably just institution thus competes for people's support in a kind of natural duty markerplace. Would this arrangement result in establishing and maintaining reasonably just institutions throughout the world! [ think it is cicar that it would not. lnstitutions which distribute resources, estabilsh and pre tect property T'ghts gUni5 rights, and capture BELÖ violators require, in order to be effective, exclusive jurisdictionover a given territory. Justiceis very unlikely to be realized when there are competing institutions which issue different rules regarding For Ihe classic presentatiofl of this objection see Simmons. Mom! Principles mal hiiancal06/ignriens, ellupier 6. Also we Siminens in We]hn ill and Siitunuits Is Tirere er Diny w Obey ahe Lrra chapter + J..egit]Iniscy'. A1NL) See especially McDonin>tL 'Duty-Bad seu Waldn3ri. 'Special Ties and NatuTal Duties', 22-7; or Wellman in Wellman and Simmons, is There a Diay 10 Obey the Lrikt chaplet 2. ¯,

Libernüsm Without Perfection

130

property rights or criminal

law within the sarne territory. Justiceis rnost likely to be established if for any given area, there is a single legitimate authority with the power to protect and enforce people's rights and ensure a just distributiari of resources or advantages. Now recall the duty-based conception of legitirnate authority: th;Li

PCESOil 1d5 f.gilÑED (C klk.Il l E1(V OVL'T BE]OÌ CE PCENE.1E| to estaiLilish objeci is likelybetter lo fulfiltheduties efjuslice lie iS (L]lt siwwilig that 11]Ç;LIleged

One

way

¶|VOÌVCS CE

10

accepts the ditecpossiNe to construel a Tiert-pert'octionist juslificationfor sla1e action discouraging drug add etion-c.g. the mairect liarrnit causes. I take no position on itial possibiluy here. [L.

A

QuestionInternal to Lil>eralTireory

'moderate

perfectionism', Chan calls political liberalism."

and will

happily

endorse

15l

them as a part of

reply that There are, however, more extreme implications of the etapirical should be unacceptabic to any deferider of political liberalism. The empirical reply leaves politEcal liberalism open to the charges of both historical and cultural reÏ«tirism. If the content of political justice is an empirical matter, then the content can change over time. If there was no consensus on equal rights for women or for racial or ethnic minority groups in our recent past, then those rights could not be part of a political liberal conception of jLLstice at that time. Alternatively, if in certain societies there is a general consensus on the truth of the of justiceitt Koran, then Lhe Koran could be the basis for a political conception those socieries. These are, I think, unacceptably illiberal iniplications of the €EELpirical of what is reasonable reply.'-' Because it deFnes the COEltent in terrns of what beliefs a certain subset of people happen to endorse, the empirical reply lacks the theoretical resources to respond to these worries about relativism and illiberalism. It will be uselvi to summarize the battery of objections i have raised against tEe external conception. The external conception, I have argued, will regularly be forced to choose between its aim of being justifiableor acceptable to actual citizens in liberal democracies, and the priELcip[es of justicethat any liberul theory must espouse. If it restricts the constituency of political justificatiorito only those real citizens

who are

al5O

TۯSOELable

in Rawls's sense in order to avoid []Ilheralor morally repugnant outcomes, tlien it faces the charge that the appeal to real citizens is nothing but a spare wheel when faced with the fact that many real c[tizens do not necessarily accept all the aspects of Rawls's account of reasonableness, for example the burdens of judgement,the external conception again will be Eorced to choose between its liberal principles and the beliefs of ordinary citizens: this is the public culture rhiemena. Similarly, the external conception must decide what to de when confronted with the fact of dissensus about justiceamongst real citizens. If the external conception accepts that there can be reasonable disagreernent about justice, then it opens itself to the asymmerry objection: why are disagreements about justice treated differently than disagreements about the good? Because the external conception is committed to respecting the beliefsof ordinary liberal citizens, it must abstain from the bootstrapping argument and instead embrace an empirical reply to the asymmetry obiection. The empirical reply asserts that liberal citizens do in fact agree more abour justicethan they do 'moderate

For a description of perfec1ionism' see Cttan. 'Legilimacy, Unanimi1y and Ferfection· ism'. For a political libeml endoisement of moderate perfec1ionism see Klosko. 'Reasonable Rejection und Neutmlity of JusliÑcalion', in Ikrfectiamsm and Neutratify: Essay.s irr i.iheral Theory, $tcveri Wall Lih]¾ and George Kloskw eds. (Oxfoni. RUWJ1LiLD & LiMËC Jeld, 2003], 189 n. 44. RawlS I[LigÏ1LbL.L iort DÉf0ITSliÎULËU Cbbenlialb view given hisbeliel'1tial perl'ectionismcan be pursurdeutsidettledentLËØ and matters afhasic justice.See Rawls, Political J.HyrnLsm, 235, or Ïustre as Fajrawss,9L ¡Jalitical lil-Jerulisni M Also should [Lull-Je interprL"[ M lO WËly LLin see Samuel Freeruan's explanatiO[L TirL> Gr1NJfJ Ibis tclativist Ûfüggfj(1JA 'Jolm Rawls: Overview', ÊÛ Affu'Ì. in I An manner. teeman, 39-4 L

"

UberaQsm Without Perfection

152

Choices for Ihe external coriception

Justlflcatlen

to Iclealized cltlzens

Justlfloatlon to real citlzens

puntic cu Jture dUemma

spare·wheel objection/codapses into Intema? corteeption

'

rejeel public

accept

culture

publle culture

bootstrapping arg urrient

dissensus about justice

asymmetry

object on

ernpirleal reply

moderare perreenonism

relatMsm

Fig. 5.1 Rejecting the external conception about

the good life, and this legitimates the asymmetric treatment of tEe two types of disagreement. But the empirical reply [s contingent on actual and so agreement, opens the door not just to forms of moderate perfectionism, but also to charges of historical and cultural relativism that have deeply illiberal

[mpilcations. Figure illustrates the order in which these probletns confront the external conception ol' political libera]ism. The external conceptiorl fails because it sets political liberalism the task of trying to do the impossible. Liberal conclusions will ¯.1

not be justifiableto a given constituency unless that constituency already enabraces certain broadly liberal ideas, for example, the idea that citizens are free and

A equal,

or that society

QuestionInternal to Lil>eralTireory

153

fair system of cooperation for mutual benefit? The external conception thus sets itself a task that will either (a} be impossible to is

a

citiZenN

EElderse

the necessary liberal ideas, or else (b) require abandoning the aim that liberal conceptions of justicemLLst be justifiedla actual citizens as we find then,. The latter route, however, entails a niore modest view of political liberalism. Political liberals should cGELcede that the puule which the theory aims to address is a puzzle that is internal to liberal theory. achieve

since not all actual

internal views Folitical liberals begin by asking what normative rnaterial is available in constructing conceptions of justice that can reasonably be addmssed to all those citizens who would live in a well-ordered liberal society. If we Lake this as Cur Ïirst question, then many of the Lraditional ways of justifying rights and institutions-for exaniple, appeals to the coniprehensive value liberal On

the

of autonomy-are in well-ordered

unt€Elable

since they rely on prernises

that reasonable people liberal society may not accept. Political liberalismthen becomes a Eree and eciual citizens in an ideal liberal an account of the kind of justifications society can offer to one another.

5.3 THE INTERNAL CONCEPTION'S

VlRTUES

in this section, I briejly explain why the internal conception is not vulnerable to the same objections pressed against the external niodeL Chapters fi-8 then offer more detail: in those chapters I show how the internal conception can rebut three objections pressed against political liberalisn, by its critics. of the most iniport3Elt The external conception, recall, faces the problem of explaining why [t aims at consensus amongst rea] citizens who might be mistaken or hold morally repugnant views. l suggested the defender of the external conception could retreat and claim that it is only the assent of real citizens who are also reasonable in certain specified ways that matter. But then the appeal to real citi2ens seems like nothing but a spare wheel-it is the conception of the reasonable person that is doing all the norrnative work, It is clear that this objection does not apply to the internal conception. The internal conception aims at the assent of reasonable citizens because it is reasonable citizens who would populate a we]L-orderedsociety according to a liberal conception of justice.Reasonable citizens are an explicitly Edealizedconstituency, and so this spare-wheel objection simply does not apply to Lhe internal view?

GlIþpOSC & COfLSlilUCDCy lhal

most obr·ious apixtrent countet·cxample lo this1hesis would be10 " TJic sarne ernhtnees version n!'Millian utili1arianism which yicitis liheral conclusions Ihan

k·nlues

wi1hout assuming

of kample, bul liberal cited I do noi ttare the space pmperly addoss utilitariattLSE, fLldher DOtillûlik•€ pl€llliB05, WL[hOLII [ will say thal 1do not belier·c a pure commitm0tLL lo f·Lir Sy¾iCTT1 OŸ NOÇ$2 ÇOORCrat|OT1, t.lüf¾ HOI1such as the iden ni' persons as free, or socieg as a Conlingently yield liberal polilical principles. There is a very ditfemnt sort of spare-wheel objec1ion ihai can be pressed agains1 the intemal coraception. This olijection is Ihe suliject of Chapter G. Ihe

"

in ihe lett.

10

ihis Lype

Libernüsm Without Perfection

154 For sirnilar

reasons,

the pubücauten·e dilemma faced by the external

conception

does not apply to the internal view. Tlte internal conception does not depend for its validity on rernaining congruent with theheliefs or values in our current public culture. hs validity is instead dependent on showing Lhat citizens who are raised in society could, in good faith, endorse the principles and institutions a well-ordered COELECTH thereis nocausefOf if it turns out that some current citizens do not endorse both aspects of ttle reasonable as specified by Rawls. TEe features of the reasonable person are the features of citizens in a well-ordered society, attd so any discrepancy between the beliefsofcurrent citizens and the two elements of reasonableness can beurtributed Lo the fact that our current society is less than ideal or well ordered. A suspEcion niay arise that this is all a bit too easy. We cannot construct our theory of pallitical liberal justice out taf thiEL RÑT. AS EØWÌ& TE2Ëiy Edin|ES, 'Ot]Ê everything, then, is constructed; we must llave some material, as it were, I'rom which to begin'> Rawls is explicit about where we find this material: the public cultLLrc of Ilberal democratic societies. It is here where we find thic idea of citizens cooperatÑOEL. $ÑDC€ ɾC5€ as free and equal, anel of society as a fair system of social ideas shape the account of the reasonable person, surely it is fair to ask, as we did Wh th@T when we pressed the public culture dilemma on the external cortceptlO these ideas are in fact irnpilcit in our current public culture? And so does the internal conception not face the same problem as the external conception, namely, that many citizens do not endorse tEe ideas Rawls claims to find in tEe public culture of liberal democracies, or at least, they do not endorse these ideas libeTals? as they are presented by Rawls and other political Whether or not this is a problem for the Internal conception depends on why political liberalismbegins with certain ideas impilcit in our public culture. Orte view is that we begiEL with the values in our public culture because political liberalism is an interpretive, rather than a justincatoryproject. Some commerltaRawls to be engaged in avery different kind of political tors have thus understood philosophy than the sort he undertook in writing A Theory of fustice." They see Rawls trying to work out a political theory only for us drawing on the basic cultural ideas found in our own political texts and traditions. Call this the interpretive explanation as to why we begin with ideas in the pub]ic culture. lf the interpretive explanation is right, then it would be a problem for political liberalism tf many citizens reject the ideas Rawls claims are implicit in our culture.

of that society.And

so, unlikethecxternalconception,

,

Rawls, Po/Hiral Liberrdinn, 104. Rawls has been inteipteted a]oug these lines by Raz and Roxy, among others. See Raz, 'Facing and Richan! Rarty, 'The Priority ol' Dernacracy in Diversity: T12eCa.se HE'Episternic Abstinence'· OOLT am? IYJËl'i Pliilosophy', in S.·laairistrr Trriter(Catubridge. Cambridge University Press, 1991), TheiT LIELUt'USlulldilly FCBCS 0]) $2Irvls's eittly initicles vil l.>tuitical liberalism, tvbich emphalaired l?5-96. the interpretive dimension in (LW3y (60f fdÍãsm.|-Of 3 ÀËÍfff¢Of not gfc5cnt ËB (LC (ÇXP ØŸ Ï ÍßÑ:GÏÏ. irLECT TC1ËYC BCEOUFLt, existing surial practices, see Aaron [arnes, one that sees Ruwls as imerpreting Y'onstructing Piiffesophy Rawls arid for Quo' & PiiMr Aþairs 33 ExistJng PrrieralNeutralily aiid Episiemology', '1mpartialily

63-1-7.

Tllis is the 501LIlion Eivouied by many al those who hate pressed the asymmelty objection. See Caticy. Clian, Clarke, of Sandel. Gerald Gaus has suggested this irnplic·LtËOll. See G|LLIs, J.iberal Neuiralay· A Coinpellirig. ·LFI( Radleal Prt[Leirele', in A·r,tcorronisentun? Neutriality, ]37-6:· ur füLLS. CAFfrCiurL, Ownership, and the Redistributive State, justificatory Lil>eralism's Classical Tilt', Social Phdosophy d·· IÞiiDEiild il C SOCËial d1ie institLIlicito social i!¾ ½t litnitt·t.L liv coilli.telinb L[15tË[LI[JØllä, seitret· maiotirces, to the (isetallat social am bUTl-CT1 I1tLifl:,111 Ilètl]TC. IntCfgrÇ[Cd S X[Ï1 EICSTlfit IH )|V as the laws of nat tire including n tll 5 WiLY.,†Ë3Ç reganlirLg pluralisrrL. BC2T metaphvsical clairn the truth uEvalue This C2D 60 any y NCCO by COniidefËttg flie falcagreemeniidisagreement is detìned purely in EH emFirical terrns.1his makes Folitical liberulism's enmmitment vi liberal neuirulily und liberal ]·iritL€Ëp ihai should il contingent in a way nel be. 6 FOf B V0tsiOrl Of (CSpOfLse see Steven A. Lecce, 'Contractualisan and Libem] NCLIlfill ly.' tËL˾ Folatirna Studies SI (1m3), 52-1-·11 freprintecl as chapter ti af hl.a Against Perfactiernsur). A IIcfenec', LbeuriBLs of reasunabieness who have urger.Iabandoning tbe burdensuEjudgemerat as a componerLt Other for differem reasons include Catriona McKinnon, Likerrlinnaurf theIJefenteofiblifica) Construclii·isna WenaT.'l and Leif Liberalism: An Intemal Critiqtic', -il-lL olitiC(LI

EBsagreementand Asymmetry

20l

Eairnesswhich the original position, or any other social contract device, is meant to model. Disagreettient is then oilly reasonable when viewed from a certain philosophical perspective, narnely, the FEE Fective of the social contract device. The fact that real people disagree abOLLt justicejust as much as they do about the good life is irrelevant, since this has no bearing on determining whether sucE disagreements are reasonable or not. From the perspective of the social contract device, it would be unreasonable to appeal to conceptions of the good and unreasonable to disagree about the content of justiceas fairness, and this is all that

inatters.

The flaw in this approach

should

clear.

Making

the distinction between disagreement in this way begs the crucial question. It assumes the conclusion that needs to be shown, namely, that it would be wrong to allow participants in the origina] position for some similar socia] contract device) to appeal to perfectionist reasons in constnieting the principles of justice. But the whtile Froblem is that we need to kumv why it would he wrong for participants in Lhe origina[ positioll lo appeal to perfectionist reasons, or rather, why political liberals believewe are justined in pmventing parties from m]ying on claims about the good life when deliberating alxaut justice.We need an independelir reasoil which justifies setting tip the theory in this way, It will not do, for exaraple, to simply ser up the original position in a way that Irakes appealing to conceptions of the good impossible or irrational, and then assert that this is why Rawls, of course, does not commit tEis perfectionisrn in politics is unreasonable. error. The blirdens of judgementare meant to provide the indeperld DT ffüßOn hê needs, and it is this independent justincationwhich is the target of the asymmetry objection." Tlie asymmetry objection can thris not be circtimvented by dispensliig with the burdens of judgenleilt,or rather, it is not possible to defend political liberalism by eschewing the burdens of jtulgementand Eailing to provide sorne alternative, independent accotmt of why liberalism should bracket perfectionist reasonable

be

and unreasonable

reasons?

Given the evident failtireofthe strategies for det'using theasymrnetry objection considered thus i'ar, perhaps political liberais ought to concede that most disagreements about jtistice are subject to precisely the same kind of reasonable

Lo explain the facL ut masonabic pluralism The burdens of judgemeni,we can sav. ure sujjicrcRt within and thus play the role requimd political libeimlism.WJiether rlie burdens are also ne(Liif OŸ tedáOI1AI)|€ LIfallstil coulti isertorili the or wherlier some other accotLDf ].1 sarlie role, is a q1iestiori addmss l briefly in Chapter 8. Lecce con1ends that we can do withoul tlie burdens of judgemem since the maml equality of (i.e. not reasonable plumlism. but simple plumlisin) and persotis, logccher with CELlail B (GTE Of dCEODEitil itËCH ihai the facL ut'couteitm is distinclively liberal urid untiperfagn lionisl. BUL it is unclear why Lhese two facts. along milit ihe assumplion cl¯moral egnality ettlail any Them is pluialism about justice and principles of jLislice uit Cecitik•ely ti>rmOf tLliperfeelionism. imposed, jtLKI (15 tËlgtci¾pÌ4LF(Llism abou1 the good life and views about she good life enn be coercively beLW [L |usl[L'O ûnd imiaosed. Thus, why does ruinral eqLLality enlail a forin of polilii's [[Lal dis[iilguiMËLes Ihe good': This is Ihe asymmetry objec1ion. and in my view Lecce lacks a plausible response to it. See Lecce, Agläns Ivaferdorrisni, chapters 6 and 7. =

L

Lpluralism¯

Liberalism Wiffrout Perfection

202

disagreement as disputes about the good life and so conclude, contra Rawls, that in tlie name of [iberal egalltarian justice are most state actions undertaken illegitirnare. Since rnest principles of justiceare subject to reasonable disagreement, all such principles are (alongwith all perfectionist judgements)lllegitimate grounds for state action. Perhaps only a very small number of liberal princ¯plesthose protecting the most basic rights and liberties of persons-can be declared beyond reasonable dispute. A legitimate state would then be a very minimal one whose only function is to protect and enforce tEose basic rights and liberties.3 Any more expansive state would be inconsistent with the liberal principle of legitimacy as stated by Rawls. I.et us cal] this reply to the asymmetry objection political libertarianism? There are a nuraber of reasons to reject political libertarianism, alid I will only briefly sketch a couple of those reasons here? Suppose, fo]Iowing Gerald Caus, we declare that only principles that are conclusively or victoriously justifiedcount disFute- Without going into all the details of Gaus's as being beyorid reasonable account of justification,a principle is conclusively or victoriously justilledwhen each relevant raember of the justificatory colistituency has decisive reasons to all availalale alternatives? prefer the principle to For example, we might suppose the following pririciple is conclusively justified: person has a right to Pitched at this level of alastruction, Ereedom of expression'. we may be able to egalitarian concepfind conclusively justijled principles that would yie]d tions of socia] justice.It seems masonable, for instance, to think the following principle is conclusively jtistified: one has a prinnafaciegreater claim to the resources or advalitages of social cooperation than anyone else'. An egalitari3tl might then argue that we carl justifya strongly redistributive basic strBCtlire from this conc]usively justifiedpriileiple. Of cotirse the strongly redistributive irnplicatilms of this principle are subject to reasonable disagreeraent (in Gaus's terrns they are inconclusively justined interpretations of a conclusively jristifiedprinciple). But if political libertarians were to appeal to this fact as a way of ruling our 'each

Lthicllic a iletal ncling to re.u<mablc° On the other hand, for sorne the sceptical objection forms part of an overall rejection of the political liberal project in favour ofsome form of perfection[sm? My alm in the is to show that the sceptical objection can be successfully rest of this chapter rebutted.

Before offering my reply to the sceptical objection, one firial clarification is called for. The sceptical objection rnust be distinguished Erom a related claim that

is sometinies made about the burdens of judgement.Some philosophers argue that it is unduly matrictive to suppose that reasonable people must accept tEe burdens of judgementas the correct explanation of reasonable pluralism, What rnatters is that reasonable people accept the fact of reasonable pluralistn-there is no need t'or political liberalism to insist on a single explanation of this fact. Political liberals should instead allow that there may be a plurality of reasonable explanations

regarding

the cause of reasonable disagmernent, and provided citizens accept one of tliese explanations, they can qualify as reasonable?2 This claim might be tEought to draw support from the sceptical objection, since if sound, the objection shows that accepting the burdens is inconsistent with other epistermc positions that are assumed to be reasonable. Rut everi if, as I argue, the sceptical objection fails, the claim that pe[itical liberalism should allow for a plurality of explanations of reasonable disagreement might remain an attractive

proposal.

Rawls, Ratirical Libemlism, [30. Bartv. liisihe as irrrptrrliaHey L68-BS. Long. Relativisri>and Ilie Foundadons of LITJLiËfil, lÄglÛË$0 äÏ|Ï Wenar, "PaliLical L.iheralisrr 4R. hJ ami Re..Jraint. McCabe, 'Knowing AbÙLit Lhe Good'; of Wall, Liberalisnr, Perfi·colonisrrr, hi r/IL fflee o Polirical Cuaa.ctrrretivrytaa Li-·Œ See for example Catriona McK.lnnon. Liberrdism rrrrd Wenar, in addition 16 pressing the sceptical objection, also makes this point. See Wener, "Prolitical Liberabsrn', 41-8. A percepiive critirple of McKinnun's view on reasonalvle disagreement arLË thC tredlausiiß•irrg burdens of jtingement is provjded by Mihaela Geoiyieva, Corrstriactingliasäte.•añeriert>JJg LiWaalNerrrrerHryt I'lin Dissertation, University of Marwhester, 200D, chapter 6.

"

"

"

.

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Liberalism Without Perfection

248

The preceding exarnple might give the misleading impression that a reas<mable belief is one that the believer is justifiedin holding given their epistemic situation. belief would thus he any belief that you are not justifiedin An unreas<mable holding.* This defmition, however, is unduly restrictive. l have used examples where someone is justified in holding a false belief in order to show how it is possible to see someone cIse's views as both reasonab]c and false,but this does not mean that all reasonable views have this structure. Rawls is careful to say that reasonable

cornprehensive

doctrines

are

denned

as any

doctrine held by a

reasonand usually

able person that is an exercise of theoretical and practical reason draws on an established tradition or body of thought? Given that we are interested in single beliefs at Lh'ts point, and riot entire doctrines, it seems safe to say that reasonable beliefscan be denned in an even more minimal fashion; any belief held by a reasonable person tEat is arrived at through an exercise of theoretical reason, which is to say that it is arrived at a more or less consistent and coherent fashion' As Rawls notes, this account of the rensanable deliberwithout ately loose. We avoid excluding doctrines [or beliefs] RS LLnreasonable strong grounds based on clear aspects of the masonable itself'.* Reasonable 'in

'is

L

doctrines open to rational

This means that we to define a be[ief as reasonable. You do not

appraisal, or evidentia]Iy supportable?

use only very weak epistemic

criteria

have to be subjectively justinedin holding a belief in order for that belief to be a 'a

So long as you have arrived at your view through more or less consistent and cohetont' exercise of reason, and your view is compatible with accepting the two elements of the trasonable person, your bel¯efis a reasonable thLls qualify one. Many beliefs may as reasonable, even if the believer is not justifiedin holding them. A belief in astro]ogy, for example, need not be ]abelled reasonable

one.

unreasonable

provided it remains

consistent

with

the rec uirements

of political

justice. Why this weal< standard

of reasonableness

rather

than a stronger one that defined reasonable beliefs as jtistifiedbeliefs?Rawls only hints at ari answer to this

question, He says that

La

tighter criterion

[ofreasonable

beliefs or doctrines] is

needed for the purposes of political liberalism'." ] believe Rawls reaches not this conclusion for the following reason. If we tried to make the definition of a reasonable belief any more stringent in epistemi< terms, it WOLLid 60COme lhe subject of disagreernentbetween reasonable persons. Reasonable people can and do disagreeabout the exact conclitions or circumstances under which peopl€ C3EL be said to be justifiedin believing a given proposition, and so we avoid any tighter .

.

.

does nai suribute Lhis definition la RJLWÑS, l.Dilq Utgilesihai adopt a intighly similar definition ofitasonable belief justified of inislake-line LiÑrtdÍSm, cohotent. 500 LOrl_G, AdrIrivism ûnri ihc FOrrrrdulidrry Ž23-7. N swls, ibthaall I.ikmli.sm, 59. " M

Althougtihe

hN

re ¯•

Rawls. 'Tlie Idea ot'INblic Reason Revisited¯. 592. Rawls. Ibidiorf Likrrali.;m, 60.

politics1IiheruliBTT1

bellef

EHLLMI

itt oader to be

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Liberalism Wiffrout Perfection

252

of the greatest inoment centuries to a inatter |religioustruth| with so Uttle success la the way of securing rational conviction ernong those nei inillally predisposed iii favour of lheir conclusioils...] do ilot wish to claiivi ihai dogmatists |thosecolivincul of the trtith of their own views] wiß be persuaded of the case t'orscepticism. But I de wish to assert that, whether or not tbc degrnatists are actually conviraced by the case for scepticisna they ought to be.62 Juany

.

.

[ think (b) does not stand up to crit[cal scrutiny. It seems to require that we cati never be certain enough in our beliefs to impose them en others when those ob;cctioil tire others reasonably disagree with LLS. But, as €ritiCS Of lË\€3Syll]ITJetry quicl< to point out, in contemporary liberal democratic societies we frequently disserttimpose our views about justice on others in the face of reasonable abortion, gun control, and tax policy are but a few examples. What can Barry legitimate examples aEpolitical impositiCEL in the face say alxmt these seemingly of reasonable dissent? The best response available to Barry (the best response available to Rawls is the one presented in Chapter 7) is to say that these examples of imposition are acceptable because all parties to the dispute accept a procedLLT2l mechanism for resolving such disputes: they accept that these disagreementscarl be resolved by a democratic vote. Since there is second-order agreemenL on the validity of the democratic procedure, the majority's imposition ol' a disputed political view is permissible. There are, flowever. two problems with this reply. Ftrat, why can reasonable disagreements about the good life not similarly be settled by a democatic

precedure? Barry needs a way of¯explaining why some reasonable disagreements

can be subject to majority rule while other reasonable disagreementscannot. The appeal to scepticism canruit perform this function since, according to 13arry's whenever thesis, we should be sceptical about our views reasonable d¯sagreement exists. This shows that attempts, like Barry's, to ground political liberalism in scepticism about our ability to know lite good are vulnerable to the asymmetry objection

a way that

Rawlsian

political libemitsm is not)_a-= Second, since liberal democratËc practice is replete with seemingly legitimate examples whert laws are imposed on a minority despite their Twasonable dissent, this casts ser¯ous

(in

doubt on the thesis that reas<mable disagreement should lead us to lack certainty about our views if by cermicry we mean whar Barry does,namely, certain enough to impose our views, on others."

Barry. jusúcc as hnyxrreiaHey,I 71 [si·l'L)fid CIT1|J˾iM15 BC L.|..A For versions of the asymmelty objection applied to Barry see. lor example, 5imon Cancy, and Libera] Neulm1ily¯.87 LD7·.or Simon Clarke, 'Contracmrianism. Liberal Neutralily, and Episierriology", 6M--7. N‡ As Susan Mendus has persuasively slican, there is a lurl]1erpieblem wilh Baray's scoplicism, namely, thal being sceptical (evettmodemlely) regairling our comprehensive beliefs changes the veiy n-gardlT1g OHC'S d(1džr|T1Ç,1Lfid RCCP1|CJLL character of our doctrinesand OLLr (Lisagrecineriis.Orie carLOO1 Ë¾Ç problflÏL DATTV's iL. MJIuliOil also La LFie ol¯ pluv·alistil 9.ar fi.illy LFF WË10lllOiiE'LL"LLL.y coinillitiecl to yet 1|lus eticc1ively disitgTrement requires removing the kind ot'pluralism ic which political liberalism is meant to be a response. See Mendus, brapartirifiryari Merraltrerri JWiticalPiidosepary,IS--25. .

"

']mpaniality

Truth and Scepticism of the sceptica[

objection

253

might,

oE course, deny that moderate scepticism should have the meaning attributed to it by Barry. Perhaps someone A proponent

sceptical of her own beliefs while still justinablybeing conndent can he moderstely cricugh abouL their truth to impose them on others who reasonably disagree. On this alternare view, theexistence of reasonable clisagreement ought to

cause us

to doubt

or

be

sceptical

about

beliefs to

our

some

mild

or traderate

degree,

but it need not cause so much doubt that it would be irrational or sub-rational to irnpose our views on others. Linking reastmable disagreement to scepticista in this way avoids the difficulties of Barry's view. BLLI ÑS iÌ\i$ 2 pl2LLSËbÍC alternative? that the mere existence of Do we have good reason to suppose cach under reasonable disagreement means that we are a normative requirement to be mildly sceptical about our own bel¯efs! This claim seems too strong to be plausible. There are, of course, circumstances where rnany reasonable peop]e disagree with us, and as a result we become uncertain that our views really are true or correct. There is nothing irrational in responding to reasonable disagreement this way. But this does not suffice to show that we must, as a matter of rational necessity, respond to all reasonable disagreement in this way. Sometimes (think of the disputes among.st philosophers) we

are sound even when confronted with the reasonable objections of others. Do we want to go so far as to sav that this certainty is irrational or sub-rational whenever reasonable disagreement exists? The answer, it seems clear to me, is no, tEough I concede there does not appear any chvious way of showing this to be correct. Still, the burden of proof must lie with the proponents of the sceptical objection since it is they who claira that the burdens of judgement and the ensuing reasonable disagreement should always cause people to doubt or be uncertain about their own beliefs. The political liberal remain certain our own

views

position is rnuch less demanding and far more plausible. Political liberals only assert that scepticism, even of the mild or moderate kind, is not rationally required

whenever

we are

faced with

rea.wmable

disagmement.

8.6.3 At kast reasonable it should

clear that the

of the three candidates

proposed at the outset of this section, {3), is also not entailed by accepting the burdens of judgement.Accepting the burdens of judgementdoes not mean that we canuar know whose views are true because no views are true, or because reason is unable to achieve the task. It is fnily conipatible with objectivisni about reason's capacity to know the good or with sincere religious belief. Political liberalism only asks citizens to accept the followingbelief:

by now be

4. Even if you are certain

final

your own views are true, you must circumstances make il at least reasonable to affirm opposing

recognize

that

views.

This belief unlike beliefs (l)-(3L is the only one that is entailed by accepting the burdensof judgenientas presented by Rawls in Pohticuluberalian. This belief

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Truth and Scepticism

255

knowledge in politics. This is what it rneans to be reasonable, to believe that our political principles nulst be constructed in terms of what can be reasonreasonable ably justifiedto others. As Rawls says, is public in a way the rational reasonable that we enter as equals is DOL. This means that il is by the on this

'the

the public world of others and stand ready to propose, or to accept, as the case with thern? 11 is a concern with this public may be, fair terrns of cooperation world-not scepticistn regarding personal beliefs nor metaphysical claims about motivares truth-that the reasonable citizen to accept the political liberal ideal of epistemic restraint in politics.

Ah

Ibid.. 54.

9 The Scope and Structure of Public Reason Perhaps no other aspect of political liberalism has been as influential, and received as

much cr[tical attention, as the idea of public reason. In one sense this is perfectly Elatural-political liberalismis premised on the claim that the exercise of political ought to be publidy justitlable to the citizens over whom that power is power exemised. Public reason is in this sense at the very core of t19epolitical liberalproject. It is iraportant, however, to distinguishbetween this general thesis regarding the public justificationof political power, and Rawls's more limÏted idea of puWic reason? Whi]e the former animates the entire theory of politica] Iiberalism,the latter refers to a particular part of Rawlsian political liberalism. The idea of public reason provides a set of guide]iaes and requirements for persons wllen they act in their capacity as citizens and public officials. It is thus a normative idea that applies to the practice of politics within liberal democratic societies. The idea of public reason entails a particular version of democratic deliberation, wherL one where citizens and public ofncials only support political decislens they sincerely believethose decisions can be justifiedby appeal to considerations that each person can reasonably endorse in their capacity as a free and equal citizen, that is, tlaat t19eyonly support lawsthat can be justifiedby appeal to public reasons. Citi20ns cannot supporl decisions if they believe the decisionacan only be

justifiedby appeal to comprehensive doctrines or other beliefs about the nature of the

which

reas<mable

citizens

are assumed

to disagree. Citizens may, of course, endorse laws that are justified by their comprehensive beliefs; indeed this may permissibly be a citizen's main motivation for endorsing the law, provided he sincerely believes the law in question is also justified by pub[ic considerations.2 The idea of public reason further requires that, in the political arena, citizens and public officials only offer each other arguments based in public reasons, and that they genera]Iy refrain from appealing to their comprehensive doctrines or other beliefs about the whole truth as they understand it. This latter requirement, as I have mentioned in previous chapters, is l<nown as the moral duty ofcivfity (it is,only a moral duty since it is not to be lega]Iy enforced) I

good life over

See Rawls,

Politiccil f.aberedsna,

lecttire Vl, and Itawls,

Ihe Idea

of Priblic Reason Itevisited'.

in

Collert.si 573-615. See Rawa. NIllimi Liberahstrr,14 L-2. See Afiricru überrrHsrri,217, or 'The ]dea of Pliblic lleason llevisited', 576-7. Tliis dancyis subject to Itawls's well-known proviso permitting the appeal to compreli<nsive reasons provided siipporting public Trasons uit ufTered in due course. Ser Poßtical Lik·mlism, li-liit; at The ldea cE Public Reason', 59 L i Krpers,

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258

Liberalism Without Perfection

forms of civic respect? Finally, the idea of pub]ic reason might be defended by appealing to its epistemic benefits. Reciairing citizens to offer public justifications to one another for their favoured laws or policies may be the best way of maximizing the information brought inlo

justifiedlaws, we

may thus realize certain

valuable

the public domain, ensuring that each new piece of information and each new argurnent is subject to extensive scrutiny, and thereby weeding out il]-informed and poorly reasoned policy proposals, leaving us with only the most epistemically robust

political solutions.7 I do not, in this chapter, offer any Un>addefence of the idea of public reason. Instead, this chapter defends two positions, one ægarding the scope of public reason, and the other regarding the structure of public reason. The scopeof public reason refers to the set of political issues to which the idea is meant to apply. Rawls claims that the idea of public reason applies only to what he calls the constitutional essentials and matters of basiejustice,but that the idea need not apply to democraticdecisions that take place within the constitutional framework. I argue, contra Rawls, that the idea of pub[ie n'ason ought to have a much broader scope-that it should regulate all the political decisions in a liberal democratic society. The smecture of public reason refers to the way in which we can successfully justifya political decisionto each and every niember of the relevant constituency. One view, advocated by Caus, is that a political decision can be Fublicly justifiedwhenever each and every member of the relevant constituency is just[fledin endorsing the decision, even if eacE person believes the decision is justifiedfor diEferent,and evea Encompatible, wasons. This appmach thus permits citizens to converge on a appeal to political decision for diñerent non-public reasons without any shared or common reasons (thoughof course shared reasons are also permitted on Gaus's view). Apinst Gaus, I argue that the structure of public reason requires shared or all public reasons: considerations persons can endorse in their capacity as reasonable citizens. Orl the dimensiorisof scope and structure, I thus take issue with the views of the two leading theonsts of public mason. 1 argue for a broader scope than that favoured by Rawls, and a more demanding structure of shared reasons than that favoured by Gaus. The scope and structure of public reason am, however, by no means the only dim€Elsions of debate. There are also important clebates reprding the constituency, site,and content of public reascit. The constitueur.yrefers to the set of individuals to whom political decisions must be justified.As we know fi·om previous chapters, Rawlsian political liberalism favours a const¯ruency of masonable cit¯zens--those

''

Charles Larmoit makes a irlated, 1|lougli [ Ihink somewhat diffCfûtlL argument for public irason, grounding it in ihe brouder ideu of respect for penams. See 1.arrnare, 'Public Reason', in The Animromy of Morahty (Carnbridgt·. Cuanbridge University Prm 2000), L%--220. I Tllis line ofaitumen1 is inoit often niade in support ol¯publle dehberation genem1|y, int11er111an which morne scholars have aTgued will have epistemic costs Rawls's idea of putilic ressun specincally, L¯JL|]MIOL UCOd since il litnils LËLO 121 ffá¾OtiS Î Cilti InlO ÛlóÇMJIillL'lli dO[[L L[L. TËLO[DO.NE(FOf[LËfif]lÌûUVOCill ot' ihe episiemic benefits of public deliberation is David Es1|1md. See his DL'JJJÛëYOlfi ÄlŠfÙfil espectally chapters 6, 9, (LOd Û,

,

The Scope and Structure of PuWicReason citizens

who endorse

the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation,

259 and

who accept the burdens of judgementand consequent fact of reasonable pluralism. identifies the domain of the public political forum where Lhe norms of public reason apply, as distinct from the non-poliLital arena, or

The site of public reason

of public reason need not apply. According to Rawls, the site of public reason has three parts: the discourse and reasoning of iudges the discourse of government oñicials and finally the discourse ofpolitical candidates and their representativesflo this Iwould also add (and this is consistent with what Rawls says elsewhere) the discourse of citizens when deliberating and voting on political issues within the scope of public mason. The content of Hawlsian Fublic reason has two parts? First, there are the substantive principles provided by the political conception of justice,or the family of liberal conceptions, all of which agree on the three general liberal principles discussed in Chapter 6.30 These principles are meant to provide citizens and pub]lc officia]s with reasons they that wt]I can appeal to when deliberating and voting on political matters-reasons be acceptable to others in their capacity as free and equal citizens. Second, there are the commonly accepted methods of inquiry and rules of reasoning that are reasonably acceptabic, and which any public justi6tation must adhere to. Though the argurnents in this chapter am maillly limited to the issiles of scope and structure, what I have to say about the scope of public reason also has a bearing on its content. By endorsing the broader view of pubilc reason's scope, i claim that Rawlsian political liberalisrn can embrace a broader and more flexibleview of public IE25OEL 5 content. I do not, in this chapter, have much to say about the constituency of public reason since this has been discussedin previous chapters, and will be the subject of

backgmund culture society,

where

the norms

further discussion in Chapter 10.

The literatureon public reason is now vast, and critiques of Rawls'sidea of piiblic far t00 ELUmffDUS ÊO € 2Ë€gURÍ€Ìÿ Bddf€SS€Õin ÍÊÑ5C EgÍ€E. The followirigis only a partial list ol' the marly objections that the idea of public reason (and the associated view of a deliberative democracy)has provoked· reastm are numerous,

•

The idea of L.Lnable

pt.Lblic

reason

societies.L

L

is either indeterminate, or inconclusive, and thus to successt'ully address many of the pressing political issues in liberal

democratic

Rawls, 'The Idea ol'Putilic Reason Revisited', 575. See Maiad f.iberahsrn, 220 or 'Tbc Jaca of Public Reason Revisited', 58 L-3. 16 For Lliecanien1ofthe principles see Rawls 'The [dca of Public Reason Revisited', 581 2. I would also add. as [ cniphasized in Chapter 6. thal ihe conieni of public reasort must also include lhe more fbundational ides of socicly n.¾B SLir Sysleril of sticial couperstian l30tWet."f1 (TEC JLfiti 1. US UÑt7005, HillCC Ihis founda1ional idea will be necessag in otv3erfor citizens10 gLibBelyreasort aboul lhe inIerpolallon, weighi, and ranking of ttle genem1 Libemlpdneiples. Il See for exarnple P¢ter IJe Marriel'fe, 'Rawls's Idem of Putilic Re|L¾OFL Üt1týc VJrHrytapl2d.af Y94), and 232-50, leh rL I lorton, 'Rarr ls, Public Reasons t he Lirnits of Liberal [usti6caQuarterly75 ( L tion', Cordernporrrty I¾iideal TJtetiry3 (2003), 5-23, or David Reidy, 'Rawls's Wide View of Pul>lic Wide Enough', 6 (2000), 49-72. Iteason: Not B

9

.4.

Hidden Hidden page page

The Scope and Structure of PuNic Reason public reason's

26 l

Section 9.3 presents the distinction between the narrow and broad views as to scope. Sections 9A--9.6 examine the three main arguments that scope.

have been advanced in favour of the narrow view. I clairn that none of these arguments offer sound SuppotL for the narrow view, whereas there are clear reasons in support of the broad vtew. Section 9.7 concludes by responding to a couple of the general worries about public rrasan listed above.

9.1

CONSENSUS

AND

CONVERGENCE

in this section and tEe following one I consider what the structure of public reason or pubitc justincationougEt to be. In these sections 1 use the terms public

reason and public justincationinterchangeably since the debate abOLLI Structürf applies in roughly the same way to public justincation as it does to Rawls's rnare specific idea of public reason. I want to defend the following Rawlsian position regarding the structum of public reason. Reasonable persons, as we know, are characterized by their accepbetweerL (T@@SEd tance of society as a fair systern of social cooperation ofthe burdens oEjudgernent and the consequent citizens, and by their acceptance fact of reasonable pluralism. Th€ COELStifDCDCy OÎ E€250036 € p€ríORS is thDS ROf composed of particular pfESOELñ WÑ[L ÖÑ5ÍËRCÌE Ë€f6.Ìt in, Tüʾ€T, un iden i7.€Ë

constituency defined by its acceptance of certain beliefs about political society. This has a very important implication for the structum of public reason. If the aim is to justify political principles peopic, and or decisions to reasonable reasonable people are an idealized constituency defined by a few core features, then if we have justined somethiELg to one reasonable person, we have justined it to all reasonable people. Reasonable people, like the parties in the origirlâË position, are identtcal in all relevant mspects. R€BEDElable people, of course, are assumed to disagree about conceptions of the good life or comprehensive doctrines, arid so they do d¯fferfrom one another in that respect, Rut that difference is considered irrelevant to the project of public reason or justification.To show that sonie political proposal, X, is publicly justified,we appeal to what reasonable appeal to their shared view of society as a fair people have in common-we system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens, and any further beliefsentailed by that ideal. You are ELO( ng3ggd in (L F3CÎiCE OËÿUhlÑC T€2500 unless you offer a reason or argument that wi]I t>eacceptable to everyorle in their capacity as free and equal citizens. Public reasons, on this Rawlsian approach, are thus símred reasons. There are, however, two ways in which this view of pubilc reasons as shared reasons miglit 80C[Ï\ LLHDCCCSsarily demanding. First, consider the worry that the Rawlsian ideal of public reason is too demandËElg ÌD th€ Gense that it assumes actual cit'izens (whoart reasonable) must all endorse a given political decision for the verysame rensons. Iames Bohmarl, for instance.claims that Rawls's account of public reason that there is one public standpoint in political lifeand not 'assumes

Liberalism Without Perfection

262

difÏerent ones'? Similarly, Dryzek argues that 'Rawls downplays the social or interactive aspect of deliberation, meaning that public reason can be undermany

Rawls implies that all individuals will reason in the taken by a solitary thinker reach the same conclusions. Rawlslan public same way, and must ultimately reason is singular'.3° According to Rohman, Rawlslan public reason is singular represents in the sense that itself as a single norm of public deliberation; in light of this nortn, agents come to agree upon some decision for the same publicly .

.

.

'il

accessible

reasons'.

This,

Bohman

argues,

is

an unduly

restrictive

account

of

public reason, one which expected where

La

wrongly stifles the reasonable pluralism that is to be in society. We should instead embrace the idea of plural public reason, single norm of reasonableness is not presupposed in deliberation; thus, with another for diferent publicly accessible to agreenient

agents can come

one

reasons'20 BohrElan

is surely right to suggest that the structure of public reasorl EU5f permit the possibility that different citizens can corne to accept a given decision for difTerent reasons, provided those reasons are indeed suitably public. There obviously problernatic, for example, in a case where one citizen seems nothing supports a law prohibiting prayer in public schools on the grounds that allowing it would be a violation of an individual's freedom of religious expression, while

another citizen reaches the same conclusion by claiming such a law will effectively violate the state's commitment to establish fair equality of opportunity for a]I citizens, religious and non-religious allke. There are, after all, almost always a

number of sound public arguments in support of any given liberal right or other liberal political decision, and it would be both unnecessary and undesirable to posit an account of public reason which reqLL[red all reasonable citizens to converge on the same argument in order for a given political decision to be publicly

justified.

While Bohman is right to make this point, it is no objection to the Rawlslarl position. Rawls, as we have seen in earlier chapters, readily concedes that public

reason can be p]tiraLRawls does not assume citizens must all embrace a political decision for the very same reasons, nor need they even agree on the same decision. [nstead he says: public reason does not ask us to accept the very same principles cí justice,but rather to conduct our fundamental discussions in terms of what we regard as a political conception. We should sincerely think that our view of the matter is based on political values everyone A vote can be held on a fundamental political can reasoriably be expected to endorse questica as on any other; and if the question is debated by appeal to paWtical values, and citizens vele lheir airicere opinion, the ideal |of pub]ic reason| is suulained 3 ...

is

James Bohman. PuMir LMik·ralian- Pirrralisrrr. Conrplexity crrrd ihrrromay (Camlaridge. M[T Prem,, L997L 80. I* John l)ryzek, 13ehbemriis I Jeniorracyand Begrnd· t.abemi.9, Critics, Crantestar3ens(Oxforasicstruc1ure of L¯ora on oil an a ppeal so piiblicity see And gw WiKlams, i1998), 'Inceratives. Encquality, and Publicily', Pli/Insaphyd-PtrhHe Ajjairs17 225-0. Cohen's reply to Williatustan L>e(cnindin Rescuing Jrrnicelic Reason Revisited', 60¯/. Barry, ||1 IfLT di ÏRffšfflISil}', 6-Ñ .

Hidden Hidden page page

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Liberalism Without Perfection

286 Let us consider

why

incarnpleteness might seem to be an important problem for public reason. Pubile reason might be incomplete in one of two ways, it might he iridererminateor inconcÏnsive with mgard to a given political cluestion.82 Public reason is indeterminate when it has nothing to say about a particular political question, in other words, when its «¯ontent cannot provide us with any reasons to favour a particular proposal lt is inconclusive when there are multiple and conflicting solutions that appear sufficiently reasonabic from the perspective of public reason. Let us take the case of indeterminacy fÏrst, as iL looks to be the most problemaric for public reason. To begin, nothing about the broad vtew of public reason Lhat i have defended here denies the possibility of indeterminary. Recall the broad view states that tEe of public mason ought to be applied, whenever possible,to exercise political power over one another. all politica[ decisions where citlZ€Els This clearly leavesroom for the possibility that some political decisions may not he amenable to public justification.Rawls may be right to suggest that sarne legislation regulating tax codes, property laws, erivironmental protection, or aELd the arts cannot be resolved by appeal to public reasons. funding for ruuseums The broad view simply denies the much stronger assertion that such issues, which are not constitutional essentials or rnatters of basicJustice, are necessarily beyond the scope of public reason. The football stadiurn/art gallery example, as well as the snail darter example both show the broad view is consistent with a very plausible account of what public reasons are. The narrow view requires us to either deriv that certain reasons are public ones even though they meet any commonserlSiCâÏ understanding of the concept, os to ignore the priority of public reasons when they are made in support of non-essential pol[tical issues. Second, I do not believethe charge of incoac]usiveness is a fatal one for public ¯dea

Critics of public reason sornetimes decry its apparent inability to solve the probleras of political life: abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and the like. TEey argue that since public reason is (apparently)Enconclusive on such questions, public reason should be abandoned in l'avour of some alternative reason.

'big'

abour justicewhich, presumably, goes beyond public reason and relies on people's comprehensive doctrines. As I have already argued in Chapter 7, even if public reason is inconclusive on many issues, this does nor imply that public reason should be abandoned in favour of appeals to religious or otherwise non-public reasoning. Although it may not provide conclusive answers to every political question, the idea of public reason is sti]I the right one for regulating our political deliberations. II' the choice is betweerl a mode] ol' public systern of

moral

rea50tling

Eg] 91 the wovrics over imleterrninacy und irummelusiveFor arL CXCC Uni, and ÎHF mDre AutBi]CO, nets see Micatt Schwart21nan, 'The Complelenen GI Publie Reason'. Foranoiher excelleni mply see Andrew Williams.'The Alleged [ncompleleness of Public Reasott'. For expossions orthe woriy soo de MaTmeffe, "Rawls's Edca of Ilubhe Reason'. Norton, 'Rawls, I=ublic Reason, arLd the J.imitmot't.ibem1 ROËLly. .iListiñealiLM6 OF 'Ruwls's Wide View oEPublic Reason: Nel Wide Enouuh'. Ag:lin, t'or more on ihe dis1inc1ion between indcicTmmacy and inconclusiveness see GOLLS, JustifjonaryLS:relisa, LSI-8.

e

"

The Scope and Structure of Pubüc Reason

28¯¡

is sometimes inconclusive, but grounds its decisions in reas<ms that are reasonably acceptable to these who are bound by them, and a model of reas<ming that is conclusive in a]I cases, but is based perfectionist or non-public LLRÅOf612nd, WC on premises and reasons that many people do not accept or even need ought to choose the former. Pubbe reason not be as conclusive as a comprehensive doctrine in order to be preferabic to it as a model oí political reason

that

discourse.*lf

this is true, then there is little reasoti to worry about expandirig the scope of public reason to the messy arena of everyday democracy.

9.7

CONCLUSlON

The airn in the last three sections

has been to

show

that the main

ar3uments

(O advanced in defence of the narrow conception are insufflCient justiÍyTCStrËCling the scope of public reason to constitutional essentials and matters of bastejustice. but readily concede that even iíl am I hope this has been conclusively demonsLrated, right, this will be at best un¯nreresting to those who are more generally sceptical regarding the value of Rawls's idea of public wason. To such sceptics, the broad view of public reasorl's scope will appear to be an undesirable and even dangerous alteration of the norms of democratic discourse. ]t may be a broad view of public reason's scope, the critics might say, but surely it is an uncornfortably narrow view of democratic debare. To mstrict even mom po]itical discussions to the moral

requirements

of public reamm might

inappropriately c.aclusionary. Religious (and other comprehens¯ve) argunients are already excluded from influencing conseern

stitutional

essentials and matters of basic justicein the Rawlsion account, and now the broad view would also exclude them &om non-essential democratic decisions. Theobjection is thus that public mason is demand ngfor citizens when applied

mo

to everyday democratic debate.Although this is by no means the only objection that has been pressed against public mason generally (recall the list in the chapter's introduction), it is an obvious reason why someone ruight be especially troubled by the broad view of public mason's scope, In œsponse to this objection we cannot deny the fact that a commitment to the perspectiveof individual citizens, and it will public reason is demand[ng pmve especially demanding fom tEe perspective of citizens whose comprehensive beliefs frequently conflict with the demands of pubile reason. The relevant question, however,is whether extending public reason into everyday democratic

nom

debate is unduly or unreasonably demanding for citizens? There are good reasons to think it is not. To return to a point made earlier, accepting the broad view of public reason's scope hears no relation to the distlaction Rawls draws between the Enc]nsive, exclusive, and wide conceptions of public reason regarding when and under what conditions we may introduce non-public a guments into the political llis polni is stressed by Willmms in

'lle

Alleged Incompletencas¯.

Libernüsm Without Perfection

288

Êht Wide approach, this means citizens are Eorum? If we, EollowlELg ROW 5, 3CC€gÍ permitted to present their comprehensive reasons er values in political debate whenever they like, that in due coume proper political reasons...are whaLever the comprthensive doctrines introduced are said presented to support 'provided

The presentation

to support'>

of comprehensive doctrines in public debate might, for exampic, be used to build civic trust between citizens-demonstrating how a particular comprehensive doctrine supports a public conception of justice helps reassure those who doubted the sincerity of its adherents' comtnitment to pLlblic ff360D'$ view LLs Accepting $COpf 1 of public reason? the broad does not entall the overly demanding principle that all religious or otEenvise comprehensive reasons are impermissible in democratic discussions over non-essential questions, only tEar such reasoning would have to be supplemented by tEe as well Citizens do not have to ho[d back frorn presenting their comprehensive views in dernocratic debate: they only have to show how those views are consistent with the pubilc conception of justicefor Ermily of conceptions) on which the political society is based. that the broad view is At this point the scepttc of public reason niight

presentation

of public

reasons

reo

say

asks demanding in a different way. It is not that the broad view unreasonably their comprehensive beliefs in democratic citimns to refrain from articulatirLg debate, but rather that they should not have to articulate public reasons in democratic debate at alL Democratic politics, one rnight argue, is supposed to be about the expression and advocacy of interests, and not an arena of public

justification, This cinim, however, requims

Why shovId we think that further argument. democratic decisions should be immune from the moral requirements of public reason? Three of the potential arguments available to the sceptic have already been rejected earlier in Sections 9.4-9.6, so what other reasons can there be that would justify excludirig the idea of public reason tiom democratic debate? Defenders of public reason will insist that respect for citizens requires that they not be subject to the exercise of political power on grounds that they cantlOf reasonably accept. They will point our that it would be incons¯srerit with the of soclety as a fair system of social cooperation if we were to base our political decisions on one or more comprehensive doctrines when there is reasonable disagreement over such doctrines. This is especially or obviously true whett there is a significant pool of political considerations available to guide our decision-EELaking that are suitably public in nature. If such public reasons do exist, reasonable citizens should want to conduct their political discourse by appeal to those considerations that thev know are acceptable to their fellowcitizens. It is therefom not clear that someone who rejects the bmad conception of public reason's scope can cohererltly do so without also rejectirLg the assumptions and ¯dea

247-54; or'T11e [dea of "6Rawls, Poffrical Lihmdism, ot'I3ublic Revisiled

PubEc Reason Revisited', 591-4. Rawls.'The [dca Reason 59| Rawls. ibliriall Ubemüsm, 148-9; 'The Idea of 13ublicReason Revisited'. 592-4. .

The Scope and Structure of PuWicReason

289

the more basic comtnitments of political liberalism.es princip[es that underpin Once the general aim of public justificationhas been embraced, I believe there are œsist of public reason caust the view that the requiœments no good grounds to regulate all our political decisions, and not mertly those that can be defined as constitutional essentials or matters of basicjustice. What i hope to have shown in the latter half oí this chapter is that there is a conception of Rawlsian public reason that is broader in scope, but also in terms of often presupposed by political liberalism's than the conception content, poponents and critics. The broad view, by denying that public reason can be restricted essentials and niatters of basic justice,necessarily broadens our to constitutional understanding of what public reasons are. In claiming Lhat public reason can be applied to non-essential political questions, I arn also committed to thedairn that would have us public reason is not as predetermined as the narrow conception believe.We should be open to the idea that the detailed content of public reason can only be worked out as part of the process of public mas<ming.This conclusion should be of interesL to all those who be[ieve in the idea of public reason, but are wary that extending its scope into our dernocratic deliberations might be unduly

constrainËng.

*

Ameson holds a siinllar view.but he draws Ihe opposite conclusion troin it. That is, since he (as [ do) vejeels the idea ihai e doctrine of Iltwrel nelitt|Llity could coherenily apply ordy 10 consiitulional essentials and inullen el basie justice. Le takes this as lunher evidence ihai Ihe uill) LJteutrality or inisguided. public juslilleation is See Arneson. 'Liberal Neutrality on Ihe Good'. 209 I l.

10 Unreasonable Citizens have developed and defended what I call the internal conception of political liberalism. On this view, political liberallsm does not aspire to justifyliberalismto everyone, but rather pmsents us with an account of political for citizens in a well-ordered liberal society. justincationthat is appropriate Thoughout the latter halfof the book, [ have stressed that political liberalismwill The preceding chapten

only be coherent and cornpellingonce we accept that its justificatoryconstituencyis restricted in thÏs way. It is thus a theory of political justificationaddæssed only to citizens who are reasonable: citizens who are willing to propose and abide by inir terms of social cooperation, prov[ded others are Ilkewise wllling, and who accept the burdens of judgementand the consequent fact of reasonable pluralisrn. [n this Einalchapter I address two important questions regarding a grOLLp ofciti2ens who am excluded from this constituency: unreasonable citizens. First, am unreasonable citizens entitled to the same liberal rights and benefits as other, trasonable citizens? Second, even if they are, are there special circumstances where the state would be justifiedin int'ringing the rights of unreasonable citizens, although it would be impertnissibic to do so to reasonable citizens? la the state, for example, justifiedin taking steps to unreasonable doctrines, as suggested by Rawls?•The aira of this chapter Ëslo address lhese questions, and thereby explain the status that unreasonable minorities have within a Ilberal democratic society. the first of the questions posed above: do unrtas<mable I begin by answering c[tizens have the same liberal rights and entitlements as other c[tizens? Although plausibility in thinking that they do not, since there is a certain superficial unreasonable citizens are rightfully excluded from the constituency of pub[ic justification,in Section 10.1 I argue that this does not entail their exclusion from the bencÏlls of citizenship. The argument l provide le support lhis conclu'contain'

sion, however, differs signifkantly from another recent account, and so Section

Of this difference. Next, l address the questiOEL whether the state is everentit]cd to infringe the rights ofits unreasonablecitizens, even if they are generally to be accorded the same rights as everyone else. Them citizens differently than are two plausible arguments for treating unreasonable their reasonable counterparts. The Brst argument is the one suggested by Raw]sLhat since unreasonabic doctrines threaten the normative stability of liberal democratic regimes they need to be contained like wars and disease. If containing

10.2 is devoted to explaining

i

Rawls, Jüünd

Ubeinusrn., M

ii,

l9.

Hidden Hidden page page

Liberalism Without Perfection

292

10.1

DO THE BENEFlTS OF CIT[ZENSHLP TO UNREASONABLE PEOPLE?

EXTEND

Because a political liberal society aims at the public _iustÏtication of political necessarily claims suitably that are not ignores public. or arguments power, it It will thus ignore appeals to religious truth or claims to racial, gender, or ethnic superiority in political argument. These are paradigmatic examFles of unreasonableness. The people who advarice these kinds of claims are thereÏore being excluded from tEe constituency of pubitc reason; the more unreasonable views will lxx If they they have, the more total their exclusion Erom this constituency reject all the premises on which public justiñcation is built, then they are by will impilcation comFletely excluded from it-none of its reasons or arguments appeal to them. Given this outcorne, it might seern plausible to conclude that such unreasonable persons are not really citizens at all, or at least not entitled to the betrefits of citizenship. After all, how can you be entitled to the benefitsof an agreement or social contract to which you were not a party, and whose basic premises you vehemently mject? The idea that to be granted the full rights of citizenship, ymi of public justification rnust he included in the constituency has some initial plausibility.Indeed, this line of argument regarding the status of unreasonable citizens has even been mistakenly attributed to Rawls. Marilyn Friedman, for example, has pool' drawn the conclusion that, for Rawls, to be excluded from the eritails a similar exclusion frorn the benefits of citizenship. Based on (a) their exclusion from the process oEpublic justificationand (6) Rawls's footnote regarding the need to "contain' unreasonable doctrines, Friedman concludes that in Rawls's citizens theory, unreasonable in be treated like the hearm of a pestilence. daily life, they will be denied the full protection of the system's basic rights and libert¯es, particularly freedom of expressiorO We can [gnore the fact that Friedraan's interpretation of Rawlsis incorrect (Rawls clearly states that hereis not one account of rolerationfor reasonable doctrines and another for umtasonable ones. Both cases are settled by the appropriate polkical principles of justiceand the conduct those princip]es permit'),4 and focusinstead on whythislineofreasoning is flawed.The fundamentalerror contained in tEepositica Friedman attributes to Rawls is the idea that the mora] force of public reason only extends to those who endorse its preraises, This, however, is not the case, Consider Rawls's theory of Justice as fairness. The principles of_iustice derived in the original position gain their moral force from the way the original position is constructed, in other words, if the original position is a genuinely fair and impartial moral perspective, then the principles of justicederived within it am going to hold for ']cgitimation

'will

.

.

Lt

'Johri Rewls and Ihe Political Ccercion ot'Unte|L¾QFI'Lbic FÇOlsIc',2,3. R4"ASO[L Rawls, lilea of PLLSLC Revisited'. 614. Also see Rawa. The Law of Peoples Lti rL. 6, where lie explicitly rejects the type M argLIIB [1| GTlf [Ll€C lli by Friedtriali. Also see LLiwls's f¾itf, remíLEË(5 lŠ¾, m È IJffdry Q M1Lrilvn

*

Friedman,

TELe

Unreasonable Cifi2ens

293

happen to endorse the pumises. One of the explicit aims of the original position is to model the freedom and equality of and not

everyone,

just those

If we conclude,

citizens.

citizens

who

with Rowls, that this fmedom and equality

entitles

citizens

rights

and freedoms, then we must believe that all citizens are entEtled to these dghts. It is fairly straigEtforward: if I accept (aj that all citizens are fxe and equal, (M that the original position models this prernise correctly, and (c) that ttle principles of justicederived from the original position are correct, then i must accept (d) that those principles apply to all citizens. Them is no mason to accept points (n)--(c)and yet deny the validity of(d). The incre fact that someonc denies the truth of (a) is not a reason not to tmat them as a citir.en, and thus not a sufIlcierti reasort to deny their basic rights or other liberties. There may be additional reasons why we would be justifiedin doing so (as I argue in later sectionsL but absent these reasons, the principles of justiceapply to them just like everyone else. Some people may make the error Friedman does because they misunderstand the nature of public justificationor social contract reasoning. It is irnportant to remember Illat the original position is not really a social contract, nor is it att actual agreernent between parties. The aim of the original position to uncover conception of a public basis for a political justice In describing the parties we are not desaibing persons as we fhid them. Rather, the parties are described according of free and equal to how we want to model rational representatives citizens. lt is crucial to always keep in mind that the original position is meant as Lo ecrtain

basic

'is

..

.

about justice. Et is device of representation frorn which we draw conclusions supposed to tell us what people woud think about justice if they were both perfectly rational and reasonable.° Given that this is its stated aim, there is no tension in declaring that its conclusions apply to everyone (in the here and now as Rawls might sayL even if they themselves are neither rational nor reasonable. The a

Eactthat surneone is unreasonable, therefore, is no sound reason for denying thera the rights and benelits of citizenship.

10.2 SHOULD UNREASONABLE CITlZENS FROM PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION: Frin Kelly and Lionel McPherson should

be

excluded

from

reject the constituency

BE EXCLUDED

the claim that unreasonable of public

persons they because justification

are unreasonable, yet still be extended the same rightsof liberal toleration as other of citizens.¯ Ke]Iy and McPherson instead believe in redrawing the constituency

iiMIS,

fitsfÏct'ris Erriverru,ß].

ihe origintil posi1ion see SarntielFrCCI111LFI, Ihe persari in on the role of the concepiion of SOt.¯Lal SOFL il[LU CoiltrisciMewf. Piiilosopry i§ PirfalicAgrairs 19 f [FDL ]D-27. |]) AgrèÛñid])l ETin Kelly ancl Lionel McPherson, 'On ToleTaling the Unreasonabic', Jorrorafof JWiricalPliitoseplay9 l200 lb 38-55.

Ear more

'RO ¯

Libernüsm Without Perfection

294

unreasonable people. TEis public justlEication so as to include some apparently section is devoted to explaining their position and my objeubHied.) A Trust-Dwierd i\gtinic-ril AgL2Ï181 Clayton, Matthew. 'Liberal Equality and Ethics! Erir¡cs L13 (2002): 8-22. Cohen, G.A. If You're arr 2galitarian, How Come You're Se Rich¯ Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. LExpensiveTaste Rldes Again.' In [ustineBurley, ed., Duorkin and His Critics, 3-29. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Rescuirig lumiceand Egiudity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Cohen, Joshtia.'Moral Pluraligrn and Polilical Consensus,' In David Copp, Jean Hampion, and Ichn E. Roemer, eds., The Irlo of Dernecracy. 270-9]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Tor a Democratic Society.' ]n Saroucl Freeman, ed., The Carnbridge Cornpanion to Rawls, 86 138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. LTruth and Public Reasca: Philosophy c5 Pabfic Affairs 3¯ï (2009): 1-42. Crewder, George. Liberafund and Vahe Phmdum. I.ondon: Coniinuuni, 2002. Challenge la I.iberalisnt.']ii DaAAer,Richard.Muterlomy, Domination, and the RepLihlican lohn Christman and Icel Anderson, ed s., Antonomy rrnd the Chaderrges to Liberalisen, 177-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, D' Agostino, Fred. Free Public Reason: Making lt Up As WeGo. New York:Oxford University Press, 1996. Darwall, Stephen. LAuthority and Second-Personal Reasons Ear Acting.' In David Sobel and Steveil Wall, eds., Reasotu forAcdon, L34--54. t:ambridge: Cambridge Liniverslty Pres.4, .

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,

--.

2009. Dreben, Hutton. 'On Rawls and Political l.iberalisili.' lii Saillue] I reenlan, ed., The Cant-

bridgeCompanion le Rrrwis,3IM6. Cambridge; Carnbridge Uriiversity Press, 2003. Dryzek, John. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberais. Critics, Contesurrions. Oxiorti: Oxford University Press, 2000. Dworkin, Gerald. 'Paternalism:Some Second Thoughts.' In Rolf Sartorius, ed., PWernalism, 105-11. Minneapolis, MN: Liniversity of Minnesota Pmss, 1983. 'Paternalism.' In Gerald Dworkin, ed., Mill's On Liberty: Critical Essays, Oxíntd: .

Rowrrian A l..iillc6eltl, l997. Dworkin, RUTlíL f..Ë. JÌ¢.Øy TÖ, EI¶c¶|Ô(.1F] EL·ss, l985. È J EJQgF (? FFi/IÇÉ Sovereige Vinne: The Thory mad Proclice of E¢µudity. Cambrielge, MA; J larvarri University Press. 2000. 'Sowreign Virtue Revisited.' Ethics ]13 (2002): 106--43. Eberle, Christopher. Religious Convicrion in Liberal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Estlund, David. 'The Insular'ity of the Reas,anable: Why Political Liberabsm Must Admit Ihe Truth,' rehit:s108 (1998); 252-75. ikmocrzitic Authoriiv; A Philosophiatl Frameierk. Princelon, NJ: Princelon University Press, 2008. Fabre, Cectie. Whosc Body 15 It Anywrry? Jusrice and the Ïnlegrity of tire Person. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Feinberg, Joe].The Moral Limits of Ille Criminal I.nw: Volume Tltree Harna to Selj¯Oxíord: Oxford University Press, 1986. I¯rledman, Marilyn. LJehn Rawls and Ihe Palilical Coercion el Unrea.conable Per>ple.' in Victor's Davian and Clark Wolf eds., TIst iden af a Ibliaical 1.iheransne E.t.cay.ean John Rawls, 16-33. Oxford: Rowman & Litticileid, 2000. ,

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