Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World

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CoxFLICT M,tx,tcEMENT

TNADtvtDEDWonLD Edited by Cltester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and PamelaAall

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS Washington, D.C.

Photographs used in this work courtesy ofAP/Wide World Photos. Reprinted with permission.

The views expressed in this book a-re those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views the United States Institute of Peace.

of

UNrroo Sreros INsrIrure oFPEACE 720017th Street NW Washington, DC 20036 @ 2007 by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rights reserved. For copyright and other information on prior publication ofall or part ofchapters 3, 7, 10, 25,28,29,35, and36, see the first entry in the Notes in those chapters.

First published2}}7 Second printing 2008

Printed in the United States ofAmerica The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements ofAmerican National Standards for Information Science-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI 239.48-7984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Leashing the dogs ofwar : conflict management in a divided world Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, editors.

/

Chester A. Crocker, Fen

P.cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-7-929223-97 -8 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: t-929223-97-8 (alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-7-929223-96-t (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 7-929223-96-X (pbk. : alk. paper) Peaceful change (International relations) 2. Conflict management 3. Securiry International. _1. I. Crocker, Chester A. II. Hampson, Fen Osler. IIL Aall, Pamela R.

-

125538.L42007

327.7',72-dA2 2006027680

CoxTENTS

Foreword Ricltard H. Solornon Acknowledgments

Contributors

Penr

1

I

IurnooucrroN

Leashing the Dogs ofWar ChesterA. Crocker, Fen Osler Harnpsln, and ParnelaAall

Pnnr

II

Souncns or CoNrr.rcrAND CrnnoNcESTo Groner SBcururv

2

International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War Jack S. Leoy

17

3

New Global Dangers

39

Michael E. Broran

4

Arms Acquisition and Violence: Are Weapons or People the Cause of Conflict?

53

Geofrey Kemp

5

Terorism and Global Security Martha Crenshata

67

6

The Challenge ofWeak, Failing, and Collapsed States Robert I. Rotberg

83

vl

CoNtBNrs State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure

95

MohamrnedAyoob Power, Social Violence, and Cltarles

CivilWars

IL5

King

Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in theTwenW-first Centurv Ted Robert

131

Gurr'

10 TurbulentTfansitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to Edzuard D. Mansfeld andJack Snyder

1l Environmental Change,

War

Securiry and Conflict

1.61.

t77

Nils Petter Gleditsch

t2

Economic Causes of Civil Conflict andTheir Implications for Policy Paul Collier

L97

13

Motivations for Conflicf Groups and Individuals

219

Frances Stewart and Graham Brozpn

Penr

III

UsBs eNo

Lrurts

oF FoRCE rN CoNFLrcr MANAGEMENT

14 Using Force for Peace in an Age ofTerror

245

Laztsrence Freedman

15 16

Limits on the Use of Force Brian Urguhart

265

Again: Humanitarian Intervention and the Challenges of "NeverAgain"

Y^e_t

277

Bruce WJentleson

17

Coercive Diplomacy RobertJ.

Art

and Patrick

299

M. Cronin

18

Expanding Global Military Capacity to Save Lives with Force Michael O'Hanlon

319

19

Economic Sanctions and International Peace and Security Chantal de Jonge Oudraat

335

IV

PnRT UsnsnND LrMrTs oF STATECRAFT, DrnrolrRcv, AND SOFT Pownn IN CoNFLICT MANAGEMENT

20 The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft, Conflict Management ChesterA. Crocker

and Power

in 355

vrr

CoNrBNrs

2l A Framework for Success: International lntervention in Societies 369

Emerging from Conflict Danie I Seruser and Patricia Thomson 22 The Place of Soft Power in State-Based Conflict Management Joseph S. Nye,Jr.

389

23 The Rule of Law in Conflict Management NeilJ. Krin

407

24 Rethinking the "War onTerror": NewApproaches to Conflict Prevention and Management in the Post-9/1"1 World Paul B. Stares and MonaYacoubian 25

425

437

International Mediation I William Zartman and SaadiaTouaal

26 Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications Louis lGiesberg

455

27 The Power of Nonofficial Actors in Conflict Management ParnelaAall

477

PenrV UsBsewo Lnnlm oF INSTITUTIoNS IN CoNpucr MeNncnmnNr 28 The United Nations and Conflict Managemenf Relevant or Irrelevant?

497

KarenA. Mingst and Margaret P Karns

29 Successes and Challenges

in Conflict

Management

527

Andrett Mack

30

New Roles for Regional Organizations Paul F Diehl

535

3t

Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers

553

Diana Chigas

32 War and Law:The Dilemmas

of International Law and 583

Coercive Enforcement

Ruth

Wedgzaood

PnnrVI UsBseNo Lrurts OF GoVERNANcE IN CoNrr,rct 33 Is Democracy the Answer?

MeNecnmnNt 603

Marina Ottazaay

34

Is Stability the Answer? Kimberly Marten

679

CoNreNts

37

Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Policy Considerations Daaid M. Malone andJake Shermin

637

Sharing Sovereig_nty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States Stephen D. Krasner

653

Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate Fen Osler Hanpson and David Mendelof

679

Index

701

FonpwoRD Ricbard H. Solomon President, United States Institute of Peace

or those of us who came of age during the ColdWar, the pace and complexity of change in today's world are at best confusing, at worst overwhelming. More than fifteen years after the end of the MAD confrontation between East and West, we find ourselves constantly surprised by new international challenges to our security and economic well-being, uncertain of their causes, and apprehensive of their consequences. Looking back five, ten, or even fifteen years, we now begin to see patterns in the unfolding ofevents, but

izattons that would regulate the constructive interplay of democracies across the globe. By the middle of the 1990s, with the international community learning the meaning of

those designs thatwe do see are onlybeginning to shape the policies and institutions that might

nium, the international terrain shifted again, not least in the United States, where intervention in other people's conflicts and nation-

help us deal with the post-post-Cold War and post-9/11 era now enveloping the world. Ifhistorians are having

a

hard time decipher-

ing the course ofevents since the breakup of the Soviet Union, would-be prognosticators are faced with an impossible task. Back in the earlv 1990s. talk of the future centered on "the new world order" that would emerge out of the wreckage of the Cold War. We hoped for an international system of multilateral organ-

"global chaos" and "ethnic cleansing" and the re-

newed meaning of "genocide," the future appeared to consist ofan unending series

ofeth-

nic or religiously fueled conflagrations and of desperate efforts by hastily assembled crews of intemational frefighters to dampen the flames

and-just perhaps-begin to rebuild tated societies.

At

devasnew millenthe of the start

building efforts became subordinated to a Post9/!7 preoccupation with homeland defense and the war against international terrorism. The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, and subsequent terrorist atrocities in BaIi, London, and Madrid, profoundly changed the mood and the security agenda not only in Washington but in capitals on five continents. Henceforth, the newly declared

tx

Fonrwom "war on terrorism" began to take precedence over all other international concerns and activities. Interventionism gained new legitimacy, justified by the new national security concerns. Nation building, too, gained new relevance in an era of failed states hijacked by religious extremists bent on murderous destruction on a global scale. Furthermore, once the Taliban and their al Qeda allies had been driven from power in Kabul and chased back into caves and villages in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. government was emboldened to embark upon a campaign of "preemptive war." Soon, GIs were struggling to stabilize Baghdad.Talk of the future now centered-depending on one's perspective-either on hopes of installing democratic regimes and constitutions across the Middle East or on fears of a widening

"imperial overreach." And today-it is late in2006

as

these words

are written-the scene is changing once again; Will the Iraq experience bring on a new pe-

riod of isolationism (a new type of Vietnam syndrome) or entrap the United States in a "long war" in the tumultuous Muslim world? The only thing that one might safely predict is the warm reception that scholars and students

will accord this volume.In an age of chaos and uncertainty, breadth and depth of knowledge are at a premium. If the future must remain shrouded in the fog of current conflicts, it is all the more important that we have a wideranglng and well-grounded understanding of the recent past and of the present so that we can better adjust to and cope with what seems likely to lie ahead. And such an understanding is exactly what is offered by the editors and authors of Leasbing tbe Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Diztided World. This volume challenges us to reflect deeply on the interplay of war and peace, coercive power, and diplomatic imagination. It provides wide-ranging analyses of the sources of con-

temporary international conflict and of the means available by which that conflict can be prevented, managed, or resolved. Furthermore

each chapter is written by an author or authors not only expert in the subject matter but also distinguished by their ability to be both analytically incisive and evenhanded. To be sure, readers will encounter strong arguments

and opinions in the pages of this book, but

theywill not be misled by distortions, nor ensnared by tendentiousness, nor blinded by rhetoric.To the contrary theywill discover reliable facts and figures, revealing interpretations, and readable, unambiguous prose. Leashing tbe Dogs of Waris the third volume

of its kind in recent publications from the United States Institute of Peace Press. And not entirely coincidentally, the other two also appeared at tuming points on the road that has led us from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the rise of global terrorism. The first of the trio, Managrng Global Cbaos, appeared in 1996, its title reflecting the humanitarian crises and ethnic violence that sprang forth in the Balkans, Africa, and the Caribbean. Dreams of a new world order were akeady fading by 7996, and there was a new and acute awareness of the feeble state of many societies and of the daunting complexity of conflicts rooted, as the editors commented, in a "rich brew of ethnonationalism, religion, socioeconomic grievances, environmental degradation, collapsed states, globalized markets, and geopo-

litical shifts." The successor to Managing Global Cbaos was Turbulent Peace, which was published five years later, in 2001-but before September 11. Its carefully chosen title reflected a cautious optimism-optimism both that the frequency and intensity of intercommunal conflict were declining and that diplomats and policymakers were learning some useful lessons about conflict management and peacemaking-that is, how third parties have some potential to manage or limit conflict and sometimes to reach negotiated setdements and make them stick. At the same time, however, the volume editors were under no illusions about the fragility of many recent setdements, the vulnerability of

xl

Fonnwono many regions to destabilizing shocks, and the lethal intractability of numerous hot conflicts. The title of the present volume is in many ways the bleakest of the three. Use of the word War makes plain that the world is no longer at peace, even a turbulent peace; the dogs ofwar are now rampant. Yet, despite its tide and like its predecessors, Leashing the Dogs of War rs

fundamentally an optimistic book.

It

recog-

nizes that the global environs are both conflict-

ridden and often bloody, and it harbors no illusions that murderous enmitywill suddenly give way to universal comity. But it does believe

-indeed.

its raison d'etre is to

advertisrthat

something can be done to moderate, reduce, and even resolve specific conflicts. In fact, its central message is not that sornetlting can be done, but that many things can be done, and that the test of the skilled peacemaker is to decide which tools will work best on which conflicts and in which combinations. The book also suggests, when taken as a whole, that we can expect to witness war-fighting and peace-

making at the same time, sometimes by the same states and other actors.

This same optimism and this same concern to predict the future, but to learn from

-not the past about how to bring peace to the present --?ermeate all the works supported and published by the United States Institute of Peace since its creation in7984. Given the close associations between the volume's editors and the programs ofthe Institute, this concurrence

should surprise no one. Chester A. Crocker, the architect while assistant secretary of state ofthe plan thatbrought democracyto Namibia, is a member of the Institute's board of directors and was for many years board chairman. Fen Osler Hampson, professor of international affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, was

a peace fellow at the Institute

in

1993-94'

Pamela Aall is vice president of the Institute's Education Program.The three of them have jointly edited or authored no fewer than six books published by the Institute's Press. These books havewon manyplaudits and a

wide readership. Managing Global Chaos and Turbulent Peace have enjoyed an especially large audience among professors and students of international affairs, conflict resolution, and related disciplines, and Leashing the Dogs of War wr\.surely continue the tradition. Indeed,

many of the young men and women now building their careers within, for example, diplomatic corps, humanitarian and relief agencies, and intergovernm entaJ, organtzations will have the opportunity to make practical use of the lessons that can be learned from the experts convened in print by Crocker, Hamp-

ion, and Aall. The United States Institute of Peace intends that those lessons will prove useful to the next generation of peacemakers as they work to rein in the dogs of war and constrain the conflicts on which they feed.

AcxxowLEDGMENTS

he task of creating a book that cuts across disciplines, perspectives, and experiences in order to define the chal-

lenges of the current security environment engages many people. Of all of these, Dick Solomon, president of the United States In-

stitute of Peace, deserves special recognition for encouraging us to capture the complex

field of conflict management and for giving us the opportunity to do so notjust once, but three times, for this volume has two predecessors, Managing Global Chaos and Turbulent Peace.Thanks also go to the chapter authors, who grappled not onlywith their own areas of expertise but also with the defining question of this book Is it possible to be at war and act as a peacemaker at the same time? This is a difficult question and we appreciate their willingness to consider it. We were wonderfirlly aided by many people at the United States Institute of Peace, especially Ethan Schechter, Raina Kim,Joseph Sany, Lindsey Ensor, andJeff Helsing

Education Program, and Joe Lataille in both Education and Finance. Michael Graham played a critical role, both as head of the Publications Program and as vice president for Management. His unwavering encouragement of this book and the others that the Education Program has produced has been heartening and much appreciated. Many Institute colleagues, including Trish Thomson, Dan Serwer, Paul Stares, N ei,Kia,David Smock, Judy Barsalou, Mike Lekson, and John Crist, have also been very supportive. Marie Marr, Kay Hechler, and all their colleagues in the Publications Program have performed the miracle of producing a first-class volume from the many worthy but quite diverse chapters thatwe delivered to them. Once again, Nigel Qrinney is at the center of this effort and his superb editorial judgment is reflected throughout the volume. He is an exceptional editor and we are lucky to have him as our collabor^tor.

in the )ilu

CoxTRIBUToRS

ChesterA. Crocker is theJames R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and former chairman of the board of directors of the United States Institute ofPeace. From 1981 to 1989 he was assistant secretary ofstate for African affairs; as

Fen Osler Hampson is professor of international affairs at and director of the Norman Paterson School oflntemational Affairs, CarletonlJniversiry Ottawa, Canada.He is the au-

such, he was the principal diplomatic architect

Peace:

and mediator in the prolonged negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that led to Namibia's transition to democratic governance and independence, and to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. He is the author of High Noon in Soutltern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborbood and coauthor (with Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall) of Taming Intraxable ConJlicts: Mediation in tbe Hardest Cases.Heis also coeditor of Turbulent Peace:The Challenga of Managing International Conflict; Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to

International

Conflict; African Conflict Resolution: Tbe U.S. Role in Peacerrr.aking; Grasping the Nettle: Ana-

lyzing Casa oflntractable Conflict; and Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Cornplex World. He is an adviser on strategy and negotiation to U.S. and European firms.

thor of five books, including Nurturing

Peace:

Fail, and coeditor of twenty others, including Turbulent I4/by Peace Settlernents Succeed or

Tlte Challenga of Managing International Conflict; ManagxngGlobal Chaos: Sources ofand Responses to International Conflict; Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict; and Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Cornplex WorldHisrecent books include Madness

in the Multitude: Human Security andWorld

Disorder and Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardex Casa (vithChesterA. Crocker and Pamela Aall). HamPSon was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace rn7993-94. He is chair of the Human Security Track of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, a joint initiative of the governments of Finland and Taryzania.

PamelaAallis vice president ofeducation at the United States Institute ofPeace. Before joining the Institute, she worked for the President's

xvr

CoNrnreutons

Committee on the Arts and the Humanities, the Institute of International Education, the Rockefeller Foundation, the European Cultural Foundation, and the International Council for Educational Development. She is also president ofWomen in International Security. She is coeditor of Turbulent Peace: Tlte Cbalof Managing International Conflict; Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict; Grasping th e Mttle : AnaIyzing Cases oflntraxable Conflict; and Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. She is coauthor of Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and lenges

the

Military in Peace and ReliefOperations (vith

Daniel Miltenberger and Thomas G. Weiss) and Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardat Cases (with Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson).

tor of the Centre for the Studv of African Economies.

Martha Crenshaw is Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global lssues and Democratic Thought, Department of GovernmentWesleyan University.

Patrick M. Cronin is director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and a former director of Research at the United States Institute of Peace. Paul E Diehl is Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science and University Distinguished Teacher/Scholar atthe University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Sir Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies and vice principal (Research) at King's

.(}la

College London.

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, James Madison College and the Department of Political Science, Michigan State Universiry and coordinator of the Muslim Studies Program, Michigan State University.

Nils Petter Gleditsch is research professor at the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), editor of the Journal ofPeace Research, and professor ofinternational relations at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology inTrondheim.

RobertJ.Art is Christian A. Herter Professor

Ted Robert Gurr recently retired

of International Relations, Brandeis University.

guished University Professor at the University of Maryland, College Par\ and founding director of the Minorities at Risk Project.

Graham Brown is economics research officer for Southeast Asia at the Centre for Research on Inequaliry Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at the University of Oxford. Michael E. Brown is dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs and professor of international affairs and political science at the George Washington University.

DianaChigas

is codirector

ofthe Reflecting on

Peace Practice project at CDA-Collaborative

Learning Projects, and professor ofpractice at the Fletcher School atTufts University. Paul Collier is professor in the Department of Economics, Oxford University, and direc-

as

Distin-

BruceW. Jendeson is professor ofpublic policy and political science at the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University. Margaret P. Karns is professor of political science at the University of Dayton.

GeofteyKemp is director of Regional strategic Programs, The Nixon Center. Charles King is chairman of the faculty and Ion Ratiu Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Stephen D. Krasner is deputy director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies

xvll

CoNtnrnutoRs and director of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State.

Louis Kriesbergis Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies, and founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts at Syracuse University.

Neil Kritz is associate vice president of the United States Institute of Peace and director of its Rule of Law Program. JackS. Levy is Board of Governors'Professor, Rutgers University, and president-elect of the International Studies Association.

AndrewMack is director of the Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues. University of British Columbia. David M. Malone is assistant deputy minister for global issues in the Canadian Foreign Service.

EdwardD.Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania.

KimberlyMarten is professor and chair, Department of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University.

DavidMendeloffis assistant professor of international affairs and director of the Centre

for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School oflnternational Affairs. Carleton University, Ottawa.

KarenA. Mingst is Loclsryood Chair Professor in the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce and orofessor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky.

Joseph S. Nye,Jr. is Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University.

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and

a

visiting lecturer at Princeton University.

Marina Ottaway is the director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Chantal deJonge Oudraat is senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the PaulH. Nitze School ofAdvanced Studies of Johns Hopkins University and adjunct professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Forergn S

ewice, Georgetown University.

Robert I. Rotberg is director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Universiry and president of the World Peace Foundation.

Daniel Serwer is vice president of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Centers of Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace. Jake Sherman is a former political affairs of: ficer in the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Jack Snyder is Robert and Ren6e Belfer Professor of International Relations, Department

of Political Science, Columbia University. Paul B. Stares is vice president of the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace. Frances Stewart is professor of development economics and director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at the University of Oford.

PatriciaThomson is the executive vice president of the United States Institute of Peace. SaadiaTouval is Professorial Lecturer in the Conflict Management Program and a visiting fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

SirBrianUrquhart

is former under secretary-

general of the United Nations.

xvrrr

RuthWedgwood is the Edward B. Burling Professor oflnternational Law and Diplomary,

ofthe Program on International Law and Organizations, at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. and director

Mona Yacoubian is a special adviser to the United States Institute of Peace's Muslim World Initiative and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

CoNtlnrsutoRs I. William Zartrntn

Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, and director of the Conflict Management Program, at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

is Jacob

Wnnx

K

IxrnoDUcTroN

LB,IsHINGTHE

DocsoF'Wnn CltesterA. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and PamelaAall

THE DoGs

Europe and the former Soviet Union, many

of war." Shakespeare's Mark Antony

hoped for the beginning of a new, more peacefirl, chapter in world history. However, the outbreak or continuation ofsectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and other corners of the globe; the emergence of a more

RY.HAVOC'AND LET

SLIP

issues this call for revenge shordy after

Julius Caesar's murder by his erstwhile friends and associates. Antony's vision of revenge includes chaos, "domestic fury and fierce civil strife," and he names "the dogs ofwar" as the instrument of destruction. What makes the image especially chilling is the knowledge that it is almost impossible to call offthe dogs once they have been let slip or unleashed. Over the

centuries, these dogs of war have been unleashed on neady every continent of the world and have direcdy or indirecdy caused the deaths

of millions. Especially in the past century, three hundred years after Shakespeare wrote Julius Caesar, the dogs of war roamed freely. The twentieth century has been called a period of "total war" not only because it witnessed two major conflagrations that engulfed much of the planet but also because it saw the dawn of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War and the

collapse of communist regimes

in Eastern

lethal and global brand of terrorism; and

a

growing cultural divide between Islam and the West dashed many ofthose hopes. At the same time, there were troubling signs that international norms and institutions, which helped checkthe proliferation of nuclearweapons and other technologies of mass destruction during the past century were eroding as a number of states-North Korea, Pakistan, and Indiacrossed the nuclear threshold. And judging from its early years, the twenty-first century seems-at first glancrno less dangerous or

conflict prone than the century it succeeded. Over the past forry years, however, we have learned much about the sources and nature of conflict as well as the means to prevent or contain war. And over the past decade, scholars, diplomats, nonofiicial practitioners, and others

CHBsrBn A. Cnocrpn, FBN Oslpn HeupsoN, eNo ParaBLe A,c.LL have turned their attention to studying and understanding the causes of sectarian violence and its intemational implications as well as documenting in rich, empirical detail global trends in the frequency,lethality, and implications of

different forms of violence. Many of these studies have also discussed the broader policy implications of this research by identifying appropriate strategies, mechanisms, and responses for conflict management and prevention.This

and what kinds of resources and capacity are required to help states make the transition from war to peace and whether further outbreaks ofviolence and conflict can be successfirlly prevented. All of this has important implications for the teaching ofinternational relations. A lot of

contemporary discussion has focused on such questions as, Can we impose democracy in states where we intervene? Can we rebuild

war-

volume is intended to capture the best ele-

torn economiesl Can outsiders reinstate or

ments of this research and the best policy recommendations and insights that flow from it: in short, to help us leash the dogs ofwar. This book differs from its predecessor in a number of ways. Turbulent Peace: The Challengu of Managing International Conflictwas

create from scratch a strong civil society? Can

published in August 2001-before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.-and provided comprehensive coverage of the principal issues of the day: the challenges of humanitarian intervention and the difficulties in reaching a sus-

tainable peace. Leasbing tbe Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World stxtswtth the premise that we are in a new security environment. A key consideration in the book is whether powerfirl states and international organizatrcns can simultaneously conduct a war on terrorism and conflict management policies in zones of conflict. The war on terrorism

and the consequences of U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed the global playrng field in a serious way. The 1990s dilemmas of humanitarian intervention and peacemaking are now joined by increasingly salient questions about how to effectively pursue nation building and democratization processes in states that are internally divided, capacity deficient, and conflict ridden. U.S.led interventions to topple unfriendly regimes have also underscored the finite uses of military power and the importance of identifying other instruments to restore oolitical order. There is active discussion uni d.but. ubo.rt postconflict strategies of conflict management

we quell or prevent the outbreak of sectarian violence? Theoretical ouestions about the normative and legal legitimacy of humanitariandriven interventions in aworld of "sovereigri' states are now joined by more practical questions about how best to mobilize the nolitical will and capacity to intervene, especially

when the United States'own power projec-

tion abilities are so heavily taxed by its strategic commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and so few of its allies are willing, or able, to filI the void. In order to assess these and other questions,

this book is organized as follows. Paft 2 explores the major causes of contemporaryviolence in the international system and identifies key trends in the pattern of violence. This part examines the roots, nature, and dynamics of terrorism and the links between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and conflict. It also assesses the question ofwhether terrorists are creations or opportunistic beneficiaries ofconflict zones. Parts 3 and 4 focus on questions of the diplomacy and tradecraft of conflict management.In addition to identi$zing the utility of different strategies of conflict management in different conflict settings, these parts enplore the question ofwhether successfi.rl conflict management and the peacefrrl settlement of conflicts in war-torn countries and regions will reduce terrorism in the future. Part 5 examines the roles ofdifferent actors and institutions and their capacities, weaknesses, and strengths in different aspects ofconflict

Loesumctun Docs opWen management. This part looks to the future of international cooperation in addressing the challenges of managing and maintaining international peace and security and examines such questions as,Will coalitions of thewilling replace the United Nations in responding to conflicts, and what happens when few are willing? Has the age of international cooperation in meeting complex emergencies endedlWhat roles will the United Nations, NAIO, the Or-

ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations play? What usefirl role is there for nongovernmental organizations in the conflict management business? Part 6 looks to the lessons and challenges of state building and nation building and whether we can learn from past successes and failures when the intemational community has intervened in countries in order to end violence and restore political order.

OroaNoNEwSEcuRrTY CnenpNcns In addition to changes in the global security environment arising from the increasing threat of terrorism, widening fractures between and among cultures, and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, there have been changes in the perception of that environment among the leading states of NATO and the European Union and many other societies.This percep-

tion includes new attitudes about the hierarchy of interests linked to conflict arenas where these challenges often arise. It also includes a heightened overall sense of insecurity and division in the international system. While recognizing an increase in the number of threats, this volume also points to evidence that all things did not change in 2001 and that many of the conflict sources we became familiar with in the course of the 1990s and from previous epochs-for example, security dilemmas, state failure, economic predation, political transitions-remain as valid and relevant in today's world as in earlier times. Any at-

tempt to draw conclusions about the prospects for international conflict management needs to keep in mind these factors of continuity as well as the drivers of change. As an example, a number of chapters in

pzrt2 of thevolume examine, from one angle or another, the increasingly salient fragmentation within the Islamic world and between it and other cultures and regions. Some contributors explore the roots and different contexts

of Islamist militancy, while others examine the uses and limits of physical coercive force in copingwith the challenge.While the members of al Qeda may be unified by a hatred of the United States and the Western values it represents, the societies that they spring from are strugglingwith much more basic issues: the tensions of modernization, including unequal wealth distribution and unmet expectations; suppressed democracy; internal divisions; and unstable neighborhoods. The anti-Western mobTlization is but a new trigger in an akeady explosive environment, and an o-o O

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221

an insufficient explanation as many multiethnic or multireligious societies live peacefirlly example, Ghana and Tanzania-while -for others arc atpe ce for decades before experiencing conflict. In fact, the vast majority of

multiethnic societies are at

Deace.6

As Abner

Cohen succinctly stated three decades ago: Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange andbizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both./

Four economic explanations have dominated recent analysis: the first explanation points to group motives and group inequalities as a source ofconflict; the second focuses on individual gains from conflict; the third is derived from a failed "social contract"l and the fourth theorizes that environmental Dressures are amalor source of conflict ("green war").

GroupMotivation Political conflicts, in contrast to most forms of criminality, consist of fighting betvveen groups: groups thatwish to gain independence or take over the state, and other groups that resist this, aiming to preserve the integrity of the nation or their own power.8 The groups that fight are united under a common banner, with broadly common purposes. These common purposes may be termed "group motives" for conflict. While individual motivation is also important, it appears that group motivation and mobllizationunderlie many political conflicts. Groups engaged in intemal conflict are often united by a common ethnic or religious identity. Since 7945,the proportion of conflicts attributable to ethnic violence has been steadily increasing (figure 2). Such conflicts are generally presented as religious (e.g., in the Philippines and Thailand) or ethnic (as in Rwanda

FnaNcss Srewenr eNo

222

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Figure2.Trends in Ethnic Conflict, 79452004

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and Burundi); such identities provide a pow-

erfiJ source of mobilization and unity. Yet many multiethnic and multireligious societies live relatively peacefi.rlly, and in many situations, the majority of people do not perceive ethnic

or religious identities as being of overriding importance. Hence we need to look beyond religion or ethnicity, as such, to find the causes of "ethnic" conflict. One plausible hypothesis is that it is where there are significant underlying differences in access to economic or political resources, providing both leaders and followers with a sffong motive to fight, that ethnic or religious differences can lead to violent mobilization. Ted Robert Gurr terms such group differences "relative deprivation," and Frances Stewart defines differences in groups'access to economic, social, and political resources as "horizontal inequalities," in contrast to the traditional "vertical inequalities," which rank indi-

viduals rather than groups.e The horizontal

inequalities explanation of conflict is based on the view that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentments that maylead to violent struggles. These inequalities may involve regional differentiation, in which case they often lead to separatist movements (as in Aceh, Indonesia, and the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka), or the different identities may occur within the same geographic space (such as in Rwanda, Northern Ireland, and Uganda), where political participation and economic and political rights are at stake.

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are multidimensional, involving access to alargevariety of resources along economic, social, and political vectors or dimensions. Along the economic vector it is not just income that is important, but also access to employment and to avariety of assets (land, credit, education). Along the

MorryRrroNs FoR CoNrlrct social vector, access to services (e.g., health care, water) and to assets (housing) can form relevant HIs. The political vector includes po\Mer at the top (presidency, cabinet), at lower levels (parliamentary assemblies, local government), in the bureaucracy at all levels, and in the army and the police. The relevant HIs are those that matter to people, and this varies across societies. For example , in Zimbabwe unequal access to land is important, while in Northern Ireland important differences concern HIs in housing, education, and jobs. HIs seem to be more provocative where they are consistent across dimensions, notably the polit-

ical and economic dimensions. The evidence seems to suggest that economic and social HIs provide the conditions that lead to dissatisfaction among the general population and, consequently, give rise to the possibilities of political mobilization, but it is political exclusion that is likely to trigger a conflict, by giving group leaders a powerful motive to organtzr, in order to gain support. There is also often a provocative cultural dimension, providing

powerful assistance in group mobilization. Examples of cultural issues that give rise to inequalities and resentments are decisions on

official languages, religion, or cultural events that favor one group or the otherl in the presence of other disposing conditions, such cultural events can provoke violence.lo The Orange marches in Northern Ireland and the adoption of Sinhalese as the official language

in Sri Lanka are examples. While horizontal inequalities give rise to political movements, these are not necessarily violent. Whether they become violent depends on whether the demands can be accommodated by the political system, or whether they meet resistance. It is important to note that relatively rich groups may instigate conflict, as may relatively poor groups. The relatively rich do so mainly to preserve their riches (andlor power) for themselves, while the relatively poor

do so out of a sense of injustice with the intention of achieving some redistribution.

223

Empirical evidence is accumulating that severe horizontil.inequalities constitute a significant cause ofviolent conflict. In the socioeconomic dimension, cross-sectional quantitative analyses have shown a significant relationship between various dimensions of socioeconomic inequality and conflict. Luca Mancini, for instance, shows that differences in infant mortality rates, which can be taken as a broad proxy for baseline levels ofsocioeconomic deprivation, between ethnic or religious groups within the districts of Indonesia help explain the location of the wave of communal conflicts that occurred after the fall of Suharto's regime in 7998.11 Scott Gates and Mansoob Murshed find a significant relationship between "spatial" horizontal inequalities (i.e., differentials between geographical regions)

and the intensity of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.l2 Although multicountry studies have been hampered by a lack of consistent and comparable data, GudrunZstby found some supporting evidence in a multicountry multiregional study, while W. L. Barrows found similar evidence across African countries. There is also substantial case study evidence; for example, Stewart's review of the experiences of nine countries shows not only that increasing socioeconomic HIs have preceded the emergence ofviolent conflict, but that reductions in socioeconomic HIs, such as occurred in Northern Ireland during the 1980s, may contribute to the conditions for a peacefi.rl resolution of such conflicts.13 However, the connection between HIs and violent conflict is not an automatic one, and some societies show severe HIs without experiencing conflict (e.g.,

BolMa, BraziI, and Ghana). Political inclusiveness is one reason that some societies avoid

conflict despite severe economic horizontal inequalities; Ghana, for example, has included political representation of all major groups in government. Nigeria has managed an uneasy peace (post-Biafra) by following the federal principle of incorporating people from all regions in government at every level. Moreover,

FneNcos SrBwenr RNo Gneuav Bnornnt

2U horizontal inequalities were not consistent in Nigeria: most political powerwas in the hands ofnortherners, but the southern parts ofthe countrywere better off from an economic and social perspective.

Political horizontal inequalities-the exclusion or underrepresentation of groups within the political structure of a state-can provoke violent conflict when they change abrupdy. In Cdte d'Ivoire, three decades of postindependence mle by F6lix Houphou€t-Boigny avoided significant conflict,largely due to the policy of balancing representatives of the major groups

in positions of importance in the government and bureaucracy. Following Houphou€tBoigny's death and the introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, political leaders sought to mobilize ethnic sentiments to enforce their grip on power and thus un-

carry out illicit production and trade. Where alternative opportunities are few, because of low incomes and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, wars are likely to be more numerous and last longer. Conflicts may persist because some powerfi;l actors benefit through the manipulation of scarcity, smuggling, and so forth and have no interest in resolving the conflict. An oft-cited case used to support this argument is the role of "conflict diamonds" in the protraction of the civil war in Sierra Leone.17 Private motivation seems also to be a predominant factor behind the persistent conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where abundant natural resources offer big rewards to those who control them. Collier and Hoeffler put forward econometric evidence to support the "greed" hypo-

dermined Houphouet-Boigny's careful balancing act, leading to a spiral ofethnicization, xenophobia, and, ultimately, civil waLr4

thesis, arguing that the observation that conflict

Private Motivation People who fight have their ovm private motivation for doing so as well as loyalty to the group that is fighting. War confers benefits as well as costs on some individuals. Political sociologists such as David Keen and Mark Duf: field and economists such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeflerhave emphasizndpnvate or individual motivation as the fundamental cause of conflict.15 The private motivation hlpothesis has its basis in rational choice economics, ar-

dividual greed.18 However, the share of primary products exports in GDP is a very crude

guing that the net economic advantages ofwar to some individuals motivate them to fight.16 In this approach, group identities are regarded

in conflict concluded: "[V]ery few contem-

not

incentives have not been the only or even the primary causes of these conflicts."21 It is difficult to accept that rational choice

as an independent factor

but

as

instru-

ments, created to help fulfillthe private motives of those who fight (especially leaders). Keen lists manyways in which war confers individual benefit on particular categories of people: it permits people, especially uneducated young men, to gain employment as soldiersl it offers opportunities to loot, to profiteer from shortages and from aid; to trade arms; and to

incidence increases as the share of primary products exports in GDP rises (up to a point) supports the view that conflict is caused by in-

approximation of"greed," and the results have been shown not to be robust to alternative specifications.le There is sffonger evidence that

oil resources are associated with conflict, but this, too, depends on the model specification and exclusions of outliers.2O Case studies suggest that even where natural resources are abun-

dant, private maximizing motives are rarely the full explanation. As a study of seven countries

por^ry conflicts can be adequately captured

as

pure instance of 'resource wars.' . . . Economic

can explain the extreme case of suicide attacks, although Mark Harrison has recendy developed a model that attempts to explain these attacks by their appeal to a person's sense

of identity and self-worth.22 However, in so doing, the explanation moves right away from

MolveroNs

FoR

CoNpuct

225

individual aggrandizement to community injustices and community constraints and incentives that influence individuals' perceptions of their ovrn identity. Although suicide attacks ac-

count for only a small proportion of violence and can be argued to be unrepresentative, most

ofconflict involve u htgh risk ofdeath or debilitating injury, which, from a rational choice perspective, would seriously hamper future opportunities for utility, so that "rationaT" actors might be likely to choose another option before engaging in rebellion. However, while this argument seems relevant to those direcdy involved in fighting, it may have less force when applied to leaders, who are rarely killed or injured. Hence leaders could be motivated by self-aggrandizement, while their followers may not follow maximizing logic but may be coerced into fighting, or persuaded to fight by cases

leaders playr.g up religious or ethnic differences and grievances: Grievance is

to a rebel organization what

(Indonesia), Biafra (Nigeria), and Katanga (Zaire), separatist rebellion often emerges in resource-rich areas ofa country, leading him to conclude that rebellion is "the rage of the rich."24 However, there are also examples of separatist movements in regions with poor re-

endowment-for example, the Muslim rebellion inThailand, theThmils in Sir Lanka, and Eritrea and Bangladesh. In resource-rich areas, the gains (and motivation) maybe individual or group, or both. However, in many cases the leaders of the rebellions left lucrative source

and safe positions to instigate rebellion. Hassan

di Tiro, for example,Ieft a secure position at the United Nations in New York to instigate the Acehnese uprising.In the case of Colombia, often depicted as a "greed"-motivated con-

flict, interviews with both leaders and those who were mobilized to fight show that generally their economic position worsened as a result of participating in the conflict-most put forward ideological reasons for fighting, including the issue of land reform.2sThus short-

image is to a business. In the economist's view of conflict, grievance will turn out to be neither a cause ofconflict, nor an accidental by-product

run self-aggrandizement does not seem to be

ofit. Rather, a sense ofgrievance

is deliberately

over, the conflicts in the natural

generated by reb el organizaions

...

[rebel supporters] are gulled into believing the discourse which self-interested rebel leaders promote.zr

At this point the group explanation and the individual explanation of conflict come together. It is hard to persuade people to risk their lives for grievances that are not genuine (i.e., unless there is some sort of exclusion or economic horizontal inequality), while it seems that leaders may be, at least in part, motivated by personal ambition in both the HI and the individual maximizing paradigms. In both cases, it is argued that they are motivated by political exclusion (i.e., political horizontal inequalities), which denies them access to resources and power.

While generally not a sufficient explanation ofconflict, it is clear that the expected rewards sometimes play a role in the decision to rebel. As Collier notes, citing the cases ofAceh

uppermost as a motive for these leaders. More-

areas were framed

resourc-rich

in ethnic terms-the

Acehnese in Indonesia, the Igbo in Biafra, and the "authentic" Katangagroups (as opposed to

migrant communities) inZaire.It seems that promoting the objective of political and cul* tural autonomy for the ethnic group was also an important source of mobilization. Hence, while individual maximization is certainly part of the story it is clearly not the whole story. Group identities and group mobllization are also generally present. While leaders undoubtedly often do sell identities as a way of securing support, they cannot create an identity out of nothing: "the lpast] acts as a

constraint on invention. Though the past can be read in different ways, it is not any past."2b A common history, language, culture, or religion is generally required to generate felt identities powerfirl enough to mobilize people for conflict. Nor can leaders expect support unless

FneNces Srnwenr eNo GneHelt BnovrN

226

there are genuine grievances among those who follow them-political, economic, social,

qpe of democracy-whether majoritarian,

or cultural.

presidential, or proportional representationthat affects propensity to conflict, rather than the level of"democracy''per se.30

Failure ofthe Social Contract The third explanation ofviolent conflict points direcdy to grievances. It derives from the view that social stability is implicidy premised on a social contract between the people and the government. According to this (hypothetical)

"Green War" (Environmental Scarciry) The fourth explanation ofviolent conflict, associated with the work of Thomas HomerDixon and the Toronto Group, is the "green

conffact, people accept state authority as long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions in terms of employment and incomes.With economic stagnation or decline, and worsening state services, the social contract breaks down, and violence results. Hence high (and rising) levels ofpoverty

The essence of this perspective is that contest for control over declining natural resources, often intensified by population pressures, is a mqor cause of violent conflict around the world. Poorer societies are more at risk because they will be "less able to buffer themselves" from environmental pressures.32 Three

and a decline in state services would be expected

dimensions of environmental scarcity are identified that maylead to conflict "supply-induced scarciry" linked to the "depletion and degradation of an environmental resource"; "demandinduced scarcity," linked to population growth and the consequent extra pressures on existing resources; and "structural scarcityr" which "arises

to cause conflict.2T High vertical inequality might also be associated with such a failure, unless accompanied by populist measures to compensate the deprived. Conversely, political institutions that are able to channel and respond to socioeconomic discontents strengthen

warr" or "environmental scarcity," argument.3l

among countries with lower per capita in-

from an unequal distribution ofa resource that concentrates it in the hands of a relatively few people."33 The Toronto Group suggests that there will probably be "an upsurge ofviolence in the coming decades that will be induced or

comes, life expectancy, and economic growth.28

aggr av ated by scarcity. "3a

the social contract and thus reduce the risk of conflict. Considerable evidence from econometric studies shows that conflict incidence is higher

Many analyses have found an inverted-Ucurve relationship between the extent of democratrzatron in a country and the risk of con-

flict, whereby the incidence of conflict both in consolidated democracies and in extreme authoritarian regimes is lower than in those countries that fall into categories in between. The usual interpretation of this is that "stable" democracies are indeed able to avert violent conflict through a strong social contract, while strongly authoritarian regimes are able to suppress potential conflict.2e Recent attention, however, has focused on the process of democ-

ratiz

tronas a time

ofparticiar vulnerability to

the emergence of conflict, while Marta Re1nalQrerol has suggested that it is the particular

The environmental scarcity hypothesis, in its various manifestations, overlaps substan-

with the other hlpotheses discussed here. It overlaps with the social contract hypothesis, for instance, in viewing poverty as a root cause of conflict, although it points to specific environmental causes of such poverty. It also often overlaps with the group motivation approach, as proponents emphasize that environmental pressures usually lead to conflict where there are "groups with strong collective tia11y

identities that can coherently challenge state authority. "3s Indeed, the "structural scarcity'' dimension of the green war approach is clearly very similar to the models of relative deprivation and horizontal inequality, albeit restricted

227

MorrverroN s FoR CoNpr,rct

to a particular dimension of inequality. In other manifestations, notably Robert Kaplan's prediction of a "coming anarchy''linking environmental degradation with increasing criminality and lawlessness, the environmental scarcity argument has more in common with the private motivation approach.36

The environmental scarcity view has been criticized byJames Fairhead, who argues that it is environmental riches, not scarcity, that are associated with conflict, interpreting environmental riches as the presence of valuable natural resources such as those found in Congo.37 The environmental riches hypothesis thus fits into the private motivation/greed hypothesis. In fact, both environmental poverty and environmental riches may cause conflict, for different reasons and in different circumstances. Other critiques of the green war hypothesis include the accusations ofa lack ofconceptual clarity and of a somewhat fatalistic approach that leaves few policy options open for conflict prevention and resolution.38 In addition, the decade that has passed since Homer-Dixon and Kaplan alike predicted an increase in conflict has seen, instead, a significant decline in worldwide conflict. It remains to be seen whether the experience of future decades will validate their predictions. Nonetheless, it is clear that while pressures arising from environmental scarcity may play an important role in many conflicts, the environmental scarcity hypothesis is-and really doesnt claim to be

more-a partial theory that contributes toward our understanding ofcauses ofa set of conflicts, but not the general conditions under which conflict is more likely to arise.

aaa These theories of conflict causes appear, in their extreme formulations, to be diametrically opposed-the oft-cited "greed versus grievance" debate being a clear example. But, as we have seen, more often than not proponents ofone perspective accept or support in

part the insights of the others.It seems that some conflicts are neatly explained by one of the explanations, some are explained by others, and some clearlyhave multiple causes. For example, Keen has explained the long conflict in

Sudan as the product ofindividual greed, as government and soldiers use the war to advance their own economic positions.3e Yet it can also be seen as an example of sharp HIs, where southerners rebel against their exploitation and seek autonomy, while northerners seek to preserve their privilege.a0 The rebellion in the south can also be seen as an example ofa failed social contract: although provision of services for the country as a whole has been improving, service provision in the south is grossly inadequate, there is no physical securiry and there is virtually no advantage to being part of the Sudanese state. Finally, the poverty of Sudanese (in both south and west) can be interpreted as due to environmental pressrres, and the wars explained as being green

wars. Most contemporary conflicts can similarlybe explained in terms of more than one of the four explanations just advanced, although in many cases it seems that one (or two) of the explanations is dominant.

Therefore, one rather simple conclusion, which qualitative analysts ofconflict are mosdy aware ofbut quantitative analysts tend to overlook, is that each ofthe broad causal theories discussed involves a degree of oversimplification and excessive generalization. The causes and dynamics of any single conflict are typically complex and sometimes contradictory and involve aspects of many, if not all, of the perspectives discussed. Yet it is important to understand which explanation dominates in a particular case, since this has important implications for appropriate policy prescriptions for the prevention and resolution of the conflict'

Conflict, Poverty, and Underdevelopment Where does this leave the "poverty and underdevelopment" explanation of conflict? Each

of

the explanations intersects differently with

228

FnaNces Srnwenr eNo GneHau BnovrN

poverty and underdevelopment. Thble 1 illustrates this, showing the main variables associated with conflict, according to the different explanations. As far as group differences and HIs are concerned, it is not absolute poverty

but relative poverty that matters. For civil wars, what matters is sharing resources of all kinds across all communities; shared poverty and underdevelopment would not lead to conflict. Where a society is poor but some groups

in securing

disproportionate share, there maybe apredisposition to conflict Nepal is an example, where strong caste and geographic inequality have led to acute relative deprivation in the context ofa society that is generally quite poor. Moving to the international dimensions of contemporary conflicts, underdevelopment in the South is associated with acute NortVSouth HIs that mav be notentially destabilizing. A more specific case is the sharp economic divide between Palestine and Israel, which is a mobilizing factor for Muslims elsewhere-an element in the cursucceed

a

rent terrorist threats. For those who emphasize individual maximization and rational choice, poverty and underdevelopment lower the opportunity costs of wars. If people, especially young men, lack

employment or fruitful income-earning opportunities, even the quite moderate "riches" conferred bywar may offer them an attractive alternative. Those who argue for the overwhelming importance of individual motivation of this type point to the empirical correlations of conflict incidence with low average incomes and iow levels of education. However, this view of conflict is based on the premise that fighting does offer opportunities for enrichment. This is difficult to argue in very poor societies, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. The general emphasis on "greed" rather than "grievance" in this approach, then, points not so much to poverty and underdevelopment as to natural resource riches (supplemented by aid flows) as the major source of conflict.

The social contract theory incorporates as part ofthe explanation ofconflict.

poverty

The failed social contract arises because the state fails to deliver-in terms of social services, economic opportunities, and physical security. Poverty and underdevelopment are certainly part of this failure. Afghanistan and Somalia are clear examples. Yet there are poor societies where the state succeeds in providing basic services and sharing the limited opportunities. Low average incomes in a society do not necessarily imply a failed social contract. Some poor states, for example,Tanzania, succeed in delivering sufficient, if minimal, social services and physical security and avoid chronic conflict. Moreover, such countries often experience faster growth rates over the long term, as with Botswana and Malaysia.

The green war hypothesis is certainly in tune with an explanation associated with poverty and underdevelopment, to the extent

that the poverty is caused by environmental pressures. However, there are many other causes

of poverty and underdevelopment, so this explanation does not provide a general connection between poverty, underdevelopment, and conflict. While there are manyconnections between

poverfy and conflict, then, the view that if we could only eliminate povertywe would also eliminate conflict is not supported by the arrilysis here. On the one hand, absolute poverty might be eliminated, yet conflict could well persist, as long as HIs continued and some groups were excluded politically as well as economically. On the other hand, a poor society can also be afau and inclusive one and need not be prone to conflict. Conflict would become less likely if development efforts were successful, leading to a lessening of some sources of conflict-this is shown by the econometric evidence. But policies for the prevention ofconflict need to go beyond raising average incomes or reducing poverty if they are to be successfirl.

MorvetroNs

229

FoR CoNp'r-rcr

Thble 1. Summary of Hypotheses and Evidence on Causal Factors in Conflict EconomicVariables

Evidence ofAssociation

Associated with Conflict

withConflict

Hypotheses

Decline/stagnation in per capita

Cross-country and case study

incomes

support

Failure of social contract; environmental degradation;

low opportunity costs private motive Horizontal inequality

Vertical inequality

High poverty

ofwar-

support

Group motives for conflict (horizontal inequalities)

Conflicting evidence

Failure of social contract

Same evidence as for per capita

Failure ofsocial contract; green war; private motives

Cross-country and case study

incomes

limited

Failure of social contract; weak

Reduced govemment revenue

Case study evidence;

and social expenditure

statistical investigation; no

govemment ability to suppress

widence for association with

conflict-failed

IMF High levels of natural resources

state

programs

Support for mineral resources

Private motives (and financing)

orly Political Factors Associated

with Conflict History of conflict

Strong statistical and case study

Persistence of economic con-

evidence

ditions giving rise to conflict; memory of conflict acting as mobiJizing agent

State expenditure as

low

Casual evidence

Weak states

Case study and statistical evidence

Horizontal inequalities

Statistical and case study evidence

Inability to negotiate change or

proportion of national income Unequal access to political power among grouPs Intermediate political regime

suppress violence

EcoNovlc, SocrAL, AND POLITICAL POLICIES fuMED

ATPREVENTING CONFLICT

Economic and social policies may contribute in each ofthe three stages ofconflict preconflict, conflict, and postconflict. First, in a preconflict situation, where there is no conflict but there is a high probability of one occurring,

preventive policies should be aimed at changing the underlying conditions in such a way as to make the outbreak of conflict less likely. Second, when a conflict has broken out, eco-

nomic and social policies can help protect the economy and people against some of the costs resulting from the conflict, for example, through food distribution.al Third, after a conflict has ended, policies are needed to help reconstruct

230 the economy. This section focuses primarily on preventive policies-these are most obviously relevant to the preconflict situation but are also relevant to the other stages, particulady the postconflict situation, since there is generally a high probability of the conflict recurring soon after a conflict has ended and it is therefore vital to introduce preventive policies. Of course, the postconflict stage also requires more straightforward reconstruction policies, such as investment to replace destroyed facilities, and policies to integrate the combatants into peacefirl activities. These are not considered here. If conflicts are regarded as irrational or caused by unavoidable ethnic clashes, there is little role for policy other than repression or separating people from different groups. But to the extent that conflicts are the outcome of economic causes, preventive policies may be effective in reducing their incidence. Each of the different theories discussed here has implications for preventive policies, which will be considered in this section. The policies should be applied to all countries that are vulnerable to conflict; which policies are relevant will depend on the situation and which theory most closely approximates the situation. Evidence suggests the following types of countries are clearly mlnerable to conflict:

.

All low-income, low-human-development countries, given the fact that at least half of these countries have been in conflict at some

time over the past thirty years and that all econometric evidence points to low income

.

.

r

correlate with conflict AnI country that has been in conflict over the past thirtyyears, because the evidence shows that previous conflict is the most sigas a

nificant pointer to further conflict An)'countrywith high horizontal inequalities in political or economic dimensions, as such countries are likely to suffer from conflict Countries whose political regime is "intermediate," that is, in transition from strong repressive regimes to more democratic regimes

FneNcBs SreweRr eNo GRRHen BnovrN Three qpes ofpolicies are needed, directed at the main factors responsible for conflict:

o o

r

Policies to address horizontal inequalities (policies aimed at group motives) Policies to reduce the functionality of conflict (i.e., to address private motives) Policies to promote equitable and sustainable development (i.e., to address social conffact failures and environmental pressures)

Correcting H ortzontal I nequalitie

s

The general direction ofpolicy change to avoid violence must be to reduce group inequalities. To achieve this, it is essential to have politically, economicall y, and socially inclusive policies. These include policies to achieve geographicaliy balanced benefits, as well as balance between ethnicities, religions, or races. Politically, this means that all major groups in a society participate in political power: the administration, the army, and the police. Inclusive economic outcomes require that horizonta) inequality in economic aspects (assets, employment, and incomes) be moderate; inclusive social outcomes require thathorizontal inequality in social participation and achieved well-being also be moderate. "Moderate" is a loose term. Group equality would be the ideal. "Horizontal equity" describes a degree of horizontal inequality that is accept-

able to major groups in sociery and hence such a degree of horizontal inequality would be unlikely to provoke conflict. The impor-

tance of any measure of inequality is increased if it occurs systematically over a number of dimensions and grows over time. Hence, such considerations should enter into ajudg-

ment ofwhat an acceptable degree ofhorizontal inequality is. The general objective of inclusivity and moderate horizontal inequality will translate differently into specific policy recommendations in particular cases, depending on the relevant groups in the society, the dimensions of importance in the particular sociery and those in which there is substantial horizontal inequality.

MorryeuoNs

23r

FoR CoNpr,rcr

Political Inclusi,uity. The most universal requirement is for political inclusivity because it is monopolization of political power by one group or another that is normally responsible for many of the other inequalities. Yet achieving political inclusivity is among the most dif-

as in the case of Belgium and Switzerland. Nigeria is an example of how the design of the constitution can affect the propensity to conflict.India is an example of a huge de-

ficult changes to bring about. It is not just a matter of democracy, defined as rule with the support of the majoriry since majority rule can be consistent with abuse of minorities, as,

federal constitution. The extent and nature of decentralization. Decentralization, like federalism, can contribute to power sharing. This may have been one reason why Bolivia avoided conflict despite deep HIs. But decentralization does not always work in the intended way; it can replace one set of power brokers with

for example, in the recent history of Rwanda, Cambodia, andZimbabwe; as long ago as the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville had identified the potential problems of the "tyranny of the majority."a In a politically inclusive democratic systemr particular types of proportional representation are needed to ensure participation by all major groups in the elected bodies. For inclusive government, representation of all such groups is essential not only at the level ofthe cabinet but also in other organs ofgovernment. For political inclusiviry members of major groups also need to be included at all levels of the civil service, the army, and the

police. An excellent example of how institutionalization ofinclusive politics can avert conflict comes from Switzerland, where the 1848 federal constitution institutionalized a high degree of power sharing, bringrng to an end centuries of intermittent fighting between Protes-

tant and Catholic cantons.

It should be emphasized that political participation can occur at many levels (central, regional, local), in different types ofdecisions (defense, economic, social), and in different

stitutions

("t-y,

in-

police, civil service). Full po-

litical participation means that significant groups in the population participate across the board, and that their presence is not just nominal.There are manyways this can be promoted, each ofwhich has been adopted, in some form or another. in divided societies.43 Here we

touch briefly on major aspects:

o A federal

constitution. Where groups are mainly separate geographically, a federal constitution can empower different groups,

veloping country that has maintained peace at a national level, probably pardy due to its

another, which may or may not diffuse group are geographdecentraJization such ically concentrated, may give greater political power to previously underrepresented groups, but it can also lead to continued (or even greater) disempowerment for some (normally minority) groups within the decentralized areas, as is also the case with federalism (e.g., in

domination.a Where groups

Nigeria). The voting system. A proportional representation (PR) system, or similar voting system, gives more power to minorities,but

with PR a majority can dominate decision making unless a power-sharing system in elected assemblies and other govemment bodies is also adopted. Such systems in developing countries, although it ^rerare is worth reporting that no countrywith PR has had serious internal conflict.as The nature of the elected assemblies.In a bicameral assembly, it is possible to combine democratic representation in one house of the assembly with geographic (as in the United States) or group representation in the other. The voting system within assemblies can be designed to prevent a single group from dominating (e.g., by requiring a two-thirds majority or by granting veto powers to particular groups). even

Seat reservation in parliament for particular groups. This has been adopted for the

232 unscheduled castes and tribes in India and also for women in a number of countries. It is an important feature of the new Iraqi

constitution.

Employment allocations within government. There can be formal or informal provisions for afair share ofpolitical posts at every level, including the presidency, the cabinet, the senior civil service, the military, and the police. For example, there is provision for tfuee presidents in Bosnia and Herzegovrna; postconflict Cambodia had two prime ministers for manyyears. Citizenship rights. These can be comprehensive, covering all who live in an area, or highly restrictive, requiring several generations of residence or extended only to "blood" relatives of some "original" inhabitants. Exclusionary citizenship rights can be highly provocative (as in Cdte d'Ivoire), but relatively easy access to citizenship rights can also generate local resentment where this is seen as an attemDt to "dilute" a re-

gional minoriry as in the Malaysian state ofSabah. Constraints on political parties. When there are no constraints, political parties in divided societies tend to become "ethnic."46 For this reason, multiparty elections often provoke violence.aT Policies toward political parties range from outlawing them altogether (as in Yoweri Museveni's Uganda) to requiring them to have multiethnic support (e.g., in Nigeria). While such policies can prevent the ethnicization of party politics, they can prove problematic where genuine regional grievances exist. The Indonesian constitution, for instance, bans regional political parties, a ban that was a major sticking point in the recently concluded peace negotiations in the province ofAceh.

Human rights protection. Strong protection of civil liberties and human rights does not ensure power sharing, but it does

limit the abuse of power and clearly has an important role to play. Conversely, some

FneNcrs Srpwanr eNo GneHev Bnov,'r.l (semi-)authoritarian regimes have used the

ethnic diversity of their population to juson human rights, particularly those relating to freedom of speech

tif' limitations

and freedom of assembly.

This account has briefly touched on the many policies that can be used to ensure political participation of major groups. There has been considerable experience in designing political systems to achieve inclusive and balanced political participation in sharply divided societies struggling to maintain peace and cohesion. Among developed countries, Belgium and Switzerland are prime examples. Many developing countries initially overcame these

problems through authoritarian regimes that suppressed dissent, but the political issues associated with multiethnic societies are coming to the fore with democnttzation.The widelv recommended formula of majoritarian multi-

party democracy is inadequate, and postconflict

countries have struggled to find alternative, more inclusive models. Nigeria, Fiji, Ethiopia, and Malaysia are examples, having modified their political systems as a consequence ofpolitical unrest. It is clear that policies to address

political HIs need to accompany economic and social policies if renewed conflict is to be avoided. Economic and Social Inclusivitv.It is not alwavs a straightforward matter to iecide what eco-

nomic and social inclusivity means. Should one aim for equality in opportunities, in access to resources, or in outcomes? Apparent equality of opportunities may lead to very unequal outcomes because of a variety of implicit practices and past disadvantages of some groups relative to others. The liberal philosophy of "equal opportunities" is at best a necessary con-

dition for advancing group equality. Equality in access to resources is likely to get nearer to providing a genuine level playing field, but it may still result in inequalities of outcomes (defined very broadly in terms of health. income

MouvetroNs

FoR

CoNprrcr

per capita, and educational achievements) because the disadvantaged group is likely to be less efficient at using a particular set of assets. For equality of outcomes, inequality in access to targetable assets may be necessary, such as with education,land, and capital.

Policies toward achieving gre ter group equality in economic entidements can be divided into three types, although the distinctions are not watertight: first, policies aimed at changing processes that are either direcdy or

indirecdy discriminatory can be adopted; second, assistance can be directed to particular groups; and third, targets and quotas can be

introduced for education, land distribution, and financial and physical assets.

The first type of policy is not so different from any set of policies to promote competition, although it involves a much more carefi.rl search for indirectly discriminatory policies than is usual.It is likely to be a relatively acceptable type of policy and can have a significant impact. For example, this was a major part of the poliry set adopted in Northem lreland.The second type ofpolicy concerns the nature and

distribution of public funds, often involving a redirection of expenditure across regions or neighborhoods,

as

well

as

groups within them.

This is in principle within the control of the government, but it may meet resistance from privileged regions or from the government itselfto the extent that it represents privileged groups. This type of policy requires carefirl review of the implications of all public expenditure (and other relevant policies) for the group distribution of benefits. It is noteworthy that such a review does not form an explicit consideration in the public expenditure reviews supported by the international donors, or that of most governments.The third type of policy, pertaining to quotas and targets, is the most controversial and politically provocative. It is

If

the nublic sector constitutes a maior source of HL (in education, employment, and infrastructure), a good deal can be achieved through direct action by the government. HIs located in the private sector are more difficult to tackle, tho"Sh all tfuee types of policies will a contribution. The growing inequality in South Africa since 1994, despite government action, shows the importance of tackiing inequalities that originate in the private sector.48 There are many cases where affirmative action has been adopted in one way or another,

make

pointing to alasge range of possible policies.ae Such policies have been adopted in the North (as in the United States, New Zealand, and Northern Ireland) and the South (as in Fiji, India, Malaysia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka). Two sorts of programs can be distinguished: those introduced by disadvantaged majorities, for example, in Fiji (ethnic Fijians), Malaysia

(Maiays/Bumiputera), Namibia (black population), South Africa (black population), and Sri Lanka (Sinhalese); and those introduced by advantaged majorities for disadvantaged minorities, for example, in Brazil, India, Northern Ireland, and the United States. Policies that have been introduced to correct group inequalities include Policies to Correct Asset Distribution

r

r r o

this type of policy that many people mean

r

when they talk of"afiirmative action," although affirmative action can be interpreted as including all three types of policies.

.

Policies to improve the group distribution of land through redistribution of govemment-

owned land, forcible eviction, purchases, and restrictions on ownership (Malaysia, Zimbabw e, Fiji, and Namibia) Policies concerning the terms of privatiza-

tion (Fiji and Malaysia) Financial assets: bank regulations, subsidizations, and restrictions (Malaysia and South Africa) Credit allocation preferences (Fiji and Malaysia)

Preferential training (BrazrI and New Zealand\ Qlotas for education (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and the United States)

FneNcBs Srowenr eNo GneHav Bnowr.l

r r

Public sector infrastructure (South Africa) Housing (Northern Ireland)

Policies to Correct Income and Employment

Distribution

I

Employment policies, including public sector quotas (Malaysia, Sri Lanka,India) and the requirement for balanced employment in the private sector (South Africa)

. tansfer payments: although there are many cases of age-,disability-, and genderrelated transfers, transfers according to ethnicity, religion, or race are rare

Reductions in sharp horizontal inequalities may be essential to produce a stable sociery but their introduction can be provocative. The most clear-cut example is Sri Lanka, where policies to improve the position of the Sinhalese were a factor stimulating Tamil rebellion. InZimbabwe,land policies, along with other

policies, have been introduced in a highly provocative way and can hardly be taken as a model. In both cases, some action was almost certainly necessary if conflict was to be avoided in the longer run, but such policies clearly have to be introduced with sensitivitv. In Malavsia.

which has instituted arguably the most extensive and comprehensive policypackage in history to reduce horyzontil.inequalities, the New Economic Policy (NEP), the successful implementation of these policies largely depended on acceptance oftheir political necessity by all

groups, precisely because

of the risk of in-

stability associated with the status quo ante. Nonetheless, Chinese discontent with the NEP policies strengthened in the mid-1980s, when the spectacular growh of the previous decade stalled, suggesting that such policies are best implemented in an economic environment that is otherwise favorable.s0

Reducing Private Incentives For conflict prevention, it is helpful to introduce policies aimed at reducing the functionality of conflict. One important aspect of such policies is to increase people's peacetime eco-

nomic opportunities, by extending their access

to education and other assets and through a dynamic peacetime economy that offers people employment and earnings opportunities, so the gains that can be made during conflict (through theft, smuggling, looting, etc.) are less attractiye.

Much of the profiting from war arises because of general lawlessness-where there is a weak state with litde control over criminality. Strengthening the state can be an important aspect ofpreventive policies, yet the policy agenda

today tends to weaken the state through the strong push toward the market, cutbacks in government expenditure, the increasing use of NGOs for service delivery and moves toward decentr alization of government. Governance reforms demanding greater transparency and accountability, aimed at improving the moral character and efficiency of the state, may not strengthen the state in the way required.

Expanding employment opportunities for young men is generally important in preventive policy, and especially for postconflict societies-high male unemployment is frequently associated with outbreaks of conflict for example, in Sri Lanka and Algeria, *hilJ lack of opportunities in general is a common feature of many countries when conflict breaks out, including, for example, in the preconflict situation in Sierra Leone. Another set of policies commonly recommended to reduce the private incentives forwar aim at reducing the "rents" arising from natural resources.5l These consist partly of domestic

reforms, such as greater transparency and competition in the production and marketing of natural resources, and pardy of international policies that may reduce trade in war commo-

dities, such as diamonds and drugs. As with the policies discussed earlier, what is appropriate inevitably differs from country to country. Restoring the Social Contract Policies to restore the social contract have

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expected to protect refugees and civilians from attack or genocide and perhaps to compel parties to end fighting.Thus, these operations have cost more and had a greater probability of casualties for peacekeepers. Some have required the maj or powers' logistical capability, personnel, heavy equipment, and even airpower.They have often been controversial because theyblur the line between peacekeeping and enforcement actions under Chapter WI, with the result that

announced that all its forces would be withdrawn byMarch !994 andundertook amalor reevaluation of its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations in Somalia ceased in7995,having succeeded in ending the humanitarian emergency (famine), but not in helping the Somalis establish an effective government or end their internal strife.

the requisite muscle was not always readily forthcoming because states were reluctant to provide sufficient military forces to back up a Security Council mundut.. The UN op.iutions in Somalia and Yugoslavia in the 1990s illustrated the difficulties of these more com-

and war, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

the Security Council devoted a record number of meetings between L991and1996 to debate whether to intervene, to what end, and with what means.The mission of UN peacekeepers

plex operations.

a cease-fire

In the case of Somalia in 7992 and 7993, the United Nations confronted a situation in which civil order had totally collapsed and warring clans had seized conffol of the country. Widespread famine and chaos accompanied

itarian assistance to creating safe areas for refugees, protecting basic human rights, and using NATO to enforce sanctions and a no-flyzone and to conduct air strikes. Security Council resolutions alone did not produce the man-

the fighting and, with control of food a vital political resource for the Somali warlords,

power, logistical, financial, or military resources

hundreds of thousands of civilians were pushed to the brink of starvation. The Security Coun-

cil was initially slow to act, assuming that it needed consent from the wadords to provide humanitarian assistance, consistent with the norms of traditional peacekeeping. In August 7992 a small contingent of lighdy armed Pakistani troops was deployed (United Nations Operation in Somalia IUNOSOM I]) to protect reliefworkers, but it was inadequate to the task at hand. Finally, in December 1992,the Security Council authorized alarge U.S.led military-hum anitarian intervention (Unifi ed Task Force IUNITAF], known to the U.S. public as Operation Restore Hope). The UN secretary-general wanted U.S. forces to impose a cease-fire and disarm factions, but U.S. leaders who had signed on to the humanitarian

mission were reluctant to enlarge the objecThat disagreement complicated relations among the participants. When U.S. soldiers were ki1led in October 1993. the United States tives.

In the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s into five separate states

sent

in !992was broadened from maintaining in Croatia and delivering human-

needed to fuIfill the mandate, however. All sides interfered with reliefefforts and targeted

UN

peacekeepers and international aid

work-

UN personnel were reluctant to use the authority given them to employ NATO air strikes. The UN safe areas were anything but ers.

safe for the civilians who had taken refuge in them and, in the case of Srebrenica, UN peacekeepers were humiliated when they failed to prevent the massacre of more than seven thousand Muslim men and bovs bv Bosnian Serbs in July 1995.8 The United Nations'peacekeeping role in Bosnia and Croatia ended when the United States brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in November 7995 and NAIO troops replaced UN blue helmets. The United Nations' role in the subsequent peacebuilding process focused on reforming Bosnia's police forces, resetding refugees, and aiding economic develooment. The United Nations has confronted similar challenges where the line between the need for enforcement and traditional peacekeeping

Tuo UNrrBo Narroxs

aNro CoNFr.rcr MaNRcm,rBNr

in a number of conflicts since the late 1990s.These include Liberia, Sierra Leone, C6te d'Ivoire, Sudan, the Democratic Repubwas blurred

lic of the Congo, Burundi, and Haiti. For example,

in Sudan,

a

UN

peacekeeping force

(Jnited Nations Mission in Sudan [UNMIS]) authorized in 2005 is chargedwith supporting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement betvveen the government and the Sudan People's Lib-

eration Movement/Army. It has authority under Chapter WI to take necessary actions involving use offorce and a range ofpeacebuilding responsibilities. More complex peacekeeping operations involve both civilian and miJitary activities. While troop contingents maybe engaged in observer activities characteristic of traditional missions, other military personnel and civilians, along with humanitarian NGOs and personnel from different UN agencies, may be involved in organiingelections,reorganiingpoliceforces, delivering relief, and carrying out other activities aimed at creating viable states. This is the essence of peacebuilding.

Namibia-a former German colony administered by South Africa from the end of World War I until 7989 and the object of intense international efforts to secure its indeoendence

the first experiment with The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), deployed in April !989,had the most ambitious, diverse mandate of any UN mission to that time.It included supervision ofthe ceasefire between South African and South West Africa People's Organization (SW\PO) forces, monitoring the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the confinement of SWAPO forces to a series of bases, super-represented peacebuilding.

vising the civil police force, securing the repeal of discriminatory and restrictive legislation, arranging for the release ofpolitical prisoners and the retum of exiles, and creating conditions for free and fair elections, which were subsequendy conducted by South A6ica under IIN supervision. With military and civilian person-

507

nel provided by 109 counffies,

UNTAG played

avrtal role in managing the process bywhich

Namibia moved step-by-step from war to a cease-fire and then to f,rll independence. The United Nations' success in Namibia led it to undertake a number of other complex missions, not all ofwhich enjoyed the same success. The agreements ending the twenty-year civil war in Cambodiain 1997 "charged the UN-for the first time in its history-with the political and economic restructuring of a member state as part of the building of peace under which the parties were to institutionalize theft reconciliation. "e The United Nations Tiansition Authority in Cambodia's ([INTAC) tasks called for up to twenty-two thousand military and civilian personnel. The military component was charged with supervising the cease-fire and disarming and demobilizing forces. Civilian personnel assumed fi,rll responsibility for administering the country for an eighteen-month transition period. The United Nations also monitored the return of 370,000 refugees from camps in Thailand, organized the L993 elections that returned civil authority to Cambodians, and rehabilitated basic infrastructure. A.s then

fIN

secretary-general

Boutros Boutros-Ghali observed, "Nothing the UN has ever done can match this operation."10 The United Nations'presence helped end the civil war and bring peace of sorts to mostofthe country. UNTAC was unable,however, to achieve a complete cease-fire, demoblhze a17 forces, or complete its civil mission. Cambodia, therefore, illustrates the diffi culty of carrying out all aspects of a complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission. Although the peacekeeping mission itself largely accomplished its goals and the United Nations conducted a successfiJ election in7993,Cambodia was not a stable state, as UNTAC's mandate

had not included building an effective legal system and constitutional process or promoting economic development. T\,vo more recent complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations-Kosovo and

508

KanBN A. MrNcsr eNo MeRcensr P. I(enNs

order, aiding the return ofrefugees, coordinat-

after almost fifteen years of UN-mediated efforts to resolve the status of East Timor-a former Portuguese colony seized bylndonesia in the mid-197Os-when violence broke out, Indonesian troops failed to restore order, and almost a half million EastTimorese were displaced from their homes.The Security Council initially authorized Australia to lead a multilateralforce to restore order and then created the United Nations tansitional Administra-

ing humanitarian relief and reconstructing key infrastructure.In addition, UNMIK has key political tasks of promoting autonomy and self-government and helping to deter-

tion in EastTimor (UNTAET) with an ambitious and extensive mission, ranging from exercising all judicial, legislative, and executive powers to assisting in developing civil and

mine Kosovo's future legal status.The head of UNMIK, a special representative of the UN secretary-general, coordinates the work of several non-UN international organizations among whom various functions are divided, the United Nations having chief responsibility for police and justice and civil administration.

social services, providing security, ensuring the

Timor-further illustrate the challenges the United Nations faces in such situations. Following NATO bombing of Serbia and intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians in East

7999,the United Nations Mission in Kosovo was authorized to establish an interim administration with all executive,legislative, and judicial powers and wide-ranging functions, including maintaining civil law and

(UNMIK)

The Kosovo mission is pathbreaking in its nature and scope but also has critical problems. Its mandate is both vague and potentially contradictory; the Albanian Kosovars want independence, but the United Nations is committed to promoting selFgovernment without undermining Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Security is provided by NAIO ffoops under KFOR,/et the division ofresponsibility between NATO and the United Nations, the European lJnion, and the Organizatronfor Security and Cooperation in Europe is not entirely clear. When and how the United Nations'interim administration could end is likewise uncertain, even if llN-mediated talks on Kosovo's future status yield an agreement on independent statehood.ll Skepticism about the long-term outcome of peacebuilding in Kosovo has been reinforced by the experience in EastTimor, where the transition to independence under llN auspices was successfirl, but the new government has little capacity beyond its capital, the econ-

omy is weak, and critical issues remain unresolved. This mission was undertaken in 1999

delivery of humanitarian aid, promoting sustainable development, and building the foundation for stable liberal democracy. Renewedviolence led to the return ofpeacekeepers in 2006, raising doubts about EastTimor's future. Ambitious peacebuilding missions such as in Cambodia, Kosovo, and EastTimor are only beginning to be subjected to carefirl analysis.

Although the length of interim administration was circumscribed in Cambodia and East Timor, that is not the case in Kosovo (nor in Bosnia, where an EU-appointed high representative remains in overall control).The missions have been variously described as forms of international trusteeship, protectorates, and even neoimperialism.l2What is evident, however, is that peacebuilding is a long process where success may not be seen for years or even decades. Recognizing the need for greater coherence in supporting the multiple dimensions of long-term assistance to ensure that

countries recovering from war do not relapse into conflict, the 2005 World Summit ofgovernment leaders, convened at the beginning of the sixtieth annual General Assembly session, approved creation of a new intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), backed by a Peace Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund.The PBC is intended to "bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies"

THn UNrrBo NATroNs eNo CoNr,r,rcr MeNacnupNr for the needs ofparticular counffies in developing public institutions and economic recovery.13 It is also expected to have a role in preventing a relapse into violent conflict by alerting the international community if adequate progress

is not being made.14

Evaluating the United Nations' Record in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilfing

What defines

success in peacekeeping and peacebuilding? An end to fighting? A political solution in the form of apeace agreementl A period ofyears (two, five, tenl) without renewed violencel The establishment of a viable state that endures for a period of time? In realiry

different tl,pes ofmissions should be evaluated

with different criteria. Tiaditional peacekeeping missions, therefore, can be assessed in terms

of

their ability to prevent the resumption of interstate war, and here the evidence is strong that the presence ofpeacekeepers reduces the risk of another war. The first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) averted war betvyeen the Arab states and Israel for eleven years (1956-67), whrle the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has kept peace between Israel and Synia on the

Golan Heights since I974.The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFIC\?) has averted overt hostilities between the Greek andTurkish communities for forty years, although it

could not prevent the Turkish invasion of northern Clprus in7974.There has been no renewal of hostilities either between Iraq and Iran or between Iraq and Kuwait, and UN monitors'presence has helped India and Pakistan to contain intermittent hostilities along the line of control in disputed Kashmir for more than fiftyyears. Yet fifty years of experience also demonstrates that having international monitors for a truce does not lead to resolution ofthe underlying conflict and that fighting may resume, even with UN monitors in place, especially since the United Nations has historically been reluctant to condemn states for violations for

509

fear of jeopardizing its impartiality. As one scholar notes, "This unfortunately undermined the organizztion's ability to use the spotlight of international attention to help maintain

that peacekeepers are most likelyto be deployed in the most difficult cases, where the military outcome has been indecisive, where belligerents have a long history ofconflict, and, hence, where peace is most fragile.The tension, however, between credibility and impartiality is a dilemma for the United Nations, one that has changed somewhat since the Cold War's end, with greater willingness to condemn belligerents and even to take military action against those who threaten peace as we discussed earpeace."15 Closer examination also shows

lier under enforcement. UN missions involving arms control verification, human rights monitoring, and election supervision tend to be successfirl because they are most similar to traditional peace-

keeping; that is, they involve unarmed ob-

They are generally linked to a peace agreement and, hence, involve consent of the parties to a peacekeeping operation. Thus, UN servers.

peacekeepers have compiled an excellent record

in facilitating elections in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, EastTimor, and elsewhere. Those missions that di{fer most from traditional peacekeeping operations tend to have the greatest difficulties, often because the forces are shorthanded, inadequately equipped, and

not well designed to c rry out multiple functions. The United Nations has had particular difficulty recruiting sufficient numbers of civilian police for peacebuilding missions. Mandates for complex operations are also frequendy unclear. Precisely because they combine different types oftasks aswell as civilian and mfitary components, the assessment of such operations maybe mixed.In Somalia, as noted, UN and U.S. forces were successful in achieving

the humanitarian tasks, but they failed in the

pacification and nation-building tasks. Cambodia is now regarded as a short-term success

KanBN A. MrNcsr eNo MRncannr P. KenNs

510

ing independence, but the long-term prognosis is uncertain. In Kosovo, the outcome remains in doubt, as it does in the several African

both before and since the ColdWar's end have been in Africa, showing, as one observer notes, that'tonflicts and problems ofgovemance continue to haunt Africa more than ever."19 Yet ever since the debacle in Somalia in 1993, the

conflicts in which the United Nations has most recently been involved-Sierra Leone, Liberia, C6te d'Ivoire, the Democratic Re-

United Nations has had notable difficulty mustering adequate resources---rspecially military forces-for African operations, leaving

public of the Congo, and Sudan. Factors that can facilitate success in these complex operations include the parties' desire for peacel the political will of member states to make necessary resources available (including sufficient forces, equipment, and authority to use them); wide deployment of police monitors alongwith police and judicial reform; extensive training of election monitors; the energy, skill, and improvisation of the secretarygeneral's special representative in the country; even-handed treatment of the parties; and, most critically, continual political support. The United Nations itself does not have the capability to ensure all ofthese factors are in place but depends on the commitments of states and, most especially, the major powers. Wars with an ethnic or religious component and a large number of factions are less likely to be resolved and less susceptible to peacebuilding efforts. Where parties, such as in Angola and Sierra Leone, depend on exports ofprimary products such as diamonds or oil for buying arms and personal enrichment, peacebuilding is also less likely to be successfi.rl because there is too much temotation to renew war to loot resources.l6 One study concludes that learning and adaptation byUN personnel make a critical difference.lT Another found that turning warring parties into political parties through demobilization and demrlitanzation of soldiers was critical.18 Finally, the cases that come to the United Nations tend to be the very hard ones, from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Cyprus, and Kashmir to Liberia, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Almost half of the UN peacekeeping operations of any type

them woefirlly shorthanded and susceptible to charges of racism. At the end of 2005, of sixteen peacekeeping operations deployed, eight were in Africa and five of those had begun since 2000. Seventy-six percent of the sixtyeight thousand peacekeepers in the field were in African operations, yet these troops were still inadequate to dealwith a number of difficult situations. As a result, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have mounted peacekeeping efforts authorized by the Security Council. Yet African troops need significant outside support. Many peacekeeping operations since the Cold War's end, including several in Africa, have also faced major humanitarian crises. These crises have called for international responses to human suffering, despite the long-

with longer-term mixed reviews. Likewise, East

Timor was a relative

success as far as achiev-

standing norm of noninterference in states' domestic affairs.

FnoUNoNTNTERFERENcE INDOMESTICAFEAIRSTo

HuualqtrerueN INtnRvBNtr oN

The UN Charter specifically precludes the United Nations from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (Article 2, Section 7). During the Cold War, not one Security Council resolution mentioned humanitarian intervention. Yet over the life ofthe United Nations, the once-rigid distinction between domestic and international issues has weakened. Civil war was not under the traditional purview of the United Nations, but because human rights are often abrogated, refugees displaced, and

Tun UNnBo NetroNs aNo CoNr.r,rct MeNacBvrBNr weapons moved across borders, such conflicts have increasingly been viewed as international,

justifying UN action. In April I99l,after the

Gulf War's end,Western allies created safe havens and no-fly zones to protect Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in the south.The United Nations'intervention in Somalia was initiated for humanitarian reasons. as was NATO's in Kosovo. Yet the United Nations is known more for its failures than for its successes in humanitarian intervention. Rwanda offers the most striking example.ln7993 the United Nations had authorized a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor a peace agreement between the Hutu-dominated government and Tutsi rebels in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

InApril 7994,fol7ovnngthe

death of Rwandan presidentJuv6nal Habyarimana (a Hutu) in a mysterious plane crash, Hutu extremists in the Rwandan miJitary and police began slaughtering the minority Tlrtsi as well as moderate Hutu. Despite reports ofthe growingviolence by UN personnel on the ground, the Security

Councilvoted to reduce UNAMIR's personnel initially, then reversed that decision a month later in the name of humanitarianism. It took almost four months to get states to provide forces, and, by that time, the genocide had left 750,000 Rwandans dead and two million displaced. The United Nations' own Department

of Peacekeeping Operations, then headed by Kofi Annan, was later faulted for not communicating the urgency of the crisis to the Secu-

rity Council, and members ofthe councilwere criticized for their failure to take action to pre-

vent the human tragedy.2o All agreed "never agairi'would theyfail to respond to genocide. The7999 NAIO action in Kosovo marked another watershed in the debate over humanrtarian intervention. The issue was not inaction but legitimacy and effectiveness. The crisis was triggered by Yugoslav (Serbian) rejection of a political settlement for Kosovo and growing evidence of ethnic cleansing that led NATO to initiate military action without

5rt

Security Council authorization. Two key questions emerged: First, could the use of force be justified without a UN Security Council resolution? Although Russia, China, and other coun-

tries protested the illegality, a Security Council resolution condemning the NAIO action failed, suggesting that many felt there was a le-

gitimate case to be made for intervention. Months of diplomary had preceded NATO's intervention and failed to change Serbian policy; all other means short of force had been used. Second, did NATO bombing alleviate or worsen the humanitarian crisis by accelerating the flight of refugees and humanitarian suffering, civilian casualties, and destruction of major infrastructure? Although the evidence on this question is mixed, an independent commission concluded that intervention in Kosovo was "illegal but legitimate."2l Beginning in 2003, the western region of Darfur in Sudan presented yet another horrific humanitarian disaster. Thousands of refugees fled their homes after attacks from govemment-backed Arab militias (Janjaweed), and many sought shelter in neighboring Chac. Over the next year, the humanitarian disaster grew to one hundred thousand refugees and more than one million intemally displaced persons, with various estimates of those killed ranging from ten thousand and up. Although various IIN agencies were active in providing food, establishing refugee camps, and initiating a massive vaccination program, their efforts were frequendy blocked by the Sudanese government. It was May 2004, however, be-

fore the Security Council addressed the issue, and then onlywith weakwords to Sudan, followed by promises to aid the African Union's deployment of cease-fire monitors. A subsequent resolution suggested possible action if Sudan failed to curb the violence, but four members, including two ofthe P-5 (China and Russia) abstained. Secretary-General Annan pushed for more concerted action, supported by U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell, who labeled Darfur a clear case ofgenocide in mid-

512 2004.22In March 2005 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, referred the Darfi.u

crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for action against those responsible for the genocide. By that time, between 180,000 and 300,000 people had died,2.4 million people had been displaced, and the Sudanese government announced it would not cooperate with the ICC.The AU had some seven thousand military and police personnel deployed in Darfur by fall 2005, but they were too few in number and poorly equipped for the job, and it was not clear enough whether their mandate was only to monitor a cease-fire or to protect civilians.23 The "never agairi' promise following Rwanda's genocide again looked hollow The Darfur case highlights three essential

problems that the United Nations (and the international community) confronted with humanitarian intervention. The first is selectivity. Why did the United Nations intervene in Somalia but ignore Sudan and Liberia, where large-scale loss oflife due to deliberate starvation, forced migrations, and massive human rights abuses were also occurring in the early 1990s? Why did the United Nations and NATO focus on Kosovo but ignore the war in Chechnya? More recently, why did the international communitymobrhze so rapidlyto aid the victims of the2004lndian Ocean tsunami but fail to resoond to the humanitarian crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur? The experience with Darfur has led many to conclude that the United Nations no longer is prepared to act in Africa because of racism and/or donor fatigue.The second problem is one of timely action and the difficulties of intervening given the remoteness and sheer size of the Darfur region, which is ten times the size of Bosnia, for example, where 60,000 NATO troops were deployed in 1995. International action was too little and too late to save thousands of human lives in Somalia, Srebrenica, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and now Darfur. Mobilizing a force takes time and significant resources-unless one or more major

KenrN A. MrNcsr eNo MeRcenrr

P.

KenNs

it in their national interest to In February 2006, the Security Council began discussion of replacing the African Union force in Darfur with a much larger, better-equipped UN force with a broader powers deem act.

mandate, yet those discussions were expected to be lengthy because no major power, including the United States, was prepared to lead a Darfirr mission.That is one of the reasons why there have been proposals for a small rapidreaction force at the disposal ofthe secretarygeneral. S till, learning from peacekeepers' experience, the best such a force could do is draw

international attention to a crisis and hope that a larger response would be forthcoming. The third problem Darfur represents is the problem of political will for humanitarian intervention. The P-5 states have conflicting interests in many situations; Russia and China have economic interests in Sudan and both states have traditionally opposed using enforcement measures for internal disputes. The Europeans and the United States have put priority on the peace accord ending the long civil war in southern Sudan. A1so, the United States does not want to jeopardize the Sudanese government's cooperation in the war against terrorism, nor does it want to commit U.S. troops to intervene. Regardless of selectiviry egregious errors, and continuing controversy, the very fact that debate is taking place over the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention marks a change. Followingthe report ofthe International Commission on Intervention and State Sover,igrrq fo and extensive debate, the 2005 World Summit Outcome endorsed the emerging norm of international responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence when states cannot protect their own.25 In so doing, it recognizedthat state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention in internal affais cannot be used to bar the United Nations or regional

organizations from intervening ifstates fail to prevent large-scale humanitarian violations. Yet the case of

Darfir illustrates that the

I

THB UNrrno NeuoNs eNo CoNprrct MeNeconaBNt

political will to stop, let alone prevent, humanitarian disasters is still lacking. THe UNrrBp NRrroNs' RorB IN COMBATINGTERRORJSM

Terrorism is an old threat to individual, state, and regional security that has taken on a number of new guises, making it a much greater threat to international peace and securitv.The Middle East conflict spawned a cycle oft.rro, following the 7967 Arab-Israeli war and Israeli occupation of the West Ban( Gaza, and the Golan Heights when Palestinian groups began using terrorism to draw attention to their cause of establishing a homeland (or destroying Israel). Contemporary terrorism frequendy targets innocent civilians.The goals are

not limited to overthrowing

a government

or

leader, or gaining an independentThmil, Palestinian, or Basque homeland, but include elimi

nating aWestern, and especially an American, presence in Islamic holy lands. The increased ease of international ffavel and telecommunications have made transnational terrorism less confined to a particular geographic place and enabled terrorist groups to form global networks and to move money, weapons, and people easily from one areato another-thus cre-

ating a global problem. The possibility that terrorists might acquire biological, chemical, nuclear, or miniaturized weapons has also raised the dangers ofterrorist attacks. International efforts to address terrorism

have long been hobbled by the inability to agree on d"finitiorr. The problem is "how to

formulate" the term without criminalizing all armed resistance to oppressive regimes. . . . how to distinguish legitimate armed struggle from terrorism and how much emphasis to place on identifying root causes ofgrievances that lead individuals and groups to adopt ter-

513

velop a normative framework defining terrorism as a common problem (without agreeing on a definition of terrorism itself) and to conclude a series of international treaties. Hijackings, so prevalent in the 1970s,led to three treaties on airline and airport safety that declared terrorist acts against civil aviation illegal and sought to ensure the safety of the flying public. Concern about similar problems at sea led to the conclusion in the late 1980s of several conventions that guarantee safety of maritime navigation and fixed platforms on the continental shelf (i.e., drilling rigs) .47979 conyention addressed the problem of hostage taking. One approved in 1980 established a legal framework to protect

nuclear material during transport. ln 7996 the UN General Assembly drafted the Comprehensive International Convention on Terrorism, but differences over how to define terrorism held up adoption. The struggle over definition was avoided in treaties on soecific isby avoiding language on terrorism's causes. address the question of terrorism only in the 1990s in sues

The Security Council began to

to specific events, particulady the downing of Pan Am and UTA flights, the as-

response

Eglptian president Hosni Mubarek, and the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. These led the United sassination attempt against

States to push the council into an activist stance on terrorism and to impose targeted sanctions

against three countries-Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan-for their roles in supporting terrorism. While broader concerns were also at work in the council's increased attention to terrorism---uch as evidence ofgrowth in global netwo*s of terrorists and fears that terrorists might acquire more powerfi;l weapons-it took the attacls on September 77,2007, to make terrorism a key priority for the United Nations and especially for the Security Council.

terorismin7972in

The United Nations and Post-9/11 Responses toTerrorism The Septemb er 77, 2007,attacks on the World

the wake of several incidents andworked to de-

Tiade Center and Pentagon elicited immediate

rorist methods."26 The UN General Assembly first began to address the general issue of

514

KennN A. MrNcsr eNo MeRcenm P. KenNs

While the Security Council

and general condemnation by the international

organizattons.

community. A day after the attacks, the UN SecurityCouncil passed Resolution 1368, condemning the heinous acts of terrorism and calling for international cooperation to punish

appeared ready to impose intrusive measures in Resolution L373, its choice to exercise no control or oversight on the use of military force in response to terrorism is troubling and may erode the United Nations' authority.2T In 2004 the secretary-general's High-Level Panel onThreats, Challenges, and Change recommended a broad-ranging strategy to address root causes of terrorism and more immediate measures such as intelligence sharing and con-

those responsible. Most important, the resolution affirmed that the terrorist attacks were a

breach of international peace under Chapter VII and recognized "the inherent right of individual or collective sel-fldefense" as a legitimate response.This was the first time that the use of force in self-defense was authorized in response to terrorism and itwas completely open-ended, allowing wide latitude for interpretation. Two weeks later, on September 28,2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373,

trolling dangerous materials. The UN General Assembly in adopting the 2005 World Summit Outcome took a major step by condemning terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever

obliging all states to clamp down on the financing, training, and movement of terrorists and to cooperate in a campaign against them, even with force if necessary. The resolution

and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security." It also stressed the

called on states to take a number of measures, including suppressing the financing ofterror-

on terrorism and called for steps to adopt and implement a comprehensive and coordinated strategy to counter terrorism.28 Yet defining terrorism maybe insufficient and conflict prevention efforts alone ineffective in preventing terrorism, whose causes lie in the structure of the global system itself. While those issues have not yet been addressed, they are linked to fundamental questions ofthe United Nations' legitimacy in today's world and of the need for major UN reform, on the one hand, and broad global changes, on the other.

ist groups, freezing their assets, blocking the recruitment of terrorists, and denying them safe haven. Under Chapter VII, the measures outlined in Resolution 7373 are binding on alI192 UN member states in contrast to the twelve treaties that bind only those states that accede to them.The resolution also established the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC),

which comprises all fifteen Security Council members and is designed to monitor states'capability to deny funding and/or haven to terrorists. The committee has been hobbled by the lack of resources to undertake comprehensive monitoring and follow-up and many states lack the capabilities to carry out the requirements; others are reluctant to do so for other reasons. In 2004 the Security Council took steps to revitalize the CTC by creating a Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), responsible for carrying out technical assistance programs to bolster states' capacity for compliance as well as engaging in proactive dialogue with states and cooperating with international, regional, and subregional

need to conclude a comorehensive convention

UN LncruMAcY rN QyosrroN AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM

The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 in the face of clear opposition from a ma-

jority of the Security Council brought to the fore a sharp debate over the effectiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations, as discussed earlier. The debate was fueled by continuing

controversy over the failures of several UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, along with a seeminglywidening gap between ambitious Security Council resolutions and the

Tue UNrrBo NerroNs eNo CoNprrct MeNecBnBNt political will of member states to provide the necessary resources to carry out the resolutions

they approved.Just

as

that debate was intensi-

UN

Secretariat itself was rocked by a series of scandals that raised the issue ofUN accountability and, hence, legrtimacy. No scan-

fring, the

dal was more publicized than that over the United Nations'manasement of the Oil-forFood Programme.

The Oil-for-Food Scandal Initiated in 7996, rhe Oil-for-Food Progamme (OFFP) was an exception to the comprehensive sanctions imposed in 1990 that permitted limited sales of Iraqi oil to finance food supplies and medicine as humanitarian relief. About $67 billion was transfered through the program. 7n 2004 sources revealed that Sad-

515

comings is the establishment of a senior post in charge of dailyUN operations-a chief operating officer.30 Various proposals have also been made to reform other aspects of the United Nations' conflict management structure.

UNReform Interwoven in the debate over the United Nations' legitimacy and effectiveness were longstanding issues about the need for IIN reforms, especiallyin the makeup ofthe SecurityCouncil.This is not a new debate. Over the United Nations'sixty-year history, there have been

dam Hussein's govemment had pocketed more

periodic calls for reform of the institution, including charter revision. In the 1970s the thrust was on improving coordination of economic and social programs in the IIN system; in the 1980s calls for financial reforms dominated the agenda. In the 1990s the increase in peace-

than $10 billion from smuggling and kick-

keeping and enforcement activities led to several

backs. Both control of smuggling and approval

efforts to reform the United Nations'security apparatus, while U. S. congres sional pressures led to extensive reductions of UN staff and the introduction of management reforms. Among the notable reform efforts relating to the United Nations'conflict management role was the 7992 AnAgendafor Peace, commissioned by the Security Council.31This led to major changes in the Department ofPeace-

of contracts were responsibilities of the P-5 but administration of the contracts was a Uli Secretariat task Among those ultimately identified as receiving kickbacks were some two thousand companies and individuals, including European politicians, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the UN director of the OFFP. An independent investigation led by former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Paul

Volcker found contractor overcharges, violations of bidding rules, and insufficiently monitored contractors.2e Although SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan was not found guilty, he, along with the Security Council and member states, was faulted for the corruption and poor administration of the program. Annan's own son was implicated, and others at the United Nations resigned or were fired. Clearly, the scandal orovided fuel for UN critics in the United Stut., and elsewhere. It raised major questions about the United Nations'ability to manage large, long-term projects and, hence, the wisdom of ambitious Security Council actions. Among the suggestions that have been put forward to remedy the Secretariat's short-

keeping Operations (DPKO), including the addition of military staff from member states and of experts in demining, training, and civilian policing. In 2000 the Brahimi Report, commissioned by the secretary-general, called for strengthening the planning and management of complex peace operations, increasing the Secretariat's information-gathering and analysis capacity to improve conflict prevention, and further changes in the DPKO to increase its size and competence. The report also signaled doctrinal changes, namely, the need to prepare for more robust peacekeeping-a clear lesson from the experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere in the 7990s.32 Many of that report's recommendations have been implemented, including the creation of strategic

516

KenrN A. MrNcsr eNo MeRcenBr

deployment stocks and rapid-deployment teams. The most recent security reform

initiative was the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change submitted in December 2004.Tit\edA More Secure World: Our Sbared Responsibility, the report called for "getting serious about pre-

vention." Among other things, it called for making the Security Council's composition better reflect today's realities (by no means a new idea), creating a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate international efforts to rebuild states (a new idea), and strengthening the secretary-general's role in mediation and peacebuilding.33 As stated earlier, the 2005

World Summit

approved the proposed Peacebuilding Com-

mission, but,

in other respects, the summit

was a disappointment to most observers. As

one noted, "The optimists had hoped for

a

'San Francisco moment'in NewYork, as decisive and momentous as the signing of the UN Charter 60 years earlier. . . . Critics might

well conclude that instead the United Nations had an Einstein moment, recalling his definition ofmadness as doing something over and over again and expecting a different result each time." Among the explanations is that "all sides pushed their own interests, blocked items not of interest to them, and crit-

icized others for not elevating the common interest." South Africas President Thabo Mbeki, for example, criticized "rich and powerful nations" for blocking expansion of the Security Council to include more developing countries. Another explanation is that "the shared values and solidaritv that makes uo an international community may have fraqd, a thread too far" with the diversity of interests and perspectives of the United Nations'much larger membership today than in 1945. Ultimately, one must recognize that UN reform is not just about process and management but embodies fundamental questions of policy, values, and legitimate behavior that pose clear

dilemmas.3a

P.

KenNs

Dilemrna 1: Strengthening the UN Secretariat wersas the Political Will of States. Managing large, complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations requires capacities that the UN Secretariat has never had. Thus, many of the

problems and shortcomings that arose in the 1990s were not surprising, given the increased demand for peacekeeping operations and sanctions. Nevertheless, the Secretariat has now taken steps to limit the damages arising from

the scandals that have rocked the organization and to prevent recurrence. For example, the Secretariat has instituted a zero-tolerance policy in dealing with problems of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers in Congo and elsewhere, fired several IIN personnel with oversight responsibilities, and pressured of-

fending states to punish those individuals responsible. In response to the OFFP scandal, the Secretariat introduced measures to improve the performance of senior management, including a better selection system for senior

officials, monitoring of individual performance, and a new Office oflnternal Oversight Services. With the adoption of policies covering antifraud and corruption, whisdeblower protection, financial disclosure, conflict of in-

terest, and procurement contracts, the Secretariat is being reorganizedto prevent the tlpes

ofpersonnel abuses found in the oil-for-food scandal. Finally, a Department of Safety and Securityhas been established in direct response to the bombing ofUN Headquarters in Bagh-

dad in August 2003 that took the lives of twenty-two UN staffmembers and underlined the need for increased security for UN personnel working in conflict environments. In short, the UN Secretariat has needed to grow in capacity, adapt its management and working procedures, and introduce efficiency measures to maintain its effectiveness, security, and legitimacy. Yet there are clear limits to what reforms of the Secretariat can accomplish. It will always be subject to the political will of states, for such is the nature of intergovernmental

THo UNrrno NeloNs eNo CoNrurcr MeNacnuBNt organizatrons-they exist and operate because states wish them to. Even if the DPKO had recognized the pending genocides in both Rwanda and Darfur, it could not act without the approval of powerfirl states. Although the United Nations could have prevented contract abuses in the Oil-for-Food Programme, itwas

for enforcing the sanctions by monitoring Iraq's borders, and they failed to do so. Even if the Secretariat were perfecdy organized to coordinate peacebuilding in Kosovo or East Timoq states still control the financing of reconstruction efforts and seconding of troops, civilian police, and states that were responsible

other personnel. Relatively litde has been done to end the problem ofsexual abuse by peacekeepers because the Secretariat cannot force

member states to prosecute offenders or to impose discipline on their troops.In short, the Secretariat has only limited independent capability and any reforms must be designed to better utilize that capability. The United Na-

tions'2005 summit failed to strengthen that capability significantly because developing countries in particular fear that Westerners would dominate the senior staffpositions even more than at present if the General Assembly gave the secretary-general more authority over

hiring and firing personnel. Dilernrna 2: Reforming the Security Council l)ersas the Power ofthe United Stales. Security Council reform has been discussed for decades (and achieved once, in7965,with an expansion from ten to fifteen members). Many have argued that if the United Nations is to remain relevant. the council's structure cannot remain rooted in the post-World War II outcome, with the victors as permanent members with veto power over substantive issues. Most reform initiatives have agreed on the need to enlarge the council to accommodate the increased

number of underrepresented developing countries and unrepresented regions. There is general agreement on the need to add more permanent members to reflect the importance of

517

countries such as Japan,Brazil, and India in financing or other contributions to peace and security. The key to Security Council reform is to increase the number of members for geographic representation and, hence, enhance its czpacrty and legitimacy while maintaining a small enough size to ensure efficiency. Unresolved are therefore three issues: how much to enlarge the council, whom to add as new permanent members, and the status of the vetowhether new permanent members would be given veto power or not and whether the use of the veto should be limited to certain situations. Disagreement overwho should be the newpermanent members is intense: Germany,Japan, or Italy as major donors?The European Union

Latin America, Argentina, Mexico, or Brazil? For Africa, South Africa, Egypt, or Nigeria? The 2004 HighLevel Panel report suggested that selection criteria include not only geographic representation but also financial, military, and diplomatic contributions.The 2005 World Summit failed to act on the issue of Security Council reform despite intensive efforts, especially by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, India, Brtii, Japan,and Germany, to promote the need for change. Almost every potential candidate has an opponent, and the current permanent members are hardly prepared to give up their own privileged status. The best members could do at the 2005 summit was to commit to "continuing . . . efforts to achieve a decision."35 Whatever proposal is ultimately (if ever) adopted requires charter revision to take effect, but it is hard to predict what set of circumstances will produce the necessary urgency and impetus for action on the issue of Security Council membership. Lack of transparency in Security Council as a single entity? From

proceedings has been an issue particularly since

the Cold War's end, when secret meetings became the norm. Yet some improvements have already been made and others have been proposed that do not require charter revision. Draft agendas are now circulated, "private"

518

KeneN A. MrNcsr eNr; MeRcenBr P. I(enNs

meetings open, and consultations with troopcontributing countries and NGOs occurring. The real dilemma is that as security threats have required more complex and more coercive responses, the only state with the capability to

undertake enforcement actions is the United States, perhaps in cooperation with a few other states. Thus, if the Security Council is to enforce its decisions, the United States must participate. Or, ifthe United States identifies a security threat and others do not concur, then the United Nations is threatened with irrelevance if the United States acts alone, as it did in lrac. As Thomas Weiss explains, "The choice is noi between the UN as a rubber stamp and a cipher the axis of subservience and the -between axis ofirrelevance."The test is "Can the council engage the United States, moderate its exercise of power, and restrain its impulses?"36

CoNcrusroN For more than sixtyyears, the United Nations has shown its ability to adapt to changing security needs and, hence, to retain a major role in global conflict management. To be sure, there have been periods when it seemed less relevant, such as during the height of the Cold War, and relevance depends somewhat on perspective. To the Unlted States, the United Nations was a hostile, irrelevant place during the 1970s, when the General Assembly and other bodies were caught up in endless debates over the proposed New International Economic Order and Zionism as a form of racism. To developing countries, the United

Nations in those years was a valuable tool for promoting their interests as the new majority. The Cold War's end and the terrorist attacks of September 17,2001, demonstrated how the United Nations can gain new relevance even for its most powerful members and be called on to meet new demands. Collective security-the concept that threats in any region of the wodd are threats to is even more applicable today than when the

all-

United Nations was founded in 1945, given the nature ofglobal terrorism and the renewed threat of nuclear proliferation, to name just two global problems. Still, there is agreement that the United Nations needs to strengthen its preventive diplomacy and mediation capacity for preventing wars between and within states. When prevention fails, there is a need for earlier decisive action by the Security Council and for steps to protect civilians, using force if necessary to avert humanitarian disasters. If the United Nations is going to be asked to undertake peacekeeping missions, especially those requiring more muscle, and to play a mapr role in rebuilding societies shattered by wa4 then its member states, especially the United States and other majorpowers,will have

to provide adequate resources in the form of peacekeepers, willingness to incur casualties, standby capacity for rapid action, transport, financing, and logistical support. Likewise, the United Nations and member states need new tools for dealing with terrorism, including coercive measures when necessary and tools for helping states enhance their own capacity to combat the threat domestically. Debates over the United Nations'legitimacy and effectiveness have come and gone over the years. Current concerns regarding the United Nations' continuing relevance, including those relating to U.S. unilateralism, need to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, there is a striking cyclical pattern wherein states ignore the United Nations for a period of time, challenge its legitimacy, and then turn to it again for conflict management and dealingwith new security threats. The United Nations remains the only truly global securiry institution-a valuable tool for states and many nonstate actors to manage conflicts and address global security threats-and has shown thatit canwork

Norns 1. This chapter draws on material in the chapofour recent books.

ters on peace and security in two

519

THB UNrrBo NerroNs eNo CoNrr-rcr MANAGEMENT International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Gor.,ernance (Bo,ider, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004);and Tlte UnitedNations in theTzuenty-First Cen-

tury,3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2007), @ copyright 2007, reprinted with permission.

12. For extended discussion ofthe issues ofinternational administration, see Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (New

York Oxford University Press, 2005), and the special issue of Global Governance

from The Human Security Report 2005 (New York Oxford University Press, 2005),

(January-March 2004).

http ://www. humans ecurityreport. info.

Assembly A./60/L. 1, Section 98.

2. 'fhe

data are

3. There is an extensive literature on sanctions. For a set ofexcellent studies ofthe "sanctions decade," however, see David Cortright and George A.Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Straagies in the 1990s (Bodder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,2000), and Sanctions and the Searcbfor Suurity: Challenga to UN Action (Bodder, Colo.: Lynne Rienneg2002).

4. Adam Roberts, "The Use ofForce," in Tlte UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century,

ed.

David M. Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne

Rienner,2004), 141.

MichaelJ. Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," ForeignAfairs 82, no.3 (May-June 2003):t6-35; and responses from Edward C. Luck, "The End of an lllusion," Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Misreading the Record," and Ian Hurd, "Too Legit to Qrit," all published in Foreign ffiirs 82, no. 4 (July-August 2003):207-205. See also the debate,

5.

See

"The United Nations Has Become Irrelevant," Foretgn ro. 1 3 8 (S eptemberOctober 20 03) : 76-24.

Po I icy,

6. Mats Berdal, "The UN after Iraq," Suntival 46, no.3 (Autumn 2004): 82.

7. United Nations,

The Blue Helmets:

A

Rer.tieus

of United Nations Peace-Keeping,3rd ed. (NewYork: IIN Department of Public Information, 1996),4.

8. United Nati ons, Report of the Secre tary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: Tbe Fall of Srebremra UN Doc. No. N54/549,November L5, 1999,http://www.unorg/peacesrebrenica.pdf.

9. Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia WTZC's Ci.uilMandate (Boulder, Colo.: Llmne Rienner, 1995),26.

13. 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN General 14. Tim Murithi, "The LIN Peacebuilding Commission and the Implications for Africa' (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on the UN at 60: Towards a New Reform Agenda, sponsored by the Institute for Global Dialogue, South African Office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Univer-

sity of Pretoria,Pretoria, South Africa, October 2728.2005). 15. Virginia Page Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," World Politics 56 (July 200a): 510.

16. Among recent assessments, see, for example, MichaelJ. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: ATheoretical and Qrantitative LmJysis," Arnerican Political Science Rertieut 94, no.4 (December 2000): 7 7 9-807. 17. Lise Morj6 Howard, "Learning to Keep the United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Civil Wars" (Ph.D. diss., University of CaliforPeace?

nia, Berkeley,2001).

18. Stephen John Stedman, "Intemational Implementation of Peace Agreements in CivilWars: Findings from a Study of Sixteen Cases," in Turbulent Peace: The C ballenga of Managing International ConJlict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001),

it

GlobalAgenda:

59th General Assembly of the Unied Nations, ed. Angela Drakulich (New York UNA,/

usA,2oo4), 109. 20. United Nations, Report of tbe Independent Inquiry into

the

Actions of the United Nations during the

1994 Genocide in Ruanda, 3/7999/7257, December L5,L999.

t99s),26.

Response, Lessons Learned

11. Alexandros Yannis, "The IIN

-7 52.

Issues before the

10. United Nations, "The'Second Generation': Cambodia Elections'Free and Fair,' but Challenges Remain," Chronicle 30, no. 5 (NovemberDecember as

Government

Global Governance I0, no. 1 (JanuaryMarch 2004): 67-81.

in Kosovo,"

7 37

19. Assefaw Bariagaber, "Africa,"

21. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Koso,r.to Report: Conflix, International (Oxford: Oxford University

Press,2000).

22, Powell's remarks were contained in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and

KenBN A. MrNcsr eNo

520 reported in the news. See http://www.washingtonpost.com./wp- dyn/ arncles/ A8364-20045e9.html.

23. Ophera McDoom,'AU Darfur Force Needs Stronger Mandate," Reuters, http://www.defense news. com/story.php?F=

1

30

1

625&C=mideast.

Z.

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,The Responsibility to Protect: Report ofthe Internationa/ Cornmission on Intentention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 2001), http://www.iciss-cisse.gc.ca. On the subject of changing norms on intervention, see also Martha Finnemore, The Purpose oflntervention: Cltanging Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), particulady

chap.4.

25.2005 World Summit Outcome.

Sections

30.

Mancanor

P.

I(enNs

United States Institute ofPeace, Report of

See

the Task Force on tbe United Nations:American Interests

and UN Reform (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005), http:/ /www.usip.org/ un/report/index/htm1.

31. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agendafor Peace: Preventiae Diplornacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping (NewYork United Nations, 1992). 32. United Nations, Report of tbe Panel on United Nations Peace Operatiozs [Brahimi Report], A/55l 305- 5/2000/809 (New York United Nations, August 21, 2000), http://www.u n.org/ peace/ reports/peace_ operations/.

33. See United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change , A More Secure Woild: Our Shared Responsibility (NewYork United Nations,

138-140.

200 4), http / / v'rv*v.un. orglsecureworld,/.

in

26. M.J. Peterson, "Using the GeneralAssembly," Terrorisrn and the UN: Before and After September 11, ed.Jane Boulden andThomas G. Weiss (Bloom-

Japan Tima, October 3, 2005, http://wwwjapantimes .co jplcgi-bin/makepr$,.p 15?eo2005 1003 a2.htm.

ington: Indiana University Press, 2004),778.

35. 2005 World Summit Outcome, Section 153. 36. Thomas G. Weiss, "Security Council Reform: Problems and Prospects in September 2005," UNAUSA Policy Brief No. 9,June 23, 2005, 4.

:

27. Jane Boulden andThomas G. Weiss, "Whither Terrorism and the United Nations?" in ibid., 11.

28.

See the 2005

World Summit Outcome. Sec-

tions 81-90.

29. For reports and documents ofthe Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oilfor-Food Programme, see http://www. 1ic-offp.org/.

34. Ramesh Thakur, "U.N.'s 'Einsteiri Moment,"

ffiw SUccESSESAND CHNLLENGES IN

CoxFLICT MexacEMENT Andrezo Mack

INtnooucnoN Is there more political violence in the world today than during the Cold War era? This is certainly the view conveyed by the mainstream media, voiced by many policynakers, and even advanced by some scholars. But the evidence tells a very different story. The Cold War years were charactertzedby ever-escalating wzrfare.

In their aftermath global

security has im-

proved dramatically.

It is true that the Cold War was the longest period without armed conflict between major powers in hundreds of years. But while international relations scholars were celebrating the so-called Long Peace and the stability of the Cold War years, the rest of the world was experiencing an ever-increasing number ofwars. Indeed, from 1946 to 1992, the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world increased threefold. Then, at the beginning of the 1990s, at

precisely the point that commentators in the West began to fret about an "explosiori' of ethnonationalist warfare around the wodd, the number ofarmed conflicts and other forms

of political violence began to drop. The decline continued throughout the decade and into the new millennium. The firll extent ofthis sffiwas revealedwith the publication by Oxford University Press of the Human Security Report late in 2005.r (Previously, only the relatively small conflict research community had paid much attention to the decline.)2 Drawing on a wide varrety of academic resources and specially commissioned research, the Human Security Reporls findings

generated considerable publicity around the wodd precisely because they ran so contrary to the prevailing conventionalwisdom of the day. They included the following:

The number of armed conflicts worldwide

has declined by more than 40 percent s\nce 7992.3 The number of the deadliest conflicts (those with one thousand or more battle deaths) has dropped even more dramatically-by 80 percent. The number of international crises, often harbingers ofwar, fell by more than 70 percent between 1981 and 2001.

52r

ANoRBw

Mecr

Figure l.Number ofWorldwide Armed Conflicts, 19462002

1950

Sources:Uppsala.

tional

1955

t965

r970

t975

t990

L995

Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; and Centre for the Study of Civii War, InternaInstitute. Oslo.

Peace Research

Wars between states. the traditional focus of security scholars, are more rare than in previous eras and now constitute less than 5 percent of all armed conflicts. The number of miJitary coups and attempted coups has declined by some 60 percent since 7963. ln 7963, therewere twenty-five coups

or attempted coups; in2004,there were ten.

All failed. The period since the end ofWorld War II is the longest interval without wars between the major powers in hundreds ofyears. Most of the world's conflicts are now concentrated in Africa. But even here there are signs ofhope. (A new data set created by Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program for the Human Security Reportfoundthat in 2002-3 the number of armed conflicts in Africa dropped from forty-one to thirty-five.) The drop in armed conflicts in the 1990s was associated with a worldwide decline in arms transfers, military spending, and ffoop numbers. (Global military expenditures rose

again in the new millennium, but the rise was mostly driven by major increases in the U.S. defense budget.) Wars have also become dramatically less deadly over the past five decades. The average number ofpeople reported killed (combatants, plus civilians caught in the cross fre) per conflict per year in 1950 was thirty-eight thousandl rn 2002, it was just six hundred decline of 98 percent. -a In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, by far the highest battle death tolls in the world were in the wars in East and Southeast Asia. In the 1970s and 1980s, most of the killing tookplace in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. But by the end of the 1990s, more people were being killed in sub-Saharan Africa's wars than in the rest of the world put together. But even here the battle-related death toll declined in the new millennium. The new data set compiled for the Human Security Re?ort found that in 2002-3 the

SuccossBs eNo Cuer-lpNGES IN CoNpr.rct MeNecBuBNr

number of reported deaths from all forms of political violence fellby 62 percent in the Americas, 32percent in Europe,35 percent in Asia, and 24 percent in Africa.a A twoyear period is obviously too short to determine trends, but the data provide further evidence that the world is not becoming ever more violent. Notwithstanding the horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica, Bosnia, the number of genocides and other mass killings plummeted by 80 percent between the 1989 high point and 2O01-following the same trend as the most violent armed conflicts.

Note that violent conflict deaths, usually called batde-related deaths, are usually only a minority of totalwar deaths. In poor countries the biggest death tolls are not from those killed in the actual fighting but from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. These "indirect" deaths can account for as much as 90 percent or more of the totalwarrelated death toll. Some argue thatwhile batde deaths may have declined recendy, "indirect" deaths have increased. In fact, there is no evidence to support such a contention. Currendy, there are insufficient data to make even rough estimations ofglobal or regional "indirect" death toll trends. But, as explained later, there are firm grounds for believing that these deaths have declined, too. The data on trends in international terrorism

contested-not least because definitions of what counts as an international terrorist incident are rarely consistent. Some data sets have shown an overall decline in international terrorist incidents ofall types since the eady 1980s but an increase in the number ofhigh*casualty attacks over the past decade. But whatever the definition, it is clear that the death toll from annual international terrorist attacks is only atiny{raction of the annual war death toll. are

Core human rights abuses (e.g., torture, extrajudicial executions, and killings by officially backed death squads) appear to have

523

declined modesdy in five out of six regions in the developing world since the mid-1990s.s Here again the data are contested, however.

Data on political violence are not very reliable-collecting statistics in war zones is difficult if not impossible, for example-and just

about every figure can be queried. But a decade after the end of the Cold War there is no longer any doubt about the direction and scope ofthe trends-even though theyremain largely unknown to most people.

Wuv

trn

WoRLDwTDE

Dncuun

IN POLITICAL VIoTENCN IS

So

LrrruE KNourN

The trend data on political violence around the world presented inthe Human Security Report refute the conventional wisdom that we live in an ever-more violent age. But why should

the dramatic changes that the report identifies be so little known or understood? There are several reasons.

First, most people get their information aboutworld events from the media,where the "if-it-bleeds-it-1eads" imperative drives news reporting. So dramatic outbreaks of political violence always getfar greater coverage than the wars that end in quietly negotiated peace agreements, or simply fizzle out. Second, part ofthe mandate ofhuman rights

and humanitarian NGOs such as Amnesty

International, Human Rights Watch, and Mddicins Sans Frontidres is to "speak truth to power"-to bring the plight of the oppressed and the victims of war to the attention of the intemational community. They do this to great effect and in the process add to the impression that we live in an ever more dangerous wodd. But there are no NGOs that have the reporttngof good news as a central part of their mandate. The picture is again unbalanced. Third, there are no fficial statistics on the numbers ofwars, war casualties, genocides, mass

killings of civilians, military coups, terrorist

5U attacks, or core human rights abuses that can be used as a reality check.6 Without access to reliable trend data, the United Nations, other

international agencies, donor governments, and NGOs have had no way of determining whether things are getting better or worse. This in turn means that security planners have had no way of determining whether or not their conflict prevention, postconflict peacebuilding, or human rights abuses are effective. The dearth of official data on security issues stands in stark contrast to the vast amount of government data (on development, health,

ANonnw Mecr the end of the Cold War. There are a number of possible, indeed plausible, explanations, but

most can-at best-explain only a small part of the decline.

The End of Colonialism From the early 1950s to the early 1980s, wars of liberation from colonial rule made uo 60 percent to 100 percent ofall international ionflicts, depending on the year. Today there are no such wars-the demise of colonialism has removed a major source of conflict from the international system.

education, etc.) that track progress (or lack

But this security-enhancing change had less

thereof) toward meeting the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)-the range of development targets the international community has pledged to reach by 2075.There are no Millennium Securitv Goals to comolement the MDGs because there are,ro offiiial datu with which to track them. There are no data in part because statistics are rarcIy collected in states at war, in part because many governments see security information as too sensitive to share even when it is collected, and in part because there is often no consensus on definitions. The United Nations General Assembly, for example, has never been able to agree on what constitutes terrorism, while some repressive governments refer to armed resistance against their rule as "violent crime." Without agreed-on definitions, data collection is impossible. There are usefirl sources of information in the scholarly community that, to a degree, make up for the lack of official data, but much of the academic material is higtrly technical, inaccessible to nonspecialists, and thus not widely known. The net effect of these factors is that popular assumptions about trends in global security tend to be very much at odds with reality.

impact than might have been expected. Civil war numbers continued to rise rapidlythroughout the 1980s well after the last violent anticolonial wars had come to an end. This was in

WnvWB Flnvn FnwpnWens Remarkably few attempts have been made to explain the decline in political violence since

part because in many newly independent countries the struggle against colonial m1e was re-

placed by armed conflicts over who should control the postcolonial state, and in part because the Cold War was now driving-or at least sustaining-much of the warfare in the developing world.

Democratization The number of democracies increased by nearly half between 7990 and 2003, while the number of civil conflicts declined sharply over (see figure 2). At first glance the surge in democratization might appear to be a plausible explanation for the decline in war-

the same period

fare. Established and inclusive democratic states

not only, almost, never go to war against each other, but they also have a very low risk ofsuccumbing to civil war. But while the risk of civil war is indeed very low in stable and inclusive democracies, countries with governments that are pasly democratic and partly authoritarian called "anocracies" by political -sometimes scientists-are more Drone to civil war than either inclusive democracies or autocracies. This matters because, while the number of democratic regimes increased dramatically in the early 1990s, so, too, did number of anocracies.

Succnssns eNo CHeIT,ENGES rN CoNptrct

MeNeceueNt

52s

Figure 2. The Rising Tide of Democratization, 7946-2002

*;m;*r: fgrng6lxgigg

C

ww

Autocracies

w

A16g1x6lgg

tru

o

O q50

o -d

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z

7960

Source:Monty

G.Manhall

1965

1970

7975

1980

1985

ce and Confict 2005: A Gtobal Suruey ofArmed Confica, SelfDeterminaion MaoePark Centerforlntemational Dwelopment and ConflictManagement, UniversityofMaryland' 2005)'

and Ted Robert Gurr, Pea

ments, andDemoracy (Col1ege

Hence it seems likely that the positive impact of the increase in the number of inclusive democracies was largely offset by the negative impact of the comparable increase in more

waf-prone anocracies. War, Poverty, and State Capacity

"proxli'measure. Other things being equal, the higher the per capita income a country has, the stronger and more capable its government. This in turn means more state resources to crush rebels and to redress grievances. The pursuit of equitable economic growth-and

This does not, of course, mean that the

hence state capacity-would, therefore, appear to be a highly effective long-term conflict prevention strategy, in addition to being a necessary condition for sustainable human development. But while there is no doubt that growth in state income and capacity is associated with a reduced risk of armed conflict in the long term, neither factor can explain the major decline in civil wars since the early 1990s. The rate of economic growth in this period is simply too slow to account for such a rapid drop in conflict numbers.8

poor are inherendy more violent than the rich. Indeed, the key factor here does not appear to be income at all but rather state capacity, for which income per capita is simply a useful

Ethnic Discrimination and Conflict Determiningwhat drives so-called ethnic conflict has been the subject ofintense scholarly

Levels of economic development and the risk

ofwar are very strongly associated (see figure 3). Indeed, one of the most striking findings to emerge from conflict research is that most of today's wars take place in very poor countries and that as per capita gross domestic product increases, the risk of war declines.T Indeed, as

figure 3 shows, the risk ofwar in countries with a $5,000 per capita income is some thirty times less than in those with an income of $250.

526

ANonnw

Mecr

Figure 3. The Association between War and Poverty

2

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74%

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o

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750 1,000 1,250 1,500 7,750 2,000 2,250 2,500 2,750 3,000 3,250 3,500 3,750 4,000 4,250 4,500 4,750 Per Capita

GDP ($)

Mrcarta; Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, "Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations" (paper prepared for the Millennium Deveiopment Goals Poverty Task Force Workshop, Bangkok, June 2004),http://www.columbia.edu,/- mh2245/papersl/HV.pdf (accessed May 6, 2006). Source:

interest in recent years. According to the

Mi-

norities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, "high levels of political discrimination are a key cause ofviolent ethnic conflict."9 The significance of this finding lies in the fact that there has been a steady decline in political discrimination by governments around theworld since 1950.In 1950, some 45 percent of governments around the world actively discriminated against ethnic groups, according to Minorities at Risk researchers; by 2003,that share had shrunk to 25 percent. Economic discrimination bygovemments followed a similar trend.1o But while this is again a trend that enhances security in the long term, it, too, fails as an explanation for the shalp decline in armed conflict in the 1990s. The security-enhancing effect ofthe steady reduction ofpolitical and economic discrimination was not strong enough to offset the inexorable decade-by-decade increase in civil

wars from the 1950s to the early 1990s. And there is no evidence to suggest that, after the end ofthe ColdWar, the reduction in discrimination suddenly became a powerful enough

force to account for the decline

in conflict

numbers.

The explanation for the dramatic drop in political violence in the 1990s has to be found in other changes that took place during, or immediately preceding, this period.

The Endofthe ColdWar The most persuasive explanation for the decline in civil conflict is found in the far-reaching political changes wrought by the end of the Cold War. First, the end of the Cold War re-

moved amajor driver of ideological hostility from the international system-a change that affected civil wars as well as international wars. Second, the end of the Cold War meant that the two superpowers ceased supporting their

Succnsses

exo

CHar.r,ENGES tN

CoNpr,rcr MeNecnvpNr

527

erstwhile clients in pro4ywars in the developing world. Denied this support, mml of these conflicts simply petered out, or the parties sued for peace. But less than 20 percent of the post-Cold War decline in conflict numbers appears to be attributable to this factor. Third, and most important, the end of the ColdWar liberated the United Nations, freeing the Security Council from the paralysis that had gripped it throughout most of the East-West

Preq)entive DiplomaE and PeacemakingThere has been a striking increase in preventive diplo-

confrontation and allowing it for the first time to play an effective global security role indeed, to do far more than its found-and, ers had originally envisaged. The impact of this wave of post-Cold War activism on political violence around the world has been both profound and the subject of extraordinarrly little study.

increases in the OSCE's conflict prevention and peacebuilding activi-

The Upsurge in International Activism Since the end of the 1980s, the United Nations

macy and peacemaking activities since the end of the 1980s. UN preventive diplomacy missions (i.e., those that seek to prevent wars from breaking out in the first place) increased sixfold between 1990 and 2002. UN peacemaking activities (those that seek to stop ongoing conflicts) also increased nearly fourfold four in 1990 to fifteen in2002.There

-from were comparable

ties over the same period and a sharp upsurge

in activism among other regional

security

organizations.

The increase in preventive diplomacy ^ctivity helped prevent a number of latent conflicts from crossing the threshold into warfare, while the rise in peacemaking activities has been associated with a major increase in negotiated peace settlements. Approximately half

ifoften inchoate, upsurge in conflict management, conflict prevention, and postconflict peacebuilding activities. The World Bank, donor states, and a

of all the peace setdements negotiated between 7946 and2003 have been signed since the end

number of regional security organizations, as well as literally thousands of NGOs, have both complemented United Nations activities and

International Support

has spearheaded a remarkable,

played independent prevention and peacebuild-

ing roles of their own. Despite the United Nations'many flaws, its charter and universal membershio-and hence

its legitimacy-give the world body a unique mandate as a security actor. But other institutions play more important roles in specific regional contexts. The United States is clearly a more important security actor in the Middle East and East Asia than the United Nations, for example,while the Organizatnn for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has played a more important security role in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The extent of the changes that have taken place over the last fifteen years is as remarkable as it has been underreoorted.The ing list is far from e"haustirre.

follow-

ofthe ColdWar.

for

Peacemaking and

PeacebuildingThere has also been an exffaordi-

supportlolitical as well as economic-for UN peacemaking nary increase in intemational

and postconflict peacebuilding missions. The

number of Friends of the Secretary-General, contact groups, and other mechanisms created by governments to support UN peacemaking activities and peace operations in countries in emerging from-conflict increased from -or four in \990 to more than twenty-eight in 2003, a sevenfold increase. Regional organizations also benefited from increased support rn their security-building efforts during this period. PostconflictPeace Operatiom. There has been a

major increase in postconflict peace operations, not just UN missions but those of regional organizations as well. One major goal ofthe evergrowing range of peacebuilding activities that these missions pursue is the prevention of any

528

ANonBw

Figure 4. Number of

IIN

Mecr

Peacemaking Activities, 1989-2002

bo

'5

ru

bo

a)

qR oE6

z

0+1989

Source:

7990

7997

7992

1993

1996

7997

t998

1999

Dtta oroided bv the United Nations Deoartment of Political Affairs.

recurrence of conflict. Since some 40 percent to 50 percent ofpostconflict countries relapse into political violence within five years of a war ending, anypolicyinitiatives that can minimize this risk will in turn reduce the risk of future wars.

The number of UN peacekeeping operations more than doubled between 1988 and

2005-from

seven to seventeen (see figure 5). The peace operations of the post-ColdWar era are not merely larger and more numerous than Cold War peacekeeping missions, they are also far more ambitious.Whereas the Cold War missions typically involved little more than monitoring cease-fires with relatively small numbers of soldiers,many of todays operations are more akin to nation building. And despite the much-publicyzedfailures, a recent

RAND Corporation study found that twothirds of UN nation-building missions that it examined had been successfirl.ll Comparable U.S. missions enjoyed a success rate of only 50 percent.

The Ue of Force-and Sanctions. The United Nations Security Council has been increasingly willing to authorize the use of force to deter "spoilers" from undermining peace agreements and in so doing to restart old conflicts.

And UN peace operations are now routinely mandated to use force to protect the peace, not just their own personnel. Sanctions are the other coercive instrument in the United Nations' atmoryand the number of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council increased more than fivefold between 1990 and 2000. While many sanctions regimes have been ineffectual and/or have imposed great harm on civilians, they can help deny warring parties access to arms and can Dressure recalciffant

regimes-and rebel gror.rpr-to enter peace negotiations. Attac king the Culture of Impunity.

to the

establishment

In addition

of the International

Criminal Court and the various UN and ad hoc tribunals, the number of governments

Succnssos eNo CHaT,IENGES rN Figure 5. Number of

IIN

CoNplrcl MaNeceupNt

529

Peacekeeping Missions, 79481004

Frn

ho

o

Zrn

z) 7955

1960

t965

7970

7975

1980

7985

t990

7995

Source:Based on data from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ index.asp (accessed July 22, 2005).

prosecuting agents of former regimes for grave human rights abuses increased from one to eleven between 1990 and 2004.If would-be

perpetrators of gross human rights abuses believe there is some prospect that they will be brought to justice for the crimes they commit, they may be deterred from acting in the

first place.

A

Greater Emphasis on Reconciliation. The number of truth and reconciliation commissions in operation in any one year has more than doubled since the end of the Cold War one in 7989 to seven in 2003.The ef-from fective pursuit of reconciliation in postconflict environments reduces the risk of renewed violence. Reconciliation is also a major aim of most peacebuilding programs.

Addressing the Root Causes of ConJlict. The United Nations, the World Bank along with

other international agencies, and donor govemments are increasingly designing development and aid policies to address what are perceived to be the "root causes" ofpolitical violence. Individually, none of these initiatives has had a grevt impact on global security. Indeed, most have achieved only modest success in terms oftheir own goals. But even where the success rate is very low-say, 30 percent to 40 percent-which is quite common, these are still successes that simply were not happening before the 1990s because so little was being attempted then. The case argued here is simple. Despite inappropriate mandates, inadequate resources, lack of coordination, and multiple inefficiencies, international activism aimed at stopping wars and preventing their reccurrence has had a real impact. But a lot more research is required to determine which specific activities and mechanisms have been most effective.

530

ANoRBwMRcT

Figure 6. Attacking the Culture of Impuniry 797U2004

w

Countries prosecuting agents ofprevious regimes for grave human rights abuses

rc

Hybrid and international criminal tribunals

0

7970

7978

1-972

Source: Data compiled by the

1980

1982

1984

Human Security Centre from

1988

a

L990

1992

t994

wide variety of print and online sources

Wrrv Tooey's Wens

gpically pit government forces that

Knr

weak and relatively few in number against small bands of ill-trained rebels. They rarely

FBr,vBR PEoPLE

The explosion of international activism after the Cold War helps explain the subsequent decline in the number of armed conflicts, but it doesnt tell us why warfare has also become progressively-though unevenly-l ess deadly since the 1950s.Therewas an averageofthirtyseven thousand batde-related deaths for each conflict waged in 1950; in 2002, there were just six hundred-an extraordinary decline. Here the key explanatory factors are quite different from those relating to the post-Cold War decline rn incidence of conflict.

o

r

The major wars of the Cold War era qpically involved huge armies, hear,y conventional weapons, air bombardment, and massive external intervention. They killed hundreds of thousands-sometimes millions. The overwhelming majority of today's wars are low-intensity conflicts fought primarily with small arms and light weapons. They

are

involve major engagements, with civilians rather than combatants often being the targeted. Although often brutal, they kill relatively few people compared with the major

r

wars of the Cold War era-typically hundreds or thousands ofbatde-related deaths rather than hundreds ofthousands. The decline in the batde-death toll may also be related to the huge increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the 1980s.8y7992,the peak year,the worldwide total of displaced people exceeded forty

million-up from a little

over ten million at the end of the 7970s. (The data from the 1970s and earlier are suspect, but there is no doubt that there was a huge increase from the 1970s to the 1990s.) Displacement is a humanitarian tragedy, but had these millions notfledtheir homes, hundreds of thousands-possibly

531

Succpssos eNo CTwT,ENGES IN CoNpr,Ict MeNRcBUBNt

far more-could have been killed. So the increase in displacement is likely one of the reasons for the decline in batde deaths.

Wnnr esour

INDTREcT DnATHS?

The death toll from combat is a critically important measure of the human cost ofwar. But, as noted earlier, it measures only the tip of the iceberg of total war deaths. In poor countries war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition cause far more death and disability than bombs and buliets.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo a series of epidemiological studies by the

In-

ternational Rescue Committee (IRC) has estimated that some 3.9 million people have died as a consequence of the fighting since 1998.12 These so-called excess deaths are people who would not have died had it not been for the war. According to the IRC,less than2 percent ofthese deaths resulted from violence. As noted

eadier, there are no global data on excess deaths,

just a series of individual country case studies ofvery uneven quality. But all the studies indicate a similar causal pattern: the poorer the country and the more destructive the war, the greater the number ofexcess deaths caused by disease and malnutrition.

These findings raise an obvious question. We know that in poor countries war-related disease and malnutrition are far greater killers than combat, but we have no data to tell us whether deaths from these causes are increasing or decreasing. So how is it possible to claim that the world is more secure? Some NGOs have pointed to the extraordinarily high death rates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur in Sudan and argued that, even though the numbers of wars and battle-related deaths may be dramatically down, the number of indirect deaths has risen. This is highly unlikely. The main drivers ofexcess deaths are the scope and intensity of fighting (for which combat deaths are the best measure), the numbers of people

displaced, the preexisting levels of nutrition and access to health care, and the timeliness, degree, and efficacy of humanitarian intervention. Since war numbers, combat deaths per conflict, and the numbers of people displaced have all declined in the past fifteen years, while funding for humanitarian assistance has more than doubled over the same period, we have every reason to expect that indirect deaths should have declined as well. What is clear is that we have more data on indirect deaths today than in any previous Period. Levels of indirect deaths comparable to those in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo and Darfirr almost certainly occurred in earlier wars, but because they were never measured, they went largely unnoticed.

No GnouNDS

FoR CotuPracnNcY

Despite the positive changes in the global security climate that the Human Security Report has described, there are no grounds for complacency. Although wars and war deaths are down, some sixty armed conflicts are still being waged around the globe, many of which have defied resolution for decades. There are still gross abuses of human rights, widespread war crimes, and ever-deadlier acts of terrorism.

Moreover, because the underlying causes of conflict are too rarely addressed, the risk of new wars breaking out and old ones starting again remains very real. And as the many failures of the past-and numerous recent reports

made clear, the United Nations reneed of reform if it is truly to firlfill its charter mandate to "save succeedino generations from the scourge of war" UN reform is critical if the present ad hoc system of managing global conflict is to become less dysfunctional. An important start

-have mains in urgent

in 2000 with the launch of the Brahimi Report-a widely praised package of recommendations for reform aimed at making UN peacekeeping operations more

was made

effective.13

532

ANoruw Macr

The Brahimi Report pointed out that the LIN Secretariat had been unprepared, under-

One of the major arguments for creating the Peacebuilding Commission has been the

staffed, and underdrnded to undertake the spate

widely agreed-on need to address the endlessly-on discussed, but never resolved, "coordination problem" that all humanitarian and

of new missions that were authorized in iggg and subsequently. In sharp contrast to many IIN reports, it eschewed emptyrhetoric in favor of pragmatic and higtrly specific recommendations on how to improve UN peace operations. Many-not all-of these recommendations have been implemented.This,plus the commitment of the current under-secretary-general for peacekeeping to promoting a "lessons-learned" culture and an evidence-based approach to mission planning has made the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) a far more effective body than it was in the 1990s.

But no amount of internal reform in the DPKO can overcome the more pervasive problems that confront IIN operations in the field, namely, the lack of adequate resources, problems with inadequately trained and equipped peacekeeping personnel, and-above all-the

lack ofeffective coordination and collabora-

tion among agencies, donors, and NGOs on the ground and between the field and headquarters.

It was in large part to address the last issue that the new Peacebuilding Commissiona recommendation from Secretary-General Annan's 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changel4-was finally approved at the United Nations' September 2005 World Summit. The Peacebuilding Commis sion is an intergovernmental body with a membership of thirty-one states that is supposed to guide overall peacebuilding policy, plan missions for postconflict environments, set standards, help ensure adequate funding, and bring a degree ofcoherence to field operations that has too often been lacking. But while widely welcomed both within the UN Secretariat and among member states, the new commission and its criticallv imoortant Secretariat-based Peacebuilding Supptrt Office (PBSO)-which will do most of the work

-face

daunting challenges.

peacebuilding missions confront to a greater or lesser degree. But the commission is essentially a consultative body that has no executive

authority. So it is by no means clear that it will be able to resolve the endless turf battles between UN agencies, the intense competition between NGOs, and the mutual suspicion that so often characterizes relationships between donors and those working in the field. It is these organizational pathologies that so often have prevented effective coordination and collaboration in the oast. Moreover, it is already clear that the Peacebuilding Commission is confronting exactly the same problem that in the past has stymied so many other UN security initiatives-namely, lack of adequate funding. The staff numbers and budgets for the PBSO recommended by the secretary-general have both been cut----an extra-

ordinary exercise in penny-pinching by member states given that the total annual funding originally requested for the PBSO was less than one-tenth of1 percent ofcurrent peacekeeping expenditure. 1s

Notwithstanding the very real problems

it confronts, the creation ofthe new Peacebuilding Commission is further evidence of an emerging system of global governance that seeks to address human security issues.

The birthing process is messy, funding

is

inadequate, and disagreements are pervasive. But the effort is not in vain. The evidence clearly indicates that the actions of an engaged international community can make a difference. Wars can be prevented, sustainabie peace agreernents negotiated, war-torn societies rebuilt, and hundreds of thousands of lives saved. The combined cost of the efforts that create these changes is little more than one-half of 1 percent of global military expenditure.

53s

Succnsses eNo CHau-ENcES tN CoNpLtct MaNecsMBNt

terrorism-have been subject to considerable criti-

Norps Much of this chapter, including all the statistics and graphs, is drawn from Human Security Center, Human

Saurity Report 2005: War and Peace in theTzt:entyfrx C en tury (New York Oxford University Press, 2005). By permission of Oford Univenity Press, Inc.

1.

Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the Tzuenty-frst Cenrzry (NewYork Oxford University Press,2005). 2. Among the first to draw attention to the decline were Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr, then of the University of Maryland, and researchers at the International Peace Research lnstitute, Oslo, and the Conflict Data Program at Uppsala University in Sweden. See

3. Armed conflicts are here defined as violent armed political confrontations that have at least twenty-five battle-related deaths a year and that involve a government as one of the belligerents. Wars

with one thousand or more batderelated deaths a year. Most data sets count only conflicts between states or between a state and a rebel group, but a new data set created by Uppsala Univerare armed conflicts

sity's Conflict Data Program for the Human Security

Report project also counts conflicts between nonstate groups in which a government is not one of the war-

ring parties.

4. The new data set includes deaths from intercommunal violence and "one-sided" attacks on civilians that had not been counted previously. 5. There

is a clear association between states

that

are major abusers of core human rights and interna-

tional conflict (see Mary Caprioli and Peter F.Trumbore, "Human Rights Rogues in Interstate Conflicts,

1980-2001," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 2 [March 2006]). The relationship between human rights abuse and civil wars is more complex. The econometric literature on the causes of armed conflict indicates that moves from autocracy toward greater political rights are associated with increased risks of

it

is also clear that effective repression can repress human rights and the risk ofwar at the same time. For example, the decline in armed conflict in the Middle East and North Africa that bearmed conflict. But

gan in the eaily 1980s has been associated crease in

with

an

in-

political repression.

cism

with respect to methodology and bias'

7. Association is not the same as cause, of course.War has apdybeen described as "development in reverse," and it is clear that in many countries low incomes are a consequence ofwar. In fact, the causal relationships run in both directions

8. Suggestive evidence for the long-term impact of economic growth in reducing the risk of armed conflict comes from East and Southeast Asia, where the number of armed conflicts declined as economic growh in the region accelerated from the mid1970s. In contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa conflicts rose throughout much of the 1990s while GDP per capita fell.

9. Victor Asal and Amy Pate, "The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950-2003," in Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Surttey of Armed C onflicts,

SelfD e termination Mosernents, and Demot -

racy, ed. Monty G. Marshall andTed Robert Gur (College Park Center for Intemational Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland,

2005).28-38. 10. Ibid. 11. RAND Corporation, "RAND Study

Says

UN Nation Building Record Compares Favorably with the US in Some Respects," press release' February 78, 2005, http / /www.rand. orglnews/press.05/ :

02.18.html (accessed July 26, 2005). 12. See International Rescue Committee, "The

Lancet Publishes IRC Mortality Study from DR Congo; 3.9 Million Have Died: 38,000 Die per Month," January 6, 2006, http://www.th eirc.org/ news/page j

sp

?itemlD =27 879 0 67 .

13. The Brahimi Report took its name from its chairman, former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi. Its official titJ'e is Report of tlte Panel on IJnited Nations Peace Operations.For a brief description, see http ://wr,vw.u n.or g/ peace/ reports/p eaceoperations/docs/pr1.htm.

14. See United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, /l More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York United Nations, 2004), http://www.un.orglsecureworld.

6, One rare exception is the collection of terrorism and human rights data by the U.S. government.

15. As is so often the case in the United Nations, the success-or failure-of the exercise will depend less on formal structures than on the caliber of the

But these data sets-particularly those dealing with

people appointed to the keY Posts'

sffi Npw Rorps FOR RncroNAL Oncnxl ZNIONS Paul F, Diebl

& F-&

*d"

52 op rHB UN CneRtBR explicitly recognizes certain roles for RTTcLE

.&- regional organizattons in the promo-

tion of international peace and security. Yet that same document makes it clear that such roles are to be inherendylimited. First, regional

organizations are confined to geographically narrow ("regional" or"1oca1") disputes, as opposed to those with broader scope and potential impact. Second, regional organ\zations are clearlyto be subordinate to the United Nations Security Council, which retains supervisory authority over regional actions as well as the right to supersede regional efforts if necessary. For much ofthe ColdWar era, regional organizations performed those limited roles in conflict management, more likelybecause oftheir underdevelopment rather than for reasons of strict adherence to UN Charter norms. With the end ofthe ColdWar, regional organizations have assumed increasingly varied, and in some cases primary, roles in conflict management. The contention in this chapter is that regional organizations have increased,

in some

cases

dramatically, their conflict man-

agement activities, but that (1) there is tremendous variation across organizations and (2) this increase has not come at the expense of the United Nations but is parallel to the trend toward general increases in global conflict management. Furthermore, regional otganization efforts have some advantages and disadvantages relative to those global activities, making the former less than clear substitutes for the laffer.

Rncrolqer O nceNlzenoNs AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The range of conflict management options open to regional organizaions is essentiallythe ,u-" u, that available to the United Nations.l Conflict management encompasses a range of actions, all designed to promote the prevention,

mitigation, and ultimately resolution of conflict. One can conceive of a continuum of conflict management activities thatvaty according to the level of commitment (resources )J)

536 and political) required and the operational level of the actittty.2

At the lower end of the continuum. regional organizations create norms on a variety of subjects, several of which may promote peace and security in the region. For example, there is a strong norm of democratization in the Western Hemisphere, fostered by the Organization of American States (OAS).3 This norm not only discourages extraconstitutional

regime change, which could promote regional instability, but also maypromote peacefirl conflict management indirecdy, given that democratic states are less likely to fight one another and more likely to adopt peacefi.rl dispute res-

olution mechanisms.4

More directly, regional organizations pass normative resolutions or issue statements on particular threats to regional order. The Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) issued a declaration in 7992 calling for the peacefi.rl resolution of disputes surrounding the Sprady Islands and the South China Sea. More specific to a given event, the North At-

lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a declaration on terrorism following the Madrid train bombings in 2004. Such actions serve to promote the interests of a region's members broadly and consequendy are not necessarily expected to have an immediate impact. In contrast, other normative actions are designed to promote immediate changes in behavior by member states. For example, following a military coup in Ecuador in 2000, the OAS passed resolutions denouncing this action and called for the restoration ofthe democratically elected president.s

Moving along a continuum indicating greater commitment and more operational ac-

tivities, regional organizations undertake a va-

riety of diplomatic efforts to advance peace and security. Diplomatic efforts, such as mediation, assume that conflicts cannot ultimately be managed or resolved except by the disputants themselves. Diplomatic efforts are able to achieve conflict management in a number of

Peur E DrBHrdifferent ways, most notably by bringing the parties in dispute together when they otherwise might not negotiate with one another. Political pressure and the prospect of legitimacy and prestige are elements that allow the regional organization to bring warring parties to the bargaining table. Regional organizations and their representatives may also pLay an active role in the negotiations themselves. They may clarify the positions of the parties, redefine the issues,6 serye as conduits for negotiation, pressure each side to make concessions, and formulate alternative proposals. Regional organizations may also play a role in providing additional incentives for the parties to come to an agreement, such as economic or political aid. Regional groups or their members might also offer themselves as guarantors of any conflict management agreement, undertaking an ongoing role in the implementation of the peace agreement. There are several conditions under which regional organizatrons develop norrns and promote cooperation. One is in response to ongoing crises and war. The European Union (EU) was among the first actors to respond to

the internattonalized civil war in Bosnia, dispatching a peace mission led by former NAIO secretary-general Lord Carrington. Similar$ the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was instrumental in the negotiations of the 1999 Lusaka Accords dealing with the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire).7 Regional or-

ganizations also respond to long-term threats to peace and securiry sometimes by constructing norms on weapons or by facilitating arms control cooperation. For example, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) initiative in the Middle East was a (failed) effort to achieve arms control in that region.s Finally, some regions have moved beyond traditional security concerns to emerging topics

on the security agenda, with the goal of establishing joint rules and norms. Such concerns include drug trafficking, terrorism, and

Now Rolns

p'oR

537

RrcroNel ORceNIzATIoNS

"human security'' problems, with Latin American organizations being the most involved in these areas.9

Regional organizations may also initiate sanctions against a state, an action requiring considerable political commitment from the organizations' members and potentially incurring some economic costs. Sanctions include, most commonly, restrictions on trading certain goods with a given state as well as arms embargoes directed against an entire region.

The Organizatton of African Unity (OAU) maintained sanctions for years against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Similarly, the OAS has excluded Cuba from its membership. Ofcourse, the imposition of economic sanctions may be done as much (or more so) for normative reasons as for inducing a change in behavior.

Moving toward the other end of the continuum, regional organtzaions also participate in a range ofactivities that fall under the peacekeeping rubric; one might include a series of related operational activities (e.g., election supervision) in this category as well.taditional peacekeeping refers to the deployment of lightly armed troops in response to threats to regional security or in response to ongoing wars, as in Congo. Peacekeepingm y entail a variety of functions, including cease-fire mon-

itoring, humanitarian assistance, postconflict reconstruction, and arms control verification. An example of a regional peacekeeping effort is the operation in Liberia authorized by the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS), referred to as ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group). Regional organizations might also promote conflict resolution and democratic institutions in ethni-

Organization for Security and Cooperation in

cally divided states, a role taken on by the

Europe (OSCE). The most coercive set of options, requiring the greatest political and resource commitments, can be categorized as enforcement. taditionally, enforcement refers to large-scale

military operations designed to defend the victims of aggression and restore peace and security by the defeat of aggressor forces; enforcement may also be designed to impose a particular solution in a given conflict.10 This strategy relies on the deterrent value ofcollective military action; if deterrence fails, however, states need to carry out the threatened military action and restore peace and security in the region. A recent example of this is NAIO's

actions against the former Yugoslavia in Kosovo. Enforcement actions can be roughly subdivided into two types.The frstrs collectizte security,inwhich a coalition of states, generaliy acting through an international otganizalon, seeks to deter or defeat (if necessary) any coalition member($ that uses military force to alter the status quo. A second type is what has been referred to as collective defense' This also involves deterrence or military action against an aggressor but is more often the product of a traditional military alliance rather than an international government al or ganization. The original role of the NATO alliance in Europe is the prototypical example.

PRrtnnNs oFREGIoNAL O nc,cNrzATIoN INvoLVEMENT During the Cold War, regional organizations played limited roles in conflict management. At the diplomatic level, some regional groups responded to crises in their regions, but such a responsewas far from assured.The OAS actually handled eleven cases during the 1960s, largely on a consensual basis with respect to the normative actions taken.This level of cooperation disintegrated, however, in the following two decades, and the organization became considerablyless active in security affairs.ll In several cases (e.g., Panama), U.S. unilateral ac-

tion replaced collective policy in the region. Similarly, the League of Arab States (LAS) convened to discuss the first crisis between Iraq and Kuwait in 1961, but the organization was largely paralyzed in handling disputes

538

Peul E DrBHr,

among its other members

several resolutions on the Ethiopian-Eritrean

decades;

conflict

in the following onlywith respect to policy toward Israel did there seem to be broad, although not universal, consensus on

joint

action.l2

Regional organizations partook in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era,

but only in a very limited fashion. The OAU launched an operation in Chad in the early 1980s, but with largely disasrrous results.l3 Other operations seemed to resemble enforcement operations as opposed to conventional peacekeeping, serving the interests of leading states in the region as much as, or more than, the region members as a whole. For example,

the Inter-American Peace Force, which followed the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in7965,and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in the mid-1970s. sanctioned bv the League of Arab States, were largely multilateral actions in name only. With respect to en-

forcement actions, no regional otganization carried out a true collective security military action. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were active military elliances, pursuing deterrent strategies against each other; except for the use of Warsaw Pact troops in putting down dissent

in Czechoslovakia, however, neither alliance carried out missions on the batdefield and indeed had no need to do so. From the late 1980s and early 1990s to the present time, there has been a dramatic upsurge in regional conflict management activi-

ties of all forms. Regional organizations dramatically increased their mediation attempts; before 797 5, regSonal, organizations conducted only an average of two mediation attempts per yea\ whereas after 7989, these averaged almost twenty per year.la African organizations have become more involved diplomaticdTy,reflecting a change in norms on that continent. The OAU was a historically weak organization that took little direct action in the region, adhering to a strict interpretation ofnational sovereignty. Its successor, the African Union (AU), has attempted to play a much more activist role.15 Normatively, the OAU/AU passed

as

well

as

the dispute over the disposi

tion of the Comorian island of Mayotte. It also drafted a treaty on a nuclear weapons-free

zone and one on preventing and combating terrorism, the latter several years before the 9/11 attacks. The European Union has also expanded its security role and has been extensively involved

in mediation, especially during the Bosnian war. In its formative decades, the European Union concentrated on cooperation in economic and social areas. In the past decade, it has attempted to form common defense and foreign policies, allowing the organization to take collective action when regional threats to security arise, as was the case in Macedonia and Kosovo.The European Union also devoted attention to old problems (e.g., Cyprus) that had been largely ignored previously, because they had implications for membership expansion. The OSCE as well has played the role of mediator, most visibly in the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict between Armenia and AzerbaTjan. Furthermore,

NAIO

also adopted normative

positions, passing resolutions and issuing statements on, among other subjects, Albania, nuclear tests in Pakistan, Georgia, and Iraq (note that each of these situations would have been considered "out of area" during the Cold War and therefore notwithin NAIO purview).16

There has been perhaps no more visible expansion of regional organization efforts than in the area of peacekeeping.lTThe total number of regional peacekeeping operations increased dramatically from nine before 1989 to thirty-one begun thereafter.ls In Africa alone since 1990, regional organizations have conducted ten peace operations. ECOWAS has carried out half ofthese operations, most prominendyin Liberia.The AU deployment in the

AIthough regional peacekeeping has grown most in Africa, that continent is not alone Sudan also received considerable attention.

in seeing more peace operations carried out by regional groupings. NATO has transformed

New Ror,Bs l'oR RncroNer ORcemzArroNS itself from a purely military alliance to an organizatron that now carries out various peace operations, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.The European Union has also begun operational activities, taking over for NATO in Bosnia and carrying out missions in Kosovo. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has also sent troops to Moldova, Georgia,

and Tajikistan, although as with Cold War peacekeeping, these operations were largely national efforts (here by Russia) with the imprimarur of a regional association. The increase in regional conflict management has not come at the expense ofglobal ef: forts. UN-sponsored mediation has increased at a faster rate than that ofregionil, organiza-

tions. Furthermore, the United Nations has conducted more than three times as many peace operations since 1988 than it did in the previous forty-three years, with an accompanying expansion of mission scope as well. Peace operations overall have increased since the end

of the Cold War, with regional organizations dramatically expanding the number of operations, but the ratio ofregional to global operations has stayed about the same.19 AIso, regional organizatrons have partnered with the United Nations in carrying out some missions, making the global-regional distinction some-

what misleading; for example, CIS peacekeeping forces cooperated with the UN mission in Thjikistan (UNMOT). Finally, regional organizatrons have conducted some enforcement operations as well. NATO's bombing of Kosovo, as well as its subsequent occupation, was the closest to being a traditional military operation. ECOWAS has also carried out missions with some enforcement elements to them, including in Sierra

Leone and C6te d'Ivoire. This is not to say that regional organizatrcns have not approved

military action taken by their members-for example, the Organization of East Caribbean States sanctioned the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 7983-yet such instances provide what Inis Claude referred to as "co-llective

539

legitimatnation"2o to natio nal actio n s rather than evidence ofregional action per

se.

RnRsous FoR GREATER

RpctoNeusnt There are a number of reasons for a greater emphasis on conflict management at the regional level. Most obvious is that the demand for conflict management has increased as well, evidenced by an increase in armed conflicts over the past two decades.2l Interstate war has remained constant or even declined since the end of the Cold War. Intrastate or civil conflict has increased both in number andvariety.

The international system has seen an increase in the number of civil wars over the past two decades, many with significant negative externalities, including fighting and refugees streaming across the borderc.22 Beyond tradi-

tional civil wars, the world has experienced a relatively new phenomenon-((fhiled" or'?isrupted" states. Such entities also foster instability in regions as well as carrying a human

toll that may

exceed that

from civil

wars.

Global organizations and their members have been overburdened with these challenges, re-

sulting in limited attention to some areas as as donor fatigue.The United Nations and

well

leading states have also chosen to ignore certain wars or failed states.This leaves gaps that have been filled by regional organizations, many of

which cannot afford to ignore the conflicts and problems at their doorsteps. Yet any increase in armed conflict cannot alone account for the magnitude of the upsurge in regional conflict management.23 Other factors are at work as well. The end of the Cold War has had some ancillary effects beyond establishing U.S. unipolarity. During the Cold War, the superpowers often assumed primary roles in regional con-

Within their respective spheres of influUnited States and the Soviet Union were able to suppress most violent conflict, through either direct military intervention flicts.

ence, the

Peul

540

or at least the threat ofit. To the extent that regional organizations and efforts existed, they were largely subordinate to the interests and directions of the leading states. Beyond

F, DIBHI-

theWestern Hemisphere and Eastern Europe, the superpowers were as frequendy involved in exacerbating conflict as they were in mitigating it. Most notably in Africa and the Middle East, the superpowers supplied arms and po-

security. These hopes were only enhanced by the global cooperation in redressing lraq's invasion of Kuwait. Yet the limits of a newworld order were quickly apparent as failed peacekeeping in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, and war in Bosnia exposed flaws in global efforts. As optimism fadedbythe middle of the 1990s, regional alternatives to LlN-sponsored efforts began to emerge.

litical support to client groups and states. When the superpowers did "cooperate"24 to manage conflict, it was frequently to prevent escalation of those conflicts that might have

AND DISADVANTAGES

RncrowerAovRNtacBs

drawn themselves into the fray. Rare were the

instances

in which the two leading

states

sought to resolve a conflict firllywith joint action. The end of the Cold War created a vacuum in some regions and new opportunities for regional efforts to fill the gaps. The end of the Cold War also led to a change in the international security environment and the interests of the leading states. With a few exceptions, such as the Iraqi inva-

sion of Kuwait, regional conflicts no longer direcdy affected the economic and security interests of Western states. Furthermore, domestic political support in those same states for intervention into regional conflicts has also declined (and strategic doctrines have been adjusted accordingly).2s Leading states may seek regional arrangements as alternatives to bilateral alliances and unilateral actions.26 This is not to say that such states will wholly abandon such initiatives (indeed one might suggest that unilateral actions have increased in recent decades), but merely that some conflicts willbe dumped or subcontracted to regional groupings.

The movement toward regional conflict management, however, is not solely a function of the Cold War's demise. Some of the recent regional efforts follow on the heels offailed global efforts, especially by the United Nations. In the early 1990s, there was optimism that the United Nations would play a major role in addressing threats to international peace and

PossibleAdvantages Overall, regional organrzattons have no record of performance superior (or indeed inferior) to that of the United Nations in conflict management.2T Nevertheless, there are differences between the two kinds of organizations. Al-

though one might expect regional conflict management efforts to experience success and failure for many of the same reasons as IIN ef: forts, the former may have some unique advantages, including greater consensus in the organization, greater support from the dispu-

tants, heightened chances for conflict resolution, and more control over third-party states. Greater Consensus in the Organization. One might expect regional organizations to have an advantage over the United Nations because their membership is more homogeneous.2s States in a regional organization are more likely to be at the same development level; share historical, ethnic, or tribal roots; and have similar political outlooks stemming from facing common regional problems.These commonalities are supposed to provide greater consensus among the members and make authorrzatron of conflict management easier, as there

will be fewer disagreements blocking strong action. Regional organizatons are also not constrained, as is the United Nations, by the veto power ofleading members.29 Indeed, some regional organizatrons have adopted procedures

Nnw Ror,Bs poR RrcroNer, ORceNrzArroNS to avoid such a deadlock; the OSCE rule on "consensus minus one" allows it to take action against any one of its members.3o

In practice, these expectations have often gone unfulfilled. One often finds great splits among members of regional organizations when dealing with regional conflicts. For example, the LAS was virtually paralyzed during the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because its members were strongly divided in their loyalties to the protagonists. Regional animosities also tend to hamper regional organizations'actions. Unity from homogeneity comes in response to threats to security external to the organization, such as Arab unity against Israel or African support for decolonizalonin Angola.The most common threats to regional peace, howeverinternal threats-are exacdy those least likely to generate consensus. It is ofcourse conceivable that, for certain conflicts, regional organizations may be able to achieve greater consensus and act more swiftly than the United Nations. Nevertheless, regional groupings have no inherent advantage on this point, and one might suggest that a disinterested global organization in a post-Cold War world may actually be better able to limit local conflict.31 Greater Supportfrom the Disputants. A second possible advantage for regional organizations

is that the support given them by the disputants and the local population will be greater than for comparable UN efforts. This argument relies on the notion that the people and governments in a region have a natural affinitywith those in that geographic area and an inherent suspicion ofwhat they perceive as outside intervention. Thus, there are frequendy calls for "AraH' or "Africari' solutions to regional conflicts before international forces intervene. Disputants may be more accepting of actions by a regional organizaiton, but, just as important, subnational groups and others in the conflicting states may see such actions as more legitimate.32

541 To the extent that regional actions can generate more support than UN missions, they have an important advantage. Yet they must clear two hurdles that may frequendy trip up such attempts. First, the organization must

reach sufficient consensus to authorize the mission, in order to give it legitimacy,fat from

in most cases. Second, and more directly to this point, a regional organization must be accepted as an honest broker in the conflict. This again may be difficult to achieve. For example, an OAS operation that is led by the United States and that may serve U.S. interests will have less legitimacy than a UN force. A Nigerian-led force in West Africa would encounter similar difficulties. If the conflict at hand causes divisions in the region as a whole, then any action is unlikely to receive authorization and, even ifapproved, may not be perceived as impartial or fair by all parties. Thus, while the advantage of greater support is true in theory it is less likely to be manifest in practice. a foregone conclusion

Heightened Chances for Conflict Resolution. Regional efforts may also be better at promoting conflict resolution than is the United Nations, which has tended to respond to crises with Band-Aid solutions to securiry problems, with limited follow-up diplomatic efforts. The United Nations has often helped negotiate cease-fires and/or deployed peacekeeping troops prior to conflict resolution (e.g., in Cyprus), but it has not often facllitated a final peace setdement once those peacekeepers are in place. The net effect is that the international community and the protagonists themselves maybe discouraged from pursuing further diplomacy to resolve the disputes and from reaching a setdement if negotiations do occur.33 At best, the United Nations has waited until a setdementwas reached to deploypeacekeepers and carrl' out peacebuilding activities, but such a settlement may never occur or take place too late to save hundreds or thousands of lives. Regional organizations may be more

Peur, F. Drnur

542 concerned with resolving the undedying conflict because the implications are much greater for the states in the area. Furthermore, they may more closely tie passing resolutions and

the stationing of peacekeeping troops to

a

mechanism, such as negotiations, or to an actual settlement plan, such as elections for resolving the dispute. In this way, there is hope

that regional organizalons can not only promote conflict management but facilitate final conflict resolution as well. In theory this contention offers litde with which to quibble. In practice, much depends on the success of those regional diplomatic efforts and the form that they take. Regional organizations such as the OAU and the Arab League have followed peacekeeping efforts with extensive diplomatic initiatives, yet reconciliation attempts in Lebanon and Chad, for

cause of the failure

ofUN

peacekeeping oper-

ations34 and economic sanctions.

Although this advantage is by no means guaranteed, the support ofthird-party states is a definite benefit for regional efforts and constitutes the primary advantage over activities run by global organizations or multinational configurations. Yet one must recognize that there may be instances in which a third-party state is not cooperative with a regional effort (e.g., Israel in any LAS action), and regional groups still have to contend with potential opposition from subnational actors, much as the United Nations does. Third-party opposition might also prevent the regional organization from taking any action. Possible Disadvantages

example, have not always been successful in the long run. Intervention by regional organizations is not necessarilv anv more successfi.rl

Regional orgarizaircns may also face situational constraints when dealing with external threats to regional peace and the involvement of regional powers.

than global efforts, .rr.., ihorrgh it may be more frequent. Indeed, the formulation of the Vance-

Little Control over External Threats. An in-

Owen plan for Bosnia, a joint effort of the European Union and the United Nations, was a failure; the Dalton Peace Accords,largely a U.S. initiative, came about after multiple failures by both organizations. More Control overThird-Par$t States.A final possible advantage of regional conflict management efforts is that they may be better able

to secure the support ofthe interested thirdparty states, who will almost certainly participate in the debate and authorizatLon of any action, whereas they may not in a UN forum. Interested third oarties are those that border the affected area-and/or have significant economic and security interests in the conflict (e.g., Syria in Lebanon, Vietnam in Cambodia). In this way, the third-party state has a better chance of modi$'ing the operation according to its views and is more likely to support it. More important, it is less likely to sabotage the organization's efforts, a major

clusive global organization by definition has no limitations on the geographic scope of its actions (except those set by national sovereignty) or on its theoretical capability to deal with threats to international peace and security. Regional organizations, in contrast, may have problems with conflicts that involve external intervention. On the one hand, there may be gre^ter consensus in the organization when external threats are present. The OAU was created, in part, to eliminate colonialism and

extraregional interference in African affairs. The OAS is in some ways an extension of the Monroe Doctrine and its solidarity against external attack One might anticipate fewer problems with internal consensus in such cases.

Effective conflict management, however, depends on more than consensus in the authorizing organization A11 disputants and relevant third parties must acquiesce or cooperate ifthe mission is to be successfirl. Unfornrnately, regional organizaitons do not have the political

NBw Rorns roR REcroNer ORceNrzATroNS influence, moral suasion, or means of coercion to convince external powers to cooperate in

conflict management efforts.The United Nations had enough difficulties convincing Belgium to refrain from hostile acts during the Congo operation in the 1960s. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can do litde to ensure Israeli or Iraqi cooperation in any conflict in the area. Only a global organizatron can deal effectively with threats from states external to the region or organizatton.The advantage that regional organizatrons have in bringing in interested third-party states disappears ifthose states are at the heart ofthe conflict and are efiernal to the region. Tlte Inability to Restrain Regional Powers. A consistent theme in the analysis of regional organizations is their inability to take concerted action against their most powerfirl members.35 Regional operations are unlikely to be authorizedincofficts that direcdyinvolve the global powers or regional powers. The organization has neither the political clout nor the resources to mount an operation opposed or not actively supported by those states. A regionally powerfirl state would be able to resist pressure to support any action, and even were one authorized, the hegemon could effectively sabotage the

mission through direct action or covertly through intermediate actors. This condition necessarily confines strong regional responses to conflicts between or within smaller states.

The problem of dealingwith a hegemon is most evident in the Western Hemisphere. The OAS has been unable to mount any effective operational action that is not supported by the United States. Although the United Nations

might also face difficulties in gaining U.S. cooperation for a peacekeeping operation in Panama, for example, the possibility seems foreclosed in the case of the OAS. Other regions may have fewer problems, at least given

current power configurations. Any regional arrangement in Asia would have difficulty

restraining Chinese or Japanese behavior.

543 Similarly, a variety o{ reeional and subregional organizations in Africa probably could not compel South Africa to halt any transgression

it might commit. In general, only the United Nations offers the potential to restrain a regional power, altho"gh perhaps not a superpower.The United Nations has the resources, even without the cooperation of some states, and it has the political power to pressure states to accede to its peacekeeping operations. The inability to restrain regional hegemons is a major disadvantage to regional initiatives.

Veruerr oNS AcRo s s RBcr oNer Onc,qNIzRtroNs To this point, we have juxtaposed regional organizations against the United Nations, treating the former as a homogeneous grouping for analytical purposes. In fact, there is ffemendous variation across regional organizations with respect to conflict management. Such differences include the frequency and type ofinvolvement as well as the organizations'likely capacity for playing important future roles in their regions.36 A number of significant differences in characteristics account for such wide variation in performance.

Threats To some extent, international organizations tend to handle the most serious conflicts. Lesser disputes either are resolved with outside intervention or are not consideredworthy of internationil. organizatrons, which are primarily reactive and crisis driven in terms of what kinds of conflicts appear on agendas. Yet no single configuration ofthreats fits all regions. Accordingly, some regions must deal with more intractable conflicts, and therefore regional associations in those areas may be less likely to take action and less likely to succeed when they do.37 Perhaps not surprisingly, the most successful regional otganizations have been those

Peur, E DmHr

544 dealing with the least serious threats, ceteris paribus.3s South America has had little need for collective conflict management since 1990 and correspondinglyhas been quite effective in dealing with lower-level threats to security.3e Similarly, Western Europe has been largely free of the most dangerous and protracted

forms of conflict, allowing its institutions to concentrate on newer security issues and to direct attention to security problems in the

ofthe continent. The most notable variation in threats has been with respect to ethnic conflict and "weak states."These problems have been prevalent in Africa,a0 but almost nonexistent in the Western Hemisphere (with the exception ofHaiti). The reason that ethnic conflicts and weak states are key problems for regional conflict management is that these conflicts have significant negative externalities. Historically, internal conflicts were not considered to be in eastern part

the purview ofregional organizattons but rather

were something to be dealt with solely by the state itself This represented a "hard-shell" view of state sovereignty. Many members of the African Union have objected to any military intervention in Darfur, Sudan, on sovereignty grounds. At the same time, ethnic conflicts and weak states have contributed to greater prospects for intervention by neighboring states,

to a territory make it more difficult to find compromise positions than do those territorial disputes over resources or defense concerns.4l

Some boundary disputes persist in Latin America, but most of these are of the less salient variety. One of the reasons that Latin America is alleged to be a "zone of peace" is that it had largely settled its borders by the end of the nineteenth century.42 The same cannot be said for all the other regions of the world, and this has significant implications for the effective ne s s o f re gio nil. or ganizatio n efforts. Africa still suffbrs from the results ofthe 1885 Berlin Conference, in which its colonial borders were drawn without reference to historical delineation or the groups living within various territories. This has been somewhat mitigated, however, by the agreement among African leaders around the time of independence that state borders would not be altered by military force. South Asia also must deal with territorial disputes, most notably the dispute over Kashmir and the problems along the

Indian-Chinese border. Most border issues have been settled in Europe, although some disputes (e.g., in Cyprus and the Balkans) have proved intractable for European institutions. Internal Rivalries Related to the kinds of threats that a region faces is the presence ofinternal rivalries be-

independent of regional organizations. The recent Congo conflict is the most egregious case of direct intervention in a civil war; there, a number of neighboring states sent troops to fight for and against various Congolese fac-

but also may paralyze attempts at collective action by the regional association. Regional

tions. This makes it almost impossible for a regional organization to reach consensus on taking action. Another problematic threat to regional peace

wars and other serious threats to Deace seem to coalesce around these rivalrier.a3 We k ro* that such rivalries, often labeled "enduring rivalries" in the scholarly literature, are the

in

greatest threats to peace.aa Similarly, the multifaceted Arab-Israeli rivalry (in actualiry several intertwined rivalries) represents the greatest threat to peace in that region. Other regions of the world are less defined by one or more central rivalries. Europe traditionally revolved around the U.S.-Soviet rivalry but

and security comes from territorial disputes,

which states fight over the possession of a piece of land, usually geographically contiguous to both sides. Especially dangerous are those disputes that involve territory that is valued for its intangible rather than tangible qualities; that is, religious, ethnic, and historical claims

tween its members. Such rivalries not only may present conflicts that are difficult to manage

Nnw Rorps pon Recroxer, OnceNrzATroNS no longer has its security arrangements organized around that competition. Latin America

certainly has had traditional rivalries (e.g., Argentina-Chi1e), but these had more limited negative externalities. A comparison of Asia and Europe reveals how rivalries affect regional conflict management efforts.45 ASEAN+3 states (ten members plus China,Japan, and South Korea) are involved in nineteen rivalries, as of 2001, with a number of patterns relevant for regional conflict management. First, several of the rivalries reflect a common external enemy-North

Korea. Nevertheless, a closer inspection reveals that although China, Japan, and South

Korea share some interests

with

respect to

North Korea (e.g., limiting nuclear proliferation), their preferences and policies with respect to that country are by no means conver-

gent. Furthermore, each of those three states has rivalries zuitb the other tzuo.Thus,although some cooperation with respect to foreign policy might be forthcoming, there is certainly not a broad basis for regional cooperation centered on North Korea. The lack of a common external enemy has long been a limiting factor

in furthering Asian security cooperation.46 Second, and related to the previous point, eleven of the rivalries are internal to the

ASEAN+3 grouping;that is, these states are more likelyto fight one another than an external enemy. Most notable are the rivalries betvyeen three of the largest economic forces in the grouping-China,Japan, and South Korea (the +3 states). Indeed, the presumed leading states in the coalition-China andJapan-are involved in eleven rivalries, including against each other. Yet there are several crosscutting rivalries as well, most critically the disagreement over the Spratly Islands, which involves

China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. Until the major-power rivalries a lesser extent the controversy surrounding the Spradys are resolved, there will be limits to how far the ASEAN+3 states can cooperate on regional security matters.

and to

545

EU

states stand

in marked contrast to those

in Asia. Although there are seventeen rivalries involving European states, most of them concern a common external opponent-the former Yugoslavia. These military confrontations with Yugoslavia stem from the Bosnian war, and many involve joint NAIO actions in Kosovo. If anything, they reveal a common approach to regional security. Importantly, none of the rivalries is internal to the organizationl of course, that could change if and whenTurkeyjoins the European Union. Still, it appears that European states have largely resolved internal squabbles, as a consequence ofpast integration efforts, but also as a pathway to further cooperative efforts in the secuflty area. Mandate/Authority and Institutions The ability of regional organizations to play significant roles in conflict management is largely conditioned by the authority granted to them by their members.4T In some cases, no security institution at all exists in a region. For example, the north Asian region has no regional organizationto handle conflict management.48 In other parts of Asia, the institutions are relativelyweak The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) provides for cooperation only in the social and economic issue areas. By definition then, it is unable to exercise any significant role in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, except very indirectly and then only through a functionalist approach to peace.4e Other regionil,organtzations, such as ASEAN, are similarly handicapped by lim-

ited mandates for security action. ASEAN action, in particular, has been limited to normative declarations. ASEAN has taken some recent stepsso to clarlfy its decision rules, but the organization has not committed itself to the use of militaryforce and has rea{firmed its principle ofnoninterference in the internal affairs of members. In other regions, the mandates of otgznizations and the level of institutionalizatronvary

Peul

546 widely. Until recently, the African lJnion was structurally weak, often little more than a forum for yearly meetings of heads of state on that continent. Much of this may be a backlash against UN involvement in Congo during the 1960s and a preference for nonintervention ofany variety by outside actors. Indeed, the predecessor OAU prohibited alliances among its members, effectively foreclosing collective security options. Accordingly, to the extent that it was involved in peacemaking activities, the organization operated through ad hoc committees.5l The AU has expanded its activities to include election monitoring and peacekeeping.It also made provisions in 2005

for a nonaggression and common defense agreement, although it is not clear that this addresses some of the main security threats there, including civil war and failed states. Several regional organizatrons have the legal

provisions to undertake avarrety of different kinds of actions.The Organizaton ofAmerican States has collective security provisions contained in its charter (Article 28) as well as provisions for other kinds ofactions, although most ofthese are directed against extraregional threats or interstate aggression, rather than

being internal matters. Similarly, the GCC and the LAS also have collective security provisions at their disposal. Some regional entities also contain conflict management provisions, even if their primary purposes are in the economic realm. For example, several regional trade associations in Africa include mechanisms for conflict managementwhen disputes arise over resources.s2

At the other

extreme of the continuum is the European region, which has multiple institutions for dealing with security. These have overlapping memberships and complementary roles. Of longest-standing import is NATO,

which traditionally handled the duties for collective security and collective defense. Since the end of the ColdWar, its missions have been modified and it now functions as a peacekeeper

in Bosnia

and Afghanistan. The European

F.

Drprtr,

Union has extended its authority in the security realm with a common defense policy and various diplomatic initiatives. NATO and the European Union are supplemented by the West European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the latter ofwhich has been involved in ethnic conflicts and election supervision. Thus, to alarge extent, the roles ofregional organizations will be determined by the mandates given to them and the extant institutional arrangements to give them effect. Yet authority for action does not guarantee action, as resources and hegemony limitations will affect when and how action is taken by the regional organization. Resources

Merely having the authority to carry out a conflict management activity is not enough if the organization lacks the requisite resources to take effective action. "Resources" in this context refers to the financial, political, and in some cases military/logistical capacity to take action. Organizations are not inherently endowed with such capacities but must rely on members for their provision for operational activities. The alternative is that conflict management actions will be confined to normative and diplomatic initiatives, which require few tangible resources. Some operations, specifically peacekeeping, collective securiry and humanitarian assistance, require large amounts ofmoneyto pay for supplies and personnel. A number of regional organizations (e.g., SADC) are composed of less developed states that lack the capacity for adequately constructing such op-

erations, much less sustaining them. Increasingly, such organizattons have appealed for support (i.e., financial, logistical, training) from the United Nations, NGOs, or leading states in the world system to carry out missions; to a limited extent, this has mitigated some of the problems encountered.This maybe more common in the future as global actors "subconffact"

NBw Roles poR RncroNer ORceNrzArroNS activities they are unwilling to perform to regional organizations and others.53 In contrast, wealthier institutions, such as the European Union, have the financial ability to run peacekeeping operations, for example, for long periods of time; this is not to say that financial concerns are absent, but rather that the reluctance of those organizations to allocate funds comes from political motivations rather than financial exigencies. The presence of financial resources alone is not a guarantee ofeffectiveness for a regional organizairon The organization and its members must also have political capital to influence regional activities. There is little doubt that the GCC, made up of six oil-rich Arab states, has the financial resources to fund al-

547

of conflict and one difficult to resolve. In the European theater, this was a major source of war for centuries. Such competition has been largely muted therel to the extent that such competition still exists, it is largely played out in the economic and political institutions of the European Union.In contrast, in the Middle East, Arab states (traditionally Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria) maybe somewhat united in their support of the Palestinian cause, but they still see one another as competitors for panArab influence or leadership. These competitions are difficult for regional associations to handle because members mayhave alliedwith different sides in the competition. Even ab-

aJ. organszaaons must draw on poorly trained and equipped military

sent that, the association may be unable to broker an agreement and take actionwhen the leading members of the organization are directly involved. Second, even when one state has clearly established itself as a regional hegemon, the consequences for regional conflict management efforts are not necessarily promising. Regional organizatrons will largelybe incapable of stopping regional hegemons, if those states are the source of regional instability. Thus, the OAS can do litde to restrain U.S. unilateral efforts,55 and ECOWAS has not been able to regulate the abuses committed by Nigeria in organization missions. One might hypothesize that were Asia to have stronger regional organtza-

oersonnel from their member states. and those militaries often lack long-force projection capabilities. The net effect is that some coercive options are foreclosed for those regional insti-

tions, it is unlikely that they could rein in China or India. Thus, when regional groupings include a hegemon, theywill be less effective than associations with a more equal bal-

tutions. When such operations are authorized, they may have suboptimal numbers of personnel, and soldiers and other organtzational staff may be especially prone to commit abuses (e.g., rape, looting).

ance of capabilities among the membership.

most any operation, but its members (save perhaps Saudi Arabia) are weak politically and militarily and are unable to broadly affect policy in the Middle East.sa One might speculate thzt any subregional organization with small membership would encounter this problem. Military resources are the third component distinguishing effective regional organizations from their less ef[ective countemarts elsewhere.

NATO clearly

has the

militarytraining,logis-

tics, and personnel to carry out a broad range of operations, even beyond the immediate European theater. Other region

Hegemony

Two aspects of hegemony account for variations in regional conflict management effectiveness. First, competition for regional influence among association members is a source

Surnnmnv eND CoNCLUSIoN

Although regional organizations are referenced in the UN Charter, their importance in international relations only became evident several decades after the United Nations was founded. Much of the growth in regional associations is a recent phenomenon, and most of that growth has been in the economic rather

Peul E Dreirl

548

than in the security area.56 Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War marks a turning point, with an upsurge in regional conflict management activities, including peacekeeping and mediation, as well as an expansion of organi-

regional organizations may also increasingly promote democratic processes in avaieqr of waysss and thus directly (..g., by supervising elections) and indirecdy (democracies are less war prone) contribute to regional peace and

zatron roles into areas such as election supervision. The increase in regional conflict management is not a function of the devolution of global governance from the United Nations to regional entities; indeed, LIN conflict management actions have increased at least as much as those of regional associations. Rather, regional organizations have responded to increases in

stability.

conflict demand in the post-Cold War era, demand that has been generated by the end the superpower competition and the failure the United Nations in some key conflicts.

a

of of

Projecting into the future, one might speculate that any future increases in regional conflict management are unlikely to come from the same sources as in the past. There is no linear trend toward -or. .onfli.t in the international system, and some studies suggest that

the most violent conflict is abating.sT This is not to say that organizations in some regions may not experience heightened activity in response to certain wars (note the extensive involvement of different European organizations in the Bosnian war), but only that there is unlikely to be a uniform pattern of rising conflict. Instead, increased regional involvement will come from orgarizatrons that choose to involve themselves in a greater proportion of conflicts that occur. Such actions may come from members who decide to expand their organizations' mandates, paving the way for greater involvement in the internal affairs of members or in operational activities such as peacekeeping. Economic associations may also adopt conflict management provisions for the security realm (much as the European lJnion has done) as a logical extension of integration efforts or simply because such provisions become essential for increased economic cooperation (e.g., management of common pool resources such as water rights). Furthermore,

Ultimately, one must question whether increased regional conflict management activity

matters. The record of effectiveness for these associations remains mixed. Regional associa-

tions are not inherently superior (or inferior) to the United Nations in conflict management efforts. Still, it is hard to argue that regional actions are not at least as beneficial as, or superior to, inaction in most cases. Nevertheless, there is considerable variation among regional groupings with respect to institutional development, resources, security challenges, and membership, and therefore effectiveness. Given the gradual evolution of international organiz trons, one should not expect a global network of firlly developed regional conflict management institutions anytime soon.

NorBs The author would like to thank T2e Kwang Teo and Matthew Shafter for their research assistance.

1.

See,

for example, Connie Peck, Sustainable

Peace:The Ro/e of the UnindNations and Regional

Or-

ganizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Litdefield, 7998).

2. Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, "The Framework for Inquiry" in TheAnatorny of Influence, ed. Robert Cox and HaroldJacobson (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Pre ss, 197 1), 7-36. 3. See Randall Parish and Mark Peceny, "Kantian Liberalism and the Collective Defense ofDemocracy in Latin America," Journal o1f Peace Research 39 (2002):229250.

See also Dexter Boniface, "Is There Democratic Norm in the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States," Global Gover-

a

nanceS

4.

Q002):365-387.

Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1994);

NBw Ror.Bs poR RBcroNar ORceNzerroNs William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American PoIitical Science Re,Liezu 88 (1994):1,4-32. and

5. Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Qrestions of Collective and National Leadership," Z atinAnerican Politics and Society 43 (2001): 703-126. 6.

P.Terrence Hopmann, Tlte Mgotiation Process

and the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996).

7.

I.

William Zartman,"RegSonal Conflict Man-

agement in Africa," in Regional Conflict Management, ed. Paul F. Dietrl andJoseph Lepgold (Lanham, Md.:

Rowman and Litdefield, 2003), 81-103.

"Negotiating Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East The ACRS

8.

Peter Jones,

Experience and Beyond," Journal of Strategic Studies 26 (2003):1s7-1,54.

Carolyn Shaw; "Conflict Management in Latin America," in Regional Conflict Management, 123-752.Htman security refers to protecting human

9.

See

freedoms and firlfillment and includes issues related

to

organized crime, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and civil violence, among others.

10. Joseph Lepgold and Thomas Weiss, eds., Collectise Conflict Management and Changing World Politics (Albany: State University of NewYork Press, 1998).

11. Carolyn Shaw, Cooperation, Confict, and Con' sensus in the Organization of American Srares (New York Palgrave,2004). 12. Hussein Hassouna, The League ofArab States and Regional Disputes (NewYork: Oceana Publications,1975).

13. Terry Mays, Africa\ First Peacekeeping Operation: Tbe OAU in Chad, 1981-1982 (London: Praeger,2002).

14. Paul F. Diehl and Young-Im Cho, "Passing the Buck? Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era," Brown J ourn a / of Wor ld Affair s !2, no. 2 (2006) : 19 7-202.

549 Salem (Cairo: Cairo

UniversityAfrican Regional In-

tegration Support Project, 2005), 35-58.

16. For some discussion ofNATO's adaptation to post-Cold War roles, see Patrick Morgan, "NATO and European Security: The Creative Use of an International Organizatron," Journal of Strangic Studies 26 (2003):4914. 17

. For

an overview of these regional organiza-

tion efforts, see AIex Bellamy and Paul Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operatio ns," International Security 29 (2005): 757-195.

18. Diehl and Cho, "Passing the Buck?" 14n. 19. Ibid. 20. Inis Claude, "Collective Legitimrzation as a Political Function of the United Nations," Interna' tional Organization 20 (1966): 367-379. 21. Paul Hensel, "The More Things Change . . . : Recognizing and Responding to Tiends in Armed Conflict," Conflict Managenent and Peace Science 19 (2002):27-52.

22. In"Armed Conflict

and Its International

Di-

mensions, 1946-2004," Journal of Peace Research 42 (2005) : 623-635, Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen point to an increase in armed conflict, especially intrastate conflict, over the past decade and a half. See also Hensel, "The More Things Change . ' . ," 22n. Yet other sources suggest a diminution of armed conflict in recent times. Much depends' however, on the baseline for comparison chosen. For example,in Peace

and Conflict 2005 (College Park, Md.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr report a key finding on decreased conflict, but this refers only to conflicts with at least one thousand related deaths and therefore is better understood as a reflection of a decline in conflict magnitude rather than frequency. The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2005), by the Human Security Centre, also reports a decline in wars. However' because one ofthe reportt key baselines is 7992, it is not clear

whether altering that baseline would produce similar

15. Ahmed Ali Salem, "Collective Security Action in the OAU: Did the OAU Need a Replace-

conclusions.

ment?" in African Regional Integration: Perspectirtes and Prospects-The Proceedings of tbe First AF&ISP International Conference for Young Researchers on African ffiirs, Mohamed Ashour and Ahmed Ali

24. EdwardKolodziej and Roger Kanet,eds.,The Cold War as Cooperation: Superpotaer Cooperation in Regional Conflict Managem.ent (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

23. Diehl and Cho, "Passing the Buck?" L4n.

550

Peur F. DrBHr,

25. Edward Koloddej, "Modeling International Security," in Resoloing Regional Conflicts, ed. Roger Kanet (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998),

17-40.

26. Good illustrations are U.S. efforts in Asia. See Galia Press-Barnathan, "The Lure of Regional Security Arrangements: The United States and Regional Security Cooperation in Asia and Europe," Strategic (2000-2001): 49-97; and Donald Blair and John Hanley, "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," Washington Quarrerly 24 (2001):7-L7 . Studies 70

27. Robert Butterworth, Moderationfrom Manfnturnational Organizations and Peace (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 7976);arfi Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, andTimothy Nordstrom, "Do Intergovernm ental, Organizaagement:

tions Promote Peace?" World Politics 57 (2005):7-38.

28. A. Leroy Benrrctt, fnturnational Organizations: Principles and Issues, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,

NJ.:

Prentice-Hall ,1991).

29. This key point is made by Connie Peck, "The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict," in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 561-583. 30. John Duffield, "Regional Conflict Management in Europe," in Regional Conflict Management, 239-268.

31. An opposite view is expressed in Peck, Szrtainable Peace,

ln.

conflicts are chosen for international organizaton action have downstream consequences for the outcomes ofthose actions. Failing to account for selection ef: fects can lead to invalid conclusions about the effectiveness of international organizations.

38. Indeed, regional organizations

have been more

inclined to address such lower-level threats, as compared with the United Nations, which has intervened more often in high{evel disputes. See Jacob Bercovitch, Scott Gartner, and MollyMelin, "The Method in the Madness ofMediation: Some Lessons forMediators from Qrantitative Studies of Mediatiori'(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C .,2005). 39. Joseph Lepgold, "Regionalism in the PostCold War Era: Incentives for Con{lict Management," in Regiona I ConJlict Management, 9-40.

40. ZNtm n,"Regional Conflict Management in

Mica," 7n. 41. Paul Hensel, "Territory: Theory

and Evidence

on Geography and Conflict," in What Do We Knozu about War? ed. John Vasquez (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Litdefield,2000), 57-84.

42. Arie Kacowicz, Perspectizte

in the Third Africa in Comparative

Zones of Peace

World: South America and

West

(Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1998).

43.

Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and International Rioalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). See Paul F,

Peace in

44.Ibid.

32. Ibid., 30n. Again, Peck argues for the opposite position: the United Nations may have more legitimacy.

33. SeeJ. Michael Greig and Paul E Diehl, "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma," International Studies Quarterly a9 Q005):

62I-625.

34. Paul F. Diehl, International ed. (Baltimore: Johns

37. In the parlance ofscholarly research, this is as a "selection effect."That is, how and which

known

Peacekeeping, rev.

Hopkins University Press, 1994).

35. Jessica Byron, "Regional Security in Latin America and Africa: The OAS and OAU in Light of Contemporary Security Issues," PSIS Occasional Papers 1/84 (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies. 1984).

36. Boehmer et a1., "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" 27n.

45. Dataaretaken fromJames Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, "The New Rivalry Dataset: Proce-

dures and Patterns," Journal of Peace Research 43 (2006) : 337-348. Data xe available at ftp:/ / 128.79 6 .23.2I2 / riv aJry/riv500web.zip.

46. Rosemary Foot, "Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue," rn Regionalisrn in World Politics, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7995), 228249.

47. Boehmer et al., "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" 27n. 48. Christopher Hemmer andPeter Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective ldentiry Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralrsm," International Organiz.ation 56 Q002): 57

5-607.

NBw Rorps poR RBcroNer, ORceNrzArIoNS 49. Kanti Bajpai, "Managing Conflict in South Asia," in Regi ona I C onfl ic t M an

50.

See

age m en

t, 209-238.

ASEAN toika (http://wrvw.aseansec.orgl

3701.htm) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (http:// !wvw. aseansec or g/ 37 42.htm). .

51. Zartman,"Regional Conflict Management in Afirica," 7n.

52. Kathy Powers, "Intemational Institutions: Formal Mechanisms for Deal-ing with Resource Conflict" (paper presented at the conference "Territorial Conflict Management," llrb

ana, I1,., 2004).

53. Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Beyond UN Subcon' tracting: Task-Sharing u:ith Regional Security Arrangernents and Seroice-Providing NGOs (New York St. Martin's Press, 1997).

551 54. Benjamin Miller, "Conflict Management in the Middle East: Between the'Old'and the ir Regional Conflict Management, 153208.

55. icar"

Shaw,

"Conflict Management in Latin Amer-

9n.

56. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The Political Econorny of Regionalism (NewYork Columbia University Press, 1997).

57. Marshall and Gurr, Peace and Conf;ct 2005, 23n; and Human Security Centre, The Human Security Report,22n. 58. For the role ofregional organizations in democra(nation, see Jon Pevehouse, Dernocracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Demotatization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

ffiK CnpncrTrESAND LtvllTs

oFNGOSAS CoxFLrcT MnxacERs Diana Cltigas

ECAUSE INTERNAIIONAL INTER\ENTION

in conflicts has gained new significance and scope since the Cold War, nongovernmental organ\zations (NGOs) have emerged as a vital player in conflict management. The new agendas for peacebuilding with the 7992 Agendafor Peace-beginning a multiplicity of roles and tasks, often entail carried out at different levels, and deep intervention in governance, humanitarian aid, and development. Conflict management is no longer seen solely in terms of peacemaking good offices, and intermediary -mediation, functions to bring about agreements-and traditional peacekeeping. "Direct prevention," supplemented by the notion of "structural prevention,"which includes awide range of activities, such as human rights education, development assistance, and support for democratic institutions and the rule of law, has emerged as part and parcel ofthe peacebuilding and conflict management agenda. The result has been an increase in the range of NGOs involved in conflict management, from conflict resolution

NGOs to humanitarian, human rights, development, and other NGOs, and in the range of ways NGOs can and do contribute to conflict management.

There has been great debate about the contributions of nongovernmental third parties. Manypraise them, noting their potential for developing a broader set ofideas and approaches to address what are today more complex con-

flicts involving relationships among whole bodies politic, based not on state interests, and across permeable boundaries diluted more and more byglobahzaion.l NGOs are said to offer flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and com-

mitment to local environments to meet the challenges ofthe new generation ofpeace operations and to make connections to civil society and the grassroots, now seen as essential

components of democracy and peacebuilding.2 Others warn of the dangers inherent in multiple agendas, the lack of accountability of NGOs, and their potential for diverting needed funds from the United Nations and other responsible intergovernmental organi zations.3 553

554

DmNa CHrces

With

more than thirty-six thousand NGOs working internationally, and countless more grassroots organrzations in areas ofconflict, with different methods, different populations, and different goals, it is almost impossible to draw general conclusions about the value of

NGOs.a

This chapter proposes a framework for considering the roles that NGOs are playing in conflict management and explores the contributions, as well as the limitations, of the various forms of NGO activities in the transfor-

mation of intractable conflict.s

RorBsoFNGOs IN CoNFLICTMANAGEMENT

broad, including religious institutions, academics, former government officials, nongovernmental organizatrons, humanitari an organizations, and thinktanks, among others.The range of interventions is equally broad, going far beas

intermediaries, go-betweens, faciJitators, or mediators between the sides of a conflict to include empowerment, advocacy, and economic and social development activities.

NGO is almost always positioned ^ctivity in contrast to official peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts but also as a complement to them. A brief word about official third-party intervention is therefore warranted in order t